Quotes of the Day:

“I wish I could tell you about these pilots. They make me sick with envy. They ride their vehicles the way a man controls a fine, well-trained quarter horse. They weave along stream beds, rise like swallows to clear trees, they turn and twist and dip like swifts in the evening. I watch their hands and feet on the controls, the delicacy of the coordination reminds me of the sure and seeming slow hands of (Pablo) Casals on the cello. They are truly musicians’ hands and they play their controls like music and they dance them like ballerinas and they make me jealous because I want so much to do it. Remember your child night dream of perfect flight free and wonderful? It’s like that, and sadly I know I never can. My hands are too old and forgetful to take orders from the command center, which speaks of updrafts and side winds, of drift and shift, or ground fire indicated by a tiny puff or flash, or a hit and all these commands must be obeyed by the musicians hands instantly and automatically. I must take my longing out in admiration and the joy of seeing it. Sorry about that leak of ecstasy, Alicia, but I had to get it out or burst.”

– On 7 January 1967, John Steinbeck was at Pleiku, Vietnam, where he flew aboard a UH-1 Huey helicopter with D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. He wrote the above about the helicopter pilots

"You learn as much from failure as from success, Dad always says. Though no one admires you for it." 

– Karen Joy Fowler

"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."

– Arthur Schopenhauer

1. How I Corps Fights: Movement and Maneuver

2. The Good, The Bad And The Ugly Of Yoon’s Korean Unification Vision

3. Kim Jong-un's Hideout Tailored Bunker Buster Power

4. N.K. leader oversees live-fire artillery drill ahead of constitutional revision

5. N. Korea likely to amend constitution by removing unification provisions

6. North Korea ‘Shrouded Sleep’ malware campaign targeting Cambodia, other Southeast Asian nations

7. President begins state visit to Philippines by honoring fallen Korean War veterans

8. N. Korea's Kim, China's Xi exchange messages marking 75 years of relations

9. N. Korea to hold parliamentary meeting to amend constitution, remove unification provisions

10. N. Korean Central Committee shakeup leads to unprecedented scuffles

11. South Korea must learn from the Gaza War

12. Don’t forget the ‘nuclear paradox’ (Korea) (interview with ROK MINDEF)

13. Matching Japan’s Counterstrike Capability With South Korea’s Three Axis System

1. How I Corps Fights: Movement and Maneuver

Koreans and Americans serving in the ROK/US Combined Forces Command might want to read this article to gain some insight into General Brunson.

I expect that he will be discussing this type of movement and maneuver without commanders in the Ground Operations Command of the ROK/US CFC. You may want to be conversant in this area.

Movement and Maneuver

Brig. Gen. Eric Landry, Canadian Army

Col. Andrew Watson, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Alex Bedard, U.S. Army

Maj. Callum Muntz, Australian Army

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/SO-24/SO-24-How-I-Corps-Fights/

Download the PDF 

U.S. Army soldiers with 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division (25th ID), fire an M240 machine gun on 2 November 2022 while defending an objective as the opposing force during Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC) rotation 23-01 at Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii. JPMRC used training scenarios specific to certain environments to train the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th ID, with joint, allied, and partnered forces under conditions in which they would fight. (Photo by Sgt. Rachel Christensen, U.S. Army)

Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations lead to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

America’s First Corps (I Corps) serves as the operational U.S. Army headquarters for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), employing U.S. Army forces in the INDOPACOM area of responsibility (AOR) to contribute to the vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Previous work by the I Corps commanding general, Lt. Gen. Xavier Brunson, outlined the vision for how I Corps fights, introducing the DARES framework: define fights, apportion efforts, resource priorities, evaluate outcomes, and seek feedback.1 The objective of this article is to build and expand upon this framework as it relates to the movement and maneuver warfighting function (M2 WfF). At the corps level, the M2 WfF is commonly misunderstood. Decisions regarding the M2 WfF need to be made well before those forces ever engage in combat with the enemy. This article first reviews how I Corps fights in the context of the INDOPACOM AOR, multidomain operations (MDO), and the I Corps distributed command and control nodes (DC2N) process. It then defines the M2 WfF. The next section introduces a thesis and applies it within the context of the DARES framework.

Tanks from 1st Armored Division download at the Port of Gladstone, Australia, on 14 July 2023 to participate in Talisman Sabre 2023. I Corps operates in archipelagic and littoral areas, relying on the joint force extensively for intratheater movement. (Photo by Sgt. Oniel McDonald, U.S. Army)

The INDOPACOM AOR is fraught with challenges unlike those seen in AORs where U.S. Army forces have played a more prevalent role in recent history. The INDOPACOM AOR contains over half of the world’s population with nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy.2 The INDOPACOM AOR’s geography often requires operations in littoral and archipelagic regions, leading to noncontiguous areas of operation (AO). Time and distance challenges in this AOR surpass those in others, impacting force movement and sustainment operations. Geography also forces the U.S. Army toward greater reliance on the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force.

Another notable factor of the AOR involves the U.S. Army’s partnerships and alliances in the region. Whereas other AORs may have well-established U.S. multinational military frameworks, the Indo-Pacific is rife with bilateral and multilateral agreements, often without a commonly understood language. Formal alliances exist with Japan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Australia. Those alliances are reinforced regularly by military exercises like Yama Sakura, Freedom Shield, Cobra Gold, Salaknib-Balikatan, and Talisman Sabre. As the geopolitical situation across the AOR evolves, traditionally bilateral U.S. engagements are expanding to include new partnerships. One example is the frequent integration of I Corps and the 1st Australian Division, or 1 (AS) DIV. Japan formally recognized 1 (AS) DIV as a participant in exercise Yama Sakura 85, traditionally a bilateral U.S.-Japan exercise. These distinguishing factors of geography and continually changing relationships within the INDOPACOM AOR set the stage for I Corps’ role within U.S. Army MDO.

Soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division, the Singapore Army, and the 1st Australia Division conduct a huddle during a Talisman Sabre field exercise in July 2023. I Corps forces frequently operate in a multinational construct without a common language or a multilateral military alliance like NATO. (Photo courtesy of I Corps Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army)

The U.S. Army fights using MDO, which highlights four tenets: agility, convergence, endurance, and depth.3 Focusing heavily on the European theater and AirLand Battle as a foundation, applying MDO to the INDOPACOM AOR presents many challenges. I Corps focuses on development and realization of the tenet of convergence, defined as “an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area.”4 I Corps plays an instrumental role in achieving convergence in the AOR by requesting and synchronizing joint effects with division maneuver. This is done while working with emerging formations external to I Corps, including multidomain task forces, security force assistance brigades, and sister service formations like Marine littoral regiments. I Corps works to integrate and synchronize operations through the development of the concept of convergence windows, an expansion on the tenet of convergence within the context of Brunson’s vision of how I Corps fights.

Staffs from I Corps and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force participate in a bilateral staff working group 6 December 2023 during Yama Sakura 85. I Corps operates with many partners throughout the Pacific without a common language or multilateral military alliance like NATO. (Photo by Pfc. Elija Magana, U.S. Army)

I Corps fights in the INDOPACOM AOR using DC2N and by posturing combat credible forces west of the international date line to build interior lines against the pacing threat, China. I Corps uses DC2N to deliberately place the headquarters in time and space, task organized and purpose built by mission and resources. DC2N seeks to decrease signature, reduce logistical requirements, reduce data bandwidth, and increase survivability for the corps headquarters. There are six pillars to DC2N (structure, form factor, data, transport, location, process) and four characteristics (agile, resilient, scalable, and survivable).5 By executing operations using DC2N to build interior lines against the pacing threat, I Corps contributes to campaigning in the AOR. Given all the above factors, how does I Corps fill its role with respect to the M2 WfF?

The M2 WfF is defined as “the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats.”6 This includes force projection activities, employing direct fires, occupying areas, conducting mobility and countermobility, reconnaissance and surveillance, and battlefield obscuration.7 The M2 WfF does not include administrative movements of personnel and equipment, which instead reside under the sustainment warfighting function.8 How do these functions materialize at the corps level, and specifically within the context of the challenges of the INDOPACOM AOR, MDO, and how I Corps fights?

M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launchers from the 17th Field Artillery Brigade are obscured by smoke as they fire during Talisman Sabre in Australia, July 2023. Fires support the movement-and-maneuver focus of I Corps on shaping conditions for division maneuver in the close area. (Photo courtesy of I Corps Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army)

The overarching concept for how I Corps fights the M2 WfF in its AOR is that I Corps shapes conditions for divisions to maneuver in the close area by focusing on movement to posture forces and by using the I Corps DARES framework to focus staff analysis and supplement doctrinal tools with best practices. Decisions concerning the M2 WfF are typically made at the future-operations-focused DC2N node (Node 2), but decision-making transfers to the Home Station Operations Center (HSOC) as required.9 This article outlines how I Corps fights with respect to the M2 WfF by using the DARES framework as a road map.

Define the Fights

Defining the fights for I Corps is a critical portion of planning an operation and serves as the basis for how I Corps fights the M2 WfF. This process can be viewed doctrinally as deciding on operational frameworks, which is part of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and the planning portion of the operations process. I Corps does not supplement these tools with any additional products or processes. However, due to the requirements of the AOR and frequent employment of I Corps in multiple roles, the corps staff needs to focus additional analysis in this area to enable timely decision-making for the M2 WfF.

The first critical aspect of defining the fights is to determine the role the corps headquarters will play in the operation. A corps headquarters can serve as a joint task force, a joint forces land component command, an army forces command, or as the senior army tactical formation, with the former three roles requiring significant augmentation.10 The corps may fill more than one of these roles during an operation and will likely also be called upon to do so in a multinational context. The decided role or roles of the corps headquarters must be understood by all as the role frequently changes in the AOR throughout a given year of campaigning.

Once the corps determines the role of the headquarters for the operation, I Corps employs doctrinal tools to further define the fights. When employed as an army forces command, joint forces land component command, or senior army headquarters, the corps staff employs IPB to help define the AO and area of interest. Combining IPB with the military decision-making process (MDMP), the staff also determines the corps area of influence. This forms the basis for the development of the corps deep, close, and rear areas, and initial designation of main efforts and supporting efforts. When employed as a JTF, I Corps uses joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment combined with the joint planning process (JPP) to define the joint operations area, joint security areas, and component AOs. The geography of the INDOPACOM AOR often necessitates a noncontiguous AO. This decreases the agility of the corps with respect to the M2 WfF and necessitates earlier decisions than in other theaters.

As employed in I Corps, defining the fights places greater staff emphasis on doctrinal tools that currently exist in IPB, MDMP, and JPP. The frequent employment of the corps in different roles and the geography of the AOR highlights the importance of developing a detailed understanding of the operational framework to facilitate timely decision-making for the M2 WfF. The staff will often develop a noncontiguous AO or joint operations area for the corps, which requires a deliberate consideration for the next element of the DARES framework, apportioning efforts.

Apportion Efforts

The process of apportioning efforts involves expanding upon defining the fights through further application of MDMP or JPP. The implications of this process enable the corps to determine the right posture of forces and the correct task organization and assist the corps staff in assessing culmination. These are all vital to the M2 WfF. Apportioning efforts results in critical products for corps operations, including fights by echelon, development of a kill contract, and an 8-day sketch (visual matrix; see the figure). The process of apportioning efforts also enables the corps staff to identify and develop the aforementioned convergence windows. Central to the analysis and development of these products is the correlation of forces and means (COFMs).

Figure. 8-Day Sketch

(Figure by authors)

Enlarge the figure

The first critical product of apportion efforts is fights by echelon, which communicates what each headquarters involved in the operation must do to achieve successful outcomes. This includes the delineation of responsibilities, or “fights,” for a higher headquarters, the corps headquarters, and subordinate organizations. This product conceptualizes what each element will do in the areas designated in define the fights. The fights by echelon can be described by many means but needs to be tailored to the operation through planning processes. It must be as specific as possible to be of the most use. Some common techniques involve using objectives, specifying enemy formations, or designating precise enemy capabilities. This simple document allows common visualization of responsibilities for each headquarters, aids in the principles of economy of force and mass and helps build unity of effort. Fights by echelon then forms the basis for development of the kill contract.

The I Corps kill contract provides greater refinement of fights by echelon focused on enemy forces in large-scale combat operations. Simply put, the kill contract specifies what enemy formations and systems each headquarters must remove from the operation in space and time for friendly forces to be successful. The term “contract” in the name implies the conditions must be met; however, the realities of military operations result in a more aspirational kill contract than a definite one. It assists commanders in understanding risk and articulates tangible requirements to achieve acceptable levels of risk for operational success to enable decision-making. The kill contract fills a vital role in synchronizing resources and allowing I Corps commanders and staffs to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations.

The kill contract is developed during the course of action analysis portion of the planning process and heavily involves the use of COFMs. As staffs iterate through course of action analysis using COFMs, they identify minimum friendly force requirements and enemy capabilities that need to be targeted by specific echelons. Staffs gain an appreciation for how these conditions need to be met in space and time. This process is challenged by the lack of standardized COFMs calculators for the pacing threat and contemporary joint warfighting systems. The minimum friendly force requirements the staff develops serve to refine the task organization and assist in the assessment of culmination. These are of vital importance given the much longer time and distance factors in the AOR.

The I Corps kill contract is a living document. The staff continues to refine it during execution, through subsequent planning, and through the targeting process. This document aids in building unity of effort and preserving economy of force, aids in massing effects, and helps realize convergence. As I Corps seeks to fulfill its kill contract, the staff often identifies the need for high-risk but high-payoff operations. I Corps seeks to mitigate the high risk of these operations through the development of convergence windows.

I Corps defines convergence windows as discrete time and space intervals in which multinational and joint forces layer effects across domains and dimensions to create temporary windows of vulnerability the corps can leverage to gain a position of advantage against an enemy force. This concept is related to the MDO concept of convergence. I Corps uses convergence windows to help achieve decisive points that will build the outcome of convergence. I Corps identifies requirements for convergence windows during planning and through development of fights by echelon and the kill contract. The staff typically plans and develops convergence windows around high-risk activities such as joint forcible entry operations, air assault operations, and aviation deep attacks. I Corps builds convergence windows through the targeting cycle. The corps staff links convergence windows, their associated operations, the placement of forces, and the sequence and timing of the operation to achieve the tenet of convergence.

A term in common use among the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force that is often conflated with a convergence window is a pulse. The U.S. Navy has used the concept of a pulse since at least the World War II era, meaning a discrete concentration of firepower directed at a specified enemy critical vulnerability designed to destroy the preponderance of an enemy’s combat potential.11 The concept of a pulse remains ill-defined and used colloquially. This working definition is related to the I Corps definition of a convergence window in that a pulse could contribute to creating a convergence window for a corps operation.

The I Corps staff takes the identified convergence windows along with their associated high-risk operations and portrays them on a visual model known as the 8-day sketch. The 8-day sketch assists the I Corps staff and commands in visualizing the operation in time and space and assists in coordinating and synchronizing the operation. The sketch portrays large-scale M2 WfF actions throughout the operation. It contains two air tasking order cycles to focus the staff on refining operations prior to the targeting cycle, which operates on a ninety-six-hour horizon. This product also aids the staff in visualizing required M2 WfF actions early enough in the process given the physics of operations in the Pacific. The 8-day sketch is continually refined throughout the operation and serves as a focal point to coordinate staff processes.

Apportioning efforts in the DARES construct involves further refinement and specification of the defined fights. This is critical for enabling decisions involving the M2 WfF. Major outputs of this process include fights by echelon, the kill contract, identification of initial convergence window requirements, and initial COFM analysis. After completing the apportionment of efforts, the corps staff next verifies the resources provided at echelon are sufficient for the defined fights and apportioned efforts.

Resource Priorities

Following apportioning efforts, the corps seeks to resource priorities. This is a critical aspect of the M2 WfF at the corps level in the INDOPACOM AOR due to time and distance factors, geography, and reliance on the joint force for intratheater movement. Considering these factors, the corps staff must resource priorities early and correctly to seize and maintain a relative position of advantage. Critical outputs of resourcing priorities are the task organization, positioning of corps sustainment assets, enabling brigade force posture, the composition and posture of the corps reserve, planning for culmination and follow-on forces, and development of the 8-day sketch. These are not novel products or processes, but the corps staff must conduct additional analysis and place emphasis on these aspects of the operation to enable the M2 WfF.

The task organization is a critical output concerning how I Corps fights with regard to M2. The task organization, informed by defining the fights and apportioning efforts, provides the correct resources to subordinate commands given their assigned missions. It enables the staff to position forces in an AOR where it is incredibly difficult to recover from a poor initial posture. Involved with the task organization is the designation of main and supporting efforts, which focuses the corps staff’s support for subordinate headquarters. The corps staff also defines and refines command and support relationships, which feed into the positioning of corps sustainment, enabling brigade forces, and the corps reserve.

The geography of the INDOPACOM AOR exacerbates posturing corps enabling brigade forces and the corps reserve. This geography typically requires a noncontiguous AO with noncontiguous corps rear areas to enable operational reach. The corps often needs to split enabling brigade forces among multiple geographic locations. It is difficult to relocate those forces within operationally relevant timelines, and repositioning typically involves reliance on the U.S. Air Force or the U.S. Navy. This necessitates early and correct decisions regarding the posture of the corps sustainment forces, the combat aviation brigade, field artillery brigades, the engineer brigade, the military police brigade, and other corps enabling forces. One corps maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB) is typically insufficient to protect multiple noncontiguous corps rear areas and enable operational reach. To fill this operational gap, I Corps has experimented with creating additional MEB-like capabilities from other enabling brigades like a military police brigade. This practice, however, detracts from the ability of an enabling brigade to fill its specified purpose. As a result of this identified gap, I Corps is requesting greater MEB support during future operations.

Positioning the reserve and the required capabilities of the reserve are also complicated by the AOR. Distances and geography in the AOR often preclude the useful employment of the reserve through road marches or Army aviation, forcing a reliance on the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy for intratheater movement of the reserve. This creates long lead times and competes with the use of vessels and aircraft for sustainment or other air and maritime missions. While I Corps may exercise control of Army watercraft, they are ill-suited for the movement of reserve formations. With noncontiguous AOs, the corps may designate and posture multiple reserves or portions of the reserve to mitigate this risk and increase responsiveness. This requires greater forethought, planning, and preparation early in the operation. The corps will often not be able to recover from poor reserve posturing with sufficient timeliness to enable commander decision-making.

While I Corps may exercise control of Army watercraft, they are ill-suited for the movement of reserve formations. With noncontiguous AOs, the corps may designate and posture multiple reserves or portions of the reserve to mitigate this risk and increase responsiveness.

These factors regarding the importance of reserve capabilities and posturing in the AOR link to the importance of assessing culmination and planning for follow-on forces early and often in the AOR. The sustainment WfF assesses and plans for casualties, materiel losses, personnel replacements, and the use of theater stocks for reconstitution operations.12 The M2 WfF works with sustainment to integrate reconstitution operations into operational tempo and decision-making and retains overall responsibility for coordinating reconstitution. When tempo and combat losses exceed the ability to reconstitute combat power, the corps seeks to employ follow-on forces. Due to the geography of the AOR, planning factors for follow-on forces are typically more than a month. The corps needs to adjust the tempo of operations, vigorously monitor culmination, and signal and request follow-on forces extremely early to ensure continued operational reach.

To manage the above-mentioned challenges, I Corps refines the 8-day sketch, developed during JPP or MDMP and apportioning efforts. The 8-day sketch helps planners to visualize culmination in sufficient time to mitigate these friction points through coordination with the joint force. It also assists in coordinating supporting staff functions to synchronize and coordinate the operation.

The resource priorities portion of the DARES framework does not introduce any novel products or processes to enable the M2 WfF, but rather forces the corps staff to focus and conduct additional analysis using existing doctrinal tools. An optimized task organization and posture of corps forces is critical for preventing culmination in the AOR. This is achieved by enabling timely decision-making for the M2 WfF through the final two DARES framework elements: evaluating outcomes and seeking feedback.

Evaluate Outcomes

Evaluating outcomes of the DARES framework is vital to informing how the corps fights with respect to the M2 WfF and involves the formulation of assessments. An assessment is “the determination of progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.”13 Evaluating outcomes, as with define the fights and resource priorities, does not necessarily add processes or products to doctrinal tools but serves to focus the staff in conducting additional analysis throughout the operations process. The major output of evaluating outcomes is the operational assessment framework. This framework is developed concurrently with the staff planning process and involves developing the assessment approach and the assessment plan.14 The operational assessment framework provides the structure through which the corps staff will inform commander decision-making and the prioritization of planning efforts during execution, which in turn enables the M2 WfF.

The first portion of evaluating outcomes is developing the assessment approach. The assessment approach answers the broad question of how the staff will approach conducting assessments during execution.15 I Corps uses a formal assessment process, conducting an assessment working group attended by representatives of all staff sections and subordinate commands. The assessment working group is run by the I Corps Future Operations section and chaired by the chief of staff. It is typically run out of the corps DC2N future-operations-focused node, with participants attending remotely from other nodes and from supporting organizations as required. To be effective, the assessment working group needs to occur at the proper time in the corps battle rhythm. To focus the staff accordingly, the assessments working group is viewed as the first meeting of the critical path. Inputs for this meeting are made through all the respective staff working groups, allowing the staff to evaluate the data that is collected before entering the assessments working group. The major output of the I Corps assessments working group is the operation assessment, which provides inputs into the I Corps operations synchronization meeting, the operations and intelligence briefing, the targeting working group, the targeting coordination board, and the commander’s update brief.

The second portion of evaluating outcomes is developing the assessment plan. The assessment plan is developed from the corps operational approach, which the staff creates during the initial stages of the planning process. The staff reviews the approach and develops indicators that will provide metrics allowing the staff to determine progress along lines of operation and lines of effort toward achieving the desired conditions for the operation. The staff divides indicators into measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and assigns them to respective staff sections. These metrics quantify progress toward decisive points, objectives, and desired conditions while allowing the corps to assess and prevent culmination and prepare future operations and plans. This in turn enables decisions regarding the M2 WfF to be made with sufficient lead time given the time and distance factors of the AOR and frequent reliance on the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force for intratheater movement. The major output of this process is the structure of the operation assessment.

Evaluating outcomes involves creating the framework of the operation assessment, which is composed of creating an assessment approach and an assessment plan. These practices are well developed in joint and U.S. Army doctrine; however, applying the DARES construct focuses the staff in conducting the additional analysis needed given the features of the INDOPACOM AOR. This in turn enables adequate decision-making involving the M2 WfF. The outputs of evaluating outcomes form the basis for the collection of data that enables decision-making, emphasized in the DARES construct as seek feedback.

Seek Feedback

During the seek feedback portion of the DARES framework, the corps executes the collection of MOPs and MOEs while building the common operating picture. This is important to how the corps fights with regards to the M2 WfF, as it enables timely decision-making and force posturing to achieve desired conditions in the AO. Each warfighting function and staff section collect MOPs and MOEs according to the assessment plan, and those efforts are coordinated and synchronized through the current operations cell with assistance from subordinate and adjacent unit liaison officers. The staff then conducts analysis of MOPs and MOEs in respective working groups. The staff brings those outputs into the corps assessment working group. The major output of the assessment working group is the operation assessment for a given twenty-four-hour period, which highlights opportunities, risks, informs decision-making, and recommends planning priorities for branches and sequels. These outputs are then integrated into current and future operations through the corps operations synchronization meeting, where the corps operations officer approves plans and fragmentary orders. Much like other portions of the DARES framework, seeking feedback does not add new practices to doctrine but merely focuses staff efforts appropriately. This in turn enables the corps to make timely decisions regarding the posture and movement of forces for the M2 WfF.

Conclusion

I Corps focuses on movement to position forces and uses the DARES framework to focus staff analysis and supplement doctrinal tools for the M2 WfF. This helps I Corps fill requirements as INDOPACOM’s operational Army headquarters. In defining the fights, I Corps clarifies the role of its headquarters, developing appropriate operational frameworks given the geographical constraints of the AOR. Through apportioning efforts, I Corps develops fights by echelon, uses COFMs to aid in the development of a kill contract, and develops convergence windows to support operations in noncontiguous battlespaces. During the resource priorities portion of the DARES framework, I Corps develops and refines the task organization, designates main and supporting efforts, and refines command and support relationships. I Corps focuses on the posturing of corps sustainment, enabling brigades, and the corps reserve during initial planning efforts to prevent culmination and facilitate timely and appropriate requests for follow-on forces. This occurs in an environment where establishing interior lines can only be accomplished through joint efforts. Development of the 8-day sketch assists the corps in visualizing and directing required movement of forces in the AOR. The evaluating outcomes portion of the DARES framework focuses staff efforts on developing the assessment approach and the assessment plan, creating the structure of the operation assessment that will enable M2 WfF decision-making during execution. Finally, in seek feedback, the corps staff collects indicators during the corps battle rhythm, evaluates those indicators, develops the operations assessment during the assessment working group, and makes recommendations for M2 WfF decision-making and planning prioritization during key battle rhythm events.

Based on current practices, there are several areas that require action. The first is with regards to COFMs tools for the pacing threat and for the joint level. The established standard COFMs tool uses Soviet threat equipment and does not adequately address joint capabilities. The Research and Analysis Center should lead development of improved COFMs tools. Due to reliance on the U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and required cooperation with the U.S. Marine Corps, I Corps requires greater integration of joint forces in command post exercises and operations in the AOR. U.S. Army Pacific should continue to assist I Corps in resourcing and synchronizing operations within INDOPACOM. The frequent archipelagic terrain in the AOR creates noncontiguous corps rear areas that typically require more than one MEB. Time-phased force deployment data and operational plans should be adjusted to account for multiple MEBs. Finally, the lack of a U.S. military multinational framework such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization hampers interoperability with partner and ally forces in the AOR. This highlights the importance of foreign liaison officers, military personnel exchange programs, and informal military engagements like the frequent integration of 1 (AS) DIV with I Corps operations.

How I Corps fights with respect to the M2 WfF involves focusing on the movement aspect of the WfF over maneuver to posture forces. It involves shaping conditions for divisions to maneuver in the close area by using the DARES framework to focus staff analysis and supplement the operations process and integrating processes. I Corps developed this practice over years of iterations conducting operations throughout the INDOPACOM AOR with the joint force, partners, and allies. It represents a continuing evolution in the application of MDO. Sharing this practice with the force is a vital part of preparing the U.S. Army for the next fight against the pacing threat, as I Corps will likely fight along several other headquarters that will not have the luxury of years of organizational learning in the AOR. With continued vigilance on sharing best practices and integrating lessons learned, the U.S. Army, our partners, and our allies will be ready for the next fight.

Notes

• Epigraph. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles (Blacksburg, VA: Thrifty Books, 2009), 22.

1. Xavier Brunson and Liam Walsh, “How I Corps Fights: Pivoting to Meet Threats in the Indo-Pacific,” Association of the United States Army, 19 April 2023, https://www.ausa.org/articles/how-i-corps-fights-pivoting-meet-threats-indo-pacific.
2. The White House, Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, 2022), 4, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf.
3. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2022), 3-2.
4. Ibid., 3-3.
5. Brunson and Walsh, “How I Corps Fights.”
6. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), 5-3.
7. Ibid., 5-3–5-4.
8. Ibid., 5-4.
9. Regarding I Corps distributed command and control nodes (DC2N), Node 1 is focused on current operations, Node 2 is focused on future operations, and Node 3 is focused on sustainment, protection, and the rear area fight. The Home Station Operations Center, located at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, provides reach-back support to forward deployed nodes. Forward nodes are restricted in size to facilitate deployment, logistics, minimize bandwidth, and decrease signature. While nodes may focus on one time horizon or warfighting function, there is redundancy so that loss of a node does not impair command and control for I Corps.
10. FM 3-94, Armies, Corps, and Division Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2021), 4-1.
11. Wayne P. Hughes Jr., “Naval Maneuver Warfare,” Naval War College Review 50, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 40, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol50/iss3/27/.
12. FM 4-0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2019), C-1–C-3.
13. Deputy Director, J-7 Joint Staff, Commander’s Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution (Suffolk, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011), I-1.
14. FM 5-0, Plans (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2022), 8-3.
15. Ibid., 8-5.

Brig. Gen. Eric Landry, Canadian Army, serves as the deputy commanding general, operations for I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the University of Québec at Montréal, an MBA from HEC Montréal, and masters’ degrees from the Royal Military College of Canada and the U.S. Army War College.

Col. Andrew Watson, U.S. Army, serves as the future operations director for I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds a BA from the University of Nevada, Reno, an MS from Kansas State University, an MMAS from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and an MA from the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Lt. Col. Alex Bedard, U.S. Army, serves as the deputy future operations director for I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy, an MEd from the University of Virginia, and an MA from the School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Maj. Callum Muntz, Australian Army, serves as a future operations planner and Australian military exchange officer for I Corps at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds a BSc in computer science, an MA in cyber security operations from the University of New South Wales, and an MA in defence and strategic studies from the Australian National University.

2. The Good, The Bad And The Ugly Of Yoon’s Korean Unification Vision

​A somewhat unfair and uninformed critique of the 8.15 Unification Doctrine. It is not about regime change or absorption despite the critiques. Some will argue these are merely semantics but I think this requires deeper study and understanding to see the potential for Korea and Koreans to have a free and unified Korea that will be very much in US interests.

But I do agree with the idea that you are either in favor of a free and unified Korea or you are at least tacitly supporting Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.

You can now download the 8.15 Unification Doctrine in English at this link: https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/news/Publications/RelatedDocuments/?boardId=bbs_0000000000000179&mode=view&cntId=5&category=&pageIdx=

 ​You can read the 18 page doctrine and the 2 page summary at the link. I recommend reading ​them and comparing them to this critique. 

My short assessment of the doctrine and the "3-3-7 Framework" is here. "Kim Jong Un: Domination, not peaceful unification​" https://www.upi.com/Voices/2024/10/03/Kim-Jong-Un-domination-not-peaceful-unification/9971727969103/

The Good, The Bad And The Ugly Of Yoon’s Korean Unification Vision – Analysis

 October 5, 2024  0 Comments

By East Asia Forum

By Abhishek Sharma

eurasiareview.com · October 4, 2024

By Abhishek Sharma

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol unveiled a new unification vision during the country’s 79th Liberation Day anniversary on 15 August 2024, updating former president Kim Young-sam’s 1994 policy. His unification vision generated significant debate among scholars, receiving both praise and criticism.

Yoon’s vision could not have come at a more strategic moment, as South Korea has the opportunity to show leadership, filling the unification void that followed Kim Jong-un’s two-state announcement. But the moment turned out to be a mixed bag, a collection of good, bad and ugly displays of Yoon’s leadership and foreign policy acumen.

The good part is that Yoon’s unification vision highlighted the importance of freedom and prosperity, envisioning a ‘country full of happiness where people’s freedom and safety are guaranteed’ and ‘a country that contributes to global peace and prosperity while spearheading international harmony and development’. This was a powerful message to send across the 38th parallel, especially after Kim Jong-un’s anti-reunification stance.

Yoon’s proposal to establish an ‘inter-Korean working group’ displayed his commitment to improving inter-Korean ties, encouraging economic cooperation and coordinating disaster and climate change responses. This contrasts with Kim Jong-un, who has systematically dismantled traces of unification by demolishing the arch of unification, closing reunification agencies, banning songs and removing the word reunification from textbooks and public spaces. Yoon’s vision demonstrates his regard for the people of divided Korea despite Kim’s desperate attempt to obliterate any chance of reunification.

Yoon’s unification vision is a fitting strategy to fill the void left after Kim Jong-un renounced reunification — once a core goal of North Korea and a break from his father and grandfather’s dream. This attempt helps Yoon in two ways — allowing him to take control of the unification narrative and keep the hope of reunification for North and South Korean citizens alive.

Yoon now needs to showcase a positive unification vision to the world and emphasise Kim Jong-un’s idiosyncrasies. Amplifying Kim’s pursuit of power would expose his selfishness and highlight that he prioritises his family’s interests over ordinary people’s lives.

The bad part was that Yoon avoided using this critical moment to emphasise and reiterate South Korea’s commitment to a peaceful unification. This reinforces existing doubts in North Korea that the South wants to unify the peninsula by force or through absorption. These doubts fuel the regime change narrative — a key element in propaganda used by Kim Jong-un.

Yoon also said South Korea would improve North Korean citizens’ ‘right to access information’ via different mediums. This attempt could either result in increased inter-Korean tensions, as seen during the trash balloon and pamphlet exchanges episode, or further restrictions on North Korean residents, as North Korea strengthens its digital authoritarian practices.

Following his speech, criticism started pouring in on Yoon’s North Korea unification approach, with many interpreting it as support for regime change. The Yoon administration had to clarify that its ‘vision aims to achieve peaceful unification with North Korea in line with the principles of the Constitution, without resorting to military aggression’.

These doubts emerge from the track record of Yoon’s administration, whose recent actions and statements have made Yoon’s commitment to unification seem shallow. Yoon and his cabinet members have made hawkish remarks about Kim Jong-un that have escalated tensions with his northern neighbour. In 2023, Yoon casually called for a ‘pre-emptive strike’ following a missile test by North Korea. South Korean Defence Minister Shin Won-sik also made unwarranted comments supporting a decapitation strike on the North Korean leader during US–South Korea special forces exercises.

The appointment of Kim Yung-ho — known for his advocacy of regime change and as a North Korean hawk who has criticised all unification policies — as Unification Minister in 2023 further highlighted Yoon’s unserious attitude towards the issue. Under Yoon, the responsibility of the Unification Ministry has been reduced to align with the President’s new right agenda, rather than to follow the mandate of the country’s constitution.

The ugly part of Yoon’s approach was his use of Liberation Day to target the opposition rather than trying to forge consensus on unification — a key aspect of Liberation Day’s legacy. He labelled those opposing his unification agenda as ‘pseudo-intellectuals’, ‘anti-unification’ and ‘anti-freedom’ forces, portraying them as North Korean sympathisers.

Such an attitude increases divisions within South Korea, adding to already strained ties with his opposition and playing into Kim Jong-un’s hands. The domestic fragmentation was evident, as the opposition celebrated Liberation Day in a separate ceremony. Yoon’s statement received condemnation from both left leaning and conservative media.

The new unification vision is a welcome and bold initiative, coming at a time when the reunification idea was losing steam. But instead of reinforcing a strong and shared vision, Yoon used this opportunity to target his opponents and conflate his foreign policy with a unification policy. His administration’s hawkish stance and its actions towards North Korea have only cemented negative perceptions of Yoon. Rather than benefiting from his vision, Yoon has deepened domestic division and strengthened Kim Jong-un’s propaganda.

Moving forward, if Yoon’s objective is to keep alive the hope of togetherness and cross-border unity — as seen in the 2024 Olympic selfie — he must recognise that bipartisan support, backed by a well-considered North Korea policy, is critical.

• About the author: Abhishek Sharma is Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme and a PhD Candidate in the Department of East Asian Studies at Delhi University.
• Source: This article was published by East Asia Forum

eurasiareview.com · October 4, 2024

3. Kim Jong-un's Hideout Tailored Bunker Buster Power

This is a Google translation of an RFA report.

Thank you to Radio Free Asia for broadcasting this message into north Korea. Kim Jong Un is getting this message and it makes him afraid as we can see in his messaging.

Kim Jong-un's Hideout Tailored Bunker Buster Power

https://www.rfa.org/korean/weekly_program/c2e0bc15d55cd55cbc18b3c4c2e0bb34ae30b300bc31acfc/armencyclopedia-bunkerbuster-for-kju-hideout.html

WASHINGTON-Kim Jin-guk kimj@rfa.org

2024.10.06

The ground-to-ground missile 'Hyeonmu-5' is splitting apart at the ceremony to commemorate the 76th Armed Forces Day held at Seoul Airport on the 1st.

 /Yonhap News

00:00 / 15:50

( Host )  We will accurately grasp the current state of the military standoff on the Korean Peninsula and seek a path to peace. This is Kim Jin-guk, presenting ' Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula  ' from Washington D.C., USA. We will connect with Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of Korea's 'Independent Defense Network.' 

Hezblah leader 's bunker devastated by 72 -ton bomb

( Host )  Late last month, Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon, a longtime enemy of Israel and a longtime ally of North Korea, was killed in an Israeli bombing. His hideout in the Lebanese capital Beirut was reduced to ashes. How was this carpet bombing possible without Israel having any bombers?

( Lee Il-woo )  On September 27, Israel carried out an airstrike on the Dahiye area south of Beirut, the capital of Lebanon, and eliminated Hezbollah's top leader, Hassan Nasrallah. This airstrike was carried out in broad daylight in the afternoon, so many people witnessed the bombing, and saw Nasrallah's hideout and the surrounding buildings reduced to rubble by the carpet bombing.

Israeli F-15I fighter jets used in the operation to kill Hassan Nasrallah (Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense)

Israel also attempted to eliminate Nasrallah by bombing several buildings during the Second Lebanon War in 2006, but all attempts failed. Nasrallah learned from that experience and fortified his main hiding place underground. The conference hall where he was killed in this bombing was a bunker 18 meters underground, protected by reinforced concrete.

Israel had been tracking Nasrallah's movements since the beginning of the year in an attempt to eliminate him, and a week before the operation, it was discovered that he had entered Beirut, making him the only person in Israel in a position to give the order to assassinate him. It appears that he was relaxed as he believed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was attending the UN General Assembly.

This airstrike operation was carried out by the 69th Squadron, which is considered the most elite unit in the Israeli Air Force. This unit is the strongest strike unit with 25 F-15I fighters, which is Israel's pride. Although it has the same base airframe as the US Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle and the ROK Air Force's F-15K Slam Eagle, the internal equipment is filled with Israeli-made equipment, and this fighter boasts the largest bomb load in the Israeli Air Force.

In footage released by Israel immediately after the operation, F-15I fighters are seen loaded with 2,000-pound, or 910-kilogram, GBU-31 JDAM, or GPS-guided bombs. Each fighter is identified as carrying six bombs, and in the footage released by Israel, eight F-15Is take off, each carrying six bombs. Of course, fighters not shown in the footage were also mobilized, dropping at least 80 bombs.

Israeli F-15I fighter jets deployed in the operation to eliminate Mount Nasrallah (Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense)

The maximum payload capacity of the F-15I fighter jet is stated to be about 13 tons, but in reality, it is common to load about four 2,000-pound bombs. This is because it puts a lot of strain on the aircraft and makes maneuverability too poor.

But in this operation, a huge amount of bombs, 5.4 tons each, were loaded, and nearly 20 fighters were mobilized to drop 72 tons of various bombs on one point in just 1~2 minutes. In fact, loading nearly 10 tons of weapons on one fighter is enormous, considering that a B-29 heavy bomber during World War II carried about 10 tons of bombs. That's why Hezbollah, who was bombed this time, must have felt like a carpet bombing. 

Bunker Buster ,  How It Works

( Host )  This bombing has drawn people's attention to a weapon called the 'bunker buster'. As the name suggests, it is a special bomb that destroys bunkers, but what exactly is the principle behind it being able to destroy bunkers that are solidly built deep underground?

( Lee Il-woo )  A bunker is a special facility made of solid materials such as concrete or steel to protect key people or facilities from enemy air raids, and a buster means to rupture or explode. In other words, a bunker buster is a general term for a special weapon made to destroy bunkers.

To understand the concept of bunker busters, you must first understand the structure and principles of bombs. Bombs, especially aerial bombs, are weapons that have a metal shell filled with explosive gunpowder called 'charges'. They are made to be loaded into the bomb bay inside an aircraft or mounted on wings, and because they need to maintain a certain posture and precision while falling, they are designed with small wings attached to the tail.

Hassan Nasrallah stronghold after bombing (Source: X)

The gunpowder in the bomb uses insensitive gunpowder to prevent detonation by small shocks or sparks, and instead, an additional detonator called a fuze is added to set off the insensitive gunpowder. This fuze can be an impact fuze or a contact fuze that explodes when hit with a certain amount of shock when it hits the ground, a proximity fuze that explodes when the bomb approaches a certain distance with a radio transmitter and receiver like a distance meter, and a time fuze that calculates the time when the bomb falls and explodes after a certain amount of time.

There are two types of bunker busters. One is a method where a heavy bomb with an extremely heavy and strong shell encasing the explosive falls to the ground, and the kinetic energy from the fall is used to penetrate the ground to a certain depth, and then detonates using a time fuze or delay fuze. Another method is a method where a penetrating warhead and a main warhead are prepared separately, and the penetrating warhead explodes first, and after the explosive force digs a path through the ground, the main warhead enters and detonates.

This time, the bunker buster used by Israel is the former. It is made by attaching a JDAM kit, a GPS-guided bomb kit, to a BLU-109 penetrating bomb or a BLU-118 thermobaric penetrating bomb. Both penetrating bombs have an outer shell made of 25mm steel, and the former is charged with regular explosives and the latter with thermobaric explosives. Once they fall from the sky, they penetrate the ground with kinetic energy and then explode using a delay fuse. Depending on the conditions, these bombs can penetrate reinforced concrete to a depth of 1.8 meters before exploding, which is why Israel fired dozens of them at one point. Since Nasrallah was in a bunker protected by multiple layers of reinforced concrete walls 18 meters deep, multiple bombs had to be dropped at the same point to penetrate them.

In addition to the method of directly penetrating the ground with the kinetic energy of a heavy warhead, there is also a method of penetrating the ground using a separate penetrating warhead. This is mainly used in missiles, and the warhead called 'Mephisto' in the missile called 'Taurus' detonates the penetrating warhead, causing a powerful heat and pressure storm, which can penetrate reinforced concrete up to 5 meters.

Of course, the penetration power introduced above is based on reinforced concrete, so ordinary soil, which is much weaker than reinforced concrete, can be penetrated by tens of meters. No matter how excellent the construction technology is, it is difficult to build a bunker with only tens of meters of reinforced concrete thickness, so it is safe to assume that most underground structures or bunkers can be easily destroyed by existing bunker buster bombs.

Kim Jong- un 's anxiety grows as he hides further and further down

( Host )  Watching this operation to eliminate the Hezbollah leader, the most chilling thing was probably North Korea's Kim Jong-un and the leadership. North Korea also has various command facilities and shelters built underground, and South Korea is also preparing various weapons to destroy them in the event of an emergency. The weapon systems of Israel and South Korea are very similar, right? 

( Lee Il-woo )  Israel's main enemies, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, have long worked hard to build underground facilities in cooperation with North Korea. Before the current Israel-Hezbollah war began in earnest, Hezbollah showed off some of its underground military bases that were connected like a spider web throughout southern Lebanon, confident that even Israeli airstrikes could not destroy its underground bases. However, Israel launched large-scale airstrikes starting in September and devastated more than half of these underground bases.

Israel has introduced and is operating various types of bunker buster weapons to destroy enemy underground facilities, but in fact, Korea is a bunker buster powerhouse even greater than Israel. Most of the soil in the Middle East is composed of limestone. On the other hand, the Korean Peninsula is mostly made of granite, which has a hardness that cannot be compared to limestone. According to the Mohs scale, which compares the hardness of rocks in mineralogy, rocks are classified from the weakest hardness 1 to the strongest hardness 10, and while limestone is around 2.7 to 2.9, granite is as hard as 5.5 to 7.

North Korea has been digging into this solid ground since the 1970s to 'fortify the entire country'. Even though they are the same underground facilities, the defensive power of underground bunkers in the Middle East and those in North Korea is completely different, and for this reason, South Korea has been very interested in weapons to destroy these underground facilities for a long time.

The BLU-109 and BLU-118 that devastated the Nasrallah stronghold this time are also in large quantities in South Korea, and they are also operating many large bombs called GBU-28s that are slightly larger than these. The BLU-109 introduced earlier is a 2,000-pound bomb, while the GBU-28 is a bunker buster that weighs an incredible 4,700 pounds. Since each bomb weighs 2.1 tons, it is a huge monster that can only be operated by the F-15K, but once launched, it flies 9 km and can penetrate 50 m of normal soil, 30 m of granite bedrock, and 6 m of reinforced concrete. Since it is laser-guided, it will not work even if you jam GPS signals around bunkers.

Bunker Buster GBU-28 (Guided Bomb Unit 28) 

The Taurus air-to-ground cruise missile briefly introduced earlier is also a powerful bunker buster. Operated by the F-15K, this missile can also penetrate 5m of reinforced concrete and explode inside.

South Korea is also preparing to launch a large number of bunker busters on ballistic missiles. First, the short-range weapon KTSSM can fall at high speed and penetrate deeper than the other bunker busters introduced above, detonating thermobaric warheads inside. The KTSSM, which South Korea created to catch North Korea's tunnel artillery by launching it in large quantities cheaply, flies 180 km, and if the thermobaric warhead explodes in an underground facility hit by this missile, even if you are in a position to avoid the warhead explosion, you will suffocate and die because the underground facility will be in a vacuum. South Korea has developed the KTSSM-II, which extends the range of the KTSSM to 300 km, and currently possesses 367 Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers that can fire two KTSSM-IIs in succession.

Korean Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missile (KTSSM)

Separately, the Hyunmoo series ballistic missiles are also equipped with high-power penetrating warheads. The Hyunmoo-IIA and Hyunmoo-IIB with ranges of 300 km and 500 km have already been deployed in hundreds of units, and the Hyunmoo-IV with a range of 800 km and a warhead weighing 2.5 tons, which is much heavier than the bunker buster bombs introduced earlier, and can strike the ground at a speed close to Mach 10, is also being deployed in large quantities. Recently, the Hyunmoo-V, which can carry a warhead weighing up to 9 tons when the range is shortened to 300 km, has also begun to be deployed. Experts have different assessments, but it is estimated that it can penetrate normal soil at least 100 m deep and up to 300 m deep, and destroy underground facilities in Pyongyang more than 100 m deep.

In the event of an emergency, South Korea plans to fire dozens of Hyunmoo-V missiles around Kim Jong-un's residence in Pyongyang, completely burning everything above and below ground. Since it takes less than five minutes for a Hyunmoo-V missile to fly to Pyongyang, North Korea must know that if South Korea makes up its mind and rushes in, it can suddenly destroy the North Korean leadership.

The effect of the tight ROK-US intelligence asset upgrade

( Host )  The story is that if South Korea sets its mind to it, it can completely burn down Pyongyang's underground facilities. Are there any areas that must be expanded in order to increase the success rate of the South Korean military's operations?

( Lee Il-woo )  Israel was able to eliminate Hassan Nasrallah, and even earlier, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the heart of the Iranian capital, because of its powerful intelligence capabilities. On September 30, former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was interviewed by Turkey's CNN, and said that Iran decided at the highest leadership level to create an elite counterintelligence organization in order to counter the operations of Israeli intelligence agencies. However, he revealed that the head of that counterintelligence organization, as well as about 20 of its key executives, were agents planted by Mossad, and because of those agents, confidential information on nuclear development and personal information of high-ranking officials were stolen, and a nuclear scientist was assassinated.

Israel has spent more than 10 years building a network of collaborators inside Iran for this operation, but North Korea is actually a more closed group than Iran, and it is difficult to infiltrate the group. Recently, with the leak of secret information from South Korea's intelligence agency, human intelligence assets in North Korea and China have been lost.

The United States can monitor and track Kim Jong-un's movements in real time using advanced reconnaissance satellites and signal intelligence collectors, but South Korea cannot independently monitor Kim Jong-un's movements without US intelligence support. In order to effectively use the bunker buster assets it has, it must maintain the best intelligence cooperation with the United States, and separately, it must quickly rebuild its own information network against North Korea.

The CIA recently posted an online advertisement in the North Korean language seeking collaborators inside North Korea. South Korea should also use all methods, public and private, to create collaborators inside North Korea and develop them to create the ability to monitor and track the locations of key targets, including Kim Jong-un, in real time.

[Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula] "This is a one-shot for North Korea's nuclear program" Stealth nuclear missile 'SLCM-N'

[Encyclopedia of New Weapons on the Korean Peninsula] “Pyongyang’s 150m Underground Bunker Turned to Scorched Earth” Reasons for Forward Deployment of US Nuclear Bombers

( Host )  This was Lee Il-woo, Secretary General of the Korea Independent Defense Network. Now, we're with Kim Jin-guk from RFA in Washington, D.C.  

Editor  Lee Jin-seo ,  Web Editor  Han Deok-in

4. N.K. leader oversees live-fire artillery drill ahead of constitutional revision

Kim Jong Un: Be afraid, be very afraid. I am afraid the "guerilla war tactics" of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State will not be as effective as regime propaganda claims. Kim Jong Un is digging his own grave with his constitutional revisions that eliminate the hope of peaceful unification for the Korean people in the north.

N.K. leader oversees live-fire artillery drill ahead of constitutional revision | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · October 6, 2024

SEOUL, Oct. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has viewed artillery academy cadets carrying out a live-fire drill and stressed the importance of "constantly training the guerrilla war tactics to wipe out the enemies through rapid mobile and surprise operations," state media said Sunday.

Kim oversaw the firing exercise by the 75th-term graduates of O Jin U Artillery Academy on the eve of their advance into the active commanding officers of the core arm of the Korean People's Army, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

It did not say when the exercise took place.

Kim called on the academy to improve education with a focus on "constantly training the guerrilla war tactics to wipe out the enemies through rapid mobile and surprise operations in conformity with the actual conditions in the operational area," the KCNA said.

The report came a day before the North holds a key parliamentary meeting Monday, where it is expected to revise its constitution by removing unification-related clauses and clarifying the nation's territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

The 11th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) takes place nine months after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations as being between "two hostile states" and vowed to no longer consider South Korea a partner for reconciliation and unification.

In a previous SPA meeting in January, Kim called for constitutional changes to officially label South Korea as North Korea's "invariable principal enemy" and to codify plans for "completely occupying" the South in the event of war.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (C) smiles during a visit to the O Jin U Artillery Academy to oversee a live-fire exercise in this photo carried by the North's Korean Central News Agency on Oct. 6, 2024. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · October 6, 2024

5. N. Korea likely to amend constitution by removing unification provisions

The regime and KJU are taking away all hope for the future offor the Korean people in the north.

This leaves the ROK on the moral high ground.

N. Korea likely to amend constitution by removing unification provisions

bhaskarlive.in

Advetisment

Seoul, Oct 6 (IANS) North Korea is set to convene a key parliamentary meeting on Monday, where it is expected to revise its constitution by removing unification-related clauses and clarifying the nation’s territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

The 11th session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) is expected to address these revisions, nine months after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations as being between “two hostile states” and vowed to no longer consider South Korea a partner for reconciliation and unification, Yonhap news agency reported.

In a previous SPA meeting in January, Kim called for constitutional changes to officially label South Korea as North Korea’s “invariable principal enemy” and to codify plans for “completely occupying” the South in the event of war.

Kim’s order to review the constitution includes “removing” any clauses related to peaceful unification and stipulating the country’s territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

South Korea’s unification ministry has said North Korea is likely to scrap previous inter-Korean agreements, including the 1991 Basic Agreement, which defined the relationship between the two Koreas as a “special relationship” tentatively formed in the process of seeking reunification, not as state-to-state relations.

It is also speculated the North’s constitutional revision may remove references to unification, shared ethnicity and race, replacing them with a focus on the forceful absorption of the South in the event of conflict.

The specific details of these changes might not be immediately disclosed, as North Korea has delayed revealing constitutional amendments in the past.

On the issue of the maritime border, North Korea may also ambiguously outline its position without providing specific details, leaving room for future legislative actions to clarify its stance.

Since adopting its socialist constitution in 1972, North Korea has amended it 10 times, with the last revision occurring in September last year.

–IANS

int/sha

6. North Korea ‘Shrouded Sleep’ malware campaign targeting Cambodia, other Southeast Asian nations

The all purpose sword.

North Korea ‘Shrouded Sleep’ malware campaign targeting Cambodia, other Southeast Asian nations

therecord.media

North Korean government hackers have targeted several Southeast Asian countries — even perceived allies like Cambodia — with a malware campaign over the last year designed to create backdoors into systems at important organizations.

Cybersecurity experts at Securonix published a 22-page examination of a campaign they call “Shrouded Sleep,” which they attributed to APT37. Allegedly housed within North Korea’s Ministry of State Security, the group is one of the country’s most prolific hacking operations.

“Cambodia appears to be the primary target for this campaign, however, it could extend into other Southeast Asian countries. This is based on the language and countries referenced within the phishing lures, and geographical telemetry data based on related identified samples,” they said.

The victim organizations, which Securonix did not name or describe in detail, are inundated with phishing emails with malware attached in a zip file. The attached backdoor, which they named VeilShell, “allows the attacker full access to the compromised machine.

“Some features include data exfiltration, registry, and scheduled task creation or manipulation,” they said.

“Overall, the threat actors were quite patient and methodical. Each stage of the attack features very long sleep times in an effort to avoid traditional heuristic detections. Once VeilShell is deployed it doesn’t actually execute until the next system reboot.”

The files within the zip are made to look legitimate because they ended in .pdf.lnk, or .xlsx.lnk and typically had fake shortcut icons to match the extension.

The researchers said each shortcut file they analyzed contained a lure document — an Excel file in one case and a PDF in another — that was opened to distract the user while the malware was dropped in the background.

Securonix shared one of the lure documents, which was written in Khmer, the national language of Cambodia.

The document relates income across economic sectors, the researchers said. “The document is rather uninteresting and is not malicious in any way. Its sole purpose is to present something legitimate to the user. This way the intended action (clicking an Excel file) produces an expected result,” they said.

Another lure document was written in English but contained information related to Cambodia.

Once the backdoor is in place, the attacker is able to send commands remotely and export data about specific files, upload other files and more.

The researchers did not have more information on what the hackers were looking for or why they would be targeting Cambodia — one of a handful of countries with an embassy in North Korea. The two countries have long standing historical ties and North Korea’s embassy is across the street from the home of former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.

Securonix researchers said the campaign was another example of North Korea’s sophistication and ability to deploy stealthy tools in their espionage campaigns across Asia.

APT37 was already implicated in another set of attacks in January that targeted media organizations and high-profile academics. Securonix reported last year on a campaign using U.S. military job-recruitment documents to lure South Koreans into downloading malicious content.

therecord.media

7. President begins state visit to Philippines by honoring fallen Korean War veterans

​I do not think that any nation honors veterans from other countries as strongly and consistently as the Republic of Korea. The Korean people in the South and its leaders continue to express their gratitude to those who came to Korea to defend freedom.

President begins state visit to Philippines by honoring fallen Korean War veterans

The Korea Times · October 6, 2024

President Yoon Suk Yeol and first lady Kim Keon Hee pay tribute to the Korean Memorial Pylon, a monument that commemorates 112 fallen Philippine soldiers during the Korean War, at the Cemetery of the Heroes in Manila, Sunday. Yonhap

Yoon's visit marks 75 years of diplomatic ties

By Anna J. Park

MANILA, Philippines — President Yoon Suk Yeol paid tribute to 112 fallen Philippine soldiers who fought and lost their lives during the Korean War as the first official engagement of his state visit to the Southeast Asian country, which began on Sunday afternoon.

The Philippines is the first stop on the Korean president's six-day itinerary, which also includes visits to Singapore and Laos before concluding on Friday. This marks the first state visit by a Korean president to the Philippines in 13 years and coincides with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Upon Yoon’s arrival in Manila at around 2:30 p.m., he proceeded to the Cemetery of the Heroes, also known as the Heroes Cemetery, in Taguig, southern Manila.

There, he visited the Korean Memorial Pylon, a monument dedicated to 112 Filipino soldiers who lost their lives during the Korean War. Former President Lee Myung-bak also paid his respects at the memorial during his state visit in 2011.

President Yoon Suk Yeol holds the hands of a Korean War veteran, expressing gratitude for his military service, during his visit to the Korean Memorial Pylon at the Cemetery of the Heroes in southern Manila, the Philippines, Sunday. Yonhap

The Philippines dispatched a total of 7,420 soldiers to the Korean War that took place nearly seven decades ago. These soldiers are referred to as the Philippine Expeditionary Forces to Korea.

The names of the 112 fallen soldiers are inscribed on the memorial, alongside inscriptions by former Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. and former Korean President Park Chung-hee, honoring their sacrifice.

Yoon encouraged war veterans and the descendants of fallen soldiers, shaking their hands and saying, "Please stay healthy. Thank you."

One war veteran shared with Yoon that he had fought in every major battle involving the Philippine military and expressed pride in his service.

President Yoon Suk Yeol and first lady Kim Keon Hee arrive at Ninoy Aquino International Airport in Manila, the Philippines, Sunday (local time), to begin a two-day state visit to the Southeast Asian country. Yonhap

After honoring the fallen veterans, Yoon met members of the Korean community in Manila and encouraged their contributions to the Philippine economy. The history of Koreans migrating to the Philippines dates back over 100 years, with the association of Koreans in the Philippines officially established in 1967.

On Monday, Yoon and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. are scheduled to hold a bilateral summit to discuss ways to enhance their cooperation across various levels.

The partnership between the two countries is expected to expand further, particularly in areas such as transportation infrastructure projects, smart farming collaboration, and nuclear power development.

“The Philippines has shown the highest economic growth rate among ASEAN countries lately. With its population of over 112 million, along with the country’s vast amount of significant natural resources such as nickel and cobalt, the country is an important partner that can create a much synergy when cooperating with the technologies of Korea,” Park Chun-sup, senior economic presidential secretary, pointed out.

President Yoon Suk Yeol and first lady Kim Keon Hee receive flower bouquets from children during his meeting with the Korean community at a hotel in Manila, the Philippines, Sunday. Yonhap

Monday’s summit will be followed by the two presidents signing a cooperative memorandum of understanding and a state luncheon that political and business leaders of the two countries will attend.

Yoon is scheduled to wrap up his state visit to the country with the Korea-Philippines Business Forum on Monday.

The Korea Times · October 6, 2024

8. N. Korea's Kim, China's Xi exchange messages marking 75 years of relations

As Mark Twain once remarked, "The death of the Sino-north Korean friendship is greatly exaggerated."

N. Korea's Kim, China's Xi exchange messages marking 75 years of relations | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · October 6, 2024

SEOUL, Oct. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to further develop relations between the two countries as they exchanged messages marking the 75th anniversary of relations, state media reported Sunday.

Kim said in the message to Xi that it conforms "with the fundamental interests of the two countries to invariably carry forward and develop the DPRK-China friendship with a long history and good traditions," according to the Korean Central News Agency.

DPRK stands for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Our Party and the government of the Republic will steadily strive to consolidate and develop the friendly and cooperative relations between the DPRK and China as required by the new era," Kim said.

Xi said in his message to Kim that the relations between the two countries have "stood the changes of the times and the trials of ever-changing international situation and become a precious asset common to the two countries and the two peoples."

"I attach great importance to the development of the China-DPRK relations," Xi said, adding that Beijing is ready to further develop relations "through strengthened strategic communications and coordination and deepened friendly exchange and cooperation."

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping take a walk at the Kumsusan State Guesthouse in Pyongyang on June 21, 2019, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by CHANG JAE SUN · October 6, 2024

9. N. Korea to hold parliamentary meeting to amend constitution, remove unification provisions

N. Korea to hold parliamentary meeting to amend constitution, remove unification provisions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr

Woo Jae-yeon

All News 09:51 October 06, 2024

SEOUL, Oct. 6 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is set to convene a key parliamentary meeting on Monday, where it is expected to revise its constitution by removing unification-related clauses and clarifying the nation's territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

The 11th session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) is expected to address these revisions, nine months after North Korean leader Kim Jong-un redefined inter-Korean relations as being between "two hostile states" and vowed to no longer consider South Korea a partner for reconciliation and unification.

In a previous SPA meeting in January, Kim called for constitutional changes to officially label South Korea as North Korea's "invariable principal enemy" and to codify plans for "completely occupying" the South in the event of war.

Kim's order to review the constitution includes removing any clauses related to peaceful unification and stipulating the country's territorial boundaries, including the maritime border.

South Korea's unification ministry has said North Korea is likely to scrap previous inter-Korean agreements, including the 1991 Basic Agreement, which defined the relationship between the two Koreas as a "special relationship" tentatively formed in the process of seeking reunification, not as state-to-state relations.

It is also speculated the North's constitutional revision may remove references to unification, shared ethnicity and race, replacing them with a focus on the forceful absorption of the South in the event of conflict.

The specific details of these changes might not be immediately disclosed, as North Korea has delayed revealing constitutional amendments in the past.

On the issue of the maritime border, North Korea may also ambiguously outline its position without providing specific details, leaving room for future legislative actions to clarify its stance.

Since adopting its socialist constitution in 1972, North Korea has amended it 10 times, with the last revision occurring in September last year.

This image, captured from footage of North Korea's state-run Korean Central Television on Jan. 16, 2024, shows the North's leader Kim Jong-un speaking at a Supreme People's Assembly meeting held the previous day in Pyongyang. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

jaeyeon.woo@yna.co.kr

(END)

10. N. Korean Central Committee shakeup leads to unprecedented scuffles

Hmmm... indications of potential internal instability?

N. Korean Central Committee shakeup leads to unprecedented scuffles - Daily NK English

"Positions at the farm are highly privileged," a source explained. "Anyone who gets one would be reluctant to give it up"

By Jeong Tae Joo - October 3, 2024

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · October 3, 2024

A photograph of chickens taken at a farm in 2007. (Flickr, Creative Commons)

North Korean officials recently reassigned from organizations supplying the ruling party’s Central Committee have resisted the changes, leading to scuffles and an ongoing investigation, according to sources inside the country.

The personnel reshuffles occurred on Sept. 18 at the Pyongyang Farm, which provides meat and eggs to Central Committee officials. The farm operates under the committee’s Finance and Accounting Department.

“Orders called for replacing all mid-level officials in charge of state security, finance, accounting, animal husbandry and agriculture,” a source told Daily NK recently. “This provoked resistance and even physical confrontation.”

Authorities claimed the changes aimed to improve organizational efficiency and replace older officials. However, some newly appointed officials were older than their predecessors, sparking accusations of nepotism.

On Sept. 21, during an induction ceremony, one official began shouting and gesturing angrily. Others joined in, escalating the argument into a brawl that paralyzed the farm’s operations for the day.

“Positions at the farm are highly privileged,” the source explained. “Anyone who gets one would be reluctant to give it up.”

Stunned by the unprecedented conflict, the Central Committee ordered the Central Prosecutor’s Office to investigate and prosecute those involved. On Sept. 22, all reassigned officials were arrested, while newly appointed officials faced no consequences.

The detained officials will likely be sent to less desirable jobs in the provinces. “They’ll probably be transferred to a fertilizer production center in North Pyongan province,” the source said. “For many, this is tantamount to exile.”

The Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Jeong Tae Joo · October 3, 2024

11. South Korea must learn from the Gaza War

So ture, Especially because we are seeing the application of north Korea tactics, techniques, and procedures (as well as weapons and equipment) employed.

South Korea must learn from the Gaza War

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-10-06/opinion/editorials/South-Korea-must-learn-from-the-Gaza-War/2149092

Published: 06 Oct. 2024, 20:29

One year has passed since the war broke out in the Gaza Strip after Hamas — an Islamist militant group representing the Palestinian Authority — launched a surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. In the ongoing war, 1,200 Israelis soldiers and civilians were killed. According to the health authority in the Gaza Strip, 41,825 Palestinians lost their lives as of Oct. 5. Palestinian casualties are 35 time larger than Israel’s.

More than 90 percent of Palestinians in the strip took refuge and 60 percent of their buildings were destroyed by Israeli bombings. Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip goes beyond imagination, as vividly seen in its indiscriminate bombings on hospitals and schools, citing the possibility of Hamas operatives hiding there, which provoked international criticism. Nevertheless, Israel chose to expand its warfronts by launching attacks on the stronghold of Houthi rebels in Yemen and by directly battling with Hezbollah, a key proxy of Iran. Israel is even poised to start a war with Iran.

The Middle East conflict and a possible expansion of the war is an alarming development for political and economic security in the region, not to mention on humanitarian grounds. Our government must make effort to stop the war in the Mideast. But at the same time, it must not dismiss the character of future wars, as suggested by the war in the Middle East.

Israel demonstrated its ability to conduct at least three wars at the same time thanks to its advanced weapons based on cutting-edge technology and science. Israel’s Iron Dome, designed to shoot down incoming projectiles, nearly neutralized enemies’ missile attacks. Israel shows military superiority thanks to the strong shield and its powerful sword.

The amazing level of information Israel showed in the process of raiding the hideouts of Hamas and Hezbollah commanders gives important lessons to our military’s intelligence capabilities. Israeli jet fighters precisely bombed a safe house in Iran and a building with a seven-story basement. That’s impossible without the outstanding intelligence-gathering ability of the Mossad and other military information organizations. We hope our military learns from Israel.

Following the Ukraine war, the Middle East war also showed the limits to war operations without U.S. military support and information assistance. That points to the need for us to further augment our alliance with the United States to prepare for North Korea’s military provocations. Israel is different from South Korea in many respects. And yet, the country’s capability to simultaneously carry out several wars points to the direction of Korea in preparing for a possible future war.

12. Don’t forget the ‘nuclear paradox’ (Korea) (interview with ROK MINDEF)

Some very important comments from the MINDEF.

Excerpts:

What meaning do you attach to the launch of the Strategic Command on the Armed Forces Day?

The command under the Ministry of National Defense is the first strategic unit to integrate and operate our military’s strategic capabilities — such as F-35s, submarines and missiles — to deter and deal with the threats from the North’s nuclear arms, missiles and other types of weapons of mass destruction. The Strategic Command will put into action the president’s strong determination to tackle the North’s nuclear threat. We will ratchet up the level of our operational capabilities in several areas — including space and the electromagnetic spectrum — in line with changes in the strategic environment.

If our nuclear armament is difficult, many Koreans want to revise the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement to the level of the U.S.-Japan agreement to secure nuclear potential.

The most realistic solution to respond to the North’s nuclear threat is to strengthen the South-U.S. extended deterrence. That’s why the two leaders launched the NCG with the Washington Declaration last year, and this year, the two leaders approved the “Korea-U.S. Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula.”

Will Trump bring up the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal again if he is elected?

The alliance has evolved over the past 70 years. Unlike during Trump’s first term, South Korea’s status has greatly changed now that the confrontation between the two camps has intensified following the Ukraine War. How many countries among U.S. allies have a military and economic power as strong as South Korea? America will likely have trouble finding a reliable substitute other than South Korea.

Do you believe Trump will rush to directly talk with Kim Jong-un again if he is re-elected?

After the 2019 Hanoi summit ended with no deal, Kim Jong-un returned home empty-handed. He will still seek the international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power and the lifting of sanctions. But it will be difficult for Washington to accept them.

Don’t forget the ‘nuclear paradox’

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-10-06/opinion/columns/Dont-forget-the-nuclear-paradox/2149090

Published: 06 Oct. 2024, 20:27

Chang Se-jeong

The author is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo.

South Korea faces grimmer security challenges than ever before. After North Korean leader Kim Jong-un abruptly disclosed a secluded facility to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency prompted controversy with an intriguing remark bordering on condoning the North’s possession of nuclear arms. But clearly, rock-solid security is a prerequisite for the country’s survival and prosperity. It starts with demoralizing the North before it takes advantage of the South’s security challenges.

On the occasion of the 76th Armed Forces Day last week amid deepening security concerns at home and abroad, the JoongAng Ilbo met with the new National Security Office Director Shin Won-sik, who took office in August, to listen to his views on the urgent diplomatic and security challenges the country faces. Shin, 66, was born in Tongyeong, South Gyeongsang, graduated from Dongseong High School in 1977 and graduated from the Korea Military Academy in 1981. He served as the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division; the director of policy planning at the Ministry of National Defense; the commander of the Capital Defense Command; the director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Operations Headquarters; the vice chairman of the JCS (lieutenant general); a People Power Party lawmaker; and the minister of National Defense. The following are excerpts from the interview.

National Security Office Director Shin Won-shik, former defense minister, explains our government’s policy to deal with various types of military threats from North Korea, including nuclear weapons and missiles, and its persistent dispatch of dirty balloons to South Korea, in an interview with the JoongAng Ilbo in the presidential compound in Yongsan District shortly before the Oct.1 Armed Forces Day. [KIM HYUN-DONG]

Q. First, what would you like to say to our military? 

A. I thank all our servicemen for faithfully performing their duties on the land, sea and sky of this country and overseas. Our security posture is solid thanks to our military personnel and their families who have quietly supported them. To protect our people from existential security threats from North Korean nuclear weapons and missiles, a strong national defense force and an ironclad readiness posture are essential.

The shortage of military manpower due to the low birthrate, the rapid decline in the application rate for junior officers and the increase in their turnover have reached serious levels. What do you think about alternatives such as the introduction of a volunteer system, including women, which is being discussed?

Since maintaining a stable regular force could be limited by the volunteer system, we still need our conscription system. In the case of the female volunteer system, the effect of recruiting troops through the system is not clear — and it can cause unnecessary gender conflict as it is perceived as a preliminary step toward a female conscription system. Realistic alternatives to the shortage of military resources include converting the current short-term service by many to a long-term service by a small number of troops, building a strong combat capability with a small number of soldiers, constructing a combined manned- and unmanned-combat system centered on artificial intelligence (AI) and expanding civilian outsourcing of non-combat missions. We plan to lift the ratio of women in the military — currently at 8 percent — to the level of advanced countries at 15 percent.

What’s your response to the North’s persistent dispatch of dirty balloons since May?

We are thoroughly monitoring those balloons from the initial stage, and military experts are retrieving the fallen balloons in the shortest possible time. We can end the North’s substandard acts only when we clearly show that the regime has nothing to gain from flying such filthy balloons across the border. As the North aims to trigger an internal conflict in the South with such attacks, I sincerely ask our citizens to trust their government.

What’s your reaction to opponents’ claim that your guideline as defense minister on responding to the North’s attacks — “an immediate and fierce fight to the finish” — can excessively provoke North Korea?

I can’t agree. North Korea has been constantly threatening South Korea’s security by disclosing its nuclear material production facilities and launching ballistic missiles. Before saying we are provoking the North, we must point to its blatant threats to our security. To respond to the North’s threats and prevent its provocations, we must remember the historical lesson that retaliation is deterrence and deterrence is peace.

Many people are concerned about the lax discipline of our military. 

Since the military is not a remote island, it cannot but reflect rapid social changes to some extent. During the liberal Moon Jae-in administration, military discipline noticeably weakened. The conservative Yoon Suk Yeol government is putting the impaired discipline back on track.

The Drone Operations Command was launched in September 2023 after a North Korean drone pierced the skies of Seoul nine months earlier. 

We are fully prepared to conduct offensive drone operations to prevent the North from provoking us that way. The drone command will be further reinforced with cutting-edge weapon systems to deter and deal with the North’s various asymmetric threats.

What do you think about “not a few South Koreans” who agree with Kim Jong-un’s declaration of “two different states” on the Korean Peninsula?

It feels like a déjà vu of the tumultuous period shortly after the liberation of Korea on Aug. 15, 1945. When the Tripartite Conference in Moscow in December that year decided on the trusteeship of Korea, communists in the South spearheaded a campaign against the move. But after the Soviet Union issued an order to approve the trusteeship, Park Hon-yong, the leader of the Workers’ Party of South Korea, immediately changed his mind to follow the directive. North Korean leader Kim Il Sung soon started a fratricidal war, which eventually lead to Park’s miserable death. Anti-constitutional forces must reflect on the past.

What effort is our government doing to protect the North Korean people’s right to know?

We are working to help North Koreans open their eyes to the value of freedom and have a stronger desire for liberty and unification. The government is planning and producing various contents that can objectively understand the North — such as the “North Korean Human Rights Report” and the “North Korean Economic and Social Reality Awareness Report.” We will support various activities aimed at spreading diverse information to the North through loudspeakers and radio broadcasts.

What do you think is the reason for North Korea’s first exposure of its production facility for highly enriched uranium?

North Korea wants to draw attention to its nuclear program before the U.S. presidential election. South Korean and U.S. intelligence agencies have been closely tracking the North’s nuclear facilities, and have established an unprecedented extended deterrence system through the Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). We will continue devising an effective system to integrate nuclear and conventional weapons based on the “Korea-U.S. Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula.” We have the ability to detect and intercept any missile attack from the North based on the joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and missile defense system. Our military has been enhancing the “Korean 3-axis defense system” capability. If the North uses nuclear weapons and missiles, the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) operation and the allies’ nuclear and conventional operation will deal a fatal blow to the North.

Do you really think North Korea will carry out its 7th nuclear test around the U.S. Nov. 5 presidential election?

There’s a possibility of the North conducting a nuclear test to strategically pressure us or to miniaturize its nuclear warheads. But the more the North advances its nuclear capabilities, the stronger the nuclear deterrence of the international community, including South Korea and the United States, will be. The North must realize the “paradox of nuclear weapons.” Given the international community’s agreement to denuclearize North Korea, we won’t skip denuclearization and go straight to nuclear arms reduction talks.

What meaning do you attach to the launch of the Strategic Command on the Armed Forces Day?

The command under the Ministry of National Defense is the first strategic unit to integrate and operate our military’s strategic capabilities — such as F-35s, submarines and missiles — to deter and deal with the threats from the North’s nuclear arms, missiles and other types of weapons of mass destruction. The Strategic Command will put into action the president’s strong determination to tackle the North’s nuclear threat. We will ratchet up the level of our operational capabilities in several areas — including space and the electromagnetic spectrum — in line with changes in the strategic environment.

If our nuclear armament is difficult, many Koreans want to revise the Korea-U.S. nuclear agreement to the level of the U.S.-Japan agreement to secure nuclear potential.

The most realistic solution to respond to the North’s nuclear threat is to strengthen the South-U.S. extended deterrence. That’s why the two leaders launched the NCG with the Washington Declaration last year, and this year, the two leaders approved the “Korea-U.S. Guidelines for Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Operations on the Korean Peninsula.”

Will Trump bring up the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal again if he is elected?

The alliance has evolved over the past 70 years. Unlike during Trump’s first term, South Korea’s status has greatly changed now that the confrontation between the two camps has intensified following the Ukraine War. How many countries among U.S. allies have a military and economic power as strong as South Korea? America will likely have trouble finding a reliable substitute other than South Korea.

Do you believe Trump will rush to directly talk with Kim Jong-un again if he is re-elected?

After the 2019 Hanoi summit ended with no deal, Kim Jong-un returned home empty-handed. He will still seek the international recognition of North Korea as a nuclear power and the lifting of sanctions. But it will be difficult for Washington to accept them.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

13. Matching Japan’s Counterstrike Capability With South Korea’s Three Axis System

Conclusion:

North Korea perceives Japan and South Korea as a unified theater of operations in the event of a conflict and may seek to weaken U.S. alliances with both nations, creating divisions between them.

This strategy could significantly compromise the security of both countries, exposing them to North Korea’s escalating missile and nuclear threats. In this context, it is critical that Japan and South Korea, along with the United States, pursue greater trilateral security cooperation.

By linking Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s Three Axis system, the two countries can present a united front against North Korean provocations and ensure that they are prepared for any potential conflict.

While political and historical challenges remain, the shared threat from North Korea makes it worth the effort to deepen security cooperation and integrate their defense capabilities. A coordinated defense strategy will not only enhance deterrence but also ensure that both nations are better equipped to respond to the complex and evolving missile threats posed by North Korea.

Matching Japan’s Counterstrike Capability With South Korea’s Three Axis System

thediplomat.com

Integrating Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s Three Axis system could strengthen the security of both countries.

By Ju Hyung Kim

October 03, 2024

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South Korea and Japan are inextricably linked by their shared geographical and security concerns, as well as their separate alliances with the United States.

In the event of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, the South Korea-U.S. combined forces would engage North Korean troops following Operations Plan 5015, an updated version of Operations Plan 5027. While the majority of U.S. reinforcements are expected to arrive from the mainland within 90 days, United States Forces Japan (USFJ) would play a pivotal role as the immediate response force, deploying from Japan ahead of those reinforcements. In such a scenario, Japan would provide support to U.S. warfighting efforts in line with Operations Plan 5055.

U.S. bases in Japan would be essential for staging and logistics support in a Korean contingency, making Japan’s cooperation and stability vital to any military response to North Korean aggression.

Japan’s proximity and its function as a logistical and operational hub – further linked through the United Nation Command and the United Nations Command Rear – create an inherent connection between Japan and South Korea in terms of their security outcomes in the event of an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula. The coordinated defense between U.S., South Korean, and Japanese forces highlights the importance of trilateral security cooperation, as any breakdown in this relationship could severely hamper efforts to respond to North Korea’s military actions swiftly.

Consequently, the security dynamics of Japan and South Korea are closely tied in the face of potential threats from North Korea, further underscoring the need for deepened cooperation between these two neighbors.

North Korean Missile Threat and Japan-South Korea’s Divergent Responses

North Korea’s missile and nuclear capabilities present a significant threat not only to South Korea but also to Japan. While South Korea has long been under direct threat from North Korean artillery and missiles due to its proximity, Japan was rudely awakened to this reality when North Korea launched the Taepodong missile over Japanese airspace in 1998. This event marked the first time that Japan was confronted with the stark reality of North Korea’s missile threat, as the Taepodong demonstrated the North Korea’s ability to reach Japanese territory.

Since then, North Korea has continued to develop and improve its missile technology, coupling it with nuclear warheads that have made the situation more perilous. The Hwasong series of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) has extended North Korea’s strike range, putting much of Japan, including critical U.S. military bases, at risk. As a result, Japan is no longer free from the North Korean military threat, with Pyongyang’s continued provocations keeping the Japanese government on high alert. This shared threat makes the security of South Korea and Japan interdependent and heightens the necessity for collaboration in missile defense and broader security measures.

Japan has developed a sophisticated missile defense structure to counter the growing missile threat from North Korea. Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) system is centered on a multi-layered defense strategy involving Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptors and ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) systems. The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System, deployed on Maritime Self-Defense Force ships, is capable of intercepting missiles during their mid-course phase, while the PAC-3 batteries are designed to intercept short-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.

Japan has also been working closely with the United States on missile defense, including the co-development of the SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missile, which is designed to improve interception capabilities against intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Japan’s missile defense architecture has been further reinforced with radar systems like the X-band radar, which enhances early detection and tracking of incoming missile threats.

In response to the increasing missile threat from North Korea, South Korea has established its own comprehensive missile defense system, the “Three Axis” system, after declining the U.S. offer for joint development of a missile defense structure in 2002. This system comprises three key components: the kill chain, the Korean air and missile defense (KAMD) system, and the Korea massive punishment and retaliation (KMPR) plan. The kill chain is intended to detect and carry out preemptive strikes on North Korean missile launch sites and military assets before a missile launch occurs, while KAMD serves as a missile defense system designed to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles. Including Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, KAMD operates in a manner similar to Japan’s BMD system. Finally, the KMPR is a retaliatory strategy that focuses on the destruction of North Korean leadership and key military assets in the event of a significant provocation or attack. Together, these three pillars aim to provide a layered and comprehensive defense against North Korean aggression.

Despite the sophistication of both Japan’s missile defense and South Korea’s Three Axis system, significant challenges remain. A key challenge lies in intercepting North Korea’s newer missiles, such as the Iskander-class ballistic missiles (KN-23), which can execute unpredictable maneuvers during flight. This makes them harder to intercept using conventional missile defense systems. While reports indicate that Patriot batteries may have intercepted Russia’s Kinzhal missiles, which possess an unpredictable flight path, during the Russia-Ukraine war, the overall effectiveness of current missile defense systems against such erratically maneuvering missiles remains uncertain.

Furthermore, missile defense systems can be overwhelmed by a saturation attack, where multiple missiles are launched simultaneously to exhaust the defense’s interception capabilities. North Korea has been developing its ability to launch large numbers of missiles in a short period, making it more difficult for Japan and South Korea to defend against such an attack effectively.

Additionally, North Korea’s advancements in solid-fuel missiles increase the speed of deployment, reducing the time for detection and interception. Beyond these factors, if North Korea were to launch a nuclear-tipped missile, even a single failed interception could result in catastrophic consequences for either Japan or South Korea. These vulnerabilities highlight the limitations of current missile defense systems and underscore the need for enhanced defensive strategies and potentially new capabilities.

Japan’s Introduction of Counterstrike Capability and Its Possible Integration with South Korea’s Three Axis System

Recognizing the limitations of purely defensive systems, Japan introduced a significant shift in its defense policy with the 2022 National Security Strategy, which includes the acquisition of counterstrike or “enemy base strike” capability. This new capability would allow Japan to launch preemptive strikes against enemy missile launch sites and command centers, aiming to neutralize threats before they can materialize.

Japan plans to enhance its long-range strike capabilities, aiming to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles by 2027 and develop its own hypersonic missiles and glide vehicles by the early 2030s. These platforms will enable Japan to strike targets deep within North Korean territory, should the need arise. The counterstrike capability represents a substantial expansion of Japan’s military posture, moving beyond the traditional defense-oriented approach. While the specifics of Japan’s counterstrike capability are still being developed, its introduction marks a critical evolution in Japan’s ability to respond to missile threats from North Korea and other regional adversaries.

In this context, integrating Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s Three Axis system could strengthen the security of both countries. For instance, Japan’s counterstrike capability could complement South Korea’s kill chain by adding an extra layer of firepower during a Korean contingency. This cooperation could allow for a division of labor, where South Korean missiles focus on mobile North Korean targets, while Japan’s counterstrike missiles are used against fixed targets like command centers. This strategic distribution would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of both countries’ defense systems by leveraging their respective capabilities. Furthermore, intelligence sharing between Japan and South Korea could be expanded to include real-time data on missile launches and targeting information, improving the effectiveness of both countries’ preemptive and retaliatory strikes. Such collaboration would require deeper military coordination and perhaps the establishment of joint operational command structures during a crisis.

Japan’s counterstrike capabilities could be effectively linked and reinforce South Korea’s Three Axis system through several strategic alignments, addressing shared threats from North Korea. They could complement each other in several ways.

First, an integration of ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities. Japan’s ISR systems, such as its intelligence gathering satellites and reconnaissance aircraft, can be integrated with South Korea’s reconnaissance network. Sharing real-time intelligence and targeting data would enhance both nations’ ability to detect North Korean missile launches and other military threats early on, increasing the accuracy of preemptive strikes or counterstrikes.

Second, via coordinated strikes and targeting. Japan’s counterstrike capability, especially once equipped with Tomahawk and hypersonic missiles, could be synchronized with South Korea’s kill chain (preemptive strike) system. This would allow both nations to execute simultaneous or complementary strikes on North Korean missile launch sites, command centers, or other critical infrastructure, multiplying the effectiveness of their responses.

Third, through enhanced coordination for response timing. By aligning Japan’s counterstrike doctrine with South Korea’s kill chain, both nations can better coordinate the timing of their responses. While Japan’s doctrine emphasizes defense after an attack begins, integrating with South Korea’s kill chain could offer flexibility, allowing earlier intervention in situations where preemptive action is deemed necessary.

Finally, Japan’s counterstrike capabilities and South Korea’s Three Axis system could complement each other through combined command and control. Establishing a joint command and control system between Japan and South Korea under the broader U.S. security framework would enable more synchronized decision-making during crises. This would ensure that Japan’s counterstrike capabilities and South Korea’s Three Axis system operate in tandem, reducing the risk of miscommunication and maximizing the overall effectiveness of their defense strategies.

Advantages and Challenges of Linkage

Linking Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s Three Axis system presents both advantages and challenges. On the one hand, linking Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s defense system would significantly strengthen their overall deterrence posture. By coordinating their responses, North Korea would be confronted with a unified and formidable defense, capable of delivering a coordinated and overwhelming reaction to both conventional and nuclear missile attacks. A joint system would improve response time, provide more comprehensive coverage of potential launch sites, and reduce the likelihood of a successful missile strike on either country.

On the other hand, the political and diplomatic challenges of such a partnership cannot be ignored. Historical tensions between Japan and South Korea, coupled with lingering mistrust, could make deep military cooperation difficult. While it’s possible that the recently established Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework includes plans to integrate Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s Three Axis system (though details remain undisclosed), public sentiment – particularly in South Korea – could significantly hinder deeper security cooperation between the two nations. Thus both nations must carefully address these concerns and ensure that any integration of their defense systems is positioned within the framework of shared security interests.

Conclusion

North Korea perceives Japan and South Korea as a unified theater of operations in the event of a conflict and may seek to weaken U.S. alliances with both nations, creating divisions between them.

This strategy could significantly compromise the security of both countries, exposing them to North Korea’s escalating missile and nuclear threats. In this context, it is critical that Japan and South Korea, along with the United States, pursue greater trilateral security cooperation.

By linking Japan’s counterstrike capability with South Korea’s Three Axis system, the two countries can present a united front against North Korean provocations and ensure that they are prepared for any potential conflict.

While political and historical challenges remain, the shared threat from North Korea makes it worth the effort to deepen security cooperation and integrate their defense capabilities. A coordinated defense strategy will not only enhance deterrence but also ensure that both nations are better equipped to respond to the complex and evolving missile threats posed by North Korea.

Authors

Guest Author

Ju Hyung Kim

Ju Hyung Kim currently serves as a defense analyst at a South Korean defense think tank. He has been involved in numerous defense projects and has provided consultation to several key organizations, including the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, the Ministry of National Defense, the Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, the Agency for Defense Development, and the Korea Research Institute for Defense Technology Planning and Advancement.

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