Quotes of the Day:
"The strategist needs to understand his subject, which is not COIN or counterterrorism; it is strategy for his particular challenge in COIN or counterterrorism."
- Colin S. Gray
“A 1950 definition called doctrine ‘the compilation of principles and theories applicable to a subject, which have been developed through experience or by theory, that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice.’”
“Doctrine is basically a truth, a fact, or a theory that can be defended by reason.”
“Doctrine cannot replace clear thinking…under the circumstances prevailing.”
- LTG John Cushman ( 2 LTG (RET) John H. Cushman, “Thoughts for Joint Commanders,” (1993 Copyright John H. Cushman)
"The history that lies inert in unread books does no work in the world.
If you want a new idea, read an old book.
`Tis the good reader that makes the good book.
A book is like a mirror. If an ass looks in, no prophet can peer out."
- The "maxims” quoted from Clark Becker, Lord Lytton, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Georg Lichtenberg quoted in Jay Luuvas.
1. N. Korea blasts U.N. Security Council for convening meeting on its missile launches
2. S. Korea, US differ over NK sanctions
3. Seoul strives to resuscitate inter-Korean peace momentum
4. Commentary: Could Kim Jong Un’s sister be the first woman leader of North Korea?
5. Underwater Missile Trucks? South Korea's New Submarine Is Special
6. North Korea Is Weaponizing the Naval ‘Gray Zone’ Against the South
7. Moon says S. Korea should take pride in latest missiles
8. How to turn away from an ally
9. North Korea’s Foreign Policy: A Revisionist State, an Alliance with China or a Third Way?
10. Standing on their own: North Korean refugees test startup dreams
11. North Korea Increases Fines for Quarantine Violations to Exorbitant Levels
12. North Korea Forces Hungry Citizens to Pay for Propaganda Murals
13. Success of 'Squid Game'
1. N. Korea blasts U.N. Security Council for convening meeting on its missile launches
We should keep in mind that a key part of the Biden Administration policy is full implementation of all relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.
Counter accusations and whataboutism:
Jo accused the Security Council of "keeping mum" about the joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea while finding fault with the North for its "normal and planned self-defensive measures."
"This is a denial of impartiality, objectivity and equilibrium, lifelines of the UN activities, and an evident manifestation of double-dealing standard," he said.
The official added that the communist state has "never acknowledged the partial and illegal U.N. 'resolution' that seriously encroaches upon the right to existence and development of sovereign states."
(LEAD) N. Korea blasts U.N. Security Council for convening meeting on its missile launches | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: UPDATES article throughout with more details)
SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- North Korea blasted the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on Sunday for convening a meeting on its recent missile launches, calling it "a manifestation of double-dealing standard."
Jo Chol-su, director of the international organization department at the North's foreign ministry, made the remark in a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), stressing that the missile tests were for "self-defense" purposes.
The statement came after the Security Council convened a meeting on Friday to discuss Pyongyang's latest weapons tests, including the test-firings of what the North claimed was "an advanced anti-aircraft missile" and a "hypersonic missile."
Last month, the North also fired two short-range ballistic missiles from a train and launched a long-range cruise missile.
"The UNSC ... put on the table the issue pertaining to the DPRK's exercise of sovereignty. This means an open ignorance of and wanton encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK and a serious intolerable provocation against it," Jo said, referring to the North by its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
Jo accused the Security Council of "keeping mum" about the joint military exercises between the United States and South Korea while finding fault with the North for its "normal and planned self-defensive measures."
"This is a denial of impartiality, objectivity and equilibrium, lifelines of the UN activities, and an evident manifestation of double-dealing standard," he said.
The official added that the communist state has "never acknowledged the partial and illegal U.N. 'resolution' that seriously encroaches upon the right to existence and development of sovereign states."
"I express strong concerns over the fact that the UNSC amused itself with the dangerous 'time-bomb' this time," he said, adding that the weapons tests have never posed any threats or harm to the security of the neighboring countries.
On Friday, the UNSC convened a closed-door meeting at the request of the U.S., Britain and France but reportedly did not reach an agreement for a joint statement due to the opposition from China and Russia.
elly@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. S. Korea, US differ over NK sanctions
The ROK and US must not fall into the regime trap that is to try to drive a wedge in the alliance. The paradox is that sanctions (and the conflict over relief) could be more damaging to the alliance than to Kim Jong-un.
We should also keep in mind that the Biden administration does not have the unilateral power to lift sanctions. The UN Security Council must approve sanctions relief and the US Congress must rescind the laws targeting the Kim family regime.
S. Korea, US differ over NK sanctions
Published : Oct 3, 2021 - 15:30 Updated : Oct 3, 2021 - 15:30
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un delivers addresses the 5th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea on Sept. 29. (KCNA-Yonhap)
The US State Department said allies should continue enforcing UN sanctions over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, in response to the South Korean foreign minister’s suggestion to ease sanctions for nuclear talks amid North Korea’s latest weapons tests.
“It is important for the international community to send a strong, unified message that the DPRK must halt provocations,” the State Department told Voice of America on Friday, referring to the North’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which test-fired a series of weapons in September.
Pyongyang, which under the UN Security Council resolutions is banned from testing or developing ballistic missiles, revealed them recently, along with a hypersonic missile and an anti-aircraft missile, urging Seoul and Washington to drop “double standards” and “hostile policy.”
The conditions the North demanded to resume dialogue include greenlighting its missile tests it says are for self-defense and granting sanctions relief. The South and US are not looking to make that happen, though the Moon administration appears more flexible.
“It’s time we review sanctions relief,” South Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong said in his answer to questions at the National Assembly Friday, noting the current "status quo" would not be in the best interests of either the South or US. Nuclear negotiations have been in limbo since 2019.
The South Korean government has been supporting easing of sanctions and signing a declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War to re-engage North Korea. The Moon administration believes ending the armistice paves way for a detente. But neither Washington nor Pyongyang has been as receptive.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who said he would consider signing a declaration if the conditions he demanded were met, said last week he would reopen inter-Korean hotlines in early October.
The North had reached out to reconnect them but since August has not responded to the South’s routine calls citing the summertime military drills Seoul and Washington hold annually. The Unification Ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs here, said it expects to see the calls to be back on track.
3. Seoul strives to resuscitate inter-Korean peace momentum
This is arguably the number one priority "foreign policy" initiative remaining for the Moon administration. Time is running out so I expect we will see a full court press by the administration to restart north-South engagement and to push the US to support such engagement. The challenge is how to manage this situation without long term damage to the alliance and without playing into the regime's blackmail diplomacy and political warfare strategy.
Seoul strives to resuscitate inter-Korean peace momentum
President Moon Jae-in salutes during a ceremony to mark the 73rd Armed Forces Day in Pohang, North Gyeongsang Province, Friday. Yonhap
Critics concerned about Seoul staying mum on Pyongyang's provocations
By Nam Hyun-woo
South Korea is striving to resuscitate peace momentum on the Korean Peninsula, releasing a series of messages directed toward the North, which, in turn, has also shown some signs recently of a reconciliatory attitude.
However, some criticism has been raised that Seoul is turning a blind eye to Pyongyang's repeated military activities, while casting a rosy outlook on the possibility of inter-Korean talks. Meanwhile, the Kim Jong-un regime has been sending confusing signals through a contradictory combination of missile launches and conciliatory speeches.
During a ceremony to mark the 73rd Armed Forces Day, Friday, President Moon Jae-in stressed the fact that the military's strong defense capability and readiness will enable permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, and that his trust in the military helped him propose a declaration to ending the Korean War to North Korea at the United Nations last month.
"I have pride in our solid security posture. I have proposed adopting an end-of-war declaration, opening a new era of conciliation and cooperation, to the international community based on such trust and pride," Moon said.
Moon's speech came just hours after North Korea announced that it had again launched what it claimed to be an anti-aircraft missile a day earlier. It was Pyongyang's fourth round of missile launches in September, which came along with statements that it may reopen stalled communication channels with Seoul.
This photo released by North Korea's Korean Central News Agency, Friday, shows what North Korea claims to be the test-firing of a newly developed anti-aircraft missile in the country the previous day. Yonhap
In its statements, the North demanded that the South "scrap its double standard" as one of its preconditions for talks on the end-of-war declaration. "Scrapping its double standard" refers to Seoul acknowledging Pyongyang's missile program as part of its "right to test weapons."
Since the statements, Moon has not used the term "provocation" to describe North Korea's missile launches, with the government mostly taking a neutral stance on the tests, while reaching out to the U.S. to join the end-of-war declaration.
After meeting with U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Sung Kim in Jakarta, Seoul's top nuclear envoy, Noh Kyu-duk, said Friday, "I explained to the U.S. the South Korean government's stance on the end-of-war declaration, which would be the most effective measure in building trust with the North."
Korean Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong went further, urging the U.S. to consider sanctions relief for North Korea. During a National Assembly session last Friday, Chung said that it is time to consider relieving sanctions on North Korea as a preemptive measure to bring North Korea to talks.
Chung also said in an interview with the Washington Post, published on Thursday, that the U.S. should offer North Korea specific incentives, despite the U.S.'s stance that it is open to dialogue without preconditions.
Along with Moon, Prime Minister Kim Boo-kyum has floated peace messages toward North Korea, regarding the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) suspension of North Korea from participating in the Beijing Winter Olympics next year.
During an interview with Nikkei Asia, the prime minister said he hopes for "the IOC to generously consider giving North Korea a chance to join the international community again," and that "ranking officials of South and North Korea can meet at the Beijing Games" if the IOC lifts the suspension.
Earlier last month, the IOC suspended North Korea's entry into the Beijing Games, producing a huge disappointment for the Moon administration, which has been seeking to use international sporting events as a vehicle for facilitating talks with the North.
As the Moon administration strengthens its outreach to the North despite its provocations, criticism is rising that South Korea may fail to protest North Korea's missile launches in the future.
"North Korea is now going beyond its conventional playbook and making provocations and a conciliatory approach simultaneously," said Rep. Tae Yong-ho of the conservative main opposition People Power Party, who is also a former North Korean diplomat. "This is a pressure on South Korea to keep tightlipped, while North Korea will expand its nuclear and missile programs."
The U.S. Department of State also seemed not in agreement with Foreign Minister Chung's call for sanctions relief on Pyongyang, instead issuing a comment that the U.S. and South Korea should stick with "unified" messages toward the North.
"The DPRK (North Korea) continues to fund its WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and ballistic missile programs through sanctions evasion efforts in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions," a Department of State official told Voice of America regarding Chung's comments.
"It is important for the international community to send a strong, unified message that the DPRK must halt provocations, abide by its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions and engage in sustained and intensive negotiations with the United States."
4. Commentary: Could Kim Jong Un’s sister be the first woman leader of North Korea?
Possibly. But I am skeptical about a "challenge" to power. Succession over time perhaps but a challenge to her brother? I do not think so. That said, I wonder what kind of effect this kind of speculation has on the regime and especially on Kim Jong-un? Can this be exploited from an informational influence activities perspective?
I do not think there is a "trinity" of power in the north. If there is it certainly does not include the people. It is more like Kim Jong-un, the Party (and specifically the Organization and Guidance Department), and the Military (but even that is under the influence of the OGD and the OGD is under the iron fist control of Kim Jong-un). So unless Kim Jong-un is his own "trinity" (like a father, son, and holy ghost- represented by Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and Kim Jong-un) the north is ruled by a single authoritarian ruler and there is not really a "trinity" of power.
Excerpts:
So, the status of Kim Yo Jong’s relationship with her brother is as scrutinised as Kim Jong Un’s physical health when it comes to if – and when – she might be in a position to challenge for ultimate power in North Korea.
In North Korea, it seems that to achieve the leadership it’s necessary to seize the grip of the trinity power of the military, party and people.
Both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un became leading figures of the National Defence Commission (NDC) – the military – as well as the party through the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). They had both developed their cult of personality, giving them access to the people.
Kim Yo Jong may have achieved name recognition in her capacity as a spokesperson on foreign relations and has access to power in the KWP. But she has not yet been appointed to a position at the NDC.
If that happens any time soon, it might be a sign that North Korea is preparing for its first woman leader.
Commentary: Could Kim Jong Un’s sister be the first woman leader of North Korea?
PRESTON, England: When the South Korean president, Moon Jae-in, called for an end to the war on the Korea peninsula recently, the initial response was a rebuff from North Korea’s vice foreign minister.
This has been the standard response from Pyongyang whenever the idea has been raised of turning the 1953 armistice between the two warring Koreas into an actual peace treaty.
So it was something of a surprise when, the following day, a rather warmer message emerged from Kim Yo Jong, the sister of North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jong Un, who declared the idea “admirable”.
She specified a number of pre-conditions which would need to be met, though: “What needs to be dropped is the double-dealing attitudes, illogical prejudice, bad habits and hostile stand of justifying their own acts while faulting our just exercise of the right to self-defence.”
This is the sort of message one would usually expect to come from Kim Jong Un himself, so it prompted a round of discussion from the media’s Korea watchers as to how much weight the world can give a statement from his younger sister.
WHO IS KIM YO JONG?
She held a meeting with president Moon and appeared in photo opportunities alongside US vice-president Mike Pence and the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe. Footage of her dominated coverage in North Korea.
Following what was reported as her diplomatic triumph at the Winter Olympics, her profile grew as she met with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, and was present at all three face-to-face meetings between her brother and US President Donald Trump.
Little is known about Kim Yo Jong’s childhood, though – even her date of birth is clouded in uncertainty. She is the youngest child of former supreme leader Kim Jong Il’s relationship with Ko Yong Hui, who was originally from Japan and thus would have been regarded as being from a lower caste in Korea’s complex “songbun” system if Kim Jong Il had not removed the official record about her origin.
Kim Yo Jong is understood to have attended the same private school with her elder brother in Bern, Switzerland, after which she attended Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang, where she studied computer science.
By 2009, Kim Jong Il’s ill-health made the succession a matter of urgent debate and it became increasingly clear that Kim Jong Un was being groomed to take over the leadership on his death. But at Kim Jong Il’s funeral, Kim Yo Jong was photographed alongside senior family members.
She has twice been elevated to the politburo, in 2017 to 2019 and 2020 to 2021. In addition, she is also a leader of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, in which capacity she has boosted the cult of personality surrounding her brother as well as made regular statements about North Korean foreign relations.
She is believed to be married to Choe Song, the younger son of the Korean Workers’ Party secretary, Choe Ryong Hae, which gives her another source of political power.
HEIR APPARENT?
How much power does Kim Yo Jong actually wield? One incident from June 2020 shows the extent to which she can exercise her will in North Korea.
In retaliation for South Korean defectors’ use of balloons to drop propaganda leaflets into the North, she warned that she had ordered the department in charge of inter-Korean affairs to “decisively carry out the next action”, adding that: “Before long, a tragic scene of the useless north-south joint liaison office completely collapsed would be seen.”
Kim Yo Jong has long been among Kim Jong Un's closest lieutenants and one of the most influential women in North Korea's isolated regime. (Photo: AFP)
The following day the building was blown up, suggesting that when Kim Yo Jong orders something, it happens.
Another interesting episode can cast some light over power relations between herself and her brother. In March 2020, Kim Yo Jong issued her first official statement, lashing out at South Korea’s presidential office, the so-called Blue House, which had called on the North to halt its live fire exercises. She referred to the leadership as “a mere child” and “a burnt child dreading fire”.
Two days later Kim Jong Un sent a message of condolence over the outbreak of COVID-19 in the South. This “underlined his unwavering friendship and trust toward president Moon and said that he will continue to quietly send his best wishes for President Moon to overcome”.
The message had Korea watchers confused as to whether the siblings were at loggerheads over North-South relations or whether this was a display of “good cop-bad cop” diplomacy.
FAMILY MEMBERS EXECUTED
This is a family where many of the possible male contenders for power have been executed or assassinated – including Kim Jong Nam, Kim Jong Un’s half-brother who was murdered with the nerve agent VX at Kuala Lumpur airport in Malaysia in 2017; and his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, who was reportedly executed by firing squad in 2013 after being accused of being a counter-revolutionary.
So, the status of Kim Yo Jong’s relationship with her brother is as scrutinised as Kim Jong Un’s physical health when it comes to if – and when – she might be in a position to challenge for ultimate power in North Korea.
In North Korea, it seems that to achieve the leadership it’s necessary to seize the grip of the trinity power of the military, party and people.
Both Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un became leading figures of the National Defence Commission (NDC) – the military – as well as the party through the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). They had both developed their cult of personality, giving them access to the people.
Kim Yo Jong may have achieved name recognition in her capacity as a spokesperson on foreign relations and has access to power in the KWP. But she has not yet been appointed to a position at the NDC.
If that happens any time soon, it might be a sign that North Korea is preparing for its first woman leader.
Sojin Lim is Senior Lecturer in Korean Studies, North Korean Studies MA & Asia Pacific Studies MA Courses Leader, Deputy Director of the International Institute of Korean Studies at the University of Central Lancashire. This commentary first appeared on The Conversation.
5. Underwater Missile Trucks? South Korea's New Submarine Is Special
Hmmm... interesting analysis but I will defer to the submariners who know about this stuff. One thing I think I can say with certainty is that South Korea submarines are far superior to anything the north can produce (or procure).
Underwater Missile Trucks? South Korea's New Submarine Is Special
As tension in Asia heats up, Seoul puts its money where its mouth is and heavily invests in underwater capabilities.
A New Submarine with New Capabilities
South Korea’s shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries recently launched the country’s third Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, bringing the class’ total to three. In addition, the Republic of Korea Navy operates two other classes of smaller conventionally-powered submarines, the German-designed Type 214 submarine, and the Jang Bogo-class submarine, a variant of another German design.
The Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine is the final tranche of the Korean Attack Submarine program, a program designed to increase the RoKN’s capabilities underwater. The Republic of Korea Navy would ultimately like to accept nine Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines in total.
Although the Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines are diesel-electric, they are an advanced design, equipped with fuel cells that allow them to cruise underwater for very long periods of time. They are the largest vessels ever constructed for the Republic of Korea Navy.
Launching submarines of any type is an achievement, but these submarines are no ordinary submarines — they launch ballistic missiles.
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles
Not only does the Republic of Korea Navy have another submarine coming online, but it also recently tested a powerful new submarine-launched ballistic missile. Although detailed specifics about the missile are not definitively known, it could be a variant of South Korea’s Hyunmoo 2B missile, a short-range solid-fueled missile. Range varies from 300 to 800 kilometers depending on the warhead.
Previously, the Republic of Korea Navy tested their missile from an underwater platform, but their most recent missile test launched from a submarine. The test was incredibly significant for South Korea — there are few countries capable of launching ballistic missiles from submarines. These include the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, India, North Korea, and France.
The benefits of submarine-launched ballistic missiles are great. Lying in wait under the surface of the water, SLBM-equipped submarines can pose a threat to virtually any target within their missile range on land or at sea.
What’s Next?
Building a domestically built and designed ballistic missile submarine is no easy feat and is a considerable achievement for the Seoul and the Republic of Korea Navy. A home-grown submarine capability allows South Korea a degree of independence and autonomy from foreign parts sourcing and maintenance for submarines and missiles.
Furthermore, as both South Korea’s submarines and missiles are made in South Korea and designed from the outset to work together, they can intermesh more smoothly than a mish-mash of parts and systems would otherwise be able. In short: the South Korean ability to threaten North Korean targets has rapidly expanded.
Caleb Larson is a multimedia journalist and Defense Writer with The National Interest. He lives in Berlin and covers the intersection of conflict, security, and technology, focusing on American foreign policy, European security, and German society.
6. North Korea Is Weaponizing the Naval ‘Gray Zone’ Against the South
Conclusion:
In sum, North Korea perfectly understands its position of weakness in the maritime domain and is emulating China’s revisionist strategy of gray zone operations to gradually overturn the status quo. As such, South Korea must first understand North Korean strategy and respond with tailored measures that prevent the achievement of adversarial aims. The recent additions of 3,800-ton submarines, SLBMs, and future light aircraft carriers will certainly advance South Korean military capabilities. But to reiterate, North Korea perfectly understands its position of technological inferiority and has nonetheless devised a gray zone strategy to achieve its political ends. What ultimately deters North Korea is a reliable nuclear second-strike capability. Will North Korea be deterred by South Korean conventional SLBMs and a slightly bigger carrier than the ROKN Dokdo-class? These are the questions that practitioners must answer before acquiring new platforms and promoting wartime OPCON transfer.
North Korea Is Weaponizing the Naval ‘Gray Zone’ Against the South
North Korea perfectly understands its position of weakness in the maritime domain and is emulating China’s revisionist strategy of gray zone operations to gradually overturn the status quo.
After months of relative restraint, the Korean Peninsula is experiencing a new arms race. Since the announcement of the Medium-term Defense Program in 2020, South Korea commissioned a 3,800-ton Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine and test-fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on September 15. The U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) missile guideline was terminated in June, freeing South Korea to develop long-range missiles, and the ROK Navy (ROKN) is expected to commission a light aircraft carrier within years. North Korea also test-fired its new cruise missile that flew approximately 1,500 km and recently resumed its ballistic missile testing after a six-month break. While South Korea has been preparing for the future wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer from the United States by acquiring cutting-edge platforms and enhancing its capabilities for autonomous military operations, there has been a lack of debate on a comprehensive strategy to counter North Korean conventional and asymmetrical military threats.
Strategy is not simply about gaining technological superiority over adversaries. As Richard Betts defined strategy, it is a “plan for using military means to achieve political ends.” Before discussing the necessity of new platforms, experts and practitioners in South Korea must carefully examine North Korea’s military strategy and devise tailored operational plans that can best deter North Korean aggression. Because there is no consensus on strategy, South Korea is wasting valuable time overcoming domestic discord on the necessity of certain platforms. Similarly, when South Korea announced plans to deploy U.S. Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) batteries in 2016, strong domestic resistance delayed the installment of related facilities. The fundamental cause of the delay was the absence of strategy, or the deficiency of a persuasive explanation on the necessity of novel defense systems.
This article intends to facilitate discussions on South Korean military strategy by laying out North Korean capabilities and aims at sea. First, North Korea is absent of a blue-water navy and is focusing on developing asymmetrical capabilities. North Korea has approximately 700 surface vessels but they are mostly small and old. The bulk of its surface ships are high-speed missile boats and patrol ships, capable of conducting operations only in the near seas. Vessels that are considered relatively large are two Najin-class frigates and two Nampo-class helicopter frigates, but the Najin-class frigates were first introduced back in the early 1970s, possessing insignificant armaments, and the Nampo-class frigates cannot compare to the ROKN Dokdo-class nor the Sejong the Great-class Aegis destroyers. Instead, North Korea has approximately seventy submarines; its Gorae-class submarines have demonstrated its capability for launching nuclear-tipped SLBMs. What must be of central concern for the ROKN is, therefore, North Korea’s underwater capabilities.
However, the real question is what North Korea’s objectives at sea are. Compared to South Korea, which has open access to high seas, not only are North Korean waters separated east-west but they are also obstructed by the existence of South Korea and Japan to its south and east. International sanctions have impeded North Korean imports and exports overseas and numerous regimes such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) have forced North Korea to rely on illegal maritime transshipment of goods. Furthermore, North Korea does not have the necessary naval power to protect its limited sea lines of communication. Therefore, North Korea’s aims at sea cannot be equivalent to the Mahanian concept of “commercial access” to which the American strategy of “freedom of navigation and overflight” is based upon. On the other hand, North Korea is keenly aware of its naval modesty and is likely to have concentrated on developing “anti-access” capabilities.
North Korea’s submarine force is best suited to the purpose of anti-access. Today, underwater detection is a formidable task since the seas are vastly wide and immensely deep. High-end sonars attached to a couple of warships and several buoys installed by surveillance aircraft are insufficient for detection. The only viable measure is to maintain a close watch of berthed submarines and to stay alert once those submarines disappear. In addition to submarines, North Korea also possesses twice as many mine warfare vessels as South Korea, multiple coastal artillery guns, and a variegated set of anti-aircraft missiles such as the SA-2s and the SA-5s to prevent the deployment of adversarial forces into its operational theaters.
In wartime, these assortments of anti-access technologies pose a significant challenge to U.S.-ROK operations at sea. With multiple layers of defensive capabilities, strategic air bombings and landing operations become increasingly difficult and the navigation of aircraft carriers off the coasts of North Korea may be too risky. In other words, another “Inchon landing” that overturned the unfavorable Korean War situation will be impossible in the future scenario. Also, once an outright war erupts in the Korean Peninsula, the potential exchange of nuclear weapons will cloud any other tactical considerations.
Then, can North Korean anti-access capabilities be largely ignored during peacetime? At first glance, North Korean waterways are insignificant as trade routes and commercial traffic is nearly absent above the northern demarcation lines. Ferries regularly sail north to Vladivostok and fishing vessels operate near the northern limit line (NLL) in the West Sea and the East Sea, but are strictly banned from trespassing pre-designated areas and pathways. Chinese anti-access capabilities are particularly threatening since the South China Sea carries approximately one-third of global shipping. However, if the sea lines of communications close to North Korean shores are insignificant, why should we care about North Korea’s anti-access capabilities that are defensive in nature? Paradoxically, it is because North Korea is using them for offensive purposes.
Enter the concept of a “gray zone”—a space between peace and war. It also refers to activities that aim to “achieve one’s security objectives without resort[ing] to direct and sizable use of force.” In the context of North Korea, it is the use of asymmetrical anti-access capabilities to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States, to weaken the credibility of U.S. commitment, and to eventually drive U.S. forces out of the Korean Peninsula.
North and South Korea are neither in a state of peace nor war. The Korean War ended with an “armistice” in 1953 but has prevented the resumption of war for almost seventy years. Most recently, the two Koreas signed the Comprehensive Military Agreement in 2018 to establish a land/maritime peace zone near the demarcation lines. Despite years of relative peace without a major war on the peninsula, North Korea is taking advantage of the gray zone to achieve its political ends. The Yellow Sea is especially murky. Since the United Nations Command commander General Mark Clark unilaterally promulgated the NLL in 1953, North Korea largely abided by the de facto demarcation line. But during the military armistice commission meeting in December 1973, North Korea demanded prior permission to enter the five islands (Baekryeong, Daecheong, Socheong, Yeonpyeong, and U Island) and in 1977, declared an exclusive economic zone that covered areas beneath the NLL. In addition to diplomatic protests, North Korea provoked armed skirmishes several times in the West Sea, culminating in the sinking of ROKN Cheonan by a midget submarine in 2010.
After 2010, North Korean gray zone operations in the West Sea became increasingly sophisticated. Instead of directly clashing with superior ROK naval forces, North Korea is emulating Chinese artificial island-building in the South China Sea to construct military facilities in contested waters. Representatively, Hambak Island was an uninhabited island before 2017 when North Korea started to install military facilities. Hambak Island is only 8 km north of South Korean U Island and within 60 km of Incheon Airport—one of the busiest international airports in Asia. Not much is known about the exact armaments and purpose of this militarization, but in contingencies, North Korea can readily deploy forces close to South Korea. In 2015, North Korea also installed coastal guns and artillery on other islands adjunct to the NLL such as Gal, Ari, and Changrin Island.
As with Chinese artificial island-building in the South China Sea, North Korea’s militarization of uninhabited islands in the West Sea not only violates the “good faith” of previous agreements with South Korea but also establishes gradual fait accomplis in contested gray areas. Considering that ambiguity, asymmetry, and incrementalism are three characteristics of gray zone operations, North Korea is using its asymmetrical forces in an ambiguous manner to incrementally change the status quo without suffering any severe repercussions. The ultimate goal is to impose limited costs on South Korea, weaken U.S. extended deterrence by engaging in operations that fall short of stated red lines, and eventually drive out U.S. influence from the Korean Peninsula. It is for this reason that Song Kim, North Korea’s ambassador to the United Nations, called on the United States to “take the first step toward giving up its hostile policy,” only days after its test launch of ballistic missiles.
In sum, North Korea perfectly understands its position of weakness in the maritime domain and is emulating China’s revisionist strategy of gray zone operations to gradually overturn the status quo. As such, South Korea must first understand North Korean strategy and respond with tailored measures that prevent the achievement of adversarial aims. The recent additions of 3,800-ton submarines, SLBMs, and future light aircraft carriers will certainly advance South Korean military capabilities. But to reiterate, North Korea perfectly understands its position of technological inferiority and has nonetheless devised a gray zone strategy to achieve its political ends. What ultimately deters North Korea is a reliable nuclear second-strike capability. Will North Korea be deterred by South Korean conventional SLBMs and a slightly bigger carrier than the ROKN Dokdo-class? These are the questions that practitioners must answer before acquiring new platforms and promoting wartime OPCON transfer.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of KIMS or NBR.
Sanghoon Kim is an Associate Researcher at Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS). He was a KF Research Fellow with the Political and Security Affairs team at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and had served in the Republic of Korea Navy as an officer for three years.
Image: Reuters.
7. Moon says S. Korea should take pride in latest missiles
Yes they should as they can produce superior military capabilities than the north. An appropriate message for Armed Forces Day in South Korea.
An arms race? Note also the comments about the amount of South Korea defense spending.
Moon is often criticized by the conservatives for keeping a low profile with regard to weapons tests strongly lambasted by the North.
But Park rebutted the notion, saying the Moon Jae-in administration spent more on its defense than any of the past governments dating to 2003, when the late former President Roh Moo-hyun took office.
The Ministry of National Defense has said it will build missiles with more firepower and flight range for the next five years as part of its 315 trillion won ($271 billion) project to improve its defense capabilities and ensure readiness against North Korea.
The two Koreas are locked in an expanding arms race, with North Korea having test-fired advanced missiles, including a hypersonic missile, in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions that ban it from testing or developing ballistic missiles.
Moon says S. Korea should take pride in latest missiles
Published : Oct 3, 2021 - 15:30 Updated : Oct 3, 2021 - 18:27
President Moon Jae-in salutes during a ceremony to mark 73rd anniversary of South Korea’s Armed Forces Day in Pohang on Friday. (Yonhap)
President Moon Jae-in said South Koreans should be proud of the latest missiles the country has recently revealed, the presidential communications secretary said Saturday in a post on Facebook.
The post quoted Moon during a closed-door meeting with senior secretaries a day after the launch.
On Sept. 15, South Korea test-fired its first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from a homegrown submarine, along with an air-to-surface missile and a cruise missile. The South was the first non-nuclear state to carry out an SLBM test from a submarine.
The SLBM launch, Moon said, was such a success that the other weapons tests, which turned out be just as successful, were overshadowed so more needed to be done to make that known, according to communications secretary Park Soo-hyun.
Moon made a rare appearance to oversee the test, in what many see as a move to reinforce the message that he was as serious about bolstering security as seeking peace talks with North Korea.
Moon is often criticized by the conservatives for keeping a low profile with regard to weapons tests strongly lambasted by the North.
But Park rebutted the notion, saying the Moon Jae-in administration spent more on its defense than any of the past governments dating to 2003, when the late former President Roh Moo-hyun took office.
The Ministry of National Defense has said it will build missiles with more firepower and flight range for the next five years as part of its 315 trillion won ($271 billion) project to improve its defense capabilities and ensure readiness against North Korea.
The two Koreas are locked in an expanding arms race, with North Korea having test-fired advanced missiles, including a hypersonic missile, in violation of the UN Security Council resolutions that ban it from testing or developing ballistic missiles.
South Korea did not join the US or Japan, when they condemned North Korea’s missile tests, saying it was closely looking at North Korea’s proposal that Seoul and Washington meet Pyongyang’s demands to resume nuclear talks, which last opened in 2019.
8. How to turn away from an ally
A warning for the alliance.
Key point here:
The incentives Chung mentioned most likely include what President Moon Jae-in said earlier — a declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War. Chung said the Biden administration must clarify its conditions for talks, including an end-of-war declaration. Chung and Moon believe the declaration will open the door to denuclearization, but reality points in the opposite direction.
"Incentives" will not achieve the desired effects of the Moon administration.
Sunday
October 3, 2021
How to turn away from an ally
In a recent interview with the Washington Post, Foreign Minister Chung Eui-yong stressed the need for the United States to present detailed incentives to North Korea to bring the recalcitrant state to the negotiating table. The incentives Chung mentioned certainly refers to an easing of sanctions. In response, the U.S. State Department immediately underscored the need for the international community to send a strong and unified message to the North.
During a visit to Washington last month, Chung highlighted the need for the United States to compensate for the North’s suspension of nuclear tests and long-range missile launches. He suggested that the time has come for Washington to do its part, starting with easing sanctions, as North Korea has abided by the suspension of nuke tests and missile launches since the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit in Singapore.
Chung seems to believe that the U.S. must make concessions to Pyongyang and accept its demands if Washington really wants talks to resume. How can our foreign minister represent North Korea in his trip to the U.S.? Even if dialogue resumes this way, it can hardly ensure denuclearization. North Korea has been beefing up efforts to develop new tactical nuclear weapons, as clearly seen in its recent test of a cruise missile. If North Korea can continue to develop its nuclear weapons, even under international sanctions, what will happen if they are lifted?
The incentives Chung mentioned most likely include what President Moon Jae-in said earlier — a declaration to end the 1950-53 Korean War. Chung said the Biden administration must clarify its conditions for talks, including an end-of-war declaration. Chung and Moon believe the declaration will open the door to denuclearization, but reality points in the opposite direction.
North Korea is more interested in forcing the U.S. to withdraw its hostile policy toward the North than in making an end-of-war declaration, as clearly revealed by the demand by the North Korean ambassador to the UN that America permanently stop its joint military drills with South Korea and the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to its ally as a precondition for dialogue for denuclearization.
North Korea increasingly makes clear its strategic goal of being recognized as a nuclear power. To cope with such an exsistential threat, the world must unite and pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. The international community needs to provide compensation for North Korea at some point. But if South Korea continues to widen the schisms in the alliance, denuclearization is impossible. Only North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would be happy to see the strange developments in the South.
9. North Korea’s Foreign Policy: A Revisionist State, an Alliance with China or a Third Way?
A long read with some very useful historical and current analysis.
Conclusion:
Although belatedly, Kim mentioned during this year’s party congress a clause in the heavily revised WPK rules that lays the groundwork for a commonwealth-style reunification approach. North Korea had stubbornly insisted on the doctrine of reunification through a federation system but has changed its stance to accept a stage of joint prosperity for the Korean people prior to instituting the federation system. The advantages of a commonwealth were renamed “Korean people’s co-prosperity,” acknowledging the language of Item 2 in the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration released 20 years ago. As his father had promised, it was inserted into the party rules. This is a counterargument to the South Korean assertion that advancing the Sino-North Korean alliance was tantamount to abandoning reunification.
Also important is Kim’s view on preventative measures against Covid-19. He decided on a self-imposed lockdown in consideration of the backward state of the North Korean healthcare system. Many third-world countries have chosen markets over epidemic prevention (in short, lives), while North Korea has made prevention of the spread of the disease the priority. The three available choices are: markets and the economy vs. national security vs. pandemic prevention. For Kim, disaster relief, namely the concept of emerging security, can be inferred to have entered the picture. If we consider that the new path embraces the concept of emerging security, then it is a development that South Koreans should welcome.
Kim maintained a revisionist hardline doctrine from the time he started out until 2017, while crisis on the Korean Peninsula clearly subsided from 2018 on. At present, dialogue with the US remains cut off, and Kim’s new path may signal a retreat to the revisionist way marked by an endless cycle of provocation and negotiation. Some assert that this new path abandons reunification in favor of building the Sino-North Korean alliance, but this could also be a strategy that includes the impetus for co-prosperity of North and South under the name of an inter-Korean commonwealth regime. If the last analysis favoring the inter-Korean commonwealth regime strategy is right, the possibility remains for South Korea to play a part in the “new way.” Finally, a paradoxical view posits that Kim’s savage anti-pandemic measures represent a path that respects life, presenting a puzzle that needs to be resolved with respect to the new path.
North Korea’s Foreign Policy: A Revisionist State, an Alliance with China or a Third Way?
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North Korea’s Foreign Policy: A Revisionist State, an Alliance with China or a Third Way?
By Jung-Chul Lee
North Korea’s Juche diplomatic line is consistent with its anti-American/anti-imperialist focus. It appears to mirror a philosophy that emerged from Kim Il Sung’s experience during his guerrilla days in Manchuria in the late 1930s through the Korean War in the early 1950s. This is because North Korea’s Juche foreign policy is also wrapped in the idea of building outposts for world socialism in Asia.
Juche diplomacy is a doctrine of balancing with self-strengthening as its foundation; it is a doctrine of dominance through internal balancing. Seen in relation to domestic politics, it argues that the foremost value is to secure regime autonomy in order to respond to external threats.
The cause-and-effect relationship is not clarified as to whether an external threat must be present to secure autonomy in domestic politics or whether regime autonomy must be secured to respond to external threats. Nonetheless, the doctrine of dominance through internal balancing merged with absolute regime autonomy in the “Juche line” and resulted in an ideology that embraces “Baekdu (Paektu) bloodline legacy” and the system of the “Suryung” (supreme leader).
Kim Jong Un also sees himself as the enforcer of this legacy handed down from North Korea’s founding fathers. With the autonomy of domestic politics uncertain, Kim had no alternative but to legitimize his power by enforcing the legacy with greater resolve. That is the reason why foreign policy in the rule-by-legacy system became more hardline as he consolidated his power. It is also the background behind Kim’s revisionist foreign policy in relation to South Korea.
Foreign Policy Objectives: Rule by Legacy and China Policy
The death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011 opened the door for talks between North Korea and the United States, and the “Leap Day Deal” was signed between the two countries on Feb. 29, 2012. But the young Kim Jong Un went ahead with a satellite launch in April of that year, causing the agreement with the Americans to collapse. China, meanwhile, had attempted to establish an engagement policy with North Korea in 2009 but seen this effort come to naught. In 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao invited North Korean State Security Department Minister Jang Song-thaek to China for talks, soothing North Korean sentiments, but then the first anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s passing came in December, and the North Korean government marked the occasion by launching another satellite. Eventually, China participated in the sanctions that were imposed on North Korea for its actions, and Pyongyang conducted its third nuclear test in 2013, which served to escalate tensions. Trust waned in the idea that under the US-China concert regime, external balancing through solidarity with China could function well against the US. That was the lesson North Korea learned in the process of the Six-Party talks on North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program. It adhered to a doctrine of strengthening internal balance based on the traditional Juche line. As a result, Kim Jong Un emerged as a strong nationalist leader, and both military hardliners and nationalist elite groups approved the purging of the “pro-China faction” led by Jang Song-thaek, who was later executed.
North Korea’s rule by legacy separates “authority” from “power,” granting exclusive authority to the country’s founders. As such, it is a unique form of power transfer, whereby the successor monopolizes the physical power that comes in the process of executing the instructions passed down from the founding fathers. Unlike the usual exercise of absolute power that comes when the successor holds both authority and power, this is a burdenless hereditary system, because the authority is granted to the founders, who are Kim’s father and paternal grandfather. Therefore, the rule-by-legacy system contains a process in which the only way to legitimize power is by having a firm resolve to enforce the founder’s last wishes.
The instructions of the founding fathers and the will of the North Korean elite remained firmly in opposition to the intervention of hegemonic alliances to its domestic politics for 60 years after the Juche line was instituted. The fact that this can be publicly called upon serves like a dress sword that the successor leader may wield. The purging of Jang Song-thaek and his pro-China faction was the way in which the rule by legacy and nationalism was expected to go. Sino-North Korean relations could only drift until North Korea again focused its attention upon external balancing.
Beyond Existential Deterrence of the US and South Korea
Once Kim Jong Un was designated to succeed Kim Jong Il, North Korea started to make assertions such as: “It is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live without normalizing relations with the US, but not without nuclear deterrent ... The issue of normalizing relations and the nuclear issue are two separate matters from A to Z. If there is something to be desired by us, it is not to normalize relations between the DPRK and the US but to boost the nuclear deterrent in every way to more firmly defend the security of our nation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 17, 2009); and: “Now that the issue of concluding the peace treaty is mentioned in the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, too, it is good to move up the order of action as required by practice in the light of the lesson drawn from the failure of the Six-Party talks. The conclusion of the peace treaty will help terminate the hostile relations between the DPRK and the US and positively promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at a rapid tempo” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 11, 2010). That is to say, with respect to the US, the country began to demand a “security-for-security” exchange framework — in other words, a dual-track process for simultaneous exchanges on denuclearization and a peace regime. In March 2013, the byungjin (two fronts) line of simultaneously pushing forward economic development and the building of a nuclear force was officially announced, followed by calls beginning in November 2014 and a visit by US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper for “suspension for suspension” — that is, halting both US-South Korean military exercises and North Korean nuclear testing. Then North Korea conducted three nuclear tests in less than two years. In the process, it displayed various strategic weapons and missile delivery capabilities, underscoring its determination to deter US moves. Thus, it went beyond brinksmanship aimed at a struggle for recognition to a demonstration of the capabilities of its internal balancing strategy.
Meanwhile, North Korea launched a series of provocations against South Korea based on the “gray zone” conflict strategy, shelling Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, firing on loudspeakers along the western front of the demilitarized zone in 2015, and blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong in 2020. While Kim asserted in a personal letter to US President Donald Trump in 2019 that the South Korean military was no match against North Korean military, North Korea had begun to show its offensive option in inter-Korean relations. This was not akin to Pyongyang’s 1970s-style strategy of unifying Korea through military force, but a tactic based on a new threat capability that could turn the Korean Peninsula into a conflict area. The so-called stability-instability paradox states that in a situation in which both sides have a nuclear deterrence, the probability of all-out war between them does not readily exist, but small-scale conflicts are more likely to occur. In that sense, the paradox is deemed to provide North Korea, which already possesses some 30 to 50 nuclear warheads, with the self-assurance that such clashes can be easily triggered. From this perspective, gray-zone conflicts, which include various low-intensity hostilities or battles in cyber-space, are highly likely to become an asset that Pyongyang can use to pressure Seoul. That is the reason why Kim has appeared confident in his aggressive, revisionist posture toward South Korea.
Continuity and Discontinuity: Three Stages and Three Views
Some have pointed to sanctions as having induced North Korea’s return to dialogue through the 2018 Pyeongchang Peace Process. This perspective paints the picture of a disguised peace offensive by a regime surrendering to sanctions. Bring in all the subsequent changes in events, however, and what had appeared to be North Korean behavior modified by sanctions turns out to be North Korean durability exceeding outside assessments. In other words, its autocratic resilience was underestimated. Now consider the fact that almost two years have passed since North Korea began to seal off its border with China to prevent the spread of Covid-19, and the argument no longer stands that North Korea was driven to the bargaining table by economic hardship three years ago.
North Korea consistently demanded during negotiations in 2018 and 2019 that South Korea-US military exercises be cancelled. The 2018 Pyeongchang Peace Process actually began with a proposal to suspend South Korea-US military exercises, which was put forward on Dec. 19, 2017. The cancellation of the military exercises in August 2018 was a decisive factor leading to the inter-Korean summit on Sept. 19, 2018, as well as the subsequent Hanoi summit in 2019 between North Korea and the US. On the other side of the coin, the resumption of the military exercises in August 2019 was the primary reason for North Korea to sever ties with South Korea and the US. Seen from this first view, the demand for a “security-for-security” framework, a consistent goal of North Korea, can be interpreted as support for the continuity of the policy objectives of the Kim Jong Un regime.
However, a different view that stressed the discontinuity of regime policy objectives was raised, starting with the fact that North Korea during the Hanoi summit demanded that sanctions be lifted. The sanctions were not the reason why it sat down at the bargaining table. However, its actions gave rise to the second view that Kim revised his objective from becoming a socialist power on the basis of muddling through to pursuing an economic development strategy premised upon mutual deterrence capabilities. That is because North Korea effectively announced the end of its byungjin line of simultaneously developing the economy and nuclear weapons in April 2018, when the government declared a new line of “concentrating all efforts on the socialist construction.” According to this assertion, North Korea’s “new way” and “offensive for making a breakthrough head-on” is not really part of the “security-for-security” process. Instead, interesting analysis has emerged positing that North Korea’s strategy has been redirected toward economic development in tandem with a Sino-North Korean alliance, in other words external balancing, as well as making the people’s livelihoods a priority.
According to the second view, objectives held by North Korea between 2012 and 2017 changed from 2018. Sino-North Korean relations, which had been frozen, have been restored, and Chinese President Xi Jinping even visited North Korea — the first state visit of a Chinese leader in 14 years. High credibility is given to the assertion that North Korea has chosen a new way forward that takes into consideration the support that China represents. North Korea has concluded that the US intention does not exist for a peace treaty through direct talks between North Korea and the US, let alone an end to military exercises or even a lifting of sanctions. The South Korean government, too, cannot wield any power to arbitrate between North Korea and the US. In this situation, Kim Jong Un has no reason to hold on to any lingering hopes for the peace process. The renewed Sino-North Korean alliance will strengthen external balancing toward the US, and based on this, it is now reasonable to establish a new economic development strategy through North Korean-Chinese co-operation.
Whether North Korea’s revisionist objectives have changed or have remained the same is debatable. The country has openly talked about “a new way” and an “offensive for making a breakthrough head-on” in the wake of the failed Hanoi summit. The objectives found therein are linked to the answers to this debate. According to the third view, it is unclear if the new path represents a departure from the old cycle of provocation and negotiation that makes the Korean Peninsula a hotspot for potential conflict, or if the Sino-North Korean alliance will lead to a new round of mutual “strategic patience.”
National Defense Commission and Party Central Military Commission
The National Defense Commission and the concept of “military-first” dominated the Kim Jong Il era. Indeed, these two things served as the organization and the ideology that sustained the system. Kim Jong Il assumed the position of National Defense Chairman in 1993, and in the process the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) became derided by him as the “party of the living corpses.” Power that had been divided among the party, the central government and the military became concentrated in the National Defense Commission. The military-first policy was launched. Because all decision-making processes became centered on the commission, a “proposal document” (jae-ui-seo) system developed. The party, the central government and the military were no longer differentiated; all agencies were merged; and 30 to 40 proposal-document units offered the ideas for making decisions. Each proposal document was examined and reported to the chairman, and in the process the secretarial function of the National Defense Commission grew in importance.
After Kim Jong Un was designated successor on Sept. 28, 2010, however, the power structure that the WPK revealed during the 3rd Conference of Party Representatives surprisingly took on the look of a factional alliance. A coalition of four major power groups clearly stood out in the succession structure. They were the just-returned old guard generation, symbolized by Premier Choe Yong-rim, a first-generation politician, and Kim Kyong-hui, the sister of Kim Jong Il; the newly-formed Jang Song-thaek group, known for its pro-China stance; the increasingly powerful military brass, armed with the regime’s “military first” policy; and the newly-realized Baekdu Bloodline, protected by the Organization and Guidance Department. This factional coalition could be maintained with Kim Jong Il at the center, and measures were also taken to prevent conflicts among forces that could potentially challenge the young successor.
Kim Jong Un apparently regarded control of the military to be his most urgent task. At the conference of party representatives, he and three other key civilians — Kim Kyong-hui (his aunt and Political Bureau member), Choi Ryonghae (South Hwanghae Province Party Secretary), and Kim Kyong-ok (1st Deputy Director of the Organization and Guidance Department) — were made generals in the Korean People’s Army. In a word, this spectacle had the look of “a party in uniform.” The era of the National Defense Commission faded, and there were signs indicating the return of a party-state system. Kim used the Party Central Military Commission, of which he was vice chairman, to conduct “epaulet politics,” repeatedly adjusting the ranks of key military personnel. At the time, Vice-marshal Ri Yong-ho, the chief of the general staff, was known to wield the real power within the military, and he was purged in July 2012, ahead of the Jang Song-thaek group.
Kim began his succession as vice chairman of the Party Central Military Commission, and he chose to lead the state through the WPK. On top of this, the North Korean Constitution was revised in 2016, abolishing the National Defense Commission and establishing the new State Affairs Commission. The National Defense Commission had been the supreme strategic organization for national defense as a matter of national sovereignty, whereas the State Affairs Commission was downgraded to just a policy guidance agency for national sovereignty. The supreme authority for national defense and guidance of military affairs was handed over to the Party Central Military Commission, which has command of the military forces for the entire country.
On top of this, all references to “military first” have been expunged from the program platform and rules of the WPK, which were revised in 2021. Nor is there any mention of “military-first” politics, “military-first” thought, or the byungjin line regarding economic and nuclear development. A Military Government Guidance Department has been established, which along with the Organizational Guidance Department and General Political Bureau create a multi-layered system of control within the military. Only half the number of military representatives participate in the WPK congress today compared with five years ago, providing the party with complete control over the military.
The proposal documents system has weakened compared with its former stature within the National Defense Commission in the Kim Jong Il era. The process of policymaking has gained strength through the party’s apparatuses for the everyday execution of affairs and decision-making. Supporting this assertion is the fact that the Presidium of the Political Bureau, which has power to delegate authority, is specified for the first time in the revised 2021 edition of the rules of the WPK. This year, Kim Jong Un has repeatedly made mention, even during meetings, of the decision-making process through the party apparatus and the public announcement of those decisions through that apparatus. This is considered proof that the Kim Jong Un regime has returned to the original party-state system of decision-making akin to the 1970s and 1980s. All of these changes mean that decisions on diplomatic policy remain concentrated within the party instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense and even the State Affairs Commission.
8th Party Congress: Opportunities, Restraints and Strategic Ambiguity
Kim, in his speech at the 8th party congress in January 2021, discussed a dual-track doctrine of national defense and diplomacy, setting forth the principle of approaching the US with “power to power, goodwill to goodwill,” even while displaying a strong distrust of the US. During his address, he also revealed plans for upgrading nuclear weapons and building up the nuclear arsenal. He alluded to missiles with multiple warheads, hypersonic missiles, nuclear submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, military reconnaissance satellites and various tactical nuclear weapons. He made clear that bolstering national defense power is a key principle that can never be retracted. During the military review held in conjunction with the congress, part of North Korea’s asymmetric weapons systems such as the Polaris 5 were unveiled, raising concerns in neighboring countries. All the while, Kim stressed that “the strong defense capability of the state never precludes diplomacy but serves as a powerful means to propel it along the right course and guarantee its success.” As such, he presented a strategic ambiguity that emphasizes that the door is open to negotiations with the US.
This kind of attitude based on strategic ambiguity was even more pronounced with respect to the policy towards South Korea. On the one hand, the hardline policy that has been in effect since last year was repeated, while on the other hand, the door for dialogue was opened little by little. In his summary report to the party congress, Kim said that the current state of affairs regarding South Korea dates to the time before the Panmunjom Declaration, and that, depending upon the position of the South Korean government, inter-Korean relations may start out anew, as they did in the spring three years ago. The exchange of cordial letters between the two heads of state in July led to the connection of a military communications line, but then the joint South Korea-US military drills in August were cited as the reason for the sudden interruption in that communication line.
Consider the doctrine of “must be prepared for both dialogue and confrontation” as North Korean-style strategic ambiguity. Then why did Kim declare that his country would travel a new path, without revealing a concrete picture? Why does he still embrace strategic ambiguity?
First, there is the constraint of an unprecedented and still unfolding Sino-US conflict; North Korea would have difficulty establishing a hasty strategic direction. Second are the opportunity factors: South Korea’s political agenda has become complicated, and North Korea’s range of strategic choices has widened in terms of the diplomatic environment around the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Therefore, no reason exists for a unilateral blocking of approaching opportunities. In this sense, strategic ambiguity is also a wait-and-see strategy for capturing opportunities. Third, in North Korea’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, unprecedented preventive measures continue to be implemented in the form of a lockdown. This situation leaves no margin for implementing new strategies. In this respect, the possibility is high for the postponement of any new path.
What things are true among the conflicting analyses presented above?
Conclusion: The Puzzle of the New Party Rules
Although belatedly, Kim mentioned during this year’s party congress a clause in the heavily revised WPK rules that lays the groundwork for a commonwealth-style reunification approach. North Korea had stubbornly insisted on the doctrine of reunification through a federation system but has changed its stance to accept a stage of joint prosperity for the Korean people prior to instituting the federation system. The advantages of a commonwealth were renamed “Korean people’s co-prosperity,” acknowledging the language of Item 2 in the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration released 20 years ago. As his father had promised, it was inserted into the party rules. This is a counterargument to the South Korean assertion that advancing the Sino-North Korean alliance was tantamount to abandoning reunification.
Also important is Kim’s view on preventative measures against Covid-19. He decided on a self-imposed lockdown in consideration of the backward state of the North Korean healthcare system. Many third-world countries have chosen markets over epidemic prevention (in short, lives), while North Korea has made prevention of the spread of the disease the priority. The three available choices are: markets and the economy vs. national security vs. pandemic prevention. For Kim, disaster relief, namely the concept of emerging security, can be inferred to have entered the picture. If we consider that the new path embraces the concept of emerging security, then it is a development that South Koreans should welcome.
Kim maintained a revisionist hardline doctrine from the time he started out until 2017, while crisis on the Korean Peninsula clearly subsided from 2018 on. At present, dialogue with the US remains cut off, and Kim’s new path may signal a retreat to the revisionist way marked by an endless cycle of provocation and negotiation. Some assert that this new path abandons reunification in favor of building the Sino-North Korean alliance, but this could also be a strategy that includes the impetus for co-prosperity of North and South under the name of an inter-Korean commonwealth regime. If the last analysis favoring the inter-Korean commonwealth regime strategy is right, the possibility remains for South Korea to play a part in the “new way.” Finally, a paradoxical view posits that Kim’s savage anti-pandemic measures represent a path that respects life, presenting a puzzle that needs to be resolved with respect to the new path.
- The evolution of Kim Jong Un’s foreign policy has been a product of both internal and external pressures and necessities. Some elements of that policy draw on the legacy of his father, while others emerge from his own priorities and his need to ensure his grip on power. A close analysis of Kim’s tenure at the country’s helm reveals that a distinctly new foreign policy path may be emerging, but one that will continue to have some ties to the past. Jung-Chul Lee explains.
- Published: September 2021 (Vol.16 No.3)
- About the author
Jung-Chul Lee is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.
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North Korea’s Foreign Policy: A Revisionist State, an Alliance with China or a Third Way?
By Jung-Chul Lee
North Korea’s Juche diplomatic line is consistent with its anti-American/anti-imperialist focus. It appears to mirror a philosophy that emerged from Kim Il Sung’s experience during his guerrilla days in Manchuria in the late 1930s through the Korean War in the early 1950s. This is because North Korea’s Juche foreign policy is also wrapped in the idea of building outposts for world socialism in Asia.
Juche diplomacy is a doctrine of balancing with self-strengthening as its foundation; it is a doctrine of dominance through internal balancing. Seen in relation to domestic politics, it argues that the foremost value is to secure regime autonomy in order to respond to external threats.
The cause-and-effect relationship is not clarified as to whether an external threat must be present to secure autonomy in domestic politics or whether regime autonomy must be secured to respond to external threats. Nonetheless, the doctrine of dominance through internal balancing merged with absolute regime autonomy in the “Juche line” and resulted in an ideology that embraces “Baekdu (Paektu) bloodline legacy” and the system of the “Suryung” (supreme leader).
Kim Jong Un also sees himself as the enforcer of this legacy handed down from North Korea’s founding fathers. With the autonomy of domestic politics uncertain, Kim had no alternative but to legitimize his power by enforcing the legacy with greater resolve. That is the reason why foreign policy in the rule-by-legacy system became more hardline as he consolidated his power. It is also the background behind Kim’s revisionist foreign policy in relation to South Korea.
Foreign Policy Objectives: Rule by Legacy and China Policy
The death of Kim Jong Il in December 2011 opened the door for talks between North Korea and the United States, and the “Leap Day Deal” was signed between the two countries on Feb. 29, 2012. But the young Kim Jong Un went ahead with a satellite launch in April of that year, causing the agreement with the Americans to collapse. China, meanwhile, had attempted to establish an engagement policy with North Korea in 2009 but seen this effort come to naught. In 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao invited North Korean State Security Department Minister Jang Song-thaek to China for talks, soothing North Korean sentiments, but then the first anniversary of Kim Jong Il’s passing came in December, and the North Korean government marked the occasion by launching another satellite. Eventually, China participated in the sanctions that were imposed on North Korea for its actions, and Pyongyang conducted its third nuclear test in 2013, which served to escalate tensions. Trust waned in the idea that under the US-China concert regime, external balancing through solidarity with China could function well against the US. That was the lesson North Korea learned in the process of the Six-Party talks on North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program. It adhered to a doctrine of strengthening internal balance based on the traditional Juche line. As a result, Kim Jong Un emerged as a strong nationalist leader, and both military hardliners and nationalist elite groups approved the purging of the “pro-China faction” led by Jang Song-thaek, who was later executed.
North Korea’s rule by legacy separates “authority” from “power,” granting exclusive authority to the country’s founders. As such, it is a unique form of power transfer, whereby the successor monopolizes the physical power that comes in the process of executing the instructions passed down from the founding fathers. Unlike the usual exercise of absolute power that comes when the successor holds both authority and power, this is a burdenless hereditary system, because the authority is granted to the founders, who are Kim’s father and paternal grandfather. Therefore, the rule-by-legacy system contains a process in which the only way to legitimize power is by having a firm resolve to enforce the founder’s last wishes.
The instructions of the founding fathers and the will of the North Korean elite remained firmly in opposition to the intervention of hegemonic alliances to its domestic politics for 60 years after the Juche line was instituted. The fact that this can be publicly called upon serves like a dress sword that the successor leader may wield. The purging of Jang Song-thaek and his pro-China faction was the way in which the rule by legacy and nationalism was expected to go. Sino-North Korean relations could only drift until North Korea again focused its attention upon external balancing.
Beyond Existential Deterrence of the US and South Korea
Once Kim Jong Un was designated to succeed Kim Jong Il, North Korea started to make assertions such as: “It is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live without normalizing relations with the US, but not without nuclear deterrent ... The issue of normalizing relations and the nuclear issue are two separate matters from A to Z. If there is something to be desired by us, it is not to normalize relations between the DPRK and the US but to boost the nuclear deterrent in every way to more firmly defend the security of our nation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 17, 2009); and: “Now that the issue of concluding the peace treaty is mentioned in the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, too, it is good to move up the order of action as required by practice in the light of the lesson drawn from the failure of the Six-Party talks. The conclusion of the peace treaty will help terminate the hostile relations between the DPRK and the US and positively promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at a rapid tempo” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jan. 11, 2010). That is to say, with respect to the US, the country began to demand a “security-for-security” exchange framework — in other words, a dual-track process for simultaneous exchanges on denuclearization and a peace regime. In March 2013, the byungjin (two fronts) line of simultaneously pushing forward economic development and the building of a nuclear force was officially announced, followed by calls beginning in November 2014 and a visit by US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper for “suspension for suspension” — that is, halting both US-South Korean military exercises and North Korean nuclear testing. Then North Korea conducted three nuclear tests in less than two years. In the process, it displayed various strategic weapons and missile delivery capabilities, underscoring its determination to deter US moves. Thus, it went beyond brinksmanship aimed at a struggle for recognition to a demonstration of the capabilities of its internal balancing strategy.
Meanwhile, North Korea launched a series of provocations against South Korea based on the “gray zone” conflict strategy, shelling Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, firing on loudspeakers along the western front of the demilitarized zone in 2015, and blowing up the inter-Korean liaison office in Kaesong in 2020. While Kim asserted in a personal letter to US President Donald Trump in 2019 that the South Korean military was no match against North Korean military, North Korea had begun to show its offensive option in inter-Korean relations. This was not akin to Pyongyang’s 1970s-style strategy of unifying Korea through military force, but a tactic based on a new threat capability that could turn the Korean Peninsula into a conflict area. The so-called stability-instability paradox states that in a situation in which both sides have a nuclear deterrence, the probability of all-out war between them does not readily exist, but small-scale conflicts are more likely to occur. In that sense, the paradox is deemed to provide North Korea, which already possesses some 30 to 50 nuclear warheads, with the self-assurance that such clashes can be easily triggered. From this perspective, gray-zone conflicts, which include various low-intensity hostilities or battles in cyber-space, are highly likely to become an asset that Pyongyang can use to pressure Seoul. That is the reason why Kim has appeared confident in his aggressive, revisionist posture toward South Korea.
Continuity and Discontinuity: Three Stages and Three Views
Some have pointed to sanctions as having induced North Korea’s return to dialogue through the 2018 Pyeongchang Peace Process. This perspective paints the picture of a disguised peace offensive by a regime surrendering to sanctions. Bring in all the subsequent changes in events, however, and what had appeared to be North Korean behavior modified by sanctions turns out to be North Korean durability exceeding outside assessments. In other words, its autocratic resilience was underestimated. Now consider the fact that almost two years have passed since North Korea began to seal off its border with China to prevent the spread of Covid-19, and the argument no longer stands that North Korea was driven to the bargaining table by economic hardship three years ago.
North Korea consistently demanded during negotiations in 2018 and 2019 that South Korea-US military exercises be cancelled. The 2018 Pyeongchang Peace Process actually began with a proposal to suspend South Korea-US military exercises, which was put forward on Dec. 19, 2017. The cancellation of the military exercises in August 2018 was a decisive factor leading to the inter-Korean summit on Sept. 19, 2018, as well as the subsequent Hanoi summit in 2019 between North Korea and the US. On the other side of the coin, the resumption of the military exercises in August 2019 was the primary reason for North Korea to sever ties with South Korea and the US. Seen from this first view, the demand for a “security-for-security” framework, a consistent goal of North Korea, can be interpreted as support for the continuity of the policy objectives of the Kim Jong Un regime.
However, a different view that stressed the discontinuity of regime policy objectives was raised, starting with the fact that North Korea during the Hanoi summit demanded that sanctions be lifted. The sanctions were not the reason why it sat down at the bargaining table. However, its actions gave rise to the second view that Kim revised his objective from becoming a socialist power on the basis of muddling through to pursuing an economic development strategy premised upon mutual deterrence capabilities. That is because North Korea effectively announced the end of its byungjin line of simultaneously developing the economy and nuclear weapons in April 2018, when the government declared a new line of “concentrating all efforts on the socialist construction.” According to this assertion, North Korea’s “new way” and “offensive for making a breakthrough head-on” is not really part of the “security-for-security” process. Instead, interesting analysis has emerged positing that North Korea’s strategy has been redirected toward economic development in tandem with a Sino-North Korean alliance, in other words external balancing, as well as making the people’s livelihoods a priority.
According to the second view, objectives held by North Korea between 2012 and 2017 changed from 2018. Sino-North Korean relations, which had been frozen, have been restored, and Chinese President Xi Jinping even visited North Korea — the first state visit of a Chinese leader in 14 years. High credibility is given to the assertion that North Korea has chosen a new way forward that takes into consideration the support that China represents. North Korea has concluded that the US intention does not exist for a peace treaty through direct talks between North Korea and the US, let alone an end to military exercises or even a lifting of sanctions. The South Korean government, too, cannot wield any power to arbitrate between North Korea and the US. In this situation, Kim Jong Un has no reason to hold on to any lingering hopes for the peace process. The renewed Sino-North Korean alliance will strengthen external balancing toward the US, and based on this, it is now reasonable to establish a new economic development strategy through North Korean-Chinese co-operation.
Whether North Korea’s revisionist objectives have changed or have remained the same is debatable. The country has openly talked about “a new way” and an “offensive for making a breakthrough head-on” in the wake of the failed Hanoi summit. The objectives found therein are linked to the answers to this debate. According to the third view, it is unclear if the new path represents a departure from the old cycle of provocation and negotiation that makes the Korean Peninsula a hotspot for potential conflict, or if the Sino-North Korean alliance will lead to a new round of mutual “strategic patience.”
National Defense Commission and Party Central Military Commission
The National Defense Commission and the concept of “military-first” dominated the Kim Jong Il era. Indeed, these two things served as the organization and the ideology that sustained the system. Kim Jong Il assumed the position of National Defense Chairman in 1993, and in the process the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) became derided by him as the “party of the living corpses.” Power that had been divided among the party, the central government and the military became concentrated in the National Defense Commission. The military-first policy was launched. Because all decision-making processes became centered on the commission, a “proposal document” (jae-ui-seo) system developed. The party, the central government and the military were no longer differentiated; all agencies were merged; and 30 to 40 proposal-document units offered the ideas for making decisions. Each proposal document was examined and reported to the chairman, and in the process the secretarial function of the National Defense Commission grew in importance.
After Kim Jong Un was designated successor on Sept. 28, 2010, however, the power structure that the WPK revealed during the 3rd Conference of Party Representatives surprisingly took on the look of a factional alliance. A coalition of four major power groups clearly stood out in the succession structure. They were the just-returned old guard generation, symbolized by Premier Choe Yong-rim, a first-generation politician, and Kim Kyong-hui, the sister of Kim Jong Il; the newly-formed Jang Song-thaek group, known for its pro-China stance; the increasingly powerful military brass, armed with the regime’s “military first” policy; and the newly-realized Baekdu Bloodline, protected by the Organization and Guidance Department. This factional coalition could be maintained with Kim Jong Il at the center, and measures were also taken to prevent conflicts among forces that could potentially challenge the young successor.
Kim Jong Un apparently regarded control of the military to be his most urgent task. At the conference of party representatives, he and three other key civilians — Kim Kyong-hui (his aunt and Political Bureau member), Choi Ryonghae (South Hwanghae Province Party Secretary), and Kim Kyong-ok (1st Deputy Director of the Organization and Guidance Department) — were made generals in the Korean People’s Army. In a word, this spectacle had the look of “a party in uniform.” The era of the National Defense Commission faded, and there were signs indicating the return of a party-state system. Kim used the Party Central Military Commission, of which he was vice chairman, to conduct “epaulet politics,” repeatedly adjusting the ranks of key military personnel. At the time, Vice-marshal Ri Yong-ho, the chief of the general staff, was known to wield the real power within the military, and he was purged in July 2012, ahead of the Jang Song-thaek group.
Kim began his succession as vice chairman of the Party Central Military Commission, and he chose to lead the state through the WPK. On top of this, the North Korean Constitution was revised in 2016, abolishing the National Defense Commission and establishing the new State Affairs Commission. The National Defense Commission had been the supreme strategic organization for national defense as a matter of national sovereignty, whereas the State Affairs Commission was downgraded to just a policy guidance agency for national sovereignty. The supreme authority for national defense and guidance of military affairs was handed over to the Party Central Military Commission, which has command of the military forces for the entire country.
On top of this, all references to “military first” have been expunged from the program platform and rules of the WPK, which were revised in 2021. Nor is there any mention of “military-first” politics, “military-first” thought, or the byungjin line regarding economic and nuclear development. A Military Government Guidance Department has been established, which along with the Organizational Guidance Department and General Political Bureau create a multi-layered system of control within the military. Only half the number of military representatives participate in the WPK congress today compared with five years ago, providing the party with complete control over the military.
The proposal documents system has weakened compared with its former stature within the National Defense Commission in the Kim Jong Il era. The process of policymaking has gained strength through the party’s apparatuses for the everyday execution of affairs and decision-making. Supporting this assertion is the fact that the Presidium of the Political Bureau, which has power to delegate authority, is specified for the first time in the revised 2021 edition of the rules of the WPK. This year, Kim Jong Un has repeatedly made mention, even during meetings, of the decision-making process through the party apparatus and the public announcement of those decisions through that apparatus. This is considered proof that the Kim Jong Un regime has returned to the original party-state system of decision-making akin to the 1970s and 1980s. All of these changes mean that decisions on diplomatic policy remain concentrated within the party instead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Defense and even the State Affairs Commission.
8th Party Congress: Opportunities, Restraints and Strategic Ambiguity
Kim, in his speech at the 8th party congress in January 2021, discussed a dual-track doctrine of national defense and diplomacy, setting forth the principle of approaching the US with “power to power, goodwill to goodwill,” even while displaying a strong distrust of the US. During his address, he also revealed plans for upgrading nuclear weapons and building up the nuclear arsenal. He alluded to missiles with multiple warheads, hypersonic missiles, nuclear submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, military reconnaissance satellites and various tactical nuclear weapons. He made clear that bolstering national defense power is a key principle that can never be retracted. During the military review held in conjunction with the congress, part of North Korea’s asymmetric weapons systems such as the Polaris 5 were unveiled, raising concerns in neighboring countries. All the while, Kim stressed that “the strong defense capability of the state never precludes diplomacy but serves as a powerful means to propel it along the right course and guarantee its success.” As such, he presented a strategic ambiguity that emphasizes that the door is open to negotiations with the US.
This kind of attitude based on strategic ambiguity was even more pronounced with respect to the policy towards South Korea. On the one hand, the hardline policy that has been in effect since last year was repeated, while on the other hand, the door for dialogue was opened little by little. In his summary report to the party congress, Kim said that the current state of affairs regarding South Korea dates to the time before the Panmunjom Declaration, and that, depending upon the position of the South Korean government, inter-Korean relations may start out anew, as they did in the spring three years ago. The exchange of cordial letters between the two heads of state in July led to the connection of a military communications line, but then the joint South Korea-US military drills in August were cited as the reason for the sudden interruption in that communication line.
Consider the doctrine of “must be prepared for both dialogue and confrontation” as North Korean-style strategic ambiguity. Then why did Kim declare that his country would travel a new path, without revealing a concrete picture? Why does he still embrace strategic ambiguity?
First, there is the constraint of an unprecedented and still unfolding Sino-US conflict; North Korea would have difficulty establishing a hasty strategic direction. Second are the opportunity factors: South Korea’s political agenda has become complicated, and North Korea’s range of strategic choices has widened in terms of the diplomatic environment around the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics. Therefore, no reason exists for a unilateral blocking of approaching opportunities. In this sense, strategic ambiguity is also a wait-and-see strategy for capturing opportunities. Third, in North Korea’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, unprecedented preventive measures continue to be implemented in the form of a lockdown. This situation leaves no margin for implementing new strategies. In this respect, the possibility is high for the postponement of any new path.
What things are true among the conflicting analyses presented above?
Conclusion: The Puzzle of the New Party Rules
Although belatedly, Kim mentioned during this year’s party congress a clause in the heavily revised WPK rules that lays the groundwork for a commonwealth-style reunification approach. North Korea had stubbornly insisted on the doctrine of reunification through a federation system but has changed its stance to accept a stage of joint prosperity for the Korean people prior to instituting the federation system. The advantages of a commonwealth were renamed “Korean people’s co-prosperity,” acknowledging the language of Item 2 in the June 15 North-South Joint Declaration released 20 years ago. As his father had promised, it was inserted into the party rules. This is a counterargument to the South Korean assertion that advancing the Sino-North Korean alliance was tantamount to abandoning reunification.
Also important is Kim’s view on preventative measures against Covid-19. He decided on a self-imposed lockdown in consideration of the backward state of the North Korean healthcare system. Many third-world countries have chosen markets over epidemic prevention (in short, lives), while North Korea has made prevention of the spread of the disease the priority. The three available choices are: markets and the economy vs. national security vs. pandemic prevention. For Kim, disaster relief, namely the concept of emerging security, can be inferred to have entered the picture. If we consider that the new path embraces the concept of emerging security, then it is a development that South Koreans should welcome.
Kim maintained a revisionist hardline doctrine from the time he started out until 2017, while crisis on the Korean Peninsula clearly subsided from 2018 on. At present, dialogue with the US remains cut off, and Kim’s new path may signal a retreat to the revisionist way marked by an endless cycle of provocation and negotiation. Some assert that this new path abandons reunification in favor of building the Sino-North Korean alliance, but this could also be a strategy that includes the impetus for co-prosperity of North and South under the name of an inter-Korean commonwealth regime. If the last analysis favoring the inter-Korean commonwealth regime strategy is right, the possibility remains for South Korea to play a part in the “new way.” Finally, a paradoxical view posits that Kim’s savage anti-pandemic measures represent a path that respects life, presenting a puzzle that needs to be resolved with respect to the new path.
- The evolution of Kim Jong Un’s foreign policy has been a product of both internal and external pressures and necessities. Some elements of that policy draw on the legacy of his father, while others emerge from his own priorities and his need to ensure his grip on power. A close analysis of Kim’s tenure at the country’s helm reveals that a distinctly new foreign policy path may be emerging, but one that will continue to have some ties to the past. Jung-Chul Lee explains.
- Published: Oct 01, 2021
- About the author
Jung-Chul Lee is a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University.
10. Standing on their own: North Korean refugees test startup dreams
A common Korean cultural characteristic: If faced with hardship they will survive. If given the opportunity they will thrive.
[Weekender] Standing on their own: North Korean refugees test startup dreams
[Weekender] Standing on their own: North Korean refugees test startup dreams
A growing number of defectors are pursuing unusual business ideas, not just NK-themed restaurants
Published : Oct 2, 2021 - 16:01
Updated : Oct 2, 2021 - 18:50
Ahn Myeong-hee, founnder and CEO of fashion startup Ryu Ae (Ahn Myeong-hee)
Ahn Myeong-hee, a 31-year-old defector from North Korea, was overwhelmed by the hardworking people, the rapidly changing social phenomena and the highly competitive environment when she first arrived in the South.
“One day I was standing at a subway station and watching people walking fast. It made me think that I’d really have to live my life to the full to become successful,” Ahn said. “At the same time, I appreciated the fact that you can see the outcome as much as the amount of effort you put in.”
After escaping from North Korea as a teenager, she started dreaming of becoming a trader while working at a tailor shop in China.
“In China, if your identity is unclear, you can’t picture a bright future, so I chose to come to South Korea to make my dreams come true. Perhaps because of the difficulties I had faced, South Korea looked like a land of opportunity to me,” she said.
In 2019, she launched fashion startup Ryu Ae with her sister, who works there as a designer.
Based on her experience in the textile industry, she is seeking business opportunities in the baby clothing market. “The number of newborns here continues to decrease here but ironically the market is expanding as family members, including uncles and aunts, give more gifts, spending large amounts on babies.”
Ahn and her team of four launched a baby clothing brand in March 2020, mainly producing organic cotton jumpsuits for infants. They are currently available through some 10 retail channels, including open marketplaces like Gmarket and Auction.
The brand uses 100 percent organic fabrics, certified by the Global Organic Textile Standard and made without toxic bleaches, dyes or other chemicals.
Unlike typical baby clothes, organic cotton products feature subtle earth tones instead of bright colors.
“They may not be as eye-catching as other companies’ products, but I know I am on the right path,” she said.
Ahn is one of a growing number of North Korean defectors looking to stand on their two own feet by launching startups.
No exact number is available to document how many North Korean defectors run startups or the size of their operations, but the growing number of startup accelerator programs is an indicator of an uptick in this trend. Currently a handful of organizations, including the Bridge and the Asan Nanum Foundation, offer support programs for North Koreans aspiring to be startup founders.
The Bridge, a Seoul-based nonprofit organization that empowers social entrepreneurs in developing countries and in South Korea, launched a startup accelerator program for North Korean defectors five years ago. The Asan Nanum Foundation, run by conglomerate Hyundai Group, runs Asan Sanghoe, a four-month entrepreneurship boot camp program for North Korean resettlers and foreign-born participants who speak Korean.
Their goals are to foster entrepreneurship for North Korean defectors by providing education, as well as by helping them develop marketing strategies and find investors and sales channels.
“There are some stereotypes regarding North Korean defectors -- that they are vulnerable and are in constant need of help. Indeed, there are many nonprofit organizations that are set up to address this sole issue because there are many North Koreans with the potential to make a startup,” Hwang Jin-sol, founder and head of the Bridge, told The Korea Herald.
“Those who have potential as businesspeople, from the startup industry’s point of view, may still need more time and effort to gain the necessary skills, making them appear less competent than South Korean startup builders. Therefore, those with potential in business are actually put in a gray zone,” Hwang said. “And we want to help them push forward and thrive in the startup area.”
Even though North Korean resettlers were brave enough to cross the border, it may be difficult for them to gain the skills they need to found startups considering the disparities in education and experience between them and their South Korean competitors. Lower credit scores also make it difficult for them to get much-needed funding.
A network of people connected through regional ties, kinship or having attended the same school is considered a valuable resource in South Korea. The Bridge focuses on connecting them with South Korean entrepreneurs to help North Korean entrepreneurs make up for the lack of such a network.
Even though it is premature to say that these programs have been successful, the latest generation of settlers from the North in South Korea show more diverse business ideas then they did just a few years ago, when North Korean restaurants were the main focus. Today they have expanded into web design and companies that sell preserved flowers.
According to a survey conducted by the Federation of North Korean Industries, an organization dedicated to North Koreans running businesses in South Korea, in 2015 the top two business sectors were restaurants and retail.
That trend is also reflected in North Koreans’ applications for startup accelerator programs -- their ideas are straightforward, and their target customers are typically their compatriots or Korean Chinese familiar with the culture that they hailed from. Simply put, they were not in the same ballpark as the IT-heavy startups that have become synonymous with success. Their ideas, such as North Korean foods and souvenirs, were rooted in the only things defectors could bring over the border with them -- their experience and craft.
Kim Ria, founder and CEO of Flower is Ria (Kim Ria)
But Kim Ria, another defector-turned-startup CEO, wanted to do something new. She started a business making preserved flowers -- something that doesn’t exist in North Korea.
“Preserved flowers are popular in Japan and in the US but North Korean people are not familiar with them,” she said. “It is a little pricy because of the costly raw materials, but I thought this is something that you want to receive as a gift.”
Before her defection from the North, Kim worked for a state-run company for two years and had to carry stones and soil for construction projects. Having been assigned to the job, she had no option but to work there 14 hours a day with no wages or any kind of reward.
“Work never ended there. People had nosebleeds due to harsh working conditions. They fainted in the sun. So I quit the job,” said Kim, who crossed the border eight years ago in fear of punishment for remaining unemployed for more than a year in the North.
Although her company, Flower Is Ria, is a humble one-person startup, she dreams big.
North Koreans are taught to lay flowers before statues of the country’s founder -- Kim Il-sung, the current leader’s grandfather -- and his son Kim Jong-il on the anniversaries of their births and deaths, but other than that, the state has no traditions involving flowers.
“If the two Koreas achieve reunification one day, I want to introduce North Korea to the culture of flowers, like going to flower festivals during springtime and giving bouquets as gifts to lovers and family members, not just to the Kim family,” she said.
These fledgling entrepreneurs give us a taste of reunification, Hwang said. North Koreans living in South Korea, who have experienced life on both sides of the border, could become mediators and help minimize trial and error if real reunification takes place, he added. Once the two sides are unified, they are the ones who will be able to come up with optimized business ideas.
“There are no better practical grounds to prepare for reunification than building a business together. Cooperating with established companies here would greatly empower North Korean entrepreneurs,” Hwang said.
11. North Korea Increases Fines for Quarantine Violations to Exorbitant Levels
Market priniciples applied to fines???
Is this an indicator of a potential COVID outbreak? Is the regime getting more worried about a possible outbreak?
Excerpts:
“Recently we had to attend a learning session titled ‘Strict Compliance with the Requirements of the Emergency Quarantine Act,’ where the punishments and fines for violations were so high that the people were shocked,” an official of a state-owned company in the central northern province of Ryanggang told RFA’s Korean Service this week.
Every adult in North Korea must attend two-hour lecture sessions twice a month in party ideology and changes in policy.
“Normally, the learning sessions are held separately for government officials and the general public, with different titles, but this time the title and content were exactly the same for both groups,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
The revised Emergency Quarantine Act listed fines the source called “shockingly high,” and punishments including unpaid labor, reeducation, dismissal from a job, and detention.
North Korea Increases Fines for Quarantine Violations to Exorbitant Levels
Fines are now based on market prices instead of citizens’ paltry government salaries.
North Korea has increased fines for violators of its extensive COVID-19 emergency rules to levels many times citizens’ salaries in an effort to enforce its draconian national quarantine effort, officials of state-run enterprises told RFA.
Since the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic, North Korea has imposed strict rules on its 25 million people, including shoot-to-kill orders near its border with China and lockdowns of entire cities and counties.
No measure has had a greater effect on society than the closure of the Sino-Korean border and suspension of all trade with China since January 2020, a move that devastated the North Korean economy, making it difficult for many citizens to make a living.
Up until now, minor violations of quarantine rules had been punishable by nominal fines based on government salaries. The average North Korean monthly salary in 2018 was about 4,000 won (U.S. $0.66), according to the Korea Joongang Daily, a South Korean newspaper.
But as the months passed, frustrated and desperate citizens began ignoring the rules, and the government decided to base fines on market prices instead of government salaries, sources told RFA.
“Recently we had to attend a learning session titled ‘Strict Compliance with the Requirements of the Emergency Quarantine Act,’ where the punishments and fines for violations were so high that the people were shocked,” an official of a state-owned company in the central northern province of Ryanggang told RFA’s Korean Service this week.
Every adult in North Korea must attend two-hour lecture sessions twice a month in party ideology and changes in policy.
“Normally, the learning sessions are held separately for government officials and the general public, with different titles, but this time the title and content were exactly the same for both groups,” said the source, who requested anonymity for security reasons.
The revised Emergency Quarantine Act listed fines the source called “shockingly high,” and punishments including unpaid labor, reeducation, dismissal from a job, and detention.
“The session strongly stressed that the emergency quarantine project is the most critical challenge facing the country, in that it is directly related to the safety of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, so the people must be of the mind where there can be no mistake,” the source said.
The source said that authorities told attendees that the higher fines were because citizens had become lax in complying with quarantine laws.
Another official, from a state-run factory in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong, the same lectures drew the same reaction.
“At the session the punishments and fines for violations of the law were explained and everyone was surprised at the amounts,” the second source said, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
The second source told RFA about fines for specific violations. On the low end of the spectrum were a 5,000 won ($0.82) to 10,000 won fine for failing to report suspected cases, suspicious packages, or animals that died with unknown causes.
The fine for doing business in an unauthorized place is between 50,000 and 100,000 won; while driving an overloaded bus carries a penalty of 100,000 to 500,000 won. Acts such as improperly disposing of wastewater from quarantined areas or raising pheasants in a cage-free environment are punishable by a fine of 500,000 to one million won.
“Residents are increasingly dissatisfied with their living difficulties under this prolonged emergency quarantine… The shift to market price-based fines pushes the fines into the territory that normal residents cannot afford, so they have no choice but to obey the government’s harsh measures.”
While imposing extensive quarantine measures and heavy punishment, North Korea maintains outwardly that it has been virus-free throughout the global pandemic, and has reported to zero confirmed COVID-19 cases and zero deaths.
Observers doubt the claim, citing costly quarantine measures and reports that hospitals isolate “suspected cases,” while those who die of suspected symptoms are quickly cremated before COVID-19 can be confirmed as the cause of death.
Reported by Chang Gyu Ahn for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Jinha Shin and Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
12. North Korea Forces Hungry Citizens to Pay for Propaganda Murals
We must observe for growing resistance potential.
But we should really think about the utter hypocrisy and tragedy of making the people contribute funds to propaganda. You cannot eat propaganda.
North Korea Forces Hungry Citizens to Pay for Propaganda Murals
People grumble that they are being made to pay to idolize the Kim family when they cannot even afford food.
Rural citizens in North Korea are angry that their government is building mosaic murals at their expense that idolize the ruling Kim family at a time when people are struggling to find their next meal, sources in the country told RFA.
Chronically short of food, the country of 25 million has seen starvation deaths in the wake of the closure of the Sino-Korean border and suspension of trade with China in January 2020 to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Authorities told the public that they are on their own to find food, RFA reported previously.
Giant murals depicting leader Kim Jong Un’s father and predecessor, Kim Jong Il; grandfather and national founder Kim Il Sung; and the eldest Kim’s first wife, Kim Jong Suk, are commonplace in the country where the members of the Kim family enjoy almost god-like status due to a firmly entrenched cult of personality.
The murals are a common feature of major thoroughfares in cities, but the government is ordering them in the countryside for the first time, sources said.
“These days, the people are all complaining about this idolization project, which must be completed by the end of October,” a resident of Musan county in the northeastern province of North Hamgyong told RFA’s Korean Service Sept. 23.
As with almost all public projects, the government is forcing local citizens to donate their time, money or materials for the murals.
“With this mural installation, the people’s dissatisfaction with the country has reached its peak,” the source said.
“The residents are suffering from major livelihood difficulties but now we have to pay 20,000 won (U.S. $3.28) in ‘loyalty funds’ per household, and we must also provide cement and prepare meals for the construction workers,” said the source.
The design of the new murals is still a secret. The source said nobody knows if the three figures will be depicted as usual or if they will present a new design.
“But nobody cares about the design in these difficult times, because they have more important things to worry about,” the source said.
“Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting border closure, most people are at the crossroads of life and death every day due to these food shortages. In such an emergency, the people are outraged that the government is burdening them by extorting money for the murals,” said the source.
A local resident cycles past a mural depicting former North Korean leaders Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il in the North Korean port of Rajin July 18, 2014. Credit: Reuters
Another source, a party official from Chunggang county in the northern province of Chagang, told RFA that the collection of funds in his jurisdiction has begun.
“The murals will be built at the borders of each county and at the borders between each district,” said the official, who requested anonymity to speak freely.
“We already have mosaic murals at several industrial sites in Changang province, including timber processing facilities in Chasong and Kopung counties, and mines and timber processing plants in the cities of Kanggye and Yanggye, so I don’t understand why they are telling us to build more at the boundaries of districts,” said the second source.
North Korea’s government has told citizens to prepare for a “second Arduous March,” referring to the 1990’s North Korean famine which killed as much as 10 percent of the country by some estimates. The second source said citizens in Chagang have begun referring to the current crisis that way.
“Many residents are perplexed because the state is passing on the cost of installing idolization murals to the residents instead of taking care of their livelihood at a time like this,” said the second source.
“The people say things like, the murals aren’t going to give us rice, and the government is against the people, making us do this project to deceive us. The people must pay to idolize our leaders when they cannot even get basic food and medicine,” the second source said.
Reported by Jeong Yon Park for RFA’s Korean Service. Translated by Leejin Jun. Written in English by Eugene Whong.
13. Success of 'Squid Game'
It really is quite amazing how successful this show is.
Success of 'Squid Game'
Korean survival drama becomes global hit
"Squid Game," Netflix's original Korean drama series, is on track to become the global streaming giant's most successful show ever. It is surprising to see the survival drama emerging as a viral hit throughout the world about two weeks after its release on Sept. 17.
On Saturday, the nine-episode thriller topped the world's popular TV show rankings tallied by streaming analytics firm FlixPatrol in 81 of 83 countries where Netflix provides its streaming services. It came second only in Denmark and Turkey. "Squid Game" has also become the first Korean drama to hit No. 1 on Netflix's top 10 TV list in the U.S.
It is also worth noting that the drama has taken the top spot at least once in the 83 countries. Even in India, where viewers are highly loyal to domestic content, "Squid Game" has gained popularity, reaching the top last Friday and Saturday. All these results show that the Korean series has succeeded in appealing to global viewers with uniqueness and creativity.
The thriller, written and directed by Hwang Dong-hyuk, revolves around life-and-death survival games among hopelessly indebted people. As Hwang said, the series satirizes a highly competitive capitalist society where more and more people are put into a corner with no hope for the future. In the drama, 456 people are invited to play a series of Korean children's games where they have to risk their lives to win a 45.6 billion won ($38.5 million) prize.
The amazingly successful debut of the Netflix TV show comes after director Bong Joon-ho's film "Parasite" won four Academy Awards in 2020. "Squid Game" and "Parasite" have much in common by dealing with the shortcomings of capitalism and extreme competition among members of our society. Both take a critical point of view on the winner-take-all mantra and the logic of the survival of the fittest. "Squid Game" seems to be drawing much attention because it features economic inequalities which have deepened amid the prolonged COVID-19 pandemic.
The worldwide online craze of "Squid Game" reflects the spread of hallyu (Korean wave), a boom of Korean pop culture. Korean dramas, better known as K-dramas, have already gained global popularity. "Squid Game" has reaffirmed the competitiveness of K-dramas and opened a new horizon for Korean culture and entertainment.
Netflix's generous investment in Korea has also contributed to making "Squid Game" a global hit. It poured $700 million in producing about 80 Korean movies and dramas between 2015 and 2020. The streaming behemoth plans to invest $500 million this year. Yet, there is a concern that the local entertainment industry might become more dependent on Netflix. This concern could grow further as Disney Plus will start its service here next month.
That's why Korean authorities need to provide more support to the local film and TV industries as well as domestic streaming service providers. It is important to map out a new strategy to help promote the production of novel and creative cultural content.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
