Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Science knows no country, because knowledge belongs to humanity, and is the torch which illuminates the world. Science is the highest personification of the nation because that nation will remain the first which carries the furthest the works of thought and intelligence."

- Louis Pasteur

"He who loses wealth loses much; he who loses a friend loses more; but he that loses his courage loses all."

- Miguel De Cervantes

"[There is] an immense, painful longing for a broader, more flexible, fuller, more coherent, more comprehensive account of what we human beings are, who we are and what this life is for."

- Saul Bellow

1. Our Special Forces’ Capacity to Evolve Despite FailureBy Andrew Exum

2. Special operations warfare

3. After missing goal again, Army announces sweeping recruiting reforms

4. Small-Town Revolt Reveals Larger German Concerns About Arming Ukraine

5. Broadcasting Russian content in a time of war

6. After Shunning Scientist, University of Pennsylvania Celebrates Her Nobel Prize

7. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2023

8. Victim who claims she was sexually assaulted at CIA headquarters sues spy agency accusing it of intimidation

9. Alliance Assignments: Defense Priorities for Key NATO States

10. Former US military pilot's lawyer tells Sydney court that extradition hearing should be delayed

11. China censored this photo of two athletes. Was it for a perceived Tiananmen massacre reference?

12. Rules of engagement issued to hacktivists after chaos

13. Why Military Education Isn't to Blame for Afghanistan and Iraq

14. Lessons From the Korean War for Ukraine

15. Beyond Rhetoric: The Tangible Impact of China-US Decoupling

16. Most ‘aid to Ukraine’ is spent in the US. A total shutdown would be irresponsible.

17. Will Xi’s Military Modernization Pay Off?

18. Meeting the Challenge of Deterring Two Nuclear Peers

19. U.S. and World Leaders Pledge Support for Ukraine ‘for as Long as It Takes’

20. A Ukrainian soldier called up Russian tech support when his captured Russian tank wouldn't start: report

1. Our Special Forces’ Capacity to Evolve Despite FailureBy Andrew Exum

I have to call out this excerpt. How many operations have been conducted outside of the operational control of the regional combatant commander?

Excerpt:

Although Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets, and Ranger companies all fought in Vietnam, they did so largely under the command of conventional military forces. The task force that fought in Somalia was a relatively new phenomenon: a “national mission force” with members from each of the military’s four services that served as a strategic asset operating outside the regional combatant commands, such as Central Command, or Centcom, established by 1986’s Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Our Special Forces’ Capacity to Evolve Despite Failure

The lesson 30 years on from the Battle of Mogadishu is that, with the right response, defeat can be a better tutor than victory.

By Andrew Exum

The Atlantic · by Andrew Exum · October 3, 2023

Thirty years ago today, the U.S. military was involved in a brief but brutal battle in Somalia. In a series of firefights over two bloody days, 18 members of America’s most elite Special Forces and hundreds of Somali militiamen were killed. This was the Battle of Mogadishu, which the journalist Mark Bowden (now an Atlantic contributing writer) famously reported for The Philadelphia Inquirer and later adapted as the book and the film Black Hawk Down.

Although the American units involved fought courageously, and inflicted heavy losses on their adversaries, the Battle of Mogadishu exposed significant weaknesses in U.S. Special Operations Forces’ capability. The televised images of dead Americans being dragged down dusty streets were scarring not only for the Clinton administration, and the American public viewing them on the evening news, but also for the units themselves.

As painful as defeats are, lost battles can end up being the greatest teachers for military organizations. The battle marked an important waypoint in the evolution of our Special Operations Forces, and to this day carries important lessons for them.

In the battle’s aftermath, for example, the Army’s primary special-missions unit—which, like many such units, grants a lot of authority to its noncommissioned officers—concluded that, on balance, it did not have as strong an officer corps as it needed. (Its ground-force commander during the battle did distinguish himself, however, and would later be America’s last NATO commander in Afghanistan.)

The 75th Ranger Regiment, the unit in which I would later serve, was a relative newcomer to such assignments and was largely unfamiliar with urban warfare. So the training I received looked very different—incorporating lessons learned in Somalia—from what my predecessors a decade prior would have had.

In my service with the Rangers, I got to know several of the men who’d fought in the Battle of Mogadishu. Some went on to fight in Iraq or Afghanistan; I did tours in both countries alongside some of them. I’ve been texting with a few of them lately, letting them know that I will be thinking of them today.

Organizations learn in different ways, but large organizations—especially large corporations and military groups—are usually the most resistant to learning. Even in the face of impending doom, such major entities generally find it easiest to keep doing what feels familiar. One of the things that has marked the evolution of U.S. Special Operations Forces, though, is a remarkable willingness to learn and adapt. They need that same willingness today.

Despite the fact that rangers predate the nation’s founding, since such raiding forces fought in the French and Indian War, the United States was a relatively late adopter in the postwar period when it came to elite special-operations forces. This is in contrast with several U.S. allies, such as France, Germany, the U.K., and Israel, all of which developed elite national counterterrorism forces in response to armed extremist movements in the 1960s and ’70s.

Although Navy SEALs, Army Green Berets, and Ranger companies all fought in Vietnam, they did so largely under the command of conventional military forces. The task force that fought in Somalia was a relatively new phenomenon: a “national mission force” with members from each of the military’s four services that served as a strategic asset operating outside the regional combatant commands, such as Central Command, or Centcom, established by 1986’s Goldwater-Nichols Act.

That force was itself the result of an earlier fiasco: the failed effort to rescue 52 embassy staff held hostage in Tehran following the Iranian Revolution in 1979. Eight Americans died in Iran, partly because the various Special Operations units involved had not really worked with one another before, and because the U.S. Army had no special-operations aviation unit to speak of—which proved a particular vulnerability in that operation.

The Army responded to the Iranian reverse by forming the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the famous “Night Stalkers” who flew in Somalia. In addition, the elite Special Operations units in each service began training together on a regular basis. The Ranger Regiment, which historically specialized in seizing airfields and conducting raids deep in enemy territory, began its gradual transformation into the kinetic force it is today.

As they had after Iran, these units learned and evolved after Somalia. This task force became the most lethal man-hunting special-operations outfit the world has ever known. Operations such as the capture of Saddam Hussein, the elimination of Osama bin Laden, and the killing of the ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are all testament to that.

The War on Terror that began after 9/11 is over, but our Special Operations Forces must continue to develop. Last year, the civilian and military leadership of the U.S. Special Operations Forces published a new strategy. It says all the right things, shifting the focus away from fighting non-state actors and toward deterring competitor states such as China and Russia. But the national-security leaders with whom I speak convey concern that these forces are too preoccupied with finding and killing terrorists.

That remains an important mission, but one not as strategically significant as in years past. For example, some of those senior figures have also made clear to me their impatience with the conventional forces that have attempted to take on complicated psychological operations. They point to some high-profile missteps in this arena, notably the use of fake accounts on social-media platforms, and express annoyance that the forces best equipped for such work—our Special Operations Forces—have not yet fully committed to the job.

The Battle of Mogadishu was a political and military disaster that forced our Special Operations Forces to recruit, train, and organize themselves differently. Out of respect for the sacrifices made 30 years ago, we should not wait for another lost battle to evolve anew.

The Atlantic · by Andrew Exum · October 3, 2023

2. Special operations warfare

Hmmmm.....

Special operations warfare | Tactics, Strategies & History

Written by James Kiras

Fact-checked by The editors of the Encyclopedia Britannica

Last Updated: Sep 29, 2023 • Article History

britannica.com

special operations warfare

See all media

Category: History & Society

Key People:

Aaron Bank

Recent News

Sep. 29, 2023, 2:20 PM ET (AP)

The Navy will start randomly testing SEALs and special warfare troops for steroids

special operations warfare, unconventional military actions against enemy vulnerabilities that are undertaken by specially designated, selected, trained, equipped, and supported units known as special forces or special operations forces (SOF). Special operations are often conducted in conjunction with conventional military operations as part of a sustained politico-military campaign. Some special operations are spectacular direct raids that capture wide publicity, but others are long-term indirect efforts that are never made known. No matter what form it takes, each special operation is an effort to resolve, as economically as possible, specific problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or impossible to address with conventional forces alone.

Differences between special operations warfare and conventional warfare

Special operations warfare is conducted by uniformed military forces. This distinction helps to differentiate special operations warfare from activities such as sabotage and subversion conducted by intelligence agencies or internal security and policing conducted by law-enforcement units employing special weapons and tactics. Sometimes the dividing line between special operations conducted by intelligence agencies and those conducted by military units is not clear, as in the case of intelligence gathering on the one hand and special reconnaissance activities on the other. Often the only difference between them is organizational, as special forces fall under military chains of command and its operators wear uniforms, whereas those from intelligence agencies do not. In addition, there are legal differences between the two activities: national laws authorizing overt and clandestine military actions may be entirely separate from laws authorizing covert actions by civilian intelligence agencies, and certainly there is a great difference around the world in the legal protections afforded to military as opposed to intelligence personnel. (Intelligence personnel have no legal standing internationally, whereas military personnel ostensibly receive some protection under the laws of war.)

Russian Interior Ministry special forces (Spetsnaz) and a civilian volunteer searching for Islamist militants in a village in the southern Russian republic of Dagestan, 1999.

Given its unorthodox nature, special operations warfare is directly related to other well-known forms of unconventional warfare such as terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and insurgency. Most often, however, special forces are trained to counter such forms of warfare, using superior tactics, equipment, supply, and mobility to defeat terrorists, guerrillas, and insurgents who adopt unconventional tactics out of necessity. Special forces seek to deprive irregular opponents of the few tactical advantages they possess by denying them mobility, sanctuary, surprise, and initiative. In other cases, though, special forces may actually conduct guerrilla warfare or insurgency against conventional state-based adversaries, for example, by harrying or harassing supplying lines, raising partisan forces, or distracting enemy forces from conventional operations by forcing them to deal with threats in areas thought to be pacified or secure.

David Stirling and members of the Special Air Service

Special operations also must be distinguished from operations conducted by “specialized” conventional military forces—for instance, airborne and amphibious units. Those forces are organized, equipped, and trained to perform one specific task (for instance, airborne assault, airfield seizure, or amphibious landing), and they would require significant time, retraining, and reequipping to conduct another task. Often such specialized units receive the moniker of corps d’elite, reflecting their unique purpose, traditions, and past achievements in combat. The most significant differences between special operations forces and specialized forces lie in two broad areas. First is the scale of their operations: special operations are relatively small-scale, being conducted by companies, platoons, teams, or squadrons, whereas specialized operations are mounted by large units such as regiments, brigades, or even divisions. The second area is orthodoxy: special operations feature improvised and often indirect approaches, whereas specialized military operations feature orthodox approaches in a relatively direct assault.

Britannica Quiz

World Wars

To sum up, special operations warfare differs from conventional warfare on the basis of three criteria: the economical way in which force is used; different considerations and calculations of political and operational risk; and the characteristics and qualities of the military forces that conduct them. The “special” qualities of special forces are a product of their organization, training, support, and, most important, selection. All these factors are discussed in detail below, and all allow for the creation of flexible forces that employ unorthodox approaches to solve difficult and risky problems.

britannica.comqs

3. After missing goal again, Army announces sweeping recruiting reforms

After missing goal again, Army announces sweeping recruiting reforms

armytimes.com · by Davis Winkie · October 3, 2023

The Army has launched far-reaching reforms that will transform how it attracts and recruits new soldiers, its top leaders said in a press conference today.

The moves come after the service failed to meet its recruiting targets for two consecutive fiscal years, which caused its end strength to fall from an original level of 485,000 in late 2021 to around 452,000 active duty soldiers today — its smallest full-time force since 1940, the year before the U.S. entered World War II.

Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said the changes came after an in-depth recruiting study that compared 25 years of internal Army data and organizational structure against labor market trends and private sector practices.

“What we’re doing is really focused on changing what we can control [and] seizing our own destiny,” Wormuth said.

The reforms, which will begin immediately, though some will take years to complete, will include:

Establishing new specialized enlisted and warrant officer recruiting career fields that will replace the existing 79R MOS and eventually abolish involuntary recruiting assignments.
Formally increasing recruiters’ mandate to woo prospective soldiers with college education, due to the shrinking proportion of workforce members who have only a high school education.
Creating an experimentation directorate within the Recruiting Command that is isolated from current-year production pressure.
Integrating effective data analysis to support recruiting policy decisions after the study group found the service has failed to verify whether historical changes were effective.
Reassigning Recruiting Command to report directly to Wormuth, and raising its commanding general rank to a three-star level and extending the command tour length to four years.
Reassigning the Army Enterprise Marketing Office to report to Recruiting Command.

Source: Secretary of the Army

Wormuth and George said the Army has failed to keep up with trends in the U.S. labor market in recent decades, and recent high-profile failures to meet accession goals were the culmination of a long-term trend. The Army has not met its contract goals since 2014, which has slowly drained its pool of “delayed entry” recruits who are awaiting training and forced it to rely on late-year recruiting surges fueled by recruiter willpower rather than effective and efficient practices.

The Army’s all-out effort to make its recruiting goals both last year and this year yielded some important successes. One such example is the Future Soldier Prep Course for applicants who need to improve their fitness or test scores before they can go to basic training, Wormuth emphasized that “continuing to sort of have the same approach but do it better and harder was not going to get us where we need to be.”

The Army’s leaders expressed confidence that shifting the Army’s recruiting model to more closely resemble that of the private sector will help it reach markets that it has struggled to tap. They believe it will also nest well with the service’s recent marketing refresh, which rebirthed the classic “Be all you can be” slogan.

How embracing ‘Be all you can be’ resurrected Army marketing

The rebrand is the latest move in a series of service-wide efforts that may reduce recent years’ recruiting struggles.

“We’re going to train [recruiters] to start using digital job boards...we’re going to start piloting large-scale career fairs in major population centers,” Wormuth said. “Instead of just having a table in a high school cafeteria, we’re really going to try to do something more like private sector companies do.”

But because the reforms will take time to implement and reach their full potential, the Army may have to make tough decisions on cutting units it can’t man in the interim due to its falling numbers.

Wormuth, however, is confident that any unit-level force structure reductions will be “very modest [and] targeted,” and will fall primarily on organizations that are redundant or haven’t been used a lot in recent years.

About Davis Winkie

Davis Winkie is a senior reporter covering the Army. He focuses on investigations, personnel concerns and military justice. Davis, also a Guard veteran, was a finalist in the 2023 Livingston Awards for his work with The Texas Tribune investigating the National Guard's border missions. He studied history at Vanderbilt and UNC-Chapel Hill.

4. Small-Town Revolt Reveals Larger German Concerns About Arming Ukraine

Excerpts:

Some in Grossenhain feared that the factory would anger President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who spent nearly five years as a K.G.B. agent in nearby Dresden, and make their city a military target.

“He knows exactly where the airfield is,” Kerstin Lauterbach, the city councilor from the Left Party who led efforts to protest the factory, said of Mr. Putin. “The population is very, very sensitive to such arguments. The history and the powder factory — it’s inseparable.”

Small-Town Revolt Reveals Larger German Concerns About Arming Ukraine

By Catie Edmondson and Ekaterina Bodyagina

The reporters traveled to the storied airfield in Grossenhain in the former East Germany, and interviewed more than a dozen people for this story.

Oct. 3, 2023

The New York Times · by Ekaterina Bodyagina · October 3, 2023

The resistance of tiny Grossenhain to a new arms plant shows how the government’s plan for a more assertive foreign policy is struggling to gain traction.

A fighter jet and a missile on display at an airfield in Grossenhain, Germany, that was home to the Red Baron during World War I, the Nazis in World War II and the Soviets in the decades that followed.Credit...Ingmar Nolting for The New York Times

By Catie Edmondson and

The reporters traveled to the storied airfield in Grossenhain in the former East Germany, and interviewed more than a dozen people for this story.

Oct. 3, 2023, 12:01 a.m. ET

When government leaders in Saxony learned that Rheinmetall, Germany’s most prominent arms manufacturer, was considering building a new munitions factory in the former East German state, they saw visions of economic boom.

It was a chance, they thought, to capitalize on the city’s storied airfield — home to the Red Baron in World War I, the Nazis in World War II and the Soviets in the decades that followed — to bring in hundreds of jobs and a slice of a huge infusion of federal funds to rebuild Germany’s depleted armed forces.

Some in the chosen city of Grossenhain, with a population approaching 20,000, saw it differently.

Sixteen of 22 members of the City Council signed a letter to Chancellor Olaf Scholz urging him to block the project. The local wing of Alternative for Germany, or AfD, the resurgent far-right political party, held a rally in June where speakers railed against arms sales to Ukraine. Residents lined up to sign a petition circulated by the city’s Left Party.

“We reject a further economic-military use after years of military use,” the petition read. “We do not want to be involved in wars all over the world in a roundabout way.”

Perhaps easily dismissed as small-town politics, the revolt in tiny Grossenhain in fact reveals far larger unease among some Germans, particularly in the former Communist East, about their country’s commitment to arming Ukraine, despite the chancellor’s professed “Zeitenwende,” or turning point, toward a more assertive foreign policy.

A technician at a Rheinmetall factory in Unterlüss, Germany, working in June on ammunition to be delivered to soldiers in Ukraine.

Support for that pivot has been muted by the decades East Germany spent as a Soviet satellite during the Cold War, which left the region with both a lingering fear of Russia and an affinity for it.

More broadly, many Germans still hold a deep aversion to war and to defense spending in a country whose Nazi past has made it reluctant to invest in military power. The view from Berlin is one thing; the political realities on the ground are another.

“Lots of people are coming from the ’80s, or the ’70s, or the ’60s — that, ‘We don’t want weapons anymore. We don’t want an army anymore. This is not needed anymore. We want to live in peace with Russia,’” said Sebastian Fischer, a member of Saxony’s state legislature who held listening sessions with voters about their concerns regarding the factory. “It’s very difficult to explain to people why we should defend Ukraine.”

The opposition to a proposed factory in Grossenhain began almost immediately after Rheinmetall’s chief executive, Armin Papperger, said in an interview in January that he was in discussions with the federal government about building a powder munitions plant in Saxony to meet a surge in demand caused by the efforts of Kyiv and its Western allies to resist the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Some in Grossenhain feared that the factory would anger President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who spent nearly five years as a K.G.B. agent in nearby Dresden, and make their city a military target.

“He knows exactly where the airfield is,” Kerstin Lauterbach, the city councilor from the Left Party who led efforts to protest the factory, said of Mr. Putin. “The population is very, very sensitive to such arguments. The history and the powder factory — it’s inseparable.”

Today, the 360-acre airfield, the largest tract of industrial-use land in eastern Germany, is home to warehouses and a small flight club, but old Soviet helicopters and jets still rest at the edges of the runways.

A stele erected in Grossenhain by Soviet forces shortly before their withdrawal in March 1993.Credit...Ingmar Nolting for The New York Times

Grossenhainers remember the Soviet presence as sometimes menacing, recounting stories of the base siphoning residents’ electricity and generating a persistent din of jets roaring overhead. But the base’s very existence also instilled fear.

Caught between two nuclear powers, the Soviets to the east and the Americans to the west, Grossenhainers fretted that the air base would put them on the front lines if nuclear war broke out. Records later released by the C.I.A. show that Americans did, in fact, scrutinize the city and base in the early 1950s, with officials filing reports on the activity there.

Ms. Lauterbach was horrified by the idea that the airfield would return to military use. When the Soviets left, residents “were relieved that there was no longer a military there,” she said.

As a leftist, Ms. Lauterbach said that she was opposed to all arms sales — not just ones to Ukraine — and that she condemned “the war of aggression” by Russia.

Yet Ms. Lauterbach said she placed some blame with European and American leaders for failing to resolve the conflict “peacefully” before it turned into a hot war. “I can imagine that Putin is feeling squeezed,” she said, “because NATO is slipping closer and closer.”

Kerstin Lauterbach, city councilor for the Left Party in Grossenhain, in her office, showing signed petitions and leaflets opposing the munitions factory.Credit...Ingmar Nolting for The New York Times

Armin Benicke, a former pilot, became a prominent voice opposing the factory, arguing that it was unsafe to build a plant producing chemicals so close to the city. He said he supported efforts to rearm Germany but was unhappy to see Berlin send so much aid to Ukraine when Germany’s own economy was struggling.

“This special fund for the Bundeswehr — 100 billion so that you can now buy a decent amount of weapons,” Mr. Benicke said, using the name for the German armed forces and referring to euros. “I say that’s a mistake, because the weapons you buy go to Ukraine.”

Jens Lehmann, who represents Saxony in the German Parliament, said in an interview that decades of trade and “socialization” with the Soviets during the Cold War had left many East Germans with a “pragmatic” view of Russia.

“People have been trading with Russia since the end of” World War II, said Mr. Lehmann. “Even after German reunification, we always got cheap and reliable Russian gas. That’s why people say about the war, ‘We have to negotiate, we have to find a diplomatic way.’”

Little information was made available to the public about what a factory in Grossenhain would look like, allowing rumors to run rampant. Dirk Diedrich, Saxony’s commissioner for strategic investment projects, said that he and other state leaders were shut out of discussions with Rheinmetall.

An old helicopter at the Grossenhain airfield in September.Credit...Ingmar Nolting for The New York Times

“What made it very difficult for us is that we could not put facts into the discussions,” Mr. Diedrich said. “No one could say what exactly are the plans of the company.”

If those discussions had taken place, he said, “We could have convinced the majority that this is a good investment.”

Instead, the AfD party, classified in Saxony as a suspected right-wing extremist organization, seized on the debate. Nearly 200 people attended its rally, carrying cardboard hearts in the party’s signature blue that read “PEACE!”

André Wendt, an AfD member of Saxony’s state parliament, accused Western governments of “putting us all at risk” and “mobilizing for war” by sending arms to Ukraine.

“It is scandalous and ahistoric when the media celebrates the move of German Leopard tanks against Russia in newsreel fashion and critics of these arms deliveries and this war are portrayed as extremist,” Mr. Wendt said in a speech at the rally.

A street in Grossenhain. Sixteen of Grossenhain’s 22 City Council members signed a letter to Chancellor Olaf Scholz urging him to block the Rheinmetall factory.Credit...Ingmar Nolting for The New York Times

The scene prompted fuming from politicians who saw the prospect of a multimillion-euro factory as an opportunity to attract Western companies that are increasingly building in eastern Germany. Early estimates suggested that Rheinmetall’s factory would have brought an investment of about $840 million and as many as 600 jobs to the region.

In the end, Rheinmetall decided against building a new factory — at least for now — in favor of expanding its existing plant on Germany’s southern border. It was an economic decision, Mr. Papperger said, concluding that a new plant would be commercially viable only with a huge new contract or a major infusion of state aid.

Mr. Lehmann said that was a shame. “The big companies are in Munich, in North Rhine-Westphalia, in Berlin, in northern Germany, somewhere on the coast. But in the east, there are relatively few defense and security companies.”

“With the Zeitenwende, there is a political will to develop the security and defense industry,” he added. “It would be a pity if this did not happen somewhere in eastern Germany.”

Catie Edmondson is a reporter in the Washington bureau, covering Congress. More about Catie Edmondson

The New York Times · by Ekaterina Bodyagina · October 3, 2023

5. Broadcasting Russian content in a time of war

The PDF of the whistleblower complaint is at this link: https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018a-f73b-d56c-abfa-ff7f09590000

Broadcasting Russian content in a time of war

Politico · by ERIC BAZAIL-EIMIL, DANIEL LIPPMAN, MATT BERG and NAHAL TOOSI · October 4, 2023

With help from Lara Seligman and Joshua Posaner

As the war in Ukraine rumbles on, debate has emerged at a U.S. government-funded broadcaster in former Soviet states over how to balance the celebration of Russian culture and traditions with hard news about Moscow’s military actions.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty — launched during the Cold War to promote American values behind the Iron Curtain — is facing a complaint from a former editor over how it has handled this question. In the July complaint, sent to the State Department Inspector General and shared exclusively with NatSec Daily, KENAN ALIYEV claims that consultants hired by the broadcaster pushed for content “celebrating Russian culture and creativity, without any regard to RFE/RL’s mission of countering Russian propaganda.”

Aliyev, a former executive editor for feature programming at one of RFE/RL’s channels, and others formerly affiliated with the broadcaster say the content misrepresents Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with executives taking a more open-minded approach to Russian cultural programming, often causing intense editorial disagreements.

A spokesperson for RFE/RL said the broadcaster is aware of Aliyev’s claims and told NatSec Daily that Congress understood it would pursue greater cultural programming when it authorized increased funding in the immediate aftermath of the 2022 invasion.

“While reporting and analyzing the news remains the bread and butter of what we do, RFE/RL also provides intelligent and effective cultural programming that is entirely consistent with our mission and values,” said the spokesperson, who like others interviewed was granted anonymity to discuss details of the complaint freely.

The State Department Office of Inspector General, which received Aliyev’s complaint, said it would not comment on investigative matters. STEVE CAPUS, a former president of NBC News and one of the consultants named in Aliyev’s complaint, did not return NatSec Daily’s request for comment.

Cultural programming has long been a staple of U.S. international broadcasts, but the war in Ukraine has prompted hostility toward Russian culture more broadly. Moscow, for its part, has in turn used this backlash to fuel its Russia-versus-the-West narrative.

“It’s in our interest to advance a different, appealing vision for Russian society that looks beyond VLADIMIR PUTIN,” said a former RFE/RL executive familiar with the matter. “You need to reach the audience inside Russia with topics and voices that appeal to them. You can’t drag them kicking and screaming to dull, tired content that is irrelevant to their lives.”

MARK POMAR, a senior fellow at the University of Texas at Austin and former RFE/RL Russian service official, noted that cultural programming could also help challenge revisionist narratives about Russian history.

“If they’re doing cultural programming that is challenging the Kremlin interpretation, that is telling Russians and showing Russians their history is far more complex than what is being presented in this sanitized version … that’s a wonderfully important thing,” Pomar told NatSec Daily.

6. After Shunning Scientist, University of Pennsylvania Celebrates Her Nobel Prize

After Shunning Scientist, University of Pennsylvania Celebrates

Her Nobel Prize

School that once demoted Katalin Karikó and cut her pay has made millions of dollars from patenting her work

https://www.wsj.com/health/after-shunning-scientist-university-of-pennsylvania-celebrates-her-nobel-prize-96157321?mod=hp_lead_pos7

By Gregory ZuckermanFollow

Oct. 4, 2023 1:50 pm ET

The University of Pennsylvania is basking in the glow of two researchers who this week were awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine for their pioneering work on messenger RNA.

Until recently, the school and its faculty largely disdained one of those scientists.

Penn demoted Katalin Karikó, shunting her to a lab on the outskirts of campus while cutting her pay. Karikó’s colleagues denigrated her mRNA research and some wouldn’t work with her, according to her and people at the school. Eventually, Karikó persuaded another Penn researcher, Drew Weissman, to work with her on modifying mRNA for vaccines and drugs, though most others at the school remained skeptical, pushing other approaches.

Karikó hasn’t only proven her detractors wrong but also reached the pinnacle of science. Her research with Weissman helped lead to the mRNA vaccines that protected people worldwide during the Covid-19 pandemic and now shows promise for flu, cancer and other diseases.

Penn, which patented their mRNA technology, has made millions of dollars from drugmakers that licensed it. And on Monday, when Karikó and Weissman were awarded the Nobel, on top of prestigious science prizes in recent years, the school expressed a different perspective on their work.

The reversal offers a glimpse of the clubby, hothouse world of academia and science, where winning financial funding is a constant burden, securing publication is a frustrating challenge and those with unconventional or ambitious approaches can struggle to gain support and acceptance.

“It’s a flawed system,” said David Langer, who is chair of neurosurgery at Lenox Hill Hospital, spent 18 years studying and working at Penn and was Karikó’s student and collaborator.

Researchers Katalin Karikó and Drew Weissman spoke on Monday after the announcement of their Nobel Prize in medicine. PHOTO: MANDEL NGAN/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

Penn wasn’t the only institution to doubt Karikó’s belief in mRNA when many other scientists pursued a different gene-based technology. In a reflection of how radical her ideas were at the time, she had difficulty publishing her research and obtaining big grants—prerequisites for those hoping to get ahead in science and gain academic promotions.

Another reason her relationship with the school frayed: Karikó could antagonize colleagues. In presentations, she often was the first to point out mistakes in their work. Karikó didn’t intend to offend, she just felt the need to call out mistakes, she later said.

Once, she saw that cells two colleagues had worked on for weeks had degraded and were no longer viable and discarded them without asking for permission, startling her colleagues.

“This is trash,” Karikó told them.

The relationship between Karikó and Penn became strained over many years. She came to the university in 1989 as a research assistant professor in the cardiology department of the medical school. Her job, which wasn’t a tenure-track position, was to do research and deliver lectures for graduate students.

Karikó was thrilled at the chance to pursue her mRNA research and became a friendly presence in the department, lugging Hungarian dishes to the office that she shared with colleagues.

Yet Karikó also was sensitive to perceived affronts. Once, while chatting with colleagues at a department Christmas party, a professor mentioned that Karikó was working for him on a project.

“You think I’m working for you?” Karikó asked him, livid, according to someone who witnessed the episode. “I’m here to advance science, I’m never, ever, working for you.”

Katalin Karikó at home in Philadelphia with her husband on Monday as news broke of her award. PHOTO: UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED/VIA REUTERS

Research-assistant professors usually were foreign-born scientists—some faculty members referred to them as “the aliens”—willing to overlook meager salaries for the experience of working in the Ivy League university’s world-class labs and because Penn promised to support their green-card applications.

Karikó felt like something of a second-class citizen. Once, she was reprimanded for using deionized water belonging to a senior member of her lab, rather than climb five flights of stairs to get some from a different laboratory, she later recalled.

After long days in the lab, Karikó returned home to write grant applications, proposing to use mRNA to develop various treatments. She rarely found success. Reviewers sometimes questioned her proposals, noting her title at the school.

Penn professors and others had good reasons for their skepticism. Most everyone else was becoming enamored with using DNA, a different molecule. DNA has two strands of nucleotides that wind around each other like a twisted ladder, making it durable.

By contrast, mRNA is single-stranded and notoriously unstable and hard to work with. Researchers had to wear gloves just to touch equipment coming in contact with the molecule; just breathing on the instruments made them unusable for mRNA. Inside the cell, mRNA only sticks around a short while before it is eliminated. And the body has developed elaborate methods to ward off the molecule.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, OCTOBER 3, 2023

Oct 3, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3, 2023

Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Christina Harward, and Mason Clark

October 3, 2023, 8:40pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on October 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu celebrated an odd group of Russian armed formations operating in the western Zaporizhia Oblast direction during a conference call with Russian military leadership. Shoigu’s choice of units could indicate he seeks to highlight Russian commanders who continue to follow Russian military leadership’s orders for relentless counterattacks. Shoigu attributed successful Russian defensive operations around Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) to elements of the Russian 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District), 56th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division), 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet), and the 291st Guards Artillery Brigade (58th CAA, SMD) during a Russian military command meeting on October 3.[1] Shoigu did not highlight other formations that are routinely credited for maintaining the Robotyne-Verbove line such as the 108th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division) or the 247th VDV Regiment (7th VDV Division).[2]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has routinely deliberately snubbed or amplified the achievements of certain commanders in order to achieve Shoigu or the Russian military command’s political objectives.[3] While it is possible that Shoigu simply wanted to celebrate only a few formations, Shoigu may have highlighted some of these formations for political reasons. Some Russian milbloggers recently indicated that Russian commanders are increasingly facing a choice between either “wasting” their troops in counterattacks to hold tactical positions, or standing up to the Russian military command by retreating to previously prepared positions, thereby risking their careers.[4] One Russian frontline unit commander also indicated that Commander of Russian VDV Forces Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky previously helped a degraded VDV formation avoid resuming counterattacks in the Bakhmut direction, and Shoigu could be snubbing formations who are advocating for tactical retreats to prepared defensive positions.[5]

Some of the formations Shoigu highlighted have been consistently counterattacking on the Robotyne-Verbove line to their detriment. ISW observed on September 26 that elements of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment and other formations of the 58th CAA (likely including the 291st Guards Artillery Brigade) continued to counterattack near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv) despite their likely degraded state.[6] ISW also assessed that the involvement of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment in these counterattacks suggests that the combat capabilities of active elements of the 7th VDV Division are significantly degraded and that these VDV elements can no longer conduct all counterattacks along the entire Ukrainian breach in the Orikhiv direction.[7] Military police of the 70th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment were recently involved in an interethnic altercation with personnel of an element of the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division).[8] Ukrainian intelligence reported that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast had “completely defeated” the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade and that the brigade had been withdrawn.[9] ISW has not observed the broader Russian information space discuss the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade’s combat operations since early to mid-September.[10] A Russian milblogger that advocates for Teplinsky claimed that elements of the 56th VDV Regiment have been consistently counterattacking from their vulnerable positions in Novofedorivka (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and that the commander of the regiment was facing a decision to either counterattack or withdraw to previously prepared positions.[11]

The Russian MoD signaled its support for Chechen units fighting in Ukraine amid a recent controversy surrounding interethnic tensions in the Russian government, military, and information space. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu personally thanked Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov for overseeing the formation of three motorized rifle regiments and three motorized rifle battalions in Chechnya during a conference with Russian military leadership on October 3.[12] Shoigu claimed that these Chechen units have “proven themselves worthy” in the war in Ukraine and that over 14,500 Russian military personnel have undergone training at the Russian Special Forces University in Gudermes, Chechnya, before deploying to Ukraine. Kadyrov claimed on October 2 that over 30,000 Chechens have deployed to Ukraine, including over 14,000 volunteers.[13] Shoigu’s public praise of Kadyrov and Chechen units indicates the Russian MoD’s support for these units amid growing interethnic tension, as well as in the context of recent controversy in the Russian information space over statements by the Chairperson of the “Patriots of Russia” political party and the State Duma Committee of Nationalities Gennady Semigin about the superiority of Chechen “Akhmat” forces over regular Russian forces.[14]

The Kremlin also publicly indicated its support for Kadyrov’s style of rule in Chechnya following significant public outcry against Kadyrov and his son. Kadyrov stated on October 2 that he supported a proposal by Chechen Republic Prime Minister Muslim Khuchiev to appoint Kadyrov’s 24-year-old daughter, current Chechen Minister of Culture Aishat Kadyrova, as Deputy Prime Minister for Social Issues.[15] Kadyrov further stated on October 3 that he presented Kadyrova with the People’s Artist of Chechnya award and a Second Class Civilian Medal of the Order “For Merit to the Fatherland,” which Russian President Vladimir Putin conferred on Kadyrova in September.[16] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to questions about Kadyrova’s appointment, stating that regional appointments are at the “prerogative of the head of the region” and that “Kadyrov is using his prerogative.”[17] The Kremlin’s deferral to Kadyrov’s recent decisions surrounding his daughter and Chechen government affairs comes after a controversy regarding Kadyrov’s praise for his son, Adam Kadyrov, who beat a detained man accused of burning a Quran. This comes despite prominent members of the Russian Human Rights Council calling for the investigation into Adam Kadyrov for the beating.[18] Both the Kremlin and MoD’s public responses on October 3 indicate that the Russian government will likely not punish Semigin, Ramzon Kadyrov, or Adam Kadyrov.

Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly preparing to announce his (certain to win) presidential campaign in November 2023, and reportedly intends to discuss the war in Ukraine as little as is necessary in political messaging. Russian outlet Kommersant reported on October 3 that sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that Putin may announce his campaign during or shortly after the opening of the “Rossiya” international exhibition and forum on November 4.[19] Kommersant’s sources claimed that the main ideological line of Putin’s campaign will be Russia as a “family of families” being attacked by its enemies and that Putin’s campaign will only discuss the war in Ukraine “exactly as much as necessary.” ISW has previously observed that Russian officials, particularly those affiliated with Putin’s United Russia party, appear concerned with the impacts the war will have on the electorate during local and regional elections.[20] Russian news outlet RBK reported that the Kremlin is compiling a list of “proxies” to campaign for Putin ahead of the March 2024 presidential elections.[21] These “proxies” must meet several criteria, including: expressing public support for Putin and the war in Ukraine; having a high level of recognition and respect in their communities; having public speaking skills and debate experience; and being involved in religion, the military, education, or other specified public spheres. Concerns within the Kremlin and United Russia over domestic support for the war and efforts to increase public support for Putin are not indications that United Russia or Putin’s dominance of Russian politics faces a legitimate threat in the upcoming presidential election.

A Reuters report published on October 3 stated that Russian forces have embedded “Storm-Z” units within conventional Russian units to conduct costly counterattacks against Ukrainian gains in key sectors of the front. Reuters reported that the Storm-Z units are composed of 100-150 personnel, including both civilian penal recruits and Russian soldiers under punishment, are embedded within conventional Russian military units, and deploy to the most exposed parts of the front.[22] Reuters estimated that Russia has currently deployed at least several hundred personnel to the front line in various “Storm-Z” units. Reuters interviewed multiple Russian soldiers, including fighters in “Storm-Z” units, which the Russian military command reportedly views as lesser than conventional military units. The Russian soldiers told Reuters that the Russian military command sends Russian soldiers to serve in the “Storm-Z” units after they commit acts of disobedience, including insubordination or drinking alcohol. Reuters reported that the Storm-Z units have sustained heavy losses, and one soldier embedded in the 237th Guards Air Assault Regiment (76th Airborne [VDV] Division) reportedly stated that his “Storm-Z” unit of 120 personnel lost all but 15 personnel while fighting near Bakhmut in June 2023. The Russian MoD has never formally confirmed the existence of the “Storm-Z” units, and ISW first reported on the existence of these “Storm-Z” units in April 2023.[23]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction and offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction.[24] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut) south of Bakhmut and on the Kopani-Robotyne-Verbove line (11-18km southwest to southeast of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[25]

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 3 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 29 of 31 Shahed drones and one Iskander-M cruise missile targeting Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[26] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces struck an industrial enterprise near Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[27]

The Armenian Parliament ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 3.[28] Armenia joins six other former Soviet countries in ratifying the Rome Statute: Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Republic of Moldova, and Tajikistan.[29] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called Armenia’s decision to ratify the Rome Statue an “incorrect step” from the perspective of Russo-Armenian relations.[30]

Key Takeaways:

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu celebrated an odd group of Russian armed formations operating in the western Zaporizhia Oblast direction during a conference call with Russian military leadership.
Shoigu’s choice of units could indicate he seeks to highlight Russian commanders who continue to follow Russian military leadership’s orders for relentless counterattacks.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled its support for both Chechen units in Ukraine and Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov amid a recent controversy surrounding interethnic tensions in the Russian government, military, and information space.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is reportedly preparing to announce his (certain to win) presidential campaign in November 2023, and reportedly intends to discuss the war in Ukraine as little as is necessary in political messaging.
A Reuters report published on October 3 stated that Russian forces have embedded “Storm-Z” units within conventional Russian units to conduct costly counterattacks against Ukrainian gains in key sectors of the front.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 3.
Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3.
The Armenian Parliament ratified the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) Rome Statute on October 3.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas.
The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is reportedly investigating Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit, likely in an attempt to remove government officials with connections to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.
Russian opposition outlet Verstka revealed that almost half of all occupation officials of the senior and middle management levels in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts are from Russia.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukranian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied areas

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on October 3 but did not advance. Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the Kupyansk direction, while elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and Hryhorivka (10km south of Kreminna) and in the Serebryanske forest area.[31]

Russian forces reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna directions and continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 3. A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced in the Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) direction on October 2.[32] Geolocated footage published on October 3 indicated that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Kreminna.[33] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and unsuccessfully attacked near Makiivka (21km southwest of Svatove).[34] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attack near Makiivka.[35] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted elements of the Russian 55th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (41st Combined Arms Army, Central Military District [CMD]) and the 228th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment (90th Guards Tank Division, CMD) as operating in the Lyman direction.[36]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut on October 3 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive actions in the Bakhmut direction.[37] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[38] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Ukrainian forces are gradually advancing near Klishchiivka and Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut) in order to break through the Russian defense near the railway line.[39] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Ukrainian forces heavily shell Russian frontline positions near Klishchiivka until Russian forces withdraw, enabling Ukrainian forces to advance.[40]

Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut on October 3 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Andriivka.[41] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces counterattacked in Andriivka but did not specify an outcome.[42] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces attacked south of Andriivka on October 2.[43] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the Russian 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade (Luhansk People‘s Republic [LNR] 2nd Army Corps), 11th Air Assault (VDV) Brigade, and 17th Artillery Brigade (likely a new unit) in a speech on October 3 as operating in the Soledar-Bakhmut direction.[44]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on October 3. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Krasnohorivka (immediately west of Donetsk City) and in the Avdiivka and Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) directions.[45] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Nevelske (immediately west of Donetsk City) on October 2.[46]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line on October 3 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff claimed that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks east of Stepove (8km northwest of Avdiivka) and near Avdiivka, Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), Krasnohorivka, Marinka, and Novomykhailivka (36km southwest of Avdiivka).[47] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also unsuccessfully attacked near Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka).[48] A Russian news aggregator claimed on October 2 that Russian forces attacked in the direction of Yurivka (20km northeast of Avdiivka) and advanced near Stepove.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Russian forces increased the intensity and expanded the geographic area of their offensive operations in this sector of the front, though Russian forces likely lack the ability to sustain any increased tempo and intensity of offensive operations.[50]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on October 3. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on October 2 and 3.[51] Russian military officials claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) on October 3.[52]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted a series of counterattacks and marginally advanced in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on October 2 and 3. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that fighting intensified along the Urozhaine-Novodonetske line (9-18km south and southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and that Russian forces advanced 200 meters in depth and cleared an unspecified forest area east of Urozhaine.[53] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces advanced towards the Hrusheva Gully (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) during a counterattack after repelling a Ukrainian attack in the area.[54] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked towards Staromayorske and Urozhaine from Pryyutne on October 3.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Russian forces achieved unspecified success towards Urozhaine.[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Staromayorske and Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[57]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance on October 3. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions on the Kopani-Robotyne-Verbove line (11-18km southwest to the southeast of Orikhiv) and that heavy fighting is ongoing on this line.[58] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Verbove.[59] Russian sources claimed on October 2 and 3 that Ukrainian forces attacked near Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[60] Another Russian milblogger claimed on October 2 that Russian and Ukrainian forces engaged in meeting engagements across the front line near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[61]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on October 3. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces spoiled a Ukrainian attack near Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv) and instead counterattacked near Robotyne, advancing several hundred meters near Robotyne and Verbove overnight on October 2-3 and on the morning of October 3.[62] Russian sources claimed on October 2 and 3 that Russian forces conducted a counterattack near Verbove.[63] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to recapture lost positions west of Verbove and southeast of Mala Tokmachka (9km southeast of Orikhiv).[64]

A Ukrainian official stated that Russian forces have established a complex trench system near Novoprokopivka. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated that Russian forces have established a system of trenches and tunnels including two-story underground dugouts in the Novoprokopivka area.[65] Fedorov stated that Russian forces are also pouring concrete in new trench lines near Tokmak.

A Russian milblogger rejected claims of Ukrainian boats operating near Nova Kakhovka in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 2. The milblogger claimed that the Russian commander on the ground in the Nova Kakhovka area did not confirm such reports.[66] The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are reconnoitering the Nova Kakhovka area and that Ukrainian forces are not active.[67]

Ukrainian sources stated that occupation officials in Crimea report the detonation of explosives at higher rates than officials in other occupied areas. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andriy Yusov noted that Crimean occupation officials make announcements about the detonation of objects daily but never specify what objects the explosions dispose of, and Ukrainian news outlet Suspilne estimated that occupation officials reported 25 such explosions just in September 2023.[68] Suspilne observed that occupation officials reported these detonations most frequently in Biyuk-Onlar (30km north of Simferopol), at the Staryi Krym training ground, in Armyansk, near Kerch, and in villages in Dzhankoi Raion.[69] There are many reasons why Russian and occupation authorities may need to conduct controlled detonations of ammunition; nevertheless, negligent Russian storage of ammunition and Ukrainian strikes in occupied Crimea have also detonated ammunition and generated explosions.[70]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Ukrainian official source claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) is investigating Kursk Oblast Governor Roman Starovoit, which may be an attempt to remove government officials with connections to deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on October 3 that the FSB’s Kursk Oblast service has begun to investigate Starovoit for building fake defensive fortifications valued at 10 billion rubles (about $100,827,000) in Tetkino on the border with Ukraine.[71] The Resistance Center stated that the tensions began because Starovoit did not pay the FSB a kickback and that the Kursk FSB was threatening criminal prosecution if Starovoit did not pay the kickback.[72] If true, the FSB is likely targeting Starovoit for his prior connection to Prigozhin under the pretense of financial crimes. Wagner-affiliated instructors reportedly conducted military training classes in Kursk Oblast in November 2022; Prigozhin visited Kursk Oblast for Russia’s Unity Day on November 4, 2022; Starovoit presumably greenlit Wagner’s effort to train the Kursk Oblast People’s Militia in the fall-winter of 2022-2023; and Prigozhin visited a training facility in Kursk Oblast in January 2023.[73] Starovoit publicly encouraged Prigozhin to stop his rebellion on June 24 but simultaneously reiterated the close cooperation between Kursk Oblast and Wagner and his respect for Wagner and its battlefield successes.[74]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated that new conscripts will not deploy to Ukraine and praised the Russian military’s successful volunteer recruitment efforts, likely to further signal his lack of intent to conduct additional mobilization in Russia. Shoigu claimed that the fall conscription cycle, which began on October 1, is proceeding according to plan and that the Russian military will conscript a total of 130,000 personnel in this cycle.[75] Shoigu reiterated that new conscripts, even those from occupied regions in Ukraine, will not deploy to the war in Ukraine. Shoigu claimed that the Russian military has no plans for additional mobilization measures as volunteer recruitment has been sufficient and that more than 50,000 citizens signed contracts with the Russian MoD in September.

The Ukrainian government continues to report on Russian efforts to force Ukrainians in occupied territory to serve in the Russian military. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on October 3 that Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev is supervising forces mobilization plans in occupied Ukraine and that the Russian military plans to mobilize mostly from occupied Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts and Crimea.[76]

The Russian military reportedly continues to recruit foreign volunteers to serve in relatively elite but likely degraded Russian Airborne (VDV) units. A Russian milblogger claimed on October 3 that volunteers from Nepal are serving in Russian Airborne (VDV) brigades.[77] ISW previously reported that Cuban volunteers are reportedly serving in the Russian 106th VDV Division.[78]

Russian officials are reportedly refusing to help former Wagner personnel as the Kremlin continues to send mixed messages about its relationship with the Wagner Group. Wagner personnel and their families in Izhevsk publicly complained in a video that Udmurt Republic Head Aleksandr Brechalov, Udmurt Minister of Social Policy Olga Lubnina, and the regional branch of the Defender of the Fatherland Foundation are refusing to help Wagner personnel who fought in the war in Ukraine and provide medical care for them.[79] The Wagner personnel and family claimed that the regional government is ignoring federal laws that grant equal combat veteran and disabled status to all soldiers who fought in Ukraine, including members of irregular formations. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin’s ideas about the relationship between Wagner elements and the Russian government are unclear at this time, possibly leading to regional heads’ uncertainty about how to treat former Wagner personnel.[80]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian opposition outlet Verstka revealed that almost half of all occupation officials of the senior and middle management levels in occupied Kherson, Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk oblasts are from Russia.[81] Verstka analyzed the biographies of 224 occupation officials and observed that many Russian officials assumed leadership positions in occupied Ukraine to flee criminal charges in Russia.[82] Verstka observed that occupied Donetsk Oblast has the highest numbers of imported Russian officials with 15 of 24 members of the occupation cabinet of ministers originating from Russia.[83] Verstka added that Ukrainian collaborators assume more municipal positions than imported Russian officials and that Russian occupation officials incentivize Ukrainians to collaborate with them by offering them high-ranking local government positions.

Russian occupation administrations continue to expand propaganda efforts in occupied southern Ukraine. The Kherson Oblast occupation administration announced that the “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World) telecommunications company plans to install 20,000 satellite receivers capable of receiving programming from 20 Russian state TV channels in occupied Kherson Oblast.[84]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko announced the creation of a Belarusian commission headed by Belarusian Ambassador to Russia Dmitry Krutoy that will reportedly deal with issues related to exports to Russia, possibly in order to help Russia evade sanctions against key Russian industries such as fertilizer and hydrocarbon products.[85] Krutoy stated that the commission will make proposals about how to fix fundamental issues facing Belarusian exports to Russia, such as logistics and railway tariff issues. Lukashenko claimed that there are shortages of mineral fertilizers and petroleum in Russia which Belarusian products can fill.

ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus as part of ongoing Kremlin efforts to increase their control over Belarus and other Russian actions in Belarus.

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

8. Victim who claims she was sexually assaulted at CIA headquarters sues spy agency accusing it of intimidation

Victim who claims she was sexually assaulted at CIA headquarters sues spy agency accusing it of intimidation | CNN Politics

CNN · by Katie Bo Lillis · October 4, 2023

The seal of the Central Intelligence Agency is seen at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia.

Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

CNN —

An unnamed female CIA trainee who claims she was sexually assaulted in a stairwell at CIA headquarters in 2022 is suing the agency, claiming that the CIA “repeatedly and improperly” discouraged her from lodging a criminal complaint against her assailant and attempted to intimidate her from testifying at his trial.

The suit specifically claims that the agency improperly shared the victim’s internal workplace instant messages with her assailant’s criminal defense team, which the victim claims were intended to falsely portray her as having an extramarital affair.

The IMs were not provided to the court as a result of a court-ordered subpoena or a request from law enforcement, according to the suit, and the victim now argues that their provision was in violation of her Privacy Act rights and represent an attempt by the CIA to prevent the conviction of her assailant by intimidating her from testifying.

Her assailant was convicted of assault and battery by the Fairfax County General District Court in August in a groundbreaking decision that pried open the tightly closed doors of the nation’s largest spy agency.

The seal of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is seen at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, April 13, 2016. (Photo by SAUL LOEB / AFP) (Photo by SAUL LOEB/AFP via Getty Images)

Saul Loeb/AFP/Getty Images

CIA watchdog investigating agency's handling of sexual assault cases

The suit comes as the CIA continues to face scrutiny on Capitol Hill over its handling of sexual harassment and sexual assault cases. The CIA inspector general in May initiated a “special review” after a number of women told congressional intelligence committees that their allegations of sexual misconduct were “grossly mishandled.”

The lawsuit provides some of the first publicly-available details about the allegations that victims have made on Capitol Hill and within the CIA about how the agency has addressed reports of sexual assault.

The suit names Director Bill Burns, whom the suit claims was briefed on the assault in the stairwell weeks after it occurred.

A CIA spokesman declined to discuss the specifics of the case, citing ongoing litigation. “CIA protects the privacy of our officers and acts in accordance with the law.”

More broadly, CIA “continues to take concerns about our handling of employee allegations of sexual assault and harassment extremely seriously, and we have already taken significant steps in this regard,” the spokesman said.

“We are focused on instilling in all officers a culture of duty to act, and ensuring they know they are encouraged to report any incidents of sexual assault to law enforcement authorities. We have also strengthened our response, including making significant organizational reforms and bringing on an experienced outside expert to lead our sexual assault and prevention efforts.”

‘You Good?’

At issue in the victim’s suit is not the assault itself – for which the assailant was convicted – but the CIA’s handling of the victim’s initial report and efforts to seek justice.

According to the suit filed Tuesday in Washington, DC, in 2022, a male CIA trainee “snuck up behind” the female officer – who is hearing impaired – in a stairwell, “wrapped a scarf tightly around her neck, began strangling her with it, made lewd remarks, and tried to kiss her forcibly on her mouth.”

The female officer told her assailant to “stop” and fled.

“He immediately tried unsuccessfully to wrap the scarf around Plaintiff’s neck again, followed Plaintiff to her office, and grabbed and forcibly kissed her,” the suit alleges. “Hours after the attack, her assailant twice texted Plaintiff to ask, ‘You good?’”

According to the suit, he had earlier sent her a series of “obscene workplace IMs.”

Both were Clandestine Service trainees who were learning to recruit and handle CIA assets – spies. Their names have been publicly withheld in court proceedings as a result.

A lawyer for the assailant, who is appealing, did not respond to multiple emails from CNN. According to transcripts of the criminal proceedings obtained by CNN, the lawyer during the assailant’s criminal trial in August acknowledged that his client wrapped the scarf around the woman in the stairwell but insisted his actions were “a joke that maybe was misunderstood or didn’t land the way it was intended.”

Instant messages

The suit lays out a series of alleged episodes in which the victim says the CIA discouraged her from reporting the attack and then retaliated against her for doing so.

But it was the CIA’s sharing of the victim’s internal instant messages that gave her cause for legal action, her attorney Kevin Carroll told CNN on Wednesday.

According to Carroll and the suit, during the assailant’s trial in August, his defense attorneys informed Carroll that the CIA had provided them with a selection of IMs between the victim and another colleague that appeared to show the victim, who is married, complaining about being “sore after sex” with that colleague. According to the suit, the messages had been “selectively edited” and the victim was in fact complaining about being sore after a workout.

“John Doe or a colleague, Richard Roe, accessed Plaintiff’s IMs, printed her records from a top-secret computer system, and provided copies of these IMs to Plaintiff’s assailant’s defense team only after selectively editing Plaintiff’s IMs to make them appear salacious: they are neither a complete record of the individuals’ workplace correspondence, nor in any way relevant to Plaintiff’s complaint,” the suit reads.

“The threat to introduce IMs embarrassing to Plaintiff is what is known colloquially as ‘slut shaming’—an effort to undermine a valid claim of sexual assault by alleging that the complainant’s purported consensual sex with others mitigates her assailant’s nonconsensual acts,” the suit claims.

Carroll said neither he nor the victim have copies of the IMs. The judge in the assailant’s case did not admit them into evidence, according to Carroll.

Other allegations

In July 2022, just over a week after the assault, the suit claims that the CIA “advised [the victim] not to contact law enforcement.

“[I]f you choose to proceed [engaging with law enforcement] then any investigation [CIA is] conducting will come to a complete stop,” the suit quotes a “CIA representative” as telling the victim. “They do not do concurrent investigations, and will have to wait to take any administrative actions, including disciplinary measures, until the police conclude theirs. It is a difficult choice I am sure. Perhaps wait out the findings of the [Security] portion, and then determine how you wish to proceed.”

By August 2022, according to the suit, the CIA’s office of security, charged with the internal investigation of the matter, “determined inaccurately that Plaintiff’s assailant had committed no crime” and closed its investigation in September.

Later that month, the suit claims, the agency “ordered [the victim] not to discuss her assault with anyone and threatened her that doing so ‘may violate federal law.’”

The victim eventually reported the assault to the FBI and Fairfax County, Virginia, police in December. The suit claims that CIA’s counsel “unlawfully advised Plaintiff that she must not truthfully answer any of law enforcement’s questions about purportedly classified matters without advance permission from the Agency” and “specifically ordered Plaintiff to protect the secret of her and her assailant’s affiliation with the Agency.”

According to the suit, the victim engaged in a number of written exchanges with the office of security as well as the agency’s general counsel, about her desire to report the assault to law enforcement. The CIA argues that “the bulk of this internal correspondence is classified,” according to the suit.

In January 2023, the victim claims that the CIA warned her she faced unspecified “consequences” if she spoke to congressional oversight committees after receiving whistleblower protection status.

In August, during a recess in the assailant’s criminal trial, the suit alleges that a member of the agency’s Office of Public Affairs (OPA) “pulled Plaintiff out of an ongoing training session, part of her regular employment duties at that time, to tell her that the Associated Press was in the process of deciding ‘at the highest levels’ whether to publish her name in relation to the criminal case against her assailant, an event that would effectively end her Agency career.”

The suit claims that the AP had “repeatedly reassured” the public affairs office that it would not publish the victim’s name.

“OPA could not have been confused on this basic point,” the suit alleges. “The unnecessary interruption of [the vicim’s]’s intensive training with OPA’s false statement caused her considerable distress before the AP confirmed the falsity of OPA’s statement, and reassured [the victim].”

A representative for the AP did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

The suit also claims that the victim’s performance reviews were downgraded based on her decision to appear before the House Intelligence Committee to discuss her assault. Her training supervisor also allegedly “chastised [the victim] verbally and in writing for allegedly interjecting her ‘personal information’ into the Agency’s training environment.”

CIA response

The CIA insists it has a “laser sharp focus on ensuring [officers] have a safe and secure work environment.”

In 2021, a CIA officer said the agency established an office to respond to sexual assault allegations and in May, hired Dr. Taleeta Jackson, a psychologist who previously oversaw a similar program for the Navy, to run the program.

According to the officer, Jackson is “developing a tailored training curriculum for Agency employees and is ensuring her office is fully resourced with trained officers to provide support to victims and respond to incidents of sexual assault within our Agency community.”

The agency has also created a “Resolution Office,” reporting to the Chief Operating Officer, that “will serve as the Agency’s focal point for harassment, misconduct, and grievance resolution processes” and “ensure that specially trained officers are empowered to identify best options to resolve issues, with a focus on fairness, transparency, and timeliness,” according to the officer.

CORRECTION: This story has been updated to clarify that the unnamed female CIA trainee is claiming that the attack in the stairwell was sexual assault.

CNN · by Katie Bo Lillis · October 4, 2023

9. Alliance Assignments: Defense Priorities for Key NATO States

Excerpts:

While these are all positive steps, allies need to enhance plans to ensure readiness and rapid reinforcement of any ally on short notice, improve combat capabilities to conduct large-scale operations, and strengthen enablement of NATO forces. Another top priority should be procuring weapons that can engage hostile forces from standoff ranges including anti-ship cruise missiles, mobile missile launchers, and small killer drones that have been used with great effect in Ukraine. NATO governments have learned from the war in Ukraine that any conflict with Russia will compel them to expend munitions at rates and quantities far beyond what current stocks could support. At Vilnius, they established a new Defence Production Action Plan to accelerate joint procurement, boost production capacity, and enhance interoperability. As part of this effort, they should commit to build robust stocks of anti-armor, anti-personnel, anti-air, and surface-to-air suppression weapons over the next five years.

Finally, lessons that the Ukrainian military is learning in operations against Russian forces should be applied to NATO defense plans and training. The establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center in Poland is already underway. Prioritizing its work would benefit both NATO and Ukraine.

Alliance Assignments: Defense Priorities for Key NATO States - War on the Rocks

STEPHEN FLANAGAN AND ANNA M. DOWD

warontherocks.com · by Stephen Flanagan · October 4, 2023

The shocking brutality of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized allied governments to address long-standing shortcomings in NATO’s defense preparations. After decades of engagement in out-of-area contingency operations, NATO is once again committed to collectively defending “every inch of allied territory and every inch of allied airspace.” The problem is that current allied defense capabilities and posture are not adequate to do so.

At their July Vilnius Summit, NATO leaders endorsed significant improvements in allied military strategy, plans, and posture. They also pledged to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense and to devote 20 percent of their military budgets to the modernization of capabilities. Allies will have an opportunity to review and accelerate these commitments at NATO’s 75th Anniversary Summit in Washington next July. While public support for NATO remains very high on both sides of the Atlantic, growing fatigue in allied countries with providing military assistance to Ukraine, coupled with the rise of populist politicians who are skeptical of NATO, or even sympathetic to Russia, could undermine support for allied defense enhancements. Robust public education efforts, close transatlantic coordination, and, most importantly, continued U.S. leadership will be essential to sustain these endeavors.

Russia has been weakened militarily and economically by its war in Ukraine. But it is expected to reconstitute its ground forces over the next several years. Coupled with its less-scathed air and naval capabilities, this will enable Moscow to continue threatening peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region. Until then, the next five years provide a window of opportunity to build a defense posture that can counter this threat.

Realizing the more robust deterrence and defense posture NATO allies are seeking will require not only sustained investments over the next five years, but also a number of other steps: developing innovative concepts to defeat aggression, exploiting new technologies, augmenting defense industrial capabilities, and better integrating national efforts. As we argue in a new RAND Corporation report, Inflection Point, each individual NATO member should focus on specific priorities as part of this collective effort. Washington, for its part, can better leverage security cooperation and adapt key NATO mechanisms to achieve greater unity of effort.

Become a Member

Priorities for NATO Members

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom will, along with the United States, continue to occupy centerstage in NATO force planning. Each of these countries has full-spectrum military capabilities and is committed to significant defense improvements. Poland and Romania are playing critical roles as anchors of forward defense in Central and Southeastern Europe. The integration of Finland, and eventually Sweden, into NATO defense plans will bolster security in the Nordic-Baltic region. With the right steps, each of these advantages can be enhanced.

France brings substantial experience in joint operations as well as heavy ground forces, artillery, short- and medium-range air defenses, and advanced combat aviation to a future conflict in Eastern Europe. But it lacks mass and sustainment capabilities. Increased U.S.-French collaboration in electronic warfare, countering massed precision fires, air mobility, and air defenses would bolster France’s contributions and collective defense. The U.S. and French armies and navies have also deepened their cooperation in recent years to improve interoperability to undertake combined, high-end operations. Building on its role as the lead nation of the NATO Battlegroup in Romania, its growing defense cooperation with Bucharest, and its naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, France could help galvanize the integrated defense of Southeastern Europe.

Germany, after decades of underspending that left the Bundeswehr in a dire state, is embracing Zeitenwende. Chancellor Olaf Scholz is gradually taking steps to strengthen the Bundeswehr and enhance Germany’s wider contributions to collective defense. If Germany realizes the proposed investments in equipment and training, and maintains its enlarged NATO Battlegroup in Lithuania, it could build on its role in NATO’s Multinational Corps Northeast and play an even larger role in defense of Northeastern Europe. Germany could also leverage its position as host nation for NATO’s Joint Support and Enabling Command and Air Command to play a leading role in allied theater enablement and sustainment. By building on the European Sky Shield Initiative as well, it could also help lead the integration of European air defense capabilities.

The United Kingdom retains formidable ground, air, and naval forces, and has committed in recent defense reviews to improving their readiness, sustainability, technological edge, and capacity for high-intensity warfighting. However, available resources may be insufficient to realize all the capabilities planned for development over the next decade. Smaller forces are also likely to be strained to meet the United Kingdom’s ambitions to maintain leadership of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, NATO battlegroup in Estonia, and European Joint Expeditionary Force, while also expanding its military operations in the Indo-Pacific. Focusing on capabilities for defense of the Northern Europe and the North Atlantic would be more strategically advantageous for Britain and allies, even as the United Kingdom seeks to retain the capability to undertake periodic naval deployments to the Indo-Pacific in cooperation with the United States, France, Australia, and other countries.

Poland has emerged as a lynchpin of NATO’s eastern flank defenses. Warsaw’s strategic resolve, rapid mobilization plans, ambitious modernization programs, and increasing readiness levels will make the Polish Armed Forces one of the best equipped and trained in NATO for countering Russia in the next five years. Poland also serves as the main transmission belt for Western security assistance to Ukraine and an important locus of training for Ukrainian forces. Poland could become a training, exercising, interoperability, and logistics hub for the alliance, enabling rapid force rotation and reinforcement of allies throughout the region. Given the deepening military integration between Belarus and Russia, allied plans and exercises in Poland should focus on defending two strategic points. First is the Suwałki gap, a 40-mile stretch of Polish territory between Belarus and Kaliningrad, which serves as a critical corridor to Lithuania and the other Baltic states. Second is the Brest gap, a stretch of open terrain along Poland’s southern border with Belarus close to Warsaw.

With Finland, and eventually Sweden, joining Norway in NATO, the alliance will be able to mount a more robust and coherent defense of the Nordic, Baltic, and Arctic regions, backed by new regional defense plans. This effort will build on longstanding regional defense cooperation among all the Nordic states and with U.S., U.K., and other NATO forces. All three countries, and allied sea lanes, remain under threat from surface ships, aircraft with long-range missiles, and attack submarines in Russia’s Northern and Baltic fleets. Norway is taking steps utilizing their advanced F-35 fighters and P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to address these threats, and Norwegian and Swedish aircraft have jointly conducted operations with U.S. heavy bombers to demonstrate the integration of NATO’s high-end conventional and strategic deterrence capabilities. Continuing these operations with Finland and other allies in the region would demonstrate the ability to hold Russian military assets at risk. Access to Finnish and Swedish airbases and airspace, and the integration of both nations’ maritime domain awareness and sea control capabilities into allied structures, will strengthen NATO’s ability to defend the Baltic Sea region.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have made significant strides in bolstering the capabilities and readiness of their comparatively small armed forces. NATO’s three enhanced forward presence battlegroups, coupled with other deployments and exercises, have also strengthened deterrence and the capacity for reinforcement. However, the Baltics remain highly exposed to direct threats of Russia’s aggression and intimidation, and therefore seek a larger NATO presence. While Germany and Canada have committed to bring their battlegroups in Lithuania and Latvia, respectively, up to brigade strength, more should be done. U.S. and allied security assistance can help fill gaps in Baltic air and missile defense, while also addressing shortcomings in artillery, anti-tank weapons, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. Innovative operational concepts combined with new technologies could rebuff a Russian attack. For example, employing a multi-domain sensing and targeting grid comprising distributed, networked ground-based and airborne sensors could allow the allies to quickly erect robust sensing zones along the border at times of heightened tensions with Russia.

Romania is emerging as the center of gravity for NATO’s defense posture in Southeastern Europe. Bucharest is making significant strides in its plans for modernizing its armed forces. Allied access to the country’s airfields, bases, and port facilities are essential to projecting power into the Black Sea and supporting Ukraine. The augmented NATO battlegroup in Romania — led by France and supported by deployments of U.S. and Polish units — as well as a rotational U.S. brigade, provide scope for leveraging Romania’s leadership of the NATO Multinational Division Headquarters Southeast and Multinational Brigade South-East to enhance the integration of regional defenses. This effort should be supported by the articulation of a long-term transatlantic strategy for the Black Sea region.

Turkey’s geostrategic importance — coupled with the contributions of its large and capable land, air, and naval forces — have sustained military cooperation with Ankara despite strained political relations with most NATO allies. Following President Erdogan’s reelection to a five-year term in May 2023, Turkey will likely continue to balance relations with Moscow and its allies and be reticent to support more robust NATO military operations to deter further Russian aggression in the Black Sea. However, the Turkish defense industry is a leader in development of low-cost, leading-edge technologies, particularly remotely piloted vehicles that have been sold to Ukraine and Poland. Turkey could become a major supplier of affordable, effective systems to allies in Central and Eastern Europe.

Collective NATO Priorities

Under its new deterrence and defense strategy, NATO stepped up both exercises and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance measures in response to Russia’s military buildup on Ukraine’s border in 2021. This enabled the alliance to rapidly deploy elements of its Very High Readiness Joint Task Force following the Kremlin’s invasion and increase the number of battlegroups in Eastern Europe from four to eight. Today, 150,000 NATO land forces — together with substantial air, air and missile defense, and maritime forces — are conducting deterrence tasks on the alliance’s eastern flank.

At their July Summit, NATO leaders endorsed the new defense strategy as well as a “family of plans” and the command and control arrangements needed to implement it. These include an overarching strategic framework for the entire North Atlantic area, operational plans for each military domain, and three regional defense plans for the North Atlantic and High North, Central Europe, and the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. This strategy aims to shape force structure, readiness requirements, and national defense investments.

NATO leaders also established a new “Allied Reaction Force” and cited progress on the Force Model, whereby allies commit to making 300,000 personnel available to NATO military commanders in 30 days. In addition to their commitments to spending and modernization, allies also pledged continued investments in emerging and disruptive technologies under two new initiatives: the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic and the NATO Innovation Fund.

While these are all positive steps, allies need to enhance plans to ensure readiness and rapid reinforcement of any ally on short notice, improve combat capabilities to conduct large-scale operations, and strengthen enablement of NATO forces. Another top priority should be procuring weapons that can engage hostile forces from standoff ranges including anti-ship cruise missiles, mobile missile launchers, and small killer drones that have been used with great effect in Ukraine. NATO governments have learned from the war in Ukraine that any conflict with Russia will compel them to expend munitions at rates and quantities far beyond what current stocks could support. At Vilnius, they established a new Defence Production Action Plan to accelerate joint procurement, boost production capacity, and enhance interoperability. As part of this effort, they should commit to build robust stocks of anti-armor, anti-personnel, anti-air, and surface-to-air suppression weapons over the next five years.

Finally, lessons that the Ukrainian military is learning in operations against Russian forces should be applied to NATO defense plans and training. The establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Center in Poland is already underway. Prioritizing its work would benefit both NATO and Ukraine.

Become a Member

Stephen J. Flanagan is an adjunct senior fellow and Anna M. Dowd is an adjunct international/defense researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Stephen Flanagan · October 4, 2023

10. Former US military pilot's lawyer tells Sydney court that extradition hearing should be delayed

What was this guy thinking about training Chinese pilots? (a rhetorical question).

Former US military pilot's lawyer tells Sydney court that extradition hearing should be delayed

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · October 4, 2023

SYDNEY (AP) — A lawyer for a former U.S. military pilot accused of illegally training Chinese aviators told a Sydney court on Wednesday that an extradition hearing scheduled for next month should be postponed due to delays in government agencies handing over crucial material.

Boston-born Dan Duggan was arrested by Australian police a year ago near his home in Orange in New South Wales state and is fighting extradition to the United States.

His lawyer, Dennis Miralis, told the Downing Center Local Court that the former U.S. Marine Corps flying instructor will apply to have the Nov. 23 extradition hearing delayed.

A magistrate will hear submissions on that postponement application on Oct. 23.

Outside court, Miralis told reporters that the delay was regrettable because Duggan has been psychologically impacted by being held in maximum-security prisons since his arrest.

“However, at the same time, it’s absolutely essential that Dan’s right to a fair hearing is preserved and nothing is done to prejudice that right,” Miralis said.

“Regrettably it’s very slow. However, it’s absolutely crucial for us to get that material,” Miralis added.

Duggan, 55, has requested documents from government agencies including the national domestic spy agency Australian Security Intelligence Organization, Australian Federal Police and the U.S. Justice Department regarding the allegations against him.

Miralis said the agencies have resisted handing over material to defense lawyers, citing secrecy concerns and the possibility of interference in international relations.

Duggan’s legal team wants to view 2,000 documents relating to their allegation that he was illegally lured from China to Australia in 2022 to be arrested for extradition.

Miralis said police will not hand over all their material until Nov. 17, six days before the scheduled extradition hearing.

Duggan, who became an Australian citizen and gave up his U.S. citizenship, maintains he has done nothing wrong and is an innocent victim of a worsening power struggle between Washington and Beijing.

Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Christopher Jessup, the regulator of Australia’s six spy agencies, announced in March that he was investigating Duggan’s allegation that the Australian Security Intelligence Organization was part of a U.S. ploy to extradite him.

Duggan returned from China to work in Australia after he received an ASIO security clearance for an aviation license. A few days after his arrival, the ASIO clearance was removed, which his lawyers argue made the job opportunity an illegal lure to a U.S. extradition partner country. They expect Jessup’s findings will provide grounds to oppose extradition and apply for his release from prison on bail before the extradition question is resolved.

Duggan’s grounds for resisting extradition include his claim that the prosecution is political and that the crime he is accused of does not exist under Australian law. The extradition treaty between the two countries states that a person can only be extradited for an allegation that is recognized by both countries as a crime.

Last month, the Australian government introduced in Parliament proposed tougher restrictions on former military personnel who want to train foreign militaries.

In a 2016 indictment from the U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C., unsealed in late 2022, prosecutors allege Duggan conspired with others to provide training to Chinese military pilots in 2010 and 2012, and possibly at other times, without applying for an appropriate license.

Prosecutors say Duggan received about nine payments totaling around 88,000 Australian dollars ($61,000) and international travel from another conspirator for what was sometimes described as “personal development training.”

Duggan has said the Chinese pilots he trained while he worked for the flying school Test Flying Academy of South Africa in 2011 and 2012 were civilians and nothing he taught was classified.

AP · by Updated [hour]:[minute] [AMPM] [timezone], [monthFull] [day], [year] · October 4, 2023

11. China censored this photo of two athletes. Was it for a perceived Tiananmen massacre reference?

I was talking to my Chinese friends (expats) about this. They said that no one in China would have even noticed that this photo was connected to Tiananmen. But by banning it the party has generated renewed interest in Tiananmen. They said this is another major miscalculation by the party.

China censored this photo of two athletes. Was it for a perceived Tiananmen massacre reference? | CNN

CNN · by Chris Lau · October 4, 2023

By Chris Lau, CNN

Updated 3:29 AM EDT, Wed October 4, 2023

Link Copied!

Ad Feedback

Gold medalist China's Lin Yuwei, left, hugs teammate Wu Yanni after their women's 100-meter hurdles final at the 19th Asian Games in Hangzhou, China, October 1, 2023.

Vincent Thian/AP

Hong Kong CNN —

China appears to have censored a photograph of two Chinese hurdlers embracing after a race because their lane numbers formed an accidental reference to the Tiananmen massacre in 1989.

The image captures Lin Yuwei, from lane 6, and Wu Yanni, in lane 4, hugging following the women’s 100-meter hurdles final at the Asian Games in Hangzhou.

As they stood together, stickers showing their lane numbers formed “6 4”, a pairing widely seen as a reference to June 4, 1989.

That day Chinese military tanks rolled into the capital Beijing during a bloody crackdown to clear students protesting for democracy in Tiananmen Square.

Beijing tightly controls references to the event, scrubbing all mention of it from the internet within China, and moving quickly to erase any reference to it on social media, including even seemingly innocuous moments when the numbers 6,4 and 89 appear together and are entirely unrelated to Tiananmen.

The race took place on October 1, China’s National Day, a delicate occasion when the authorities are more vigilant against any signs of dissent that may distract from celebrations.

State broadcaster CCTV originally posted the photograph on Weibo, China’s Twitter-like social media service, on Sunday night, but removed it from its account about an hour later, CNN has found.

A search on Weibo Thursday no longer yielded results of the same image, though scattered postings of another photograph showing the two athletes crossing a hurdle with their lane numbers on display – though in an less conspicuous manner – can still be found.

The photograph cannot be found on Baidu, China’s popular search engine, and Google services are blocked in the country.

The image can be seen in an article published Monday by state news agency Xinhua but the numbers have been cropped out of the photo.

CNN has reached out to Weibo, Baidu, CCTV and the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party for comment.

China imposes stringent censorship not just on criticism of the Communist Party but also matters it deems sensitive and incongruous with the party’s values and ideology.

The rules have in the past led to the censorship of what might appear to some to be innocuous images, such as women’s cleavage and men modeling in lingerie as a gimmick on social media to boost sales.

CNN · by Chris Lau · October 4, 2023

12. Rules of engagement issued to hacktivists after chaos

Should there be a new convention in Geneva to consider this?

Excerpt:

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has, for the first time, published rules of engagement for civilian hackers involved in conflicts.

Rules of engagement issued to hacktivists after chaos

BBC · by Menu

Image caption,

A member of the Squad 303/Anonymous hacker group attacking Russia

By Joe Tidy

Cyber correspondent

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has, for the first time, published rules of engagement for civilian hackers involved in conflicts.

The war watchdog warns unprecedented numbers of people are joining patriotic cyber-gangs since the Ukraine invasion.

The eight rules include bans on attacks on hospitals, hacking tools that spread uncontrollably and threats that engender terror among civilians.

But some cyber-gangs have told BBC News they plan to ignore them.

'Spreading globally'

The ICRC, responsible for overseeing and monitoring the rules of war, is sending the new rules to hacking groups particularly involved in the Ukraine war. It is also warning hackers their actions can endanger lives, including their own if deemed to make them a legitimate military target.

Patriotic hacking is not new, with many attacks around the world at times of heightened tension or conflict over the past decade. For example, the ICRC statement highlights pro-Syrian cyber-attacks on Western news media in 2013.

But the worrying trend, accelerated by the cyber-chaos in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, is now spreading globally, ICRC legal adviser Dr Tilman Rodenhäuser says.

"Some experts consider civilian hacking activity as 'cyber-vigilantism' and argue that their operations are technically not sophisticated and unlikely to cause significant effects," he says.

"However, some of the groups we're seeing on both sides are large and these 'armies' have successfully disrupted many civilian objects, including banks, companies, pharmacies, hospitals, railway networks and civilian government services."

Based on international humanitarian law, the rules are:

Do not direct cyber-attacks against civilian objects
Do not use malware or other tools or techniques that spread automatically and damage military objectives and civilian objects indiscriminately
When planning a cyber-attack against a military objective, do everything feasible to avoid or minimise the effects your operation may have on civilians
Do not conduct any cyber-operation against medical and humanitarian facilities
Do not conduct any cyber-attack against objects indispensable to the survival of the population or that can release dangerous forces
Do not make threats of violence to spread terror among the civilian population
Do not incite violations of international humanitarian law
Comply with these rules even if the enemy does not

The ICRC is also imploring governments to restrain hacking and enforce existing laws.

The Ukraine conflict has blurred the boundaries between civilian and military hacking, with civilian groups such as the IT Army of Ukraine being set up and encouraged by the government to attack Russian targets.

The IT Army of Ukraine, which has 160,000 members on its Telegram channel, also targets public services such as railway systems and banks.

Its spokesman told BBC News it had not decided whether to implement the ICRC rules. The group has already banned attacks on healthcare targets - but said the wider civilian impact was unavoidable.

"Adhering to the rules can place one party at a disadvantage," the spokesman added.

Large groups in Russia have similarly attacked Ukraine and allied countries - including disruptive but temporary attacks, such as knocking websites offline, on hospitals.

Image caption,

Killnet's leader, Killmilk, plans to ignore the rules

"Why should I listen to the Red Cross?" a representative of Killnet, which has 90,000 supporters on its Telegram channel, asked BBC News.

Pro-Russian groups are accused of working directly for, or in conjunction, with the Kremlin. But Killnet strongly denies this.

Meanwhile, a representative of Anonymous Sudan, which in recent months has begun attacking technology companies and government services it says are critical of Sudan or Islam, told BBC News the new rules were "not viable and that breaking them for the group's cause is unavoidable".

And a high-profile member of the Anonymous collective told BBC News it had "always operated based on several principles, including rules cited by the ICRC" but had now lost faith in the organisation and would not be following its new rules.

BBC · by Menu

13. Why Military Education Isn't to Blame for Afghanistan and Iraq

Conclusion:

To blame a chaotic withdrawal from Kabul on Goldwater-Nichols, JPME or flag officers' experience on joint staff is not supported by the facts. Further, while it echoes apparently widely shared sentiments, to suggest that flag officers should resign or threaten to resign in protest of policies with which they do not agree is dangerous. The generals and admirals, though their preferred policies may indeed be the best path to military success in a given instance, are not elected by "we the people" and are not the ultimate decision-makers under the U.S. constitutional system.

Why Military Education Isn't to Blame for Afghanistan and Iraq

military.com · by Military.com | By Brent Lawniczak · October 3, 2023

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to [email protected] for consideration.

Strategic military success and failure most often lie outside of the bounds of solely military knowledge, expertise or execution. Purported failures in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan -- even the microcosm of Kabul -- are arguably symptoms of greater problems in policymaking, rather than shortcomings in professional military education.

Civilian policymakers may not always make the right call with difficult policy decisions in the eyes of the military professional. The military professional might even find those policies "stupid." Perhaps Gen. Douglas MacArthur was right and President Harry Truman was wrong about the need to fight the Chinese in the 1950s. Even if MacArthur was right, this did not protect him from being fired for insubordination.

A pair of articles that has recently appeared on Military.com ("Why Our Generals Don't Win" and "Why Our Generals Can't Think") penned by retired Marine Col. Gary Anderson were broadly critical of senior U.S. military officers and joint professional military education (JPME). The articles are built on a profound misunderstanding of history, civil-military relations, and what is and what is not occurring at JPME institutions. While a close examination and even criticism of both policymakers and military leaders regarding recent conflicts -- particularly the withdrawal from Afghanistan -- are warranted, the record upon which Anderson stakes his arguments must be clarified if we are to draw the right lessons.

In his Sept. 7, 2023, piece, Anderson explains to readers "Why Our Generals Don't Win." The author begins by correlating the "win" in Operation Desert Storm to the fact that the leaders of that era were not professionally or intellectually damaged by reforms in joint education and organization. Blaming the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act for bloated staffs and misguided education, the author provides no evidence that Desert Storm military leaders possessed unique skills that directly led to that operational win. Arguably, the nature of the conflict itself -- given the unusually clear and limited policy goals -- led to unequivocal operational success.

Civilian national policymakers told the military to get the Iraqi military out of Kuwait. The military did so. Many would argue, however, that this was only a temporary "win" and that strategically it resulted in the need to go back 20-some years later. That is a policy issue, not a warfighting issue.

Anderson also points to the reforms as having resulted in deleterious effects on the military services, criticizing the Army, Navy and Marine Corps in turn. His claims about military failures come from a fundamental misunderstanding about who makes policy decisions and who carries them out.

At the direction of the commander in chief of the armed forces, the military conducted the Afghanistan withdrawal not from Bagram but from Kabul. In his second article, in which he explains "Why Our Generals Can't Think," Anderson claims that no general questioned that decision. Perhaps it is a statement about our current society that anyone, let alone a seasoned military veteran such as Anderson, would expect that an article in "The Atlantic" would provide insights into private and likely classified discussions between civilian policymakers and military leaders at the highest level regarding the decisions over war policies. The charge that no general questioned the decision to withdraw from Kabul rather than Bagram is spurious.

Further, comparing that decision to the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu -- with French losses in dead, wounded and captured in the tens of thousands -- borders on ridiculous, despite our shared national pain of losing lives in the attack on our forces during the withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Along with Anderson's expectation that military advice -- and ultimately any military disagreement with civilian policymakers -- should be part of public debate is his suggestion that military leaders whose advice is not followed should resign. While military leaders must have moral courage, they should not publicly complain, resign or threaten resignation if they do not get their way in a policy decision. U.S. civil-military tradition, which begins with the U.S. Constitution, should not be changed into a system in which civilian policymakers are essentially blackmailed by the generals. Military leaders would never tolerate such behavior from their own subordinates. There is no reason to expect that civilian authorities should be beholden to such coercion.

While military officers have an obligation to refuse an immoral or illegal order -- something Anderson correctly states -- they do not have the right or duty to, as he claims, "say 'no' to a patently stupid order or plan." It is widely known in the military that the ranks above do not know as much as those in the trenches: They are "stupid," in Anderson's terms. "They just don't get it" -- says the private of the sergeant, the lieutenant of the major, the colonel of the general. If those executing military plans refused to do so on the grounds of believing the plans or their leaders were stupid, either nothing would ever get done or the military would need to reinstitute summary execution for refusal to obey orders. Neither of those are good options.

An officer's commission states that they are being bestowed "special trust and confidence" for a reason. Officers do swear an oath to the Constitution, not a president or king. But the U.S. constitutional system is also one of civilian control of the military. The general is not the arbiter of what is or is not constitutional. "We the people" have vested that power in three branches of government.

Moreover, a general who threatens resignation, especially during crises, does not serve his or her country or subordinates well. Readers should recall that Dwight Eisenhower (one of Anderson's examples of great generals) disagreed with the requirement from civilian leaders to liberate Paris during World War II. Eisenhower and other military planners worried that doing so would be a drain on resources necessary for more important military aims. In that case, the political and cultural significance of the objective -- Paris -- outweighed other purely military factors. This is not to say Eisenhower was wrong, but that military and political professionals quite often view problems with different lenses. In the U.S. constitutional system, if there is a difference of opinion, the judgment of those elected by "we the people" must carry the day. If that is not the case, our representative republic will be in peril. The issues at stake are bigger than Kabul or Bagram.

Anderson's criticism of Goldwater-Nichols having resulted in uniformed Navy leaders failing to build enough submarines is misplaced. Likewise, his dig against the Marine Corps' Force Design 2030 indicates bitterness that things are not being done the way the author would have them done, nothing more. The public fight between the Corps' traditionalists and those behind Gen. David Berger's changes also teaches us much -- but nothing good about the supposed military professionals having such a public display. Additionally, just as with attack submarines, if the U.S. Congress wanted the Marine Corps to have tanks and keep all of its Howitzer batteries, then the Marine Corps would have to do it. The Marines may not think it wise, but the Corps would have no choice. Just ask the Air Force about who really determined the long-overdue retirement of the A-10 Warthog and the production of a second F-35 engine. Military professionals give military advice, and civilian policymakers decide and fund.

Anderson next attacks the Goldwater-Nichols requirement that officers serve in joint billets for promotion to flag rank. He charges that "there is no empirical evidence serving in a role like the graves registration officer at Central Command" will provide the makings of a good joint commander.

Perhaps, but a stint at the American Battle Monuments Commission did not seem to impede the military genius of the future five-star general Eisenhower. He had never led so much as a fire team in combat before leading the Allied invasion of North Africa, and ultimately becoming the supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in Europe. However, "Ike" was a graduate of both the Army Command and General Staff College and the Army War College, though this last statement is just as much a declaration of correlation, rather than causation, as Anderson is inclined to use. Further, it was arguably Eisenhower's diplomacy with multiple national leaders and often shockingly self-righteous military subordinates, as well as his keen selection and management of such subordinate combat planners and leaders, that made him so successful in Europe against Axis forces.

While modern U.S. military staffs are arguably too large, blaming reforms made in 1986 comes with no real evidence. Claiming that "Rommel's Panzer Army" was smaller than current joint U.S. military staffs will be chalked up to a typo in the original article. However, Rommel's staff certainly was smaller than current U.S. combatant command staffs. It is also irrelevant. Rommel's warfighting experience was relegated to what he was able to affect in North Africa with his Afrika Korps -- a responsibility dwarfed in time and space by current joint commands.

It is also important to bring to the attention of readers the fact that Rommel lost. That Rommel was able to temporarily "[overrun] most of North Africa" is irrelevant. Drawing on the lessons of losers in terms of exemplary task organization is not the lesson to be learned for today's U.S. joint force.

The author then shifts gears with a non sequitur that the best warfighters in history were largely self-taught the profession of arms, but also that a large number of current officers have had no experience as staff officers. Anderson claims that on staff "is where the real mastery of grand tactics and operational art is learned. ..." Then why point to 10-month JPME programs as the sole source of blame for the supposed tactical, operational or strategic failures of current uniformed military leaders? JPME is certainly not perfect, nor is it perfectible.

A single academic year either mid-way or just past mid-way of an officer's career is insufficient to "master grand tactics and operational art." The timing is also much too late in a military career to suddenly provide "mastery" of such a complex profession. Officers are considered professionals and their individual PME occurs not once or twice, but over a career of service and leadership. That the "real mastery" occurs while doing is quite correct. JPME provides professional growth. If the seeds of the military profession are not planted and nourished early and continuously throughout a career, no 10-month program (master's degree or not) will suffice to make up for that shortfall.

Anderson also claims that JPME does not but "must include a serious study of military theory, history and staff planning." This author agrees and, along with a talented cadre of professors, teaches each of these subjects at JPME. Anderson also claims that the instructors at JPME are not required to be combat experts. This is true, but to say they are not, as he claims, "knowledgeable about the study of war" is inaccurate.

If the requirements to teach at JPME included combat experience, we would have precious few teachers. Not every combat veteran is interested in teaching at JPME. Moreover, many military professionals, though knowledgeable of combined-arms and other martial topics, are still not qualified to teach nor particularly adept at teaching any subject. Certainly, Anderson and the reader can point to many examples of highly knowledgeable, yet abjectly incapable, teachers.

Anderson's solution for JPME is "a program of rigorous reading of military history interspersed with periodic exercises that require the students to make sound decisions, and insist[ence] that they be able to issue clear plans and orders based on those decisions." Perhaps a visit to a JPME institution in the last 20 years or so would reveal these very things are indeed occurring. They were this author's experience as a JPME student nearly 20 years ago, and they continue to form the core of this author's teaching experience at JPME since 2008 at different institutions. Again, no 10-month program is sufficient for true mastery, but these facts suggest that Anderson's charges about what is occurring in our JPME programs are ill-informed.

Next, Anderson's critique of the failures resulting from the revolving door of leaders and units in Afghanistan seems valid enough. However, little evidence is provided to bolster the argument other than a claim that Gens. David Petraeus and Jim Mattis were exceptional leaders compared to the others who came before and after them. This claim borders on hero worship, as do the author's claims of the genius of flag officers of yore. One might ask what then explains these two generals' failure to solve the myriad problems -- military, social, political and otherwise -- in Afghanistan. The author answers his own question and rebuts his fundamental argument at the same time. It was "the stubborn incompetence and corruption of the Afghan government and its military." Therefore, it was not, as Anderson has suggested, an Army that can't plan, a Navy that doesn't build submarines, a Marine Corps that no longer has tanks, Goldwater-Nichols, JPME, or the size of joint staffs.

Anderson concludes, after providing no empirical evidence of his many claims, that "only the top 10% of field-grade officers" annually need to serve on a joint staff, thereby enabling the "slashing" of the size of staffs "without sacrificing quality." No explanation is given for what the right staff size is, what staff billets should be sacrificed, nor how that "top 10%" would be selected across each of the military services. Each of the branches has vastly different areas of "quality" and expertise required to execute its warfighting functions. What are the desired qualities of a joint (versus Army, Air Force, Marine Corps or Navy) staff officer? Is the officer going to the staff to provide advice and assistance to the commander, or to be groomed for command? To ask is to answer. Someone, unfortunately, needs to be assigned as the graves registration officer at U.S. Central Command.

Anderson's final claim is absolutely true: "A military professional must be a master of his trade." Any individual professional or service branch that would rely on one or two 10-month JPME programs to provide that mastery is delusional. Yet, the truth is also undermined by another misleading claim (and misreading of history) that the great generals "never served as joint officers before leading great armies and fleets to victory." Of course they didn't. There was no such thing as a joint staff as we now know it at the time. However, Eisenhower served in multiple staff positions prior to leading the greatest military force ever assembled (again, never having led anything or anybody in combat prior). Grant, Pershing and Nimitz all served in various non-leadership and non-combat roles. The real difference between their experiences and the experiences of today's military officers is that today some of the time that officers spend in staff roles is on a joint staff. Modern military operations require officers with at least a modicum of knowledge outside of their own specialty and service. We are a better force now than we were 80 years ago.

The wisdom of civilian policy decisions should not be conflated with the U.S. military's level of martial prowess. Anderson does make a solid point regarding the compressed timeline in which many things must occur in a modern officer's career. However, this is not a result of Goldwater-Nichols, but both the shortened time between promotions and the "up-or-out" promotion system. Eisenhower spent about 16 years of his career at the rank of major. Today's officers serve at the rank of major for about 6 years, give or take.

U.S. policymaking and military leadership are far from perfect. They deserve -- they require -- pointed criticism and careful reflection by civilian and military professionals. Policymakers, just like generals and admirals, make decisions with incomplete information, in rapidly evolving and complex situations. Carl von Clausewitz famously presented this as "the fog of war" -- a concept with which any JPME graduate is familiar. A selective and incomplete reading of history, doctrine, law and the U.S. Constitution are dangerous things to use as evidence to criticize policymakers and upon which to suggest sweeping changes to civil-military relations and warfighting. It only adds to the fog.

To blame a chaotic withdrawal from Kabul on Goldwater-Nichols, JPME or flag officers' experience on joint staff is not supported by the facts. Further, while it echoes apparently widely shared sentiments, to suggest that flag officers should resign or threaten to resign in protest of policies with which they do not agree is dangerous. The generals and admirals, though their preferred policies may indeed be the best path to military success in a given instance, are not elected by "we the people" and are not the ultimate decision-makers under the U.S. constitutional system.

-- Dr. Brent Lawniczak, Ph.D., is a retired Marine aviator and the author of the book "Confronting the Myth of Soft Power in U.S. Foreign Policy" (Lexington Books) and a number of scholarly articles in peer-reviewed journals. He currently serves as an instructor of military and security studies at the Air Force's Air Command and Staff College, where he also teaches an elective on the U.S. Constitution.

-- The opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of The Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other U.S. government agency.

military.com · by Military.com | By Brent Lawniczak · October 3, 2023

14. Lessons From the Korean War for Ukraine

I spent all morning at the Korean War Memorial and we focused exclusively on the Korean War (rather than warfare in Korea for the past 5000 years which is in the museum). Our international delegation (Korea, China, Japan, Russia, Mongolia, Australia, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia) had some very interesting discussions from very different historical perspectives. Interestingly, the unofficial consensus I assessed was that there are lessons to be learned from the Korean War, at least at the strategic level.

Lessons From the Korean War for Ukraine

Russia can’t achieve total victory in Ukraine today for the same reason why the U.S. was unable to defeat the Korean communists decisively in the 1950s: rational and self-imposed restraint.

thediplomat.com · by George Monastiriakos · October 3, 2023

Rational and self-imposed restraint disadvantages Russia in Ukraine; the United States and its United Nations allies experienced similar limitations during the Korean War. While Ukraine is already exploiting this to its advantage, Washington and Brussels would be wise to do the same.

In the 1950s, global peace and stability were on the precipice. World War II had devastated swathes of Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Tens of millions of people, mostly innocent and defenseless civilians, were killed in the bloodiest conflict of all-time.

To end the war, the United States demonstrated the destructive power of nuclear weapons twice, killing more than 100,000 civilians at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. If the 1940s weren’t apocalyptic enough, the Soviet Union also detonated its first atomic bomb at Semipalatinsk in 1949.

Like today, Moscow was busy challenging the newly formed United Nations’ mandate to preserve peace and stability wherever it could. The United States oversaw Western Europe’s reconstruction. The Marshall Plan was enacted, NATO was established, and the Schumann Declaration laid the legal and intellectual foundations to institutionalize peace on the European continent.

Yet East Asia remained unstable. General Douglas MacArthur had consolidated the U.S. occupation of Japan and helped revive Japanese democracy. Nevertheless, contrary to the decisive defeat of the Soviet and Yugoslav-backed communists in the Greek Civil War, Mao Zedong led the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to victory against Chiang Kai-Shek’s Kuomintang in China – forcing Chiang and his KMT government to flee across the strait to Taiwan.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The outbreak of the Cold War inevitably led to brinkmanship on the newly liberated and hotly contested Korean Peninsula. Communist China and the Soviet Union both backed the Korean communists, led by Kim Il Sung. Washington and its United Nations allies supported the internationally recognized government of South Korea, led by Syngman Rhee.

Yet the United States fought with a figurative arm tied behind its back in the Korean War because Washington was obsessed with avoiding a repeat of the apocalyptic 1940s and preventing the outbreak of World War III. Rational and self-imposed restraint on U.S.-led United Nations forces in Korea was twofold.

First, their own rules of engagement forbade them from attacking military infrastructure located outside of Korea. Even though all Chinese, Soviet, and Korean communist military targets were technically fair game on the Korean Peninsula itself, the United States refrained from attacking their transport networks, logistics hubs, ammunition dumps, training centers, military bases, weapons depots, and soldiers stationed beyond Korea’s borders in China.

Second, their own strategic objective was not to expel the Korean communists from Korea into China, but to hold them at the 38th parallel – the pre-war border between North and South Korea. The U.S. insisted on fighting the war under these conditions, even if it meant extending the duration of the conflict and sustaining additional casualties. Highly controversial given the treasure sacrificed to the Korean cause, over time, this even resulted in a public dispute between MacArthur and President Harry Truman.

Above all, Washington prioritized containing the conflict within Korea’s borders, avoiding potential massive retaliation from China and the Soviet Union, and preventing the outbreak of World War III. In restraining itself, the United States enabled the Soviet Union and China to provide the Korean communists with an indispensable lifeline: a consistent supply of weaponry and manpower, which helped them fight the war to a stalemate.

Moscow is trapped in a similar predicament today. Despite calls for peace by pro-Putin appeasers, it is Russia – not the West – that is most concerned with preventing escalation.

In fact, the evidence suggests that the Kremlin is willing to extend the conflict’s duration, sustain additional military casualties, tolerate Ukraine’s ground incursions into border regions like Belgorod, risk Ukrainian drone strikes destroying military targets in the Russian Federation, endure canceled commercial flights at international airports in cities such as Moscow, suffer crippling economic sanctions, and even endure embarrassing international isolation to avoid fighting a full-scale war against NATO.

Like the U.S. in Korea, Russia will not risk striking military targets located in NATO countries because Moscow seeks to contain the conflict within Ukraine’s borders, avoid massive retaliation from the Alliance, and prevent the outbreak of a great power conflict – or nuclear exchange. Given that Moscow’s mission to capture Kyiv in three days has turned into a 19-month fiasco, Russia already has its hands full with the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). Triggering NATO’s Article 5 and having the most powerful military alliance in history join the fight against Russia would be suicidal. This, above all else, is Moscow’s ultimate limitation in Ukraine.

The AFU is not subject to that same constraint. Having learned from the United States’ experience in Korea, the AFU is committed to expelling Russia from Ukraine’s borders. It is also able and willing to strike military targets deep within Russian territory to accomplish that objective. Furthermore, like the Soviet Union and China in Korea, Kyiv’s partners can afford to underwrite the war for as long as the Ukrainian people are able and willing to fight.

Hypothetically, the West could train tens of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers and provide Ukraine with an unlimited supply of high-quality weaponry, ammunition, and humanitarian assistance. No matter how many weapons factories, storage facilities, repair shops, and training centers the West builds in neighboring NATO countries like Poland, Romania, and Czechia, Russia has no way of stopping those indispensable lifelines from reaching Ukraine.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Put simply, Russia can’t achieve total victory in Ukraine today for the same reason why the U.S. and its United Nations partners were unable to defeat the Korean communists decisively in the 1950s: rational and self-imposed restraint. The West would be wise to recall the lessons from America’s difficulties in the Korean War, reverse-engineer the requisite solutions, and expedite the transfer of deliverables required for Ukraine to expel Russia from its territory.

An isolated and impoverished but nuclear-armed North Korea is terrible for Asia, and a permanently divided Ukraine would be just as bad for Europe.

GUEST AUTHOR

George Monastiriakos

George Monastiriakos is an adjunct professor of law at the University of Ottawa, and a fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. You could read his published works at www.Monastiriakos.com.

thediplomat.com · by George Monastiriakos · October 3, 2023

15. Beyond Rhetoric: The Tangible Impact of China-US Decoupling

Excerpts:

Meanwhile, Washington is increasingly worried about China’s rise.

The deteriorating political relationship has prompted both countries to reconsider their economic integration in order to prevent dangerous dependency and subsequent vulnerability. Even though China and the United States have long fostered each other’s development, security concerns are now overtaking the economic gains of globalization.

The gradual erosion of China-U.S. economic ties is evidenced by trade and investment data.

...

Nonetheless, it would be naïve to think that the strong ties developed over more than 30 years of hyper-globalization can be broken easily and quickly. For example, although other countries are replacing China as exporters to the U.S., it might not be enough to solve the puzzle of U.S. dependence on Chinese inputs. The data indicates that countries increasing their exports to the U.S. have also increased their imports from China, especially for sectors like electronics, where U.S. imports of Chinese products have declined the most. This suggests that, because global value chains are so entangled with China, diversification may not substantially reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese inputs and suppliers in the short to medium term.

Beyond Rhetoric: The Tangible Impact of China-US Decoupling

From trade data to investment, economic statistics are starting to reflect the emphasis on curtailing dependencies.

thediplomat.com · by Gabriele Manca · October 4, 2023

Together, China and the United States exemplify the globalization trend of the early 21st century. Despite differing views on world affairs, the two economic powerhouses have successfully coexisted and even benefited from each other, fostering the growth and prosperity of the global economy as a whole. However, in recent years, their political relationship has deteriorated, and peaceful coexistence has become increasingly challenging. Now, in a new development, political frictions are being reflected in economic relations.

China’s impressive economic growth and global interdependence have boosted its political influence, elevating it to superpower status. Meanwhile, the United States has seen a decline in its relative power on the world stage. This is not due to weakening on the United States’ part, but rather the result of China becoming stronger.

As China’s political and economic influence grows, it has taken a more assertive international stance. “Chinese leaders are in essence realist. Their making of Chinese foreign policy often starts from a careful assessment of China’s relative power in the world,” said Suisheng Zhao, a professor of Chinese politics and foreign policy at the University of Denver.

Meanwhile, Washington is increasingly worried about China’s rise.

The deteriorating political relationship has prompted both countries to reconsider their economic integration in order to prevent dangerous dependency and subsequent vulnerability. Even though China and the United States have long fostered each other’s development, security concerns are now overtaking the economic gains of globalization.

The gradual erosion of China-U.S. economic ties is evidenced by trade and investment data.

Specifically, the Chinese footprint in the U.S. economy is shrinking. In the first half of 2023, China lost its title as the top exporter of goods to the United States for the first time in 15 years. In addition, both official and alternative data sources show a sustained slowdown in Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States since 2017, with annual investment falling from $46 billion in 2016 to less than $5 billion in 2022. Additionally, Chinese companies’ operations, earnings, and workforce in the U.S. have also exhibited a downward trend in the past few years.

Companies are increasingly aware of the impact of geopolitics on their operations. As tensions rise, they feel the need to align with their own country’s strategic objectives and concerns. And as economic ties loosen, there will be less pressure on the Chinese and U.S. governments to keep tensions in check, creating a vicious cycle of worsening relations.

Security Over Trade

According to the last (unadjusted) data released by the U.S. Commerce Department, the United States imported about $239 billion worth of goods from China from January to July 2023; that represents a 25 percent drop compared to the same period in 2022. Amid that decline, China lost its position as the United States’ top supplier of goods for the first time since 2005, being overtaken by Mexico and Canada.

This new scenario might be influenced by the supply chain problems experienced during the pandemic and by a general fall in Chinese exports; nonetheless, there are reasons to assume that it is closely related to the growing geopolitical tensions between the two powers. The U.S. drop in Chinese imports has been mainly driven by a decline in tariffed or highly scrutinized goods. U.S. companies are increasingly seeking out new suppliers due to the rising uncertainty and costs associated with importing from China.

As the United States has worked to diversify its suppliers, China has moved toward diversification of its export markets. The U.S. and Europe are no longer the main destinations: Southeast Asia has surpassed them in trade volume. According to data reported by Bloomerg, shipments from China to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states reached a value of almost $600 billion per month. As a result, the 10-nation bloc is now ahead of the United States and European Union on the list of China’s top trading partners.

The shift has been helped also by the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a multilateral free trade agreement that includes the members of ASEAN plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. RCEP and the ongoing shift in export markets illustrates China’s strategy of mitigating the risks associated with an over-reliance on the markets of countries with which Beijing has increasingly strained relations.

More Competition, Less Investment

According to a recent report by the Rhodium Group, in 2022 Chinese FDI in the United States reached its lowest point in a decade. The negative trend of Chinese investment in the U.S. started in 2017 and it is fair to expect that 2023 will confirm the negative trajectory. The report highlights that Chinese FDI in the United States averaged just $667 million between 2019 and 2022. This amount is substantially lower than the resources invested by multinationals from smaller Asian or European economies like Singapore, South Korea, and Spain.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The deterioration of political trust and the increasing geopolitical competition between Beijing and Washington have undeniably been significant forces underpinning the negative trend of Chinese FDI in the United States. The Biden administration has limited Chinese companies’ access to certain markets for national security reasons, particularly in the technology sector. Furthermore, the U.S. government has implemented various measures to regulate exports and impose sanctions on Chinese businesses. It has also extended investment screening to outbound capital flows and introduced robust industrial policies that promote significant capital investments in U.S. manufacturing while limiting the involvement of Chinese investors. Two examples of such policies are the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).

Nonetheless, it would be misleading to solely blame the geopolitical tensions between two nuclear-armed powers for the recent trend. The drop in Chinese investments abroad, including in the United States, is also related to internal dynamics initiated several years ago. Since 2016, stricter control on outbound capital flows has been gradually reintroduced under Xi Jinping’s leadership. This has encouraged domestic households and businesses to reinvest their money in the local economy instead of foreign enterprises. Additionally, the zero COVID policy adopted by China throughout 2022 further reduced outbound foreign direct investment due to restrictions on cross-border travel, which hindered deal-making activities.

Back to the Future

Throughout history, the exchange of goods and services between nations has been influenced by power struggles. Now, after a long period where the global economy has focused on maximizing profits, it seems that we are reverting to an older model, in which geopolitics and national security are the main drivers of economic activity. Governments around the world are going back to a “realist” approach, which puts security first and acknowledges that economic integration has security externalities.

The data shows that decoupling is not just an empty slogan. Multinational companies are taking into account the geopolitical concerns of their own, and other, governments. Chinese companies know that investing in the United States today is very different from doing it 10 years ago.

Nonetheless, it would be naïve to think that the strong ties developed over more than 30 years of hyper-globalization can be broken easily and quickly. For example, although other countries are replacing China as exporters to the U.S., it might not be enough to solve the puzzle of U.S. dependence on Chinese inputs. The data indicates that countries increasing their exports to the U.S. have also increased their imports from China, especially for sectors like electronics, where U.S. imports of Chinese products have declined the most. This suggests that, because global value chains are so entangled with China, diversification may not substantially reduce U.S. reliance on Chinese inputs and suppliers in the short to medium term.

GUEST AUTHOR

Gabriele Manca

Gabriele Manca works on the editorial board of ISPI, the Italian Institute for International Political Studies.

thediplomat.com · by Gabriele Manca · October 4, 2023

16. Most ‘aid to Ukraine’ is spent in the US. A total shutdown would be irresponsible.

Excerpts:

As the above indicates, “aid to Ukraine” covers many different activities, so Congress could make distinctions rather than following an “all or nothing” approach. For example, Congress could drop unrelated items and put those through the regular appropriations process. Congress could focus on near-term requirements and defer longer-term requirements to future budgets. Congress could increase oversight to assure itself and the American people that the funds are spent appropriately. Above all, if members have concerns about aid, Congress could hold hearings on the individual elements of aid. This would also respond to criticisms of Congress giving a “blank check to Ukraine.

But above all else, Congress needs to do something to keep faith with Ukraine, which has sacrificed thousands of its citizens and dozens of its villages on the expectation that the United States would support its fight against aggression. Inaction would be irresponsible, given the many detrimental effects that an abrupt cessation would cause. The American people expect Congress to make decisions and not govern by inaction.

Most ‘aid to Ukraine’ is spent in the US. A total shutdown would be irresponsible. - Breaking Defense

A lot of money considered to be "aid to Ukraine" is actually spent in the US. In this op ed, Mark Cancian argues that eliminating that funding would be bad business for both Ukraine and American interests.

breakingdefense.com · by Mark Cancian · October 3, 2023

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Ukraine’s Defence Minister Rustem Umerov speak at the 15th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, Sept. 19, 2023 (DoD photo by Chad J. McNeeley)

When Congress narrowly avoided a government shutdown, it did so by kicking the can down the road on continued aid for Ukraine. But what is actually in that aid? In this new analysis, Mark Cancian of the Center for Strategic and International Studies breaks down the numbers and reveals that less than half the money is going overseas, with the majority instead being spent in America itself.

“Aid to Ukraine” has become a sticking point in congressional budget negotiations, but the term is a misnomer. Much of the money supports US activities, and much of the money directly supporting Ukraine is spent not abroad, but here in the United States.

Although there are legitimate questions about the aid’s purpose and the war’s outcome, a blanket termination of the funding — as is now set without further Congressional action — would have unexpected and adverse consequences, such as leaving US forces in Eastern Europe unfunded and undermining global humanitarian relief. Although Congress has punted the final budget decision to mid-November, it needs to resolve the Ukrainian aid question now before previously appropriated funds run out.

CSIS has tracked aid to Ukraine from the beginning of the conflict, publishing analyses in May 2022 (“What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?”), November 2022 (“Aid to Ukraine Explained in Six Charts”), February 2023 (“What’s the Future of Aid to Ukraine?”), and, most recently, this August (“Aid to Ukraine: The Administration Asks for Money and Faces Political Battles Ahead”). These analyses have divided the aid into six categories: support of US military forces, shipment of US equipment to Ukraine, weapons procurement and services for the Ukrainian armed forces, humanitarian relief, economic support to the Ukrainian government, and US government agencies.

The charts below show how the money is distributed for the $24 billion supplemental that the administration has proposed and for the $113 billion that Congress has previously appropriated.

It is worth walking through the six aid categories to understand what is there, what it does, and what would happen if the funds disappeared.

Support of US military forces. At the beginning of the war, the United States sent forces to Eastern Europe to reassure the allies about US commitment and enhance deterrence in case the Russians thought about moving beyond Ukraine. Those forces peaked at about 20,000 personnel, but have declined over time to a current level of about 10,000. Units rotate about every six months. The aid packages include funds for the additional costs of these deployments, such as transportation, billeting, and a small amount for personnel benefits. The packages also include enhanced cyber defenses and increased intelligence operations in Europe.

Although the threat has diminished as Russian military capabilities have declined, it has not disappeared. Eastern European NATO allies would see withdrawal as reneging on NATO commitments. Even without additional funding, the administration would likely continue these efforts, meaning that DoD would take funds from other activities — weakening US global capabilities, particularly deterrence of China. The DoD Comptroller has stated, “I want to be clear, the department does not support that approach, which will create unacceptable risk to us.”

Some strategists have suggested withdrawing the forces and telling the Europeans that Ukraine is their problem, but such a move contravenes decades of bipartisan US foreign policy. If the United States wants to adopt such a strategy, it should do so deliberately, as a result of a strategic review, and not as the byproduct of a congressional budget impasse.

Funding for US government agencies. Although DoD and the Department of State have had the leading roles, US support for Ukraine has been a whole of government effort. For example, the Treasury Department has received money to enforce the extensive sanctions regime that the United States has imposed on Russia. In the current proposal, the Department of Energy would receive $66 million to prevent nuclear smuggling and prepare for possible radiological incidents, such as damage to the often-threatened nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia.

Like the support for US military forces, this money relates to Ukraine but does not go to Kyiv and benefits American interests broadly.

Humanitarian assistance. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has produced 6.2 million refugees globally and disrupted the global food supply. Help for refugees flows through USAID and then to many relief NGOs. Food relief goes through various Department of Agriculture programs. A significant amount of money helps settle Ukrainian refugees who have come to the United States.

These needs will not go away when the fighting ends. It will likely take years for all the refugees to go home and for the economic disruptions of war to dissipate.

Provision of US military equipment. Every two weeks or so, DoD announces another package of munitions and equipment that it is sending to Ukraine. This equipment comes from US stocks and, therefore, arrives relatively quickly; Most weapons arrive within a few weeks, though some take longer because of the training and logistics involved.

The budget mechanism is complicated. Congress has authorized billions of dollars of presidential drawdown authority (PDA) (22 USC 2318) allowing the president to send equipment to Ukraine. Previously, such aid was limited to $100 million a year and consisted mainly of older items sent to allies and partners with underdeveloped militaries. The war in Ukraine constituted a change whereby the United States has provided billions of dollars of such aid to a sophisticated military.

This aid runs about $1.4 billion monthly and is critical for maintaining Ukrainian resistance. Militaries in combat need a continuous flow of weapons, munitions, and supplies to replace those destroyed or used up in operations. Without this flow, resistance would weaken almost immediately and collapse within a few weeks as the pipeline of previously authorized items dried up.

The statutory authority does not require that the items be replaced, since that was not an issue in the past when most of the items provided were obsolescent and on their way out of the US inventory. However, replacement is militarily and politically necessary in the current circumstances because the United States is providing top-of-the-line equipment in large quantities.

An accounting change in early summer gave DoD $6.2 billion more PDA authority for transfers to Ukraine. However, according to the DoD Comptroller, there is only $1.6 billion, or just one month’s worth, of money for the US to backfill the weapons it is sending out.

Weapons and services to the Ukraine military. This flows through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI), a transfer account that moves money into other budget accounts for execution. A large part of the funding allows Ukraine to sign contracts with the US defense industry to buy weapons and munitions, for example, HIMARS and Javelins. Because these items must be manufactured, they will not arrive in Ukraine for two to three years and will likely be used for rebuilding the Ukrainian military postwar.

The USAI also funds logistic support, salaries and stipends for Ukraine’s military, the purchase of foreign equipment, and intelligence support to Ukraine. These have immediate battlefield impact, and funds are nearly gone, with only $600 million left. This will last about two weeks, although DoD could stretch it out to a month by focusing on near-term needs.

Economic support to the Ukrainian government. This is “aid to Ukraine” in the purest sense. The war has disrupted the ability of the Ukrainian government to collect taxes and, thereby, its ability to provide regular government services. Outside funds replace these lost tax revenues. The argument for doing so is that it prevents social disintegration in Ukraine and, by maintaining a minimum level of services, allows workers and military personnel to focus on the war, not the survival of their families. Congress has enacted $27.3 billion of such support, and the administration says that most of this has been committed. The $24 billion aid package now being considered contains $3.4 billion for this purpose. The United States, like many countries, flows the funds through the World Bank.

This is one area where the Europeans and other global partners have exceeded the United States. Collectively, they have provided $111 billion, according to the Kiel Institute’s Ukraine tracker.

Most Ukraine ‘Aid’ Spent in the United States

As the discussion above shows, a large part of the aid is spent in the United States. Funding of US agencies, most of the funding for US military forces, most of the military equipment backfill and Ukrainian equipment purchases, and a part of the humanitarian assistance stay in the United States.

In all, about $68 billion of the $113 billion enacted (60 percent) would be spent in the United States, benefiting the armed forces and US industry.

This question of where money is spent also explains why some sources for “aid to Ukraine” spending cite $60 billion or $70 billion while others, like this analysis, cite $113 billion. The smaller number comes from the Kiel institute, which only includes funds committed and destined for Ukraine. Thus, it excludes money that has been appropriated but not yet committed to use. It also excludes money that is not spent in Ukraine. The $113 billion total includes everything. The former number might be described as “aid to Ukraine,” the latter number as “US efforts as a result of the war in Ukraine.”

Diverse Elements Of Aid Imply Opportunity For Choices

Some aid items are only tangentially related to the war in Ukraine. The Office of Management and Budget calls this the “Christmas tree” problem: Supplemental appropriations look like “free money,” and advocates try to attach funding for their programs to these bills. Thus, past appropriations of Ukrainian aid have included money for rare earth mining, development of advanced nuclear reactors, and modernizing the strategic petroleum reserve.

The administration’s proposed $24 billion aid package includes $1 billion for “transformative, quality, and sustainable infrastructure projects that … would allow the United States to provide credible, reliable alternatives to out-compete China.” The World Bank would receive $1 billion “to support the [International Development Association] crisis response window, which provides rapid financing and grants to the poorest countries to respond to severe crises” and another $1.25 billion through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development for loan guarantees “to provide financing to help countries such as Colombia, Peru, Jordan, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, Kenya, and Vietnam build new infrastructure and supply chains.” Finally, the package requests $200 million “to counter destabilizing activities of Vagner and other Russian malign actors in African countries.”

While these might be worthwhile activities, they are unrelated to the war in Ukraine. Congressional members concerned about the amount of spending for Ukraine might started here in their review.

As the above indicates, “aid to Ukraine” covers many different activities, so Congress could make distinctions rather than following an “all or nothing” approach. For example, Congress could drop unrelated items and put those through the regular appropriations process. Congress could focus on near-term requirements and defer longer-term requirements to future budgets. Congress could increase oversight to assure itself and the American people that the funds are spent appropriately. Above all, if members have concerns about aid, Congress could hold hearings on the individual elements of aid. This would also respond to criticisms of Congress giving a “blank check to Ukraine.

But above all else, Congress needs to do something to keep faith with Ukraine, which has sacrificed thousands of its citizens and dozens of its villages on the expectation that the United States would support its fight against aggression. Inaction would be irresponsible, given the many detrimental effects that an abrupt cessation would cause. The American people expect Congress to make decisions and not govern by inaction.

Mark Cancian, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Marine colonel now with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

17. Will Xi’s Military Modernization Pay Off?

Excerpts:

These challenges aside, Xi is well on his way to realizing his goal of an outward-facing PLA. China’s armed forces will continue to modernize, flex new muscles, and challenge neighbors and other actors perceived to be undermining Chinese sovereignty as Beijing defines it. In a long People’s Daily editorial in November 2022, Xu Qiliang, the outgoing vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, exhorted the PLA to be prepared to “fight for every inch of land on issues involving national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The world should trust that the Chinese military is heeding Xu’s words.

This is the new reality. Another reality is that the U.S. military and its allies and partners are not going away. And the stakes in a confrontation are growing higher. Should an incident occur between U.S. and Chinese forces that escalates into a crisis, these countries—both nuclear powers—could find themselves embroiled in a catastrophic conflict that neither side wants nor can afford. But to date, Beijing has decided to constrain its military-to-military communications with the United States to the bare minimum and eschew serious discussions with Washington about crisis management. This is not just worrisome; it is also dangerous.

Given the strides the PLA has made, Xi should have the confidence to have his military leaders sit down with U.S. interlocutors and work to find ways to decrease the possibility of misunderstandings. In the past several months, high-level Chinese and U.S. civilian officials have been working to reopen bilateral lines of communication with a flurry of diplomatic meetings. But military leaders are conspicuously absent from this process.

For its part, Beijing must understand that it is in its interest to engage. Xi wants a strengthened PLA so that China can project more sovereignty and authority. But he must acknowledge that a stronger military entails more responsibilities—not only to use force wisely but also to discuss ways to preclude and manage potential crises with the armed forces of other nations. Now is the time for serious discussions between the PLA and the Pentagon that draw a road map to a military relationship that can address the strategic concerns of both sides. Washington has been reaching out; the ball is now in Beijing’s court. Rejecting such dialogues and merely continuing to beef up the PLA risks undermining the security that Beijing seeks.

Will Xi’s Military Modernization Pay Off?

China’s Armed Forces Are More Capable—but Beijing Feels Less Secure

By David M. Finkelstein

October 4, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by David M. Finkelstein · October 4, 2023

For months, all eyes have been on the high-level personnel turmoil in the Chinese military. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu has not been seen in public for weeks, raising questions about whether he still holds his position. Li Yuchao, the commander of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force, which oversees China’s arsenal of conventional and nuclear missiles, has also been replaced. Many observers have interpreted these shake-ups as a sign that deep problems plague the highest reaches of the Chinese military, or that Chinese President Xi Jinping intends to continue consolidating his power. But the frenzied media speculation around these personnel changes should not distract from the fact that the Chinese armed forces are making impressive strides in modernization.

Since he came to power in 2012, Xi has overseen a series of reforms that have strengthened and modernized the PLA’s warfighting abilities while reemphasizing its political role as “the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party.” Accomplishing this has not been easy; efforts by previous Chinese leaders to overhaul the PLA have often fallen short thanks to the military’s insularity. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Deng Xiaoping sought to rearm and reorganize the PLA to better defend China’s land borders from a menacing Soviet military presence to the north and an aggressive Vietnam to the south. But today, China’s biggest military challenges lie further afield. Consequently, Xi and his generals have sought to create a PLA that is more integrated and outward-facing—a PLA that can shape the country’s external security environment in Asia, secure Beijing’s expansive maritime claims in its neighborhood, back up Xi’s global political and economic objectives, and credibly challenge other advanced militaries operating in the Indo-Pacific. In short, a PLA that can project military power close to home and far away in support of Beijing’s larger global agenda.

Xi’s progress to date in revamping the Chinese military has been impressive. But even as his efforts have made the PLA stronger, they have generated new risks. The military’s improved capabilities, coupled with foreign leaders’ growing concerns about how Beijing intends to employ its military, have already prompted a degree of pushback from abroad that Beijing may not have anticipated. Moreover, Xi’s leadership overhauls may well be unnerving to the military officials charged with China’s defense. As Xi prepares the PLA for the future, he must acknowledge that military modernization alone cannot make China more secure—and that if he fails to accompany it with appropriate communication, especially with the United States, it could even backfire.

REASSERTING CONTROL

The modernization of the PLA has been in the works for decades, beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s efforts to overhaul the military in the years following China’s Cultural Revolution. In the 1990s, Jiang Zemin made significant revisions to China’s national military strategy, reorienting the PLA to counter offshore threats and increasing the country’s defense budget. Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor, recognized that in addition to its traditional missions of defending China’s territorial sovereignty and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the PLA had to become a force supporting Beijing’s larger global ambitions. Indeed, in his work report to the 18th Party Congress in 2012, Hu declared that the country required “powerful armed forces” that are “commensurate with China’s international standing.”

As a result of these efforts, the armed forces gradually became more capable. The military that Xi inherited, however—including by the PLA’s own account—still had key structural flaws. Though it now had a stockpile of impressive weaponry, its organizational structure was ill suited for fighting the multiservice, offshore campaigns that would likely feature in Beijing’s future conflicts. Even more troubling, the PLA was unevenly managed, political indoctrination within the armed forces was viewed as weak, and corruption was ubiquitous.

Military modernization alone cannot make China more secure.

Faced with these challenges, Xi has spearheaded the most significant retooling of the PLA since the republic’s founding in 1949, seeking to make it both “red,” or politically aligned with the CCP, and “expert,” or capable of advanced modern warfare. He considers building a highly capable and politically reenergized military to be a critical element of his greater quest to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Xi has been much more personally involved than Hu was in Beijing’s efforts to revitalize the PLA, and his direct involvement in the military’s affairs has likely allowed him to succeed in areas his predecessors could not.

Xi has carefully consolidated and institutionalized his personal authority over the military. In 2014, the Chinese media began to promote the so-called chairman responsibility system, in which control of the military is placed squarely in the hands of the chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission, who happened to be Xi himself. Two years later, as part of a sweeping reorganization, Beijing abolished the PLA’s general staff system, enabling the commission to absorb many of its previous functions. Xi is also the first party leader to take the title of commander in chief of the PLA’s Joint Operations Command Center, a headquarters established in 2016 to provide a supreme command over wartime operations. One of Xi’s signature domestic policies has been to strengthen the role of the party in all Chinese institutions. It is therefore not surprising that he has focused on the political orientation of the PLA. Many of the institutional reforms and organizational changes Xi has wrought have focused on ensuring there is no daylight between the party and the military. These include steps to deal with endemic corruption as well as to reassert party control over the armed forces through a network of CCP party committees within PLA units. Part of the work conducted by this military-political complex within the armed forces is ensuring that they understand the party’s assessment of China’s external security situation. For example, troops are being exposed to a narrative in which China is embattled by external hostile forces bent on containing the country’s rise, undermining its sovereignty, and supporting Taiwan independence to keep China from becoming whole. It is because of these threats, the message goes, that the PLA must become a more capable fighting force.

BUILDING A STRONGER FORCE

Under Xi’s leadership, the PLA has also undergone extensive administrative, organizational, and doctrinal changes to improve its capacity to fight. Over the last few years, the military has dismantled its 1950s-era Soviet-inspired organizational structure and streamlined wartime command and control of operational forces. New service-level organizations, such as the Strategic Support Force, have been created to manage and deploy emerging technologies in new operational arenas, including cyberspace and outer space. In 2016, the PLA also reconstituted its conventional and nuclear missile forces, previously a branch of the ground forces, as a separate service known as the PLA Rocket Force and established a centralized logistics command.

The same year, the five legacy military administrative regions into which China had been divided geographically were abolished in favor of joint theater commands focused on war contingencies on the country’s periphery. The services were rebalanced to better align the navy, air force, and missile forces with the military’s need to project military power beyond China’s borders. Beijing has expanded the size and survivability of its nuclear arsenal. And in 2020, the PLA adopted a new set of doctrinal principles to guide commanders in waging future wars as a multiservice joint force in all domains of battle, including air, land, sea, and cyberspace. The Chinese military has also generated myriad regulations aimed at better managing and regulating its forces.

Xi should have the confidence to have his military leaders sit down with U.S. interlocutors.

Xi was probably not the architect of the PLA’s reform program, although he reportedly chaired some of the military’s bodies overseeing its development and implementation. His contribution was nonetheless vital: he provided the previously absent political muscle needed to impose radical and dislocating changes upon an institution in which vested bureaucratic interests had long stymied necessary changes. Xi dealt with this resistance by giving his imprimatur to a reorganization that dismantled institutional and geographic power bases, swept aside superfluous personnel, enforced mandatory retirements, and extended the anticorruption campaign being waged across the greater CCP into the PLA.

These changes have likely left the PLA much better positioned to fight modern warfare than it was ten years ago. Given its streamlined organization and expanded doctrinal guidelines, it is closer to being able to conduct joint multiservice operations—an objective Beijing has aimed for ever since it observed how the United States and coalition forces conducted such operations in the Gulf War in 1990–91. And the PLA appears increasingly capable of operating beyond its shores within the Indo-Pacific region, a development that is provoking concern in the United States and elsewhere.

FLEXING ITS MUSCLE

Xi is the first Chinese leader for whom the PLA can finally offer a wide array of credible military options for a variety of uses, including noncombatant evacuations, crises that fall below the threshold of war, and major conflicts, all conducted with the implicit backing of enhanced nuclear capabilities. Significantly, under Xi, Beijing has shown a willingness to flex some of its new muscles. On the border with India, confrontations between Chinese and Indian forces have recently flared over unresolved territorial disputes, resulting in casualties on both sides. In the South China Sea, Chinese forces including the navy and coast guard are more vigorously enforcing Beijing’s maritime claims through coercive actions against other claimants: in August, for instance, the Chinese coast guard blocked Filipino boats from reaching the Second Thomas Shoal, a site in the disputed Spratly Islands that sits in the exclusive economic zone established by the Philippines. The PLA is increasingly employing risky tactics to challenge U.S. and other regional military forces operating in nearby international waters and airspace, and has ratcheted up military pressure against Taiwan.

Beijing seems unlikely to take a softer military posture anytime soon. In the case of Taiwan, the PLA has clearly been given the green light to maintain constant military pressure on the island. Over the past year or so, the military has conducted major multiservice demonstrations of force against Taiwan in retaliation for such events as the August 2022 visit of Nancy Pelosi, then the U.S. House speaker, to Taipei or the meeting of the current House speaker, Kevin McCarthy, with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen during her transit of the United States in April 2023. Equally significant, the PLA sends dozens of Chinese fighter jets into the island’s air defense identification zone on a near daily basis, sometimes crossing the line that bifurcates the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese navy also continues to demonstrate its ability to operate around Taiwan. These operations do more than send political messages: they demonstrate China’s new capabilities.

The PLA has expanded its range of operations beyond Taiwan. Over the last few years, it has participated in combined naval exercises with foreign partners, such as Russia and Iran, in locations as wide-ranging as the Baltic Sea, the Gulf of Oman, and the Mediterranean Sea. In Asia, China and Russia have conducted joint naval exercises or patrols in the East China Sea, in the Sea of Japan, and even in the vicinity of Alaska’s Aleutian Islands. The PLA established its first overseas military facility in Djibouti in 2017. Ostensibly created to service the Chinese naval flotillas that engage in antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the facility also gives Beijing a permanent naval presence at the far end of critical seaways on which China depends for its energy imports. Reports released by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2022 suggest that the Djibouti facility will not be the last overseas base the PLA establishes. According to the department’s assessment, the Chinese military is likely considering over a dozen other locations in Asia and Africa to support its ground, air, and naval forces in the future.

PAYING THE PRICE

Despite the irrefutable progress the PLA has made under Xi’s leadership, a more capable military has not made China’s leaders feel more secure. The assessments of the country’s external security situation in Xi’s report to the 20th Party Congress in October 2022 were the starkest in decades. “External attempts to suppress and contain China may escalate at any time,” Xi stated, and the country “must therefore be more mindful of potential dangers” and “be prepared to deal with worst-case scenarios.” By the time the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, an advisory body, convened in March 2023, Xi was no longer mincing words. “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-round containment, encirclement, and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development,” he said, according to the official state news agency, Xinhua.

Beijing may be right in asserting that its security environment has grown more tense lately, but Chinese leaders do not seem to appreciate the role they have played in generating this tension. China’s flexing of its new military capabilities has motivated some actors in the region to find ways to hedge or even push back against the country’s more assertive military posture. There can be no doubt that Chinese actions have created a strategic rationale for the United States and its partners to work together in new ways that Beijing finds extremely worrisome. These new collaborations include the Quad, a dialogue among Australia, India, Japan, and the United States focused on the Indo-Pacific; AUKUS, a defense collaboration grouping Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States; and an April 2023 agreement between Washington and Manila giving U.S. forces access to four more sites in the Philippine archipelago. Releasing its latest national security strategy in December 2022, Japan announced its intention to acquire new missile counterstrike capabilities. And U.S. and allied forces have ramped up their military presence and multilateral exercises in the Indo-Pacific. It can be argued that the American military posture in Asia has not been this robust in decades—a response, in large part, to China’s strengthening of its military. As a result, China is ironically feeling less rather than more secure despite its impressive progress in its military modernization programs.

HOW TO BUILD LONG-TERM SECURITY

These challenges aside, Xi is well on his way to realizing his goal of an outward-facing PLA. China’s armed forces will continue to modernize, flex new muscles, and challenge neighbors and other actors perceived to be undermining Chinese sovereignty as Beijing defines it. In a long People’s Daily editorial in November 2022, Xu Qiliang, the outgoing vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, exhorted the PLA to be prepared to “fight for every inch of land on issues involving national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” The world should trust that the Chinese military is heeding Xu’s words.

This is the new reality. Another reality is that the U.S. military and its allies and partners are not going away. And the stakes in a confrontation are growing higher. Should an incident occur between U.S. and Chinese forces that escalates into a crisis, these countries—both nuclear powers—could find themselves embroiled in a catastrophic conflict that neither side wants nor can afford. But to date, Beijing has decided to constrain its military-to-military communications with the United States to the bare minimum and eschew serious discussions with Washington about crisis management. This is not just worrisome; it is also dangerous.

Given the strides the PLA has made, Xi should have the confidence to have his military leaders sit down with U.S. interlocutors and work to find ways to decrease the possibility of misunderstandings. In the past several months, high-level Chinese and U.S. civilian officials have been working to reopen bilateral lines of communication with a flurry of diplomatic meetings. But military leaders are conspicuously absent from this process.

For its part, Beijing must understand that it is in its interest to engage. Xi wants a strengthened PLA so that China can project more sovereignty and authority. But he must acknowledge that a stronger military entails more responsibilities—not only to use force wisely but also to discuss ways to preclude and manage potential crises with the armed forces of other nations. Now is the time for serious discussions between the PLA and the Pentagon that draw a road map to a military relationship that can address the strategic concerns of both sides. Washington has been reaching out; the ball is now in Beijing’s court. Rejecting such dialogues and merely continuing to beef up the PLA risks undermining the security that Beijing seeks.

DAVID M. FINKELSTEIN is Director of the China and Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Division at the Center for Naval Analyses.

Foreign Affairs · by David M. Finkelstein · October 4, 2023

18. Meeting the Challenge of Deterring Two Nuclear Peers

Excerpts:

The most likely path to peer nuclear conflict involves escalation from an ongoing regional conventional conflict. Increased forward-deployment of U.S. conventional forces could help to deter such conflict in the first place by the ability to bring force to bear more quickly and reduce reliance on vulnerable reinforcement routes. The goal is to prevent faits accomplis. In recent years, progress has been made in NATO Europe, but more could be done there and in Asia. In addition, conventional deterrence could be strengthened by ensuring that weapons and command and control assets are sufficiently hardened to moderately severe nuclear environments, and that the U.S. regional commands, supported by Strategic Command, adapt their planning to fight the war once nuclear weapons are introduced to the conventional battlefield. Additional deployment of new or existing types of U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces, to include a modern nuclear, land-attack sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N), would bolster deterrence and help reduce the need for ICBM warhead augmentation.

Conclusion

The Biden team, if it is not already doing so, should, with urgency over coming months, establish a DoD-led process to review the Russian and Chinese nuclear programs, their potential for acceleration, the implications of Sino-Russia condominium in the nuclear arena and the status of U.S. force upload capabilities, and develop a set of response options for Presidential decision. At minimum, a decision is warranted to ensure a viable, executable option to field a few hundred additional ICBM warheads to meet emerging deterrence needs in the 2030 timeframe.

Meeting the Challenge of Deterring Two Nuclear Peers

By John R. Harvey

October 04, 2023

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/10/04/meeting_the_challenge_of_deterring_two_nuclear_peers_983713.html?mc_cid=864514fdeb&mc_eid=70bf478f36&utm

This June 4, 2021, satellite image provided by Planet Labs Inc. that has been annotated by experts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies shows what analysts believe is a field of intercontinental ballistic missile silos near Yumen, China. The U.S. military is warning about what analysts have described as a major expansion of China's nuclear missile silo fields, at a time of heightened tension between the U.S. and China. (Planet Labs Inc., James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at Middlebury Institute of International Studies via AP)

A critical national security question has recently emerged: Will the United States need to adjust its nuclear posture in light of the so-called “two nuclear peer” problem? Specifically, this refers to China’s ongoing ramp up of its ICBM force to the point where its nuclear force, in size and capabilities, will approximate forces currently fielded by the United States and Russia. This may well alter the deterrence challenge facing the U.S. A bipartisan study group recently concluded that currently planned U.S. nuclear forces are insufficient to reliably deter China as a nuclear peer, an aggressive Russia, and possibly both simultaneously.[i] Another study argues that Washington adopt a deterrence policy of targeting population to obviate the need to bolster forces.[ii] At issue, also, is the degree to which the United States should plan to hold China’s ICBMs at prompt risk with its ICBMs. This paper addresses:

Counterforce vs Countervalue deterrence strategies? Answering the wrong question.
Implications of Sino-Russian condominium.
China’s ICBM buildup as a driver for U.S. force augmentation.
Additional warheads required and when to upload them.

In the past, U.S. nuclear forces were focused on deterring Russia; China was a lessor included case in the sense that if the U.S. had the capabilities needed to deter the Soviet Union, it surely could also deter China. The emergence of China toward nuclear peer status, seen as a prospect for the mid-2030s, changes that calculation. Quoting from the Biden NPR:

By the 2030s the U.S. will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries. This will create new stresses on stability and new challenges for deterrence, assurance, arms control, and risk reduction.[iii]

Deterring a hostile Russia and China, possibly at the same time, has been a fixture of U.S. policy for decades. During the Cold War, even in light of a major nuclear exchange with Russia, sufficient survivable warheads were maintained to deter any incentive by China to “pile on.” This was during a time when both Russia and the United States maintained many thousands of strategic warheads, while China possessed just a few tens of ICBMs. There was both quantity and flexibility then in U.S. forces to deter both. Today, with deployed strategic, accountable warheads under New START capped at 1550, estimates are that China will field one thousand additional ICBM warheads by 2035.[iv] Moreover, the intensive, ongoing U.S. program to modernize each leg of the aging Triad leaves little excess capacity to respond with new nuclear program starts in the near term. What to do?

Counterforce vs Countervalue deterrence strategies? Answering the wrong question.

Most simply put, U.S. deterrence strategy for decades has been to hold at risk those assets valued most highly by adversary national leaders. This includes the ability to prosecute conventional and nuclear warfare.[v] Some, however, incorrectly characterize this strategy as a choice between holding forces at risk, most specifically nuclear forces, or threatening cities and population centers with the express purpose of killing innocent civilians, which they unfortunately label as countervalue targeting.[vi]^,^[vii] If the United States altered its current deterrence strategy to intentionally target population and not forces, they argue, it could avoid the need for a costly buildup in response to China’s ICBM buildup.[viii] That argument and its ramifications have been thoroughly countered in a recent piece which, in line with past rigorous studies, calls into question whether authoritarian regimes such as in Moscow and Beijing are adequately deterred by threats to their populace.[ix] In these regimes, human lives appear to be viewed as tools of the state and therefore expendable in service to the state, rather than as in democracies where the state seeks to serve its citizens and ultimately is answerable to them.[x]

To be clear, the United States adheres to the international Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and does not intentionally target cities or population.[xi] U.S. policy is to minimize civilian casualties in wartime operations. That said, striking targets that are co-located with civilian centers or objects may be consistent with the LOAC if their military significance is high—even though destroying such targets could result in a number of unintended casualties. In some cases, however, such installations will not be targeted because avoiding the prospect of inflicting excessive unintended collateral damage must take precedence.[xii]

U.S. deterrence strategy, very importantly, depends on the specific adversary to be deterred and is neither solely counterforce nor countervalue but involves a mix of targets that are all tied to the adversary’s value structure and its ability to pursue warfare. The potential cost incurred in their destruction is intended to ensure that no rational adversary would ever contemplate a nuclear attack of any scale against the United States or its allies.

U.S. nuclear forces include a robust capability to hold adversary nuclear forces at risk. Over the years, this has been a topic of debate. But to be clear, the main area of contention is not U.S. counter nuclear force capabilities but U.S. prompt counter nuclear force capabilities represented largely by its ICBM force. Indeed, most warheads in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and even some conventional weapons systems today, have sufficiently high accuracy and explosive power to hold at risk many of the hardest military targets fielded by adversaries including nuclear forces. Only ICBMs, however, can deliver such warheads to targets within 30 to 60 minutes of a President’s decision to execute such a strike. A prompt counterforce component of the U.S. nuclear triad is important for several reasons:

Contributes to robust deterrence in both central strategic and regional scenarios by enabling a full range of enemy assets to be held at timely risk.
Complicates enemy attack planning—multiple ICBM aim-points eliminates cheap attack.
Enables redundancy and complementarity among triad components.
Provides the President with options to limit damage to the U.S. and its allies.
In rare cases against certain adversaries, coupled with defenses and other conventional forces, provides limited capabilities to preempt an imminent enemy nuclear strike.
While prompt counterforce has potential to be destabilizing in nuclear crises, asymmetries in such capabilities could be destabilizing in a different sense.

This last point deserves clarification. During the Cold War, accurate, large throw-weight, highly-MIRVed, silo-based Soviet SS-18 ICBMs represented a significant disparity in prompt counterforce capability compared with the U.S. ICBM force of lower throw-weight, less-highly-MIRVed Minuteman IIs and IIIs. Fewer than 100 out of a total 300 deployed SS-18s could target each Minuteman silo with two warheads, eliminating most U.S. ICBMs. In the Carter-Reagan nuclear modernization program, this disparity was redressed by fielding two highly accurate ballistic missile systems: the 10-warhead Peacekeeper ICBM and the 8-12 warhead Trident D-5 SLBM (also with prompt delivery capability if not as responsive).

This was controversial: Wasn’t the U.S. making matters worse by incentivizing the Soviets to put their ICBMs on “hair trigger” alert, both decreasing crisis stability and increasing the chance of an inadvertent launch based on false warning? What actually happened was that once their fixed ICBMs were being held at comparable risk, the Soviets adjusted their force by trending to lower throw-weight, less highly-MIRVed, and more survivable mobile ICBMs. At the same time, they demonstrated an increased propensity to limit the silo-based SS-18s in arm control agreements. By taking on a near-term risk of potentially increased crisis instability, the U.S. shaped the arms competition towards a longer-term, more stable evolution in forces. Later on, when New START was concluded, the Obama administration downloaded the Minuteman IIIs to single warhead thus strengthening crisis stability by making them a much less desirable target to attack.

Implications of Sino-Russia coordination

One complexity regarding force sufficiency and deterrence involves the potential for various levels of Sino-Russia security coordination. If the Russian and Chinese nuclear (and conventional) threats were independent and uncorrelated, then the two nuclear peer deterrence problem would be more manageable. If the U.S. and Russia were to agree in some form, once New START expires in 2026, to continue limits on warheads and delivery systems, there would be little need to augment U.S. strategic forces in regard to Russia. If China stopped once it achieved peer status, some adjustment to targeting priorities may be warranted but not likely a pressing need for U.S. force augmentation. If the threats are uncorrelated, planned U.S. strategic forces are likely sufficient to deter.[xiii]

If China and Russia coordinate in their planning and force posture, then this calculus changes and will depend on the details. Coordination could range from minimal consultations or assistance to, perhaps less likely, a full-fledged alliance between the two countries with integrated forces and force planning. For example, if U.S. forces were engaged in a NATO-Russia conventional conflict, with accompanying nuclear overtones, China, even with minimum coordination with Russia, could exploit this opportunity “on the fly” to pursue its threat to take over Taiwan by force. A proactive (and, notwithstanding, expensive) strategy would be to posture sufficient conventional forces, combined with forces provided by allies, to deter this second conflict while fighting the first, and to retain sufficient nuclear forces to deter one or both conflicts from going nuclear. In light of recent developments, including in the nuclear arena, we must assume some degree of Sino-Russian cooperation in regional conflict.[xiv]

Holding ICBMs at risk as a driver for U.S. force augmentation

As stated earlier, U.S. policy is to hold at risk critical assets and installations most valued by enemy leaders. An adversary’s nuclear forces might well fall into that category. In the case of China’s ongoing ICBM ramp up, the U.S. must decide whether and how to hold such forces at risk. One alternative is a force augmentation involving additional U.S. ICBM warheads.

Whether to hold the entire Chinese ICBM force at risk, some portion of it, or none of it is an open question. Indeed, U.S. policy specifies a role for counterforce targeting “only to the extent practicable or feasible.” For example, Russia’s 1990s initial deployments of mobile ICBMs made these forces more difficult to target. The policy seemed then to suggest: “OK to continue to try to hold mobile ICBMs at risk, but plan to do so with available forces and don’t expect a ramp up that would exceed existing limits in order to meet a more demanding requirement.” U.S. strategic force augmentation, depending on whether any agreed limits on forces are put in place after New Start expires, may require adjustment to this policy.

There is a benefit to the U.S. having a capability to hold some portion of China’s silo-based ICBMs at prompt risk. And not just for damage limitation. The Chinese should come to understand, as the Russians eventually did, that these systems are not being given a “free ride,” thus providing some disincentive to the ongoing ramp-up. [xv] In light of possible Sino-Russian coordination, this would require some augmentation of U.S. ICBMs (and potentially SLBMs). Depending on assessment of the likelihood of various levels of cooperation, this shortfall could be redressed with a smaller or larger force augmentation. Effective U.S. ballistic missile defenses could lower augmentation needs as could, potentially, additional forward deployments of existing, and potentially new types of U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces.

How many warheads to upload?

In the near term, U.S. forces could be augmented by uploading reserve warheads to existing delivery systems. Re-MIRVing Minuteman III and, at some cost in responsiveness, uploading warheads to fill currently-unoccupied slots on the Trident D-5 SLBM could add several hundred additional warheads to the deployed force.[xvi] Ensuring that sufficient reserve warheads are available (and not placed in the dismantlement queue!), and timely provision of tritium and limited-life components (e.g., gas bottles, neutron generators) to activate reserve warheads is essential. Once activated, timelines for weapons upload will vary depending on the delivery system—days to weeks for bombers, weeks to months for the subs, and one to three years for ICBMs. To be sure, uploading does add some operational inefficiencies. Still, this is not an insignificant force augmentation capability by any measure.

How many warheads might need to be uploaded? China may add about one thousand ICBM warheads (350 silos) by 2035 with about half fielded by 2030.[xvii] If upload is primarily to hold at risk some portion of China’s silo-based ICBMs, options could include—700 additional warheads (2 per silo), 350 additional warheads (one per silo), or quite possibly fewer depending on willingness to accept risk. Two on one targeting will be seen as, and indeed is, excessive. Given this admittedly rough estimate and assuming that Russia remains at roughly current levels, in the nearer term at least no more than a few hundred additional ICBM warheads could meet “two peer” deterrence needs.

When to upload?

One study argues to upload reserve warheads starting in 2026 when New START expires.[xviii] This may be premature assuming a hedge upload capability that can be fully executed in one to three years, well before China’s new ICBMs become fully operational in 2035. If this estimate holds, there is more time to work the “two peer” problem while pressing to eliminate any force upload capability shortfalls. And what if, after New START expires, Russia presses to extend limits in some form simply to constrain any U.S. upload so that China might catch up? Would the U.S. reject such a proposal from Russia? Pressing for an earlier than needed upload, possibly via a unilateral decision not to seek to extend arms limits, would be contentious and has potential to upset the so far bipartisan consensus on modernization. On the other hand, being skeptical of intelligence assessments is prudent policy; we must consider that China could accelerate its buildup. Uploading sooner hedges that risk.

If one is optimistic regarding the 2035 estimate, prudent and timely U.S. force augmentation would begin in the 2030 timeframe. This would provide time both to build a political consensus for augmentation without jeopardizing the ongoing modernization program, and to fix any force upload shortfalls. It would also provide time for other strategies (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, U.S.-China dialog on strategic stability) that, while perhaps unlikely to succeed in the current security environment could, if they did, conceivably mitigate if not alleviate upload needs.

Some further thoughts on deterrence

Conclusion

I would like to acknowledge very useful discussions with Frank Miller, Keith Payne, Brad Roberts, and Rob Soofer in preparing this paper. Recommendations and conclusions are my own.

John R. Harvey, Ph.D., served in senior posts in the Departments of Energy and Defense overseeing U.S. nuclear weapons policies and programs including, from 2009-13, as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

Notes:

[i] China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer—Implications for U.S. Deterrence Strategy, A Report of a Study Group Convened by the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2023.

[ii] Karl Lieber and Darrell Press, “US Strategy and Force Posture for an Era of Nuclear Tripolarity,” Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, April 2023.

[iii] 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, unclassified version issued by the Biden administration on 27 October 2022.

[iv] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022, Annual Report to Congress, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2022.

[v] So-called counterforce targets include conventional and nuclear forces whether stationary or on the move, associated infrastructure, industry that supports these forces, and national political and military control. Nuclear counterforce targets include ICBM silos, mobile ICBMs, submarine bases, strategic bomber bases, elements of the nuclear command and control system, ballistic missiles and bombers on route to targets and air and missile defenses.

[vi] See Lieber and Press, op cit.

[vii] “Countervalue” in the context of nuclear targeting is an unfortunate term because it is imprecise. It includes cities and population but is more than that. It can also include certain high-value installations, industry or assets that do not directly support an adversary’s warfighting potential. A more appropriate term for use by the analysts cited would be “counter-population” targeting.

[viii] Lieber and Press, op cit.

[ix] Keith B. Payne, John R. Harvey, Franklin C. Miller, Robert Soofer, The Rejection of Intentional Population Targeting for “Tripolar” Deterrence, National Institute for Public Policy Information Series #563, September 2023.

[x] Ibid.

[xi] Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, June 2015 (updated July 2023).

[xii] All targets in U.S. war plans are vetted for military necessity, as well as the criteria of proportionality and distinction which address potential civilian collateral damage. Proportionality obliges states to “to refrain from attacks in which the expected harm incidental to such attacks would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated to be gained and to take feasible precautions in planning and conducting attacks to reduce the risk of harm to civilians . . . .”. Distinction, sometimes called discrimination, “obliges parties to a conflict to distinguish principally between the armed forces and the civilian population, and between unprotected and protected objects.” Ibid.

[xiii] Adjustments in U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces may still be warranted if needed, among other things, to assure allies of our commitments to come to their defense in light of extensive Russian deployments of these systems.

[xiv] In 8 March 2023 testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, called attention to Russia’s provision of highly-enriched uranium for use in China’s breeder reactors. According to Plumb “. . . there's no getting around the fact that breeder reactors are plutonium, and plutonium is for weapons.” One might speculate that this could be in exchange for support (e.g., arms transfers) in the ongoing conflict with Ukraine. Russia and China jointly issued a statement in February 2023 highlighting security cooperation in which both leaders noted “Friendship between the two States has no limits.”

[xv] To be clear, to achieve this benefit does not require holding the entire Chinese ICBM force at prompt risk.

[xvi] Uploading additional cruise missiles to B-52 bombers—they can carry up to twenty but are typically deployed with fewer—would add significantly to that total.

[xvii] Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, 2022, op cit.

[xviii] See China’s Emergence as a Second Nuclear Peer, op cit.

19. U.S. and World Leaders Pledge Support for Ukraine ‘for as Long as It Takes’

U.S. and World Leaders Pledge Support for Ukraine ‘for as Long as It Takes’

The New York Times · by Michael D. Shear · October 3, 2023

President Biden, in a conference call with world leaders amid tumult in Congress, insisted that U.S. aid would not be interrupted.

President Biden with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine in the Oval Office last month.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Reporting from Washington

Oct. 3, 2023

President Biden has told his counterparts in a number of allied countries that he remains confident that Congress will approve military and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine “for as long as it takes” in spite of opposition among some Republicans that blocked funding over the weekend, a national security spokesman said on Tuesday.

In a call on Tuesday morning, Mr. Biden spoke with the prime ministers of Canada, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and the presidents of Poland and Romania. The chancellor of Germany and the foreign minister of France also joined the call, along with the leaders of the European Commission, the European Council and NATO.

John Kirby, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said early in the afternoon that Mr. Biden had told the leaders that “we cannot under any circumstances allow America’s support for Ukraine to be interrupted. Time is not our friend.” Mr. Kirby said Mr. Biden made it clear that he did not expect any interruption in U.S. aid to Ukraine, despite Congress’s weekend passage of a 45-day stopgap funding bill that did not include any new aid to the country.

“The president certainly talked to the leaders about the vote over the weekend and expressed to them exactly what I expressed to you,” Mr. Kirby said. “He’s confident that we’re going to continue to have bipartisan and bicameral support up on Capitol Hill.”

The call with foreign leaders was an attempt by Mr. Biden to ease concerns that U.S. support for Ukraine was wavering in the aftermath of the passage of the short-term spending bill.

Mr. Biden, his top aides and congressional Democrats and Republicans have said they are confident that further financial commitments will be agreed to in a final spending bill. But the failure to include more aid for Ukraine in the bill the House and Senate passed highlighted the decreasing willingness of some Republicans to fund Kyiv’s war effort.

A readout of the call from the office of the British prime minister, Rishi Sunak, said that Mr. Sunak had “thanked President Biden for convening the call and for his, and the United States’, leadership in supporting Ukraine.” A summary of the call from German officials said the talks “centered on the firm conviction of all participants to support Ukraine.”

The White House provided few details about the discussion among the leaders.

Mr. Kirby shrugged off the ongoing, chaotic power struggle among Republicans in the House on Tuesday. He said that the president and other White House officials had spoken with House Republicans at all levels and remained confident that there was plenty of support for additional Ukraine funding.

Mr. Kirby said that existing funding would last for “a bit,” which he said could be another month or two, depending on what weapons Ukraine needed in its fight against Russia’s invasion. But he said that the impact on the battlefield would be drastic if the ability to provide weapons was interrupted, even for a day.

“There shouldn't be any lapse,” he said.

Mark Landler, Christopher F. Schuetze, Gaia Pianigiani and Monika Pronczuk contributed reporting.

Michael D. Shear is a White House correspondent for The New York Times, covering President Biden and his administration. He has reported on politics for more than 30 years. More about Michael D. Shear

The New York Times · by Michael D. Shear · October 3, 2023

20. A Ukrainian soldier called up Russian tech support when his captured Russian tank wouldn't start: report

You have to love the creativity and initiative of soldiers.

A Ukrainian soldier called up Russian tech support when his captured Russian tank wouldn't start: report

Business Insider · by Kwan Wei Kevin Tan

Russia's T-72B3 tanks at a rehearsal for a military parade in 2020.

Viktor Vytolsky/Epsilon via Getty Images

A Ukrainian soldier called Russian tech support to help with a captured Russian tank, Forbes reported.
The support staff seemed unaware they were speaking with a Ukrainian and offered assistance.
Ukraine has been capturing and repurposing Russia's tanks for its own use.

A Ukrainian officer apparently decided to call Russian tech support for help when he ran into issues operating a captured Russian tank.

The officer, whose call sign is Kochevnik, appeared in a video to be making calls trolling staff members of the Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod. The videos were posted to YouTube by Militarnyi, a Ukrainian media outlet reporting on the war.

Kochevnik said he had problems with his Russian T-72B3 tank, a model that is widely used by Russia's military. The T-72B3 is also the most advanced version of the Soviet-era T-72 tanks.

The video, which Forbes reported on in a story published Sunday, did not specify when or where Kochevnik and his fellow Ukrainian soldiers captured the tank. Insider was unable to independently verify who Kochevnik called and when that call took place.

Kochevnik first called up a person he said was a Uralvagonzavod staff member, who gave his name as Aleksander Anatolevich. On the call, Kochevnik ran through a litany of complaints about the tank, including that it had been spewing oil and had faulty compressors.

"I am the commander of an armor group, and the problem is we simply cannot operate it," Kochevnik said in the video, per Forbes.

The person on the other end of the phone appeared to be unaware that he was speaking with a Ukrainian soldier. He assured Kochevnik that he would raise Kochevnik's issues with the design bureau and the engine manufacturer, Forbes reported.

In the second half of the video, Kochevnik called someone he said was a Uralvagonzavod director, Andrey Abakumov. That person could be heard telling Kochevnik to report the tank's issues via a WhatsApp message, Forbes reported.

Kochevnik appeared to reveal his identity to both men at the end of the calls.

"Look, I'm the commander of the armored group K-2. This is the second mechanized battalion of Ukraine's 54th Mechanized Brigade," Kochevnik said during the first call.

"When we take more of these tanks as our trophies, make them better so that it will be easier for us to operate them. Agreed? Thank you very much. Take care of yourselves. Glory to Ukraine," he added.

Data from the open-source-intelligence website Oryx indicates the Russian military has lost two-thirds of its tanks since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Jakub Janovsky, a military analyst from Oryx, told Insider in May that Russia had about 3,000 operational tanks when it invaded. Oryx's 2022 data suggested the Russians had lost at least 2,329 tanks.

Besides destroying the tanks, the Ukrainians have also been repurposing them for their own use.

Michael Kofman, the director of the Russia Studies Program at The Center for Naval Analyses, said in March that Ukraine had been capturing and using Russia's T-80 tanks.

"They were very easily identifiable. You can see an entire unit composed of nothing but captured Russian tanks," said Kofman, who was speaking at an event hosted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Representatives for Russia's Ministry of Defense did not immediately respond to a request for comment from Insider sent outside regular business hours.

Business Insider · by Kwan Wei Kevin Tan

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: [email protected]

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: [email protected]

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website