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Quotes of the Day:
"The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land, you may almost hear the beating of his wings."
- John Bright, appealing for an armistice during the Crimean War in a House of Commons speech (Feb. 23, 1855)
"We must either learn to live together as brothers or we are all going to perish together as fools."
- Martin Luther King, Jr.
"The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting out ink."
- George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language” in Horizon magazine (April, 1946); reprinted in Shooting an Elephant (1950)
1. Chinese aircraft intruded into S. Korea's air defense zone more than 70 times last year: military
2. S. Korean envoy on N.K. human rights to visit U.S. this week
3. Yoon's approval rating drops after hot mic incident: poll
4. After flurry of missile launches, N.Korean media dismiss allies’ moves to sharpen deterrence
5. How to Halt North Korean Cyber Aggression
6. Supporting Human Rights in North Korea
7. Victims seek justice for North Korea's false promise of 'paradise on Earth'
8. [ANALYSIS] Yoon's poor support rate burdens his foreign policy agenda
9. Russians in Korea fear long arm of Putin's mobilization
10. Lifting the veil on N. Korea’s “Daeyang network”
11. N. Korea instructs law enforcement agencies to crackdown on unemployed, workplace deserters
12. Women Cross DMZ Statement on Kamala Harris’ Visit to the DMZ
1. Chinese aircraft intruded into S. Korea's air defense zone more than 70 times last year: military
China appears to be getting aggressive though it does not appear most of these incursions have been publicly reported.
Chinese aircraft intruded into S. Korea's air defense zone more than 70 times last year: military | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 3, 2022
SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- Dozens of Chinese and Russian warplanes entered South Korea's air defense identification zone (KADIZ) last year, a document showed Monday.
In a document submitted to the National Assembly, South Korea's defense ministry said the number of times that Chinese military aircraft entered the KADIZ surpassed 70 last year, similar to that of the previous year.
The number of entries by Russian aircraft into KADIZ has exceeded 10 times since 2017, while topping 20 times in 2019.
Japanese warplanes have entered the overlapping South Korean and Japanese air defense zones an average of 500 times per year after giving prior notice, according to the document.
The air defense zone was first drawn in 1951 by the U.S. Air Force during the 1950-53 Korean War to prevent air clashes between nations surrounding the Korean Peninsula. The area is not territorial airspace but is zoned off to request foreign planes identify themselves to prevent accidental clashes.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 3, 2022
2. S. Korean envoy on N.K. human rights to visit U.S. this week
I will attend lunch with her on Friday.
I will be addressing the three part strategy recommendation with her: human rights upfront, influence operations, and pursuit of a free and unified Korea.
"A Three Part Plan To Enhance President Yoon’s North Korea Strategy: Toward A Free And Unified Korea"
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/09/a-three-part-plan-to-enhance-president-yoons-north-korea-strategy-toward-a-free-and-unified-korea/
S. Korean envoy on N.K. human rights to visit U.S. this week | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 3, 2022
WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's new envoy for North Korean human rights will make her first visit to the United States this week since taking office, officials said Sunday.
Lee Shin-hwa plans to meet officials of the State Department and the White House, as well as experts and activists, in Washington, D.C., during her four-day trip starting Wednesday to discuss various pending issues, including Pyongyang's nuclear threat and missile provocations.
Lee, a political science professor at Korea University, was appointed as the new envoy in July, filling a post that has been left vacant since September 2017.
North Korea's human rights record has drawn greater international attention since the U.N. Commission of Inquiry issued a report in 2014 after a yearlong probe, saying North Korean leaders are responsible for "widespread, systematic and gross" violations of human rights.
North Korea has long been accused of grave human rights abuses, ranging from holding political prisoners in concentration camps to committing torture and carrying out public executions.
Still, North Korea has bristled at outside criticism, calling it a U.S.-led attempt to topple its regime.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 3, 2022
3. Yoon's approval rating drops after hot mic incident: poll
Korea needs to get over this. The "hot mic incident" has had no impact on the alliance.
Yoon's approval rating drops after hot mic incident: poll | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 3, 2022
SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol's approval rating fell for the first time in four weeks after his remarks caught on a hot mic in New York caused an uproar here, a survey showed Monday.
In the poll of 2,522 voters conducted by Realmeter from Monday to Friday last week, 31.2 percent positively assessed Yoon's job performance, down 3.4 percentage points from the previous week.
Yoon's disapproval rating was 66 percent, up 3.8 percentage points.
The drop could be attributable to the hot mic controversy and Yoon's accusation of media manipulation after he came under fire for using vulgar words in private remarks to aides caught on a hot mic during his trip to New York last month, according to Bae Cheol-ho, a senior analyst at Realmeter.
Though the recording of Yoon's remarks was not clear due to noise, many thought that he used foul language while talking about U.S. Congress and U.S. President Joe Biden. Yoon's office rejected the claim, saying he was referring to South Korea's opposition-controlled National Assembly and did not mention U.S. Congress or Biden.
The poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percentage points at a 95 percent confidence level.
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · by 이원주 · October 3, 2022
4. After flurry of missile launches, N.Korean media dismiss allies’ moves to sharpen deterrence
A full court press from the Propaganda and Agitation Department through a number of its "news outlets."
Excerpts:
Uriminzokkiri denounced the Yoon government for being “frantic about the reckless rehearsal for war against the DPRK while clinging tenaciously to the nuclear devil,” referring to the US. The DPRK is North Korea’s official name.
“The warmongers, who have frantically waged a reckless war rehearsal racket against the DPRK, are clamoring about the ‘power of the alliance,’ but in fact, it is only the pitiful bravado of those who are frightened by our military might.”
Meari, another North Korean mouthpiece, argued Monday that the Yoon government has been “going completely insane about confronting a nuclear weapon state while having the ‘crumbling empire’ at its back.” The media outlet called the Yoon government “moronic.”
“The problem is that the traitorous Yoon Suk-yeol group is … completely clueless about what strategic position the DPRK has reached, and what kind of disastrous consequences its reckless behavior -- which it has made relying on its master (the US) -- will bring,” the Meari said. “Only the curse of the nation and shameful destruction will befall the traitorous group.”
North Korea’s Uriminzokkiri on Sunday played down the South Korea-US alliance’s efforts to enhance the viability of the US’ extended deterrence through various channels, including the deployment of the US’ strategic assets on the peninsula.
Uriminzokkiri said North Korea “will never be surprised even though the (South Korean) puppets bring all the US’ nuclear weapons” to the peninsula.
“The puppet warmongers, who engage in nuclear war saber-rattling against us, who view ‘floating military bases’ as a mere lump of scrap metal, are such morons…” the media outlet said.
Tongil Sinbo, a North Korean weekly, said Saturday that the Yoon government’s initiative to enhance the viability of the US’ extended deterrence as “self-destructive braveness.”
After flurry of missile launches, N.Korean media dismiss allies’ moves to sharpen deterrence
Propaganda outlets ratchet up attacks on S.Korea’s defense strategy to reinforce alliance’s defense posture
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · October 3, 2022
North Korea’s propaganda outlets have continued to dismiss South Korea and the US’ move to reinforce their deterrence and military readiness as “bravado” against a “nuclear weapons state,” arguing that North Korea merely sees a US aircraft carrier as a “lump of scrap metal.”
Multiple propaganda outlets have simultaneously launched a flurry of attacks on the Yoon Suk-yeol government’s defense strategy to reinforce the South Korea-US combined defense posture and enhance the viability of the US extended deterrence against mounting threats from North Korea.
The recent spate of blistering criticisms came after South Korea and the US conducted large-scale combined naval drills from Sept. 26 to 29 in the East Sea operational area, called the Korea Theater of Operations.
The US Navy’s nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and its carrier strike group joined the exercises. The bilateral naval drills involving a US aircraft carrier were staged in South Korean waters for the first time since November 2017.
North Korea’s Uriminzokkiri, which mainly targets South Korean audiences, claimed Monday that the Yoon Suk-yeol government is “bringing the Korean Peninsula to a nuclear war crisis.”
Uriminzokkiri denounced the Yoon government for being “frantic about the reckless rehearsal for war against the DPRK while clinging tenaciously to the nuclear devil,” referring to the US. The DPRK is North Korea’s official name.
“The warmongers, who have frantically waged a reckless war rehearsal racket against the DPRK, are clamoring about the ‘power of the alliance,’ but in fact, it is only the pitiful bravado of those who are frightened by our military might.”
Meari, another North Korean mouthpiece, argued Monday that the Yoon government has been “going completely insane about confronting a nuclear weapon state while having the ‘crumbling empire’ at its back.” The media outlet called the Yoon government “moronic.”
“The problem is that the traitorous Yoon Suk-yeol group is … completely clueless about what strategic position the DPRK has reached, and what kind of disastrous consequences its reckless behavior -- which it has made relying on its master (the US) -- will bring,” the Meari said. “Only the curse of the nation and shameful destruction will befall the traitorous group.”
North Korea’s Uriminzokkiri on Sunday played down the South Korea-US alliance’s efforts to enhance the viability of the US’ extended deterrence through various channels, including the deployment of the US’ strategic assets on the peninsula.
Uriminzokkiri said North Korea “will never be surprised even though the (South Korean) puppets bring all the US’ nuclear weapons” to the peninsula.
“The puppet warmongers, who engage in nuclear war saber-rattling against us, who view ‘floating military bases’ as a mere lump of scrap metal, are such morons…” the media outlet said.
Tongil Sinbo, a North Korean weekly, said Saturday that the Yoon government’s initiative to enhance the viability of the US’ extended deterrence as “self-destructive braveness.”
“The traitorous group should clearly understand that the behavior of confronting fellow countrymen with absolute power by referring to extended deterrence is a foolish act (like) jumping into a fire with gunpowder,” the Tongil Sinbo said, urging the Yoon government not to act rashly.
North Korea’s dismissal conspicuously came after the country fired a flurry of ballistic missiles in unusually short intervals last week at a sensitive time when the US aircraft carrier engaged in bilateral and trilateral naval drills with South Korea and Japan on and near the Korean Peninsula.
A total of seven short-range ballistic missiles were fired toward the East Sea from Sep. 25 to Oct. 1 in four discrete launches. North Korea has launched 38 ballistic missiles so far this year.
The spate of missile launches in a week seems to be an apparent tit-for-tat action against the alliance’s move to reinforce their deterrence and defense posture against North Korea.
But North Korea’s recent military action was the first time it has fired ballistic missiles at a time when a US nuclear-powered aircraft was deployed on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea also unprecedentedly fired two ballistic missiles on Oct. 1, around four hours before South Korea was set to stage a large-scale military parade to mark the Oct.1 Armed Forces Day with the participation of President Yoon, Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup and top military commanders.
South Korea’s Unification Minister Kwon Young-se assessed that North Korea’s main intention behind the consecutive missile launches was to “tame the new South Korean government” in an interview with Yonhap News Agency on Sunday.
Kwon explained that North Korea seems to be seeking to concurrently “gain the upper hand in handling Korean Peninsula affairs and advance its weapons systems.” The minister added that another goal could be to “grab the US’ attention,” as North Korean issues have been relegated to a lower priority in Washington behind other domestic political issues.
By Ji Da-gyum (dagyumji@heraldcorp.com)
koreaherald.com · by Ji Da-gyum · October 3, 2022
5. How to Halt North Korean Cyber Aggression
Excerpts:
It may be argued that cyber deterrence is impossible because of the difficulties of attribution. As some scholars argue, North Korea’s advanced techniques to avoid detection may make early detection and attribution difficult for target states. However, there is evidence that the attribution issue can be mitigated. For instance, research has found that deterrence may be possible even with imperfect attribution if certain improvements, such as reducing false alarms or replacing misidentification with non-detection, can be made. Moreover, an anonymous member of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea noted that recent developments in attribution technologies have made attribution less challenging than before.
In sum, focusing on the denial strategy alone, as South Korea has done, is ineffective in halting North Korea’s cyber aggression, while U.S. cyber strategy lacks a clear and credible signaling mechanism for how it will act collectively with allies and partners in response to cyber operations. To address this gap, the alliance should develop a joint cyber deterrence strategy—including appropriate punishment measures—which clearly states the threshold of activities it seeks to deter and its proportional responses. At the same time, the two countries should continue to strengthen their cyber resilience in partnership with other global and regional partners.
How to Halt North Korean Cyber Aggression
The United States and South Korea should develop a joint cyber deterrence strategy that clearly states the threshold of activities it seeks to deter and the alliance’s proportional responses.
The National Interest · by Eunjung Irene Oh · October 2, 2022
Amid growing threats in cyberspace, the Republic of Korea (ROK) under President Yoon Suk-yeol is likely to deepen its cyber cooperation with the United States. Unlike his predecessor, who had been criticized for being soft on Pyongyang, Yoon has made it clear that his administration will take a stern stance against North Korea’s aggression, including in cyberspace. Yoon’s administration has identified cybersecurity as one of the most pressing threats and designated it as a key national task. To that end, Yoon has repeatedly pledged to bolster cooperation with Washington on cybersecurity, as demonstrated by a joint statement issued just a week after his inauguration in which the word “cyber” appeared ten times. In that statement, Washington and Seoul agreed to “expand cooperation to confront a range of cyber threats from the DPRK, including but not limited to, state-sponsored cyber-attacks.” The statement even included an entire paragraph on the specific focus areas of cyber policy: cyber deterrence, protection of critical infrastructure, and combating cybercrime and associated money laundering, to name a few. Most recently, both sides held their first cyber working-level group in Washington to discuss North Korea’s cyber threats and develop policy options to respond to those threats at the alliance level.
Despite these recent developments, South Korea and the United States have largely fallen short of making tangible progress in effectively deterring North Korea’s cyber threats. Cyber deterrence is the practice of preventing malicious cyber activities through the existence of a credible threat of counteraction. For successful deterrence, several conditions must be met: 1) A low level of aggressor motivation; 2) Clarity about who will be deterred and counteraction by deterring states; 3) A high level of confidence by an aggressor that defenders have the capability and will to carry out threats. However, the current ROK-U.S. cyber strategy fails to address any of these elements, leaving North Korea to continue its cyber operations by reinforcing its perceptions that cyber operations are a low-cost and high-return enterprise. Key factors that have affected the North Korean regime’s cost-benefit analysis for carrying out cyberattacks include North Korea’s faltering economy and the United States and South Korea’s lack of credible retaliation measures. As a result, the current cyber strategies of the United States and the ROK need to be aligned to include elements of punishment in tandem with improved defensive cyber capabilities.
Cyber Operations: Low-Cost, High-Return
North Korea is known to employ cyber operations to achieve various strategic goals, including the punishment of critics who run afoul of the regime, intelligence gathering, and revenue generation. In recent years, cyberattacks have increasingly focused on generating income, primarily to sustain the regime and its nuclear program, as its economy has continued to shrink due to both internal and external factors, such as chronic food shortage and United Nations-led sanctions. The outbreak of COVID-19 and the following border closure have exacerbated North Korea’s economic situation; last year, its economy contracted at a record rate of 4.5 percent. These economic conditions have incentivized the North Korean regime to continue its cyber operations for financial profit. In 2021 alone, North Korea was believed to have stolen almost $400 million in cryptocurrency, marking a 40 percent increase compared to a year before. Given the cratering economy, North Korea is likely to continue its cyber operations, including cryptocurrency thefts, bank heists, ransomware and extortion, and attacks on cryptocurrency exchanges.
North Korea’s motivation to commit cyberattacks is also extremely high because Pyongyang believes it is low-risk, largely because it has been able to get away without appropriate punishment in the past. Instead of holding the DPRK accountable for its actions, the ROK and the United States have responded with passive measures, often without a coherent response at the alliance level. For instance, out of a series of cyberattacks against American and South Korean government institutions, media, financial infrastructure, and defense contractors since at least 2009, the alliance has neither made joint statements denouncing the DPRK in the immediate aftermath nor responded jointly with retaliatory actions that could have possibly discouraged the regime from pursuing future attacks. Instead, the alliance reacted by publishing a joint statement with vague wording, such as that the alliance “will continue to consult with one another to counter those threats [cyber threats emanating from North Korea],” which carries little signaling value.
The alliance has also lacked coordination in its responses to North Korea’s cyber aggression, mainly because of the two countries’ different approaches to cyber deterrence. For instance, the ROK’s main cyber strategy has been a purely defensive one that focuses on improving defensive cyber capabilities. According to the “110 key national tasks” released by the Yoon administration, the government will “strengthen its cyber deterrence capability” by “advancing hacking detection, disruption and tracking systems through research and development.” Likewise, the 2019 National Cyber Security Strategy published under the Moon Jae-in administration states that the “cyber deterrence strategy” is aimed at “developing preventive capabilities to collect, manage, and remove vulnerabilities in its networks.” In line with these deterrence strategies under two different administrations, the ROK has invested heavily in strengthening early warning and detection capabilities, mandating regular mock cyber crisis exercises in the government, and separating the intranet from the internet network for facilities and companies critical to national security.
On the other hand, the United States has taken a different trajectory by introducing a strategic concept that requires more proactive and “persistent engagement.” The new “Defend Forward” cyber strategy aims to “disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source” by “defending against malicious cyberspace activities as far forward as possible” and “contesting adversary attempts to disrupt key government and military functions.” It is still unclear whether this strategy implies that the United States seeks to achieve deterrence in cyberspace, including by punishment. Past cases show that the United States may not be seeking deterrence by punishment, as indicated by a series of cyberattacks against North Korea in which the United States was suspected to be a perpetrator but never acknowledged its involvement. Whether or not the United States was behind these attacks with an aim to “deter” future threats from North Korea, Washington makes it clear that it seeks to achieve some level of deterrence against cyber threats. The 2020 Cyberspace Solarium Commission Final Report, for example, introduces the concept of “cyber layered deterrence,” which combines enhanced defense capabilities and a “clearer signaling strategy with collective action by [U.S.] partners and allies.” Despite the introduction of this concept, it is surprising that the ROK and the United States do not yet have any agreed-upon strategic framework that stipulates how the alliance will jointly respond to North Korea’s cyber operations, thereby clearly signaling to North Korea that its behavior in cyberspace will be met with a stern and consistent alliance response.
The Limitations of Denial
South Korea has mainly pursued deterrence by denial, that is, focusing on improving defensive cyber capabilities. Between 2019 and 2022, the South Korean government spent approximately $1 billion on cyber defense, especially on building data protection infrastructure. The reasoning for such a defensive strategy is that cyber aggressors will be less likely to conduct attacks if they believe that they have lower chances of success. Nevertheless, pursuing a defensive approach alone has had limited success in preventing the DPRK from conducting cyber operations; continued successful cyberattacks by state-backed North Korean hackers clearly demonstrate this limitation. This is because the denial strategy alone does little to address the actions and motivations of the attacker. In the current structure, even if the DPRK gets caught attempting to hack energy companies, for example, all it receives is public attribution by the South Korean government, with no retaliatory response. The DPRK has little, if any, incentive to halt cyber operations until the mission is successful, as it faces no retribution for its actions.
North Korea also has strong incentives to conduct cyber operations because it has much to gain from cyber operations against defenders with high internet connectivity and digitally reliant economies. It is extremely difficult for advanced, democratic states with high levels of internet penetration to develop, maintain, and strengthen cyber defense systems for all the vulnerable sectors that are capable of responding to continuously evolving offensive cyber threats. Plus, the government and publicly owned companies, which are often targets of cyberattacks, tend to lack the speed and agility necessary to respond to these attacks. Moreover, a high proportion of institutions in South Korea, including banks, media, hospitals, and defense contractors, are in the private domain and thus outside of government control, which makes oversight and seamless detection especially challenging. On the other hand, less than 1 percent of North Korea’s population has access to the internet, which means that it has far less of a need to invest in defense and can allocate most of its resources to developing offensive capabilities. Given this incentive structure, a simple denial strategy alone is unlikely to affect North Korea’s perceived costs and benefits of conducting cyber operations. To complement the strategy, South Korea needs a mechanism to credibly signal to North Korea that its aggression will be met with stern and consistent responses.
Realizing the limitations of past cyber strategies, the Yoon administration appears to be taking more proactive steps in strengthening South Korea’s cyber capabilities. Recently, cyber experts from South Korea participated for the first time in Cyber Flag 22, an annual U.S. Cyber Command exercise that offers realistic training against the activities of malicious cyber actors. Yoon also announced his plan to nurture “100,000 cyber warriors” that can “protect South Korea’s technology and cyber security amidst fierce cyber battles between major powers.” The announcement of the details of the plan signals a shift away from President Moon Jae-in’s approach toward developing a cyber force. While Moon had also stated that his government would “expand a cyber force,” at least on paper, his administration took no significant action toward meeting that goal, wary of growing its own cyber force for domestic political reasons. The Moon administration accused its Cyber Command of interfering in the presidential election by posting comments in favor of then-presidential candidate Park Geun-Hye. Moon even scrapped “cyber psychological warfare” conducted by the command to fight against the DPRK’s online misinformation campaigns. Unlike his predecessor, Yoon has neither a personal grudge against the Cyber Command nor an interest in politicizing the cyber unit. It is likely, therefore, that the Cyber Command will play a greater role in fighting North Korea’s cyber threats under Yoon, with more financial and human resources being devoted to the command.
However, given the publicly available information, the scope of operations that the ROK is willing to undertake to deter North Korea’s evolving cyber operations remains unclear. What is clearly lacking is an alignment between the South Korean and American cyber deterrence strategies, which is necessary to effectively address the motivations of the North Korean regime through collective action. The fragmented deterrence frameworks that the two countries currently have—one focusing on simple denial, and the other lacking a clear signaling mechanism for collective action—fall short in altering North Korea’s perceived costs of launching cyber operations. Rather than issuing vague diplomatic statements that do not credibly convey the alliance’s resolve to firmly respond to North Korea’s cyber aggression, the alliance should communicate its intent and commitment to counteracting Pyongyang’s aggression in cyberspace in order to prevent operations from being carried out in the first place.
A Joint Cyber Deterrence Strategy
Several key elements have to be agreed upon between the two allies in developing a joint cyber deterrence framework. First, what types of cyber operations and what level of activities does the alliance seek to deter? Answering this question is critical for developing appropriate response options and credibly communicating the “red line” to the adversary. As in conventional deterrence, defining a low-threshold cyberattack and devising a proportionate response measure can be particularly challenging.
The alliance can first try to deter the most dangerous types of cyberattacks. Such attacks include disruptions to critical infrastructure, including but not limited to joint U.S.-ROK military assets, power generation and distribution facilities, and nuclear plants. Of course, the alliance would need to agree on what constitutes “critical infrastructure.” With this basic agreement, the allies should consider revising the Mutual Defense Treaty or extended deterrence framework to explicitly include cyber threats as “armed attacks,” which would formally acknowledge that the alliance is prepared to act jointly to counter cyber threats.
Second, what would the proportional responses be if that “red line” is crossed? Would the alliance conduct a cyber response or use non-cyber retaliation? In the case of retaliatory responses against the DPRK, it could be argued that North Korea’s extremely limited internet access may limit the effectiveness of offensive cyber operations against the North. However, past cases show that an attack against North Korean servers could, at the very least, cause a significant nuisance to Kim Jong-un. For instance, an American hacker once took down North Korea’s entire internet connectivity. Even though the deterrence effect of offensive cyberattacks should be assessed further, the alliance’s offensive capability can still serve as a useful tool for cyber deterrence by increasing the DPRK’s level of confidence that the two countries can retaliate. In addition to cyber responses, the alliance should consider responding with cross-domain options. In this case, the challenge would be to clearly establish what threshold a cyberattack would need to reach in order to be met with a specific non-cyber response and to manage the risk of escalation after the counteraction. However, the risk of escalation can be mitigated by clearly communicating with the adversary the threshold and corresponding response in advance. With this strategic framework, the alliance could jointly issue a diplomatic statement demonstrating its intent to make good on its threats.
This is not to argue that a denial strategy is a complete failure and that the alliance should shift away from improving its defensive cyber capabilities. However, the current denial strategy alone does not alter the incentives of the North Korean regime to conduct cyber operations. Thus, the alliance should implement a joint cyber deterrence strategy involving punishment in tandem with the existing focus on cyber defense. In addition to planning a strategic cyber defense framework, South Korea and the United States must continue their effort to strengthen their technical capability to defend against cyberattacks through exercises, training, workshops, and information sharing.
It may be argued that cyber deterrence is impossible because of the difficulties of attribution. As some scholars argue, North Korea’s advanced techniques to avoid detection may make early detection and attribution difficult for target states. However, there is evidence that the attribution issue can be mitigated. For instance, research has found that deterrence may be possible even with imperfect attribution if certain improvements, such as reducing false alarms or replacing misidentification with non-detection, can be made. Moreover, an anonymous member of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea noted that recent developments in attribution technologies have made attribution less challenging than before.
In sum, focusing on the denial strategy alone, as South Korea has done, is ineffective in halting North Korea’s cyber aggression, while U.S. cyber strategy lacks a clear and credible signaling mechanism for how it will act collectively with allies and partners in response to cyber operations. To address this gap, the alliance should develop a joint cyber deterrence strategy—including appropriate punishment measures—which clearly states the threshold of activities it seeks to deter and its proportional responses. At the same time, the two countries should continue to strengthen their cyber resilience in partnership with other global and regional partners.
Eunjung Irene Oh is a participant in the North Korea Cyber Working Group (NKCWG), an initiative of the Korea Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. The author would like to thank members of NKCWG for their feedback and insight.
Image: Reuters.
The National Interest · by Eunjung Irene Oh · October 2, 2022
6. Supporting Human Rights in North Korea
Now we just need to have the Biden administration appoint a US ambassador for north Korean human rights.
My recommendation for Greg Scarlatoiu stands. Read his bio below. There is no one more qualified than Greg.
https://www.hrnk.org/about/staff-interns.php
Supporting Human Rights in North Korea - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Supporting Human Rights in North Korea
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Supporting Human Rights in North Korea
Press Statement
September 30, 2022
As we reflect on North Korea Freedom Week, we recognize the courage of the North Korean defector and human rights community, which continues to speak on behalf of the millions of North Koreans suffering deplorable abuses and who are unable to advocate for themselves. Despite the regime’s announcement that it has overcome COVID-19, its borders remain sealed, and the humanitarian situation remains dire. More than 100,000 individuals, including children, remain detained in the country’s vast network of prison camps, while the regime diverts resources from the people and systematically uses forced labor to generate revenue in support of its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.
For those who have escaped, many remain vulnerable to abuse and are subjected to transnational repression. We remain deeply concerned about the plight of North Korean asylum seekers. North Koreans who are forcibly repatriated are reportedly commonly subjected to summary execution, torture, arbitrary detention, forced abortion, and other forms of gender-based violence.
The international community must act to hold accountable those responsible for these human rights abuses. The United States remains committed to shining a spotlight on the egregious human rights situation in the DPRK and working with allies and partners to promote accountability and increase the free flow of information into, out of, and within the DPRK.
state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
Greg Scarlatoiu
Executive Director
Read Bio
Greg Scarlatoiu is the Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) in Washington, D.C. He has coordinated 28 HRNK publications addressing North Korea’s human rights situation and the operation of its regime. He is a visiting professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul as well as instructor and coordinator of the Korean Peninsula and Japan class at the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Scarlatoiu is vice president of the executive board of the International Council on Korean Studies (ICKS). He is also a member of the advisory board for The Korea and World Politics Institute. Prior to HRNK, Scarlatoiu was with the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in Washington, D.C. He has over six years of experience in international development, on projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. For fifteen years, Scarlatoiu has authored and broadcast the weekly Korean language ‘Scarlatoiu Column’ to North Korea for Radio Free Asia. A seasoned lecturer on Korean issues, Scarlatoiu is a frequent commentator for CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera, Voice of America, Radio Free Asia and other media organizations. He has published op-eds and letters to the editor in newspapers including The Washington Post, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal. He has published academic papers in volumes produced by organizations including The Hanns Seidel Foundation, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and the International Journal of Korean Studies. He has appeared as an expert witness at several Congressional hearings on North Korean human rights. Scarlatoiu holds a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy from the Fletcher School, Tufts University, and a Master of Arts and Bachelor of Arts from Seoul National University’s Department of International Relations. He graduated from the MIT XXI Seminar for U.S. national security leaders in 2016-2017. Scarlatoiu was awarded the title ‘Citizen of Honor, City of Seoul,’ in January 1999. He is fluent in Korean, French, and Romanian. A native of Romania born and raised under that country’s communist regime, Scarlatoiu is a naturalized U.S. citizen.
7. Victims seek justice for North Korea's false promise of 'paradise on Earth'
Victims seek justice for North Korea's false promise of 'paradise on Earth'
The Korea Times · October 3, 2022
People wave North Korean flags before boarding ships bound for North Korea at Niigata port in Japan, in this file photo taken in December 1959. More than 93,000 people, mostly ethnic Koreans living in Japan, headed to the North under its resettlement program between 1959 and 1984. Courtesy of Kim Deog-young
Japanese court acknowledges propaganda by Kim regime as criminal offense
By Jung Min-ho
Eiko Kawasaki was just 17 when she made the most critical decision of her life.
She joined North Korea's resettlement program that promised a "paradise on Earth" in the country where she felt she truly belonged.
As an ethnic Korean living in Japan, Kawasaki believed the message promoted by "Chongryon," a pro-Pyongyang organization based in Tokyo, and boarded a ship bound for the self-proclaimed "socialist utopia" ― where she was told there was no discrimination against people like her and everything from education to food would be free.
The day she arrived at Chongjin, a North Korean port city, she realized everything she was told was a lie. But it was too late. Her decision was irreversible. The regime did not let the settlers leave what she found out quickly was the exact opposite of paradise. There, Kawasaki survived 43 years, before escaping back to Japan in 2003.
"In just two months, I started to contemplate suicide," Kawasaki, now 80, said during a press conference at the National Assembly in Seoul, Thursday. "Some people who went there with me already killed themselves, only to be treated as if they were not humans. Trucks came to move the bodies and no one knew where they were heading."
She was among 93,000 people, mostly ethnic Koreans, who left Japan between 1959 and 1984 under the resettlement program. As a result of the Treaty of San Francisco in 1951, they lost their Japanese citizenship.
People on ships bound for North Korea wave at a crowd at Niigata port in Japan, in this Dec. 14, 1959, file photo. Courtesy of Kojima Hidenori When they arrived in North Korea, their illusion, formed by propaganda material that was filled with deceptively alluring images and blatant lies, was shattered by the stark reality of life there. North Koreans were starving and did not have basic freedoms, which the new arrivals had taken for granted in Japan. Moreover, they were labeled as "jjokbari" (a racial slur referring to Japanese people), who constitute the lowest class in what she described as a living hell.
"Those who came from Japan were not allowed to work at the government or its agencies … People looked at us with a cynical eye. Some were falsely accused of being spies and treated as such, meaning that they were beaten, sent to political camps or even killed without clearly knowing why," Kawasaki said. "After the death of founder Kim Il-sung in 1994, I thought all this pain would be finally over soon, only to be disappointed with the continuation of the oppressive rule and the terrible famine afterward. I thought death would be better than life there. So I decided to escape."
She is one of only a lucky few who managed to make it to Japan or South Korea. Yet most of them, if not all, still suffer from traumatic memories of the North and miss their families they they had to leave behind.
In recent years, Kawasaki and several other victims have been demanding justice at courts in Japan and the International Court of Justice for the lies that led them to make the wrong decision, trying to hold accountable the institutions allegedly involved in creating those lies and implementing the scheme.
In March, the Tokyo District Court rejected their case seeking compensation from the North Korean government and their relatives' right to return to Japan. But Kawasaki said the ruling was meaningful because it acknowledged, for the first time, that the false promise, of living in a "paradise on Earth," was a criminal offense. This was, she added, only the beginning of their fight for justice and they will continue to build their cases on it.
Eiko Kawasaki, second from left, speaks about her experience in North Korea during a press conference at the National Assembly in Seoul, Thursday. Korea Times photo by Jung Min-ho '
Seoul, Tokyo should be united against human rights violations'
When the Korean Peninsula was divided after World War II and the Korean War (1950-53), hundreds of thousands of Korean residents in Japan ― many of whom were forcibly brought there as laborers during Japan's colonial rule over Korea (1910-45) ― found themselves confused about their national identity. They were no longer Japanese nationals (although they received permanent residency statuses) and their birth country was divided into two.
After its defeat at the end of World War II, Japan found itself with about 600,000 foreigners inside its borders. Ethnic Koreans suffered from discrimination and a lack of financial opportunities. So when the North Korean government said it would welcome them, hoping to fill a shortage of workers, the Japanese government embraced the idea quickly, according to Kim Deog-young, a filmmaker working on the forthcoming documentary, "A Strange Paradise," and one of the speakers at the press conference.
"The ethnic Koreans were seen as troublemakers in Japan and could not get decent jobs at state organizations. Some reports say the unemployment rate among them was eight times higher than that of Japanese citizens at the time … For the Japanese government, they were a big political problem," Kim told The Korea Times.
Many were searching for an escape and North Korea provided it ― with the support from the Japanese government and the Red Cross, which painted the program as a humanitarian one. This is why Japanese politicians pay little attention to the issue even though more than 8,000 Japanese citizens were among the victims, he added.
The victims of North Korea's deceitful resettlement program hold a rally near the Tokyo District Court in central Tokyo, in this March 23 file photo. Courtesy of Lee So-ra Thus, for many victims and their families, it is difficult to understand the Japanese politicians who bring up the issue of the 17 Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea whenever they have a chance, but say nothing about their citizens victimized by North Korea's resettlement program.
The victims lament that their unique identity as ethnic Koreans living in Japan makes it hard to motivate any politicians to take action. The North's regime takes no blame and still claims to be a "paradise on Earth." The South Korean government, which protested the program, believes it is an issue between Pyongyang and Tokyo, while the Japanese government believes it is a matter involving Koreans.
"I think it is, above all, an issue of human rights, which is supposed to unite South Korea and Japan against serious rights violations committed by North Korea," Kim said. "I hope the two countries (South Korea and Japan) will cooperate to resolve it and repair frayed relations in doing so."
The Korea Times · October 3, 2022
8. [ANALYSIS] Yoon's poor support rate burdens his foreign policy agenda
Excerpts:
Speaking at the country's 74th Armed Forces Day ceremony on Saturday, Yoon promised that the militaries of South Korea and the United States would "strongly respond" to the North's military provocations and threats. Yoon's "audacious initiative" aimed at North Korea's denuclearization in exchange for economic rewards has yet to gain much public support. North Korea launched missiles after U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris' visit last Thursday to the DMZ, the line officially separating the two Koreas.
"Yoon's solid domestic standing matters a lot in terms of executing his foreign policy agenda. Given South Korea's greater exposure in batteries and semiconductors, Seoul's longtime allies want the Yoon administration to take a more expanded role, internationally. If Yoon's support rate plunges more, then his high-profile foreign policies will go no further," a PPP lawmaker said on condition of anonymity.
"Yoon has to rebrand himself as the chief risk management officer by relying less on the views of likeminded elites, those of whom share his background. It doesn't matter how much political experience Yoon has because what matters the most is that his administration is becoming ineffective."
[ANALYSIS] Yoon's poor support rate burdens his foreign policy agenda
The Korea Times · October 3, 2022
Yoon needs to play role of chief risk management officer
By Kim Yoo-chul
A presidential job approval rating is considered to be the benchmark in measuring the job execution ability of a country's leader. A low approval rating can undermine how much an incumbent president can achieve during his or her time in office.
Within that context, the difference between maintaining a solid job approval rating and a weak one could be the difference in getting things done.
Since his inauguration in May, President Yoon Suk-yeol's job approval rating has plunged to a new low of 24 percent amid concerns about the economy as well as controversy over his remarks on a hot mic in New York, according to a weekly survey released last week by Gallup Korea. Yoon's predecessor, Moon Jae-in, had a 45-percent support rate when he left Cheong Wa Dae in May.
Despite coming into the presidential office with a bold vision to combat domestic challenges, rising wealth inequality and a political gridlock, Yoon's agenda has faced continuous backlash and obstruction from the country's main opposition party and from even some members of his own ruling party.
Yoon's low support rate is due mostly to domestic setbacks, as his approval ratings are in sync with the public's dissatisfaction over his administration's economic policies amid rising energy prices, high inflation and nomination of ex-prosecutors to important positions in the administration. Yoon himself was Korea's prosecutor general until he decided to run for president after disagreeing with the Moon Jae-in administration's attempts to reform the prosecution.
But experts and lawmakers in the country's ruling People Power Party (PPP) view that Yoon's low support rate will have a knock-on effect throughout his administration's foreign policy agenda.
A poor support rate will hinder Yoon's earlier commitment to take a hawkish stance toward North Korea and adopt a tough line with China, as he vowed to get closer to the United States and improve relations with Japan.
"President Yoon himself has become the key underlying factor that led to a new low of a 24-percent job approval rating. When assessing the president's support rate, all things matter. Supporters of Yoon and the PPP had hoped things would get better, but what's happening due to the accumulated storylines, things that the public hear and are told, is reaching a very alarming level," said Bae Jong-chan, chief of Insight K, a local consultancy.
The core challenge for an unpopular president is that he will no longer have substantial political support to win backing for his leadership on various key issues that may encounter domestic resistance. Experts say that if Yoon's support rate plunges even more, then his foreign policy initiatives being sought will face opposition.
Protesters stage a rally to oppose a visit by U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris in front of the presidential office in Seoul, Sept. 29. The banners read, "We denounce President Yoon Suk-yeol's government participating in the South Korea-U.S.-Japan military alliance!" AP-Yonhap
The country's main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), used its majority in the National Assembly to pass a motion calling for Yoon to dismiss Foreign Minister Park Jin, to hold him accountable for Yoon's recent problems overseas.
Yoon didn't accept the non-binding motion. His gaffes abroad were partly related to protocol issues encompassing scheduling difficulties, which led him to forgo paying his respects to Queen Elizabeth II as she lie in state on her funeral day. The presidential office said that Yoon's comments caught on camera included parts that "cannot be specified." Yoon said that he never said the words, President Biden, and doesn't remember cursing, despite the video footage.
Seoul's key diplomatic challenges include handling Beijing's discontent about South Korea's joining of a U.S.-led initiative for semiconductor supply chain resilience, known as the Chip 4, as China is South Korea's largest trading partner. Tokyo is unwilling to accept repeated conciliatory gestures from Seoul to improve bilateral relations. In the meantime, North Korea is set to conduct another nuclear test sometime between Oct. 6 and the U.S. mid-term elections on Nov. 7, according to Seoul's intelligence officials.
Need to improve public's perception
Because there are a lot of factors to analyze when assessing a president's approval rating, Yoon's current poor rate of support doesn't necessarily mean political paralysis is inevitable.
But the presidential office and top presidential aides are increasingly being asked to apply measures to improve the perception of Yoon, according to PPP officials and aides to former President Moon.
"A presidential approval rating doesn't mean that the public agrees or disagrees with all things. More likely, the approval rating is about general perceptions. More South Korean citizens want Yoon to play the role of the top risk management officer at a time of high uncertainty on multiple fronts. Yoon is the president of South Korea, not a professional prosecutor," an aide to former President Moon said by telephone.
A low job approval rating doesn't always act as a constraint on the implementation of a president's foreign policy agenda. But Seoul's restoration of bilateral relations with Tokyo and improvement of relations with Pyongyang are issues with a high degree of domestic political polarization, said government officials and experts.
For example, a survey conducted by local pollster Media Tomato of 1,009 respondents on Sept. 26 and 28 showed that more than 55 percent disapproved of Yoon's informal one-on-one talks with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly, while 37 percent supported it.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin speaks during a press conference in Seoul in this file photo. South Korea's opposition-controlled National Assembly passed a motion, Sept. 29, calling for President Yoon Suk-yeol to dismiss the foreign minister over a series of alleged diplomatic missteps, including Yoon's controversial remarks caught on a hot mic while in New York. AP-Yonhap
Relations between Japan and South Korea are at their lowest in decades, after Seoul's top court ordered Japanese companies to compensate surviving South Korean victims of wartime forced labor, which the Japanese government rejected. Tokyo has yet to respond to South Korea's request for the restoration of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA,) a military information-sharing pact, and for the withdrawal of its export controls on chemicals used by South Korean semiconductor manufacturers.
"If Yoon and his foreign policy team want to see improvement in Seoul's ties with Tokyo, then Yoon needs solid public support. One reason behind Japan's passiveness regarding Seoul's requests is because of its worries over Yoon's low approval rating," said a former senior diplomat.
Regarding the North Korean nuclear issues, no signs of improvement with Pyongyang have been seen since he took power. In fact, Yoon said North Korea would face a "determined and overwhelming response" from South Korea and the United States if Pyongyang attempts to use nuclear weapons.
Speaking at the country's 74th Armed Forces Day ceremony on Saturday, Yoon promised that the militaries of South Korea and the United States would "strongly respond" to the North's military provocations and threats. Yoon's "audacious initiative" aimed at North Korea's denuclearization in exchange for economic rewards has yet to gain much public support. North Korea launched missiles after U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris' visit last Thursday to the DMZ, the line officially separating the two Koreas.
"Yoon's solid domestic standing matters a lot in terms of executing his foreign policy agenda. Given South Korea's greater exposure in batteries and semiconductors, Seoul's longtime allies want the Yoon administration to take a more expanded role, internationally. If Yoon's support rate plunges more, then his high-profile foreign policies will go no further," a PPP lawmaker said on condition of anonymity.
"Yoon has to rebrand himself as the chief risk management officer by relying less on the views of likeminded elites, those of whom share his background. It doesn't matter how much political experience Yoon has because what matters the most is that his administration is becoming ineffective."
The Korea Times · October 3, 2022
9. Russians in Korea fear long arm of Putin's mobilization
Monday
October 3, 2022
dictionary + A - A
Russians in Korea fear long arm of Putin's mobilization
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/10/03/national/socialAffairs/Korea-Russia-visa/20221003180449698.html
Protesters demand an end to Russian's invasion of Ukraine and denounce Russian President Vladimir Putin's mobilization order at a demonstration in Jung District, central Seoul, on Sept. 21. [NEWS1]
Fears of being called up for war are spreading among Russians residing in Korea as the ripples of fear generated by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s mobilization order reach distant shores.
Vitaly, a 34-year-old Russian who declined to give his surname to avoid any problems for his family at home, is currently living in Guro District, southwestern Seoul, on a 60-day visa. He's been aiming for a while to get a longer term visa, but that has become a matter of urgency.
Vitaly says he is unable to sleep properly due to anxiety about being called up to fight in Ukraine.
“Two friends from my hometown have already been taken to the battlefield,” he said, holding up two fingers.
A 29-year-old Russian graduate student in Seoul who withheld his name completely told the JoongAng Ilbo that worries about being drafted is affecting his studies.
“All of the research and experiences I accumulated while struggling these past few years studying at a Korean university could go down the drain at any moment,” he says. “It’s just frustrating that we Russians in Korea have no say about any of this."
The Russian government has announced that citizens doing their studies will be exempted from the mobilization order, but that's not giving much relief. The graduate student in Seoul say there is a growing worry that young male students are being drafted back at home.
While Russians in Korea might appear to be beyond the reach of Moscow’s mobilization order — draft summons must be physically seen and signed by reservists to be effective — those whose stays in Korea are expiring have few legal options but to return to Russia, where they fear being called up.
According to Seoul’s justice ministry, Russians accounted for the largest segment of Europeans living in Korea last year, with a total of 21,326 Russians residing in Korea on both long- and short-term stays.
Over eighteen thousand were men, with 5,317 being between 20 and 30 years of age — the main demographic being conscripted back home.
A lot of Russians in Korea work in construction and other heavy industries. Recently, they've stopped applying for jobs — presumably to lay low.
“Only two weeks ago, we could usually find a Russian man to work for us for an hourly wage of 10,000 won ($6.93), but we’ve noticed that the number of Russian applicants dried up late last week, and we can’t hire a Russian for less than 15,000 won,” said a recruiter surnamed Lim who runs a labor agency in Ansan, Gyeonggi.
Concerns are also growing that Russian male students might overstay their visas and hide in Korea to avoid deportation to their homeland.
“We saw it during the early stages of the Covid-19 crisis, when Chinese students who didn't want to return to China would disappear suddenly, leaving their universities in an awkward position,” said a university administrator in Seoul.
“We cannot rule out the possibility that Russian students might also disappear to avoid being dragged to war.”
The local entertainment industry, which targets the global market by training K-pop idols from outside Korea, has also been forced to put its Russian-oriented recruitment on hold in light of Putin’s mobilization order,
“We were planning a K-pop idol group that includes Russian members for our Russian audience, but eventually decided to scrap the plan,” said one entertainment group official. “Each large Korean entertainment agency has trainees from Russia or former Soviet countries, but none of us can risk fostering Russian talent in the middle of a mobilization order."
Calls for humanitarian support for Korea’s Russian residents propose visa extensions — but not all are in favor.
Unlike Ukraine and Myanmar — both nations whose residents in Korea have been granted temporary visas allowing extensions to their employment and academic studies due to war and strife at home — Russia is widely seen as an aggressor. Many European Union member states not only closed their borders to Russians, but have indicated in recent days they will not grant visas to people fleeing Russia to avoid conscription.
Domestic human rights groups have urged the Korean government to take measures more actively supportive of Russian military service dissenters.
Under the Fourth Geneva Convention — signed by 196 countries including Korea — people from a warring country who do not wish to participate in armed conflict are entitled to protection without facing discrimination based on their nationality.
BY KIM NA-YOON, MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]
10. Lifting the veil on N. Korea’s “Daeyang network”
Something to ponder.
Excerpts:
However, ordinary people reportedly make little use of the Daeyang network because many places still provide little or no access to it.
“It’s not easy to access the network in many of Pyongyang’s districts,” the source said. “The only place in the city it is easy to access is around Jung District, where the base station of the Daeyang technical operations department of the Pyongyang Information Technology Bureau is located.”
However, the source said the authorities plan to expand service, with more base stations being constructed primarily in large cities so people living in or around Pyongyang can use the network.
However, given that intranet infrastructure is already in place for North Korea’s existing state network, it remains unclear why there would be a need for additional equipment to support the Daeyang network.
Lifting the veil on N. Korea’s “Daeyang network”
Ordinary people make little use of Taeyang because many places still have no access to the network
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: North Korea's Arirang 151 smartphone. (Daily NK)
Daily NK has recently learned of the existence of a private network in North Korea called the “Daeyang network.”
The Daeyang network is an “internal modem system that enables specific agencies or registered units and individuals to access [the network] and download or read material,” a source in North Korea told Daily NK on Tuesday.
“It’s a separate system from Mirae, which is an indoor and outdoor wireless internet service network,” he said.
According to the source, the information technology department of the State Affairs Commission handled Daeyang’s development, while the Daeyang technical operations department of the Pyongyang Information Technology Bureau of the Ministry of Information Industry runs its day-to-day operations.
The Mirae wireless network, for its part, grants access to users using a specific subscription application. Daeyang, too, appears to grant access through special subscription procedures and verification methods.
The source told Daily NK that to access the Daeyang network, one needs to buy and register a SIM card before verifying their ID. Every time somebody enters the network, they need to enter the password they created to verify their identity.
“It differs from the existing state intranet in that it has restricted boundaries and range, allowing users to access specific data from specific regions,” he said.
This means users can access Daeyang only by going through several verification procedures, including the inputting of personal information and registering of SIM cards. This suggests that the North Korean authorities are very carefully verifying the identities of its users.
The source said institutional access is granted to verified workplaces that have been given permission. Individuals in positions of responsibility can also access the network.
“Some people are even granted one-time verification to the network,” he said.
He also explained that users can access various forms of high capacity data on the Daeyang network.
The network has registered pages with academic papers, essays, lecture materials and photos from research labs and centers attached to universities in Pyongyang, sites to access the Rodong Sinmun and movies (through a service called “Life’s Friend”), and pages with foreign comic books and recently-released films.
“The network enables the storage and browsing of a sea of materials,” the source said, adding that groups and organizations usually download materials, while individuals use the “Life’s Friend” page to purchase films.
However, ordinary people reportedly make little use of the Daeyang network because many places still provide little or no access to it.
“It’s not easy to access the network in many of Pyongyang’s districts,” the source said. “The only place in the city it is easy to access is around Jung District, where the base station of the Daeyang technical operations department of the Pyongyang Information Technology Bureau is located.”
However, the source said the authorities plan to expand service, with more base stations being constructed primarily in large cities so people living in or around Pyongyang can use the network.
However, given that intranet infrastructure is already in place for North Korea’s existing state network, it remains unclear why there would be a need for additional equipment to support the Daeyang network.
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
11. N. Korea instructs law enforcement agencies to crackdown on unemployed, workplace deserters
Excerpts:
“Rumors are going around that those busted by the mop-up teams are being exiled with their families to mines and farming villages suffering labor shortages,” he said.
“For a while, the government was screaming about mop-up campaigns and wars of annihilation against users of Chinese-made mobile phones, but now, they’ve basically declared war against the jobless and workplace deserters,” he continued, adding, “Cracking down on people who are roaming around to put food on the table is just an excuse to exert control over the people.”
N. Korea instructs law enforcement agencies to crackdown on unemployed, workplace deserters
"Mop-up teams" have been active everywhere in North Hamgyong Province since Sept. 20, a source told Daily NK
dailynk.com
FILE PHOTO: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province. (Daily NK)
North Korea recently instructed its law enforcement agencies formulate measures by mid-December to deal with the unemployed and individuals who abscond from their workplaces.
Following the recent Seventh National Conference of Judicial Officers, the authorities appear intent on further bolstering state control using law enforcement agencies.
According to a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province on Wednesday, the authorities on Sept. 17 ordered branches of the police, prosecution and other agencies throughout the country to wage an “intensive struggle” against the unemployed and workplace deserters until mid-December.
North Korean authorities claimed in the order that the jobless and workplace deserters have been “sowing chaos in social order, roaming the country engaging in theft and burglary.”
They ordered law enforcement agencies to “thoroughly root out anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior such as violent crime by organizing mop-up teams to wipe out the jobless and workplace deserters.”
According to the source, “In the past, the Workers’ Party ordered that the jobless and workplace deserters receive ideological education and that the authorities ensure their living conditions in a responsible way. But now, it says it will punish them as criminals.”
In particular, the source said the authorities — believing jobless individuals and workplace deserters of uncertain abode are at the heart of burglaries, murders and other criminal cases — issued the directive to resolve problems related to public order.
In response to the recent order, police and prosecutors in cities and counties throughout North Hamgyong Province, including Chongjin, formed “mop-up” teams from Sept. 20 to crackdown on the jobless and workplace deserters. These teams differ jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction on account of local conditions; generally speaking, however, they include one prosecutor, two police officers and a four-man enforcement squad composed of discharged soldiers.
The mop-up teams are targeting individuals who have not gone to work or who have been out of contact with their workplaces for three months or more. They are also targeting young people and laborers who have abandoned their assigned organization, such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea or Socialist Patriotic Youth League.
In particular, the authorities called on law enforcement agencies to look into workplace deserters who pay money to shirk their workplace or organizational responsibilities.
The Workers’ Party appears to believe that individuals who pay to get out of work or organizational responsibilities have bigger ideological problems than those who just left their workplace or organization due to financial problems.
However, officials tasked with cracking down on those who pay to shirk their workplace or organizational duties are reportedly accepting bribes to protect them or look the other way.
Indeed, collusion continues between enforcement officials and the jobless and workplace deserters because many government officials are in a tenuous financial situation due to the continued border closure.
Based on the source’s account, mop-up teams have been active everywhere in North Hamgyong Province since Sept. 20.
“Rumors are going around that those busted by the mop-up teams are being exiled with their families to mines and farming villages suffering labor shortages,” he said.
“For a while, the government was screaming about mop-up campaigns and wars of annihilation against users of Chinese-made mobile phones, but now, they’ve basically declared war against the jobless and workplace deserters,” he continued, adding, “Cracking down on people who are roaming around to put food on the table is just an excuse to exert control over the people.”
Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.
Read in Korean
dailynk.com
12. Women Cross DMZ Statement on Kamala Harris’ Visit to the DMZ
Women Across DMZ is at best a shill for north Korea. Or it is acting as a foreign agent supporting north Korean actions. Or perhaps there is worse still.
A little revisionist history here.
Excerpts:
We urge the Biden administration to prioritize diplomacy and take immediate steps to reduce tensions and build trust. That includes stopping joint military exercises, which do not deter North Korea but instead incite them to take provocative actions. Following the Singapore Declaration, when the leaders of the United States and North Korea pledged “to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity” and “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” the United States canceled a joint military exercise with South Korea, which North Korea responded to by blowing up a nuclear testing site and self-imposing a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. Pyongyang also released three detained Americans and repatriated the remains of U.S. service members from the Korean War.
Women Cross DMZ Statement on Kamala Harris’ Visit to the DMZ
womencrossdmz.org · September 29, 2022
September 29, 2022
Posted in: Press Releases
As a women-led organization that advocates for peace on the Korean Peninsula, we are greatly disappointed in Vice President Kamala Harris’ recent visit to the DMZ. While Harris stated, “Our shared goal, the United States and the Republic of Korea, is a complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” the Biden administration continues to take actions and make statements that heighten military tensions and the risk of war.
Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that halted but did not permanently end the Korean War. American and North Korean military commanders who signed that agreement recommended that both sides negotiate a permanent settlement to the war within six months, but 70 years later, such a settlement remains elusive. The tragic consequences of this forever war are the ongoing separation of families, the extreme militarization of the Korean Peninsula, and tens of millions of people living under the constant threat of renewed war. The unresolved Korean War remains the root cause of the security crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
Furthermore, the U.S. strategy of sanctions, isolation, and military buildup has failed to resolve this crisis or achieve goals such as denuclearization or improved human rights. In fact, sanctions harm ordinary people in North Korea, with particular impacts on women.
It is time for a bold new approach — specifically, a peace-first approach that puts ending the Korean War at the beginning, and not the end, of the process. Ending the Korean War by replacing the armistice with a peace agreement would go a long way toward reducing tensions and averting another potentially devastating conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
We urge the Biden administration to prioritize diplomacy and take immediate steps to reduce tensions and build trust. That includes stopping joint military exercises, which do not deter North Korea but instead incite them to take provocative actions. Following the Singapore Declaration, when the leaders of the United States and North Korea pledged “to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity” and “to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula,” the United States canceled a joint military exercise with South Korea, which North Korea responded to by blowing up a nuclear testing site and self-imposing a moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests. Pyongyang also released three detained Americans and repatriated the remains of U.S. service members from the Korean War.
Since negotiations between the United States and North Korea have stalled, and the United States and South Korea have resumed joint military exercises, North Korea has ended its self-imposed moratorium on long-range missile and nuclear tests and affirmed its right to possess nuclear weapons.
The people of the United States and Korea do not want another war. As women peace activists, we urge you to take the best — and perhaps only sustainable — path forward by ending the Korean War and replacing the armistice with a peace agreement.
womencrossdmz.org · September 29, 2022
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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