Quotes of the Day:

"The true test of civilization is, not the census, nor the size of cities, nor crops--no, but the kind of man the country turns out."

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

"Relativism, positivism, and nihilism – modern doctrines which mock wisdom and scorn virtue – have at the dawn of the twenty-first century come to dominate."

– Harry V. Jaffa

“But you can’t make people listen. They have to come round in their own time, wondering what happened and why the world blew up around them.”

– Ray Bradbury

1. Lawmakers From Both Sides Pressed Pentagon on Legal Basis for Drug Boat Strikes

2. Why Not Let Ukraine Hit Moscow?

3. Ukraine at the Rubicon

4.Trump’s Drone Deal With Ukraine to Give U.S. Access to Battlefield Tech

5. War Department pushes back on 'false' narrative of internal strategy split

6. Pentagon leadership directs DOD civilian employee supervisors to expedite removal of underperformers

7. How Chinese Weapons Transformed a War Between Two Neighbors

8. Decision Dominance in the Age of Agentic AI

9. Groundbreaking Launched Effects Demonstration Marks Key Step in U.S. Army Modernization Strategy

10. Interview with Ylli Bajraktari

11. Kirigami parachute suitable for humanitarian missions stabilizes quickly and doesn't pitch

12. Pentagon downgrades leadership role for Air Forces-Europe to 3-star

13. "Credible Threat" Of Drone Attacks Prompted Massive Chicago Airspace Restrictions, CBP Claims

14. Why America Lost the War in Afghanistan: A Requiem Essay

15. New 4-star command activation brings together recruiting, training and future technology

16. Army expands program targeting recruits with specialized skills

17. Hybrid air denial: The new gray zone battleground raging above Europe

18. 'Shadow economies' are growing. Military planners and operators must take them into account

19. The Return of the Starvation Weapon

20. China's missile shield outshining Trump's Golden Dome

21. Manila vows to block China’s militarization of Scarborough Shoal

22. Veterans See Costs and Risks in Hegseth’s Military Rewind to 1990

23. What Women Heard in Hegseth’s Remarks About Physical Standards

24. A Big Production for a Small Vision

25. Right Message, Wrong Messenger.

26. Five Takeaways About the Culture of Lawlessness in the U.S. Special Forces

1. Lawmakers From Both Sides Pressed Pentagon on Legal Basis for Drug Boat Strikes

​I would hate to be on this hot seat.

Excerpts:

The Trump administration has said that all of those killed—at least 17 people—were narcoterrorists.

Matthews’s legal explanation to senators in the briefing is different from the White House’s public justification for the campaign. The administration last month sent a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.) and Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa explaining its view that the president acted within his constitutional authority as commander in chief to conduct the initial strike.

The White House has also said the U.S. is exercising its right to self-defense under international law. “It is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that will be necessary,” Trump wrote in the letter.

Lawmakers From Both Sides Pressed Pentagon on Legal Basis for Drug Boat Strikes

Republicans and Democrats press top Defense Department lawyer in closed-door briefing

By Lara Seligman

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, Alexander Ward

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 and Siobhan Hughes

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Updated Oct. 2, 2025 9:22 pm ET

The USS Stockdale, a guided-missile destroyer, in Panama last month. Photo: Enea Lebrun/Bloomberg News

Quick Summary

• Senators from both parties questioned the Pentagon’s legal justification for striking alleged Latin American drug boats in the Caribbean.View more

Senators on both sides of the aisle pressed the Pentagon’s top lawyer in a closed-door meeting to provide a better legal explanation for striking alleged Latin American drug boats in the Caribbean, according to people with knowledge of the matter.

In a classified Senate Armed Services Committee briefing Wednesday, the Pentagon general counsel, Earl Matthews, detailed the legal basis for the military’s attacks ordered by President Trump.

Matthews repeatedly referred to Trump’s designation of some Latin American drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations, which he said granted the Defense Department unilateral authority to use military force against them, some of the people said. Matthews refused to provide a written justification for the strikes, which legal experts say is necessary for transparency and accountability.

A day after the closed-door briefing, Trump declared Thursday in a confidential notice to Congress that the U.S. is in a “non-international armed conflict” with the cartels. In the document, which was viewed by The Wall Street Journal, the administration dubbed the cartels as “designated terrorist organizations” and said it “determined that their actions constitute an armed attack against the United States.”

The New York Times earlier reported the confidential notice.

Some of the Republican and Democratic lawmakers who attended Wednesday’s Armed Services Committee briefing expressed concern about the administration’s rationale and urged officials to devise a stronger legal case, some of the people familiar with the discussion said.

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WSJ’s Vera Bergengruen explains how the heightened rhetoric and military moves by the Trump administration and Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro could escalate. Photo: Martin Bernetti/AFP/Getty Images; Francis Chung/CNP/ZUMA Press

Sen. Tim Kaine, a Virginia Democrat who attended the briefing, didn’t discuss the details of the briefing but said there is bipartisan “confusion and concern” with the Pentagon’s legal explanation for the strikes.

“I was there, I’m not satisfied,” Kaine said, noting that he and Sen. Adam Schiff (D., Calif.) recently introduced a War Powers Act resolution to “reassert congressional control over military action of this kind in the Caribbean.”

Sen. Jack Reed (D., R.I.), the top Democrat on the committee, criticized the Trump administration for offering “no credible legal justification, evidence or intelligence” for the strikes.

“Every American should be alarmed that their president has decided he can wage secret wars against anyone he calls an enemy,” Reed said.

The questions raised in Wednesday’s meeting illustrate a potential split between lawmakers and the White House on one of the more controversial uses of force this year. While there is broad agreement on combating drug smuggling and drug use in the U.S., there is growing concern on Capitol Hill that the administration has gone beyond its legal authority, especially as it has yet to present public evidence that the targets were drug traffickers.

The chief Pentagon spokesman, Sean Parnell, said Wednesday in a statement that the operations “are lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in complete compliance with the law of armed conflict.”

Parnell added that the briefing was classified. “Unauthorized disclosure of the information” provided Wednesday “would reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security” and Pentagon operations, assets or individuals, he said.

President Trump said in a confidential notice to Congress that the U.S. is in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ with drug cartels. Photo: Hu Yousong/Xinhua/ZUMA Press

A majority spokesman for the committee also noted the confidential nature of the briefing.

“It is incredibly alarming to suggest that the substance of that briefing is being discussed given the security clearance required to attend,” said the spokesman, Dave Vasquez. “The Senate Armed Services Committee majority treats this leak to the press as a potentially serious breach of security.”

Not all Republican members of Congress back the attacks. Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.) has strongly criticized the campaign, but none of the Republicans on the Armed Services Committee have publicly spoken out against the strikes.

“President Trump has every right under Article II of the Constitution to wage war against those who are waging war on the United States,” said Republican Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas, a member of the committee, in a statement to the Journal. “These types of actions have been done many times by presidents of both parties.”

Sen. Joni Ernst (R., Iowa), who attended the Wednesday briefing, declined to discuss what took place, but said she approved of the administration’s military campaign against the cartels. 

“I fully support President Trump in getting rid of the scourge of drugs at home by taking the fight to the narcoterrorists,” said Ernst. “If these traffickers continue to smuggle drugs, they will be met by a swift and fierce reaction.”

Some military lawyers and other Pentagon officials have raised concern internally about the legal implications of the campaign against drug cartels in Latin America. Pentagon officials told congressional staffers in a closed-door briefing after the first strike, on a vessel from Venezuela, that the military struck the boat several times from the air even though it had turned around and started heading toward shore.

Todd Huntley, a retired Navy judge advocate and director of the national security law program at the Georgetown University law school, said using the foreign-terrorist order, or FTO, designation as justification for the strikes isn’t a sound legal argument.

“Declaring an organization as an FTO does not bring with it any additional authority to use force against those organizations,” Huntley said, adding that the designation is primarily used to prosecute actors that provide “material support” to such groups. 

The administration has broadly referred to groups smuggling drugs out of Latin America as “cartels,” though most regional analysts agree only Mexican traffickers come close to that definition. South American gangs operating in the Caribbean, like Tren de Aragua, which has been designated as a terrorist organization, don’t control the supply chain like Mexican cartels.

On Monday, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro said he is ready to declare a state of emergency over what he characterized as American aggression after the U.S. military attacks on vessels from Venezuela. 

The Trump administration has said that all of those killed—at least 17 people—were narcoterrorists.

Matthews’s legal explanation to senators in the briefing is different from the White House’s public justification for the campaign. The administration last month sent a letter to House Speaker Mike Johnson (R., La.) and Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley of Iowa explaining its view that the president acted within his constitutional authority as commander in chief to conduct the initial strike.

The White House has also said the U.S. is exercising its right to self-defense under international law. “It is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that will be necessary,” Trump wrote in the letter.

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com, Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Siobhan Hughes at Siobhan.hughes@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 3, 2025, print edition as 'Lawmakers Press Pentagon On Legal Basis for Boat Strikes'.

2. Why Not Let Ukraine Hit Moscow?

​And why not let them interdict north Korean weapons and ammunition being sent to Russia as well as north Korea troops? (asking for a friend).

Why Not Let Ukraine Hit Moscow?

Trump offers intelligence support for long-range strikes inside Russia.

By The Editorial Board

Oct. 2, 2025 5:42 pm ET

The U.S. Army conduct live fire tests of the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, Dec. 14, 2021. Photo: john hamilton/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The news this week that the U.S. will lend intelligence support for Ukraine’s long-range missile strikes on Russian targets is welcome—and testifies to the live debate inside the Trump Administration on how to deal with Vladimir Putin’s refusal to negotiate an end to his assault on Ukraine.

All who follow the war understand that Ukraine won’t gain the upper hand in the fight if the Russian homeland is a sanctuary. Mr. Trump himself said on social media this year that President Biden’s big mistake was refusing to let Ukraine “fight back” instead of merely defending its own territory. He was right then, not that his policy has changed much since.

Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure are doing real damage. The Hudson Institute in its Oct. 1 battlefield update noted that “Russia has been placing protective metal structures over its energy facilities to protect them from long-range Ukrainian drone strikes. The Kremlin also recently banned the export of gasoline until the end of 2025 in an effort to conserve its resources for domestic use.”

U.S. intel will make these attacks pack a more powerful and precise punch. The intelligence support is at least a tacit overruling of those in the Administration, especially in the Pentagon’s strategy shop, who fret that any such help amounts to dangerous escalation that might rile Mr. Putin.

A crucial question is whether Mr. Trump will put targeting restrictions on the new Extended Range Attack Munition soon to arrive in Ukraine. These cheaper munitions will give Ukraine better ability to strike at longer ranges. Their U.S. development for Ukraine is a success story amid so much defeatism about insufficient and too-expensive U.S. weapons inventories.

Mr. Trump still isn’t ready to get tough on Mr. Putin, and one wonders if this week’s leaks are designed to stave off criticism that he isn’t doing what he really should: Putting sanctions on buyers of Russian oil and on Mr. Putin himself; seizing Russian assets frozen in foreign accounts; expanding Ukraine’s long-range weapons arsenal, including Tomahawk cruise missiles.

Even on the good days, Mr. Trump’s Ukraine policy is a muddle. But we’ll still applaud an incremental improvement like more U.S. intelligence support for Ukraine to help pressure Mr. Putin to the negotiating table.

3. Ukraine at the Rubicon

Ukraine at the Rubicon

An elite Russian unit is escalating its use of drones in Donetsk, forcing the defenders to innovate.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/ukraine-at-the-rubicon-61a39ae9

By Jillian Kay Melchior

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Oct. 2, 2025 5:12 pm ET

Anti-drone nets over a road near the front-line town of Kostiantynivka in Donetsk, Aug. 24. Photo: yevhen titov/Reuters

Slovyansk, Ukraine

Things looked bleak for the wounded soldier. His neck and arm were gravely injured. “It was noon, an open field—evacuation impossible,” recalls Sgt. Andrii Temnohorov, commander of a medical post in Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region. Reconnaissance drones could easily spot the combat medics, and Russia routinely targets rescuers. Blood loss is a top cause of preventable battlefield deaths in Ukraine, and this man urgently needed a transfusion.

Fortunately Sgt. Temnohorov and his special-forces brigade colleagues had been experimenting with a novel way to deliver blood by drone. They trained ordinary soldiers to perform transfusions, taught drone operators to warm blood in a water bath before delivering it, and discovered that blood and transfusion kits could survive a drop of up to 100 feet if packaged carefully in bubble wrap. Fridge-to-front blood delivery by drone was “still faster than any evacuation measures.” It saved the wounded soldier that day in March, and Ukraine’s Azov Brigade now does it “at a systemic level,” Sgt. Temnohorov says.

Similar innovations are sustaining Ukraine in the face of Russia’s onslaught. Vladimir Putin wants to devour all of Donetsk oblast, but Ukrainians still control about 25% of it. Ukraine has established a 31-mile defensive line here known as the fortress belt that has stymied Russian advances. Ukrainian troops and experts I interviewed felt confident this stronghold could withstand direct assaults for years. This has caused the Russians to shift their approach, focusing instead on “battlefield air interdiction.”

The idea is simple: If the Ukrainians holding the line can’t get supplies, reinforcements, medical evacuations and other necessities, they’ll be weakened, perhaps critically so. To isolate them, the Russians are striking targets in the rear. To soldiers on the ground, this feels like “a Middle-Aged siege, a modern version of that, with drones attacking all roads,” says Capt. Yevhen Alkhimov, a press officer for Ukraine’s 28th Mechanized Brigade, which is fighting around the southern edge of the fortress belt. “The main goal now is to exhaust us and to cut off whole logistics in the Donetsk region.”

Ukrainians’ current nemesis in Donetsk is the Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies, an elite Russian unit at the center of this interdiction campaign. The name may express the view that drone warfare is a rubicon—a point of no return—or perhaps it’s a reference to the Rubik’s Cube, a puzzle for Russia to solve.

Ukraine has excelled at drone warfare in part because tinkerers are allowed to work closely with units on the ground on quick solutions to battlefield problems. In response, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov conceived of Rubikon in summer 2024. Rubikon’s squads include “experienced pilots, engineers, and people who quickly test tactics and throw them onto the front,” says Cmdr. Mamuka Mamulashvili of the Georgian Legion of Ukraine’s Armed Forces. He encountered the Russian unit around the northern Ukrainian city of Sumy last year.

Rubikon is “slotting in and deploying to front lines the Kremlin sees as important,” says Kateryna Stepanenko of the Institute for the Study of War. Since July the Russians have forced Ukraine to announce restrictions on at least two major roads in Donetsk, including the road to Slovyansk, the northernmost city in the fortress belt.

I visited Slovyansk in mid-September. Days before my trip, sources warned me of Russian attacks on the highway leading there, along with photos of burned-out vehicles struck by drones. Andrii Fonta, a ground drone engineer, said that when Rubikon began targeting the roads around Kostiantynivka, they eliminated 14 Ukrainian vehicles in one night, “unfortunately with casualties.” Cmdr. Viacheslav Bilkovskiy described having to stay in the field for eight days rather than the usual four after Russians cut off the route behind him. His compatriots managed to deliver ammunition, gasoline for generators and other supplies by ground and aerial drone.

On my way back from Slovyansk, I saw how Ukraine had begun erecting nets along the road to catch drones. The system isn’t perfect—drones sometimes get through openings and hit vehicles—but it works most of the time. Ukrainian units avoid gatherings in the open and find ways to camouflage vehicles and depots.

Russia’s interdiction campaign is likely to intensify. The deputy commander of a company of an intelligence battalion, who goes by the nom de guerre “Veles,” estimated Rubikon has roughly 400 drone pilots and 600 engineers and logistics specialists. Ukraine expects the unit to expand rapidly this year, to perhaps as many as 6,000 personnel. Cmdr. Mamulashvili, the Georgian fighter, thinks the threat is manageable. Rubikon “isn’t magic,” he says. “They’re not invincible—they have bases, logistics, and people who make mistakes.” But Ukraine remains short on midrange weapons that can strike targets in the 12- to 60-mile range. That means “the Rubikon guys and their assets have a relative sanctuary to operate,” says Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute.

Blame a deficit in resources, not technology. Funding limitations have forced Ukraine to triage priorities for domestic weapons, limiting production of some useful arms. The West can help with an interdiction campaign of its own: Moscow has about $300 billion in reserves in the West ripe for confiscation, if only the U.S. and Europe could muster the will to do it. Hand those assets over to Ukraine to fund weapons production. As Veles said: “If we had resources like Rubikon, we would knock them out.”

Ms. Melchior is a London-based member of the Journal’s editorial board.

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After at least 19 Russian drones enter Polish airspace, with some shot down by allied fighter jets, President Trump says it could have been a "mistake." But is this more likely a calculated provocation by Vladimir Putin, perhaps his way of testing the West?

Appeared in the October 3, 2025, print edition as 'Ukraine at the Rubicon'.

4. Trump’s Drone Deal With Ukraine to Give U.S. Access to Battlefield Tech

​Excerpts:

In pursuing the deal, American officials would also reap the benefits of a Ukraine drone industry that Washington has quietly supported for years. After Ukraine’s failed 2023 counteroffensive, then-national-security adviser Jake Sullivan commissioned several intelligence analyses, which indicated that the development of short-range and long-range drones would buttress the Ukrainian military.

The Biden administration allocated $1.5 billion in additional support for Ukraine’s UAV and missile programs, including the provision of key components that weren’t produced in the country. Then-President Joe Biden briefed Zelensky about the scope of the effort in a Washington meeting in September 2024.

“We believed it would be strategically impactful for Ukraine to possess a sustainable and massive supply of effective domestically produced drones,” said David Shimer, who served as the director for Ukraine policy on the National Security Council during the Biden administration. “Now we have an opportunity to learn from Ukraine’s innovations ourselves.”

...

Western governments and companies aren’t just seeking Ukrainian technology but also data and experience from its battlefield.

“Any company that does not [have a team in Ukraine] doesn’t understand the current battlefield conditions for drones and robotics,” said Sam Vye, chief executive of Syos Aerospace, a New Zealand-based land and sea-drone manufacturer.

Trump’s Drone Deal With Ukraine to Give U.S. Access to Battlefield Tech

Team from Kyiv is in Washington this week to work out agreement details

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trumps-drone-deal-with-ukraine-to-give-u-s-access-to-battlefield-tech-f6b0f895

By Michael R. Gordon

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 and Alistair MacDonald

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Oct. 2, 2025 12:00 pm ET

A Ukrainian drone operator preparing for a launch last month from a field near Orikhiv, Ukraine. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ

Quick Summary

• Ukraine is negotiating a deal with the U.S. to share its drone technology in exchange for royalties or compensation.View more

A Ukrainian team is in Washington this week to craft a landmark agreement with the Trump administration that would involve Kyiv sharing its battle-tested drone technology with the U.S. in exchange for royalties or other forms of compensation, according to officials from both countries.

The prospective deal, which has the backing of President Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, would mark a milestone in the security relationship between Washington and Kyiv.

For years, the Ukrainian military has received U.S. weapons, most recently under an arrangement in which the Trump administration sells arms to European nations that are donating them to Kyiv.

Under the new deal, Ukraine would draw on its extensive experience in producing and using drones to battle the Russian military. A team of Ukrainians, led by the country’s Deputy Defense Minister Sergiy Boyev, began several days of talks in Washington with Pentagon and State Department officials on Tuesday.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Trump met last month at the United Nations headquarters. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Finalizing the detailed agreement, which could be worth billions of dollars, is likely to take months, a U.S. government official said.

While the U.S. companies make some sophisticated drones, the Ukrainians are well ahead in mass producing cheap unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, that have proved to be effective in battle.

“It is just a reality that we need Ukrainian drone tech in the U.S.,” said William McNulty, a partner at UA1, a U.S. venture-capital fund, which has invested in eight Ukrainian defense companies.

The potential deal also has political significance as Kyiv looks to solidify ties with Trump, whose support for Ukraine has sometimes been erratic. Trump has become increasingly frustrated with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to step up attacks on Ukraine while rebuffing White House appeals to negotiate a peace settlement, which has also opened the door to more U.S. and Ukrainian cooperation.

The drone agreement is emerging as part of a package that would include a separate “megadeal” in which Ukraine is hoping to purchase tens of billions of dollars in arms from the U.S., Zelensky said Saturday. Ukraine is hoping that the arms deal includes long-range missiles to expand its striking power against Russia.

The potential drone deal also highlights how much the U.S. industry can benefit from Ukraine, which has pioneered new technologies, tactics, as well as the ability to rapidly incorporate innovations for a changing battlefield. With the war in Ukraine rewriting how nations fight, governments, investors and companies in Europe have already been rushing to capitalize on Ukraine’s drone technology.

A U.S. government official said the drone deal is designed to allow U.S. forces to capitalize on Ukraine’s competitive advantage in UAVs. In turn, Kyiv is seeking to pay for high-end American weapons. He was referring to the Patriot antimissile system, the Himars launchers that fire GMLRS rockets and Army Tactical Missile Systems, or Atacms, and the Air Force’s multirole fighter.

A Ukrainian soldier preparing a drone near Chasiv Yar, Ukraine, last year. Photo: Manu Brabo for WSJ

Ukraine has pioneered the use of cheap drones, including naval drones. Photo: Emanuele Satolli for WSJ

Ukraine’s use of Atacms against targets inside Russia has been subject to Pentagon review, and none has been fired against objectives in Russian territory since Trump took office. Trump officials said they are now weighing Ukraine’s appeal for long-range American weapons and have authorized the provision of intelligence for Kyiv’s own long-range strikes against energy targets in Russia, which have mainly been carried out with drones.

The U.S. and Ukraine are exploring several different mechanisms for facilitating drone technology transfer from Kyiv to the U.S., according to people familiar with the talks. They include deals in which Ukrainian companies provide drone technology and prototypes to American companies in exchange for a royalty or an arrangement in which a Ukrainian company establishes a subsidiary in the U.S. to produce drones. Another possibility is buying the drones directly from Ukraine for the U.S. military.

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WSJ documents the sudden shifts in President Trump’s views as he tries to negotiate an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Photo: Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

In April, the Trump administration and Kyiv reached a deal that gave the U.S. access to Ukrainian mineral resources. But the Ukrainian government mainly controls the rights to its mineral resources, making it an easier deal to negotiate.

Any accord over drone technology will have to facilitate access to technology and systems from private Ukrainian drone companies. There are more than 300 drone companies in the country, according to the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths, a trade organization.

The widespread use of Chinese parts in Ukrainian drones is one problem that needs to be managed. U.S. companies that acquire Ukrainian drones and technologies can’t use Chinese components because of the imperative of having secure supply lines.

Ukraine turned to drones from the very start of Moscow’s full-scale invasion, using them to inflict damage on Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. Since then, the country has pioneered the use of cheap First Person View attack drones, marine drones and artificial intelligence in this sector, among other innovations.

Ukraine produced more than two million drones last year.

Ukraine can produce its drones for 20% to 30% of the cost of Western makers, said UA1’s McNulty. That expertise in mass producing cheap drones is what the West most needs, analysts say.

Antidrone nets hang over a street in Orikhiv, Ukraine. Photo: Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

In pursuing the deal, American officials would also reap the benefits of a Ukraine drone industry that Washington has quietly supported for years. After Ukraine’s failed 2023 counteroffensive, then-national-security adviser Jake Sullivan commissioned several intelligence analyses, which indicated that the development of short-range and long-range drones would buttress the Ukrainian military.

The Biden administration allocated $1.5 billion in additional support for Ukraine’s UAV and missile programs, including the provision of key components that weren’t produced in the country. Then-President Joe Biden briefed Zelensky about the scope of the effort in a Washington meeting in September 2024.

“We believed it would be strategically impactful for Ukraine to possess a sustainable and massive supply of effective domestically produced drones,” said David Shimer, who served as the director for Ukraine policy on the National Security Council during the Biden administration. “Now we have an opportunity to learn from Ukraine’s innovations ourselves.”

In Europe, companies and investors have already reached a similar conclusion. In September, the U.K. and Kyiv announced a deal to share technology and produce Ukrainian drones in Britain. The two sides already plan to mass produce in the U.K. an unmanned system named Octopus, which intercepts other drones in the air.

Earlier this year, the Danish government signed an agreement with Kyiv to help Ukrainian defense companies make drones and other weapons in Denmark.

Meanwhile, European companies and investors are putting money into Ukrainian drone makers. German drone maker Quantum Systems, for instance, bought a 10% stake in Frontline, a Ukrainian autonomous ground and aerial-vehicle maker. It has the option to increase that to 25%.

Frontline is looking for a European site to manufacture some of its products. “It’s about scaling production in a safe environment,” said Mykyta Rozhkov, a Frontline executive.

Other Ukrainian companies are also scouting for foreign bases. Skyeton, which manufactures the Raybird, a surveillance drone the company claims can operate for more than 28 hours, said it is currently in talks to start a factory in southern England.

Western governments and companies aren’t just seeking Ukrainian technology but also data and experience from its battlefield.

“Any company that does not [have a team in Ukraine] doesn’t understand the current battlefield conditions for drones and robotics,” said Sam Vye, chief executive of Syos Aerospace, a New Zealand-based land and sea-drone manufacturer.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 3, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Turns to Ukraine For Drone Technology'.

5. War Department pushes back on 'false' narrative of internal strategy split

​I would be interested in hearing from the Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders and what they have to say. But of course all the substantive discussions are private and classified.

But has any strategy ever been seamlessly coordinated? The DEPSECWAR may have been better served to say that there were frank and wide ranging discussions with many different perspectives on how to best defend our nation before consensus could be reached.

I was really hoping we would have heard a description of the new NDS in Quantico. I wonder if there were discussions or talks that were held in private that were closed to the media. I would surely have taken the opportunity to brief the new strategy to the very captive audience and ensure all leaders were on the same sheet of music in regards to the NDS.

War Department pushes back on 'false' narrative of internal strategy split

Deputy Secretary of War says strategy was 'seamlessly coordinated' with all leaders

foxnews.com · Greg Wehner Fox News

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Defense secretary orders sweeping military overhaul to boost readiness

Syracuse University professor and former U.S. Army paratrooper Sean McFate joins ‘Fox News Live’ to discuss Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s plans to modernize the U.S. military and enhance preparedness for future global threats.

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Rejecting reports of a split with the brass, the Department of War says the National Defense Strategy was "seamlessly coordinated" with senior civilian and uniform leaders — and that "any narrative to the contrary is false."

On Monday, The Washington Post reported that multiple senior officers had raised concerns about the forthcoming strategy, pointing to a divide between political leadership.

Deputy Secretary of War Steve Feinberg pushed back on Wednesday, in an on-the-record statement to Fox News Digital.

"The Department’s National Defense Strategy has been seamlessly coordinated with all senior civilian and military leadership with total collaboration — any narrative to the contrary is false," Feinberg said.

RENAMED DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMING ‘SOON,' TRUMP SAYS

The Pentagon in Arlington, Va., where War Department officials, pushed back on claims of a civil-military rift and said the National Defense Strategy was fully coordinated. (Alex Wong/Getty Images)

A senior War Department official said the strategy was the product of "extensive and intensive" collaboration across the department.

The drafting team included a policy lead, a Joint Staff deputy and representatives from the military services who consulted widely with civilian and uniformed offices.

Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby and the acting deputy under-secretary for policy, Austin Dahmer, met with leaders from every group. The official called that level of policy-shop engagement "unprecedented."

SUPPORTERS HAIL TRUMP’S PENTAGON REBRAND AS ‘HONEST,’ CRITICS CALL IT RECKLESS

Gen. Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided feedback to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

Air Force Gen. Dan Caine, who chairs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided feedback directly to Secretary of War Pete Hegseth and Colby, the official said, and both assured him his input would be reflected in the final draft.

The Post report said political appointees in the Pentagon policy office led the drafting and described unusually sharp pushback from some commanders over priorities and tone.

The War Department disputes that characterization and says the document was coordinated at the principal level and aligned closely with the National Security Strategy.

The pushback comes a day after Hegseth addressed hundreds of commanders at Marine Corps Base Quantico.

War Secretary Pete Hegseth speaks during a meeting of senior military leaders at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Tuesday, in Quantico, Va. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

TOP US MILITARY BRASS TO HOLD SECRETIVE MEETING WITH HEGSETH AS TRUMP RAMPS UP RUSSIA CRITICISM

In a 45-minute speech, he argued the force needs tougher standards and a tighter focus on warfighting. He has recalled one-star and above officers from around the world to brief in person and has removed several senior general officers as part of a broader overhaul.

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Hegseth says new directives will restore rigorous physical, grooming and leadership standards and require combat roles to meet one set of physical benchmarks.

The Washington Post did not immediately respond to Fox News Digital’s request for comment.

Fox News Digital’s Jasmine Baehr and Morgan Phillips contributed to this report.

Greg Wehner is a breaking news reporter for Fox News Digital.

Story tips and ideas can be sent to Greg.Wehner@Fox.com and on Twitter @GregWehner.

foxnews.com · Greg Wehner Fox News

6. Pentagon leadership directs DOD civilian employee supervisors to expedite removal of underperformers

Pentagon leadership directs DOD civilian employee supervisors to expedite removal of underperformers

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper · October 2, 2025

Pentagon leaders are moving to further cull the department’s civilian workforce by targeting underperformers for removal.

In a new directive issued this week, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Anthony Tata laid out processes for weeding out employees who are deemed to be not up to snuff.

“Supervisors and human resources (HR) professionals are directed to act with speed and conviction to facilitate the separation from Federal service of employees performing unsuccessfully,” Tata wrote in a memo to senior Pentagon leadership, combatant commanders, and DOD agency and field activity directors.

Justifications for removal include “consistent failure” to meet deadlines, quality standards, or productivity targets; inability to perform key tasks; and “repeated errors or omissions that disrupt operations or harm agency objectives,” according to an attachment to the memo.

“Minor or isolated performance issues (e.g., occasional mistakes) typically do not suffice unless they accumulate into a pattern of significant impact,” it noted.

Supervisors have been directed to team with HR officials to issue written notices of proposed removal to low performers detailing their deficiencies.

Targeted employees will be given seven calendar days to respond orally or in writing to the notice, “or as consistent with collective bargaining agreements,” the memo explained, noting that workers can request copies of all materials that informed the issuance of the notices and have the right to be represented, “consistent with” DOD component procedures.

“The deciding official, who shall be no more than two levels above the supervisor in the reporting chain or who may be outside of the rating chain, as designated, will review the detailed notice and the employee’s response and deliver a written decision within 30 calendar days of the written notice of proposed removal,” Tata wrote.

“Unlike removals pursuant to chapter 43 of title 5, U.S.C., performance improvement plans (also known as PIPs) are not required. Suspensions should not substitute for removal to the extent removal is warranted. Supervisors must consider all past performance deficiencies and past corrective and/or disciplinary actions,” he added.

However, Tata noted that all labor obligations must be satisfied prior to any changes in the conditions of employment of bargaining unit employees.

His office is expected to intervene in certain cases, and officials tasked with making these types of decisions may face additional scrutiny if they are seen as dragging their feet or not being aggressive enough.

If a deciding official doesn’t uphold a proposed removal or fails to provide a final decision within the 30-calendar day window, the case file will be forwarded to the Pentagon’s Personnel and Readiness directorate, which will “review submitted cases for trends with timeliness delays and/or supporting documentation, and to assess potential supervisor and/or HR training needs,” per the memo.

Heads of DOD components “must hold managers at all levels accountable for addressing poor employee performance,” Tata wrote.

Employees who receive a notice about their proposed removal may be offered voluntary separation incentive payments, voluntary early retirement authority, or an individualized Deferred Resignation Program.

The department made similar offerings earlier this year to encourage tens of thousands of DOD civilians to voluntarily leave DOD. Those personnel cuts were part of the Trump administration’s DOGE efforts.

Offering incentives for voluntary departures of employees deemed to be underperforming, is intended to “facilitate efficient employee removals,” according to Tata’s memo.

Tata’s directive came on the same day that Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth issued a slew of memos, including one on modern workforce management.

“We recently surveyed our civilian workforce. We heard loud and clear that personnel policies must better reflect our high-performance culture. This requires reforming how we treat both top and bottom performers. Winning organizations optimize the workforce spectrum,” he wrote, noting a need to “demystify” the removal process and give managers more guidance on how to separate low performers.

“Complex offboarding creates cultural drag that hurts morale across the Department and hinders our mission,” Hegseth wrote.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_

In This Story

• Anthony Tata
• pete hegseth
• workforce

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper · October 2, 2025

7. How Chinese Weapons Transformed a War Between Two Neighbors

​Are we paying sufficient attention to what is happening in the Asia-Indo-Pacific?

How Chinese Weapons Transformed a War Between Two Neighbors

China urged Cambodia and Thailand to end their border war in July. But weeks earlier, it had sent rockets and artillery shells to Cambodia, Thai intelligence documents show.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/29/world/asia/thailand-cambodia-china-weapons.html

A Y-20 transport aircraft, the type used to send arms to Cambodia, at an air show in Zhuhai, China, last year.Credit...Hector Retamal/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

By Sui-Lee Wee

Sui-Lee Wee reviewed Thai intelligence documents and interviewed analysts who track military activity in Southeast Asia.

Sept. 29, 2025

The Chinese military planes touched down in Cambodia over three days in June, weeks before a simmering border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand exploded into war.

The aircraft were Y-20s, known as Chubby Girls in China for their wide body and ability to carry heavy cargo. They made six flights to the southwestern city of Sihanoukville, bringing rockets, artillery shells and mortars, according to Thai intelligence documents reviewed by The New York Times, a shipment that has not been previously reported.

The Chinese weapons were packed into 42 containers and stored at the nearby Ream Naval Base, the documents said. Days later, Chinese-made ammunition was moved from the base hundreds of miles to the north, to Cambodia’s contested border with Thailand, according to the documents.

Asked for comment on the Thai intelligence reports, a senior Cambodian official did not deny many of the basic details about the shipment.

Thailand and Cambodia blamed one another for starting the war, which lasted for five days in late July. Before the conflict began, the movement of arms to the border was a crucial part of Cambodia’s buildup. For months, Cambodia had been entrenching its forces along the boundary, near an ancient temple claimed by both Cambodia and Thailand. It laid new roads and constructed a military base; all those structures were visible in satellite images.

With this buildup, analysts said, Cambodia entered the standoff with a much more provocative posture toward Thailand than that it had previously taken. But both sides relied heavily on arms from the same place: China, which has cultivated close strategic and economic ties with the two Southeast Asian states.

The accounts of independent monitors generally support the conclusions of the Thai intelligence assessment, especially about the origin of some of the weapons used by Cambodia. According to Fortify Rights, a human rights group, the rockets that Cambodia used against four Thai provinces were mostly of Chinese origin. On the first day, Thai authorities said, Cambodia struck a gas station, a hospital and civilians’ homes, killing at least 13 civilians.

Image

Cambodian soldiers reloaded a Soviet-era BM-21 multiple rocket launcher in Preah Vihear Province in July. Thai documents state that from June 21 to 23 China sent nearly 700 rounds for the rocket launcher.Credit...Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“The entirety of the evidence suggests that there has been a concerted decision by the Cambodian leadership in the months and years leading up to the border clashes to change the status quo along the border,” said Nathan Ruser, an analyst for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

A senior officer from the Thai Armed Forces contacted by The Times confirmed the authenticity of the documents, saying that the information had been gathered by an intelligence network across military branches. Two other officers confirmed that the documents had been shared internally within the armed forces. All three spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss documents they said were classified.

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In a statement, Lt. Gen. Rath Dararoth, Cambodia’s secretary of state for defense, did not dispute the basic details of the weapons shipments to his country from China but described the Thai intelligence reports as “misleading.” He said the equipment movements referred to in the documents “coincide directly” with the conclusion of Cambodia’s annual joint military exercise with the People’s Liberation Army of China.

But that exercise had ended weeks earlier, in late May. General Dararoth would not answer any more questions.

China’s Defense Ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

Cambodia’s preparation and resupply probably allowed it to prolong its fight, but Thailand was able to assert its dominance quickly with its far more advanced arsenal. Thai forces retaliated with airstrikes by F-16 jets that bombed targets in Cambodia.

By the time a cease-fire was reached five days later, at least 40 people had been killed, including civilians on both sides, and hundreds of thousands more displaced.

China’s Balancing Act

China played an active role in trying to bring about the cease-fire, but the accounts of weapons shipments complicate Beijing’s effort to cast itself as a neutral peace broker in Southeast Asia.

While Cambodia’s military budget is a fraction of Thailand’s, each country has dramatically increased spending in recent years and turned to China for weapons. Beijing now far outranks the United States as the biggest source of arms for Thailand, which is a longstanding U.S. treaty ally.

Chinese officials have publicly denied allegations in the Thai press about arming Cambodia against Thailand. In late July, a day after the fighting began, a senior Chinese military official met with the acting Thai defense attaché in Beijing. The Chinese official said that China had not provided any military equipment to Cambodia for use against Thailand since tensions between Cambodia and Thailand had begun.

The Chinese official’s publicly reported statements did not provide specific dates.

Tensions started heating up in February, after Cambodian soldiers and civilians sang the Cambodian national anthem at an ancient temple claimed by both sides. A Cambodian soldier was killed in a skirmish in May, and five Thai soldiers were maimed by land mines in July. Cambodia has blamed Thailand for starting the conflict by cutting off access to the temple.

Image

Thai personnel searching for land mines in Surin, bordering Cambodia, last month. Analysts say Cambodia took a more provocative military posture than it previously had, in the weeks before its five-day war with Thailand.Credit...Lillian Suwanrumpha/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

The Thai military intelligence reports found that, from June 21 to 23, China sent nearly 700 rounds for Soviet-era BM-21 multiple barrel rocket launchers as well as Chinese-made multiple launch rocket systems — Type 90B and PHL-03. China also shipped artillery shells for the SH-1 Chinese self-propelled howitzer and artillery for Soviet-era antiaircraft machine guns, the documents said.

Over the next two days, Cambodia moved ammunition to two border provinces, Oddar Meanchey and Preah Vihear, according to the documents.

Such a salvo of deliveries would probably have had to be approved by senior Chinese leadership, analysts said.

“This level of rapid resupply was clearly not business as usual,” said Anthony Davis, a Bangkok-based analyst with Janes, a publication specializing in defense and security.

A Contested Border

The two-centuries-old temples that are at the heart of the dispute lie near a border drawn by France in the early 1900s, when it ruled Cambodia, and are claimed by both neighbors. In the 1960s, an international court ruled that the Preah Vihear temple belonged to Cambodia, but Thailand, which refers to the shrine as Phra Viharn, never accepted the decision.

Earlier this year, Cambodia appeared to be trying to bolster its position.

It built a military base just east of the Preah Vihear temple, gaining a better vantage point over Thai troops across the border. The new structure could have been used as an artillery base, said Mr. Ruser, the Australian analyst. Starting in late 2022, Cambodia also built more roads and other infrastructure in what analysts said was a concerted effort to militarize parts of the border.

Image

Damage at the Preah Vihear temple, which is known in Thailand as Phra Viharn, in Cambodia last month. The two countries have contested ownership of the temple for decades. Credit...Agence Kampuchea Press, via Associated Press

“This fortification occurred in multiple sectors along the border, which rules out the idea that it could just be one commander looking to improve their tactical positioning,” said Mr. Ruser, who studied satellite imagery of the area. “This implies that it was a much more expansive order from the Cambodian military.”

General Dararoth said the new base was part of standard improvements to Cambodia’s defenses. He added that Cambodia had “no attack doctrine in place,” and that its military activities were “not directed at any neighbor or external actor.”

Hangyu Lee, a researcher at Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, a nonprofit that tracks global conflict, said, “It remains clear that Cambodia’s military buildup was significantly more proactive than Thailand’s.”

Mr. Lee said that, in contrast with Cambodia, Thailand was “largely reactive and defensive.” The Thai Army reinforced existing outposts, built supply roads, deployed artillery and armored assets and stepped up surveillance to keep pace with Cambodian activity, he said.

Cambodia calls Thailand the aggressor and has repeatedly accused Thai soldiers of encroaching on its territory. It also blames Thailand’s pro-nationalist forces for stoking the border tensions. To resolve the conflict, Cambodia has sought intervention from an independent body such as the International Court of Justice, which Thailand has rejected.

Cambodia’s Limits and Potential Calculations

Cambodia has a much weaker military than its neighbor, and it insists that it does not want war with Thailand. So why would it start sending troops and weapons to the border?

Some analysts say that Cambodia’s de facto leader, Hun Sen, wanted to shore up nationalistic support at a time of growing discontent over the economy, or that he was driven by a falling out with a former Thai prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, whose daughter Paetongtarn Shinawatra was Thailand’s leader at the time of the hostilities.

Others suggest that, after years of Chinese support, Mr. Hun Sen may have been confident Cambodia was in a stronger position than in past clashes.

In 2011, during the last major clash with Thailand, Cambodia quickly ran out of ammunition, according to Rahman Yaacob, a researcher on Southeast Asia’s defense policy at the Australian National University. That shortfall pushed Phnom Penh to deepen its military ties with China.

Image

Tea Seiha, left, Cambodia’s defense minister, and Dong Jun, his Chinese counterpart, at a military forum in Beijing on Sept. 18. In recent years, China has become Cambodia’s most important military backer.Credit...Greg Baker/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

Since then China has become Cambodia’s main military backer. The two countries have conducted annual drills together regularly for the past nine years, except during the coronavirus pandemic. In 2018, China gave Cambodia more than $100 million in military aid. Chinese weapons now make up a majority of Cambodia’s weapons arsenal, according to analysts.

“They feel they are much more well equipped compared to 2011,” Mr. Rahman said. “That’s the reason this conflict was quite serious, because heavy weapons were used instead of just rifles and small-arms fire.”

Battlefield photos posted on social media also showed Cambodian soldiers with Chinese-made SHE-40 122-millimeter artillery rockets that are used with multiple rocket launcher systems.

“Everything we saw that was being put into the rocket launchers were Chinese rockets,” said Peter Bouckaert, a conflict expert at Fortify Rights, the nonprofit.

“China should look at what the Cambodian Army did during this conflict and raise their concerns about the indiscriminate use of their weapons,” Mr. Bouckaert said. “It doesn’t improve its image when it’s supplying weapons that are being used to kill civilians in other Asian countries.”

Pablo Robles contributed reporting from Seoul, Phuriphat Dejsuphong and Kittiphum Sringammuang from Bangkok, and Li You from Beijing.

8. Decision Dominance in the Age of Agentic AI

E​xcertps:

Decision dominance in the future will depend on executing the cycle of understanding, visualizing, directing, and assessing at a tempo faster than the enemy. The vignettes from Ukraine, the Meuse-Argonne, Sudan, and the fight against ISIS all underscored how fragile and decisive each of these steps can be: clarity before action, vision under pressure, decisive direction, and relentless assessment. What changes today is not the importance of the cycle, but the speed at which it must be executed. Adversaries are already harnessing AI and digital networks to accelerate their own decision processes, compressing timelines and raising the stakes. To maintain an advantage, commanders and staffs must integrate agentic AI as a partner that enables each step of the cycle to happen faster, with greater clarity, and at a scale no staff alone can match.

Agentic AI can continuously integrate live data, analyze outcomes in real time, and present actionable options. These systems can accelerate understanding, compress visualization, enhance the speed and precision of guidance given, and make assessment persistent rather than periodic. Decision dominance is no longer merely the art of the commander’s intuition; it can become a sustained operational capability when powered by autonomous, adaptive intelligence. Realizing this potential, however, requires more than just adding AI to a workflow.

The solution lies in addressing cultural, technical, and institutional challenges together. For the cultural barriers of trust and adoption, leaders must normalize AI through training, education, and wargaming that treat agentic systems as staff teammates rather than mysterious black boxes. For the technical barriers of integration, systems must be tested, red-teamed, and designed for interoperability across domains and classification levels, with resilience against deception and manipulation built in from the start. And for the challenge of imitators, the Department must establish clear standards, rigorous evaluation processes, and transparent demonstrations that separate genuine capability from marketing hype before credibility is lost.

In practice, this means doctrinal adaptation and even reorganization, embedding agentic AI into staffs as an accountable member of the decision-making team, much as past generations integrated Field Artillery officers, Intelligence Analysts, or Logisticians. By doing so, the institution can overcome mistrust, enforce discipline in its use, and ensure commanders and staffs see it not as a threat but as a force multiplier. The payoff is a decision process that is faster, sharper, and more adaptive, enabling decision dominance without sacrificing the human judgment at its core.

A handful of companies are already pushing the frontier of true agentic AI, building adaptive agents, leveraging advances in gaming technology to enhance their functions, and moving far beyond the retrieval-augmented generation systems too often passed off as “AI.” These efforts point to what the future of operational planning and execution could look like if innovation is given room to grow. For the Department, the task is to identify and engage with these pioneers rather than default to organizations with flashy marketing, inflated statistics, or venture capital gloss. The real breakthroughs will come from those designing systems for the wars of tomorrow, not repackaging tools for the problems of the past.

The lesson is clear: the future of warfare will demand the deliberate integration of Agentic AI into every stage of planning and execution. Nations that embrace this technology will gain the ability to act faster, anticipate outcomes more accurately, and seize initiative in ways traditional methods cannot match. Agentic AI is not a distant possibility, it is already here. Those who act now, adapting culturally and organizationally, will master it first and secure decision dominance, while those who hesitate will fall behind in the wars of tomorrow.

Decision Dominance in the Age of Agentic AI

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/03/agentic-ai-decision-dominance/

by John Herrman

|

10.03.2025 at 06:00am

Introduction

Imagine a commander on a battlefield where every second is a razor’s edge between victory and catastrophe. One delayed decision, one misstep, and lives are lost, missions collapse, wars shift. This is decision dominance, the power to understand, decide, and act faster than the enemy. In today’s conflicts, where data moves faster than bullets, decision dominance is survival. Nations like China and Russia are racing to master it, pouring billions into AI and real-time networks to outpace the United States.

The Department of Defense has recognized this reality. In its 2023 Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence Adoption Strategy, it emphasizes that AI integration is essential to “accelerate the speed of commanders‘ decisions and improve the quality and accuracy of those decisions.” Reflecting this commitment, the DoD has allocated $1.8 billion for AI programs in fiscal year 2025, underscoring the strategic priority placed on AI-enabled decision-making. This substantial investment signals a shift from traditional decision support systems to Agentic AI, systems that do not merely provide information but actively sense, reason, and act within command-and-control workflows.

Unlike static dashboards or predictive models, these systems continuously interpret live operational data, coordinate across multiple domains, and generate courses of action in real-time. This distinction matters: many tools branded as “AI” today are little more than sophisticated retrieval engines or generative models delivering summaries, which is far from truly autonomous, goal-oriented agents. They are the digital equivalent of early mechanization in World War I, when armies bolted machine guns onto horse-drawn wagons or strapped armor to trucks, calling themselves “armor,” incremental steps that fell short of true maneuver warfare. By contrast, Agentic AI represents a blitzkrieg leap: an integrated, adaptive system that fuses sensors, information, warfighting functions, operations with assessments as a feedback loop. This creates a dynamic decision support system that moves at the speed of conflict.

As the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) Strategy emphasizes, achieving “information advantage at the speed of relevance” requires precisely this kind of AI-enabled agility,. History shows that militaries often diverge in how they respond to disruptive technology. Some adapt doctrine to exploit it fully, while others remain anchored in past methods, solving yesterday’s problems while their adversaries prepare for tomorrow’s.

In 1940, the French Army was the world’s finest, armed to the teeth, dug into fortified lines. Yet in six weeks, the German Wehrmacht crushed them. Why? The French clung to static defenses and slow couriers, tethered to old tactics. The Germans, by contrast, rewrote their doctrine in Truppenführung and built a force designed to exploit the cutting-edge technology of the day: FM radio. This simple but revolutionary tool allowed dispersed tanks, infantry, and aircraft to communicate and synchronize at a tempo the French could not match. For the first time, commanders could practice true operational art, coordinating maneuver across multiple domains in real time. They turned chaos into victory, achieving decision dominance that left the French reeling.

Today, the choice is similar. Armies can embrace live data and Agentic AI, reshaping doctrine and practice to fight the wars of the future, or remain anchored in legacy methods, solving the problems of the past. Just as the FM radio unlocked operational art in 1940, Agentic AI has the potential to unlock decision-centric warfare today. The question is whether doctrine and habits will adapt to seize it.

Obstacles and Enduring Challenges

Yet this leap is not without obstacles both culturally and technically. Integrating agentic systems into staff processes requires overcoming organizational resistance and entrenched habits. History shows that militaries often struggle to abandon legacy methods, and the introduction of AI is no exception. Much has been written about how AI could reshape the Napoleonic staff model itself, raising the possibility that decision-making processes such as the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) may evolve into something fundamentally different. The greater question, however, is one of trust: will commanders and staffs accept AI-generated assumptions, courses of action, and recommendations when lives are at stake? Even the most sophisticated system cannot confer advantages if human leaders hesitate to use it.

The greater question, however, is one of trust: will commanders and staffs accept AI-generated assumptions, courses of action, and recommendations when lives are at stake?

A further complication is the crowded landscape of so-called “AI” tools. Many systems marketed as artificial intelligence are, in practice, little more than retrieval-augmented generation models or static dashboards wrapped in the language of autonomy. These imitators create noise in the operational environment, leading commanders and staffs to question whether any AI system can truly deliver on its promises. When inflated claims fail in practice, confidence in the broader concept of AI is undermined, making leaders more hesitant to adopt agentic systems even when they offer genuine capability. The danger is not just technological confusion but institutional skepticism. Clear definitions, rigorous evaluation, and demonstrated performance are therefore essential if Agentic AI is to be distinguished from imitators and trusted as a partner in planning and operations.

Beyond culture, technical integration poses its own challenges. Connecting agentic systems across services, echelons, and security domains introduces friction, as legacy platforms, classification barriers, and competing standards complicate the flow of information. At the same time, reliance on AI introduces its own form of friction. Adversaries will look to exploit this new mode of decision-making. They will seek to deceive, inject false data, or corrupt the very sources AI depends on, which becomes a form of digital fog of war. The challenge, then, is not simply building intelligent systems, but ensuring they are resilient against manipulation.

The hardest challenge, however, is not building the system but convincing leaders to act on its outputs. That hesitation is not new. For centuries, commanders and staffs have wrestled with how to see clearly in the fog of war and decide with confidence despite uncertainty. Carl von Clausewitz captured this enduring problem in his 1832 masterpiece On War, describing coup d’œil—the commander’s “inner eye” that discerns the decisive elements of a situation at a glance, even amid confusion and friction. He warned that without this faculty, plans collapse under pressure, because clarity is the foundation of all decisive action.

These barriers do not diminish the promise of Agentic AI. In fact, they highlight that successful adoption must be accompanied by cultural change, secure integration, and doctrine that frames AI as a trusted partner rather than a disruptive outsider. Overcoming these hurdles will require not only technical solutions but also training, experimentation, and organizational reform. These are all steps that ensure commanders and staffs can rely on AI outputs with confidence rather than suspicion. The payoff is significant: a force that can exploit the speed and adaptability of agentic systems without sacrificing the trust and judgment that remain central to command.

In this sense, the problem facing commanders and staffs today is less about technology than about clarity and judgment. Agentic AI can be understood as an extension of the coup d’œil: a tool that senses, interprets, and presents live operational data in a way that accelerates comprehension without supplanting human intuition. Where Clausewitz emphasized the commander’s cultivated ability to grasp what matters most, AI can expand that faculty across larger, faster, and more complex streams of information. This framing aligns directly with the Army’s doctrinal steps of command—Understand, Visualize, (Describe), Direct, (Lead), Assess. Each element reflects a modern embodiment of coup d’œil. Trust, then, comes not from replacing intuition with a machine, but from fusing human intuition with AI-enabled perception to achieve a sharper, more resilient form of coup d’œil at every stage of the decision cycle.

Through this historical lens, the subsequent sections illustrate how modern tools, coupled with classical principles of command, can produce decision dominance in practice. The following stories are drawn from firsthand command experience, showing how clarity, visualization, decisive action, and continuous assessment can be enhanced through technology to outpace adversaries in complex operational environments.

Understand — Clarity Before Action

Clausewitz described coup d’œil as the ability to see clearly through uncertainty, a skill that remains the first step in achieving understanding in modern operations. In January 2022, during planning for a looming crisis in Ukraine, the XVIII Airborne Corps faced how fragile that clarity can be. Tasked with planning a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine loomed, the team needed an airfield in Poland to serve as a Temporary Safe Haven for evacuees and incoming C-17s. Given Poland’s long-standing status as a NATO ally, it was expected that critical details—runway specifications, fuel capacity, and infrastructure, would be readily available from U.S. European Command. They were not.

Instead, the planning team found itself circling potential sites on a paper map and then spending the better part of a day digging through scattered sources to research each location, trying to determine which were feasible. Even after that effort, there was no substitute for sending leaders forward to physically recon each site, an approach that consumed weeks when days mattered. The gap in knowledge and understanding nearly derailed the operation before it began. It was a vivid demonstration of Clausewitz’s insight: commanders cannot rely on secondhand reports or assumptions, but must cultivate a grasp of the environment, or coup d’œil, to discern decisive elements at a glance.

The broader lesson is just as important: assuming higher headquarters will provide everything needed is a mistake. There is no shortage of information today, but its volume is overwhelming, and identifying relevant details in time is the true challenge. Leaders usually know the decisions they must make and the information required, but finding and validating that information through manual processes takes precious time. In war, time is a commodity that cannot be wasted.

What once demanded laborious reconnaissance could be compressed into seconds, enabling understanding at the speed required for modern conflict.

Agentic AI offers transformational potential. By fusing live radar feeds, open-source data, social media streams, logistics databases, and other sources, an agentic system could have delivered instant clarity on Poland’s airfield runway conditions, throughput capacity, and infrastructure status, without weeks of delay. What once demanded laborious reconnaissance could be compressed into seconds, enabling understanding at the speed required for modern conflict. The ability to understand faster than the enemy is the first step toward decision dominance.

Visualize — Seeing the End State Before the First Move

Understanding the environment is only the first step. Commanders must also visualize the fight, cutting through complexity to imagine the end state before the first move. This step often requires time and reflection, but in modern war, time is scarce. Agentic AI offers an advantage: by processing vast amounts of data, surfacing recommendations, and testing assumptions, visualization can be achieved faster and with greater clarity, accelerating planning and achieving decision dominance.

In September 1918, Colonel George C. Marshall faced this challenge during the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, a make-or-break campaign to end World War I. As the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) Plans Officer (G5), the task was staggering: move 600,000 troops, 3,000 artillery pieces, 90,000 horses, and a million tons of supplies 50 miles in two weeks, without alerting the Germans. Overwhelmed, he stepped away. Sitting by a French canal, he watched an elderly fisherman cast his line. For half an hour, silence. Then, clarity: the network of roads, the cadence of night marches, and coordination with French allies, a logistical masterpiece began to taking shape. Back at his desk, he turned vision into plan, moving the American Expeditionary Forces undetected and setting the stage for victory. Historian Edward G. Lengel calls it a turning point.

Marshall’s canal-side vision demonstrates how deliberate focus under pressure can unlock clarity, but also highlights the time required to reach insight. Today, agentic systems can compress that process, turning hours of contemplation into near-real-time visualization. By surfacing options, stress-testing assumptions, and helping commanders and staffs see the end state sooner, Agentic AI accelerates the planning cycle, giving leaders the ability to visualize faster than the enemy and seize decision dominance.

Direct — From Insight to Action

Directing is where insight becomes action. It is about making decisions decisively, adapting under pressure, and turning possibilities into results. Visualization helps identify options, but directing turns understanding into outcomes.

In March 2023, during non-combatant operations in Sudan, Khartoum’s only viable airport was blocked, and hundreds of Americans needed evacuation quickly. For days, every conventional option was unattainable and the outcome seemed impossible. Then a memory sparked: a friend laughing about Planes, Trains, and Automobiles, Steve Martin yelling, “Those aren’t pillows!” after an awkward moment with John Candy. That line triggered a realization: planes were out, but trains, buses, or boats might work. The contracting team was directed to explore these alternatives: “Check train tickets, charter buses, find coastal routes.” A nonstop bus from Khartoum to a port was secured, followed by boats to Saudi Arabia. It was not pretty, but it saved hundreds of lives.

The lesson: directing is about seizing opportunity and turning inspiration into action, even when the situation seems impossible. Agentic AI could transform this process. Instead of relying on human memory or improvisation alone, AI could rapidly query live transport data, generate multiple viable routes, and present actionable options in seconds. What once required intuition and persistence can now be achieved faster, with greater clarity and confidence, turning sparks of insight into coordinated, decisive action.

Assess — Continuous Evaluation 

Directing gets plans moving, but execution without follow-up is incomplete. Assessment ensures plans deliver. It is not a one-off; it is a relentless cycle of evaluating actions, spotting gaps, and improving, even when no one is complaining.

This lesson was reinforced in 2017 during operations against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. A High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) battalion supporting those operations had been operating for weeks. The strikes it was delivering seemed successful. But based on the commander’s observations after a battlefield circulation, challenged the assumptions that all strikes were successful. The unit began to preform continuous assessments through the Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) process for every strike. These assessments uncovered a problem: rockets from one area were off by five to ten meters. Close enough to achieve effects, but in a city, five to ten meters could be catastrophic. Investigation revealed a flaw in the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). The AFATDS defaults to Height Above Ellipsoid for target elevation, instead of what the HIMARS launcher uses: Mean Sea Level. This difference led to an error in elevation calculations that ultimately offset the rockets by five to ten meters. No one had complained, but active assessments identified the error, enabling correction and restoring precision. Assessment was not a formality; it was a safeguard against unseen risk.

Today, agentic AI could perform this kind of assessment continuously, analyzing live BDA feeds and operational data, highlighting anomalies, and delivering actionable insights in real time. Instead of waiting for the next battle rhythm event or decision board, commanders could act immediately to correct course, reduce risk, and maintain decision dominance. Assessment is continuous, adaptive, and far faster than humans alone.

Conclusion — Agentic AI and the Future of Decision Dominance

Decision dominance in the future will depend on executing the cycle of understanding, visualizing, directing, and assessing at a tempo faster than the enemy. The vignettes from Ukraine, the Meuse-Argonne, Sudan, and the fight against ISIS all underscored how fragile and decisive each of these steps can be: clarity before action, vision under pressure, decisive direction, and relentless assessment. What changes today is not the importance of the cycle, but the speed at which it must be executed. Adversaries are already harnessing AI and digital networks to accelerate their own decision processes, compressing timelines and raising the stakes. To maintain an advantage, commanders and staffs must integrate agentic AI as a partner that enables each step of the cycle to happen faster, with greater clarity, and at a scale no staff alone can match.

Agentic AI can continuously integrate live data, analyze outcomes in real time, and present actionable options. These systems can accelerate understanding, compress visualization, enhance the speed and precision of guidance given, and make assessment persistent rather than periodic. Decision dominance is no longer merely the art of the commander’s intuition; it can become a sustained operational capability when powered by autonomous, adaptive intelligence. Realizing this potential, however, requires more than just adding AI to a workflow.

Exia Labs products like Blue (pictured) and Recon leverage Agentic AI to understand complex operational environments and support the warfighter by creating an understanding of the operational environment, and generating courses of action with actionable recommendations. This next-generation planning technology accelerates understanding and decision-making.

The solution lies in addressing cultural, technical, and institutional challenges together. For the cultural barriers of trust and adoption, leaders must normalize AI through training, education, and wargaming that treat agentic systems as staff teammates rather than mysterious black boxes. For the technical barriers of integration, systems must be tested, red-teamed, and designed for interoperability across domains and classification levels, with resilience against deception and manipulation built in from the start. And for the challenge of imitators, the Department must establish clear standards, rigorous evaluation processes, and transparent demonstrations that separate genuine capability from marketing hype before credibility is lost.

In practice, this means doctrinal adaptation and even reorganization, embedding agentic AI into staffs as an accountable member of the decision-making team, much as past generations integrated Field Artillery officers, Intelligence Analysts, or Logisticians. By doing so, the institution can overcome mistrust, enforce discipline in its use, and ensure commanders and staffs see it not as a threat but as a force multiplier. The payoff is a decision process that is faster, sharper, and more adaptive, enabling decision dominance without sacrificing the human judgment at its core.

A handful of companies are already pushing the frontier of true agentic AI, building adaptive agents, leveraging advances in gaming technology to enhance their functions, and moving far beyond the retrieval-augmented generation systems too often passed off as “AI.” These efforts point to what the future of operational planning and execution could look like if innovation is given room to grow. For the Department, the task is to identify and engage with these pioneers rather than default to organizations with flashy marketing, inflated statistics, or venture capital gloss. The real breakthroughs will come from those designing systems for the wars of tomorrow, not repackaging tools for the problems of the past.

The lesson is clear: the future of warfare will demand the deliberate integration of Agentic AI into every stage of planning and execution. Nations that embrace this technology will gain the ability to act faster, anticipate outcomes more accurately, and seize initiative in ways traditional methods cannot match. Agentic AI is not a distant possibility, it is already here. Those who act now, adapting culturally and organizationally, will master it first and secure decision dominance, while those who hesitate will fall behind in the wars of tomorrow.

Tags: agentic AI, AI, Artificial Intelligence, Artificial Intelligence (AI), Command and Control, decision dominance, decision-making, decision-making cycle, Future of War, future operating environment, Military Decision Making Process, Staff work

About The Author

• 
  
• John Herrman
• John Herrman is a co-founder of Exia Labs, a defense technology company developing Agentic AI solutions for decision dominance in operational planning and decision-making. He is a retired U.S. Army Colonel with 29 years of service highlighted by commanding at the Battalion and Brigade level where he deployed in support of operations in the CENTCOM AOR. His final assignment was serving as the XVIII Airborne Corps G5, where led planning for multiple operations during his tenure.

9. Groundbreaking Launched Effects Demonstration Marks Key Step in U.S. Army Modernization Strategy

​I remember in the 1980s when Fort Lewis was the High Technology Test Bed. 

(The 9th Infantry Division at Fort Lewis in Washington served as the U.S. Army's High Technology Test Bed (HTTB) from 1983, evaluating equipment and tactics for a new type of motorized infantry division. The HTTB program sought to create a lighter, more deployable division than traditional heavy forces, with enhanced firepower to bridge the gap between light and heavy divisions, leading to innovations like the Fast Attack Vehicle.)

Excerpts:

Several Soldiers described the training as comprehensive and easy to understand.

“I will definitely be able to tactically employ the equipment and take it back to my unit to teach my Soldiers," stated Sgt. Devin Heaton, a cavalry scout assigned to the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment.

The primary goals of the LE-SR SUD include gathering Soldier feedback, validating initial requirements, and successfully deploying LE technology with an array of formations. Ultimately, the event aimed to mitigate risks and accelerate the fielding of initial Launched Effects capabilities to all active-duty divisions by the end of 2026.

“This demonstration is critical to ensuring Launched Effects meet the needs of the warfighter and integrate seamlessly into Army operations,” said COL Danielle Medaglia, Project Manager, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, while observing the demonstration. “Modernization is not just about technology; it’s about empowering our Soldiers with the tools they need to succeed in the battles of tomorrow.”

Now that the LE-SR SUD concluded, the Army will analyze and incorporate Soldier feedback to refine LE requirements and inform future modernization efforts. Additional demonstrations and exercises will further develop and validate this war-winning capability.

Groundbreaking Launched Effects Demonstration Marks Key Step in U.S. Army Modernization Strategy

army.mil · October 2, 2025

1 / 2 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA – The U.S. Army achieved a major modernization milestone with the Launched Effects-Short Range Special User Demonstration (LE-SR SUD). For the first time, operational units employed Launched Effects (LE) technology in a field environment. The demonstration occurred between August 4th and 22nd 2025. (Photo Credit: Matthew Ryan) VIEW ORIGINAL

2 / 2 Show Caption + Hide Caption – Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA – The U.S. Army achieved a major modernization milestone with the Launched Effects-Short Range Special User Demonstration (LE-SR SUD). For the first time, operational units employed Launched Effects (LE) technology in a field environment. The demonstration occurred between August 4th and 22nd 2025. (Photo Credit: Matthew Ryan) VIEW ORIGINAL

Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA – The U.S. Army achieved a major modernization milestone with the Launched Effects-Short Range Special User Demonstration (LE-SR SUD). For the first time, operational units employed Launched Effects (LE) technology in a field environment. The demonstration occurred between August 4th and 22nd 2025.

“Launched Effects are a game changing capability and will revolutionize how we operate in contested environments. Employed at echelon, they allow us to maneuver against enemy forces while striking decisively at key targets and safeguarding our formations,” stated Brig. Gen. David Phillips, Program Executive Officer, Aviation.

Launched Effects offer a new approach to challenges on the battlefield. They allow forces to act decisively, adapt to complex situations and maintain a war-winning advantage in future large-scale combat operations.

“Soldiers involved in the demonstration are not just operators; they are active contributors to shaping the future of Launched Effects,” said Lt. Col. C Hunter Gray, LE Product Manager. “We, with our Army and industry partners, will use their feedback to assess LE’s impact across all areas, including materiel, doctrine, training, and personnel. This input will help refine fielding requirements, improve training programs, and ensure the technology meets the needs of our Soldiers.”

The LE-SR SUD employed a progressive “crawl, walk, run” training methodology. Soldiers began with classroom instruction on system operation, maintenance, and then transitioned to field exercises culminating in immersive scenarios based on specific use-cases. This phased approach built Soldiers proficiency and confidence with the new technology.

Several Soldiers described the training as comprehensive and easy to understand.

“I will definitely be able to tactically employ the equipment and take it back to my unit to teach my Soldiers," stated Sgt. Devin Heaton, a cavalry scout assigned to the 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment.

The primary goals of the LE-SR SUD include gathering Soldier feedback, validating initial requirements, and successfully deploying LE technology with an array of formations. Ultimately, the event aimed to mitigate risks and accelerate the fielding of initial Launched Effects capabilities to all active-duty divisions by the end of 2026.

“This demonstration is critical to ensuring Launched Effects meet the needs of the warfighter and integrate seamlessly into Army operations,” said COL Danielle Medaglia, Project Manager, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, while observing the demonstration. “Modernization is not just about technology; it’s about empowering our Soldiers with the tools they need to succeed in the battles of tomorrow.”

Now that the LE-SR SUD concluded, the Army will analyze and incorporate Soldier feedback to refine LE requirements and inform future modernization efforts. Additional demonstrations and exercises will further develop and validate this war-winning capability.

By: Anthony Buchanan, Launched Effects Operations Analyst

army.mil · October 2, 2025

10. Interview with Ylli Bajraktari

E​xceprts:

Octavian Manea: What does the war in Ukraine reveal about the future of warfare and how should we adapt to it?

Ylli Bajraktari: Ukraine offers profound insights, validating many 3OS assumptions while highlighting industrial-age realities. First, there is a more “transparent battlefield”: Ubiquitous sensors (drones, commercial satellites) make surprise difficult and massed formations highly vulnerable. Survival requires dispersion and deception. Second, there is the “drone revolution”: low-cost drones (FPV, commercial UAVs) have democratized access to airpower and ISR. Third, the primacy of fires and EW: artillery and precision strike dominate, but control of the electromagnetic spectrum is essential for survival and targeting. Fourth, mass still matters: warfare consumes vast amounts of munitions, emphasizing the need for a robust defense industrial base. Finally, there are adaptation cycles: the ability to adapt technology and tactics rapidly (measured in weeks, not years) is crucial.

How we should adapt? First, I think we need to accelerate “Replicator”: Ukraine validates the need for large numbers of low-cost, attritable systems. We also need to invest in resilient C2 and EW: develop networks that can operate in a contested EMS. Additionally, there is a need to strengthen the industrial base: ensure the capacity to produce munitions and equipment at scale. Finally, we need to integrate commercial tech: develop faster pathways to integrate commercial technology into military operations.

Octavian Manea: Looking from today’s perspective, what should an Offset X type of strategy be about in order to restore the credibility of deterrence?

Ylli Bajraktari: “Offset X” should not be about discovering the next technological revolution. The technologies identified in the 3OS (AI, autonomy, human-machine teaming) are still the defining technologies of this era. Instead, Offset X must be about operationalizing and scaling the 3OS at speed. The credibility of deterrence rests on demonstrated capability, not just concepts.

The key elements of Offset X should include, first, achieving decision superiority (making JADC2 real): the highest priority must be delivering a functional JADC2 system. We must develop the tools and concepts to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than the adversary, even when communications are degraded.

Second, mastering human-machine integration at scale: moving beyond individual systems to integrating AI and autonomy across the entire force, optimizing battle management and decision support.

Third, revolutionizing the defense ecosystem (speed and scale): the current acquisition system is too slow. Offset X requires a new model emphasizing speed, agility and the seamless integration of commercial technology. We need to move from “inventing” to “fielding” rapidly.

Fourth, dominating the software-defined battlefield: future conflicts will be won by those who adapt their algorithms fastest. Prioritizing software development and the ability to rapidly update systems in the field is crucial.

Finally, redefining resilience: moving beyond platform survivability to resilience in the network, logistics (contested logistics) and the industrial base.

Interview with Ylli Bajraktari

by Octavian Manea

|

10.03.2025 at 06:00am

CSDS-SWJ STRATEGY DEBRIEFS • 10/2025

Interview with Ylli Bajraktari, by Octavian Manea

This interview is part of a collaborative initiative with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy.

Ylli Bajraktari, President and CEO of the Special Competitive Studies Project.

Before launching the Special Competitive Studies Project (SCSP), Ylli served as the Executive Director of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI). Prior to joining the NSCAI, he served as Chief of Staff to the National Security Advisor LTG H.R. McMaster, held a variety of leadership roles for former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and served as Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dempsey.

Octavian Manea: How would you define an offset strategy?

Ylli Bajraktari: Fundamentally, an offset strategy is a deliberate, long-term competitive approach to counteract an adversary’s advantages – often numerical superiority or geographic position – by leveraging asymmetric strengths. It is about changing the paradigm of competition rather than competing symmetrically. The goal is to restore deterrence by fundamentally altering how forces operate and imposing costs on the adversary.

Historically, we look at two precedents. The First Offset (1950s) was built around Eisenhower’s “New Look”, leveraging United States (US) nuclear superiority to offset the Soviet Union’s conventional dominance in Europe. The Second Offset (1970s-1980s) recognized the arrival of nuclear parity and focused on restoring conventional deterrence through the fusion of stealth, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), satellite reconnaissance and networking (the “Reconnaissance-Strike Complex”).

The Third Offset Strategy (3OS), initiated around 2014, was born from the recognition that the advantages of the Second Offset were eroding. Adversaries, having studied the American way of war, developed sophisticated Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities specifically designed to neutralize our precision battle networks.

Octavian Manea: What were the distinctive traits of the Third Offset Strategy (3OS)?

Ylli Bajraktari: The distinctive traits of 3OS focused on the next wave of technological advancements needed to sustain US power projection. The core thesis was that the fusion of Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomy and human-machine collaboration would provide the decisive edge. It recognized that the speed of future conflict would exceed human decision-making capabilities. Key pillars included autonomous learning systems, human-machine collaborative decision-making, advanced manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) and network-enabled autonomous weapons.

Octavian Manea: Did the 3OS have a coherent theory of victory?

Ylli Bajraktari: Yes. The theory of victory was deterrence by denial through conventional overmatch. The goal was to credibly demonstrate that the US could identify, target and neutralize aggression, even within highly contested A2/AD environments, faster than the adversary could achieve their objectives. It aimed to prevent a fait accompli.

Octavian Manea: There are many ways to understand and define the notion of strategy. What are the specific implications of conceptualizing the 3OS as a competitive strategy?

Ylli Bajraktari: Framing 3OS as a competitive strategy means viewing it through the lens of long-term competition. It was not just about winning a specific war; it was about maintaining a durable advantage over decades. This involves making strategic investments that impose costs on adversaries, forcing them to invest in areas where we are stronger or where their investments are less effective, thereby sustaining our military-technical edge and agility.

Octavian Manea: Let us unpack the structural context that gave rise to the 3OS. There was a concern that peer competitors were on the verge of achieving parity in PGMs and theater-level battle networks. But why is parity perceived as dangerous, as something to be avoided at all costs?

Ylli Bajraktari: The broader context was the diffusion of the Second Offset. Competitors achieved parity not globally, but locally, in specific technologies crucial to US power projection: PGMs, ISR and theater battle networks.

The US way of war is fundamentally expeditionary. We fight “away games”. This requires access to forward bases, the ability to move forces across oceans and the assurance that those forces can operate effectively upon arrival. Parity in precision battle networks fundamentally threatens this model. If an adversary can see what we see and strike what we strike, they can target our critical nodes – our carriers, airbases, logistics hubs and command centers.

Why is parity dangerous? There are 3 consequences that we should have in mind.

Firstly, there is an erosion of deterrence. US foreign policy relies on extended deterrence – the promise to defend allies. Localized parity emboldens adversaries to attempt rapid aggression, believing they can achieve objectives before the US can effectively respond.

Secondly, there is the vulnerability of US assets. Parity in PGMs makes the foundation of US expeditionary warfare highly vulnerable.

Lastly, there is the reality captured by the “stability-instability paradox”: while nuclear parity might induce stability, conventional parity can induce instability. If a competitor believes they can achieve a rapid conventional victory, they are more likely to attack.

Parity was a call to action because the status quo was no longer sufficient. We needed to develop entirely new ways of fighting that negated the adversary’s investments in A2/AD.

Octavian Manea: What were the fundamental characteristics of what it is called the traditional American Way in Warfare, often referred to as the Desert Storm model? What made it obsolete?

Ylli Bajraktari: The “Desert Storm model” was characterized by four dimensions. First, through “sanctuary and buildup”: the assumption that the US could utilize secure forward bases (like Saudi Arabia) to build up an “Iron Mountain” of logistics and equipment over several months, free from enemy attack. Second, through “undisputed domain dominance”: assumed control of the air, sea, space and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Third, “methodical, sequential operations”: gaining air superiority, degrading enemy C2, followed by decisive ground maneuver. Finally, via centralised Command and Control (C2): hierarchical command structures relying on superior C4ISR.

Competitors adapted specifically to counter it and targeted centers of gravity such as access and networking. Concretely, China and Russia developed A2/AD strategies to prevent the US from executing the Desert Storm playbook. They concentrated their efforts on: 1) attacking the buildup: they developed massive arsenals of precision ballistic and cruise missiles to target US bases, ports and aircraft carriers from the outset. There is no longer sanctuary; 2) contesting the domains: they invested heavily in sophisticated Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS), counter-space capabilities and cyber/EW to deny automatic dominance; and 3) targeting the network: they focused on degrading the C4ISR architecture (the satellites and communication links) that the US relies on.

In short, the Desert Storm model assumes an uncontested buildup followed by a synchronized campaign. Today, the fight begins immediately, everywhere, and the buildup itself is the first target.

Octavian Manea: You worked very closely with Bob Work at the peak of the 3OS, so I am wondering about your take on the notion that the Deputy Secretary of Defense was emphasizing back then, especially in the context of deteriorating security on NATO’s eastern flank. You will recall that he made the case for a Multi-Domain Operational Fires Network and for ‘light infantry hunter-killer teams with anti-tank weapons and the ability to call-in precise highly lethal fires’. Today, we hear the same discussion but in an Indo-Pacific context – developing a Joint Fires Network (JFN) is literally at the forefront of the warfighting Indo-Pacific posture. To what extent is such a JFN a legacy of the 3OS? To what extent is such a multi-service JFN the answer to the needs to blunt and deny aggression in the first island chain?

Ylli Bajraktari: Deputy Secretary Work’s emphasis on “Operational Fires Networks” was central to the 3OS vision. The concept of distributed “hunter-killer teams” reflected the realization that large, centralized platforms are too vulnerable in a precision-strike environment. Survivability requires distribution, mobility and low signatures.

The JFN – I hope was inspired by the 3OS. The 3OS identified the need to connect any sensor to any shooter across all domains to achieve decision advantage. This vision is the core principle of today’s JADC2 (Joint All-Domain Command and Control) efforts.

In the Indo-Pacific, a JFN is critical for blunting aggression. To deter an invasion of Taiwan, the US must rapidly sense, understand and act. This means connecting space sensors, Marine Corps littoral units, submarines, autonomous drones and long-range bombers in real-time. A JFN enables concepts like Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO), creating a dense web of fires.

Octavian Manea: How fungible is the idea of a Joint Fires Network from a cross-theatertheater perspective?

Ylli Bajraktari: The concept is highly fungible, but the implementation must be tailored.

In Europe, geography is compressed, and the threat is primarily land-based. The emphasis is on air defense, counter-battery fire and integrating NATO allies. Bob Work’s “hunter-killer teams” concept is tailored to this environment.

The Indo-Pacific theater is primarily maritime and aerospace, characterized by the “tyranny of distance”. The emphasis is on anti-ship fires, long-range precision strike and resilient communications.

The underlying JADC2 architecture should be the same, but the specific sensors and shooters plugged into that network will differ.

Octavian Manea: To what extent is there progress in actually developing effective new operational concepts – new ways of fighting? In the days of the 3OS there were calls for a new Assault Breaker.

Ylli Bajraktari: Progress has been significant at the conceptual level across the services:

the Army focused on Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) and the creation of Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs); the Navy/USMC focused on Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) and EABO; the Air Force developed the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) construct, moving away from large bases to dispersed locations to generate combat power under attack.

The “new Assault Breaker” (Assault Breaker II) is not a single program but the integration of JADC2, long-range fires, autonomous systems and these operational concepts. It is a system-of-systems approach designed to “break” an adversary’s attempt to seize territory, such as a large-scale amphibious assault in the Western Pacific.

The legacy of the 3OS is that it provided the intellectual foundation for the current US approach to warfare.

• 3OS provided the “Why” (the eroding advantage).
• MDO, DMO, and ACE are the “How” (the operational concepts).
• JADC2 is the “Means” (the technical architecture).

The 3OS catalyzed the shift back to great power competition, prioritized key technologies like AI and autonomy and institutionalized innovation (DIU, SCO).

Octavian Manea: Autonomy was a key component of the 3OS. How do initiatives and programs such as Replicator & Hellscape fit into the emerging US approach to warfare, and what do they reveal about new ways of fighting – particularly within the First Island Chain?

Ylli Bajraktari: Autonomy was central to 3OS as a way to offset adversary mass and operate at speed in contested environments. “Replicator” (fielding thousands of attritable autonomous systems at scale) and the desired operational effect of “Hellscape” (saturating the battlespace, particularly the Taiwan Strait, with autonomous systems) are the realization of this vision, driven by the urgent need to counter China’s advantages in mass.

They are integral of the US emerging approach to warfare by: 1) “generating asymmetric mass”: if the US cannot match China ship-for-ship, it must generate mass through large numbers of low-cost, autonomous systems; 2) “shifting the cost curve”: cheap, attritable systems impose significant costs on adversaries who must defend expensive platforms; and 3) “enabling distributed operations”: autonomous systems are key enablers for DMO and EABO, acting as persistent sensors and strike platforms where manned systems cannot operate.

Overall, there is a shift towards decentralized, autonomous and saturation-based warfare. This emphasizes swarming tactics, human-machine teaming (humans “on the loop”, not “in the loop”), and the critical importance of software-defined capabilities and rapid adaptation.

Octavian Manea: What does the war in Ukraine reveal about the future of warfare and how should we adapt to it?

Ylli Bajraktari: Ukraine offers profound insights, validating many 3OS assumptions while highlighting industrial-age realities. First, there is a more “transparent battlefield”: Ubiquitous sensors (drones, commercial satellites) make surprise difficult and massed formations highly vulnerable. Survival requires dispersion and deception. Second, there is the “drone revolution”: low-cost drones (FPV, commercial UAVs) have democratized access to airpower and ISR. Third, the primacy of fires and EW: artillery and precision strike dominate, but control of the electromagnetic spectrum is essential for survival and targeting. Fourth, mass still matters: warfare consumes vast amounts of munitions, emphasizing the need for a robust defense industrial base. Finally, there are adaptation cycles: the ability to adapt technology and tactics rapidly (measured in weeks, not years) is crucial.

How we should adapt? First, I think we need to accelerate “Replicator”: Ukraine validates the need for large numbers of low-cost, attritable systems. We also need to invest in resilient C2 and EW: develop networks that can operate in a contested EMS. Additionally, there is a need to strengthen the industrial base: ensure the capacity to produce munitions and equipment at scale. Finally, we need to integrate commercial tech: develop faster pathways to integrate commercial technology into military operations.

Octavian Manea: Looking from today’s perspective, what should an Offset X type of strategy be about in order to restore the credibility of deterrence?

Ylli Bajraktari: “Offset X” should not be about discovering the next technological revolution. The technologies identified in the 3OS (AI, autonomy, human-machine teaming) are still the defining technologies of this era. Instead, Offset X must be about operationalizing and scaling the 3OS at speed. The credibility of deterrence rests on demonstrated capability, not just concepts.

The key elements of Offset X should include, first, achieving decision superiority (making JADC2 real): the highest priority must be delivering a functional JADC2 system. We must develop the tools and concepts to sense, understand, decide, and act faster than the adversary, even when communications are degraded.

Second, mastering human-machine integration at scale: moving beyond individual systems to integrating AI and autonomy across the entire force, optimizing battle management and decision support.

Third, revolutionizing the defense ecosystem (speed and scale): the current acquisition system is too slow. Offset X requires a new model emphasizing speed, agility and the seamless integration of commercial technology. We need to move from “inventing” to “fielding” rapidly.

Fourth, dominating the software-defined battlefield: future conflicts will be won by those who adapt their algorithms fastest. Prioritizing software development and the ability to rapidly update systems in the field is crucial.

Finally, redefining resilience: moving beyond platform survivability to resilience in the network, logistics (contested logistics) and the industrial base.

Tags: American Way of War, military innovation, Offset Strategy, strategy, US Way of War, Way of war

About The Author

• 
  
• Octavian Manea
• Octavian Manea is a PhD Researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) that he joined in October 2021. He is interested in the changing character of conflict and the implications of such alterations for the US-led alliance system. Octavian is also broadly interested in strategic studies, transatlantic relations and security issues. He worked for many years as a journalist, and is currently a contributor at the Romanian weekly 22 and the Small Wars Journal. In addition, Octavian was the managing editor of the Eastern Focus Quarterly in Bucharest and was affiliated with the Romania Energy Center (ROEC). Octavian was a Fulbright Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, where he received an MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies. He also holds a BA and an MA in political science and international relations from the University of Bucharest.

11. Kirigami parachute suitable for humanitarian missions stabilizes quickly and doesn't pitch

​What are all the ways we could employ this capabiity? My mind immediately thinks of resupplying teams in remote, contested, or denied areas. We will only be limited by our imagination. 

Excerpts:

The research team believes these characteristics could be useful for purposes ranging from parcel delivery in remote areas to exploration of Mars in outer space. However, in their view, the most likely and practical application in the near future is humanitarian aid deliveries of water, food and medicine, particularly since the parachute has a very low production cost.

"We made these parachutes by laser cutting, but a simple die-cutting press would also do the trick," Mélançon says. "What's more, the parachute is seamless and is attached to the payload by a single suspension line, making it easy to use and to deploy."

The researchers tested their concept through numerical simulations, wind-tunnel tests, laboratory drops and outdoor drops from a drone. The tests point towards a considerable potential that has yet to be explored.

Kirigami parachute suitable for humanitarian missions stabilizes quickly and doesn't pitch

techxplore.com

October 1, 2025

by Polytechnique Montréal

edited by Stephanie Baum, reviewed by Robert Egan

Stephanie Baum

scientific editor

Robert Egan

associate editor

This article has been reviewed according to Science X's editorial process and policies. Editors have highlighted the following attributes while ensuring the content's credibility:

fact-checked

peer-reviewed publication

trusted source

proofread

Laser cutting of a closed-loop kirigami pattern allows a plastic sheet to adopt the shape of an inverted bell. Credit: Martin Primeau

A team of engineers from Polytechnique Montréal report a new and unique parachute concept inspired by the Japanese art of kirigami today in Nature. This simple, robust and low-cost approach has a wide variety of potential applications ranging from humanitarian aid to space exploration.

Kirigami is a technique that modifies the mechanical properties of a sheet of material by making precise folds and cuts to it. Children use it to make snowflakes out of paper, and engineers have used it to create extensible structures, flexible medical devices and deployable spatial structures. However, kirigami techniques have never been applied to parachute production.

The Polytechnique Montréal research team has now changed all that.

Indoor release of a paper version of the parachute. Credit: Frédérick Gosselin

A parachute cut from a plastic sheet

Through a novel project, led by professors David Mélançon and Frédérick Gosselin from Polytechnique Montréal's Mechanical Engineering Department, a new type of parachute made from a plastic sheet cut in a "closed-loop" kirigami pattern has been developed.

The pattern used gives the sheet of plastic new mechanical properties. In free fall, it assumes the shape of an upside-down bell when any type of weight or object is attached to its center.

"One advantage of this parachute is that it quickly stabilizes and doesn't pitch, regardless of the release angle," says Mélançon, co-author of the article. "And unlike conventional parachutes, it follows a strict ballistic descent trajectory."

How a laser cutting machine is used to apply a kirigami motif on a plastic or paper sheet to generate a parachute. Credit: Martin Primeau

The research team believes these characteristics could be useful for purposes ranging from parcel delivery in remote areas to exploration of Mars in outer space. However, in their view, the most likely and practical application in the near future is humanitarian aid deliveries of water, food and medicine, particularly since the parachute has a very low production cost.

"We made these parachutes by laser cutting, but a simple die-cutting press would also do the trick," Mélançon says. "What's more, the parachute is seamless and is attached to the payload by a single suspension line, making it easy to use and to deploy."

The researchers tested their concept through numerical simulations, wind-tunnel tests, laboratory drops and outdoor drops from a drone. The tests point towards a considerable potential that has yet to be explored.

Indoor release of a paper version of the kirigami parachute. Credit: Frédérick Gosselin

"The parachute's behavior doesn't change even when the size of the device is augmented," says Frédérick Gosselin. "This suggests that it could be scaled up for larger applications."

The Polytechnique Montréal research team is now working on identifying new cutting patterns to endow the parachutes with different and new properties.

"We want to change the patterns in order to go even further: the parachutes could descend in a spiral, for example, or glide before dropping," says Mélançon. "We would also like to be able to vary the trajectory of descent depending on the payload, so the cargo could be sorted as the parachutes come down to Earth. This is a whole new design endeavor that opens up a multitude of possibilities."

More information: Danick Lamoureux et al, Kirigami-inspired parachutes with programmable reconfiguration, Nature (2025). DOI: 10.1038/s41586-025-09515-9

Journal information: Nature

Provided by Polytechnique Montréal

Citation: Kirigami parachute suitable for humanitarian missions stabilizes quickly and doesn't pitch (2025, October 1) retrieved 2 October 2025 from https://techxplore.com/news/2025-10-kirigami-parachute-suitable-humanitarian-missions.html

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A parachute made from a plastic sheet using a closed-loop kirigami pattern stabilizes rapidly in free fall, avoids pitching, and follows a ballistic descent regardless of release angle. It is low-cost, seamless, easily deployable with a single suspension line, and maintains performance when scaled. Potential applications include humanitarian aid delivery and space exploration.

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12. Pentagon downgrades leadership role for Air Forces-Europe to 3-star

​Just the beginning? If this is an indication downgrades will likely occur to commands during normal command rotations. The incoming commander will be a rank lower.

Pentagon downgrades leadership role for Air Forces-Europe to 3-star

Defense News · Stephen Losey · October 2, 2025

The Pentagon has downgraded the rank of the Air Force’s top commander in Europe to a three-star general.

President Donald Trump on Monday nominated Lt. Gen. Jason Hinds to be the next commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa. But unlike every other permanent USAFE commander since the late 1950s, Hinds’ new assignment will not come with a promotion to four-star general.

A Department of the Air Force spokesperson said the change was made in response to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s order to cut the numbers of general officers throughout the military.

“In alignment with the Department of War directive to reduce general and flag officer positions, the nominee for the United States Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa commander is at the lieutenant general grade,” the spokesperson said.

Hegseth in May issued a memo to the Pentagon’s senior leadership ordering a minimum 20% reduction to four-star generals and admirals in the military’s active components, and a minimum 20% reduction of general officers in the National Guard.

“The Department of Defense is committed to ensuring the lethality of U.S. military forces to deter threats and, when necessary, achieve decisive victory,” Hegseth wrote in May. “To accomplish this mission, we must cultivate exceptional senior leaders who drive innovation and operational excellence, unencumbered by unnecessary bureaucratic layers that hinder their growth and effectiveness.”

“A critical step in this process is removing redundant force structure to optimize and streamline leadership by reducing excess general and flag officer positions,” he continued.

Trump has long been skeptical of U.S. involvement in Europe and accused allies there of not spending enough on their own defense. Towards the end of his first administration Trump moved to pull some troops out of Germany, and some lawmakers have expressed concern in recent months that he may draw down troop levels there at a time when Russia is increasingly aggressive.

Hegseth said in February that the administration was reviewing force levels worldwide, but had no short-term plans to cut troop levels in Europe.

Hinds has served as deputy commander of USAFE since September 2024, and its acting commander since May, when former USAFE head Gen. James Hecker retired. He is an experienced F-22 and F-15 instructor pilot with nearly 30 years in uniform, who has also served as a wing commander.

The commander of USAFE oversees the United States’ airpower in both Europe and Africa, as well as serving as head of NATO Allied Air Command.

For USAFE’s first dozen years, after its founding in 1945, the command was most often headed by three-star generals, including then-Lt. Gen. Curtis LeMay. That changed in 1957, as the Cold War with the Soviet Union intensified and Gen. Frank Everest took command.

Everest’s tenure marked the start of nearly seven decades of largely continuous four-star leadership at USAFE, except for short intervals with three-stars as acting commander.

Other commands in the Air Force with three-star commanders include U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Air Force Special Operations Command, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Materiel Command and Air Education and Training Command. The Air Force’s inspector general and surgeon general are also three-star generals.

U.S. Army Europe and Africa is commanded by a four-star, Army Gen. Christopher Donahue.

With Hecker’s retirement, the Air Force now has about 11 four-star generals. Those include Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin and his nominated successor, Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Daniel Caine, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe and NATO military commander Gen. Alexus Grynkewich and the heads of NORAD, U.S. Africa Command and the National Guard Bureau.

The Air Force’s vice chief of staff is also a four-star billet, but that role has been vacant since Trump fired Gen. Jim Slife in February.

The commanders of Air Force Global Strike Command, Air Mobility Command, Pacific Air Forces and Air Combat Command are also four-star generals. But Gen. Thomas Bussiere, currently commander of Global Strike, announced Tuesday evening he had decided to retire for personal and family reasons.

The White House nominated Bussiere to be vice chief of staff this summer, but his nomination was withdrawn in September.

The White House also announced five other nominations for Air Force and Space Force major generals to receive their third stars and new assignments:

• Maj. Gen. Jason Armagost, currently the commander of the Eighth Air Force and Joint-Global Strike Operations Center, would become Global Strike’s deputy commander.
• Maj. Gen. Clark Quinn, currently deputy commander of Air Education and Training Command, would become AETC’s commander.
• Maj. Gen. Jennifer Hammerstedt, currently director of logistics, engineering and force protection at ACC, would become the new commander of AFMC’s Air Force Sustainment Center.
• Maj. Gen. Daniel Tulley, currently director of operations at U.S. Transportation Command, would become commander and president of Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama.
• Space Force Maj. Gen. Dennis Bythewood, who is now special assistant to the chief of space operations, would become commander of U.S. Space Forces-Space/Combined Joint Force Space Component Commander at Vandenberg Space Force Base, California.

About Stephen Losey

Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

13. "Credible Threat" Of Drone Attacks Prompted Massive Chicago Airspace Restrictions, CBP Claims

​Will it only be a matter of time before this becomes the new normal?

"Credible Threat" Of Drone Attacks Prompted Massive Chicago Airspace Restrictions, CBP Claims

Customs and Border Protection has responded to our inquiry about the airspace closure, claiming it was put in place due to a risk of drone attacks.

Howard Altman

Updated Oct 2, 2025 10:40 PM EDT

160

twz.com · Howard Altman

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP) asked for an unprecedentedly massive drone flight ban over Chicago due to a “credible threat” that law enforcement would be attacked by uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) amid large scale detentions and protests. Their statement was in response to our questions about why such a large Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) was requested. You can catch up with our original story about the TFR here.

“CBP requested a Temporary Flight Restriction due to a credible threat of small, unmanned aircraft systems being used against law enforcement during Midway Blitz,” CBP told us. Midway Blitz is the name of the operation taking place in the Chicago area. The flight restriction extends for a 15-mile radius over the greater Chicago area and into Lake Michigan.

FAA

The CBP statement did not mention any specifics, but referenced prior incidents of violence during protests against the ICE immigration enforcement wave that has resulted in more than 1,000 arrests in several cities around the country.

“Our brave law enforcement is facing a surge in assaults and violence, including a domestic terrorist shooting in Dallas and Antifa riots in Broadview,” the statement read.

White House

Last week, a sniper opened fire on an ICE detention facility in Dallas. The shooter died of self-inflicted gunshot wounds, while two detainees were wounded.

Law enforcement and emergency personnel respond near the scene of a shooting at a US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention facility in Dallas, Texas, on September 24, 2025. (Photo by Aric Becker / AFP) ARIC BECKER

In Broadview, as we mentioned in our previous story, protests against the ICE arrests have been aimed at a federal facility in this suburb located about 10 miles west of Chicago. The facility is being used to detain hundreds of people arrested on suspected immigration violations. At least five people have been arrested amid clashes between protesters and agents in which chemical agents have been deployed to disperse crowds.

Federal law enforcement officers are confronted by pro-immigration demonstrators outside an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) processing center in Broadview, Illinois, on September 19, 2025. (Photo by OCTAVIO JONES / AFP) OCTAVIO JONES

“The Trump administration will utilize every tool to keep our law enforcement safe,” CBP added. “The TFR will be in effect until October 12th.”

We asked CPB for proof of a threat from small drones, whether any officers had ever been attacked this way before, and if this was the first time they issued such an explanation. We also contacted a lawyer’s group representing protestors and the Chicago mayor’s office. We will provide updates with any pertinent details we get.

It is unclear if there have been any situations where protestors have used or attempted to use drones to attack officers. The proliferation of small and often commercially available weaponized drones for nefarious purposes is a story we have covered deeply over many years. There is increasingly concern that these systems could be used in kinetic attacks within the homeland by non-state actors. They are already in common use with drug cartels and foreign terror groups, for instance. Yet this is the first time we have heard of claimed intelligence linking them to protests or that these capabilities exist with groups participating in them.

We will continue to push for answers.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.

14. Why America Lost the War in Afghanistan: A Requiem Essay

​Excerpts:

The nation possesses one of the largest and best-funded militaries in the world. US troops are well-trained and disciplined. US general officers are well educated and dedicated to task under constitutionally mandated civilian authority. Moreover, NATO stood shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally. So, how could America lose? Warfighting strategies are gauged through an analysis of three factors: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Hint: America’s political and military leadership failed to appreciate all three. The US institutions of the Presidency, Congress, and Pentagon should step up and shoulder the blame. I am concerned that they won’t.

...

Serious and deep introspection is required on the part of America’s civil and military leaders. My maternal grandfather told me many years ago, “The fish stinks from the head down.” So, it does. The Bush White House selected national warfighting objectives in Afghanistan that were grossly unrealistic. The US Congress continues to abrogate its Constitutionally mandated duty to deliberate fully the implications of a declaration of war – with all the terrible accountability that entails – leaving a critically important responsibility to successive chief executives, who have not done well by it. Finally, the nation’s corps of flag officers needs to conduct an in-depth review of their role in this all-too-Greek of tragedies. There is plenty of blame to go around. But beyond the fully expected political finger-pointing and chest-beating, some clear-eyed rationality is required. The moral courage must be found to squarely face the mistakes made, and then take appropriate corrective action to ensure that this sort of debacle never happens again.

Why America Lost the War in Afghanistan: A Requiem Essay

by Robert Bruce Adolph1 day ago

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A lone United States Marine sits on a wall at Hamid Karzai International Airport on August 20, 2021. Kabul, Afghanistan. Image Credit: US Marine Corps photo by 1LT Mark Andries

America lost the war in Afghanistan. All the blood and treasure expended was – in the end – largely for naught. I understand why many who fought there might feel differently. It is terribly difficult to walk away from the massive sunk costs. The assertion that US efforts were in vain is a hateful idea to those who lost comrades-in-arms or were horribly scarred physically or psychologically. Tragically, the same was true of those in the US Armed Forces who battled bravely in Vietnam. The national warfighting strategy adopted in Southwest Asia by the Bush Administration clearly failed, leaving his successors with the ultimate recurring foreign policy disaster. Everyone involved is the worse for it, especially the Afghans who supported the US and its allies for more than 20 years. In this special issue of Atlantisch Perspectief on multilateralism, Afghanistan is also a recurring topic as America’s lost war is also a lost battle for the international community and multilateral collaboration.

The nation possesses one of the largest and best-funded militaries in the world. US troops are well-trained and disciplined. US general officers are well educated and dedicated to task under constitutionally mandated civilian authority. Moreover, NATO stood shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally. So, how could America lose? Warfighting strategies are gauged through an analysis of three factors: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Hint: America’s political and military leadership failed to appreciate all three. The US institutions of the Presidency, Congress, and Pentagon should step up and shoulder the blame. I am concerned that they won’t.

AN ABSURD OBJECTIVE

The opening successful strategic raid into Afghanistan was conducted by the CIA-supported 5th Special Forces Group in the fledgling months of the conflict. They won battle after battle with the assistance of the US Air Force and by making allies of the Afghan Northern Alliance. America should have left following those victories, goal achieved. But she remained based on the wrong-headed notion that the transformation of a centuries-old war-torn tribal society into a semi-modern liberal democracy was possible. Change on such a fantastic scale would have required a multi-generational commitment that was unsustainable. Plus, any competent cultural anthropologist would have confirmed that first allegiances in such societies are to self & family, and village & tribe. The emotional abstraction of primary loyalty to the nation-state in the cultural context of Afghanistan was therefore always amorphous, lacking in both form and substance. The rapid success of the Taliban because of mass desertions within the Afghan Army and security forces is proof of this assertion.

The progenitors of the conflict inside the Bush White House a generation ago confused deep pockets and a martial ideology with the development of an actual strategy that should have included an early exit ramp. The US Armed Forces overmatched the Taliban in every category that mattered except patience and a capacity to suffer defeat after battlefield defeat without losing heart. They knew, from experience gathered over centuries of struggle against foreign invaders, that eventually the US and its allies would leave, even if it took decades. Simply put, the Taliban were – as were the North Vietnamese in another long war – willing to contemplate terrible losses over a prolonged period that successive White Houses of either political party never could.

THE ORIGINAL SINS

The primary goal of the war in Afghanistan was to end the Taliban’s support for Al Qaeda. That objective might have been accomplished early in the conflict. The Taliban was driven out of the national capital of Kabul more than two decades ago. But they survived to fight another day… and another… and another. Once the Taliban were removed from power, the senior US military officer on the ground should have then sent a no-nonsense message to the Taliban leadership stating that America would now withdraw, while stating unequivocally that if they again provided succor to Al Qaeda, America would lose an encore. The threat of departing, and the possibility of return, may have worked. The Taliban respect the exercise of raw power, and little else. We will never know in any case. It was never attempted.

The White House of that era seems instead to have taken an absurd “we broke it… we bought it” position. It is critically important to point out that the national civil leadership of that day, President George W. Bush, advised by both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, made the ridiculous decision to remain in Kabul and attempt the insurmountable. This decision was reflective of both outrageous arrogance and incredible naïveté. But the decision to rush into war never should have been theirs in the first place. That authority, under the US Constitution, belongs only to Congress. The Framers’ intent was that such a critically important decision needed to be fully deliberative, to ensure right action, adequate funding, and the full support of the American people. Tragically, Congress has abrogated this authority to successive chief executives. The negative result – a failure of national institutions – should now be obvious to all.

Another point bears closer inspection: even the globe’s most powerful military has limitations, notwithstanding the much-abused American taxpayer. The Bush White House seems to have forgotten a key lesson from US domestic history: democracy cannot be bought. It must be earned by a country’s citizens. The price is always paid in blood. Afghans proved unwilling to fight for their own country. For this reason, perhaps more than any other, successive presidential administrations were foolhardy to remain in Afghanistan. This means that the various US strategies – mere variations on a common theme – were neither suitable to context nor feasible given the limitations regarding use of the military cudgel. To add insult to injury, President Bush’s decision to fight two conflicts simultaneously – the war in Iraq – was always a fool’s errand on its face. Saddam Hussein had nothing whatever to do with the tragic events of 9-11, and the much-promised weapons of mass destruction were never found. Simply put, the Iraq War was a conflict that never needed to be fought, while having the net effect of draining resources away from the far more strategically important Afghan theater.

Still, it may not have mattered. In terms of warfighting objectives, all the Taliban had to do was survive: a far easier goal to achieve than the wholesale transformation of a badly fragmented tribal society. The US Armed Forces and NATO changed tactics, techniques, and strategies, and periodically swapped out senior generals over a two-decade period while attempting to accomplish an impossible mission. The American military’s senior-most leadership’s can-do attitude amplified by many billions of dollars failed to bring the Taliban to heel. The US, after all, was eventually fighting a war for “hearts and minds.” The Taliban killed anyone and everyone, women and children included, who might have, in time, developed a taste for freedom along with minds of their own.

America lost the war in Afghanistan. All the blood and treasure expended was – in the end – largely for naught. I understand why many who fought there might feel differently. It is terribly difficult to walk away from the massive sunk costs. The assertion that US efforts were in vain is a hateful idea to those who lost comrades-in-arms or were horribly scarred physically or psychologically. Tragically, the same was true of those in the US Armed Forces who battled bravely in Vietnam. The national warfighting strategy adopted in Southwest Asia by the Bush Administration clearly failed, leaving his successors with the ultimate recurring foreign policy disaster. Everyone involved is the worse for it, especially the Afghans who supported the US and its allies for more than 20 years. In this special issue of Atlantisch Perspectief on multilateralism, Afghanistan is also a recurring topic as America’s lost war is also a lost battle for the international community and multilateral collaboration.

The nation possesses one of the largest and best-funded militaries in the world. US troops are well-trained and disciplined. US general officers are well educated and dedicated to task under constitutionally mandated civilian authority. Moreover, NATO stood shoulder-to-shoulder with its ally. So, how could America lose? Warfighting strategies are gauged through an analysis of three factors: suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. Hint: America’s political and military leadership failed to appreciate all three. The US institutions of the Presidency, Congress, and Pentagon should step up and shoulder the blame. I am concerned that they won’t.

AN ABSURD OBJECTIVE

The opening successful strategic raid into Afghanistan was conducted by the CIA-supported 5th Special Forces Group in the fledgling months of the conflict. They won battle after battle with the assistance of the US Air Force and by making allies of the Afghan Northern Alliance. America should have left following those victories, goal achieved. But she remained based on the wrong-headed notion that the transformation of a centuries-old war-torn tribal society into a semi-modern liberal democracy was possible. Change on such a fantastic scale would have required a multi-generational commitment that was unsustainable. Plus, any competent cultural anthropologist would have confirmed that first allegiances in such societies are to self & family, and village & tribe. The emotional abstraction of primary loyalty to the nation-state in the cultural context of Afghanistan was therefore always amorphous, lacking in both form and substance. The rapid success of the Taliban because of mass desertions within the Afghan Army and security forces is proof of this assertion.

The progenitors of the conflict inside the Bush White House a generation ago confused deep pockets and a martial ideology with the development of an actual strategy that should have included an early exit ramp. The US Armed Forces overmatched the Taliban in every category that mattered except patience and a capacity to suffer defeat after battlefield defeat without losing heart. They knew, from experience gathered over centuries of struggle against foreign invaders, that eventually the US and its allies would leave, even if it took decades. Simply put, the Taliban were – as were the North Vietnamese in another long war – willing to contemplate terrible losses over a prolonged period that successive White Houses of either political party never could.

THE ORIGINAL SINS

The primary goal of the war in Afghanistan was to end the Taliban’s support for Al Qaeda. That objective might have been accomplished early in the conflict. The Taliban was driven out of the national capital of Kabul more than two decades ago. But they survived to fight another day… and another… and another. Once the Taliban were removed from power, the senior US military officer on the ground should have then sent a no-nonsense message to the Taliban leadership stating that America would now withdraw, while stating unequivocally that if they again provided succor to Al Qaeda, America would lose an encore. The threat of departing, and the possibility of return, may have worked. The Taliban respect the exercise of raw power, and little else. We will never know in any case. It was never attempted.

The White House of that era seems instead to have taken an absurd “we broke it… we bought it” position. It is critically important to point out that the national civil leadership of that day, President George W. Bush, advised by both Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney, made the ridiculous decision to remain in Kabul and attempt the insurmountable. This decision was reflective of both outrageous arrogance and incredible naïveté. But the decision to rush into war never should have been theirs in the first place. That authority, under the US Constitution, belongs only to Congress. The Framers’ intent was that such a critically important decision needed to be fully deliberative, to ensure right action, adequate funding, and the full support of the American people. Tragically, Congress has abrogated this authority to successive chief executives. The negative result – a failure of national institutions – should now be obvious to all.

Another point bears closer inspection: even the globe’s most powerful military has limitations, notwithstanding the much-abused American taxpayer. The Bush White House seems to have forgotten a key lesson from US domestic history: democracy cannot be bought. It must be earned by a country’s citizens. The price is always paid in blood. Afghans proved unwilling to fight for their own country. For this reason, perhaps more than any other, successive presidential administrations were foolhardy to remain in Afghanistan. This means that the various US strategies – mere variations on a common theme – were neither suitable to context nor feasible given the limitations regarding use of the military cudgel. To add insult to injury, President Bush’s decision to fight two conflicts simultaneously – the war in Iraq – was always a fool’s errand on its face. Saddam Hussein had nothing whatever to do with the tragic events of 9-11, and the much-promised weapons of mass destruction were never found. Simply put, the Iraq War was a conflict that never needed to be fought, while having the net effect of draining resources away from the far more strategically important Afghan theater.

Still, it may not have mattered. In terms of warfighting objectives, all the Taliban had to do was survive: a far easier goal to achieve than the wholesale transformation of a badly fragmented tribal society. The US Armed Forces and NATO changed tactics, techniques, and strategies, and periodically swapped out senior generals over a two-decade period while attempting to accomplish an impossible mission. The American military’s senior-most leadership’s can-do attitude amplified by many billions of dollars failed to bring the Taliban to heel. The US, after all, was eventually fighting a war for “hearts and minds.” The Taliban killed anyone and everyone, women and children included, who might have, in time, developed a taste for freedom along with minds of their own.

The original sins were committed by President George W. Bush and the Congress that continues to this day to fail in their duty – as demanded by the Framers – to fully deliberate the implications to the nation prior to a declaration of war.

THE GENERALS’ PART

It may be true that the nation’s most senior generals forcefully informed the Bush White House that remaining in Afghanistan was a bad idea. It may also be true that they informed the Bush White House that fighting two wars simultaneously was unwise. Finally, it may also be true that they informed the Bush White House that the national political objectives desired were unattainable. If these afore-mentioned assumptions are proven false, then our nation’s most senior military leadership has much to answer for. It is a betrayal of the nation’s citizens in uniform – who fight and die in faraway lands – and their families, when the country’s elder flag officers fail to devise warfighting strategies that are within the realm of what is feasible. It was never acceptable for the country to remain engaged in what came to be known as America’s Forever War: an outrageously costly conflict lacking a foreseeable endpoint.

Some believe that the leadership of the US Armed Forces should be held to account for strategic failures in Afghanistan. According to retired US Army Special Forces Colonel Glenn Harned, “The U.S. military suffers from ‘Ludendorff Syndrome,’ after the German General who lost World War I. Like Ludendorff, we believe that tactically and operationally proficient formations can mitigate poor strategic plans, despite all the historical evidence that suggests that the opposite is true.” In other words, dreadful decisions regarding war made by a sitting US President – advised by seemingly malleable senior generals – cannot be rectified by soldiers fighting and dying in strange lands.

The US had already driven the Taliban out of Kabul and out of power more than two decades ago. Regardless, then US President Bush Jr. decided to maintain an American military presence in Afghanistan. Depicted here are former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, former President George W. Bush, and former Vice President Dick Cheney from left to right (photo: Wikimedia / Cherie A. Thurlby)

MAJOR LIMITING FACTORS

The Geneva Conventions – largely a product of their experience in WWII – are the American military bible on what the US Armed Forces can and cannot do legally on the battlefield. The conventions reflect humanitarian values. The US Military followed them. The Taliban did not. America attempted to limit collateral casualties, especially during the Obama Administration. The Taliban did not. The Taliban knew an essential old-world war-fighting truth: the winner triumphs by embracing the idea that the ends justify the means. It is a brutal and bloody truth. The Taliban’s rag-tag light infantry wore no distinguishing uniform in violation. They used houses of worship to plan and implement their offensives in violation. They intentionally killed innocents via suicide attacks when it served their interests in violation, and more. Of course, the Taliban, being a sub-state actor, never signed the Geneva Conventions.

The Taliban were resolutely ruthless in the prosecution of their war aims. America and her allies were not. The result is all too apparent. Dexter Filkins in the New Yorker magazine makes a powerful case that humanitarian impulses might best be placed on hold until the fighting is done, and victory achieved. Filkins references Professor Samuel Moyn of Yale University suggesting that America’s warfighting methodology “…is so civilized that it has reduced our incentive to stop fighting.” Moyn, in his book Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Re-invented War, goes on to theorize that, “The American way of war is more and more defined by a near complete immunity from harm for one side and unprecedented care when it comes to killing people on the other.” I would argue that his characterization of “near complete immunity from harm” seems so only from his classroom’s perspective in New Haven, Connecticut. However, this humanitarian focus may not be conducive to achieving victory.

In addition, and despite multiple denials over many years, the government of Pakistan sheltered the Taliban and Al Qaeda within its borders. That haven has given the Taliban ample opportunities to prosecute their kind of fight. In other words, the US Armed Forces largely respected, with some exceptions, Pakistan’s sovereign borders. Lawyers serve on warfighting staffs to advise commanders what is and what is not tolerated under the law. Therefore, America and its military generally comply with what is legal. The Taliban clearly did not, nor did their covert supporters within Pakistan. America’s limitations are joined at the hip to respect for law and humanitarian values. For the Taliban and Pakistan’s government, such concerns clearly mattered little or not at all. Was this a mistake – to have given so much importance to law and humanitarian values when the enemy did not? I can assure you that the Taliban see such concerns only as a weakness to be exploited.

THE ARM-CHAIR GENERALS

I have read an avalanche of commentaries regarding the defeat in Afghanistan written by otherwise intelligent people who may have never heard a shot fired in anger; never worn a uniform; never carried a rifle; and never lost a friend or family member on a foreign battlefield. They make remarks such as, “Well, there was never a purely military solution to the conflict.” This statement might be mistaken. Had America and its allies turned their full military might loose on the Taliban, I suspect that they would have been vanquished in short order. But that would have meant killing… lots of killing… the kind of killing that America has not engaged in since WWII. When the US and its allies last engaged in that sort of bloodletting in Europe – ending in 1945 – the result was approximately four million Germans dead or missing. The result was similar in the Asia-Pacific theater, heralded by the dropping of two atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Two of the globe’s most dynamic democracies rose from the ashes: both beneficiaries of American humanitarianism and economic largesse. However, those humane instincts came to the forefront only once victory was achieved. Is this a key lesson that the US needs to re-learn?

America’s political leadership may have forgotten, if it ever knew, that war is death-dealing. War is supposed to be what happens when every other attempt to find accommodation with adversaries has failed. When that happens, the job of the nation’s military is to carry out that mission – killing – in support of morally sound, ethically based, and hopefully feasible national objectives. Is America’s political leadership no longer willing to countenance such bloodbaths to achieve victory? If not, future conflicts must – of necessity – be very carefully selected. Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and popular commentator Ralph Peters recently told me that we should “Either fight to win or stay home.” His wisdom constitutes uncommon common sense. But is anyone listening?

AN IGNOBLE END

Despite the hue and cry of the US Republican Party’s rightwing war hawks, the Biden White House made a difficult but necessary call. He and his staff knew that there would be significant negative blow-back following the decision to depart Afghanistan. Also, and lest we forget, it was the Trump Administration that negotiated the American withdrawal. It is therefore even more important to keep in mind that the key mistake was in staying. That original error – made by President Bush – could not be corrected. Remaining militarily engaged in Afghanistan for another 20 years would not have changed the outcome, but only delayed the inevitable. This lesson was supposed to have been learned once before in Vietnam. It seems that one titanic national catastrophe was not enough to drive the point home. America seems doomed to replicate some of the worst of its own history.

Could the implementation of the US withdrawal have been better handled? I believe so. But it was always going to be ugly, whenever, and however it was done. I was responsible for conducting the United Nations evacuation of Freetown in Sierra Leone, West Africa in May of 2000 ahead of invading Revolutionary United Front guerrillas. Trust me, there are no pretty evacuations. More to the point, defeat is a hideous orphan that nobody wants to take home.

Former US Ambassador to Kabul Karl Eikenberry’s 2009 no-longer-secret cables to the then US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, were eerily prescient regarding the reasons behind the defeat. These same said cables were likely the reason why he was replaced by the Obama Administration. He apparently had the temerity to disagree with the then favored more-troops-is-better solution of that period. Eikenberry, himself a former US Army lieutenant general, was right. However, too much truth-telling and an appreciation for reality-on-the-ground is seldom career enhancing in times of armed conflict.

An entire generation in America grew to adulthood while the nation was at war in Afghanistan: a war that in no way was a response to an existential threat to the nation… a war that was far away… a war that touched only those who served there and their families… a war that was never declared by the American Congress in contravention of the US Constitution… a war that lacked resources because of the other fight in Iraq… a war with amorphous, unrealistic, and changing objectives… a war that resulted in the deaths of nearly 2,500 US Military with more than 20,000 wounded… a war that killed more than 1,000 of our NATO allies… a war that conservatively cost the American people over two trillion dollars (source: Brown University) – not to mention the surfeit of dead and wounded among the native populace that dwarves US and Coalition losses running into the many tens of thousands: an ignoble end indeed.

CONCLUSION

Serious and deep introspection is required on the part of America’s civil and military leaders. My maternal grandfather told me many years ago, “The fish stinks from the head down.” So, it does. The Bush White House selected national warfighting objectives in Afghanistan that were grossly unrealistic. The US Congress continues to abrogate its Constitutionally mandated duty to deliberate fully the implications of a declaration of war – with all the terrible accountability that entails – leaving a critically important responsibility to successive chief executives, who have not done well by it. Finally, the nation’s corps of flag officers needs to conduct an in-depth review of their role in this all-too-Greek of tragedies. There is plenty of blame to go around. But beyond the fully expected political finger-pointing and chest-beating, some clear-eyed rationality is required. The moral courage must be found to squarely face the mistakes made, and then take appropriate corrective action to ensure that this sort of debacle never happens again.

The comparison between the US’ involvement in Vietnam and Afghanistan is commonly made. Both missions saw Washington invest considerable funds, military force, and time, only to be disappointed by the end result. Depicted are Marines assisting the Department of State with a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Afghanistan (photo: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Staff Sgt. Victor Mancilla)

One final point – in case you missed it – the US Military does not have the luxury of choosing its adversaries. That selection belongs to the national civilian leadership that made wrong and rushed choices in the case of Afghanistan. America must fight future wars in ways that are suitable to the context, feasible given understood limitations, and acceptable to the nation. Albert Einstein is credited with the remark that when addressing any problem, “One usually spends 10% of their time thinking about the issues and 90% trying to fix them.” Einstein rightly suggests that those ratios be reversed. This is especially true regarding the political decision to engage in a foreign conflict. The stakes could not be higher. Once again, America won all the battles and still lost the war.

A senior US soldier that I respect, and who prefers to remain anonymous, told me on this subject that, “The problem ultimately is us.”

** This piece appeared previously in the Netherlands’ “Atlantic Perspectives Magazine” and the Special Forces Association’s “The Drop.”

—

*** Editor’s Note: If you liked this article, you’d definitely want to check out Bob’s latest book: Surviving the United Nations – A True Story of Violence, Corruption, Betrayal, and Redemption.

It’s an eye-opening account of a Green Beret’s second career at the United Nations.

And don’t just take my word for it, here is what Publishers Weekly had to say:

“In his humanitarian and peacekeeping missions for the United Nations he dealt with child soldiers, blood diamonds, a double hostage-taking, an invasion by brutal guerrillas, an emergency aerial evacuation, a desperate hostage recovery mission, tribal gunfights, refugee camp violence, suicide bombings, and institutional corruption. His UN career brought him face to face with the best and worst of human nature, and he shares it all here.”

Click the link above to pick up your copy from Amazon today. You’ll find it every bit as riveting as the author himself. – GDM

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15. New 4-star command activation brings together recruiting, training and future technology

​Congratulations to General Hodne.​ I recall his time at Georgetown when he was doing his Army War College fellowship. 

I suppose this is the other way we'll see a reduction in general officer positions, through consolidation of commands. But he is going to have a lot on his plate as these are three huge responsibilities.

What a great location. I just visited UT Austin last month and it is really a very nice place to visit and I imagine to live and work.

New 4-star command activation brings together recruiting, training and future technology

Stars and Stripes · Rose L. Thayer · October 2, 2025

Gen. David Hodne, right, and Command Sgt. Maj. Raymond Harris, command team for Army Transformation and Training Command, uncase the flag of the new command during an activation ceremony Oct. 2, 2025, at the Lady Bird Johnson Auditorium at the University of Texas at Austin. (Rose L. Thayer/Stars and Stripes)

AUSTIN, Texas — The Army on Thursday formally combined two four-star commands under one leader who will oversee everything from soldier recruitment and training doctrine to the modernization of equipment and preparation for future combat.

The Army Transformation and Training Command, led by newly promoted Gen. David Hodne, brings together Training and Doctrine Command and Army Futures Command. The two outgoing Army commands’ flags were cased in a ceremony Thursday at the University of Texas at Austin, and the new flag of what is referred to as the T2C was revealed. The new unit patch prominently features a sword.

“For the first time in modern history, the Army unified the functions of force design, force development and force generation,” Hodne said during his remarks. “Technology alone never transformed war. The tank, the airplane, the drone, none changed battlefields by themselves. It required new tactics, new concepts, and new organizations to integrate them into coherent warfighting systems.”

Within the new command that will establish its headquarters in the Futures Command’s space in Austin, three three-star-led subordinate units will spearhead the main initiatives from different locations, said Maj. Gen. John Cushing, chief of staff of T2C. The roots of these three units are the Futures and Concepts Center that will remain at Fort Eustis, Va.; Recruiting Command located at Fort Knox, Ky.; and the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

However, the new command has a year to put all these moving pieces into place, he added.

“What we’re trying to do is rebalance where do people sit in terms of the capabilities that they’re going to provide,” Cushing said. “We’ve got enough room in Austin, and the area has been certainly gracious to welcome us in and give us opportunities to be able to put people in the right places.”

In the seven years since the Army established Futures Command, it procured office space in a downtown high-rise building and more in Round Rock, a northern suburb, as well as partnerships and connections with the University of Texas at Austin, Texas A&M University in College Station and with the tech hub Capital Factory in downtown. The Army Software Factory is at an Austin Community College campus.

The Army announced the consolidation as one of several in May intended to meet Pentagon requirements to reduce the number of general officers in the military and remove redundancies.

Gen. Randy George, the Army’s chief of staff, said the merger integrates how the Army trains, fights and modernizes.

“Transformation is not just about product innovation, it’s about process innovation,” he said during remarks broadcast from the Pentagon to the ceremony through a video livestream.

George was unable to travel to the ceremony because of a lapse in federal funding that has caused the government to shut down. The shutdown has also resulted in the furlough of nonessential government civilians, which make up about 90% of Army Futures Command personnel.

Rose Thayer

Rose Thayer

Rose L. Thayer is based in Austin, Texas, and she has been covering the western region of the continental U.S. for Stars and Stripes since 2018. Before that she was a reporter for Killeen Daily Herald and a freelance journalist for publications including The Alcalde, Texas Highways and the Austin American-Statesman. She is the spouse of an Army veteran and a graduate of the University of Texas at Austin with a degree in journalism. Her awards include a 2021 Society of Professional Journalists Washington Dateline Award and an Honorable Mention from the Military Reporters and Editors Association for her coverage of crime at Fort Hood.

Stars and Stripes · Rose L. Thayer · October 2, 2025

16. Army expands program targeting recruits with specialized skills

​Innovation. We are turning the tables. Usually the Army (and all services) provide the skills and then the civilian world benefits when they leave the service. Now we benefit from those who have already acquired relevant skills in the civilian world. Of course the civilian world will still reap the benefits in the long term. These soldiers will return with more experience, more technical skills, discipline, and leadership abilities. Win win.

Army expands program targeting recruits with specialized skills

Stars and Stripes · John Vandiver · October 2, 2025

Tank maintainers assigned to 3rd Infantry Division pull a power pack from an M1A2 Abrams main battle tank with the help of an M-88 tracked recovery vehicle at Fort Stewart, Ga. in 2024. The Army is adding more job fields to a program aimed at giving new recruits with unique skills a jump start into their careers. (Kevin Larson/U.S. Army)

The U.S. Army is adding more job fields to a program aimed at giving new recruits with unique skills a jump start into their careers.

The Army on Wednesday said it will now include 17 new military occupational specialties to its Civilian Acquired Skills Program. The initiative enables soldiers with relevant civilian skills to bypass some initial training and start their military careers at an advanced level.

“The Army gets skilled specialists into the force faster and at a lower cost, while the Soldier receives a significant head start in their military career,” Brig. Gen. Gregory Johnson, director of military personnel management, said in a statement.

The most recent Army job specialties added are wide-ranging and include everything from Patriot missile system repairers to Abrams tank maintainers and respiratory specialists.

A soldier assigned to 31st Air Defense Artillery Brigade conducts training with Patriot missile batteries within the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility on Feb. 8, 2025. The Army is adding more job fields to a program aimed at giving new recruits with unique skills a jump start into their careers. (Steve Asfall/U.S. Army)

To qualify, applicants must have verified civilian training, certifications and relevant experience. The program opens the door to receiving a higher rank or accelerated promotion upon enlistment, the Army said.

Over the last several years, the Army has expanded the program from a handful of job specialties to about 60 now.

The revised Army’s CASP program is open to applicants entering active duty, the reserves and National Guard.

The latest update authorizes the following 17 new MOSs:

• 68V – Respiratory Specialist
• 91A – M1 Abrams Tank System Maintainer
• 91J – Quartermaster & Chemical Equipment Repairer
• 91M – Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Maintainer
• 91P – Self-Propelled Artillery Systems Mechanic
• 91S – Stryker Systems Maintainer
• 92A – Automated Logistical Specialist
• 92F – Petroleum Supply Specialist
• 92W – Water Treatment Specialist
• 92Y – Unit Supply Specialist
• 94E – Radio Equipment Repairer
• 94F – Computer/Detection Systems Repairer
• 94P – Multiple Launch Rocket System Repairer
• 94R – Avionics and Survivability Equipment Repairer
• 94S – Patriot System Repairer
• 94T – Short Range Air Defense System Repairer
• 94Y – Automatic Test Systems Operator/Maintainer

Stars and Stripes · John Vandiver · October 2, 2025

17. Hybrid air denial: The new gray zone battleground raging above Europe

​And it will not be limited to Europe. We have to learn from this.

Hybrid air denial: The new gray zone battleground raging above Europe

Defense News · Maximilian K. Bremer · October 2, 2025

This week, Denmark imposed a nationwide ban on all civilian drone flights as European leaders gather in Copenhagen for the European Union Summit. The move follows repeated drone incursions in recent weeks, which Danish authorities have labeled “hybrid attacks,” after sightings of unidentified drones forced airport closures and threatened military sites.

Denmark is far from alone. In recent weeks, NATO fighters scrambled over Poland to intercept 19 Russian drones while another Russian drone loitered in Romanian airspace for nearly an hour. Debris washed ashore in Bulgaria and Latvia, and unidentified drones have also been reported over Germany’s Schleswig-Holstein region, Norway’s main airport, and near a Swedish naval base.

Far from isolated incidents, these incursions reveal a coordinated pattern in a new type of gray zone warfare — what we term “hybrid air denial” — that blurs the lines between peace and war. In this approach, adversaries use low-cost drones to access and deny commercial activity in the air littoral, producing outsized effects on security, the economy and public confidence.

RELATED

EU vows haste in ‘drone wall’ plan for eastern borders

Companies offering counter-drone technology have begun jockeying for position for the envisioned project.

Air denial has long been a wartime strategy, relying on fighter patrols, surface-to-air missiles or no-fly zones to contest control of the skies and prevent adversary air forces from operating freely over the battlefield. Recent conflicts, from Ukraine to Armenia-Azerbaijan and Gaza, show that drones, including low-cost systems operating in the air littoral, can extend this strategy to lower altitudes. Now, this approach is increasingly moving into the gray zone, with adversaries leveraging drones to challenge national airspace, test sovereignty and disrupt both civilian and military air operations without triggering full-scale conflict.

What makes drones especially effective for hybrid air denial is their combination of easy access, low cost and minimal perceived risk.

First, drones provide easy access to the air littoral. From commercial to military-grade systems, drones operate at lower altitudes, where the line between the military battlespace and the civilian air traffic system is as blurred as the line between conflict and combat. In these crowded skies, adversaries have persistent opportunities to episodically exploit the air littoral.

Second, drones can generate disproportionate effects at low cost. They are inexpensive, especially compared with the costs of intercepting them. In Polish airspace, for example, NATO used missiles costing between $500,000 and $1 million each to shoot down Russian drones worth about $10,000 apiece. A single drone, far cheaper than any modern aircraft, can shut down an airport handling tens of thousands of passengers and millions of dollars of cargo.

Finally, drones offer more reward than risk. Because these systems lack human operators onboard, and are typically unarmed, adversaries can pursue hybrid warfare at lower escalation risks. And since they can deploy off-the-shelf commercial systems, they operate with plausible deniability, making it hard for authorities to determine ownership and hold the perpetrators accountable.

Put differently, hybrid air denial flips the risk onto the target country: Either let drones fly, effectively ceding control of the air littoral through inaction, or attempt to shoot them down and risk collateral damage, including ground casualties, as a consequence of taking action.

Through hybrid air denial, adversaries demonstrate that the target government cannot fully secure and control its airspace, creating outsized effects that extend far beyond the immediate physical threat. In wartime, drones can disrupt operations and complicate military logistics; in peacetime, they can paralyze commerce and instill fear in populations — and even inspire copycat disruptions that multiply the effect.

Travelers, pilots and citizens are left uncertain about the safety of the skies. Every incursion forces governments to explain their inability to prevent such disruptions, eroding trust in institutions. Airport shutdowns divert flights, delay commerce and ripple through supply chains, all at staggering financial cost. Through these low-cost tactics, adversaries can achieve strategic impact at a fraction of the price that NATO countries spend on air defense and air traffic control.

Responding to this challenge will not be easy. Conventional military defenses were designed to counter high-end aircraft and missiles, not drones blending into or penetrating civilian airspace. Likewise, civil aviation authorities must contend with threats that straddle regulatory and military domains. And this is not just Europe’s problem — China routinely employs similar tactics against Taiwan, Japan and other neighbors in the Indo-Pacific. The United States should take note: These events expose vulnerabilities that exist at home as well.

To address this threat, the United States should ensure Golden Dome’s nationwide coverage has a particular counter-drone focus on civilian airports and other critical infrastructure. Extending coverage beyond military sites to commercial hubs and urban centers will deny adversaries the ability to exploit gaps in U.S. defenses, thereby reducing disruptions to air traffic, commerce, and public confidence. This cannot be done with costly, exquisite systems. Instead, the United States needs low-cost, persistently deployed countermeasures to defend the air littoral at scale.

In the 21st century, denying the air does not always mean shooting down fighters or bombers. It can mean sending a handful of drones that shut down an economy for a day, spread uncertainty across borders and undermine trust in governments to keep skies safe. Recognizing this strategy for what it is — weaponized disruption — is the first step toward countering it.

Maximilian K. Bremer is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel, a nonresident fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and head of Mission Engineering and Strategy for Atropos Group.

Kelly A. Grieco is a senior fellow with the Reimagining U.S. Grand Strategy Program at the Stimson Center and an adjunct professor in the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University.

18. 'Shadow economies' are growing. Military planners and operators must take them into account

​Follow the money. Always.

Excerpts:

In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the shadow economy has expanded and evolved. Moscow has expanded its insurance substitutes in Asia and the Middle East. Iran has intensified illicit oil exports through shadow shipping companies. China's Belt and Road Initiative obscures illicit finance connected to strategic resource competition. African gold increasingly flows through Russia’s Wagner Group, funding Kremlin-backed mercenary campaigns while undermining global financial integrity. Southeast Asia's narcotics and cyber-crime hubs have expanded along with geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The intersection of shadow economies and cybercrime has intensified as rogue states and criminal groups engage in ransomware, theft, and fraud against private and public institutions, laundering proceeds through increasingly sophisticated cryptocurrency mixers and exchanges in permissive jurisdictions. These cyber-enabled revenues exacerbate the difficulty in tracing funds and enforcing sanctions.

This all has implications for strategic stability and economic statecraft. Sanctions can no longer be considered silver bullets. Policymakers must anticipate leakage through illicit markets. Illicit revenue streams lengthen conflicts, necessitating long-term strategic preparedness for protracted war.

'Shadow economies' are growing. Military planners and operators must take them into account

Black markets prolong wars, defang sanctions, fray alliances, and help rogue governments and groups survive and thrive.

By Maj. Benjamin Backsmeier

October 2, 2025 01:21 PM ET

\defenseone.com · Maj. Benjamin Backsmeier

The Benin-flagged tanker Boracay, seen here anchored off Saint-Nazaire, France, on Oct. 1, 2025, is blacklisted by the European Union for being part of Russia's sanction-busting "shadow fleet." DAMIEN MEYER/AFP via Getty Images

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Ideas

Black markets prolong wars, defang sanctions, fray alliances, and help rogue governments and groups survive and thrive.

|

October 2, 2025 01:21 PM ET

• Commentary
• Russia
• China
• Asia-Pacific

By Maj. Benjamin Backsmeier

October 2, 2025 01:21 PM ET

• Commentary
• Russia
• China
• Asia-Pacific

Vast and global “black markets”—what national-security practitioners call shadow economies—are no longer peripheral nuisances but core strategic terrain. Trade executed outside regulatory, taxation, and enforcement frameworks prolongs wars, defangs sanctions, frays alliances, and helps rogue governments and groups survive and thrive. These flows have long been treated as problems for law enforcement, but military and defense policymakers and planners must increase their efforts to account for and stem them.

Shadow trade enables regimes and insurgent groups to survive extreme pressure. Iran's illicit oil exports help sustain the regime amid punishing sanctions. North Korea endures through complex illicit portfolios: counterfeit currency, arms smuggling, cyber theft, and forced labor. Russia earns billions by evading sanctions on oil, gas, and gold exports. Oil-smuggling states create front companies and “dark fleets” of tankers—Russia alone has more than 600—that swap oil at sea to evade sanctions. Shadow insurers and financiers based in Russia, India, other Asian countries, and the Middle East have replaced Western underwriters, generating billions of dollars for the Kremlin's war machine.

Shadow economies blunt the efforts of countries and international organizations to coerce behavior, both in the near and long term. In the near term, revenue lost to sanctions can be made up by illicit trade. In the longer term, rogue states create new systems of patronage to replace formal systems of trade and finance—for example, Russian elites cut off from Western financial systems learn to profit from smuggling and offshore schemes. Shifting influence from formal institutions grants states the operational deniability and adaptability needed to evade economic warfare. There are risks—illicit actors may be empowered to pursue divergent interests—but the benefits are usually worth the costs. And all this erodes deterrence, for why should a regime fear sanctions they can evade?

Shadow economies also strain alliance cohesion. Certain countries—“permissive jurisdictions”—are willing to turn a blind eye or even lend a helping hand to sanctions circumventors. Among them are India, Turkey, UAE, Iran, certain African states, and flag-of-convenience registries.

And shadow economies lengthen wars. Russia’s illicit exports have helped the country defy predictions that it could not sustain immense expenditures on its war on Ukraine. Opium revenues helped the Taliban prevail in Afghanistan.

In the wake of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the shadow economy has expanded and evolved. Moscow has expanded its insurance substitutes in Asia and the Middle East. Iran has intensified illicit oil exports through shadow shipping companies. China's Belt and Road Initiative obscures illicit finance connected to strategic resource competition. African gold increasingly flows through Russia’s Wagner Group, funding Kremlin-backed mercenary campaigns while undermining global financial integrity. Southeast Asia's narcotics and cyber-crime hubs have expanded along with geopolitical competition in the Indo-Pacific.

The intersection of shadow economies and cybercrime has intensified as rogue states and criminal groups engage in ransomware, theft, and fraud against private and public institutions, laundering proceeds through increasingly sophisticated cryptocurrency mixers and exchanges in permissive jurisdictions. These cyber-enabled revenues exacerbate the difficulty in tracing funds and enforcing sanctions.

This all has implications for strategic stability and economic statecraft. Sanctions can no longer be considered silver bullets. Policymakers must anticipate leakage through illicit markets. Illicit revenue streams lengthen conflicts, necessitating long-term strategic preparedness for protracted war.

Here are some steps to take:

• Apply our resources and expertise in mapping terrorist-finance networks to broader shadow economies. Use or create intelligence-fusion centers that can identify actors, flows, and chokepoints using data from financial, maritime, cyber, and law enforcement sources.
• Include intelligence and assumptions about shadow economies in training, modeling, wargaming, forecasting, and planning.
• Strengthen U.S. partners’ ability to enforce trade laws and regulations. Because sanctions evaders seek pathways through countries with weaker enforcement, the United States must strengthen customs, financial oversight, and regulatory capacities in frontline states through training, resource sharing, joint operations, and interoperable sanctions enforcement frameworks.
• Make it harder for banks, insurers, shipping companies, and logistics firms to unwittingly enable shadow trade by providing incentives for them to use secure information-sharing platforms, create industry blacklists of shell firms, and increase due-diligence standards.
• More precisely target sanctions. Instead of driving large swaths of economic activity underground, take aim at known channels of illicit activity: maritime insurance providers, logistical corridors, key financial rails, and so on.
• Dissuade “permissive jurisdiction” governments from enabling shadow trade through diplomatic engagement, economic incentives, and multilateral pressure.
• Fight cyber-enabled illicit finance by integrating cybersecurity and financial intelligence efforts, regulating cryptocurrency, improving cross-border cooperation, and hardening critical infrastructure.

Maj. Benjamin Backsmeier is an infantry officer assigned to the INDOPACOM Army Reserve Element. His research focuses on how illicit financial networks interact with national-security interests. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Department of the Army or Department of Defense.

19. The Return of the Starvation Weapon

​You would think that with the "CNN-effect "(old 1990s term I know and news and information is even more ubiquitous than back then) that shining a light on these tragedies would deter states from allowing them to happen or rally international governments to pressure states and groups to prevent these conditions. But only civil society seems to care (as we see in protests) and that governments and the international community seem to just stand by and let them happen. No matter the political or security situation non-combatants do not deserve to suffer this fate. Humans need to be better than this. But I fear that Thucydides remains timeless: The strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must."

Excerpts:

Today’s surge in starvation crimes may portend even worse in the future. Observing the lack of accountability in Tigray, Mariupol, El Fasher, and now Gaza City, autocrats and warlords in any of a dozen of the world’s hot spots may well seize the chance to employ this terrible weapon. Danger spots include a looming new war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, escalating conflicts in the West African Sahel, Myanmar’s ongoing campaign to destroy the country’s Rohingya minority, and Venezuela’s relentless food crisis.

Paradoxically, this trend is occurring even as international bodies have finally begun to condemn weaponized starvation. Eighteen months ago, in the case brought by South Africa against Israel, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel should immediately provide a full spectrum of humanitarian relief and essential services, at scale and unhindered. Aharon Barak, the Israeli judge nominated to sit on the court, voted for the measure, making it unanimous. Israel hasn’t complied, a failing that increases the risk that the ICJ will in due course find that the Israeli government hasn’t met its duty to prevent genocide. In November 2024, the International Criminal Court for the first time cited starvation crimes in announcing international arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, giving a high profile to the issue. On Sudan, UN Security Council Resolution 2736, of June 2024, still stands, demanding humanitarian aid and protection of civilians in the famine zone—but has never been enforced. Failing to enforce these decisions risks making a mockery of them.

In a world with apparently insoluble problems, preventing famine is one of the easier ones. Sufficient humanitarian funding is one step—$85 billion would meet the UN’s overall target for this year. That’s tiny compared with current spending on arms or the development of artificial intelligence. And those funds won’t be needed next year if agreed measures against starvation crimes are enforced. States can legitimately fight in self-defense, but the rules of war must be obeyed. The humanitarian tent can be expanded to include new organizations, but they must be made to comply with rigorous professional standards and conform to the principle of humanity.

The global consensus against the starvation weapon took decades to achieve. Now, international apathy risks letting it collapse at the moment it is most needed. Political solutions in Sudan and between Israel and Palestine may be hard to find, but keeping people from starving is perfectly feasible. It should be something on which all can agree.

The Return of the Starvation Weapon

Foreign Affairs · More by Alex de Waal · October 3, 2025

The Collapse in Global Norms Fueling the Catastrophes in Gaza and Sudan

Alex de Waal

October 3, 2025

A Palestinian child waiting to receive food from a charity in Gaza, August 2025 Hatem Khaled / Reuters

ALEX DE WAAL is Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation and author of Mass Starvation: The History and Future of Famine.

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In late August, two of the world’s leading food crisis assessments came to the same conclusion about what is happening in Gaza: “famine with reasonable evidence.” One was the UN-affiliated Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC); the other was the U.S.-based Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a partnership of government agencies formerly under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Both bodies use rigorous criteria to designate five progressive levels of food insecurity, with “famine” as the worst. In concluding that Gaza had reached level 5, the IPC further noted that since the crisis is “entirely man-made, it can be halted and reversed.”

For months, the starvation of Gaza has seized international attention. But it is not the only war-induced famine unfolding in the world right now. In fact, it is not even the worst. In July 2024, the IPC concluded that “famine with reasonable evidence” was unfolding in war-torn Sudan, where large parts of the population have been cut off from food aid. Since then, the situation has only worsened. According to recent IPC estimates, some 800,000 Sudanese are now suffering full-blown famine and another eight million face what the IPC calls a level 4 food “emergency,” just one step below that threshold. And just below that, some 22 million people—an astounding half of the country’s total population—are contending with a level 3 food “crisis,” meaning they need aid in order to avoid becoming trapped in a doom loop of hunger and destitution. Current cease-fire proposals for both Sudan and Gaza—including the Trump administration’s new plan for Gaza unveiled on September 29—call for the reopening of humanitarian-aid channels as soon as the fighting stops. But for both populations, that may be too late. International humanitarian law dictates that essential aid should not be contingent on a cease-fire.

Famines under any circumstance have been comparatively rare since the late twentieth century. In recent decades, bigger and more skilled relief agencies and better early-warning systems have made it much easier to address hunger crises before they reach catastrophe. By the 2010s, an international consensus also seemed to have emerged against the starvation weapon. In 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2417—which formally highlighted the link between armed conflict and hunger and condemned depriving civilians of food as a method of warfare. At the time, China, Russia, and the United States each preferred to denounce some regimes while being more lenient toward others. But they all voted for the principle that intentionally starving civilians was a war crime.

Just seven years later, that looks like a long-lost era, and not only because of the disastrous wars in Gaza and Sudan. In conflicts around the world, including in Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Ukraine, military forces and their backers have once again been weaponizing hunger. Yet leading global powers, distracted by volatile geopolitical shifts, new rivalries, and economic challenges at home, have done little to stop them. Meanwhile, the humanitarian-aid budgets of many wealthy countries have been drastically cut. The result is that more and more, belligerents can inflict mass starvation on vulnerable people with impunity.

HUNGERING THEM OUT

Withholding access to food is among the oldest weapons of war. In the twentieth century alone, it was used by all sides in both world wars, by colonial powers such as the French in Algeria and the British in Malaya, and by governments fighting separatists such as Nigeria in the 1960s and Ethiopia in the 1980s. In Sudan, successive regimes have for decades resorted to starvation campaigns to achieve military aims. In 1988, near the frontline of a previous civil war between the government and southern rebels, I witnessed unchecked starvation, with civilians dying at a rate almost 50 times the IPC famine threshold. The Sudanese brigadier in charge of that sector made no pretense about the government’s aim: “We’re hungering out the rebels,” he said. As the officer well knew, the men with the guns are always the last to go hungry—so his forces were creating a famine and emptying the land of civilians, at which point the insurgents would have to either surrender or starve.

The horrors of that war were a catalyst for change. The next year, under U.S. pressure, Khartoum allowed the UN to set up Operation Lifeline Sudan, the first time the UN crossed the battle lines to aid civilians in a rebel zone. It had an immediate impact. (Khartoum’s generals later complained that the intervention cost them victory and ultimately led to the secession of South Sudan.) Over the following decades, data on hunger crises also improved. During the 2010s, when manmade famines loomed in northern Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen, FEWS NET and the IPC—which had been set up in the 1980s and the early 2000s, respectively—allowed the world to track the progressive effects in real time, in color-coded maps. Humanitarians now had a blueprint for how to monitor and prevent starvation; they just needed high-level political backing to sweep away the roadblocks, open aid corridors, and demand cease-fires.

The UN spoke softly about Russia’s starvation tactics in Mariupol.

With the UN Security Council’s passage of Resolution 2417, it looked like that resolve had finally crystallized. At the time, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley spoke passionately against the hunger weapon, singling out the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, which had freely used starvation sieges in Syria’s civil war. She refrained from publicly condemning Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their blockade of Yemen, but U.S. officials worked quietly—and effectively—to ensure that aid was delivered. For the first time, both the United States and its global rivals appeared to be united in the determination to make starvation a war crime.

But that moment was short-lived. After Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and blockade of Ukraine’s grain exports, international attention shifted to securing global food supplies. To get Russian President Vladimir Putin to consent to the UN’s Black Sea Grain Initiative, which aimed to allow Ukraine to safely export food, the UN had to speak softly about Moscow’s own use of starvation against Ukrainians, including the Russian army’s 85-day siege of the city of Mariupol. By this point, Ethiopia had already begun a war of starvation against the rebellious region of Tigray. When the IPC predicted famine, Addis Ababa simply responded by dismantling the country’s IPC working group, which, as the host government, it chaired. Famine denialism—keeping out journalists and suppressing humanitarian data—proved effective, and others have since followed that playbook. Tigray was a key test of Resolution 2417, but in the end, the Biden administration wasn’t ready to press for tough measures at the UN Security Council when Ethiopia failed to end the blockade. By 2023, the year the current wars in Sudan and Gaza started, starvation tactics were already making a comeback.

MUTUALLY ASSURED STARVATION

Sudan is today’s biggest and most intractable famine. Amid the vicious two-and-a-half-year civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a ruthless paramilitary organization led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, known as Hemedti, the numbers of hungry, destitute, and displaced are mounting every day. Because the warring parties restrict aid operations and many parts of the country are difficult to access, data is poor. But there’s no doubt that millions of civilians face truly desperate conditions, and even by conservative estimates, tens of thousands of them, most of them children, have already perished.

This tragedy is a direct result of actions taken by the warring parties on a population that is especially vulnerable to food weaponization. Before the current war began, more than two million people in Darfur were already living in camps and relied on World Food Program rations—more than half of which was funded by USAID. In the Nuba Mountains in the south of the country, there was an ongoing food emergency. Sudan’s urban dwellers were hungry, too: the Sudanese economy had all but collapsed, in part because of the loss of oil revenues following the independence of South Sudan, where most of the oil was located. In this precarious situation, RSF forces have systematically pillaged towns and villages and laid siege to , the last SAF stronghold in Darfur, for more than 500 days. Trapped inside are some 250,000 people who are cut off from food. In turn, Burhan has exploited his status as the head of the UN-recognized government to restrict the flow of aid into Darfur and other RSF-controlled areas. Meanwhile, in the Nuba Mountains, a three-sided war is unfolding—between the RSF, SAF, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army-North, which draws its support from the Nuba people, non-Arab farming communities who have long resisted the Arab-Muslim domination of the Sudanese state. Although the SPLA-N and RSF recently signed a political pact, people in encircled towns and ravaged villages continue to starve.

Without immediate intervention, it is almost certain that tens of thousands of Sudanese will die of hunger in the coming months. Yet this catastrophic situation has failed to trigger international action. This year, the UN scaled back its emergency appeal for Sudan, aiming to reach just two-thirds of the 30.9 million people in need. Even so, as of September, that bare-bones goal is barely 25 percent funded. Until January this year, USAID supported 1,400 community kitchens across Sudan, which were run by a network of local volunteers and were considered highly effective. But with the Trump administration’s gutting of USAID, 900 of the kitchens have been forced to closed. Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and the European Union, once aid superpowers, are tightening their purse strings, and wealthy Arab states, which have been meddling on both sides of the civil war, aren’t footing the bill. Even the UN Security Council has been unable to muster a strong response. In June 2024, the council passed, with Russia abstaining, a resolution ordering the RSF to allow aid into El Fasher. But in November, Moscow vetoed a second, more forceful resolution, saying it infringed on Sudanese sovereignty—a sign of how impunity has become the norm.

In mid-September, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, together with his counterparts in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—collectively the Quad—announced a cease-fire plan that requires the two sides to immediately allow in humanitarian aid. It’s the right plan, and hopefully the other Quad members will set aside their differences and press the generals to implement it. But that’s only the first step. Actually stopping the crisis not only requires international aid groups purchasing and shipping food and medicine, but also getting the aid to where it is needed, a process that involves relief convoys traversing vast distances on poor roads with numerous roadblocks where local commanders run extortion rackets. For those already sucked into the vortex of famine, this slow timeline could be a death sentence.

MILITARIZED HUMANITARIANISM?

If Sudan is the world’s worst manmade hunger crisis, Gaza has become its most visible. For months, images of starving children and crowds of desperate people risking life and limb in a struggle for food have shocked the international public. In their August reports, the IPC and FEWS NET added hard data and expert judgment to those images. Even before Israel’s ground invasion of Gaza City began, conditions were dire for the nearly one million people remaining there. Fully 30 percent of them—more than the “famine” threshold of 20 percent—had no access to food at all. Because of extremely limited access, the IPC was unable to obtain its preferred metric for malnutrition—surveys of weight-to-height ratios of children under five. But using its second-best measure, surveying children’s mid-upper-arm circumference, it found a sixfold increase in malnutrition between early June and later July—the kind of exponential spike that occurs when a population is spiraling into famine. By August, reported deaths from starvation were also mounting, and the IPC inferred, in line with its data from previous crises, that these numbers are a small fraction of the overall hunger toll, with many more perishing from the ravages of disease on malnourished bodies and low rates of survival after surgery because wounds need nutrition to heal.

Beyond pointing out that the famine is manmade, neither the IPC nor FEWS NET allocates blame. But the causes have been plain for the world to see. In early March, Israel began a total blockade of Gaza and did not allow food into the territory for 11 weeks. And when Israel, under enormous pressure, finally allowed some aid to resume, it insisted that aid would henceforth be distributed not by the UN and long-established humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, but by a new entity, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, under the supervision of the Israel Defense Forces. The switch of aid delivery to the inexperienced GHF, at precisely the moment when Gaza’s population was plunging into famine, was disastrous. Instead of the 400 or so centers run by the UN and its partners, the GHF has just four locations, three of them in the far south and one in the center of Gaza—and none at all in Gaza City or the north. As has been widely reported, aid distribution from these sites has been plagued by violence, with more than 1,000 people shot and killed by IDF soldiers and private security contractors. The GHF cannot say who has eaten, sold, or hoarded the food boxes it is distributing. Quite possibly, substantial amounts have been grabbed by various criminal gangs or by Hamas itself—another count of GHF’s lethal incompetence.

Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu has tried to dismiss the pictures of starving children as “fake” and claimed falsely that the IPC has lowered its thresholds for famine. The IPC has responded with detailed technical explanations of its methods, in line with its well-established protocols. (Notably, Israel was quiet about what transpired last May, when FEWS NET reported that northern Gaza was in famine, and the IPC adjudged that the evidence didn’t yet warrant the finding.) If Israel wanted to clear its name, it could permit better humanitarian data gathering—and indeed, allow international journalists to enter Gaza. But it has not. Aid practitioners know what’s needed to reverse the Gaza famine, and because the area is small and accessible, they could make it happen very quickly. But in order to do so, external powers, and particularly the United States, must force Israel to allow the UN and humanitarian agencies to do their job, unhindered and at scale.

Essential aid should not be contingent on a cease fire.

The United States has the power to turn this crisis around. In March 2024, the Biden administration pressured Israel to allow in more aid, and the crisis was briefly ameliorated. In January 2025, the incoming Trump administration insisted on a cease-fire, and Israel concurred. In early August, responding to international outrage, Israel allowed more food in, and the exponential increase in malnutrition rates charted by the IPC flattened. And now, U.S. President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan for Gaza promises “full aid” to begin through the UN and humanitarian agencies when Israel and Hamas accept the agreement. That could end starvation quickly. In the meantime, if Netanyahu’s Operation Gideon’s Chariots II forces the evacuation of Gaza City, that will mean the closure of 11 of Gaza’s 18 remaining hospitals and make it impossible to save the most malnourished children. Every day counts.

For aid workers, the urgency of needs has created a larger dilemma. With few other options, senior UN officials reluctantly began talking with the GHF, exploring whether collaboration might be possible. Established humanitarians condemned this, arguing that the GHF doesn’t adhere to core humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. To a degree, these shortcomings should not be disqualifying: after all, an occupying power—such as Israel in Gaza—has legal obligations to provide aid, but it clearly isn’t neutral or independent. But ending mass starvation requires more than handing out boxes of food. It also must reverse the dehumanizing effects. In such a crisis, people are so gripped by hunger that they may transgress social norms—scavenging in garbage heaps, eating animal fodder, and stealing food or hiding it from their neighbors. Survivors often remember famines as when they lived like animals and may be scarred by shame and humiliation. Thus far, the GHF has failed the test of humanity because it fails to treat Palestinians as dignified human beings. The foundation’s basic rations might keep people alive but destroy their dignity in doing so.

DISARMING THE WEAPON

Today’s surge in starvation crimes may portend even worse in the future. Observing the lack of accountability in Tigray, Mariupol, El Fasher, and now Gaza City, autocrats and warlords in any of a dozen of the world’s hot spots may well seize the chance to employ this terrible weapon. Danger spots include a looming new war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, escalating conflicts in the West African Sahel, Myanmar’s ongoing campaign to destroy the country’s Rohingya minority, and Venezuela’s relentless food crisis.

Paradoxically, this trend is occurring even as international bodies have finally begun to condemn weaponized starvation. Eighteen months ago, in the case brought by South Africa against Israel, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel should immediately provide a full spectrum of humanitarian relief and essential services, at scale and unhindered. Aharon Barak, the Israeli judge nominated to sit on the court, voted for the measure, making it unanimous. Israel hasn’t complied, a failing that increases the risk that the ICJ will in due course find that the Israeli government hasn’t met its duty to prevent genocide. In November 2024, the International Criminal Court for the first time cited starvation crimes in announcing international arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, giving a high profile to the issue. On Sudan, UN Security Council Resolution 2736, of June 2024, still stands, demanding humanitarian aid and protection of civilians in the famine zone—but has never been enforced. Failing to enforce these decisions risks making a mockery of them.

In a world with apparently insoluble problems, preventing famine is one of the easier ones. Sufficient humanitarian funding is one step—$85 billion would meet the UN’s overall target for this year. That’s tiny compared with current spending on arms or the development of artificial intelligence. And those funds won’t be needed next year if agreed measures against starvation crimes are enforced. States can legitimately fight in self-defense, but the rules of war must be obeyed. The humanitarian tent can be expanded to include new organizations, but they must be made to comply with rigorous professional standards and conform to the principle of humanity.

The global consensus against the starvation weapon took decades to achieve. Now, international apathy risks letting it collapse at the moment it is most needed. Political solutions in Sudan and between Israel and Palestine may be hard to find, but keeping people from starving is perfectly feasible. It should be something on which all can agree.

Foreign Affairs · More by Alex de Waal · October 3, 2025

​20. China's missile shield outshining Trump's Golden Dome

​Excerpts:

According to Zhao, the US maintains its missile defense targets “rogue states” like North Korea and Iran, not China, which China finds unconvincing. He says China fears a creeping US plan to nullify its nuclear deterrent.

He points out that Chinese experts often conflate technical and geopolitical concerns, warning that US deployments near China—such as the THAAD system—undermine both its conventional strike capability and broader regional influence.

On the other hand, Zhao states that US analysts believe China overstates missile defense threats to justify nuclear modernization, which keeps both sides trapped in a spiraling security dilemma.

In the end, the race to build rival Golden Domes may prove less about perfecting shields than about fueling a dangerous cycle where the pursuit of security only deepens nuclear threats.

China's missile shield outshining Trump's Golden Dome - Asia Times

US still debating Golden Dome’s design while China researchers leverage leap in data processing tech to field a prototype

asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · October 3, 2025

China’s leap to field a prototype “Golden Dome” missile shield before the US has finalized its own design signals a new phase in the rivals’ arms race, where the drive for security threatens to heighten nuclear risk.

Last month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that China had fielded a working prototype of a “Golden Dome”-style global missile defense system before the US had finalized its own plans, underscoring a widening technological gap in strategic defense.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), led by senior engineer Li Xudong of the Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology, has deployed a “distributed early warning detection big data platform” reportedly capable of monitoring up to 1,000 real-time missile launches worldwide.

Using an array of space, air, sea and ground-based sensors, the system integrates fragmented data from diverse platforms, identifies warheads versus decoys and transmits information across secure but bandwidth-limited military networks using advanced protocols such as Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC).

Researchers say the platform enables unified global situational awareness by consolidating early-warning data into a single command layer for the PLA.

By contrast, the US Golden Dome, unveiled by US President Donald Trump in May as an integrated missile shield spanning multiple domains, remains without a settled architecture, with US defense officials citing data-flow management as the program’s greatest challenge.

China’s swift deployment of a Golden Dome–style shield signals its drive to expand space defenses and project parity. Yet, it also raises doubts over whether it is investing in the same costly, unproven concept that is now testing the US’s capabilities.

Jacob Mezey states in an August 2024 Atlantic Council report that China’s development of a strategic missile defense system reflects interconnected security, technological and political objectives.

Mezey notes that ballistic missile defense (BMD) development strengthens and legitimizes its anti-satellite (ASAT) program – reflecting dual-use capabilities.

He adds that BMD development shields China’s leadership, command-and-control, nuclear forces and key infrastructure from a US preemptive strike and provides greater protection against India’s advancing missile forces, enabling China to study vulnerabilities in US BMD operations, signal technological parity and reinforce international competitiveness.

Crucially, Mezey says China’s building of required sensor networks supports a possible launch-on-warning posture, deepening strategic resilience while complicating adversary planning and bolstering crisis stability.

Examining China’s missile defense capabilities, Hsiao-Huang Shu notes in a 2021 report for the Institute of National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) that China has mastered kinetic hit-to-kill technology and conducted early deployments of long-range radars, reportedly with ranges of up to 4,000 kilometers.

Shu emphasizes that these capabilities give China leverage against US medium-range deployments in Asia and help blunt India’s advancing missile threat.

However, Shu points out that China’s BMD system is still limited to defending key areas and infrastructure, such as Beijing, Shanghai, the Bohai Sea Economic Zone and the Three Gorges Dam.

Yet even with those limits, China has showcased a prototype at a time when the US Golden Dome remains more concept than capability.

While much of the US Golden Dome’s details are classified, Time reported in August 2025 that the system comprises a four-layered architecture integrating space-based sensors and interceptors with three terrestrial tiers.

According to the report, the space layer handles early warning and tracking, and the upper land layer deploys Next Generation Interceptors (NGI) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Aegis systems.

Beneath that, Time reports there is a Limited Area Defense tier that includes Patriot missiles, advanced radars and a new “common” launcher. Time also states that a new missile field in the US Midwest will supplement existing Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) sites in California and Alaska.

However, there are significant questions about the Golden Dome’s feasibility. In a September 2025 Scientific American article, Rami Skibba mentions that critics of the US Golden Dome system cite its opacity, exorbitant cost and strategic instability.

In the same report, David Wright mentions that exempting Golden Dome from “fly before you buy” safeguards risks billions on unproven tech. Wright points out gutted oversight and unrealistic interception expectations, especially against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with decoys and chaff.

Skibba also cites Laura Grego, who says that it is the economics, not the tech, which makes Golden Dome so challenging to implement. Skibba notes that ICBMs are far cheaper to build than any defense system.

The American Physical Society warned in February 2025 that it would take 16,000 interceptors to destroy 10 ICBMs, while the US Department of Defense (DoD) noted in 2024 that China has 400. However, China may also face the same challenge, as the US also has 400 Minuteman III ICBMs.

Skibba adds that Golden Dome’s low earth orbit (LEO) satellites would decay without costly replacements, driving expenses beyond US$1 trillion. Grego warns that one compromised satellite could let a nuclear warhead slip through.

Beyond technical limits, the political implications loom larger. But even as experts debate architectures, the deeper issue lies in perception: each side reads the other’s defenses through a lens of mistrust.

Tong Zhao points out in his June 2020 book, “Narrowing the US-China Gap on Missile Defense: How to Help Forestall a Nuclear Arms Race”, that US-China perceptions of each other’s missile defense systems are shaped by deep ambiguities and mutual suspicion.

According to Zhao, the US maintains its missile defense targets “rogue states” like North Korea and Iran, not China, which China finds unconvincing. He says China fears a creeping US plan to nullify its nuclear deterrent.

He points out that Chinese experts often conflate technical and geopolitical concerns, warning that US deployments near China—such as the THAAD system—undermine both its conventional strike capability and broader regional influence.

On the other hand, Zhao states that US analysts believe China overstates missile defense threats to justify nuclear modernization, which keeps both sides trapped in a spiraling security dilemma.

In the end, the race to build rival Golden Domes may prove less about perfecting shields than about fueling a dangerous cycle where the pursuit of security only deepens nuclear threats.

asiatimes.com · Gabriel Honrada · October 3, 2025

21. Manila vows to block China’s militarization of Scarborough Shoal

​I must emphasize this Ambassador's comment here:

“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”

 – Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024

Manila vows to block China’s militarization of Scarborough Shoal - Asia Times

Military chief Brawner drops gauntlet on contested South China Sea feature after China declares it a nature reserve

asiatimes.com · Jason Gutierrez · October 3, 2025

MANILA – The Philippines on Friday said it would not allow China to militarize the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea, where Beijing has recently announced it would transform the area into a nature reserve.

Armed Forces of the Philippines chief General Romeo Brawner said the Philippines was also looking at expanding the scope of large-scale joint military exercises to include more training with like-minded countries beyond its traditional ally, the United States.

He said Manila would prevent any moves by China to make Scarborough Shoal into a militarized area, similar to what Beijing did at Mischief Reef in 1995, where they first built a small structure ostensibly as a resting spot for fishermen caught in bad weather.

“And in fact, they said anybody can use it. And so we allowed them to do that,” Brawner told members of the Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines (FOCAP). “Later on, they built it into an artificial island, a militarized island that is now equipped with missile systems, radar systems, a big airfield that could accommodate jet fighters and even cargo planes and so on.”

“So we do not want that to happen to Scarborough. That’s why we are closely watching” their actions, he said. Once the Chinese are monitored to have built structures in the area, the government will quickly address the issue diplomatically.

Known as Bajo de Masinloc in the Philippines, Scarborough Shoal is considered a traditional fishing ground for generations of Filipino fishermen. It lies just 125 nautical miles (232 kilometers) west of the country’s main Luzon island inside the Philippines’ internationally recognized exclusive economic zone.

In contrast, it is 472 nautical miles to the nearest Chinese province of Hainan. Still, Beijing claims historical rights over the shoal despite its proximity to the Philippines, making the maritime feature a potential flashpoint of conflict.

The shoal, a U-shaped rocky outcrop, has been under China’s de facto control for 13 years after a monthslong standoff in 2012. The Philippines took China to an international arbitration court in The Hague, which invalidated Beijing’s sweeping claims in a 2016 ruling. Beijing has rejected the ruling, even as world powers, including the United States, hailed the decision.

The same court also said China had violated the rights of Filipinos, who were routinely harassed by the China Coast Guard from going into the shoal area.

“Once they build a structure there, that would be a different story. We have several options that we could do. Diplomatically, we could file protests, but we are watching so that we will not have a repeat of Mischief Reef,” Brawner said on Friday.

Mischief Reef, which is west of the Philippines’ island of Palawan, has been transformed by the Chinese into an artificial island that has a runway, radar systems and and surface-to-air missiles. What happened there is a cautionary tale for Manila.

Last month, Manila’s foreign ministry formally filed a diplomatic protest against China for its announced plans to create a nature reserve in Scarborough.

The protest was a “strong, unequivocal and formal articulation” of Manila’s objection to the Chinese plan, it said. The creation of the nature reserve was announced on September 10, a move analysts said was meant to bolster China’s territorial claim to Scarborough, known as Huangyan Island in China.

China has countered that it was within its legal right to set up the reserve, which it claimed was aimed at protecting Scarborough’s ecological diversity. It said the Philippines’ protests were groundless.

China has been holding drills near Scarborough since February, with its Southern Command saying that they were meant to boost “the control of relevant sea and air areas, resolutely defend national sovereignty, and security and resolutely maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea.”

At least two of its warships, backed by several aircraft, are frequently seen in the region.

Jason Gutierrez was head of Philippine news at BenarNews, an online news service affiliated with Radio Free Asia (RFA), a Washington-based news organization that covered many under-reported countries in the region. A veteran foreign correspondent, he has also worked with The New York Times and Agence France-Presse (AFP).

asiatimes.com · Jason Gutierrez · October 3, 2025

22. Veterans See Costs and Risks in Hegseth’s Military Rewind to 1990

​Excerpts:

Mr. Toor also said Mr. Hegseth was right to call out many of the issues he raised in his talk. As a Marine captain, he encountered onerous training mandates and uneven enforcement of fitness standards, and saw scruffy faces proliferating in the ranks.

“The problems are real,” he said. “But I’m not sure he is going about them in a way that helps. I had really good Marines who, because of a medical condition, legitimately couldn’t shave. Under these rules, I would lose those guys. How is that making our military better?”

Mr. Christensen expressed similar concerns about changes that Mr. Hegseth made to the military’s offices of equal opportunity and inspector general, which investigate reports of misconduct and discrimination. Mr. Hegseth said those offices had been “weaponized, putting complainers, ideologues and poor performers in the driver’s seat.”

The new directives mandate that reports be dealt with swiftly, but also allow the military to identify and punish people who make complaints that are determined to be unfounded.

Veterans See Costs and Risks in Hegseth’s Military Rewind to 1990

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has identified real problems, veteran officers say, but by looking back 35 years for policy cues, he risks hurting, not helping, military readiness.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/02/us/hegseth-military-veterans-standards.html

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth gathered nearly all of the nation’s generals and admirals at Quantico, Va., on Tuesday to hear his vision for the military.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Dave Philipps

Oct. 2, 2025

A ban on beards. A focus on physical fitness, and more protections for unapologetically aggressive leaders. In an unusual speech in front of hundreds of generals and admirals, and in a flurry of memorandums afterward, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth outlined his vision of a tougher and more disciplined military, without what he called “woke garbage” getting in the way.

But former military officers took issue with Mr. Hegseth’s list of policy changes, saying that some of them seemed redundant and others threatened to undermine his goals of increased readiness and lethality.

The secretary focused heavily on personnel matters. In are mandatory shaving, more harrowing basic training and daily physical training for everyone. Out are requirements that protect whistle-blowers from retribution and rules that require formally reviewing past misconduct when screening leaders for promotion.

Don Christensen, a retired Air Force colonel and former military lawyer who watched the speech, said it seemed “disconnected from reality.”

“The big issues in the military are not with beards and people being out of shape and rampant D.E.I.,” said Mr. Christensen, who after retiring from the military led Protect Our Defenders, a group that protects whistle-blowers.

Mr. Hegseth urged the assembled generals and admirals to apply what he called the “1990 rule,” and scrutinize any changes to training or standards that were made in the last 35 years. “1990 seems to be as good a place to start as any,” Mr. Hegseth told his audience.

It was also the last year before laws that excluded women from combat roles were changed, starting a long process that has led to women serving in nearly every part of the armed forces, including top leadership. And since then, the military has become increasingly diverse as well.

Though Mr. Hegseth issued no new guidelines specific to women, he said all combat troops would be required to meet “the highest male standard only.”

“This is not about preventing women from serving,” he said. “But when it comes to any job that requires physical power to perform in combat, those physical standards must be high and gender-neutral. If women can make it, excellent. If not, it is what it is.”

This left a lot of people in uniform scratching their heads, because women who serve in combat roles already have to meet the same physical performance standards as men, and have been required to do so for as long as they have been allowed into those jobs, the last of which were opened to women nearly a decade ago.

Another of Mr. Hegseth’s directives was aimed at excluding from deployment nearly all troops who wear beards, including those with religious exceptions.

He spoke disparagingly about such troops. “No more beardos,” Mr. Hegseth told the assembled generals and admirals. “The era of rampant and ridiculous shaving profiles is done.” He added that if troops “don’t want to shave and look professional, it’s time for a new position or a new profession.”

Sukhbir Toor, a field artillery officer and observant Sikh who retired from the Marine Corps this year, said Mr. Hegseth’s remarks seemed disconnected from military reality.

“I just don’t think he understands what he’s talking about,” Mr. Toor said, “and the way he goes about it is extremely disrespectful.”

Like hundreds of other Sikhs, he was given permission to wear a beard and a turban while in uniform, and has shown he can effectively wear a gas mask with his beard. He said the new restrictions excluding troops with beards from deployment — an important step in earning promotion — would effectively cut short the careers of many observant Muslims and Jews, as well as his fellow Sikhs.

“We have Sikh service members serving right now in artillery, in infantry, in Special Operations, deployed around the world, away from their families,” he said. “We’ve shown we can do the job and we represent the warrior ethos that the secretary is talking about. To hear the secretary refer to us as beardos — to me, it’s appalling.”

To be sure, some of the issues Mr. Hegseth raised in his speech resonated with many in uniform. Shaving exemptions have proliferated, and leaders have been told not to question troops about them, for fear of violating medical privacy rules. Resolving complaints made to inspectors general can take months even when they are not supported by evidence, stalling the careers of the troops involved. And commanders often struggle to fit in all the training programs they have to take on topics like human trafficking and cybersecurity — requirements that Mr. Hegseth said would be reviewed.

“I don’t know how many of those trafficking trainings I sat through, even though it’s something I never dealt with,” said Mr. Christensen, who served in the Air Force for 20 years. “I one-hundred-percent agree that a review of those trainings makes sense.”

Mr. Toor also said Mr. Hegseth was right to call out many of the issues he raised in his talk. As a Marine captain, he encountered onerous training mandates and uneven enforcement of fitness standards, and saw scruffy faces proliferating in the ranks.

“The problems are real,” he said. “But I’m not sure he is going about them in a way that helps. I had really good Marines who, because of a medical condition, legitimately couldn’t shave. Under these rules, I would lose those guys. How is that making our military better?”

Mr. Christensen expressed similar concerns about changes that Mr. Hegseth made to the military’s offices of equal opportunity and inspector general, which investigate reports of misconduct and discrimination. Mr. Hegseth said those offices had been “weaponized, putting complainers, ideologues and poor performers in the driver’s seat.”

The new directives mandate that reports be dealt with swiftly, but also allow the military to identify and punish people who make complaints that are determined to be unfounded.

“This is only going to hurt,” Mr. Christensen said. “If you are afraid you’ll be punished for speaking up, just because the allegations couldn’t be proved, it will discourage a lot of people.

Noting that he had seen repeated abuses in his time running a group that protects whistle blowers, he added: “This system is in place for a reason. You only need to go back through recent history to see that complaints of sexual harassment, discrimination and other misconduct were founded.”

Mr. Christensen also found the secretary’s plans to allow drill instructors to be more aggressive during boot camp, and to drop long-established rules that restrict instructors from physically touching trainees, to be puzzling.

“Those rules were created after decades and decades of abuse and assault,” Mr. Christensen said. “I don’t think that will end well.”

Many of the regulations Mr. Hegseth is rolling back were put in place after 1990, as an increasingly diverse military learned to deal with problems like harassment and discrimination. For many troops, the year that Mr. Hegseth has set as his standard was a dark time when sexual harassment went unpunished and women were barred from flying combat missions, serving on many warships or doing other work central to the military’s mission.

“If we went back to the way it was in 1990, I would not have been allowed to do my job,” said Elisa Cardnell, a former Navy officer who served on a destroyer and now runs the Service Women’s Action Network. “Times have changed. We have a lot of women serving in combat, and we have shown that it can work.”

There are now about 10,000 women serving in combat units. The number of women in the most physically demanding Special Operations jobs remains small, in part because the grueling physical standards required of all candidates for those roles are something that few men, and even fewer women, can meet.

Mr. Cardnell said she found it confusing when Mr. Hegseth, who has repeatedly said that he believed women did not belong in combat jobs, demands that the military stop lowering performance standards to make accommodations to women.

“He keeps talking about fixing a problem that doesn’t exist,” she said. “We all are required to meet the same standards. But I’m afraid we are at a point where women just existing in the military has become a political issue.”

A correction was made on Oct. 2, 2025: An earlier version of this article referred incorrectly to Don Christensen’s role in Protect Our Defenders. He was the group’s president, not its founder.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com.Learn more

Dave Philipps writes about war, the military and veterans and covers The Pentagon.

23. What Women Heard in Hegseth’s Remarks About Physical Standards

​Excerpts:

“I tried to stay open-minded to what he was trying to say,” Captain Scholley said of Mr. Hegseth’s remarks. “Because every time a new commander takes over in the military, they set the tone.”

During 24 years of active-duty service, Captain Scholley said, opportunities for women in the armed services had improved, but only because they fought hard to overcome the misogyny in the military.

“Things I thought had gotten better are now being eroded,” she said. “I had to work really, really hard to get to where I was, and even work harder than some of my male counterparts in order to be taken seriously and get the jobs I wanted.”

“Hegseth just made it sound like we were just handed things just because we were women and there were quotas, which is so far from the truth,” she added.

When Kate Wilder was an Army captain in 1980, she overcame intense resistance from some senior male officers to become the first woman to graduate from Army Special Forces training, meeting all of the standards expected of male soldiers. She retired as a lieutenant colonel.

“Nobody changed the standards for me,” Colonel Wilder said in an interview. “I didn’t ask for any changes to be made, and nobody did me any favors, either. So, I went along and took the test just like everybody else did.”

“You just have to get out there and prove the people wrong,” she added. “And just do your best.”

Soon after Colonel Wilder graduated from the Special Forces school, the Army barred women from applying for that course.

What Women Heard in Hegseth’s Remarks About Physical Standards

The defense secretary raised the issue suggesting women were getting into combat not because they met high standards, but because they were given a pass.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/02/us/politics/women-military-hegseth-physical-standards.html

A training event known as “the gauntlet” at the Citadel, the South Carolina military academy, in 2019.Credit...Alyssa Schukar for The New York Times

By John Ismay

Reporting from Washington

Oct. 2, 2025

Bobbie Scholley, a retired Navy captain and advocate for women in military special operations, decided to watch Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s address on Tuesday to hundreds of military leaders to see whether he had anything new to say.

But after about 30 minutes into a livestream of the event, she snapped her laptop closed.

“I listened to it with my gut just clenching, and it just kept getting worse and worse and worse until finally I turned it off,” Captain Scholley said in an interview.

In the hodgepodge of messages, Mr. Hegseth told the crowd at a base in Virginia that physical fitness standards had slipped in recent years to make it possible for women to serve in combat roles. It is an idea he has often repeated, without evidence.

Women, he said, should be held to the “highest male standard.”

“If that means no women qualify for some combat jobs, so be it,” Mr. Hegseth told the crowd.

Mr. Hegseth often talks about fitness standards for women, though it is unclear which ones he is referring to. Three categories of military physical tests have been given to men and women for decades.

The secretary raised the issue suggesting that women were getting into combat not because they met high standards, but because they were given a pass. Men and women must meet different basic fitness standards for admission to the military, but for the most high-risk, high-demand positions, standards are gender-neutral.

As a junior officer in 1983, Captain Scholley graduated from the Navy’s deep-sea diving and underwater salvage courses, which are among the most physically demanding in the military. Only about two dozen women had completed the classes since the Navy allowed women to attend eight years earlier.

“I tried to stay open-minded to what he was trying to say,” Captain Scholley said of Mr. Hegseth’s remarks. “Because every time a new commander takes over in the military, they set the tone.”

During 24 years of active-duty service, Captain Scholley said, opportunities for women in the armed services had improved, but only because they fought hard to overcome the misogyny in the military.

“Things I thought had gotten better are now being eroded,” she said. “I had to work really, really hard to get to where I was, and even work harder than some of my male counterparts in order to be taken seriously and get the jobs I wanted.”

“Hegseth just made it sound like we were just handed things just because we were women and there were quotas, which is so far from the truth,” she added.

When Kate Wilder was an Army captain in 1980, she overcame intense resistance from some senior male officers to become the first woman to graduate from Army Special Forces training, meeting all of the standards expected of male soldiers. She retired as a lieutenant colonel.

Image

A Navy SEAL-style training exercise at Folly Beach in South Carolina in 2018.Credit...Alyssa Schukar for The New York Times

“Nobody changed the standards for me,” Colonel Wilder said in an interview. “I didn’t ask for any changes to be made, and nobody did me any favors, either. So, I went along and took the test just like everybody else did.”

“You just have to get out there and prove the people wrong,” she added. “And just do your best.”

Soon after Colonel Wilder graduated from the Special Forces school, the Army barred women from applying for that course.

Trump Administration: Live Updates

Updated 

Oct. 2, 2025, 6:14 p.m. ETOct. 2, 2025

• Trump name-checks Project 2025 as he threatens to dismantle agencies.
• Partisan language was inserted into Education Department workers’ automated emails without their consent.
• ‘Really bummed’: Visitors find a closed presidential library in Atlanta.

That changed only in 2016 when the Defense Department formally dropped the last remaining restrictions on women in combat. Four years later, a female National Guard soldier became the first woman to graduate from Special Forces training after Colonel Wilder.

When Captain Scholley showed up at the Navy’s Dive and Salvage Training Center in Panama City Beach, Fla., in 1983, there was only one other woman in her class.

Their senior instructor, a chief petty officer, told them to let him know “if anyone gives you any problems because you’re women.”

“And then he turned right around and said, ‘Don’t expect any slack, because you’re going to get the same treatment as all the other men,’” she recalled. “And we’re like, ‘Well, no, of course, chief, we don’t expect any special treatment.’”

The deep-sea diving equipment they wore weighed about 120 pounds, Captain Scholley recalled, and was not built to fit women’s bodies.

She went on to command both a salvage ship and a mobile diving and salvage unit, and was one of the senior diving officers for the recovery of TWA Flight 800, which exploded over Long Island Sound in 1996.

In 2000, she supervised dive operations inside the U.S.S. Cole, the Navy destroyer that was badly damaged in a terrorist attack off the coast of Aden, Yemen, and helped to stabilize the stricken vessel and recover the bodies of sailors trapped underwater inside the ship.

Captain Scholley also led Navy expeditions in 2001 and 2002 that recovered sections of the U.S.S. Monitor, a Union ironclad that sank in a gale off Cape Hatteras, N.C, during the Civil War.

During those expeditions, divers battled bad weather and strong underwater currents, had to breathe specialized gas mixtures at depths of 240 feet, and underwent treatments in hyperbaric chambers once they reached the surface.

That mission involved 24-hour diving operations seven days a week for 45 days, all while the divers lived on a rented oil exploration barge anchored over the Monitor’s wreck.

Even with those accomplishments, Captain Scholley and Colonel Wilder both served at a time when the decades-long journey to equality for women in the military was still ongoing.

Women were first allowed to serve on warships and fly combat aircraft in 1993, but were still prohibited from joining certain direct-combat occupations like the infantry, artillery, submarines and many special operations career fields.

The ban on women serving aboard submarines ended in 2010, and the last prohibitions against women in other combat roles were dropped by the Defense Department in 2015.

At the time Captain Scholley served, being a deep-sea diver was not considered a combat job, but this week Mr. Hegseth expanded the list of what are considered “combat arms occupations” in the Navy to include divers and explosive ordnance disposal technicians.

Mr. Hegseth further directed men and women in combat jobs across the Defense Department to “execute their service fitness tests at a gender-neutral, age-normed male standard scored above 70 percent.”

But it was unclear which tests would be used and what those scores would be, and the Pentagon did not respond to a request for clarification on Wednesday.

The physical fitness test that Captain Scholley took to enter dive school more than 40 years ago was the same required of men and has not changed: a 500-yard swim, a 10-minute rest, two minutes of push-ups, two minutes of sit-ups, pull-ups with no time limit, and another 10-minute rest followed by a mile-and-a-half run.

“If I can make it, then just don’t put a ‘do not enter sign’ in front of my path and make me have to not enter because I may have committed the mortal sin of being born female,” Colonel Wilder said. “I mean, that’s not right. That doesn’t cut it.”

John Ismay is a reporter covering the Pentagon for The Times. He served as an explosive ordnance disposal officer in the U.S. Navy.

24. A Big Production for a Small Vision

A Big Production for a Small Vision

Hegseth’s in-person speech was disruptive, wasteful, and unoriginal.

thedispatch.com · Mike Nelson

Despite doomsaying about loyalty oaths ahead of Pete Hegseth’s gathering of top U.S. military officers this week, it appears not every decision the defense secretary makes is indicative of creeping fascism. We can take comfort in the fact that many of his decisions are not authoritarian, but rather incredibly stupid and amateur. Indeed, his conclave of the bulk of America’s generals and admirals falls firmly into the latter category.

First reported by the Washington Post last week, Hegseth directed that every general and flag officer in command, and their senior enlisted advisers, travel to the Quantico Marine Corps base for an in-person meeting held Tuesday. In the lead-up, the Pentagon was closed-lipped about the intent of the meeting, the urgency of convening it within a week of notification, and the reasons for holding it in person.

To be sure, part of a defense secretary’s role is to impart his or her vision to the country’s defense and military apparatus. And the means by which he or she delivers that message is at his or her discretion. Therefore, convening a quorum of 800 senior leaders is within the secretary’s authority—but leaders at the national level are hired in part to exercise their judgment to discern between what they can do and what they should. In other words, is the desired result of these types of meetings important enough to justify the cost and disruption?

“In many ways, this speech is about fixing decades of decay,” Hegseth said. “We’re ending the war on warriors.” Despite producing lots of tough-talking soundbites, however, the “substance” of the event seemed to be light, to put it generously. The secretary laid out a vision of a warrior culture for the department that he has presented multiple times, in multiple formats, including in his book on the topic. But one would be hard pressed to find an idea, or even a phrase, which Hegseth himself had not repeated ad nauseam for the past eight months. While it is true that physical fitness and uniform standards are important, neither argument is revelatory, nor should they be the most pressing priority of a secretary of defense.

President Donald Trump, for his part, took the opportunity to air political grievances before the captive audience of commanders. While the overtly partisan portions of the speech were inappropriate for the audience, the senior officers listened respectfully without cheering, clapping, or reacting—a welcome change from a more enthusiastic reception to Trump’s similarly inappropriate speech at Fort Bragg in June.

Not only was this event a performance lacking in real substance, it also caused significant tumult to pull off. The Pentagon’s global enterprise is massive, both in scale and complexity. It is the largest agency in the federal government, with operations and priorities spanning the entire world and time horizons decades into the future. To move the machinery of American defense, a secretary is given a wide variety of tools to convey his or her vision, guidance, and orders. There are written communications, both in the form of published policy documents and private secure networks. There are secure video conference capabilities, which allow key leaders and decision makers across every time zone to convene simultaneously. And there is the chain of command, through which the secretary can impart guidance that is then passed to military leaders and translated from the strategic and conceptual to the concrete, eventually reaching the level of the individual soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, or guardian. But of all the possible tools, in-person communication, while it may indeed come with greater impact and clarity, is often the least efficient.

While it is not out of the ordinary for civilian leaders and senior commanders to conduct meetings, councils, and conferences for their subordinate commanders, these usually involve direct subordinates. This gathering went much further. For example, based on the reported guidance that all generals in command positions must attend, the audience would have included the commanding general of the Army’s 25th Infantry Division. The 25th ID commander’s boss is the commander of I Corps, whose boss is the commander of U.S. Army Pacific, whose bosses are both the chief of staff of the Army and the commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, both of whom report directly to the secretary of defense. In other words, Hegseth felt the need to reach down four levels below him rather than allowing commanders one to two levels down to impart the guidance to their respective commands.

Does Hegseth not trust the officers in his direct command to correctly impart his guidance? The military relies on a hierarchical system, and not leaning on commanders to implement strategic vision to subordinates creates micromanagement, distrust, and grinds initiative to a halt. It is also condescending to a group whose number included several former commanders of the Delta Force, the 75th Ranger Regiment, special forces groups, and others for whom a lecture on warrior ethos was far from necessary.

Moving 800 general officers and senior enlisted advisors is no small task, but the level of complexity may not be obvious to the general population. For some of these commanders, the matter of getting to Northern Virginia was as simple as booking a flight on a major carrier and taking a taxi to Quantico. But many of the attendees were commanders overseeing active operations. For example, the combatant commanders leading the 11 geographically aligned or functionally focused unified commands usually need secure communications while in transit, which means traveling on one of the limited Air Force fleet that can support the requirement. Usually, these commanders travel at varied times, allowing the Air Force to sequence the flights of these aircraft accordingly. But this event required significant overlap and simultaneous travel, likely requiring multiple commanders to travel on the same aircraft.

The massive travel directive required leaders to incur some level of risk, balancing between risk-to-force (consolidating multiple commanders on single flights) and risk-to-mission (dispersing commanders in a way that means several are not in communication with their commands during transit). Were either likely to be catastrophic? No. Was it possible that this undertaking could have ended in catastrophe? Of course. Forget any trepidation one might feel as to whether threat actors would try to exploit such a situation; it’s worth remembering that the largest losses of life suffered by both the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions since World War II were due to peacetime aircraft crashes. This is in addition to the risk of nearly every major commander in the U.S. military convening in one place at the same time.

Why take the risk for what amounted to a glorified “pep rally”? What crucial bit of new insight did the secretary impart that could not have been delivered via video conference or written guidance? As seems to be the case for many of Hegseth’s social media videos and speeches, this was another example of activity without accomplishment, performance without productivity.

Hegseth has, in the past, tried to distinguish himself from his predecessors by drawing a contrast between out-of-touch generals and a down-in-the-dirt major with “dust on his boots.” The speciousness of the argument aside, the question of whether Hegseth will ever grow into being anything more than one who limits his view to the tactical level, focusing on physical training while eschewing the strategic and institutional demands of his job, remains.

The format of this meeting suggests Hegseth lacks the ability to properly communicate with his global enterprise through more efficient means. And the substance of it indicates that Hegseth lacks the intellectual rigor to properly direct his attention toward preparing his department for the challenges at hand, like revitalizing the defense industrial base, ramping up shipbuilding, and reorganizing the services based on the conflicts we might need to be prepared to face. Instead, Hegseth seems to believe that if he repeats vague proclamations about warrior spirit or purging woke ideology louder, more often, or in different fora, these words will act like an incantation, magically unlocking his desired outcome when said in the right location or combination.

Instead of using his and his commanders’ valuable time to meet the varied demands of their roles and address threats to the country, the secretary decided instead to turn the gears of the global military machine toward facilitating an event aimed at making him feel or appear in charge. As the great Margaret Thatcher said, “Being powerful is like being a lady. If you have to tell people you are, you aren’t.”

thedispatch.com · Mike Nelson

25. The Quantico Convocation ... Right Message, Wrong Messenger.

​Excerpts:

Conclusion

In many respects, the content of the Quantico convocation carried messages worth considering: sharpen standards, refocus on lethality, streamline leadership. Yet delivered by Pete Hegseth and framed by Donald Trump, the entire exercise risks being remembered not as a professional reset, but as a political spectacle.

The tragedy is that the right message—the need for excellence, cohesion, and readiness—was discredited by the wrong messenger, a man whose biases and politicization cast doubt on motive, method, and outcome.

The result is a compound dilemma: a force that must strive for higher standards, yet must now do so under leaders who have eroded the very trust and impartiality on which those standards depend.

That is the deeper danger—not just a military called to higher performance, but a military led into politicization under the guise of warrior ethos.

Compound Security, Unlocked

The Quantico Convocation ...

Right Message, Wrong Messenger.

https://compoundsecurityunlocked.substack.com/p/the-quantico-convocation?r=7i07&utm

Isaiah Wilson III

Oct 02, 2025

“A republic, if you can keep it.”

— Benjamin Franklin

On September 30, 2025, the U.S. military witnessed a spectacle without precedent. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth summoned hundreds of generals and admirals—many flown in from combatant commands and global billets—into one cavernous hall at Quantico. President Trump joined him at the podium.

The images were striking: a mass gathering of the American military’s most senior leaders, called with little notice, and addressed in bluntly ideological terms.

What was said is consequential. But equally consequential is how it was said, and who said it.

The Announcements

Hegseth and Trump rolled out sweeping pronouncements:

• Fitness standards reset: “highest male standards” imposed universally across combat roles, effectively shrinking the pool of women eligible for certain fields.
• Cultural rollback: wholesale elimination of DEI programs, tightening grooming codes, and re-centering “warrior ethos” above all else.
• Leadership cuts: 10% reduction in flag billets, with 20% cuts at the four-star level.
• Symbolic rebranding: Trump floated renaming the Pentagon the “Department of War.”

Taken individually, these changes might be defended as tightening standards, reemphasizing lethality, and streamlining a bloated flag corps. In many respects, these are not illegitimate debates. The message itself—combat readiness, focus, lethality—is not inherently wrong.

The Delivery: Out of Pattern and Out of Bounds

The delivery, however, was problematic in every sense:

1. Scale and Surprise
2. Mass-assembling hundreds of senior officers into one hall for a single speech, with global operational responsibilities disrupted, is operationally brittle and institutionally unprecedented. Commanders were pulled from their duties for what amounted to a political rally masquerading as professional guidance.
3. Civil-Military Norms
4. The rhetoric was openly ideological. Labeling senior officers “fat generals” and tying loyalty to policy alignment sounded more like a loyalty test than professional military guidance. This risks unlawful command influence—eroding candor in the chain of command at the very moment when candor is essential.
5. Institutional Chilling Effect
6. Changes to oversight structures—IGs, EO offices, JAGs—were hinted at as well. If realized, such moves would shrink protected spaces for dissent, whistleblowing, or red-team analysis, replacing them with fear and compliance.

Right Message, Wrong Messenger

Here lies the deeper paradox.

Calls for higher standards, warrior ethos, and leaner leadership resonate with many in uniform. Yet they were delivered by a messenger whose record undercuts the legitimacy of the message.

Pete Hegseth, from his earliest days as a commentator and activist, has trafficked in culture-war identity politics. His biases—against women in combat, against non-white “others,” against institutional diversity—are well documented. When such a figure insists on higher standards, what many hear is not an even-handed professional call to excellence, but a partisan rebuke cloaked in the language of discipline.

That perception matters.

Standards only command respect when they are seen as impartial, fairly applied, and rooted in universal principles of military necessity—not in the preferences or prejudices of the man holding the microphone. Delivered by Hegseth, even the partially right message curdles into suspicion.

Is this about readiness, or about ideology? About lethality, or about loyalty?

The “Merit-Based” Subterfuge

Let’s say it plainly.

In recent years, “merit-based” has been weaponized to launder identity attacks as technocratic common sense. You redefine the test, then call the outcome “neutral”:

• Set male-only benchmarks as the universal yardstick, and you’ve quietly shrunk the pipeline for women.
• Erase DEI as “politics,” and you’ve dissolved the tools that surface discrimination and keep standards applied fairly.
• Roll back EO/JAG/IG protections, and you’ve signaled to marginalized troops—including trans service members—that reporting abuse can cost them their careers.
• Package all of that as “readiness,” then accuse critics of being anti-merit.

So then, if we choose to open our eyes and see the truth behind all the veils, … this isn’t about concerns over lowering standards.

It’s about consistent standards, relevant to mission, impartially applied, with real safeguards against bias.

A military that drives away talented Americans because they’re trans, or because they don’t fit a nostalgic image of who “looks like” a warfighter, is not a stronger force. It’s a smaller one—with less trust inside the ranks and less credibility with the public.

The Costs (Real, Not Theatrical)

• Readiness risk: Recruiting is already tight. Shrinking eligibility and scaring off entire communities makes the force more brittle, not more lethal.
• Cohesion and trust: Troops don’t need slogans; they need to know the system is fair. If “merit” is a fig leaf for exclusion, trust collapses.
• Allies watching: Partners saw a partisan spectacle. That breeds doubt about U.S. steadiness. Doubt is expensive.
• Adversaries exploiting: Moscow and Beijing will frame this as proof the U.S. military is politicized and divided.Strategic Costs and Risks

1. Readiness and Talent
2. Shrinking eligible pools at a time of recruiting shortfalls is a gamble. Talent is already scarce; narrowing the aperture further may degrade readiness, not improve it.
3. Allied Confidence
4. Allies and partners watched this event live. They saw politics injected into America’s military leadership, and they will adjust their trust accordingly. Expect hesitation in basing, intel-sharing, and combined operations.
5. Adversary Exploitation
6. Russia, China, and others will seize the optics. They will paint the U.S. as internally divided, increasingly politicized, and less reliable as a security guarantor.

What to Watch

• Directives in Writing: Are speeches converted into binding policy?
• Personnel Moves: Who is fired, retired, or reassigned next?
• Congressional Oversight: Do lawmakers resist, acquiesce, or accelerate the changes?
• Recruitment Data: Do women and minority accessions drop further?
• Allied Signaling: Do caveats creep into coalition planning?

Conclusion

In many respects, the content of the Quantico convocation carried messages worth considering: sharpen standards, refocus on lethality, streamline leadership. Yet delivered by Pete Hegseth and framed by Donald Trump, the entire exercise risks being remembered not as a professional reset, but as a political spectacle.

The tragedy is that the right message—the need for excellence, cohesion, and readiness—was discredited by the wrong messenger, a man whose biases and politicization cast doubt on motive, method, and outcome.

The result is a compound dilemma: a force that must strive for higher standards, yet must now do so under leaders who have eroded the very trust and impartiality on which those standards depend.

That is the deeper danger—not just a military called to higher performance, but a military led into politicization under the guise of warrior ethos.

“It is not enough to have the right ends; the means must be worthy of the ends.”

— Reinhold Niebuhr

26. Five Takeaways About the Culture of Lawlessness in the U.S. Special Forces

This is quite an allegation. Can the dots be connected?

Conclusion:

The article reveals that the vision of unbridled power held by the Trump administration has its roots in the lawlessness of the United States’ wars overseas.

Five Takeaways About the Culture of Lawlessness in the U.S. Special Forces

Until now, many of the troubling events that took place during the war in Afghanistan have been shrouded in secrecy.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/30/magazine/afghanistan-war-green-berets-trump-hegseth.html

NY Times · Matthieu Aikins · September 30, 2025

Green Berets training support staff at Camp Mackall in North Carolina in May.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times

Until now, many of the troubling events that took place during the war in Afghanistan have been shrouded in secrecy.

Green Berets training support staff at Camp Mackall in North Carolina in May.Credit...Victor J. Blue for The New York Times

By

• Sept. 30, 2025

In Afghanistan, during the United States’ longest war, special operators like the Green Berets shouldered a disproportionate share of the fighting. At home, they were held up as heroes for their highly publicized exploits. But behind the glory, there was a dark side the public did not see: a culture of rule-breaking that led to war crimes and, eventually, a vigilante ethos openly embraced by leaders at home.

This troubling history has been shrouded by the Army’s intense secrecy around its operators. In the past four years, I interviewed two dozen current and former members of Army Special Operations, including some who were willing to publicly accuse the organization of misconduct. The Times filed lawsuits that yielded thousands of pages of previously unpublished investigations, detainee files and other military records. To track down and interview scores of local witnesses, I made multiple trips to Afghanistan, where I have been reporting since 2008.

A spokeswoman for Army Special Operations, Lt. Col. Allie Scott, defended the organization. “We have fully investigated and adjudicated the cases you cover,” she wrote. “We are confident our actions stand up to the strictest scrutiny.”

Until now, it hasn’t been possible to reckon with many of these events because they were kept secret. Doing so helps us to understand not only the toll of the war on the U.S’s elite forces but also our current political moment, as the Trump administration loosens restraints on the military, orders lethal military strikes on alleged Venezuelan “narco-terrorists” in the Caribbean and deploys troops to American cities.

Here are five takeaways from the four-part magazine investigation.

A Green Beret’s Confession Outraged the Military. Then He Found an Ally in Trump.

Did a Green Beret Unit Commit One of the Worst U.S. War Crimes in Decades?

How War-Crime Accusations Against Green Berets Were Denied and Buried

They Celebrated Vigilante Justice on the Battlefield. Then They Brought It Home.

The Special Forces’ culture of rule-breaking emerged from the pressures of an unconventional war.

Deployed on isolated firebases in violent enemy territory in Afghanistan, some Green Berets developed practices that skirted or even broke Army regulations, ones that were often tolerated by commanders for the sake of the mission. But rule-breaking could escalate into more serious crimes. The operators I spoke to told me they had employed Afghan guards and translators for offensive firepower and used local forces to hold detainees. Some soldiers carried “drop guns” that they could plant on bodies.

A number of Green Berets were convicted in corruption-related cases. Others were accused of extrajudicial killings. Many of them came from the Third Special Forces Group, which had a lead role in the mission in Afghanistan.

Special Operations commanders overlooked evidence of what might have been one of the worst war crimes committed by U.S. forces in Afghanistan.

After a team of Green Berets and their secret Afghan proxy force were accused in 2012 of killing nine detainees in Nerkh, a farming district in Wardak Province, Special Operations commanders carried out three investigations — and cleared the unit.

But after local protests, the Special Forces were pushed to leave Nerkh, and human remains identified as the missing nine were found outside their base. The Army opened a criminal investigation that lasted for nearly a decade. Until now, its results have never been revealed.

To understand what really happened in Nerkh, I traveled there and spoke to scores of local witnesses and former detainees. I also interviewed two Afghans who worked for the Green Berets, Zikria and Kazem, who admitted to having abused and killed detainees and said Americans had been involved as well.

Through a lawsuit, I also obtained files from the military’s three initial investigations, which show that commanders ignored clear evidence of misconduct by the team. A retired Green Beret brigadier general I spoke to agreed.

The Army’s aggressive prosecution of Maj. Mathew Golsteyn reveals how it could pursue Green Berets, if it chose to.

At a job interview with the C.I.A., Maj. Mathew Golsteyn admitted to killing a bombmaking suspect in Afghanistan in 2010. Golsteyn — who told me he had done the right thing for his men and his mission — was kicked out of the Special Forces. When he went public, the Army pushed to court-martial him for murder.

I obtained previously unreported files from the Golsteyn investigation that show how Army commanders pressured former members of his team into confessing their role in dismembering and burning the body of the bombmaking suspect. The Army’s actions stand in stark contrast to the Nerkh case, in which the bodies of nine detainees were found outside a former U.S. base. The case file I obtained showed that investigators amassed substantial evidence of misconduct, but the case was quietly closed by the Army without charges in 2022. Members of the Nerkh team were decorated and promoted.

Golsteyn told me he believed that his true crime was breaking the Green Berets’ code of silence.

This wartime culture of lawlessness has reverberated in a wave of domestic crimes committed by soldiers with Army Special Operations.

In recent years, Army Special Operations has been plagued by murders, drug-trafficking, fraud and sex crimes committed by its soldiers. Many of these were committed around Fort Bragg, N.C., headquarters to both Army Special Operations and the Third Special Forces Group.

To understand the scale of the problem, I collected news and police reports of incidents around Special Forces bases and obtained the personnel records of the soldiers involved, as well as vital records and court documents. The picture was one of serious crime at all levels, from young operators to senior leaders.

The problem of crime has led to questions in Congress, where military leaders promised accountability. Yet Special Forces commanders whose soldiers were involved in misconduct have been repeatedly promoted.

The operators’ vigilante ethos has been embraced by leaders like Trump and his defense secretary, Pete Hegseth.

Pete Hegseth, a former Fox News host, rose to prominence in part through his vociferous defense of Golsteyn and other service members accused of war crimes. “They’re not war criminals; they’re warriors,” he said in 2019, shortly before Golsteyn and others received a pardon from President Trump.

In the current administration, Trump and Hegseth have pushed to loosen legal restraints on the armed forces, both abroad and in the United States, and to expand the role of the military at home. They have purged the military’s top lawyers, deployed active-duty troops to patrol American streets and authorized lethal strikes on those they designate as “narco-terrorists,” summary killings that experts say violate international law.

On Sept. 30, Hegseth spoke against “stupid rules of engagement” at a hastily organized meeting of top military officials, and Trump defended his domestic troop deployments, saying, “We should use some of these dangerous cities as training grounds for our military.”

The article reveals that the vision of unbridled power held by the Trump administration has its roots in the lawlessness of the United States’ wars overseas.

NY Times · Matthieu Aikins · September 30, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com