Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"The true test of civilization is, not the census, nor the size of cities, nor crops--no, but the kind of man the country turns out."

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

"Relativism, positivism, and nihilism – modern doctrines which mock wisdom and scorn virtue – have at the dawn of the twenty-first century come to dominate."

– Harry V. Jaffa

“But you can’t make people listen. They have to come round in their own time, wondering what happened and why the world blew up around them.”

– Ray Bradbury

1. Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy

2. Engine Test Preparations and Modernization at Sohae Satellite Launching Station

3. Seoul’s dangerous gamble with wartime command

4. US, ROK agree to expand drone cooperation as North Korea doubles down on UAVs

5. Lee Jae-myung calls for North Korea to allow contact between separated families

6. Russian government jet flies to North Korea, a week before military parade

7. ＜Inside N.Korea＞Information spreads that 'Kim Jong-un regime received $5,000 per fallen soldier from Russia' — Authorities conduct massive crackdown, calling it 'rumors' (Revised version)

8. U.S. Army Secretary highlights North Korea, China threats ahead

9. Unification minister fuels confusion on North Korea

10. Lee's OPCON gamble

11. Kim Jong Un orders creation of unified satellite intelligence command system

12. JCS chairman, USFK commander visit front-line military unit

13. Bessent says Trump, Xi will have 'pull-aside' meeting in Korea, expects breakthrough in trade talks

14. Lee meets Korean War refugees on first day of Chuseok holiday

15. 6 in 10 S. Koreans to skip ancestor-honoring ceremony during Chuseok: survey

16. Adoptees, birth families, officials demand justice as Korea confronts abuses

17. Millions hit road as weeklong Chuseok holiday begins in South Korea

18. From Stray Kids to BLACKPINK’s Rosé: Inside the racism K-pop stars still face

1. Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy

Excellent questions analyzed.

For Kim, why now?

Is Beijing now acknowledging North Korea’s nuclear power status?

Does this represent a failure of recent U.S.-South Korea summitry seeking to lead North Korea back to the negotiating table?

How should Seoul and Washington respond?

What about Kim’s daughter?

Why the visit to the ICBM-related facility?

Will this significantly strengthen Beijing’s influence with Pyongyang?

Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy - Beyond Parallel

beyondparallel.csis.org · Sydney Seiler · October 2, 2025

Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy

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This first appeared as a CSIS Korea Chair Platform here.

In early September, Kim Jong-un took the rare but not entirely surprising step of traveling to Beijing to participate in the September celebration of the “80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War,” as China calls it. Kim departed Pyongyang two days earlier, after making a brief publicized visit to a factory involved in solid-fueled ICBM production, a likely signal that while embracing two of his socialist comrades, Kim had not forgotten Donald Trump nor slowed his efforts to strengthen his nuclear arsenal targeting the United States. Kim’s confidence in showing up for this international event was likely bolstered by China’s promises he would have a front and center position in both entering and watching the event together with President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin. The symbolism was likely the main deliverable: there was no read-out of any summitry, substantive discussions, or agreements. A follow-on visit by North Korean foreign minister Choe Son-hui in late September yielded no further insight into the current diplomatic agenda between Beijing and Pyongyang.

For Kim, why now?

Kim’s decision to attend this event is consistent with North Korea’s diplomatic strategy of locking in acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear power status one country at a time, although he had generally avoided multinational gatherings where he would have less likelihood of being the center of attention. The visit also enables Kim to appear to be open to further thawing of the North Korea-China relationship under the right conditions. Kim is likely not to be receptive to any suggestions from China to back off his cooperation with Russia, slow the growth of the North Korean nuclear and missile program, or return to denuclearization dialogue. For his part, Xi Jinping is unlikely to have pressured Kim to make any such commitments, and the images of Xi, Putin, and Kim entering the parade venue together signals Beijing is comfortable for the most part with Russia-North Korea cooperation to date. Overall, the visit advanced North Korea’s overarching diplomatic goal of gradually normalizing his interaction with the outside without engaging in denuclearization dialogue.

Is Beijing now acknowledging North Korea’s nuclear power status?

It’s complicated. Beijing’s invitation to Kim and the seat of prominence it gave him at the parade makes clear it sees a possibility for improving North Korea-China relations even sans forward progress on denuclearization. For the past several years, Beijing’s call for Washington and other parties to understand and address Pyongyang’s “legitimate security concerns” has sought to put the ball in the U.S. court for resuscitating denuclearization dialogue while evidencing a de facto tolerance of a non-denuclearizing North Korea. The shared commitment to countering hegemonism announced in the September 28 read-out of Foreign Minister Choe’s meetings with Wang Yi demonstrates China-North Korea strategic alignment against the United States while dodging the issue of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. This leaves Beijing’s messaging a step behind Moscow’s “respect” and “understanding” for North Korea’s nuclear program, as articulated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in July. Yet to be seen is whether Kim is disappointed he did not receive a clearer endorsement of his nuclear weapons status either during the September 4 Kim-Xi meeting or Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s September 28 meeting with Choe Son-hui.

Does this represent a failure of recent U.S.-South Korea summitry seeking to lead North Korea back to the negotiating table?

No. Kim’s pivot away from diplomacy with Washington and Seoul to concentrate on “axis of upheaval” friends such as Moscow and Beijing has its roots in a diplomatic shift following Kim’s failure to gain U.S. and South Korean acceptance for his nuclear power status in 2018 and 2019 summitry with Presidents Trump and Moon Jae-in. It does, however, pour cold water on expectations that the recent Trump-Lee Jae Myung summit could be a springboard to restarting meaningful denuclearization dialogue with Pyongyang. The CRINK (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) community allows Kim to maintain a long-standing strategic prioritization of nuclear weapons over reform, opening, and integration into the international order. Kim likely hopes his diplomacy with Moscow and Beijing might serve as a model for possible talks with President Trump in which the nuclear issue may be glossed over.

How should Seoul and Washington respond?

Distancing and dismissing, in the near term, and unwavering calls for denuclearization diplomacy over time may be the best way for South Korea and the U.S. to minimize any nuclear legitimacy or negotiating leverage Kim Jong-un hoped to generate through his attendance at Beijing’s celebration. Though criticized by conservatives, President Lee’s dispatch of the National Assembly speaker to the event was a pragmatic move consistent with Seoul’s desire for improved relations with Beijing without conferring leader-level legitimacy to the event. If Beijing mimics Moscow in its “respect” and “understanding” of the North’s nuclear development language, such comments should be dismissed with an emphasis on all countries need to abide by and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions proscribing the North’s nuclear and missile activities. Even if President Trump succeeds in enticing Kim Jong-un to talks by initially downplaying denuclearization as an immediate near-term objective, sustained messaging on denuclearization will be helpful in reminding Kim of the limits of progress in relations with Washington sans meaningful denuclearization steps.

What about Kim’s daughter?

North Korean media coverage of Kim Ju Ae has, from the very beginning, suggested she is likely Kim Jong-un’s chosen successor. Her participation in various domestic and now diplomatic events with her father demonstrates a long-term, well-rounded preparation Kim Jong-un may feel he was denied by his father, Kim Jong-il. This does not suggest a sense of urgency or an imminent leadership vacuum, but may point to a desire to ensure a firm foundation is laid for what would be North Korea’s first succession to a female leader.

Why the visit to the ICBM-related facility?

Kim may have had multiple audiences for choosing to visit the factory involved in composite carbon fiber material production for, according to KCNA coverage, a “new-type solid-fuel engine” to be used in Hwasong-19 and Hwasong-20 production. The visit, coming a week after the U.S.-South Korea summit on August 25, could be a reminder to both Washington and Seoul that Pyongyang is interested in missile and nuclear development, not dialogue. It also could signal Beijing not to expect Pyongyang to refrain from actions such as ICBM launches in hopes of scoring diplomatic point with China. To the domestic and broader international audience, images of Kim leading the growth of the nuclear and missile program complement the impressions from Beijing of Kim’s nuclear leader status. In any of these cases, the visit could presage upcoming rocket engine testing or even an ICBM launch.

Will this significantly strengthen Beijing’s influence with Pyongyang?

Not likely. Like his grandfather Kim Il-sung, who learned to navigate the complicated relationship between China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Kim Jong-un may see limited opportunity to nudge Beijing toward giving the same attention and acknowledgment of North Korea’s “heightened strategic status” as Moscow has. Kim is likely seeking to achieve what he failed to in 2018-2019 diplomacy: moving Beijing into a more open posture of deemphasizing denuclearization, lowering pressure including sanctions enforcement targeting North Korea, and accepting North Korea’s nuclear power status. Beyond that, however, Beijing and Moscow are unlikely to allow Pyongyang to exploit any real or perceived split between Beijing and Moscow in their respective dealings with North Korea.

Sydney Seiler is a senior adviser (non-resident) with the Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C.

The views expressed in this submission are the author’s and do not imply endorsement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Intelligence Community, or any other U.S. government agency.

Headline image: KCNA/AP

beyondparallel.csis.org · Sydney Seiler · October 2, 2025

2. Engine Test Preparations and Modernization at Sohae Satellite Launching Station

Extensive imagery at the link: https://beyondparallel.csis.org/engine-test-preparations-and-modernization-at-sohae-satellite-launching-station/

Engine Test Preparations and Modernization at Sohae Satellite Launching Station - Beyond Parallel

beyondparallel.csis.org · Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, Jennifer Jun · October 2, 2025

Military

Engine Test Preparations and Modernization at Sohae Satellite Launching Station

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Key Findings

A unique sequence of four satellite images collected on September 27, 2025, shows likely preparations for a new engine test at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station.
Throughout the facility, development priorities have shifted over the past year from modernizing the original launch pad and building a large underground facility to constructing a new horizontal processing building, a probable research facility, and an L-shaped pier. These additions will provide the infrastructure needed for North Korea to launch larger and more capable space launch vehicles at Sohae.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service assessed that North Korea received Russian assistance in reconnaissance satellite and launch platform development in return for supporting the war in Ukraine.
The human and financial costs of the development of the Sohae facility are considerable and are a clear indication of Kim Jong-un’s strong desire to prepare for future operations to launch additional satellites for security, science, and international prestige.
The observed activities for potential preparation for a new engine test could also be limited to maintenance work at the test stand.

In March 2022, Kim Jong-un visited the Sohae Satellite Launching Station (referred to as the Sohae Satellite Launching Ground in North Korean media). During the visit, he “evaluated the present state of the ground and advanced the task to modernize it on an expansion basis.” He also set forth the task of building numerous facilities. Among the more specific items mentioned were:

“Reconstructing on an expansion basis the launching ground zone and the facilities for the general assembly and trial gearing of rocket and for the trial gearing of satellite…
establishing extra facilities for the injection and supply of fuel…
modernizing parts of the launch control facility and major technical posts on an expansion basis…
expanding the capacity of the engine ground jet test site…
ensuring the convenience of carrier rocket transport…
improving the ecological environment around the launching ground…
building a grandstand in the safe zone opposite to the launching ground.”

Kim Jong-un standing on the Sohae Satellite Launching Station’s launch pad during his March 11, 2022, inspection. To Kim’s right are illustrations of several of the various projects planned for the modernization and development project. (KCNA)

The visit and subsequent development of the site is a clear indication of Kim Jong-un’s priorities and a strong desire to prepare for future operations to launch additional satellites for security, science, and international prestige. Additionally, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service assessed that North Korea received Russian assistance in reconnaissance satellite and launch platform development in return for supporting the war in Ukraine.

Satellite imagery of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station in September 2025 show that Kim’s directives have led to significant progress and efforts to expand the capabilities of the site will likely continue for the foreseeable future.

New Activity at the Yunsong Vertical Engine Test Stand

An engine test was apparently conducted at the vertical engine test stand, sometimes referred to as the Yunsong Vertical Engine Test Stand, in late June this year, as was evidenced by burnt vegetation at the exit of the stand’s exhaust deflector.

More recently, a unique sequence of four satellite images collected on September 27, 2025, by Vantor, previously known as Maxar, shows what appears to be preparations for a new engine test. The activities observed in the series of images collected on September 27, 2025, suggest either preparations for a new test or maintenance work of the test stand.

The first image collected at 9:30 a.m. local time shows the test stand quiet, as it has been for the past two months. The second image collected at 12:49 p.m., shows that the rail-mounted environmental shelter has been pulled back from the test stand, and a truck is present between the two. A third image, collected at 2:29 p.m., shows that the truck is no longer present. However, a large telescoping crane has arrived, and there is evidence of what is likely water draining off the test site’s pad. In the past, such cranes have been used to lift a test engine up and into the test stand itself. Finally, an image collected at 3:00 p.m. shows the test stand area once again quiet with no vehicles present, but the rail-mounted environmental shelter is still pulled back away from the test stand and only a small patch of water remaining on the site’s pad.

The New Yunsong Pier

The most notable development at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station over the past year is the new L-shaped pier to the southeast corner of the perimeter.

Prior to the expansion of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, the agricultural village of Yunsong was located on a small peninsula in the extreme southeast corner and outside of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station perimeter. With the expansion of the facility beginning in 2022, the area was incorporated into the facility.iii Subsequently, construction of what would become a large L-shaped pier and associated access road began in mid-2022. Construction continued slowly and between June and July 2025, a new seawall and pier with basin were completed. The pier has a total of approximately 350 meters of docking space and an 80-meter-long basin. There is an approximately 110-meter-long surface level rail system that partially encompasses the basin that will likely be used to mount a gantry crane in the future.

The first cargo vessel observed in readily available commercial imagery at the new pier was an approximately 65-meter-long vessel, seen through cloud cover on September 28, 2025. Although clouds and haze partially obscure the view of the pier, a barge, potentially two, is also present in the same image.

The construction of the L-shaped pier was likely undertaken as part of Kim’s desire to ensure “the convenience of carrier rocket transport.” However, the addition of this pier is intriguing as mud flats exposed during routine tidal swings surround the area, preventing vessel access or stranding vessels. Furthermore, the waters around the small peninsula are often clogged with ice in the winter. Such environmental factors have likely led to North Korea’s intention to bring large cargo here by barge, as suggested by the presence of the surface-level rail system along the basin. There is also speculation that it could be used to transport large rocket components or that the Nampo submersible missile launch barge may alternately be transferred here in the basin.

Rail Station, Assembly Buildings, and New Railroad Spur Line

Approximately 4.5 kilometers northwest of the L-shaped pier and into the more central area of the Sohae Satellite Launching is an area that has also undergone considerable development during the past three years. The development includes a new railroad spur line with two new bridges and branches off the existing spur line, which leads to the original launch pad. This new branch line leads to the new high-bay horizontal assembly/processing building and underground facility. Additionally, the area includes a new rail-served high-bay horizontal assembly/processing building located alongside the covered railroad station, as well as a horizontal assembly/processing building that existed prior to the last three years’ development.

A view of the center section of the facility showing the covered railroad station, original horizontal assembly/processing building, new large high-bay horizontal assembly/processing building, and the initial construction stages of a new railroad spur line, including two new bridges, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

The most notable new development in this area is the new rail-served high-bay horizontal assembly/processing building that measures approximately 200 by 49 meters. This building consists of a long central assembly/processing hall with workshops, offices, and storage rooms located along its length. Processing buildings support the assembly, integration, testing, and checkout of SLVs or ballistic missiles before they are transported to the launch pad.

The layout and size of the new horizontal processing building indicates that it can handle all existing North Korean space launch vehicles (SLV) and ballistic missiles, as well as those estimated to come into service in the foreseeable future. As of September 9, 2025, the building is externally complete but activity around it indicates that interior work to finish construction is slowly continuing.

The new railroad spur line servicing the building and the nearby underground facility is in its initial stages of construction. Depending upon resources allocated, the spur line could be completed during early 2026.

A close view of the new large high-bay horizontal assembly/processing building, and the initial construction stages of a new railroad spur line, September 7, 2025. The yellow and red “flare” over the building is a result of a bright reflection off the roof. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Except for minor changes to the types and numbers of equipment and supplies present, little has changed at the original horizontal assembly/processing building. The 12 large trailer tanks first observed during mid-2024 remain, the southern access road to the building remains blocked, and the rail spur line leading from the covered rail station to the original launch pad that passes the building remains usable.

Entrance, Headquarters, and Warehouse

At the entrance, headquarters, and warehouse of the Sohae site, minor activity has been observed in satellite imagery during the past year. While the rail-served warehouse facility remains active, no equipment or supplies are presently stored out in the open. The main entrance and checkpoint, as well as the administration and security headquarters area, remain quiet. The latter has only two small unidentified vehicles present in the courtyard. No railcars, construction equipment, or piles of sand or gravel are observed at the temporary rail-served delivery point immediately south of the administration and security headquarters area. The current level of activity observed at these locations is typical of what has been observed throughout 2025.

Underground Facility

Construction of the large underground facility (UGF) east of the new high-bay horizontal assembly/processing building, which began in 2022, continues at its west portal and access roads. While details concerning the interior layout of the facility are unknown, its overall length, including current portals, is approximately 695 meters. If it is similar to other strategic UGFs, it is likely to include smaller interior branch tunnels and a railroad siding. Notably, the west portal has been extended some 130 meters from the original excavation point since 2022 but remains incomplete with construction suspended since mid-2024. The reason for this apparent suspension is unknown.

As noted above, the road and rail spur line work to the west portal is ongoing. At the east portal, construction on the portal itself appears complete, but vehicle and personnel activity around the portal indicates that access road work continues. Furthermore, excavation from the portal to the southeast is ongoing. Since March 2025, the excavation work has extended to approximately 940 meters to the southeast. It is too early to determine whether this is for a new road or for a roadbed to continue the new railroad spur line through the UGF and onto the coastal launch pad 760 meters further to the southeast. Alternately, if it is a continuation of the spur line, it could lead to a new railroad siding to support the coastal launch pad.

Original Launch Pad

Approximately 1 kilometer south of the original horizontal assembly/processing building is the original launch pad. Barring occasional activity, there have been no significant developments observed here over the past year. An earlier renovation program, which began in 2022 to replace the existing fuel and oxidizer storage facilities and the construction of two large water tanks, has been suspended or cancelled since 2023. Work on refurbishing the rail-mounted transfer structure and entrance to the underground rail terminal was completed in 2023. As of September 2025, the original launch pad appears to be in caretaker status.

The original launch pad showing the rail mounted transfer structure and other details, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Located approximately 650 meters to the east of the original launch pad is one of the two primary construction support compounds. It is from here that workers and heavy construction equipment have been dispatched to work on projects around the Sohae facility. Satellite imagery from the past year has shown continuing activity and changes in the quantities and types of supplies, equipment, and vehicles present, providing further indication of the ongoing construction activity at Sohae.

VIP Observation Facility and Horizontal Engine Test Stand

On the hill mass looking over the original launch pad and the two engine test stands is one of two VIP observation facilities at Sohae. While no activity of significance is observed here in recent imagery, the observation building has undergone minor development during the past nine months, with a structure added to its roof. The reason for this addition is unclear. Although nothing of significance has recently changed at the nearby support building, a new approximately 6-meter-diameter radome, likely associated with tracking or telemetry download, was installed on its roof during 2023.

A view of the VIP observation and telemetry facilities overlooking the test stands at Sohae, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Below and to the east of the VIP observation facilities are the vertical and horizontal rocket engine test stands and the ballistic missile test silo. As noted above, activities for either preparation for an engine test or maintenance were observed at the Yunsong vertical engine test stand in recent imagery. At the horizontal engine test stand, sometimes referred to as the Yunsong Horizontal Engine Test Stand, a test supervised by Kim Jong-un was reportedly conducted two weeks ago on September 9, 2025. According to Rodong Sinmun, the test was of “a high-thrust solid-fuel engine using the composite carbon fiber material” and “heralds major changes in expanding and strengthening the nuclear strategic forces of the DPRK.” The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announced that this was the “ninth ground launch test of the engine [and that it] will be the final test in the development process.” And that the “maximum thrust of the new engine is 1,971 kN.”

Approximately 125 meters north of the horizontal engine test stand is the underground test silo built in 2023. It was from here that North Korea conducted a test launch of a potentially navalized version of the KN-23 on March 19, 2023. Since then, no activity has been observed at the underground test silo.

A photograph released by Rodong Sinmun showing the September 8, 2025, engine test at the Sohae horizontal engine test stand (Rodong Sinmun).

A photograph released by North Korea showing the March 19, 2023, launch of a KN-23 (potentially the navalized version) from the underground test silo at Sohae (KCNA).

East Coast VIP Observation Facility, Coastal Launch Pad, and Support Facilities

During the past several years, North Korea has shifted construction efforts to the east side of the Sohae facility. These efforts have been focused upon construction of a VIP observation facility, a coastal launch pad for solid fuel SLVs, and several support facilities.

Between 2022 and 2023, North Korea began construction of a new VIP observation facility on the east coast of the Sohae facility, approximately 1.3 kilometers north-northwest of the coastal launch pad, to observe and film SLV launches from the new east coast launch pad. No activity has been observed here since construction was suspended mid-2024 and remains incomplete in recent imagery.

Construction of the coastal launch pad for solid fuel SLVs, sometimes identified as the Yunsong Launch Pad, began in April 2023 and was generally complete by the end of May 2023. Since that time there have been four reported launches of a Chollima 1 SLV (May 30, 2023, August 23, 2023, November 21, 2023, and May 27, 2024) from the facility. All of these are reported to have been for launching a “military reconnaissance satellite.” Of these, only the November 21, 2023, launch was successful and placed the Malligyong-1-3 satellite into orbit. As of September 25, 2025, the Malligyong-1-3 remains on orbit at approximately 500 kilometers above the Earth. Its ability to capture and transmit images is uncertain. The coastal launch pad has remained quiet since the May 27, 2024, launch attempt, however, it maintains the capability to conduct a surprise launch at any time of Kim Jong-un’s choosing.

A close-up view of the coastal launch pad on the east side of the facility. The rail mounted environmental shelter obscures a view of the strong arm used to launch the SLVs, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

A photograph released by Rodong Sinmun showing the November 21, 2023, launch of the Chollima-1 SLV, with the Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite, from the coastal launch pad on the east coast (Rodong Sinmun).

Approximately 1.1 kilometers northwest of the coastal launch pad is a small probable research facility built between 2022 and 2023. The facility consists of four buildings (one a high-bay building), two storage tanks (potentially nitrogen and liquid oxygen), nearby water tank, and a small pond. The nature of the work conducted here is unknown but may be related to satellite processing before launch. No significant activity has been observed here over the past year.

The probable research facility 1.1 kilometers northwest of the coastal launch pad, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Approximately 300-meters south of the coastal launch pad are a barracks and warehouse and support area that were constructed in 2023 and 2024, respectively.

The barracks and warehouse and support area south of the coastal launch pad, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Activity on the Western Side of the Facility

Located within the western half of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station are a small number of facilities, including the National Aerospace Technology Administration (NATA) Launch Control and Observation building, NATA support facility, livestock facility, and a former warehouse and support facility. No activity of any significance has been observed here during the past year, and all these facilities appear to be in caretaker status. It should be noted that in 2019, a network of dirt roads was developed throughout the western side of the facility. At that time and subsequently in 2022 when Kim announced plans for expansion, it was believed that these roads would connect future support facilities. However, this has not happened to date.

The NATA Launch Control and Observation building, support facility, and helicopter landing pad, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

The livestock and former warehouse and support facilities on the western side of Sohae, September 7, 2025. Satellite image © 2025 Vantor. Image may not be republished without permission. Please contact imagery@csis.org.

Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is a Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Victor Cha is President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Jennifer Jun is an Associate Fellow and Project Manager for Imagery Analysis with the iDeas Lab and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Special thanks for Vantor for imagery and Hana Cho for markups support.

References

“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Sohae Satellite Launching Ground,” Rodong Sinmun, March 11, 2022.
Kim Bum-soo, “NIS: N. Korea Receives Russian Expertise in Spy Satellite, Launch Platform Tech,” KBS World, April 30, 2025, https://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=192754.
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Inspects Sohae Satellite Launching Ground,” Rodong Sinmun, March 11, 2022.
Some preliminary information on the Nampo submersible test stand barge can be found in Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. “Nampo Missile Test Stand Barge Update: Continued Intermittent Activity,” Beyond Parallel, June 9, 2022, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/nampo-missile-test-stand-barge-update-continued-intermittent-activity/.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. “New Engine Test Stand and Construction Progress at Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” Beyond Parallel, December 15, 2022, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/probable-new-engine-test-stand-and-construction-progress-at-sohae-satellite-launching-station/.
Coincidently, on March 5, 2017, North Korea conducted a simultaneous launch of four Scud-ER missiles just 200 meters west of this facility. See: Anna Fifield, “North Korea launches more missiles; 3 land in Japanese waters,” Washington Post, March 5, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-launches-another-missile-perhaps-one-that-can-reach-us/2017/03/05/943010ee-96e2-4ff4-83aa-2fe09cd65831_story.html, and Ju-Min Park and Kaori Kaneko. “North Korea fires four missiles toward Japan, angering Tokyo and South Korea,” March 6, 2017, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKBN16C0YU/.
Ibid.; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. “Continuing Construction Progress at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” January 24, 2023, Beyond Parallel, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/continuing-construction-progress-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/; and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. “Vertical Engine Test and Ongoing Construction at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” Beyond Parallel, May 6, 2024, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/vertical-engine-test-and-ongoing-construction-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/.
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. “Continuing Construction Progress at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” Beyond Parallel, January 24, 2023, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/continuing-construction-progress-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/.
“Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Ground Jet Test of Carbon Fiber Solid-fuel Engine,” Rodong Sinmun, September 9, 2025.
“The Missile General Bureau of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Conducts Ground Launch Test of a Carbon Fiber Solid-State Engine,” KCNA, September 9, 2025.
As an example of one of these failed launches, see Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, and Jennifer Jun. “Another Failed Satellite Launch at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station,” Beyond Parallel, May 28, 2024, https://beyondparallel.csis.org/another-failed-satellite-launch-at-the-sohae-satellite-launching-station/.
NATA was formerly known as the National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA).

beyondparallel.csis.org · Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Victor Cha, Jennifer Jun · October 2, 2025

3. Seoul’s dangerous gamble with wartime command

Some excellent points. The sovereignty issue is a myth.

And I have to repeat what I wrote yesterday:

But there is no such thing as transfer of the wartime OPCON. There will only be a simple change of command of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command from a US General to a Korean General. The command relationships will remain the same. The ROK/US CFC will continue to answer to both nations equally as it does now. The US does not have OPCON of Korean forces nor will Korea have OPCON of US forces. The ROK/US CFC has OPCON of both forces for both the ROK and US governments who manage CFC through the permanent military committee.

Every Commander of the ROK/US CFC since 1978 has said that he works for both presidents equally. That will be the same when a ROK general takes command of CFC.

Excerpts;

For South Koreans, the danger is greater still – their country already lies inside that line.

This geographic reality makes Seoul’s position especially precarious:

Loosening integration with Washington does not insulate Korea, it turns the nation into a frontline state without a shield.

Lee’s OPCON ambition may resonate as a patriotic breakthrough. But sovereignty without security is illusory.

In a region defined by nuclear threats, revisionist powers, and asymmetric coercion, South Korea cannot afford to gamble on symbolic gestures.

Instead of weakening command unity, Seoul should deepen integration with Washington – preserving full deterrence and maintaining credible alliance cohesion.

Real sovereignty comes not from isolation, but from unity that no rival dares challenge.

Pursued recklessly, OPCON transfer trades sovereignty on paper for peril in reality.

Seoul’s dangerous gamble with wartime command - Asia Times

As North Korea and China grow bolder, transfer of operational control of troops to South Korea could strip away its defenses

asiatimes.com · Hanjin Lew, Jio Lew · October 2, 2025

On October 1, South Korea’s Armed Forces Day, President Lee Jae Myung declared: “To proactively respond to the rapidly changing security environment, independent national defense is inevitable. Based on a solid South Korea–US alliance, we will restore wartime operational control (OPCON) and lead the allied defense posture.”

Lee cast OPCON transfer as the final act of restoring sovereignty and achieving genuine self-defense. But this is not a bold act of autonomy – it is a strategic risk that could hollow out deterrence and weaken South Korea’s very security.

Lee and his supporters frame OPCON transfer as if Seoul were a vassal state of the US. But that narrative obscures critical nuance.

The myth of lost sovereignty

Under existing arrangements, South Korea retains peacetime control of its military, while in wartime the Combined Forces Command (CFC) assumes operational control over both South Korean and US forces.

The CFC is structured as a binational command: the commander is a US general, the deputy a Korean, and staff positions alternate nationality.

A recent South Korean editorial warned, “The decision on OPCON transfer must be based on what will prevent war – not on abstract notions of pride or nationalism.”

A signal of weakness to Pyongyang and Beijing

Reducing America’s role in wartime command sends the wrong message. Neither Pyongyang nor Beijing will take it as confidence; both are far more likely to see it as a wedge in the allied front.

China, already viewing South Korea as a potential weak link in the US strategic chain, is working to bind Seoul economically.

On September 29, major outlets reported an “invasion of China money” as Korean government bonds, stocks, and real estate were snapped up indiscriminately. Beijing now holds more than twice as much South Korean government bond debt as Washington holds.

Such inflows deepen economic vulnerability and hand Beijing greater leverage – a reminder that strategic dependency is not only military but financial, as well.

Political leftism dressed as strategy

Lee’s OPCON push reflects less military prudence than the imprint of his anti-US, pro-China agenda. In the past, he has called American troops in South Korea “occupiers” and declared that China should be free to do as it wishes with Taiwan.

His stance recycles a long-standing leftist narrative that portrays South Korea as dependent on Washington and casts the alliance as an obstacle to autonomy.

Yet the reality is dire: North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats are escalating, China’s military and economic footprint is expanding and regional strategic competition is intensifying.

To push for command transfer under such conditions is nationalist theater, not responsible statecraft.

History’s warning

In January 1950, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined America’s Asian defense perimeter, pointedly excluding South Korea.

Pyongyang and Beijing read it as a green light, and within months Kim Il Sung invaded with Mao’s approval and Stalin’s backing.

The lesson is stark: Whenever allies appear excluded from Washington’s security umbrella, adversaries see it as a license for aggression.

America’s chaotic exit from Afghanistan showed how quickly adversaries exploit any perception of abandonment.

Island chain strategy

Island chain strategy. Map: ResearchGate

At the same time, international security experts stress the “first island chain” strategy to contain China.

For South Koreans, the danger is greater still – their country already lies inside that line.

This geographic reality makes Seoul’s position especially precarious:

Loosening integration with Washington does not insulate Korea, it turns the nation into a frontline state without a shield.

Lee’s OPCON ambition may resonate as a patriotic breakthrough. But sovereignty without security is illusory.

In a region defined by nuclear threats, revisionist powers, and asymmetric coercion, South Korea cannot afford to gamble on symbolic gestures.

Instead of weakening command unity, Seoul should deepen integration with Washington – preserving full deterrence and maintaining credible alliance cohesion.

Real sovereignty comes not from isolation, but from unity that no rival dares challenge.

Pursued recklessly, OPCON transfer trades sovereignty on paper for peril in reality.

Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs. Jio Lew contributed research for this article.

asiatimes.com · Hanjin Lew, Jio Lew · October 2, 2025

4. US, ROK agree to expand drone cooperation as North Korea doubles down on UAVs

Just one area needed in Alliance Modernization.

US, ROK agree to expand drone cooperation as North Korea doubles down on UAVs

US secretary of the army and South Korean defense chief discuss role of drones in ‘modern warfare’ at meeting in Seoul

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/us-rok-agree-to-expand-drone-cooperation-as-north-korea-doubles-down-on-uavs/

Jooheon Kim October 3, 2025

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back during his visit to a ROK army unit dedicated to drone testing on Sept. 4, 2025 | Image: Ministry of National Defense

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back held talks with the U.S. secretary of the army on Thursday and agreed to expand drone cooperation, emphasizing the importance of a “robust” defense posture to deter North Korean military threats.

The meeting in Seoul with Daniel Driscoll, a senior civilian official within the U.S. Defense Department, came as the DPRK has declared the development of advanced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) the military’s “top priority,” reflecting lessons learned from its deployment of troops to the war in Ukraine.

“Both sides agreed to expand cooperation in the joint research, production, and operation of drones, recognizing their growing significance in modern warfare,” the Seoul’s defense ministry stated in a press release.

The U.S. and ROK officials also concurred on the importance of maintaining a strong combined defense posture to counter the DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats.

Ahn highly praised the crucial role of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

He further stressed the need to further strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in science, technology and MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul) to develop the ROK-U.S. alliance into a “future-oriented, comprehensive strategic partnership,” and Driscoll reportedly expressed his agreement.

North Korea has been pushing forward its own military drone program through frequent tests at Panghyon Airbase and accelerated construction of a nearby drone factory, according to NK Pro analysis of satellite imagery.

This activity likely supports efforts to modernize UAVs and mass-produce suicide drones, especially as DPRK soldiers gained combat experience in drone warfare during the conflict in Ukraine. Leader Kim Jong Un has also called for incorporating AI into unmanned systems.

While Seoul did not offer specifics about the envisioned U.S.-ROK drone cooperation, South Korean navy Lieutenant Shin Hong-jung pointed out that the military currently lacks sufficient personnel to operate drones.

“The ROK army is still primarily organized around regular infantry and mechanized infantry units,” he told NK News. “Unless we grant full autonomy to unmanned systems, which isn’t feasible yet due to a lack of proper governance, human-operated control structures will need to remain in place for the time being.”

Shin, who previously served aboard a submarine, noted that unmanned surface and underwater vehicles in the ROK navy have seen little actual deployment.

Last month, Ahn unveiled his plan to nurture 500,000 “drone warriors” by strengthening drone education for military personnel. The Lee administration has also emphasized the need to use new technology like unmanned systems to compensate for manpower shortages in the decades ahead.

Edited by Bryan Betts

5. Lee Jae-myung calls for North Korea to allow contact between separated families

However unlikely it is that Kim Kim Jong Un will agree to this request/demand President Lee must continue to make this request. It is a human rights issue and every time KJU denies it he shows himself to be a human rights abuser. President Lee is giving Kim the opportunity to change. But if we won't change he is going to become vulnerable to change from within.

Lee Jae-myung calls for North Korea to allow contact between separated families

South Korean president visits border and meets citizens displaced from hometowns in the DPRK ahead of Chuseok holiday

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/lee-jae-myung-calls-for-north-korea-to-allow-contact-between-separated-families/

Jooheon Kim October 3, 2025

President Lee Jae-myung meets South Koreans displaced from their hometowns on Oct. 3, 2025. | Image: ROK Presidential Office

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung met with citizens displaced from their hometowns in North Korea by the peninsula’s decades-long division on Friday, expressing hope that improvements in inter-Korean ties will allow separated families to reconnect.

The meeting took place at the Ganghwa Peace Observatory on the inter-Korean border ahead of the fall harvest holiday of Chuseok, when Koreans traditionally visit their hometowns to gather with family and honor their ancestors.

“The tensions between the two Koreas have intensified, and hostility has become so severe that there is no contact at all anymore,” Lee said on Friday. He stated he felt guilty that the breakdown was due to a lack of political effort.

Lee called on the DPRK to at least allow basic communication between separated family members to confirm each other’s safety, stating that letter exchanges should take place from a humanitarian perspective despite military and political confrontations.

“Just a moment ago, I looked over the river and saw geese flying in a straight line,” he said, stating that it’s regrettable how animals fly freely while human beings draw lines and prevent each other from crossing them.

He then promised to do his best to bring forward the day when they can hear news from their hometowns and warmly reunite with their separated families.

Lawmaker Park Hyun-woo of the conservative People Power Party, whose grandfather originally hailed from North Korea’s Haeju, praised Lee for meeting with displaced persons but urged stronger efforts to help them confirm the fate of their loved ones.

“What lingers deep in the hearts of displaced people is the longing to know whether their family members are still alive, whether they can meet regularly, and ultimately, whether unification, which would open the path back to their hometowns, will ever happen,” he told NK News.

He mentioned that many of them perform ancestral rites at home in South Korea even if their deceased grandparents are buried in the North, or visit Paju near the border as a symbolic gesture.

President Lee Jae-myung watches a flock of birds flying near the inter-Korean border on Oct. 3, 2025. | Image ROK Presidential Office

As of August, a total of 134,489 people have registered with the South Korean government as separated family members, but only 35,311 of them are still alive.

The last reunion of separated family members took place at North Korea’s Mount Kumgang in Aug. 2018 during the Moon Jae-in administration, following a series of inter-Korean summits and the historic first meeting between the U.S. and DPRK leaders.

But while South Korea has continued to push for more reunions in the years since, the North has not responded and allowed any further contact between separated families.

NK Pro analysis shows that the DPRK has also begun dismantling the South Korean-built Inter-Korean Family Reunions Center in the Mount Kumgang tourist region, a 12-story hotel where meetings have taken place in the past.

In late 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un denounced the goal of reunification and declared that the South was a “hostile, enemy state,” not a nation of ethnic compatriots.

Edited by Bryan Betts

6. Russian government jet flies to North Korea, a week before military parade

Let's see the parade.

Who gives a better parade? China, Russia, or north Korea?

Russian government jet flies to North Korea, a week before military parade

Presidential fleet’s Tu-204-300 airliner has transported top officials to Pyongyang in past, hinting at high-level visit

https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/russian-government-jet-flies-to-north-korea-a-week-before-military-parade/

Shreyas Reddy October 3, 2025

Special Flight Squadron Rossiya's Tu-204-300 aircraft bearing the registration number RA-64058 | Image: Anna Zvereva via Flickr (Sept. 14, 2016) (Creative Commons - CC BY-SA 2.0)

A Russian government jet known to transport top officials made a brief visit to North Korea from Thursday to Friday, aviation data shows, hinting at a possible high-level visit to Pyongyang a week before an expected military parade.

A Tupolov Tu-204-300 aircraft (RA-64058) operated by Russia’s Special Flight Squadron Rossiya took off from Moscow shortly before midnight (Russian time) on Wednesday and arrived in Pyongyang around 1 p.m. local time the following day, according to the flight tracking service Flightradar24.

The jet remained in the North Korean capital for a day before embarking on its return journey around 1 p.m. Pyongyang time on Friday, crossing over into Russian airspace via China a couple of hours later. The flight remains en route to its destination as of 4:30 p.m. KST on Friday.

Neither Russia nor North Korea has announced the purpose of the flight’s visit so far, but the aircraft’s history suggests it may have ferried a high-level delegation to Pyongyang.

The Russian Special Flight Squadron Tu-204-300’s overnight flight route from Moscow to North Korea on Oct. 2, 2025 | Image: Flightradar24

This week’s visit marks RA-64058’s second trip to Pyongyang, as it was one of two aircraft that carried a delegation led by Sergei Shoigu, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, in June.

Other senior government officials such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov have also used the aircraft, which is part of the presidential fleet and has visited destinations including Egypt, Turkmenistan and Armenia in the past six months.

The jet’s day-long stopover in Pyongyang comes a week before the 80th founding anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea on Oct. 10, which the state is expected to celebrate with a large-scale parade showing off its expanding arsenal of nuclear-capable missiles and conventional weapons systems.

Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, currently serving as deputy chairperson of the national Security Council, is among those expected to attend the event alongside world leaders and other senior officials.

The Tu-204 aircraft’s departure a week before the anticipated parade makes it unlikely that it transported a Russian delegation for the anniversary celebrations, although it could have carried other officials for a preparatory visit.

The visit could also be part of Russian officials’ frequent comings and goings over the past two years as Moscow and Pyongyang ramp up cooperation in a variety of fields.

The flight came a day after the defense ministers of North Korea and Russia unveiled a new statue in Moscow honoring Korean partisans who fought alongside Soviet forces in World War II, underscoring the two countries’ emphasis on military cooperation under an alliance forged last year.

Anton Sokolin contributed reporting to this article. Edited by Bryan Betts

7. ＜Inside N.Korea＞Information spreads that 'Kim Jong-un regime received $5,000 per fallen soldier from Russia' — Authorities conduct massive crackdown, calling it 'rumors' (Revised version)

KJU profits from his dead. But note the power, threat, and fear of information.

＜Inside N.Korea＞Information spreads that 'Kim Jong-un regime received $5,000 per fallen soldier from Russia' — Authorities conduct massive crackdown, calling it 'rumors' (Revised version)

asiapress.org

A North Korean soldier, estimated to be 19 years old, taken prisoner by Ukrainian forces in early January 2025. During his interrogation, he said: "My mother doesn't know I was sent to Russia." Photo released by Ukrainian authorities.

Recently in northern regions of North Korea, information is spreading that the Russian government paid Kim Jong-un regime $5,000 for each soldier killed in action after being dispatched to Russia.North Korean security authorities are conducting a massive crackdown, dismissing it as rumors. (ISHIMARU Jiro / KANG Ji-won)

◆Rumors Also Spread That Workers Sent to Russia Are Being Deployed to the Battlefield

“I heard the information started circulating around Rason (in North Hamgyong Province) that our government received $5,000 per fallen soldier from Russia. It's spread so widely now that practically everyone knows about it. The Ministry of State Security (secret police) is conducting a massive crackdown, saying ‘It's a rumor. Anyone who talks about it will be arrested without question.’"

A reporting partner living in the northern region conveyed this on September 26. They say authorities are even examining the mobile phone communication records of those under investigation.

Another reporting partner in North Hamgyong Province said that local recruitment of workers to be sent to Russia began in September, but "There are reports that a tremendous number of soldiers have died in Russia. About 80 workers are being sent from the local area, but there are rumors they'll be deployed to the battlefield, so families are extremely worried."

◆Authorities Explain to Residents That 'the Combat Opponent Is South Korea'

South Korea's intelligence agency, the National Intelligence Service, revealed to the South Korean National Assembly in early September that the Kim Jong-un regime has deployed 15,000 people to Russia, with an estimated 2,000 deaths among them. Additionally, the UK Ministry of Defense announced in June that an estimated 6,000 or more had been killed or wounded.

Another reporting partner living in North Hamgyong Province reported at the end of August that "Authorities are explaining that those who fought in Russia were up against South Korean troops deployed as support forces."

※ASIAPRESS communicates with its reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

※Correction

"We are correcting an error in our September 30, 2025 article ' Information spreads about $5,000 payment for war casualties in Russia — Authorities conduct massive crackdown calling it "rumors"'. The original article stated that families of fallen soldiers were receiving $5,000 payments, but we are correcting this to reflect that the Russian government paid the Kim Jong-un regime $5,000 per fallen soldier. This correction stems from a miscommunication within ASIAPRESS. We sincerely apologize for the error. The corrections to this article were made on October 1, 2025."

'Russian deployment heroes’ stained with youth's blood (1) Creating a ‘new hero’ myth through propaganda

＜Inside N. Korea＞ Explains that they fought South Korean forces in Russia - Youth education already begun with "Let's become bullet and bomb suicide squads"

asiapress.org

8. U.S. Army Secretary highlights North Korea, China threats ahead

U.S. Army Secretary highlights North Korea, China threats ahead

Posted October. 03, 2025 07:11,

Updated October. 03, 2025 07:11

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251003/5884513/1

U.S. Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll said Oct. 1 that U.S. Forces Korea’s main mission is to counter threats from both North Korea and China. His remarks came as the Trump administration considers reshaping USFK into a multipurpose maneuver force in Northeast Asia, including a focus on China, prompting speculation about potential changes to its role and size.

At a press conference at Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, Driscoll was asked whether USFK’s main focus is North Korea or China. He said both are fundamental threats. Acting Eighth Army Commander General William Taylor said the alliance must maintain a strong, modernized force under the mutual defense treaty to respond to any Indo-Pacific threat.

The Army secretary leads the Department of the Army under the Pentagon and oversees policies on budget, personnel deployment, and operational support. Of the roughly 28,500 U.S. troops in Korea, about 20,000 are Army personnel, suggesting that any future adjustment in USFK’s size would likely affect the Army first.

When asked about a recent Pentagon internal listing that showed USFK Commander Xavier Brunson as a three-star lieutenant general rather than a four-star, Driscoll did not respond directly, noting only that the Army headquarters staff had recently grown too large.

Hyo-Ju Son hjson@donga.com

9. Unification minister fuels confusion on North Korea

Mr Minister, I recommend less talk in public and more planning for unification behind the scenes.

Unification minister fuels confusion on North Korea

Posted October. 02, 2025 08:11,

Updated October. 02, 2025 08:11

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251002/5882467/1

Unification Minister Chung Dong-young has stirred controversy with a string of muddled statements on North Korea policy. In Berlin on Sept. 29, while attending an international forum, he said North Korea has become one of three nations capable of striking the U.S. mainland. The comment effectively treated Pyongyang as a nuclear-armed state alongside China and Russia, with both warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

His view conflicted with remarks President Lee Jae-myung made five days earlier in New York, where Lee said reentry technology was the only remaining hurdle for North Korean ICBMs. That capability, withstanding extreme heat and shock on reentry, is the final step to a complete ICBM. Gen. Jin Young-seung, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, also said recently that the North has not proven reentry. Yet the minister responsible for North Korea policy spoke as if Pyongyang had already finished the job, leaving the public understandably confused.

Chung also argued that because North Korea calls itself a “strategic state,” policy should begin from the reality of its changed status. In North Korean usage, the term signals a self-claimed nuclear power. His stance sounded like a call to negotiate after recognizing the North’s nuclear status, at odds with the government’s denuclearization goal and its policy that nuclear possession is unacceptable.

His recently floated idea of “peaceful two states” has generated further discord inside the government. The notion of recognizing North Korea as a separate country runs counter to the Constitution, which defines the national territory as the Korean Peninsula and its adjacent islands and declares unification a national objective. National Security Adviser Wi Seong-rak said the government does not accept a two-state formula, but Chung has not withdrawn his position.

Less than a month remains before the APEC summit in Gyeongju, where tough diplomacy with the United States, China and Japan over the North Korean nuclear issue is expected. A fresh U.S.–North Korea dialogue is also possible. If internal mixed messages continue, even Washington could question Seoul’s commitment to denuclearization. In such conditions, any U.S.–North Korea talks risk deeper disagreement over how to resolve the nuclear problem.

At home, North Korea policy is sharply divisive, which makes public support essential. The government must speak with one voice to earn that support. The minister overseeing North Korea policy should not undermine that principle with careless remarks.

10. Lee's OPCON gamble

We can make this work. I am still an advocate that any military operation in north Korea should be led by a Korean general. This is for two main reasons: one for eh US and one for the ROK.

For the ROK, the only outcome of regime collapse or war must be unficaition and the establishment of a free and unified Korea. The military will have to support the political process. Therefore the military effort supporting the political process of unification needs to be led by a Korean general.

For the US, we cannot afford another Iraq and Afghanistan. Specifically we must not give the perception tha the US is an occupying force in north Korea. Yes US troops will be a apt of the ROK/US CFC but if a US general commands the troops the Koreans in the north and South as well as the international community may perceive the US as an occupying force. We cannot afford another Iraq and Afghanistan

But the OPCON transition (or Change of Command for the ROK/US CFC) must not be an excuse for the US to abandon Korea (a fear among Koreans as well as a desirese among the American retrenchers).

But this is the key point:

With North Korea as a persistent threat, alienating key allies by labeling U.S. forces as "foreign troops" could be counterproductive. Building a self-reliant military does not mean turning away from allies; rather, it means working together to navigate the region's increasingly volatile security landscape. Framing alliances as obstacles to independence undermines the very strength South Korea seeks to build. Calling U.S. troops “foreign” undermines the allies we need.

Building a self-reliant military is not at odds with having a strong ROK/US alliance. Two self-reliant militaries makes the alliance stronger. Although paradoxically the US military in Korea is not self-reliant.. It is not capable of fighting a war alone against north Korea. Even with US reinforcements it would be hard pressed to fight along in Korea without its ROK teammates. This is what people fundamentally do not understand about the ROK/US alliance. It has evolved over time with two complementary militaries with mutual support to each other and each bringing their comparative advantages to the alliance. and warfighting.

But one of the reasons we should want the ROK to have a strong self-reliant military is so that it can fully support the Mutual Defense Treaty against threat to either nation in the Pacific area as wella s to commit forces to support contingencies throughout the region and the world.

Lee's OPCON gamble - The Korea Times

Published Oct 2, 2025 11:41 am KST

Military might needs more than numbers

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

President Lee Jae Myung has once again emphasized the importance of a self-reliant military, weeks after sparking debate by referring to the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea as "foreign troops" that are not indispensable to the nation’s defense.

“We have every reason to be proud of and confident in our military capabilities. Based on that confidence, we must pursue a stronger military to achieve peace and prosperity for this country. This is the direction our nation must follow,” Lee said during a speech marking Armed Forces Day on Wednesday.

In his address, Lee used the term “self-reliance” three times and, for the first time since taking office on June 4, directly called for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to South Korea.

It remains unclear whether his remarks signal a shift in policy on wartime command or if he intends to use OPCON as leverage to pressure Washington into breaking the deadlock in stalled tariff negotiations.

During a July 15 confirmation hearing, then Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back stated that the Lee administration aimed to complete the OPCON transfer before the end of Lee’s term. However, the presidential office quickly downplayed his remarks, describing them as Ahn's personal opinion.

This time, the presidential office stated that Lee holds a firm belief in the need for the OPCON transfer but did not specify a timeline for when it should take place.

Lee’s Armed Forces Day speech has reignited debate over the gap between the country’s theoretical military strength and its actual wartime effectiveness.

He expressed confidence in South Korea’s defense capabilities, noting that the country’s defense budget is 1.4 times that of North Korea’s entire gross domestic product and that South Korea is ranked as the world’s fifth-largest military power. “Given this, we should not be in doubt about our military strength,” Lee said.

While factually accurate, Lee’s statements overlook a critical point: Military spending and theoretical rankings do not necessarily translate to success on the battlefield. The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine illustrates this disconnect clearly.

Russia, ranked as the world’s second-largest military power after the United States, was expected to swiftly defeat Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly believed Russian forces would take control of Kyiv within 10 days of the invasion's start in February 2022. However, Ukraine — ranked only 20th in global military strength — has continued to resist fiercely, defying expectations.

Russia's assumed quick victory has instead become a prolonged and costly conflict. Despite its overwhelming resources, Moscow has faced setbacks and even turned to North Korea for assistance as the war drags on.

This example underscores a key reality: Military capability on paper does not always reflect battlefield outcomes. Lee's confidence, while grounded in impressive statistics, may underestimate the complexity of real-world conflict.

As Lee stated, South Korea is ranked as the world’s fifth-largest military power. In contrast, North Korea ranks 34th — far behind in terms of overall military capability. On paper, the two Koreas are not comparable. However, as demonstrated by the war between Russia and Ukraine, superior rankings and military spending do not guarantee an easy victory in an actual conflict.

One overlooked factor is combat experience. North Korean troops are reportedly gaining battlefield experience through their involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict — a factor not reflected in military capability rankings, yet crucial in actual warfare. Combat experience can be a decisive advantage, and its absence in numerical assessments highlights the limitations of such rankings.

Military rankings indicate relative capability, but they do not determine outcomes. While South Korea spends significantly more than the impoverished North on defense and weapons procurement, including from foreign suppliers, this disparity does not ensure success in a potential conflict.

Despite its status as a global military power, South Korea still needs allies — especially the United States — to train with and fight alongside when necessary. No matter how capable South Korea becomes, collaboration with partners is essential to maintaining readiness, enhancing combat skills and ensuring national security.

With North Korea as a persistent threat, alienating key allies by labeling U.S. forces as "foreign troops" could be counterproductive. Building a self-reliant military does not mean turning away from allies; rather, it means working together to navigate the region's increasingly volatile security landscape. Framing alliances as obstacles to independence undermines the very strength South Korea seeks to build. Calling U.S. troops “foreign” undermines the allies we need.

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

11. Kim Jong Un orders creation of unified satellite intelligence command system

He just wants a good looking command center like the one in the photo. The old photo of in his "command center" with him sitting at a desk with a single phone smoking a cigarette while watching a missile launch no longer is good enough for him.

Kim Jong Un orders creation of unified satellite intelligence command system

The move "might face technical limitations, but it would become a threat the other side can't ignore...," a source told Daily NK

By Jeong Tae Joo - October 3, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/kim-jong-un-orders-creation-of-unified-satellite-intelligence-command-system/

A photo of the Pyongyang General Control Tower published in state media on November 23, 2023. (Rodong Sinmun-News1)

Kim Jong Un has ordered North Korea’s military to build an integrated command system linking reconnaissance satellite data with the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), aiming to analyze enemy movements and issue orders in real time.

A source in the military told Daily NK recently that the Central Military Commission “issued an order signed by Kim Jong Un to connect intelligence gathered by military reconnaissance satellites with the General Satellite Control Center’s command and transmission system in real time.”

He said that “technical teams from five specialized agencies, including the General Satellite Control Center, the RGB, and the Academy of National Defense Science’s Electronic Weapons Institute, were tasked with forming a task force.”

Another military source said that Kim “called for reconnaissance satellites, the General Satellite Control Center, and the RGB to be connected as one command and control system so that enemy movements are analyzed and translated into orders as soon as they are detected.”

Building an integrated intelligence system

In the order, the relevant agencies were instructed to focus on several key objectives: accelerating the preprocessing of satellite imagery, combining and analyzing signals and communications intelligence, automatically relaying commands to the RGB’s operational units, and duplicating the fiber-optic cables of underground facilities while strengthening defenses against electronic warfare.

The order also called for the construction of an “integrated information platform” that simultaneously processes satellite and electronic intelligence.

This suggests the authorities are attempting to implement a modern command concept that integrates satellite intelligence collection and analysis with the drafting and execution of orders.

The move indicates North Korea has been considering how to operationally integrate data from its Malligyong-1 reconnaissance satellite since announcing its launch in November 2023. At the time, North Korea claimed to have successfully put the satellite into orbit, but its capabilities were never independently verified.

North Korea’s National Aerospace Development Administration (NADA) built its General Satellite Control Center in Pyongyang in 2015. Signs have emerged on several occasions that the authorities wish to expand the facility. The task force appears to be an effort to develop the country’s basic space infrastructure in line with operational needs.

Protecting critical infrastructure

The authorities are simultaneously taking measures to defend the General Satellite Control Center from attack by moving facilities underground, enhancing defenses against electronic warfare, and diversifying communication frequencies. This is part of a strategy to harden the facility and prevent attempts to paralyze the command system in wartime.

However, some North Koreans have quietly pointed out that the country lacks the technological capacity to implement a command system that collects and analyzes satellite information and drafts orders in real time. “To process satellite data, you need not only a high-speed communication network but also the support of a large-scale computing network. Currently, North Korea’s system operates on delayed data, not real-time delivery,” one source said.

Nevertheless, some view the order to establish a real-time satellite command system as a significant endeavor. Another military source said the latest task “might face technical limitations, but it would become a threat the other side can’t ignore as an attempt to complete a command structure that can’t be severed in wartime.”

Read in Korean

12. JCS chairman, USFK commander visit front-line military unit

The press should always acknowledge General Brunson's primary position especially when he inspects front line forces. He is the commander of the ROK/US CFC which is the command charged with deterring an attack, defending the ROK, and defeating the north Korean people's Army. USFK is a subunified command that is a force provider to the CFC. And of course as the Senior US MIlitary Officer Assigned to Korea (SUSMOAK) he and the ROK Chairman make up the Permanent Military Committee.

JCS chairman, USFK commander visit front-line military unit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 3, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman Gen. Jin Yong-sung and the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson, visited a front-line military unit Friday to inspect readiness based on the combined defense posture, the JCS said.

It marked the first military inspection by Jin since his inauguration earlier this week, as well as his first joint inspection with Brunson, who also serves as a commander of the S. Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command and the commander of the U.N. Command, which oversees the Korean War armistice.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Jin Yong-sung (3rd from R) and the U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson (3rd from L) pose for a photo during their visit to a front-line military unit on Oct. 3, 2025, in this photo provided by the JCS. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Jin and Brunson visited general posts and outposts in an Army unit located just south of the western border with North Korea on the first day of the extended Chuseok holiday. The two commanders inspected the operational environment, major facilities and equipment.

During the visits, Jin called for "watertight" defense operations and urged maintaining a firm operational posture able to "respond decisively against enemy provocations under the combined defense posture," the JCS said in a release.

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Chairman Gen. Jin Yong-sung (3rd from R) and the U.S. Forces Korea Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson (2nd from R) inspect a front-line military unit on Oct. 3, 2025, in this photo provided by the JCS. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Brunson congratulated Jin on assuming his new role, noting that the ROK-U.S. Alliance is the greatest asymmetric advantage on the Peninsula, according to the JCS.

The U.S. commander emphasized its combined capabilities credibly deter aggression, safeguard the armistice and ensure peace and stability.

The commanders reaffirmed that the Korean military should uphold peace and stressed the importance of maintaining capabilities and posture based on the alliance, it noted.

Both sides also concurred that the alliance's combined capabilities deter threats, uphold the armistice agreement and ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the JCS added.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · October 3, 2025

13. Bessent says Trump, Xi will have 'pull-aside' meeting in Korea, expects breakthrough in trade talks

Bessent says Trump, Xi will have 'pull-aside' meeting in Korea, expects breakthrough in trade talks | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · October 3, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Oct. 2 (Yonhap) -- U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping will have a "pull-aside" meeting in South Korea late this month, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Thursday, anticipating a "pretty big breakthrough" in his parallel trade talks with his Chinese counterpart.

Bessent made the remarks during a CNBC interview, a day after Trump also reaffirmed he will meet the Chinese president "in four weeks," as South Korea is preparing to host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in the southeastern city of Gyeongju from Oct. 31-Nov. 1.

"The most important thing we are going to see is a meeting, a pull-aside meeting with President Trump and party chair Xi in Korea towards the end of the month," Bessent said.

This file photo, released by Reuters, shows U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent attending a meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Argentine President Javier Milei during the 80th United Nations General Assembly, in New York, on Sept. 23, 2025. (Yonhap)

The secretary underscored the importance of the two leaders' in-person engagement.

"What gives us great comfort is the respect that the two leaders have for each other. So it will be helpful for them to be able to speak in person and set the framework for trade going forward," he said.

Bessent expressed optimism for his own parallel trade talks with China's Vice Premier He Lifeng.

"I think with President Trump's leadership and his relationship, the respect party chair Xi has for him, that this round, which would be our fifth round of talks, should show a pretty big breakthrough," he said.

On Wednesday, Trump wrote on Truth Social that a major topic of his discussions with Xi will be soybeans.

China has reportedly stopped buying U.S. soybeans over the past several months, while turning to soybean producers in Brazil and other countries.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · October 3, 2025

14. Lee meets Korean War refugees on first day of Chuseok holiday

Lee meets Korean War refugees on first day of Chuseok holiday | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · October 3, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung met with people who fled to South Korea from North Korea during the 1950-53 Korean War on the first day of the extended Chuseok holiday Friday, his office said.

The meeting took place at the Ganghwa Peace Observatory in the western city of Incheon, where Lee expressed sympathy to the families and wished them a warm holiday.

From a lookout point, they gazed toward North Korea and also took photos together.

The presidential office said Lee plans to use the weeklong holiday to rest and prepare for the remainder of the year, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Oct. 31 and Nov. 1.

On Sunday, he is scheduled to appear on a TV cooking show to introduce his favorite Korean foods and promote them.

President Lee Jae Myung (C) talks with people who were displaced during the 1950-53 Korean War while looking toward North Korea at the Ganghwa Peace Observatory in the western city of Incheon on Oct. 3, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · October 3, 2025

15. 6 in 10 S. Koreans to skip ancestor-honoring ceremony during Chuseok: survey

Cultural erosion?

6 in 10 S. Koreans to skip ancestor-honoring ceremony during Chuseok: survey | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · October 3, 2025

SEOUL, Oct. 3 (Yonhap) -- Six out of 10 South Koreans do not plan to set up the traditional ancestor-honoring ceremony, known as "charye," during this year's Chuseok holiday, a survey showed Friday, indicating a shift in perceptions surrounding ancestral rituals.

According to the survey conducted by the Korea Rural Economic Institute (KREI), only 40.4 percent of respondents said they would prepare a charye table during the extended Chuseok holiday, which began Friday.

Charye is a traditional ancestral rite held during major holidays like Chuseok to honor deceased family members. It typically involves a formal table setting with various types of traditional Korean dishes and liquor offered in reverence.

The figure marks a significant drop from 2016, when 74.4 percent of respondents said they observed the ritual, the institute said.

KREI attributed the shift to several factors, including the simplification of holiday customs, the rise of smaller families and changing values among younger generations.

This undated file photo, provided by G Market, shows a table set up for "charye," a traditional ancestor-honoring ceremony. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

khj@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Han-joo · October 3, 2025

16. Adoptees, birth families, officials demand justice as Korea confronts abuses

A tragic woudn that will never heal.

Adoptees, birth families, officials demand justice as Korea confronts abuses - The Korea Times

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Mie Lee Hansen, now 38 years old and living in Denmark, thought she knew the story of her adoption and the family that gave her away. She had documents that offered convincing information about her Korean background, including the fact that she had two older sisters.

After taking a DNA test, she was reconnected with a Korean relative — but the story she learned from this long-lost relative differed radically from what was in those files.

“The real story is that when my mother went into labor, she was rushed to the hospital,” Lee said. “She gave birth, and after she recovered and requested to see her baby, she was told that the baby was stillborn. The day after my mother went home, my maternal grandmother returned to the hospital to claim my body. But the doctors told her to go home and became angry with her.”

Needless to say, her family was shocked to learn that she was very much alive.

“When my Korean family read my adoption file, they said, 'Everything here is fake.' The file had their names and the city we lived in, and it was true that I had two older sisters. But everything else was false. Birth parents never gave permission for me to be adopted. Somebody took their child. Somebody stole me,” Lee said.

Lee was one of several adoptees from around the world who gathered in Seoul last month to share their stories and demand accountability for decades of human rights violations in Korea’s international adoption system.

The 3rd Adoption Truth Day International Conference, held Sept. 10-11 at the National Assembly in Seoul, brought together survivors, birth families, researchers, lawmakers and officials in what organizers called a “historic step toward justice.”

“This conference is our space, created by adoptees, for adoptees,” Peter Moller, co-director of KoRoot and the Danish Korean Rights Group, said in his opening remarks. “We cannot change the past, but we can change the present and shape the future. Our task now is to ensure that the truth we have uncovered leads to real change.”

Investigations confirm systemic abuses

The conference followed a ruling in March from Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which uncovered evidence of systemic human rights violations throughout the adoption process. Investigators found widespread evidence of falsified documents, coerced or absent parental consent and children declared dead or missing before being sent overseas.

On the first day, researchers from France and Sweden presented the results of similar inquiries in their own countries, highlighting illegal practices in adoption systems and the urgent need for reparations. Korean TRC officials described their findings as a “stepping-stone decision” for adoptees’ rights, stressing that the work of uncovering the full truth is ongoing.

“Adoptees are not second-class citizens, not objects, not commodities,” Moller declared. “We are human beings with the same rights as anyone else.”

Calls for accountability

Korean lawmakers joined the discussions alongside representatives from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, National Police Agency and National Center for the Rights of the Child (NCRC). Civic groups urged the government to implement TRC’s recommendations and to ensure that reparations, transparency and family reunification efforts are pursued.

Boon Young Han, co-director of the Danish Korean Rights Group, emphasized the collective nature of the movement: “Adoption and human rights are inseparable. The dignity of each child and family must be at the very center of policy.”

Organizers announced a follow-up international meeting in November in cooperation with the U.N. Committee on Enforced Disappearances, underscoring the global dimension of the struggle.

While participants acknowledged that decades of separation and harm cannot be undone, the gathering marked a turning point in the movement for adoptee rights.

“This is not about blame,” Moller said. “It is about drawing a line in history so that the rights of adoptees and families are finally recognized — and never again ignored.”

Representatives from TRC and the police outlined their positions and the services available to adoptees.

The NCRC did not give an official speech, but an official noted that adoptees could once again apply for family searches and related requests, following a suspension during a temporary archiving project.

Adoptees shared ongoing concerns and highlighted persistent challenges. The police’s DNA program, for instance, conveyed mixed messages about public awareness and commitment to community engagement. Adoptees reported difficulties at police stations, where staff were sometimes unaware of the program.

Adoptees also cited human rights violations related to international adoption that have been investigated in other countries, calling for similar investigations in Korea.

Antonia Giordano is a freelance photographer and writer based in Seoul. An adoptee, Antonia deeply understands and connects with the issues surrounding adoption and post-adoption. Visit giordanoantonia.myportfolio.com and follow @antonia_creative_services on Instagram.

Alice Hong is a freelance writer and comedian based in Seoul. Follow her at @hippohong on Instagram.

The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint

17. Millions hit road as weeklong Chuseok holiday begins in South Korea

Millions hit road as weeklong Chuseok holiday begins in South Korea

koreaherald.com · Shin Ji-hye · October 3, 2025

On the first day of the Chuseok holiday, Friday, travelers line up for check-in at Terminal 1 of Incheon International Airport. (Yonhap)

Highways across South Korea ground to a crawl and Incheon International Airport saw record passenger traffic Friday, as millions hit the road or boarded flights on the first day of the Chuseok holiday.

Traffic congestion began on major highways in the morning, the Korea Expressway Corp. said.

As of 9 a.m., estimated travel times from Seoul tollgates were seven hours to Busan, six hours and 30 minutes to Ulsan, six hours and 10 minutes to Mokpo, six hours to Daegu, five hours and 40 minutes to Gwangju, four hours and 10 minutes to Gangneung, and three hours and 40 minutes to Daejeon.

On the first day of the Chuseok holiday, Friday, traffic is congested on the southbound lanes near the Jamwon Interchange of the Gyeongbu Expressway in Seoul. (Yonhap)

Holiday travelers board express buses at Seoul Express Bus Terminal in Seocho District, Seoul, Thursday, ahead of the Chuseok holiday. (Yonhap)

In the opposite direction, estimated travel times to Seoul were five hours and 10 minutes from Busan, four hours and 40 minutes from Ulsan, three hours and 40 minutes from Mokpo, four hours and 10 minutes from Daegu, three hours and 20 minutes from Gwangju, two hours and 40 minutes from Gangneung, and one hour and 33 minutes from Daejeon.

However, traffic on major expressways eased later in the evening. As of 9 p.m. the drive between Seoul and Busan was expected to take 4 1/2 hours, both northbound and southbound. Likewise, the expected travel time in both directions decreased to four hours and 20 minutes between Seoul and Ulsan; three hours and 50 minutes between Seoul and Mokpo; three hours and 20 minutes between Seoul and Daegu; three hours and 20 minutes between Seoul and Gwangju; two hours and 40 minutes between Seoul and Gangneung; and 1 1/2 hours between Seoul and Daejeon

About 5.24 million vehicles were expected to be on the move nationwide, including 440,000 leaving the Seoul metropolitan area for the provinces and 430,000 traveling from the provinces into the capital region.

Traffic is projected to be heaviest on Sunday, the day of Chuseok, with congestion expected to ease to normal levels by Wednesday afternoon.

A family boards a train at Seoul Station on Thursday as they head to their hometown for the Chuseok holiday. (Yonhap)

Seoul Station was crowded from early morning Thursday with holiday travelers heading to visit their families.

To accommodate demand, Korail has implemented special transport measures for the holiday period, which began Wednesday. The company is operating 10 additional trains a day until Oct. 12, providing an average of 330,000 seatsa day.

As of 8 a.m. Friday, overall train reservations had reached nearly 80 percent, with southbound routes recording a booking rate of 95.3 percent.

Passengers, including holiday travelers, walk after getting off a train at Gwangju Songjeong Station in Gwangsan District, Gwangju, on Thursday, a day before the Chuseok holiday. (Yonhap)

The duty-free zone at Terminal 1 of Incheon International Airport is crowded with travelers on Friday, the first day of the Chuseok holiday. (Yonhap)

Meanwhile, demand for overseas travel surged, with Incheon International Airport forecast to post a record number of passengers during the holiday. Airport authorities said about 2.45 million travelers are expected to use the airport during the seven-day holiday period from Friday through Thursday — an average of 223,000 passengers a day.

A family heads to their hometown for the Chuseok holiday at Seoul Station on Friday. (Yonhap)

The busiest day is expected to be Friday, with 129,000 outbound travelers.

A child pushes a suitcase at Seoul Station on Thursday while heading to their hometown for the Chuseok holiday. (Yonhap)

shinjh@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Shin Ji-hye · October 3, 2025

18. From Stray Kids to BLACKPINK’s Rosé: Inside the racism K-pop stars still face

From Stray Kids to BLACKPINK’s Rosé: Inside the racism K-pop stars still face - The Korea Times

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A growing number of K-pop stars are speaking out — or being spoken for — after a string of incidents abroad sparked renewed outrage over racial discrimination in the Western entertainment world. The latest controversy centers on BLACKPINK’s Rosé, who was cropped out of a group photo by a major fashion magazine despite being one of Saint Laurent’s most prominent ambassadors.

Rosé attended the Saint Laurent 2026 Spring/Summer womenswear show in Paris on Sept. 29 (local time) as the luxury brand’s global ambassador, a role she has held since 2020. On Oct. 1, she shared photos and videos from the event, thanking creative director Anthony Vaccarello: “Thank you for inviting me to another incredible show. Your work is so beautiful. Love you.”

Captured from Elle UK

Captured from Vogue

The controversy erupted when Elle UK posted a group photo of Rosé with Hailey Bieber, Zoë Kravitz and Charli XCX — but cropped Rosé out entirely. Other fashion magazines, including Vogue, uploaded the full image, leading many fans to accuse Elle UK of racial discrimination.

The situation escalated when Charli XCX shared a version of the photo where Rosé appeared heavily shadowed, and Bieber reposted it on Instagram Stories. As backlash mounted, Elle UK uploaded a solo photo of Rosé, but criticism of the magazine remains intense.

Girls' Generation member Yoona / Screenshot from online communities

Rosé’s treatment is far from an isolated case. In recent years, several K-pop artists have faced similar incidents — from red carpet snubs to offensive remarks — despite the genre’s skyrocketing global popularity.

At the 77th Cannes Film Festival in May 2024, Girls’ Generation member Yoona was stopped by a female security guard while attempting to pose for photographers. Yoona remained calm and smiling but eventually appeared visibly uncomfortable as the guard continued to block her. Reports later surfaced that the same guard had obstructed African-American singer Kelly Rowland and Dominican actress Massiel Taveras, fueling speculation of racially motivated behavior.

Stray Kids / Courtesy of JYP Entertainment

Around the same time, Stray Kids became the first K-pop group to attend the prestigious Met Gala as a full group — but the historic moment was marred by racist comments from some reporters. Members were reportedly told, “You all look crooked,” “You’re short, try jumping,” and “I’ve never seen such emotionless faces.” Bang Chan, the group’s Korean-Australian leader, quietly led the members away.

BLACKPINK's Jennie / Screenshot from online communities

Even fellow BLACKPINK member Jennie faced accusations of racism during the 2024 Chanel Cruise fashion show. Actress Margaret Qualley touched Jennie’s newly dyed blonde hair and asked, “Is this real?” Later, when Jennie leaned in for a cheek kiss while posing for a photo, Qualley abruptly turned away — behavior that many criticized as racially insensitive.

Some argued that Qualley might simply dislike physical contact, but past photos showing her exchanging kisses with numerous celebrities undermined that explanation.

The incidents come at a time when Korean pop culture is reaching unprecedented global audiences. The recent success of the animated film “K-pop Demon Hunters” has further boosted international interest in Korean music and entertainment. Yet attitudes toward Asian celebrities in the Western world appear stubbornly unchanged.

This article from Xportsnews is adapted by a generative AI system and edited by The Korea Times.

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy - Beyond Parallel

Kim Jong-un’s Flurry of Diplomacy

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Engine Test Preparations and Modernization at Sohae Satellite Launching Station - Beyond Parallel

Engine Test Preparations and Modernization at Sohae Satellite Launching Station

Key Findings

New Activity at the Yunsong Vertical Engine Test Stand

The New Yunsong Pier

Rail Station, Assembly Buildings, and New Railroad Spur Line

Entrance, Headquarters, and Warehouse

Underground Facility

Original Launch Pad

VIP Observation Facility and Horizontal Engine Test Stand

East Coast VIP Observation Facility, Coastal Launch Pad, and Support Facilities

Activity on the Western Side of the Facility

References

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