Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"We must believe that we are gifted for something and that is the thing, at whatever cost, must be attained."

– Marie Curie

"I prefer to be true to myself, even at the hazard of incurring the ridicule of others, rather than to be false, and to cinur my own abhorrence."

– Frederick Douglas

"The strongest people are not those who show strength in front of the world but those who fight and win battles that others do not know anything about."

– Jonathan Harnsich

1. 56th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique (Korea-US)

2. North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy

3. North Korea ICBM Test Seeks to Grab U.S. Attention on Eve of Vote

4. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2024

5. North Korea’s fanatical regime just got scarier

6. North Korea's Best Soldiers Are Fighting in Ukraine | Opinion

7. What do North Korean troop deployments to Russia mean for geopolitics?

8. Philly Shipyard's Transformation: How Hanwha’s Investment Is Driving U.S. Navy Readiness

9. Analysis: Increased sabotage risk in South Korea’s defense-industrial sector

10. Russia could transfer missile tech to North Korea, ‘escalating’ threats, South Korea warns

11. North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading toward Ukraine, US says

12. Russia asks at UN meeting: If the West aids Ukraine, why can’t North Korea help us?

13. White House ‘strongly condemns’ North Korean missile test

14. Study Estimates North Korea’s $5.5 Billion Military Supply Deal with Russia in Ukraine War

1. 56th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique (Korea-US)

An excellent run down of all the key issues.

However, there is one very significant statement buried in the 7th paragraph. Secretary Austin is the highest ranking US government official to make a statement since Camp David about Korean unification. Now the ROK and US military (the ROK/US Combined Forces Command can add unification to the end state of the campaign plan and a key task is to set the conditions for and provide military support to the political process of unification. This should be a key element of the Korean defense plans. Hopefully we will read a similar if not stronger statement about the fprurist of a free and unified Korea in the 2+2 communique. Hopefully I will no longer hear statements from US actions officers in DOD and State who say we cannot talk about unification or that the statements from the ROK and US Presidents and the Japanese Prime Minister in the Camp David Principles and the Spirit of Camp David were just public relations statements and not "real policy." This is a significant statement in the SCM and must not be overlooked. It is especially useful in the political warfare battle with the Kim family regime since Kim Jong Un has eliminated the concept of peaceful unification and declared a two state Korean peninsula with the ROK as an enemy state.

7. Both leaders reiterated the willingness of their Presidents to pursue dialogue and diplomacy, backed by a robust and credible deterrence and defense posture. In this regard, Secretary Austin expressed support for the goals of the ROK's Audacious Initiative and President Yoon’s vision of a free, peaceful, and prosperous unified Korean Peninsula, and welcomed President Yoon’s desire to open a path for serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK. Both sides reaffirmed that they remain open to dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions and pledged to continue close coordination.

56th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3951794/56th-security-consultative-meeting-joint-communique/

Oct. 30, 2024 |

1. The 56th United States (U.S.)-Republic of Korea (ROK) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Washington, D.C., on October 30, 2024. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and ROK Minister of National Defense Kim Yong Hyun led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. On October 17, 2024, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown Jr., and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Kim Myung-soo, presided over the 49th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).

2. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed that the U.S.-ROK Alliance is the linchpin of peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and beyond based on our shared values, including freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. The two leaders reviewed progress taken during 2024 to implement the "Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance," including enhancing extended deterrence against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), modernizing Alliance capabilities based on science and technology cooperation, and strengthening solidarity and regional security cooperation with like-minded partners. They noted that the SCM has played a pivotal role in developing the ROK-U.S. Alliance into a Global Comprehensive Strategic Alliance and would continue maintaining its role as a core consultative mechanism to discuss the future development of the Alliance and provide strategic direction. The two leaders also provided direction and guidance for continued progress in 2025 through a newly endorsed framework of U.S.-ROK bilateral defense consultative mechanisms that effectively and efficiently support Alliance objectives. Both concurred that the current U.S.-ROK Alliance is stronger than ever and reaffirmed the two nations' unwavering mutual commitment to a combined defense posture to defend the ROK as stated in the U.S-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, and as reflected in the Washington Declaration. The two leaders also resolved to continue to strengthen the Alliances' deterrence and defense posture against DPRK aggression and promote stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the region.

3. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the current security environment in and around the Korean Peninsula and discussed cooperative measures between the two nations. The Secretary and Minister expressed grave concern that the DPRK continues to modernize and diversify its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. The two sides condemned the DPRK's multiple missile launches, including ballistic missiles, its attempted launches of a space launch vehicle, and Russian-DPRK arms trade as clear violations of existing UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs). They noted that these actions present profound security challenges to the international community and pose an increasingly serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and throughout the Indo-Pacific region, as well as in the Euro-Atlantic region.

4. Secretary Austin reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear, conventional, missile defense, and advanced non-nuclear capabilities. He noted that any nuclear attack by the DPRK against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and would result in the end of the Kim regime in line with the 2022 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. He highlighted the increased frequency and routinization of U.S. strategic asset deployments as committed to by President Biden in the Washington Declaration, and noted that these were tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend the ROK.

5. The two leaders highly appreciated the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) inaugurated following the Washington Declaration. Both applauded the completion on July 11, 2024, of "United States and Republic of Korea Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula," which represents tremendous progress of the NCG commended and endorsed by President Biden and President Yoon. The two leaders affirmed that the completion of the Guidelines established the foundation for enhancing ROK-U.S. extended deterrence in an integrated manner. Minister Kim noted that, through such progress, the ROK-U.S. Alliance was elevated to a nuclear-based alliance. The two leaders stressed that the principles and procedures contained in the Guidelines enable Alliance policy and military authorities to maintain an effective nuclear deterrence policy and posture. The Secretary and Minister also welcomed the successful execution of the ROK-U.S. NCG table-top simulations and table-top exercises to enhance decision-making about nuclear deterrence and operations, and planning for potential nuclear contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides affirmed that the full capabilities of the two countries would contribute to the Alliance’s combined deterrence and defense posture, and in this regard the Secretary welcomed the recent establishment of the ROK Strategic Command. The Secretary and Minister directed the NCG to continue swift progress on NCG workstreams, including security protocols and expansion of information sharing; nuclear consultation processes in crises and contingencies; nuclear and strategic planning; ROK conventional support to U.S. nuclear operations in a contingency through conventional-nuclear integration (CNI); strategic communications; exercises, simulations, training, and investment activities; and risk reduction practices. They noted that such efforts would be coordinated to strengthen capabilities of the ROK and United States to enhance U.S.-ROK extended deterrence cooperation in an integrated manner, and looked forward to receiving regular updates on NCG progress activities at future SCMs.

6. The two sides pledged to continue coordinating efforts to deter DPRK's nuclear threat with the Alliance's overwhelming strength, while continuing to pursue efforts through sanctions and pressure to dissuade and delay DPRK's nuclear development. Both leaders stressed the importance of full implementation of UNSCRs by the entire international community, including the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council. The two leaders urged the international community to prevent and respond to DPRK’s sanctions evasion so that it abandons its illegal nuclear and ballistic missile development. To this end, they decided to work closely with each other and the international community to combat the DPRK's illegal and malicious cyber activities, cryptocurrency theft, overseas laborer dispatches, and ship-to-ship transfers. The Secretary and Minister expressed concern that Russia-DPRK military cooperation, which has been intensified since the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between the two, is deepening regional instability. The two leaders made clear that military cooperation, including illegal arms trade and high-technology transfers between Russia and the DPRK, constitute a clear violation of UNSCRs, and called on Russia to uphold its commitments. The two leaders also strongly condemned in the strongest terms with one voice that the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK has expanded beyond transfers of military supplies to actual deployment of forces, and pledged to closely coordinate with the international community regarding this issue.

7. Both leaders reiterated the willingness of their Presidents to pursue dialogue and diplomacy, backed by a robust and credible deterrence and defense posture. In this regard, Secretary Austin expressed support for the goals of the ROK's Audacious Initiative and President Yoon’s vision of a free, peaceful, and prosperous unified Korean Peninsula, and welcomed President Yoon’s desire to open a path for serious and sustained diplomacy with the DPRK. Both sides reaffirmed that they remain open to dialogue with the DPRK without preconditions and pledged to continue close coordination.

8. The Minister and the Secretary noted concerns that the DPRK’s claims of "two hostile countries," and activities near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) could threaten peace and the Armistice on the Korean Peninsula. The two leaders strongly condemned DPRK’s activities that raise tension on the Korean Peninsula, such as multiple unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) infiltrations in the past, as well as the recent unilateral detonation of sections of inter-Korean roads and ongoing launches of "filth and trash balloons," and urged the DPRK to immediately cease such activities. The Secretary and the Minister concurred that the Armistice Agreement remains in effect as an international norm guaranteeing the stable security order on the Korean Peninsula, and that all parties of the Korean War should abide by it while it remains in force. Both sides noted that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) has been an effective means of separating military forces and preventing military tension over the past 70 years, and urged the DPRK to respect the NLL.

9. Secretary Austin and Minister Kim reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in implementing, managing, and enforcing the Korean Armistice Agreement, deterring DPRK aggression, and coordinating a multinational, united response in case of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. They reaffirmed that UNC has successfully contributed to those aims for more than 70 years and continues to carry out its mission with the utmost respect for the sovereignty of ROK, the primary host nation. Both sides welcomed the successful organization of the second ROK-UNC Member States Defense Ministerial Meeting and expressed their appreciation for UNC Member State contributions. They welcomed the addition of Germany to UNC, and noted that peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, including the Korean Peninsula, and Euro-Atlantic regions are increasingly connected. The two leaders are determined to continue seeking the expanded participation in UNC by like-minded countries that share the values of the 1953 Washington Declaration, anchored in the principles of the UN Charter and mandates of relevant UNSCRs. Secretary Austin thanked Minister Kim for the ROK’s efforts to support the UNC’s role to maintain and enforce the Armistice Agreement, and to support the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression. In this regard, the Secretary and Minister both highlighted their desire to expand combined exercises, information sharing, and interoperability between the ROK, the Combined Forces Command, and UNC Member States.

10. The Secretary and the Minister also noted the critical role that U.S. forces in the ROK have played for more than 70 years and reaffirmed that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) continues to play a decisive role in preventing armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, and in promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Secretary Austin reiterated the U.S. commitment to maintain current USFK force levels to defend the ROK.

11. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed the work of the various bilateral mechanisms such as the U.S.-Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD). They welcomed efforts to enhance information sharing through the U.S. Shared Early Warning System (SEWS) for strengthening the Alliance’s detection capabilities in response to advancing DPRK missile threats. They also commended the work of the Counter-Missile Working Group (CMWG) and reviewed "the Joint Study on Alliance Comprehensive Counter-Missile Strategy" aimed at informing recommendations for counter-missile capabilities and posture of ROK and United States. The Secretary and Minister also discussed concrete efforts to strengthen cooperation in space and cyber to robustly deter and defend against growing threats. They endorsed efforts by the Space Cooperation Working Group (SCWG) to improve space situational awareness information sharing and interoperability, and acknowledged the need to expand ROK participation in exercises and training that can strengthen Alliance space capability and improve resilience against growing space threats. In particular, the Secretary also welcomed ROK participation in the Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) cell to leverage space industry and strengthen allied space capabilities. The Secretary and Minister also pledged to deepen cyber cooperation through the Cyber Cooperation Working Group and improve coordination through cyber defense exercises, such as Cyber Alliance and Cyber Flag. Overall, both leaders expressed appreciation for the continuing cooperation to ensure the Alliance’s space, cyber, and counter-missile efforts to keep pace with the evolving threats posed by the DPRK.

12. Noting the importance of science and technology (S&T) cooperation, the Secretary and Minister decided to establish the Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee (DSTEC) at the Vice-Minister-Under Secretary level within this year, to guide and prioritize Alliance defense S&T cooperation. They noted priority areas for cooperation including autonomy, artificial intelligence, and crewed-uncrewed teaming are particularly vital to ensure the ROK is able to achieve the goals of Defense Innovation 4.0 and modernize Alliance capabilities. Both leaders also welcomed future S&T cooperation related to quantum technologies, future-generation wireless communication technologies, and directed energy to ensure that S&T advancements enhance the combined capabilities of the Alliance. This included efforts to identify potential areas of collaboration on AUKUS Pillar II. The Secretary welcomed the Minister’s proposal to host a Defense Science and Technology conference in 2025, and concurred that the DSTEC should leverage this conference to baseline and prioritize Alliance defense S&T collaboration.

13. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed efforts to improve the interoperability, interchangeability, and resilience of the U.S. and ROK defense industrial base. They underscored the need to improve efficient and effective collaboration in the development, acquisition, fielding, logistics, sustainment, and maintenance of defense capabilities, and to ensure that S&T advancements are swiftly and seamlessly transitioned into acquisition and sustainment efforts. Both leaders welcomed progress under the U.S. Regional Sustainment Framework (RSF) and welcomed ROK participation in a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) pilot project on Air Force aviation maintenance. The two leaders noted that this pilot project could lead to more bilateral co-sustainment opportunities, and also expand defense industrial collaboration with like-minded partners in the region in light of the ROK’s key role in the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) contact group. The Secretary and Minister also noted with satisfaction the recent U.S. Navy contract with ROK shipyards to conduct MRO services for U.S. vessels, and underscored the potential to expand such work to improve the resilience of the Alliance’s posture in the Indo-Pacific Region. The Secretary and Minister also recognized the need to improve reciprocal market access to deepen defense industrial cooperation and enhance supply chain resiliency, and are committed to accelerate cooperation with the goal of signing the Reciprocal Defense Procurement Agreement next year based on guidance from both Presidents.

14. The Secretary and the Minister received and endorsed the MCM Report to the SCM presented by the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Charles Q. Brown. They welcomed the efforts of General Brown, Admiral Kim, and the MCM to enhance military plans, posture, training, exercises, and efforts to coordinate U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) activities and enhance military strength of the Alliance. The Secretary and Minister concurred that the Freedom Shield 24 (FS 24) and Ulchi Freedom Shield 24 (UFS 24) exercises, which included realistic threats from the DPRK advancing nuclear, missile, space, and cyber threats, enhanced the Alliance’s crisis management and strengthened deterrence and defense capabilities. In addition, they assessed that combined field training exercises (FTX), which were more extensive than the past year and conducted in land, maritime and air domains, enhanced interoperability and combined operations execution capabilities. Based on such outcomes, both leaders decided to continue strengthening combined exercises and training in line with the rapidly changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula, and further decided that future combined exercises should include appropriate and realistic scenarios including responses to DPRK nuclear use. The Secretary and the Minister also emphasized that ensuring consistent training opportunities for USFK is critical to maintaining a strong combined defense posture. Secretary Austin noted the efforts of ROK Ministry of National Defense (MND) to improve the training conditions for U.S. and ROK forces and stressed the importance of maintaining close cooperation between USFK and MND for the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for training.

15. Given the growth and diversification of the DPRK’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and delivery systems, both leaders assessed efforts and works to ensure execution of Alliance missions under a CBRN-challenged environment. In particular, they welcomed progress by the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee (CWMDC), including the expansion of information sharing required for nuclear elimination operations consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the strengthening of cooperation to prevent proliferation of WMD in the Indo-Pacific region. Both leaders welcomed continued multinational counter-proliferation activities in the region amidst advancements of DPRK nuclear and missile program and intensification of arms trade between Russia and the DPRK following the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty. Secretary Austin expressed appreciation for ROK contributions to various global security efforts such as Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the Minister and the Secretary concurred on the importance of maintaining cooperative efforts to enforce relevant counter-proliferation UNSCRs.

16. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed the progress and works to fulfill the Conditions-based Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COTP). Both leaders reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned in a stable and systematic manner. They received the results of the annual U.S.-ROK bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems for conditions #1 and #2 based on the bilaterally-approved assessment criteria and standards. Both leaders affirmed that there was a significant progress of this year’s bilateral evaluation on readiness posture and capabilities, and pledged to continue close consultations between the ROK and the United States. for the establishment of the Future-CFC. The Secretary and the Minister also reaffirmed that Future-CFC Full Operational Capability (FOC) Certification would be pursued when the results of the bilateral evaluation on the capabilities and systems of conditions #1 and #2 meet the mutually approved levels. Regarding condition #3, the Secretary and the Minister decided to remain in close consultation for the assessment of the security environment. Both sides pledged to support continued evaluation and progress in wartime OPCON transition implementation through annual MCMs and SCMs, and affirmed that the wartime OPCON transition would strengthen ROK and Alliance capabilities and the combined defense posture.

17. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the regional security environment, and plans to expand U.S.-ROK security cooperation throughout the Indo-Pacific region to support maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient. They also reaffirmed support for Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) centrality and the ASEAN-led regional architecture as well as regional efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum. In particular, the two leaders noted the importance of enhancing cooperation during the implementation of both the ROK and U.S. respective strategies for the Indo-Pacific region. To this end, the Secretary and the Minister endorsed the "Regional Cooperation Framework for U.S.-ROK Alliance Contributions to Security in the Indo-Pacific," and discussed priorities areas and partners to better respond to the complex regional and global security situation. After reviewing the work of the ROK-U.S. Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG), both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen defense cooperation with ASEAN members and work together with the Pacific Island Countries to contribute to regional security. The Secretary and the Minister also acknowledged the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as reflected in the April 2023 "Joint Statement in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Alliance between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea."

18. The Secretary and the Minister reflected on the remarkable progress made during 2024 to fulfill the historic understandings at the Camp David Summit. They welcomed the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework (TSCF), signed by the Ministers and the Secretary of the United States, ROK, and Japan in July, along with enhanced sharing of missile warning information and efforts to systematically conduct trilateral exercises, including the first execution of the multi-domain trilateral exercise FREEDOM EDGE. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed their commitment to continuing to promote and expand trilateral security cooperation including senior-level policy consultations, trilateral exercises, information sharing, and defense exchange cooperation.

19. The two sides also took the opportunity to reaffirm that expediting the relocation and return of U.S. military bases in the ROK is in the interests of both countries, and decided to work closely to ensure the timely return of the bases in accordance with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and related agreements. The two leaders noted the significance of the complete construction of Yongsan Park, and pledged to expedite the remaining return of Yongsan Garrison. The Minister and the Secretary also reaffirmed their mutual commitment to discuss the return of other U.S. military bases through regular consultations through SOFA channels to reach mutually acceptable outcomes in the future.

20. Secretary Austin expressed his gratitude that the ROK is contributing toward ensuring a stable environment for U.S. Forces Korea. The Secretary and Minister also welcomed the recent conclusion of consultations related to a 12th Special Measures Agreement (SMA), and concurred that it would greatly contribute to the strengthening of the U.S.-ROK combined defense posture.

21. Secretary Austin and Minister Kim affirmed that the discussions during the 56th SCM and the 49th MCM contributed to strengthening the U.S.-ROK Alliance with a vision toward the further development of a truly global alliance. The two leaders commended the U.S. and ROK military and civilian personnel that worked to strengthen the bond of the Alliance, and expressed appreciation for their shared commitment and sacrifice. Both sides expect to hold the 57th SCM and 50th MCM in Seoul at a mutually convenient time in 2025.

2. North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy

From two of my very best friends who have forgotten more about this subject than I will ever know. In dealing with north Korea it is imperative that we understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and no one knows this better than Robert COllins and Greg Scarlatoiu.

Excerpts:

Recommendations to pass legislation to change conditions in North Korea historically ignore the actual political power system of the Kim Regime which is party-based and not state-based. Demands should focus on changing party policies because all state agencies strictly follow party guidelines. Each state agency or department, regardless of size or level, follows the decisions of the embedded KWP committee in that organization. An example is asking for changes in the criminal code that presumably would be enforced by the courts and police agencies. However, all court representatives, including judges, and police take orders from the party, not the state, and legal decisions are made based on political consequences and requirements.[8]

South Korea's cultural wave is fiercely battling the cultural indoctrination of the Kim Jong-un regime to win the hearts and minds of North Koreans. When human rights demand begins to effectively pressure human rights denial, ruling regimes such as that of North Korea’s Kim double their efforts at suppression through new policies and legislation.

North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy

Posted by Committee for Human Rights in North Korea with No comments

https://www.hrnkinsider.org/2024/10/north-koreas-lawfare-strategy.html

North Korea’s Lawfare Strategy[1]

By Robert Collins

Edited by Greg Scarlatoiu

October 30, 2024

The weakening of totalitarian regimes results in the worsening of human rights denial. North Korea is no exception. The Kim regime's latest indicator of this weakness is its recent "lawfare" strategy of extreme punishment for cultural violations, as demonstrated by 2021-2023 legislation designed to stop the infiltration of South Korean culture into the North.

South Korean culture continues to permeate into North Korean society slowly but surely, particularly among the younger generations of the North. Hallyu, the “Korean Wave,” or South Korean culture, entertainment, and information, has proven to be so attractive to younger North Koreans that they are willing to risk their lives and future to enjoy the likes of K-pop, South Korean movies and anything else they can gain access to electronically.

As a response to this infiltration of South Korean culture into North Korea, the Kim regime has taken to the concept of threatening punishment for anyone caught watching or listening to South Korean culture and information. This punishment goes beyond the previous historical approaches to state violence. According to the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB), there has been a 40-fold increase in human rights violations by the Kim regime against the citizens of North Korea.[2]

The Kim regime has expanded its cultural control to its own version of “lawfare.” While the concept of “lawfare” has been in use for a while, it has recently gained added significance in the United States. The term refers to one political party employing legal challenges and court decisions to attack another political party for the purpose of discrediting the other party and/or its representatives.

In the last four years, the Kim regime has compelled the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Supreme People’s Assembly to pass laws designed to restrict North Korean citizens from learning of what the world is like outside the borders of North Korea, especially what life is like for their fellow ethnic Koreans in the South. Consequently, the Kim regime compelled North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly to promulgate the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture in 2020, the Youth Education Guarantee Law in 2021 and the Law on Protecting Pyongyang Cultural Language in 2023.

The Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture (반동사상문화배격법) was amended in August 2022 and supplemented by Order No. 1028 of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly. It is made up of four chapters and 41 articles. Articles 1-7 define and list the aims of the anti-reactionary thought law. Articles 8-14 address the responsibilities of the local officials to enforce the law. Articles 15-26 target the media violators of the law access and use. Articles 27-40 describe the punishments to be applied to violators of the law.[3]

The Youth Education Guarantee Act (청소년 교육 보장법) of 2021 is designed to eliminate among the youth “anti-socialist and non-socialist thought” and ideologically educate young people how to be totally loyal to orders from the party and Kim Jong Un. The law has five chapters and 45 articles. The law states what young people “must not do during efforts to establish a socialist lifestyle,” and lists other institutional and individual violations. It also states that violators must “take legal responsibility” for their wrongdoing. Punishments range from years of forced labor to death sentences.[4]

The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act (조선민주주의인민공화국 평양문화어보호법) was implemented by the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly’s Order No. 1028 on August 19, 2022. This act has 4 chapters and 41 articles.[5]

North Koreans are punished for using ‘anti-socialist’ words picked up from smuggled South Korean dramas. Those youths who are found guilty of violating these laws – listening to K-pop, watching South Korean movies, illegally importing South Korean media technology – are arrested in front of captive youth audiences to emphasize the Kim regime’s staunch attitude against South Korean cultural infiltration into the North. It should be understood that violations of the party’s Ten Great Principles of Monolithic Ideology (TPMI) and not violations of the criminal code are the reason most people are sent to political prison camps. The Kim regime’s lawfare is designed to support these ideological principles.

Under the Kim regime, party influence is pervasive in both criminal and political cases. In criminal cases, the government assigns lawyers to the defense. Defense lawyers are not considered advocates for the defendant so much as independent parties to help persuade the accused to admit his/her guilt, although they apparently present facts to mitigate punishment.[6] "With the influx of external culture and information such as South Korean soap operas and K-pop, many North Koreans are consuming Juche culture by day, South Korean culture by night," Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said in his keynote speech at the 2024 International Dialogue on North Korean Human Rights held in Washington.

Regardless, one can be sentenced to prison and heavy labor by organizations other than a court. The Ministry of State Security (the secret police), peer trials and locally based Socialist Life Guidance Committees all can sentence a person without going through the established legal system. Peer trials are particularly political and focus on non-support of the TPMI; failing to study or criticism/distortion of the teachings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il and party policy; and minor economic crimes.

North Koreans are punished for using ‘anti-socialist’ words picked up from smuggled South Korean dramas. Yet, there are reports that even the lead initiator of these laws, Kim Jong-un, has been watching some of these South Korean movies, as evidenced by the language he has been using in his public addresses to the North Korean people. When addressing older flood victims recently, though normally referring to them as “comrades”, he referred to them as “citizens.” Rather than referring to older victims as “senior,” he called them “elders.” He called television “TV” rather than the normal North Korean term “terebi.” Lastly, Kim referred to the flood situation as “navigating rough terrain,” a change from the more normal North Korean term of “difficult and tiring situation.”[7]

Recommendations to pass legislation to change conditions in North Korea historically ignore the actual political power system of the Kim Regime which is party-based and not state-based. Demands should focus on changing party policies because all state agencies strictly follow party guidelines. Each state agency or department, regardless of size or level, follows the decisions of the embedded KWP committee in that organization. An example is asking for changes in the criminal code that presumably would be enforced by the courts and police agencies. However, all court representatives, including judges, and police take orders from the party, not the state, and legal decisions are made based on political consequences and requirements.[8]

South Korea's cultural wave is fiercely battling the cultural indoctrination of the Kim Jong-un regime to win the hearts and minds of North Koreans. When human rights demand begins to effectively pressure human rights denial, ruling regimes such as that of North Korea’s Kim double their efforts at suppression through new policies and legislation.

[1] This paper is a version of a recent conference presentation in Seoul, South Korea.

[2] 북한인권정보센터, The Database Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB). 2024년 북한인권백서, White Paper on North Korean Human Rights. October 8, 2024. Pages141 and 356. https://nkdb.org/publication/?bmode=view&idx=121771392.

[3] Seulkee Jang, “Daily NK acquires full text of the anti-reactionary thought law,” dailynk.com, March 21, 2023. URL: https://www.dailynk.com/english/daily-nk-acquires-full-text-of-the-anti-reactionary-thought-law/.

[4] Mun Dong Hui, “North Korean young people stupefied by strong punishments in “Youth Education Guarantee Act”, dailynk.com, February 17, 2022. URL: https://www.dailynk.com/english/north-korean-young-people-stupefied-strong-punishments-youth-education-guarantee-act/.

[5] DailyNK, “The Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Act of The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” dailynk.com, January 2023. URL: https://www.dailynk.com/english/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/03/Pyongyang-Cultural-Language-Protection-Act_English-and-Korean-Versions_Daily-NK.pdf

[6] Kyu Chang Lee, Gwang Jin Chung, “The North Korean Criminal Trial System: Characteristics and Actual Practice,” KINU Research Abstract 11-05. URL: www.kinu.or.kr.

[7] Ahn Chang Gyu and Park Jaewoo, “Kim Jong Un shocks listeners by using South Korean terms in speech,” rfa.org, August 16, 2024. URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/korea/north-korea-south-korea-korean-wave-language-dialects-kim-jong-un-speech-yalu-river-flood-08162024111909.html/ampRFA.

[8] Andrea Matles Savada, “Country Study – North Korea,” Federal Research Division

Library of Congress, 1993. URL: http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9648.html.

3. North Korea ICBM Test Seeks to Grab U.S. Attention on Eve of Vote

Kim needs more attention? He is already grabbing a lot of attention for his deployment of troops to Putin's War.

Reshape policy? I do nothing KJU's blackmail diplomacy will achieve positive effects for him (blackmail diplomacy -the use of increased tension, threats, and provocations to coerce political and economic concessions). The only thing that may result from this is that the "engagers" who blame the US for the situation on the Korean peninsula and seek to lift sanctions in return for negotiations will continue to advocate for giving concessions and shifting to arms control negotiations and seeking a freeze on the north's nuclear and missile program. And that will contribute to KJU's political warfare strategy, undermine the ROK and the US and drive a wedge in the alliance. But it is doubtful that either Harris or Trump will be influenced to change policy in a way that will benefit Kim.

But does KJU think that Trump would serve him better? I think he would be mistaken and disappointed. I do not believe either he or Harris will provide the concessions he desires. Kim will have to be satisfied with trying to sow what he thinks will be policy chaos and the continued attempts to subvert the ROK, the US, and the ROK/US alliance.

What should we do? Recognize Kim's strategy(s). Understand the strategy. EXPOSE the strategy. qAnd attack the strategy with a superior political warfare strategy

Excerpts:

The outcome of next week’s U.S. election could reshape Washington’s policy with the Kim regime should former President Donald Trump win. Pyongyang never took up the Biden administration’s repeated offers to meet without preconditions, with top North Korean officials doubting the talks would deliver meaningful results. Vice President Kamala Harris has signaled adopting a similar tact.

Meanwhile, Trump—the only sitting U.S. president to have ever met a North Korean leader—has touted his close relationship with Kim, which included frequent letter exchanges. At July’s Republican National Convention, Trump said about his connection with the 40-year-old dictator: “Now North Korea is acting up again, but when we get back, I get along with him,” Trump said. “He’d like to see me back, too. I think he misses me.”

An ICBM launch could help Trump make the argument that he is the better candidate to tame autocrats such as Kim, pointing out that North Korea refrained from missile tests for a good stretch of his time in the Oval Office, said Lee Sung-yoon, a global fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

“It would be irresponsible of Kim Jong Un not to resort to a major provocation on the eve of the U.S. election,” Lee said. “An ICBM launch, the North’s first in some 10 months, only helps the candidate who once was his pen pal.”

North Korea ICBM Test Seeks to Grab U.S. Attention on Eve of Vote

Kim Jong Un says long-range missile launch sends a message to rivals ahead of a U.S. election that could reshape Washington’s policy toward Pyongyang

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korea-launches-an-icbm-days-before-u-s-election-ffb5159a

By Timothy W. Martin

Updated Oct. 31, 2024 2:28 am ET

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North Korean leader Kim Jong Un Photo: KCNA/AP

SEOUL—Just days before the U.S. presidential election, North Korea said it launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that stayed airborne longer than anything the Kim Jong Un regime had ever tested before.

Pyongyang has traditionally carried out weapons tests or provocations timed around key American political events or holidays—moves that security experts say seek to grab Washington’s attention.

North Korea has previously demonstrated it has long-range missiles that could reach the U.S. mainland. The ICBM launched Thursday morning local time flew for more than 85 minutes, according to Japan’s Defense Ministry. That tops North Korea’s previous record of roughly 74 minutes.

Showcasing a lengthier flight time suggests not only the potential for an ICBM to travel greater distances but also fly with heavier payloads. One of Kim’s top weapons priorities is possessing a long-range missile powerful enough to carry several nuclear warheads that would dramatically multiply the damage a single weapon could deliver.

In a statement hours after the launch, North Korea’s Defense Ministry didn’t provide details about the missile’s flight. But Kim, who was on-site for the launch, reportedly said the ICBM test was meant to show a “counteraction will” to unspecified rivals, whom he accused of tightening their nuclear alliance and undertaking “various adventuristic military maneuvers.” That is a clear reference to the growing partnership and joint exercises between Washington, Seoul and others.

“I affirm that the DPRK will never change its line of bolstering up its nuclear forces,” said Kim, referring to the country’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The outcome of next week’s U.S. election could reshape Washington’s policy with the Kim regime should former President Donald Trump win. Pyongyang never took up the Biden administration’s repeated offers to meet without preconditions, with top North Korean officials doubting the talks would deliver meaningful results. Vice President Kamala Harris has signaled adopting a similar tact.

North Korea’s fanatical regime just got scarier

A new missile test, troops to Russia and death sentences for K-pop

https://www.economist.com/asia/2024/10/30/north-koreas-fanatical-regime-just-got-scarier

Photograph: Getty Images

Oct 30th 2024|SEOUL and YEONPYEONG

HE KAESONG Industrial Complex in North Korea has long symbolised hopes for peace and unity on the Korean peninsula. Opened in 2004, it housed South Korean factories that employed North Korean workers. Joint production trudged along until 2016, when South Korea turned off the lights in response to advances in North Korea’s nuclear programme; subsequent attempts to restart the project faltered. This month Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s dictator, made clear that it has no future by blowing up the roads that connect Kaesong to the south.

The destruction of roads is just one sign of rising tensions on the Korean peninsula. North Korea has strengthened its ties with Russia, dispatching an estimated 11,000 troops to help Vladimir Putin wage war against Ukraine; South Korea fears that Mr Putin will provide sensitive missile or nuclear technology in return. On October 31st, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in almost a year, which had its longest flight time yet. It may also conduct a nuclear test around America’s elections next week. Less visibly, but no less ominously, over the past year Mr Kim has reversed decades of official doctrine by declaring that the two Koreas are not a single divided people but rather separate, hostile states.

Yoon Suk Yeol, South Korea’s president, has laid out a hard-edged policy toward the North, too. Channels of communication have gone cold. Lower-level provocations have proliferated. South Korea resumed broadcasts of anti-communist propaganda targeted at North Korean soldiers along the border, while North Korea has sent balloons filled with rubbish into South Korea. All this suggests that the stand-off on the peninsula has entered a dangerous new phase.

The Korean war pitted neighbours against each other. Ryu Jae-sik, who hails from Gangwon, the southern half of a province split when the peninsula was divided, recalls capturing a soldier from the northern half of his home province: “I saw myself in him.” The fighting came to a halt in 1953, with the signing of an armistice and the creation of a demilitarised zone. Mr Ryu, like many at the time, imagined that the unresolved state of affairs would not last. The division endured far longer and the two societies diverged far further than expected. Yet throughout cycles of hostility and detente in recent decades, both governments’ stated aim was peacefully to reunify their divided lands and people, however unrealistic that seemed.

Mr Kim, in effect, has “come out and said the king is naked”, says Andrei Lankov of Kookmin University in Seoul. Breaking with the doctrines of his grandfather and father, Mr Kim declared peaceful reunification “impossible” and removed a monument to reunification that stands over a road to Pyongyang. He has ordered his armed forces to be prepared to “subjugate” the South (now a “belligerent state”) and called on his officials to “eliminate” bodies that work on inter-Korean relations. He no longer wants his people to see themselves in South Koreans: references to a shared Korean ethnicity have been stripped from propaganda songs and textbooks.

One objective of Mr Kim’s new policy may be to help justify a crackdown on South Korean television shows and music. K-culture has spread widely in the North, and threatens to puncture the regime’s propaganda bubble. In recent years Mr Kim has passed ever-tougher laws criminalising the consumption of K-culture. Recent escapees recount cases of teenagers being given lengthy prison sentences for watching k-dramas; rights groups have documented numerous executions for distributing such cultural dope. If the illegal material is the handiwork of the same single Korean people, such brutality is hard to justify, even for Mr Kim. The new policy resolves that contradiction. Similarly, under the old doctrine a nuclear attack on South Korea amounted to friendly fire; now it would be a blow against the enemy.

External events have also contributed to Mr Kim’s hardening stance. Failed talks with Donald Trump in 2019 left him embittered and he soured on the idea of negotiating sanctions relief with America. (Though if Mr Trump returns to the White House, he may change his mind.) The pandemic in 2020 gave Mr Kim cover to isolate his country even further. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led Mr Putin to turn to Pyongyang for help. For North Korea, Russia emerged as “a great saviour” in a time of need, says Tae Yong Ho, a former high-level North Korean diplomat-turned-South Korean politician. Russia has provided Mr Kim with fuel, food, hard currency and, perhaps, advanced technology. South Korean officials think it has emboldened Mr Kim.

Chart: The Economist

North Korea’s recent steps have prompted the South to reassess its own posture. Ever fewer South Koreans see themselves in North Koreans: with each passing generation, support for reunification fades (see chart). In a speech this August, Mr Yoon laid out a new policy of his own. While nominally still calling for unification, it makes explicit that it can happen only if the South absorbs the North. Even some South Korean progressives have downgraded their expectations. Lee Jong-seok, who served as minister of unification during the early years of the Kaesong complex’s work, sighs at the prospects of a unified peninsula. “Perhaps my descendants will see it,” he says. “The most important thing for now is not having war.”

Launching an all-out attack would be suicidal for Mr Kim. But he could escalate much further than destroying roads or testing missiles. On Yeonpyeong, a flashpoint island near the maritime border that North Korea shelled in 2010, one resident says they fear a repetition of the day “everything was ablaze”. Since that incident, the North’s military capabilities have grown. “Backed by a growing nuclear arsenal and support of Russia, Kim may feel more comfortable in taking chances,” writes Sydney Seiler, formerly America’s most senior intelligence officer for North Korea. Mr Yoon’s insistence that South Korea will respond to any provocations with force also increases the risk of tit-for-tat moves spiralling out of control. Imagining such a war is all too easy. Imagining lasting peace, by contrast, is becoming harder. ■

6. North Korea's Best Soldiers Are Fighting in Ukraine | Opinion

They may be the best trained (I believe they are if they are SOF but of course that is all relative) but if they are not trained in combined arms maneuver warfare, if they are not provided with the necessary fires to facilitate maneuver, or if they are employed in only as replacements within the Russian military units they are destined for failure. And if they are employed as SOF and do achieve some success will Russia be able to exploit the effects? If Russian cannot explain the effects it doesn't matter if north Korea sends 10,000 supermen to Putin's War. If the Russian SOF (Speztnaz and GRU) and the Wagner PMC could not achieve success in Ukraine, what makes us think that the nK SOF can achieve something better?

North Korea's Best Soldiers Are Fighting in Ukraine | Opinion

Newsweek · by Gordon G. Chang · October 30, 2024

An advance unit of North Korean troops may already have been deployed to the front lines in Ukraine to fight for Russia, South Korea's Defense Intelligence Agency announced today. The DIA also said the soldiers appear to be headed to the Kursk border region. Ukraine's forces are inside Russia in that area.

This is not the first time North Korean troops have been on the battlefield. "Small elements of the North Korean military were operating alongside the Russians in Ukraine as far back as a year ago," Brandon Weichert, author of the just released A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, told me this week.

Ukraine has already reported that six North Koreans soldiers were killed in one of its missile strikes.

Reports from South Korea's National Intelligence Service suggest the North will send, once the current deployment is complete, four brigades of light infantry of the 11th Corps, more than 12,000 soldiers.

"They are the best trained, best fed, and best equipped troops in the Korean People's Army," North Korea military analyst Bruce Bechtol told me. "Kim Jong Un is sending his finest. These guys are not cannon fodder."

Four brigades will not be a "game changer," but as Bechtol, author of North Korean Military Proliferation in the Middle East and Africa: Enabling Violence and Instability, points out, we do not know how many more Pyongyang will send.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has already had one substantial effect on the war. "Now, October 2024, fully half the shells the Russian army has expended over the past year in the war with Ukraine have come from North Korea," Bechtol notes. "How is that not a game changer?"

Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (L) shaking hands during their meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Amur region on September 13, 2023. Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (L) shaking hands during their meeting at the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Amur region on September 13, 2023. VLADIMIR SMIRNOV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images

The presence of even a few North Koreans at the front in Ukraine will change the world in profound ways. For one thing, it will confirm that hardline states have banded together and are now fighting alongside each other. China has supported the Russian war effort from the beginning of the conflict with everything including troops.

"The Chinese have had 'technical advisers' on the ground with elements of the Wagner Group since about a year ago," Weichert told me. "These advisers were charged with maintaining the Chinese-provided drones that Wagner mercenaries were deploying. There are numerous reports of the advisers deploying into combat with those mercenaries."

Now is China also responsible for supplying troops through North Korea?

Many analysts think Beijing is upset. For instance, Cho Han-bum of the Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul told Hong Kong's South China Morning Post that Pyongyang's dispatch of soldiers to Russia is an "action that crosses China's red line" because close ties between the Kim and Putin regimes could weaken Beijing's leverage over the North.

The Chinese leadership may not see it that way, however. The Kim regime's critical dependence on China—China accounted for 95 percent of the North's announced trade before a recent deal arms deal with Russia—suggests the Chinese are not that worried about Pyongyang's move to bulk up their Russian ties.

"North Korea fully depends on China's economic aid to survive, as is increasingly the case with Russia," Charles Burton, a former Canadian diplomat in Beijing and scholar with the Prague-based Sinopsis think tank, told me. "So Beijing has leverage to ensure that any independent Russia-North Korea alliance will not go very far." In short, Beijing believes that neither Vladimir Putin nor Kim Jong Un is strong enough to move away from China.

There is, despite everything, an inclination in American policy circles to think the best of Chinese leaders, so it's hard for Washington policymakers to believe that China actually approves of the growing links between Moscow and Pyongyang. There are, however, reasons to speculate that it does.

In fact, the North Korea-Russia arrangement benefits Beijing, which believes it is in its interest to support both neighboring regimes. The North Korean leader needs revenue, because at this moment his economy and agriculture are both failing. At the same time, Russia's depleted forces need soldiers to fight Ukraine.

In this case, Beijing is also avoiding criticism from around the world for helping both parties. As Sari Arho Havren of the Royal United Services Institute told Newsweek in June, Beijing does not want to see Russia defeated in Ukraine and Xi wants to "maintain the appearance of limiting direct military support for Russia himself."

Xi Jinping is almost certainly pleased that he is accomplishing many objectives with one sly maneuver. The North Korean regime is reducing the need for Chinese aid, Russia is getting assistance for the Ukraine war and therefore tying up states that Beijing perceives to be foes, and China is out of the spotlight as most everyone assumes it is aggrieved.

Many scholars downplay the sustainability of the relationships among the three regimes, but as James Fanell of the Geneva Center for Security Policy pointed out to me in July, "China, Russia, and North Korea are more aligned today than at any time since the Korean War."

China and North Korea are now both present on the battlefield in Ukraine. As these hardline states align and close ranks with Russia, they are taking on the rest of the world in what looks like the most consequential war of this era.

Gordon G. Chang is the author of Plan Red: China's Project to Destroy America and The Coming Collapse of China. Follow him on X @GordonGChang.

The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.

Newsweek · by Gordon G. Chang · October 30, 2024

7. What do North Korean troop deployments to Russia mean for geopolitics?

Excerpts:

North Korea’s troop presence in Russia has at least two longer-term implications. First, Putin has demonstrated again that, far from being isolated, countries are willing to support Russia during its war in Ukraine. The lengths North Korea has taken to enable Putin’s war may encourage other states to strengthen their own bilateral military ties with Russia; Iran, for example, may increase its cooperation with Russia as it braces for possible escalation with Israel.

Second, deeper Russia-North Korea military cooperation comes at a time of escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula. This includes North Korea’s recent destruction of inter-Korea roads and railways and the alleged incursion of South Korean drones into North Korea this month. North Korea’s decision to dispatch troops to Russia indirectly suggests that North Korea is hardening its strategic position against South Korea. Should Russia further boost North Korea’s weapons capabilities and deliver troops and munitions to Pyongyang through its Far East, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia will need to prepare for a new phase of greater instability and possible escalation in Northeast Asia.

What do North Korean troop deployments to Russia mean for geopolitics?

Andrew Yeo and Hanna Foreman

October 29, 2024

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-do-north-korean-troop-deployments-to-russia-mean-for-geopolitics/?utm

In early October, Ukrainian intelligence reported that several thousand North Korean soldiers were undergoing training in Russia in preparation for deployment to the Ukrainian front line later this year. South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) later corroborated Ukraine’s assertions, sharing satellite images of Russian vessels transporting the first batch of 1,500 North Korean special forces to Russia’s Far East. On October 23, White House National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby confirmed the presence of at least 3,000 soldiers. The Pentagon now believes that 10,000 North Korean troops are in Russia with a contingent heading toward the Kursk region in western Russia to battle Ukrainian forces.

The large deployment of North Korean troops in Russia represents a troubling new phase in the Russia-Ukraine war while carrying deeper implications for global politics. We address five key questions related to accelerating North Korea-Russia military cooperation.

What do Russia and North Korea stand to gain?

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reap immediate military benefits from North Korean troops. Since August 2023, Russia has reportedly received 13,000 shipping containers that include artillery rounds, anti-tank rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles to replenish badly depleted Russian munitions and weapons. Now facing a potential shortage of conscripts, the use of North Korean troops will temporarily relieve domestic pressure to recruit more Russians this autumn. Deploying foreign forces to Ukraine also addresses the backlash Putin faced after sending fresh Russian conscripts to the front lines.

North Korea will likely receive additional economic benefits and greater military-technical assistance from Russia, possibly including satellite and rocket technology. Once opposed to North Korea’s nuclear program, Putin may now find it useful to help improve North Korea’s missile capabilities and nuclear weapons delivery systems. Russia may also help North Korea upgrade its aging submarine fleet. North Korean soldiers could gain valuable combat experience fighting alongside Russians and be able to evaluate firsthand how effective its military technology fares against Western-manufactured arms and defenses.

How effective are North Korean troops and what risks does the regime face?

It is unclear how well North Korean troops will perform in combat. Although North Korean troops are undergoing training in Russian military facilities in the Far East, differences in language, culture, training, and warfighting doctrine could diminish the effectiveness of North Korean forces until they are better integrated with Russian units.

Reportedly, Kim has dispatched special operations forces from the Eleventh Army Corps known as the “Storm Corps.” These are elite troops trained for infiltration and assassination missions, with more military training than new Russian conscripts sent to the frontlines. However, it seems unlikely that Kim Jong Un would continue to dispatch a large number of elite soldiers to Russia if casualties mount at the same rate as Russian casualties.

One risk the North Korean regime faces is the possibility of its soldiers deserting the battlefield and seeking to defect to Ukraine or South Korea. Although the claim has not been independently verified, Ukrainian intelligence reported that 18 North Korean soldiers stationed near the Russia-Ukraine border had deserted their positions.

It is possible that some North Korean soldiers who surrender or are captured by Ukrainian forces may not want to return to Russia or North Korea. These soldiers may seek asylum or ask to be transferred to South Korean authorities.

North Korean prisoners of war may need to be protected under the Geneva Convention and eventually returned to Russia or North Korea. However, South Korea’s defense minister described North Korean troops in Russia as mercenaries disguised in Russian uniforms and acting under Russian military command, suggesting that Ukraine may not be obligated to repatriate North Korean soldiers seeking asylum. The defection of North Korean special operation forces would represent an embarrassing blow to the Kim regime.

How has South Korea responded to North Korean troops in Russia?

From the South Korean perspective, Seoul has yet to say what might catalyze its direct involvement in the form of sending military personnel and lethal aid to Kyiv. To date, South Korea has helped backfill weapons for Ukraine by supplying arms to NATO members.

Since the start of the war, South Korea has been reluctant to directly send lethal weapons to Ukraine and has mostly provided economic and humanitarian support. However, this new development may force Seoul to consider supporting Kyiv by sending weapons, sharing intelligence, and sending military intelligence personnel. If Seoul decides to send arms to Kyiv, the move would require substantive legislative revisions to its Foreign Trade Act; South Korea is currently prohibited from sending lethal weapons to live conflict zones except for peaceful uses, and countries that purchase South Korean weapons cannot re-export them to third-party countries without Seoul’s permission.

Regardless of whether South Korea provides Ukraine with offensive weapons, Pyongyang’s actions have pushed Seoul to work more closely with its European partners, including NATO. On October 28, a delegation of South Korean intelligence and defense officials briefed NATO’s North Atlantic Council and Indo-Pacific partners on their assessments of North Korean troop deployments to Russia and pledged to continue coordination on monitoring the situation in Ukraine. Increased cooperation between South Korea and NATO will enable Seoul to share and receive information regarding North Korean combat capabilities and tactics and track North Korean troops sent to the Ukrainian front line. South Koreans could also assist Ukrainians in carrying out psychological operations to encourage North Korean soldiers to defect.

Where does China stand?

China has avoided comment when asked whether North Korean troops are in Russia. Publicly, Beijing has offered diplomatic platitudes calling for de-escalation in Ukraine and peace on the Korean Peninsula. Privately, however, Beijing remains worried about the risks that it cannot directly control, potential instability on its doorstep, and likely increased security cooperation between South Korea, Japan, and the United States and emerging coordination between NATO and Seoul as a response to Pyongyang’s military adventurism.

While Beijing has provided diplomatic and economic cover for Moscow over its invasion of Ukraine, Beijing’s relationship with Pyongyang has been tepid lately. The communication gaps between the three governments have put China in the uncomfortable position of trying to prevent further regional destabilization, given its geopolitical and economic challenges.

What are the global implications of North Korea-Russia military cooperation?

The image of North Korean and Russian soldiers fighting together plays into the narrative of a growing “axis of upheaval” between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. To date, however, the most significant relationships between the four actors have been separate and bilateral in nature.

The dispatch of North Korean troops to Russia indicates that Pyongyang is “all in” with assisting Russia’s unjust war effort in Ukraine. While North Korea has previously been known for its cyberthreat, money laundering, arms trafficking, and illicit trade activities, this new development may embolden Pyongyang to participate in other ongoing conflicts and future wars on behalf of like-minded partners opposed to the West.

Authors

Andrew Yeo

Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies

@AndrewIYeo

Hanna Foreman

Senior Research Assistant - Center for Asia Policy Studies

8. Philly Shipyard's Transformation: How Hanwha’s Investment Is Driving U.S. Navy Readiness

Philly Shipyard's Transformation: How Hanwha’s Investment Is Driving U.S. Navy Readiness

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Wilson Beaver and Dominic Seibold · October 28, 2024

Military Hardware: Tanks, Bombers, Submarines and More

PACIFIC OCEAN (Oct. 1, 2024) The Independence-class littoral combat ship USS Mobile (LCS 26) comes alongside the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) for a fueling-at-sea, Oct. 1, 2024. Theodore Roosevelt, flagship of Carrier Strike Group 9, is underway conducting routine operations in the U.S. 3rd Fleet area of operations. An integral part of U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. 3rd Fleet operates naval forces in the Indo-Pacific and provides he realistic, relevant training necessary to execute the U.S. Navy’s role across the full spectrum of military operations – from combat operations to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. U.S. 3rd Fleet works together with our allies and partners to advance freedom of navigation, the rule of law, and other principles that underpin security for the Indo-Pacific region. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Richard Tinker)

A $100 Million Investment in Philly Shipyard is Starting to Pay Dividends for Pennsylvanians and America’s Navy: Earlier this year, Hanwha Ocean Company bought Philly Shipyard for $100 million. Though it was met with little fanfare from the public at the time, the investment was a big deal in the Navy.

It came after requests from American defense experts and government officials for shipbuilders from allied countries to invest into the worn down, depleted, and inefficient mess that is the US shipbuilding industry. Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro even called the deal, “a game-changing milestone” for America’s “Maritime Statecraft.”

Now, the new partnership is paying dividends, for Hanwha, Philadelphia, and the United States. In late August, Hanwha secured an annual Navy maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) contract. That contract and the new work at Philly Shipyard will go a long ways towards fixing the Navy’s current maintenance backlog, which is currently contributing to both shipbuilding delays and cost overruns.

According to a 2022 Government Accountability Office report, the Navy’s current maintenance backlog amounted to $1.8 billion. This inefficiency has a major impact on America’s combat readiness has contributed to the Navy’s decision to decommission 9 ships before their expected service life.

Unfortunately, things have only gotten worse under the Biden-Harris administration. Misguided spending priorities and a lack of urgency have set back America’s ability to keep up with and deter China, which is the world’s largest Navy numerically and whose fleet is still growing fast.

Hanwha could help turn the tide in that fight, though. With the purchase of the Philly Shipyard, it is now positioned to compete for contracts for building new ships, which could be an enormous windfall not only for Philadelphia workers, but also our naval power.

Specifically, the Philly Shipyard is well positioned to compete for contracts to construct Constellation-class frigates. Currently, these ships are only being built at Marinette Marine in Wisconsin, with the first ship set to set sail in 2029 following production delay. But Navy leadership has already called for an increase in the construction of new missile-guided frigates, and the Philly Shipyard is now well-positioned to compete for building these additional frigates.

The new investment in the Philly Shipyard is a refreshing step in the right direction. It is also a reminder that our efforts to reshore industry and rebuild our defense industrial base will benefit American workers first and foremost, like the new workers who will need to be hired as Philly Shipyards expands.

If we want to win, however, we need to build on this positive momentum. Policymakers should work to create maritime prosperity zones, implement programs to solve labor shortages, and cut down on overregulation in order continue to promote further investments in and expansion of our naval infrastructure, especially at Philly Shipyards.

As our Navy works to meet the challenges of tomorrow, Hanwha’s new investment means Philadelphia will be playing a leading role in the fight. By fixing the maintenance glut and building new ships, Philly Shipyard will be vital to preserving the security of the American people.

Why? Because the first battle of the next great power competition will not take place in the far-off seas of the Pacific; it will be fought in places like Philly Shipyard on the Delaware as we set out to defeat our own deficiencies. And this is a battle we can’t afford to lose.

About the Authors

Wilson Beaver is a Policy Advisor for defense budgeting at The Heritage Foundation. Dominic Seibold is a Fall 2024 Member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation.

NOTE: This piece has been updated since publication.

In this article:

Written By Wilson Beaver and Dominic Seibold

Wilson Beaver is a Policy Advisor for defense budgeting at The Heritage Foundation. Dominic Seibold is a Fall 2024 Member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation.

nationalsecurityjournal.org · by Wilson Beaver and Dominic Seibold · October 28, 2024

9. Analysis: Increased sabotage risk in South Korea’s defense-industrial sector

Subversion and sabotage are fundamental elements of unconventional warfare (to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power). And the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State likely employ them. And given the South's role as a partner in the arsenal of democracy, the South Korean defense industry is a logical target for sabotage by the north and other members of the "Dark Quad." There are myriad ways to achieve sabotage from physical attacks to cyber to employment of techniques by the work force as outline in the OSS simple sabotage manual,

(https://www.cia.gov/static/5c875f3ec660e092cf893f60b4a288df/SimpleSabotage.pdf)

Analysis

Analysis: Increased sabotage risk in South Korea’s defense-industrial sector

South Korea's defense collaborations and raised diplomatic profile heightens the risk of sabotage at key defense-industrial sites.

https://www.junotane.com/p/increased-sabotage-risk-in-south-korea-defense-industrial-sector?r=7i07&utm

Oct 30, 2024

Event or Trend: Following the 30 October nuclear submarine shipyard fire in Barrow-in-Furness, UK, concerns over foreign sabotage by Russian agents have intensified. With South Korea's growing defense collaborations and raised diplomatic profile, there is now heightened potential for sabotage at its key defense-industrial sites.

Significance: The sabotage of defense infrastructure in Europe shows a shift toward more aggressive, clandestine operations by foreign agents, allegedly Russian operatives. South Korea’s expanding partnerships with Western defense programs, including submarine technology and joint military production with NATO countries, may attract similar operations targeting critical defense-industrial facilities.

South Korea is a global defense supplier and now plays a strategic role in global Western security and defense industrial supply chains. Sabotage would carry broad consequences. Disruptions would delay key projects, impact South Korea's defense exports, and damage its international reputation. This growing threat affects not only national security but also diplomatic relationships, as allies may question the ability to safeguard shared technology and infrastructure.

Analysis: Recent acts of sabotage across Europe, attributed to Russian operatives, have become more frequent, particularly targeting defense and critical infrastructure. These include railway disruptions, cyberattacks, and military facility incidents.

On 30 October, a fire was reported at BAE Systems nuclear submarine shipyard in Barrow-in-Furness. The complex is the second-largest indoor shipbuilding complex in Europe and holds facilities crucial to nuclear submarine production, including for the Dreadnought Class and Astute Class submarines. While not yet investigated, following similar incidents across Europe, there is suspicion that the fire may be an act of sabotage. There are growing concerns that such actions could be replicated elsewhere.

South Korea’s defense sector is increasingly intertwined with Western military projects, and it is emerging as a major player in arms production, including naval shipbuilding. The current geopolitical environment—characterized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and escalating U.S.-China tensions—has made South Korea a more attractive target for those seeking to disrupt Western-aligned defense networks.

South Korea’s raised diplomatic profile makes it susceptible to the kinds of sabotage seen across Europe. Russia, known for targeting military and strategic sites in retaliation for diplomatic moves, may consider South Korea’s expanding defense footprint as a provocation. South Korea has recently signed defense agreements with countries like Poland and Norway and entered cooperative projects with the U.S. on naval and missile defense systems. These ties, while beneficial, also position South Korea as a secondary target in geopolitical disputes with Western nations.

The Barrow-in-Furness incident exemplifies how industrial sabotage can disrupt key military supply chains, and South Korean facilities, such as those in Ulsan or Geoje, could face similar risks. Additionally, the nature of modern sabotage can range from physical destruction to cyber incursions, further complicating prevention.

South Korea’s lax cyber security culture also raises the risk that sabotage may not be purely physical. A compromised defense-industrial facility in South Korea could delay delivery schedules for military exports, including self-propelled howitzers, tanks, and munitions, thus affecting both economic interests and international partnerships.

As concerns regarding the risk of sabotage increase, defense-industrial partners are seeking assurance that South Korea has the ability to protect shared defense technology and production.

South Korea’s security services have historically maintained a focus on preventing foreign influence in domestic production, including labor disputes, technical malfunctions, and accidents.

A number of states have raised the issue with their South Korean counterparts. Their current primary concern is not foreign influence in domestic production but rather covert operations by foreign agents.

The public is currently opposed to South Korea’s direct involvement in support of Ukraine, and President Yoon’s approval rating is at a historical low. However, heightened Russian diplomatic activity in South Korea has attracted attention. A high-profile sabotage event could:

Influence South Korea’s decision-making on the direct support of Ukraine.
Impact South Korea’s ability to directly support Ukraine.

Domestic industry is largely unprepared. Enhanced security procedures will slow business interaction; reduce the operational freedom of employees; and require immediate funding to raise awareness.

Outlook: In the short term (0-12 months), South Korea will see heightened scrutiny from allies and will require tighter security protocols at defense-industrial sites. Medium-term outcomes (1-5 years) will include the development of shared counter-sabotage practices with partner states and stricter industry security guidance.

10. Russia could transfer missile tech to North Korea, ‘escalating’ threats, South Korea warns

Yes, this is possible and concerning. The question is how to prevent it or what to do about it?

Russia could transfer missile tech to North Korea, ‘escalating’ threats, South Korea warns

Washington, Seoul launch cooperation efforts to meet new, shared missile threats.

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

October 30, 2024 04:15 PM ET

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

As North Korean troops train in Russia for likely deployment against Ukrainians, South Korea’s defense minister said Wednesday that Moscow might send Pyongyang dangerous missile technology that he said would “escalate tensions” across the Korean peninsula and make North Koreans a far more threatening force.

“There is a high possibility that North Korea, in exchange for their troops’ deployment, would ask for cutting-edge technology,” Kim Yong-hyun said at a Pentagon press conference with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Kim said the requests would likely be in the areas of tactical nuclear weapons, ICBMs, reconnaissance satellites, and missile submarines.

Austin said some 10,000 North Korean soldiers are currently in Russia, where “they're drawing equipment and conducting some training.”

Austin said Russia might send the North Koreans to its Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces have been fighting since they invaded in August. He called that possibility “disturbing,” but wouldn’t comment on the timing of that or that it was a certainty that would occur.

Pentagon spokesman John Kirby said on Tuesday that the soldiers are likely special operations forces.

Background

North Korea has been steadily increasing the destructive power of its nuclear weapons for years and in November 2017 unveiled a new design for an intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15, which could reach the continental United States and closer targets in the Pacific.

But North Korea’s missile program lacks the sophistication of China’s and Russia’s, due in large part to crushing international sanctions (and possibly, clandestine U.S. sabotage.) Result: despite a large and expensive increase in testing over the last ten years, North Korea’s missiles are unreliable, especially the long-range variants. They have failed launch tests, exploded in the air near North Korean population centers, and, especially the intercontinental missiles, have not shown they can actually hit any target other than the ocean.

Russia could help North Korea fill some of those technological gaps, particularly in terms of targeting with satellite data, which means its missiles could become much better far sooner than was thought possible just a few years ago.

Why far sooner? In part because giving technology to North Korea was something Vladimir Putin promised not to do.

“Let me remind you that Russia signed onto the UN Security Council resolution agreeing not to provide military assistance to North Korea,” Austin said. “Of course, we know that Putin has gone tin-cupping to get weapons from the DPRK and Iran. Turning to a pariah state like North Korea for troops just underscores how much trouble he is in.”

Joint response

In response to the deepening coordination between Russia, China, and North Korea, the United States and South Korea on Wednesday advanced a new series of cooperation agreements to enable technology transfer and joint development between the two countries.

According to a Pentagon fact sheet, the initiatives include:

More cooperation on nuclear deterrence to build out better joint responses to nuclear and conventional threats on the Korean Peninsula via the Nuclear Consultative Group.
Enhancements to crisis management through joint field exercises like Freedom Shield and Ulchi Freedom Shield.
Upgrading the Shared Early Warning Systems to more quickly share radar and other data in response to North Korean or other missile threats.
Establish a new Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee to help both militaries integrate AI, autonomous systems, and quantum tech into defense applications.
Accelerate industrial cooperation through the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience and mutual maintenance and repair, or MRO, to improve interoperability between the two militaries’ equipment.

The two militaries also announced today a new regional cooperation framework” to increase collaboration on Indo-Pacific security, with an emphasis on maritime security, defense-industry cooperation, and multilateral exercises.

Those efforts build on a trilateral security agreement that Japan, South Korea, and the United States launched this July in Tokyo. That agreement advanced its own framework to institutionalize missile-data sharing, high-level dialogues, and joint military exercises.

“The nuclear and missile threat from North Korea is now an existential threat, not only to the ROK but also to the Indo-Pacific region. We had a shared understanding that the ROK US, Japan, trilateral security cooperation framework signed in this July represents a historic milestone in trilateral security cooperation,” Austin said.

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

11. North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading toward Ukraine, US says

So what does this mean? Does anyone think this provides "cover" for the nKPA forces? Or does this mean the nKPA forces will be employed as replacements and integrated into Russian units?

North Korean troops in Russian uniforms are heading toward Ukraine, US says

AP · by TARA COPP · October 30, 2024

LOLITA C. BALDOR

TARA COPP

Copp covers the Pentagon and national security for the Associated Press. She has reported from Afghanistan, Iraq, throughout the Middle East, Europe and Asia.

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AP · by TARA COPP · October 30, 2024

12. Russia asks at UN meeting: If the West aids Ukraine, why can’t North Korea help us?

Ha ha ha!

The simple answer is that Ukraine with US, NATO and other's support is helping Ukraine defend itself from the illegal and brutal invasion by Russia. The attempt at "whataboutism" here is precious. Bless his heart.

Russia asks at UN meeting: If the West aids Ukraine, why can’t North Korea help us?

https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/russia-asks-at-un-if-west-aids-ukraine-why-cant-north-korea-help-us?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=topic/world

Mr Vassily Nebenzia said Russia's military interaction with North Korea does not violate international law. PHOTO: REUTERS

Updated Oct 31, 2024, 02:46 PM

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NEW YORK - Russia's envoy to the United Nations on Oct 30 questioned why its allies like North Korea could not help Moscow in its war against Ukraine, given Western countries claim the right to help Kyiv.

Mr Vassily Nebenzia faced a blunt argument at a Security Council meeting from the United States, Britain, South Korea, Ukraine and others, who all accused Russia of violating UN resolutions and the founding UN Charter with the deployment of troops from North Korea to help Moscow.

“Supporting an act of aggression, which completely violates the principles of the UN Charter, is illegal,” South Korea’s UN ambassador Joon-kook Hwang said.

“Any activities that are entailed with the DPRK’s dispatch of troops to Russia are clear violations of multiple UN Security Council Resolutions,” he added, referring to the North by its official name.

Some 10,000 North Korean troops were already in eastern Russia, and it appeared likely that they would be used to support combat operations in Russia's Kursk region, near the border with Ukraine, US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin said on Oct 30.

Mr Nebenzia said Russia's military interaction with North Korea does not violate international law.

Russia has not denied the involvement of North Korean troops in the war, which it has been waging in Ukraine since February 2022.

“Even if everything that’s being said about the cooperation between Russia and North Korea by our Western colleagues is true, why is it that the United States and allies are trying to impose on everyone the flawed logic that they have the right to help the Zelensky regime... and Russian allies have no right to do a similar thing,” Mr Nebenzia said.

Ukraine’s UN ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya responded: “None of the countries that provide assistance to Ukraine is under Security Council sanctions.”

“Receiving assistance from the fully sanctioned North Korea is a brazen violation of the UN Charter,” he added. “Sending the DPRK troops to support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is a flagrant violation of international law.”

North Korea has been under UN Security Council sanctions since 2006, and the measures have been steadily strengthened over the years with the aim of halting Pyongyang’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

North Korea has not acknowledged the deployment of troops to Russia, but said any such move would be in compliance with international law.

“If Russia’s sovereignty and security interests are exposed to and threatened by continued dangerous attempts of the United States and the West, and if it is judged that we should respond to them with something, we will make a necessary decision,” North Korea’s UN ambassador Song Kim told the council.

“Pyongyang and Moscow maintain close contact with each other on mutual security and development of the situation,” he said.

However, deputy US ambassador Robert Woodward warned North Korean leader Kim Jong Un: “Should DPRK’s troops enter Ukraine in support of Russia, they will surely return in body bags. So I would advise Chairman Kim to think twice about engaging in such reckless and dangerous behaviour.” REUTERS.

13. White House ‘strongly condemns’ North Korean missile test

We need to recognize and understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and then expose and attack that strategy.

And we need to include a human rights upfront approach in so doing. Every statement "condemning" north Korea should include a human rights component to highly how Kim Jong Un's deliberate policy decisions to prioritize nuclear weapons and missile development is the direct cause of the suffering of the Korean people in the north.

Simply wagging our finger and scolding the regime is not enough. We need a superior political warfare strategy that effectively employs information and influence.

White House ‘strongly condemns’ North Korean missile test

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4963174-white-house-strongly-condemns-north-korean-missile-test/?utm

by Brett Samuels - 10/30/24 9:04 PM ET

The White House on Wednesday warned North Korea “needlessly” raised tensions with the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

A spokesperson for the national security council said the United States “strongly condemns” the test launch out of North Korea, calling it a “flagrant violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions.”

Sean Savett said in a statement that the U.S. determined the launch did not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to allies, but that it “needlessly raises tensions and risks destabilizing the security situation in the region.”

“It only demonstrates that the DPRK continues to prioritize its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs over the well-being of its people,” Savett said in a statement. “We urge all countries to condemn these violations and call on the DPRK to cease its destabilizing actions and engage in serious dialogue.

“The national security team is closely coordinating with our allies and partners,” he continued. “The United States will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the American homeland and Republic of Korea and Japanese allies.”

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said it detected a missile launch from North Korea early Thursday local time, according to The Associated Press. South Korea said the missile was designed to strike the continental United States.

The launch came as U.S. officials have increasingly warned that North Korea has sent troops to aid Russia in its war against Ukraine.

14. Study Estimates North Korea’s $5.5 Billion Military Supply Deal with Russia in Ukraine War

How much of the resources could have been used to take care of the Korean people in the north?

Study Estimates North Korea’s $5.5 Billion Military Supply Deal with Russia in Ukraine War

While the exact contents of the containers from North Korea are unclear, analysts estimate 80-95% are ammunition – mainly 152mm and 122mm artillery shells – with 5-20% being other weapons.

by Julia Struck | October 30, 2024, 8:23 am

kyivpost.com · by Julia Struck · October 30, 2024

While the exact contents of the containers from North Korea are unclear, analysts estimate 80-95% are ammunition – mainly 152mm and 122mm artillery shells – with 5-20% being other weapons.

by Julia Struck | October 30, 2024, 8:23 am

This handout from South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) released on October 18, 2024 shows an undated satellite image by Maxar Technologies of what NIS said is the Russian vessel Angara, loaded with North Korean weapons, departing from Rajin Port in the North Korean city of Rason. North Korea has decided to send a "large-scale" troop deployment to Russia to support their war in Ukraine, with 1,500 special forces already in country and training before, Seoul's spy agency said on October 18. (Photo by Handout / various sources / AFP)

North Korea’s arms deal with Russia could be worth up to $5.5 billion, providing a critical lifeline as Russia faces mounting ammunition shortages in its war against Ukraine, according to researcher Olena Guseinova from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul.

Reports suggest Moscow has turned to Pyongyang not only for weapons but potentially even personnel. Guseinova’s study outlines a deal with North Korea that could provide Russia with urgently needed military supplies.

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“Taking into account potential price variations, the total cost of the arms deal is estimated to range between $1.72 billion and $5.52 billion,” the study read. “Guseinova estimates the value of the arms deal between the two countries at up to $5.5 billion, viewing North Korea’s military support as a critical, timely resource for Moscow.”

Intelligence reports suggesting that North Korea might be supplying weapons to Russia first appeared in September 2022, around seven months after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

While initially met with some skepticism due to limited evidence on the battlefield, these reports gained credibility as the intensity of Russian artillery fire gradually decreased. In the early stages, Russian forces fired approximately 70,000 to 80,000 rounds daily in March-April 2022, which fell to 60,000 by May. By January 2023, daily usage dropped to 20,000 rounds, then to 14,000 by April-May, 12,000 by July-August, and just 8,000 by November.

British Defence Intelligence Update Ukraine 30 October 2024

Latest from the British Defence Intelligence.

This steady decline likely stemmed from Russia’s miscalculation regarding the war’s duration, resulting in faster-than-anticipated depletion of its stockpiles. Even with efforts to ramp up domestic production, Russia’s current output of around 250,000 artillery shells monthly—totaling roughly 3 million annually—can only sustain a daily firing rate below 10,000 rounds. While this rate is adequate for low-intensity engagements, it is insufficient for the sustained, large-scale bombardments required for Russia’s war strategy.

To address this shortfall, Russia has had to look for external sources of ammunition, which appears to have led it to seek support from North Korea.

As per the report, convincing the Kim regime to assist took some time, as the first shipment of military equipment to Russia was not delivered until August 2023—nearly a year after intelligence initially reported on the potential arms deal between Pyongyang and Moscow. This delay suggests that negotiations were challenging and required significant bargaining efforts.

By October 2023, it was confirmed that North Korea had transferred over 1,000 containers of weaponry to Russia. This number surged to 6,700 containers by February 2024 and nearly doubled to either 13,000 (according to South Korean intelligence) or 16,500 (according to US intelligence) containers by August 2024. Ultimately, shipments are expected to reach 20,000 containers by October 2024.

While satellite imagery cannot pinpoint the exact distribution of the contents within these containers, most analysts estimate that approximately 80-95% of the shipments consist of ammunition—primarily 152mm and 122mm artillery shells. The remaining 5-20% includes various other weaponry, such as portable surface-to-air missiles, rifles, rocket launchers, and mortars.

Low-Range Estimate

$1.72 billion: Based on $300 per 152mm artillery shell, $150 per 122mm shell, $1.5 million per KN-23/24 tactical ballistic missile, and 1 Bulsae-4 anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) vehicle set.
$2.84 billion: Based on $500 per 152mm artillery shell, $300 per 122mm shell, $1.5 million per KN-23/24, and 2 Bulsae-4 ATGM sets.

High-Range Estimate

$4.63 billion: Based on $800 per 152mm shell, $500 per 122mm shell, $3 million per KN-23/24, and 2 Bulsae-4 ATGM sets.
$5.52 billion: Based on $1,000 per 152mm shell, $500 per 122mm shell, $3 million per KN-23/24, and 2 Bulsae-4 ATGM sets.

According to available data, commercial ties between Russia and North Korea have steadily increased from 2022 to 2024. In 2022, trade volume was $3.78 million, rising nine-fold to $34.4 million in 2023 and further increasing to $52.9 million from January to May 2024.

This upward trend suggests a potential return to pre-sanction levels when the average annual trade volume between the two countries hovered around $100 million, the study read. This marks a significant recovery, especially compared to the 2018-2020 period, when annual turnover was approximately $45 million.

Despite this growth, the $52.9 million figure in 2024 remains modest, particularly when compared to the much larger trade volumes between North Korea and China. In 2023, Russia accounted for just 2% of North Korea’s trade, while China dominated at 97%. This imbalance is unlikely to shift in Moscow’s favor soon due to the limited range of goods North Korea can offer.

Even if trade between Russia and North Korea exceeds $100 million in 2024, it is likely to reflect sanctions evasion rather than genuine expansion of their economic relationship. Notably, reported trade statistics do not account for the arms deal estimated between $1.72 billion and $5.52 billion, suggesting that weapon transactions may occur through a barter system or a mix of barter and cash.

The latter is more plausible, as North Korea likely sought a substantial inflow of hard currency to support its struggling economy. Experts note that food and oil are primary items in this barter system; in March 2024, the first direct oil shipments to North Korea occurred since UN sanctions were imposed in 2017.

The report also discusses potential troop deployments, concluding that up to 20,000 North Korean soldiers could be sent to Russia.

Beyond addressing its immediate military needs, Russia aims to leverage its relationship with North Korea and the transfer of military technology to challenge Western alliances, particularly in East Asia. This strategy seeks to create security and diplomatic issues for countries like South Korea and Japan, shifting the geopolitical landscape in Russia’s favor.

However, this approach has limitations, the research said. North Korea’s outdated and unreliable weaponry raises doubts about the sustainability of the arms deal, while Pyongyang's history of shifting alliances makes it an unpredictable partner. Furthermore, empowering a more aggressive North Korea could strain Russia’s relationship with China. Moscow's deepening ties with North Korea, especially in the transfer of sensitive technologies, may further isolate Russia internationally.

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Julia Struck

Julia Struck is a news writer and Kyiv Post correspondent who has previously worked as a parliamentary editor, journalist, and news editor. She has specialized in covering the work of Ukrainian parliament, government, and law enforcement agencies.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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