Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Every sentence that I utter must be understood not as an affirmation, but as a question."

– Niels Bohr

"They are able because they think they are able."

– Virgil

"Strangely enough, this is the past that somebody in the future is longing to go back to."

– Ashleigh Brilliant

1. DoDI 3000.07: New policy for Irregular Warfare

2. Driving PME Modernization: How CGSC is Leading the Army’s Educational Transformation

3. Trump Meets With Xi, Declares Immediate Cut to Tariffs

4. Trump Says U.S. Will Begin Testing Nuclear Weapons

5. How China Enables Russia’s Military

6. Israel Accuses Hamas of Playing a Macabre Game With Hostage Bodies

7. Trump and Xi Ease Off the Trade War, but New Nuclear Threat Brings a Chill

8. The US draws down some troops on NATO’s eastern flank

9. The Shadow of October 7th: Peacekeeping (In)Effectiveness in a World of Evolving Conflict

10. A Response to Sergey Lavrov, or Why the Budapest Memorandum is the Key and the Only Possible Platform for Restoring the System of International Law and Legal Order. The alternative is an inevitable slide into a Third World War

11. China’s military may discard its rigid command structure, report warns

12. Leaked memo details National Guard plan for a 'quick reaction force' in US cities

13. As Trump Weighs Sale of Advanced A.I. Chips to China, Critics Sound Alarm

14. Special Operations Command Pacific undergoing first AI boot camp this week

15. Hegseth says US Forces Japan ready for next phase of reorganization amid China threat

16. US missiles stationed in Philippines can reach China: official

17. Pentagon removes key protections for civilian workers, moves to fire with ‘speed and conviction’

18. The American Military Officer After Liberalism

19. America and China Can Have a Normal Relationship

20. Trump's 'amazing' bargain with Xi turns out a dud

1. DoDI 3000.07: New policy for Irregular Warfare

The Discourse| Uncategorized

DoDI 3000.07: New policy for Irregular Warfare

by David Maxwell

10.30.2025 at 10:39am

The new DOD Instruction 3000.7 Irregular Warfare can be downloaded HERE. (a 32 page document)

Thanks to SOF Support for flagging this and providing the summary and operational vignette below.

Surprisingly (or perhaps unsurprisingly) there have been no news reports of the new IW policy since the DoDI was published on September 29, 2025

All I can say is this:

“America may not be interested in irregular warfare but IW is being practiced around the world by those who are interested in it.”

With no apologies to Trotsky

Executive Summary: DoD Instruction 3000.07 – Irregular Warfare (IW)

Overview

The Department of Defense (DoD) has reissued its Irregular Warfare directive as a formal Instruction (DoDI 3000.07), effective September 29, 2025. This new framework elevates Irregular Warfare (IW) as a core joint force competency and establishes the Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) as the hub for doctrine, training, and collaboration. IW remains a critical tool for achieving U.S. national security objectives in the gray zone between peace and large-scale war.

What is Irregular Warfare?

Irregular Warfare is defined as the use of indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities by states and non-state actors to coerce or assure others. Unlike conventional war, IW often focuses on eroding an adversary’s legitimacy and influence or strengthening the political will of allies and partners. It includes:

Unconventional warfare
Counterterrorism & counterinsurgency
Foreign internal defense & security force assistance
Stabilization activities
Counter-threat finance and transnational organized crime
Civil affairs operations
Military information support operations (MISO)
Operations in the information environment (OIE)

Why It Matters

Strategic Competition: IW is central to countering adversaries who rely on coercion, disinformation, or proxy forces rather than direct military confrontation.
Whole-of-Government Approach: IW requires close collaboration with interagency, international, and partner organizations to achieve lasting effects.
Proactive Defense: IW allows the U.S. and allies to prevent small threats from growing into major conflicts.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) at the Core

SOF play a leading role in IW due to their ability to:

Operate with and through foreign partners, including irregular forces.
Extend U.S. reach into denied or hostile areas.
Conduct clandestine and non-attributable missions.
Integrate with conventional forces for unified campaigning.

The Instruction also underscores the importance of language, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge (LREC)—areas where SOF already excel.

Irregular Warfare Center (IWC)

The IWC serves as the focal point for:

Training and education in IW for both military and civilian personnel.
Partner engagement and international collaboration.
Research, doctrine development, and lessons learned.
Building interoperability across the U.S. Government and allied forces.

Implications for the SOF Community and Families

Recognition of SOF Expertise: DoD acknowledges IW as a core mission area, solidifying SOF’s role as the tip of the spear.
Long-Term Commitment: Families can expect IW missions to remain central to SOF deployments and training.
Support for Partners: SOF will continue to help allies build resilience against aggression, reinforcing the value of partnership and trust.
Future-Ready Force: Investments in cyber, space, and artificial intelligence will shape how SOF adapts to new irregular challenges.

Conclusion

DoDI 3000.07 reaffirms that Irregular Warfare is not a peripheral task—it is a strategic necessity. For the SOF community, this means continued leadership in missions that require adaptability, cultural acumen, and the ability to operate in the most complex environments. For families and supporters, it highlights why ongoing programs of resilience, care, and advocacy remain essential.

SOF Support remains committed to honoring the resilience of SOF warriors and families who stand at the forefront of this enduring mission.

Example: SOF Employing Irregular Warfare in Practice

In a coastal partner nation facing coercion by a criminal proxy network, a small SOF team deploys to work by, with, and through the host nation’s maritime police. Over several months, the team helps map illicit finance flows, trains a vetted boarding unit on low-cost, releasable equipment, and establishes a simple information cell that counters disinformation by sharing verified seizure results and community safety messages. In parallel, civil affairs projects restore a storm-damaged pier to reduce the community’s dependence on the smuggling economy. The partner force leads every interdiction while SOF remain in an advisory role. As arrests disrupt the network’s revenue and the public regains trust in local authorities, the host nation sustains operations with minimal U.S. presence—a textbook IW outcome: eroding adversary influence, strengthening partner legitimacy, and denying freedom of action to malign actors.

2.Driving PME Modernization: How CGSC is Leading the Army’s Educational Transformation

An excellent overview.

My two criticisms:

A passing mention of "to synchronize irregular efforts" and no mention of operations in the information environment, influence, or information warfare (IWar).

CGSC Partnership| Essay| The Latest

Driving PME Modernization: How CGSC is Leading the Army’s Educational Transformation

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/29/pme-modernization-cgsc-transformation/

by Ethan Diven

10.29.2025 at 11:24am

For more than a century, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has been the intellectual core of the Army’s learning enterprise. From its origins as America’s “School for War” at Fort Leavenworth to its present role as the nucleus of Army University, CGSC has evolved alongside the Army’s operational requirements and doctrinal evolutions to deliver cutting-edge warfighting capabilities that bridge the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Today, the college serves as an engine for professional military education (PME) modernization across the Army enterprise—enabling leaders to think critically, employ emerging technologies, and integrate warfighting functions. The imperative to educate tomorrow’s leaders provides decisive advantages in large-scale combat operations as the Army seeks to counter and defeat diverse threats in an era of accelerating change.

The requirement for continuous transformation, directed by the Secretary of the Army in 2025, establishes a framework and sense of urgency to modernize force design, tactical training, and military education under the new Transformation and Training Command (T2COM). This reorganization merges and replaces the Army Futures Command and the Training and Doctrine Command, also providing the accelerant to integrate transformation efforts in ways that reimagine and reorganize the entire PME system. T2COM’s mandate is clear: to drive change across the Army institution from concept to combat through education and training that prepare leaders to execute joint and multi-domain operations. Within this construct, CGSC is driving educational modernization under Army University governance in ways that translates modernization objectives into intellectual and technological overmatch across the operational force.

As part of this mandate, CGSC is leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) and calibrated personas to better deliver warfighting capabilities to the operational force. This includes employing AI programs to refine strategic analysis, accelerate operational planning, enable staff processes, and inform leader decision-making. Seeking to provide a relevant and cutting-edge learning experience, the college is incorporating the latest collaborative tools from the operational force, including One Brief, Vantage, AI Flow and Power BI to enhance warfighter education. Further, CGSC and its subordinate schools are strengthening partnerships with the Army’s combat training centers, centers of excellence—especially the Mission Command Center of Excellence and their command-and-control expertise—, and the Combined Arms Command-Training team in order to bring the latest lessons, trends, and decision optimization tools directly into the classroom.

America’s School for War

Since its founding in 1881, CGSC has trained and educated generations of Army leaders by continually adapting its curriculum to accommodate the evolving character of warfare while integrating new practices and technologies. In the early twentieth century, the college served as the proving ground for officers who would lead U.S. forces in World War I, developing staff planning processes that emphasized synchronization of theater logistics with fire and maneuver. During World War II, the college expanded dramatically to graduate thousands of officers to lead division, corps and field army operations across multiple theaters. The postwar period saw the integration of airpower, logistics, and emerging technologies into its instruction, laying the foundation for the operational art that defined Cold War planning to support NATO allies and counter Warsaw Pact adversaries.

CGSC continued to refine its educational approach to meet new strategic and operational challenges throughout the Cold War and post-Desert Storm eras with new pedagogical and technological reforms. The college’s curriculum shifted from rote staff procedures to courses on critical thinking and adaptive leadership, reflecting lessons learned from campaigns in Indochina, South America, and the Middle East. As the Army began the 21st century, CGSC led the intellectual transition to full-spectrum and counterinsurgency operations by preparing officers to synchronize conventional, irregular, and interagency efforts. Each transformation, which required innovation and adaptation at echelon, reaffirmed CGSC’s enduring mission: to educate leaders to think strategically and act decisively amid uncertainty and complexity.

This imperative for PME modernization continues under the Army Transformation Initiative and the T2COM reorganization that envisions a merging of Army University and the Army War College in order to better integrate the learning continuum across the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. Under this new Army University construct, CGSC will bridge tactical training at Centers of Excellence with strategic education at Senior Service Colleges by combining new technologies and focus areas with proven instructional practices to graduate officers, non-commissioned officers, and Army civilians who are prepared to execute decisive leadership on arrival to their new commands. This includes direct integration of data analytics, artificial intelligence, and systems thinking into small-group seminar discussions and warfighting exercises. Just as it prepared leaders to operationalize mechanization of the past century, CGSC is educating leaders for a new era of autonomous, algorithmic, and cybernetic warfare.

Driving Warfighting Education

CGSC serves as the nucleus of professional military education for Army University and the Army enterprise through its four principal schools: the Command and General Staff School (CGSS), the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the School for Command Preparation (SCP), and the Army Management Staff College (AMSC). Together, these institutions create a seamless continuum of education that produces officers, non-commissioned officers, and Army civilians with the required skills to plan, operate, command, and manage across the Army and joint force with a predominant, though not exclusive, focus on warfighting at the high tactical and operational levels of war. Standing in support, Army University Press amplifies professional discourse through multi-media delivery while the Combined Arms Research Library enables research and scholarly activities.

The Command and General Staff School is a school for applied warfighting and organizational leader development. It prepares majors to plan, synchronize, and execute corps and division operations through a curriculum that integrates data analytics, artificial intelligence, and system thinking while providing the largest Joint Professional Military Education certification in the Department of War. Students employ advanced tools and practices to analyze complex environments, develop operational approaches, and accelerate decision-making. Organized around small-group seminars that include joint, interagency and multinational representation, CGSS awards master’s degrees that balance theory with application to ensure that every major departs Fort Leavenworth ready to immediately lead and execute at “race pace” in assigned formations. The newly established Advanced Warfighting Certification, which is earned by the top cohort as a rigorous measure of effectiveness, identifies graduates with superior warfighting competency for employment by senior leaders.

The School of Advanced Military Studies serves as the Army’s premier course for operational planning and blends timeless theories of warfare with emerging operational sciences. Colloquially called “Jedi Knights,” SAMS students master division, corps, and joint task force operations through seamless integration of operational design and systems analysis to enable advanced planning and execution. Known for its exacting selection process and academic rigor, the school awards masters degrees while combining deep understanding of history, strategy, political science, and philosophy with data sciences and artificial intelligence to create a truly multi-disciplinary curriculum. SAMS, which administers the Army’s primary doctoral program, drives innovation through planning with AI-informed personas, deliberative LLM prompt engineering instruction, and collaborative tool implementation. The students who graduate this challenging course enable senior Army and joint force commanders to understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead and assess more effectively in complex environments.

The School for Command Preparation continues this continuum of education by developing command sergeants major, lieutenant colonels, colonels, and general officers to lead America’s Soldiers. As the Army’s aspiring command teams assemble from all over the world to learn and grow together at Fort Leavenworth, the pre-command course prepares them to lead formations, manage resources, and generate readiness amidst an unpredictable strategic environment. Benefiting from curricula that combines mentorship from experienced commanders and command sergeants major with challenging coursework, PCC graduates employ critical thinking to develop subordinates, evaluate performance, and manage resources. Notable innovations include the application of data literacy and AI integration to inform how leaders give guidance and apply judgment for planning and execution. Fundamentally, the course empowers command teams to make data-informed decisions that enhance lethality and agility while centering on the human dimension of leadership.

Finally, the Army Management Staff College provides Army civilian professionals with an advanced education in organizational leadership and resource management that is required to lead complex organizations. Taught by experienced practitioners with deep institutional knowledge attained by experience and certification, AMSC’s sequence of courses prepare civilian leaders in the Army’s workforce to align unit priorities, recruit and train personnel, and manage funding streams in ways that incorporate real-world data and case-based learning that parallels the Army’s operational decision-making models. Representing an essential, and often understated, component of Army professional military education that compliments the uniformed PME hierarchy, the school produces and disseminates a shared governing language across the Total Force that informs the foundation of the Army enterprise and ensures mission success.

Transforming the Learning Enterprise

The imperative to modernize PME, on behalf of Army enterprise, is more than a curriculum update: it represents a systemic transformation in how the institution learns and innovates. With administrators and faculty continuously devising new ways to reconceptualize learning, CGSC’s schools are deploying rigorous pedagogical approaches that include immersive simulations, artificial intelligence-supported analysis, and collaborative digital learning environments to replicate the speed and complexity of modern warfare. These instruments empower students to test plans and strategy in real time, explore operational dilemmas through enhanced wargaming, and execute enhanced decision-making. Yet the heart of this transformation remains the human intellect. The goal is not to replace judgment with machines, but to refine assessment and decision-making through data-supported insight to achieve true cognitive overmatch in the decision space.

In keeping with its mandate to deliver warfighting capabilities, CGSC’s efforts to modernize PME center on preparing graduates to lead in division, corps, and joint task force commands with the focus on winning in Multi-Domain Operations. This necessitates learning outcomes that provide the skills, judgment, and ethical considerations required to excel in joint, interagency, and multinational environments. Graduates will integrate warfighting functions and complicated staff processes within appropriate legal and moral frameworks. Emphasizing the use of critical and creative thinking with the benefit of historical understanding, CGSC ensures students can diagnose complex problems, adapt to uncertainty, and synchronize actions at echelon to achieve campaign objectives. This focus directly supports the Army’s modernization goals and aligns the college with the operational vision of the T2COM reorganization.

Faculty excellence underpins every aspect of the drive towards educational transformation. CGSC’s administrators, instructors, and professors combine operational experience with academic credibility to deliver advanced education that balances traditional pedagogy with adaptive curricula. Comprising a mix of uniformed instructors who bring recent operational experience and civilian professors who bring deep institutional knowledge, the educational teams at CGSS, SAMS, SCP, and AMSC guide students through accredited degrees and certified courses that strengthen, rather than dilute, the art and science of warfighting. Because of this commitment to teach and inspire the next generation of Army, joint, and coalition leaders, thousands of students depart Fort Leavenworth each year equipped not only with new knowledge, but with new ways of thinking that empower them to lead change across the Army enterprise.

Driving PME Modernization

CGSC stands at the forefront of the Army’s vision for continuous transformation across the enterprise. By aligning the distinctive missions of CGSS, SAMS, SCP and AMSC with the AWC under Army University’s unified learning enterprise, America’s School for War, in keeping with its historic mission to graduate combat leaders who can lead formations in large-scale combat operations, is directly supporting the Army’s vision for transformative change to combat emerging challenges and evolving threats.

CGSC’s efforts to enable this generational renewal will ensure that military education remains the foundation of warfighting excellence for America’s primary land power institution. These innovations, centering on the application of new technologies and practices to enhance educational delivery, will ensure that the college drives innovation directly in support of the evolving needs of the operational force.

Looking towards an uncertain future, the United States Army’s success will not be determined by technology alone, but by the intellect of those who employ it to win in the crucible of combat. By developing leaders who can out-think, out-learn, and out-adapt any adversary, the Command and General Staff College is driving change with a nested sense of urgency that is seizing opportunities provided by the spirit of Army transformation to catalyze warfighting innovation throughout classrooms and auditoriums where students translate ideas and inspiration into practice and application. As it has for more than a century, the CGSC will continue to modernize PME to enable cognitive overmatch in the most demanding environments. These changes, and others that will occur in coming months, will ultimately achieve the 41st Chief of Staff of the Army’s mandate for “continuous transformation” that means “iteratively adapting evolving how we fight, how we organize, how we train, and how we equip.”

Winning matters—and CGSC’s role in transforming PME will drive how we win.

Tags: Army learning, CGSC, Command and General Staff College, PME, Professional Military Education, SAMS, School of Advanced Military Studies, School of War

About The Author

Ethan Diven
Colonel Ethan Diven, US Army, is the Provost of Army University and the Commandant of the US Army Command and General Staff College. A graduate of Command and General Staff College and the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, he has operational experience with light, armored, airborne, and special operations forces with combat tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa. Colonel Diven’s recent assignments include command of the 2nd Armored BCT, 3rd Infantry Division with deployment to Eastern Europe in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve; Chief of Land Operations, Joint Enabling Capabilities Command, with service in support of Operation Octave Quartz in Somalia, and Allies Refuge in Afghanistan; and as the Commander of Operations Group, National Training Center, at Fort Irwin, CA.

3. Trump Meets With Xi, Declares Immediate Cut to Tariffs

Trump Meets With Xi, Declares Immediate Cut to Tariffs

U.S.-China summit offers relief to both sides while high-stakes rivalry carries on

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-meets-xi-for-high-stakes-u-s-china-summit-a9c7738f

By Josh Chin

and Meridith McGraw

Updated Oct. 30, 2025 3:41 am ET

Quick Summary

The U.S. is lowering tariffs on Chinese goods to 10% from 20% in exchange for China’s cooperation on fentanyl precursor chemicals.View more

BUSAN, South Korea—President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping emerged from their first face-to-face meeting in six years with a temporary truce in the bruising trade fight between the two superpowers.

Their agreement lowers immediate tensions between the U.S. and China, which have been locked for months in a bitter struggle over trade and technology that has hurt both their economies.

The agreement includes a reduction in stiff U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods in exchange for a pledge by China to crack down on the trade in the chemicals used to produce fentanyl.

China also promised to ease the exports of rare earths—minerals that Western manufacturers rely on to make a range of goods. And Beijing promised to buy “tremendous amounts” of American soybeans, said Trump.

While the detente provides relief to both sides, it does little to address the fundamental divergence between two superpowers whose economies are decoupling in many sectors and who are racing for supremacy in areas such as artificial intelligence.

In comments to reporters on his way back to the U.S. from South Korea, Trump was effusive about the meeting.

“Overall, I guess on the scale of from zero to 10, with 10 being the best, I would say the meeting was a 12,” he said.

Xi and Trump with their teams at the meeting. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

China has turned elsewhere for soybeans during trade tensions with the U.S. Cliff Owen/AP

The actual numbers the two agreed on were more modest. The U.S. is cutting tariffs on China by 10%, Trump said, in exchange for a promise by China to take “very strong action” on chemicals used to produce fentanyl. After the reduction, U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports will be 47%, said Trump.

China promised to ease some of the controls it imposed on exports of processed rare-earth minerals for one year. It dominates the production of the minerals, which are needed to make everything from smartphones to submarines. Its restrictions this year on rare-earth exports have badly hurt U.S. businesses.

In addition, China agreed to buy large amounts of U.S. soybeans, according to Trump. China already ordered several soybean cargoes from U.S. grain handlers earlier this week, offering relief to American farmers who have been in a panic this harvest season as trade tensions sent Chinese buyers elsewhere to source the crop.

The drop in Chinese purchases hit Trump’s rural political base hard. U.S. soybean farmers have called on the administration for help as they dealt with billions of dollars in lost sales to the world’s largest soybean importer. China placed orders for soybean shipments shortly before Thursday’s meeting.

China’s Commerce Ministry affirmed the details of the deal as Trump described it with regards to soybean purchases, cooperation on fentanyl and rare-earths export controls.

The U.S. also agreed to put on hold for one year a September move to apply export restrictions to certain subsidiaries of already blacklisted entities, the Chinese Commerce Ministry said.

Xi has been Trump’s most formidable rival as the White House seeks to impose its will on U.S. trading partners, refusing to bow to the pressure of American tariffs and showing a willingness to hit back. The standoff has rattled markets and unsettled U.S. allies, which face pressure from Washington to help keep Beijing in check despite being slapped with Trump tariffs of their own.

Despite that resistance or because of it, Trump has repeatedly expressed his admiration for Xi—including as he sat down across from the Chinese leader at a long, white table in a small room at Gimhae Air Base on Thursday.

“President Xi is a great leader of a great country, and I think we’re going to have a fantastic relationship for a long period of time,” he said.

Xi, speaking to Trump through an interpreter, said: “I always believe that China’s development goes hand-in-hand with your vision to make America great again. Our two countries are fully able to help each other succeed and prosper together.”

Since the start of his second term, Trump has vowed to complete a comprehensive trade deal that would shrink the U.S.’s massive trade deficit with China—a goal he failed to accomplish in his first term despite a damaging trade war.

Speaking on Air Force One, Trump said he thinks the U.S. and China will be able to sign a trade deal “pretty soon,” and that they didn’t have too many stumbling blocks left.

President Trump spoke to reporters on Air Force One. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Some trade analysts were skeptical. Describing Thursday’s agreements as marginal, William Bratton, an analyst at BNP Paribas Securities, wrote that they don’t “represent a ‘grand bargain’ or a large-scale reset of the relationship.”

Xi appeared to come out of the meeting with a strong hand, analysts said, particularly on rare earths.

China began implementing strict export controls on rare earths in April. In October, Beijing angered the Trump administration by further enhancing restrictions on the export of the minerals, including increasing the number of controlled rare-earth elements.

While the newer rare-earth export rules are likely to be delayed, many industry watchers noted that China appears set to maintain the export-control procedures it introduced in the spring.

That would preserve Beijing’s ability to punish the U.S. economy by denying export licenses to a swath of American companies that rely on rare earths.

On fentanyl, much will depend on the actions China takes next. The U.S. has pressed China for years to do more to control the export of chemicals used to make the drug, a synthetic opioid blamed for more than 100,000 overdose deaths in the U.S.

More-stringent regulation of the chemicals likely won’t be enough to solve the crisis because Chinese producers are adept at slightly altering the chemistry of precursors to get around the rules. Analysts who study the issue say more concrete steps, such as China announcing arrests of suspected producers of precursor chemicals, are crucial to stemming flows of such chemicals to Mexican cartels.

For years, China has been willing to dangle the possibility of more cooperation on counternarcotics in exchange for concessions by Washington, only to pull back its cooperation when ties turn sour.

For U.S. importers of Chinese products, the lowering of fentanyl-related tariffs to 10% offers some relief. That could make China relatively more cost-competitive for sourcing products, after hefty tariffs this year led to a drop-off in trade between the two countries.

For the first nine months of the year, China’s exports to the U.S. fell nearly 17% from the same period a year ago, according to Chinese government data.

Still, the trade agreement is unlikely to stop a continuing trend of U.S. buyers diversifying supply chains outside of China. Companies have spent millions of dollars moving production to places such as Southeast Asia. Many still view the U.S.-China relationship as volatile and subject to new tariffs at Trump’s whim.

But a broader mood of cooperation prevailed on Thursday. Trump said that he and Xi discussed the conflict in Ukraine, including how China and the U.S. could work together “to get that war finished.” China has emerged as Russia’s strongest political and economic backer since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Taiwan—the most dangerous potential flashpoint between the U.S. and China—never came up in the meeting, according to Trump. Fears have been percolating in Taiwan that Trump’s dealmaking instincts might lead him to trade away U.S. support against Beijing’s territorial claim to the self-ruled island in exchange for concessions on trade.

The president said he would travel to China in April and that Xi would follow with a visit to the U.S.

Trump and Xi last met in person in 2019, when they held an 80-minute lunch on the sidelines of a Group of 20 meeting in Osaka, Japan, and agreed to a cease-fire in trade hostilities.

At the time, the Trump administration had been pushing for fundamental changes in Chinese economic policy, including an end to state subsidies to industry and demands for technology transfer as the price of entry to China’s market for American companies.

A “Phase One” trade deal signed in early 2020 addressed neither of those points, instead obligating China to buy more soybeans from American farmers—something Beijing largely failed to fulfill. A Phase Two never materialized.

Write to Josh Chin at Josh.Chin@wsj.com and Meridith McGraw at Meridith.McGraw@WSJ.com

4. Trump Says U.S. Will Begin Testing Nuclear Weapons

To the nuclear experts I would ask, is this really technically and scientifically necessary?

To the deterrence experts I would ask, does this contribute to deterrence?

To the non-proliferation experts I would ask, does this risk nuclear proliferation?

Trump Says U.S. Will Begin Testing Nuclear Weapons

President says he has instructed the Pentagon to test ‘on an equal basis’ with Russia and China

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-says-u-s-will-begin-testing-nuclear-weapons-df02292e

By Michael R. Gordon

and Alex Leary

Updated Oct. 30, 2025 5:12 am ET

President Trump speaks to members of the military aboard the USS George Washington. Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press

Quick Summary

President Trump ordered the Pentagon to begin testing nuclear weapons “on an equal basis” with Russia and China.View more

WASHINGTON—President Trump said that he has ordered the Pentagon to “start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis” with Russia and China.

But it remained unclear whether Trump was referring to the testing of nuclear warheads or the missiles and other delivery systems that carry them.

“Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis,” Trump wrote on social media. “That process will begin immediately.”

Trump’s post came shortly before a meeting in South Korea with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Later, in comments to reporters during his return flight to the U.S., Trump said the administration plans to issue an announcement with more detail on the tests. He declined to explain the reason for his move but said it didn’t relate to China.

“It had to do with others,” he said, without specifying any countries. “They seem to all be nuclear testing.”

Asked if he thought the world is entering a more risky nuclear environment, he said, “I don’t think so.” The president added that he would “like to see a denuclearization.”

The U.S. last conducted a nuclear weapons test in 1992 and has joined Russia and China in observing a decadeslong moratorium on underground nuclear blasts.

It wasn’t immediately clear what prompted his post, though Russian President Vladimir Putin said this week that Russia has tested a new type of nuclear-powered cruise missile and a nuclear-powered underwater drone.

In his social-media message, Trump said the U.S. has more nuclear weapons than any other country and took credit for upgrading the U.S. nuclear arsenal during his first term. “Because of the tremendous destructive power, I HATED to do it, but had no choice! Russia is second, and China is a distant third, but will be even within 5 years,” he wrote, explaining why he is calling for tests.

The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for additional details. Some experts questioned whether Trump might have been referring to the flight tests of missiles that carry nuclear warheads rather than the nuclear explosive.

Russia and China aren’t carrying out underground nuclear tests, though they are testing missiles and other delivery systems. North Korea conducts nuclear tests, but hasn’t done so since 2017.

The U.S. Energy Department has the responsibility for maintaining the reliability of nuclear weapons while the Pentagon develops the weapons that carry them.

The U.S. periodically tests unarmed intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the Minuteman III to assure their reliability.

For decades, Russia and China have observed a moratorium on underground nuclear tests, along with the U.S. And the U.S. has an extensive program to ensure the reliability of its nuclear arsenal through small nuclear experiments and computer simulations that former officials and many experts say makes testing unnecessary.

The U.S. has conducted more than 1,000 nuclear tests. China has carried out 45 nuclear tests, the last of which was in 1996.

Resuming nuclear testing could also work to the disadvantage of the U.S. since the American weapons complex has carried out many more nuclear tests than China and, thus, has more data to draw on.

“I don’t think testing is necessary to assure reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal,” said Gary Samore, who served as the top expert on weapons of mass destruction for former President Bill Clinton’s National Security Council. “It would be a gift to Russia and China, which are developing new types of nuclear weapons and would benefit from the resumption of testing.”

The U.S. signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which bans underground tests, in 1996, though the U.S. has never ratified the accord.

The directors of the U.S. nuclear laboratories have regularly certified the reliability of the arsenal based on advanced simulation and experiments. It could take months for the U.S. to prepare and carry out a nuclear test, if the order were given to do so.

Like Russia and other major powers, China is observing the moratorium on nuclear tests. But Beijing has resisted the effort to be drawn into arms control agreements that would limit its arsenal or provide for inspections.

Following Trump’s remarks, a spokesman for China’s foreign minister said Beijing urges the U.S. “to earnestly abide” by the global nuclear-test ban.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 30, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Says U.S. Will Test Nuclear Weapons'.

5. How China Enables Russia’s Military

A testing ground for drones (among many other things)- China is likely learning a lot from Putin's war.

How China Enables Russia’s Military

New evidence shows the supply-chain trail aiding Moscow’s drone makers.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/china-russia-military-ukraine-xi-jinping-donald-trump-vladimir-putin-e7a26ee0?mod=hp_opin_pos_5

By The Editorial Board

Oct. 29, 2025 5:37 pm ET

A serviceman of the Russian Airborne Troops launches a FPV drone in the border area of Russia's Kursk Region, Feb. 25. Russian Defence Ministry/Zuma Press

As President Trump prepares to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping on Thursday, it’s useful to recall that Mr. Xi continues to attack American interests across the world. The latest evidence comes in new reports on China’s help for Russia’s military campaign against Ukraine.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi said this summer that China doesn’t provide lethal weapons to Moscow. But non-public reports prepared for the U.S. State Department and European governments cast doubt on Beijing’s denials by following the money and supply-chain trails from Chinese manufacturers to Russian drone makers.

The reports, which we reviewed, were written by the Center for Defense Reforms, a Kyiv-based think tank whose staff has previously worked for Ukrainian intelligence and the Ministry of Defense. They draw on customs data, corporate records and non-public military and intelligence information.

One brief looks at the so-called FPV drones Russia uses to attack Ukrainian troops and civilians near the front lines. Last year Russia imported more than 3.3 million motors from the Chinese company Shenzhen Kiosk Electronic Co, which likely sources them from other Chinese manufacturers, the report finds.

These engines can have nonmilitary uses such as washing machines, pumps or electric scooters. But the report says the “final recipient” is Rustakt LLC—a Moscow-based company identified by Ukrainian intelligence as a drone maker. In December 2024 the European Union sanctioned Rustakt for its support of Russia’s military.

The report finds that between July 2023 and February 2025, Rustakt imported nearly $294 million in various Chinese products, including more then $83 million in electric motors. This trade continued after the EU sanctions. “The scale and structure of the supplies” it imports “indicate that Rustakt is not only a manufacturer but a logistics centre” for other Russian drone makers, the report says.

Russia is also increasing production of long-range drones for large-scale attacks on Ukrainian cities. China has become “the main external supplier,” providing “critical components such as engines and navigation systems” for these Shahed-type drones, the report claims.

In February 2024 the U.S. imposed sanctions on several entities that form the Alabuga network that produces long-range drones at a Russian facility built with Iranian help. Yet the report finds that, between June and August 2024, a Chinese company exported more than 685,500 engine parts to Drake LLC, one of those U.S.-sanctioned Russian companies.

Ukraine has also identified the Russian company Morgan LLC, which is not under U.S. sanction, as a supplier of long-range drone components for the Alabuga facility. Since 2024 Morgan imported nearly $5 million in goods from China, the report finds. That included 7,800 units of lithium-polymer batteries “listed in the documents as products for the needs of a ‘special military operation’ (as the Russian Federation calls the war unleashed in Ukraine),” the report notes.

There are dozens of such examples in these reports. They add to the case for imposing secondary sanctions on Chinese businesses that aid Russia’s imperialism.

Israel Accuses Hamas of Playing a Macabre Game With Hostage Bodies

Delays and an alleged ruse are seen as tactics to gain time as the militant group tries to reassert control over Gaza

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-accuses-hamas-of-playing-a-macabre-game-with-hostage-bodies-0b1f79a3

By Anat Peled

and Summer Said

Oct. 29, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Red Cross members in Gaza City on Monday as heavy machinery removed rubble. AFP/Getty Images

Quick Summary

Israel accused Hamas of staging the recovery of a hostage’s body, releasing drone footage of what it said was an alleged ruse.View more

Israel and the Red Cross accused Hamas of staging the recovery of a hostage’s body this week, the latest in a string of incidents straining a cease-fire that the Trump administration is trying to hold together.

Israel on Tuesday released what it said was drone footage showing Hamas tossing a body wrapped in white out of a window, burying it, and then using an excavator to unearth it in front of Red Cross representatives.

Israel said the remains belonged to Ofir Tzarfati, a 27-year-old hostage who died shortly after being wounded in the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks, according to his family. His body was partially recovered two years ago by Israel’s military.

Israel accused Hamas of a macabre manipulation that violated the terms of the cease-fire. The Red Cross criticized the U.S.-designated terrorist group for involving it in an apparent ruse.

“It is unacceptable that a fake recovery was staged, when so much depends on this agreement being upheld and when so many families are still anxiously awaiting news of their loved ones,” the humanitarian agency said.

Hamas said it is abiding by the terms of the cease-fire deal and that Israel’s claims were an attempt to create a pretext to restart the war. Israel said it launched strikes against dozens of Hamas assets and targeted 30 militants Tuesday after one of its soldiers was killed in Gaza. Health authorities in Gaza said more than 100 people were killed, including children.

Israel said it returned to the cease-fire on Wednesday but later said it had struck Hamas targets in northern Gaza.

A vehicle carrying the bodies of four hostages arriving in Tel Aviv on Oct. 15. Ahmad Gharabli/AFP/Getty Images

Israeli officials believe Hamas is deliberately delaying the return of hostages’ bodies to gain time to consolidate power and reassert control over the battered enclave. Since the declaration of the cease-fire more than two weeks ago, Hamas has cracked down on its opponents within the Gaza Strip, including carrying out public executions of members of a rival clan.

“Hamas’s strategy is to drag this out as long as possible without breaking the cease-fire and entering into direct clashes with [President] Trump and the U.S. and the mediating countries,” said Tamir Hayman, a former head of Israeli military intelligence who is close to Israel’s military establishment. “The method of buying time is trickling these bodies back under the excuse they are searching for them.”

The debate over the hostages’ bodies adds an emotional point of pressure to a cease-fire already strained by a rash of skirmishes along the dividing line that separates Israeli forces from the rest of Gaza.

The strong support among the Israeli public for ending the war was rooted in the urgency of recovering all the hostages, dead and alive. Hostage families and right-wing lawmakers are now leaning on the government to punish Hamas.

“These actions are not mistakes or misunderstandings,” the Hostages Families Forum said Tuesday. “They are deliberate acts of cruelty designed to deepen the families’ suffering and prolong Hamas’s control.”

Hamas has pushed back against the criticism, saying it is searching for the bodies in good faith. The group has told Arab mediators that in many cases the people holding the hostages have died. Israeli intelligence believes Hamas has lost the location of a handful of bodies, according to people familiar with the matter. There is a risk that some might never be found.

Trump’s cease-fire agreement anticipated that recovering the bodies would be a complex task given the extent of the destruction in Gaza. It gave Hamas 72 hours to turn over any bodies in its possession but didn’t set a deadline for the rest, requiring only that Hamas cooperate in the process.

Hamas sparked anger in Israel when it handed over only four bodies on the first day of the exchange in early October. The group has since returned a total of 15 bodies out of the 28 that were still in Gaza, a sluggish pace that has drawn criticism from the Israeli public and hostage families.

Israel believes Hamas knows the location of around eight more bodies, according to Arab mediators and a person familiar with the matter.

Machinery searches through rubble for the bodies of hostages in Khan Younis in southern Gaza Strip on Monday. Haitham Imad/EPA/Shutterstock

The remains of one of the bodies returned by Hamas this month turned out not to belong to a hostage, but to a Palestinian from the West Bank accused of collaborating with Israel, the Arab mediators said.

Hamas released all 20 of the living hostages it held on the first day of the early October exchange. Militants led by Hamas had taken 251 hostages from Israel during the Oct. 7 attacks that also left around 1,200 people dead.

An Egyptian search team has been in Gaza in recent days searching for bodies, sometimes accompanied by Hamas members. It faces challenges including unexploded Israeli ordnance and a lack of equipment such as excavators, bulldozers and heavy trucks, according to the Arab mediators.

The Egyptian search team also suspects Hamas members are reluctant to reveal tunnel entrances and other infrastructure, Arab mediators said.

Israel has so far allowed only Egypt to send a team to take part in the search, even though Egypt has repeatedly asked for help, including from Turkey, which gained valuable experience during the country’s devastating 2023 earthquake, the Arab mediators said.

Earlier this month, U.S. Vice President JD Vance urged patience with the recovery effort.

“This is not going to happen overnight,” the vice president said. “Some of these hostages are buried under thousands of pounds of rubble. Some of the hostages nobody even knows where they are.”

Write to Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

7. Trump and Xi Ease Off the Trade War, but New Nuclear Threat Brings a Chill

First the heat of the nuclear armageddon. Then the chill of a nuclear winter. (apologies for the sarcasm).

Trump and Xi Ease Off the Trade War, but New Nuclear Threat Brings a Chill

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/30/business/us-trump-china-xi-trade.html

NY Times · Erica L. Green · October 30, 2025

The two leaders reached an agreement on fentanyl, some tariffs and rare earths, at least for a year. But even as the global trade picture cleared a little, Mr. Trump spurred new worries about nuclear proliferation.

Listen to this article · 9:42 min Learn more

President Trump said after their meeting in Busan, South Korea, that he and Xi Jinping of China had agreed to an economic truce, walking back some of the tariffs and retaliatory measures that had roiled the world economy.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

By Katie Rogers and

Katie Rogers and Erica Green are White House correspondents following the president’s travels in Asia.

Oct. 30, 2025, 6:54 a.m. ET

Ahead of the high-stakes meeting between President Trump and Xi Jinping of China on Thursday, world leaders were hoping for news of an economic truce that could help stabilize the global economy. They got it.

They got something extra, as well: intensified concerns about whether the world is entering a new era of nuclear weapons proliferation among global powers.

After a 90-minute face to face meeting in South Korea, Mr. Trump announced that the two leaders had sharply de-escalated their trade standoff, agreeing, in essence, on a yearlong cease-fire that would roll back tit-for-tat measures including steep tariffs and shutting off access to rare earth metals.

The meeting was the most anticipated and consequential event of Mr. Trump’s nearly weeklong tour through Asia, where he engaged in a series of trade and security agreements with other countries in the region, many of them geared toward containing Beijing.

“I guess on the scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the best, I would say the meeting was a 12,” Mr. Trump said aboard Air Force One as he returned to Washington.

The agreement was a win for the world economy, but was brokered under the shadow of a new and sudden amplification of nuclear threats between global powers.

Just minutes before he landed in Busan, South Korea, to meet with Mr. Xi, Mr. Trump announced on social media that the United States would immediately restart nuclear weapons testing after a lull of more than 30 years. The announcement came after Russia announced that it had also conducted tests of a nuclear-capable missile and sea drone this week.

One of the helicopters in the presidential transport fleet, known as Marine One, arriving at the international airport in Busan.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

“Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis,” he wrote, saying the process would begin immediately.

Mr. Trump did not provide any further details about the decision. But with his message, Mr. Trump seemed to be ratcheting up pressure as he prepared to meet with the leader with the world’s second- largest economy and third-largest nuclear arsenal.

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in East Asia and Eastern Europe? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

After the meeting, Mr. Trump praised Mr. Xi as a “tremendous leader of a very powerful country.” And he appeared to soften his hard-edged statement from earlier in the day, suggesting that his announcement was not aimed at China but at other nations that he repeatedly declined to name.

“We have more nuclear weapons than anybody, we don’t do testing,” Mr. Trump said. “We’ve halted it years — many years ago,” he said. “But with others doing testing, I think it’s appropriate that we do also.”

But the chaotic backdrop to the meeting was a reminder of how Mr. Trump’s approach to issues and diplomacy can change on a dime — even on a matter as vital as the strategy governing the American nuclear arsenal — and also displayed his increasingly volatile approach to foreign policy since he retook office.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi met for roughly 90 minutes in Busan, discussing economic measures and the war in Ukraine, among other things. Leaders said that nuclear testing and the Taiwan issue never came up.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

The meeting also drove home how much is at stake every time the United States and China meet now: the global economy, security across the world and the sprawling implications of negotiation between the two countries, affecting everything from individual alliances in the Indo Pacific to the outcome of the Russian invasion in Ukraine.

A readout issued by the Chinese official news agency Xinhua after the meeting did not address what agreements were made but did allude to China’s recent move to cut off supplies of critical minerals.

The statement noted that Mr. Xi told Trump that recent “twists and turns” in the U.S.-China relationship should be a lesson to them both to avoid the “vicious cycle of mutual retaliation.”

The meeting concluded with clear victories for Mr. Trump’s foreign and domestic agenda.

Mr. Trump told reporters on Air Force One that China had agreed to suspend for a year its limits on exports of rare earth metals, which are crucial for a wide range of advanced manufacturing industries. The move by China earlier this month to restrict the exports had prompted Mr. Trump to threaten to cancel this week’s meeting.

He also said that Mr. Xi had agreed to take stronger action to stop the flow of precursor chemicals for making fentanyl and that the United States in response would reduce to 10 percent, from 20 percent, the fentanyl-linked tariffs it had imposed on China early this year. Reducing fentanyl deaths in the United States has been a priority for Mr. Trump.

In a social media post, Mr. Trump said that Mr. Xi had also committed to purchasing a “massive amounts of Soybeans” and other agricultural products, adding that “Our Farmers will be very happy!” He wrote that China would also “begin the process” of purchasing American energy.

Mr. Trump speaking to the press on Air Force One after his meeting with Mr. Xi.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

While Mr. Trump greeted Mr. Xi warmly ahead of their talks at a military base in Busan, the mood was more fraught than it had been when he met the leaders of Japan and South Korea earlier this week.

For Mr. Trump, his five days in Asia beforehand had largely been about gathering honors and securing trade deals quickly. On Thursday, the tour took a sober turn as he encountered Mr. Xi, even as he called him a “friend of mine.”

Before meeting, the two leaders tensely shook hands in front of a row of Chinese and American flags at an air base in Busan, with Mr. Trump doing the talking and Mr. Xi staying largely silent.

“President Xi is a great leader of a great country, and I think we’re going to have a fantastic relationship for a long period of time,” Mr. Trump said.

Mr. Xi, for his part, approached the meeting with caution and steeliness. In his remarks, Mr. Xi likened China-U.S. relations to a “giant ship” that requires steady joint leadership.

Mr. Xi also said that he and Mr. Trump “do not always see eye to eye with each other” and said it was “normal for the two leading economies of the world to have frictions now and then.”

He also suggested that he would not bend to Mr. Trump’s “America First” agenda. “I always believe that China’s development goes hand in hand with your vision to make America great again,” Mr. Xi said.

Before their private meeting, the two leaders said they were focused on the long list of trade negotiations before them, and signaled they would ignore far graver concerns, including the resumption of nuclear testing among hotly competing countries and Mr. Xi’s interest in putting more distance between America and Taiwan.

Mr. Xi did not respond to a question about whether he would raise the issue of Taiwan at the meeting. Mr. Trump did not answer a question about why he had ordered nuclear weapons testing to resume for the first time in 33 years. The president paused before declining to answer the question, a rare reaction for an almost always spontaneous leader.

As the two leaders met, Mr. Trump tried to emphasize a friendly tone, while Mr. Xi took a steelier, reserved approach.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

Mr. Trump said after the meeting that the issue of Taiwan did not come up during the leaders’ discussion. On Wednesday, Mr. Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One that he did not expect it to, and he would not say whether or not he supported independence for the self-governed island, which China claims as its own.

The two leaders discussed partnering to address other conflicts, he said. Mr. Trump said that he and Mr. Xi had discussed the war in Ukraine at length and that they were “going to work together to see if we can get something done.”

Mr. Trump, who has pressured other nations to stop purchasing Russian oil, which is helping to fund its invasion of Ukraine, noted that Mr. Xi had been buying oil from Russia for a long time but said they did not really discuss the topic.

Mr. Trump’s announcement that he would resume nuclear testing came after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said that his country had successfully tested a nuclear-powered and nuclear-capable missile, and then, separately, a nuclear sea drone that could set off a tsunami. And Mr. Xi is overseeing one of the fastest buildups of a nuclear arsenal on Earth.

Asked whether he believed his directive would create a riskier nuclear environment, Mr. Trump brushed off its impact saying, “I think we have it pretty well locked up.”

Mr. Trump added that the United States was already in talks with Russia about denuclearization and that “China would be added to that.”

Mr. Trump’s announcement also came after he had made substantial announcements about building the defenses of American allies in the region.

At a naval base near Tokyo on Tuesday, Mr. Trump said that the Japanese government had placed an order of American-made missiles to arm their fighter jets. His administration has been pressuring the Japanese to spend more on military defense.

Standing next to him, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan promised that she had renewed her resolve “to make the Indo-Pacific free and open,” a reference to checking Chinese maneuvers and territorial ambitions in the South China Sea.

Mr. Trump and Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi of Japan on Tuesday, aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier George Washington.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

In South Korea, Mr. Trump highlighted the country’s investment in American shipbuilding and said later that he had given the U.S. ally “approval to build a nuclear powered submarine.”

By the time he arrived in Busan, Mr. Trump was hoping that he had collected enough leverage for an agreement with Mr. Xi and was looking for more chances to engage.

Throughout his trip, Mr. Trump struck a hopeful tone about striking a deal that could bolster a fragile trade truce that the United States and China struck last month after four rounds of negotiations. As he flew back to Washington, Mr. Trump declared victory.

He called the meeting “a great success” and announced that he would visit in China in April.

“The whole relationship is very, very important,” he said.

David Pierson contributed reporting from Busan, David E. Sanger from Washington, and Lily Kuo from Taipei.

Katie Rogers is a White House correspondent for The Times, reporting on President Trump.

Erica L. Green is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin

NY Times · Erica L. Green · October 30, 2025

8. The US draws down some troops on NATO’s eastern flank

This is the problem. Every single movement of US troops is interpreted from the perspective of the strength of the US commitment. We need to understand that that is how our friends, partners, and allies, as well as the press, pundits, and adversaries view it. Therefore we need a proactive information support plan for every more - and we need to be proactive. A "response to query only" plan is not an effective plan in the modern information era.

Of course there are myriad reasons for redeployment or stationing of troops. But we should sondeir every move as an opportunity to send the right message. We must learn to lead with influence, especially in the context of strategic competition. Military activities in strategic competition support diplomacy through execution of a strong information support plan.

Rather than defend our actions we need to proactively inform the public and press and pundits and ensure we are sending the proper messages of strategic reassurance and strategic resolve.

Of course our military is restrained by the civilian political leadership who likely doesn't want to have to publicly defend these actions. But the uniformed military has to press the civilian leadership to be proactive in the information domain. Trust the public affairs and information experts. They would like nothing more than to be proactive. Turn them loose. Let slip the information dogs of war (apologies for the attempt at humor).

Excerpt:

The U.S. Army later confirmed the move, but denied it was a sign of lessened commitment to NATO.

The US draws down some troops on NATO’s eastern flank

https://www.militarytimes.com/global/europe/2025/10/29/the-us-draws-down-some-troops-on-natos-eastern-flank/?utm

By Lorne Cook, The Associated Press and Stephen McGrath, The Associated Press

Oct 29, 2025, 10:15 AM

A U.S. Army paratrooper assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division rucks to an assembly area as a part of a joint forcible entry during Swift Response 24 at Luna, Romania, May 13, 2024. (Spc. Ashley Xie/Army)

BRUSSELS (AP) — The United States has informed its NATO allies that it will scale back its troop presence along Europe’s eastern border with Ukraine as it focuses on security priorities elsewhere in the world, Romania’s defense ministry said on Wednesday.

The U.S. Army later confirmed the move, but denied it was a sign of lessened commitment to NATO.

Depending on operations and exercises, around 80,000-100,000 U.S. troops are usually present on European soil. NATO allies have expressed concern that the Trump administration might drastically cut their numbers and leave a security vacuum as European countries confront an increasingly aggressive Russia.

The administration has been reviewing its military “posture” in Europe and elsewhere, but U.S. officials have said that the findings of the review were not expected to be known before early next year.

NATO has recently been bulking up its defensive posture on its eastern flank bordering Belarus, Russia and Ukraine after a series of airspace violations by drones, balloons and Russian aircraft.

European build-up

The Romanian defense ministry said that the U.S. decision will “stop the rotation in Europe of a brigade that had elements in several NATO countries,” including at a base in Romania.

It said in a statement that about 1,000 U.S. troops will remain stationed in Romania. As of April, more than 1,700 U.S. military personnel were estimated to be deployed there. A brigade usually numbers anywhere from 1,500 to 3,000 troops.

Romania’s Defense Minister Ionut Mosteanu said the decision reflects Washington’s shift “toward the Indo-Pacific” region, and that allied troop numbers would remain above the number before Russia’s full-scale invasion of neighboring Ukraine.

“Our strategic partnership is solid, predictable, and reliable,” he said in a news conference.

In a post on X, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker said the U.S. “remains committed to Romania.”

“Our strong presence in and enduring commitment to Europe remains steadfast, including support for Eastern Sentry,” a NATO operation along the eastern flank, he wrote. He did not mention the troop drawdown.

After the war started in 2022, NATO bolstered its presence on Europe’s eastern flank by sending additional multinational battle groups to Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia. Many more European troops are now stationed there.

The ministry statement said that the U.S. “decision also took into account the fact that NATO has strengthened its presence and activity on the Eastern Flank, which allows the United States to adjust its military posture in the region.”

101st Airborne troops to fly out

In a statement later on Wednesday, U.S. Army Europe and Africa said that the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division will return to its base in Kentucky as previously planned but that no other U.S. troops would rotate into Europe to replace it.

“This is not an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to NATO and Article 5,” it said, in a reference to the collective security guarantee in the organization’s treaty that an attack on one ally should be considered an attack on all 32.

“Rather this is a positive sign of increased European capability and responsibility. Our NATO allies are meeting President Trump’s call to take primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe,” it said.

It insisted that the move “will not change the security environment in Europe.”

Government officials in Poland and Lithuania, which lie further north along Europe’s eastern flank, said they had not been informed of any U.S. troop drawdown in their countries.

Asked about the move, a NATO official said that “adjustments to U.S. force posture are not unusual.” Under the terms of their employment contract, the official is permitted to speak to reporters but only on condition that they not be named.

The official said that even with this new adjustment, about which NATO was informed in advance, the American “force posture in Europe remains larger than it has been for many years, with many more U.S. forces on the continent than before 2022.”

The official played down any security concerns, saying that “NATO and U.S. authorities are in close contact about our overall posture – to ensure NATO retains our robust capacity to deter and defend.”

___

McGrath reported from Leamington Spa, England. Claudia Ciobanu in Warsaw and Geir Moulson in Berlin contributed to this report.

9. The Shadow of October 7th: Peacekeeping (In)Effectiveness in a World of Evolving Conflict

Excerpts:

Conclusion

The events that followed October 7th indicate that the existing structures for UN PKOs in the Middle East are not prepared to address the intricacies of contemporary conflicts. Long-standing mandates, an absence of a unified training doctrine, and political constraints have significantly undermined the efficacy of the operations. This has made the “blue helmets” more susceptible observers than efficient stabilizers. The UN is currently reassessing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations; however, an essential transformation in doctrine from passive observation to a more dynamic and proactive engagement is required, emphasizing not merely the tasks to be executed, but also the manner in which they are carried out.

While this article examines PKOs in the Middle East, the implications of revisions in their capacities and capabilities to execute mandates may impact other UN missions globally. Moreover, such a change might significantly influence public perception, which typically regards UN operations as bureaucratic and a needless expenditure of resources.

Action-oriented mandates that enable peacekeeping operations to actively reduce tensions, along with a comprehensive restructure of the UN training system to standardize the knowledge and capabilities of TCCs operating within the same Area of Responsibility, are of paramount importance. Nonetheless, comprehending the dynamics and objectives of the UNSC, the prospect for substantial reform regarding mandates remains unattained. A more pragmatic and practical approach must be considered. The question lies in how to effectuate substantial change that would enable PKOs to sustain their role as a valuable and efficient instrument of the international community for conflict resolution and mediation.

The responsibility is with the latter, specifically the P5 members of the UNSC, to implement a thorough and immediate reform of peacekeeping, focused on a proactive strategy in the operational and tactical landscape. The future of peacekeeping as a mechanism for global stability necessitates a novel model that is both agile and adaptive, as are the conflicts it aims to contain.

The Shadow of October 7th: Peacekeeping (In)Effectiveness in a World of Evolving Conflict

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/30/the-shadow-of-october-7th/by Jorge Delgado Golusda

10.30.2025 at 06:00am

Abstract

The aftermath of the October 7th assaults on Israel revealed and intensified the significant shortcomings of existing peacekeeping frameworks in contemporary conflicts. This article analyzes the inefficacy of enduring United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) in the Middle East. The analysis indicates that the missions’ long-standing mandates, insufficient training for asymmetric threats, and political limitations imposed by the UN Security Council (UNSC) have incapacitated them from preventing or effectively mitigating escalations involving non-state actors and irregular warfare. The article contends that the difficulties encountered in the Levant represent the changing global conflict dynamics and that the conventional peacekeeping operations methodology is outdated. It finishes by arguing for a fundamental overhaul of peacekeeping doctrine, emphasizing a transition to a more dynamic and proactively mandated approach to maintain the relevance and efficacy of UN missions in the future.

Introduction

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations globally, especially in the Middle East, encounter ever more intricate obstacles. Hybrid armed actors such as Hezbollah complicate their operational capabilities, while targeted misinformation campaigns by conflicting parties erode faith in their role and efficacy. Recent conflict events irrevocably alter the operational environment of these operations. Nonetheless, the international community regards them as an essential source of stability in the region, having maintained a presence for over 77 years.

On October 7th, Hamas launched an attack on Israel, focusing on areas and communities adjacent to the Gaza border, resulting in around 1,200 fatalities and over 200 people taken hostage. This event precipitated a broader conflict between Israel and Hamas that rapidly expanded throughout the region. Three UN missions operate along Israel’s borders with Lebanon and Syria, each under distinct mandates, aimed at functioning as a stabilizing force between conflicting parties. The attack and subsequent escalation in the region highlight the significant shortcomings of existing peacekeeping frameworks in managing conflicts involving non-state actors and entrenched regional rivalries, necessitating a thorough reevaluation of peacekeeping efficacy in preventing and mitigating such crises.

The Landscape Before October 7th

Since Israel’s independence and ensuing conflicts with neighboring countries, the UN has maintained a presence through various diplomatic and peacekeeping missions, referred to as the “Blue Helmets.” It has adjusted to the changing dynamics of the conflict for nearly 77 years and has intervened on behalf of the parties to implement short-term solutions designed to reduce hostilities by facilitating ceasefires and establishing buffer zones. Currently, the Blue Line along the Lebanese-Israeli border and the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan (Heights) region has an active United Nations presence. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established in 1978 and is situated in southern Lebanon. The United Nations Disengagement Force ( was established after the Yom Kippur War to oversee the buffer zone between Israeli and Syrian military units. It persisted in its operations during the Syrian Civil War, notwithstanding threats from insurgent factions, Iranian proxies, and Israeli intrusions. Both missions are supported by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This mission has been active in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, and Egypt since 1948. This is presently the sole UN mission with a regional presence, supplying military observers to oversee the ceasefires.

Despite this significant presence, all these missions lack the necessary capacity and capabilities to mitigate the potential violent actions between the conflicting parties, as exemplified by the 2006 Lebanon War and Israel’s recent activities in Lebanese and Syrian territories. Tensions persist at elevated levels, with these organizations offering only a transient reduction in hostilities through their sheer presence rather than through substantive action.

Multiple fundamental factors contribute to this issue. The active involvement of non-state actors in Lebanon and Syria’s civil war is a significant factor, as UN peacekeeping operations lack the resources and capabilities to confront irregular threats. Moreover, decade-old mandates aimed at preventing state escalation, primarily in a supporting role to the conflict, hinder proactive measures against non-state actors and relegate these missions to a more observational role rather than an action-oriented one that would enable them to achieve their objectives. A significant aspect is the absence of responsibility and engagement from the existing transitional Syrian administration and the Lebanese government in the regions where the PKOs are stationed.

The October 7th Attacks as a Catalyst for Regional Escalation

The unexpected and unparalleled attack by Hamas on Israel, coupled with the latter’s response, revealed and intensified the interrelation with Israel’s regional wars. These incidents have illustrated how a localized conflict may swiftly incite broader instability in an already tumultuous region, where Israel is the focal point for various factions and organizations, many of whom are financed by Iran, directly impacting UN PKOs in the area.

The conflict in Lebanon affected UNIFIL’s area of responsibility. The kinetic engagement between Israel and Hezbollah involved missile and rocket strikes on military and civilian sites in Israel, with Israel retaliating through precision airstrikes in Lebanon, specifically targeting Hezbollah leadership in the suburbs of Beirut and compounds in southern Lebanon, leading to the deaths of senior Hezbollah officials. Furthermore, the incursion of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) into Lebanon, aimed at repelling Hezbollah forces, compelled UNIFIL personnel to seek refuge in their bases while taking fire from both IDF troops and Hezbollah fighters. Nevertheless, the mission persisted with constraints on observation and reporting for the UNSC, conveying the realities on the ground to the international community. Nevertheless, it faced significant restrictions concerning freedom of movement and presence in various localities throughout southern Lebanon and was unable to execute its mandate in assisting the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) with regional disarmament, not only due to the conflict itself but also because of the LAF’s diminished presence in the area, which had withdrawn to avoid direct confrontations with the IDF.

In Syria, where UNDOF operates, no active military engagements occurred as a result of the attacks on October 7th. Upon the collapse of the Assad government, Israel capitalized on the situation to reposition its forces westward. The IDF breached the de facto border, known as the Alpha Line, seizing the buffer zone and Syrian positions within the Area of Limitation designated for Syrian troops. Since then, Israel has declared that the 1974 agreement had collapsed, owing to the lack of a Syrian counterpart to handle this issue, thus constraining UNDOF’s responsibilities and contributions in the region.

The Limited Effectiveness of Peacekeeping in Preventing Escalation

Both missions failed to avert the escalation following the October 7th attacks, partly because their mandates do not include intervention by the use of force to de-escalate situations. Peacekeeping forces serve as a deterrent to prevent parties from escalating hostilities, due to the multinational composition of the personnel involved in these missions. The cost associated with UN casualties is far too great for the conflicting parties and the international community, due to the potential backlash among citizens of Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) and international condemnation. The ramifications of UN casualties in the region are contingent upon the concerned party. An instance of impunity regarding assaults on peacekeepers occurred in 2006 when unarmed military observers were killed at a UN Observation Post by Israel. The latter, despite the primary responsibility for the protection of UN personnel in fulfilling the mission mandate, rests with the host country.

Additional concerns pertain to the intensity and characteristics of contemporary conflict. Both missions were established in the 1970s. The technological innovations, strategies, and characteristics of these regional conflicts have progressed. Current peacekeeping operations function with few personnel, as UNIFIL has approximately 10,000 troops, whereas UNDOF consists of 1,000 men. There is a lack of substantial air and naval presence, limited to support missions primarily. Compared to the conflicting parties, the UN’s presence lacks effective deterrence mechanisms and is not specifically structured to prevent or swiftly respond to cross-border assaults by the involved actors in the region. It is unable to proactively enforce its mandate while facing ongoing threats from the host countries that impede its operational freedom in the designated areas.

A crucial factor is the lack of a baseline training and educational framework to address the various risks now facing the region. The UN mandates that TCCs undergo a pre-deployment course featuring a common curriculum tailored for this sort of deployment. They touch on several issues in a short period of time. In other words, a mile-wide and an inch-deep course. There is also a lack of standardized training in irregular warfare, while Hezbollah is regarded as the preeminent non-state actor globally. Furthermore, peacekeepers are inadequately taught within the UN educational framework to manage high-risk scenarios. This training originates from their own military, encompassing varying levels of expertise, competence, and, crucially, differing interpretations of the application of force. The latter exhibits a deficiency in standardized military vocabulary and terminology. Although this gap narrows throughout mission deployment, it remains ineffectual, as the six-month UN rotation system renders it inadequate for maintaining a functional force capable of successfully executing its mission.

Another significant factor to examine is their leadership structure. A UN mission authority exists, often an officer of General level, alongside a national command led by the most senior officer present on the ground. This facet may possess wider ramifications. In 2014, 45 Fijian peacekeepers stationed at a UN post were abducted by Syrian rebels in the Golan buffer zone after the commanding General of UNDOF ordered their surrender. Subsequently, a comparable incident occurred using a Philippine-manned UN post. The senior national authority, however, ignored the directive, and Philippine forces confronted Syrian opposition fighters, successfully repelling the assault and subsequently crossing into Israel later that night.

The Role of International Actors and the Limitations of Diplomacy

The UNSC is the sole authority capable of sanctioning UN PKOs. This means that they are generally consensus-oriented and reliant on the alignment of the United Nations Security Council’s member states, which include the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom — the P5 — permanent members of the council possessing veto powers from the sole entity that enforces binding resolutions on the international stage. PKOs operate under constrained mandates influenced by tenuous mutual interests.

Sanctions targeting Israel are consistently blocked by the United States, and those impacting Russian interests, particularly in Syria prior to the demise of the Assad regime, experience similar obstruction. Notwithstanding the international community’s calls for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon and subsequently from Syria, the United States’ financial support and veto power in the UNSC facilitated Israel in accomplishing its objectives. The presence of Russian military in the Golan region, supporting Al Assad’s regime, contradicted the latter’s support for missions in the area. The endeavors of PKOs to execute their missions are constantly undermined by P5 nations. Moreover, each year the missions are required to renew their mandates. The recent intensification of the war and interests by the current US administration may have impacted the UNSC’s decision to terminate UNIFIL’s operations by the end of 2026.

Nevertheless, the missions offer a supportive framework for enhanced interaction between the conflicting nations that would likely not occur in the absence of UN mediation or presence. Currently, UNIFIL facilitates contact between Israel and Lebanon to ensure that isolated events and Blue Line issues are resolved peacefully. It also offered its facilities –UNIFIL’s headquarters in Naqoura, Lebanon– for a US-mediated compromise between Israel and Lebanon about an unresolved maritime border dispute that impacted the interests of both sides due to the possible exploitation of gas resources.

Notwithstanding prevailing circumstances, disinformation campaigns, and constrained resources, the UN’s presence in the region via peacekeeping operations is regarded by states as a neutral platform for enhanced diplomatic dialogue, which could ultimately facilitate the resolution of other conflicts. Although Israel, Lebanon, and Syria bear the primary responsibility for attaining lasting peace, UN missions facilitate the emergence of accords. They continue to be regarded as a beneficial presence for the countries engaged in attaining their own objectives and interests.

Reassessing Peacekeeping for a New Era of Conflict

What mechanisms might peacekeeping operations employ to effectively deter serious escalations when a specific side perceives an existential threat? This is likely the most challenging subject to address in a region where, despite a substantial on-ground presence and the utilization of diplomatic channels, tensions have repeatedly intensified.

On the international stage, the efficacy of PKOs has been demonstrated, serving as “a key driver of the gradual decline in the number and severity of armed conflicts,” despite constrained mandates and budgetary limits that influence on-ground efficiency and potential impact. The Middle East missions are familiar with these constraints, yet contribute to a modest success in maintaining regional stability.

Consensus from the UNSC is essential for modifications to mandates and increases in budgetary allocations. Diplomatic support, especially from the P5 countries, is essential to ensure that their interests do not impede peacekeeping operations on the ground. Enhancements for effective deterrence should focus on expanding the existing mandates regarding actions to decrease tensions.

Furthermore, given these objectives and the multifaceted nature of missions centered on conflict prevention and resilience—which may encompass everything from medical treatment to infrastructure projects—missions must be assigned the appropriate resources, including budget, manpower, and equipment.

One of the most critical components for successful deterrence pertains to the existing training system. The UN system is deficient in a doctrine that can be implemented promptly due to the rapid turnover of personnel, insufficient shared tactical and technical competencies, and a lack of a unified operational language across TCC. Reforms to the training system are essential for the missions to establish a unified and sustained training regimen that addresses the disparities within each TCC. This is crucial in the region, as the missions have not adjusted to the persistent asymmetric threats that have existed for decades in the area. Their present capacity to resolve this issue is nonexistent.

Conclusion

The events that followed October 7th indicate that the existing structures for UN PKOs in the Middle East are not prepared to address the intricacies of contemporary conflicts. Long-standing mandates, an absence of a unified training doctrine, and political constraints have significantly undermined the efficacy of the operations. This has made the “blue helmets” more susceptible observers than efficient stabilizers. The UN is currently reassessing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations; however, an essential transformation in doctrine from passive observation to a more dynamic and proactive engagement is required, emphasizing not merely the tasks to be executed, but also the manner in which they are carried out.

While this article examines PKOs in the Middle East, the implications of revisions in their capacities and capabilities to execute mandates may impact other UN missions globally. Moreover, such a change might significantly influence public perception, which typically regards UN operations as bureaucratic and a needless expenditure of resources.

Action-oriented mandates that enable peacekeeping operations to actively reduce tensions, along with a comprehensive restructure of the UN training system to standardize the knowledge and capabilities of TCCs operating within the same Area of Responsibility, are of paramount importance. Nonetheless, comprehending the dynamics and objectives of the UNSC, the prospect for substantial reform regarding mandates remains unattained. A more pragmatic and practical approach must be considered. The question lies in how to effectuate substantial change that would enable PKOs to sustain their role as a valuable and efficient instrument of the international community for conflict resolution and mediation.

The responsibility is with the latter, specifically the P5 members of the UNSC, to implement a thorough and immediate reform of peacekeeping, focused on a proactive strategy in the operational and tactical landscape. The future of peacekeeping as a mechanism for global stability necessitates a novel model that is both agile and adaptive, as are the conflicts it aims to contain.

Tags: insurgency, irregular warfare, Israel-Hamas Conflict, peacekeeping, terrorism, United Nations

About The Author

Jorge Delgado Golusda
Jorge Delgado Golusda is a Major in the Chilean Army, currently serving as Head of Academics of the Non-Commissioned Officer Academy of the Chilean Army. He is the Director of the Fellows Program with the Irregular Warfare Initiative. He has multiple assignments in disaster relief and emergency response missions in Chile and peacekeeping deployments with the United Nations in the Middle East and the European Union Forces in Bosnia & Herzegovina. He holds a bachelor’s in military science from the Chilean Military Academy, a bachelor’s in social science from Diego Portales University, and a master’s in international development policy from Duke University.
X: https://x.com/jdelgadogolusda

I did not expect to read this.

Excerpts:

No, that's not all. The Russian minister is traditionally disingenuous, citing selective facts, concealing the truth and manipulating international law. The truth is that, in addition to nuclear safety guarantees, Ukraine was also given the following commitments under Article 2 of the Memorandum: "The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine..." To resolve issues arising from violations of guarantees and obligations, this international agreement also established a platform for diplomatic settlement and negotiations among the signatory countries. According to Article 6: "Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall consult in the event a situation arises that raises questions concerning these commitments." In other words, expansion of the format is possible, with China and France immediately joining the Memorandum, but narrowing it beyond the signatory countries is not. This is in terms of the fulfilment of guarantees and obligations under the treaty for Ukraine.

...

The international legal order is a multi-level system designed to ensure peace, stability and justice in international relations based on international law. The implementation of the Budapest Memorandum is a test of the viability of the existing international legal order, the system of international law, collective security and agreements in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The loss of confidence in international security guarantees will set a dangerous precedent. Each state will begin to rely solely on force, leading to a new nuclear arms race and paving the way for World War III.

Ігор Смешко

Професор, генерал-полковник

29 жовтня 2025, 20:07

A Response to Sergey Lavrov, or Why the Budapest Memorandum is the Key and the Only Possible Platform for Restoring the System of International Law and Legal Order. The alternative is an inevitable slide into a Third World War

https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/smeshko/69026601e982a/

115

"The system of international law is upheld through mutual recognition of the foundations and principles which, regardless of their metaphysical origins, function in practice as rules of the game. The eloquent statement pacta sunt servanda (Latin: 'agreements must be kept') effectively contains the assertion that the integrity of the system is based solely on the will to participate jointly in a common game. As soon as one of the parties ceases to abide by the rules, the entire system of international law collapses (even if only temporarily)." (Johan Huizinga, Dutch historian and philosopher)

On 26 October 2025, in an interview with the Hungarian YouTube channel Ultrahang, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: "It (the Budapest Memorandum) states that Ukraine, like other former Soviet republics that have renounced nuclear weapons, will receive guarantees that nuclear states provide to non-nuclear states. That's all. That's all. These guarantees state that nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear states that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons." (https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2025/10/26/8004537/)

No, that's not all. The Russian minister is traditionally disingenuous, citing selective facts, concealing the truth and manipulating international law. The truth is that, in addition to nuclear safety guarantees, Ukraine was also given the following commitments under Article 2 of the Memorandum: "The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine..." To resolve issues arising from violations of guarantees and obligations, this international agreement also established a platform for diplomatic settlement and negotiations among the signatory countries. According to Article 6: "Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall consult in the event a situation arises that raises questions concerning these commitments." In other words, expansion of the format is possible, with China and France immediately joining the Memorandum, but narrowing it beyond the signatory countries is not. This is in terms of the fulfilment of guarantees and obligations under the treaty for Ukraine.

Sergey Lavrov's statements lead to only one conclusion: another attempt by the Kremlin to justify its aggression against Ukraine and, through selective manipulation of international law, to destroy not only its statehood and people, but also the existing system of international law and international legal order.

"It is not enough to simply dream of winning the lottery; you must also purchase at least one lottery ticket at least once in your life... If the victim refuses to file a lawsuit and go to court, even perfect laws and law enforcement agencies are powerless to help them."

It is well known that politicians around the world tend to shift the blame for their own selfishness, cowardice, inaction, incompetence and professional ignorance onto the 'imperfection' of laws and international treaties.

The most painful case for Ukraine is the Budapest Memorandum. It is a valid international treaty that guarantees the state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security of Ukraine.

The memorandum was concluded in full compliance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969. It unconditionally requires compliance with its provisions, in accordance with the current system of international law that has developed since the end of World War II.

As in the case of domestic legislation, in the event of a violation of the provisions and conditions of an intergovernmental treaty, the interested party whose rights have been violated must officially appeal to the international authorities and the violating states, demanding the restoration of its rights.

However, since Russia's annexation of Crimea and its armed aggression against Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine's political leadership has failed to address the guarantor states (all five member states of the UN Security Council with permanent representation) with official diplomatic notes and in the form prescribed by legal protocols, regarding the fulfilment of their obligations under the Memorandum. Nor have they requested that Russia's voting rights in the UN Security Council be suspended as a party to the armed conflict and aggressor in the war against Ukraine.

Instead of the above-mentioned, nearly the entire information space – including that of Ukraine – has been dominated by Kremlin-driven disinformation narratives about the alleged "nullity of the Budapest Memorandum," the absence of specific security guarantees in the text of the international agreement, and the "emptiness of the paper," which is directly refuted by the specifics and logic of each point of the treaty itself and the entire Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Even if certain Western leaders lack honour, dignity and responsibility for preserving peace on the planet, this does not exempt them from future judgement by history. The Ukrainian leadership is not exempt from its duty to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty through diplomatic means, using the only 'trump card' it has in any peace negotiations – the Budapest Memorandum.

On 19 October 2025, Gunther Krichbaum, State Minister for European Affairs at the German Foreign Office, reiterated this point: "We must remember that there was the Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia recognised the integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine in exchange for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons. What has now happened to this agreement has not been forgotten."

Today, Russia has effectively destroyed the existing international legal order, which had ensured peace in Europe for 70 years after the end of the Second World War.

By annexing Ukraine's Crimea in 2014, Russia violated a number of multilateral international agreements to which it was a party, including the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Act and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

The first two international treaties mentioned above define the basic principles of international law: the inviolability of borders, the territorial integrity of states, the faithful fulfilment by states of their obligations, refraining from the threat or use of force, and non-interference in matters that fall within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.

The third international agreement – the Budapest Memorandum – between Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and China provided Ukraine with guarantees of its security and territorial integrity in exchange for its commitment to renounce nuclear weapons and to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear state.

Following a joint appeal by the signatory countries to the UN General Assembly and the Security Council, the Memorandum was registered as an international treaty – an official document of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council.

That joint statement bears the signature of the current Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, who was Russia's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in 1994.

At the request of the signatory countries, the text of the Budapest Memorandum was included in the agenda of the regular session of the UN Security Council in 1995 and distributed as an official document of the UN Security Council. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is a full-fledged international treaty and is binding on all parties that have signed it.

According to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the signatory states – permanent members of the UN Security Council – not only reaffirmed their commitment to respect Ukraine's sovereignty and existing borders, but also to 'refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.'

By signing the Budapest Memorandum on 5 December 1994, Ukraine voluntarily renounced the world's third-largest arsenal of nuclear weapons. To this day, Ukraine remains the only country in the world that has made the largest global contribution to nuclear disarmament, thereby strengthening peace and international security on our planet. Following Russia's brutal violation of the Budapest Memorandum and the unwillingness of other nuclear signatory states to ensure the effectiveness of international law and Ukraine's security guarantees, no country in the world will ever again make such a contribution to strengthening the security of others at the expense of its own security.

Former US Republican Senator John McCain noted back in 2014: "America should have acted on the Budapest Memorandum long ago. He also added that from now on, it will be more difficult to negotiate with "nuclear" states to give up their nuclear weapons. It is quite obvious that the agreements of the Budapest Memorandum, which were supposed to guarantee the complete territorial integrity of Ukraine, including Crimea, have been completely violated.

(https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/26567259.html)

By violating the Budapest Memorandum, Russia has undermined the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the event of non-compliance with the Budapest Memorandum and failure to provide real security guarantees to Ukraine, Ukraine has the right to withdraw from this treaty. Both treaties are interrelated for Ukraine (the full name of the Budapest Memorandum is the Memorandum on Security Assurances in Connection with Ukraine's Accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons). Ukraine's withdrawal from this treaty will, de facto, spell its demise. Then no country in the world would ever exchange possession or the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons in exchange for any security guarantees, and would not accede to this agreement.

Therefore, it is clear that the effectiveness of any new future agreements in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons will depend entirely on the implementation of previously signed agreements. First of all, this applies to Ukraine, the world leader in terms of nuclear disarmament, and therefore to the implementation of the Budapest Memorandum. Failure to implement it, especially by the world's democratic countries, is a blow to the image of all democratic countries. It also undermines the entire system of international law, which is based on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

By violating the Budapest Memorandum and Ukraine's borders, Russia has launched a 'domino effect' that could destroy all borders in Europe. These are the borders established after the end of World War II, whose inviolability was confirmed in 1975 in Helsinki. Ukraine's failure to return to its legally recognised borders is tantamount to recognising the Helsinki Accords as a 'house of cards', which any country can now destroy in relation to its neighbour, as long as it has the power to do so.

On 3 March 2025, Polish President (1990-1995) Lech Wałęsa and former Polish dissidents addressed US leader Donald Trump with a statement in support of Ukraine: "We call on the United States to fulfil the guarantees it gave together with the United Kingdom in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which explicitly states the commitment to defend the integrity of Ukraine's borders in exchange for its renunciation of its nuclear stockpiles. These guarantees are unconditional: there is no mention of interpreting such assistance as an economic exchange. ] (https://www.istpravda.com.ua/columns/2025/03/3/164779/)

The only platform for peace talks can be the format of the signatory countries to the Budapest Memorandum.

Unconditional confirmation of security guarantees to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum and its supplemental agreement. Russia's gross violation of the Budapest Memorandum and the incomplete implementation of its provisions by other signatories require that the Additional Agreement to the Memorandum establish a step-by-step, time-bound mechanism to implement the guarantees provided for in the Memorandum, thereby preventing new aggression against Ukraine. This detailed mechanism could be provided by the nuclear signatories to the Memorandum, if they agree, and by new countries or alliances of countries that, based on reciprocity with Ukraine, express a desire to strengthen collective security in the future.

This step is the only possible way to restore the international legal system destroyed by Russia in 2014. The addition of a new agreement to the memorandum is due to the fact that the current text, a full-fledged and valid international treaty, has proved insufficient for some politicians to interpret unambiguously and implement unconditionally. This has led to the tragedy of the Ukrainian people, eleven years of war in Europe, and the destruction of the entire system of international law and agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A radical solution to this issue would be to join such a NATO agreement as a new, collective guarantor of Ukraine's security in the event of new aggression against it. In exchange for Ukraine's commitment, which currently has the most experienced and combat-ready army in Europe, it will become a guarantor of security for the Alliance member countries in the event of aggression against them. In fact, this is a separately defined alliance between Ukraine and NATO, without the deployment of infrastructure and troops of the Alliance member countries on its territory.

(https://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/smeshko/61cc88f72e5f8/).

The next step should be for the coalition of democratic countries of the world to provide assistance to Ukraine in restoring its destroyed territories and economy, and to help it quickly restore democratic institutions of power and accept it into the European Union. This should be accompanied by the formulation of an appropriate strategy for such assistance, similar to 'the Marshall Plan' for Ukraine, and the resolution of the issue of compensation by Russia for the damage it caused to Ukraine during the war.

The international legal order is a multi-level system designed to ensure peace, stability and justice in international relations based on international law. The implementation of the Budapest Memorandum is a test of the viability of the existing international legal order, the system of international law, collective security and agreements in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The loss of confidence in international security guarantees will set a dangerous precedent. Each state will begin to rely solely on force, leading to a new nuclear arms race and paving the way for World War III.Блог автора – матеріал, який відображає винятково точку зору автора. Текст блогу не претендує на об'єктивність та всебічність висвітлення теми, яка у ньому піднімається. Редакція "Української правди" не відповідає за достовірність та тлумачення наведеної інформації і виконує винятково роль носія. Точка зору редакції УП може не збігатися з точкою зору автора блогу.

11. China’s military may discard its rigid command structure, report warns

But isn't any command structure by definition rigid?

Have we in the US military really adopted the philosophy of mission command? What is the PLA learning from us?

This is the referenced report:

Mission Command with Chinese Characteristics?

Exploring Chinese Military Thinking About Command and Control in Future Warfare

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2257-1.html

China’s military may discard its rigid command structure, report warns

Defense News · Michael Peck · October 29, 2025

Even as China embarks on a massive military buildup, America comforts itself with an ironclad belief: As with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, superior Communist numbers will be undercut by rigid command and clumsy tactics that can be exploited by more agile U.S. forces.

But what if China embraces the more flexible Western concept of mission command?

“A Chinese military that fully embraces mission command would likely lead to improved operational performance, with quicker decision-making, better adaptability, and greater resilience in the face of degraded C4ISR,” according to a new report by Rand Corporation.

There is evidence that Chinese military reformers are beginning to push for the People’s Liberation Army to adopt mission command, researchers warn in the U.S. think tank’s Oct. 22 report. A more flexible, decentralized Chinese system would be more resistant to U.S. tactics such as attacking command and control centers. In turn, the report suggests, this would force the U.S. to revise its strategy.

The concept of mission command essentially means commanders expressing the general intent of the mission, leaving subordinates to use their own judgment on how to implement those goals. It is an approach that worked well for the Germans in World War II and works well for the Israel Defense Forces today, enabling initiative and rapid decisions while their opponents waited for orders from higher command. Today’s U.S. military — in theory at least — embraces mission command, despite frequent concerns that commanders micromanage their subordinates.

China’s political leaders have long worried that the effectiveness of their armed forces are being undermined by rigid and over-centralized command, unrealistic training and widespread corruption. A 2023 Pentagon report pointed to “genuine anxieties among PRC [People’s Republic of China] leaders about the PLA’s readiness and ability to conduct joint operations if tested under real combat conditions.” China’s president Xi Jinping has conducted repeated purges of senior officers, with nine generals and officials recently expelled as part of an anticorruption drive.

For now, reformers are gingerly testing the waters, with mission command appearing in select units such as special operations forces and warships operating in distant waters, according to the Rand report’s authors.

“There is ample evidence that Chinese military strategists are advocating for institutional PLA adoption of mission command,” Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, who co-authored the Rand study, told Defense News. “And that some PLA units are experimenting with mission command in some PLA exercises, but it is unclear so far how widely mission command is being adopted throughout the PLA.”

Controlling the military is a dilemma for any authoritarian government. The military is usually the force that props up the regime — and is the one force that can overthrow it. In Nazi Germany, for example, the armed forces, or Wehrmacht, were made to swear an oath to Adolf Hitler rather than Germany itself.

Similarly, the PLA is not the armed forces of the Chinese nation, but rather the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party. Commissars sharing command with regular officers at every level — from army headquarters to submarines on patrol — enable the CCP to keep an eye on the military. For the PLA, the “first and primary responsibility is to ensure the continued survival of the CCP regime, and generally to faithfully follow the orders of the CCP leadership,” Rand researchers noted.

YJ-19, China's first operational hypersonic cruise missile, seen during a military parade in Beijing, Sept. 3, 2025. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)

The report’s authors see three options for China. For the U.S. and its allies, the most dangerous would be for the Chinese military to fully adopt mission command, the report suggests.

“The U.S. way of war has historically focused on degrading adversary C2 [command and control],” the report notes. “A PLA that embraces mission command is likely to be much more resilient against such U.S. strategies, requiring adapting or developing new U.S. approaches.”

One way for the U.S. to impede Chinese adoption of mission command is to avoid joint exercises.

“Potential PLA exposure to successful foreign command practices should be a factor when U.S. allies and partners consider undertaking a bilateral or multilateral exercise with the PLA,” the authors suggest.

Another option is partial adoption of mission command, perhaps out of skepticism that Chinese commanders are capable of fully implementing the concept. Some units, such as special operations and warships, would enjoy some degree of operational freedom (though nuclear, space and cyber forces would likely remain tightly controlled). However, this could be problematic if “inadequate implementation and organizational dynamics lead to a faulty hybrid of centralized and mission command that result in inconsistent PLA operational performance,” the study states.

It could also increase the chance of war.

“A PLA command structure that empowers lower-level command while not improving command capability and discipline could result in more aggressive and self-interested behavior, without central PLA leadership direction,” the report warns.

On the other hand, China’s leaders may simply decide that it’s safer to keep the existing system of tight command. This may involve more frequent use of “skip echelon,” where military and political leaders bypass the chain of command and issue orders directly to lower-level formations. This option would show “CCP desires for political control outweigh any acknowledged benefits for operational performance, leading to slow, more brittle PLA command,” according to the report.

Still, voices within the Chinese military may still carefully call for reform.

“The CCP will almost certainly continue to prioritize Party control, as evident in recent purges of PLA senior leadership,” Beauchamp-Mustafaga said. “But PLA advocates of mission command would argue that Beijing can have its cake and eat it too. Decentralized execution while retaining high levels of Party control when it matters.”

About Michael Peck

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him on X at @Mipeck1. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

12. Leaked memo details National Guard plan for a 'quick reaction force' in US cities

Isn't riot control one fo the traditional specified tasks for the National Guard.

However, let's consider the timeline for this. Is it realistic? There are only two weekends between now and January. How do all 50 states meet this requirement in two months (or even four months with four weekend training periods since the Executive Order was published on August 25th)?

The active duty military would be hard pressed to establish such forces and have them fully mission capable in that short time span - and 4 weekends for the National Guard is hardly enough for sufficient training. I seriously doubt we are going to mobilize these forces and take them away from their civilian jobs to give them the training over the next two months to meet this requirement. Does our civilian leadership recognize the flaws in this directive?

Leaked memo details National Guard plan for a 'quick reaction force' in US cities

Each state will have a quick reaction force unit made up of hundreds of troops ready to deploy by Jan. 1, 2026, according to an official memo.

Patty Nieberg

Published Oct 29, 2025 2:23 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · Patty Nieberg

The National Guard is developing a “quick reaction force” of troops trained in crowd control and civil disturbance that can be ready to deploy to U.S. cities by January, according to a leaked memo viewed by Task & Purpose.

All 50 states, Puerto Rico and Guam will have their own quick reaction force, or QRF. The National Guard Bureau memos show that most states will have 500 troops assigned to these units, except for those with smaller populations like Delaware, which will have 250 troops in its QRF, Alaska with 350, and Guam with 100 troops. The Washington, D.C. National Guard is directed to maintain a “specialized” military police battalion with 50 National Guard soldiers on active duty orders.

A National Guard spokesperson told Task & Purpose that the bureau is coordinating with the secretary of defense, all U.S. states, territories, and the District of Columbia, “in planning that will implement the direction” President Donald Trump laid out in an Aug. 25 Executive Order.

According to the spokesperson, who spoke with Task & Purpose under the condition their name not be used, that executive order directed the secretary of defense to ensure that each state “designate an appropriate number” of trained National Guard troops “to be reasonably available for rapid mobilization” to assist federal, state, and local law enforcement in “quelling civil disturbances and ensuring the public safety and order whenever the circumstances necessitate, as appropriate under law.”

“We’ve never had a National Guard quick reaction force before, so this is a completely new unit,” a National Guardsman familiar with the plans told Task & Purpose.

The Guardsman said the QRFs are different for the Guard, which is typically deployed at a moment’s notice for national disaster response or to assist law enforcement.

“This is different because we’re essentially establishing a unit for space to respond to civilian activities,” they said. “We are ready to go when we’re called upon. We’re not asked to stand up an entire unit ready to quell dissent at any moment.”

The states are directed to use the “Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course.” They will also provide “Level I” and “Level II” civil disturbance training, which includes courses on de-escalation of force techniques, crowd control, handheld radio communications, proper use of body shields, batons and tasers, pepper spray, and public safety, according to the memos.

The guardsman, who previously mobilized for a mission to assist law enforcement, said the gear and training that the QRF forces are getting is “taking it up a level.”

“It gets into like what you would need for hasty checkpoints and for detainee operations and the training that they’re going to have is much more extensive than what we’re generally doing when we’re training to assist civilian authorities,” they said.

The National Guard Bureau will give each state 100 sets of crowd control equipment and provide two full-time Guardsmen on active duty orders to manage training, equipping, and response. Commanders are directed to provide monthly updates on their unit’s training, personnel and equipment status in an online defense readiness reporting system, according to the memo.

The goal is to have the National Guard quick reaction forces operational by Jan. 1, with units setting aside an additional five days of training. The memo states that five-day courses are available in October, November and December.

The Guardsman said the QRFs will use volunteer National Guard troops, but said they think it’s likely that others will be “voluntold” to join the mission “if enough people don’t volunteer.”

When asked about the plans earlier this month, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said he would not comment on “particulars,” but said the U.S. has “multiple layers of National Guard response forces.”

“We’ve got a lot of different ways that, constitutionally and legally, we can employ title 10 and title 32 forces, and we will do so when necessary,” Hegseth added.

Are you a member of the National Guard who’s recently been mobilized? We’d like to hear from you.

Task & Purpose Video

Each week on Tuesdays and Fridays our team will bring you analysis of military tech, tactics, and doctrine.

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Patty Nieberg

Senior Reporter

Patty is a senior reporter for Task & Purpose. She’s reported on the military for five years, embedding with the National Guard during a hurricane and covering Guantanamo Bay legal proceedings for an alleged al Qaeda commander.

taskandpurpose.com · Patty Nieberg

13. As Trump Weighs Sale of Advanced A.I. Chips to China, Critics Sound Alarm

Excertps:

After meetings with Mr. Huang, Mr. Trump reversed course this summer and said the H20 chip could be sold and that the federal government would take a cut of that revenue. That is illegal under current laws, but Mr. Huang said on Tuesday that the U.S. government was drafting a regulation to be able to collect those fees.

Mr. Trump’s current and former advisers said that, as with other issues, he had a more transactional view of U.S. technology, seeing it as a potential bargaining chip for other wins.

Mr. Trump has also been focused on the performance of the U.S. stock market, of which Nvidia is a major driver. On Wednesday, Nvidia became the first publicly traded company to top $5 trillion in market value. In South Korea on Wednesday, Mr. Trump was heard to ask after Mr. Huang’s location.

Beijing has discouraged Chinese companies from using the H20 chip, pushing them to try domestic alternatives. But tech experts said the Chinese would most likely welcome the Blackwell sales. Nvidia has developed a downgraded version of the Blackwell for China, the B30A, which experts said had about half the computing power of a normal Blackwell but many times the capacity of chips that China could produce domestically.

Chris McGuire, a former State Department official who helped develop the tech controls for the Biden administration, said the sales would “cede the biggest advantage that America has in A.I.”

“Blackwell chips are maybe the most sophisticated products made on earth,” he said. “It is a very, very powerful product, and giving it to China is crazy.”

As Trump Weighs Sale of Advanced A.I. Chips to China, Critics Sound Alarm

By Ana Swanson and Tripp Mickle

Ana Swanson covers trade, and Tripp Mickle reports on technology.

Oct. 29, 2025

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

NY Times · Tripp Mickle · October 29, 2025

The president signaled he would discuss the sale of Nvidia’s Blackwell chips in a summit on Thursday, a move U.S. officials warned would be a “massive” national security mistake.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/29/us/politics/trump-china-nvidia-chips-sales.html

Listen to this article · 8:55 min Learn more

Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, at the company’s conference in Washington on Tuesday.Credit...Eric Lee for The New York Times

Oct. 29, 2025

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

As President Trump flew to South Korea on Wednesday to prepare for a summit with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, he made some remarks that set off alarm bells among Washington officials concerned about America’s rivalry with China.

“We’ll be speaking about Blackwell,” Mr. Trump said of his meeting with Mr. Xi, referring to the most advanced artificial intelligence chip from the U.S. chipmaker Nvidia. Mr. Trump called the technology a “super duper chip”; complimented Nvidia’s chief executive, Jensen Huang; and declared, “We’re about 10 years ahead of anybody else in chips.”

Mr. Trump’s comments signaled a major potential change for U.S. policy that many Washington officials warn poses a national security risk. Selling such advanced A.I. chips to China is currently banned, and U.S. officials have worked for years to restrain Beijing’s access to the cutting-edge technology.

The president’s reversal, if it comes to pass, would have widespread implications. Nvidia, which has emphasized the importance of maintaining access to the Chinese market, would reap new sales. But critics have argued that A.I. technology is important enough to potentially shift the balance of power in a strategic competition between the United States and China.

On Wednesday, speculation that the Trump administration may imminently approve the sale of those chips to China mobilized opposition from critics inside and outside the White House and in Congress.

Senator Chris Coons, Democrat of Delaware, said on CNN that the reports “alarmed” him.

“The defining fight of the 21st century will be who controls artificial intelligence,” he said. “It would be a tragic mistake for President Trump, in order to get some soybean orders out of China, to sell them these critical cutting-edge A.I. chips.”

In an interview, R. Nicholas Burns, the U.S. ambassador to China from 2021 to 2025 and now a Harvard professor, said he hoped the Trump administration would “hold the line” on U.S. tech sales to China, calling them “a massive mistake.”

The People’s Liberation Army of China wants to dislodge the United States, and sees technology as key to doing that, Mr. Burns said. Chinese laws also require companies to share technology and information with the government if asked.

If the Chinese military became stronger by better adapting technology over the next decade, the consequences for the United States and allies like Japan, South Korea and India could be dire. Any gains for American companies from selling into China would most likely be “very short-lived,” Mr. Burns said, since the Chinese government wants to become self-sufficient in chip technology, as it has in other industries.

“The loss would be incalculable,” Mr. Burns said. “We’ve got to prioritize national security over the interests of any one company.”

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in China? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

John Rizzo, a spokesman for Nvidia, said in a statement on Wednesday that “China has more than enough domestic chips for all of its military applications and has no reason to use our products for that purpose.”

“We support the Trump administration’s vision for America to win and promote U.S. leadership and jobs,” he said, adding, “National security does not require America to retreat and forfeit industrial leadership to America’s foreign competitors.”

The White House did not immediately return a request for comment.

The outcome of Mr. Trump’s meeting with Mr. Xi, scheduled for Thursday in South Korea, remains to be seen. But the administration has sought an arrangement with China that could restore stability to the relationship and restart some commerce, including soybean purchases that China halted after Mr. Trump imposed tariffs this year.

Mr. Trump and other officials have hailed a potential deal in which China could resume those agricultural purchases, curb exports of chemicals used to make illicit fentanyl and pause the introduction of its new licensing system on rare earth minerals, while the United States pauses or removes some of its tariffs.

Beijing has also pushed the United States to halt or roll back its tech controls and other punitive measures against China, like new fees for Chinese ships docking in U.S. ports.

One former government official briefed on the discussions said that the Chinese had driven a hard bargain, and that Mr. Trump had wanted to reach an early agreement with China to buy not just soybeans but other farm products, like barley, wheat, corn and nuts. Mr. Trump had been briefed on fraying political support among communities in Iowa, Kansas and elsewhere that have been hurt by Chinese retaliation, the official said. That has influenced how the president is thinking about the midterm elections next year, the official said.

President Trump arriving in South Korea on Wednesday. He is scheduled to meet with President Xi Jinping of China on Thursday.Credit...Haiyun Jiang/The New York Times

Mr. Trump said Wednesday that he expected to lower U.S. tariffs on China, adding that he and Mr. Xi “would work out something.” He said that the U.S.-Chinese relationship was very good and that he believed the meeting would have “a very good outcome for our country and for the world.”

Nvidia and Mr. Huang, who increasingly has Mr. Trump’s ear and confidence, have pushed for Blackwell sales to China. The Silicon Valley company has argued that such sales would accelerate America’s leading position in A.I.

On Tuesday at Nvidia’s first conference in Washington, Mr. Huang said he did not know whether Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi would discuss chips, but argued that allowing the sale of Nvidia chips to China would benefit both countries.

“We want as many countries around the world to be building on American tech standards,” he said. Mr. Huang added that half of the world’s A.I. researchers were in China, and that if they were cut off from Nvidia’s technology, that would hurt U.S. tech development.

In a keynote speech earlier on Tuesday, Mr. Huang also cast Nvidia as a successor of American innovators like AT&T, IBM and Apple. He mentioned America more than two dozen times and highlighted how Nvidia was beginning to make A.I. chips in Arizona, which he said Mr. Trump had asked his company to do. He closed the speech by thanking the audience for “all for your service and making America great again.”

Mr. Huang was expected to travel to South Korea to participate in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, where Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi will meet on the sidelines. Mr. Huang declined on Tuesday to share his travel plans, and a Nvidia spokesman declined to comment on whether Mr. Huang would be present with the two leaders.

In his first term, Mr. Trump cracked down on Chinese tech companies like Huawei, which led to broader and more systematic controls on cutting-edge technology in the Biden administration. Those restrictions have rankled Beijing, which called them unfair and has stoked efforts to develop China’s own technology.

In Mr. Trump’s second term, officials initially promised to restrict U.S. support of Chinese A.I. companies, after the release of a new A.I. system by DeepSeek, a Chinese start-up, rattled Washington. In April, the Trump administration moved to block the sale to China of one Nvidia chip, the H20, a downgraded version of the company’s Hopper chips made particularly for China, over concerns that it may accelerate those developments.

After meetings with Mr. Huang, Mr. Trump reversed course this summer and said the H20 chip could be sold and that the federal government would take a cut of that revenue. That is illegal under current laws, but Mr. Huang said on Tuesday that the U.S. government was drafting a regulation to be able to collect those fees.

Mr. Trump’s current and former advisers said that, as with other issues, he had a more transactional view of U.S. technology, seeing it as a potential bargaining chip for other wins.

Mr. Trump has also been focused on the performance of the U.S. stock market, of which Nvidia is a major driver. On Wednesday, Nvidia became the first publicly traded company to top $5 trillion in market value. In South Korea on Wednesday, Mr. Trump was heard to ask after Mr. Huang’s location.

Beijing has discouraged Chinese companies from using the H20 chip, pushing them to try domestic alternatives. But tech experts said the Chinese would most likely welcome the Blackwell sales. Nvidia has developed a downgraded version of the Blackwell for China, the B30A, which experts said had about half the computing power of a normal Blackwell but many times the capacity of chips that China could produce domestically.

Chris McGuire, a former State Department official who helped develop the tech controls for the Biden administration, said the sales would “cede the biggest advantage that America has in A.I.”

“Blackwell chips are maybe the most sophisticated products made on earth,” he said. “It is a very, very powerful product, and giving it to China is crazy.”

Ana Swanson covers trade and international economics for The Times and is based in Washington. She has been a journalist for more than a decade.

Tripp Mickle reports on some of the world’s biggest tech companies, including Nvidia, Google and Apple. He also writes about trends across the tech industry like layoffs and artificial intelligence.

See more on: Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, R Nicholas Burns, U.S. Politics

NY Times · Tripp Mickle · October 29, 2025

14. Special Operations Command Pacific undergoing first AI boot camp this week

Yes. This is likely a good thing. While the Commander outlines a new "trinity" of "robotics, autonomy and resilient networks" we must never forget the other two SOF trinities and figure out how AI and this new trinity can support the SOF fundamental missions and comparative advantages that it brings to the joint force. We must not chase the shiny thing for the sake of the shiny thing and abandon our basic missions.

The foundational SOF Trinities:

(1) Missions

Irregular Warfare,

Unconventional Warfare,

Support to Political Warfare

(2) The comparative advantage of SOF:

Influence,

Governance,

Support to Indigenous Forces and Populations

And keep this in mind:

UW is fundamentally problem solving; using unique, non-doctrinal and non-conventional methods, techniques, people, equipment to solve (or assist in solving) complex political-military problems

And creating dilemmas for our adversaries

Excerpts:

“The combination of those three things — robotics, autonomy and resilient networks — we think are absolutely critical for us. As I mentioned, the ability to disrupt our adversaries’ ability to target us, that is the oxygen that we require to operate in this theater,” he said.

Lessons from how China is approaching emerging technology and using sensors to process information from the sea floor to space are instructive for how US and friendly forces will have to be successful in the region.

“The really important part … is all that information you gather it’s great, but it’s meaningless if you can’t transport it to somewhere where you can then make a coherent picture out of it,” VanAntwerp said. “If we can’t understand what’s going on and have ability to make a coherent picture out of that information, which does require a resilient network, then it will be ultimately meaningless, or you will have just disparate elements that are operating without awareness of their job within the bigger picture.”

Special Operations Command Pacific undergoing first AI boot camp this week - Breaking Defense

The AI boot camp will help directors and deputy directors better understand how to apply the technology.

By Mark Pomerleau on October 29, 2025 12:33 pm

breakingdefense.com · Mark Pomerleau · October 29, 2025

WASHINGTON — Special Operations Command Pacific is running its first ever artificial intelligence boot camp this week, in an effort to familiarize officials with how it can be useful everyday, according to the organization’s commander.

“The reasons why AI adoption has been difficult for us is because we’re creatures of habit, one. A lot of us have been at this for 20 or 30 years, you’ve developed workflows and processes, and we fear change,” Maj. Gen. Jeffrey VanAntwerp said Tuesday at AFCEA’s TechNet Indo-Pacific conference in Hawaii. “We don’t want to do something differently. It seems inefficient at first. At first, potentially, we don’t even trust it. We don’t trust the results. The second one, I think is equally as big, if not bigger, is that we don’t know how. We don’t know how to do the new thing.”

Indo-Pacific Command does not have a choice when it comes to adopting AI, VanAntwerp said, noting that commander Adm. Samuel Paparo has directed INDOPACOM be an AI-enabled command.

The AI boot camp this week will pull in directors and deputy directors for four days with experts teaching them how to make sense of some of the large language models the command has at its top secret, secret and unclassified enclaves.

VanAntwerp said he hopes the excitement of experts and others coming in will “infect” directors and deputy directors to be a catalyst within the headquarters as they metastasize AI usage, given it is an incredibly powerful tool.

But, he clarified, AI won’t be the decision maker, instead serving as an aid to decision making.

Other important technologies for the region include the combination of robotics, autonomy and the network that will enable the command and control of these capabilities.

“The combination of those three things — robotics, autonomy and resilient networks — we think are absolutely critical for us. As I mentioned, the ability to disrupt our adversaries’ ability to target us, that is the oxygen that we require to operate in this theater,” he said.

Lessons from how China is approaching emerging technology and using sensors to process information from the sea floor to space are instructive for how US and friendly forces will have to be successful in the region.

“The really important part … is all that information you gather it’s great, but it’s meaningless if you can’t transport it to somewhere where you can then make a coherent picture out of it,” VanAntwerp said. “If we can’t understand what’s going on and have ability to make a coherent picture out of that information, which does require a resilient network, then it will be ultimately meaningless, or you will have just disparate elements that are operating without awareness of their job within the bigger picture.”

breakingdefense.com · Mark Pomerleau · October 29, 2025

15. Hegseth says US Forces Japan ready for next phase of reorganization amid China threat

We need to think bigger. A Northeast Asia Combatant Command.

Strategic Concept: Establishing a Combined Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/strategic-concept-establishing-a-combined-northeast-asia-combatant-command-neacom-in-seoul/

Hegseth says US Forces Japan ready for next phase of reorganization amid China threat

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson · October 29, 2025

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reviews Japanese troops alongside his Japanese counterpart, Shinjiro Koizumi, at Camp Ichigaya in Tokyo, Oct. 29, 2025. (Seth Robson/Stars and Stripes)

CAMP ICHIGAYA, Tokyo — U.S. Forces Japan has all the personnel it needs to become a joint force headquarters and is ready for the next phase of its reorganization, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said after meeting his Japanese counterpart here Wednesday.

“This important change will improve our warfighting capabilities, our lethality and our readiness,” Hegseth told reporters at the headquarters of Japan’s Ministry of Defense.

“All phase one personnel are in place, and we are ready to begin phase two shortly,” he said after meeting new Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi.

USFJ’s upgrade is part of the allies’ response to a growing Chinese military. Beijing has built the world’s largest navy and routinely transits the waters around Japan, sometimes alongside Russian naval vessels.

Along with increasing the size of its defense budget, Japan has positioned missiles on its southwest islands, which are at risk of attack in any attempt by China to reclaim nearby Taiwan.

“China’s unprecedented military buildup and its aggressive military actions speak for themselves,” Hegseth said alongside Koizumi at Ichigaya.

The first steps to restructure the command from a liaison organization to one integrated for operations with its Japanese counterparts were announced by Hegseth during his first visit to Tokyo as defense secretary in March. His predecessor, Lloyd Austin, announced USFJ’s restructuring in July 2024.

“Moving from a headquarters primarily charged with an alliance management mission to one that, in time, will integrate and synchronize operations that span the spectrum of operations from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and armed conflict is a monumental task,” USFJ commander Air Force Lt. Gen. Stephen Jost wrote in an editorial for the Asahi newspaper in June.

To strengthen their alliance, the United States and Japan must continue building strong, lethal, combat-credible forces, Hegseth said.

“There’s no way to replace hard power,” he said.

Japan’s commitment to spend more money on defense is an important step, Hegseth said.

“To increase our strength, we are going to invest now and invest quickly while we still have time,” he said.

The former Fox News host spoke to around 6,000 troops aboard the USS George Washington aircraft carrier Tuesday at Yokosuka Naval Base, homeport of the U.S. 7th Fleet in nearby Kanagawa prefecture, ahead of President Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

That morning, Trump and Takaichi signed agreements on defense and critical minerals.

American and Japanese troops standing shoulder to shoulder at Yokosuka were a reminder of the strength and depth of the alliance, Hegseth said at Ichigaya.

The 55,000 U.S. troops in Japan alongside Japanese self-defense forces stand ready to defend both nations, he said.

The defense ministers will take steps to ensure U.S. and Japanese troops have what they need to train, fight and win, Hegseth added.

Koizumi noted Takaichi’s remarks a day earlier — that the U.S.-Japan partnership is the world’s greatest alliance and that she would work to strengthen both countries.

“Secretary Hegseth and I share the responsibilities for the implementation,” he said.

During an hourlong meeting, the pair discussed the blueprint for the future of the alliance, Koizumi said. Improving U.S.-Japan command and control and expanding their military presence in the southwest of the country is essential, he said.

Hegseth, who arrived in Japan on Tuesday, is next slated to join Trump in South Korea for the final leg of his Asia trip.

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson · October 29, 2025

16. US missiles stationed in Philippines can reach China: official

Excerpts:

Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. said in an interview on Friday: "These are medium-range missiles, meaning that if they are launched, they can reach mainland China and even their artificial islands. But for us, they do not matter to others; we are strengthening the [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to defend our country against any nation attempting to invade or seize our territory."

Guo Jiakun, spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, said at a press conference on February 12: "China will not sit idly by when its security interests are harmed or threatened … We call on the Philippines to change its course, and make a strategic choice that truly serves the fundamental interest of itself and its people, rather than staying on the wrong path and hurting the Philippines itself when it comes to issues like Typhon."

US missiles stationed in Philippines can reach China: official

By Ryan Chan

China News Reporter

https://www.newsweek.com/us-missiles-stationed-in-philippines-can-reach-china-official-10949484

Newsweek

A Philippine general said on Friday that the United States Typhon missile system deployed in the country since April last year is capable of striking China.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Why It Matters

The Typhon Mid-Range Capability system is a land-based missile system operated by the U.S. Army. It can launch two types of missiles—the Tomahawk and the Standard Missile-6—against aerial, surface and land targets, with respective ranges of about 1,000 and 290 miles.

The U.S. Army initially deployed the Typhon missile system in the Philippines for drills, but the U.S. and the Philippines, allies under a mutual defense treaty, later decided to keep it there indefinitely. Eastern and southern China and parts of the South China Sea—where Beijing and Manila have territorial disputes—fall within range of the system.

What To Know

Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. said in an interview that deploying the Typhon missile system is part of the military's effort to strengthen its capability to defend the country against any invasion attempt, the Daily Tribune reported.

While acknowledging that mainland China and China's artificial islands in the South China Sea are within range of the system, the general said the weapon's range does "not matter to others" as the Philippines focuses on building defenses against "any threats."

"It is not specifically targeting China, but these missile systems are here so we can train. Once we acquire these capabilities, we must be ready to use them," the general said. Manila revealed its interest in buying the Typhon missile system last November.

The Philippine military chief said that even without hosting the U.S. missile system, the country is already a target because of its "very strategic" location, close to Taiwan and serving as a chokepoint between the South China Sea and the broader Pacific.

China's communist government has claimed sovereignty over the self-governed island of Taiwan and has threatened to use force to achieve reunification. The Typhon missile system could strike Chinese invasion forces in the air and at sea from the Philippines.

...

The Philippines and Taiwan form part of a north-south defensive line known as the First Island Chain, along with Japan, under a U.S. containment strategy that aims to project military power to deter and defend against potential Chinese aggression.

The Chinese defense and foreign ministries have been urging the U.S. and the Philippines to withdraw the Typhon missile system from the Philippines, saying the deployment undermines China's legitimate security interests and warning that it would take necessary countermeasures.

"This is a significant step in our partnership with the Philippines, our oldest treaty ally in the region," the U.S. Army previously said of the "landmark" Typhon missile system deployment, saying it has enhanced interoperability, readiness and defense capabilities.

What People Are Saying

Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief General Romeo Brawner Jr. said in an interview on Friday: "These are medium-range missiles, meaning that if they are launched, they can reach mainland China and even their artificial islands. But for us, they do not matter to others; we are strengthening the [Armed Forces of the Philippines] to defend our country against any nation attempting to invade or seize our territory."

Guo Jiakun, spokesperson for China's Foreign Ministry, said at a press conference on February 12: "China will not sit idly by when its security interests are harmed or threatened … We call on the Philippines to change its course, and make a strategic choice that truly serves the fundamental interest of itself and its people, rather than staying on the wrong path and hurting the Philippines itself when it comes to issues like Typhon."

What Happens Next

China is likely to continue pressuring the Philippines over the Typhon missile system deployment, which could further increase tensions in the contested South China Sea.

Newsweek

17. Pentagon removes key protections for civilian workers, moves to fire with ‘speed and conviction’

What does it mean to fire someone with conviction?

Pentagon removes key protections for civilian workers, moves to fire with ‘speed and conviction’

by Ellen Mitchell - 10/28/25 5:49 PM ET

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/5577739-pentagon-civilian-personnel-rules/

The Pentagon has pulled key protections for its civilian personnel, directing managers to move with “speed and conviction” to fire underperforming workers, according to a memo issued one day before the U.S. government shut down.

“Supervisors and human resources (HR) professionals are directed to act with speed and conviction to facilitate the separation from Federal service of employees performing unsuccessfully,” states a Sept. 30 memo signed by the Pentagon’s top personnel policy officer, Under Secretary of Defense Anthony Tata.

It also warns that managers will be held accountable if they don’t address “poor employee performance.”

The new guidelines, which became public Tuesday, have sparked fears that they could be used to push out anyone at the Pentagon who doesn’t agree with or toe the line on the Trump administration’s programs.

It’s unclear how many employees may have been fired since the memo took effect. The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment from The Hill.

Nearly half of the Defense civilian workforce — about 334,900 employees — have been furloughed for the shutdown, according to the department’s contingency plan released last month.

Of those remaining, about 24 percent are paid through sources other than the annual appropriations bill Congress has been unable to pass. Another 30 percent are considered “excepted” employees who must continue to work jobs such as those involved in providing medical care, emergency response or protecting human life.

Furloughed and excepted workers are not paid during a shutdown, but they are guaranteed back pay once the government reopens.

The Trump administration has attempted to fire thousands of furloughed employees while the government is closed — part of the president’s bid to greatly reduce the federal workforce in his second term — but the move has been blocked by a California federal court that found such cuts were likely illegal.

At the Pentagon, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has been on the warpath in ousting those seen as standing in the way of President Trump’s agenda, which includes bringing a “warrior ethos” back to the U.S. military.

“The sooner we have the right people, the sooner we can advance the right policies. Personnel is policy,” Hegseth told hundreds of generals and admirals last month in an unprecedented speech at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia.

The memo now makes it easier for managers to fire Defense civilian personnel, with office heads told to cite criteria used in federal job evaluations known as Douglas Factors.

The factors allow managers “flexibility to address performance issues swiftly and effectively,” according to Tata.

“This approach empowers supervisors to act decisively when performance undermines [Defense Department] objectives, reinforcing a culture of excellence,” the memo states, adding later that every position supports the mission, “so deficiencies in any role can warrant strong action.”

Employees targeted for firing now have just seven days to challenge unfavorable review.

The sped-up firing process comes after Hegseth earlier this year ordered the Pentagon’s workforce to be cut by nearly 8 percent, or about 60,000 personnel, via voluntary buyouts and attrition.

18. The American Military Officer After Liberalism

Excerpts:

Like the Prodigal, though the West has denied eternal verities in the name of isolated, cynical, ironic detachment, we have found the result neither nourishing nor convincing. We gaze into a future where “extreme license coexists with extreme oppression.” Some seek truth, both old and new. Others seek to enrich themselves in the upheaval that could come in the decline of liberalism, just as the turmoil of the 1630–50s preceded its birth in the 1680s. Depending on what a society hopes to find, it will reshape its politics accordingly.

The military will, and ought to, follow. Or, if civic collapse is deep enough, it may abandon Huntingtonian professionalism entirely, seize power, and attempt to force its own political order into being.

Burk and Brooks remind us that our current civil-military model has always been contested, delicate, and culturally dependent. A coherent, intentional polity may cultivate neo-Prussian subordination or civic-spirited Heinleinism. A fragmented one might drift toward factionalism or chivalric decentralization.

The future American officer will not be Huntington’s 20th century ideal. He will be wrought by whatever comes next, whether liberal in its present form or authoritarian, aristopopulist, communitarian, or something we don’t have a label for yet. The question is not whether the military can survive through such a turning of the age — it always has — but whether we are willing to think seriously about it before history compels us to.

The American Military Officer After Liberalism

Peter Mitchell

October 30, 2025

warontherocks.com · October 30, 2025

Across academia, government, and Silicon Valley, on social media, and in leading journals, intellectuals and political leaders are openly debating what comes after liberalism. Yet inside the military profession, this conversation is either ignored or waved away with half-measures, critiques of Samuel P. Huntington, and calls for more civil-military engagement. What’s missing is a serious reckoning with how a post-liberal political order, should one ever arise, could reshape the military profession itself.

By liberalism, I mean here both the broad Enlightenment “classical liberalism” of individual rights and limited democratic government, and its late-20th-century “progressive” form dominated by bureaucratic proceduralism. Post-liberalism in this thought experiment refers not to a single ideological program but to the family of arguments that liberalism may be exhausted. Whether a post-liberal America would still be an Aristotelian “America” as defined by its constitution and first principles is its own debate. My concern here is how the military profession may adapt if liberal norms no longer anchor it.

Otto Hintze argued well over a century ago that military organization is never independent but mirrors the political order of the state it serves. As such, the Huntingtonian model of military professionalism, rooted in liberal democracy, is historically contingent rather than universal. If liberalism weakens, the profession of arms will inevitably adapt to whatever civic order replaces it. Because the military has always drawn its legitimacy from its regime, officers ought to be prepared to redefine professionalism in post-liberal contexts rather than assume present norms will endure.

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Huntington and the Liberal Baseline

Huntington’s 1957 The Soldier and the State was the first attempt to establish a canon for the liberal-democratic military profession. Huntington defined professionalism as a triad of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The officer, in this model, is a neutral expert: highly skilled in managing violence, responsible to the state, and isolated from partisan politics. However, Huntington did not reduce the officer corps to mere technocrats with howitzers. He insisted that officers needed a distinct institutional culture to resist liberal society’s individualism, precisely so they could serve liberalism without being washed away by it. “A bit of Sparta in the midst of Babylon,” as Huntington famously praised the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.

Civilian leaders set policy, the military executes. “I am a soldier,” George S. Patton summarized. “I fight where I am told, and I win where I fight.” In return, the state shields the soldier from the political and legal consequences of the violence he unleashes on its behalf. The American officer corps has long assumed this “objective control” model as the natural order of things, protected not by the letter of the law but by unwritten norms.

But The Soldier and the State was written at the height of liberal self-confidence, in a Cold War world where liberal-democratic institutions appeared both durable and inevitable, and served as a powerful counter to a Soviet Red Army entirely co-opted by the political. Huntington’s model remains indispensable as a framework tied to a particular moment in history. To assume it timeless is to mistake a momentary prescription for a universal law. What is considered political is never frozen in time, nor is our understanding of what constitutes “neutrality.” One recent critique noted that the current U.S. military uses Huntington as a shield, allowing officers to retreat behind hollowed norms of neutrality even as politicization grows unchecked.

Beyond Huntington

Several thinkers, aware of the volatile nature of civil-military relations, have since sought to revise Huntington’s approach. In The Professional Soldier, written just a decade after Huntington in the midst of the 1960s, Morris Janowitz described the military amidst changing social and political currents. For him, the officer corps was less a cloistered guild of neutral experts than a “constabulary,” constantly renegotiating its legitimacy with a changing society: adaptation instead of Huntington’s separation.

James Burk took this a step further, arguing that military professionalism is bound to the culture in which it is embedded. If liberal democracy wanes, so too does the Huntingtonian conception of objective control. Professionalism would not so much disappear as it would take on the coloration of whatever regime comes next.

Rebecca Schiff’s concordance theory expands this, suggesting legitimacy arises not from separation but from mutual agreement between military, political elites, and citizenry through taking a keen look at military professionalism outside Western liberal democracies. Schiff identified four indicators of domestic military intervention: the officer corps’ social composition, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style.

Peter Feaver, on the other hand, reframed civil-military relations as a “principal-agent” problem, showing how political oversight constantly shapes professionalism through elected civilians acting as principals and the military as agents. Deborah Avant and Michael Desch highlighted how domestic institutions and global pressures condition the profession, often in ways Huntington never anticipated. Desch argues that external threats, not professional norms, are the primary drivers of strong civilian control, and that the American model is historically unusual. Together, they suggest that the military profession is less a timeless equilibrium than a constantly shifting bargain between officers, civilians, and the political order of the day.

Eliot Cohen went the furthest of all to lay a petard underneath the neat lines of Huntingtonian theory. His book Supreme Command argued that four case studies of strong civilian leaders (Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion) did not abstain from intrusion but dictated strategy through direct engagement. All of these writers, however, are still operating from a liberal framework, assuming the continuing primacy of the autonomous, rights-bearing individual.

Present Challenges to Liberalism

Debates are happening because liberalism is under growing strain. Citizens increasingly regard government as distant, unresponsive, and rigged in favor of elites. Populist movements from left and right are fueled by this loss of legitimacy. People resort to mass protest movements or political violence instead of community organization or civic engagement. Globalized markets and relentless meritocracy have created unprecedented inequality. Society promises diverse pluralism but delivers homogeneity. Science and technology, the supposed tools of humanity, now use us. The very machines built to liberate us from natural law have produced an ecological crisis, a fertility crash, and digital dependency. The state once designed to be restrained becomes a surveillance state. The only political solutions offered are liberal ones: either progressive liberals arguing for restrictions on the market and greater governmental intervention to restore equity, or classical liberals (so-called “conservatives” or “libertarians”) arguing for a freer market and smaller government for more meritocracy.

A political philosophy founded on rights-bearing individuals liberated from constraints, secured by a state limited to protecting rights, and empowered by market forces has, after 300 years of maturation, produced its opposites: inequality, alienation, and a creeping sense of entrapment. Even the foremost assumptions of the classical liberal, that human beings are rational and autonomous creatures in pursuit of universal objective truth, are no longer considered valid. The postmodern “incredulity towards metanarratives” has removed them. “Truth” tends to be regarded as a product of social-linguistic conditioning. There is no such thing as a “neutral vantage point.” Reason and institutions are nothing more than tools of power. Individuals are shaped and constrained by the discourses and culture they are born into.

Postmodernism is not just academic, but has rippled out into the professional classes and society at large. Doctors and lawyers may still orient themselves toward love and justice. The postmodern officer has no such anchor. Philosophically untethered from his cherished “neutrality” and increasingly incapable of articulating how the profession of arms can be linked to a telos, he finds himself adrift in the political landscape. Where there is no vision, the people perish.

Douglas MacArthur once declared, “There is no substitute for victory.” The postmodern American military has moved beyond such outdated notions. Now victory is a social construct. And if the ultimate end of war can no longer be grounded in universal principles, the means must justify themselves. Strategy devolves into technique. The officer’s value is measured less by character, wisdom, or good judgment than by his ability to optimize processes.

Thus, it comes as no surprise that in our day, American officers have increasingly styled themselves as individual systems managers. RAND engineers, operations researchers, and staff planners are the archetype: the officer as a rational STEM expert whose value lies in managing complexity. Within this managerial state, officers become loyal to their expertise itself, as easily plugged into J.P. Morgan as a combatant command.

Expertise subsumes Huntington’s responsibility and corporateness. Officers are held unaccountable for strategic failures. Politicization infiltrates through the walls of separation. The oath becomes, in practice, not to the Constitution and political leaders but to the technocracy of arms. Risa Brooks writes that what counts as professionalism today is unstable and has critically undermined its relationship with civilian authority. Feaver, Avant, and Desch show how the American civil-military bargain is historically unusual and highly susceptible to outside forces. The contemporary American officer still espouses Huntingtonian language, but in practice his promotion systems and incentives reflect a different order.

Civilian control under this current model becomes subjective rather than objective. Control is exercised through cultural and ideological alignment. Professionalism comes to mean technical excellence plus adherence to dominant cultural narratives.

This is the present challenge: an officer corps that claims neutrality by retreating into process yet must promote through performatively reproducing prevailing orthodoxies. The result is a military that is simultaneously insulated from society by impenetrable techno-jargon and deeply politically enmeshed through ideological policing. It is professionalism void of substance, shiny and nacreous as the inside of an oyster shell and just as empty. It foreshadows what the military may look like if liberalism gives way.

Post-Liberalism

“Post-liberal” is not a synonym for authoritarianism or a politician in Budapest. The term refers to a broad family of intellectual projects that argue liberalism has exhausted itself through atomization of society, erosion of common values, and the inability of procedural rules to resolve deep cultural divides. This has in turn spawned the deconstructivism that now threatens to tear the liberal world apart. Political theorists from right and left like Patrick Deneen, Adrian Vermeule, Gladden Pappin, Alasdair MacIntyre, Chantal Mouffe, and John Gray, among others, have argued that a durable political order may require reintroducing substantive common goods, strong moral traditions, and alternative forms of sovereignty from renewed localism to “aristopopulism.”

These debates are not happening on the margins. Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed was recommended by President Barack Obama. Curtis Yarvin attended President Donald Trump’s second inauguration.

These thinkers are shaping the future policymakers who will one day sit in Congress, staff the White House, and issue orders to the military. The officer corps cannot afford to remain complacent, assuming that the Huntingtonian framework will remain viable by default. The cautionary tale of Imperial Germany illustrates the danger of subordinating politics to military ends, producing what Ritter called a “political doomsday machine.” James Burk reminds us that professionalism is contingent. If liberalism wanes, so too will its military model.

I now present five possible views of a post-liberal officer corps and its relationship to the state, organized by familiarity. Huntington titled his book The Soldier and the State, but in practice the state — its political order, its first principles — always comes first, even in Prussia. These models are derivative of the political orders that would allow them to take root. And, as with Huntington’s own categories, they are not mutually exclusive. They may be mixed at different levels as society demands, such as the contemporary Russian mixing of patrimonial and mercenary. This does not seek to predict whether liberalism will collapse or manage to adapt to the present crisis. Rather, this seeks to explore how a military profession might diverge from the familiar baseline. The point is not to map a single destiny but to sketch the range of possibilities that a post-liberal order may impose on its soldiery. Nor is the point to endorse any one of them over the other, as all of them have significant failings and critical vulnerabilities.

These models also differ in what they imply about the future of the state itself. Liberalism and the modern nation-state arose together. It is hard to imagine one fading without questioning the future of the other. The neo-Prussian, Heinleian, and patrimonial models assume a unitary state but ideologically transformed. The mercenary and chivalric envision a partial decay into networks of megacorporations or localities. Keeping these in mind may clarify not only what sort of officer corps would emerge, but what sort of polity he would serve.

Patrimonial

Patrimonialism represents the baseline state toward which civil-military relations drift unless institutions intentionally resist it. As political polarization and distrust of institutions intensify, those in power may determine that loyalty to the party is a more reliable guarantor of control than loyalty to the Constitution. A leader, remembering Cohen’s examples of successful political intrusion, could directly seize control of the military in order to centralize power in an indefinitely-extended emergency. Promotions would cease to be a function of professional merit and would become a reflection of ideological purity and personal allegiance. Senior officers would be expected to publicly endorse political positions. Military units would be used to enforce partisan orders. The institutional guardrails that separate the military from domestic politics would be dismantled.

This condition is by far the most common military organization outside of the West. Authority is conferred primarily through factions, nepotism, and political litmus tests, not merit. The state and the military are so intertwined it is difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s “civil-military fusion” and the Russian siloviki are contemporary examples.

However, the U.S. military’s professional ethos, though under stress, is deeply inculcated. A powerful heritage of non-partisanship and meritocracy stands as a formidable bulwark against complete politicization of the officer corps. The oath to the Constitution remains a powerful and unifying force. Furthermore, the sheer size of the U.S. armed forces make a top-down, ideologically driven purge difficult to execute without sparking mass resignations or revolt.

A patrimonial military is a deeply compromised profession, becoming an extension of the regime rather than a national institution. There are rare cases of patrimonial militaries achieving success through organizational innovation (the Ottoman Janissaries) or sheer mass and ruthlessness (the Soviet Red Army). More often, patrimonialism corrodes competence, as appointments are based on favor rather than internal standards of excellence. The result is a steady decline in combat effectiveness and a heightened risk of the military being turned against its own citizens or rival factions.

Mercenary

This model could emerge from a fiscal and political retreat from imperial responsibilities. As the cost of maintaining a global military becomes politically and economically untenable, the state would begin to outsource its needs to private military companies. This would be sold as a more efficient, less politically costly alternative to a standing army. The military-industrial complex would shift to these companies as primary customers. The best and brightest officers, disillusioned with low pay and suffocating bureaucracy, would find more lucrative opportunities with these firms. The state’s military would shrink to a small, specialized force, with the bulk of its power projection handled by private entities.

From condottieri to the East India Companies, these professional soldiers are loyal only to their corporation. They are self-regulating, jealously guard their privilege of violence-for-pay, and serve regimes on contractual terms, as the present Executive Outcomes and the post-Wagner Africa Corps do. Mercenary professionalism is viewed as shareholding, not national service. However, constitutional and ethical objections to such a national mercenary force are understandably immense. The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to raise and support armies, a power that Americans would be loath to see surrendered to private companies. Without a capable standing army, there is the risk that a powerful private military company would obtain dominant leverage over the state and public order, as recent history (and the nightmares of authors from Niccolò Machiavelli to Mike Pondsmith) demonstrates. Public outrage over “soldiers without borders” and a lack of accountability in past operations by private military companies, would likely indicate a cool reception for this model in the United States.

If this model were indeed to prevail, the U.S. government would lose its monopoly on the use of force, a foundational principle of the modern nation-state. Its foreign policy would be conducted not by public servants, but by corporations operating on a for-profit basis. This could lead to a complete lack of transparency and any sort of accountability. In a crisis, the government would be dependent on a private entity, which would inevitably prioritize its bottom line over national security.

Heinleian

This model is named for the American novelist Robert A. Heinlein (U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1929), author of Starship Troopers and many other influential works of science fiction. A profound societal calamity, like a catastrophic defeat or a collapse of civil society, could create a demand for a unifying national purpose. The idea that service is the only path to national revival could gain traction, propelled by a populist-nationalist movement. The military, as the most respected and visible institution of service, would become the arbiter of civic virtue. A reform movement in the wake of a constitutional convention could tie voting rights, office-holding, and other privileges to military service. The officer corps would be upheld as the new moral aristocracy.

The Heinleian model differs from 20th century fascism in that it exalts service, not party, state, or volk. Its illiberal philosophy lies in reserving the privileges of citizenship for those who perform military service. Officers become guardians of tradition and the body politic. Professionalism merges with virtus, as in the cursus honorum of the Roman Republic. The military becomes the avenue by which civilians achieve full political standing. Anyone can be a citizen, as long as they serve.

In such a polity, the purpose of the state is redefined. The liberal state exists to secure individual rights and mediate competing visions of the common good. The Heinleian state exists to cultivate and sustain a virtuous military.

Of course, this model is fundamentally at odds with the principles of universal suffrage and individual rights enshrined in the Constitution. The prospect of disenfranchising a large portion of the population from citizens into civilians would spark a massive legal and political battle, and possibly a rebellion depending on the level of helotry the civilians are to be reduced to. The idea of creating a designated underclass is (at present) anathema to the American way of life. Furthermore, the U.S. military is not currently designed as a gatekeeper to citizenship. Most general and flag officers would likely resist such a radical role shift — though one suspects many junior officers might see an opportunity in it.

Such a Heinleian society could be cohesive, motivated, racially diverse, and high-trust at the cost of militarism, Singaporean levels of authoritarianism, and underutilizing a significant fraction of its population. The military would become the most powerful institution, not just in security, but in politics and culture. This could lead to a stable but deeply illiberal state, where the military’s influence on policy reigns unchallenged.

Neo-Prussian

A charismatic leader, promising to restore order and national greatness in the face of perceived failure, would begin to demand personal loyalty over loyalty to institutions. The officer corps, disillusioned with political dysfunction and bureaucratic inefficiency, might willingly trade its allegiance to a failing system for a direct relationship with a strong, effective leader. Professionalism would be redefined to being a ruthlessly effective tool of state power. The military serves the leader’s will without question, seeing political debate as a civilian mess to be best avoided. Unlike the patrimonial model, which corrupts professionalism to short-circuit potential military opposition, the neo-Prussian has a high degree of interdependence and trust between the officer and the regime. Leaders of the regime always have military experience.

The officer corps is a professional caste loyal to the leader and the state, not to an abstract constitution. Officers swear to their ruler, with professionalism defined by strict internal standards of excellence and loyalty. Neutrality is maintained by executing orders faithfully and “staying out of politics.” This carries a special allure to the American military mind. “Prussian efficiency” has long been the gold standard for effectiveness dating all the way to Friedrich von Steuben, then Emory Upton’s reforms, and later the post-World War II emulation of Auftragstaktik and veneration of Carl von Clausewitz. However, the institutional checks and balances of the U.S. government, as well as the oath to the Constitution, are specifically designed to prevent this very outcome. The decentralized nature of military command and the existence of multiple power centers (Congress, the president, the joint chiefs) make it impossible for any single leader to command personal fealty across the entire force. There also would be significant internal resistance from officers who would see this outcome as irredeemably unconstitutional.

This model promises a powerful and historically effective military, but one that is an instrument of the leader, not the people. It could lead to a stable but authoritarian state, with the military acting as the enforcer of the leader’s will. The officer corps would be highly insulated and self-regulating, but it would have forfeited its role as a neutral servant of the republic.

Chivalric

As the military becomes increasingly diverse and reflective of a society in the midst of a culture war, a segment of the officer corps might begin to feel that the state has lost its moral compass. They may look beyond value-neutral professionalism for a higher purpose, finding it in a specific religious tradition, a philosophical school, or a set of founding principles they believe the state has abandoned. Their loyalty would be to this transcendent order, the Constitution being a document that derives its legitimacy from these higher principles. In a conflict of duties, their moral allegiance would supersede their legal one. A collapse of civil society could then cause these officers to act on their transcendental ideals.

Medieval knights swore fealty both to obey their liege and to defend the Catholic Church, pledging to both a secular sovereign and a transcendent moral or religious order. When the two conflict, the transcendent order prevails. Professionalism becomes a vocation.

It is worth noting that the pluralistic and multicultural nature of the U.S. military makes a single, shared “transcendent order” impossible pending an outbreak of national fervor that would make the Second Great Awakening look like Burning Man. An officer corps swearing allegiance to specific spiritual tenets would be in direct conflict with the constitutional principle of religious freedom. The institutional separation of church and state would make this model untenable, likely leading to deep unrest and a crisis of command pending complete revision (or removal) of the Constitution. As in the mercenary model, this could also entail the state losing its monopoly on violence, as the new “knights” of this order could foment a feudal political structure where they promise to serve the state but remain free to exercise power in their personal fiefdoms. Such a society would increasingly resemble a new dark age.

A chivalric military would be a highly motivated and moral force when brought together, but thinly spread, decentralized, and unruly without a very strong leader (see Richard the Lionheart versus his inept brother John Lackland) to hold it in check. Internal schisms would occur over doctrinal disputes, as well as full-fledged rebellion if officers believe the state has strayed from its first principles.

Which Model?

These scenarios are not abstractions without consequence. One can already see evidence of patrimonial promotion incentives, transnational militaries, and New York Times articles written by ex-generals debating what is a transcendental order.

One might describe this as a shift from objective control through clear institutional boundaries to subjective control through cultural and ideological conformity. The labels differ depending on perspective, but the mechanism is observable.

Again, these models are not predictions but thought experiments. The point is not that any particular one (or any of them) will come true, but that the profession must be intellectually prepared for civic orders that may succeed the status quo.

Indeed, it is very difficult to imagine a United States of America, the grand historical experiment of liberalism, that has explicitly abandoned the liberal and constitutional basis for its government without simply describing a completely new country altogether. To lose liberalism may mean to lose America as we know it. That may prove the ultimate limit on any of these models.

Sed Contra

This essay does not argue liberalism will collapse, only that military officers should be intellectually (and spiritually) prepared for alternatives. Some may argue that the answer is not post-liberalism but a recovery of “true” American classical liberalism along the lines of a Jeffersonian democracy with its suspicion of standing armies and preference for state militias. Such a vision promises fidelity to part of the Founders’ intent and added insulation against the dangers of a politicized federal military.

Three problems stand in the way. First, turning that clock back is impossible without first dismantling the post-Civil War constitutional order and possibly repealing the Fourteenth Amendment. Such upheaval is historically far more likely to result in Caesar than Cincinnatus. Second, the militia-based model of Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson is not a professional military, and thus out of the scope of this essay. Thirdly, protecting a nation-state with nothing but a citizen militia is a pipe dream. Independence in the 21st century requires a permanent professional military, if only to sustain a nuclear deterrent. No polity can remain sovereign without one.

Others may object that abandoning liberalism means abandoning the rule of law — and with it, any recognizable professional military ethic. But as Adrian Vermeule notes, the rule of law is not a liberal achievement. Roman law, medieval jurists, and early modern legal traditions all operated independently of liberal individualism, yet they maintained robust systems of order, justice, and legality. Vermeule provocatively writes: “The real question is not whether the rule of law can be obtained in the absence of liberalism, for it obviously can. The real question is whether it can be obtained in the [continued] presence of liberalism.”

This should give pause to those who assume a possible decline of liberalism necessarily spells blood in the streets. As Burk wrote, military professionalism is unlikely to dissolve into something unrecognizable. A post-liberal profession of arms would still be governed by a code of conduct, discipline, and justice, just as Roman legions, knightly orders, and the Bourbon armies of Louis “L’État, c’est moi” XIV once did, and as the People’s Liberation Army does today — all without being “liberal” in any sense of the word.

The real fragility, then, is not in the oath that officers take but in the civic order that stands behind it. Officers swear to constitutions, but constitutions cannot interpret themselves. If district judges cannot agree on the Constitution’s meaning, why pretend soldiers can? If civilian authorities appear to abandon their obligations to law or citizens, the military is placed in a bind: obey and risk becoming the tool of tyrants, or resist and shatter the political order you swore to uphold.

That tension is not hypothetical. It is the dilemma of every officer from Alcibiades to Zumwalt.

The temptation is to resolve this situation by retreating into separation: civilians here, politics there, military over here, clean lines and clear spheres. But the task is harder, and more human. Professions endure not in isolation but when they cultivate thick boundaries that can breathe, strong enough to resist invasion, yet porous enough to inform one another.

After Liberalism

Like the Prodigal, though the West has denied eternal verities in the name of isolated, cynical, ironic detachment, we have found the result neither nourishing nor convincing. We gaze into a future where “extreme license coexists with extreme oppression.” Some seek truth, both old and new. Others seek to enrich themselves in the upheaval that could come in the decline of liberalism, just as the turmoil of the 1630–50s preceded its birth in the 1680s. Depending on what a society hopes to find, it will reshape its politics accordingly.

The military will, and ought to, follow. Or, if civic collapse is deep enough, it may abandon Huntingtonian professionalism entirely, seize power, and attempt to force its own political order into being.

Burk and Brooks remind us that our current civil-military model has always been contested, delicate, and culturally dependent. A coherent, intentional polity may cultivate neo-Prussian subordination or civic-spirited Heinleinism. A fragmented one might drift toward factionalism or chivalric decentralization.

The future American officer will not be Huntington’s 20th century ideal. He will be wrought by whatever comes next, whether liberal in its present form or authoritarian, aristopopulist, communitarian, or something we don’t have a label for yet. The question is not whether the military can survive through such a turning of the age — it always has — but whether we are willing to think seriously about it before history compels us to.

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Peter Mitchell is a U.S. Army officer and author.

The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the views or positions of U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style, War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Midjourney

warontherocks.com · October 30, 2025

19. America and China Can Have a Normal Relationship

Conclusion:

Neither the United States nor China can fully hobble each other’s economy, but each side has economic tools that can inflict real damage if adversarial competition continues unchecked. As Trump and Xi head to the negotiating table, the conditions are ripe for an inflection point in U.S.-Chinese relations that could set a path toward a more stable and effective relationship. Such a course correction is far from guaranteed. But it is a possible and worthy goal.

America and China Can Have a Normal Relationship

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-and-china-can-have-normal-relationship

Foreign Affairs · More by Da Wei · October 30, 2025

How to Move Past Strategic Competition

Da Wei

October 30, 2025

U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng in Geneva, Switzerland, May 2025 Martial Trezzini / Reuters

DA WEI is Director of the Center for International Security and Strategy and a Professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University.

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In the repeated cycles of confrontation and détente that define U.S.-Chinese relations, a paradox has emerged. Economic relations between the two countries are more fraught than ever: in early October, for the second time in just six months, the United States and China launched a trade war, imposing prohibitive export restrictions and threatening to raise tariffs to previously unthinkable levels.

Yet the U.S.-Chinese relationship also appears increasingly resilient. Although leaders in both Washington and Beijing have seemingly shrugged their shoulders at the rapid decoupling of the world’s two largest economies, the first bout of trade escalation in April and May gave way to a period of relative calm. Over the past ten months and even during the final two years of the Biden administration, U.S.-Chinese relations have been showing signs of rebalancing. Each time a crisis has arisen, such as when a Chinese unmanned high-altitude balloon flew into American airspace in 2023, U.S. and Chinese leaders have sought to quickly stabilize ties, suggesting that the world’s two largest economies still share a structural need for a broadly steady relationship.

These contradictory trends signal that the U.S.-Chinese relationship might be at an inflection point. Neither Washington nor Beijing harbors any illusions that the two countries can return to the pre-2017 era, in which interdependence and engagement, rather than decoupling and strategic competition, were its defining features. But short-term economic spats and tactical maneuvering for potential deals should not obscure the possibility that the United States and China can move beyond an era of adversarial competition toward a more normal relationship—one in which they can coexist peacefully in a state of cool but not hostile interactions. The meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping this week in South Korea presents a narrow but important opportunity for the United States and China to enter a new phase of bilateral relations.

AMERICA VERSUS THE WORLD

The possibility of an inflection point stems in part from changes in U.S. foreign policy. From Beijing’s perspective, Trump’s first term marked the onset of a period of strategic competition in which the United States, viewing China as its most serious adversary and competitor, sought primarily to contain or slow China’s economic and technological rise. It was, in other words, the United States versus China. Under President Joe Biden, Washington maintained the same goals but sought to do so in concert with its allies—the West versus China. For strategists and policymakers in China, both Trump and Biden believed that American and Chinese interests were fundamentally at odds, and therefore the only option was unyielding competition that left no room for compromise.

Although Trump has continued to pressure China in his second term, U.S. foreign policy has shifted. Trump has recalibrated the United States’ economic and security relations with the entire world. His so-called Liberation Day tariffs in April, for instance, targeted more than 100 countries, including many U.S. allies. The Trump administration has repeatedly pressured longtime U.S. partners in Europe to pay for more of their own security, even at the cost of straining ties. Trump’s approach can no longer be characterized as the United States or its allies versus China, but rather the United States versus the rest of the world.

In previous eras, the United States and China found ways to build a foundation on which the two countries could work together despite their disagreements. In the 1970s and early 1980s, they cooperated to counter the Soviet Union. After the Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War, Beijing and Washington promoted economic integration and shared in the gains of globalization. In the past decade, however, as countries have turned away from globalization, the grounds of cooperation between the United States and China have eroded. But by more fully rejecting the entirety of the old model of globalization—and reorienting its foreign policy strategy away from targeting only China—the Trump administration has created an opportunity to establish a new basis for improved relations.

AFTER GLOBALIZATION

Although strategists and policymakers in Washington and Beijing alike tend to blame the deterioration in U.S.-Chinese relations on hostile policies from the other side, an alternative explanation is that the old model of globalization became unsustainable. Growing friction is a function of structural shifts as much as individual leaders.

China rose spectacularly in the post–Cold War era of liberal internationalism led by the United States. But by relying on a political and economic model distinct from Western liberalism, China’s rise effectively stretched the liberal order to its breaking point. The United States also benefited greatly from a liberal, unipolar world, but it failed to address the dislocation that globalization brought to its own economy and society, leading to intense domestic backlash.

The United States is now dismantling the system it built and led. Many Democrats and Republicans alike have pushed back on liberal internationalism and have instead embraced industrial policy and economic nationalism. Neither the United States nor China now accepts economic efficiency as a justification for dependence on the other side’s financial systems, critical goods, and advanced technologies. Countries cannot halt this process of deglobalization. They can only adapt to it.

China’s growing confidence may make that task easier. In recent years, the United States has imposed significant restrictions on China’s development through export controls on industries such as semiconductors. Yet China has continued to achieve technological breakthroughs. China’s growth rate has slowed, but the economy continues to expand. And Beijing has now found ways to pressure Washington, most notably by controlling the supply of rare-earth magnets on which many U.S. industries rely. A confident China can focus more on implementing sound economic policies at home and less on how U.S. pressure might hinder its goals. By doing so, China will continue to develop and may even improve its global standing relative to the United States.

In this context, policymakers and strategists in both China and the United States have a rare opportunity to temper their attitudes toward each other. Beijing could reconsider whether the United States is intent on thwarting China’s rise. Washington could reassess the dominant perception that China seeks to overthrow U.S. global leadership. A change in narratives will help move past the hostility that has prevented the two sides from working together more productively.

A REBALANCING ACT

The United States and China do not have to be friends, but they do have to avoid being enemies. A new type of relationship requires rebalancing how the two countries depend on each other. For decades, their economic ties were asymmetric: China relied on the United States’ monetary and financial systems, as well as its advanced technology, to fund its growth and provide the know-how it needed to develop its economy. The United States, in turn, depended on Chinese manufacturing to produce low-cost goods to consume. The fierce competition of the past decade has shattered that old pattern. The Trump administration has made clear that the United States will no longer accept a massive trade deficit with China, and Chinese leaders have expressed their uneasiness about reliance on U.S. financial and technological tools. Even before the trade war that broke out in 2018, the two countries had already started to decouple some parts of their economies.

In a relationship characterized by levelheaded stability, competition between the United States and China would endure. But both countries would need to regulate the intensity of the competition and establish clearer lines to demarcate where their economies and societies should interact and where they should be independent. Large-scale Chinese investment in the United States in electric vehicles and batteries, for instance, would make both countries more equally reliant on each other in manufacturing, technology, and finance. But investment should be limited to certain sectors in which both countries agree that collaboration is mutually beneficial. This type of interdependence is more stable—and likely more sustainable—than one in which the United States provides high-value inputs and China produces low-value outputs. Both sides would be more likely to feel they are benefiting from the economic relationship and seek to preserve the balance.

The conditions are ripe for an inflection point in U.S.-Chinese relations.

The two countries also need to recalibrate their geopolitical relations in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. military routinely conducts reconnaissance missions and freedom of navigation operations near China’s coastline, insisting on its legal right to do so and the necessity of reassuring its regional allies of its security commitments. But these actions risk provoking a dangerous conflict between the world’s two largest military powers. The United States could lower regional tensions by reducing the frequency of these politically provocative actions. Instead, the United States could employ other technological means, such as satellites, to gather military intelligence, which would reduce the risk of military confrontation while allowing it to uphold its security commitments.

U.S. and Chinese leaders can also de-escalate tensions around Taiwan. The Trump administration could reassure Beijing of its position on the island’s future by formally opposing Taiwanese independence. In response, Beijing could reduce the frequency of military exercises and increase cross-strait exchanges. If leaders in Beijing believe there is hope for peaceful reunification, there is less urgency to use military force to resolve the question of Taiwan’s status. This arrangement aligns with Trump’s global vision of trying to broker peace in areas of long-standing conflict.

From the 1990s until this year, the United States prioritized a universal outlook, whereas China focused on nation building. Now, for the first time in decades, the U.S.-Chinese relationship involves two nationalist powers. Trump’s call to “Make America Great Again” and Xi’s vision of the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” are both nationalist goals. Such nationalist visions are not necessarily in conflict. Instead, the United States and China can support each other’s rejuvenation, or at the very least, avoid impeding the other’s progress toward that goal. Trump’s “America first” approach suggests this is possible: when the United States focuses on itself in its foreign policy, it is often more restrained toward China, as has been the case in the South China Sea in the first year of Trump’s second term.

Neither the United States nor China can fully hobble each other’s economy, but each side has economic tools that can inflict real damage if adversarial competition continues unchecked. As Trump and Xi head to the negotiating table, the conditions are ripe for an inflection point in U.S.-Chinese relations that could set a path toward a more stable and effective relationship. Such a course correction is far from guaranteed. But it is a possible and worthy goal.

Foreign Affairs · More by Da Wei · October 30, 2025

20. Trump's 'amazing' bargain with Xi turns out a dud

Where you stand depends on where you sit. A lot of different spins on the agreements.

Excerpts:

So, despite what Trump appears to believe, little of what he’s doing with tariffs is going to shrink cross-border trade. What Trump World misses, Moec notes, is that “instead of bringing production back to the countries where products are used, global companies have been reorganizing their supply chains around groups of countries or clubs with similar values or security concerns.”

Moec adds that “this rejig is a diluted version of globalization but can still keep the wheels moving. As long as clubs include both low-wage nations and high-spending economies, the adverse effects of fragmentation – such as inflation and lower efficiency – could be mitigated.”

Even as Trump complains about China’s dominance, he’s paving the way for Asia’s biggest economy to grow its influence. Ending US development aid created more space for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its colossal infrastructure investment strategy around the globe, particularly the Global South.

“None of these people has any idea of how the world works,” says Stuart Stevens, a longtime Republican strategist whose latest book is titled The Conspiracy to End America. “The world’s greatest power wants to have as little influence as Liechtenstein.” Either by design or inadvertently, Stevens says, Trump era policies are “going to give away American power” to China and Russia.

Yun Sun, director of China programs at the Stimson Center, adds that any “deterioration of US leadership and credibility will benefit China.”

That goes, too, for Chinese assets. Investors and Asian central banks sitting on mountains of US Treasury securities are already concerned enough about Washington’s US$38 trillion debt load and stubbornly high inflation. Now it’s time to count the ways Trump’s supposed truce with Xi could unravel in short order, shaking up global markets anew.

Trump's 'amazing' bargain with Xi turns out a dud - Asia Times

Trump raised expectations of a grand China trade deal but wholly underdelivered in his much-anticipated summit with Xi

https://asiatimes.com/2025/10/trumps-amazing-bargain-with-xi-turns-out-a-dud/

asiatimes.com · William Pesek · October 30, 2025

US President Donald Trump touted the trade-war breakthrough with China’s Xi Jinping with predictable triumphalism. On Thursday, Trump gushed about an “amazing” meeting with Xi, where he agreed to cut China’s tariff to 47%. But the odds that posterity will concur are exceedingly low.

For one thing, there’s nothing “grand” about the bargain to which Trump and Xi are discussing in the loosest and vaguest terms possible. Specifics, targets, enforcement mechanisms and punishment for non-compliance will all be discussed by US and Chinese trade officials at a future date.

Nothing on the table, though, alters the mechanics of a US$659 billion trade relationship in any notable way. Face-saving agreements to throttle back on tariffs, buy more soybeans and increase the flow of rare-earth minerals are grand on some levels. But narrowing America’s trade deficit with China requires a wholesale remaking of commercial dynamics.

For another, myriad tripwires could — and likely will — return Trump and Xi to battle stations. Count the ways things could go awry: China depreciating the yuan; Trump depreciating the dollar; the US economy slowing sharply; either side failing to live up to a deal; domestic political troubles prompting either leader to lash out abroad.

“It’s good for the world’s top two largest economies to dial down tensions,” says Ting Lu, economist at Nomura Holdings, “but we believe the superpower rivalry will likely escalate in the future.” As such, he says, global investors are learning to embrace the new normal of “tension, escalation and truce.”

Economist Chang Shu at Bloomberg Economics says, “we expect the leaders to approve the deal, but whether it will bring lasting relief to markets is less clear — the new reality for US-China ties appears to be one of frequent ruptures and short-term fixes.”

Goldman Sachs economist Jan Hatzius adds that the “recent policy moves suggest a wider range of potential outcomes than appeared to be the case ahead of the last few key US-China meetings. The likely scenario seems to be that both sides pull back on the most aggressive policies and that talks lead to a further—and possibly indefinite—extension of the tariff escalation pause reached in May.”

Of Trump, Ali Wyne, senior US-China researcher at the International Crisis Group, notes that “he seems to think of Xi not as an avatar of imperial ambition, but rather as the head of an impressive rival business company.” This means the best-case scenario is for Trump and Xi to “leverage mutual vulnerability as a gateway to mutual restraint.”

Yet Trump’s ambition to curb China’s rise, while understandable, lacks any sense of proportion.

“The allure of a single, sweeping deal is understandable,” says Patricia Kim, economist at Brookings Institution. “It offers the promise of clarity in a troubled, high-stakes relationship. But history proves that there is no silver bullet. Managing US-China relations since Nixon’s dramatic visit to China in 1972 has not been about grand gestures or chasing some mythical end state.”

Success requires the tough but ongoing work of strategic management — balancing competition and cooperation, setting firm boundaries and constantly recalibrating to protect US interests.

“For decades, both the United States and China have sought an elusive, all-encompassing agreement — one that would, in a single stroke, resolve their fundamental disputes,” Kim notes. “Time and again, both sides have been disappointed. The reality is that many of their core demands are irreconcilable.”

China, Kim explains, portrays any American pushback as limiting China’s rise and as contrary to free trade principles — despite “its own egregious track record of state-led economic intervention and coercive trade practices.”

For the US, Kim says, a grand bargain would demand the very things China refuses to concede: renouncing military aggression against Taiwan and in the East and South China Seas; curbing its non-market policies that have long disadvantaged American businesses; improving its human rights record, and embracing democratic practices at home.

But the real reason Trump’s China trade talks might not matter in the long run is that Xi was readier for 2025 than Trump World realized. After the Trump 1.0 trade war, Team Xi accelerated efforts to pivot trade away from China’s economy. Today, fast-increasing shipments to Europe, Southeast Asia and Global South nations are enabling Xi to navigate around Trump’s tariffs.

Trump’s exploits from 2017 to 2021 catalyzed China Inc not just to sandbag the export sector but also to increase competitiveness in ways that the Trump 2.0 gang hadn’t noticed, notes Arthur Kroeber, head of research at Gavekal Dragonomics. Chinese exporters now “have plenty of workarounds through transshipment and relocating late-stage production to lower-tariff countries,” he says.

These rules-of-origin-bending transshipments, of course, have painted a target on the backs of several export-geared Southeast Asian economies. Trump pledges to punish countries engaging in the large-scale arbitrage of passing Chinese goods through lower-tariff countries to avoid US levies.

It remains an open question whether Trump will carry through on such threats. But China’s overcapacity is accelerating de-industrialization in parts of Southeast Asia. The heirs apparent to China’s low-cost manufacturing throne — including Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand — may be seeing their “China+1” dreams dashed.

Even though exports to the US plunged 27% in September year-on-year, global exports hit a six-month high, climbing 8.3%.

Still, China’s Ministry of Commerce is hardly happy about things. “For a long time, the US has been overstretching the concept of national security, abusing export control, taking discriminatory actions against China, and imposing unilateral long-arm jurisdiction measures on various products, including semiconductor equipment and chips,” the ministry said. “The US actions have severely harmed China’s interests and undermined the atmosphere of bilateral economic and trade talks, and China is resolutely opposed to them.”

Trump’s extreme bilateralization of trade is a reminder that his economic strategies are ripped from the pages of the mid-1980s.

The rationale behind Trump’s tariff policies dates back to a time when the five most industrialized nations held vast sway over global dynamics: His obsession with a weaker dollar is inspired by a deal struck 40 years ago in New York’s Plaza Hotel, an iconic property Trump owned for a while. His tax priorities have critics linking them to the “trickle-down economics” era.

The problem with a US leader having his head stuck in 1985, aside from the obvious, is that “Made in China 2025” is upending the global economy now. And at a moment when China is investing in where it thinks the world will be in 2035. This goes, too, for a Global South that’s increasingly forging its own path — one that barely factors in where the US might fit in a decade from now.

“The world economy is splitting into competing groups instead of a single connected system of globalization of the 1990s,” says Gilles Moec, chief economist at AXA Investment.

So, despite what Trump appears to believe, little of what he’s doing with tariffs is going to shrink cross-border trade. What Trump World misses, Moec notes, is that “instead of bringing production back to the countries where products are used, global companies have been reorganizing their supply chains around groups of countries or clubs with similar values or security concerns.”

Moec adds that “this rejig is a diluted version of globalization but can still keep the wheels moving. As long as clubs include both low-wage nations and high-spending economies, the adverse effects of fragmentation – such as inflation and lower efficiency – could be mitigated.”

Even as Trump complains about China’s dominance, he’s paving the way for Asia’s biggest economy to grow its influence. Ending US development aid created more space for Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its colossal infrastructure investment strategy around the globe, particularly the Global South.

“None of these people has any idea of how the world works,” says Stuart Stevens, a longtime Republican strategist whose latest book is titled The Conspiracy to End America. “The world’s greatest power wants to have as little influence as Liechtenstein.” Either by design or inadvertently, Stevens says, Trump era policies are “going to give away American power” to China and Russia.

Yun Sun, director of China programs at the Stimson Center, adds that any “deterioration of US leadership and credibility will benefit China.”

That goes, too, for Chinese assets. Investors and Asian central banks sitting on mountains of US Treasury securities are already concerned enough about Washington’s US$38 trillion debt load and stubbornly high inflation. Now it’s time to count the ways Trump’s supposed truce with Xi could unravel in short order, shaking up global markets anew.

Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek

asiatimes.com · William Pesek · October 30, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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