Quotes of the Day:

"The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land, you may almost hear the beating of his wings."

- John Bright, appealing for an armistice during the Crimean War in a House of Commons speech (Feb. 23, 1855)

 "We must either learn to live together as brothers or we are all going to perish together as fools." 

- Martin Luther King, Jr.

"The great enemy of clear language is insincerity. When there is a gap between one’s real and one’s declared aims, one turns as it were instinctively to long words and exhausted idioms, like a cuttlefish squirting out ink."

- George Orwell, “Politics and the English Language” in Horizon magazine (April, 1946); reprinted in Shooting an Elephant (1950)

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 2 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (02.10.22) CDS comments on key events

3. Japan as the third global military power

4. U.S. defense secretary sees no imminent invasion of Taiwan by China

5. Biden’s Chance to Restore American Dignity in Iran

6. FDD | U.S., Israeli Navies Conduct Exercise as Iran Steps up Maritime Aggression

7. Defining and Achieving Success in Ukraine

8. Philippines and U.S. kick off naval exercises amid China tension

9. Japan’s Africa aid rivals China in terms of ‘quality over quantity’: analysts

10. Military Leaders Warn China Could Weaponize Ports in Latin America

11. Ukraine Needs Expeditionary Economics, Not USAID

12. Petraeus: US would destroy Russia’s troops if Putin uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine

13. Chinese espionage, cyber programs pose major counterintelligence threat, Senate report warns

14. The empty modern promise of sovereign capability

15. EXCLUSIVE: China 'would not' invade Taiwan if Beijing believes it owns the island, Asian trade official says

16. N. Korea instructs law enforcement agencies to crackdown on unemployed, workplace deserters

17. A U.S. ‘Ships Act’ Would Break China’s Control of the Seas

18. China’s demographic crisis looms over Xi Jinping’s third term

19. US-Philippines drawing closer on defense of Taiwan

20. Air Force Academy’s ‘mom/dad’ controversy draws renewed attention to a modern, military-wide debate

21. White House pressuring Israel to cut research ties with China over dual-use concerns

22. Statement on the fatal flaws found in a defunct CIA covert communications system

23. Xi Jinping’s Quest for Order

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 2 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-october-2

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on October 2:

• Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements east and northeast of Lyman and have liberated Torske in Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces withdrew from their positions northeast of Lyman, likely to positions around Kreminna [FK4] and along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[24]
• Ukrainian forces continued to advance on settlements east of Kupyansk and have liberated Kisharivka in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]
• Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut, Vyimka, and Avdiivka.[26]
• Ukrainian forces resumed counteroffensives in northern Kherson Oblast and have secured positions in Zolota Balka and Khreshchenivka. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also liberated Shevchekivka and Lyubymivka, pushing Russian forces to new defensive positions around Mykailivka.[27]
• Russian forces continued to target Kryvyi Rih and Mykolaiv Oblast with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.[28]
• Russian State Duma MPs withdrew a law that would have given mobilized men a one-time payment of 300,000 rubles (about $4,980) and other benefits, without providing a reason for their decision.[29] Ukrainian military officials stated that Russian forces are forming a motorized rifle division with mobilized men from Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and the Republic of Adygea.[30]
• Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a draft law to the State Duma on admitting the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, to the Russian Federation.[31]

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 2

Oct 2, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Special Edition on Russian Information Space Following the Defeat in Lyman

Kateryna Stepanenko and Frederick W. Kagan

October 2, 10:15 pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

This campaign assessment special edition focuses on dramatic changes in the Russian information space following the Russian defeat around Lyman and in Kharkiv Oblast and amid the failures of Russia’s partial mobilization. Ukrainian forces made continued gains around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, and have broken through Russian defensive positions in northeastern Kherson Oblast. Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow when more confirmation is available.

The Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, combined with the Kremlin’s failure to conduct partial mobilization effectively and fairly are fundamentally changing the Russian information space. Kremlin-sponsored media and Russian milbloggers – a prominent Telegram community composed of Russian war correspondents, former proxy officials, and nationalists – are grieving the loss of Lyman while simultaneously criticizing the bureaucratic failures of the partial mobilization.[1] Kremlin sources and milbloggers are attributing the defeat around Lyman and Kharkiv Oblast to Russian military failures to properly supply and reinforce Russian forces in northern Donbas and complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the progress of war.[2]

Some guests on heavily-edited Kremlin television shows that aired on October 1 even criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian oblasts before securing their administrative borders or even the frontline, expressing doubts about Russia’s ability ever to occupy the entirety of these territories.[3] Kremlin propagandists no longer conceal their disappointment in the conduct of the partial mobilization, frequently discussing the illegal mobilization of some men and noting issues such as alcoholism among newly mobilized forces.[4] Some speaking on live television have expressed the concern that mobilization will not generate the force necessary to regain the initiative on the battlefield, given the poor quality of Russian reserves.[5]

The Russian information space has significantly deviated from the narratives preferred by the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that things are generally under control. The current onslaught of criticism and reporting of operational military details by the Kremlin’s propagandists has come to resemble the milblogger discourse over this past week. The Kremlin narrative had focused on general statements of progress and avoided detailed discussions of current military operations. The Kremlin had never openly recognized a major failure in the war prior to its devastating loss in Kharkiv Oblast, which prompted the partial reserve mobilization.[6]

The Russian MoD has consistently focused on exaggerating Russian success in Ukraine with vague optimistic statements while omitting presentations of specific details of the military campaign. The daily Russian MoD briefing has claimed capturing the same villages more than once as ISW and independent investigators have observed, and the Russian MoD rarely releases photographic evidence confirming claims of Russian advances.[KS1] [7]

The Russian MoD has sought to impose this kind of narrative on the milbloggers as well. Advisor to the Russian Defense Minister Andrey Ilnitsky called on Russian journalists and milbloggers on May 26 to refrain from presenting detailed coverage of the war and to avoid publishing negative information that could help the West infiltrate the Russian information space and win the “hybrid war.”[8]

The milbloggers largely disregarded the MoD’s directives, and Putin seemed to support them in this disobedience, rewarding them with a lengthy personal meeting on June 17.[9] Most milbloggers have continued to report Russian battlefield setbacks and to criticize failures in the partial mobilization, often in strident tones. Putin has not apparently punished any major milbloggers for their outspokenness or allowed others to punish them. He has, however, kept their critiques off of the mainstream Russian airwaves. Kremlin mouthpieces on federally-owned TV channels had continued to puppet the MoD and Kremlin lines for the most part—until the partial mobilization.

The Kremlin’s declaration of partial mobilization exposed the general Russian public to the consequences of the defeat around Kharkiv and then at Lyman, shattering the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the war as limited and generally successful. The Russian defeat around Lyman has generated even more confusion and negative reporting in the mainstream Russian information space than had the Russian withdrawals from Kyiv, Snake Island, or even Kharkiv. The impact of Lyman is likely greater because Russians now fear being mobilized to fix problems at the battlefield. An independent Russian polling organization, the Levada Center, found that more than half of respondents said that they were afraid that the war in Ukraine could lead to general mobilization, whereas the majority of respondents had not voiced such concerns in February 2022.[10] Russians also likely see that the Kremlin is executing the current partial mobilization – which was supposed to be a limited call up of qualified reservists – in an illegal and deceptive manner, which places more men at the risk of being mobilized to reinforce collapsing frontlines.

Putin relies on controlling the information space in Russia to safeguard his regime much more than on the kind of massive oppression apparatus the Soviet Union used, making disorder in the information space potentially even more dangerous to Putin than it was to the Soviets. Putin has never rebuilt the internal repression apparatus the Soviets had in the KGB, Interior Ministry forces, and Red Army to the scale required to crush domestic opposition by force. Putin has not until recently even imposed the kinds of extreme censorship that characterized the Soviet state. Russians have long had nearly free access to the internet, social media, and virtual private networks (VPNs), and Putin has notably refrained from blocking Telegram even though the platform refused his demands to censor its content and even as he has disrupted his people’s access to other platforms. The Russian information space has instead relied on journalists and TV talk-show guests to enforce coerced self-censorship, especially after the Kremlin adopted a law that threatens Russians with up to 15 years in jail for “discrediting the army.”[11] The criticism on Russian federal TV channels of military failings and failings of the partial mobilization effort, especially following the defeat at Lyman, is thus daring and highly unusual for the Kremlin’s propaganda shows. It has brought the tone and tenor of some of the milblogger critiques of Russia’s performance in the war into the homes of average Russians through official Kremlin channels for the first time.

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Evgeniy Prigozhin have further damaged the Kremlin’s vulnerable narratives during and after the fall of Lyman. Kadyrov published a hyperbolic rant on October 1 in which he accused the Russian military command of failing to promptly respond to the deteriorating situation around Lyman and stated that Russia needs to liberate the annexed four oblasts with all available means including low-yield nuclear weapons.[12] Prigozhin reiterated Kadyrov’s critiques of the Russian military leadership. The West‘s focus on Kadyrov’s nuclear threat obscured the true importance of these statements.

Kadyrov and Prigozhin are bona fide members of the small group of leaders Russians call siloviki—people with meaningful power bases and either membership in or direct access to Putin’s inner circle. Kadyrov has a history of irresponsible statements and boasts that do not always grab headlines or shape narratives in Russia. Prigozhin is not a normally dominant voice either, although his prominence has grown in recent weeks.[13] But their statements on October 1 have had a profound effect on the Russian information space. Together they broke the Kremlin’s narrative that attempted to soften the blow of the defeat around Lyman. Federal outlets had largely expressed hopeful attitudes that newly mobilized men and deployed reinforcements could either hold the line or conduct counter-attacks in the near future, prior to Kadyrov’s statement.[14] But talk shows on federally-controlled channels picked up immediately on the Kadyrov-Prigozhin statements, prompting commentators on live television to add to the criticism of the higher military command.[15] The Kremlin’s propagandists even had to disrupt the presentation of the former Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Deputy Commander Andrey Gurulyov when he started to blame the higher military command for the defeat in Lyman during a live broadcast.[16]

Kadyrov and Prigozhin’s statement likely publicly undermined Putin’s leadership, possibly inadvertently. Kadyrov specifically targeted the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, and accused Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov of covering up Lapin’s failures in Lyman. Putin had publicly expressed his trust in Lapin when the Russian MoD announced Lapin’s victory around Lysychansk on June 24.[17] Western military officials have also reported that Putin has been making operational military decisions in Ukraine and micromanaging his military command.[18] Putin is thus likely responsible for the decisions not only not to reinforce Lyman but also to attempt to hold it--facts that are probably known to a number of people in his inner circle at least.[19] Kadyrov’s direct attack on Lapin is thus an indirect attack on Putin, whether Kadyrov realizes it or not. Putin and his mouthpieces have been extremely tight-lipped about the performance of the military commanders or their replacements, which makes Kadyrov’s statement and Prigozhin’s echo of it especially noteworthy.

Putin likely recognizes the dangerous path Kadyrov and Prigozhin had begun to walk, prompting push-back by Kremlin-controlled voices and milbloggers against the direct critiques of military commanders. Federal television channels characterized Kadyrov’s statements against Lapin as rather “harsh,” while milbloggers argued that the Russian MoD is more responsible[KS2] [FK3] for the defeat claiming that Lapin was not in command of the Lyman garrison.[20]

Putin has not previously censored nationalist milblogger figures, Kadyrov, war correspondents, and former proxy officials, likely because he has seen them as voices pushing for his preferred policies that Russians willing to support him are more likely to trust. ISW has previously assessed that Putin is likely attempting to keep the milbloggers on his side and to use them to establish new scapegoats for his failures in Ukraine.[21] Putin may also have obtained a more unvarnished view of what is occurring on the frontlines than he was getting from the chain of command, which may be one of the reasons he met with the milbloggers in mid-June. Milbloggers likely have a reputation with their audiences of being more accurate sources than the Russian MoD because they report setbacks and mistakes, while advancing pro-war and patriotic views. Putin likely seeks to retain the favor of the audience these nationalist figures reach as they promote his grandiose vision for the war.

The milblogger community may begin to undermine Putin’s narratives to his core audience amidst the defeats and failures of the Russian war in Ukraine, however, especially as their narratives spread to mainstream Kremlin-controlled outlets. Milbloggers are increasingly appearing on Russian state television and in Kremlin-affiliated outlets following the collapse of the Kharkiv frontline and are boldly pointing out failures in the Russian military campaign, while exaggerating the need for Russia to win the war and the price Russians should be prepared to pay.[22] Putin likely attempted to win back some of the milbloggers by inviting them to his annexation speech in Moscow and by integrating them into the mainstream media.[23] But mibloggers are fueling impossible expectations and making demands that Putin and the Russian government cannot possibly meet. They insist that Putin seize all of Ukraine, when Russian forces are only capable of making incremental territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka. They are calling on Russian military recruitment centers and the Russian MoD to fix the generational bureaucratic issues plaguing partial mobilization. They are likely adding to the domestic problems Putin will face in the coming months, however much it may seem to Putin that they are helping him through a hard time.

Putin may be experiencing an odd variant of the problems Mikhail Gorbachev encountered resulting from his glasnost’ (openness) policy. Gorbachev partially opened the Soviet information space in the mid-1980s in the hopes that Soviet citizens would give him insight into the causes of bureaucratic dysfunction within the Soviet state that he could not identify from above. But Soviet citizens did not stop where Gorbachev wanted or expected them to and instead began attacking the entire Soviet system. The reforms (perestroika) he initiated after a period of glasnost’ ended up destroying the Soviet Union rather than strengthening it.

Putin is no doubt fully aware of this pattern and surely has no intention of repeating it. He has never established Soviet-level degrees of control over the Russian information space even as he has steadily narrowed it to only platforms he tolerates. He has absolved the milbloggers of having to adhere to Kremlin-approved narratives while keeping open the platform on which they present to a core constituency on which he relies, and he is now mainstreaming them further. It remains to be seen how much Putin will tolerate and what will happen if and when he attempts to shut down the milbloggers and their critiques, increasingly of his own decisions, that he has allowed for the moment to circulate in Russia.

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on October 2:

• Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements east and northeast of Lyman and have liberated Torske in Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces withdrew from their positions northeast of Lyman, likely to positions around Kreminna [FK4] and along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[24]
• Ukrainian forces continued to advance on settlements east of Kupyansk and have liberated Kisharivka in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]
• Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut, Vyimka, and Avdiivka.[26]
• Ukrainian forces resumed counteroffensives in northern Kherson Oblast and have secured positions in Zolota Balka and Khreshchenivka. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also liberated Shevchekivka and Lyubymivka, pushing Russian forces to new defensive positions around Mykailivka.[27]
• Russian forces continued to target Kryvyi Rih and Mykolaiv Oblast with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.[28]
• Russian State Duma MPs withdrew a law that would have given mobilized men a one-time payment of 300,000 rubles (about $4,980) and other benefits, without providing a reason for their decision.[29] Ukrainian military officials stated that Russian forces are forming a motorized rifle division with mobilized men from Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and the Republic of Adygea.[30]
• Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a draft law to the State Duma on admitting the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, to the Russian Federation.[31]

[1] https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1576469565437267968; https://t.me... dot ru/video/06c9e2ac69571a918b1fb9a63068f349/; https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576410989104627712

[2] https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576331334317879297; https://... dot ru/brand/66924?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=special-donbass&utm_campaign=special-donbass-programs; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/

[4] https://twitter.com/JuliaDavisNews/status/1576045751209431040; https://smotrim dot ru/video/2487471

[5] https://twitter.com/adagamov/status/1576531804324270080; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/

[7] https://www dot proekt.media/research/ofitsialnaya-statistika-minoborony/#geography

[8] https://amicable dot ru/news/2022/05/26/19847/vystuplenie-v-sfrf/

[14] https://smotrim dot ru/video/2486671

[15] https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/; https://smotrim dot ru/brand/66924?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=special-donbass&utm_campaign=special-donbass-programs; https://rutube dot ru/video/06c9e2ac69571a918b1fb9a63068f349/

[20] https://rutube dot ru/video/06c9e2ac69571a918b1fb9a63068f349/; https://t.me/m0sc0wcalling/12221; https://t.me/Hard_Blog_Line/8283; ht...

[22] https://smotrim dot ru/video/2486671; https://rutube dot ru/video/77145f16c0922abfa2caddae758cbc25/

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (02.10.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (02.10.22) CDS comments on key events

As of the morning of October 2, 2022, more than 1,196 Ukrainian children are victims of full- scale armed aggression by the Russian Federation, Prosecutor General's Office reports. The official number of children who have died and been wounded in the course of the Russian aggression is 412, and more than 784 children, respectively. However, the data is not conclusive since data collection continues in the areas of active hostilities, temporarily occupied areas, and liberated territories.

Ukraine conducted 24 exchanges and returned 808 people from Russian captivity, said Deputy Defense Minister of Ukraine Anna Malyar. She noted that at the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion, the Cabinet of Ministers established the Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War based on the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which unites more than ten state agencies and organizations. Furthermore, the Deputy Minister of Defense emphasized that Ukraine complies with all norms of the Geneva Conventions regarding the treatment of prisoners of war.

According to the head of the Lugansk Oblast Military Administration, Serhiy Gaidai, the Russians took 76 Ukrainian orphans from the occupied territories of Luhansk Oblast. They are kept in social rehabilitation centers for minors in the Moscow region. Another 104 children under supervision in social institutions of the so-called "LPR" are being prepared to be transferred under guardianship to Russian families.

Over the past day, October 1, as a result of Russian military aggression on the territory of Ukraine, eight civilians were killed, and another 21 people were injured. The Deputy Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, Kyrylo Tymoshenko, reported this on Telegram, referring to the data of regional military administrations, Ukrinform reports. In Zaporizhzhia Oblast - one dead, four wounded; in Mykolaiv Oblast- seven wounded; in Kharkiv Oblast – four dead, one wounded.

In the morning, the Russian troops shelled Zaporizhzhia and its neighborhoods. The industrial infrastructure was destroyed. According to preliminary information, the enemy struck with four S-300 missiles.

In the Donetsk Oblast, the troops of the Russian Federation shelled 18 towns and villages in the past day, reported by the National Police. On October 1, enemy shelling killed 2 civilians in Avdiivka and 1 in Paraskoviivka. 9 more were injured. In total, law enforcement officers documented 32 Russian war crimes in the Oblast during the day. 27 civilian objects were destroyed and damaged by enemy strikes: 22 residential buildings, a hospital, farm buildings and a railway station.

In particular, in Avdiivka, a medical facility and six apartment buildings were damaged due to the impact of Russian shells, and civilians were injured and killed. The police also helped to evacuate 151 more people from the Donetsk Oblast yesterday. Since the beginning of the mandatory

evacuation, more than 20,700 civilians have left the Oblast with the help of the police, including 3,363 children and 997 people with disabilities.

The enemy attacked Mykolaiv Oblast at night with seven "Shahed-136" kamikaze drones. Five of them were destroyed. They also struck Mykolayiv with eight S-300 missiles, Operational Command "South" reported. In residential areas, apartment buildings and outbuildings were damaged. Initially, seven people were injured.

In Kharkiv Oblast, during the past day, the Russians shelled Kupyansk and villages of Kupyansky district (1 wounded), Vovchansk and Gatishche of Chuguyiv district.

The bodies of five people who tried to evacuate on their own were found in Kharkiv Oblast. Serhii Bolvinov, head of the Investigative Department of the State Police in the Kharkiv region, reported this on Facebook, Ukrinform reports. According to his information, the residents of Kupyansk tried to evacuate to Kharkiv on their own by car on May 6 but came across a Russian land mine on the way.

Also, in Kharkiv Oblast, an ambulance that was on its way to a patient's call was blown up by a mine. The driver died, reported the Center for Emergency Medical Aid and Disaster Medicine on Facebook. According to local mass media, the tragedy happened in Balaklia. The ambulance burned to the ground.

At night, the enemy attacked two districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast - Nikopol and Kryvyi Rih. In Nikopol, private houses, farm buildings and power lines were damaged. A kamikaze drone attacked Kryvyi Rih - two floors of the local lyceum were destroyed.

In the Akhtyrka district of Sumy Oblast, a car of the Ukrtelecom service crew blew up on an enemy land mine. There were four people in the car, three in the hospital. The driver, unfortunately, died on the spot, the head of the Sumy District Police Department reports.

Operational situation

It is the 221st day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy continues to concentrate its efforts on establishing full control over the territory of Donetsk Oblast, maintaining control over the captured territories, and disrupting the intensive actions of the Ukrainian troops in certain directions.

It fires at the positions of the Ukrainian troops along the contact line and conducts aerial reconnaissance. It inflicts strikes on civilian infrastructure and residential buildings, violating the norms of international humanitarian law and the laws and customs of war.

The threat of the enemy launching air and missile strikes on the entire territory of Ukraine persists. Over the past day, the enemy launched 4 missile and 16 air strikes, and carried out more

than 75 MLRS rounds at military and civilian objects on the territory of Ukraine. In addition, the enemy uses the Iranian-made "Shahed-136" UAVs for attacks on infrastructure facilities.

During the past day, more than 30 Ukrainian towns and villages were affected by the Russian strikes, including Bilohorivka, Bakhmut, Krasnohorivka, Maryinka, Vodyane, Trudove, Bohoyavlenka, Novoukrainka, Orihiv, Zaliznychne, Illinka, Nikopol, Blahodativka, Mykolaiv, Ochakiv, and Odesa. On the state border, Seredyna Buda, Fotovizh and Budky of the Sumy Oblast were shelled.

To restrain the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, six battalions of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus (from the 6th, and 11th separate motorized brigades, 103rd separate airborne brigade and a detachment of the 5th separate SOF brigade) were deployed at Belarus- Ukraine section of the border. Five Russian BTGs (consolidated BTG of the 144th motorized rifle division (MRD), consolidated BTG of the 3rd MRD of the 20th Army, BTG of the 15th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd MRD, the 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division of the 1st tank army, BTG of the 79th motorized rifle regiment of the 18th MRD of the 11th Army Corps) were deployed at Russia-Ukraine section of the border.

In the city of Budyonnovsk, Stavropol Krai (RF), about 5,000 people arrived for mobilization to the 205th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 49th Army of the Southern Military District. Combat training began with the personnel.

Aviation of the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out 29 strikes during the past day, damaging the enemy's stronghold, 22 areas of concentration of weapons and military equipment, and 6 enemy anti-aircraft missile systems. Ukrainian air defense units shot down 2 enemy UAVs.

Ukrainian missile troops and artillery struck 8 enemy command and control posts, 10 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment, 3 warehouses with ammunition and 2 anti-aircraft missile systems S-300 during the day.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remains low. Kharkiv direction

• Zolochiv-Balakleya section: approximate length of combat line - 147 km, number of BTGs of the

RF Armed Forces - 10-12, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 13.3 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments, 245th motorized rifle regiment of the 47th tank division, 6th and 239th tank regiments, 228th motorized rifle regiment of the 90th tank division, 1st motorized rifle regiment, 1st tank regiment of the 2nd motorized rifle division, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 6th Combined Arms Army, 27th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Tank Army, 275th and 280th motorized rifle regiments, 11th tank regiment of the 18th motorized rifle division of the 11 Army Corps, 7th motorized rifle regiment of the 11th Army Corps, 80th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th Army Corps, 2nd and 45th separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 1st Army Corps of so-called DPR, PMCs.

The enemy continued shelling from tanks, mortars, barrel and rocket artillery in the areas of Vovchansk and Gatyshche, and used UAVs in the Golubivka area to detect the position of Ukrainian troops.

Two BTGs from the 144th motorized rifle division (MRD), which are fighting tense counter-battles with the advanced units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces southeast of Borova and on its southern outskirts, and BTG of the 3rd MRD, which is trying to hold back the advance of the Defense Forces from Kupyansk bridgehead, were gradually squeezed out of their positions and forced to retreat in the direction of Svatove.

During the day, units of the Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in the area of Kozacha Lopan.

In the border areas of the Belgorod region, the enemy deployed six BTGs from the 61st separate marines brigade of the Northern Fleet, 138th separate motorized rifle brigade (two BTGs), 11th tank regiment, 9th motorized rifle regiment of the 18th MRD, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 11th Army Corps.

Enemy units of the 138th separate motorized rifle brigade carried out provocative actions in the area of the Hoptivka checkpoint.

On September 30, about 200 mobilized personnel were transported to the Belgorod airfield by Il-76 military transport aircraft to man the units of the 11th Army Corps.

Kramatorsk direction

● Balakleya - Siversk section: approximate length of the combat line - 184 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17-20, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

●  252nd and 752nd motorized rifle regiments of the 3rd motorized rifle division, 1st, 13th, and 12th tank regiments, 423rd motorized rifle regiment of the 4th tank division, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Combined Arms Army, 35th, 55th and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, 2nd and 4th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 2nd Army Corps, 7th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 1st Army Corps, PMCs.

Russian forces fired at the Ukrainian Defence Forces' positions in Hryhorivka, Bilohorivka, Verkhnokamianske and Rozdolivka. They carried out airstrikes on the positions of Ukrainian troops in the Bilohorivka area (with Su-24). To clarify the position of Ukrainian troops and adjust artillery fire, the enemy used UAVs, including "Orlan-10", in the districts of Kramatorsk, Dorozhnyanka, Nesteryanka, Novopavlivka, Novoandriivka, Ozerne, Drobysheve, Karpivka, Zolotarivka, Spirne.

The Russians managed to withdraw no more than 1.5-2 consolidated battalions from the encirclement in the Lyman area, mainly from the 752nd motorized rifle regiment of the 3rd MRD,

the remnants of the 13th and 16th detachments of the BARS, the 208th rifle regiment of the mobilization reserve of the 2nd Army Corps, and self-propelled battery from the 147th self- propelled artillery regiment.

The units that exited the encirclement are restoring combat capability in the area northeast of Kreminna under cover of two BTGs of the 21st separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army, which are holding the front in the area of Yampol and the western and southwestern outskirts of Kreminna.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 235 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 17 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments, 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th tank regiment of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy fired at the positions of the Ukrainian Defense Forces in the areas of Soledar, Bakhmut, Bakhmutske, Odradivka, Opytne, Yakovlivka, Yuryivka, Novoselivka, Avdiyivka, Krasnohorivka, Opytne, Pervomaiske, Maryinka, Novomykhailivka and Vodyane, and carried out airstrikes on the positions of Ukrainian troops in the area of Krasnohorivka (with a pair of Su-25s), Maryinka (with a pair of Mi-8s), Vodyane (with a pair of Mi-8s).

During the past day, units of the Defense Forces repelled enemy attacks in the areas of Vyimka, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Vesela Dolyna and Pervomaiske.

Fighting continues in Pokrovske-Bakhmutske; Pokrovske-Bakhmut. The enemy had no success and retreated; Vershyn, Zaitseve; in Kodema- Zaitseve; Kodema -Odradivka, where units of the PMC "Wagner" are advancing, and Pisky, Nevelske, where the 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps is attacking.

The advance of the enemy 4th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 2nd Army Corps in the direction of Mykolaivka, Vyimka, was stopped, and the enemy was thrown back to the starting line.

Zaporizhzhia direction

●  Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

●  Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 29th Combined Arms Army, 38th and 64th separate motorized rifle brigades, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th Combined

Arms Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37 separate motorized rifle brigade of the 36th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 136th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 58 Combined Arms Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps, 39th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 68th Army Corps, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, and 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy inflicted fire damage in the areas of Novoukrainka, Paraskoviivka, Prechystivka, Pavlivka, Neskuchne, Shakhtarske, Velyka Novosilka, Novoandriivka, Zaliznychne, Hulyaipole, Hulyaipilske, Poltavka, Novopil and Vremivka, and carried out an air strike on the positions of Ukrainian troops in the Zaliznychne area (with Su- 25).

It has been confirmed that the ammunition warehouse was destroyed after a fire attack on September 30 in the area of Chernihivka (Zaporizhzhia Oblast), and about 50 people were wounded.

Kherson direction

● Vasylivka–Nova Zburyivka and Stanislav section: approximate length of the battle line - 252 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 27, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.3 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 114th, 143rd, and 394th motorized rifle regiments, 218th tank regiment of the 127th motorized rifle division of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 57th and 60th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 5th Combined Arms Army, 135th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments of the 19th motorized rifle division, 70th, 71st and 291st motorized rifle regiments of the 42nd motorized rifle division, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiments of the 106th parachute airborne division, 7th military base of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 16th and 346th separate SOF brigades.

The operational situation is unchanged.

Measures of partial mobilization, announced by the military and political leadership of the Russian Federation, are ongoing. Since September 30, enemy military units based on the territory of the Republic of Crimea have been put on FULL combat readiness. It is known about the formation of a motorized rifle division on the peninsula's territory with the mobilized male population of Crimea, the Krasnodar Krai and the Republic of Adygea.

According to the available information, two thousand mobilized persons arrived at the permanent deployment base of the 810th separate marines brigade (Sevastopol).

Kherson-Berislav bridgehead

●  Velyka Lepetikha – Oleksandrivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 250 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces – 22, the average width of the combat area of one BTG –

11.8 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 108th Air assault regiment, 171st separate airborne assault brigade of the 7th Air assault division, 4th military base of the 58th Combined Arms Army, 429th motorized rifle regiment of the 19th motorized rifle division, 33rd and 255th motorized rifle regiments of the 20th motorized rifle division, 34th, and 205th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 49th Combined Arms Army, 224th, 237th and 239th Air assault regiments of the 76th Air assault division, 217th and 331 Air assault regiments of the 98th Air assault division, 126th separate coastal defense brigade, 127th separate ranger brigade, 11th separate airborne assault brigade, 10th separate SOF brigade, PMC.

The enemy fired at the positions of Ukrainian troops with tanks, mortars, barrel and jet artillery in the areas of Myrolyubivka, Novovoznesneske, Vysokopilya, Arkhangelske, Ivanivka, Olhyne, Biloghirka, Velyke Artakove, Andriivka, Sukhy Stavok, Bezymenne, Blahodativka, Mala Seidemynukha, Kyselivka, Berezneguvate, Lyubomirivka, Shevchenkove, Kobzartsi, Shyroke, Blahodatne, Partyzanske, Novohryhorivka, Myrne, Pravdyne, Oleksandrivka. The enemy used UAVs (up to 34 sorties) on the tactical depth of the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to clarify the position of Ukrainian troops and adjust artillery fire.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the sea and connect unrecognized Transnistria with the Russian Federation by land through the coast of the Black and Azov seas.

On October 2, 8 enemy warships and boats are in the Black Sea conducting reconnaissance and control of navigation. Up to 24 Kalibr missiles are ready for a volley on three carriers: one 1135.6 frigate and two Buyan-M missile corvettes. In general, the current activity of the Russian Federation at sea is characterized by low intensity.

All four project 636.3 submarines in the Black Sea are located in the port of Novorossiysk.

Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 14 Su-27, Su-30 and Su-24 aircraft were deployed from Belbek and Saki airfields.

Enemy landing ships are located at the Novorossiysk and Sevastopol bases.

The Russian forces continue to carry out intensive missile and artillery and air strikes on the objects of the civil and military infrastructure of the seaports of Ukraine. On the night of October 2, the enemy used 7 kamikaze drones, "Shahid 136", over Mykolaiv. 5 drones were shot down by Ukrainian air defense. The enemy also attacked Mykolaiv Oblast with S-300 air defense missiles (7 missiles) and X-59 missiles from Su-35 aircraft.

On October 1, a significant explosion occurred at the Belbek military airfield. The local media say the reason was the ejection of a combat plane from the airfield's runway, resulting in the plane's explosion. The pilot managed to eject. The aircraft was completely destroyed by fire and explosion.

On September 30, the Ro-Ro ship "Sparta II", owned by "Oboronlogistika" LLC, chartered by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, passed the Bosphorus Strait, entered the waters of the Black Sea and transited to the port of Novorossiysk. The nature of the cargo is being clarified. The specified vessel may carry military cargo for logistical support of the Russian troops in Ukraine. Earlier, on August 27, the S-300PMU-2 anti-aircraft missile battalion was moved from the port of Tartus (Syria) to the Novorossiysk base point by the "Sparta II" ship.

"Grain Initiative": on October 2, the 5th vessel chartered by the World Food Program of the United Nations, the NEW ISLAND vessel, arrived at the port of Chornomorsk for loading. After loading with wheat, the ship will go to Somalia. Also, today, as part of the implementation of the "grain initiative", 5 ships left the ports of "Odesa", "Chornomorsk", and "Pivdenny". On board, they are 114.7 thousand tons of agricultural products for the countries of Africa and Europe. Among them is the bulk carrier ARGO 1, transporting 31 thousand tons of corn to Egypt, and the bulk carrier DOGA K with 10 thousand tons of wheat for Tunisia.

Since the departure of the first ship with Ukrainian food, 5.8 million tons of agricultural products have been exported. A total of 257 ships left Ukrainian ports with food, which was sent to the countries of Asia, Europe and Africa.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 02.10

Personnel - almost 60,110 people (+500);

Tanks - 2,377 (+23);

Armored combat vehicles – 4,975 (+26);

Artillery systems – 1,405 (+8);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 337 (+1); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 176 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 3,796 (+10); Aircraft - 264 (0);

Helicopters – 227 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,015 (+6); Intercepted cruise missiles - 246 (0);

Boats / ships - 15 (0).

Ukraine, general news

The International Atomic Energy Agency is making every effort to release Igor Murashov, the general director of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, kidnapped by Russia, Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba wrote on his Twitter. As reported earlier, on Friday, September

30, the general director of ZNPP, Igor Murashov, was forcibly detained by the Russians on the road from the station to Energodar. He was blindfolded and taken in an unknown direction.

The Verkhovna Rada is going to nationalize more than 900 objects belonging to the Russian Federation. At the next meeting, the Verkhovna Rada will consider the issue of nationalization under a special procedure of assets of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. This was announced by the deputy head of the Committee on Economic Development, Roksolana Pidlas, the press service of the VRU reports on Telegram.

International diplomatic aspect

For the first time since the beginning of the all-out invasion, Pope Francis directly begged Vladimir Putin to stop the "spiral of violence and death" in Ukraine. The Pontiff condemned Russia's illegal annexation of the Ukrainian territories for it goes against international law. "My appeal goes above all to the president of the Russian Federation, begging him to stop this spiral of violence and death, even out of love for his own people," Francis said. He addressed "an equally hopeful appeal to the president of Ukraine to be open to a serious peace proposal." The Pope repeated the false claim Putin used to justify his aggression about the necessity of respecting "the rights of minorities and (their) legitimate worries." Neither he elaborated on what he believes "a serious peace proposal" might be after numerous war crimes and destruction, followed by the illegal annexation and the "partial mobilization" aimed at carrying out the initial goals of the so-called "Special military operation."

Italy, Belgium, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany have summoned Russian ambassadors to their countries for a demarch related to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea.

"Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, is waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, a sovereign country. It has started a mobilization, however partial that is. It is talking increasingly loosely about the use of nuclear weapons. In outright contempt of international law, it has arranged sham referendums in areas it has occupied from its neighbor. And as President Putin just declared moments ago, it is using those illegitimate results to claim that these areas are now part of the Russian Federation", the President of Finland described the profound change in the European security environment. Sauli Niinistö reiterated Finland's readiness to "continue its assistance to Ukraine and the Ukrainian people for as long as it is needed." Though he underlined the ability to defend itself as one of the key pillars of the country's security, he also mentioned the web of partnership and membership in NATO. Twenty- eight countries out of thirty have already ratified Finland's membership documents. Sauli Niinistö mentioned relations with Russia as an important factor, for it's impossible to escape geography. The idea is to maintain a functioning relationship with Russia as possible at a given time. Russia "will continue to be our neighbor, even if there is no turn for the better."

Following Ukraine's official application for NATO membership, the heads of nine European NATO members issued a joint statement backing it. The leaders of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia declared their "support Ukraine in its defense against Russia's invasion, demand (that Russia) immediately withdraw from

all the occupied territories and encourage all allies to substantially increase their military aid to Ukraine." However, the US officials expressing their continued support suggested focusing on solving the current issues rather than investing efforts into a membership endeavor.

Germany's defense minister has made a surprise visit to Odesa. Talking to her Ukrainian counterpart, Christine Lambrecht informed Oleksiy Reznikov that the first IRIS-T SLM air defense system will be delivered in the coming days. So far, Germany has provided defense aid worth

$719 million. However, Kyiv is asking MBTs Leopards and IFVs Marders, while Berlin says it doesn't want to send tanks alone. Last month the US embassy in Berlin rejected the Chancellor's notion that there's an agreement between the western allies not to send modern tanks to Ukraine. The American diplomats stated that there are no such limitations and every country supports Ukraine with anything it finds appropriate.

Forty-seven percent of Germans support sending tanks to Ukraine, while forty-three reject it, according to a ZDF poll. The Greens are leading those who support that idea (62%), followed by Christian Democrats Union (55%) and Olaf Scholz's Social Democrats (54%). The most vocal voices against tanks' delivery are alt-right AfD (80%) and the Left (64%). The opinion on whether Ukraine might win is sharply divided, with 42 percent batting on Ukraine and 41 percent doubting a Ukrainian victory. However, even facing further economic difficulties, most Germans (74%) favor continued support of Ukraine, while only a fifth want this support to end. The most numerous opponents of Ukraine's support are the alt-right AfD (70%).

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3. Japan as the third global military power

Excerpts:

In remarks at the East-West Center discussion Hughes accepted that Japan’s relationship is complicated by their economic engagement, and that Japan seeks to make itself more ‘indispensable’ to China in key areas, including key technologies and investment. “Japan doesn’t want to decouple the way that some people in the United States talk about.”

However, he recognises that in many areas China is Japan’s ‘adversary’, particularly with respect to economic security, key supply chains, key technologies, and rare earth minerals.

Economic concerns must also be taken in context with other priorities, and it these, Hughes argues, that can force ultimately force decisions. Emboldened military posturing in the Indo-Pacific provides the context. “China is now crossing red lines for Japanese national security, whether it’s Japanese territory, whether it’s Taiwan with its sea lanes. It’s actually undermining potentially the entire US security system, the region. This is pretty existential now for Japan.”

Japan as the third global military power

Japan is building its military to new heights, but will ‘Bilateralism Plus’ have it taking up global security responsibilities?

By Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite

army-technology.com · by Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite · October 3, 2022

F-35 fighter aircraft from the Japan Air Self-Defense Force take part in a military review. (Photo by Kazuhiro NOGI / AFP) (Photo credit should read KAZUHIRO NOGI/AFP via Getty Images)

If Japan fulfils its budget goals in the next five years the nation will go from the fifth or seventh strongest military power – in terms of firepower or defence spending respectively – to third in the world after the US and China.

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Japan’s defence expenditure is anticipated to increase from $53.1bn next year to $70.4bn in 2027, reflecting a compound annual growth rate of 7.3%, according to GlobalData.

After the Cold War, Japan maintained a ‘dual hedge’, encouraging relationships with both China and the US to preserve its own autonomy. Under the post-WWII Yoshida doctrine, Japan relied primarily on the US for defence and economic support with a limited allowance to grow its own military power, capping its military spending at 1% of GDP.

That state of affairs had been held together by the Cold War balance of western allies against a Eurocentric threat. With the end of the Cold War, Tokyo sought autonomy from the US economically by increasing its trade involvement with China but chided against a deeper relationship with Beijing by tightening its military bonds with the US.

An end to Japan’s hedging

“Japan is not really hedging against dependence on the US anymore,” said Dr. Christopher Hughes, Professor of Japanese Studies and International Politics and Pro-Vice-Chancellor of the University of Warwick, in an online moderated discussion with the East-West Center, on 7 September. Japanese policy makers no longer perceive the Yoshida doctrine of economic diplomacy globally and military dependence on the United States as a tenable strategy to respond to the defence and security challenges that Japan faces today.

Yoshida did not intend for Japan to be a non-military power permanently, but prioritised economic development with military power to follow later. In a contemporary, multipolar world with regional threats, Japan’s anti-military tendencies lost support. From 2015, Tokyo’s main strategy turned back to strengthening the US-Japan bilateral alliance.

A new analysis of Japan’s military trajectory, put forward by Hughes in his book , argues Japan is responding to a challenging external security environment by becoming an “increasingly capable, reliable and – crucially – integrated US ally”.

SDF procurement for global deployment

Japan’s armed services have now moved to a multi-dimensional defence force enterprise by striving for more ability and jointness in operational ability. The modernisation effort is bringing its army, navy and air force closer together as well as venturing into new domains, including cyber operations and space.

The three services have recently made significant procurements in advanced capabilities offering the potential for global deployments. In the air domain alone, Japan introduced the Kawasaki P-1 in 2013, with 33 aircraft now in service and 60 more on order to replace the country’s P3-C fleet. Also in 2013, Japan signed a deal with Lockheed Martin for 42 F-35B aircrafts, then extended the deal in 2019 to acquire a total of 105 F-35A and 42 F-35B variants. As recently as 2020, a deal was signed with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as the lead developer for almost 100 units of the sixth-generation F-X stealth fighter.

In the naval domain Japan is expanding its blue-water capabilities through the conversion of the Izumo-class helicopter carriers into fully-fledged aircraft carriers able to operate the F-35B fighter. Its surface fleet can field more than 40 frigates and destroyers, while subsurface assets include the capable Sōryū-class submarines.

While these represent a formidable fleet for global deployment, Tokyo is devoting many of these capabilities to homeland defence, particularly for its southwestern islands that are at risk from Chinese incursions. The Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and US forces are beginning to ‘mirror’ their behaviour in island chain defence – and potentially Taiwan defence – as it becomes integrated into the overall US strategy. “Another important shift is that if necessary, Japan may undertake some global responsibilities,” said Hughes.

International relationships and collective responsibilities

South Korea, US and Japan trilateral anti-submarine exercise as part of efforts to sharpen deterrence against North Korean military threats. (Photo by South Korean Defense Ministry via Getty Images)

“Many past analyses are sort of still holding on to, I think, rather well outdated views of Japan’s military policy,” said Hughes. Overoptimistic partners who hope for more international cooperation are going to be disappointed if they were hoping Japan would seek greater autonomy from the US through international security cooperation arrangements.

Japan has shifted to accepting greater defensive responsibilities, including to some extent regional defence, acting through the US-Japan alliance and US security system.

But while the work Tokyo does with partners, and its expanded regional and global military cooperation is increasing in quantity, the efforts are essentially designed to reinforce the US-centric architecture for homeland defence. “Japan is becoming a global military power,” said Hughes, “but it’s very selective and it’s within these parameters.

“Japan will venture out globally. It will do more with other partners. But again, it will only do that in order to service the needs of the US-Japan alliance and to service its own homeland security.”

However tight the sphere of Japan’s concerns, in order to shore up, support and reinvest in the US regional and global security system, it may have to undertake collective self-defence responsibilities. Hughes sees this as a ‘major change’ that has taken effect only since 2015.

Bilateralism Plus and ‘plug-and-play’ alliances

“We have seen a shift, I think from the old Yoshida doctrine to this new Abe doctrine and this talk about a proactive contribution to peace.”

Japan has built up many lateral security defence relationships with other nations over recent decades, with a range of new bilateral, multilateral or mini lateral relationships. Functionally, these serve as extensions of the US-Japan alliance system, using the alliance as a template to achieve integrated deterrence.

“It’s sort of ‘plug-and-play’, being able to integrate other allies into the US-Japan centred alliance system,” says Hughes.

While Japan uses the language of international contribution, essentially it is trying to strengthen its relationship with the United States.

Hughes describes this approach as ‘Bilateralism Plus’, a practice that does not mean seeking a multilateral identity or trying to de-centre from the US but does include networking and building new relationships that reinforce the existing US-Japan security relationship. “Whenever Japan has doubts about US commitment to the region or to Japan’s defence, what it does is double down,” said Hughes, establishing security arrangements with other nations that include the US in their formation, reinvesting and solidifying the original alliance.

As Prime Minister, Shinzō Abe established this as a new doctrine, deepening cooperation with the US and reducing the amount of hedging with other countries. Looking at the revised US-Japan defence guidelines, Hughes is clear that Japan is giving up on many of the hedging gains it has made it made inside and outside the alliance.

Potential checks on Japan’s bilateralism

In review of Hughes’s argument, Dr. Ellis Krauss, Professor Emeritus of the School of Global Policy & Strategy at the University of California San Diego, posits that Japan faces challenges to operating as a global power through the US-Japanese alliance. “Japan’s dependence economically on China may now be one of its greatest limitations, or checks, on bilateralism,” Krauss speculates that Japan’s military dependence on the US, and its capacity to act within that alliance, is kept in check by China through trade relations in the region and a need to keep a degree of good relations.

In remarks at the East-West Center discussion Hughes accepted that Japan’s relationship is complicated by their economic engagement, and that Japan seeks to make itself more ‘indispensable’ to China in key areas, including key technologies and investment. “Japan doesn’t want to decouple the way that some people in the United States talk about.”

However, he recognises that in many areas China is Japan’s ‘adversary’, particularly with respect to economic security, key supply chains, key technologies, and rare earth minerals.

Economic concerns must also be taken in context with other priorities, and it these, Hughes argues, that can force ultimately force decisions. Emboldened military posturing in the Indo-Pacific provides the context. “China is now crossing red lines for Japanese national security, whether it’s Japanese territory, whether it’s Taiwan with its sea lanes. It’s actually undermining potentially the entire US security system, the region. This is pretty existential now for Japan.”

army-technology.com · by Andrew Salerno-Garthwaite · October 3, 2022

4. U.S. defense secretary sees no imminent invasion of Taiwan by China

U.S. defense secretary sees no imminent invasion of Taiwan by China

Reuters · by Doina Chiacu

WASHINGTON, Oct 2 (Reuters) - U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Sunday he sees no imminent invasion of Taiwan by China but said China was trying to establish a "new normal" with its military activities around the island.

A visit to Taiwan early in August by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi enraged China, which subsequently launched military drills near the island. Those have continued, although on a much reduced scale.

"I don't see an imminent invasion," Austin said in an interview broadcast on CNN.

"What we do see is China moving to establish what we would call a new normal. Increased activity - we saw a number of center line crossings of the Taiwan Strait by their aircraft. That number has increased over time. We've seen more activity with their surface vessels and waters in and around Taiwan."

The United States and its allies have responded to the drills by continuing to sail through the region. A U.S. Navy warship and a Canadian frigate made a routine transit through the Taiwan Strait on Sept. 20.

The United States will continue to work with its allies and partners "to ensure that we maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific," Austin said in an interview on CNN's "Fareed Zakaria GPS" that was recorded on Friday.

The narrow Taiwan Strait has been a frequent source of military tension since the defeated Republic of China government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with the communists, who established the People's Republic of China.

The United States is working to reopen channels of military communication with China, something that is critical to both countries, Austin said.

China in August halted cooperation with the United States in a number of areas, including dialogue between senior-level military commanders, in retaliation for Pelosi's visit to Taiwan.

Austin said he has communicated by phone and in person with his Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe, who agreed that open communications were important.

"We'll do everything we can to continue to signal that we want those channels open and I would hope that China will begin to lean forward a bit more and work with us," he said.

Reporting by Doina Chiacu; editing by Grant McCool

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Doina Chiacu

5. Biden’s Chance to Restore American Dignity in Iran

Excerpts:

What is most striking about the regime’s response so far is its relative lack of violence. Revolutionary Guard commanders worked out a riot-control plan after crushing the massive pro-democracy Green Movement in 2009. The regime effectively deployed this hit-hard-quickly approach in nationwide protests in 2017 and 2019. In the latter clash, which was a violent eruption of the poor, the Revolutionary Guards reportedly used automatic weapons. Hundreds died.

That hasn’t happened yet against the thousands of women protesting. Like all declining dictatorships, the clerical regime has had a failure of imagination—in this case, about how to handle protesting women. Islamic societies treat women as legally inferior to men. Their protection is at the core of male identity and pride. To slaughter women in large numbers, or to rape them in police detention, puts severe pressure on the traditional Islamic pillars that give this regime legitimacy. The religious state could fall because women are forcing their men into action.

The Biden administration has now run into this buzzsaw of sexual politics and faith. If the president were wise, he would throw his lot in with Iranian women. Mr. Biden wasn’t going to stop the Iranian bomb in Vienna. Aligning American policy behind the rebels at least gives the administration a chance at regime change. It also gives the White House a chance to restore American dignity.

Biden’s Chance to Restore American Dignity in Iran

If the hijab falls, so does the theocracy, and aligning the U.S. behind the rebels gives them a chance.

By Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh

Oct. 2, 2022 6:14 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/articles/bidens-chance-to-restore-american-dignity-in-iran-islamic-republic-mahsa-amini-morality-police-diplomacy-foreign-policy-11664726046

The Islamic Republic’s impasse has once more exploded in the streets. The triggering event was the killing of Mahsa Amini by Iran’s morality police last month. But the tension—the rot in the Islamic system depressing the country—lies much deeper. For the clerical regime, it’s an insoluble predicament.

Among the casualties of this uprising may be the White House’s desperate quest to restore Barack Obama’s nuclear deal. Even before the streets erupted, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, wasn’t biting at the new agreement proffered in Vienna this summer. When beset by regime-shaking domestic discontent, Iran’s theocracy tends to scorn diplomatic mediation. Repression at home produces truculence abroad.

One of the persistent problems with American policy toward Iran has been mirror-imaging. The Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, Hussein Amir-Abdollahian, revealed that Tehran had received word from the Biden administration, after the protests had started, that it remains committed to reviving the nuclear deal—that the “will and goodwill” to do so remain.

It isn’t hard to imagine Western functionaries believing that Iran’s internal turmoil gives them a diplomatic opening. When presidents and prime ministers get into trouble at home, they often look for foreign-policy triumphs. With the same logic, the clerical oligarchs would now be prone to come to terms to refurbish their domestic appeal. All this misses the fundamental fact that Iran’s theocrats, who claim to know the mind of God, pay little attention to public opinion.

For nearly two decades, arms control has dominated the Western approach to Iran. It is predicated on two assumptions. First, that the other side is pragmatic and can shelve ideological impulses for the sake of an agreement. Second, that the Iranian government is a responsible stakeholder and can be trusted with residual nuclear assets. Even when a revived accord’s sunset provisions expire, the logic goes, Iran’s theocrats would be too allured by commerce to do anything rash.

Such assumptions about the Islamist regime have always been wrong. We have clung to them either because of our poverty of mind (secularists don’t analyze the religious well) or because we fear the daunting alternatives. Devising a patient policy of undermining the Islamic Republic, as America once did against the Soviet Union, exceeds our imagination and political will. By default, we offer concessions.

As surreal as it may seem to Mr. Biden’s Iran team, the administration’s urgency for a new nuclear agreement may well be seen by many within Iran’s ruling elite as a Western trap. “Washington is always trying to weaken Iran’s stability and security although it has been unsuccessful,” a foreign ministry spokesman opined after the Amini protests started.

This isn’t mere rhetoric, an excuse to give the regime some comfort in a land seething with anti-theocratic sentiment. Conspiracy-obsessed, Mr. Khamenei and his henchman have always seen sinister Western hands lurking behind oppositionists, especially those who seek greater personal freedom and democracy. The regime has its own lexicon: demands for democracy without clerical oversight are seditious innovation, and calls for relaxation of cultural strictures are apostasy.

In Iran, state and society now exist on different planes. The divine republic may be smug, corrupt and cruel (as more-sensitive members of the clergy acknowledge), but the theocracy genuinely believes it is following God’s blueprint. A restless citizenry chanting “Mullahs get lost!” and “We don’t want your Islamic Republic!” rejects it all. Even if the regime can wait out the protesters, killing as few women as possible, it can’t escape the fundamental challenge: If the hijab falls, so does the theocracy.

What is most striking about the regime’s response so far is its relative lack of violence. Revolutionary Guard commanders worked out a riot-control plan after crushing the massive pro-democracy Green Movement in 2009. The regime effectively deployed this hit-hard-quickly approach in nationwide protests in 2017 and 2019. In the latter clash, which was a violent eruption of the poor, the Revolutionary Guards reportedly used automatic weapons. Hundreds died.

That hasn’t happened yet against the thousands of women protesting. Like all declining dictatorships, the clerical regime has had a failure of imagination—in this case, about how to handle protesting women. Islamic societies treat women as legally inferior to men. Their protection is at the core of male identity and pride. To slaughter women in large numbers, or to rape them in police detention, puts severe pressure on the traditional Islamic pillars that give this regime legitimacy. The religious state could fall because women are forcing their men into action.

The Biden administration has now run into this buzzsaw of sexual politics and faith. If the president were wise, he would throw his lot in with Iranian women. Mr. Biden wasn’t going to stop the Iranian bomb in Vienna. Aligning American policy behind the rebels at least gives the administration a chance at regime change. It also gives the White House a chance to restore American dignity.

Mr. Gerecht is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Takeyh is a senior fellow at Council on Foreign Relations.

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Appeared in the October 3, 2022, print edition as 'Biden’s Chance to Restore American Dignity in Iran'.

6. FDD | U.S., Israeli Navies Conduct Exercise as Iran Steps up Maritime Aggression

FDD | U.S., Israeli Navies Conduct Exercise as Iran Steps up Maritime Aggression

fdd.org · September 30, 2022

Latest Developments

The naval forces of the United States and Israel conducted a four-day bilateral training exercise, dubbed Digital Shield, this month in the Red Sea’s Gulf of Aqaba. The joint exercise comes in the wake of Iran’s attempts to seize American unmanned surface vessels, or USVs, in both the Red Sea and Persian Gulf over the past 30 days. The exercise focused on “enhancing maritime awareness using unmanned systems and artificial intelligence in support of vessel boarding operations,” according to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. The USVs used in the exercise improve the ability to monitor the malign maritime activities of Tehran and its terror proxies.

Expert Analysis

“When it comes to maritime security in the Middle East, Iran is an arsonist posing as a firefighter. Tehran’s strategy of exporting terrorism depends on its ability to keep its activities hidden and its adversaries divided. It is not surprising that Iran is concerned about the increasing ability of the United States and its partners to monitor and counter malign maritime activity. Israel, the United States, and its Arab partners should press ahead with efforts to increase combined maritime surveillance and interdiction capabilities.” – Bradley Bowman, FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power Senior Director

Tehran Targets American Unmanned Surface Vessels

On August 29, the U.S. Navy detected an Iranian ship in the Persian Gulf towing an American USV. When U.S. forces responded, the Iranian vessel cut the line towing the USV and departed. Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, the commander of the U.S. 5th Fleet, called the attempted seizure “flagrant, unwarranted and inconsistent with the behavior of a professional maritime force.”

Undeterred, only two days later, another Iranian ship seized two U.S. USVs that had been operating in the Red Sea for more than 200 days without incident. Two U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyers responded quickly, seeking to recover the USVs. The Iranian crew refused to release them for approximately 18 hours, eventually relenting the next morning.

Iranian Maritime Smuggling

Iran uses the maritime domains in the Middle East to threaten freedom of navigation and smuggle weapons to terror proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen. These proxies use these weapons to conduct both maritime and land attacks. The U.S. 5th Fleet “seized 9,000 weapons being smuggled along routes historically used to unlawfully supply the Houthis in Yemen” in 2021, Vice Admiral Cooper said in April 2022. In March 2022, then-top U.S. commander in the Middle East Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said the Houthis conducted at least 45 cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia and the UAE thus far in the year.

Important Waters

McKenzie added the Middle East is home to “three of the world’s five most vital transit choke points.” The Red Sea, for example, serves as a primary route between Europe and Asia, with the Suez Canal sitting at its northern end and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait at its southern end. In 2021, the Suez carried approximately 12 percent of global trade, 8 percent of seaborne liquefied natural gas, and 5 percent of the world’s crude oil. When the Suez was blocked by a cargo ship for six days in March 2021, it held up a reported $60 billion in trade. Tehran’s activities in and near these waters threaten global commerce and the core security interests of the United States and its partners.

Related Analysis

• “New Mideast task force can counter Iranian arms smuggling, but more capabilities are needed,” by Bradley Bowman, Ryan Brobst, and RADM (Ret) Montgomery
• “Expand Israel-Arab-US military drills to counter Iran and its proxies,” by Bradley Bowman and Ryan Brobst

fdd.org · September 30, 2022

7. Defining and Achieving Success in Ukraine

Probably one of the most comprehensive assessments produced so far.

Conclusion:

Ukraine’s military success against Putin’s aggression is a necessary step in the larger contest with Moscow. The bigger picture requires us to implant in Putin’s mind an acute appreciation for the West’s capacity and willingness to defend the existing order. Moscow must be made to recognize it will not gain anything from its vicious campaign, and come to realize that its interests are being undermined by its own actions. Ultimately, Russia will have to realize that it will continue losing the larger contest with Western democracies.

Defining and Achieving Success in Ukraine

By Frank Hoffman PRISM Vol. 10, No. 1

ndupress.ndu.edu

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Dr. Frank G. Hoffman, USMC (Ret.), is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the National Defense University.

View of the ruined city center of Kharkiv. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. March 1, 2022. Photo by Pavel Dorogoy.

View of the ruined city center of Kharkiv. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. March 1, 2022. Photo by Pavel Dorogoy.

View of the ruined city center of Kharkiv. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine. March 1, 2022. Photo by Pavel Dorogoy.

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The Post–Cold War era ended with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s series of strategic miscalculations against Kyiv. But the contest is much larger than a border dispute between Russia and Ukraine. A more overt contest has emerged, pitting Russia’s grievances and illusions against the Western democracies and the vestiges of a rules-based order. That contest is most evident in Ukraine, which has passed through a critical turning point after Russia’s attempted coup de main against the President Zelensky government in the capital failed spectacularly.1 As noted in an insightful April 2022 study, Putin’s initial gambit reflected “the death throes of an imperial delusion,” but also indicated that Russia was preparing for a protracted and deadly struggle.2 The West reveled over the former, and overlooked the portents of Moscow’s preparations.

The U.S. strategy being employed in coordination with our Allies has adapted to changing circumstances, gaining both an appreciation for the conflict’s serious consequences to international order and greater optimism about Ukraine’s chances of success and not just its survival. This strategic reassessment is reflected in the policy goals announcement made by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan: “ . . . what we want to see is a free and independent Ukraine, a weakened and isolated Russia, and a stronger, more unified, more determined West.”3 Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin echoed those comments, though his focus on the second policy aim was misunderstood as a unilateral escalation.4 The implications of the policy and the consensus behind these goals is revealed by the accelerated security assistance the United States is providing and by the advance weaponry being supplied. Congress has substantially increased aid to Ukraine for the coming year to over $40 billion.5

The U.S. policy aims are reasonable, although their internal consistency may contain some challenges. A free and independent Ukraine is not necessarily one whose territorial integrity is restored or whose economic survival is assured. A weakened Russia that cannot repeat this debacle has certainly been achieved at this point, given the losses that Moscow incurred by its incompetent management of the war. A cohesive and stronger North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a worthy goal already in evidence given the Alliance’s contributions to Ukraine, and now substantially augmented by the impending accession of Finland and Sweden.6

Yet, the war in Ukraine has passed its 150-day anniversary and is now a grinding war of attrition. Western sanctions have impaired Russia’s economy but are not forcing Moscow to reconsider its policy at this time.7 Russia has altered its war aims as well, but not altered its barbaric tactics. “What was proclaimed as a quick punitive expedition,” notes one former intelligence officer, “has been revised into a war to annex as much of Ukrainian territory as possible and, within that territory, to destroy any concept of Ukrainian national identity.”8

A predicted stalemate scenario that this author laid out in April 2022 is being borne out with the Russians making slow and costly advances, which is all that they can hope to achieve.9 Neither side seems likely to prevail, although the future may present new circumstances.

The question of the day, to borrow the title of a famous book from the long war on terrorism, is “Tell Me How This Ends.”10 General David Petraeus’ famous question looms just as large today. There is a lot of sentiment behind ensuring that Putin cannot win this war, and for declarations that “Ukraine must win,” but not a lot of ideas on how to make that happen anytime soon.11 Some columnists passionately press for a clear military defeat. Yet, the “Putin Must Lose” school does not offer a clear way to generate that endstate and does not weigh the related human costs or risks. The majority of commentary today is focused on “why” Ukraine must prevail, and less detailed when it comes to the “how.”12

While there seem to be some clear and public aims in the United States, there is less agreement within NATO and precious few ideas on the ways and means to obtain them. In short, there is much consensus on ensuring a Russian loss, but little agreement on the ways to make that happen. Some seek peace for the sake of reducing the extensive human suffering in Ukraine, while others want off ramps to avoid “humiliating Putin.”

The strategic discipline demonstrated to date by the U.S. government, employing all the tools of statecraft in close linkage with allies and parties, has been commendable. Putin’s naked aggression has been blunted, and his strategic failure is evident to the entire globe, even if Moscow won’t admit it. It is time to ask, as Eliot Cohen did, what is our goal or what will victory look like.13 Is a battlefield victory by Ukraine the right goal and what would generate that result? What are the realistic chances of success, and what could undercut Ukraine’s chances of succeeding on the battlefield? This article examines the ongoing war and explores options that lead to ending the conflict in some way that would constitute success or “victory.” Decisive victory in a purely military sense is an unlikely prospect. A frozen conflict, a larger and longer version of Donbas across the entire Ukrainian frontier, is increasingly likely despite the efforts by the West to induce Russia to back down. The prospects of a grinding stalemate are evident and extending the fighting creates spillover consequences for other U.S. strategic priorities. A war of endurance may play to U.S./European economic advantages but could evolve in a way that harms longer-term interests.

Now is the time to reassess collective strategies for bringing this conflict to an end rather than accept the costs and consequences of its protracted character.

Is Victory Possible?

Few political or military options seem available aside from continuing the current approach, which is predicated upon massive security assistance to provide the arms the Ukrainian people need to defend themselves. Are the Alliance strategy and contributions enough? Can Ukraine build off its initial success around Kyiv and thwart Russian advances along the eastern and southern coastlines? Some analysts believe that Kyiv could restore the status quo that existed before Russia launched its attack in February.14

Assessing the relative chances of Ukraine’s ability to not just hold the line but regain the 20 percent of its territory from occupation raises a key question for the West. Can success be obtained with a strategy that relies so heavily on Ukraine to bear the entire human cost of combat? President Zelensky has vowed to retake all of the occupied territory. Is this feasible, and at what cost? The Ukrainians make it clear they are willing to bear that horrific cost, while also recognizing that they want to convert that battlefield success into a durable political solution. Yet, Ukraine, even with massive military transfusions, may not be able to regain its lost territory by force of arms. It would require offensives of combined arms maneuver against dug-in Russian forces for success, reversing the conditions of the prior battles and victories in the north. Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable courage, but it has also suffered grievous losses.15 Russia is regrouping and making some gains, including in the contested Donbas. It is also learning lessons and adapting under fire.16 It is making small advances to date, and the grinding progress has given Putin hope that he may secure all the Donbas and attrit the Ukrainian army’s best forces. It is likely that Russia will be satisfied with a frozen conflict, perhaps with Moscow simply digging in along a rather extended front. It could also annex the occupied territory and try to install its own local governments. It is laying the foundation for introducing its own governance structure, Russian language signs, and issuing passports at this time. By the time this article is published, Russian could still be occupying a large chunk of Ukraine, as shown in figure 1.

Figure 1. Ukraine Theater of Operations

Figure 1. Ukraine Theater of Operations

Figure 1. Ukraine Theater of Operations

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A straight up military victory for either side is increasingly unlikely, but wars bring about unlikely circumstances and dramatic shifts in fortune. It helps to understand what one’s policy goals are first to determine what constitutes success and to assess what is feasible.

Defining Success

It is time to question aims, assumptions, and risk. Most importantly, we need to ask if we have a “theory of victory” for this war.17 Kyiv has now made their own hypothesis for a theory of victory much clearer. It may not be realistic but it is clear. Is the strategy and its inherent logic realistic about the complexities of the conflict? Does the military notion of victory and defeat capture the only options to resolve the conflict or at least stop the horrific violence? What trade space exists for negotiations, including territory or political constraints on both sides? Too many have deflected this issue, deferring to Kyiv. But there are Western chips on the negotiating table: sanctions relief, security guarantees, reconstruction costs, freedom of navigation, etc. Kyiv has borne the butcher’s bill and thus should sit at the head of the settlement table, but it cannot write checks for U.S. taxpayers or unilaterally pass on bills for the West to pay. Moreover, the goals it sets for reclaiming territory from Russian occupation have to be balanced against how much security assistance is available and offered.

The answer to the larger questions involves generating a broader “theory of success” for the West.18 The U.S. representative to NATO called for a strategic defeat of the Russian Federation.19 Those comments should mean that Putin’s strategy in Ukraine is completely stopped. But that statement and Secretary Austin’s widely cited comment in Poland about “weakening” Russia came across to allies in Europe as a call for regime change. The Secretary’s statement simply outlined a longer-term goal, consistent with Mr. Sullivan’s, to ensure that Russia cannot simply regroup and reattack Ukraine next year. Yet, this has surfaced cracks in the West about desired political outcomes and what constitutes “victory.”20 Is it about defending Ukraine, or a military defeat of Russia’s armed forces, or a larger and more enduring end to tensions with Moscow? The two contests are inter-related but winning in Ukraine does not necessarily and automatically resolve the larger contest.

Opinions on U.S. objectives vary and emotive calls to embrace Ukrainian victory as the singular goal are increasingly voiced now, with little distinction from actions that best serve Washington’s or the West’s interests.21 We also need to align our strategy with Ukraine’s leadership. We need to come to an agreement on what constitutes success in Ukraine and on the larger challenge posed by Putin against Europe, writ large.

To reassess objectives going forward, we need to be clear-eyed about Putin’s agenda. This is far more than a fight between Moscow and Kyiv. As the Atlantic Council noted, Putin seeks to dismantle the entire post–Cold War European security architecture and reestablish a Russian sphere of influence over Eastern and Central Europe.22 He wants veto authority over how states in Europe exercise their sovereign rights of political, economic, and security association. He has designs on a weaker if not dissolved NATO. These are not objectives compatible with Europe’s interests or security.

We also need to understand Putin’s theory of victory, which is not hard to capture. Putin’s logic is based on his willingness to pile more men and materiel, and accept higher losses, in order to simply grind down Kyiv’s defense through sheer brute force. As Russian expert Keir Giles aptly put it, Moscow seeks to “keep up the pressure on Ukraine longer than Ukraine can keep up Western interest in supporting it in its fight for freedom.”23 That is Moscow’s theory of victory in a war of endurance that Putin started.

U.S. Strategy: Interests and Risk

What are U.S. interests and what are our desired outcomes? According to Thomas Friedman, we must stay laser-focused on the U.S. national interest and not stray in ways that lead to exposures and risks Friedman does not want.24 Friedman does not want the United States burdened with the obligation of a large protectorate in Eastern Europe, and is worried about the building momentum towards direct war with Russia. However, Friedman was vague about exactly what interests he sought to secure and in what priority. What exactly are the U.S. interests?

U.S. President Joe Biden understands the scale of the challenge and its character. He has spoken about how today’s liberal democracies now face a test, a “great battle for freedom. A battle between democracy and autocracy. Between liberty and repression. Between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force. In this battle, we need to be clear-eyed.”25

The Administration has been clear-eyed but also cautious. The Administration has lived up to its strategic guidance, and exploited diplomacy first, and reserved raw military force as “a last resort, not the first.”26 The Biden Administration deserves credit for conceiving of the conflict in more than military terms and for understanding that the contest would be a war of wills and systemic attrition. The impulses of the “crusader reflex” in U.S. strategic culture were restrained and replaced with a prudent regard for consequences and risks.27 The Administration’s strategic discipline and statecraft is quite impressive to date, especially the coordination with allies in Europe. But we need to be equally clear-eyed when it comes to economic sanctions and diplomacy. The reassessment and accelerated military aid have bought time, but they may not guarantee Ukraine’s success or secure America’s strategic interests.

Russia’s behavior touches on several national interests for Washington. Breaking them down, the United States has calculated that U.S. vital interests, particularly the long-term stability of Europe proper and a stronger NATO alliance, are the most critical. To protect these prioritized interests, Washington has elected to support Ukraine generously but restrict its support and not directly intervene with U.S. forces. It recognizes that Ukraine’s sovereignty is challenged and understands the horrific suffering Russia has caused, but the Administration’s geopolitical risk calculation concludes that the war against Ukraine does not require or warrant a more forceful or direct intervention.

This appears to comport with polling data collected by the Chicago Global Affairs Council, which showed large majorities of Americans support more aid, but indicate less support for taking risk in fighting.28 However, this data was collected in late March and may not reflect the cumulative impact of inflation, gas price hikes, and other economic trends the United States is now facing.29

Figure 2. (Adapted from Chicago's Global Affairs Council)

Figure 2. (Adapted from Chicago’s Global Affairs Council)

Figure 2. (Adapted from Chicago’s Global Affairs Council)

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During the first Cold War, international law and norms were held as core national interests and were important enough to be enforced by the United States, often with military force. At different points in time, democracy and liberal values were national interests to be advanced, with hard power if needed. In today’s context justice, human rights, international law, and norms of the rules-based order are described as important but not vital interests. Preserving our alliance and its collective security while also keeping a wary eye on the presumed more strategic competition with China appear to be the higher interests being prioritized at the highest level. These are the vital interests that seem to be operative in formulating U.S. strategy. Some may argue that the assessment is fear-based or risk averse, leading to crushing defeat for a democracy rather than a dangerous aggressor. But on balance, it arguably reflects prudence and strategic discipline based upon deliberative analysis versus idealistic imperatives or impulses.30

Evaluating Risk. We also need to appreciate what is at risk. Risk in national security is often not well defined.31 Policymakers cannot merely act upon their understanding of a state’s interests; they must examine risks and consequences of both actions and inaction as well. The purpose of thinking about risks is to avoid faulty logic and not allow human biases to creep in. Research suggests that intellectual rigor, self-examination, and openness to information and alternative perspectives represent an “antidote to the frivolous treatment of risk.”32

The range of possible outcomes, desired or unintended, from the ongoing war are varied and dangerous. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, defined it, “If this is left to stand … if Russia gets away with this cost-free, then so goes the so-called international order, and if that happens, then we’re entering into an era of seriously increased instability.”33 This raises a question of just how to best preserve an international security order that lasted nearly 80 years without great power war. That order has been under challenge for the last decade or so.

The United States and Europe seek to reinforce the larger system indirectly with aid to Ukraine but not direct military power. The major interests in preserving the rules-based order and protecting human rights and international law may be gained in the long run vis-a-vis Moscow, but not at increased risk to NATO’s internal cohesion or direct attack against the security of its member states.

Contagion is another risk. In this new version of Hobbes’ world, we may need to revive the Cold War domino theory for autocracies. As The Economist noted in an editorial, “Reward Mr. Putin now, and the risk that other autocracies start launching similar invasions of weaker neighbors increases.”34 Handing a victory to Russia here is alleged to increase risk from other autocratic states with ambitious ideas about territory, including China and the South China Sea or Taiwan.

The risk of a larger war with the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons is the principal risk that captures NATO and European Union (EU) leadership attention. Whether or not Putin would use such weapons is a speculation with inordinate consequences. This may not reflect well on the large investment the United States makes on its own strategic deterrent if one concludes that it does not deter Russian behavior. Conversely, one might discount Putin’s saber rattling as merely an application of Russian disinformation and reflexive control, a form of perception management that seeks to manipulate adversary decisionmaking.35 Russia seems to have been very successful in embedding this perception into Western leaders. 36 But it is a potential risk.

Stability can be subjected to intensive pressures from something as simple as spikes in food prices, which can have downstream political repercussions in places like Africa and the Middle East, which are highly reliant upon agricultural imports from Ukraine and Russia. Russia seeks to exploit the chaos it has created for political gain, and its blockade of coastal ports and international waters, while “hoarding its own food exports, is a form of blackmail,” according to the EU President.37 Recent analyses on rising food prices suggest that this is a real problem, see figure 3. 38 Spiking food prices correlate with higher incidents of instability.

Figure 3. Real Food Price Index 2006-2022

Figure 3. Real Food Price Index 2006 to 2022

Figure 3. Real Food Price Index 2006 to 2022

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The conflict comes with short-range and long-term implications for the global economy. This is most evident in higher energy prices, which could seriously impact Western economies. Some European countries may be in recession as of this writing. Energy markets have seen crude oil prices almost double in the past year, and they are expected to stay high for some time.39 Figure 4 shows the 50 percent increase in the price of a barrel of crude oil over a one-year period.40 Making matters worse, natural gas prices also are in flux due to reduced demand, higher transportation costs, and sanctions against Russia. This will depress the global economy and possibly push key Allies in Europe into recession and political turmoil.

Figure 4. Crude Oil Futures Prices

Figure 4. Crude Oil Futures Prices

Figure 4. Crude Oil Futures Prices

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There are other risks as well from this grinding war of attrition, including protracted violence and resultant humanitarian disaster. According to the United Nations, the number of people displaced globally by conflict, violence, and human rights violations has now crossed over 100 million for the first time on record, propelled by the 11 million forced to flee the war in Ukraine.41 The second order effects—an unstable Europe, recession, disease breakouts, and food insecurity—will have major repercussions. The Russian blockade could cause a global food crisis, and possibly starve millions, and it is highly likely that many millions will face increased food insecurity.42 There are numerous disruptions that are aggravated by Putin’s aggression.43 Figure 5, which provides an outlook on food security by country, reveals a larger problem that Ukraine’s crisis merely exacerbates.44

Figure 5. Food Insecurity Index by Country and Source

Figure 5. Food Insecurity Index by Country and Source

Figure 5. Food Insecurity Index by Country and Source

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The final risk concerns Ukraine’s capacity over time. The Biden Administration’s strategy has upsides in terms of its comprehensive and coalition-based approach. But the downside of the U.S. approach is that it takes months to implement and places a lot of faith in and burden on Kyiv and its troops to do the heavy lifting. We should recognize the limits of the Ukrainian armed forces. Ukraine is a nation under arms, counting on a combination of professionals and over-aged patriots. Although they have displayed heroic motivation and resilience, they may not have the manpower to hold their lines, absorb high-tech Western weapons, and undertake offensive operations to recover lost ground in the face of Russia’s massive amount of stand-off firepower.45 They may be able to sustain their defensive lines but may lack the combat power to push Russian forces back to pre-invasion borders. We underestimated Ukraine at the start of this war, but we still need an objective net assessment to see if the logic of our strategy produces a feasible outcome. Certainly, the long-range missiles now flowing in improve the odds.

In war, as Churchill once noted, “the terrible ‘ifs’ accumulate.”46 Risk accrues over time, for both sides. More risks to global security, including famine, emanate from this conflict each week. The instability Putin threatens by weaponizing wheat poses significant consequences for countries struggling to import grain and deepens food insecurity.47 Miscalculation and escalation are constant risks. Reducing those risks and their likely implications is in our interest ultimately, and thus contesting Russian aggression is a strategic necessity.

Strategic Courses of Action

Having explored the contours of the strategic interaction, what courses of action does the West have given what we have observed and learned from 150 days of war? Can diplomacy resolve this crisis or should overt military support from NATO be deployed inside Ukraine? This next section evaluates diplomatic and military options, and concludes with a discussion about merging them into a more comprehensive strategy focused on compelling an end to the war.

Diplomacy. Professor Barry Posen feels that a Ukrainian military victory is unlikely and that a political and diplomatic solution should be pursued. He argues:

In Ukraine, the Russian army is likely strong enough to defend most of its gains. In Russia, the economy is autonomous enough and Putin’s grip tight enough that the president cannot be coerced into giving up those gains, either. The most likely outcome of the current strategy, then, is not a Ukrainian triumph but a long, bloody, and ultimately indecisive war.48

Posen is rightfully concerned that a protracted and vicious conflict would extend the loss of human life and increase the damage to Europe’s economy and is also wary of escalation—including the potential use of nuclear weapons. But key European leaders, including French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio, have previously advocated diplomatic solutions to the war.49 They hoped that Putin would rationally assess his diminished chances of a battlefield success, as Posen suggests, and seek to get out from under the massive sanctions package levied on Moscow. But Putin did not act according to their analysis and it is not clear why Posen assumes that rationality prevails in the Kremlin. Putin is clearly not “a first-class strategist who should be feared and respected.”50 Putin’s judgment is shaped by imperial illusions as shown by Jeffrey Mankoff in his Empires of Eurasia.51 The imperial histories of Europe cast a long shadow even today, with Russia seemingly trapped between delusions of power and vulnerability. As William Burns, the U.S. director of the CIA put it, President Putin is “stewing in a very combustible combination of grievance and ambition and insecurity.”52 The American intelligence community finds Putin more unpredictable than ever.53

Would some sort of negotiated settlement with a Russian withdrawal from selected areas be feasible? There are calls for negotiations to this conflict but little common ground on what the deal might look like.54 The Italian proposal, a cease fire and some concessions to promote a peace conference, is thin on actual compromises. Both sides have flatly rejected it.

Given the dynamics on the battlefield, both sides will have problems compromising and dealing with their domestic politics. Putin obviously has fewer concerns about his domestic base, but his actions to tightly control the information space and dissent inside Russia suggests he knows that his authority and position can be challenged. He needs to deliver some benefit for the horrible costs his war has imposed on his economy and his devastated military.

President Zelensky is strong politically but also has constraints. In a recent survey, 82 percent of Ukrainians polled stated that territory should not be given to Russia in trade for peace and “under any circumstances, even if this prolongs the war.”55 Just 10 percent of Ukrainians who participated in the poll indicated that they were willing to cede land now to gain peace. Given this, Zelensky cannot politically accept an agreement that locks in Russia’s current position inside Ukraine, or survive politically if he goes against the majority of his electorate.56

At this point, neither side seems prepared to negotiate. Russia is making incremental progress in Donbas and holds a lot of terrain. The Ukrainians have mobilized and shifted to securing their eastern and southern regions, and expect greater success as they absorb advanced weaponry. A settlement is not in sight and a premature deal would alleviate the horrible suffering inside Ukraine only temporarily. Russia may regroup over time and threaten Ukraine’s freedom and peace in Europe yet again. At this point there seems to be no available mechanism or motivation to implement a political solution or even a cease fire. The latter may be palliative, stopping the massive violence, but it is certainly not conducive to long-term stability if it simply locks in the current battle lines and tensions—and with Putin holding three times more ground than before the war.

More Direct Military Force. If a political solution is not likely, are there military options that require consideration? Some analysists have argued that NATO should call Russia’s bluff and use armed force for specific and narrowly defined humanitarian purposes, including no-fly zones or escorted naval convoys to enforce freedom of the sea. Some have called for more forceful options including some sort of U.N. Peace Enforcement Operation.57

More recently, advocates have called for a humanitarian mission to keep grain flowing to and from Odessa.58 Others seek to use a NATO force to sustain trade going into and out of Ukraine’s ports, which is possible but depends on Turkey and other Allied nations supporting the maritime force that ensures that Ukraine is not blockaded.59 The Russian Navy suffered a setback in the Black Sea when the flagship cruiser Moskva was sunk but it still has the strongest naval force in those waters.60

Of course, using force invariably comes with potential risk of escalation. The authority and appetite for intervention in Ukraine, whether no fly zones or humanitarian escorts, are limited. Direct intervention has little appeal inside the Alliance, especially from states that have underfunded defense for years. Most observers feel that direct and overt intervention, with either planes in the air over Ukraine or troops on the ground, is a step too far. There is a risk that Putin would simply escalate further and possibly attack a NATO ally. Putin and his Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov never fail to condition Western policy makers with less than subtle commentary about their tactical nukes. Numerous Western leaders have cited fears of World War III and the chance of global war repeatedly since the start of the war.61

While there are few credible advocates for more direct intervention, the risk calculus needs recalibration due to Russian losses and clear dysfunction. Putin has little military force left to deploy; his army is starting to field legacy and junkyard quality systems.62 He may attempt to escalate the conflict in response, inside of Ukraine or beyond in NATO countries, if the West was to inject any overt form of military force. To do so would risk pitting what is left of his diminished combat power against a much larger NATO force. A former U.S. policy official assessed those odds in stark terms, “If the Ukrainian military can fight the Russian military to a standstill, imagine what it would look like if the United States and its allies joined?”63 There is ample evidence to assess how a contest of arms between Russia and a professional combined arms force will play out, and it is likely that NATO’s airpower would make the Alliance far more effective than combat operations in Ukraine to date. The chances of Ukraine regaining all its lost ground may be slim, but it is difficult to imagine that either the United States or NATO would not prevail due to numerous qualitative advantages as well as evident and enduring Russian deficiencies. It is not hubris to conclude that U.S. forces would be effective in Ukraine, while also recognizing that Russia’s armed forces have been learning from their experience.64

However, there are members in NATO not willing or able to provide combat forces for such an operation. An intervention could be a coalition of the willing, but activating that coalition may impose costs or risks to NATO members. Nor does the Alliance want to accept the risk of an attack on an Alliance member that would trigger a debate on Article 5 obligations. A rupture in the Alliance hands a win to Putin. Moreover, geographic access for large ground forces into Ukraine is not easily resolved without major diplomatic and logistical challenges. The same is true for keeping the Black Sea open and preserving freedom of navigation in international waters. Putin’s shift to the south made the Black Sea a new front in the campaign, one where NATO has fewer options in using force to break the blockade due to both geography and international law.65

Relatives cry at the mass grave of civilians killed during Russian occupation in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine. April 8, 2022. Photo by: Manhhai.

Relatives cry at the mass grave of civilians killed during Russian occupation in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine.

Relatives cry at the mass grave of civilians killed during Russian occupation in Bucha, on the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine. April 8, 2022. Photo by: Manhhai.

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Contrary to claims, realistic strategic gains from the use of force by the West are possible.66 Yet, the uncertain dynamics of escalation and shared risks must be factored in. Gains may be achieved but possibly at the cost of even larger vital interests to Washington and NATO. At this point, defined NATO and U.S. goals are being gained and vital interests preserved without taking that risk. President Biden has made it clear that there are limits to U.S. goals and support, and he defined what his government will not do in Ukraine. 67 This includes placing combat forces inside Ukraine, which explains the current approach of unprecedented sanctions, intelligence sharing, and robust security assistance. Thus, our theory of success is tied to Kyiv’s success and its theory of victory, which requires substantial fighting and far more additional military aid.68

Comprehensive Compellence. The pure diplomacy and military options could be combined in order to shorten the cruelty and compress the timelines of the conflict. This could be achieved by increasing political, economic, and military pressure with an approach that seeks an end to the fighting and the reestablishment of Ukrainian territorial integrity including the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. This approach—comprehensive compellence—uses all elements of statecraft to pressure Putin to stop his aggression.69 Having failed to deter him last February, we now seek to compel or induce Putin to stop his massive and brutal incursion. The elements of this approach are integrated and include political, military, and economic costs together to increase pressure and urgency. NATO’s security assistance should focus on providing a more than adequate amount of long-range fires and sufficient loitering munitions with anti-radiation sensors to degrade electronic warfare capabilities. Improved air defense assets to deflect the Russians from employing precision missile attacks on key infrastructure are also needed.70

The EU initiative for a stronger oil embargo and the several increments of advanced rocket systems being sent indicate that adding more pressure is possible. For economic pressure, there is discussion about using Russia’s frozen hard currency reserves to pay for reconstruction, albeit there are legal considerations to address.71 Rather than seize the reserves, it may be more palatable for governments to transfer those funds to a body such as the International Criminal Court or the EU Court where a fund grandmaster will deal with claims from Kyiv. Even that funding will only address half of Ukraine’s damages and recovery. The idea that Moscow will pay for its wanton destruction will help compel Putin to stop the terrorism he is sponsoring against Ukraine’s civilian population. The announcement from European leaders to endorse Ukraine for candidate status in the EU is a productive element of what could be a comprehensive effort targeting the long-term viability of Ukraine and signaling to Moscow that a sphere of influence is not acceptable.72

Comprehensive compellence need not be all stick and no carrot. Carrots or diplomatic inducements could be part of a concerted approach towards Putin.73 The problem is providing incentives that do not signal capitulation of any core interests. But surely there are various travel sanctions and property seizures from Russian oligarchs that may be negotiated as well as potential security guarantees for Russia and Ukraine to initiate discussions. Future energy options can be offered as an incentive later, as Putin may find that subordination to China is unappealing, especially as evidence grows that Russia’s status as an energy superpower and strategic partner is declining appreciably.74 Restrictions on Russian cultural and sporting events could be rescinded, as we are not at war with Russia’s culture, just the regime. Zelensky has openly discussed a neutral status for his nation, and at one time acknowledged that territorial concessions were possible. Those concessions may no longer be acceptable to Kyiv, given the dynamics of the war and Ukrainian losses.

In addition, to further create a sense of urgency, the West can announce a series of energy levels it would allocate for Russian energy exports, in declining packages over the next few months. The longer Putin waits, the lower the future financial benefit from Russia’s energy sales (and investment and technology) towards Russia’s future options. The EU still has more powerful sticks that it could employ, including maritime tanker embargos.75

But diplomacy and a political solution will require painful compromise on both sides. These are not “face-saving” gestures or “off ramps” but a pragmatic reality for ending this conflict. Judging from President Joe Biden’s The New York Times article, the need for a political solution is clearly recognized. The measured strategy implementing that policy right now should be strengthened and made more urgent until Mr. Putin realizes he cannot outlast the West and that he has to settle soon or accept “frozen sanctions” and other penalties for his frozen war.

Being pragmatic via comprehensive compellence does not mean a “sell-out” of Ukraine. Quite the contrary, it is simply a recognition of reality and the need to resolve a conflict that has serious repercussions beyond Ukraine. The risk to European stability should help clarify NATO’s goals and frame an endgame for the Alliance.76

Assessment

So, diplomacy offers few options, and in the military contest, we currently have a draw. But it appears that Ukraine is and will continue to expand its military power, while Russia’s deteriorates. Lawrence Freedman is surely right that the systemic advantages of the West favor Ukraine, and that time favors Ukraine at the operational level of war.77 Ukraine has asymmetric advantage in motivation and morale which counts for a lot. Clearly, given the country’s existential challenge, it can mobilize more manpower despite the significant population differential (Russia’s 145 million to Ukraine’s 44 million). Moreover, what combat power Moscow can muster is increasingly outdated and may not be easily reconstituted.78 This leaves the current strategy in play for now.

To secure its interests, the West will have to preserve its cohesion and support to Kyiv. Putin should not be allowed to dictate Moscow’s control over its “near abroad,” as that does not advance a stable order or sustain a free and independent Europe with NATO as a crucial element of its security. Russia is not going away, but neither can it be allowed to operate against its neighbors the way it has for the last decade.79 While the decline of Russia is very clearly not a myth, Moscow will remain a persistent problem.80 Over the mid-range it will not recover from the losses it has suffered, but Putin will remain reckless and retain unconventional options.

Kyiv’s endurance is predicated upon an assumption of sizable external support, and here time may not favor the defenders of freedom. That assumption will be sorely tested by economic conditions including inflation, recession, energy prices, and empty food shelves in several regions. As long as it receives the support from the West, Ukraine can continue to thwart Russian advances. Sustainment of the West’s support will be key to victory.81 This could test the West’s collective resolve to give Ukraine continued economic and military aid. Even Zelensky understands the potential for lagging support and the growing fatigue in the West.82

Putin is trying to stretch out the clock in the hopes that the Western public will tire of cold homes and pricey gas for their cars. Ukraine is operating off a different timeline as it seeks to push back Russian forces.83 Putin’s Army is likely to be destroyed waiting for the democracies and NATO to blink. At present, support for high levels of aid to Ukraine enjoys a considerable amount of support from the U.S. Congress. Polls suggest the American public is supportive even in the face of strain on the domestic economy. The Administration must work to sustain that support as it will be key to winning this war of endurance.

Russia has much larger problems in both material and manpower.84 It faces severe challenges in a war of attrition, including simply maintaining its current force levels. It is evidently facing a manpower shortage, calling in prisoners, mercenaries, and retired veterans. Russia’s forces are best described as exhausted and hollowed out.85 If one takes a careful stock of the Russian military, it is possible to assess a growing need to withdraw their forces in Ukraine, and a long effort to reconstitute a ready force able to defend their current borders. Reconstituting the current force, including tanks, aircraft, precision munitions, and advanced communications gear is going to take 5 to 7 years. Substantial support from China and Iran may accelerate that effort a few years. But external support will not alleviate persistent deficiencies in manpower and leader development.

At this time (July 2022), the West should be less patient and push hard for an endgame to establish the just peace that should be its ultimate objective.86 This comprehensive solution, mixing sticks and carrots, should be offered as soon as possible to reduce the risks and the larger costs of this crisis. But not at the expense of Ukraine’s prosperity and security. To advance that goal, the strategic discipline demonstrated by NATO to date must be continued but the pressure levied against Putin needs to be increased. One should not be cavalier about escalation when dealing with an unpredictable and mistake-prone opponent, but the West can continue to pressure Putin.87

Conclusion

Ukraine’s military success against Putin’s aggression is a necessary step in the larger contest with Moscow. The bigger picture requires us to implant in Putin’s mind an acute appreciation for the West’s capacity and willingness to defend the existing order. Moscow must be made to recognize it will not gain anything from its vicious campaign, and come to realize that its interests are being undermined by its own actions. Ultimately, Russia will have to realize that it will continue losing the larger contest with Western democracies. PRISM

Notes

1 Rob Johnson, “Dysfunctional Warfare: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Parameters 52, no. 2 (Summer 2022), 5–20.

2 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Operation Z: Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion (London: Royal United States Institute, April 22, 2022).

3 Jake Sullivan, statement on NBC’s Meet the Press, April 10, 2022, available at <https://www.nbc.com/meet-the-press/video/full-jake-sullivan-weapons-are-arriving-every-day-in-ukraine/420357951>.

4 Lloyd Austin quoted by David Sanger, “Behind Austin’s Call for a ‘Weakened’ Russia, Hints of a Shift,” New York Times, April 25, 2022, 1; Missy Ryan, and Annabelle Timsit, “U.S. wants Russian military ‘weakened’ from Ukraine invasion, Austin says,” Washington Post, April 25, 2022; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/25/russia-weakened-lloyd-austin-ukraine-visit/>.

5 Catie Edmondson and Emily Cochrane, “House Passes $40 Billion More in Ukraine Aid, With Few Questions Asked,” New York Times, May 10, 2022, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/10/us/politics/congress-ukraine-aid-questions.<html?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20220511&instance_id=61016&nl=the-morning&regi_id=125171424&segment_id=91882&te=1&user_id=7da20347041190bb7e0ae63e3c726274>.

6 Joel Hickman, “Why Finland and Sweden’s Accession Is a Game-Changer for NATO,” CEPA, June 28, 2022, available at https://cepa.org/why-finland-and-swedens-accession-is-a-game-changer-for-nato/. See also, “NATO Allies Sign Accession Protocols for Finland and Sweden,” NATO, July 5, 2022, available at <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197763.htm>.

7 Ashish Valentine, “Are Sanctions Actually Hurting Russia’s Economy? Here’s What You Need to Know,” National Public Radio, July 1, 2022, available at <https://www.npr.org/2022/07/01/1109033582/are-sanctions-actually-hurting-russias-economy-heres-what-you-need-to-know>.

8 Phillip Wasielewski, The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine after 100 Days (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022), 4, available at <https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/the-evolving-political-military-aims-in-the-war-in-ukraine-after-100-days/?utm_source=FPRI+E-Mails&utm_campaign=ea941fac95-ukraine-event-march922_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_e8d0f13be2-ea941fac95-157830637>.

9 Frank Hoffman, “What Comes Next in Ukraine, Three Scenarios,” Modern War Institute, April, 14, 2022.

10 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends, General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: PublicAffairs, 2008).

11 Anne Applebaum, “Ukraine Must Win,” The Atlantic.com, March 22, 2022, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/03/how-democracy-can-win-ukraine/627125/.

12 For this author’s early effort on fleshing out the “how” see Frank Hoffman, “Defining and Securing Success in Ukraine,” Lawfire blog, June 20, 2022 at https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2022/06/20/dr-frank-hoffman-on-defining-and-securing-success-in-ukraine/.

13 Eliot A. Cohen, “What Victory Will Look Like in Ukraine,” The Atlantic, May 11, 2022, available at <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/ukraine-russia-goals-win-war/629815/>.

14 Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, “What If Ukraine Wins? Victory in the War Would Not End the Conflict With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2022, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-06/what-if-ukraine-wins?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=What%20If%20Ukraine%20Wins?&utm_content=20220610&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017>.

15 Associated Press, “As Ukraine Loses Troops, How Long Can It Keep Up the Fight?” VOA News, June 4, 2022, available at <https://www.voanews.com/a/as-ukraine-loses-troops-how-long-can-it-keep-up-the-fight-/6603860.html.>

16 Michael Kofman, “NATO Should Avoid Learning the Wrong Lessons from Russia’s Blunder in Ukraine,” The Economist, June 7, 2022.

17 Brad Roberts, “On the Need for a Blue Theory of Victory,” War on the Rocks, September 17, 2020, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/on-the-need-for-a-blue-theory-of-victory/>.

18 Frank G. Hoffman, “The Missing Element in Crafting National Strategy, A Theory of Success,” Joint Force Quarterly 97 (2nd Quarter, 2020), 55–64.

19 Camille Gijs and Hannah Roberts, “Western Allies Ramp Up Rhetoric against Russia, Want ‘Defeat’ of Moscow,” Politico, May 20, 2022, available at <https://www.politico.eu/article/western-allies-nato-us-uk-eu-against-russia-want-to-see-defeat-moscow/>.

20 David Sanger, Steven Erlanger, and Eric Schmitt, “How Does It End? Fissures Emerge Over What Constitutes Victory in Ukraine,” New York Times, May 26, 2002, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/26/us/politics/zelensky-ukraine-war.html.>

21 Alexander Vindman, “America Must Embrace the Goal of Ukrainian Victory,” Foreign Affairs, May 11, 2022, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-05-11/america-embrace-ukraine-victory-goal>.

22 Andriy Zagorodnyuk, “How to Make a Russian Invasion of Ukraine Prohibitively Expensive,” Atlantic Council, January 9, 2022, at <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/how-to-make-a-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-prohibitively-expensive/>.

23 Keir Giles, quoted in David Leonhardt, “The Battle for Donbas,” New York Times, March 30, 2022 available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/30/briefing/russia-ukraine-battle-for-donbas.html?campaign_id =9&emc=edit_nn_20220601&instance_id=62871&nl=the-morning&regi_id=125171424&segment_id= 93873&te =1&user_id=7da20347041190bb7e0ae63e3c726274>.

24 Thomas Friedman, The War is Getting More Dangerous for America and Biden Knows It,” New York Times, May 6, 2022, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/06/opinion/biden-ukraine-leaks.html>.

25 “Full Transcript of President Biden’s Speech in Warsaw on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” ABCnews.com, March 26, 2002, available at <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/full-transcript-president-bidens-speech-warsaw-russias-invasion/story?id=83690301>.

26 Interim National Security Guidance (Washington, DC: The White House, March 2021), 14, available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf>.

27 A reference to the classic Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State, The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1997).

28 Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, “Americans Support Ukraine—but Not with US Troops or a No-Fly Zone,” Chicago Global Affairs Council, April 2022, available at <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/Final%20US%20Ukraine%20Brief.pdf>.

29 Inflation in the United States is at a 40-year high, see Rachel Siegel, “June Inflation Soared 9.1%, a New 40-Year High, Amid Spiking Gas Prices,” Washington Post, July 13, 2022, available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/07/13/inflation-june-cpi/>.

30 Michael J. Mazarr, “Duty Bound to Disaster: Beware the Imperative in Foreign Policymaking,” War on the Rocks, March 22, 2022, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/duty-bound-to-disaster-beware-the-imperative-in-foreign-policymaking/>.

31 Michael J. Mazarr, “Fixes for Risk Assessment in Defense,” War on the Rocks, April 22, 2022, available at <https://warontherocks.com/2015/04/fixes-for-risk-assessment-in-defense/>.

32 Michael J. Mazarr, “The True Character of Risk,” Risk Management, June 2016, available at <https://www.rmmagazine.com/articles/article/2016/06/01/-The-True-Character-of-Risk->. Mazarr argues that decision making processes can capture risk, but “risk failures are mostly attributable to human factors—things like overconfidence, personalities, group dynamics, organizational culture and discounting outcomes—that are largely immune to process. In dealing with risk, human factors will defeat procedures every time.”

33 Quoted in Zachary Cohen, Ellie Kaufman, and Michael Conte, “Exclusive: Top U.S. General Tells CNN ‘Global International Security Order’ Is at Stake Following Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” CNN.com, April 26, 2002, available at <https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/26/politics/mark-milley-interview-cnntv/index.html>.

34 “Ukraine Needs Support, Not Timorous Advice,” The Economist, editorial, May 26, 2022.

35 For one expert in this obscure aspect of Russian military theory, see Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies Vol. 17 (2004), 237–256.

36 Michael Nienaber, “Germany’s Scholz Focuses Ukraine Policy on Avoiding Nuclear War,” Bloomberg, April 22, 2022, available at <https://www.stripes.com/theaters/europe/2022-04-22/germany-scholz-focuses-ukraine-policy-avoiding-nuclear-war-5768055.html>.

37 ”How Inflation is Flipping the Economic Script,” McKinsey & Company, July 6, 2022, available at <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/inflation/how-inflation-is-flipping-the-economic-script?cid=other-eml-alt-mip-mck&hdpid=47252fc8-f7be-4565-86a8-3c510163dcc4&hctky=13511506&hlkid=7c0016fe142248caa3a5a608ba1ee1ba>.

38 Shane Harris, “U.S. Intelligence Document Shows Russian Naval Blockade of Ukraine,” Washington Post, May 23, 2022, 1.

39 Gregory Brew, “Oil Prices Will Likely Rise to $150 a Barrel Soon,” Foreign Policy, June 8, 2022; Greg Ip, “Gas Prices Test American Appetite for New Cold War with Russia,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2022.

40 U.S. Energy Information Administration, June 2022 at Short-Term Energy Outlook (eia.gov).

41 “Ukraine, Other Conflicts Push Forcibly Displaced Total Over 100 Million for First Time,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 23, 2022, at <https://www.unhcr.org/ua/en/45221-ukraine-other-conflicts-push-forcibly-displaced-total-over-100-million-for-first-time.html>.

42 Joel Gehrke, “Russia Close to Triggering Famine that Will Kill Millions, Cindy McCain Says,” Washington Examiner, May 10, 2022, available at <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-close-to-triggering-famine-that-will-kill-millions-cindy-mccain-says/ar-AAX7Y7M?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=82ad49d666ec47418f5bf56b336fe997&fbclid=IwAR1B5PaLwyjZ6UMLiiAoeLLKiLRpiGWw5eWW05UaSA46iQ_TxDlV7gQE-9c>.

43 Olivia White et al, “The War in Ukraine: Twelve Disruptions Changing the World,” McKinsey & Company, May 9, 2022, at <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/war-in-ukraine-twelve-disruptions-changing-the-world>.

44 Anushka Mohite Mahale, Shreeshan V, “Food Protectionism: Starving the World of Effective Climate Response?” CarbonCopy, July 1, 2022, available at <https://carboncopy.info/newsletters/vol-1-july-2022-hunger-games/>.

45 Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Natlia Yermak, “High-Tech Western Weapons Pose Challenge for Untrained Ukrainian Soldiers,” New York Times, June 6, 2022, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/world/europe/ukraine-military-western-weapons.html>.

46 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis, Vol. 1 (London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923), 255.

47 David Ignatius, “The Ripple Effect of the Ukraine War is ‘a Potential Mass Starvation Event,’” Washington Post, June 16, 2022, available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/16/russia-ukraine-gain-shipments-food-prices-famine-black-sea/>.

48 Barry Posen, “Ukraine’s Implausible Theories of Victory,” Foreign Affairs, July 8, 2022, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-08/ukraines-implausible-theories-victory>.

49 Nicely summarized at Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Italy Floats 4-Point Peace Plan to End Ukraine Conflict Including Winding Down of Sanctions,” The Economic Times, May 23, 2022, available at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/italy-floats-4-point-peace-plan-to-end-ukraine-conflict-including-winding-down-of-sanctions-against-russia/articleshow/91732120.cms? utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst>.

50 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 5 (September/October 2014), 77–89. For an opposing current perspective see, Ngaire Woods, “What the Mighty Miss: The Blind Spots of Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2022, available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-21/what-mighty-miss.

51 Jeffrey Mankoff, Empires of Eurasia: How Imperial Legacies Shape International Security (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022).

52 William Burns cited in “Transcript: Vladamir Putin Doesn’t Believe He Can Afford to Lose: William Burns,” Financial Times, May 9, 2022, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/bd87fafd-1f9c-4dcd-af64-940cf9495ce5?campaign_id=249&emc=edit_ruwb_20220509&instance_id=60889&nl=russia-ukraine-war-briefing&regi_id=125171424&segment_id=91747&te= 1&user_id=7da20347041190bb7e0ae63e3c726274>.

53 Connor O’Brien, “Top Intel Official Warns Putin’s Invasion Could Become ‘More Unpredictable And Potentially Escalatory,’” Politico, May 10, 2022, available at <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/10/dni-haines-putin-ukraine-invasion-unpredictable-00031375>.

54 Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, “What If Russia Makes a Deal?” Foreign Affairs, March 23, 2022, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-23/what-if-russia-makes-deal?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&utm_campaign=What%20If%20Russia%20Makes%20a%20Deal?&utm_content=20220325&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017>.

55 Emily Sullivan, “Ukrainians Unwilling to Give Up National Territory,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, blog, May 26, 2022, available at <https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/commentary-and-analysis/blogs/ukrainians-unwilling-give-national-territory>.

56 Lawrence Freedman, “How Long Will the War Last,” Comment is Freed, May 27, 2022, available at <https://samf.substack.com/p/how-long-will-the-war-last?s=r>.

57 Daniel Gernstein and Doublas Ligor, “Time for a U.N. Peace Enforcement Operation in Northern Ukraine?” Lawfare, April 27, 2022 available at <https://www.lawfareblog.com/time-un-peace-enforcement-operation-northern-ukraine?utm_source=AdaptiveMailer&utm_>.

58 One experienced NATO hand suggests a humanitarian option in Ivo Daalder, “How to End Russia’s Black Sea Blockade,” Politico, May 28, 2022, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/how-to-end-russia-black-sea-blockade-nato-ukraine-trade/.

59 Lawrence Freedman, “Breaking the Black Sea Blockade,” Comment is Freed, May 17, 2022, available at <https://samf.substack.com/p/breaking-the-black-sea-blockade?s=r>.

60 “Russian Warship: Moskva Sinks in Black Sea,” BBC News, April 15, 2022, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61114843>.

61 Imanuel Marcus, “Olaf Scholz: ‘There Must Not be a Nuclear War,’” Berlin Spectator, April 23, 2022, available at <https://berlinspectator.com/2022/04/23/olaf-scholz-there-must-not-be-a-nuclear-war/>.

62 “Stung By Losses, Russia Pulls Out Its ‘Antique Tanks’ From The Boneyard Used During Soviet-Afghan War,” The Eurasian Times, May 26, 2022, available at https://eurasiantimes.com/russia-pulls-out-its-antique-tanks-from-the-boneyard/.

63 For an informed alternative perspective see, David J. Johnson, “Would We Do Better? Hubris and Validation in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks, May 31, 2022.

64 David Johnson, “Would We Do Better? Hubris and Validation in Ukraine,” War on the Rocks,” May 31, 2022.

65 James Stavridis, “The Next Front in the Ukraine War Will Be on the Black Sea,” Bloomberg, May 6, 2022; Bradford Dismukes, “Breaking Russia’s Naval Blockade,” Clio’s Musings, July 8, 2022, at <https://cliosmusings.blog/2022/07/08/breaking-russias-naval-blockade/>.

66 Tom Stevenson, “America and Its Allies Want to Bleed Russia. They Really Shouldn’t,” New York Times, May 11, 2022, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-america.html>. Mr. Stevenson contends that “By expanding support to Ukraine across the board and shelving any diplomatic effort to stop the fighting, the United States and its allies have greatly increased the danger of an even larger conflict. They are taking a risk far out of step with any realistic strategic gain.”

67 Joseph Biden, “What America Will and Will Not Do in Ukraine,” New York Times, May 31, 2022, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/31/opinion/biden-ukraine-strategy.html>.

68 As presented by Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Dmytro Kuleba, “How Ukraine Will Win: Kyiv’s Theory of Victory,” Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2022, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-17/how-ukraine-will-win>.

69 Frank Hoffman, “America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy against Russia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 28, 2022.

70 Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory (London: Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022).

71 Tom Keatinge and Maria Nizzero, “From Freeze to Seize: Creativity and Nuance is Needed,” RUSI, June 7, 2022, available at <https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/freeze-seize-creativity-and-nuance-needed>.

72 Andrew Kramer and Michael Levenson, “Europe Offers Ukraine a Hope of Joining the E.U., but Not a Vast Arsenal,” New York Times, June 16, 2022, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/world/europe/ukraine-eu-macron-scholz-zelensky.html?campaign_id=9&emc=edit_nn_20220617&instance_id=64291&nl=the-morning&regi_id=125171424&segment_id=95798&te=1&user_id=7da20347041190bb7e0ae63e3c726274>.

73 From the astute UK defense analyst Sean Monaghan, Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 25, 2022), available at <https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/052522-reviving-the-prospects-for-coercive-diplomacy-in-ukraine.pdf>.

74 Maria Shagina, “Russia’s Status as an Energy Superpower is Waning,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, blog, June 14, 2022, available at <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/06/russias-status-as-an-energy-superpower-is-waning#:~:text=In%20the%20long%20term%2C%20Russia%E2%80>.

75 “How the World Is Paying for Putin’s War in Ukraine,” Bloomberg, June 1, 2022, available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022-06-01/has-sanctioning-russia-worked-oil-gas-sales-put-285b-in-putin-s-pocket#xj4y7vzkg>.

76 Felicia Schwartz and Amy Kazmin, “What Is America’s End-Game for the War in Ukraine?” Financial Times, May 29, 2022, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/315346dc-e1bd-485c-865b-979297f3fcf5>.

77 Lawrence Freedman, “Time Favours Ukraine in its Grim Struggle for National Survival,” Financial Times, June 5, 2022, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/f2f360e0-25f8-4060-83a3-775eb244d1d2>.

78 See the detailed assessment on timelines by military domain and weapons production cycles by Pavel Luzin, “One-Way Ticket,” Riddle, available at <https://ridl.io/one-way-ticket/>.

79 Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Michael Kofman, “Russia Is Down. But It’s Not Out,” New York Times, June 2, 2022, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/02/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-nato.html>.

80 Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor, “The Myth of Russian Decline,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2021-10-19/myth-russian-decline>.

81 Kirstin J. H. Brathwaite and Margarita Konaev, “The Real Key to Victory in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, June 29, 2022, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-29/real-key-victory-ukraine>.

82 John Bacon, Jorge L. Ortiz and Celina Tebor, “Zelensky Says War ‘Fatigue is Growing’ in West,” USA Today, June 6, 2022, available at <https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-moves-to-seize-350m-plane-from-russian-oligarch-zelensky-says-war-fatigue-is-growing-in-west-live-ukraine-updates/ar-AAY7PhM>.

83 Raphael Cohen, “The Ukraine War’s Three Clocks,” RAND, blog, April 1, 2022, available at <https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/04/the-ukraine-wars-three-clocks.html>.

84 Lawrence Freedman, “Why the Russian Military Should be Very Worried,” The New Statesman, July 12, 2022 at <https://www.newstatesman.com/world/europe/ukraine/2022/07/ukraine-war-why-russian-military-should-be-worried>.

85 Brendan Cole, “Russian Forces ‘Increasingly Hollowed Out’ in Ukraine—U.K. Intel,” Newsweek, June 28, 2022, available at <https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-war-putin-troops-hollowed-out-mod-kremenchuk-1719734>.

86 Fareed Zakaria, “It’s Time to Start Thinking About the End Game in Ukraine,” Washington Post, June 16, 2022, available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/06/16/ukraine-war-endgame-russia-europe-us-goals/>.

87 Dan Altman, “The West Worries Too Much About Escalation in Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs, July 12, 2022, available at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-07-12/west-worries-too-much-about-escalation-ukraine>.

ndupress.ndu.edu

8. Philippines and U.S. kick off naval exercises amid China tension

Philippines and U.S. kick off naval exercises amid China tension

Reuters · by Reuters

MANILA, Oct 3 (Reuters) - The armed forces of the United States and Philippines launched two weeks of joint naval exercises on Monday, reinforcing a close military alliance at a time of regional uncertainty over tensions between Washington and Beijing.

KAMANDAG, an acronym in Filipino for "Cooperation of the warriors of the sea", runs until Oct. 14, will involve 2,550 American and 530 Filipino troops and include island-based exercises in amphibious landings, live fire and humanitarian assistance.

U.S. allies Japan and South Korea are joining the exercises as observers. The Philippines and United States, which are bound by a 70-year-old Mutual Defence Treaty, have been holding exercises for decades.

Reporting by Karen Lema; Editing by Martin Petty

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Reuters

9. Japan’s Africa aid rivals China in terms of ‘quality over quantity’: analysts

Japan: the "gold standard?"

Japan’s Africa aid rivals China in terms of ‘quality over quantity’: analysts

By Maria Siow South China Morning Post6 min

View Original

• Japan has been investing in the continent for longer than China and applies international standards to its infrastructure financing, analysts said
• Its pockets may not be as deep, but its support of good governance and democratic principles makes it a tempting development partner for African states

Maria Siow

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Published: 11:00am, 2 Oct, 2022

Engineers from China and Tanzania on a construction site in Dar es Salaam. Analysts said Japan focuses on providing training to African countries rather than exporting its workers like China does. Photo: Xinhua

Japan might not be able to rival China when it comes to exerting economic influence on the African continent, but analysts say Tokyo can offer an alternative model of development and compete with Beijing on providing infrastructure financing and good governance to international standards.

While it may currently seem like Japan is eager to play catch up with China in Africa, they said it has in fact long been one of the most important actors on the continent.

Late last month, at the eighth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Tunisia, Japan pledged US$30 billion in public and private financial contributions to the continent over the next three years.

02:55

Japan pledges US$30 billion of aid and investment for Africa to counter Chinese influence

The move has been widely seen as an attempt to exert economic and diplomatic influence in Africa and counter China’s standing.

Speaking via video link, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida pledged to help Africa “urgently deal with issues such as … unfair and opaque development finance”, in what was interpreted as a swipe at China’s lending practices.

Beijing has denied that it aims to catch countries in a “debt trap” with its Belt and Road Initiative, as Japan and other Group of 7 members have claimed, with a foreign ministry spokesman saying last month that “the so-called Chinese debt trap is a lie made up by the US and some other Western countries to deflect responsibility and blame”.

Purnendra Jain, visiting senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies, said Japan can offer an alternative development model for Africa.

“It is for the African nations to decide for themselves which models appeal to them and are in their national interest,” he said, adding that Japan was a player on the continent even before Beijing launched its Forum of China-Africa Cooperation in 2000.

“It’s hard for Japan to compete with China in quantity terms, but Tokyo offers quality projects which are transparent in nature and in partnership with African nations,” Jain said.

Celine Pajon, head of Japan research at the French Institute of International Relations’s Centre for Asian Studies in Paris, said while Japan could not match the amount China was pledging to Africa, Tokyo sought to differentiate itself from Beijing by insisting on quality in its approach to development lending.

“Tokyo applies international standards on infrastructure financing, it supports good governance and democratic principles,” Pajon said, adding that Japan also focused on investing in human resources by providing training to African countries instead of exporting its workers like China does.

The number of Chinese workers in Africa peaked at 263,659 in 2015, according to the John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies’ China Africa Research Initiative (CARI), but the figure has steadily declined since then.

By the end of 2020, it stood at 104,074 – down 43 per cent from the previous year – largely because of pandemic-related travel difficulties.

Japan can support Africa’s economic recovery from the pandemic by helping nations build up their fiscal autonomy and working to prevent sovereign and private debt defaults, Pajon said.

“Rather than competing with China, Japan is trying to provide an alternative to what Beijing has to offer,” she said, adding that while the two countries’ investments in infrastructure are complementary, cooperation is not possible as China “does not consider international standards in its development practices”.

“China’s economic expansion is progressing at the expense of human rights and good governance,” Pajon said, referring to civil society criticisms in recent years over China’s failure to promote good governance and human rights despite its strong economic presence on the continent.

Pajon said Japan should continue to train African workers to take advantage of commercial opportunities, and expand its cooperation with third partners such as the European Union, India, Australia, and the United States.

Kishida, in his address to TICAD last month, pledged support for African youth-led start-ups and said Japan would provide business, education, agriculture, and healthcare and medical training to 300,000 Africans over the next three years.

Pajon said Tokyo could also use its expertise in renewable energy and electrical power to support Africa’s green energy transition through investment.

Shinichi Takeuchi, director of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies’ African Studies Centre, said Japan’s infrastructure building in Africa was much more expensive than that done by China.

“That is why Japan tends to focus on the modernisation of existing infrastructure,” Takeuchi said, adding that the country’s “main challenge lies in the private sector, which has been reluctant to be engaged with Africa”.

Japanese companies have long held misconceptions of Africa as a region bedevilled by rampant civil wars, with business leaders calling in recent years for firms to review their perceptions and overcome their reluctance to invest.

Indeed, the number of Japanese companies operating in Africa rose from 169 in 2013 to 259 in 2019, according to Rama Yade and Tyrell Junius of the Atlantic Council’s Africa Centre, writing in a paper published on September 1.

“It is in the field of innovation that these companies bring the most significant advantage compared to China, which is more focused on infrastructure,” they said, adding that Japan was right to “elevate its ambitions” in Africa.

“It is a global power and can restore influence by leveraging its tremendous strengths in Africa”, they said, noting that Japan’s strengths in areas such as transport production and electronic equipment manufacturing could be better leveraged.

“On a continent that has a critical need for creating jobs and transforming its economy, Japan can be a game-changer,” they added.

01:31

Addis Ababa road built by Chinese company aims to ease traffic woes in Ethiopian capital

Japan’s recent US$30 billion pledge to Africa showed that it is “significantly conscious of China”, Takeuchi of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies said. But he said TICAD, launched in 1993, also demonstrated that the country was and remains an important player on the continent.

“Understanding TICAD only in the context of China-Japan rivalry is not correct,” Takeuchi said, adding that “nobody can nullify or deter China’s activities in Africa”.

China invested US$148 billion in Africa between 2000 and 2018, according to CARI, and research by global management consulting firm McKinsey & Company showed that more than 10,000 Chinese-owned firms are currently operating on the continent, doing over US$2 trillion worth of business since 2005.

Last year, China also promised US$10 billion in trade finance to support African exports and another US$10 billion in credit lines for financial institutions and in 2018 pledged US$60 billion in aid and loans to Africa.

TICAD, which is convened every three years, was never conceptualised as a counter to China. Japan had already poured billions of dollars into building roads, power plants and ports in Africa long before China became a major player on the continent.

But after Japan was hit by a period of economic slowdown, especially during the so-called lost decade from 1991 to 2001, it cut its development financing for overseas investment to concentrate on rebuilding its own economy.

Jain from the National University of Singapore said that Tokyo has emphasised partnerships and human security – including the freedom from want and fear – in Africa.

“Japan’s global healthcare initiatives also distinguish Tokyo’s approach to African development from other development actors,” Jain said.

In his TICAD address, Kishida announced a record-breaking commitment to advance global health security, pledging up to US$1.08 billion towards The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria – 30 per cent more than the country gave three years ago.

He also called for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for Africa and said Japan would continue to push for one when it becomes a non-permanent member in 2023-24.

Maria Siow

Maria Siow is a long-time China-based correspondent and analyst with keen interest in East Asia. Maria has a masters degree in international relations.

10. Military Leaders Warn China Could Weaponize Ports in Latin America

Conclusion:

China, Russia and the European Union are active in Latin America today. Isaiah’s prophecy shows that these powers will soon team up against the United States. The dual-use ports China is building in the region will prove extremely useful when that happens. God gave America the Panama Canal and many other strategic maritime passageways, ensuring it would become an economic and military superpower. But God also warned that if America did not obey Him, then not only would these gates be taken away, they would be used against it!

Military Leaders Warn China Could Weaponize Ports in Latin America

A power that controls the Caribbean Sea could cripple the U.S. economy.

BY ANDREW MIILLER • OCTOBER 3

thetrumpet.com · by Andrew Miiller

Mainland China has a documented plan to replace the United States as the world’s premier superpower before the hundredth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Revolution. This anniversary is only 27 years away, so U.S. military leaders are growing concerned about Chinese-owned ports in Latin America. If China militarizes these ports, it could cripple the U.S. economy by restricting its access to ocean shipping.

“When experts talk about China’s influence in Latin America, they mostly focus on their economic influence: the more than $153 billion in investments since 2005, and more than $140 billion in loans,” Joseph Humire of the Center for a Secure Free Society told Fox News on September 13. “While that is important, it’s more important to understand how China has leveraged that economic influence to gain military, intelligence and geopolitical advantage in Latin America and the Caribbean, turning the region toward authoritarianism.”

According to a report released by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission last November, “China aspires to deepen its military engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean,” so it is “financing and constructing potential dual-use infrastructure such as ports.”

Chinese companies are constructing 40 ports on both sides of the Panama Canal, including the Port of Manzanillo in Mexico, the Port of Balboa in Panama, the Port of Chancay in Peru, the Port of Punta Arenas in Chile, the Port of Buenos Aires in Argentina, the Port of Paranaguá in Brazil, the Port of Valparaiso in Cuba, and the Port of Freeport in the Bahamas. The Chinese Communist Party says it needs these ports to trade with Latin American nations. American officials worry China could turn these ports into naval bases.

“I was just in Panama about a month ago and flying along the Panama Canal and looking at all the state-owned enterprises from the prc on each side of the Panama Canal,” Gen. Laura Richardson, chief of U.S. Southern Command, said in July at the Aspen Security Conference. “They look like civilian companies or state-owned enterprises that could be used for dual use and could be quickly changed over to a military capability.”

Such militarized ports spread throughout Latin America would pose a significant threat to the United States. About 57 percent of U.S. seaborne exports flow from the Mississippi Basin to international markets via the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea. A foreign power with control over the shipping lanes passing through the Caribbean Sea would be able to besiege the United States and cripple its economy.

In Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry explains a scripture in Genesis 22:17 where God promises to give Abraham’s descendants control over “the gate of his enemies.” A gate is a narrow passage of entrance or exit, so when speaking nationally, a “sea gate” is a maritime choke point like the Straits of Florida, the Windward Passage or the Yucatan Channel. But the singular gate referenced in Genesis 22 cannot refer to any other sea gate except the Panama Canal.

The American people are descended from Abraham’s grandson Manasseh, and the Panama Canal is the most strategic “sea gate” to America’s security. It allows U.S. industries to quickly move ships between the east and west coasts. It also allows the U.S. military to project power across two oceans. Any power that wanted to challenge the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere would have to control the Panama Canal. This fact highlights why military officials like General Richardson are concerned about China’s dual-use ports in Latin America.

Some 2,700 years ago, God inspired the Prophet Isaiah to write about a vast trade bloc—“a mart of nations”—that would form in the end time (Isaiah 23:3). Verse 1 shows that a lead nation in this trade bloc would be “Chittim.” Mr. Flurry explains in his booklet Isaiah’s End-Time Vision that Chittim, or Kittim, is an ancient name for modern China. Another leading entity in the trade bloc is “Tyre.” Mr. Flurry explains that this represents “the commercial center” of modern Europe. A related passage in Ezekiel 27 mentions ancient names for modern Russia (Tubal and Meshech), showing that it too will join this “mart.”

China, Russia and the European Union are active in Latin America today. Isaiah’s prophecy shows that these powers will soon team up against the United States. The dual-use ports China is building in the region will prove extremely useful when that happens. God gave America the Panama Canal and many other strategic maritime passageways, ensuring it would become an economic and military superpower. But God also warned that if America did not obey Him, then not only would these gates be taken away, they would be used against it!

For more information about what the Bible prophesies concerning the Panama Canal, please read Isaiah’s End-Time Vision and China’s Dangerous Move Against America, by Gerald Flurry.

thetrumpet.com · by Andrew Miiller

11.  Ukraine Needs Expeditionary Economics, Not USAID

I think Professor Schramm does not have any experience with USAID and does not understand its mission. Development is even its name.

I have worked with many great professionals in USAID and they do more than distribute relatively small amounts of compassionate aid. I have seen them working all kinds of local economic investment.

Excerpt:

USAID is a relief agency that distributes relatively small amounts of compassionate aid while advancing American concerns about global warming, food security and human rights.

​This Is USAID:

USAID is the world's premier international development agency and a catalytic actor driving development results. USAID's work advances U.S. national security and economic prosperity, demonstrates American generosity, and promotes a path to recipient self-reliance and resilience.

https://www.usaid.gov/

USAID supports inclusive, sustained, and resilient economic growth in our partner countries as central to reducing poverty and dependency. We partner with host governments, local and international private sector and non-governmental organizations, development assistance organizations, financial institutions, and other donors to foster enterprise-driven development.

Our programs expand enterprise-driven economic growth and employment through robust analysis, regulatory reform, trade promotion, and entrepreneurial capacity development to foster sustainable development outcomes. USAID’s economic growth and trade programs focus on:

Providing expert research, analyses, and technical capacity building to support USAID to make smart, evidence-based program decisions to help partner countries achieve their own development objectives;

Building trade capacity to implement trade agreements, remove trade barriers, improve customs procedures, and modernize markets that improve competitiveness and level the playing field, which generates economic growth in partner countries;

Improving the enabling environment for private investment through support for regulatory reform and private sector advocacy that opens markets;

Increasing employment opportunities through improved market systems that enhance competition and enterprise growth.

In line with the U.S. National Security Strategy, and complementing USAID’s recent appointment to the National Security Council, USAID’s programs play a catalytic role in promoting private-sector-led economic growth, helping partner countries become stronger trading and security partners. Our economic growth programs help build new markets for the United States by supporting the emergence of middle-class consumers that can buy U.S. goods and services.  

Economic Growth goes hand-in-hand with USAID’s Private Sector Engagement (PSE) Policy to build capacity and support our partner countries to plan, finance, and implement solutions to solve their own development challenges.

https://www.usaid.gov/economic-growth-and-trade

​

Ukraine Needs Expeditionary Economics, Not USAID

‘Whole of government’ approaches to rebuilding economies don’t work. Local investment does.

By Carl Schramm

Oct. 2, 2022 6:22 pm ET

Ukraine won’t only have to reclaim its sovereignty when its war with Russia is over, it will need to rebuild its economy. That’s why President Volodymyr Zelensky is already appealing to American and global investors to commit capital to restoring his country’s postwar economy. In a September op-ed for the Journal he emphasized Ukraine’s past industrial and scientific success, lauded the country’s particularly well-qualified STEM workforce, and identified $400 billion in opportunities for outside investors.

That’s all good news. The bad news? The U.S. government may no longer have the skills to help Ukraine effectively develop its economy.

At Mr. Zelensky’s request, the U.S. Agency for International Development is putting together a team of bankers and businesses interested in investing in Ukraine. The task, however, is far beyond the scope and competency of USAID, which has no experience in developing market institutions at the scale needed to revive an economy as big as Ukraine’s, let alone making commercial deals. USAID is a relief agency that distributes relatively small amounts of compassionate aid while advancing American concerns about global warming, food security and human rights.

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The U.S. once had an effective model for rebuilding postwar economies—a field increasingly known as “expeditionary economics.” Inspired by Col. Irwin Hunt, who led U.S. reconstruction efforts in Europe after World War I and believed that officers needed training to “guide the destinies” of the communities under their “temporary sovereignty,” the Army’s School of Military Government opened in 1942 to prepare officers to manage the civil affairs of towns, cities and nations that had been, or were about to be, devastated. American officers learned how to set up banking and legal systems and how to re-establish hospitals, water and sewage systems, and transportation infrastructure.

Most important, the school’s graduates advanced the American model of entrepreneurial capitalism, helping to rebuild national economies by strengthening local markets without reference to a central plan. The postwar rebirth of economies in affected European countries reflected more on the importance of local initiative than specific directives from Washington, London, Paris or Bonn. Especially in Germany and Italy, U.S. officers worked at the local level to re-establish civic infrastructure including public utilities, banks, courts, and educational institutions.

American attitudes shifted after World War II. With the advent of the Cold War, the U.S. put its trust in the power of international institutions to prevent conflict. The School of Military Government closed in 1953. In hindsight, perhaps it should have stayed open. The U.S. would eventually face extended postconflict struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Partisans in search of political gain often derided these efforts as “nation building,” but some military expertise in the business of resurrecting shattered economies would undoubtedly have been useful.

Take Iraq. The Army’s reconstruction efforts deployed a “whole of government” strategy that engaged dozens of U.S. agencies. But the term “whole of government” relieves any individual agency of responsibility for the outcome. And after a half-century of dormancy in effective “expeditionary economics,” no government agency had any useful experience in rebooting a decimated national economy.

This is a valuable lesson for Mr. Zelensky and the U.S. in 2022. A top-down approach won’t work. It never does. People will form economies on their own in any situation. They will invent trade, production and systems to build elemental prosperity in their community. Expeditionary economics operates on respect for this kind of spontaneous organization.

A rebuilding program for Ukraine will start with establishing fundamental conditions for economic success. First, there must be peace and the country must have sovereignty. Second, the country’s postwar leadership must assure investors that their capital will be productively deployed.

Ukraine needs a Ukrainian entrepreneurial ecosystem, not a centrally administered carbon copy of Palo Alto, Calif. It has good prospects. The engagement of its citizen volunteers speaks to a deep entrepreneurial spirit that could create new businesses once peace comes.

Ukraine also has a promising comparative advantage in its highly trained technical workforce. Its mathematicians and scientists have made the country a center for nuclear engineering, for example. The country must work to support local capital markets ready to provide funds to small and medium-sized startups to ensure postwar success. An international mentoring program can give timely advice to fledgling entrepreneurs at the local level.

Laws that discourage commercial corruption must be put in place to help these entrepreneurs succeed. Specifically, the law must protect the property rights of inventors, entrepreneurs and investors in the innovations on which new businesses thrive.

If the U.S. commits to helping Mr. Zelensky rebuild his war-torn country, it must not repeat the mistakes of Iraq and Afghanistan. Expeditionary economics offers a guide to helping Ukraine emerge better off from a terrible destruction.

Mr. Schramm is a university professor at Syracuse and author of “Burn the Business Plan.” He oversees expeditionary economics research for Frontier Allies.

12.  Petraeus: US would destroy Russia’s troops if Putin uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine

Excerpts:

Rubio said he believed it “quite possible” that Putin could strike distribution points where US and allied supplies are entering Ukraine, including inside Poland. The senator acknowledged the nuclear threat, but he said most worries about “a Russian attack inside Nato territory, for example, aiming at the airport in Poland or some other distribution point”.

“Nato will have to respond to it,” he said. “How it will respond, I think a lot of it will depend on the nature of the attack and the scale and scope of it.”

But as a senator privy to Pentagon briefings, Rubio resisted being drawn on whether he’d seen evidence that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

“Certainly, the risk is probably higher today than it was a month ago,” Rubio said, predicting that Russia would probably take an intermediate step.

“He may strike one of these logistical points. And that logistical point may not be inside … Ukraine. To me, that is the area that I focus on the most, because it has a tactical aspect to it. And I think he probably views it as less escalatory. Nato may not.”

Petraeus: US would destroy Russia’s troops if Putin uses nuclear weapons in Ukraine

Former CIA director and retired army general says Moscow’s leader is ‘desperate’ and ‘battlefield reality he faces is irreversible’

The Guardian · by Edward Helmore · October 2, 2022

The US and its allies would destroy Russia’s troops and equipment in Ukraine – as well as sink its Black sea fleet – if Russian president Vladimir Putin uses nuclear weapons in the country, former CIA director and retired four-star army general David Petraeus warned on Sunday.

Petreaus said that he had not spoken to national security adviser Jake Sullivan on the likely US response to nuclear escalation from Russia, which administration officials have said has been repeatedly communicated to Moscow.

He told ABC News: “Just to give you a hypothetical, we would respond by leading a Nato – a collective – effort that would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea and every ship in the Black sea.”

The warning comes days after Putin expressed views that many have interpreted as a threat of a larger war between Russia and the west.

Asked if the use of nuclear weapons by Russia in Ukraine would bring America and Nato into the war, Petreaus said that it would not be a situation triggering the alliance’s Article 5, which calls for a collective defense. That is because Ukraine is not part of Nato – nonetheless, a “US and Nato response” would be in order, Petreaus said.

Petreaus acknowledged that the likelihood that radiation would extend to Nato countries under the Article 5 umbrella could perhaps be construed as an attack on a Nato member.

“Perhaps you can make that case,” he said. “The other case is that this is so horrific that there has to be a response – it cannot go unanswered.”

Yet, Petreaus added, “You don’t want to, again, get into a nuclear escalation here. But you have to show that this cannot be accepted in any way.”

Nonetheless, with pressure mounting on Putin after Ukrainian gains in the east of the country under last week’s annexation declaration and resistance to mobilization efforts within Russia mounting, Petreaus said Moscow’s leader was “desperate”.

“The battlefield reality he faces is, I think, irreversible,” he said. “No amount of shambolic mobilization, which is the only way to describe it; no amount of annexation; no amount of even veiled nuclear threats can actually get him out of this particular situation.

“At some point there’s going to have to be recognition of that. At some point there’s going to have to be some kind of beginning of negotiations, as [Ukrainian] President [Volodymyr] Zelenskiy has said, will be the ultimate end.”

But, Petreaus warned, “It can still get worse for Putin and for Russia. And even the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield won’t change this at all.” Still, he added, “You have to take the threat seriously.”

Senator Marco Rubio, the ranking Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee told CNN that Putin was down to two choices: established defensive lines or withdraw and lose territory.

Rubio said he believed it “quite possible” that Putin could strike distribution points where US and allied supplies are entering Ukraine, including inside Poland. The senator acknowledged the nuclear threat, but he said most worries about “a Russian attack inside Nato territory, for example, aiming at the airport in Poland or some other distribution point”.

“Nato will have to respond to it,” he said. “How it will respond, I think a lot of it will depend on the nature of the attack and the scale and scope of it.”

But as a senator privy to Pentagon briefings, Rubio resisted being drawn on whether he’d seen evidence that Russia is preparing to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine.

“Certainly, the risk is probably higher today than it was a month ago,” Rubio said, predicting that Russia would probably take an intermediate step.

“He may strike one of these logistical points. And that logistical point may not be inside … Ukraine. To me, that is the area that I focus on the most, because it has a tactical aspect to it. And I think he probably views it as less escalatory. Nato may not.”

The Guardian · by Edward Helmore · October 2, 2022

13. Chinese espionage, cyber programs pose major counterintelligence threat, Senate report warns

Excerpts:

China has also tried to exploit Americans’ doubts about U.S. leaders, undermine democracy, and seek to promote a positive image of China, the report said. China has spread COVID-19 disinformation by claiming the United States created the virus and has stepped up activities that seek to mold public discourse and mute criticism of China’s repressive policies toward minority Uyghurs.

Sen. Marco Rubio, Florida Republican and vice chairman of the committee, said the Chinese conduct long-term intelligence recruitment of younger Americans in their twenties who can be used in the future to promote policies and narratives favorable to China, such as regarding Taiwan or Tibet.

“Twenty years from now, these individuals will be running companies or key agencies in government and maybe even elected,” Mr. Rubio said. “This is a multifaceted, new-era type challenge, which our agencies simply weren’t created to function.”

Michelle Van Cleave, former national counterintelligence executive, told the committee the current structure of counterintelligence agencies is not designed to effectively halt foreign spies, noting that the “best defense is a good offense.”

“But unfortunately, our counterintelligence enterprise has never been configured to be able to preempt,” she said. “Preemption requires strategic national planning and coordinated operations against foreign intelligence threats. By contrast, our [counterintelligence] agencies have very distinct and separate missions, and they operate within their own lanes.”

Chinese espionage, cyber programs pose major counterintelligence threat, Senate report warns

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times

Sunday, October 2, 2022

m.washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com

China’s human spying, cyber espionage and more recently covert disinformation operations are a “600-pound gorilla in the room” of foreign counterintelligence threats, according to a Senate report on the growing problem of adversary spying.

The heavily redacted report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence warns that the U.S. government’s central counterintelligence agency and other components are ill-equipped and poorly structured to counter growing foreign spy threats.

Foreign intelligence agents and hackers from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and others are engaged in obtaining secrets and technology from both U.S. government agencies and the private sector with little resistance from counterintelligence agencies, the report states, but one threat stands above all others.

“China, however, is the ‘600-pound gorilla in the room,’” the report states.

The report was made public late last month and is largely focused on the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC), a relatively new agency set up to be the key policymaking center for counterintelligence units. The center is part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

“NCSC, as the U.S. [government] lead for [counterintelligence], lacks a clear mission as well as sufficient and well-defined authorities and resources to effectively confront this landscape,” the report said. “Moreover, NCSC‘s placement within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may hinder its ability to scale and respond to threats in an agile manner. Despite these challenges, there is no consensus among [counterintelligence] officials on a way forward for NCSC.”

SEE ALSO: Chinese researchers leaving the U.S. amid rising tensions, study finds

A spokesman for NCSC said the center appreciates the panel’s report on ways to improve the center’s operations and will continue to work with the committee on the matter.

The report is part of an ongoing committee investigation into U.S. counterintelligence capabilities. The last legislation on the topic was enacted in 2002 and is deficient in addressing cyber and technology collection by foreign intelligence services, senators and experts said during a hearing on the report.

One suggestion for improving counterspy efforts would be to make NCSC a separate agency similar to Britain’s domestic counterintelligence agency, MI-5. Currently, the FBI is charged with conducting counterintelligence operations in the United States and the CIA takes the lead on threats from abroad.

The gap in responsibilities between the agencies has been exploited for decades by foreign spy services that have recruited spies and stolen extremely-damaging secrets from nearly every national security agency and the military. The 152-page report identifies shortfalls in U.S. counterintelligence but does not offer clear solutions.

“I’d love to say that report came up with a series of specific recommendations. It did not,” said Committee Chairman Mark Warner, Virginia Democrat.

Mr. Warner said he has doubts about creating a separate counterspy agency but added that the committee is thoroughly investigating the possibility.

China threat

The report outlines several ways China in particular is gathering secrets and information in the United States. The operations range from traditional approaches such as planting spies in intelligence and defense agencies to newer methods of cyberespionage from computer networks. China’s spies also are targeting agencies not involved in national security, private-sector businesses and academia.

Chinese intelligence is also engaged in covert influence operations that support its other spy operations.

Targeting of university researchers for technology and other know-how also is a key tool.

A list of targets of Chinese intelligence operations was mostly blacked out in the report — except Beijing’s efforts to infiltrate U.S. critical infrastructure, such as the electrical grid and the financial sector.

Beijing’s spies, hackers and influence agents “launched a full-scale campaign to develop or acquire technologies [China] deems critical to its national interests,” the report added.

China is approaching parity with the United States in gross domestic product and in certain elements of its military power.

The United States, over the past 40 years, also became “interdependent” with China, unlike past adversaries such as the Soviet Union.

“China seeks to first displace the United States as the regional power in East Asia, and then to eventually displace the United States as the global hegemon,” the report said.

The confrontation with China is unlike the Cold War standoff with the Soviet Union, which was both military and ideological. The current rivalry with China is being waged across the economic, technological, military, diplomatic and ideological spectrums.

Acquiring technology is key to Chinese strategy and plans and is regarded as the main enabler of both economic growth and national power.

Targets of Chinese intelligence gathering include artificial intelligence, quantum computing, integrated circuits, genetics and biotechnology, high end new materials, new energy and intelligent vehicles, smart manufacturing, aerospace engines and gas turbines, deep space, deep earth, deep sea, and polar exploration, among others, the report said.

“It is important to emphasize that China is an authoritarian nation that makes little distinction between its public and private sectors,” the report said.

The Chinese system does not distinguish between civilian and military sectors and calls for “fusing” technology and resources for both.

China’s full-throated spying approach uses all available means of collection from human spying, technical collection, and cyber espionage, to penetrate the government, private sector, and academia, the report said.

Currently, the FBI is investigating over 2,000 cases of Chinese technology and information theft.

The Chinese intelligence agencies also are using “gray zone” warfare – below the level of armed conflict – against the United States, the report said.

Non-intelligence assets

One unique feature of Chinese operations is the use of non-intelligence assets, including businesspeople, students and researchers at U.S. laboratories.

The FBI reported that Beijing’s “massive, sophisticated computer hacking programs” are the largest in the world. Chinese cyber forces operate from every major city in China, with robust funding and sophisticated hacking tools, the report said.

The NCSC views countering Chinese influence operations as part of its counterspy mission. The report said China’s network of Confucius Institutes – Beijing-funded language and culture centers – are used as tools by government intelligence.

China has also tried to exploit Americans’ doubts about U.S. leaders, undermine democracy, and seek to promote a positive image of China, the report said. China has spread COVID-19 disinformation by claiming the United States created the virus and has stepped up activities that seek to mold public discourse and mute criticism of China’s repressive policies toward minority Uyghurs.

Sen. Marco Rubio, Florida Republican and vice chairman of the committee, said the Chinese conduct long-term intelligence recruitment of younger Americans in their twenties who can be used in the future to promote policies and narratives favorable to China, such as regarding Taiwan or Tibet.

“Twenty years from now, these individuals will be running companies or key agencies in government and maybe even elected,” Mr. Rubio said. “This is a multifaceted, new-era type challenge, which our agencies simply weren’t created to function.”

Michelle Van Cleave, former national counterintelligence executive, told the committee the current structure of counterintelligence agencies is not designed to effectively halt foreign spies, noting that the “best defense is a good offense.”

“But unfortunately, our counterintelligence enterprise has never been configured to be able to preempt,” she said. “Preemption requires strategic national planning and coordinated operations against foreign intelligence threats. By contrast, our [counterintelligence] agencies have very distinct and separate missions, and they operate within their own lanes.”

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

m.washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times http://www.washingtontimes.com

14. The empty modern promise of sovereign capability

Excerpts:

The solution to the world’s supply chain challenges will be found in data, reducing barriers to entry for new firms, boosting competition and pushing back trade protectionism. Sovereign capability sounds reassuring but in the modern world of complex and interdependent manufacturing it’s based on empty promises.

The empty modern promise of sovereign capability | East Asia Forum

3 October 2022

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

eastasiaforum.org · by EAF editors · October 3, 2022

Author: Editorial Board, ANU

As the old aphorism goes, governments are terrible at picking winners, but losers are great at picking governments. It’s advice which many governments seem to have forgotten as they start using taxpayers’ money to build industries that are deemed to be vital.

The latest vital manufacturing industry supposedly in need of government help to build ‘sovereign capability’ is semiconductors. Semiconductors are an essential component in electronic devices, from communications, computing and cars through to military systems, healthcare and clean energy.

COVID-19 wreaked havoc on global semiconductor supply chains. And with China as a growing major global supplier of semiconductors, and production concentrated in Northeast Asia, the United States has taken the bold step of moving to subsidise its semiconductor industry — thus ‘Japanising its industrial policy’ the Financial Times has said. Some suggest that US partners in Asia, like Australia, Japan and other countries should now do the same.

There’s a major problem with this strategy: it won’t work. Sovereign capability in semiconductors is a largely empty promise.

There are four fallacies that undermine the plausibility of the sovereign capability idea.

The first is the ‘made locally’ fallacy. The notion that our supply chain challenges are solely the result of international trade does not stack up. This fallacy was exposed during COVID-19. Plenty of the things people have struggled to buy during the pandemic were made locally. Making things locally does not guarantee a resilient supply chain.

The second fallacy is the input fallacy. Things we think we ‘produce’ locally actually include many inputs that come from overseas.

Take the simple surgical face mask as an example. Face masks have at least four components: the medical grade fabric, the elastic, the thin metal strip that bends over your nose and the stitching that holds it together. Having genuine sovereign capability in the production of face masks means being able to produce all four of these things domestically, and then assemble them domestically, too.

And that’s just a simple face mask. A ventilator has more than 240 components, all of which have their own array of inputs as well. To be sovereignly capable, a country needs to make every single one of them.

The third fallacy is the ‘just in case’ fallacy. A new catch phrase of politicians is that we need to move away from ‘just in time’ business models towards ‘just in case’. Requiring businesses to hold buffer stocks, they argue, is a great way to make our supply chains more resilient.

It’s also a way to make countries poor. Business owners will tell you that stockpiling inventory costs money. Requiring local businesses to hold buffers in case a once-in-a-100-year pandemic strikes would make those businesses uncompetitive.

The bigger question for ‘just in case’ supply chains is: just in case of what? If local cafes need to prepare for a once in 100-year pandemic, why not the zombie apocalypse, World War III, and world-destroying asteroids? Where do we draw the line?

The fourth fallacy is the ‘essential business’ fallacy. The idea of having sovereign capability in producing essential goods and services assumes we know what an ‘essential’ good or service is. Many governments around the world have had three years to agree domestically on what constitutes an ‘essential business’. Most still don’t have an answer.

What constitutes ‘essential’ depends on the crisis. Hand sanitiser is essential during a pandemic, but pretty low on the list during World War III. And what about inputs? Many governments designated PPE as essential during COVID-19, but not the components used to make it. Governments designated ventilators as essential, but not the machines used to treat sleep apnoea, even though it’s essentially the same machine.

‘Sovereign capability’ is not a serious solution. But supply chain resilience is a serious problem. So, what can be done it about?

In our lead article this week, Samuel Goodman explores what countries can do to strengthen the resilience of global supply chains for semiconductors.

First, we need to understand when a supply chain is at risk and when it is not. ‘Individual states should analyse their supply chains for the points of greatest vulnerability’, recommends Goodman. Whether a supply chain is at risk depends on how many alternative suppliers are available for a particular good or service and how easily businesses in one industry can substitute over and start producing that good or service (think: sleep apnoea machines being switched to ventilators, or gin distilleries making hand sanitiser). It has nothing to do with exposure to international trade.

Second, and related to this, we need to get smarter with data. Understanding all the components needed to make something — and all the components needed to make those components — is a tough job when there are millions of products that are constantly changing. Modern data sets make this easier. Bank transaction data — combined with a proper system of classifying what businesses actually produce — allows us to build a picture of a country’s production capacity. It tells us who makes what, how much they make, and how many alternative suppliers are available.

Third, we need to strengthen our connections as a country. ‘For most countries, a cost-effective way to reduce risk across supply chains could be to form more robust multilateral partnerships,’ says Goodman. ‘A constellation of states with similar policy goals might be better positioned to shore-up shared bottlenecks and deficiencies’.

Robust multilateral partnerships are easier said than done with strategic competition in full vogue. The US-led Chip 4 alliance with Japan, Taiwan and South Korea could help secure semiconductor supply chains, but US efforts to cut China out of semiconductor supply chains will not be met with the same enthusiasm by all members. South Korea and China recently agreed to their own semiconductor agreement, unsurprising with 40 per cent of South Korea’s chips sold to China. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) will also be tested if it seeks supply chain resilience from China given almost all the 14 IPEF members have China as their largest trading partner.

Many of the world’s supply chain challenges came from inward-looking protectionist policies. Vaccine hoarding during COVID-19 is a significant example. The G20 countries need to recommit to their promise during the global financial crisis to resist trade protectionist measures. And regional arrangements such as RCEP and CPTPP are set to play a role.

The solution to the world’s supply chain challenges will be found in data, reducing barriers to entry for new firms, boosting competition and pushing back trade protectionism. Sovereign capability sounds reassuring but in the modern world of complex and interdependent manufacturing it’s based on empty promises.

The EAF Editorial Board is located in the Crawford School of Public Policy, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

eastasiaforum.org · by EAF editors · October 3, 2022

15.  EXCLUSIVE: China 'would not' invade Taiwan if Beijing believes it owns the island, Asian trade official says

Excerpts:

"We do not believe that China would invade Taiwan, because China considers Taiwan as part of China," Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, delegate attached to the prime minister of Cambodia and soon-to-be Secretary-General of ASEAN, told Fox News Digital in an exclusive interview. "Why would it invade Taiwan?"

"I believe that the Chinese leaders are wise and … we believe that they would not do that," he added.

Dr. Kao stressed that Cambodia, his homeland, as well as other members of the economic trading block ASEAN, wish to see peace in the region and would like to "give diplomacy a chance" to resolve any potential disputes over Taiwan.

EXCLUSIVE: China 'would not' invade Taiwan if Beijing believes it owns the island, Asian trade official says

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

Video

Senior Cambodian official Kao Kim Hourn discusses global security

Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, the incoming ASEAN Secretary-General, discussed concerns over international food and energy security after Putin renewed his nuclear weapons threat.

UNITED NATIONS, New York – A top Cambodian official has questioned the logic of China invading Taiwan if Beijing believes the island nation is part of China, while also pushing for peaceful relations in the international security landscape.

"We do not believe that China would invade Taiwan, because China considers Taiwan as part of China," Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, delegate attached to the prime minister of Cambodia and soon-to-be Secretary-General of ASEAN, told Fox News Digital in an exclusive interview. "Why would it invade Taiwan?"

"I believe that the Chinese leaders are wise and … we believe that they would not do that," he added.

Dr. Kao stressed that Cambodia, his homeland, as well as other members of the economic trading block ASEAN, wish to see peace in the region and would like to "give diplomacy a chance" to resolve any potential disputes over Taiwan.

CHINA HAS OPENED OVERSEAS POLICE STATIONS IN US AND CANADA TO MONITOR CHINESE CITIZENS: REPORT

"Cambodia, like other countries, we are a peace-loving nation," Dr. Kim explained. "Cambodia has gone through war, conflicts and genocide. We certainly are strong advocate[s] for peace, negotiations and diplomacy. At the end of the day, everything has to deal with diplomacy, and that's what we want to do."

Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, delegate attached to the prime minister of Cambodia, current chairman of ASEAN and recently elected secretary-general, speaks with Fox News Digital in the Rose Garden of the United Nations headquarters in New York City, 9/22/22. (Fox News Digital)

Dr. Kao recently won election as the secretary-general of ASEAN, a 10-nation trade bloc in South East Asia that comprises the third-largest economic power in Asia after China and India. He is the first Cambodian to hold the position, and he is keen to pursue his philosophy of peace as he navigates the complicated economic situation that has developed on the continent.

South East Asia produces a significant amount of rice, exporting roughly 30% of the world’s supply, according to data from the OEC – approximately equivalent to the amount of grain Russia and Ukraine export in a given year.

FURTHER TROUBLE IN RUSSIA'S BACKYARD AS RECENT FIGHTING BETWEEN ALLIES CREATES NEW HEADACHE FOR PUTIN

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has disrupted food supplies and exports that threaten to create "multiple famines," according to the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres. That crisis has presented an opportunity for ASEAN to capitalize on its rice exports and step up to help avert – or at least ease – the problem.

But Dr. Kao stressed that even as ASEAN tries to help with food security concerns, it faces its own hurdles, thanks to inflation and the rising cost of energy, which could hinder some efforts to harvest and export its food.

In this photo provided by the An Khoun Sam Aun/National Television of Cambodia, Cambodia's prime minister, right, joins an online meeting of the ASEAN-China special summit at Peace Palace in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, Monday, Nov. 22, 2021. (An Khoun SamAun/National Television of Cambodia via AP)

"We [have] a number of countries … producing and also exporting -- Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, among others," Dr. Kao said. "Certainly, we are playing our role to support the food security that has been impacted heavily by the war in Ukraine and the challenges of cost by [the] energy security crisis."

"Certainly, we have been exporting our rice to countries that need this … food security," he continued. "I think we are one of the key countries that are supporting the food security, but at the same time … we have been heavily impacted by the growing prices of energy security and, of course, the inflation … having an impact on our people."

APPLE COURTS CHINESE CHIP MAKER, PUTTING US COMPETITIVENESS AND SECURITY AT RISK

But the war in Ukraine shows no signs of slowing down, which can only lead to further problems in the coming months: Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a partial mobilization, which kicked off a draft to help swell the ranks of the Russian army as it faces greater difficulty in its offensives.

Putin also renewed his threat to use nuclear weapons in case Russia were to feel that other nations intended to attack it.

This image provided by Malaysia Prime Minister Office shows ASEAN leaders and Chinese President Xi Jinping, top, second from right, on screen during an online meeting of the ASEAN-China special summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Monday, Nov. 22, 2021. (Malaysia Prime Minister office via AP)

Dr. Kao urged Russia and other aggressive countries to "learn from history" and take "wisdom" from past transgressions in order to avoid using nuclear weapons "at all costs."

PUTIN ANNEXES OCCUPIED UKRAINE TERRITORY

"I hope that history would not repeat itself," Dr. Kao said, pointing out that the atomic bombs dropped on Japan by the United States in World War II should serve as "major lesson" on the use of those weapons.

"I think in this world at this time, the last thing we need is … any country to use nuclear weapons."

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"We have to work together to combat … terrorism, extremism and violence, and we believe that the message of love and kindness, of course, of helping those who are really [in] need," he said.

Peter Aitken is a Fox News Digital reporter with a focus on national and global news.

foxnews.com · by Peter Aitken | Fox News

16. N. Korea instructs law enforcement agencies to crackdown on unemployed, workplace deserters

Excerpts:

“Rumors are going around that those busted by the mop-up teams are being exiled with their families to mines and farming villages suffering labor shortages,” he said.

“For a while, the government was screaming about mop-up campaigns and wars of annihilation against users of Chinese-made mobile phones, but now, they’ve basically declared war against the jobless and workplace deserters,” he continued, adding, “Cracking down on people who are roaming around to put food on the table is just an excuse to exert control over the people.”

N. Korea instructs law enforcement agencies to crackdown on unemployed, workplace deserters

"Mop-up teams" have been active everywhere in North Hamgyong Province since Sept. 20, a source told Daily NK

dailynk.com

FILE PHOTO: Onsong County, North Hamgyong Province. (Daily NK)

North Korea recently instructed its law enforcement agencies formulate measures by mid-December to deal with the unemployed and individuals who abscond from their workplaces.

Following the recent Seventh National Conference of Judicial Officers, the authorities appear intent on further bolstering state control using law enforcement agencies.

According to a Daily NK source in North Hamgyong Province on Wednesday, the authorities on Sept. 17 ordered branches of the police, prosecution and other agencies throughout the country to wage an “intensive struggle” against the unemployed and workplace deserters until mid-December.

North Korean authorities claimed in the order that the jobless and workplace deserters have been “sowing chaos in social order, roaming the country engaging in theft and burglary.”

They ordered law enforcement agencies to “thoroughly root out anti-socialist and non-socialist behavior such as violent crime by organizing mop-up teams to wipe out the jobless and workplace deserters.”

According to the source, “In the past, the Workers’ Party ordered that the jobless and workplace deserters receive ideological education and that the authorities ensure their living conditions in a responsible way. But now, it says it will punish them as criminals.”

In particular, the source said the authorities — believing jobless individuals and workplace deserters of uncertain abode are at the heart of burglaries, murders and other criminal cases — issued the directive to resolve problems related to public order.

In response to the recent order, police and prosecutors in cities and counties throughout North Hamgyong Province, including Chongjin, formed “mop-up” teams from Sept. 20 to crackdown on the jobless and workplace deserters. These teams differ jurisdiction-to-jurisdiction on account of local conditions; generally speaking, however, they include one prosecutor, two police officers and a four-man enforcement squad composed of discharged soldiers.

The mop-up teams are targeting individuals who have not gone to work or who have been out of contact with their workplaces for three months or more. They are also targeting young people and laborers who have abandoned their assigned organization, such as the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea or Socialist Patriotic Youth League.

In particular, the authorities called on law enforcement agencies to look into workplace deserters who pay money to shirk their workplace or organizational responsibilities.

The Workers’ Party appears to believe that individuals who pay to get out of work or organizational responsibilities have bigger ideological problems than those who just left their workplace or organization due to financial problems.

However, officials tasked with cracking down on those who pay to shirk their workplace or organizational duties are reportedly accepting bribes to protect them or look the other way.

Indeed, collusion continues between enforcement officials and the jobless and workplace deserters because many government officials are in a tenuous financial situation due to the continued border closure.

Based on the source’s account, mop-up teams have been active everywhere in North Hamgyong Province since Sept. 20.

“Rumors are going around that those busted by the mop-up teams are being exiled with their families to mines and farming villages suffering labor shortages,” he said.

“For a while, the government was screaming about mop-up campaigns and wars of annihilation against users of Chinese-made mobile phones, but now, they’ve basically declared war against the jobless and workplace deserters,” he continued, adding, “Cracking down on people who are roaming around to put food on the table is just an excuse to exert control over the people.”

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com

17.  A U.S. ‘Ships Act’ Would Break China’s Control of the Seas

Excerpts:

America needs a “U.S. Ships Act” that sets a clear national maritime strategy, channels investment into developing the country’s shipbuilding industrial base and includes financial and other supports to help American shipbuilders and shipping companies reclaim lost ground in international markets. The United States also needs to replace its fleet of mostly obsolete ships that are kept on standby to carry military supplies in an overseas conflict, as was done successfully during the Persian Gulf war and which may be necessary in a conflict over Taiwan.

All of this must be accompanied by a push to recruit, train and retain the tens of thousands of skilled American workers who will be needed for this industry revival. The United States has a strong basic infrastructure for maritime education in place, with the federal merchant marine academy, six state academies and various other programs. But shipbuilding is hard work, and working on commercial vessels can mean weeks away from home. Aggressive recruiting programs are needed starting at the high school level, with the sincere message that building and operating ships can be a safe, rewarding career choice that helps make America stronger.

The broader regulatory outlook needs to change too, starting with the current system for international shipping that allows ships registered in “flag of convenience” countries like Liberia to carry American cargo, competing directly with U.S.-flagged vessels. Those countries often have minimal safety, labor and environmental standards, allowing ships to operate with lower costs, putting more heavily regulated U.S. ships at a disadvantage.

Countering China’s maritime dominance will take time, money and commitment. But if we fail to diversify American import sources and re-establish some control over the global maritime supply chain, the United States may find itself in a confrontation with China, and with one arm tied behind its back.

A U.S. ‘Ships Act’ Would Break China’s Control of the Seas

nytimes.com · by Michael Roberts · October 3, 2022

China Ocean Shipping Company’s 400-meter container carrier ‘China Cosco Taurus’ at a port in Greece.Credit...Yannis Kolesidis/European Pressphoto Agency

By Michael Roberts

Mr. Roberts is a former shipping industry executive and past president of the American Maritime Partnership.

Soon after President Xi Jinping of China took power, he instructed top Communist Party leaders in a 2013 speech to turn the country into a “maritime superpower.”

China already has the world’s largest navy, though its ability to contend with U.S. naval forces remains in doubt. But leaders in Beijing have realized that maritime strength is not measured solely in firepower.

Success in commercial shipping would have “great and far-reaching significance” for Chinese national strength and security, Mr. Xi told the Politburo then, reminding the party that throughout history the most powerful nations were those that controlled the seas. Nearly a decade later, Mr. Xi’s vision is a reality.

China has become a global maritime powerhouse, with thousands of commercial vessels plying sea lanes, a vast shipbuilding industry capable of churning out more vessels and such dominance of global supply chains that it could bring the United States to its knees in a conflict.

The U.S. economy is heavily dependent on products and resources from China and East Asia, transported through shipping networks that are increasingly under the control of Chinese interests. China, including Hong Kong, owns more commercial vessels than any other country — almost twice as many as second-place Greece. It builds about half of the world’s large commercial ships, up from just 3 percent in 1993, and produces 96 percent of the world’s dry shipping containers.

Chinese entities have gained ownership shares in marine terminals and infrastructure around the world — including some U.S. terminals — through the Belt and Road Initiative, Mr. Xi’s global plan to extend his country’s economic reach. And a congressional advisory body has warned that Beijing could use shipping data to track cargo movements for commercial or strategic advantage. This includes U.S. military equipment, much of which is transported via commercial shipping.

The vast majority of U.S. trade with China is done by sea, and the United States relies on Chinese imports of computers, smartphones, technical components and essential machinery. But China also dominates global production of specialized commodities like refined lithium and rare-earth products, crucial components in a range of high-tech products including those with military applications.

The risk of overreliance on potential adversaries has been made clear by Russia’s throttling of natural gas to western Europe, which has sent prices soaring and crimped supplies as winter approaches. America got a taste of its own vulnerability when skyrocketing demand for Chinese-made face masks and personal protective equipment early in the pandemic caused China to stall shipments, and subsequent supply-chain gridlock caused chaos for U.S. importers and exporters.

If China and the United States went to war over Taiwan, Beijing could direct Chinese shipping companies to interfere with U.S.-bound products or resources. Beijing has shown its willingness to play hardball on other occasions, including blocking a range of imports from Australia after it called for an investigation into the source of the coronavirus. Trade disruptions would hurt China, too. But it’s easier for authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent over asking their citizens to endure economic pain, and Beijing is moving to insulate itself from such shocks through economic decoupling from the United States.

America was the world’s leading shipbuilder after World War II. But in 1981 the government canceled an important subsidy program, leaving American shipyards to compete directly with heavily subsidized foreign rivals. The impact has been severe: U.S. shipbuilders delivered an average of about 16 ships per year over the decade ending in 2018, mostly for Navy or Coast Guard use; Chinese shipyards had orders for 1,529 large commercial ships at the end of last year. Fewer than 200 such vessels flew the U.S. flag at the end of 2021 versus more than 5,000 Chinese ships. Hobbled by unfavorable tax policies and other competitive disadvantages, the last of the large U.S. shipping companies sold out to foreign buyers in the 1990s.

The CHIPS and Science Act — passed by Congress in July to diversify America’s global sources of semiconductors and support U.S. manufacturers — showed what can be done when there is bipartisan recognition of the risks the country faces.

America needs a “U.S. Ships Act” that sets a clear national maritime strategy, channels investment into developing the country’s shipbuilding industrial base and includes financial and other supports to help American shipbuilders and shipping companies reclaim lost ground in international markets. The United States also needs to replace its fleet of mostly obsolete ships that are kept on standby to carry military supplies in an overseas conflict, as was done successfully during the Persian Gulf war and which may be necessary in a conflict over Taiwan.

All of this must be accompanied by a push to recruit, train and retain the tens of thousands of skilled American workers who will be needed for this industry revival. The United States has a strong basic infrastructure for maritime education in place, with the federal merchant marine academy, six state academies and various other programs. But shipbuilding is hard work, and working on commercial vessels can mean weeks away from home. Aggressive recruiting programs are needed starting at the high school level, with the sincere message that building and operating ships can be a safe, rewarding career choice that helps make America stronger.

The broader regulatory outlook needs to change too, starting with the current system for international shipping that allows ships registered in “flag of convenience” countries like Liberia to carry American cargo, competing directly with U.S.-flagged vessels. Those countries often have minimal safety, labor and environmental standards, allowing ships to operate with lower costs, putting more heavily regulated U.S. ships at a disadvantage.

Countering China’s maritime dominance will take time, money and commitment. But if we fail to diversify American import sources and re-establish some control over the global maritime supply chain, the United States may find itself in a confrontation with China, and with one arm tied behind its back.

Michael Roberts (@mrob359) is an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute and a non-resident senior fellow at the Navy League’s Center for Maritime Strategy. He is former president of the American Maritime Partnership, was a senior executive with Crowley Maritime Corp and continues to provide consulting services to the maritime industry.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.

nytimes.com · by Michael Roberts · October 3, 2022

18. China’s demographic crisis looms over Xi Jinping’s third term

Graphics at the link: https://www.ft.com/content/199c92ca-4f1e-4898-9152-d021936f6ab4

China’s demographic crisis looms over Xi Jinping’s third term

The world’s most populous country will start shrinking this year, weakening the government’s economic tools

Financial Times · by Eleanor Olcott · October 3, 2022

China’s president Xi Jinping is poised to secure an unprecedented third term as leader at a congress of his Communist party this month, but behind the political theatre a broader shift is playing out.

Demographers predict the world’s most populous country will start to shrink in 2022, a turning point with profound ramifications for its future.

“That China’s population decline has coincided with the start of Xi’s third term is symbolically and practically significant,” said Wang Feng, an expert on Chinese demographic change at the University of California, Irvine.

While Xi is clearly in the political ascendancy, the economic tools at his disposal are increasingly constrained by a property sector meltdown, the damage to consumer confidence caused by successive coronavirus lockdowns, and local government fiscal shortfalls.

The rapid ageing of China’s population — a process that will accelerate during Xi’s third term — will further chip away at Beijing’s powers to stimulate growth and manage economic crises.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

Over the next five years, the first cohort of people who became parents during the “one-child policy” era that began in 1980 will increasingly advance from their 60s and 70s — or what sociologists describe as being “young-old” — into their 80s.

Wang said this growing group of “old-old”, with a higher likelihood of developing costly chronic diseases, would make greater care demands both on their children and the state.

Local governments are already struggling to meet the rising cost of health and social care. Their spending on China’s sprawling zero-Covid infrastructure has ballooned, while tax receipts from the battered property sector have plummeted.

“If this continues, how can China sustain the pension payments for this enlarging elderly population,” said Wang.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

Not all experts are pessimistic about the economic impact of the ageing population.

Jane Golley, a China economist at the Australian National University, said a shrinking number of working-age people was a natural consequence of the country’s economic development.

“A smaller workforce means reduced labour supply, which means workers can demand higher wages,” Golley said. Growth in gross domestic product per capita would outpace overall GDP expansion as China’s population shrank, she said.

But other experts warned that China could lose its cost advantage in manufacturing without having transitioned to the consumption-led economic model of developed economies.

China’s birth rate has been in decline for many years. Between the start of Xi’s rule in 2012 and 2021, the number of babies born each year fell by more than 45 per cent, to 10.6mn.

Beijing in 2016 eased national birth controls, which were widely known as the one-child policy in reference to the standard limit for urban residents of the dominant Han ethnic group. Local governments have since extended maternity leave and introduced subsidies for new parents.

China, which has the highest abortion rate among large economies, last year moved to tighten controls over abortions for non-medical purposes. Experts warned that officials could take more drastic measures to limit women’s access to abortion.

But Beijing’s measures to stimulate fertility have had little impact, particularly in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic and a strict zero-Covid policy that has disincentivised the young from getting married and having babies.

Yi Fuxian, an obstetrics expert at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and a long-term critic of the one-child policy, said rising unemployment and fear of persistent lockdowns have prompted young couples to delay marriage and childbearing. He estimated this would reduce the number of births in China by 1mn in both 2021 and 2022.

“The zero-Covid policy has greatly reduced people’s willingness to have children,” Yi said.

You are seeing a snapshot of an interactive graphic. This is most likely due to being offline or JavaScript being disabled in your browser.

For a country’s population to remain stable, 2.1 children on average need to be born to each couple. Ms Li, a 34-year-old mother in the north-eastern province of Jilin, is one of the tens of millions of Chinese parents who have decided to stop at one.

Li, who declined to give her personal name, has a three-year-old and recently returned to part-time work selling tickets for local tourist attractions. “The expense of raising a child is like a bottomless pit,” said Li.

High property prices and heavy spending on education are major factors. In China, the average total cost of raising a child is nearly seven times per capita GDP, compared with four times in the US, according to YuWa Population Research, a Chinese think-tank.

Concerns about expensive childcare have been exacerbated by the economic insecurity wrought by lockdowns. Li’s hairdresser husband suffered a salary cut when his salon was forced to shut down during Jilin’s prolonged spring lockdown.

“One child is enough. We have no money or energy to raise a second,” she said.

Additional reporting by Xinning Liu in Beijing and Andy Lin in Hong Kong

Video: Is China's economic model broken?

Financial Times · by Eleanor Olcott · October 3, 2022

19. US-Philippines drawing closer on defense of Taiwan

Excerpts:

For some experts, however, the Taiwan crisis, and the Philippines’ potential response, represents an existential challenge to the US-Philippine alliance.

“What would it do to the US-Philippine alliance if Americans were dying 50 miles from the shores of the Philippines and the Philippine government refused [to assist]”, Poling, who leads CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), told this correspondent.

“Allies cannot be neutral,” and the Philippines “has responsibility to Americans just like Americans have responsibility to Filipinos.”

US-Philippines drawing closer on defense of Taiwan

Marcos Jr government racing to upgrade mutual defense alliance with eye on possible US-China conflict over Taiwan or South China Sea

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · October 3, 2022

MANILA – For the first time, top defense chiefs from the United States and the Philippines personally joined detailed operational planning in the US Indo-Pacific Command in Honolulu, Hawaii, in a move to bolster their century-old alliance.

The unprecedented joint planning came almost exactly a week after Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s first personal meeting with US President Joseph Biden on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York.

In a major departure from the anti-American tirades of his immediate predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, the new Filipino leader has praised America’s role as an anchor of stability in the Indo-Pacific, which “is something that is much appreciated by all the countries in the region, and the Philippines especially.”

Encouraged by Manila’s apparent new strategic orientation, Washington is doubling down on bilateral security cooperation. It’s a strategic objective that has become more important and urgent in Washington in light of rising tensions over Taiwan and across the South China Sea.

With its strategic geographic location, the Philippines would be at the heart of any potential major conflict between the US and China in the region. As such, the two allies are expected to increase joint military activities to as many as 500 next year, with the US expected to deploy a whopping 16,000 troops for the annual Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder) wargames.

“Our countries share a vision of an open, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific, free from coercion or bullying,” US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said during the recent unprecedented US Indo-Pacific Command meeting with his Filipino counterpart Jose Faustino Jr.

“The United States remains unwavering in our support for a strong and independent Philippines that can defend its sovereignty, ensure prosperity for its people and strengthen security in the region,” Austin said.

“Our two countries are working together to reach a common understanding of the importance of our defense alliance…in advancing our respective country’s interests and promoting peace and prosperity in the region,” Faustino told his American counterpart during his Hawaii visit.

Faustino and Austin had plenty to talk about at US Indo-Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii, on September 29, 2022. Photo: US DoD / Chad J McNeeley

Next year, the US and Philippines are expected to conduct more joint military exercises than any time in history and more than any alliance across the Indo-Pacific.

From 300 bilateral military activities in 2022, next year could see as many as 500 joint exercises, underscored by the doubling of US participation in the massive Balikatan exercises held on Philippine shores.

Those joint maneuvers, which in 2019 simulated warfighting including an amphibious seizure of an island in the South China Sea, have raised China’s hackles. This year they are expected to be expanded to involve amphibious and island protection drills in tandem with Australia and Japan.

After six years of uncertainty and mutual recriminations under Duterte, who repeatedly threatened to end the Philippine-US alliance after US criticism of his government’s human rights record, the two long-time allies are now racing to make up for lost time in upgrading the alliance, which is underwritten by the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

“We’re trying to do the kind of modernization process that we did with the Japan-US alliance in the 1990s – we’re trying to do it [for the Philippine-US alliance] in about two years, what took 20 years in the case of Japan,” Gregory Poling, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC, told this correspondent.

In the past few months, the two allies have pressed ahead with full implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which grants the American military sweeping access to a wide range of vital military bases across the Philippines.

By building advanced military facilities in strategically-located Philippine bases, the US Pentagon will in future be in an optimal position to build both a forward deployment presence as well as jointly respond to nearby contingencies.

In a statement, the Pentagon has recognized how the two allies are “deepening our enduring security alliance under the auspices of the Mutual Defense Treaty and multiple other agreements, including the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement [EDCA].”

“Looking ahead, we seek to enhance the posture of our alliance to address new and emerging challenges,” a Pentagon spokesman said. “We intend to continue to implement infrastructure projects at current EDCA locations and explore additional sites for further development,” he added.

A Philippine naval officer stands guard during the arrival of American missile destroyer USS Chung Hoon before US-Philippine joint naval military exercises in a file photo. Photo: AFP / Noel Celis / Getty Images

“[O]ur relationship with the United States is at its best right now,” Jose Manuel Romualdez, a close relative of the Philippine president and the country’s longstanding ambassador to Washington, recently told the Philippine Congress.

In particular, the Basa Airbase, which is situated strategically in the South China Sea and near Taiwan, has been the site of several recent big-ticket joint projects under EDCA.

“And that’s the sign of the urgency I think both bureaucracies [have] at least recognized…and Taiwan is a key part of this,” Poling told this correspondent, underscoring the broader relevance of the US-Philippine alliance amid rising US-China tensions in the region.

Throughout the Cold War, the Philippines’ hosting of America’s largest overseas bases was an essential component of US regional operations including military interventions in Korea and Vietnam. Over the past two decades, however, counterterrorism and, to a lesser degree, the South China Sea disputes have largely dominated bilateral security cooperation.

Now, the Biden administration is intent on fortifying the Philippines’ position in its “integrated deterrence” strategy for the Indo-Pacific, drawing on a wide network of bases and alliances across the First and Second Island Chains, stretching from Japan in the north to Australia in the south, with the Philippines along with Singapore and Vietnam serving as key Southeast Asian partners in between.

Aside from being America’s oldest ally in Asia, the Philippines’ geography is increasingly seen as vital to the Pentagon’s operational priorities in the region. In particular, the Philippines’ northernmost and essentially uninhabited island of Mavulis, located in the Luzon Strait, is only 140 kilometers from Taiwan’s southernmost tip.

It currently hosts a squad of Filipino soldiers in a small shelter, a desalination plant and a lighthouse – and obviously has the potential for US-assisted expansion under the EDCA. The Philippine military has also stepped up its efforts to build naval facilities on nearby Fuga Island.

The strategic relevance of those island posts came to light in 2019, when the Philippine military blocked attempts by several Chinese companies to invest in the strategically-located islands.

“The Chinese have no use for Fuga [Island]. It [the private investment bid was] really…about Taiwan, to deny us, and in extension the US, the use of those islands [in the event of war],” Colonel Michael Logico, director of the Philippine military’s Joint and Combined Training Center, recently told the media.

A number of high-profile war games conducted by top Washington-based think tanks showed that any major kinetic operation by China will likely concentrate on Taiwan’s southern shores. And America’s access to nearby Philippine bases proved a crucial element in a potential US victory against invading Chinese forces.

US access to the Philippine island of Mavulis could be decisive in a conflict with China. Image: Facebook

“We are a US ally, we are in a strategic location. We are so near that if anything happens in Taiwan, we will be involved,” former Philippine military chief General Emmanuel Bautista recently told media.

The Philippines represents a “key terrain” for Sino-American competition, Bautista said, since it connects the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Sibutu Passage in the south and Bashi Channel and Luzon Strait in the north.

While the Marcos Jr administration has so far tried to project “neutrality” on the Taiwan issue, and repeatedly called for peaceful management of the crisis, Manila has expressed new openness to allowing American access to its vital bases in the north in the event of a Taiwan or other contingency.

“Nobody wants to have any kind of war or confrontation,” said Romualdez, a key architect of the recent Philippine-US rapprochement. He recently said that the Philippines will allow US forces to access Philippine bases “if it is important for us, for our own security.”

For some experts, however, the Taiwan crisis, and the Philippines’ potential response, represents an existential challenge to the US-Philippine alliance.

“What would it do to the US-Philippine alliance if Americans were dying 50 miles from the shores of the Philippines and the Philippine government refused [to assist]”, Poling, who leads CSIS’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), told this correspondent.

“Allies cannot be neutral,” and the Philippines “has responsibility to Americans just like Americans have responsibility to Filipinos.”

Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on Twitter at @richeydarian

asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · October 3, 2022

20. Air Force Academy’s ‘mom/dad’ controversy draws renewed attention to a modern, military-wide debate

Excerpts:

​Elaine Donnelly, founder and president of the nonprofit Center for Military Readiness, is among those who believe the new trends aren’t for the best.

“What we support, and what the academy should continue to support, is nondiscrimination and equal opportunity for everyone,” said Donnelly, who in 1992 served on a presidential commission that studied women in combat and the idea of “cohesion” in the military. “The entire military as an institution is being forced into these kinds of instructions.”

The Air Force Academy isn’t the only institution to feel the sting of the blowback, either. The Navy was ridiculed earlier this year after a diversity training video, presented like a kids’ TV show, appeared online. A new “Diversity Peer Educator” initiative at the Navy’s Annapolis-based training academy has also drawn the ire of the anti-woke movement.

Any program that encourages cadets to be constantly aware of what separates, rather than what binds them together, erodes one of the military’s core strengths, Donnelly said.

“In the military, people are part of a unit. That’s why they wear a uniform. You can’t wear your hair any old way, you can’t dress as you please. You are subject to orders,” she said.

Essentially, everyone’s the same. Telling cadets to think otherwise, even obliquely, is “a big mistake.”

“It seems like there’s this movement to try to make the military world more like the civilian world,” Donnelly said. “That is not going to work for our military culture, which is very, very different from civilian culture ... and needs to be.”

Air Force Academy’s ‘mom/dad’ controversy draws renewed attention to a modern, military-wide debate

Stars and Stripes · by Stephanie Earls · October 2, 2022

U.S. Air Force Academy Class of 2021 graduates toss their service caps as the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds fly overhead during the Academy’s graduation ceremony in Colorado Springs, Colo., May 26, 2021. (Trevor Cokley/U.S. Air Force)

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colo. (Tribune News Service) — The “woke wars” that have been raging in U.S. culture for the past few years have now arrived full force in military academies, as evidenced by the recent controversy over a diversity and inclusion briefing at the Air Force Academy — and the academy’s defense of the program.

Academy officials say such diversity training is long overdue and will build better leaders, while critics worry about what appears to be a changing culture and focus in the military and its institutions that will be to the detriment of the nation’s defenses.

One slide presented as part of the training program bore language that encouraged cadets to “recognize diverse family formation” by using broad terminology that avoided gendered references. The academy said the slide was taken out of context; cadets aren’t prohibited from using the terms “mom” and “dad,” as some news reports claimed, and the information presented as part of the training was “not intended to stand alone.”

But the academy’s response has only served to fuel ongoing controversy about so-called wokeism in the military, a debate that was re-stirred after images of the AFA training slides were shared beyond the campus north of Colorado Springs last month, reported on by Fox News Digital and then a slew of other outlets.

The slides , visual aids used in a moderated presentation at the academy — and the only elements of the presentation subsequently leaked to the media — made their points in a series of bullet points. One slide encouraged cadets to use “person-centered” and “inclusive language” that doesn’t imply presumptions about others’ situations, preferred pronouns or family life.

So, “parents/caregivers/guardians” instead of “mom and dad.”

And “ya’ll/team/squaddies/everyone/folks,” instead of “you guys.”

It also discouraged cadets from using terms such as “colorblind.”

A second slide explained that diversity and inclusion are key to developing warfighters who are prepared to lead the Air Force and Space Force “with character.”

“How can we Lift Others (motivate our teams) if we don’t know our people?” it asked, citing a 2016 study that found “Diverse teams outperform other teams.”

Some who oppose the language on the slides do so amid what they believe is a groundswell aimed at fundamentally changing military culture.

Some also now say their beef isn’t only with the language and training but the academy’s response to those who cried foul.

“The issue to us grads is, we belong to an institution that prides itself on an honor code,” said retired Lt. Gen. Rod Bishop, a 1974 academy grad and chairman of the board for Stand Together Against Racism and Radicalism in the Services (STARRS). The organization of retired military officers is involved in a lawsuit against the Defense Department, which it accuses of promoting “critical race theory” at the Air Force Academy and of stonewalling veterans’ requests for information that could help in the legal fight.

Bishop said he believes the academy’s response to public reaction to its diversity and inclusion training is similarly disingenuous.

“I don’t want to call anyone a liar, but they’re trying to mislead the public by saying that these slides were taken out of context,” Bishop said. “The slides speak for themselves.”

What the slides say, however, depends on who’s listening — and what they’re listening for.

Academy Superintendent Lt. Gen Richard M. Clark addressed the controversy in a letter last week to members of the U.S. Air Force Academy Association of Graduates.

“The intent behind having this briefing was to help cadets in their quest to become leaders of character for our Air Force and Space Force, which will always be our prime directive at USAFA,” Clark wrote. “Our cadets will be charged to lead teams of people composed of Americans that don’t necessarily look alike, think alike, or speak like they do, but are unified by our common purpose to support and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

He went on to call America’s diversity a source of its strength, opening the door to “creative and innovative solutions, which will give us the strategic edge our country needs in the future.”

The AFA’s diversity and inclusion training programs were developed in partnership with a team of cadets who wanted to offer “tools and techniques to build effective, inclusive teams made up of diverse members.” The portion of the briefing that drew immediate and emotional outcry was the slide entitled “inclusive language,” said Clark, explaining that the presentation was meant to give cadets “an idea of the kinds of words that are effective when respectful leaders build strong, inclusive teams.”

“Throughout my Air Force Career, I’ve been taught that words matter, and this slide highlights that adage. It was NOT intended to prohibit the use of any words,” he said. “The words ‘mom’ and ‘dad’ are absolutely NOT prohibited words at USAFA. I highlight that because if I did prohibit the use of the word ‘mom,’ my mom and my wife would probably never speak to me again.”

Clark’s message had almost 400 comments within days of its posting last week on the graduate association’s Facebook page. Only a fraction of commenters had good, or even benign things, to say; one commenter had a theory as to why:

“The number of people on here parroting ... Fox News ‘talking points’ while pretending otherwise is humorous. Leave off with politics. ... Let the USAFA leadership do their jobs please.”

Those who take issue with how academy leadership are doing those jobs say their concerns run deeper than political agendas and woke wording.

Touchy-feely simply doesn’t work in a military setting, they argue, and can only serve to compromise a system based on conformity, cohesion and merit, that had been running just fine.

“I understand that in a Diversity and Inclusion briefing that all USAFA cadets received at the beginning of this school year cadets were instructed to tell each other personal, confidential details about themselves and share their ‘pronouns,’ with briefers being instructed to encourage vulnerability ‘for best effect,’” wrote Colorado Springs Republican U.S. Rep. Doug Lamborn, in a Sept. 20 letter to Superintendent Clark. “Presumably the motivation behind these required briefings is to introduce the Academy’s new minor in Diversity and Inclusion.”

The minor debuted at the academy last year, following similar moves by institutions including U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Such a course of study may be a recent addition at the Air Force Academy, but diversity and inclusion programs in the military are far from new.

Opponents are now fighting a modern battle on multiple fronts — one that began during the civil rights movement and advanced in bounds during the Obama administration, with federal programs that stressed diversity and, perhaps most notably, the 2011 end of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the military’s official counsel to enlisted personnel who were non-heterosexual.

Elaine Donnelly, founder and president of the nonprofit Center for Military Readiness, is among those who believe the new trends aren’t for the best.

“What we support, and what the academy should continue to support, is nondiscrimination and equal opportunity for everyone,” said Donnelly, who in 1992 served on a presidential commission that studied women in combat and the idea of “cohesion” in the military. “The entire military as an institution is being forced into these kinds of instructions.”

The Air Force Academy isn’t the only institution to feel the sting of the blowback, either. The Navy was ridiculed earlier this year after a diversity training video, presented like a kids’ TV show, appeared online. A new “Diversity Peer Educator” initiative at the Navy’s Annapolis-based training academy has also drawn the ire of the anti-woke movement.

Any program that encourages cadets to be constantly aware of what separates, rather than what binds them together, erodes one of the military’s core strengths, Donnelly said.

“In the military, people are part of a unit. That’s why they wear a uniform. You can’t wear your hair any old way, you can’t dress as you please. You are subject to orders,” she said.

Essentially, everyone’s the same. Telling cadets to think otherwise, even obliquely, is “a big mistake.”

“It seems like there’s this movement to try to make the military world more like the civilian world,” Donnelly said. “That is not going to work for our military culture, which is very, very different from civilian culture ... and needs to be.”

(c)2022 The Gazette (Colorado Springs, Colo.)

Visit at www.gazette.com

Distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC.

Stars and Stripes · by Stephanie Earls · October 2, 2022

21. White House pressuring Israel to cut research ties with China over dual-use concerns

Excerpts:

But Gabi Siboni, an Israeli senior cyber expert and a reserve colonel in the IDF, told Breaking Defense that US concerns are understandable, as Israeli academic institutions invest in cyber research while some of the students and scientists have been trained by the Israeli defense forces while serving.

“That said, over the last few years, and partly in response to mounting US pressure on Israel to reconsider its relationship with China, there has been a noticeable cooling of economic activities between the two countries,” he noted.

The Technion, Israel’s top technical academy, has been cooperating with China for years. In 2013, the Technion partnered with Shantou University in the Guangdong province of China and the Li Kashing Foundation (a philanthropic fund registered in Canada) to establish the Guangdong Technion Israel Institute of Technology (GTIIT).

Asked by Breaking Defense about American concerns over research ties with China, a spokesperson said “The Technion perceives its involvement in GTIIT, from its inception to the present day, as limited to global subjects related to sustainability and the environment for the good of all humankind. In particular, it addresses the many challenges that China faces in water pollution, air pollution, soil pollution and food. Thus the educational programs that have been launched by the Technion in GTIIT have all focused on these subjects.”

White House pressuring Israel to cut research ties with China over dual-use concerns - Breaking Defense

A Ministry of Defense source told Breaking Defense that the Americans are especially concerned about the leakage of sensitive data about cyber capabilities, mini-satellites and electronic warfare systems.

breakingdefense.com · by Arie Egozi · September 29, 2022

Chinese and Israeli flags hang together at a 2017 event. (Photo by Lintao Zhang/Pool/Getty Images)

TEL AVIV — The US is quietly pressuring Israel to limit academic and research ties with China, over fears Beijing could access military technology through “dual-use” research efforts, sources here tell Breaking Defense.

The move comes as Israel is moving to create stronger bonds with Chinese research institutes, including an agreement launched last year specifically “to attract excellent Chinese students” to come study in Israel.

Soft pressure began over the summer, when President Joe Biden visited Israel, but has intensified recently to what one Ministry of Defense source described as a “request that cannot be rejected.” The goal from DC, the Israeli sources said, is to minimize, or if possible cut altogether, cooperation between Israeli and Chinese research organizations.

Israeli officials were surprised by the focus from Washington, and are now engaged in a back and forth with the Biden administration on how to move forward, per the source. Those talks were likely part of a Sept. 28 meeting this week between the national security advisors for both countries, Jake Sullivan and Eyal Hulata, at the White House.

Israeli defense sources told Breaking Defense that the main source of concern for Washington are so-called “dual-use” technologies, the kind of systems that have commercial applications but can also be used in defense products. That includes the kind of tech found in research programs dealing with cyber, space, communications, and long-range observation systems, to name just a few. In some Israeli academic institutions, these research topics are offered to foreign students, including those from China.

A Ministry of Defense source told Breaking Defense that the Americans are especially concerned about the leakage of sensitive data about cyber capabilities, mini-satellites and electronic warfare systems.

Those concerns are amplified by the nature of Israel’s civil-military intermingling. Many of the students and scientists that are part of the academic sector in Israel also serve as reservists in some of the Israeli Defense Forces’ elite technical units, such as the SIGINT-focused Unit 8200. That those researchers could be working on R&D capabilities with Chinese students is driving alarm bells in DC, the sources say.

The Israeli Ministry of Defense and the US embassy in Israel declined to comment for this story. A request for comment to China’s embassy in Israel was not returned by publication.

The pressure follows similar campaigns from Washington to try and limit, or outright sever, China’s influence in Israel. Last year, the Biden administration pressured Israel over espionage concerns related to a Chinese-built port in Haifa while the information provided by the US led to Israel cracking down on Chinese attempts to receive Israeli defense technology.

US officials are wary of what has been termed China’s “military-civil fusion” effort, where any technology developed for civil or commercial use inside China must also be shared with the military.

Beijing “is implementing this strategy, not just through its own research and development efforts, but also by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies – including through theft – in order to achieve military dominance,” a US State Department factsheet [PDF] reads.

In a Sept. 20 analysis, researcher Casey Babb wrote on the INSS website that “relations between China and Israel have gradually deepened over the last two decades across a wide range of fields.”

“For decades, the CCP has prioritized the theft and access of sensitive information, technology, and knowledge from research communities around the world,” Babb wrote. “From opaque academic recruitment efforts, consenting research partnerships, large-scale investments into academic institutions, covert espionage operations, cyber intrusions, and other tactics, China has developed a wide-ranging toolkit of licit and illicit activities to support its tech transfer ambitions throughout international research communities.”

Helping spur the American pressure is a relatively new Israeli initiative to increase scientific collaboration with China. In an Oct. 2021 announcement, the Israeli embassy in Beijing released details about this initiative, stating “The government of Israel attaches great importance to the academic and scientific ties between China and Israel. Large budgets and funds have been already allocated to this important goal.”

In addition to support for undergraduate students, the announcement includes encouragement for Chinese doctoral students to come and spend three years, all expenses paid, doing research in Israel. And the two countries “agree to launch calls for proposals to support collaborative basic research projects between Chinese and Israeli scientists in the areas of Life Sciences and Medicine and Exact Sciences and Technology. These joint research projects are to be carried out by established research groups from both countries.”

President Joe Biden participates in a tête-à-tête with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid, Thursday, July 14, 2022, at the Waldorf Astoria Jerusalem in Jerusalem. (Official White House Photo/Adam Schultz)

It appears that the new agreement with China largely flew under Washington’s radar until around the time of Biden’s July visit to Israel. In the lead up to that event, the White House issued a statement “launching the new Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology, tasked with establishing a U.S.-Israel technological partnership on critical and emerging technologies and solutions to global challenges: pandemic preparedness, climate change, implementation of artificial intelligence, and trusted technology ecosystems.”

Babb, in his analysis for INSS, called the announcement “a clear signal to China,” one which “underscore that Jerusalem is taking Washington’s concerns seriously.”

A White House readout of the the Sept 28 meeting between Sullivan and Hulata reads that the two “discussed the launch of the U.S.-Israel Strategic High-Level Dialogue on Technology that same day, a new vehicle announced by the President and Prime Minister Lapid in July in Israel to enhance technological collaboration to address pandemic preparedness and climate change, promote trustworthy artificial intelligence, and protect our technology ecosystems.”

Asked if China was specifically brought up during the meeting, a National Security Council spokesperson declined further comment beyond the readout.

Balancing Politics From Both Sides

Talking with sources and experts, there is no clear consensus on how Israel should respond to Washington. Balancing the interest of working with China with the political pressure from the US has been a longstanding challenge for Jerusalem, according to a senior defense industry source.

“Defining technologies as dual-use ones include almost every advanced technology,” the source noted. “The American demand calls for a very serious public debate because it will affect Israel in the long run.”

A former senior official in the Israeli defense establishment, speaking on background, added that DC needs to come at this issue with a greater understanding of the importance China plays for Israel economically.

“There must be a system that will evaluate specific cooperation projects, and not an across-the-board action,” the former official said.

Dany Yatom, former head of the Israeli Mossad, told Breaking Defense that Washington may be overplaying its concerns.

“I think that is some cases the Americans exaggerate,” Yatom said. “There must be a continuous dialogue with Washington about what can pose a threat to US security and what is innocent.”

But Gabi Siboni, an Israeli senior cyber expert and a reserve colonel in the IDF, told Breaking Defense that US concerns are understandable, as Israeli academic institutions invest in cyber research while some of the students and scientists have been trained by the Israeli defense forces while serving.

“That said, over the last few years, and partly in response to mounting US pressure on Israel to reconsider its relationship with China, there has been a noticeable cooling of economic activities between the two countries,” he noted.

The Technion, Israel’s top technical academy, has been cooperating with China for years. In 2013, the Technion partnered with Shantou University in the Guangdong province of China and the Li Kashing Foundation (a philanthropic fund registered in Canada) to establish the Guangdong Technion Israel Institute of Technology (GTIIT).

Asked by Breaking Defense about American concerns over research ties with China, a spokesperson said “The Technion perceives its involvement in GTIIT, from its inception to the present day, as limited to global subjects related to sustainability and the environment for the good of all humankind. In particular, it addresses the many challenges that China faces in water pollution, air pollution, soil pollution and food. Thus the educational programs that have been launched by the Technion in GTIIT have all focused on these subjects.”

22. Statement on the fatal flaws found in a defunct CIA covert communications system

Statement on the fatal flaws found in a defunct CIA covert communications system - The Citizen Lab

citizenlab.ca · September 29, 2022

In 2018, Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman of Yahoo News reported that a system used by the CIA to covertly communicate with its assets around the world had been compromised by Iran and China around 2011. The compromise reportedly led to the death of “more than two dozen sources” in China in 2011 and 2012, and also reportedly led Iran to execute some CIA assets and imprison others.

Because the network was used by CIA assets around the world, the compromise also reportedly enabled Iran and China to track espionage activities outside of their borders, related to other countries.

While relevant oversight bodies reportedly performed an investigation into the as-yet-unreported compromise in 2013, Yahoo News reported that those responsible for the intelligence failures were never held accountable: “One of the central concerns among those familiar with the scope of the breakdown is the institutions responsible for it were never held accountable.”

In 2022, we learned from Reuters journalist Joel Schectman that a CIA asset who was captured in Iran, and subsequently served seven years in prison, communicated with his agency handlers via a hidden communications app on a website iraniangoals[.]com. Reuters reports that Iran’s compromise of the network may have led to the asset’s capture. We investigated the website in an effort to understand the vulnerabilities leveraged by Iran and China, and to learn whether the United States had been using an irresponsibly secured system for asset communication. Our investigation, led by Citizen Lab senior researcher Bill Marczak, confirmed the reports of a fatally insecure network.

We shared our findings with Schectman, whose Reuters story can be found here: America’s Throwaway Spies: How the CIA failed Iranian informants in its secret war with Tehran.

Extensive Design Flaws and Shortcuts

Using only a single website, as well as publicly available material such as historical internet scanning results and the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine, we identified a network of 885 websites and have high confidence that the United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used these sites for covert communication.

The websites included similar Java, JavaScript, Adobe Flash, and CGI artifacts that implemented or apparently loaded covert communications apps. In addition, blocks of sequential IP addresses registered to apparently fictitious US companies were used to host some of the websites. All of these flaws would have facilitated discovery by hostile parties.

Had we conducted this research while the websites were still online, as China and Iran likely would have, we would not even have needed to rely on the Wayback Machine and other tools. Knowing only one website, it is likely that, while the websites were online, a motivated amateur sleuth could have mapped the CIA network and attributed it to the US Government.

The websites, which purported to be news, weather, sports, healthcare, and other legitimate websites, appeared to be localized to at least 29 languages and geared towards at least 36 countries.

Figure 1: Portion of one such easily-identified covert communications website, which is being published by Reuters. We have redacted the URL, name and other identifying details.

Identifying Americans Abroad

The bulk of the websites that we discovered were active at various periods between 2004 and 2013. We do not believe that the CIA has recently used this communications infrastructure. Nevertheless, a subset of the websites are linked to individuals who may be former and possibly still active intelligence community employees or assets:

• Several are currently abroad
• Another left mainland China in the timeframe of the Chinese crackdown
• Another was subsequently employed by the US State Department
• Another now works at a foreign intelligence contractor

Limited Disclosure

Given that we cannot rule out ongoing risks to CIA employees or assets, we are not publishing full technical details regarding our process of mapping out the network at this time. As a first step, we intend to conduct a limited disclosure to US government oversight bodies.

Our mission is to undertake independent, evidence-based research holding governments and corporations accountable for their actions in the digital space, regardless of who those governments and corporations are. The reckless construction of this infrastructure by the CIA reportedly led directly to the identification and execution of assets, and undoubtedly risked the lives of countless other individuals. Our hope is that this research, and our limited disclosure process, will ensure that no one connected to these websites will be in danger, and lead to accountability for this reckless behavior.

citizenlab.ca · September 29, 2022

23. Xi Jinping’s Quest for Order

Excerpts:

Washington needs to tread carefully here. Countries often seek out Chinese technology or assistance in an effort to solve genuine governance challenges, and U.S. officials have not always been effective in pairing their critiques of China’s behavior with constructive alternatives. But Chinese exports and activities already pose serious threats for data security, citizen privacy, human rights, and liberal democracy, and under the GSI, these concerns are likely to grow. Thus far, Washington’s focus on military competition in the Indo-Pacific risks overlooking and missing the nonmilitary—but equally serious—challenges that the GSI poses to global and regional security order and to American interests.

Whether or not China resorts to military might to achieve these goals, the approach outlined under the GSI thus far should give the United States pause. The fact that the initiative is founded on the comprehensive national security concept and seeks to project that concept’s focus on regime security abroad should be a warning. The CCP aims to revise global and regional security governance to more closely align with its regime security interests and to use Chinese foreign policy as a tool to secure its hold on power at home. The United States should not underestimate the risks of this new Chinese approach to foreign policy.

Xi Jinping’s Quest for Order

Security at Home, Influence Abroad

By Sheena Chestnut Greitens

October 3, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Sheena Chestnut Greitens · October 3, 2022

In April 2022, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech on foreign policy at the Boao Forum for Asia, an annual conference of business executives and world leaders in Hainan Province. In it, he proposed what he called Quanqiu Anquan Changyi, or the Global Security Initiative (GSI), which he framed as “promoting the common security of the world.” Xi offered few details of how the initiative might be put into practice, however, and with Western governments intensely focused on Russia’s unfolding war in Ukraine, the speech did not receive much attention.

But the speech was hardly insignificant. As Chinese diplomats and analysts close to the government have made clear in the months since, the GSI marks a significant shift in Chinese foreign policy. It directly challenges the role of U.S. alliances and partnerships in global security and seeks to revise global security governance to make it more compatible with the regime security interests of the Chinese Communist Party.

During his first two terms, Xi transformed China’s approach to internal security in ways that caught the world off-guard—writing China’s first-ever national security strategy and a host of new security laws, restructuring the country’s domestic security apparatus, purging and jailing many of the security forces’ top leaders, building a massive surveillance state, and intensifying repression at a speed that few outside observers predicted. The guiding framework for those efforts was something that Xi called the “comprehensive national security concept,” which was really a regime security concept codified as grand strategy. Now, Xi is applying that framework to foreign policy, attempting to remake regional and global security order to guard against threats to China’s domestic stability and further consolidate the party’s grip on power.

SECURITY ABOVE ALL

Xi’s new approach to security began to take shape in 2014, when he rolled out what he called the zongti guojia anquanguan, or comprehensive national security concept, often also referred to as the “overall” or “holistic” state security concept. At the same time, he unveiled a new party body, the Central National Security Commission, tasked with putting the concept into practice. At the time, many U.S. analysts thought the CNSC would resemble the U.S. National Security Council, but the linguistic parallel turned out to be misleading. The Chinese conception of national security places a much greater emphasis on internal security than the American one (a better translation might be “state security”). Much of the CNSC’s work is conducted in secret, but most of its known meetings have focused on domestic matters, such as the potential for COVID-19 to fuel instability in China or the party-state’s counterterrorism policy in Xinjiang.

As its name suggests, the comprehensive national security concept is comprehensive. According to the CCP Central Committee, it covers “political, military, homeland security, economic, cultural, social, technological, cyberspace, ecological, resource, nuclear, overseas interests, outer space, deep sea, polar, and biological security issues, among others.” Defined this widely, the concept can frame almost any topic or area of life as a security threat and empower Chinese officials to respond accordingly.

In an increasingly dangerous world, the party’s chief aim is political security.

The concept also reveals the CCP’s underlying sense of insecurity: it portrays threats to China as growing and the country’s capabilities as inadequate. Even the phrase “major changes in the world unseen in a century,” used often by Chinese officials and commonly portrayed by Western analysts and officials as a triumphal assessment of China’s rise, has a darker side. In the context of official discourse, it often implies that rising opportunity is accompanied by rising peril. In November 2021, the CCP Central Committee argued that China was faced with “unprecedented external risks and challenges” and that “China’s ability to safeguard national security falls short of what is required of us by the current circumstances.”

In an increasingly dangerous world, the party’s chief aim is political security, which Chinese officials and state media have defined as “safeguarding party leadership, China’s socialist system, and the authority of the Central Committee with Xi Jinping at the core.” Xi and other CCP leaders believe that both political unrest and ideological contamination could threaten this order. In their view, communism in the Soviet Union was doomed by corruption from within, lack of ideological commitment, and insufficient party control over the organs of coercion. One can draw a direct line from these threats to each of Xi’s signature initiatives: his anticorruption campaign; his efforts to strengthen patriotic education, ideological indoctrination, and the party’s penetration of society; and his push to assert party control over the military and domestic security apparatus. Comprehensive national security is the strategic concept that ties these seemingly disparate efforts together.

PREVENTION AND CONTROL

Not all the ideas in Xi’s comprehensive national security concept were new. Aspects of the concept drew on long-standing themes in Chinese history and party discourse—for example, the tendency to see internal and external threats as interconnected. But the comprehensive national security concept made clear that the Chinese political system needed to take internal, nontraditional security threats such as terrorism and unrest much more seriously. The concept’s function was also novel: it served as a systematic framework for officials to assess and address threats and gave them new tools with which to do so. Moreover, the concept called on officials to become more proactive about heading off such threats, replacing the language of “stability maintenance” that characterized previous eras of Chinese leadership with a discourse centered on fangkong, or “prevention and control.”

The concept transformed how China handled internal security. In January 2015, eight months after Xi announced the concept, the Politburo approved China’s first-ever national security strategy; the Politburo approved a second five-year strategy in 2021. Unlike the U.S. National Security Strategy, China’s strategy is not publicly available, but based on official media coverage, it appears to closely parallel the content in Xi’s speeches and other official commentaries. The inauguration of a formal national security strategy was significant not just because of its content but also because it indicated a significant change in China’s national security policymaking process.

Other reforms followed. Since the comprehensive national security concept was announced, China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress, has passed a raft of national security legislation on topics ranging from criminal procedure to border security, regulation of nongovernmental organizations, data security, counterterrorism, intelligence, cybersecurity, and other threats. Xi has also reorganized the military and domestic security forces, including the command structure of the People’s Armed Police, to strengthen party control over these organs. Meanwhile, his anticorruption campaign—which has targeted officials in the military, police, state security, and judicial system, in particular—aims to ensure that corruption does not erode the CCP’s control over coercive agents from below or make them susceptible to bribery or other forms of compromise by foreign intelligence agencies. The CCP has even replicated the CNSC subnationally, embedding subordinate national security commissions in the party structure down to the county level to ensure that national security concerns inform local decision-making.

China has ramped up spending on its surveillance state.

China has also ramped up spending on its surveillance state. Under an official 2015 directive to construct what the party-state calls a “multi-dimensional information-based prevention and control system for public and social security,” local and provincial governments have substantially increased spending on domestic security, collectively exceeding what China spends on national defense. Much of the investment has been in technology for surveilling the public and in back-end analytical platforms that use the resulting data to improve governance and maintain social order.

Application of the comprehensive national security concept has yielded the harshest repression in Hong Kong and Xinjiang, two places where Beijing is especially fearful that foreign powers could foment internal instability. In Hong Kong, a new national security law has steadily eroded civil liberties and civil society, and many pro-democracy activists have been jailed or forced to flee into exile abroad. Repression has been even more severe in Xinjiang, which the CCP identified in 2014 as a test case for applying the comprehensive national security concept. (The region presents precisely the combination of internal and external security concerns that the party-state is worried about.) A visit by Xi to Xinjiang in April 2014, immediately after he launched the concept, only raised the bureaucratic stakes. The result has been a sharp escalation in collective repression of the region’s Uyghur Muslim population, not only through the rapid expansion of surveillance and police power but also by confining citizens in a network of internment and “re-education” camps that showcase the extremes to which China now goes to prevent the emergence of threats.

SAFE CHINA, SAFER WORLD?

As Xi concludes his second term as party leader and approaches the start of a likely third, there are signs that the CCP is thinking seriously about how to project the comprehensive national security concept abroad. This effort appears to center on the Global Security Initiative that Xi announced in Hainan in April. Like the comprehensive national security concept (also announced in April, eight years earlier), the GSI includes a fair bit of rhetoric used previously by party leaders and Chinese diplomats—just repackaged in a more systematic and strategic fashion. And like the comprehensive national security concept when it was first proposed, the GSI is currently vague, more of a slogan than a well-developed policy. (Even the Chinese word for “initiative,” changyi, implies a proposal or suggestion more than a concrete action plan.) Given the GSI’s nebulous and somewhat repetitive framing, it is not surprising that the initiative received little attention when it was announced.

But observers should not assume that because the GSI is vague it will be insignificant. To the contrary, Chinese-language commentary suggests that the initiative will serve as a bridge between Beijing’s domestic security agenda and its foreign policy. Analysts at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, a think tank associated with China’s Ministry of State Security, describe the GSI as a “vivid practice for guiding China’s diplomatic work based on the comprehensive national security concept.” Other Chinese analysts refer to it as the “vertical continuation” of the comprehensive national security concept and a mechanism by which to “coordinate between China’s domestic security and the common security of the world.” That phrase also appears in an important resolution on party history adopted by the CCP Central Committee in November 2021, which describes the protection of national security as a “fundamental task” for the CCP and the party’s “top priority.” If these descriptions are accurate, then Chinese officials will be under substantial pressure to operationalize the GSI over the next five years. Their goal will be to revise the international system in ways that protect not just China’s national interests as they are traditionally understood but also the security of the regime and the CCP’s hold on power, as the comprehensive national security concept directs.

From the CCP’s point of view, externalizing the comprehensive national security concept through the GSI makes sense. Xi has always seen external security threats largely through the prism of how they could undermine party rule at home. For much of the past ten years, official statements have urged Chinese bureaucrats to address potential threats early and preventively, often using medical metaphors such as calls to “immunize” the Chinese body politic against foreign pathogens that could infect it. By the same preventive logic, ensuring the regime’s security at home requires a more proactive and interventionist approach abroad to defend against intruding threats of “encirclement, suppression, disruption, and subversion,” as the Central Committee phrased it last fall. Indeed, one of the most puzzling things about the comprehensive national security concept has always been that it lacked a robust foreign policy dimension, despite attributing many of China’s internal security issues to external meddling. In that sense, the GSI is actually overdue.

Xi sees external security threats largely through the prism of how they could undermine party rule at home.

What the GSI will look like in practice is still an open question. It took several years for the full import and impact of the comprehensive national security concept to become clear. The same will likely be true of the GSI. But China’s dissatisfaction with the current international security order is not a secret, and in its calls for reform are some clues about what themes the GSI may emphasize.

The first is the need to reform the global and regional security architecture. Chinese officials argue that the U.S. system of alliances and partnerships in particular is destabilizing because it pursues security for members of that network at the expense of those outside it. Ukraine is a key example used to bolster these arguments. Since the war began, Chinese officials have consistently assigned primary blame for the conflict to NATO and the United States, rather than to Russia. (The joint Russian and Chinese statement issued on February 4, 2022, suggested that both powers share a fear that U.S. influence on their peripheries will destabilize their regimes at home, one of the core threats that the comprehensive national security concept seeks to guard against.) Chinese officials present the GSI’s emphasis on “indivisible security” as a superior alternative to the bloc system created by U.S. alliances and, under the initiative, have called directly for changes to Asia’s security architecture.

A second theme is that the world must consider new forms of security cooperation to address nontraditional security threats. In practice, this has meant an expansion of Chinese police activity worldwide and offers of police training and law enforcement assistance as a growing element of Chinese foreign policy. In a speech at the 2017 Interpol General Assembly in Beijing, Xi argued that the international security environment had changed: threats had diversified, traditional and nontraditional security threats were more entwined than before, and transnational threats were increasing. These “new problems,” all identified in the comprehensive national security concept, meant that “global security governance had many inadequacies” and therefore required reform—an assessment repeated in statements on the GSI by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi this year. Similarly, at an internal work conference in 2019, China’s senior domestic security officials called on police and internal security personnel to strengthen and develop “a new system of international public security cooperation” and “promote the establishment of an international law enforcement cooperation and coordination system under the unified leadership of the Ministry of Public Security Party Committee.”

The GSI, therefore, is likely to amplify an already growing trend: international outreach by Chinese police and domestic security officials. China has already begun to expand the deployment of police liaison officers abroad and has held high-level discussions on “foreign police training with Chinese characteristics,” with the aim of “enhancing the international influence” of China’s police work and “telling the story of a ‘Safe China.’” This has meant not only active engagement with existing global agencies such as Interpol but also building new forums such as the Lianyungang Forum, where Chinese officials share best practices and Chinese surveillance and policing companies market their wares to foreign law enforcement agencies and officials. The GSI is also increasingly a feature of China’s regional diplomacy. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit last month, Xi invited member-states to participate in the initiative, offering to train thousands of their law enforcement officers and otherwise help them build security and counterterrorism capacity. A similar proposal to a group of ten nations in the Pacific Islands also included offers of substantial police and law enforcement assistance (although it was ultimately rejected), and police cooperation has been a notable feature of China’s growing relationship with the Solomon Islands.

U.S. officials are not always effective in pairing critiques of China’s behavior with constructive alternatives.

These offers of police and domestic security assistance seem designed to make China the security partner of choice for countries that might not want such assistance to come with the human rights conditions or democratic accountability mechanisms that Western nations often demand. And they follow on the heels of a global expansion in Chinese exports of surveillance technology, such as Huawei’s Safe City platforms, which appear in dozens of countries worldwide. Chinese companies market these products as tools for ensuring public safety and managing nontraditional security, in keeping with Xi’s focus on nontraditional and domestic threats to social stability. But given the primacy of political security in China’s own police and law enforcement system, the expansion of these activities abroad is likely to result in a marked increase in transnational repression—something that the United States is already monitoring closely.

Washington needs to tread carefully here. Countries often seek out Chinese technology or assistance in an effort to solve genuine governance challenges, and U.S. officials have not always been effective in pairing their critiques of China’s behavior with constructive alternatives. But Chinese exports and activities already pose serious threats for data security, citizen privacy, human rights, and liberal democracy, and under the GSI, these concerns are likely to grow. Thus far, Washington’s focus on military competition in the Indo-Pacific risks overlooking and missing the nonmilitary—but equally serious—challenges that the GSI poses to global and regional security order and to American interests.

Whether or not China resorts to military might to achieve these goals, the approach outlined under the GSI thus far should give the United States pause. The fact that the initiative is founded on the comprehensive national security concept and seeks to project that concept’s focus on regime security abroad should be a warning. The CCP aims to revise global and regional security governance to more closely align with its regime security interests and to use Chinese foreign policy as a tool to secure its hold on power at home. The United States should not underestimate the risks of this new Chinese approach to foreign policy.

• SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS is Associate Professor and Director of the Asia Policy Program at the University of Texas at Austin and a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Foreign Affairs · by Sheena Chestnut Greitens · October 3, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

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Editor, Small Wars Journal

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