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Quotes of the Day:
"What is the use of living, if it be not to strive for noble causes and to make this muddled world a better place for those who will live in it after we are gone? How else can we put ourselves in harmonious relation with the great verities and consolations of the infinite and the eternal? And I avow my faith that we are marching towards better days. Humanity will not be cast down. We are going on swinging bravely forward along the grand high road and already behind the distant mountains is the promise of the sun."
– Winston Churchill
"The real art of conversation is not only to say the right thing in the right place but to leave unsaid the wrong thing at the tempting moment."
– Lady Dorothy Nevill
"It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood."
– James Madison
1. North Korea’s Hezbollah Connection
2. Russia’s nuclear partnership with North Korea
3. What Would Be Japan’s Role in a New Korean War?
4. INTERVIEW (John Bolton): Trump ‘would love to see his friend Kim Jong Un again’
5. <Lighting Up N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (5) What Happened During COVID... "Drink Willow Branch Brew" - Misguided Quarantine Policies Only Led to Residents' Deaths
6. New Japanese Prime Minister: “I Want ROK-US-Japan Unity to Respond to North Korean Threats”
7. North Korean hacker group accused by US government still conducting cyberattacks
8. "Kim Yo-jong's criticism of Ukraine is single-mindedly directed at Russia"
9. CIA expands online recruitment of informants to China, Iran, N. Korea
10. Consultations under way for summit between Yoon, Japan's Ishiba in Laos: presidential office
1. North Korea’s Hezbollah Connection
For those who have not been paying attention. north Korea is a key facilitator among the "Big 5" of the Dark Quad and violent extremist organizations. We ignore the regime's contributions at our peril.
North Korea’s Hezbollah Connection
North Korea has been a key supplier and facilitator of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and logistical flexibility.
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · October 2, 2024
As we watch Israel move into Lebanon with ground forces this week, it is important to understand that this would not be necessary unless Hezbollah had a vast network of tunnels that prevents destruction from purely air power. To destroy or degrade Hezbollah’s military ability to continue attacking Israel’s citizens, the IDF must send in land forces to attack them underground. This military paradigm shift, which started in the 2006 war, would not exist were it not for the expertise, engineering, equipment, advisors, and technicians provided by North Korea. Now we see it in action thanks to North Korean military proliferation and Hezbollah’s unending appetite for launching rockets into towns in northern Israel.
Numerous reports following the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war provide evidence that Hezbollah’s underground facilities were constructed under North Korean supervision and advising in 2003–2004. The tunnels contained, among other things, dispensaries, arms dumps, and food stocks. This significant tunnel network was far more robust than Israeli forces anticipated as they prosecuted combat operations against Hezbollah in 2006. To quote an article in the Israeli press, “Hizbullah’s military bases, armories, bunkers and communications networks were much more extensive than Israel’s intelligence services estimated on the eve of the 2006 war.” Other reporting based on testimony from a former IRGC officer states, “With the assistance of several Iranian engineers and technicians, as well as North Korean experts, who traveled to Lebanon disguised as servants for the Iranian embassy and its officers, Hezbollah has successfully built a 25km long underground belt, with 12-meter openings along it, the officer added. Every four openings are connected to one another through an easily accessible passageway.” However, the system Hezbollah used in 2006 was only the beginning.
In 2021, a critical report from the Alma Research Center (AMC) in Israel revealed Hezbollah had built another larger tunnel system—with the assistance of the North Koreans, of course (and the Iranians). Hezbollah agreed to a $13 million deal with KOMID (North Korea’s primary proliferation front company) to build a forty-five-kilometer tunnel system connecting several key nodes in Lebanon, reportedly much longer and more sophisticated than the first tunnel system. The North Koreans had already been paid $6 million by 2014, and the tunnel system appears to have been completed by 2021. As the report explains, “In our estimation, the cumulative length of all the tunnels in the ‘Land of the Tunnels’ can reach up to hundreds of kilometers. Hezbollah tunnels, like Hamas tunnels, contain underground command and control rooms, weapons and supply depots, field clinics, and specified designated shafts used to fire missiles of all types (rockets, surface-to-surface missiles, anti-tank missiles, and anti-aircraft missiles). These shafts are hidden and camouflaged and cannot be detected above ground.”
What the evidence presented above shows us is that Hezbollah has been building up in anticipation of another conflict with Israel. Clearly, they have been enabled in this process by support from North Korea and Iran. It is also important to note that these tunnels are a key factor, perhaps the key factor, in Israel’s decision to bring ground forces into the conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanese territory. The tunnels not only give Hezbollah longer sustainment but also the ability to move forces and equipment from combat zone to combat zone without detection from IDF aircraft or other intelligence collection methods. Thus, North Korea has been a key aspect of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and logistical flexibility. There is now quite simply no other way of going after Hezbollah forces except to take out this extensive and sophisticated tunnel system—and that will take ground troops.
This is yet another example of the fact that North Korea’s fingerprints are all over the violence in the Middle East that has occurred since October 7, 2023. There is now definitive evidence that North Korea supplied Hamas with F-7 RPG’s 122mm rockets and launchers as well as other small arms. Pyongyang has supplied the Houthis with both conventional weapons and ballistic missiles, and Iran (its biggest customer) with the same—including the genesis of missile systems and engines that attacked Israel in April.
Despite a plethora of evidence, the United States government has yet to acknowledge the involvement of North Korea in the violence that is ongoing in the Middle East. The reasons for that are almost unexplainable. There has been no hesitation to address North Korea’s proliferation to Russia. But why is there no discussion of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah? Unless or until the United States engages in more robust enforcement of existing sanctions and publicly announces North Korea’s role in the current violence in the Middle East, Pyongyang will continue to engage in these financially lucrative, sanctions-busting activities.
Dr. Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. is a professor of Political Science at Angelo State University. He is also the president of the International Council on Korean Studies and a fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies. The author of five books dealing with North Korea, his latest work is entitled North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa.
Image: Shutterstock.com
The National Interest · by Bruce E. Bechtol · October 2, 2024
2. Russia’s nuclear partnership with North Korea
Excerpts:
Mr. Putin will eventually have to answer to the people for this tragic act of aggression against a sovereign, independent Ukraine. The key is for Ukraine to remain resilient and get the support it needs from the U.S. and the European Union. Hopefully, there will be a cease-fire and an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But it should be on terms amenable to Kyiv, not dictated by Moscow.
When the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will no longer need North Korean artillery and missiles and will likely be unable to provide North Korea with meaningful energy and food support. That’s when North Korea will again rely on China — committed to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — in efforts to retain China’s economic lifeline for the energy, food and trade necessary for its survival.
It will also be a time for North Korea to normalize relations with the United States — conditioned on complete and verifiable denuclearization — and be part of the family of nations, with the eventual lifting of sanctions and economic development assistance from the global community.
Russia’s nuclear partnership with North Korea
Kim Jong-un has given up on normalizing relations with U.S.
washingtontimes.com · by Joseph R. DeTrani
By - Tuesday, October 1, 2024
OPINION:
On Sept. 13, North Korea announced the visit of its leader, Kim Jong-un, to a secret site to produce weapons-grade uranium. Pictures showed Mr. Kim surrounded by centrifuges, stating that North Korea would “exponentially increase the production of nuclear weapons … for greater defense and preemptive attack capabilities.”
The U.S. has known since 2000 that North Korea had a secret program to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. In 2002, the U.S. informed the leaders in Pyongyang that their secret uranium-enrichment program violated the 1994 Agreed Framework, which committed North Korea to freeze its nuclear program at Yongbyon and the construction of nuclear reactors for nuclear weapons in return for two proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactor for civilian energy.
North Korea has repeatedly denied having a secret uranium-enrichment program in the 30 years of negotiations that produced the 1994 Agreed Framework, the Six-Party Talks Joint statement of 2005 and the 2018 Summit Agreement between then-President Donald Trump and Mr. Kim.
The 2019 leadership summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, ended with no agreement because Mr. Kim refused to disclose the existence of North Korea’s secret uranium-enrichment sites. This was unfortunate but not surprising because North Korea thought it could pretend to abandon its nuclear weapons program in return for the eventual normalization of relations with the U.S. while retaining a secret nuclear weapons capability.
It appears that Mr. Kim has given up on his goal of normalizing relations with the U.S. He now realizes that he must verifiably dismantle all nuclear weapons and programs, including his uranium-enrichment program, if normalization of relations with the U.S. is North Korea’s ultimate objective. Mr. Kim has made a strategic decision: Retaining and producing more nuclear weapons is more important than normal relations with the U.S.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently declared that “denuclearizing North Korea is a closed issue as it understands North Korea’s logic that nuclear weapons are a foundation of its defense.” He went on to say that Russia will stand with North Korea in resisting what he said the U.S. portrays as expanded nuclear deterrence with South Korea and Japan.
The irony in these comments from Mr. Lavrov is profound. Russia was part of the Six-Party Talks with North Korea from 2003 to 2009 and with China was a voice calling for North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and programs.
But now, after Russia invaded Ukraine and is subjected to international sanctions, it needs material support from countries such as China, North Korea and Iran. And in this case, Russia apparently was prepared not only to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state but also to potentially aid North Korea with its nuclear, missile, satellite and conventional programs.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in 2022 has been a disaster. Ukraine has taken the city of Kursk in Russia. Despite Russia’s advances in the eastern front in Ukraine, Russian casualties are nearly 1,200 each day, with estimates of overall Russian casualties exceeding 500,000.
These figures far exceed the casualties the Soviet Union suffered in Afghanistan after its invasion in 1979. It was not only the casualties in Afghanistan but also the Soviet public’s disgust with the war that was killing so many of its people and the expense that added to the Soviet Union’s eventual bankruptcy.
Mr. Putin will eventually have to answer to the people for this tragic act of aggression against a sovereign, independent Ukraine. The key is for Ukraine to remain resilient and get the support it needs from the U.S. and the European Union. Hopefully, there will be a cease-fire and an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But it should be on terms amenable to Kyiv, not dictated by Moscow.
When the war in Ukraine ends, Russia will no longer need North Korean artillery and missiles and will likely be unable to provide North Korea with meaningful energy and food support. That’s when North Korea will again rely on China — committed to the complete and verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — in efforts to retain China’s economic lifeline for the energy, food and trade necessary for its survival.
It will also be a time for North Korea to normalize relations with the United States — conditioned on complete and verifiable denuclearization — and be part of the family of nations, with the eventual lifting of sanctions and economic development assistance from the global community.
• Joseph R. DeTrani served as special envoy for the Six-Party Talks with North Korea from 2003 to 2006 and as director of the National Counterproliferation Center. The views expressed here are the author’s and not those of any government agency or department.
Copyright © 2024 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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washingtontimes.com · by Joseph R. DeTrani
3. What Would Be Japan’s Role in a New Korean War?
Excerpt:
Conclusion
If North Korea were to launch a full-scale invasion of South Korea at this point, it should anticipate Japan’s multifaceted involvement, ranging from missile defense and maritime security to logistical support for U.S. forces. Japan’s contribution would likely surpass its role during the Korean War, especially given its decision to acquire counterstrike capabilities and its right to exercise collective defense, enabled by the 2015 legislation. Japan is therefore expected to provide an unprecedented level of operational support to U.S. forces in a second Korean War. If Pyongyang’s leadership fully understands this, they may attempt to create divisions not only between the United States and South Korea, and the United States and Japan, but also between Japan and South Korea. Strengthening the trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea — and reinforcing the weakest link, Japanese-South Korean relations — is thus crucial.
What Would Be Japan’s Role in a New Korean War? - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · October 3, 2024
As North Korea continues to advance its nuclear capabilities along with long-range missiles and China’s potential invasion of Taiwan, along with U.S. military responses, dominates discussions on Far East Asian security, the recent establishment of the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework has sparked questions about whether it includes detailed action plans for regional contingencies, such as simultaneous full-scale conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. With the specifics of the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework still confidential, and uncertainty surrounding whether it will evolve into an East Asian NATO equivalent (the Asia-Pacific Treaty Organization, a concept proposed by South Korean President Park Chung-hee in the 1960s but never realized), it is unclear how the three major democracies in the region — the United States, Japan, and South Korea — would collectively respond to such crises.
In the post-war period, security in the Far East was primarily ensured by two bilateral defense alliances: the U.S.-South Korean Mutual Defense Treaty and the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. While the former was designed to defend South Korea against a North Korean invasion, the latter aimed to protect Japan from external threats. However, the absence of a security treaty between Japan and South Korea made the connection between the two countries — the critical link within the tripartite relationship — particularly susceptible to domestic issues, especially historical disputes. As a result, the framework for security cooperation between Japan and South Korea had to be continuously shaped and reshaped by political leaders on both sides throughout the post-war era.
However, based on my research, as detailed in my doctoral dissertation “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” the two countries demonstrated a significant level of security cooperation throughout the post-war period, even in the absence of a formal military alliance. For example, during the Korean War, Japan made substantial contributions to South Korean security despite not having formal diplomatic relations with South Korea at the time. With this context in mind, I aim to specifically explore Japan’s role in the event of an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. What actions could Japan take in such a crisis, and what types of security support could it provide to South Korea?
To address these questions, I first examine the historical precedent of Japan’s actions during the Korean War, which remains the only instance of an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula in the post-war era. Secondly, I analyze Japan’s recent legislative development and integrate insights from interviews I conducted with over 20 Japanese security experts, including Akiyama Masahito, a former vice minister of defense, and Michishita Narushige, vice president of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, as well as officials from the Self-Defense Forces. As a whole, this article presents an overview of the actions Japan could and is likely to take in the event of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula in 2024.
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Japan in the Korean War
Shortly after North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel on the morning of June 25, 1950, they employed their version of Blitzkrieg, forcing South Korean forces to retreat all the way to Pusan in the southeastern part of the peninsula. Although President Harry S. Truman announced on June 27, 1950 that U.S. forces would intervene under the auspices of a U.N. resolution, the United States faced challenges due to its geographical distance from Korea and the effects of significant arms reductions following World War II. As a result, the United States needed to identify a large logistics base and staging ground to deploy its forces in the region, with Japan emerging as the most suitable candidate.
Due to the limited territory available for U.N. forces to operate within the Pusan perimeter, Japan’s ports and transportation infrastructure became essential for transferring military hardware and non-military supplies from Japan to the Korean Peninsula, especially during the early phase of the war. After World War II, Japan’s ports, such as those in Yokohama, Kobe, and Kitakyushu, were revitalized and fully utilized by the U.S. military to transport troops, weapons, and supplies. The proximity of Japan’s western ports, such as Moji and Shimonoseki, to Korea made these hubs indispensable. In particular, maritime transportation was essential for conducting military operations, such as the Incheon landing in September 1950 and the Wonsan landing in October of the same year. Japanese crews, operating under U.S. command through the Naval Shipping Control Authority for Japanese Merchant Marine, transported thousands of U.S. and U.N. troops alongside vast quantities of military supplies. Japanese ships were also responsible for evacuating U.N. troops and Korean civilians during the Hungnam evacuation in December 1950, an operation that safely transported 17,500 vehicles, 105,000 soldiers, and 91,000 civilians.
Japan’s industrial capacity was another vital component of the U.N. war effort. Following the destruction of much of Korea’s infrastructure during the war, Japan became the primary site for repairing, refurbishing, and upgrading military equipment through Operation Rollup. This initiative, launched in 1947, aimed to regenerate surplus military equipment left in Japan and the Pacific after World War II. From June to October 1950, Japanese factories regenerated 15,000 general-purpose vehicles, 489,000 small arms, and 1,418 artillery pieces for use in the war. By the end of the war, Japan had repaired or rebuilt 65 percent of the military vehicles used in Korea. Japanese workers, supervised by U.S. military personnel, refurbished tanks, artillery, and other equipment that was crucial in the defense of Pusan and other early battles. M-4A3 Sherman tanks, initially introduced to Japan through Operation Rollup, were upgraded and sent to Korea, giving the U.N. forces much-needed firepower against North Korean forces. Aircraft were also repaired and upgraded in Japan. Japanese companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Aircraft refurbished U.S. bombers and fighter jets such as the B-29, F-51, and F-80. These aircraft, critical to U.S. air operations in Korea, were retrofitted with improved fuel systems and weapons. The regeneration program played a key role in maintaining U.S. air dominance throughout the war.
One of Japan’s most significant operational contributions during the Korean War was minesweeping. North Korea, supported by Soviet expertise, laid thousands of sea mines around key ports to block U.N. naval operations. Given the U.S. Navy’s limited minesweeping capabilities — having drastically reduced its fleet after World War II — Japan’s experienced minesweeping crews and vessels were indispensable. A total of 46 Japanese minesweepers and over 1,200 former Imperial Navy personnel were deployed to clear sea routes around Korean ports like Incheon, Wonsan, and Gunsan. These efforts enabled safe passage for U.N. ships, facilitating critical amphibious operations like the Incheon landing in September 1950. The clearance of sea mines also protected the transport of troops and supplies, ensuring the success of military campaigns and maintaining U.N. naval superiority.
In addition, Japan’s U.S. military bases were used extensively as launching pads for U.N. air, naval, and ground operations. Bases such as Itazuke Air Base and Kadena Air Base were critical for U.S. air dominance in the Korean War. U.S. fighter jets and bombers operated from Japanese airfields, launching missions against North Korean and Chinese forces. For instance, during the early phases of the war, B-29 bombers from Japan conducted bombing campaigns that targeted North Korean military installations.
In sum, Japan’s logistical and operational contributions during the Korean War were essential to the success of U.N. forces. Through transportation, equipment repair, minesweeping, and training, Japan played a multifaceted role that went beyond merely providing bases. Although Japan did not formally deploy troops under the U.N. flag, its security contributions were widely recognized by key figures like Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, and Adm. Arleigh Burke, who witnessed the Korean War firsthand.
What About the Next Korean War?
Japan’s involvement in a second Korean War would likely be more extensive. Japan would play a critical support role in conjunction with the United States, focusing on missile defense, maritime security, and logistical assistance. Japan’s involvement in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula would likely exclude direct combat operations due to political sensitivities and legal restrictions. However, it would offer significant operational and logistical support through various activities. Beyond the 2015 U.S.-Japanese defense guidelines, the most reliable insight into Japan’s potential actions during a Korean contingency is found in Operation Plan 5055. Although this plan is confidential, some details have been disclosed in media reporting.
Operation Plan 5055, developed as an upgrade to Concept Plan 5055 after North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, is a comprehensive U.S.-Japanese defense strategy designed to address potential North Korean contingencies. It divides scenarios into two categories: one where Japan provides support without facing a direct attack, and another where Japan is directly attacked, particularly by ballistic missiles. The plan outlines detailed cooperation between U.S. and Japanese forces in areas such as situational awareness, logistics, command and control, and missile defense. It includes measures for search and rescue operations, protection of U.S. bases and ports, and rear-area support activities involving local authorities.
In the event that the latter scenario occurs, Japan’s ballistic missile defense system would play a crucial role in countering North Korean missile attacks. Given North Korea’s ability to launch missiles targeting not only South Korea but also U.S. military assets and territories in the region, such as Guam and Hawaii, Japan’s Aegis-equipped destroyers and land-based interceptors could play a critical role in intercepting these missiles. Japan’s ballistic missile defense capability would provide an additional layer of defense to U.S. forces and assets, ensuring their operational effectiveness during a Korean contingency. This would also help mitigate the potential for “nuclear decoupling” — the possibility that North Korea could drive a wedge between U.S. and South Korean/Japanese forces by threatening nuclear strikes, thereby weakening the coalition’s resolve.
Meanwhile, Japan would likely dispatch its minesweepers to Korean waters in such circumstances. North Korea is known to have deployed thousands of sea mines along its coastlines. These mines would pose a significant threat to U.S. and South Korean naval operations in the event of a conflict. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force has a well-established minesweeping capability, as demonstrated during the International Mine Countermeasures Exercise 2013, and would likely be tasked with clearing sea routes in and around the Korean Peninsula. This operation would be crucial for ensuring the safe transport of U.S. reinforcements and supplies to the region, helping to facilitate landing operations in North Korea if necessary.
Japan’s role would extend to anti-air, anti-submarine, and anti-ship warfare. North Korea’s air force, though relatively outdated, could still pose a threat to reconnaissance and transport aircraft. Japanese fighters could help protect U.S. air assets from North Korean interceptors or aircraft attempting to infiltrate South Korean or Japanese airspace. Additionally, North Korea’s submarine fleet could attempt to disrupt sea lines of communication between Japan and South Korea, which are critical for the transport of U.S. military personnel and supplies. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, with its advanced anti-submarine capabilities, would be tasked with neutralizing North Korean submarines that pose a threat to these vital sea routes or to U.S. Navy vessels operating in the region.
Additionally, with Japan in the process of acquiring a counterstrike capability and planning to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States by 2027, this new capability could be employed to strike North Korean missile launch sites or other key military targets in the event of a Korean contingency. This would align Japan with South Korea’s “kill chain,” which aims to neutralize North Korean missile threats preemptively. While Japan’s counterstrike capability is not yet fully operational, its development signals a shift towards a more proactive defense posture, one that could significantly enhance U.S. and South Korean efforts to disable North Korean military infrastructure during a conflict.
The protection of U.S. Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons would be another critical role for Japan. These squadrons, which carry pre-positioned military supplies and equipment, are strategically stationed in locations such as Guam and Okinawa. In the early stages of a Korean contingency, these supplies could be rapidly deployed to South Korea, potentially even before a formal decision is made to send reinforcements from the U.S. mainland. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force would likely be tasked with protecting these ships as they transit to South Korea, ensuring the quick deployment of essential military assets to the battlefield.
Japan’s logistical support, facilitated through its Self-Defense Forces, would be a key component of U.S. operations during a Korean contingency. Under Japan’s 2015 security legislation, the Self-Defense Force is authorized to provide rear-area support to U.S. forces, which could include the use of Japanese ports and airfields for resupply operations, medical support, and transport of personnel. Japan’s role in maintaining supply chains and providing logistical assistance, including the refueling and maintenance of U.S. military aircraft and ships, would help sustain U.S. military operations on the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, Japan could assist with the evacuation of non-combatants, including Japanese citizens and possibly U.S. civilians, from South Korea.
In addition to combat-related support, Japan could provide humanitarian assistance during a Korean contingency. This would include search and rescue operations for U.S. and allied personnel, as well as ship inspections to ensure compliance with international sanctions against North Korea.
Despite its enhanced capabilities, particularly in missile defense, minesweeping, and rear-area logistics, the chances of Japanese ground forces operating on South Korean soil remain slim. South Korea has traditionally opposed the presence of Japanese forces on its territory due to historical sensitivities, making it unlikely that the South Korean government would allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces to engage in direct combat operations on the peninsula. Several Korean military officials I interviewed noted that, in an extreme situation — such as the U.S.-South Korean combined forces being decimated by North Korean forces in the initial phase of the war and forced to retreat further south — the deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces on Korean soil might become inevitable. However, due to political sensitivities, it remains highly unlikely that this scenario would occur.
Conclusion
If North Korea were to launch a full-scale invasion of South Korea at this point, it should anticipate Japan’s multifaceted involvement, ranging from missile defense and maritime security to logistical support for U.S. forces. Japan’s contribution would likely surpass its role during the Korean War, especially given its decision to acquire counterstrike capabilities and its right to exercise collective defense, enabled by the 2015 legislation. Japan is therefore expected to provide an unprecedented level of operational support to U.S. forces in a second Korean War. If Pyongyang’s leadership fully understands this, they may attempt to create divisions not only between the United States and South Korea, and the United States and Japan, but also between Japan and South Korea. Strengthening the trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan, and South Korea — and reinforcing the weakest link, Japanese-South Korean relations — is thus crucial.
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Dr. Ju Hyung Kim is a defense analyst at a South Korean defense think tank and is currently in the process of transforming his doctoral dissertation, titled “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.
Image: Navy Chief Petty Officer James Mullen via Wikimedia Commons
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Ju Hyung Kim · October 3, 2024
4. INTERVIEW (John Bolton): Trump ‘would love to see his friend Kim Jong Un again’
INTERVIEW: Trump ‘would love to see his friend Kim Jong Un again’
Former National Security Advisor John Bolton discusses North Korea issues, possible Trump return.
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/john-bolton-trump-kim-jong-un-north-korea-nuclear-10022024170945.html
By Lee Sangmin for RFA Korean
2024.10.02
Former National Security Adviser John Bolton, Aug. 17, 2022.
Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images
John Bolton was National Security Adviser to former President Donald Trump from 2018-2019. During Bolton’s tumultuous tenure, one of the goals of the administration was to secure a nuclear-free Korean peninsula by engaging in direct dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
In June 2018, Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to hold a summit with a North Korean leader when he met Kim in Singapore. Two more meetings with Kim would follow in 2019, first in Hanoi in February, and again in June on the border between South and North Korea, alongside then-South Korean President Moon Jae-in, but the two sides failed to reach any agreements.
Bolton resigned in September of 2019 and went on to write a controversial book the following year detailing his time advising the president.
RFA Korean journalist Lee Sangmin recently interviewed Bolton, asking him to share his thoughts on North Korea’s nuclear program, the likelihood of another meeting between U.S. and North Korean officials, and how another Trump presidency might affect U.S. policy on North Korea.
The interview has been edited for length and clarity.
RFA: North Korea unveiled a uranium enrichment facility last month and Kim Jong Un visited the facility. During the Hanoi summit in 2019, President Trump discussed five nuclear sites with Kim Jong Un and asked him to get rid of all of them. Do you think that the uranium enrichment facility that he visited this time is one of those five nuclear sites mentioned at the summit?
Bolton: There's no doubt that the North Korean nuclear weapons program and indeed the entire North Korean nuclear infrastructure is very extensive and they've taken many measures over the years to conceal it from the outside world. They're well known for doing things including ballistic missile development in deeply buried sites. That's the protection they have from the outside world being able to detect what they're up to.
RFA: On Sept. 26, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said North Korea is a “de facto nuclear weapons state.” Do you have any reaction to his remark?
Bolton: I think, given that there have been at least six nuclear tests that we know of, there's no doubt that North Korea has that capability. But it's a long way from recognizing reality to accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. I don't accept it as a legitimate nuclear weapons state. I think – at least in terms of its ballistic missile development – it still can't, it still doesn't have that capability. And I think all of this should simply say to us we must redouble our efforts to make sure that North Korea never does get a deliverable nuclear weapon.
RFA: In negotiations with North Korea, do you think the new goal should be disarmament instead of denuclearization?
Bolton: I don't think the North Koreans are serious about negotiation. I think they've strung us out for 25 years unfortunately or even longer – 35 years – very successfully. And as we speak now, Israel is under attack by Iranian ballistic missiles. Hopefully they don't carry North Korean nuclear warheads. But it just shows what happens when you don't take this kind of threat as seriously as we should have.
RFA: If former President Trump is reelected, do you think he would be willing to talk with North Korea about denuclearization or just disarmament?
Bolton: I don't think President Trump knows the difference between the two. I think he would love to see his friend Kim Jong Un again. I think this would be very bad news for South Korea, Japan, and other countries in the region because I think that North Korea is even more determined than it was five years ago to be able to threaten the Republic of Korea and Japan and others with deliverable nuclear weapons. So our time is very short. I certainly understand that.
RFA: Do you think that North Korea will return to personal diplomacy if Trump is reelected?
Bolton: I think there's a very good chance they would because I believe they think they can out-bargain Donald Trump and get him to agree to terms that are unfortunately very favorable to North Korea.
During President Trump's term, the North Koreans rolled out the same playbook they've used in other negotiations like the agreed framework, like the negotiations in the Bush administration, where they get tangible economic benefits up front with only promises on their part to denuclearize, which they never seemed to get around to. And that's the kind of deal that's very beneficial to North Korea, but it won't bring denuclearization, it won't bring peace and security in East Asia.
I think Trump doesn't fully understand the nature of what's at issue. I think that's one reason back in 2018, he canceled the major joint exercises between R.O.K. and U.S. forces that were purely defensive in nature, gave it to North Korea for nothing and got nothing in return. So it's a disturbing prospect that he would come back again and perform the same way.
RFA: Do you think that Trump might have learned from his previous dealings with Kim and what has happened over the previous five years?
Bolton: There's no evidence that he's learned his lesson. Unfortunately, he said on the campaign trail recently that he looked forward to seeing his friend Kim Jong Un again.
RFA: Recently relations between North Korea and Russia are on the upswing, especially because of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Should that conflict end, do you think that this trend of close ties will continue?
Bolton: I think the relations between the two countries will continue to grow. Kim Jong Un has established himself really in the same position as his grandfather – able to play China off against Russia, something that hasn't happened since the collapse of the Soviet Union when Russia for its own internal weaknesses really didn't pay as much attention to North Korea, which became much more dependent on China. So Kim Jong Un is happy to be a go-between between the two bigger powers. I think it enhances his leverage unfortunately.
RFA: There are some who think that South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons rather than rely on the United States’ policy of extended deterrence. What are your thoughts on this matter?
Bolton: I hope that that decision isn't made and I would instead favor the redeployment of American tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. But I understand why South Koreans are worried that a regime like the Biden administration or the Harris administration or even the Trump administration couldn't be depended upon. And if that's the case, then if I were in South Korea's place, I'd get nuclear weapons too. I just hope it doesn't come to that. I would prefer that they feel comfortable with extended deterrence by the United States.
It's not that I worry about South Korea, I think it's obviously one of the most responsible countries in the world. But every country that gets nuclear weapons on its own inspires other countries to do the same. So I think [if that were to happen] Japan would be more likely to get nuclear weapons and [so would] other countries around the world. That's how proliferation works.
RFA: You have often said that the collapse of the North Korean regime is the only way to solve the North Korean problem. Do you still feel this way, and do you think such a development is likely?
Bolton: I do think that South Korea and the United States, Japan and others should really be working toward the reunification of the Korean peninsula under the kind of government and economic system that South Korea has. That's for the good of the people of North Korea who are living in a large prison camp today, and I wish we could find more creative ways to do that.
It's not replacing Kim Jong Un with another dictator, it's bringing the Korean people back together again under the right kind of system that our policy should be aiming at.
Edited by Eugene Whong.
5. <Lighting Up N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (5) What Happened During COVID... "Drink Willow Branch Brew" - Misguided Quarantine Policies Only Led to Residents' Deaths
The terrible suffering of the Korean people in the north.
<Lighting Up N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (5) What Happened During COVID... "Drink Willow Branch Brew" - Misguided Quarantine Policies Only Led to Residents' Deaths
asiapress.org
Cover of the top-secret document "Comrade Kim Jong-un's speech at the emergency expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party on July 25. Photo by ASIAPRESS
<Lighting Up N. Korea's Four Dark Years> (1) Almost the Only Escape Route -The New Generation ‘Donju’ Who Crossed the Sea Tell About COVID-19, Chaos, and Social Change
As examined in the previous article, North Korean residents were already struggling with desperation due to the government's market suppression policies coupled with border closures, losing their sources of income even before exposure to the coronavirus. The nationwide spread of the coronavirus was another hardship imposed on the people of North Korea. (JEON Sung-jun)
◆ When Did the First Infection Occur?
After closing its borders in January 2020, North Korea never officially acknowledged any confirmed cases of coronavirus until May 12, 2022. However, according to an internal document classified as “top secret” by North Korean authorities and obtained by ASIAPRESS, Kim Jong-un had already acknowledged the entry of coronavirus into the country during the early stages of the pandemic.
Kim Jong-un's admission at the July 25 meeting that "we ultimately failed to prevent the new coronavirus from entering the country..." Photo by ASIAPRESS
On July 25, 2020, at an emergency expanded meeting of the Workers' Party Political Bureau, Kim Jong-un said: "Although we have taken strong emergency quarantine measures nationwide in various aspects over the past six months, we have finally failed to prevent the new coronavirus from entering our territory" and "Our country is now facing a dangerous health crisis situation that is frightening to imagine."
Indeed, three days later, on July 28, ASIAPRESS reporting partners in North Pyongan and North Hamgyong provinces reported receiving information from neighborhood units that infections had occurred in some areas, such as Pyongsong and Sariwon.
<Inside N. Korea> COVID Confession: Local Authorities Notify Public of Rising Coronavirus Cases in 3 Regions, Including Pyongsong and Sariwon
But was it the effect of North Korea's ruthless quarantine control, where people were forcibly isolated for 20 days for cold symptoms without proper testing? Until May 2022, there were only occasional reports of local lockdowns, but no evidence of a nationwide coronavirus outbreak. This seems to have boosted the Kim Jong-un regime's confidence.
In contrast to the extreme caution about the coronavirus in the early stages, Kim Jong-un held a large-scale military parade on April 25, mobilizing some 20,000 troops. Many experts point to this parade as the cause of the May outbreak.
Finally, on May 12, 2022, North Korean authorities officially acknowledged the spread of the coronavirus.
◆ Supply Shortages and Hoarding Cause Drug Prices to Skyrocket
While acknowledging the spread of COVID-19, North Korean authorities simultaneously implemented nationwide isolation measures. However, it appears that the authorities focused on isolating residents and punishing violators rather than providing effective medical support and countermeasures.
"For a month, they completely blocked everything. People couldn't leave their homes at all. Streets and buildings were completely sealed off. I also had COVID at that time, and almost everyone around me was infected," said Kang Gyu-rin.
Kang said that by the time she was infected, the price of medicine had increased tenfold.
"Paracetamol (an antipyretic), which we call P500, used to cost 50 won per tablet, but it went up to 500 won, a tenfold increase. But even then, there were no medicines available. Some people didn't sell medicine because they expected the price to go up 100 times, even though people's lives were hanging by a thread."
Domestically produced penicillin from the Suncheon Pharmaceutical Factory. It is said to have a bad reputation due to many counterfeits and low efficacy. Photographed in North Korea in 2015 by ASIAPRESS
Just four days after declaring a nationwide lockdown, on May 16, the Korean Central News Agency reported in detail on Kim Jong-un's anger at judicial and prosecutorial officials, including the head of the central prosecutor's office, for failing to strictly enforce the party's drug supply policy. It seems that hoarding was rampant among those with money, and they were held responsible for failing to prevent it.
The phenomenon of drug hoarding caused the prices of already scarce drugs to skyrocket, exacerbating the suffering of the people.
◆ Residents Drink Willow Brew While the State Profits from Drug Sales
Folk remedies are an important way for North Koreans to cope with poor medical services and drug shortages. But Kang Gyu-rin says government broadcasts, on which North Koreans with relatively little medical information rely heavily, have actually harmed them.
"The broadcast told people to drink water boiled with willow branches, but some people died from drinking too much of it. Later, the state denied ever broadcasting such information."
There is also strong criticism that the authorities' inappropriate response actually increased the pain and suffering of North Koreans. Kim Myung-ok says the authorities administered a paratyphoid vaccine, claiming it was a COVID-19 vaccine.
"What they called COVID-19 vaccine was actually an injection of paratyphoid bacteria. But when people received this injection, they developed high fevers and became more severely ill. After that, people refused to be vaccinated out of fear. An elderly woman who lived downstairs also died from the effects of that vaccination."
Kim emphasized that later, when drugs imported from China were sold through pharmacies at government-set prices, the government profited by selling them at prices higher than the existing market prices.
"Around the end of May (2022), I think the drugs came in. The state sold them at market prices. When I bought glucose to treat patients, something that used to cost 2,200-2,500 won before COVID was now 6,000-7,000 won. But they claimed that this was the price set by the government. The government was basically doing business."
◆ Floundering State, Dying People
In early June 2022, an ASIAPRESS reporting partner provided information about the infection situation and the authorities' response in the northern region. According to the news at the time, the government's only criterion for diagnosing infections was to measure people's temperatures.
"If the temperature is above normal, the person is isolated and cannot leave the house. After about a week, the temperature is taken again, and if the fever has subsided, the person is considered recovered. During the time one is registered as having a fever, all contact is prohibited, including contact with the leader of the neighborhood unit.”
At that time (June 6, 2022), based on the reporting partner's neighborhood unit, there were 6 severely ill patients, 12 recovered patients, and 7 symptomatic individuals, estimated to be about 30-40% of the area's residents.
Neighborhood units (inminban) are North Korea's lowest level of administrative organization, consisting of approximately 20-30 households. They relay instructions from the district (dong) offices, which are the equivalent of South Korea's administrative welfare centers, and are responsible for keeping detailed records of residents' trends and reporting them to the authorities.
Kang Gyu-lin describes the situation: "Many people around us were running out of food, some were dying of starvation; it was just chaos."
Kang Kyu-lin
In the absence of adequate food supplies, a nationwide blockade began and continued, killing people who had barely eked out a living from the markets. Since most North Koreans don't have much in the way of savings, either in terms of money or food, people who couldn't survive the lockdown began to show up.
"At first, people thought it would be okay once the lockdown was lifted, but for those who live from day to day, the lockdown went on too long, and they couldn't hold out. So many people sold whatever assets they had to make ends meet. But it seems that not only were the residents struggling, but the state was also struggling a lot."
As residents' suffering increased and casualties mounted, authorities lifted the lockdown on June 12, 2022, a month after implementing the nationwide lockdown. But by then, many victims had already died.
After the month-long nationwide lockdown, the number of people unable to buy food due to lack of cash increased significantly, and with the addition of the COVID-19 aftermath, the number of victims increased even more.
In the next article, ASIAPRESS will examine in detail the aspects of the humanitarian crisis that befell the North Korean people and its causes. (to be continued)
A map of North Korea (ASIAPRESS)
<Lighting Up N. Korea's Dark Four Years> (4) “The People Are at the End of Their Tether”: A Country that Wants to Control Markets and Rule by Calories
asiapress.org
6. New Japanese Prime Minister: “I Want ROK-US-Japan Unity to Respond to North Korean Threats”
Some good news here.
New Japanese Prime Minister: “I Want ROK-US-Japan Unity to Respond to North Korean Threats”
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/shigeru-ishiba-10022024152312.html
WASHINGTON-Lee Sang-min lees@rfa.org
2024.10.02
Shigeru Ishiba, Japan's new prime minister
/AFP
00:00 /03:35
Anchor : Newly appointed Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba has stated that he will develop cooperative relations among South Korea , the United States , and Japan , just as his predecessor, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, did, and will respond unitedly to the threat from North Korea . Reporter Lee Sang-min reports . Prime Minister Ishiba had his first phone call with U.S. President Joe Biden since his inauguration on the 2nd . According to data from the Japanese Prime Minister's Office, President Biden and Prime Minister Ishiba agreed to further develop networks with like-minded partners among Japan, the United States , and South Korea; Japan, Australia ( i.e., Australia ) , India, and the United States ; and Japan , the United States, and the Philippines .
They then agreed to continue to cooperate closely on issues such as North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
The White House also announced in a press release that day that the two leaders promised to strengthen regional cooperation with like-minded countries, such as the trilateral partnership between Japan, the United States, and South Korea. Prime Minister Ishiba also had his first telephone conversation with South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol that day, and the South Korean presidential office announced that the two leaders agreed that South Korea and Japan, South Korea, the United States, and Japan need to unite in response to North Korea’s continued provocations . In a press conference that day, Prime Minister Ishiba said that he spoke with President Yoon on the phone and that the progress in Japan-South Korea relations between former Prime Minister Kishida and President Yoon was “ dramatic . ” He went on to say that trilateral cooperation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan has also progressed considerably, and that this has greatly contributed to regional peace and stability . [ Prime Minister Ishiba ] said that I would like to continue this cooperation , develop it further, and further strengthen cooperation between Japan and South Korea . He also said he wanted to further strengthen trilateral cooperation among Japan , the United States and South Korea .
The ROK-US Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force are conducting joint maritime training in the seas south of Jeju Island in April to enhance their joint response capabilities to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. From the right, the ROK Navy's Aegis destroyer Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong, the US Navy's aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force's destroyer Ariake. [Provided by the Navy]
Korea, US, Japan “ Freedom Edge 2nd Exercise to be Held in the Near Future ”
President Yoon : “ South Korea-US-Japan Cooperation Wo n’t Change with Change in Leader ”
When asked by Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 2nd whether the trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan would continue after the inauguration of the new Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba, the State Department spokesperson responded that the United States has been working to institutionalize trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan . He went
on to say that regardless of political changes in Japan and the United States ahead of the elections, trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan would still play an important role in the future of the three countries .
The spokesperson emphasized that a strong and effective relationship among South Korea, the United States, and Japan is essential to the common security and interests of all three countries .
He introduced that based on a firm commitment to democracy, he is pursuing a positive and forward-looking agenda with allies in Korea and Japan, which focuses on solving the most urgent problems of today and the future. He
also promised an annual meeting between the leaders of Korea, the United States, and Japan, the foreign and defense ministers, and the national security advisers, and in reality, they have held meetings more frequently than that.
Former Deputy U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Robert Rapson told Radio Free Asia (RFA) on the 2nd that no major changes are expected in Japan’s foreign and security policies after Prime Minister Ishiba takes office . Rapson, who served as the political attaché and acting chief of mission at the U.S. Embassy in Japan for four years starting in 2015
, assessed that Prime Minister Ishiba has a wealth of experience in the security field . He predicted that it is unlikely that he will take a significantly different line from former Prime Minister Kishida in terms of North Korea policy, and that there will likely be no large-scale diplomatic plans toward North Korea, such as those of former Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi . He also predicted that North Korea is likely to maintain a cold and critical attitude toward Prime Minister Ishiba’s government . He also said that while Prime Minister Ishiba supports the benefits of improving relations with South Korea and increasing trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, it remains to be seen what measures he will take to strengthen the continuity of trilateral cooperation regarding the so-called “historical issue” and to support President Yoon Seok-yeol’s weakened domestic political position . This is Lee Sang-min from RFA . Editor Park Bong-hyeon , Web Editor Kim Sang-il
7. North Korean hacker group accused by US government still conducting cyberattacks
If you receive an email from me with the following address please ignore it: "david.maxwell181@proton.me" And do not click on ant links.
The phishing email that went out to a lot of people allegedly from me is pasted below. Please ignore it.
North Korean hacker group accused by US government still conducting cyberattacks
https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/food_international_org/hecker-cyber-attack-10022024145813.html
WASHINGTON-Kim So-young kimso@rfa.org
2024.10.02
On July 25, the FBI indicted North Korean hacker Rim Jong Hyok, accusing him of being a key figure in Andariel's cybercrime and espionage activities.
/Yonhap News
00:00 / 02:38
Anchor : It has been discovered that North Korea's representative hacker group continued to carry out cyberattacks even after being indicted by the U.S. government and offered a huge bounty . Reporter Kim So-young reports .
Symantec, a multinational software company headquartered in the United States and the Czech Republic, said on the 2nd that the North Korean hacker group ' APT 45 ' , also known as 'Andariel' and 'Stonefly', attempted cyberattacks against at least three private companies in the United States in August .
'Andariel' ( the name given by the US government ) was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department in 2019 for alleged illegal cyberattacks .
Afterwards, the FBI and the Department of Justice issued an arrest warrant for Lim Jong-hyuk, a key figure in Andariel, on charges of spreading ransomware , or malicious programs, targeting U.S. hospitals and medical institutions .
Lim Jong-hyuk, who was indicted, is wanted with a reward of up to $10 million .
Symantec analyzed that the three private companies that were targeted by Andariel were not companies that had confidential information that the North Korean regime would want , and that the attacks were financially motivated .
These three companies reportedly suffered no direct damage as a result of the failed ransomware attack by North Korean hackers .
Symantec noted that the indictment of the North Korean hacker group by the U.S. government did not lead to a halt in its activities.
Symantec said Andariel's hacking techniques have become significantly more sophisticated since it was first revealed in 2009 through hacking attacks targeting multiple government and financial websites in South Korea and the United States .
He added that the hacking group had also carried out attacks on two U.S. Air Force bases, NASA, and government agencies in South Korea , Taiwan , and China , in addition to U.S. hospitals .
US indicts North Korean hacker who stole military and nuclear information… $ 10 million bounty
$ 6 Million Hacking Incident… Experts : “North Korea Behind It”
Seth Bailey, the U.S. State Department's Deputy Special Representative for North Korea Policy, said in a talk hosted by the Korea Society on the 1st that North Korea's increasingly malicious cyber activities pose a serious threat to the world .
Deputy Bailey : I think we have to consider the global threat that North Korea poses through its very aggressive and powerful cyber hacking program, which is primarily designed to hack defense contractors in other countries .
Meanwhile, on July 25 , the Federal Bureau of Investigation indicted North Korean hacker Rim Jong Hyok, calling him a key figure in Andariel's cybercrime and espionage activities .
At the time, the State Department said Andariel had harmed five health care companies, four U.S.-based defense contractors, two U.S. Air Force bases, and NASA's Office of the Inspector General, and that Lim Jong - hyuk played a role in the effort .
This is Kim So-young from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting.
Editor Park Bong-hyeon , Web Editor Kim Sang-il
From: David Maxwell <david.maxwell181@proton.me>
Date: Monday, September 23, 2024 at 8:25 PM
To:
Subject: Fw: Re: Paper on Nuclear No-First Use and Peace in the Northeast Asia
Dear friends and colleagues,
I hope you are doing well.
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Foundation for Defense of Democracies
8. "Kim Yo-jong's criticism of Ukraine is single-mindedly directed at Russia"
The bad cop being a bad cop.
"Kim Yo-jong's criticism of Ukraine is single-mindedly directed at Russia"
https://www.rfa.org/korean/news_indepth/whats-happening-in-north-korea-makino_kim-yo-jong-zelenski-russia.html
WASHINGTON-Handeok In hand@rfa.org
2024.10.02
On June 19, North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong-un signed the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between North Korea and Russia at the Kumsusan State Guest House in Pyongyang, with his younger sister Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea, standing next to him.
/AFP
00:00 /12:37
Anchor : This is 'Looking at the Korean Peninsula' where we look back at news related to North Korea with Yoshihiro Makino, a visiting professor at Hiroshima University in Japan and a foreign affairs reporter for the Asahi Shimbun. This is reporter Han Deok-in, who will be our interviewee as we analyze and forecast the rapidly changing situation on the Korean Peninsula.
[ Reporter ] Mr. Makino. On September 25, China launched an ICBM, or intercontinental ballistic missile, into the Pacific Ocean for the first time in 44 years. What message do you think China was trying to convey with this ICBM launch? Should we see it as having a political meaning beyond a simple military exercise?
Yoshihiro Makino, Visiting Professor at Hiroshima University, Japan and Foreign Affairs Correspondent for the Asahi Shimbun
[ Makino Yoshihiro ] China originally launched missiles toward the inland Gobi Desert and other areas, and rarely announced the launches. This time, they launched a long-range ICBM in the Pacific. I think the intention was to show off deterrence, targeting not only the US mainland, but also US bases in the Pacific, such as Guam and Hawaii.
According to an announcement by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, as of January 2024, China's nuclear warheads are estimated to be 500, an increase of 90 from January of last year. Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Defense previously estimated that China's nuclear warheads would reach 1,500 by 2035. Therefore, experts are raising the possibility that China may have changed its existing strategy of keeping its nuclear weapons to the minimum required for deterrence. And China has originally maintained a policy of "no first use of nuclear weapons" and "not using nuclear weapons except for nuclear deterrence purposes." However, it is also possible that China has changed this nuclear strategy through this launch. In other words, if it is true that China's nuclear strategy has changed, I think the possibility that China will use nuclear weapons has also increased.
There are projections that North Korea will increase its nuclear weapons in the future, but China's nuclear power is incomparably stronger than North Korea's. I think that this change in China is likely to have an impact on many East Asian countries, including South Korea and Japan.
An intercontinental ballistic missile test-launched into the Pacific Ocean the previous day is shown in a photo released by the Chinese government on September 26. / People's Liberation Army (PLA), AFP
[ Reporter ] The U.S. Department of Defense announced that China had given advance notice of this launch, and especially emphasized that military communication is being maintained. This kind of communication between the U.S. and China contrasts with North Korea’s military isolation. How does North Korea interpret China’s military actions as it watches them?
[ Makino Yoshihiro ] Yes, first of all, the US government is emphasizing that China gave advance notice this time. This is because the Joe Biden administration has considered communication through military channels between the US and China to be very important. In April of this year, the US-China defense ministerial meeting was held for the first time in 18 months, and at that time, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun discussed security issues through a video conference.
On the other hand, North Korea continues to be militarily isolated. North Korea continues to not give prior notice to neighboring countries about missile launches or nuclear tests, and has only announced the launch schedule for satellite-carrying rockets, but has not announced the exact launch time. I think this is because North Korea has a different view on arms control than the international community. The international community believes that arms control is necessary because unintended conflicts can occur if military power is expanded without limit, and they try to build trust by disclosing each other's military information to the extent possible so that the other side does not misunderstand. However, North Korea does not seem to follow this concept of arms control very well.
Although a military agreement was signed between the South and the North in September 2018, there were no clear measures to build trust, such as mutual information disclosure, based on this agreement. I think this situation can be considered a very dangerous factor even in the international community.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles displayed by China at military parades in 2015 and 2019 / AFP
[ Reporter ] Since it was an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch, it seems far-fetched to say that the missile itself was aimed at Korea. Even so, is there anything that Korea should be concerned about from a security perspective? Also, in light of recent reports of a Korea-China summit, what are the prospects for the current development of Korea-China relations?
[ Makino Yoshihiro ] China's nuclear power is rapidly expanding. Accordingly, the possibility of China using nuclear weapons is also increasing. As I mentioned earlier, in the past, China maintained a 'no-first-use' policy of not using nuclear weapons preemptively, but recently, it is possible that this policy may change. In particular, the possibility that China will counterattack with nuclear weapons in the event of an emergency is increasing.
In this situation, the Yoon Seok-yeol government in Korea has placed great importance on the Korea-US alliance and has taken a hard-line stance toward China. In an interview with Reuters in April 2023, President Yoon defined the tense situation in the Taiwan Strait as an “attempt to change the status quo through force,” emphasizing that the Taiwan issue is not a problem between China and Taiwan, but a global issue. In response, China strongly objected and stated that it cannot allow external intervention in the Taiwan issue. For this reason, the current Korea-China relationship is one level lower than the US-China relationship.
Also, although the relationship between North Korea and China has cooled, China still seems to think that North Korea is necessary to expel the US military from the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, the deterioration of the relationship between South Korea and China is likely to have a negative impact on South Korea's security. At the very least, I think South Korea needs to pursue communication with China through military channels, like the US and Japan.
[ Reporter ] On the 24th, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said at a high-level meeting of the UN Security Council held at the UN headquarters in New York that North Korea and Iran had become accomplices in war crimes due to their arms deals with Russia. In response, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, strongly protested through the Korean Central News Agency on September 29th, calling it "absurd." North Korea has been clearly supporting Russia while intervening in the Ukraine issue, so why do you think it reacted so excessively?
[ Makino Yoshihiro ] I think Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong's statement is evidence that North Korea sees Russia as a very important partner. North Korea has traditionally used the strategy of competing the two countries to gain benefits from China and Russia. However, as it attempted its seventh nuclear test in 2022, relations with China, which opposed it, have cooled. On October 1, General Secretary Kim sent a congratulatory message to President Xi Jinping for China's National Day, but in the message, he used the expression "friendly relations" instead of "strategic relations." On the other hand, he used the expression "alliance" to refer to Russian President Vladimir Putin, showing that he is further strengthening relations with Russia.
Therefore, from North Korea’s perspective, Russia can be said to be the main partner from which it can obtain maximum support in the short term. That is why Vice Department Director Kim Yo-jong appears to have strongly opposed President Zelensky’s criticism of military support between North Korea and Russia. In addition, the fact that Russian Defense Minister Shoigu visited North Korea and met with General Secretary Kim in September can be interpreted as a discussion of new possibilities for cooperation between North Korea and Russia. It is also possible that various cooperation plans were discussed, including the issue of sending North Korean workers to the occupied Ukrainian region. In a situation where North Korea is trying to expand cooperation with Russia, it may have intended to further solidify relations with Russia by strongly opposing international criticism.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky /AP
'Kim Yo-jong show-off' North Korea's reconnaissance satellite rises to altitude for the third time
Blinken: "UN Security Council must respond to strengthened North Korea-Russia military cooperation"
"Prolonged Ukraine war may limit North Korea's weapons support"
White House NSC director: "Pay attention to whether China will stop North Korea-Russia military cooperation"
[ Reporter ] Finally, North Korea recently revised its criminal code, increasing the number of death penalty offenses from 11 to 16 and strengthening control over weapons and explosives. Do you think that the Kim Jong-un regime's sense of crisis or anxiety was behind this revision of the criminal code? Also, what practical effect do you think this revision will have on strengthening the North Korean regime?
[ Makino Yoshihiro ] Public executions have been increasing in North Korea this year. In particular, this summer, there was a report that about 30 middle school students were publicly executed for watching South Korean dramas. These incidents are evidence that North Korea is strengthening its control policy to solidify the system. The increase in the number of death penalty crimes from 11 to 16 can be seen as an attempt to legally organize this control.
North Korea has attempted to control its thoughts through laws such as the Rejection of Reactionary Ideology and Culture Act since 2019, but it seems to have turned to a more powerful politics of fear because it was ineffective. The Kim Jong-un regime is using fear to control its people while strengthening its hostile policies toward the outside world. In particular, it seems that fostering hostility toward South Korea is a means to strengthen the justification for internal control.
However, such a strong control policy is likely to further increase the discontent of the people. General Secretary Kim Jong-un's recent visit to flood-stricken areas and his attempts to appease the people are also interpreted as a carrot-and-stick strategy to resolve the discontent of the people. In the end, it seems that General Secretary Kim has decided that in order to maintain the regime, not only politics of fear but also a certain degree of appeasement is necessary.
[ Reporter ] Yes, Mr. Makino. Thank you for speaking with us today. This was Han Deok-in from RFA Free Asia Broadcasting in Washington.
Editor Noh Jeong-min, Web Editor Han Deok-in
9. CIA expands online recruitment of informants to China, Iran, N. Korea
Adding targeting for the remaining 3 of the Dark Quad.
CIA expands online recruitment of informants to China, Iran, N. Korea
The Korea Times · October 3, 2024
The seal of the Central Intelligence Agency at CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., April 13, 2016. AP-Yonhap
The U.S. CIA on Wednesday launched a new drive to recruit informants in China, Iran and North Korea, adding to what it says has been a successful effort to enlist Russians.
The premier U.S. spy agency posted instructions in Mandarin, Farsi and Korean on its accounts on X, Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, LinkedIn and the Dark Web on how to contact it securely, a CIA spokesperson said in a statement.
"Our efforts on this front have been successful in Russia, and we want to make sure individuals in other authoritarian regimes know that we're open for business," the spokesperson said, adding that the CIA was adapting to increased state repression and global surveillance.
A Mandarin-language video posted to YouTube featuring only written instructions advised individuals to contact the CIA via its official website using trusted encrypted Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) or the TOR network.
"Your safety and wellbeing is our foremost consideration," it said.
It asked for individuals' names, locations, and contact details not associated with their real identities, along with information that could be of interest to the CIA, cautioning that responses were not guaranteed and could take time.
Liu Pengyu, a Chinese embassy spokesman, accused the U.S. of waging "an organized and systematic" disinformation campaign against China and said that "any attempts to drive a wedge between the Chinese people and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) or to weaken their close bond will inevitably fail."
The Russian embassy and Iran's U.N. mission did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
The CIA's thirst for intelligence has grown as China expands cooperation with Russia and Iran and flexes its regional military muscle.
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are known within the U.S. intelligence community as "hard targets" - countries whose governments are difficult to penetrate.
The U.S. also is grappling with Iran's conflict with Israel, its nuclear program, its growing links with Russia and its support for militant proxies.
North Korea's nuclear weapons program is another U.S. intelligence target, along with what U.S. officials say are Pyongyang's arms supplies to Moscow for the war against Ukraine, an allegation that Moscow and Pyongyang deny.
The CIA began recruiting Russians in 2022 by posting Russian language texts on its social media accounts on how to contact the agency securely, followed by videos in 2023. (Reuters)
The Korea Times · October 3, 2024
10. Consultations under way for summit between Yoon, Japan's Ishiba in Laos: presidential office
(LEAD) Consultations under way for summit between Yoon, Japan's Ishiba in Laos: presidential office | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 3, 2024
(ATTN: CHANGES headline, dateline, lead; UPDATES with more details in paras 2-3, 5-7)
SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol and new Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba have been arranging to have their first in-person meeting on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit in Laos, Yoon's office said Thursday.
Yoon plans to visit Laos from Wednesday to Friday, as part of his three-nation Southeast Asian trip that includes stops in the Philippines and Singapore.
"South Korea and Japan have been consulting on a bilateral meeting, assuming the Japanese Prime Minister's visit to Laos," a senior presidential official told reporters.
The planned meeting comes amid expectations over how Yoon and Ishiba will work together to keep up the momentum for greater bilateral cooperation in tackling evolving North Korean threats and other shared challenges.
On Wednesday, Yoon and Ishiba held their first phone talks, where they shared the need for bilateral cooperation as well as trilateral cooperation with the United States to deal with North Korean threats.
During the call, the leaders agreed to continue their regular "shuttle diplomacy" and meet at the earliest opportunity for candid discussions on bilateral relations and other shared concerns.
Bilateral ties have significantly improved after Yoon decided last year to resolve the long-running row over Japan's wartime mobilization of Koreans for forced labor by compensating victims without asking Japanese firms for contributions.
Yoon and Ishiba's predecessor, Fumio Kishida, had since restored the long-suspended shuttle diplomacy of visiting each other whenever necessary and held 12 summits over the last two years.
President Yoon Suk Yeol talks over the phone with Japan's new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at his office in Seoul on Oct. 2, 2024, in this photo provided by the presidential office. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 3, 2024
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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