Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners


Quotes of the Day:

“As we see it, a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion, or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy country’s exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons.”
- Qiao Liang, Unrestricted Warfare

“When people begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced use of military force to resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another form and in another arena, becoming an instrument of enormous power in the hands of all those who harbor intentions of controlling other countries or regions.”
- Qiao Liang, Unrestricted Warfare

“Faced with these prospects, even J. Saiteerdou [as printed], who is responsible for the investigation of computer crimes in the FBI of the United States, said with both self-confidence and worry: “Give me ten carefully chosen hackers, and within 90 days I would then be able to have this nation lay down its arms and surrender.”
- Qiao Liang, Unrestricted Warfare

1. China Sends Record Number of Military Aircraft Into Taiwan’s ADIZ
2. Three aircraft carriers train together near Okinawa as China ramps up pressure on Taiwan
3. Afghanistan, China, And The Gray Zone: House Committee Passes Intel Bill
4. Why China sent a record number of fighter jets into Taiwan's defence zone over the weekend
5. Increasing People’s Republic of China Military Pressure Against Taiwan Undermines Regional Peace and Stability
6. 357. The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict
7. Inside the CIA’s secret Kabul base, burned out and abandoned in haste
8. Afghanistan Isn't Good Terrorist Real Estate
9. The Battle of Mogadishu 25 years later: How the fateful fight changed combat operations
10. FDD | The Taliban Is Using the Doha Accord to Protect Al-Qaeda
11. Options to Counter Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa
12. Reflections on trust from father of fallen Green Beret on 4th anniversary of deadly Niger ambush
13. The Elusive Quest for Victory in War
14. Pandora Papers: An offshore data tsunami
15. FDD | Biden Brags About Diplomacy. It’s All Spin.
16. Trump’s Exit From Asian Trade Pact Damaged America, Boosted China
17. The Myth that Democracies Bungled the Pandemic
18. He’s Australia’s Most Decorated Soldier. Did He Also Kill Helpless Afghans?
19. Hungary’s Leader Fights Criticism in U.S. via Vast Influence Campaign
20. The coin that could avert a federal debt default
21. Leader of Prestigious Yale Program Resigns, Citing Donor Pressure
22. Universities Are Shunning Their Responsibility to Democracy
23. Maria Ressa urges world leaders: 'Act now' vs infodemic threatening democracies
24. Biden And The Reality Of Current State Of Democracy In World25. 



1. China Sends Record Number of Military Aircraft Into Taiwan’s ADIZ


China Sends Record Number of Military Aircraft Into Taiwan’s ADIZ
realcleardefense.com · by Associated Press
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — China flew more than 30 military planes toward Taiwan on Saturday, the second large display of force in as many days.
Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said 39 aircraft entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in two sorties, one during the day and one at night. That followed a similar pattern on Friday, when 38 planes flew into the area south of the self-governing island.
China claims Taiwan, which lies off its east coast, as its territory. The two split in 1949 during a civil war in which the Communists took control of mainland China and the rival Nationalists set up a government on Taiwan. The Communist Party marked the 72nd anniversary of its rule on Friday.
Taiwan’s premier, Su Tseng-chang, spoke out on Saturday against the first day’s flights.
“China has always conducted brutal and barbarian actions to jeopardize regional peace,” he said while attending the opening ceremony of a science park in southern Taiwan.
China has been sending military planes into the area south of Taiwan on a frequent basis for more than a year. The 38 and 39 planes on Friday and Saturday were the most in a single day since Taiwan began releasing reports on the flights, Taiwan’s Central News Agency said.
The Defense Ministry said 20 planes took part in the daytime flights on Saturday and another 19 at night. It identified most of them as J-17 and SU-30 fighter jets.
© copyright 2021 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
realcleardefense.com · by Associated Press
2. Three aircraft carriers train together near Okinawa as China ramps up pressure on Taiwan

Three aircraft carriers train together near Okinawa as China ramps up pressure on Taiwan
Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · October 4, 2021
The aircraft carriers USS Ronald Reagan, USS Carl Vinson and HMS Queen Elizabeth join the Japanese helicopter destroyer JS Ise in leading vessels from six nations through the Philippine Sea near Okinawa in this undated photo from the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. (JMSDF)

Three aircraft carriers — two American and one British — were among an armada of 17 warships from six countries that trained together over the weekend in the Philippine Sea.
The USS Ronald Reagan, fresh off its deployment to the Middle East, met the USS Carl Vinson and HMS Queen Elizabeth on Saturday southwest of Okinawa, according to a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force news release Monday. They were accompanied by other vessels from the United States, Japan, United Kingdom, New Zealand, Netherlands and Canada.
The training, which included air defense, anti-submarine warfare, tactical maneuvers and communication drills, continued through Sunday, the release said.
Seventh Fleet on Monday referred questions about the exercise to the Hawaii-based U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, which did not immediately respond to an email seeking comment.
U.S. Navy ships involved in the exercise included the guided-missile destroyers USS Shiloh, USS Chafee, USS The Sullivans and the guided-missile cruiser USS Lake Champlain, according to the release. The other nations’ vessels included destroyers, frigates and replenishment ships.
Photos of the training showed the three carriers, along with the Japan’s flattop helicopter destroyer JS Ise, leading the 13 other vessels through the sea.
The exercise wrapped up as the Chinese military flew 16 warplanes over waters south of Taiwan, less than 400 nautical miles from Okinawa.
China sent 38 warplanes into the area on Friday and 39 aircraft on Saturday, the most in a single day since Taiwan began releasing reports on flights in September 2020. The flights came in daytime and nighttime sorties.
A statement from U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price warned that China’s military activity near Taiwan risks miscalculation and undermines regional peace and stability.
“We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion against Taiwan,” the statement said.
Information from The Associated Press was used in this report.
Alex Wilson

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · October 4, 2021

3. Afghanistan, China, And The Gray Zone: House Committee Passes Intel Bill
Excerpts:

The Director of National Intelligence requested some $62.3 billion for FY2022’s National Intelligence Program. The House committee summary didn’t put a number on the total budget it proposed, but it said it was slightly higher than what the administration had requested.
The House bill now moves to the floor for debate and a vote before Congress begins reconciling it with the Senate’s version.
Afghanistan, China, And The Gray Zone: House Committee Passes Intel Bill - Breaking Defense
The bill also requires the IC to share information with the Defense Department's Unexplained Aerial Phenomena Task Force.
breakingdefense.com · by Brad D. Williams · October 1, 2021
The CIA seal on the floor of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virg. (Pool Photo by David Burnett/Newsmakers)
WASHINGTON: The House Intelligence Committee passed its version of the 2022 Intelligence Authorization Act on Thursday reflecting the committee’s priorities for fiscal year 2022 via a laundry list of items, ranging from Afghanistan and China to gray-zone competition and “unexplained aerial phenomena.”
“One of our committee’s principal responsibilities is crafting an Intelligence Authorization Act that keeps our country secure while ensuring the Congress’ ability to conduct vigorous oversight, protect civil liberties, care for our personnel, and provide for the resources intelligence professionals need to safeguard national security,” said House Intelligence Committee Chair Rep. Adam Schiff, D-Calif., in a statement. “The bill passed out of the committee today is a strong bipartisan package.”
The full text of the finalized bill was not available at press time, but according to a summary published by Schiff, the bill’s provisions include one requiring the Intelligence Community to produce a National Intelligence Estimate — considered the IC’s “premier analytic product” — on the risks and opportunities around Afghanistan over the next two years, as well as reporting on the Taliban’s expected relationship with China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia.
Since the US completed a full military withdrawal and closed the US embassy in Kabul in August, some lawmakers have expressed concern about the US’s ability to conduct over-the-horizon (OTH) missions to effectively combat terrorist operatives who will find safe haven under the new Taliban regime. OTH activities include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations. Without a significant — if any — presence of US spies on the ground in Afghanistan, ISR activities will rely on air and space assets, as well as cyber and signals intelligence (SIGINT).
But cyber and SIGINT depend on access to communications networks, and local reports suggest the Taliban destroyed some communications infrastructure during its march to Kabul earlier this year. Since taking power, the Taliban has cut internet access, if only temporarily, in Kabul and Panjshir province. Such moves effectively block the US — as well as China — from conducting operations on those networks.
Nevertheless, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin this week reassured both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees that the US has the capabilities for effective OTH operations. Central Intelligence Agency Deputy Director David Cohen and other IC leaders have also expressed confidence in long-range intelligence gathering. Still, some lawmakers in both parties remain skeptical, especially following an errant airstrike in August aimed at ISIS-K terrorists that instead killed innocent Afghan civilians.
Separately, the bill requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation to perform a security assessment of any Chinese product or service before buying it, reflecting broader concerns about the potential of Chinese cyberespionage.
In addition, the bill requires the IC to conduct a National Intelligence Estimate on US gray-zone competition with China, Russia, Iran, and others. Gray-zone activities refer to perceived hostile behaviors that fall short of justifying a kinetic response. Cyberspace is a prominent domain of gray-zone competition.
Another notable priority is investigating “anomalous health incidents,” referring to so-called Havana Syndrome. US intelligence and diplomatic staff in recent years have been targeted both at home and abroad by some type of attack that has caused brain injuries, vertigo, tinnitus, and a slew of other symptoms. Some experts believe Havana Syndrome is the result of directed energy attacks.
Cohen was asked last month about the CIA’s progress on investigating Havana Syndrome, to which he replied, “We’ve gotten closer,” but “not close enough to make the kind of judgment that people want. We’ll get there. I can’t tell you whether it will be tomorrow, next week, or six months from now. But every piece of intelligence we collect on this helps build out the picture.”
The bill also requires the IC to share information with the Defense Department’s Unexplained Aerial Phenomena Task Force, “as they continue to investigate this mysterious threat to US airspace and our military forces.”
The Director of National Intelligence requested some $62.3 billion for FY2022’s National Intelligence Program. The House committee summary didn’t put a number on the total budget it proposed, but it said it was slightly higher than what the administration had requested.
The House bill now moves to the floor for debate and a vote before Congress begins reconciling it with the Senate’s version.


4. Why China sent a record number of fighter jets into Taiwan's defence zone over the weekend

A view from Australia.

Why China sent a record number of fighter jets into Taiwan's defence zone over the weekend
ABC.net.au · October 4, 2021
Beijing has sent a record number of fighter jets into Taiwan's defence zone over its National Day weekend, amid a surge in nationalism on the mainland.
The show of force over three consecutive days is part of a longer-term trend described by many as a campaign of intimidation targeting the self-governing island.
The recent military activity has also come ahead of Taiwan's National Day on October 10, which will mark 110 years since the founding of the Republic of China.
Chinese state media reports the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has flown planes into Taiwan's defence zone on 198 days this year so far.
So why is Beijing so keen to demonstrate its air force capabilities to Taiwan? How have other countries responded? And what does tropical fruit have to do with it?
What's been happening between Taiwan and China?

Chinese state media praised the sorties.(AP: Taiwan Ministry of Defence
)
On October 1, China's National Day, Beijing sent 38 planes into Taiwan's defence zone, which both China and Taiwan authorities said was a new record.
"The PLA has done an excellent job!" an editorial in the state-run tabloid Global Times said.
"This can be seen as a form of the National Day military parade in the Taiwan Straits, which used to be held at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
"[It was] not a guard of honour. They are fighting forces aimed at actual combat."
A further 39 planes were sent on Saturday, with a total of 100 fighter jets flying into Taiwan's defence zone by the end of the weekend.
Chinese audiences, meanwhile, flocked to watch The Battle of Changin, a patriotic war film described by state media agency Xinhua as being about a "courageous battle during the war to resist US aggression and aid Korea" during the Korean War.
Why is China sending fighter jets?
Wen-Ti Sung, an expert on China's foreign policy from the Australian National University, said Beijing's show of force was for international and domestic audiences.
He said it could be a response to the new AUKUS pact between Australia, Britain and the United States.

China views Taiwan as its territory.(ABC News: GFX/Jarrod Fankhauser
)
"It (the pact) is a big deal that signals Australia's greater willingness to be engaged with security [issues] in Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea," Mr Sung said.
"It will be increasing deterrence against China, and China does not look upon [that] very favourably."
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Mr Sung added that Taipei's talks with the US to change the name of Taiwan's representative office — its de facto embassy in the US — from Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office to Taiwan Representative Office was likely to have also irked China.
Taiwan's diplomatic offices can only be addressed with "Taipei" rather than "Taiwan" as most countries do not recognise the island as a sovereign country.
"It's natural that China will want to show some muscle at this point to signal to the other actors internationally, for example the US and Australia, that if they make further moves in this direction, then China may risk serious escalated military tension, potentially conflict," Mr Sung said.
"It may also hope to deter the US and Australia from making further moves to strengthen Taiwan's international engagement in the international space."
Mr Sung said it was also "high time" for Beijing to show off its military strength in the period between China's National Day and Taiwan's National Day on Sunday.
"[It wants] to both very visually represent the notion of the 'China Dream' that is associated with the 'strong-nation dream' and 'strong-military dream'," he said.
"Since the official narrative about the Xi Jinping era is all about China getting strong, it makes sense that Xi makes an increasing public show of force to illustrate that."
"Taiwan, which has a defensive military posture and possesses a key place in the CCP's (Chinese Communist Party) nationalism narrative, is a natural recipient of this show of force."
How have different parties responded?
The Chinese government last week described Taiwan Foreign Minister Joseph Wu — who it views as a "die-hard" supporter of Taiwanese independence — as a "shrilling" fly.
Taiwan's foreign ministry dismissed the comments as "not worthy" of a response.
But Mr Wu told the ABC's China Tonight program that Taiwan "would like to engage in security or intelligence exchanges with other like-minded partners, Australia included, so Taiwan is better prepared to deal with the war situation".
"If China is going to launch a war against Taiwan, we will fight to the end. And that is our commitment," he said.
The US said it was "very concerned" by "China's provocative military activity near Taiwan".
It has also pledged to come to Taiwan's defence if China launches an invasion.
"[It is] destabilising, risks miscalculations, and undermines regional peace and stability," the US State Department said in response to Beijing's recent sabre-rattling.
"We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion against Taiwan.
"The US commitment to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region."
Australia's Department of Defence told the ABC it was "concerned by China's increased air incursions into Taiwan's air defence zone over the past week".
"Resolution of differences over Taiwan and other regional issues must be achieved peacefully through dialogue and without the threat or use of force or coercion," a spokesperson said.
"Our goal is to maintain an Indo-Pacific region that is secure, prosperous and based on the rule of law."
What do China and Taiwan want?
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has seen the transformation of China into an economic and geopolitical superpower, while also wielding tight control over every aspect of social, cultural and political life on the mainland.
It views Taiwan as part of its territory and wants to reclaim it as part of the People's Republic of China.

Taiwanese human rights activists stage a protest on China's National Day.(Reuters: Ann Wang
)
"Solving the Taiwan question and realising the complete reunification of the motherland are the unswerving historical tasks of the Chinese Communist Party and the common aspiration of all Chinese people," he said.
"All sons and daughters of China, including compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, must work together and move forward in solidarity, resolutely smashing any 'Taiwan independence' plots."
Taiwan's government responded by noting China's economic success under the CCP, but decrying it as a dictatorship that suppressed human rights.
"The CCP should abandon its aggressive political claims on Taiwan as well as the diplomatic suppression and military threats towards Taiwan," a statement said at the time.
Kolas Yotaka, a spokeswoman for the Taiwanese President, was even more forthright.
"The CCP wants Taiwan for their 100th birthday. Just pick something else. Grow up," she wrote on Twitter.
While previously a military dictatorship, Taiwan has evolved into one of the Asia Pacific's few liberal democracies.
For example, it's the only place in Asia where same-sex marriage is legal.

A majority of people in Taiwan oppose reunification with China.(AP: Chiang Ying-ying
)
Taiwan has also watched the rapid erosion of civil liberties in Hong Kong in recent years, so few Taiwanese citizens are enthusiastic about the prospect of rejoining the mainland either.
The annual Taiwan National Security Survey showed in late 2020 that only 1 per cent of the population supported reunification with the mainland, while 60 per cent opposed adopting Beijing's "one country, two systems" framework for Hong Kong.
What does tropical fruit have to do with it?
China's coercion of Taiwan has become increasingly economic as well as military.

Taiwan accuses China of economic "intimidation".(ABC News: GFX/Jarrod Fankhauser
)
Taiwan, which has a population of about 24 million, has strong economic ties to the mainland.
Up to 2 million Taiwanese are estimated to be living and working in China, and before the pandemic almost 3 million mainland Chinese tourists visited Taiwan annually.
Taiwan is one of the largest investors in China, according to the Taiwanese government, and trade between the two was worth US$149 billion ($205 billion) in 2019.
However, China has begun to impose trade sanctions against Taiwan.
Last month, it banned the import of Taiwanese sugar and wax apples over alleged pest concerns.
That followed a comparable ban on pineapples in March, prompting Taiwan to threaten action against Beijing at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
"This is not the first time China has used agricultural exports to other countries as political threats," Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party said at the time.

Sugar apples are among the casualties of China-Taiwan tensions.(AP: Chiang Ying-ying
)
What might happen next?
Full-blown military conflict is still far from becoming a reality.

A tank participates in Taiwan's annual Han Kuang military drill last month.(Reuters: Ann Wang
)
"We've already seen how China annexes territory it regards as its own in Hong Kong," Andrew Hudson, international director of the Centre for Policy Development, said.
Mr Hudson said he would be "surprised" if China began bombing Taiwan.
"The more insidious trade and economic gradual annexation — that's what we should be more focused on," he said.
Mr Sung said people in Taiwan were likely on alert but not quite alarmed.
"The notion that China may launch a major invasion against Taiwan has been around for easily over a quarter century," he said.
“So for many people, there's no real reason why it would make sense that Beijing will launch the attack now.”
ABC.net.au · October 4, 2021

5. Increasing People’s Republic of China Military Pressure Against Taiwan Undermines Regional Peace and Stability

Increasing People’s Republic of China Military Pressure Against Taiwan Undermines Regional Peace and Stability - United States Department of State
state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson
HomeOffice of the SpokespersonPress Releases...Increasing People’s Republic of China Military Pressure Against Taiwan Undermines Regional Peace and Stability
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Press Statement
October 3, 2021
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The United States is very concerned by the People’s Republic of China’s provocative military activity near Taiwan, which is destabilizing, risks miscalculations, and undermines regional peace and stability. We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure and coercion against Taiwan.
We have an abiding interest in peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. We will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability, and we will maintain our commitments as outlined in the Three Communiqués, the Taiwan Relations Act, and the Six Assurances. The U.S. commitment to Taiwan is rock solid and contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and within the region. We will continue to stand with friends and allies to advance our shared prosperity, security, and values and deepen our ties with democratic Taiwan.
state.gov · by Ned Price, Department Spokesperson


6. 357. The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict
The TRADOC Pub The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict can be download at this link: https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/telligent-evolution-components-attachments/01-9016-00-00-00-16-55-27/OEAddendum_5F00_04292021.pdf

Below is a chapter by chapter summary and highlights.

The complementary TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare can be downloaded here:

Of course I look for one thing in these documents. The term irregular warfare is not used once in either document. "Irregular operations" is used in 525-92 -OE and the Changing Character of Warfare.. Irregular warfare is described in terms of hybrid and gray zone.

The second driver deals with the combination of this instability with adaptive, thinking adversaries who are modernizing, and will continue to modernize their capabilities and adjust them to this changing OE. Throughout this continuum, these adversaries will present an array of threats that will be lethal and will be presented across multiple domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber.) Our adversaries will operate in and among populations and in complex terrain, and endeavor to negate many of our own traditional technological advantages and force us to operate with degraded capabilities and take advantage of the infrastructure and other resources cities offer. They will adopt hybrid strategies that take advantage of a range of capabilities that deny us a conventional force-on-force fight unless the situation is advantageous to the adversary. They will use proxy forces that provide plausible deniability, yet directly allow them to not only shape the battlespace, but even achieve their objectives without risking a wider conflict. Similarly, they also may choose to work with, sponsor, or support terrorist or criminal entities to achieve a similar end. Irregular operations, often in concert with proxies, terrorist, or criminal activities, operating within a “Gray Zone” short of war, will challenge our ability to come to grips with the enemy and perhaps present an unfavorable cost benefit equation to our political leaders. Our adversaries will rely on strategic capabilities, such as weapons of mass destruction, information operations, and direct cyber-attacks designed to give us pause in responding to their actions and provide them the strategic space they need to operate. Space is becoming an increasingly congested, commercialized, democratized, and contested domain. State and non-state actors compete to enhance their ability to operate while working to deny what was once an area of superiority. Finally, they will develop conventional force structures capable of providing anti-access and area denial capabilities designed to keep us from entering forces into a battle space, or at a minimum, provide an operational barrier that we will have to spend time and resources to breach. 

357. The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict | Mad Scientist Laboratory
madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil · by user · October 4, 2021
“Our adversaries are not just thinking in terms of matching us in materiel, but also in terms of people and approaches to warfare. They are challenging each of these pillars, which for many in the Army have become cherished truisms. The dominance that we achieved is not a fact of life, but is instead a contest in which we engage each day. We cannot rest on our laurels, but must instead find new ways to equip, train, and lead the greatest fighting force in the world.”
— GEN Paul E. Funk II, CG, TRADOC
[Editor’s Note: The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has approved and published The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict. This document is intended to complement previously published Operational Environment (OE) documents, expanding and adding to our understanding of the OE in light of recent events — think of it as an addendum. The document explores the impact of COVID-19 on the OE and presents four potential post-pandemic alternative futures to consider in terms of Competition, Crisis, and Conflict. It addresses China as our designated Pacing Threat and Russia as a near-peer threat; and describes their respective efforts to modernize and challenge the Army’s dominance in the land power domain as they endeavor to prevail in Competition, Crisis, and Conflict against the United States. This document also explores the impact of Climate Change on the OE and the associated challenges and opportunities facing the Army. Additionally, it is aligned with, and informed by, the Joint Operating Environment 2040, the Interim National Security Strategy, and Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Papers. Today’s post features an excerpt of its Key Judgements; a link to the comprehensive document may be found at the conclusion of today’s post, along with a host of additional, informative links — Read on!]
The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict is intended to build on the Operational Environment (OE) analysis found in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-92, The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Warfare. While that document focused heavily on OE conditions, namely on the development of new technologies and their impact on warfare, it paid less attention to the activities of our Pacing Threat, China, and our other near-peer threat, Russia. Furthermore, although it referenced pandemics as apossible threat to the Homeland, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the OE represent a significant shock to the system that required new analysis, the context of which is addressed in Chapter 1.
Chapter 2 presents the efforts of China and Russia to develop and modernize their militaries and focus on prevailing in Competition, Crisis, and Conflict against the United States.
  • While the United States was engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our adversaries studied us and determined that the best way to defeat the United States is to
  • In Conflict, our adversaries want to use stand-off capabilities to fracture the U.S. population internally, separate the elements of the Joint Force, and divide us from our allies and partners.
  • China and Russia will contest us in every domain and across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) spheres in Competition, Crisis, and Conflict.
  • While the United States invested in equipment and capabilities for the counterinsurgency fight, our most formidable adversaries invested in capabilities that provide them with a degree of overmatch in a few key areas.
  • China and Russia are global powers. China is our designated Pacing Threat and most technologically sophisticated adversary, while Russia remains a near-peer threat with global reach and a large, highly capable nuclear arsenal.
  • Technology among peer and near-peer competitors will be roughly equivalent; the side with the best people and the best approach to Competition, Crisis, and Conflict will have the advantage.
Chapter 3 focuses on the COVID-19 pandemic, and most importantly, on its impact on the OE in terms of the power dynamic between the United States, China, and Russia. It offers four potential alternative futures—called worlds—to consider the impact of the pandemic in terms of Competition, Crisis, and Conflict.
  • The Status Quo Reprieve world represents a continuation of the pre-COVID-19 OE with little real change resulting from the pandemic. This means China and Russia will continue to develop their capabilities along a steady track toward contested equality around 2030.
  • The Relative Advantage world postulates a future in which the impacts of the pandemic on the United States, China, and Russia are relatively equal, but the centralized authorities and economies of China and Russia allow them to focus more on defense than a general recovery, as in the United States. In this case, the OE speeds up, and China and Russia pose a significant challenge by 2025-2028. We view this as the most likely outcome.
  • The most dangerous outcome is the Mind the Gap world, in which our adversaries recover quickly, while the United States craters. Under these conditions, our adversaries’ modernization programs rocket forward, posing a direct challenge to the United States in the next few years.
  • Finally, the best case (but least likely) outcome is the New Renaissance world, in which the United States’ ability to innovate allows it to recover more quickly, while our adversaries struggle. This allows the United States to outpace its rivals across the DIME spheres.
Chapter 4 provides a deeper insight into the impact of our adversaries’ modernization efforts, which directly challenge the key pillars of the U.S. Army’s post-DESERT STORM dominance in the land power domain.
  • Our dominance rested on three assumptions:
  • We are the best equipped Army in the world;
  • We have the best trained Soldiers and the most dynamic leaders; and
  • Our ability to conduct maneuver warfare is unmatched.

  • This dominance was the result of efforts the Army made across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P).
  • While there is much focus on the materiel aspects of our adversaries’ modernization efforts, materiel advantage may be fleeting.
  • Our adversaries understand this and are contesting us across the other factors that deal with human capital; these advances may be more long-lasting.
  • Our adversaries have conceived of new approaches to warfare, namely China’s “intelligentized warfare” and Russia’s “New Generation Warfare” concepts. Both adversaries hold large-scale exercises designed to practice these approaches and to improve their forces. They have emulated the U.S. military in developing new combat training centers and are designing new professional military education systems that aim to create a culture of learning.
Opportunities exist for the U.S. Army to future-proof the force. For instance, the Army can potentially overcome materiel capacity challenges from our adversaries by reshaping the force to be faster, more adaptive, more lethal, and one equipped with cost-informed systems more easily produced at scale.
The U.S. military can lean on the unique strengths of its allies in NATO andthroughout the INDOPACOM region. Common purpose with like-minded states adds significant value in Competition, Crisis, and Conflict—particularly when the many of the adversaries’ allies are the victims of coercion.
If you enjoyed this post, download and check out The Operational Environment (2021-2030): Great Power Competition, Crisis, and Conflict in its entirety here.
Explore the U.S. Army’s single consistent OE narrative (spanning the near, mid-, and far terms out to 2050) further in:
Learn more about China as our Pacing Threat in the following TRADOC G-2 content:
… and the following Army Mad Scientist content:

madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil · by user · October 4, 2021

7.  Inside the CIA’s secret Kabul base, burned out and abandoned in haste

Inside the CIA’s secret Kabul base, burned out and abandoned in haste
The Guardian · by Emma Graham-Harrison · October 3, 2021
The cars, minibuses and armoured vehicles that the CIA used to run its shadow war in Afghanistan had been lined up and incinerated beyond identification before the Americans left. Below their ashy grey remains, pools of molten metal had solidified into permanent shiny puddles as the blaze cooled.
The faux Afghan village where they trained paramilitary forces linked to some of the worst human rights abuses of the war had been brought down on itself. Only a high concrete wall still loomed over the crumpled piles of mud and beams, once used to practise for the widely hated night raids on civilian homes.
The vast ammunition dump had been blown up. Many ways to kill and maim human beings, from guns to grenades, mortars to heavy artillery, laid out in three long rows of double-height shipping containers, were reduced to shards of twisted metal. The blast from the huge detonation, which came soon after the bloody bomb at Kabul airport, shook and terrified the capital city.
All formed part of the CIA compound that for 20 years was the dark, secret heart of America’s “war on terror”, a place were some of the worst abuses to sour the mission in Afghanistan would fester.
The sprawling hillside compound, spread over two square miles north-east of the airport, became infamous early on in the conflict for torture and murder at its “Salt Pit” prison, codenamed Cobalt by the CIA. The men held there called it the “dark prison”, because there was no light in their cells, the only occasional illumination coming from the headlamps of their guards.

Taliban special forces show journalists around the abandoned compound. Photograph: Emma Graham-Harrison/The Observer
It was here that Gul Rahman died of hypothermia in 2002 after he was chained to a wall half-naked and left overnight in freezing temperatures. His death prompted the first formal CIA guidelines on interrogation under a new regime of torture, eviscerated in a 2014 report that found that the abuse did not provide useful intelligence.
The base has for two decades been a closely guarded secret, visible only in satellite photos, navigated by the testimony of survivors. Now the Taliban’s special forces have moved in and recently, briefly, opened up the secret compound to journalists.
“We want to show how they wasted all these things that could have been used to build our country,” said Mullah Hassanain, a commander in the Taliban’s elite 313 unit, who led the tour of destroyed and burnt-out compounds, “burn pits” and incinerated cars, buses and armoured military vehicles.
Taliban special forces include suicide attackers who recently marched through Kabul to celebrate seizing the capital. Vehicles now emblazoned with their official “suicide squadron” logo escorted journalists around the former CIA base.
It was a grimly ironic juxtaposition of the most cruel and ruthless units on both sides of this war, a reminder of the suffering inflicted on civilians by all combatants in the name of higher goals, over several decades.
“They are martyrdom seekers who were responsible for the attacks on important locations of invaders and the regime. They now have control of important locations,” said a Taliban official, when asked why suicide squads were escorting journalists, and if they would continue to operate. “It is a very big battalion. It is responsible for the security of important locations. They will be expanded and further organised. Whenever there is a need, they will respond. They are always ready for sacrifices for our country and the defence of our people.”
They planned to use the CIA base for their own military training, Hassanain said, so this brief glimpse of the compound is likely to be both the first and last time the media is allowed in.

The sprawling hillside base near Kabul airport became infamous for its Salt Pit prison. Photograph: Emma Graham-Harrison/The Observer
The men guarding it had already changed into the tiger-stripe camouflage of the old Afghan National Directorate of Security, the spy agency once in charge of hunting them down.
The paramilitary units that operated here, based in barracks just near the site of the former Salt Pit jail, included some that were among the most feared in the country, mired in allegations of abuse that included extrajudicial killings of children and other civilians. The barracks had been abandoned so fast that the men who lived there left food half-finished, and barracks floors were littered with possessions spilled out of emptied lockers, cleared in an apparent frenzy.
Mostly they had taken or destroyed anything with names, or ranks, but there were 01 patches, and one book that was filled with handwritten notes from weeks of training.
Nearby, the site of the Salt Pit jail had apparently been razed a few months earlier. A New York Times satellite investigation found that, since spring, a cluster of buildings inside this part of the CIA compound had been levelled.
Taliban officials said they did not have any details about the Salt Pit, or what had happened to the former jail. Rahman’s family are still searching for his body, which has never been returned to them.
Other torture techniques recorded at the site included “rectal feeding”, shackling prisoners to bars overhead, and depriving inmates of toilet “privileges”, leaving them naked or wearing adult diapers.
Construction equipment was abandoned on the site, with concrete slabs half poured. Next door, a building that had once been fortified with high-tech doors and equipment had apparently been firebombed, its interior as totally destroyed and reduced to ash as the cars outside.
Destroying sensitive equipment at the base would have been complex, and there was evidence of several burn pits where everything from medical kits and a manual on leadership was put to the flames, along with larger pieces of equipment.
The Taliban officials were jumpy about letting journalists into areas that had not been officially cleared. They had found several booby trap bombs in the rubble of the camp, Hassanain said, and were worried that there might be more.
For days, helicopters ferried hundreds of people from the base to inside the airport, where men from the 01 force – aware they were likely to be prominent targets for reprisals – helped secure the perimeter in return for evacuation in the final hours, under a deal struck with the US.
Untouched nearby was a recreation hall with snooker, ping-pong, darts and table football gathering dust. A box in the corner held brain teaser puzzles. It was unclear what the Taliban, once so austere that they even banned chess, would do with the trappings of western military downtime.
The Guardian · by Emma Graham-Harrison · October 3, 2021

8. Afghanistan Isn't Good Terrorist Real Estate
Paul Pillar, always the contrarian.

Afghanistan Isn't Good Terrorist Real Estate
Foreign Policy · by Paul R. Pillar · October 3, 2021
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Even if the Taliban wanted to serve as a safe haven, there’s no reason to think terrorists would want to take up the offer.
By Paul R. Pillar, a nonresident fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
A carpet bearing images of a map of Afghanistan and flags of different countries is pictured inside a shop on Chicken Street in Kabul. on Feb 2, 2015. SHAH MARAI/AFP via Getty Images
As U.S. military forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan, much attention has been given to the monitoring of, and possible action against, any terrorist activity inside Afghanistan. CIA Director William Burns stated in congressional testimony in April that the military withdrawal would diminish “the ability to collect and act on threats” in Afghanistan. In testimony last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray expressed concern that foreign terrorist groups “will have an opportunity to reconstitute, plot, inspire in a space that’s much harder for us to collect intelligence and operate against than was the case previously.”
The heads of U.S. agencies responsible for collecting information on terrorist groups will focus, understandably and appropriately, on the challenges of such collection. But the fear of, in Wray’s words, a terrorist “safe haven to be recreated” in Afghanistan is an artifact of Americans’ traumatic history with the 9/11 attacks. To the extent that a terrorist group may find a geographic haven useful, there is nothing special about Afghanistan. If such a group is looking for a conflict-ridden place with some local sympathizers where outlaws can hang out and the group can pitch a tent, there are numerous other locations in the world from which to choose.
More fundamentally, a patch of real estate is one of the less important factors that determine a group’s ability to conduct international terrorist attacks, especially ones aimed at a target half a globe away. Access to real estate may be useful for a group engaged in insurgency or civil war—as al Qaeda was in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. The country provided space for the training and basing of recruits, most of whom engaged in military operations inside Afghanistan in support of the Taliban during the war there in the late 1990s.
As U.S. military forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan, much attention has been given to the monitoring of, and possible action against, any terrorist activity inside Afghanistan. CIA Director William Burns stated in congressional testimony in April that the military withdrawal would diminish “the ability to collect and act on threats” in Afghanistan. In testimony last month, FBI Director Christopher Wray expressed concern that foreign terrorist groups “will have an opportunity to reconstitute, plot, inspire in a space that’s much harder for us to collect intelligence and operate against than was the case previously.”
The heads of U.S. agencies responsible for collecting information on terrorist groups will focus, understandably and appropriately, on the challenges of such collection. But the fear of, in Wray’s words, a terrorist “safe haven to be recreated” in Afghanistan is an artifact of Americans’ traumatic history with the 9/11 attacks. To the extent that a terrorist group may find a geographic haven useful, there is nothing special about Afghanistan. If such a group is looking for a conflict-ridden place with some local sympathizers where outlaws can hang out and the group can pitch a tent, there are numerous other locations in the world from which to choose.
More fundamentally, a patch of real estate is one of the less important factors that determine a group’s ability to conduct international terrorist attacks, especially ones aimed at a target half a globe away. Access to real estate may be useful for a group engaged in insurgency or civil war—as al Qaeda was in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. The country provided space for the training and basing of recruits, most of whom engaged in military operations inside Afghanistan in support of the Taliban during the war there in the late 1990s.
But territory is less relevant to the planning and preparing of an international terrorist attack. An example is the 9/11 operation itself. It obviously had an Afghanistan connection, but not in ways that were unique to Afghanistan, and preparations for the attack were geographically dispersed. Financing of the hijackers’ activities, for example, was centered in the United Arab Emirates and Germany. Plot mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed used long-distance electronic communication for coordinating those activities. The most important preparations for the attack took place more in apartments in Europe, flight schools in the United States, and cyberspace than in Afghanistan.
The fact is that many factors affect the likelihood of Americans falling victim to international terrorism. These include a host of economic and political circumstances in the places where would-be terrorists live. Research by the scholar Robert Pape, for example, has found that the single most frequent motivation for suicide terrorism is foreign military occupation.
That finding is highly relevant to the United States and Afghanistan. Like the Soviets before them, U.S. forces in Afghanistan came to be seen by many Afghans and those who sympathized with them as occupiers, not liberators or stabilizers. It was as perceived occupiers that Americans most recently fell victim to international terrorism—in an August suicide bombing by the Islamic State that killed 13 U.S. service members outside the Kabul airport.
It is not only military occupation but also the harm to civilians from military operations that motivates terrorism. The killing of 10 innocent Afghan civilians, including seven children, in late August by a missile fired from a U.S. drone exemplifies the kind of harm inflicted all too often in the so-called war on terror—because of either mistaken identification, as in this instance, or seemingly unavoidable collateral damage from operations aimed at legitimate targets. The military operations, including in Afghanistan, may have bred at least as many anti-U.S. terrorists, through the anger and desire for revenge that such operations incite, as they have eliminated.
Even if a safe haven were important, the notion that one would be available to international terrorists in Afghanistan rests mostly on the past partnership between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Mentioned less often is how that partnership was a wartime alliance, at a time when the Taliban were struggling to defeat the opposition Northern Alliance and conquer the portion of Afghanistan it did not control.
If civil war were to resume in the months ahead, the Taliban conceivably might find use for assistance from even the much weaker al Qaeda of today. But to the extent that the Taliban secure their position as the new ruler over all of Afghanistan, the old alliance loses its relevance.
The history of that alliance, along with various personal and familial relationships, will sustain ties between elements of the Taliban and what remains of al Qaeda. The question is not—as it is too often phrased—the either/or one of whether the Taliban will cut all such ties. What matters instead is the direction in which the Taliban will exercise influence, including on al Qaeda, that is relevant to possible international terrorism.
Whatever one thinks of the Taliban, they can be counted on to pursue their overriding interest in maintaining political power in Afghanistan. They are highly insular and have no interest in international terrorism. Among their strongest memories is how al Qaeda’s 9/11 operation resulted in the biggest disaster the Taliban have ever suffered—being ousted from power and setting back by two decades their quest to rule all of Afghanistan. They have every interest in not letting that happen again, as well as continuing to be the archenemy of the Afghan branch of the Islamic State.
Because of the trauma of 9/11, fear of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan will forever lurk in American minds. Fear of the political fallout from a future terrorist incident somehow connected, however tenuously, to Afghanistan probably is part of what led three U.S. presidents to keep troops there before Joe Biden finally pulled the plug on the operation. There are no guarantees about how policies toward Afghanistan will affect the danger of terrorism against Americans. But considering all the relevant factors and not just one or two, that danger is less with the U.S. military out of Afghanistan than it would be if U.S. forces remained there.
Paul R. Pillar is a former deputy chief of the Counterterrorist Center at the CIA and a nonresident fellow of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
Foreign Policy · by Paul R. Pillar · October 3, 2021

9. The Battle of Mogadishu 25 years later: How the fateful fight changed combat operations
Do you want to feel old? Note the age of the Ranger Regiment Commander.

“The battle reinforced my decision to join [Army special operations forces], and I doubled down on my training and prep,” Beaudette said.
He would later benefit from others' experience from that battle when he arrived at his Operation Detachment-Alpha team and met his team sergeant, Rick Lamb, a Mogadishu veteran.
The three-star called Lamb “one of the finest leaders” he’d ever served with in his career.
The current commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Col. Brandon Tegtmeier, was a cadet at West Point during the operation. One of his instructors during Ranger assessment and selection was a veteran of the battle.
A quarter century later, the heroism and bravery of the men who fought that battle continue to inspire current troops and Tegtmeier said today’s Rangers “strive to emulate them.”
Tegtmeier echoed others in how the lessons learned from the battle only serve to reinforce the fundamentals of combat training. But, he added that it also underscores the importance of building interoperability between forces before the fight.
And beyond the standard warfighting skills, Mogadishu emphasized the importance of the human terrain and the challenges of the counterinsurgency mission, he said.
The Battle of Mogadishu 25 years later: How the fateful fight changed combat operations
armytimes.com · by Todd South · October 2, 2018
Twenty-five years ago, news flashed across television screens that U.S. troops had engaged in some of the most intense urban combat since Vietnam and suffered more dead and wounded in a matter of hours than recent years of operations combined.
The Battle of Mogadishu on Oct. 3-4, 1993, in Somalia would later be viewed as a tactical success in which, despite daunting odds and unforeseen mishaps, a force of about 100 Americans held off more than 1,000 enemy who poured streams of small arms and rocket attacks in an intense, coordinated ambush.
U.S. forces had arrived in the war-torn country in 1992 on a humanitarian mission to get food to starving people in a city where resources were controlled by various warlords. One of those warlords, Gen. Muhammed Farah Aideed, had directed forces that conducted attacks on U.N. allies, killing dozens, and also a bombing in August 1993 that killed four U.S. military police officers.
Those attacks changed the mission, dubbed Operation Gothic Serpent, for Task Force Ranger to begin focusing on raids to capture Aideed and his top commanders. Those raids, initially the kind soldiers train for routinely, erupted into a crisis when militiamen downed two Black Hawk helicopters using rocket propelled grenades. The 15-hour battle that ensued left 18 Americans dead and 73 injured. And shocking images of American soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were seared into the memories of many Americans at home.
The book by journalist Mark Bowden and later the movie “Black Hawk Down” chronicled the battle in harrowing detail, memorializing it and contributing to its enduring legacy in both military and civilian circles.
RELATED

For a long time, both the Marines and Army failed to do anything substantial to prepare for large-scale urban combat — other than to avoid it whenever possible.
Though the Army Rangers, Delta Force operators, 10th Mountain Division soldiers and other service members who took part in the fight would be recognized for their heroism, the battle signaled the end of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and was characterized by many as a strategic failure.
U.S. forces would go on to perform multiple humanitarian and peacekeeping missions for the rest of the 1990s, but military and civilian leaders were careful to avoid such intense combat and losses. The lessons learned by the special operations forces echoed into the post-9/11 era and continue to resonate to this day.
Lt. Gen. Fran Beaudette, head of U.S. Army Special Operations Command, told Army Times that the sacrifices and bravery of those who fought in Mogadishu are reminders of the “professionalism, cohesion and valor of our forces.”

The wreckage of a jeep burns in a Mogadishu street Oct. 3, 1993, after it was destroyed by a remote controlled bomb, injuring three U.S. service members. (AFP via GettyImages)
Beaudette was not in Mogadishu at the time but had submitted his Special Forces selection package just prior to the battle and recalled trying to piece together what had happened with friends and colleagues from his conventional infantry unit.
“The battle reinforced my decision to join [Army special operations forces], and I doubled down on my training and prep,” Beaudette said.
He would later benefit from others' experience from that battle when he arrived at his Operation Detachment-Alpha team and met his team sergeant, Rick Lamb, a Mogadishu veteran.
The three-star called Lamb “one of the finest leaders” he’d ever served with in his career.
The current commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment, Col. Brandon Tegtmeier, was a cadet at West Point during the operation. One of his instructors during Ranger assessment and selection was a veteran of the battle.
A quarter century later, the heroism and bravery of the men who fought that battle continue to inspire current troops and Tegtmeier said today’s Rangers “strive to emulate them.”
Tegtmeier echoed others in how the lessons learned from the battle only serve to reinforce the fundamentals of combat training. But, he added that it also underscores the importance of building interoperability between forces before the fight.
And beyond the standard warfighting skills, Mogadishu emphasized the importance of the human terrain and the challenges of the counterinsurgency mission, he said.
After 9/11, as the Global War on Terror unfolded nearly a decade later, several Mogadishu veterans were in key positions of leadership in the ranks.
“They hammered home to us the criticality of being comprehensively ready, how being an expert in the basics was fundamental, and how personal and professional discipline, especially in combat with our indigenous partners, was paramount to success,” Beaudette said.
Individuals interviewed, and multiple case studies of the battle repeat that same takeaway — realistic training and repetition to the point of mastery were crucial.
“The Ranger Regiment’s ability to learn from the tactical lessons of Mogadishu was absolutely critical in preparing us for combat in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in the early years of the conflicts,” Tegtmeier said.
Command Sgt. Maj. Reese Teakell was still a teenager when he deployed with 3rd Ranger Battalion to Somalia. Some of his noncommissioned officers had combat experience from operations in Grenada or Panama, but many had never seen a firefight. But they had all been brought up by the Vietnam generation, who drilled into them the importance of rigorous training.
“There was a warrant officer who told me this: He said, ‘Hey, make sure you’re ready to go. Nobody improves in a firefight. You go into the firefight with the skill and knowledge you’ve trained with,' ” Teakell said. “Don’t use the time you have to prepare lightly.”
It’s easy for current soldiers to see the past two decades of near-constant deployments as the norm. But for troops from the late 1970s until the late 1990s, actual combat operations were rare and brief.

A U.S. Black Hawk helicopter with U.S. troops in Mogadishu, Somalia, Sept. 2, 1993. (Alexander Joe/AFP via Getty Images)
Retired Army Maj. Larry Moores at the time counted himself lucky ― or unlucky, if you asked his mother, he said.
He had deployed to Grenada but missed Panama because he was in Officer Candidate School. He later deployed to Somalia, Haiti and then Afghanistan before retiring.
A year after Somalia, his unit, Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, was one of the few with combat experience to share with troops then headed to Haiti.
Though many of the fundamental skills remained the same, some training and operational tactics changed immediately.
Moores noted that for both Haiti and later Afghanistan, Rangers flew into areas from ships offshore for raids rather than establishing ground bases in or near large cities, such as in Mogadishu.
A 2002 paper on Mogadishu by Maj. Christopher Forbes at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, titled “In order to win, learn how to fight: the U.S. Army in Urban Operations,” noted that lessons learned included focus on marksmanship, physical fitness, battle drills and medical training.
After Mogadishu, Rangers added more close-quarters combat training to their marksmanship drills and strove to have every Ranger certified as a combat lifesaver since the ratio of troops to medics was 48-to-1.

American and U.N. soldiers patrol Oct. 13, 1993, in southern Mogadishu, Somalia. (Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images)
They also found problems with planning for contingencies. The Mogadishu raid was expected to be a one- or two-hour operation, so many soldiers brought only a basic ammunition load, no night vision goggles and one canteen of water.
Even commonly trained tactics such as “stacking and moving” along walls in the urban area proved “extremely perilous,” Forbes wrote.
That required later changes in dismounted movement.
A larger tactical shortfall, though, was more due to operational or even strategic miscalculations. The Rangers had no armored vehicles, and even their Humvees lacked firepower beyond .50-caliber machine guns. They had no grenade launchers, and due to the civilian-packed urban terrain, fire support was limited to close-air support from helicopters.
The sometimes direct connection pf how tactical events unfold and the larger strategic aims continues today with Ranger service in Afghanistan, Tegtmeier said.
High level plans lacked thorough analysis, noted another study out of the Combat Studies Institute Press, titled “Understanding the ‘Victory Disease’ From the Battle of Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond,” by Maj. Timothy Karcher.
Karcher points out that Task Force Ranger had six times conducted missions using similar tactics to those used in the Battle of Mogadishu before the incident. That established a pattern that enemy forces could recognize and exploit.
“If you use one tactic twice, you should not use it a third time, and the Americans already had done basically the same thing six times,” a Somali militia commander told the Washington Post after the battle.

Three homeward bound U.S. Army Rangers carry their bags and M-16 rifles toward a military transport plane at Mogadishu International airport Oct. 21, 1993, for the withdrawal from Somalia. (Hocine Zaourar/AFP via Getty Images)
Even to date, only a handful of battles over the past two decades even come close to matching the sustained intensity of that 15-hour fight in Mogadishu.
Most enemy contact in recent years has been through improvised explosive device attacks or short-term ambushes that last minutes before adversaries retreat.
Teakell points out that Mogadishu was an ambush that went “on for hours.”
In those situations, the defending force is designed to lose.
But that wasn’t the case in Mogadishu.
“The circumstances were seemingly to the enemy’s benefit,” Teakell said. “We not only fought through it, we stayed to take care of our people.”
He was shoved into the driver’s seat in his vehicle convoy. A turret gunner was killed early in the ambush and immediately replaced by another soldier who was then shot in the leg.
Those are lessons he still carries with him now as the command sergeant major for the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division.
“What does it take to have a team that can not only survive that level of contact, but also persevere in it?” he said. “That’s a lesson for any formation, how to build a team with those kinds of people, soldiers, leaders.”
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War. 

10. FDD | The Taliban Is Using the Doha Accord to Protect Al-Qaeda
There Is enough criticism to go around.

Excerpts:
During the hearings this week, Gen. Milley emphasized that the Taliban hasn’t severed its relationship with al-Qaeda. On that score, Milley is right. And this is another reason the Biden administration should declare the Doha deal null and void: the Taliban hasn’t lived up to a single counterterrorism provision within it, despite the previous administration’s claims.
The Trump team sold the Doha deal as a major counterterrorism success. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad repeatedly vouched for the Taliban’s counterterrorism assurances in the agreement. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that the Taliban “would work alongside of us to destroy, deny resources to and have al-Qaida depart from that place.”
“They will be killing terrorists,” Trump said of the Taliban after the Doha deal was signed. “They will be killing some very bad people. They will keep that fight going.”
Instead, the Taliban is using the Doha accord to protect the terrorists. Al-Qaeda couldn’t have hoped for a better outcome.
FDD | The Taliban Is Using the Doha Accord to Protect Al-Qaeda
That's one of many problems with ‘over the horizon’ counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow and Senior Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · October 1, 2021
This week, both the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) held hearings on the debacle in Afghanistan. The main witnesses were the three American generals who oversaw the chaotic withdrawal of American forces at the very end. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley, and CENTCOM Commander Gen. Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie were all called to testify before the committees. I, too, was honored to testify before SASC on Thursday. You can read my written testimony here, if interested, and also watch a video of the session.
There are many lines of questioning I could focus on in this Vital Interests newsletter, but I’ll stick to just one. Many of the representatives and senators were worried about America’s ability to conduct so-called “over the horizon” counterterrorism operations, which are principally missile strikes from outside the theater of operation. America no longer has a footprint inside Afghanistan, so any attempt to go after al-Qaeda or Islamic State (ISIS) figures will be from an “over the horizon” posture.
I agree with many of the concerns that were expressed. America’s ability to collect intelligence on he ground has been severely hampered, if not eliminated entirely. Quite frankly, it wasn’t that great to begin with, as al-Qaeda’s presence inside Afghanistan was consistently underestimated.
Some claim that the U.S. can go after terrorists in Afghanistan just as it does in places such as Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. But Afghanistan is different. Unlike those three countries, it is landlocked. There aren’t nearby waterways to operate in. And the U.S. still hasn’t secured basing rights in any neighboring countries. Some of Afghanistan’s neighbors, such as Iran, are hostile to any American presence.
Another country neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan, hosted and sponsored the Taliban for the past 20 years despite being America’s putative ally. The Pakistanis may not even allow the U.S. to use its airspace in the future. Even if Pakistan does relent, the Pakistani military and intelligence services are duplicitous. There’s a reason President Obama didn’t warn the Pakistanis that the Navy SEALs were coming in May 2011, when they hunted down Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The Obama administration was worried that the Pakistanis would tip off the al-Qaeda founder. According to bin Laden’s bodyguard, Nasser al-Bahri, the Pakistanis did just that in late August 1998, when they warned the al-Qaeda master that the U.S. was prepared to strike his camps in Afghanistan. Bin Laden lived to terrorize another day.
But there’s another problem with the over-the-horizon model that hasn’t received as much attention. Let me explain.
The three generals who testified this week all agreed that the bilateral withdrawal agreement between the Trump administration and the Taliban fatally undermined the government of Afghanistan. The generals came to this position only belatedly , however, as the U.S. military signed off on the whole phony peace process with the Taliban. From my perspective at the time, it was obvious that America’s negotiations with the Taliban were the beginning of the end for Kabul.
I don’t want to revisit all of that here, but I do want to isolate one additional problem with the Doha deal that the generals didn’t pick up on. The Taliban is using it to protect al-Qaeda. Here’s how.
Earlier this month, after Pentagon spokesman John Kirby refused to rule out airstrikes targeting Sirajuddin Haqqani and other members of the so-called Haqqani Network, the Taliban responded by arguing that such attacks would violate the Doha accord. On September 9, the Taliban released a statement titled, “Latest US position regarding blacklist is a violation of Doha Agreement.”
“Pentagon officials have remarked that some cabinet members of the Islamic Emirate or family members of [the] late Haqqani Sahib – may Allah be pleased with him – are on the US blacklists and still targets,” the statement’s opening line reads. “The Islamic Emirate considers this position a clear violation of the Doha Agreement which is neither in the interest of the United States nor Afghanistan.”
Haqqani Sahib is a reference to the late Jalaluddin Haqqani. He was the patriarch of the so-called Haqqani Network, which is an integral part of the Taliban. You can read my written testimony for a summary of the Haqqanis’ intimate, decades-long relationship with al-Qaeda. Jalaluddin protected and worked with Osama bin Laden. His son, Sirajuddin, remained one of al-Qaeda’s closest allies throughout the war in Afghanistan. He may even be a part of al-Qaeda’s own leadership. Either way, Sirajuddin is an al-Qaeda man. One of his lieutenants was even responsible for protecting Osama’s son, Hamza, who was killed a few years ago in a U.S. drone strike under murky circumstances.
There’s much more to the story, but the point is there’s no question the Haqqanis have been in bed with al-Qaeda since the 1980s. And now Sirajuddin Haqqani, who has been the Taliban’s deputy emir (or No. 2) since 2015, has also been named the interior minister of the Taliban’s regime. This gives Sirajuddin broad power to oversee the internal police state and security forces for the resurrected Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. In his new role, Sirajuddin also has the power to protect his blood brothers in al-Qaeda. Other members of the so-called Haqqani Network are playing prominent roles in the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate as well.
The Taliban argues that the Doha agreement protects Sirajuddin, as well as all of the other Haqqanis who work with al-Qaeda.
In its September 9 statement, the Taliban (correctly) emphasized that the Haqqanis do “not have a separate name or organizational setup.” This was a response to claims made by State Department spokesman Ned Price and the Pentagon’s Kirby, both of whom tried to create some distance between the Haqqanis and the Taliban in the public’s mind. Price went so far as to claim the Haqqani Network and the Taliban are “separate entities,” which is false.
Not only does the Taliban reject Price’s argument, it goes further, pointing out that the Haqqanis were represented in the Doha negotiations and are, therefore, protected by its provisions. The U.S. agreed to review the U.N. sanctions against Taliban leaders, with the goal of removing them, once “intra-Afghan negotiations” began. The Taliban overthrew the government of Afghanistan instead, but the Taliban still argues that the sanctions should be lifted, including those targeting Sirajuddin Haqqani. Remember: Sirajuddin is a wanted terrorist with a $10 million bounty on his head.
The Doha agreement includes this troublesome passage:
“The United States and its allies will refrain from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan or intervening in its domestic affairs.”
That passage could easily be read as a ban on any counterterrorism operations, over the horizon or otherwise. And this puts the Biden administration in a pickle. On the one hand, the administration says it wants to keep the terror threat in check with targeted airstrikes. On the other hand, the administration has acted as if the Doha agreement remains in effect.
But the Biden team can’t have it both ways, as the Taliban claims that same accord bans all American operations in Afghan airspace.
On September 29, the Taliban reiterated this argument in another statement titled, “About airspace of Afghanistan.” The Taliban claims that the U.S. continues to fly drones overhead, thereby “violating all international rights, law” and the U.S. “commitments to the Islamic Emirate in Doha, Qatar.”
“These violations must be rectified and prevented,” the Taliban argues, meaning the U.S. should no longer fly its drones in Afghan airspace.
During the hearings this week, Gen. Milley emphasized that the Taliban hasn’t severed its relationship with al-Qaeda. On that score, Milley is right. And this is another reason the Biden administration should declare the Doha deal null and void: the Taliban hasn’t lived up to a single counterterrorism provision within it, despite the previous administration’s claims.
The Trump team sold the Doha deal as a major counterterrorism success. Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad repeatedly vouched for the Taliban’s counterterrorism assurances in the agreement. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that the Taliban “would work alongside of us to destroy, deny resources to and have al-Qaida depart from that place.”
“They will be killing terrorists,” Trump said of the Taliban after the Doha deal was signed. “They will be killing some very bad people. They will keep that fight going.”
Instead, the Taliban is using the Doha accord to protect the terrorists. Al-Qaeda couldn’t have hoped for a better outcome.
Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD’s Long War Journal. Follow Tom on Twitter @thomasjoscelyn. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Thomas Joscelyn Senior Fellow and Senior Editor of FDD's Long War Journal · October 1, 2021

11. Options to Counter Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa
Excerpt:

While primarily operating in Sudan, Wagner Group has been active throughout Africa[9]. Wagner Group uses both gray zone tactics described above, normalizing transgressions and fait accompli. As such, America and their allies and partners allied state actors have two options available to them that would allow them to combat or minimise the impact that Wagner Group are having in the African theatre[10].

Options to Counter Russia’s Wagner Group in Africa
divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · October 4, 2021
Benjamin Fincham-de Groot is a masters candidate at Deakin University pursuing his masters of international relations with a specialization in conflict and security. He can be found on twitter at @Finchamde. Divergent Opinions’ content does not contain information of an official nature nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group.
National Security Situation: Russia’s Wagner Group, a Private Military Company, conducts military-like operations in Africa. As a PMC, Wagner Group’s activities can be disavowed by the Russian government.
Date Originally Written: August 10, 2021.
Date Originally Published: October 4, 2021.
Author and / or Article Point of View: The author believes that Russia’s Wagner Group poses a threat to stability in Africa. This article discusses options to project U.S. influence and protect American interests in the African theatre.
Background: Grey zone tactics are the use of civilian or non-military assets to achieve military or strategic objectives. These tactics are useful for state actors to use or project power while maintaining a plausible deniability that can minimise the chance of conflict escalation[1][2].
Broadly, there are two ways in which state actors work to effect change through grey zone tactics[3]. First, through grey zone tactics a state actor normalises transgressions through small violations that each create precedent to justify a greater violation[4]. Thus, whereas it would be unreasonable for one state actor to escalate to full-blown conflict over a freedom of navigation operation, or a lesser violation of airspace, each unanswered transgression creates precedent for greater transgression without repercussion. One example is the steady escalation of Chinese military flight incursions into Taiwanese airspace[5]. Second, the fait accompli in which a state actor swiftly and suddenly achieves a strategic objective and positions near-peer rivals to choose between escalation and acceptance. This tactic can be pertinent to seizing an objective, extracting a person of interesting, or destroying an enemy asset.
Antulio Echevarria believes that a key aspect of grey zone tactics has been ensuring that no transgression executed as a grey zone manoeuvre is so significant as to illicit a response from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under Article Five. This article states that any attack on a NATO member state should be treated as an attack on all of them; and that any military attack should be responded to in kind. To stay below the Article Five threshold, grey zone tactics in Europe have primarily been used in the cyber-domain. That said, the definition of what constitutes an attack under Article Five is evolving and has grown to include transgressions in both space and cyber.
Significance: Africa is increasingly become a theatre for great power competition[6]. The United States has a well-established presence there, both military in nature and for peace-keeping operations. China is developing its ability to project power from Africa and within it, and has recently completed its first port capable of servicing Chinese aircraft carriers away from Chinese sovereign territory in Djibouti.
Through 2018 and 2019, pursuant to President Omar Hassan al-Bashir being convicted by the International Criminal Court of war crimes, Sudan was isolated within the global community. It was Vladimir Putin’s Russia that came to Sudan’s aid in supporting Sudan through trade generally, but also supplying Sudan with a significant supply of weapons. Further, when pro-democracy protesters pushed for al-Bashir to step down, the Russian paramilitary contractors known as Wagner Group were unleashed on the protesters.
While officially unaffiliated with Putin, the Russian military or any part of Russian intelligence, Wagner Group nonetheless have ties with Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Kremlin insider[7]. Thus, because of their ties with Prigorzhin and the Kremlin, the actions of Wagner group are considered to be simultaneously enacting the Kremlin’s agenda and projecting Russian power, while also operating as a private military contractor whose behaviour cannot be held against any given state. That is to say, it is a reasonable assumption that any and all actions taken by Wagner Group are on behalf of or towards the strategic goals of the Kremlin, but must be considered as being beneath the threshold of war as they are not representing a state at this time[8].
While primarily operating in Sudan, Wagner Group has been active throughout Africa[9]. Wagner Group uses both gray zone tactics described above, normalizing transgressions and fait accompli. As such, America and their allies and partners allied state actors have two options available to them that would allow them to combat or minimise the impact that Wagner Group are having in the African theatre[10].
Option #1: First, given that American forces are already deployed in the African theatre, it is reasonable that some troops can be repositioned. If Wagner Group were to act on key strategic or humanitarian objectives, they would have to choose between escalating and initiating combat with American forces or abandoning those objectives[11]. As much as openly pursuing Wagner Group assets for their war crimes would be difficult to justify to the United Nations Security Council, and might be seen as the pursuit of Russian nationals; positioning assets to defend strategic objectives minimises the capacity for Wagner Group to achieve Russian strategic goals[12]. This is not to say that these repositioned American forces should patrol endlessly, but rather be positioned around key objectives such that Wagner Group assets must risk greater escalation and greater personal risk in pursuing those strategic objectives.
Risk: This option risks an escalation of conflict between Wagner group assets and the American military.
Gain: This option deters of Wagner Group assets from achieving their strategic goals, and minimizing Russian power projection in Africa.
Option #2: The U.S. could deploy their own paramilitary contractors into the African theatre to counter Wagner Group. These paramilitary contractors, similar to the ones the Americans deployed into Afghanistan and Iraq, could be used to provide strategic pressure, or engage in combat with Wagner Group assets in the event in efforts to maintain the security of key assets. Significantly, the deployment of paramilitary contractors in defense of American and humanitarian assets would reasonably be below any threshold for war, and be unlikely to escalate beyond that initial conflict.
Risk: This option risks an escalation of conflict between Wagner Group and American-employed paramilitary contractors.
Gain: This option protectis humanitarian assets in the African theatre, minimising Russian power projection, and demonstrating American investment in protecting Allied assets. Through the utilization of paramilitary contractors, this also frees up the U.S. military to focus on other threats.
Other Comments: Africa is increasingly a theatre for great power competition. With Russia and China pursuing very different avenues of projecting power onto that continent, America and its allies need to clarify what their goals and strategic aims are in that region; and to what lengths the West is willing to go to in order to pursue them.
Recommendation: None.
Endnotes:
[1] Mazarr, Michael J. Mastering the gray zone: understanding a changing era of conflict. US Army War College Carlisle, 2015.
[2] Banasik, Miroslaw. “Unconventional war and warfare in the gray zone. The new spectrum of modern conflicts.” Journal of Defense Resources Management (JoDRM) 7, no. 1 (2016): 37-46.
[3] Echevarria, Antulio. “Operating in the Grey Zone: An Alternative Paradigm for US Military Strategy.” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (2016).
[4] Carment, David, and Dani Belo. War’s Future: The Risks and Rewards of GreyZone Conflict and Hybrid Warfare. Canadian Global Affairs Institute, 2018.
[5] Jackson, Van. “Tactics of strategic competition: Gray zones, redlines, and conflicts before war.” Naval War College Review 70, no. 3 (2017): 39-62.
[6] Port, Jason Matthew. “State or Nonstate: The Wagner Group’s Role in Contemporary Intrastate Conflicts Worldwide.” (2021).
[7] Marten, Kimberly. “Russia’s use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group.” Post-Soviet Affairs 35, no. 3 (2019): 181-204.
[8] Rondeaux, Candace. Decoding the Wagner group: Analyzing the role of private military security contractors in Russian proxy warfare. New America., 2019.
[9] Benaso, Ryan. “Invisible Russian Armies: Wagner Group in Ukraine, Syria and the Central African Republic.” (2021).
[10] Belo, Dani. “Conflict in the absence of war: a comparative analysis of China and Russia engagement in gray zone conflicts.” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 26, no. 1 (2020): 73-91.
[11] Gannon, J. Andrés, Erik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay, and Peter Schram. “The Shadow of Deterrence: Why capable actors engage in conflict short of war.” (2021).
[12] Rizzotti, Michael A. “Russian Mercenaries, State Responsibility, and Conflict in Syria: Examining the Wagner Group under International Law.” Wis. Int’l LJ 37 (2019): 569.
divergentoptions.org · by Divergent Options · October 4, 2021

12. Reflections on trust from father of fallen Green Beret on 4th anniversary of deadly Niger ambush

This saddens me too.

Excerpts:
What I write is not from a place of vindictiveness or bitterness, for I have neither. I am familiar with those who comprised ODA 3212′s higher command. Their service prior to October 2017 was honorable, worthy of respect and admiration. I have taken no pleasure, and have been saddened, by careers and promotions lost in the years that have followed the Tongo Tongo battle. I fully understand the challenges in making decisions in hostile conditions where situational awareness can be incomplete and misleading. And I believe in forgiveness even in leadership failures such as Tongo Tongo, and that those given forgiveness can move on to become much better leaders, ones you want in command when the next battle occurs. But a condition of forgiveness is admitting and owning failures. And when leaders fail to own up to their mistakes, fail to stand up and say “This is on me, and I own the failures,” they show themselves unworthy of continuing trust, in particular when the lives of people are in the balance.
“I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.”
Trust in God? Absolutely.
Trust in the United States of America? No so much.
The events on and following Oct. 3 and Oct. 4, 2017, have taught me that trust in the United States is dependent on those persons in positions of trust. People will at times invariably fail, and that is not a reason to lose trust. Loss of trust occurs when those in positions of trust do not step up and own their failures. And when those in leadership both continue in leadership and fail to own their mistakes, something we now see all too often, a pandemic of failures can ensue, and the outcomes will not be pretty.

Reflections on trust from father of fallen Green Beret on 4th anniversary of deadly Niger ambush
militarytimes.com · by Henry Black · October 4, 2021
On Oct. 4, 2017, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 3212 was attacked just outside the village of Tongo Tongo in Niger. My youngest son was a medic and member of ODA 3212. My son, Staff Sgt. Bryan C. Black, was killed in the attack along with three of his teammates and five partner Niger soldiers.
As the anniversary of my son’s death and the deaths of his teammates and Niger partners approached, I have thought much on the last four years, and what I have since learned. Those thoughts brought me back to a specific phrase in the Code of Contact, a phrase I first heard in January 1979 when I entered active duty in the Marine Corps, and which has remained with me all these years:
“I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.”
Reflecting on the last four years, I have asked myself: “Do I trust in my God?” The answer is a solid ‘yes,’ for I have experienced that, in the darkest times, my God has been trustworthy and has kept all His promises.
I have also asked myself: “Do I trust in the United States of America?” As an active Marine from 1979 thru retirement in 1999, the answer would have been “yes.” For a number of reasons, in the years since my retirement until October 2017, my trust became less sure. And in the four years since October 2017, the answer is: “Not so much.”
“Trust” takes many forms. From the military perspective, trust might be a senior commander listening to a subordinate commander. For example, if a subordinate commander is assigned a mission, but considers the mission untenable and therefore recommends against it, trust might be the senior commander responding “Got it, we will cancel or delay the mission.” Or, in the same scenario trust might be the senior commander responding “Got it, but this is a ‘must do’ mission. Lay out your concerns, and we will provide you with all available resources to mitigate risk and maximize success.” This second trust scenario appears to have been the case for ODA 3336 on April 6, 2008, for a mission to the Shok Valley, Afghanistan.
I became aware of the battle in Shok Valley when I met Ron Shurer in Puyallup, Washington, in December of 2019, when Ron was honored with a ceremony and memorial at his high school alma mater, Rogers High School. Ron was a medic with ODA 3336 during the Shok Valley mission, and was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions. As I listened to Ron, the stories of ODA 3336 in Shok Valley and ODA 3212 in Tongo Tongo seemed to share both similarities and differences, so in subsequent days I spent time looking at the details of the Shok Valley battle, to include reading about the details of the mission in the book “No Way Out”, authored by Mitch Weiss and Kevin Maurer. Here’s a synopsis of key elements:
The Team Commander of ODA 3336, along with the commander of the Afghan commandos integrated into the ODA, were opposed to the mission, and the Team Commander requested that the mission be cancelled or postponed. His request was denied by his higher command. However, to support the mission, an Air Force combat controller was attached to ODA 3336, and both airborne and on-call rotary and fixed-wing kinetic assets, along with responsive medevac assets, were integrated into the mission. Shortly after heliborne insertion into the objective area, the mission quickly went awry when the ODA and Afghan commandos came under a coordinated attack from a numerically superior and well-positioned enemy force. However, ODA 3336 was able to call in immediate, robust and continuous kinetic air support. The mission failed, with a number of ODA members seriously wounded and three Afghans reportedly killed, but the unit survived, the wounded were medevac’d, and the ODA and commandos were able to be extracted, all because of the robust, immediately available, and continuous kinetic air support. After the mission, the team was not denigrated for a mission failure for which they bore no fault, and team members were honored with numerous and high awards for heroism. ODA 3336′s higher command proved itself worthy of trust by allocating assets for the mission that enabled the majority of the ODA and commandos to survive.

Memorial to the four U.S. troops killed in an ambush in Niger on Oct. 4, 2017. From left to right, Sgt. La David Johnson, 25, of Miami Gardens, Fla., Staff Sgt. Dustin M. Wright, 29, of Lyons, Ga., Staff Sgt. Jeremiah W. Johnson, 39, of Springboro, Ohio and Staff Sgt. Bryan C. Black, 35, of Puyallup, Wash. (Photo courtesy Henry Black).
Sadly, for ODA 3212′s October 2017 mission to Tongo Tongo, its higher command failed. Based on a detailed review of the US African Command’s (AFRICOM) investigation, and based on a detailed review of the mission as described in the book “Sacrifice”, authored by Michelle Black, in contrast to the higher command of ODA 3336, the higher command of ODA 3212 proved itself unworthy of trust.
On Oct. 3, 2017, ODA 3212 had completed its mission taskings in the vicinity of the town of Tiloa. The mission had been planned by ODA 3212, mission taskings had been successfully executed, and ODA 3212 was returning to its base. Only a few hours’ drive from mission completion, ODA 3212′s movement to home base was halted by its higher command. The team was ordered to turn north and execute a new mission near the border with Mali. The Team Commander, with agreement from the commander of the accompanying Niger partner force, recommended against the mission, citing several risk factors. His recommendation, as with ODA 3336 and Shok Valley, was denied. However, unlike Shok Valley, ODA 3212′s higher command indicated it was unworthy of trust by providing no additional resources to mitigate risk. Therefore, the Team Commander, on his own initiative, seeking to minimize the serious risks to his force that were being ignored by higher command, contacted another U.S. team, a heliborne unit called Team Arlit, and requested their participation. Arlit agreed, contacted ODA 3212′s higher command, and obtained approval to participate. Higher command directed ODA 3212 to be the supporting force, Arlit the main force. ODA 3212 was directed to travel north to a specified location and did so while higher command and Arlit planned the mission. When ODA 3212 and its partner force arrived at their specified location, they were informed by higher command that Arlit was forced to abort. ODA 3212 was ordered to execute the mission with no replacement supporting force. ODA 3212′s Team Commander, again citing the now elevated risks, requested to abort and return to base. Higher command again proved itself unworthy of trust: The Team Commander’s request was denied and ODA 3212 was ordered to execute the mission. Higher command failed to reassess risk. No additional resources were allocated to mitigate the enhanced risks from (1) the loss of the heliborne force, (2) the elimination of a supporting force, (3) the lack of medevac and kinetic air support, and (4) the increase in risk by now being required to travel through the night without support within a geographic area where, in the last 12 months, there had been seven attacks on Nigerien Army convoys and installations by up to 100 heavily armed and highly mobile insurgents.
ODA 3212 traveled from roughly midnight to 4 a.m. to reach its designated jump off point in the objective area. The ODA traveled in three underpowered, unarmored ‘militarized’ civilian vehicles, with the Niger partner force in five large trucks. The move north covered 15 miles thru mostly roadless, rough terrain, often requiring a ground guide to lead the convoy, and was of necessity noisy, debilitating, and observed by insurgents. After conducting mission taskings on the objective area, ODA 3212 and its partner force stopped at the village of Tongo Tongo to obtain food and water for the Niger soldiers. Upon exiting the village, the ODA and partner force were attacked by over 100 heavily armed, highly mobile insurgents. There was no kinetic air support, and no medevac. In spite of fighting effectively with sound tactics, four Americans and five Nigeriens were killed. The remaining members of ODA 3212 and the Niger partner force were most likely saved from death by low-level flyovers of two French Mirage jets. The survivors were ultimately extracted by heliborne French forces.
Upon completion of its investigation, the AFRICOM investigation team, and thus ultimately the AFRICOM commander who approved the investigation, were themselves proved unworthy of trust. The AFRICOM commander and the investigating team, overlooking the poor decisions, inadequate resourcing and absence of risk mitigation by ODA 3212′s higher command, and failing to identify and applaud the sound advice repeatedly given by the Team Commander, completely exonerated the higher command, and placed virtually all blame on the Team Commander and his ODA. The Team Commander and ODA were subsequently denigrated and dishonored publicly by the AFRICOM commander, with awards for heroism given at lower levels than deserved or not given at all.
‘Trust in the United States of America”? Not so much.
When I entered the Marine Corps, I was taught that the officer-enlisted relationship was more than a superior-subordinate relationship. That it was akin to a father-son relationship, and a teacher-student relationship. I learned that, as a leader, my primary job was to lead while ensuring that my “subordinates” were given all possible resources to maximize chances of success and minimize chances of failure. I learned that I was responsible for all actions for my unit, that a unit failure was my failure, and that I would be the first in line for a “fix” to rectify any failure. Sadly, on Oct. 3 and Oct. 4, 2017, ODA 3212′s higher command demonstrated the opposite, and showed itself unworthy of trust. And in the days after Oct. 4, higher command again proved itself unworthy of trust by failing to “own up” to its actions that led to the disaster, by failing to stand in front of ODA 3212 and say “this is on us and not on them,” by letting the blame due them to instead be piled on top of ODA 3212 and its commander.
What I write is not from a place of vindictiveness or bitterness, for I have neither. I am familiar with those who comprised ODA 3212′s higher command. Their service prior to October 2017 was honorable, worthy of respect and admiration. I have taken no pleasure, and have been saddened, by careers and promotions lost in the years that have followed the Tongo Tongo battle. I fully understand the challenges in making decisions in hostile conditions where situational awareness can be incomplete and misleading. And I believe in forgiveness even in leadership failures such as Tongo Tongo, and that those given forgiveness can move on to become much better leaders, ones you want in command when the next battle occurs. But a condition of forgiveness is admitting and owning failures. And when leaders fail to own up to their mistakes, fail to stand up and say “This is on me, and I own the failures,” they show themselves unworthy of continuing trust, in particular when the lives of people are in the balance.
“I will trust in my God and in the United States of America.”
Trust in God? Absolutely.
Trust in the United States of America? No so much.
The events on and following Oct. 3 and Oct. 4, 2017, have taught me that trust in the United States is dependent on those persons in positions of trust. People will at times invariably fail, and that is not a reason to lose trust. Loss of trust occurs when those in positions of trust do not step up and own their failures. And when those in leadership both continue in leadership and fail to own their mistakes, something we now see all too often, a pandemic of failures can ensue, and the outcomes will not be pretty.
Henry Black is a retired Marine Corps major. His son, Staff Sgt. Bryan Black, a Special Forces medic, was one of the four U.S. soldiers killed in Niger in October 2017. Black is currently an analyst for the FBI and lives in Washington state with his wife, two daughters-in-law, one son and four grandchildren.
Editor’s note: This is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com.

13. The Elusive Quest for Victory in War


Fighting and succeeding versus fighting and winning?

The Elusive Quest for Victory in War
The mission of the U.S. military might be better described as fighting and succeeding in the nation’s wars.
By Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
October 2021 Proceedings Vol. 147/10/1,424
usni.org · October 1, 2021
A major problem with victory as a goal is that victory is an emotion-laden word. The accomplishment of limited military and political aims that do not satisfy the emotions or seem to justify the costs of the war may not feel like victory. Because we cannot precisely measure the value of most war aims or accurately judge the cost of their attainment, it is often difficult to perceive the point at which the cost of fighting exceeds the value of victory.
—Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1-1, Strategy
Fighting terrorists and insurgents for two decades has made it difficult for the U.S. military to transition from thinking about regional “wars amongst the people” to potential conflict between major nuclear powers.1 This challenge is exacerbated by fading Cold War memories and having to cope with COVID-19 at the same time U.S. global supremacy is being challenged by China and, to a lesser degree, Russia. Managing these competitors in a way that preserves American hegemony while avoiding conflict—the “Thucydides Trap” that befell Sparta and Athens during the Peloponnesian War—will not be easy.2
The narrative that national security professionals use to discuss warfare in the second nuclear age opens a window into the richness of strategic thinking about deterrence, escalation, and war termination. Thus, the continued focus at U.S. war colleges and combatant commands on designing a theory of victory to defeat great power adversaries seems ill-suited for big wars in the 21st century. Conceptualizing war in terms of winners and losers, rather than achievement of more modest political objectives, risks strategic overreach and ignores warfare’s historical trend toward gray inconclusiveness.3

The surrender of Japan on board the USS Missouri (BB-63) in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 established in the public a notion of total victory that is unhelpful in planning for wars in the nuclear age. Credit: Naval History and Heritage Command
Moreover, emotional terms such as victory and defeat can distract strategists and Pentagon planners from grappling with the complexities of war between nuclear adversaries: why it might occur, how it should be fought, and for what ends. The wrong mental model—nostalgic images reminiscent of the iconic 1945 surrender ceremony on board the USS Missouri (BB-63)—can create false expectations and undermine popular support when use of force proves necessary. In short, victory and defeat trivialize why nations seek to limit war and strive to ensure that conventional conflicts do not escalate into nuclear conflagrations.
War termination is not a new theme. In his 1971 classic, Every War Must End, former Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé argued persuasively that more thought goes into starting wars than ending them. And when the end does come, it typically involves reaching agreement with former enemies over an admixture of ceasefires, negotiated settlements, territorial concessions, prisoner negotiations and repatriations, unilateral withdrawals, and the like. In short: “To bring fighting to an end, one nation or the other almost always has to revise its war aims.”4 Not surprisingly, the cost to the victor frequently determines the severity of the postwar environment.
Iklé’s views rest firmly on Clausewitz’s dicta that all wars are fought for political purposes and military force is a policy instrument that civilian leaders select to achieve postwar objectives. Yet, the U.S. armed forces are more often used for humanitarian relief, peacekeeping operations, forward presence, state-building, promoting democracy, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism than fighting existential threats requiring an adversary’s unconditional surrender. At least for now, wars of annihilation have become the exception rather than the rule. This is a positive development for mankind and may explain why nuclear weapons use is anathema. Nonetheless, discussion of war termination beyond a simplistic construct of winners and losers has failed to gain traction. There are a number of possible reasons why this is so, and several things can be done about it.
What Are We Fighting For?
One of war’s many paradoxes is that nations cannot achieve postwar objectives if their armed forces make a habit of losing battles and campaigns; however, winning them does not automatically translate into strategic success. The more protracted a conflict becomes, the easier it is to focus on the clash of opposing forces instead of the political objectives, or ends, for which the conflict is being waged. As former Foreign Affairs editor Gideon Rose puts it: “Leaders and publics have usually gotten so caught up in beating the enemy that they find it hard to switch gears and think clearly about constructing a desirable and stable political settlement. So they rarely handle the endgame challenges well and usually find themselves at the mercy of events rather than in control of them.”5
As casualties and costs mount, senior leaders quite rightly reassess the value of the object for which they are fighting. Unfortunately, the metrics they use are often tactical in nature and focus on the number of enemy troops killed, bombs dropped, and cities captured instead of on other substantive prerequisites and strategic enablers necessary to achieve their political goals. The body count in Vietnam received more attention than the legitimacy and effectiveness of Saigon’s central government. In the second Iraq War, postconflict stabilization was an afterthought compared to how rapidly coalition forces liberated Baghdad. As strategist Colin Gray pithily observed, “Military action is initiated not for its military effect, which must be trivial in scale and inherent significance, but rather for its psychological and hence political consequences.”6 Thus, ensuring military action remains strategically intentional will present a perennial challenge.
Keep the Gloves On
Donald Stoker, a former Naval Postgraduate School professor, argues that U.S. wars might end more favorably if less attention was given to limiting the means (application of force) and more was paid to crafting the ends for which America’s sons and daughters fight and die. Perhaps. But Stoker’s proposition that limited wars might be terminated more quickly and decisively using unlimited means is flawed for three reasons.7
First, using unlimited means to wage counterinsurgencies and gray zone conflicts (i.e., hybrid wars)—the preponderance of wars the United States has fought since Vietnam—risks employing excessive force and harming the civilian populations the U.S. and host-nation security forces must protect to succeed.
Second, U.S. legitimacy and credibility with the international community require the United States to apply lethal force in a proportional manner that adheres to the normative strictures of the laws of armed conflict, which guide battlefield behavior. Aerial bombing that fails to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants and excessive destruction of civilian infrastructure (beyond the parameters of “military necessity”) is morally wrong and harmful to U.S. interests.8 Unquestionably, China and Russia will exploit lapses in U.S. battlefield behavior to paint the United States as an evil aggressor in pursuit of imperial aims. In short, to succeed in limited wars, restraint must be applied to both means and ends.
Third, implicit in the unlimited means argument is the notion that insufficient combat power is the principal reason the United States failed to achieve its policy objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is untrue: Troop surges during both wars had short-term, positive impacts on tactical operations but did not alter either outcome, notwithstanding the United States’ overwhelming technological advantage. Causal factors beyond the number of “boots on the ground” proved more decisive in shaping the end game. As political science professor Jeffrey Meiser notes: “A casual observer of American strategic discourse over the past decade and a half could be excused for thinking strategy is simply a debate about how many troops should be deployed for combat operations. This approach misses the core function of strategy, which is to figure out what to do with those boots on the ground.”9
Deterrence Dynamics
Today’s policymakers face three geostrategic imperatives: to avoid a major conventional war with China and Russia; to identify opportunities to cease hostilities while preserving U.S. national interests should conflict occur (frequently called “off-ramps”); and, most important, to reduce potential catalysts for escalation that could motivate adversaries to cross the nuclear threshold first.10 Theory-of-victory hyperbole clashes with all three by presenting a zero-sum approach for trying to prevent war and limiting escalation after conflict breaks out. Victory rhetoric also reflects a general disregard for nuclear deterrence dynamics.
Nations acquire nuclear weapons to protect themselves against regime change and existential defeat.11 Retaining second- (and possibly third-) strike nuclear response options means any adversary foolish enough to violate the nuclear taboo must be prepared to suffer devastating nuclear counterattacks. Mutually assured destruction restrains nuclear adversaries and has made deterrence by denial both credible and effective for more than 75 years. (That deterrence theory may be eroding is a different issue.12)
Advocates of brinkmanship and controlling escalation by fighting a limited nuclear war (i.e., embracing a “cost-imposition strategy” that seeks to punish an enemy with increasing levels of pain) overlook the primary incentive that dissuades great powers from crossing the nuclear threshold in the first place—confidence they can achieve an acceptable outcome to an ongoing conventional conflict without using weapons of mass destruction.13 The less favorable the outcome to one party, the more that side will be incentivized to cross the nuclear threshold.14 Signaling an intent to “double down” and “win” pushes deterrence dynamics in an unhelpful direction, which could inadvertently escalate a conflict. This is especially true if adversaries fear the United States is on the cusp of initiating conventional strikes to destroy their nuclear command-and-control systems and second-strike retaliatory capabilities. In short, this approach could trigger a “use it or lose it” mentality that spirals out of control.15

The chaos of the evacuation of Afghanistan evoked memories of the fall of Saigon in April 1975. Former Under Secretary of Defense Fred Iklé argued persuasively in 1971 that more thought goes into starting wars than ending them. In retrospect, Iklé used considerable understatement when he wrote: “To bring fighting to an end, one nation or the other almost always has to revise its war aims.” Credit: Associated Press (Neal Ulevich)
The emergence of dual-capability weapon systems (armed with conventional or nuclear warheads) and the continued improvement of conventional missile technology, especially highly maneuverable hypersonics, will make it more difficult to identify the nature of incoming attacks.16 This increases the risk decision-makers could misconstrue a conventional attack for a nuclear strike. It also explains why any future conventional war between major powers will naturally become a “competition over the limits of violence,” as both sides race to convince each other of their commitment to avoid escalation and find an off-ramp.17
The March to Success
Navy Captain Mark Morris has argued that strategists must have a “scenario story that describes a possible path to victory. Such a story is not an attempt to predict the future but rather some plausible explanation of what could happen.”18 The problem with this argument is that, in a big war between nuclear adversaries, for one side to prevail and “win” in a classical sense the threat or use of nuclear weapons is a virtual given. This hidden assumption about nuclear escalation is problematic. Moreover, when strategists do invent a scenario story, it is often heavily biased in favor of U.S. forces, exaggerating their positive impact and—most damning of all—underestimating adversaries’ ability to deny the United States its war objectives.
In his book detailing five U.S.-sponsored Middle East regime changes from 1953 to 2011, former assistant secretary of state Philip Gordon describes a storyline process in which multiple administrations repeatedly assumed new foreign regimes would be friendlier to the United States than the ones deposed. However, as Gordon documents, the flimsy knowledge policymakers had of the diverse range of political actors who could potentially take the reins of power made this a fatally flawed assumption.19 Wishful thinking replaced sober-minded cost-benefit analysis.
Recognizing that current and future wars cannot be accurately described by labeling adversaries as winners and losers has prompted Jeffrey Meiser to advocate for a theory-of-success framework, which “encourages creative thinking while keeping the strategist rooted in the process of causal analysis; it brings assumptions to light and forces strategists to clarify exactly how they plan to cause the desired end state to occur.” Of course, at the heart of any strategy are the explicit and implicit assumptions planners adopt—but too often fail to verify and validate. Meiser contends that, by articulating a theory of success, strategists will be inspired to think more seriously about how resources are used—the actions (ways) to undertake—rather than simply focusing on the available resources (means). In the process, he thinks, this approach will motivate planners to develop “rival theories of success” and help decision-makers discover and leverage new sources of power.20
Use the F-Word
A theory of success provides planners with a more practical, flexible, and modest framework for contemplating big war in the nuclear age than linear road maps, which promise victory in a wide range of military undertakings with differing operational contexts. Yet, while developing a theory of success will likely be a useful part of the military planning process, it will be insufficient—unless it is complemented with the F-word: Failure.
Assessing how a military plan can fail to achieve the desired and often murky political end state gives planners a feedback loop that can help strengthen the plan before it is approved and implemented. The loop works in two ways. First, for every major possible cause of failure planners identify, they can attempt to devise a remedy or mitigation. Next, planners can assign levels of risk to help senior political and military leaders decide which course of action or operational plan has the most promise to succeed.
Thinking about failure has inspired research psychologist Gary Klein to implement “Project Pre-Mortem,” which encourages corporate and military leaders to subject finished plans to failure thinking.21 Instead of asking what might go wrong, the premortem assumes the plan has failed catastrophically, and team members must describe why. After running dozens of premortem events, Klein is convinced this analytical tool helps a plan avoid falling victim to groupthink, overinvested advocates, untested hypotheses, hidden assumptions, voiceless stakeholders, domineering bosses, and the tendency for bureaucracies to assume plans will magically implement themselves.22
Achieving Strategic Coherence
Historian Michael Howard argues that the West persuaded the Soviet Union it would lose the Cold War, not by defeat in a traditional sense, but by “a nuclear catastrophe in which such terms as ‘defeat’ and ‘victory’ were irrelevant.”23 Today, adopting a new lexicon that focuses on success instead of victory will help planners more carefully define the ends, ways, and means they will use to limit conflicts. This approach should spawn a deeper appreciation across the national security community for the stark differences between fighting nonstate actors—who thus far have posed no existential threat to the U.S. homeland—and nuclear-armed adversaries capable of generating apocalyptic effects at almost any time and place.
British military historian Hew Strachan reminds us that Clausewitz believed the ultimate purpose of war was for peace. . . . The aim was to create a military situation sufficiently favorable to give relative advantage in the negotiation of peace. The destruction of the enemy’s armed forces or the seizure of his territory were not the aims of the war but the means to opening the door to its cessation.24
U.S. military schools, diplomatic training courses, and midcareer executive education programs should continue to educate national security professionals about the adverse consequences of conflating means and ways with political ends. More important, the war aims (political objectives) the U.S. armed forces seek to accomplish using force must be crafted with a clarity that can come only from a thorough grasp of history, a mastery of critical-thinking skills, and lengthy public service careers that require engagement in constructive civil-military discourse—in which strategic wisdom is valued at least as much as tactical finesse and battlefield prowess.
1. GEN Rupert Smith, USA, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), xiii.
2. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 27–40.
3. Cathal J. Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), 2.
4. Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End, 2d ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 96.
5. Gideon Rose, How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 4.
6. Colin S. Gray, Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007), 33.
7. Donald Stoker, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the Present (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 3–9, 175–79, 203–4.
8. James M. Dubik, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, Theory (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 2016), 3–14.
9. Jeffrey W. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016): 83.
10. Thomas C. Greenwood, “Winning Battles Will Not Be Enough in Great Power Conflict,” Marine Corps Gazette (November 2020): 53.
11. Greenwood, “Winning Battles,” 54.
12. See Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., “The Eroding Balance of Terror: The Decline of Deterrence,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 2019): 62–74.
13. See Thomas G. Mahnken, “Cost-Imposing Strategies: A Brief Primer,” Maritime Strategy Series, Center for New American Security (November 2014); John K. Jordan, “Limited Nuclear War: The 21st Century Challenge for the United States,” Livermore Papers on Global Security no. 4 (Livermore, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research, July 2018), 13.
14. Jordan, “Limited Nuclear War,” 13.
15. Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018), 128–31.
16. Seyom Brown, “The New Nuclear MADness,” Survival 62, no. 1 (February–March 2020): 82–83.
17. Jordan, “Limited Nuclear War,” 42.
18. Mark Morris, “AirSea Battle vs. Offshore Control: Which Has a Better Theory of Victory?” War on the Rocks, 26 November 2013, 2.
19. Philip H. Gordon, Losing the Long Game: The Failed Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 2020).
20. Meiser, “Ends + Ways + Means,” 86–87.
21. Gary Klein, “Performing a Project Premortem,” Harvard Business Review, (September 2007): 1–2.
22. Zoom interview with Dr. Gary Klein and Dr. Yuna Wong on 4 December 2020. I am grateful to Dr. Wong for introducing Klein’s Pre-Mortem Project to me.
23. Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and International Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 88.
24. Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: A Biography (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 174.
usni.org · October 1, 2021


14.Pandora Papers: An offshore data tsunami


Graphs and charts at the link:

A description of the papers:
The Pandora Papers investigation is the world’s largest-ever journalistic collaboration, involving more than 600 journalists from 150 media outlets in 117 countries.
The investigation is based on a leak of confidential records of 14 offshore service providers that give professional services to wealthy individuals and corporations seeking to incorporate shell companies, trusts, foundations and other entities in low- or no-tax jurisdictions. The entities enable owners to conceal their identities from the public and sometimes from regulators. Often, the providers help them open bank accounts in countries with light financial regulation.
The 2.94 terabytes of data, leaked to ICIJ and shared with media partners around the world, arrived in various formats: as documents, images, emails, spreadsheets, and more.

Pandora Papers: An offshore data tsunami
The Pandora Papers’s 11.9 million records arrived from 14 different offshore services firms in a jumble of files and formats – even ink-on-paper – presenting a massive data-management challenge
October 3, 2021
icij.org · by Emilia Díaz-Struck
A 2.94 terabyte data trove exposes the offshore secrets of wealthy elites from more than 200 countries and territories. These are people who use tax and secrecy havens to buy property and hide assets; many avoid taxes and worse. They include more than 330 politicians and 130 Forbes billionaires, as well as celebrities, fraudsters, drug dealers, royal family members and leaders of religious groups around the world.
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists spent more than a year structuring, researching and analyzing the more than 11.9 million records in the Pandora Papers leak. The task involved three main elements: journalists, technology and time.
What is the Pandora Papers?
The Pandora Papers investigation is the world’s largest-ever journalistic collaboration, involving more than 600 journalists from 150 media outlets in 117 countries.
The investigation is based on a leak of confidential records of 14 offshore service providers that give professional services to wealthy individuals and corporations seeking to incorporate shell companies, trusts, foundations and other entities in low- or no-tax jurisdictions. The entities enable owners to conceal their identities from the public and sometimes from regulators. Often, the providers help them open bank accounts in countries with light financial regulation.
The 2.94 terabytes of data, leaked to ICIJ and shared with media partners around the world, arrived in various formats: as documents, images, emails, spreadsheets, and more.
The records include an unprecedented amount of information on so-called beneficial owners of entities registered in the British Virgin Islands, Seychelles, Hong Kong, Belize, Panama, South Dakota and other secrecy jurisdictions. They also contain information on the shareholders, directors and officers. In addition to the rich, the famous and the infamous, those exposed by the leak include people who don’t represent a public interest and who don’t appear in our reporting, such as small business owners, doctors and other, usually affluent, individuals away from the public spotlight.
While some of the files date to the 1970s, most of those reviewed by ICIJ were created between 1996 and 2020. They cover a wide range of matters: the creation of shell companies, foundations and trusts; the use of such entities to purchase real estate, yachts, jets and life insurance; their use to make investments and to move money between bank accounts; estate planning and other inheritance issues; and the avoidance of taxes through complex financial schemes. Some documents are tied to financial crimes, including money laundering.
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What’s in the Pandora Papers?
The more than 330 politicians exposed by the leak were from more than 90 countries and territories. They used entities in secrecy jurisdictions to buy real estate, hold money in trust, own other companies and other assets, sometimes anonymously.
The Pandora Papers investigation also reveals how banks and law firms work closely with offshore service providers to design complex corporate structures. The files show that providers don’t always know their customers, despite their legal obligation to take care not to do business with people who engage in questionable dealings.
The investigation also reports on how U.S. trust providers have taken advantage of some states’ laws that promote secrecy and help wealthy overseas clients hide wealth to avoid taxes in their home countries.
What form did the data come in?
The 11.9 million-plus records were largely unstructured. More than half of the files (6.4 million) were text documents, including more than 4 million PDFs, some of which ran to more than 10,000-pages. The documents included passports, bank statements, tax declarations, company incorporation records, real estate contracts and due diligence questionnaires. There were also more than 4.1 million images and emails in the leak.
Spreadsheets made up 4% of the documents, or more than 467,000. The records also included slide shows and audio and video files.
What’s different about this leak from others we’ve heard about?
The Pandora Papers information – the 2.94 terabytes in more than 11.9 million records – comes from 14 providers that offer services in at least 38 jurisdictions. The 2016 Panama Papers investigation was based on 2.6 terabytes of data in 11.5 million documents from a single provider, the now-defunct Mossack Fonseca law firm. The 2017 Paradise Papers investigation was based on a leak of 1.4 terabytes in more than 13.4 million files from one offshore law firm, Appleby, as well as Asiaciti Trust, a Singapore-based provider, and government corporate registries in 19 secrecy jurisdictions.
The Pandora Papers presented a new challenge because the 14 providers had different ways of presenting and organizing information. Some organized documents by client, some by various offices, and others had no apparent system at all. A single document sometimes contained years’ worth of emails and attachments. Some providers digitized their records and structured them in spreadsheets; others kept paper files that were scanned. Some PDFs contained spreadsheets that had to be reconstructed into spreadsheets. The documents arrived in English, Spanish, Russian, French, Arabic, Korean and other languages, requiring extensive coordination among ICIJ partners.
The Pandora Papers gathered information on more than 27,000 companies and 29,000 so-called ultimate beneficial owners from 11 of the providers, or more than twice the number of beneficial owners identified in the Panama Papers.
The Pandora Papers connected offshore activity to more than twice as many politicians and public officials as did the Panama Papers. And the Pandora Papers’ more than 330 politicians and public officials, from more than 90 countries and territories , included 35 current and former country leaders.
The new leak also includes information on jurisdictions not explored in previous ICIJ projects or for which there was little data, such as Belize, Cyprus and South Dakota.
The legal entities in the files of six providers – the companies, foundations and trusts – were all registered between 1971 and 2018. The records show providers and clients shifting their business from one jurisdiction to another after investigations and resulting rule changes.
How did you explore the files?
Only 4% of the files were structured, with data organized in tables (spreadsheets, csv files and a few “dbf files”).
To explore and analyze the information in the Pandora Papers, ICIJ identified files that contained beneficial ownership information by company and jurisdiction and structured it accordingly. Each provider’s data required a different process.
In cases where information came in spreadsheet form, ICIJ removed duplicates and combined it into a master spreadsheet. For PDF or document files, ICIJ used programming languages such as Python to automate data extraction and structuring as much as possible.
In more complex cases, ICIJ used machine learning and other tools, including the Fonduer and Scikit-learn softwares, to identify and separate specific forms from longer documents.
Some provider forms were handwritten, requiring ICIJ to extract information manually.
Once information was extracted and structured, ICIJ generated lists that linked beneficial owners to the companies they owned in specific jurisdictions. In some cases, information about where or when a company was registered wasn’t available. In others, information was missing about when a person or an entity had become the owner of the company, among other details.
After structuring the data, ICIJ used graphic platforms (Neo4J and Linkurious) to generate visualizations and make them searchable. This allowed reporters to explore connections between people and companies across providers.

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To identify potential story subjects in the data, ICIJ matched information in the leak against other data sets: sanctions lists, previous leaks, public corporate records, media lists of billionaires and public lists of political leaders.
ICIJ’s partner in Sweden, SVT, generated spreadsheets containing data extracted from passports found in the Pandora Papers.
ICIJ shared records with media partners using Datashare, a secure research and analytical tool developed by ICIJ’s technical team. Datashare’s batch-search function helped reporters match some public figures with the data.
The leak contains routine documents that service providers gather for due diligence – news articles, Wikipedia entries, information from financial data provider World-Check – that don’t necessarily confirm whether a person is hiding wealth in a secrecy jurisdiction. ICIJ used machine learning to tag such files in Datashare, enabling reporters to exclude them from their searches.
Our 150 media partners shared tips, leads and other information of interest using ICIJ’s global I-Hub, a secure social media and messaging platform. Throughout the project, ICIJ held extensive training sessions for partners on the use of ICIJ technology to explore, mine and better understand the files.
What did you research and how did you organize it?
Having identified documents that contained information on the owners of offshore entities and structured the information by provider, ICIJ unified the data in a centralized database.
This provided ICIJ and its media partners with a unique data set of beneficial owners of companies in secrecy jurisdictions.
ICIJ eliminated duplications in the data and identified key elements, such as nationality of the owner, country of residence and place of birth. This enabled us to find, for instance, nearly 3,700 companies with more than 4,400 beneficiaries who were Russian nationals – the most among all nationalities in the data. The figure includes 46 Russian oligarchs.
ICIJ also researched and analyzed the use of U.S. trusts, using keyword searches and matches with public data, among other methods.
As a result, ICIJ identified more than 200 trusts settled, or created, in the U.S from 2000 to 2019, with the largest number registered in South Dakota. The trusts were connected with people from 40 countries (not including the U.S.). ICIJ identified assets in single trusts worth between $67,000 and $165 million held between 2000 and 2019. The data shows that U.S. trusts held assets worth a total of more than $1 billion. Those included U.S. real estate and bank accounts in Panama, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Puerto Rico, the Bahamas and elsewhere.
To perform the analysis of U.S.-based trusts, ICIJ manually gathered information on the creators, known as settlors; the beneficiaries, and the assets held by the trusts. ICIJ was able to identify and gather data on trusts from 15 U.S. states and the District of Columbia.
ICIJ and its media partners used keyword searches to identify politicians in the data, using passport information to help with the identification.
ICIJ used public records to verify details related to the companies and to be sure the people named in the data were actually the political leaders identified with those names. We found some false positives and discarded them. Among sources used in the research were the Dow Jones Risk and Compliance database, Sayari, Nexis, OpenCorporates, property records in the U.S and U.K., and public corporate records. More than 330 politicians and high level public officials, including 35 country leaders were confirmed.
ICIJ structured the information in a spreadsheet and put it through two rounds of fact-checking. Data gathered on politicians was also visualized in the profiles in our Power Players feature.
ICIJ matched Forbes’s billionaires lists against the Pandora Papers to find more than 130 who had entities in secrecy jurisdictions. More than 100 of them had a combined fortune valued at more than $600 billion in 2021.
ICIJ analyzed 109 so-called suspicious activity reports to financial authorities filed by the Panamanian law firm Alemán, Cordero, Galindo & Lee, or Alcogal, and learned that 87 of the anti-money-laundering forms were written only after authorities or journalists had publicly identified the firm’s clients as involved in alleged wrongdoing.
ICIJ also read through several thousand publicly available employees’ profiles and found out that more than 220 lawyers associated with the giant law firm Baker McKenzie in 35 countries had previously held government posts in agencies including justice departments, tax offices, the EU Commission, and offices of heads of state.
ICIJ also did research and analysis to explore the role offshore finance plays in hiding looted art and ancient relics that authorities and communities seek to reclaim.
Finally, the Pandora Papers investigation identified more than 500 BVI companies that had been clients of Mossack Fonseca, the law firm at the center of the Panama Papers scandal, and moved their business to other BVI providers in the aftermath whom we found in the data.
ICIJ also matched Panamanian companies from the Panama Papers data against data available for the Panama corporate registry on OpenCorporates, and found out that at least 113 companies had changed registered agents and simply moved to Alcogal between April 3, 2016 and 2020. Together with The Miami Herald data team, ICIJ also counted 759 BVI companies that specifically considered moving to Trident Trust as part of the provider’s so-called “Mossfon Project”.
How big a slice of all offshore provider data in the world does the Pandora Papers leak represent?
The Pandora Papers probe offers a broad look at secrecy jurisdictions and offshore service providers, but the data came incomplete.
The quality of the data varied by provider. In some cases, the data tied to companies didn’t offer information about the jurisdiction where they were registered, the period during which an individual was linked to an entity, or about intermediaries. The data still offered important information about owners and, in some cases, transactions and other financial details.
The 14 providers, which offered services in at least 38 jurisdictions, are part of a larger industry of offshore services operating around the world. It’s hard to say how much of the universe of provider data we have, a small fraction, probably.
For example, in the BVI, where six, or nearly half, of the providers found in the Pandora Papers have acted as registered agents, they are among at least 101 firms acting in that capacity, according to the BVI Financial Services Commision. In March 2021, there were more than 370,000 active companies, about a dozen for each of the tiny island nation’s inhabitants.
Why so many more ‘ultimate beneficial owners’ – UBOs – here than in previous leaks?
A significant proportion of the beneficial ownership information in the Pandora Papers comes from reports generated by providers for the BVI’s Beneficial Ownership Secure Search System, or BOSS, established in the wake of the 2016 publication of the Panama Papers. This information is not available to the public.
A 2017 BVI law requires providers to report to BVI authorities the names of the real owners of the companies registered there. The leak identified many documents containing such information.
Why so many world leaders and politicians in the data?
Alcogal and Trident Trust was where we found a large number of current and former politicians and public officials as clients. Most of their companies were registered in the BVI and Panama. Alcogal clients include nearly half of the politicians and public officials identified in the Pandora Papers. In the beneficial ownership data that ICIJ was able to structure, nearly half of the companies were linked to Alcogal. Alcogal, headquartered in Panama, has among its founders several politicians, one of whom served as Panama’s ambassador to the United States.
Why so many beneficial owners from Russia and Latin America?
Some of the providers, based on their location and the jurisdictions where they do business, such as Cyprus, have a large proportion of Russian clients, the largest group by nationality in the Pandora Papers data.
In the Pandora Papers, more than 30% of the companies that received services from Demetrios A. Demetriades LLC, or DadLaw, a provider headquartered in Cyprus, had one or more Russians as beneficial owners. Similarly, more than 40% of the companies that received services from Seychelles-based Alpha Consulting Group, also had one or more Russians as beneficial owners. Alcogal and Fidelity Corporate Services Limited were also among the providers with the largest number of Russian clients.
A large proportion of beneficial owners appearing in the data are from Latin America. More than 90 of the more 330 politicians and public officials in the data are from Latin America. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela are among the countries with the largest representation of beneficial owners. In the leaked data, Alcogal headquartered in Panama, has the largest group of Latin American clients.
Where are the U.S. citizens and multinational corporations?
When it comes to creating offshore companies, foundations and trusts, parties from different parts of the world and with different needs select different providers and jurisdictions for their shell companies.
Pandora Papers documents cover a large number of providers, but obviously not all, or even most, of them, and many jurisdictions are not represented in the data.
In previous ICIJ investigations, including 2017’s Paradise Papers, the leak came from a prestigious law firm with a larger corporate practice, Appleby. As a result, the data included more documents about multinationals. Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, which are popular havens for corporations, were among the jurisdictions with a large presence in that leak.
As for U.S. nationals, ICIJ identified more than 700 companies with beneficial owners connected to the U.S. in the Pandora Papers; Americans were also among the top 20 nationalities represented in the data. In the Pandora Papers, Russia, the United Kingdom, Argentina, China and Brazil, are among the countries with the largest representation of beneficial owners.
In the Paradise Papers, U.S. citizens had a larger relative presence.
Is ICIJ going to release the Pandora Papers data?
With today’s publication, ICIJ is sharing data and details about the use of companies in secrecy jurisdictions by more than 50 politicians, through the Power Players feature. ICIJ is planning to incorporate data from the Pandora Papers into the Offshore Leaks database. To learn more about ICIJ’s data releases, subscribe to ICIJ’s email newsletter.
Contributors: Bruno Thomas, Anisha Kohli, Helena Bengtsson, Shirsho Dasgupta, John Keefe, Miranda Patrucic, Pierre Romera, Marcos García Rey
icij.org · by Emilia Díaz-Struck


15. FDD | Biden Brags About Diplomacy. It’s All Spin.
Quite a critique here;
And speaking of Trump and Biden, the Biden administration virtue signaled that it would treat immigrants compassionately, more so than under former President Trump. Twitter compassion is one thing. But he’s defended his continuation of Trump’s pandemic-inspired Title 42 policy to expel most immigrants trying to enter the U.S. and has, nine months into his policy, expelled more people than Trump did after implementing it in March 2020.
The problem has been compounded by Haitians streaming into the U.S. to escape poverty, political turmoil, and a major earthquake. What would Trump do? He mocked Haiti and in 2018 sought to end the Temporary Protective Status for Haitian refugees who had come to the U.S. after the 2010 earthquake. It was not a Boy Scout’s moment, but Biden has outdone him: expelling migrants as they arrive. Speak like a Squad member, act like a Proud Boy​.​
Trump was no multilateralist. He was brash, rude, bombastic, and did not care much about allies and alliances, if America’s interest, as he saw it, diverged. To have the French almost miss him speaks volumes of the diplomatic blunder the Biden presidency is becoming.
FDD | Biden Brags About Diplomacy. It’s All Spin.
fdd.org · by Emanuele Ottolenghi Senior Fellow · September 29, 2021
“Diplomacy is back,” President Biden triumphantly tweeted from the G7 summit back in June. The president has devoted a good deal of airtime since taking office to ennobling rhetoric about America returning to the world stage as a reliable multilateralist, a trusted ally, a responsible global player. Paris climate treaty rejoined. Ready to return to Iran’s nuclear deal. No more travel bans and caging of immigrants. America is back. Diplomacy is back.
It’s all spin.
French President Emmanuel Macron recalled his U.S. ambassador for consultations, over what Paris considers a stab in the back from Washington. (It took a fence-mending call from President Biden before Macron agreed to return his ambassador to Washington.) The casus belli is Australia’s decision to scuttle a submarine deal worth billions to France in favor of a partnership with Washington and London instead.
The French-Australian deal for diesel submarines was beset with rising costs and delays—a possible reason for Australia’s about-face. The new Australian-U.S.-British partnership will deliver nuclear submarines, albeit with considerable delay over the French deal, also leaving Australia—a country without a nuclear industry—more dependent on its foreign partners than in the canceled deal. France may be hyperventilating—this is the country that lamented America’s hyperpower not so long ago—but wasn’t Biden’s team of grown-ups supposed to know how to handle imperfect allies with savoir-faire? Weren’t they supposed to restore confidence among alienated allies by avoiding precisely the kind of crisis they now have at their doorstep?
Why so much fury over an arms deal? Because allies do not blindside allies.
Recalling ambassadors is not trivial. In fact, in the more than 200 years of French-U.S. bilateral relations, it is unprecedented. It is such a big deal that French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said that “This brutal, unilateral, and unpredictable decision reminds me a lot of what Mr. Trump used to do.”
It’s clearly worse: France, after all, left its ambassador in Washington all four years of the Trump presidency.
Even when the mercurial former president took to Twitter to deride France, the French ambassador stayed in Washington. The French did not recall their ambassador when Trump went beyond juvenile twitter taunts and took strategic decisions that clearly ran against what Paris held dear, including walking away from the Iran nuclear deal, leaving the Paris climate accords, supporting Brexit, or moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. Each time, the French criticized and regretted Trump’s policy. Their ambassador stayed put.
Nor did the French recall their ambassador when Barack Obama and George W. Bush antagonized Paris. Not in the summer of 2013, when Obama set a red line on Syria’s use of chemical weapons and then, when France was ready to join the U.S. in a punitive strike, changed his mind. Not in response to the 2003 Iraq war—which the French bitterly and very openly opposed. Even during the Cold War bilateral flare-ups did not trigger such an escalation. The French did not recall their ambassador during the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Washington aligned itself with the Soviet Union[!] against the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt. It never happened. Until Biden.
Defending the U.S. volte-face against France on the merits of the deal misses the point: There are ways to soothe angry allies over divergent interests. If they recall their ambassador, that is a sign of a diplomatic blunder of epic proportions.
And blunders are piling up. Afghanistan aside, the Biden administration dragged its feet for months on COVID-19 travel restrictions against European citizens, under spurious pretexts, especially as immunization percentages in Europe outpaced America’s and the anti-vax craze made the U.S. a higher risk location than any country in Europe. The European Union opened its borders to vaccinated Americans over the summer. Biden failed to reciprocate until now—agreeing to open to Europeans from November onward. Would Trump have kept borders closed, given Europe’s immunization rates last June? Moot point. Biden did.
And speaking of Trump and Biden, the Biden administration virtue signaled that it would treat immigrants compassionately, more so than under former President Trump. Twitter compassion is one thing. But he’s defended his continuation of Trump’s pandemic-inspired Title 42 policy to expel most immigrants trying to enter the U.S. and has, nine months into his policy, expelled more people than Trump did after implementing it in March 2020.
The problem has been compounded by Haitians streaming into the U.S. to escape poverty, political turmoil, and a major earthquake. What would Trump do? He mocked Haiti and in 2018 sought to end the Temporary Protective Status for Haitian refugees who had come to the U.S. after the 2010 earthquake. It was not a Boy Scout’s moment, but Biden has outdone him: expelling migrants as they arrive. Speak like a Squad member, act like a Proud Boy.
Trump was no multilateralist. He was brash, rude, bombastic, and did not care much about allies and alliances, if America’s interest, as he saw it, diverged. To have the French almost miss him speaks volumes of the diplomatic blunder the Biden presidency is becoming.
Emanuele Ottolenghi is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a non-partisan research institute in Washington D.C. Follow him on Twitter @eottolenghi.
fdd.org · by Emanuele Ottolenghi Senior Fellow · September 29, 2021



16. Trump’s Exit From Asian Trade Pact Damaged America, Boosted China

Again, this is arguably the biggest strategic failure of the Trump administration and one that rivals the other strategic failure of the 21st century.

Trump’s Exit From Asian Trade Pact Damaged America, Boosted China
Forbes · by Stuart Anderson · October 4, 2021
... [+]Getty Images
Removing the United States from the Asia-Pacific trade pact designed to promote U.S. economic and strategic interests over China’s will go down as one of the worst decisions by an American president in the past 50 years, according to trade and foreign policy analysts. Now that China has applied to join the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, Donald Trump’s decision looks even worse than it did in 2017.
Background: President George W. Bush proposed a trade agreement with like-minded Asia-Pacific countries in 2008. “While quick to embrace TPP [Trans-Pacific Partnership] and successful in concluding an agreement among the parties, President Barack Obama fatally delayed pushing for trade promotion authority from Congress in 2014,” writes Matthew P. Goodman, senior vice president for economics at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “And in one of his first, catastrophic acts as president, Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the unratified TPP—not understanding that it was one of the most powerful tools he had to compete with his nemesis, China.”
The Latest Developments: On September 16, 2021, China submitted an application to join what is now called the Comprehensive Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTTP). The group of countries in the trade pact currently includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam. China’s notification was sent to New Zealand’s trade minister, the designated CPTPP member for such matters, notes Wendy Cutler, a vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute.
New Zealand’s trade minister is well aware of the stakes. “It was February 2017 and President Trump’s first address to a joint session of Congress,” according to Tim Groser, who served as New Zealand’s trade minister (2008–15) and ambassador to the U.S. (2016–18). “As the president announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, I was thinking about a conversation I’d had with a particularly astute Asian ambassador. He’d suggested to me that if a book on the decline of American influence in Asia and the Indo-Pacific were ever written—and he hoped it never would be—its first chapter would be an account of the withdrawal of the U.S. from TPP.”
Will China Be Accepted into the Trade Pact?: China has prepared for gaining admittance to the CPTPP, even though the criteria and its poor relations with some of its members make the country’s entry less than certain. “Despite concerns over its inward-looking ‘dual circulation’ strategy, China has spent the past few months tearing down trade and investment barriers to make it easier to negotiate its entry to the 11-member trans-Pacific trade pact,” write Henry Gao, an associate professor of law at Singapore Management University and the author of a National Foundation for American Policy analysis on a proposed U.S. strategy to address China trade issues at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Weihuan Zhou, director of research at the Herbert Smith Freehills CIBEL Centre at the law and justice faculty at UNSW Sydney.
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“At the international level, such a move is a continuation of China's strategy of being more active in international rule-making, following the conclusion of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) with its Asian neighbors last year, and the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with Europe last December,” according to Gao and Zhou. “This is in marked contrast to the approach taken by the Biden Administration, which, despite its rhetoric that ‘America is back,’ has not been able to conclude or even initiate any major international trade agreement in its first eight months in office. Moreover, domestic political considerations are likely to keep the U.S. from returning to the CPTPP anytime soon. This creates a perfect window of opportunity for China to maneuver its way into a trade pact that was, ironically, created by the U.S. in order to contain China.”
The Impact on the United States: China’s latest actions and the U.S. government’s poor policy choices concern American companies. “First, China would have to overcome formidable obstacles to join the CPTPP. It would have to win over current CPTPP governments that have ongoing differences with China or that question its readiness to join,” said John Murphy, senior vice president for international policy at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, in an interview. “It would need to undertake deep reforms to its system of state capitalism and regulation to meet the pact’s terms and convince the other parties that it had done so. However, if Beijing managed to clear these hurdles, Chinese firms would win substantial advantages over their U.S. competitors in terms of access to markets across the Asia-Pacific.”
Murphy notes, “The United States would face a significant setback in its efforts to shape the international economic landscape to support our values and interests. These dynamics show the risk that Washington’s inaction on trade could deal a severe blow to U.S. competitiveness and to the long-term prospects for American workers and companies.”
Joining the Asia-Pacific trade pact is a priority for China’s leadership. “China's application to join the CPTPP is not a spontaneous decision but has been long in the making,” according to Gao and Zhou. “Since 2013, China has been carefully studying the CPTPP, including its predecessor the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Last November, President Xi formally confirmed China's intention to join the pact. In the long run, China's accession could further cement the Asia Pacific's role as the world's leading economic bloc, with CPTPP and RCEP [Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement] playing complementing roles to further boost growth in the region.”
The Trump administration’s trade policy was a story of inflicting great harm and achieving few successes. The administration levied tariffs on $350 billion worth of imports from China. The Congressional Budget Office estimated the Trump tariffs cost the average U.S. household more than $1,200 a year. The Biden administration has maintained the tariffs.
Trump’s trade policies, particularly tariffs on steel and aluminum, cost many manufacturing workers their jobs. The tariffs also resulted in companies listed on the U.S. stock market losing an estimated $1.7 trillion in market value, according to research by Mary Amiti, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and Columbia University economists Sang Hoon Kong and David Weinstein.
The Trump administration’s trade policies harmed consumers and companies and failed to achieve their stated objectives with China or America’s other trading partners. Donald Trump’s decision to pull the United States out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership created an opening for China and will continue to put U.S. workers and companies at a competitive disadvantage.
Forbes · by Stuart Anderson · October 4, 2021


17.  The Myth that Democracies Bungled the Pandemic

Excerpts:

The desire for swift, unified, and determined policy to fight COVID-19—and for an end to endless health restrictions—is understandable. But before we embrace authoritarianism in the name of expediency, we should remember that Mussolini did not actually get the trains running on time. The supposed improvements were partially mythical, partially attributable to pre-Fascism initiatives, and limited to only some aspects of the railway system. In addition to being murderous, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were deeply corrupt, even kleptocratic. Democracies face criticism of their vaccination campaigns precisely because they are democracies: They have cultures of open discussion and free media. But when it comes to developing and administering the lifesaving vaccines that can stop the virus, democratic governance is working.

The Myth that Democracies Bungled the Pandemic
The argument that authoritarian governments outperform democracies in a crisis has found new life during the coronavirus pandemic. The data tell a different story.
The Atlantic · by Justin Esarey · October 4, 2021
The idea that dictatorships get things done while democracies dither has an ancient provenance and enduring appeal. When times were tough in the ancient Roman republic, the Senate appointed a strongman with virtually unlimited powers (but a temporary term of office) to tackle the crisis. Abraham Lincoln, the savior of American democracy and the Great Emancipator, suspended the writ of habeas corpus and arbitrarily jailed dissenters to maintain the Union’s resolve to win the American Civil War. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini supposedly “made the trains run on time”—democracies cannot always do the same.
The argument that authoritarian governments outperform democracies in a crisis has found new life during the coronavirus pandemic, especially within the Chinese government. The Global Times, a newspaper published by the Chinese Communist Party as an arm of the People’s Daily, stated bluntly that Western countries “failed to prevent the virus from spreading in their countries … as a result of their governance systems” and that “the West cannot have a government that is as powerful as China’s.” Indeed, China’s reported deaths from COVID-19 are remarkably low, just under 5,700 in a country of more than a billion people. In case the implication is too subtle, the paper has also directly said that “systematic advantages, including top-down effective governance and ability to mobilize social resources” are behind China’s success. Meanwhile, the United States—the world’s most powerful democracy—is well into its fourth wave of mass hospitalizations and deaths; more than 660,000 Americans are dead of the disease as of this writing. A recent article in Foreign Policy (hardly a bastion of authoritarianism) argued that nations with “collective discipline, deference to authority, and faith in the state” are the ones that have succeeded in confronting this public-health crisis, even though democracy itself is not to blame. Similarly, Francis Fukuyama thinks that it is not necessarily democracy but “whether citizens trust their leaders, and whether those leaders preside over a competent and effective state,” that is crucial to defeating a pandemic.
The idea that top-down societies have handled COVID-19 better may explain in part why governance around the world has become more autocratic since the start of the pandemic: People crave decisive action. Those in democracies who resist decisive action, such as vaccine mandates, often appeal to their right to personal freedom, despite the fact that vaccine mandates are both ethically and historically compatible with democracy. Meanwhile, Western news outlets announce that “America has failed at collective action” or that “the U.S. has failed to persuade Americans to get vaccines.” Even Francis Collins, the director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, said that the U.S. is “failing” on COVID because of low vaccination rates. The pressure this criticism creates for democratic governments to be more forceful must be immense. Still, in 2020, most countries that had been designated as “free” by Freedom House stayed that way: Reductions in political rights and civil liberties were most marked in dictatorships and hybrid regimes.
Should the world turn to dictatorship to beat back the pandemic and the many other challenges we face? Even if dictatorships were better than democracies at fighting the pandemic, that wouldn’t be reason enough to replace presidents with politburos and parliaments with juntas. Freedom, equal representation, and civil rights are more important than ruthlessly enforced public-health measures. Nevertheless, the bold, resolute governance that autocracy supposedly offers may be tempting. The glamour of that dark path conflicts with the fact that, despite the negative publicity they have faced, democracies are at least as effective at vaccinating their citizens as non-democracies. Our World in Data, a collaboration between researchers at Oxford University and the Global Change Data Lab, provides up-to-date information on the proportion of each country’s citizens who have received at least one dose of COVID-19 vaccine, as well as on their GDP per capita. Experts from the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg classify regimes on the basis of their adherence to free elections and protection of individual rights, making it possible to compare the performance of democratic regimes with that of autocratic ones. At the same level of economic prosperity, democracies are on average comparable to or slightly better than their autocratic counterparts in terms of how much of their population has been vaccinated. Some democracies have underperformed their peers, but others have overperformed. The same is true for dictatorships.
Figure 1: Worldwide vaccination rates by regime type. Each point represents a country; the lines are the prediction from a best-fit logistic model.
In fact, though it may be surprising to many, democracies have proved that they have the edge in many aspects of this crisis, including the initial containment of spread and compliance with measures designed to limit transmission. They are also better at preventing deaths from COVID-19. Democracies have reported more fatalities from the disease than have autocracies, but these reports are complicated by autocracies’ tendency to fudge their data to make things look better. One way of getting around that problem is to estimate how many more people died in 2020 (when the pandemic broke out) compared with previous years. This is precisely what Ariel Karlinsky and Dmitry Kobak did. Although excess mortality is an imperfect measure of COVID deaths and available for fewer countries than the fatality data are (Russia is included but China is not), it is a harder number to falsify. Karlinsky and Kobak’s data can be used to compare democracies with dictatorships in their percentage of excess deaths during the pandemic. And at every level of GDP per capita, democracies do at least as well as, and sometimes better than, dictatorships.
Figure 2: Worldwide COVID-19 deaths. The boxplot shows the distribution of death rates for countries sorted by regime type. The bold line in the center of the box is the median death rate; the edges of the box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles of death rates. Outliers are indicated by black dots. The poorest countries are excluded from this plot to avoid including possibly unreliable reports from states with low capacity; however, the qualitative difference in death rates between democracies and dictatorships is unchanged by this exclusion.
Figure 3: Worldwide excess mortality rates in 2020 by regime type. Every point represents a country. The lines are the prediction from a linear best-fit model, excluding Peru as an apparent outlier.
The desire for swift, unified, and determined policy to fight COVID-19—and for an end to endless health restrictions—is understandable. But before we embrace authoritarianism in the name of expediency, we should remember that Mussolini did not actually get the trains running on time. The supposed improvements were partially mythical, partially attributable to pre-Fascism initiatives, and limited to only some aspects of the railway system. In addition to being murderous, fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were deeply corrupt, even kleptocratic. Democracies face criticism of their vaccination campaigns precisely because they are democracies: They have cultures of open discussion and free media. But when it comes to developing and administering the lifesaving vaccines that can stop the virus, democratic governance is working.
The Atlantic · by Justin Esarey · October 4, 2021


18.  He’s Australia’s Most Decorated Soldier. Did He Also Kill Helpless Afghans?


He’s Australia’s Most Decorated Soldier. Did He Also Kill Helpless Afghans?
The New York Times · by Yan Zhuang · October 3, 2021
Ben Roberts-Smith is suing three newspapers that accused him of unlawful killings in Afghanistan. But much more than the reputation of one soldier is at stake.

Ben Roberts-Smith denies news reports that he kicked a handcuffed Afghan man off a cliff.Credit...Dean Lewins/Australian Associated Press, via Associated Press
By
Oct. 3, 2021
MELBOURNE, Australia — The elite Australian troops stormed into a mud-walled Afghan village in the late summer of 2012 on a white-hot mission.
Days earlier, a rogue Afghan Army soldier had killed three of their comrades. A tip indicated that the assailant might be hiding in the village. While a search failed to turn him up, the Australian special forces fatally shot another Afghan man they encountered there.
That much is known. But the moments just before the man’s death have become the subject of an intense legal dispute involving Australia’s most decorated living soldier, rekindling hard questions about the costs of the country’s 20-year mission in Afghanistan and the conduct of its most highly trained soldiers.
In one version of events, the dead man was a laborer named Ali Jan, and he was kicked off a cliff by the decorated soldier, Ben Roberts-Smith. According to this account, Mr. Jan, bound in handcuffs, hit the ground with such force that his teeth were knocked out, and he was then shot dead as Mr. Roberts-Smith watched. This is the story told by three Australian journalists who wrote about the episode and by three Afghan men who say they were at the scene.
In the other version, told by Mr. Roberts-Smith, there was no cliff and no kick, and little evidence that the man was even called Ali Jan. The special forces, Mr. Roberts-Smith said, legitimately engaged and killed the man, who was a Taliban scout.
The two accounts have emerged as Mr. Roberts-Smith, 42, sues three newspapers for defamation in what has been called Australia’s trial of the century. He is seeking the largest damages award in Australian history, most likely in the millions of dollars.
Australia had a military presence in Afghanistan for two decades.
Australia removed the last of its troops from Afghanistan in June, weeks before the United States did the same, allowing a rapid takeover of the country by the Taliban. Seven months earlier, the Australian military had released a damning public accounting of years of battlefield misconduct among its special forces in Afghanistan, including “credible evidence” that 25 soldiers had been involved in the murders of 39 Afghan civilians.
No soldiers were named in the report. But it has been revealed in court that Mr. Roberts-Smith, and the events of the late-summer day in 2012, are under police investigation over potential war crimes. With further investigation into battlefield misconduct likely to take years to resolve, the defamation case is the first time any inquiry into soldiers’ actions in Afghanistan has played out in open court.
Mr. Roberts-Smith is a symbol of the “Anzac myth,” a belief that modern-day Australia was forged by soldiers, stretching back to World War I, who embodied the national values of camaraderie, courage and sacrifice, said John Blaxland, a national security expert and war historian at the Australian National University. “And this case is exposing the weak foundations of the myth,” he said.
Courtroom Showdown
Ben Roberts-Smith’s path to the battlefields of Afghanistan was set at an early age.
He was educated at a prestigious private boys’ school in Western Australia that has spawned politicians and mining magnates. Following in the footsteps of his father, a retired army major general and state Supreme Court justice, he joined the military at 18.
He went on to become the only current member to receive the military’s two top honors. He was awarded the Medal of Gallantry in 2006 and the Victoria Cross in 2011, both for actions in Afghanistan.
In 2013, the year he left the full-time army, he was named Australia’s Father of the Year. Two portraits of him are displayed in the nation’s war memorial, as is a uniform he wore in Afghanistan, for which the memorial had to make a special mannequin because Mr. Roberts-Smith stands about 6 feet 8 inches tall.
“Wherever he went, wherever it was, he was the subject and object of what I would regard as reverential mobs,” Brendan Nelson, a former defense minister who once led the war memorial, said during the defamation trial.
That changed in 2018, after The Age, a Melbourne newspaper, and its sister newspapers The Sydney Morning Herald and The Canberra Times published a series of articles reporting that a powerful and charismatic senior officer had killed or been involved in the murder of Afghan detainees.
Mr. Roberts-Smith in 2011 with Mark Donaldson, left, and Keith Payne, two other recipients of the Victoria Cross, Australia’s highest military honor.Credit...Pool photo by Cpl. Chris Moore
Mr. Roberts-Smith was not named in the articles, but he later asserted that he was clearly identifiable. Soon after their publication, he began defamation proceedings against the newspapers.
The papers, which under Australian law have the onus of proving that what they reported was substantially true, have said in court that Mr. Roberts-Smith was involved in six killings, none of which occurred “in the heat of battle.”
But over nearly two weeks of testimony in June, Mr. Roberts-Smith strenuously denied the allegations, saying that five of the deaths occurred during combat and that the sixth never happened.
In a packed Sydney courtroom, he painted a noble image of special forces soldiers. “I did everything that I was supposed to do, and I followed the rules,” he said.
His virtuous portrayal sometimes clashed with bizarre and lurid details that emerged during the trial. Mr. Roberts-Smith admitted hiring a private investigator to spy on a girlfriend at an abortion clinic after they had agreed to end her pregnancy. He told the court that soldiers had used the prosthetic leg of an Afghan he had killed — an armed Taliban insurgent in his telling, and a prisoner in the journalists’ — as a drinking vessel.
As for the centerpiece allegation — that he kicked an Afghan man off a cliff and witnessed his murder — Mr. Roberts-Smith said, “Frankly, I can’t see how they can believe it, because none of it adds up.”
Three Afghan witnesses, testifying through an interpreter via video from Kabul, told a very different story. They said that they had known Mr. Jan as a laborer who had no Taliban connections. Two said they had seen a “big soldier” kick him off a cliff and later found Mr. Jan’s body with bullet wounds.
Mohammed Hanifa, who said he was Mr. Jan’s step-nephew, testified that he had been detained alongside Mr. Jan. Both had their hands tied behind their backs, he said.
“I told Ali Jan, don’t laugh or don’t smile, because they do not like when you smile or when you laugh,” he said.
Understand the Taliban Takeover in Afghanistan
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Who are the Taliban? The Taliban arose in 1994 amid the turmoil that came after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989. They used brutal public punishments, including floggings, amputations and mass executions, to enforce their rules. Here’s more on their origin story and their record as rulers.
Who are the Taliban leaders? These are the top leaders of the Taliban, men who have spent years on the run, in hiding, in jail and dodging American drones. Little is known about them or how they plan to govern, including whether they will be as tolerant as they claim to be. One spokesman told The Times that the group wanted to forget its past, but that there would be some restrictions.
How did the Taliban gain control? See how the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan in a few months, and read about how their strategy enabled them to do so.
What happens to the women of Afghanistan? The last time the Taliban were in power, they barred women and girls from taking most jobs or going to school. Afghan women have made many gains since the Taliban were toppled, but now they fear that ground may be lost. Taliban officials are trying to reassure women that things will be different, but there are signs that, at least in some areas, they have begun to reimpose the old order.
What does their victory mean for terrorist groups? The United States invaded Afghanistan 20 years ago in response to terrorism, and many worry that Al Qaeda and other radical groups will again find safe haven there. On Aug. 26, deadly explosions outside Afghanistan’s main airport claimed by the Islamic State demonstrated that terrorists remain a threat.
How will this affect future U.S. policy in the region? Washington and the Taliban may spend years pulled between cooperation and conflict, Some of the key issues at hand include: how to cooperate against a mutual enemy, the Islamic State branch in the region, known as ISIS-K, and whether the U.S. should release $9.4 billion in Afghan government currency reserves that are frozen in the country.
But then the big soldier came, Mr. Hanifa said, and Mr. Jan smiled. The soldier “kicked him really hard,” and Mr. Jan “was rolling down, rolling down until he reached the river. The soldier was looking at him. He was standing and looking at him.”
Shortly after the Afghan men testified in late July, the proceedings were delayed until November because of a coronavirus outbreak in Sydney. The trial is expected to run well into next year.
Pursuing Justice
Australia’s defense chief, Gen. Angus Campbell, delivering findings in November of battlefield misconduct in Afghanistan.Credit...Pool photo by Mick Tsikas
When the Australian military released its report on battlefield misconduct in November, the country was commended for its openness and transparency. The military vowed sweeping changes, and 19 soldiers were referred for criminal investigation.
The government set up an independent office to investigate the cases and provided it with funding and experienced officials.
But it is unlikely that all the soldiers will go to trial, given the increasing challenge of collecting evidence about events that happened over a decade ago, said Ben Saul, who teaches international law at the University of Sydney.
“The longer this drags on,” he said, “the more difficult it is to get a successful prosecution.”
And the more time that passes, the more the investigations may be susceptible to domestic forces. With the accused soldiers garnering significant public support, Professor Saul said, “the question is whether that support over time tips over into pressure to basically stop these kinds of investigations or prosecutions.”
There are already signs of a shifting political agenda. When a new defense minister, Peter Dutton, took office in April, one of his first acts was to reverse a decision to strip a meritorious unit citation from a group of about 3,000 special forces soldiers at the center of the misconduct report. Mr. Dutton said he wanted to let soldiers know that “the government had their back.”
The defense minister is trying to “minimize further fallout,” said Professor Blaxland, the national security expert, and prevent any further damage to the special forces as Australia turns its attention toward the prospect of great-power conflict in Asia.
The government, Professor Blaxland added, also wants to shield itself from questions about its leadership during the Afghanistan war, especially as defenders of the military argue that the soldiers were just following its orders.
The case of Mr. Roberts-Smith strikes at the heart of the debate, he said: “Was this something that Australian soldiers were doing legitimately, did the Australian government support it happening, and did the Australian government enable it to happen?”
The lawyer Bruce McClintock with Mr. Roberts-Smith. They have denied all accusations that Mr. Roberts-Smith was a party to unlawful killings in Afghanistan. Credit...Joel Carrett/EPA, via Shutterstock
The New York Times · by Yan Zhuang · October 3, 2021


19. Hungary’s Leader Fights Criticism in U.S. via Vast Influence Campaign


Hungary’s Leader Fights Criticism in U.S. via Vast Influence Campaign
The New York Times · by Benjamin Novak · October 4, 2021
Viktor Orban, the country’s far-right prime minister, has spent millions on lobbying, support for think tanks and cultivating allies in Washington.

Former Vice President Mike Pence’s visit to Hungary last month was one of several by U.S. conservatives wooed by allies of Prime Minister Viktor Orban.Credit...Laszlo Balogh/Associated Press
By Kenneth P. Vogel and
Oct. 4, 2021, 3:00 a.m. ET
WASHINGTON — Former Vice President Mike Pence turned up in Hungary last month to speak to a conference on conservative social values hosted by the far-right government of Prime Minister Viktor Orban.
Jeff Sessions, the former attorney general, was another recent visitor. Tucker Carlson did his Fox News show from Hungary for a week this summer. The American Conservative Union is planning a version of its CPAC gathering in Budapest early next year.
Those are among the more visible recent fruits of a well-funded campaign by Mr. Orban in the United States that stretches back a decade and now stands as a case study in how governments around the world seek to shape policies and debates in Washington, sometimes raising concerns about improper foreign influence in U.S. politics.
Carried out by a network of government offices, Washington lobbyists, Hungarian diaspora groups, educational institutions and government-funded foundations, the effort’s main impact has been to bolster Mr. Orban’s image as a conservative leader on the world stage — and to counter his reputation as an authoritarian nationalist who is cozying up to Russia and China.
It has also notched some tangible, if fleeting, policy victories for Mr. Orban, including the withdrawal during the Trump administration of a State Department grant to nurture independent news media in Hungary and the securing of a long-coveted Oval Office meeting for Mr. Orban in 2019 with President Donald J. Trump.
Much of what the Hungarian network has done is legal and standard operating procedure in Washington. But some of its activities touch on gray areas, including transparency requirements for those acting on behalf of foreign interests, concerns arising from overseas efforts to sway presidential campaigns, and the ethics of think tanks accepting money from governments or their proxies.
Last year, two prominent foreign policy think tanks in Washington severed ties with the Hungary Foundation, a group funded by the Hungarian government, amid concerns about its connections.
And Joseph R. Biden Jr.’s presidential campaign distanced itself from a volunteer policy adviser after receiving reports of his ties to Mr. Orban. The campaign referred the matter to the F.B.I., according to people familiar with the situation.
The network’s efforts can be traced to around 2011, the year after Mr. Orban became prime minister for the second time. As he worked to raise his global profile, he convened people with ties to Hungary from around the world in a Diaspora Council partly “to assist in developing a coordinated representation of the Hungarian position and interests in foreign media and toward decision makers,” according to government documents.
The Obama administration was leery of Mr. Orban, but the Hungarian leader won an invitation to the White House in 2019 from President Donald J. Trump.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times
Among the groups represented on the roster of attendees at the council’s first meetings were U.S. organizations that have played roles in the influence network.
The leader of one group that participated in the council, Maximilian N. Teleki, has been active for years in Democratic politics. He spearheaded an informal Hungarian-Americans for Biden effort, donated $1,715 to the campaign and served on its volunteer foreign policy group on Europe.
In August 2020, though, Brian P. McKeon, who was serving as a foreign policy adviser to the Biden campaign and is now a top official in the State Department, informed Mr. Teleki that the campaign had “received several reports and expressions of concern about your having connections” to Mr. Orban’s government and political party, Fidesz, according to emails obtained by The New York Times.
Mr. McKeon wrote that the campaign was “not in a position to determine the veracity of these reports” but added “we think it best, for the good of the campaign, that you step back from your participation” in the foreign policy advisory network, which included hundreds of volunteers.
The warning came as Mr. Biden’s campaign was taking precautions to avoid comparisons to 2016, when Russia interfered to try to help Mr. Trump in the election.
“I can unequivocally state that I have had no substantive contacts with ANY members of the Hungarian government or Fidesz since I started working” on the advisory group, Mr. Teleki replied, distancing himself from Mr. Orban.
Mr. Teleki stepped away from the policy group, and campaign officials reported their concerns to the F.B.I., according to people familiar with the situation. It is not clear whether there is an active investigation.
The episode did not stop Mr. Teleki from occasionally engaging with the Biden team, including helping arrange a campaign policy briefing on Zoom for people with ties to Central and Eastern European countries.
Maximilian N. Teleki is a Democrat who has been active in Hungarian diaspora politics.
Last month, Mr. Teleki joined an off-the-record call hosted by the White House, during which he asked a question about the treatment of ethnic minorities in Ukraine — an issue that Mr. Orban has used as a cudgel against Ukraine.
Another prominent figure in the Hungarian diaspora, Frank Koszorus Jr., said there had been discussions about efforts to try to improve the bilateral relationship under Mr. Biden.
“People are interested in contacts with Democrats as well as Republicans,” said Mr. Koszorus, who had registered to lobby for the Hungarian embassy in the 1990s and the early 2000s.
He also served until recently as the chairman of the American Hungarian Federation. The group pressured Mr. Trump’s administration to reconsider the State Department grant intended to foster free press in Hungary. Mr. Orban’s allies had criticized the grant as an example of Washington meddling in their affairs.
To finance some of the efforts in the United States, Mr. Orban’s government authorized the creation and funding of a nonprofit group in 2012 that would come to be known as the Hungary Foundation.
It has donated more than $5.2 million through the end of last year to think tanks, conservative groups, colleges and Hungarian-American organizations — including $1.3 million to groups previously led by Mr. Teleki and Mr. Koszorus — to fund conferences, fellowships and cultural programs.
In 2014 and 2015, some of the foundation’s more prominent board members, including former Gov. George E. Pataki of New York and the diplomat Kurt D. Volker, stepped down over the possibility that the group might be required to register as an agent of the Hungarian government under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, or FARA. The act requires the disclosure of lobbying or public relations campaigns in the United States on behalf of certain foreign interests.
George Pataki, above left, and Kurt Volker, right, resigned their board positions at the Hungary Foundation over concerns about foreign lobbying rules.Credit...Shawn Thew/European Pressphoto Agency
They both rejoined in 2016.Credit...Loren Elliott/Reuters
In late 2015, the Justice Department issued an advisory opinion that the foundation could be exempt from registering under FARA as long as its activities were limited to “bona fide religious, scholastic, academic or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts,” and it did not engage in lobbying or public relations.
Mr. Volker and Mr. Pataki rejoined the board in 2016, and the foundation hired a new executive director, Anna Smith Lacey, a former congressional liaison in the Hungarian Embassy in Washington.
The foundation and Ms. Smith Lacey were soon engaging with U.S. officials and policy debates in ways that sometimes seemed to test the language in the Justice Department’s opinion.
Ms. Smith Lacey, a Hungarian citizen whose father is a prominent government official there, attended one of a series of meetings about Central Europe at the State Department that a Trump appointee held with representatives of groups focused on the region. And she appeared at exclusive gatherings with U.S. officials overseeing Central Europe organized by recipients of foundation grants, including the Atlantic Council and the Center for European Policy Analysis, each of which had received more than $200,000 from the Hungary Foundation.
At a panel hosted by the Atlantic Council in 2019, Ms. Smith Lacey pushed back against claims that democratic governance was eroding in Hungary and accused the United States and other Western countries of hypocrisy, asserting that they treated immigrants, Jews and Christians poorly. She linked Mr. Orban’s agenda to the American nationalism preached by Mr. Trump.
Anna Smith Lacey said the Hungary Foundation was meant to bring understanding between Americans and Hungarians and was not a lobbying group. Her father is a prominent Hungarian government official.Credit...via Hungary Foundation
Ms. Smith Lacey said her attendance at the State Department meeting was unrelated to her role with the foundation, and that the foundation grants did not support the Atlantic Council conference.
But in 2019, the Atlantic Council and the Hungary Foundation entered a partnership to hold private strategy retreats with U.S. and Hungarian policymakers and experts.
A delegation from the Atlantic Council traveled to Budapest a few months after the conference to lay the groundwork for the retreats, which the council envisioned as a platform to discuss issues including the erosion of the rule of law and press freedom.
But a meeting at the foreign ministry grew confrontational, with Hungarian officials insisting that the topics be limited to less contentious issues like trade and energy, according to the Atlantic Council. The Hungarian government did not respond to a request for a comment.
After the meeting, Ms. Smith Lacey’s foundation notified the council that the Hungarian government was no longer interested in the project.
“Our board has decided that the project was not a good fit for us due to FARA considerations,” Ms. Smith Lacey said in an email to The Times.
But Daniel Fried — a former U.S. ambassador to Poland who was on the trip as an Atlantic Council scholar — said he was left with the impression that the change of heart occurred high up in Mr. Orban’s government.
“The question is, and it’s a fair question, did they want to move to the center and have us help sort of validate that kind of move, or did they want to stay on the hard right and simply use us as cover?” Mr. Fried said in an interview. “If Orban was interested in finding a way back to a center-right place, this would have been one way he could do it. But in my view, he wasn’t interested. He was going to go all in on hard right.”
Last year, the Atlantic Council returned a $158,000 grant for the retreats and ended its relationship with the Hungary Foundation, which has been funded almost entirely by $21 million in grants from the Hungarian government, according to Hungarian and U.S. government documents.
The Center for European Policy Analysis also ended its relationship with the foundation amid concerns about its ties to Mr. Orban’s government as well as a potential conflict between Mr. Volker’s roles as a board member of the foundation and a fellow at the center, according to people familiar with the situation.
Ms. Smith Lacey rejected the idea that the foundation was part of a Hungarian government influence operation, saying “our mission is cultural, educational and scholastic. We are not a lobby. Hungary has lobbying firms. I am not interested in that at all.”
Since May 2012, Mr. Orban’s government has paid more than $4.5 million to lobbyists.
His office paid $83,000 in 2013 and 2014 to a well-connected Washington lobbying firm that had partnered with a consulting firm managed by a former cabinet minister in his government who was serving as the chief executive of the Hungary Foundation.
In late 2014, Mr. Orban’s office hired Connie Mack IV, a Republican from Florida who had served in Congress until 2013.
Over the next few years, Mr. Orban’s government paid $3.4 million to firms run by Mr. Mack, including one that partnered with an Orban-backed Hungarian think tank.
Mr. Mack helped win support for withdrawing the State Department media grant that Mr. Orban’s allies had opposed.
After Mr. Mack’s contract ended, the Hungarian government signed a deal with Policy Impact Strategic Communications, a firm run by William Nixon, a veteran Republican lobbyist, that was paid $265,000 to provide lobbying and public relations assistance in 2018 and 2019. It had previously helped form a group called the Hungarian American Institute that arranged a visit by Hungarian legislators to Washington.
The father of Mr. Carlson, the Fox News host, is on the board of both Policy Impact and the Hungarian American Institute. The elder Mr. Carlson does not appear to have been involved in his son’s coverage of Mr. Orban’s government.
But Policy Impact helped lay the groundwork. The firm introduced the younger Mr. Carlson to the Hungarian ambassador, arranged an interview on Mr. Carlson’s show in 2019 with Hungary’s minister of foreign affairs and trade, and helped to arrange meetings with Hungarian officials for a Fox News producer who traveled to Budapest in 2019 to research Mr. Orban’s agenda.
Tucker Carlson, left, with Mr. Orban in Budapest in August. The prime minister welcomed Mr. Carlson when he was filming his Fox News show in the city this summer.Credit...Office of the Hungarian Prime Minister
Asked about the lobbying firm’s efforts, Mr. Carlson said in a text message that “none of this is relevant to anything,” adding that he interviewed Mr. Orban because he was impressed by the Hungarian leader’s immigration policies.
Another organization that has received funding from the Hungarian government, the Danube Institute, has provided fellowships for Western conservatives and also arranged and paid for a speech in Budapest last month by Mr. Sessions, who said he was promised a modest fee.
Mr. Pence lauded Mr. Orban’s social agenda during his speech, but he also urged a tough stance against China, an uncomfortable issue given Mr. Orban’s increasing alignment with Beijing. His appearance came at a conference hosted by Hungary’s minister for families.
The minister was among the Hungarians who met in Washington with officials from the American Conservative Union as the group considered an installment of its Conservative Political Action Conference in partnership with the Budapest-based Center for Fundamental Rights, another organization linked to the Hungarian government.
“It certainly seems like the government wants to partner with us,” said Matt Schlapp, the president of the conservative union.
The New York Times · by Benjamin Novak · October 4, 2021

20. The coin that could avert a federal debt default

Is this a legitimate course of action or simply a gimmick that would undermine trust and confidence in the dollar?

The coin that could avert a federal debt default
Axios · by Felix Salmon
An increasingly vocal chorus of commentators is saying that the U.S. Treasury should #MintTheCoin — issue a small platinum token, give it a face value of $1 trillion, and deposit it at the Federal Reserve.
Why it matters: The gambit, if successful, would prevent the potentially catastrophic debt default that, thanks to Congressional intransigence on both sides of the aisle, is looming fast.
The big picture: When a U.S. Treasury secretary is tasked with averting a fast-looming potential cataclysm, she has to consider all possible options — even those that seem bizarre at first light.
  • Treasury has reportedly considered and rejected the platinum-coin idea — but then again, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin said in 1995 that using the Exchange Stabilization Fund to bail out Mexico would be impossible. (He ended up doing exactly that just a few weeks later.)
How it works: The Fed, once given the coin, would credit Treasury's account with $1 trillion that would not count towards the national debt.
  • The scheme looks legally feasible, although it would surely be challenged in the courts. Politically, however, it looks like a non-starter. The Democratic Party is capable of raising the debt ceiling through the reconciliation process, but refuses to do so for political reasons: They want Republicans to grapple with the fiscal reality of the bills they have already passed.
  • Democrats control the White House and Treasury, neither of which seem to have any more appetite than their Congressional counterparts to let the country off the hook without Republicans being somehow involved.
Driving the news: Bloomberg executive editor Joe Weisenthal, who has an invaluable FAQ on the issue, says that he's "been coinpilled since at least 2013". More recent converts include Nobel laureate Paul Krugman; economist Dean Baker; former Mint director Philip Diehl; members of Congress including Rashida Tlaib and Jerry Nadler; and others including Hayes Brown and Zachary Carter.
  • They all agree that the debt ceiling serves no useful fiscal purpose: It's a dumb political cudgel that risks triggering an unconstitutional and catastrophic default.
  • The trillion-dollar coin would effectively take that cudgel out of the hands of the politicians, rendering them slightly less capable of causing a calamity through inaction alone.
The other side: The trillion dollar coin would allow the government to spend money without borrowing it or raising it via taxation. That could be a dangerous precedent to set.
  • Even if it's legally sound, no one knows whether it's physically possible to mint a platinum coin between now and Oct. 18, when the U.S. risks going into default. Maybe we'll find out at some point in the next few weeks.
Axios · by Felix Salmon

21. Leader of Prestigious Yale Program Resigns, Citing Donor Pressure

Yale's Grand Strategy program should be an educational model for national security studies.

Leader of Prestigious Yale Program Resigns, Citing Donor Pressure
The New York Times · by Jennifer Schuessler · September 30, 2021
The historian Beverly Gage, who has run the Grand Strategy course since 2017, says the university failed to stand up for academic freedom amid inappropriate efforts to influence the curriculum.

“It’s very difficult to teach effectively or creatively in a situation where you are being second-guessed and undermined and not protected,” Beverly Gage said in explaining her decision to resign.Credit...Tess Ayano for The New York Times

By
Sept. 30, 2021
The Brady-Johnson Program in Grand Strategy is one of Yale University’s most celebrated and prestigious programs. Over the course of a year, it allows a select group of about two dozen students to immerse themselves in classic texts of history and statecraft, while also rubbing shoulders with guest instructors drawn from the worlds of government, politics, military affairs and the media.
But now, a program created to train future leaders how to steer through the turbulent waters of history is facing a crisis of its own.
Beverly Gage, a historian of 20th-century politics who has led the program since 2017, has resigned, saying the university failed to stand up for academic freedom amid inappropriate efforts by its donors to influence its curriculum and faculty hiring.
The donors, both prominent and deep-pocketed, are Nicholas F. Brady, a former U.S. Treasury secretary under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, and Charles B. Johnson, a mutual fund billionaire and leading Republican donor who in 2013 made a $250 million donation to Yale — the largest gift in its history.
Days after the 2020 presidential election, Professor Gage said, an opinion article in The New York Times by another instructor in the program calling Donald J. Trump a demagogue who threatened the Constitution prompted complaints from Mr. Brady.
Four months of wrangling over the program later, Professor Gage resigned after the university administration informed her that a new advisory board it was creating under previously ignored bylaws would be dominated by conservative figures of the donors’ choosing, including, against her strong objections, Henry A. Kissinger, the former secretary of state under President Richard M. Nixon.
Her resignation, which Yale has not yet made public, raises the question of where universities draw the line between honoring original agreements with donors and allowing them undue sway in academic affairs. It’s a question that can become turbocharged when colliding political visions, and the imperatives of fund-raising, are involved.
Since taking over the program, Professor Gage has expanded the syllabus to include grass-roots social movements, like the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong and the civil rights movement in the United States. Until late last year, she said, she had received no criticism from the donors or the administration about the course’s direction.
In a statement, Yale’s president, Peter Salovey, offered praise for her teaching and scholarship. But the administration disputed her claims that Yale had given in to donor pressure.
Pericles Lewis, the university’s vice president for global strategy and vice provost for academic initiatives, said the university was simply adhering to its 2006 agreement with the donors, which Professor Gage had resisted.
“It wouldn’t have a controlling power,” he said of the board. “But I can understand why that would not be her cup of tea.”
What the administration sees as legitimate oversight, Professor Gage, who remains a tenured professor in the history department, sees as a sudden effort by the donors to establish “some form of surveillance and control” over the program.
“It’s very difficult to teach effectively or creatively in a situation where you are being second-guessed and undermined and not protected,” she said in an interview.
‘It is traditionally thought that the faculty determine the curriculum.’
The Grand Strategy program was founded in 2000 by the Yale historians John Lewis Gaddis, a leading scholar of the Cold War, and Paul Kennedy, the author of “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” along with the diplomat Charles Hill, a former aide and adviser to George P. Shultz and Mr. Kissinger.
The idea was to teach leadership through an eclectic curriculum of classic texts, case-studies and crisis simulations, incorporating thinkers and topics from Thucydides, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli to the Cold War.
Nicholas F. Brady was U.S. Treasury secretary under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush.
Along with Mr. Brady, Charles B. Johnson, a mutual fund billionaire and leading Republican donor, endowed the Grand Strategy program with a gift of $17.5 million in 2006.
The course “arose out of the desire to reaffirm the power of the big idea,” the journalist Molly Worthen wrote in “The Man on Whom Nothing Was Lost,” her 2005 biography of Mr. Hill. “It came from the professors’ alarm at the rise of the ‘wonk,’ the Clinton-era policy expert with no concept of broad context.”
The course quickly drew admirers (and imitators) well beyond Yale, along with plenty of suspicion on the predominantly liberal campus, where some saw it as a cultish bastion of retrograde “great man” history.
In 2006, it was formally endowed with a combined gift of $17.5 million from Mr. Johnson and Mr. Brady. In a 2013 article in The Yale Daily News, Professor Gaddis said Mr. Brady had given a single directive: “Teach common sense.”
“Grand Strategy” is a capacious but slippery concept, one that has generated continuing debates about its meaning. In his 2018 book “On Grand Strategy,” Professor Gaddis defined it as “the alignment of unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities.”
“Grand Strategy” is a capacious but notoriously slippery concept, one that has generated continuing debates about its meaning, and plenty of books.
In recent years, scholars have extended the concept to business, global public health, party politics and other areas.
Professor Gage, 49, has incorporated social movement strategy into the course. (In a recent essay, she described herself as someone who “was as likely to be a protester as a policymaker.”) She said she has sought to bring in a demographically, politically and intellectually diverse group of practitioners as teachers and guest speakers. Recent invitees have included the former defense secretary James N. Mattis; the conservative intellectual Yuval Levin; the civil rights lawyer Vanita Gupta, and the racial justice activist Heather McGhee.
Professor Kennedy said he supported the direction of the course under Professor Gage. “She is a very gifted leader and teacher,” he said.
Professor Gaddis echoed the sentiment, adding: “I don’t think the Yale administration has sufficiently insulated her. It is traditionally thought that the faculty determine the curriculum, and I think that’s how it should be.”
‘I am not teaching Grand Strategy the way Henry Kissinger would.’
Professor Gage, who was recently nominated to the National Council on the Humanities, was renewed by Yale as program director in July 2020. (She is also a contributing writer for The New York Times Magazine and has written opinion pieces for The Times.) She described her previous relationship with the donors as supportive.
But she said the tone abruptly changed last November, a week after the presidential election, when Bryan Garsten, a Yale political scientist who teaches in the program, published an opinion article called “How to Protect America From the Next Donald Trump.”
The next day, Professor Gage received an email from Mr. Hill saying Mr. Brady had called “to grouse” about the article, “complaining that there was no grand strategy in it.” According to the email, which was viewed by The Times, Mr. Brady also said that “this is not what Charlie Johnson and I signed up for.” (Mr. Hill died last March, at 84.)
In a phone call with Professor Gage that day, Mr. Brady reiterated his view and began asking about the syllabus and practitioners. “It was strange, because none of that had changed much in the past three years,” she said.
Representatives for Mr. Brady, 91, and Mr. Johnson, 88, said they were unavailable for comment.
In another phone call, on Nov. 13, Professor Gage said, Mr. Brady lamented that the program isn’t “what it was.” When she pressed for specifics, he said she wasn’t teaching Grand Strategy “the way Henry Kissinger would.”
“I said, ‘That’s absolutely right. I am not teaching Grand Strategy the way Henry Kissinger would,’” she said.
Later that day, Mr. Brady sent her an excerpt from the 2006 donor agreement, outlining an outside five-member “board of visitors” that would advise on the appointments of the practitioners.
Charles Hill, a former aide and adviser to George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, was one of the founders of the Grand Strategy program, along with John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Kennedy.Credit...Michael Marsland/ Yale University
Professor Gage had never heard of this board, which had never been established. Dr. Lewis, the vice provost, told her he would look into it. Two weeks later, Dr. Lewis said he had confirmed details in the donor agreement, and Yale had a legal obligation to create the board.
Professor Gage wasn’t happy. But if it were created, she insisted to Dr. Lewis, it would need diversity across generational, ideological, methodological, racial and gender lines. And the donors could not be allowed to appoint its members.
Yale, she said, seemed to agree. What followed were nearly two months of back and forth, with Dr. Lewis sending along a string of suggestions — most of them Republicans or conservatives, Professor Gage said. She said she told him most would be fine, as long as the board had a diverse mix.
But in late February, things “started to head downhill.” she said. In a phone call, she said, Dr. Lewis told her that the donors were threatening to sue to reclaim the remaining Grand Strategy endowment. And it was suggested that Mr. Johnson’s $250 million donation might also be in doubt.
Dr. Lewis also said that Mr. Brady wanted a researcher whom he had previously commissioned to write a 2016 book about the program to observe class and report back.
On March 4, things came to a head. According to Professor Gage, Dr. Lewis told her that Mr. Johnson had what Dr. Lewis said was a mistaken impression that he could choose the board, and that he wanted to name Stephen J. Hadley, former national security adviser to George W. Bush; Thomas H. Kean, the former Republican governor of New Jersey; and Mr. Kissinger.
Professor Gage told him the board lacked the necessary variety, and that she objected to Mr. Kissinger. “He represents the opposite of the generational shift I have been trying to make,” she said in the interview.
The next week, Professor Gage said, Dr. Lewis said Dr. Salovey was moving ahead with a board including those three men. And it would not include anyone with social-movement expertise, because the donors didn’t want that.
Yale’s administration disputed the notion that it had given into pressure from the donors, one of whom donated $250 million to the university in 2013 — the largest gift in its history.Credit...Christopher Capozziello for The New York Times
That evening, she spoke with Dr. Salovey, who asked her to see things “from the university’s perspective,” as she recalled it, describing it as a donor-management situation that would likely settle down.
She told him that unless Yale came out more strongly in favor of academic freedom and in support of the current program, she would resign. Several days later, she did so, effective in December.
‘A place of open engagement across ideological lines.’
Dr. Lewis called Professor Gage “an outstanding historian and a great teacher.” But in an interview with The Times, he pushed back on the notion that Yale had been swayed by donor pressure. Aside from a strong desire for Mr. Kissinger, he said, the donors did not pick any board members, beyond wanting an international relations focus (which he called “the original remit of the program”).
Dr. Lewis said the donors had not relayed any political concerns about the board or the program. “The way they expressed to me, it was more about wanting to be sure the goal of international engagement and so on was there, and that we had distinguished practitioners,” he said.
As for the suggestion that Mr. Brady’s researcher might attend class and report back, Dr. Lewis said the thought was that it might be time for “an update” to her book, which was published in 2016 — an idea, he said, that he ruled out.
Asked about Professor Gage’s claim that Dr. Salovey informed her that he intended to include three people on the board she has been told Mr. Johnson wanted, a spokeswoman for Yale declined to comment. “We’re not going to confirm this level of detail about private conversations,” she said.
Dr. Lewis said he did not recall if Mr. Johnson’s $250 million donation came up. Nor did he recall any threats of legal action, though there had been discussion whether the remaining funds could be put to other uses “if for some reason we felt Grand Strategy had reached the end of its time.”
Despite those conversations, Dr. Lewis said there were no plans to discontinue the program, which he called “one of the jewels in the crown of the Yale curriculum.”
Professor Gage said that at a time when many people are concerned about the lack of political diversity at elite campuses, it was ironic that the Grand Strategy program had come under fire.
“This program really tried to be something that lots of people say they want universities to be: a place of open engagement across ideological lines,” she said.
The New York Times · by Jennifer Schuessler · September 30, 2021


22. Universities Are Shunning Their Responsibility to Democracy

I concur that colleges and universities are instrumental to the democracy project.

Excerpts:
Colleges and universities are indispensable to the democratic project. Besides educating citizens, they are among the institutions in our society with the greatest capacity to launch students from marginalized or under-resourced backgrounds up the social ladder. They are stewards of fact and curators of knowledge. They are seedbeds of pluralism, bringing together students and teachers from all parts of society. As institutions, they are interwoven with democracy’s ends and values.
Renewing their obligation to democracy will require not only work but also risk and imagination. Presidents, deans, and faculty leaders across the country must champion the cause. It is worth the fight for a simple reason: Our democracy may depend on it.
Universities Are Shunning Their Responsibility to Democracy
The Atlantic · by Ronald J. Daniels · October 3, 2021
I was born in Canada, and my sense of national identity, like that of many Canadians, was formed in direct relation—perhaps in opposition—to the great colossus to the south. We were a country that aspired not to the lofty abstractions of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” but to the more prosaic benefits of “peace, order, and good government.” I have always been proud of Canada’s basic values—but I have also envied the grandeur of the American experiment, even in the face of its shortcomings and contradictions.
When I first came to the United States, in the mid-2000s, I expected, perhaps naively, that this country would be a bastion of civic learning. Surely the stewards of the world’s first modern democracy would understand the need to cultivate an understanding of both its majesty and its mechanics—the Enlightenment ideas that animate it and the institutions that make it work. But when my children enrolled in high school in Philadelphia, they received only a weak introduction to any of this. That modest exposure, however, was far more elaborate than what many other children across the country receive. Two years ago, during a seminar at Johns Hopkins University, I asked my students if any of them had learned about core democratic ideas and institutions in high school. Only a smattering of hands went up—and those few were at half-mast.
This post is adapted from Daniels’ forthcoming book.
The dearth of civic education is corrosive. According to an Associated Press–GfK survey, from 1984 to 2014, the share of American adults who said that staying informed about current affairs and public issues was “not an obligation that a citizen owes to the country” more than tripled, from 6 to 20 percent. Over roughly the same period, according to Cambridge University’s Centre for the Future of Democracy, dissatisfaction with democracy among young people has risen precipitously, particularly in the United States.
For decades, elementary and secondary schools have borne the responsibility of educating about citizenship. But in an era when funding is limited and partisans on all sides are quick to detect the merest whiff of agendas they dislike, civics and social-studies classes are among the first to shrivel. A majority of principals and other school leaders surveyed in 2018 by Education Week believed that students were not getting enough civics education. Often, there is little they can do.
America’s colleges and universities must step into the breach. Almost 70 percent of recent high-school graduates enroll in college each year; they do so at a time in their lives when they are developing habits and convictions that will persist into adulthood. Yet American universities in recent years have shunned responsibility for an education in democracy almost entirely.
There is no single reason for this. The structure of modern universities, which distributes decision making and authority across a host of specialized departments and other stakeholders, including administration, faculty, and governing boards, is surely one factor; this structure often impedes a generalized view of anything, much less education in civics. Debates among academics over how a shared vision of democracy should be taught—or indeed over whether any such vision exists, or could possibly exist, or ought to be taught—also tend to undermine civic efforts before they can even begin.
For these reasons, among others, universities have remained, at best, bit players in the project of educating a democratic citizenry. In truth, they ought to be a bulwark, bolstering a system of self-governance that is more fissured and fragile than at any time in decades.
The trajectory of civic education at American colleges and universities resembles a sine wave: periods of consensus and activity alternating with periods of apathy and distraction.
The nation’s Founders recognized that indifference, ignorance, and prejudice could tear the republic apart. The United States in 1790 boasted fewer than a dozen colleges, and one popular idea shared by many of the Founders was to create a national university. No one believed more fiercely in this project than George Washington, who devoted a fifth of his inaugural State of the Union address to the idea. A national university never came to fruition in quite the way Washington had envisioned. But in the decades after his death, hundreds of colleges sprang up across the American landscape.
Virtually all of them offered a standard curriculum that culminated in a moral philosophy course. Typically taught by the college’s president, that course was designed to give students an opportunity to exercise moral agency, personal autonomy, and debating skills—core capacities of democratic citizenship—by engaging with serious philosophical and political questions. At its best, the course became a conversation among equals, a dynamic captured perfectly by the description, attributed to President James A. Garfield, of the ideal college: Mark Hopkins, the famed president of Williams College, Garfield’s alma mater, “on one end of a log and a student on the other.”
With the rise of research universities in the 1870s, schools turned away from moral philosophy and toward newly ascendant disciplines such as political science, economics, and sociology. Course catalogs swelled with new offerings in American government and history. Yet in this era of ever-multiplying fields and highly specialized courses, there was little guarantee that future chemists or engineers, or indeed any specialists, would reap the benefit of courses outside their chosen areas. Abraham Flexner, the prominent chronicler of higher education, noted pointedly that when it came to “civic and human relations,” colleges and universities left students at the mercy of “accident, habit, and prejudice.”
Global catastrophe brought a response. In 1918, as the United States ramped up participation in the war effort, some 500 colleges and universities were transformed into de facto military-training centers. Enlisted students at these schools were required to take “War Issues,” a new course designed to survey the political, economic, and philosophical underpinnings of the conflict. World War I ended two months after the course was launched, but nearly 300 institutions continued offering it for the remainder of the academic year.
That was the first stirring of what came to be called the general-education movement, which aimed to restore to college and university curricula a shared educational experience. Throughout the interwar years, university presidents across the country collaborated closely with faculty to design required courses focused on democratic citizenship. The most celebrated and enduring of these is surely the “Contemporary Civilization” sequence at Columbia University, which began in 1919 and continues to this day.
The Second World War amplified this commitment. In 1945, a committee formed by Harvard’s president, James B. Conant, produced the surprise national best seller General Education in a Free Society, which sought to define a common set of understandings and capacities to equip students for citizenship in a democracy. A year later, a national commission on higher education that had been convened by President Harry S. Truman declared that the “first and most essential charge upon higher education is that at all levels and in all its fields of specialization, it shall be the carrier of democratic values, ideals, and process.” By 1950, nearly half of all colleges and universities in the country had adopted a general-education program, most with an explicit focus on democratic citizenship.
That success was cut short by the Cold War’s race for scientific dominance, along with a university ecosystem that, more and more, prized path-breaking discovery and unfettered faculty autonomy. By 1960, general education was, according to the writer Alston Chase, “in full retreat.” Throughout the ’60s, the activism and social concern of the civil-rights era mostly found expression outside the classroom. Yet in the ’70s and into the ’80s, the watchword on campus was careerism, not idealism.
By the mid-’80s, a rising chorus of voices sought to prove that colleges and universities could shake off civic apathy. In 1985, the presidents of Brown, Georgetown, Stanford, and other schools formed Campus Compact, a coalition of colleges and universities devoted to promoting community service. In time, that commitment evolved into “service learning,” which combines local community engagement with classroom study. Today, hundreds of institutes, centers, and offices of service learning operate at colleges and universities across the country. Campus Compact’s membership has grown from 102 institutions in 1986 to more than a thousand in 2019.
The impact of service education has been unequivocally positive. Students who engage in service-learning opportunities in college are more likely to volunteer throughout their postcollegiate lives; to be more tolerant toward others; and to demonstrate leadership in their communities. But service learning, on its own, is not an education in democracy. It generally does not seek to explain why democratic values matter or to ask hard questions, such as why democracies have fallen short of the values they proclaim. It is not designed to nurture affinity for democracy as a system of popular governance. And it does not aim to provide students with the knowledge necessary to engage with or reshape democratic institutions. Service learning has, in this one respect, become a crutch: a way for university presidents to celebrate civic engagement without explicitly having to provide a civic education.
I began my own career during the heyday of service learning. After the implosion of the communist world, beginning in 1989, when thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama were confidently declaring the historical inevitability of liberal democracy, focusing civic-learning efforts on community service made sense. Universities did an admirable job at helping train a generation of socially engaged citizens. Yet I and many others had blithely assumed that students had an adequate understanding of democratic citizenship. They did not. Our civic initiatives were built not on a bedrock of democratic knowledge but on sand.
Inertia is a familiar aspect of academic life. For better or worse, colleges and universities are institutions that prize careful, prolonged deliberation. They resist change. They are innately skeptical of reform. This is true not only of consequential matters but of trivial ones—recall the description by Clark Kerr, who served more than half a century ago as the influential president of the University of California system, of the modern university as a collection of “individual entrepreneurs held together by a common grievance over parking.”
But universities are capable of making bold and innovative changes when there is sufficient will. During my own career, I have had the privilege of seeing and participating in efforts to create significantly more opportunities for first-generation and low-income students; to pioneer cutting-edge research programs in fields such as artificial intelligence and vaccine development; and to forge deeper partnerships between universities and the communities of which they are a part. Each of these efforts had significant obstacles to surmount.
Making education for democracy a core element of higher education’s mission will face its own obstacles, and maybe tougher ones. Chief among them will be the political and ideological divisions, often bitter and unyielding, that can turn any conversation about common values into a ferocious encounter. But we are at a rare moment when the left and the right seem to be aligned behind the idea that more civic education is crucial.
Sonia Sotomayor and Neil Gorsuch, who don’t agree on much, are both pressing the case. A bipartisan bill under consideration in Congress proposes a $1 billion investment in civic education. And colleges and universities in red and blue states alike have begun to take up the cause. Purdue University recently instituted a new civic-literacy requirement for graduation; state legislatures in Florida and Missouri have passed laws requiring something similar for public-university students. Stanford has launched a pilot course for first-year students called “Citizenship in the 21st Century” as part of a proposed new core curriculum. At my own school, Johns Hopkins, faculty across the university, with the support of the SNF Agora Institute, have started to seed democracy-themed courses throughout the curriculum. These efforts may be starting to pay off: The Annenberg Public Policy Center found that more Americans in 2021 reported having taken a course focused on the U.S. government and the Constitution during college than at any time in the past decade.
As these examples illustrate, education for democracy can take many forms, and there is great value in that. No matter its form, the civic education we provide should be encompassing and evenhanded. Studying historical texts from the archives of democracy, for instance, is just as important as practicing the art of peaceful protest to enact change. Neither is inherently reactionary nor inherently radical—both are indisputably democratic. Likewise, civic education should incorporate a rigorous investigation of the ways in which the democratic experiment—in the United States and elsewhere—has fulfilled aspirations. But it should also recognize the ways in which democracy has fallen tragically short. Above all, it should provide students with the knowledge and tools to renew democracy’s promise.
One thing we do know: Civic education works. Study after study has shown that civic education at all levels of schooling—including at the college level—instills a sense of political agency and compensates for what students may not always get at home. In 2019, the sociologists Andrew J. Perrin and Alanna Gillis showed empirically not only that college education is a strong predictor of future democratic participation but also that students who take a social-sciences class in particular are more likely to vote. There appears to be an analogous connection at the national level. Countries listed by the Varieties of Democracy project as the strongest democracies in the world (for instance, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Estonia) are also among those in which young people possess the greatest civic knowledge, as assessed by the International Civic and Citizenship Education Study.
Colleges and universities are indispensable to the democratic project. Besides educating citizens, they are among the institutions in our society with the greatest capacity to launch students from marginalized or under-resourced backgrounds up the social ladder. They are stewards of fact and curators of knowledge. They are seedbeds of pluralism, bringing together students and teachers from all parts of society. As institutions, they are interwoven with democracy’s ends and values.
Renewing their obligation to democracy will require not only work but also risk and imagination. Presidents, deans, and faculty leaders across the country must champion the cause. It is worth the fight for a simple reason: Our democracy may depend on it.
This post is adapted from Daniels’s forthcoming book, What Universities Owe Democracies.
The Atlantic · by Ronald J. Daniels · October 3, 2021
23. Maria Ressa urges world leaders: 'Act now' vs infodemic threatening democracies


And Maria Ressa called out Facebook and its influence on terrorism many years ago (2013)  From Bin Laden to Facebook 10 Days of Abduction, 10 Years of Terrorism

Maria Ressa urges world leaders: 'Act now' vs infodemic threatening democracies
Rappler CEO and president Maria Ressa appealed to world leaders to "act now" against disinformation, a weapon populist regimes have been using to erode democracies.
The veteran Filipino journalist made the appeal during the first global Ministerial Summit for Information and Democracy held on the sidelines of the 76th United Nations General Assembly in New York on Friday, September 24.
Virtually addressing the summit from Manila, Ressa said populist digital authoritarians have used the infodemic – a portmanteau of "information" and “epidemic” – to perpetuate their power.
“All around the world, these populist digital authoritarians are using the scorched earth policy to get elected. Then they use the formal powers of their post, the tools of democracy, to cave institutions in from within. It’s time to end the whack-a-mole approach on the technology platforms to fix what they’ve broken,” Ressa said.
“Please, we need you to act now,” she added.
Ressa has endured constant political harassment and arrests under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s government, and has posted bail 10 times to remain free.
Rappler itself is facing multiple government-backed cases, with Ressa arrested twice. She was convicted of cyber libel under a law that was not yet enforced when Rappler published the article in 2012. The verdict is under appeal.
In April, Ressa received the prestigious UNESCO/Guillermo Cano World Press Freedom Prize for championing press freedom in the face of great danger.
Ressa believes social media platforms like Facebook should be held more accountable for the proliferation of lies online, which have caused divisiveness and cultivated the worst of human behavior across the world.
“They are, by design, dividing us and radicalizing us. This isn’t a free speech issue. It is not the fault of the users. These platforms are not merely mirroring humanity; they’re making all of us our worst selves, creating emergent behavior that’s destroying our world,” she said.
“It’s not a coincidence that divisive leaders are the ones who do the best on social media,” Ressa added.
Disinformation 'aggravating' pandemic
Diplomats at the summit also said the coronavirus pandemic has raised the stakes for governments and tech platforms to battle disinformation online.
Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne said there should be a balance between combatting the infodemic and ensuring people still have their right to free speech.
“So in countering the infodemic, our focus as democracies should be on countering the divisiveness and disorder it seeks to ferment. We need to bolster the spirit of operation and understanding in the international community, to limit the spread of false and harmful information, including social media channels,” said Payne.
Latvian Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs said disinformation is only "aggravating" the spread of the COVID-19, all thanks to rumors and conspiracies aimed to discredit lifesaving vaccines and other health policies.
“I think that considerable part of activities take place on social media and pandemics showed that online platforms need to take additional measures to combat misinformation while protecting and strengthening freedom of expression and data privacy online,” said Rinkēvičs.
Rinkēvičs also said governments must promote social media literacy in society, beginning in elementary schools and amping up information drives across all communication channels.
In March, the UNGA unanimously approved a Latvia-led resolution establishing the Global Media and Information Literacy Week, part of Latvia’s push to address disinformation challenges in the UN framework. – Rappler.com
Rappler multimedia journalist Mara Cepeda is a 2021 fellow of the Reham Al-Farra Memorial Journalism Fellowship. She will be virtually covering the 76th United Nations General Assembly, foreign policy, and diplomacy during the program.

24. Biden And The Reality Of Current State Of Democracy In World

A view from Indonesia.

Excerpts:
Building dialogue forums such as the Copenaghen Democracy Summit or the Bali Democracy Forum” is an attractive option but it will not be enough. Biden’s allies will ultimately prioritize economic cooperation that has a significant impact on their countries rather than just adhering to democratic values. Therefore, the infrastructure project Build Back Better World starting in 2021 involving G7 countries must be built carefully and efficiently. Being a counter to the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) project, this project can be a new era for the hegemony of the United States.
A less serious response to the Tunisian issue, and leaving Afghanistan when the country still needs America is not the right action. The public will ask what kind of commitment Biden wants to build, if policies like this continue then the narrative that democracy is under threat will only become a slogan.
Don’t forget that America still has close ties to the authoritarian state. Biden should also start thinking about how to deal with the United States’ affinity with authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The two countries are one of the main partners of United States Economic and security in the Middle East. Biden will have to weigh whether to leave his main running mate for democratic values ​​or vice versa.
And in the end, building on the narrative that a common enemy of Chinese and Russian influence is not enough to sustain democracy, Biden must learn from history that his predecessors did something bigger in the form of direct economic aid and propaganda during the war. Cold War, only through this can Biden win the heart of the international community.


Biden And The Reality Of Current State Of Democracy In World – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · by Gufron Gozali* · October 3, 2021
From a report submitted by The Economist, the index of democracy worldwide in 2020 was at its lowest position in the last 14 years, only getting a score of 5.37%. Restrictions on gathering in public spaces, distrust of election results and coups, are directly the main factors behind the decline of democracy as in Indonesia. There has even been a shift in the form of democracy in developed countries. France, Hong Kong and even America are currently in the category of flawed democracies. In fact, they are one of the main sponsors of democracy, this shows that there is considerable damage to democracy.
Biden, who is the current President of America, is trying to build a common narrative that democracy is facing a real threat. The threat comes not only from China which is considered the main sponsor of authoritarian values ​​but also from the strengthening of autocrats around the world. This narrative is used as a way to build awareness that at this time there needs to be real action for democracy to survive.
Biden is trying to encourage dialogue between each democratic country through forums such as the Copenaghen Democracy Summit 2021, with the hope of building awareness with the world community about the future of democracy. Not only that, Biden together with G7 countries openly formed infrastructure projects for countries in Asia and Europe with the name Build Better World as an effort to compete with China’s BRI project which is considered a real threat to the existence of democracy. The project and forum was an important step for Biden to demonstrate that America will not remain silent as it is.
The President of the United States has consistently directed and built a foreign policy narrative oriented to the promotion of democratic values. Woodrow Wilson in 1918 said that “the interests of the United States will be in line with the values ​​of democracy and the rule of law.” This spirit was reaffirmed during the Cold War, the United States provided economic assistance to countries in Europe, especially those who adhered to the democratic notions contained in thePolicy Marshall Plan. Although the application of democratic values ​​will only be applied if it is in accordance with American interests. However, this narrative must be maintained in order to maintain the international order.
The realities of world democracy
But first, Biden must realize how the world is today. The problem is that the countries with the leading democracies and the countries with the largest democracies depend too much on China and Russia such as Indonesia and Pakistan, which are major sponsors of authoritarian values. China is currently a trading partner major for Asia and even the European Union. China has succeeded in displacing the United States, which has become a major player in the region. And last but not least, Russia has strong relations with countries that are members of the EU such as the Netherlands because it is one of its main trading partners.
Indonesia, which is one of the largest democracies in the world, places China as its main trading partner and this greatly affects Indonesia in responding to the policies taken by China, as evidenced by Indonesia’s attitude which tends to be passive in dealing with the issue of Uighur Muslims. serious human rights violations by the Chinese government against ethnic Uighurs who are Muslim, such as physical and psychological torture. Even though the majority of Indonesia’s population is Muslim, the policies taken should be able to adjust to these facts. Not only in Indonesia, Pakistan also takes the same attitude.

Pakistan has very close relations with China, through the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Pakistan received an investment of 62 billion dollars from China which began in 2013. CPEC is an infrastructure project that focuses on building roads, ports and even power plants in order to boost the economy. and connectivity in Pakistan. This cooperation makes Pakistan unable to oppose China’s policies. In the case of Uighur Muslims, in an interview conducted by The Independent with Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, Khan stated that “I accept the statement or version presented by the Chinese government about Muslims in Uighurs, and am more worried about the problems at the border.” This shows that the democratic values espoused does not guarantee that the foreign policy of a country will be in tune, in the end the interest will be the main factors that drive the country to act.
Biden response so far
After demonstrations for months demanded the improvement of the situation in Tunisia. President Saied on 25 June 2021 took steps to freeze parliament for 30 days, sacked Prime Minister Hichem Mechichi and Defense Minister Brahim Bartagi, and banned gatherings of more than three people in the streets and other public places. Kais Saied’s actions were considered an act of coup d’etat and hurt the spirit of the Arab Spring by the public and observers alike. America is being asked to take concrete action so that things don’t worsen but in fact the opposite.
The Biden administration has taken this matter very calmly, as evidenced by statements by Jen Psaki, who is secretary of the White House, which says that the government “will learn more about the situation, urge calm, and support Tunisia’s efforts to move forward in line with democratic principles.” Yet this is the key and the right moment to show seriousness to Biden in support of democracy issues.
On the other hand, the Taliban who had just taken control of Afghanistan after Biden surprisingly withdrew thousands of American troops. This ends America’s commitment to building a democratic regime in Afghanistan.article The Economist, written by Henry Kissinger, said that “Biden is trying to create a narrative that America’s only options are complete control or peaceful departure from Afghanistan.” Biden’s recklessness raises questions about how committed he is to pushing the narrative of building stability and a democratic regime.
What Biden should do
Building dialogue forums such as the Copenaghen Democracy Summit or the Bali Democracy Forum” is an attractive option but it will not be enough. Biden’s allies will ultimately prioritize economic cooperation that has a significant impact on their countries rather than just adhering to democratic values. Therefore, the infrastructure project Build Back Better World starting in 2021 involving G7 countries must be built carefully and efficiently. Being a counter to the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) project, this project can be a new era for the hegemony of the United States.
A less serious response to the Tunisian issue, and leaving Afghanistan when the country still needs America is not the right action. The public will ask what kind of commitment Biden wants to build, if policies like this continue then the narrative that democracy is under threat will only become a slogan.
Don’t forget that America still has close ties to the authoritarian state. Biden should also start thinking about how to deal with the United States’ affinity with authoritarian states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The two countries are one of the main partners of United States Economic and security in the Middle East. Biden will have to weigh whether to leave his main running mate for democratic values ​​or vice versa.
And in the end, building on the narrative that a common enemy of Chinese and Russian influence is not enough to sustain democracy, Biden must learn from history that his predecessors did something bigger in the form of direct economic aid and propaganda during the war. Cold War, only through this can Biden win the heart of the international community.
*Gufron Gozali, is a research assistant from the Islamic University of Indonesia.
eurasiareview.com · by Gufron Gozali* · October 3, 2021






V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Personal Email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
Web Site: www.fdd.org
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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