Quotes of the Day:

“I wish I could tell you about these pilots. They make me sick with envy. They ride their vehicles the way a man controls a fine, well-trained quarter horse. They weave along stream beds, rise like swallows to clear trees, they turn and twist and dip like swifts in the evening. I watch their hands and feet on the controls, the delicacy of the coordination reminds me of the sure and seeming slow hands of (Pablo) Casals on the cello. They are truly musicians’ hands and they play their controls like music and they dance them like ballerinas and they make me jealous because I want so much to do it. Remember your child night dream of perfect flight free and wonderful? It’s like that, and sadly I know I never can. My hands are too old and forgetful to take orders from the command center, which speaks of updrafts and side winds, of drift and shift, or ground fire indicated by a tiny puff or flash, or a hit and all these commands must be obeyed by the musicians hands instantly and automatically. I must take my longing out in admiration and the joy of seeing it. Sorry about that leak of ecstasy, Alicia, but I had to get it out or burst.”

– On 7 January 1967, John Steinbeck was at Pleiku, Vietnam, where he flew aboard a UH-1 Huey helicopter with D Troop, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry. He wrote the above about the helicopter pilots

"You learn as much from failure as from success, Dad always says. Though no one admires you for it." 

– Karen Joy Fowler

"All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident."

– Arthur Schopenhauer

1. 2024 William J. Donovan Award® Dinner

2. Deterring Dictators: Whose Foreign Policy Will Stand Up to China, Russia, and Iran?

3. The Dollar Is Too Strong for America’s Own Good

4. Bridging the Gap: The Dynamics Between Irregular Warfare Practitioners, Academics, and Policymakers

5. An American alternative to the China’s Belt and Road Initiative

6. China could wage economic war on Taiwan to force surrender, report says

7. Assessing the Kursk Campaign: A special assessment of Ukraine’s campaign in Kursk two months after H-Hour by Mick Ryan

8. HUR Destroys Russia’s $10 Million ‘Wasp’ Anti-Aircraft System Using FPV Drone

9. After the deluge, the lies: Misinformation and hoaxes about Helene cloud the recovery

10. China’s Balancing Act With the ‘Axis of Upheaval’

11. Ishiba’s Integrated Deterrence: What Japan’s New Prime Minister Means for Taiwan

12. Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

13. Israel’s Decapitation Strikes Leave Russia Trembling

14. New US missile built to pierce China's A2/AD bubble

15. US needs a solution to China's problem

16. For a more lethal joint force, answer the 'Five Ws' of climate change

17. Israel Launches New Offensive in Northern Gaza, Orders Mass Evacuation

1. 2024 William J. Donovan Award® Dinner

In only two weeks. Some great Americans will be honored. Hope to see you there.

The William J. Donovan Award® Dinner, the preeminent annual gathering of the U.S. intelligence and special operations communities, will be held in Washington, DC, on October 19, 2024. David Ignatius described it as a "wonderful celebration of our country at its best."

This year's recipient of the Donovan Award is former DIA director LTG Patrick Hughes, USA (Ret.). We will also honor Janet Braun, Medal of Honor recipient Col. Paris Davis, USA (Ret.), and former DDO Gregory Vogle. We will commemorate the 80th anniversaries of D-Day and the liberation of Paris.

Individual tickets can be purchased online by clicking here. If you or your company would like to be a sponsor of this year's dinner, you'll need to download the invitation by clicking here. (Click on the down arrow above the horizontal line in the upper right-hand portion of the screen.) Fill out the response form on pages five and six, save the invitation to your computer, and send it back by email, or by "snail mail" to the address below.

To reserve a room at the Ritz-Carlton, 1150 22nd Street NW, for October 18, 2024, and October 19, 2024, at the reduced price of $399 per night, call 202-835-0500 by September 20, 2024, and mention The OSS Society’s room block. Reservations can also be made online by clicking here.

Additional rooms are available on the same dates at the Washington Marriott Georgetown, 1221 22nd Street NW, for $229. Reservations can be made until September 27, 2024. Call 202-872-1500 and mention The OSS Society’s room block. Reservations can also be made online by clicking here.

If you cannot attend the dinner but would like to make a tax-deductible donation to The OSS Society to help us educate Americans about the importance of strategic intelligence and special operations to the preservation of freedom - and honor Americans who have served at the "tip of the spear" as our Nation's first line of defense since World War II - please click here. Thank you in advance for your generous support.

The OSS Society’s mission has never been more imperative. 



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2. Deterring Dictators: Whose Foreign Policy Will Stand Up to China, Russia, and Iran?

My biased question: Why no mention of north Korea? Why not discuss the entire "Dark Quad" rather than only the trinity of totalitarians? I think we need to address the full range of threats in a holistic manner since they are surely coordinating their efforts on various levels.

Excerpts:

Deterrence in great power competition means keeping our hands on the levers of control and our rival's hands off. Isolationism, trade wars, and alienating democratic allies and partners are not conducive to maintaining dominance over global affairs. If we give up this power, someone else will fill the void, and future generations of Americans will struggle to succeed in a world designed to keep them out of markets and regions the new hegemon does not want Americans in.

By Trump’s admission, he wants to exit NATO, place tariffs on all goods coming into the U.S., and demonstrate contempt for the idea of leading the Western democratic nations against the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian rivals. Furthermore, Trump’s repeated claims to resolve the Ukraine-Russian war in one day are absurdly unrealistic. The Ukrainians won’t participate in negotiations with the premise that they will give up all the land lost to Russia in battle. Trump will likely suspend aid to Ukraine, which will weaken the democratic alliance and embolden both Russia and China. This will fail to create the deterrence necessary to avert more hostile actions in the future.

Furthermore, Trump’s erratic style and caricature of a strongman will weaken faith in the steady image of the American system and the dollar. Trade wars will not enrich America or necessarily drive the return of domestic production. While deeply popular with millions of Americans, his style did not translate well on the global stage in his first term. His embrace of chaos may have some deterrent effect, but when combined with his transactional approach, it will likely create a more permissive environment for autocrats and drive up the global price of goods. The total of these approaches makes Trump a uniquely poor choice for managing foreign affairs. 

Harris has demonstrated some grit on the campaign trail, but it remains to be seen if campaign rhetoric will translate into real-world toughness. A toughness is needed to push past our current fearful state of deterrence management. She must select an experienced, no-nonsense team with the wisdom and guts to reject Biden’s excessive caution. If the Harris foreign policy team can craft policy with the vision for what the United States wants to achieve over the next five years and manage it, we can advance beyond the status quo. This assumes she blends Kissinger’s realism and Biden’s penchant for alliance-building and improvement. Teddy Rosevelt’s “Carry a big stick, and speak softly” approach would be a worthy adaptation for Harris, as long as that stick bruised a few heads. Harris is an unknown and, like Trump, is equally loved and reviled by the American electorate. Whether she can handle the divisions tearing at the country and pressures exerted abroad is unknown.

Domestic policy will be as much a drain as foreign policy for the next president, and in the final days of the 2024 Presidential election, which is looking like a draw at this point, we are boiling things down to hope. While not a viable course of action, the nation must hope whoever wins is up to the task and creates a better future for all Americans. Judging by the analysis presented, the devil we don’t know might be the better bet than the one we do. 

Deterring Dictators: Whose Foreign Policy Will Stand Up to China, Russia, and Iran?

An Examination of the Biden, Harris, and Trump Foreign Policies

For and By Practitioners

By G. E. Butler, October 6, 2024

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/deterring-dictators-whose-foreign-policy-will-stand-up-to-china-russia-and-iran?utm

Introduction

As the election draws near, getting a better sense of the effectiveness of the next President’s foreign policy should be scrutinized and considered as part of each voter’s ballot calculus. The foreign policy analysis published by Strategy Central over the past three weeks, along with selected deterrence articles, was used to compare policy and possible success at deterring China, Russia, and Iran. We used AI to compare and judge each policy. The conclusion was a surprise.

In comparing the foreign policies of Donald Trump, Joe Biden, and Kamala Harris to determine whose approach would most effectively restore the United States' deterrence capabilities against authoritarian rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran, we must first understand the context in which each policy was crafted. The U.S. today faces a deteriorating global order, one increasingly shaped by authoritarian regimes that challenge the norms of international relations with little repercussions. These regimes exploit gaps in international rules and capitalize on weakened U.S. deterrence. With that backdrop, we can now compare the respective foreign policies of Trump, Biden, and Harris and judge their relative effectiveness in confronting these challenges.

Trump's Foreign Policy: Aggressive and Transactional

Donald Trump's foreign policy, best summarized by the slogan "America First," sought to redefine U.S. global leadership by focusing on immediate U.S. interests over multilateral agreements and traditional alliances. Trump's approach was defined by unpredictability and assertiveness, often using tariffs, economic pressure, and military force as tools for coercion. Notable decisions included withdrawing from the Iran nuclear deal, imposing heavy tariffs on China, and brokering the Abraham Accords in the Middle East.

However, Trump's foreign policy frequently alienated traditional allies, as exemplified by his antagonistic relationship with NATO. While he pressured European allies to increase defense spending, he often threatened to withdraw U.S. support for the alliance. His rhetoric on authoritarian leaders like Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping was erratic, ranging from personal praise to harsh criticism.

Trump's reliance on economic warfare, particularly tariffs, was intended to rebalance trade relations but often strained diplomatic ties and heightened tensions. His confrontational approach to China included a series of trade wars, but this strategy was criticized for focusing too much on short-term wins rather than long-term stability. Trump's emphasis on "peace through strength" led to increased defense spending and the creation of the U.S. Space Force. Still, his foreign policy also lacked a clear and consistent strategy for deterring adversaries.

While Trump's unpredictability occasionally worked to the U.S.'s advantage by keeping adversaries on edge, it ultimately undermined trust among allies, which is essential for maintaining a united front against common threats like China, Russia, and Iran.

 Biden's Foreign Policy: Multilateral and Alliance-Centric

President Joe Biden entered office with the promise of restoring U.S. global leadership through multilateralism and strengthening alliances, particularly NATO. His administration took a more measured and predictable approach compared to Trump's, focusing on coalition-building and diplomacy. Biden’s foreign policy emphasized competition with China, particularly through alliances like AUKUS and the Quad, to counter Beijing’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. Biden's support for Ukraine during Russia’s invasion is a testament to his commitment to collective security, as he rallied NATO allies to impose crippling sanctions on Moscow and provided substantial military aid to Kyiv.

One of Biden’s key foreign policy achievements was rebuilding trust with European allies alienated by Trump's unilateralism. However, Biden's foreign policy was not without flaws. His chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, which resulted in the rapid takeover by the Taliban, significantly damaged U.S. credibility and emboldened adversaries like Russia and China. Critics also argue that his incremental support for Ukraine has prolonged the conflict without delivering a decisive outcome.

Biden’s approach to China focuses on "strategic competition" rather than confrontation, aiming to curb China's growing influence through economic and military alliances while avoiding outright conflict. This strategy includes restrictions on technology exports and strengthening domestic industries like semiconductor production. However, Biden’s restraint in escalating tensions with China while ensuring long-term stability may be seen as too passive in the face of an increasingly assertive Beijing.

Biden's reliance on alliances and diplomacy creates a more stable and predictable environment for U.S. global deterrence. Still, the slow pace of implementation in areas like Ukraine and Taiwan risks emboldening adversaries.

Kamala Harris's Foreign Policy: Balancing Multilateralism and Modern Challenges

As Vice President, Kamala Harris has largely aligned her foreign policy positions with those of Biden but has introduced some key distinctions. Harris's foreign policy framework addresses emerging global challenges like climate change, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity, focusing on the Global South and human rights. She has strongly advocated for continued support for Ukraine and maintaining a robust U.S. military presence in NATO. However, Harris places a greater emphasis on diplomacy and reducing U.S. military engagements abroad, marking a subtle departure from the more hawkish elements of Biden’s policy.

Harris’s approach to China mirrors Biden’s in many ways, focusing on "de-risking" rather than decoupling from China. She supports maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan while bolstering U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, such as with Japan and South Korea. Harris’s foreign policy team, composed of figures like Philip Gordon and Rebecca Lissner, advocates for a pragmatic internationalism that balances traditional U.S. interests with progressive concerns like human rights and climate change.

However, Harris’s emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism could lead to a perceived softening of U.S. deterrence. While her focus on modern global issues is forward-looking, critics may argue that her approach risks underestimating the immediate threats posed by authoritarian regimes like China, Russia, and Iran.

 Comparing the Three Approaches to Deterrence

When comparing Trump, Biden, and Harris on their ability to strengthen U.S. deterrence, it is clear that each brings distinct advantages and challenges. Trump's confrontational and erratic approach generated immediate, albeit volatile, results. His willingness to use tariffs and military threats made adversaries wary, but it also alienated allies and lacked the long-term strategic vision necessary for sustainable deterrence.

Biden's focus on multilateralism and rebuilding alliances offers a more stable and predictable framework for deterrence. His ability to rally NATO against Russia and form new alliances in the Indo-Pacific demonstrates the strength of his approach. However, Biden’s cautious and incremental strategy may not be aggressive enough to deter authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, which thrive on U.S. indecision.

Harris's foreign policy continues Biden’s multilateralism but with a greater focus on modern challenges like climate change and human rights. While her emphasis on diplomacy and engagement is commendable, it may be seen as too soft in the face of rising global authoritarianism.

 Ranking and Justification

Biden’s multilateralism is the most effective long-term strategy for improving U.S. deterrence in ranking the three foreign policy approaches. His ability to rebuild alliances and strengthen NATO provides a solid foundation for collective security against authoritarian regimes. However, Biden's slow and cautious approach may benefit from some of Trump's assertiveness, particularly when dealing with immediate threats.

While aggressive and effective in generating short-term results, Trump's foreign policy lacks the strategic foresight and alliance-building needed to sustain long-term deterrence. His unpredictability undermined trust among U.S. allies and left gaps in the international order that adversaries like China and Russia exploited.

Harris's approach, while modern and forward-looking, risks being perceived as too diplomatic and not sufficiently focused on the immediate authoritarian threats facing the U.S. Her focus on global cooperation, while necessary, may need to be balanced with a more assertive stance on deterrence.

Thus, Biden’s foreign policy ranks first, followed by Trump’s for its effectiveness in immediate deterrence, and finally, Harris’s, which holds promise but may need a more robust deterrence component to deal with current threats.

Conclusion

While logical from the limited inputs for AI to draw its conclusions, it seems patently wrong that Biden’s policy would be the best. The botched withdrawal from Afghanistan, the undeterred invasion of Ukraine, Hamas and Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel, and the increasing boldness of the Chinese to push back on the U.S. and its partners in the Pacific have occurred on Biden’s watch. The 2017 and 2022 NDS rely on deterrence to maintain a friendly status quo for the U.S. and its allies and partners. Avoiding war is the right notion, given the costs and risks. However, being perpetually intimidated by the fear of passing imaginary red lines or paralyzed into inaction by outsized concepts of retaliation is the current hallmark of this and previous administrations. Deterrence cannot improve with this mindset and the failure to enforce with penalty what the U.S. finds unacceptable. Failing to punish rivals for illegal or excessively provocative actions creates the danger of escalatory actions we find unacceptable. Instead of nipping something in the bud, it will only fan the flames. With more significant provocation, the U.S. will have to act with serious force to disrupt, degrade, or simply stop actions that blow past our red lines.

Trump’s excessively personal and volatile nature makes the long-term commitment necessary to create lasting power dynamics in the international space almost impossible. Either Trump or Harris will win and will have to improve on Biden's (and previous administrations') poor deterrence performance. One key to this is keeping our friends close and our firm grip on the global international system. As any old monarch would tell you, “He who makes the rules and enforces them reaps the system's rewards.” 

Deterrence in great power competition means keeping our hands on the levers of control and our rival's hands off. Isolationism, trade wars, and alienating democratic allies and partners are not conducive to maintaining dominance over global affairs. If we give up this power, someone else will fill the void, and future generations of Americans will struggle to succeed in a world designed to keep them out of markets and regions the new hegemon does not want Americans in.

By Trump’s admission, he wants to exit NATO, place tariffs on all goods coming into the U.S., and demonstrate contempt for the idea of leading the Western democratic nations against the Russian, Chinese, and Iranian rivals. Furthermore, Trump’s repeated claims to resolve the Ukraine-Russian war in one day are absurdly unrealistic. The Ukrainians won’t participate in negotiations with the premise that they will give up all the land lost to Russia in battle. Trump will likely suspend aid to Ukraine, which will weaken the democratic alliance and embolden both Russia and China. This will fail to create the deterrence necessary to avert more hostile actions in the future.

Furthermore, Trump’s erratic style and caricature of a strongman will weaken faith in the steady image of the American system and the dollar. Trade wars will not enrich America or necessarily drive the return of domestic production. While deeply popular with millions of Americans, his style did not translate well on the global stage in his first term. His embrace of chaos may have some deterrent effect, but when combined with his transactional approach, it will likely create a more permissive environment for autocrats and drive up the global price of goods. The total of these approaches makes Trump a uniquely poor choice for managing foreign affairs. 

Harris has demonstrated some grit on the campaign trail, but it remains to be seen if campaign rhetoric will translate into real-world toughness. A toughness is needed to push past our current fearful state of deterrence management. She must select an experienced, no-nonsense team with the wisdom and guts to reject Biden’s excessive caution. If the Harris foreign policy team can craft policy with the vision for what the United States wants to achieve over the next five years and manage it, we can advance beyond the status quo. This assumes she blends Kissinger’s realism and Biden’s penchant for alliance-building and improvement. Teddy Rosevelt’s “Carry a big stick, and speak softly” approach would be a worthy adaptation for Harris, as long as that stick bruised a few heads. Harris is an unknown and, like Trump, is equally loved and reviled by the American electorate. Whether she can handle the divisions tearing at the country and pressures exerted abroad is unknown.

Domestic policy will be as much a drain as foreign policy for the next president, and in the final days of the 2024 Presidential election, which is looking like a draw at this point, we are boiling things down to hope. While not a viable course of action, the nation must hope whoever wins is up to the task and creates a better future for all Americans. Judging by the analysis presented, the devil we don’t know might be the better bet than the one we do. 

End Notes

1. "America’s Weak Deterrence: Can Biden, Trump, or Harris Rebuild U.S. Power Against Authoritarian Rivals?"
2. "Deterring Dictators: Whose Foreign Policy Will Stand Up to China, Russia, and Iran?"
3. "Reclaiming Global Dominance: The Battle Between Trump, Biden, and Harris to Restore U.S. Deterrence"
4. "America on the Brink: How Biden, Trump, and Harris Plan to Confront the Rise of Authoritarian Powers"
5. "Who Will Save U.S. Hegemony? A Comparative Look at Trump, Biden, and Harris’s Foreign Policy"

3. The Dollar Is Too Strong for America’s Own Good

​Excerpts:

Restricting flows of incoming capital “is an idea that has received surprisingly little discussion in policy circles, but it could benefit the United States and ultimately, the rest of the world,” Simon Tilford, now the chief economist at the Center for European Reform, and Hans Kundnani, now a visiting fellow at the Remarque Institute at New York University, wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2020.

They suggested that the United States could penalize short-term speculation but exempt long-term investment by foreigners.

When I asked Koo about that, he said “the genie is out of the bottle,” meaning it’s too late to go back to a world of capital controls, which he said would be highly disruptive.

Jonas Goltermann, the deputy chief markets economist for Capital Economics in London, agreed with Koo: “Even if you thought you were moving toward a better world, you’d have a big shock in the interim from breaking all the financial linkages.” On the other hand, he didn’t think Koo’s solution of coordinated intervention in the foreign exchange market was likely to work, either.

As I said, not an easy problem to solve. Right now, though, it’s just being ignored by politicians. “This is the debate that is missing in Washington, D.C.,” Koo said. “If the establishment doesn’t really address this issue, Donald Trump can run amok,” he said. Trump is correct that big, chronic trade deficits are a problem, Koo said, “but his tariffs are not the solutions we like to see.”

The Dollar Is Too Strong for America’s Own Good

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/04/opinion/dollar-exchange-richard-koo.html

Oct. 4, 2024

Credit...Illustration by The New York Times; photographs by CSA Images/Getty

• Share full article
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By Peter Coy

Opinion Writer

The economist Richard Koo built pianos in Hong Kong for his father-in-law for a year and a half between college and graduate school. Now he is the chief economist of Nomura Research Institute in Japan.

He told me that his experience in business helped sensitize him to the commercial importance of currency exchange rates, which are how much one nation’s currency is worth in terms of others’.

If a nation’s currency rises against others’, the goods it exports become more expensive for foreign buyers, and the goods it imports become cheaper, displacing domestically made products.

“You try to cut costs. One day you open the newspaper and see all of your efforts of months and months are down the drain. You have to be in a job like that to feel the pain” of exchange rate fluctuations, “and sometimes the joy,” Koo said. “Maybe that’s one reason I never completed my Ph.D.” he added. “I was always arguing back against my professor, saying, ‘That’s not the way the world works.’”

Koo argues that the dollar is chronically overvalued to the detriment of the U.S. economy, especially the manufacturing sector. He says the damage to manufacturers — and factory jobs — caused by the dollar’s strength helps account for the backlash against free trade in the United States. His proposed solution is a new international accord to lower the dollar’s value, similar to the Plaza Accord of 1985 that was struck in New York’s Plaza Hotel by the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain and France.

The Coalition for a Prosperous America, which is made up mainly of small and medium-sized manufacturers, calculates that last month the yuan was 24 percent undervalued against the dollar, the yen was 32 percent undervalued and the euro was 19 percent undervalued. “If we realigned the dollar to a competitive level, there would be a boom in U.S. manufacturing production and the entire U.S. economy, including job numbers, and household incomes would benefit,” Jeff Ferry, the organization’s chief economist, wrote to me by email.

“The price of the dollar is one of the most important prices in the world economy and we are letting it be tossed about like a wooden ship on stormy seas,” Ferry added.

I talked to Koo about his ideas and I read about other plans for how to deal with the seemingly perpetual trade deficits of the United States. One thing I found is that this is not an easy problem to solve. But I give Koo credit for trying.

Koo is a citizen of the United States, where he attended college and graduate school, although he has spent most of his life in Japan. He has worked for Nomura since 1984. Fluent in Japanese, he’s often called on by the Japanese media to give an American perspective on the news. He’s famous, at least among economists, for coining the term “balance sheet recession” to describe Japan’s prolonged slump after its real estate boom busted in 1990. He sees China following the same pattern now.

The United States keeps running trade deficits because the dollar isn’t sinking to the level that would be required to balance imports and exports. I’d say the reason the dollar isn’t sinking is that there is strong demand by the rest of the world to invest in the United States, including through American stocks, bonds, companies and real estate, and dollars are needed to do that. The United States, for all its problems, is perceived as a safe haven.

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There is another way to look at the same set of facts, which is that Americans have no one to blame but themselves for the trade deficit because they’re under-saving. By this theory, given a lack of domestic savings, the only way they can fund needed investment is to bring in money from abroad, so foreigners spend their dollars on investments in the United States rather than American goods and services. (Households usually do most of the saving and businesses usually do most of the investing.)

I don’t find the second explanation as satisfying as the first one, but in either case, it’s clearly not the trade balance that’s determining exchange rates. It’s investors. And that includes foreign governments, which sometimes use their own currencies to buy up dollars, thus keeping the dollar strong and making their nations’ goods and services relatively cheap. China was notorious for doing this, although recently it has had to lean the other way, propping up the yuan (also called the renminbi), which has fallen from favor because of a slump in the Chinese economy.

The strong dollar is good for American consumers, who benefit from low import prices, but bad for Americans whose companies export or compete with imports (as I have written a million times since 1985, when I covered the aftermath of the Plaza Accord).

Koo admits that a new Plaza Accord would be much harder to strike than the original. China, a minor player in 1985, is a huge one now, and would be reluctant to allow a significant appreciation of the yuan against the dollar, since that would hamper Chinese exports. From the looks of it, the Chinese want the yuan to stay right around where it is.

Koo said it would still be in China’s interest to join a coordinated international intervention to bring the dollar lower, because doing so would blunt protectionist pressures in the United States, ultimately helping Chinese exporters. If China came onboard, other Asian nations would as well, he predicted.

Another strategy would be to limit the inflows of foreign capital that are responsible for propping the dollar up. Capital controls used to be common, even in developed nations, but came down after World War II, and especially after 1980, as economists preached the message that the free flow of money across borders would enhance global productivity by getting resources to their highest and best use.

Michael Pettis, a professor of finance at Guanghua School of Management at Peking University in Beijing, wrote in June that capital controls would “restrict the ability of foreigners to dump excess savings into the U.S. economy.”

Restricting flows of incoming capital “is an idea that has received surprisingly little discussion in policy circles, but it could benefit the United States and ultimately, the rest of the world,” Simon Tilford, now the chief economist at the Center for European Reform, and Hans Kundnani, now a visiting fellow at the Remarque Institute at New York University, wrote in Foreign Affairs in 2020.

They suggested that the United States could penalize short-term speculation but exempt long-term investment by foreigners.

When I asked Koo about that, he said “the genie is out of the bottle,” meaning it’s too late to go back to a world of capital controls, which he said would be highly disruptive.

Jonas Goltermann, the deputy chief markets economist for Capital Economics in London, agreed with Koo: “Even if you thought you were moving toward a better world, you’d have a big shock in the interim from breaking all the financial linkages.” On the other hand, he didn’t think Koo’s solution of coordinated intervention in the foreign exchange market was likely to work, either.

As I said, not an easy problem to solve. Right now, though, it’s just being ignored by politicians. “This is the debate that is missing in Washington, D.C.,” Koo said. “If the establishment doesn’t really address this issue, Donald Trump can run amok,” he said. Trump is correct that big, chronic trade deficits are a problem, Koo said, “but his tariffs are not the solutions we like to see.”

The Readers Write

At some point U.S. companies with operations in China, or that are affected by Chinese competitors, and their critics in Congress must find a middle way, particularly in electric vehicle and solar panel manufacturing. Requiring Chinese market leaders to manufacture in the United States and license their technologies to Americans needs to be commonplace. China must moderate its drive toward self-sufficiency. China can’t have its moon cake and eat it too. At the same time, we must oppose the “China is the enemy” groupthink that dominates the official thinking in Washington.

Douglas Barry

Washington

I don’t see how Apple eliminates Chinese dependency. It would have to work down, component layer by layer, even as it managed an ever broader and more detailed set of supplier relationships, requirements, etc. Impossible to do without impact on profit margins. A possible route for Apple is to make some U.S.-based contract manufacturer its new Foxconn. Ten years? Easily.

Tom Barson

East Lansing, Mich.

Frank McCourt said he would buy TikTok, pitch the algorithm, and allow for authentic relationships. What if that’s not a sustainable business? Tech companies engineer for engagement, because if users don’t come back, the product fails. Unfortunately, engagement is dangerously close to addiction, and treading that line is hard.

Dan Frankowski

Minneapolis

Quote of the Day

“The labor of women in the house, certainly, enables men to produce more wealth than they otherwise could; and in this way women are economic factors in society. But so are horses.”

— Charlotte Perkins Gilman, “Women and Economics” (1898)

Peter Coy is a writer for the Opinion section of The Times, covering economics and business. Email him at coy-newsletter@nytimes.com. @petercoy

4. Bridging the Gap: The Dynamics Between Irregular Warfare Practitioners, Academics, and Policymakers

We still have a long way to go to understand and develop appropriate approaches to irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is an (or one) approach to political warfare (versus" the" approach as I have previously written).  Strategic competition is political warfare.

Will DOD's Irregular Warfare Center at the Defense Security Cooperation Agency contribute effectively to bridging this gap? Perhaps a new Irregular Warfare Center of Excellence will become the necessary bridge.

This requirement for bridging the gap was most effectively articulated in LTG Cleveland and Daniel Egel's "American Way of Irregular Warfare: An Analytic Memoir." https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA301-1.html

Excerpts from an "American Way of Irregular Warfare" (P. 221-222)

Recommendation to Concerned Citizens: Establish an Institution Outside Government Dedicated to Understanding American Irregular Warfare

Arguably, our victory in the Cold War resulted as much from America’s ability to harness its intellectual capacity as it did from its industrial might. Academic institutions and think tanks became vital in expand- ing U.S. thinking on defense and in providing experts to serve in gov- ernment. These patriots then provided the intellectual underpinning for policies and strategies that kept communism at bay and eventually won the Cold War.

The United States has not had—again, in my view and based on my own experience—the same quality of expertise for irregular war- fare. There are pockets of excellence within the U.S. government that study the phenomenon of irregular warfare, such as SOCOM’s Joint Special Operations University and the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis and Special Operations/Irregular Warfare program. And there are a handful of academics at universities and think tanks dedicated to the study of aspects of irregular warfare. However, this existing expertise is limited in that few professionals can dedicate themselves to the study of irregular warfare in any meaningful way. Further, as consequence of how these organizations are funded, few are in a position to provide an independent and critical perspective on America’s performance in this form of warfare.10

I believe that an independently funded center, or a public-private center supported by both Congress and private citizens, at a university or think tank dedicated to the study of American irregular warfare would provide our country three necessary capabilities. The first is a continuous and independent critique of U.S. capabilities, policies, and strategies in irregular warfare to determine how the United States is performing in its many irregular engagements and might do better in this type of war. Second, it would provide a stable of professionals who are expert in the contemporary use of irregular warfare, both how our adversaries apply this form of warfare and how the United States can deploy irregular warfare defensively and offensively to contest these adversaries, whether state or nonstate. The third would be to capture and analyze irregular warfare experiences, providing a publicly avail- able record of our successes and failures and thus serving as a bridge between irregular warfare practitioners and the American people 11

This center, which might be established in concert with the recommended congressional review and combine a broad range of dif-ferent expertise, could be focused on irregular warfare or perhaps on the broader concept of irregular statecraft.12 It would be directed by an internationally recognized national security professional who would be essential for both guiding the research and engaging with Con- gress, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the CIA, and other diplomatic, intelligence, and homeland security organiza- tions. The staff would include a modest number of academics repre- senting the diverse skill sets necessary for irregular warfare (or irregular statecraft) at the operational and strategic levels, including anthropol- ogy, economics, psychology, and sociology, but also practitioners from across relevant U.S. agencies. This center would likely prove a worthy investment of both private and public funds, as it reduces the risk of costly interventions and makes the United States more likely to gain an enduring advantage in global competition.

​A related proposal is An American Way of Political Warfare, also by LTG Cleveland and Daniel Egel (and Ryan C. Crocker, Andrew Liepman, David Maxwell​) https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE304.html

Bridging the Gap: The Dynamics Between Irregular Warfare Practitioners, Academics, and Policymakers

Sal Artiaga

Irregular Warfare & Latin America National Security Commentator

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/bridging-gap-dynamics-between-irregular-warfare-sal-artiaga-tarnc/?trackingId=b6YBCcwXQ%2F6D%2B1cho24png%3D%3D

October 5, 2024

Irregular warfare (IW) combines military actions, academic theories, and strategic policies. This field draws important viewpoints from each area. Yet, differences between those who fight, research, and create policies can cause problems. Soldiers who face combat situations provide hands-on lessons. Researchers offer big-picture concepts and deep studies, while government officials concentrate on broader aims and policymaking. We must understand these differences to create effective IW plans and develop opportunities for better communication and collaboration.

The Role of Practitioners in Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare practitioners carry out IW operations on the ground. These include special operations forces, intelligence operatives, and other military personnel who employ unconventional tactics, guerilla warfare, sensitive activities, and psychological operations. Practitioners have direct experience and practical know-how, having dealt with IW's unpredictable and often chaotic nature. They frequently face situations that don't match theoretical models. The complexities of human behavior in local cultures and the changing nature of conflict zones can make strict academic frameworks seem to need to be more in touch with real-world conditions. Practitioners need spaces to present their experiences and insights in ways that academics and policymakers understand. Practitioners’ specific terms and tactical focus can create obstacles to clear communication. On top of that, practitioners often work under policies made by people who might need to grasp the operational environment. This situation can cause frustration and a feeling of disconnect between what happens in the field and what policies say.

The Contribution of Academics

Scholars studying irregular warfare help by researching, analyzing data, and developing theories to explain and predict how IW works. They look at past events, study specific cases, and do real-world research to create frameworks that guide practitioners and policymakers. These academics depend on the data they can get, which might not be complete or up-to-date. Because IW often involves classified activities, it's hard to get complete and accurate information, which makes it challenging to analyze. Additionally, the ideas and findings from academia don't always apply immediately to what practitioners need. To connect theory and practice, you need to understand both areas well. While academics can shape policy through research and speaking up, they often have an indirect effect. Their impact depends on whether policymakers want to use what academics have learned and published.

The Strategic Perspective of Policymakers

Policymakers develop and execute strategies that guide IW operations. They focus on bigger-picture goals, national security issues, and oversight. When developing IW strategies, decision-makers need to consider political factors, public opinion, and how to use resources. Policymakers must deal with complex interests like domestic politics, relationships between countries, and military objectives. Balancing these interests can lead to compromises that might not match the ideal plans suggested by practitioners or scholars. Quick shifts in IW scenes call for strategies that can bend and adjust. Yet, government processes and political factors slow down the creation and launch of new policies. Decision-makers must blend input from experts and scholars, which can be challenging given the gaps in how these groups work together, what they value most, and what they see as key.

The Need to Hear from Practitioners

Academics and policymakers often marginalize practitioners despite their invaluable experience and dominate discussions. Providing opportunities for practitioners to convey their thoughts and insights is critical to advance IW plans and strategies. Practitioners offer hands-on insights that can support or challenge academic models and policy ideas. Their expertise provides a reality check, making sure plans can work. Practitioners can spot new and clever approaches that might not come up in big-picture talks or policy chats based on what they see. We need practitioners who think outside the box and have the talent to solve problems to create IW plans that are flexible and adaptable. Discussions between practitioners, academics, and policymakers help everyone understand each other better and close communication gaps. This ensures real-world facts shape policies and that academic studies stay helpful and on point.

Conclusion

Irregular warfare is complex and needs a complete approach that uses the strong points of people who do it, study it, and make rules about it. Each group faces challenges, but we need all their know-how to develop good IW plans and strategies. We can close the gap between ideas, actions, and rules by creating spaces for practitioners to share what they’ve learned and getting everyone to communicate. This integration improves IW strategies and ensures plans are based on real-world environments, backed by solid research, and fit with more significant objectives. Taking on this team approach will lead to IW results that can change, bring new ideas, and promote successful strategies.

Sal Artiaga

Irregular Warfare & Latin America National Security Commentator

5. An American alternative to the China’s Belt and Road Initiative

It appears this article is only published at Indianexpress.com. I would think a US Congressman's article would be published in the US mainstream press.

I also wonder why the State Department's Global Engagement Center does not seem to be publicizing this US capability to compete with OBOR (or Belt and Road iInitiative as China now names it).

Excerpts:

According to estimates by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as of September 2023, China had active investments in 101 port projects globally. Among these, 10 are strategically located around the Indo-Pacific and can potentially be used for naval purposes. The Hambantota port is one of them. The development of these ports not only enhances China’s economic interests — it also extends its geopolitical influence.

To counter China’s influence, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has emerged as a vital player. Last year, it committed half a billion dollars toward the development of the West Container Terminal in the Port of Colombo, which is the largest and busiest transhipment port in the Indian Ocean. Unlike China-based lenders, the DFC supports projects led by the private sector that are strategically and economically sound. Shipping and logistics are expected to contribute significantly to Sri Lanka’s GDP, sustaining more than 40,000 jobs and bolstering the country’s status as a global logistics centre.

The US-backed terminal will not serve as a panacea to Sri Lanka’s economic and development issues. However, it is emblematic of how the US does business in countries looking to develop their infrastructure and other critical sectors — advancing America’s strategic interests, as well as theirs, and promoting stability and prosperity. US investments prioritise transparency, high standards, and strategic interests, contrasting with the often opaque terms and potential long-term dependencies associated with some China-backed projects. Sri Lankan leaders didn’t need to appeal to Washington for support or worry about falling into debt traps. Instead, the DFC offers high-quality, transparent projects and assurances of continued partnership.

An American alternative to the China’s Belt and Road Initiative

US’s International Development Finance Corporation, unlike China-backed loans and projects, is in the long-term interest of emerging economies, global order.

Written by Ami Bera

Updated: October 4, 2024 13:30 IST

indianexpress.com · October 4, 2024

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), referred to as “Yi dai yi lu” in Chinese, has reshaped global infrastructure financing and investment. It promotes a “China-centred model” of development, which often does not set terms with regard to human rights, transparency or Western legal and market-based principles. BRI emphasises flexible, voluntary cooperation without the stringent legal frameworks and infrastructure financing that host governments might find beneficial in the short term to start projects. Such a model comes with risks for participating countries. As we navigate this landscape, the US must offer a compelling alternative that prioritises transparency, rule of law and sustainable economic models.

Projects associated with BRI have frequently led to substantial financial obligations for participating countries. These arrangements typically involve long-term repayment commitments to Beijing, creating financial dependence on the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) and giving the PRC significant leverage over host nations. This influence extends beyond loan terms and project implementation to broader political pressures China may exert on these countries.

China frequently prefers to extend or renegotiate loans rather than offer debt forgiveness, thereby maintaining or even increasing its economic and political sway over host governments. In contrast, institutions like the World Bank and IMF have shown greater willingness to forgive debt, particularly for highly indebted poor countries.

The Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka has become a focal point in discussions about China’s lending practices and the stress they place on recipient countries. Here’s what happened: In 2017, Sri Lanka leased a 70 per cent stake in the Hambantota Port to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited for 99 years in exchange for $1.12 billion. This deal was not a debt-equity swap or debt cancellation, but a separate transaction from the original loans used to construct the port. Facing a dire financial situation, the Sri Lankan government used the $1.12 billion to strengthen its foreign reserves and make short-term foreign debt repayments, rather than pay off PRC loans for the port’s construction. This decision reflected Sri Lanka’s broader economic problems, stemming from persistent trade and budget deficits, low foreign direct investment, and sluggish export growth. While the PRC monies for the lease provided immediate financial relief, they did not address Sri Lanka’s underlying economic challenges and did not provide a sustainable solution to its debt problems. Instead, the loans contributed to the transfer of a strategic Sri Lankan asset to a PRC entity, raising concerns about Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and the effectiveness of such PRC deals in addressing underlying economic challenges.

The Hambantota Port, strategically located in the Indian Ocean, is part of China’s broader geopolitical strategy to secure essential trade and energy supply routes. It is one of many PRC port projects in the Indian Ocean Region including Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Burma.

According to estimates by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), as of September 2023, China had active investments in 101 port projects globally. Among these, 10 are strategically located around the Indo-Pacific and can potentially be used for naval purposes. The Hambantota port is one of them. The development of these ports not only enhances China’s economic interests — it also extends its geopolitical influence.

To counter China’s influence, the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) has emerged as a vital player. Last year, it committed half a billion dollars toward the development of the West Container Terminal in the Port of Colombo, which is the largest and busiest transhipment port in the Indian Ocean. Unlike China-based lenders, the DFC supports projects led by the private sector that are strategically and economically sound. Shipping and logistics are expected to contribute significantly to Sri Lanka’s GDP, sustaining more than 40,000 jobs and bolstering the country’s status as a global logistics centre.

The US-backed terminal will not serve as a panacea to Sri Lanka’s economic and development issues. However, it is emblematic of how the US does business in countries looking to develop their infrastructure and other critical sectors — advancing America’s strategic interests, as well as theirs, and promoting stability and prosperity. US investments prioritise transparency, high standards, and strategic interests, contrasting with the often opaque terms and potential long-term dependencies associated with some China-backed projects. Sri Lankan leaders didn’t need to appeal to Washington for support or worry about falling into debt traps. Instead, the DFC offers high-quality, transparent projects and assurances of continued partnership.

But America’s ability to continue countering the harmful effects of China’s international lending practices is not guaranteed. Five years after it was formed, Congress needs to reauthorise the DFC next year to continue its work. This process serves as an opportunity to strengthen and expand DFC’s tools, which I believe — and many of my colleagues from across the political spectrum agree — have been highly effective in promoting sustainable investments that adhere to high standards for environmental protection, human rights, and worker rights. DFC’s mission is to mobilise private capital to address development challenges, advance US foreign policy, and catalyse economic growth in emerging markets. This commitment sets it apart from other development finance models. We also must send an essential message to our partners around the world: America remains committed to transparent, sustainable, and mutually beneficial development.

As we navigate the complex landscape of global infrastructure investment, the US must continue to offer a viable alternative that upholds our values, promotes economic growth, and ensures stability. By doing so, we can strengthen our strategic partnerships and contribute to a more prosperous and secure world.

The writer is a Democratic Member of the US House of Representative

indianexpress.com · October 4, 2024

6. China could wage economic war on Taiwan to force surrender, report says

One line of effort of China's Unrestricted Warfare.

China could wage economic war on Taiwan to force surrender, report says

AP · October 4, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — U.S. military officials and analysts have for years warned of possible armed attacks or blockades by China on Taiwan, but a report released Friday has raised a red flag about possible non-military tactics that could be used effectively against the self-governed island.

Beijing could wage an economic and cyber war to force a surrender from Taiwan without direct use of military power, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington-based research institute, said in the report. Such a likely but overlooked scenario, it said, poses a challenge for the U.S., the island’s biggest ally, and suggested Washington make preparations for how best to respond.

FDD researchers teamed up with banking and finance experts in Taiwan over two days earlier this year to simulate likely non-military moves by Beijing, such as disinformation campaigns and cyber attacks on infrastructure. The exercise was the first of its kind and seeks to fill an analytical gap, FDD said.

“Modern globalization has created more economic connections that China can exploit to achieve coercive aims,” the report said. “Technological innovation created even more digital connections, offering more possibilities for coercion, including through the targeting of critical infrastructure.”

Beijing has vowed to take Taiwan, by force if necessary, although Chinese President Xi Jinping has promised to make “utmost efforts” to do so peacefully. Taiwan split from the mainland in 1949 during a civil war when the defeated nationalist government fled to the island.

Tensions have flared in the Taiwan Strait since 2016 when Beijing began to increase diplomatic and military pressure on the island, prompting the U.S. to step up its support. Washington, which is obligated under U.S. law to provide Taipei with sufficient military hardware for its defense, has argued that it is in the U.S. interest to keep peace in the strait and to stand with democracies such as Taiwan to maintain the rules-based world order.

Beijing has demanded the U.S. stay out of Taiwan, arguing it is a purely domestic affair.

President Joe Biden has indicated he would send troops to defend Taiwan in case of an armed attack from China, but the U.S. government has yet to formulate a plan to respond to non-military tactics, giving Beijing flexibility in working to undermine Taiwan without triggering an outright response from Washington that a military invasion would, the FDD researchers said.

Taiwan’s foreign and defense ministries had no immediate comment on the report.

With an estimated 1 million Taiwanese living and working in China, economic ties have grown ever closer. That has made the possibility of economic coercion, boycotts and military blockades an even bigger threat.

In the simulation exercises, the experts from the U.S. and Taiwan studied possible moves by Beijing such as conducting psychological wars to erode public trust, banning imports of Taiwanese products or raising tariffs on them, short-selling Taiwanese stocks, freezing bank transfers across the strait, cutting fiber optic cables, and targeting energy imports and storage.

Recommendations include that Taiwan diversify its energy imports, relocate businesses away from the mainland, develop new markets, and build alliances and partnerships. The report suggested that the United States develop a playbook of options to counter China and improve coordination with allies.

The Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance, which worked with FDD on the simulation exercises, has argued that Taiwan must strengthen its financial resilience.

“China could destabilize Taiwan’s financial system to incite social unrest as a precursor to invasion,” the report said.

Russell Hsiao, executive director of the Washington-based Global Taiwan Institute, said Beijing has already been ramping up non-military measures against Taiwan and that such efforts are expected to intensify in the coming months and years.

“It behooves the United States and Taiwan to work with allies and like-minded partners to strengthen our collective resilience to China’s weaponization of economic interdependence,” Hsiao said.

___

AP writers Fatima Hussein in Washington and Christopher Bodeen in Taipei contributed to this report.

AP · October 4, 2024

7. Assessing the Kursk Campaign: A special assessment of Ukraine’s campaign in Kursk two months after H-Hour by Mick Ryan

Excerpts:

Conclusion

It is impossible to win a war without being able to win battles. However, battle alone is insufficient to win a war. Tactical actions and success must aggregate to achieve operational objectives which in turn provide the foundations for strategic and political success. Therefore, in this article, I have attempted to look at the four levels of war to assess the status and progress of the Kursk campaign. Tactical assessments alone are insufficient.

The Ukrainian Kursk campaign renewed interest in the war from many outside observers when it commenced in early August this year. The audacious Ukrainian attack into Russia saw a surge in confidence among Ukrainians and their supporters. It achieved surprise when many had bought into the story of transparent battlefield and showed that offensive conventional operations were still possible in the modern era.

Unfortunately, despite the very considerable tactical achievements of the Ukrainian armed forces in Kursk, these achievements have yet to translate into significant strategic or political progress in Ukraine’s favour. That is not to say that this progress won’t occur, but it would have been good to see more progress on these fronts before now.

Many Ukrainian military personnel have sacrificed themselves in the Kursk campaign. The politicians and strategists behind the Ukrainian campaign need to ensure it was worth these sacrifices.

Assessing the Kursk Campaign

A special assessment of Ukraine’s campaign in Kursk two months after H-Hour

https://mickryan.substack.com/p/assessing-the-kursk-campaign?utm

Mick Ryan

Oct 06, 2024

∙ Paid

Source: @DefenceU on Twitter / X

Two months ago, Ukraine launched one its most audacious campaigns of the war. While it initially appeared to be a small-scale incursion similar to previous Belgorod operations, it quickly became apparent that this was a significant conventional ground campaign that had experienced combat formations in the vanguard.

For the first couple of weeks at least, Ukrainian ground forces were able advance rapidly along several axes of advance inside Kursk. The Russians, caught off guard in Moscow, were slow to respond to the incursion, repeating a pattern from other events when they have been surprised.

However, by September, the Russian response to the Ukrainian incursion had begun to take shape. Forces from multiple brigades and divisions were deployed from Russia and from inside Ukraine to stem the Ukrainian progress, which throughout September the Russians largely achieved. In the second half of September, the Russians were able to mount a significant counterattack against the western part of the Ukrainian salient and smaller attacks against the Ukrainians in the southeastern part of the salient.

But the Ukrainians have steadfastly held on, despite losing some of the territory they initially captured. It is going to take the Russians some time, and a significant allocation of ground forces, fires and aerial strike capabilities to dislodge the Ukrainians.

As they have in other parts of the theatre, the Russians chose the less experienced Ukrainian brigades in the Kursk salient as the focal point of their counterattack. While the Russians were able to seize some territory in these attacks, their progress was hampered by Ukrainian interdiction of reserves, strikes against crossings over the Seim River, and the opening of another Ukrainian axis of advance to the west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk.

Assessing battlefield success and failure is often quite simple. Winning and losing are quickly and clearly visible. However, assessing the strategic and political outcomes of battlefield events can often take a little longer. However, sufficient time has passed since the beginning of the August Kursk campaign for an initial assessment of the political and strategic effectiveness of the campaign to be made. It is a campaign that is sure to be assessed for its impact on the trajectory on the war for a long time to come.

Two months after Ukrainian forces cross their lines of departure and began their breach of the Russian defenses in Kursk, the Ukrainian campaign has settled into a series of smaller battles to push back Russian counter attacks and defend the ground they have seized since early August this year. The campaign is consuming valuable combat formations and resources.

Therefore, at the two month of Ukraine’s Kursk campaign, it is time to assess the effectiveness of the operation. I intend to do this by reviewing the impact of the campaign at the four key levels of war: tactical, operational, strategic, and political. Each has its own nuances and success at one level does not automatically translate into success in another.

Tactical Effectiveness

There is no doubt that the Ukrainian assault into Kursk, including its breach of border defenses and obstacle zones, was a major success. Beginning with a very effectives deception campaign against the Russians, the Ukrainians were able to deploy forces to the border area, concentrate them in assembly areas and then cross their respective lines of departure for the attack into Kursk.

The attack was not entirely unanticipated. The Russians did pick up concentrations of Ukrainian troops just on the other side of the border. Deception plans aren’t perfect. But in this case, despite the detection, the Ukrainians were able to deceive the Russians about their intentions. This gave them sufficient time to concentrate, attack and break through the initial Russian defensive lines.

Source: Institute for the Study of War, 5 October 2024.

The Ukrainians also appear to have rapidly recognized their initial successes, and had additional forces postured to exploit this success. This is an important part of any large scale attack. Posturing second and third echelon forces to conduct forward passage-of-lines operations to sustain the tempo and ferocity of an attack is crucial. It is also evidence of very competent planning on the part of the Ukrainians.

Operational Effectiveness

The operational level of war is the level at which battles, and other military activities are designed, planned, and orchestrated to achieve larger campaign objectives. These in turn should support the achievement of key elements of a military strategy.

What was the military strategy that this operation was designed to support?

This of course is classified but we can speculate that the Ukrainians, understanding the current trajectory of the war did not favour their long-term prospects, needed to change that status quo. As part of this assessment, the Ukrainian military and politicians will have also appreciated that Putin is continuing with his strategy of wearing down Ukraine and waiting out the West, while the U.S. and NATO continue with their strategy to help Ukraine just enough to defend itself but not enough to defeat Russian forces in Ukraine. Therefore, the only actor who could change this status quo was Ukraine.

This is a valid appreciation. What we might question is the method chosen to change the status quo. Is the Kursk campaign the right answer to the question of ‘how do we change the status quo in this war?’

This far, the Ukrainians have demonstrated they can plan and execute a campaign in Ukraine. They have shown they can sustain forces on an expeditionary campaign outside their own borders, and conduct an effective defence as well as supporting operations, to achieve tactical and operational objectives.

This means that Ukraine is conducting a good campaign. It doesn’t mean it was the right action at the operational level to effect a change in the strategic status quo. I think this remains an open question given the opportunity costs of using very experienced forces and large quantities of munitions and other logistic support in Kursk. Did Vuhledar fall because of the focus of forces and materiel in Kursk? How much of Russia’s progress in the past two months is a direct result of Ukraine’s redirection of forces to its north eastern border and into Russia? These are good questions, but we have nowhere near the data to answer them just yet.

Strategic Effectiveness

Allan Millett and Williamson Murray have described effective strategic thinking as much more important than tactical or operational excellence. They stress the importance of getting strategy right when they write in their article Lessons of War that “it is more important to make correct decisions at the political and strategic level than it is at the operational or tactical level. Mistakes in operations and tactics can be corrected, but strategic mistakes live forever.”

One area of strategic effectiveness that should be emphasized is that the Ukrainians assault into Russia demonstrated that offensive operations are still possible in this war. Too much of the narrative in the media about this war is focussed on ‘stalemate’ and ‘ trenches’. These are certainly part of the story of this war, but not the full story. In their audacious crossing into Kursk, the Ukrainians showed they were still able to plan an offensive campaign, generate surprise against their enemy while doing so, and sustain offensive operations over a period of weeks.

Why does this matter?

First, it challenges the idea which has taken hold in some parts of the strategic community in the West that Ukraine will not be able to liberate its territory currently occupied by Russia. This is important because it should sustain (if not increase) the resolve of Ukraine’s key Western supporters to continue (or increase) their assistance. It also gives the Ukrainian military a great shot of confidence as well.

Second, it demonstrates that the Ukrainians have thought through the challenges of the modern battlefield and developed evolved tactics and techniques that involves combined arms, air-land integration with a heavy emphasis on drones and EW. These new techniques should be studied by Western military organisations, although this should be done against the differing context of Ukraine and other likely theaters such as the Pacific.

Finally, the impact on Ukrainian morale – both civil and military – should not be underestimated. Observing your own forces conducting offensive operations after the past year of disappointments will have been significant in the minds of Ukrainians.

Despite this, to be truly effective at the strategic level, the Kursk campaign needs to have changed the strategic calculus of the key participants in the war. Tactical success is of little worth if it does not translate into strategic outcomes. This is where the Kursk campaign is problematic.

As yet, the Kursk campaign has not changed the calculus of the Russians, NATO leadership or the U.S. administration. Putin continues to prioritize the Russian offensives that have continued for months in the Donbas. The Russians have managed to continue advancing on multiple fronts, including capturing the destroyed town of Vuhledar, advancing to the Oksil River and now drawing up to the gates of Pokrovsk. The Kursk campaign, while it has drawn Russian forces from other parts of Ukraine, has not fundamentally changed the tempo of Russian operations in many parts of the Donbas. Indeed, in the weeks after the beginning of the Kursk campaign, Russian attacks on their Pokrovsk axis of advance actually increased.

Putin knows he currently occupies nearly 18% of Ukraine, while Ukraine occupies way less than 1% of Russia. For Putin, this is probably a fair trade at this point of the war. Kursk has not fundamentally shifted Putin’s strategy for the war.

The Kursk campaign has not shifted the strategy of NATO either. While NATO is implementing an array of initiatives to increase defence production, streamline provision of aid to Ukraine, assist Ukraine in cyber and information operations and is also training many Ukrainians, the core strategy of NATO is yet to embrace the defeat of Russia in Ukraine. Kursk has not changed that approach. And while Zelenskyy continues to call for Ukraine to be admitted to NATO, Kursk does not appear to have furthered that aspiration any closer to fruition.

The U.S. administration has also remained unswayed by the Ukrainian campaign in Kursk. Continued pleas to allow Ukraine to employ American long-range strike weapons in their full capacity from the Ukrainian president have been ignored by the Biden administration. Neither candidate for president was able to answer ‘yes’ to a question in the recent presidential debate about whether they wanted Ukraine to win. The current U.S. strategy for the war is enabling a slow strangulation of the Ukrainian state by their brutal neighbor. Without a significant shift in U.S. strategy, which currently appears obsessed with ‘avoiding World War Three’ rather than helping Ukraine win, a long-term Ukrainian defeat is very possible.

Political Effectiveness

Ultimately, any military activity must support the achievement of political objectives. This is basic Clausewitzian theory about war. And so far, it is difficult to see where Ukraine’s position politically has been improved by the Kursk offensive.

In the initial days of the Kursk campaign, the Ukrainians received kudos from many of their supporters. However, this was often tempered by backgrounding officials in Europe and the U.S. complaining about the lack of coordination or warning from the Ukrainians that such an offensive into Russia was planned.

While Ukraine had good reasons for adopting this approach (another lesson from the 2023 counteroffensive), it may have left some lingering political challenges in the relationships that Ukraine has developed with its most important supporters. At some point in the future, once all the key participants have published their memoirs it will be interesting to see just how the Ukrainian surprise attack into Kursk changed the relationship between Zelenskyy and key leaders in the U.S. and Europe.

Politically, Putin appears to have publicly shrugged off the Kursk campaign. While news of the Ukrainian attack appeared in the Russian press in the first couple of days of the offensive, it has gradually tapered off to almost nothing. Putin can’t pay a domestic political price for something his people know nothing about. Therefore, the Kursk campaign does not appear to have resulted in any significant political pressure of Putin, although in one regard it has allowed him to reinforce his narrative about the threat posed to Russia by Ukraine and NATO.

Source: @DefenceU at Twitter / X

To add to the challenges faced by Ukraine’s government, anti-Ukraine politicians have continued to spruik their messages in Europe and in the U.S. This has resulted in a more difficult political environment for governments and their efforts to continue the financial, military, humanitarian and other forms of support for Ukraine. The Kursk campaign has not resulted in any decrease in these anti-Ukraine voices, some of whom are indirectly funded by Russian misinformation campaigns.

President Zelenskyy has often discussed the Kursk campaign as a key element of his new Victory Plan. Exactly how the seizure of Russian territory is employed in the plan remains unknown, although Zelenskyy has stated he will reveal it at the next Ramstein meeting of Ukraine supporters. We could speculate that some form of territorial swap with the Russians for land they occupy in Ukraine is the desired outcome. However, with Kursk being a fraction of 1% of Russian territory, and Russia occupying nearly 18% of Ukraine, the fruits of the Kursk campaign are likely to be quite small politically.

A final political element at present is the war in the Middle East. This is absorbing the time of decision makers in Washington DC, and reducing the amount of time that can be focussed on strategic decision making about Ukraine. Additionally, the defence of Israel is likely to consume some of the materiel required by Ukraine such as Patriot missile interceptors, precisions munitions and artillery munitions. The longer the war in the Middle East continues, the greater the political challenge that the Ukrainians will have in securing attention and resources to defend against Russia. Whether the Kursk campaign helps or hinders this situation remains to be seen.

Assessment

Despite the brilliant surprise that Ukraine pulled off against the Russians in early August, the effective battlefield operations in Kursk since, the Ukrainian Kursk campaign is yet to change the trajectory of this war. Russia continues its advance on multiple axes of advance in eastern Ukraine, and none of Ukraine’s supporters have shifted their strategy for provision of aid.

Therefore, in reviewing the four levels of war examined in this article, the following assessments might be made:

At the tactical level, the Kursk incursion has been a success for Ukraine. Russian territory has been seized (albeit a very small proportion of Russian territory overall) and Ukrainian combat and support formations appear to have performed well. The Ukrainians have demonstrated that they have learned many of the lessons of the failed 2023 counter offensive, particularly in the employment of experienced versus new brigades, the orchestration of EW, drones, fires and air defence, and the planning and achievement of surprise.

At the operational level, the Kursk campaign is a mixed bag. The Ukrainians have mounted and executed a large-scale campaign involving tens of thousands of troops in Russia and Ukraine and sustained it over two months. This is a significant achievement. However, the Kursk campaign is yet to draw sufficient reserves from Russia’s main effort in the Donbas to be declared a successful campaign (at least not yet). And while we cannot draw definitive connection between Ukrainian reverses in the Donbas and the campaign in Kursk, balancing military resources between these two fronts will be an ongoing challenge for Ukraine.

At the strategic level, the Kursk campaign is yet to bear fruit for Ukraine. Putin has maintained his course in Ukraine, with his operations on the ground in the Donbas as well as his aerial campaign to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure and terrorize Ukrainian civilians continues unhindered. Neither NATO nor the U.S. have reconsidered or revised their respective strategies for supporting Ukraine. Ukraine’s ‘big swing’ to change the status quo of the war through the Kursk campaign, and change the strategic calculus of the key actors in the war, is yet to demonstrate any significant degree of success.

At the political level, the Kursk campaign did deliver an initial surge in morale for Ukrainian soldiers and civilians, and this can never be under rated as part of an overall war effort. However, this has not translated into any significant political success for President Zelenskyy and his government. Zelenskyy, despite his whirlwind tour of Europe and America to brief his new victory plan, appears to have not (yet) swayed the Biden Administration or the leadership of European nations from their current policies in supporting Ukraine. While the full details of the Ukrainian victory plan remain unknown (neither have we seen the U.S. strategy for Ukraine), Zelenskyy has hinted that it includes requests for significant increases in support – munitions, materiel, training and authorities about long range weapons – in order to rapidly change the military situation and bring Russia to the negotiating table. If Kursk was designed as a key element in this plan, it is yet to succeed in doing so.

That doesn’t mean that the Kursk campaign is at once a brilliant tactical success and a strategic and political failure. At least not yet. However, given the expenditure of resources and the reallocation of precious, experienced combat formations to the Kursk campaign, the return on investment is yet to become fully apparent. As such, another assessment in a couple of months is warranted after more information becomes available, and the full results of the 2024 Russian air and ground campaigns in Ukraine become clearer.

Conclusion

It is impossible to win a war without being able to win battles. However, battle alone is insufficient to win a war. Tactical actions and success must aggregate to achieve operational objectives which in turn provide the foundations for strategic and political success. Therefore, in this article, I have attempted to look at the four levels of war to assess the status and progress of the Kursk campaign. Tactical assessments alone are insufficient.

The Ukrainian Kursk campaign renewed interest in the war from many outside observers when it commenced in early August this year. The audacious Ukrainian attack into Russia saw a surge in confidence among Ukrainians and their supporters. It achieved surprise when many had bought into the story of transparent battlefield and showed that offensive conventional operations were still possible in the modern era.

Unfortunately, despite the very considerable tactical achievements of the Ukrainian armed forces in Kursk, these achievements have yet to translate into significant strategic or political progress in Ukraine’s favour. That is not to say that this progress won’t occur, but it would have been good to see more progress on these fronts before now.

Many Ukrainian military personnel have sacrificed themselves in the Kursk campaign. The politicians and strategists behind the Ukrainian campaign need to ensure it was worth these sacrifices.

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8. HUR Destroys Russia’s $10 Million ‘Wasp’ Anti-Aircraft System Using FPV Drone

We must learn from our Ukrainian friends. The US defense industrial base should be embarrassed.

HUR Destroys Russia’s $10 Million ‘Wasp’ Anti-Aircraft System Using FPV Drone

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · October 6, 2024

The HUR highlighted that a Russian anti-aircraft missile system worth $10 million was destroyed by a drone costing just "several hundred dollars."

by Kyiv Post | October 6, 2024, 4:04 pm

Soldiers from the “Kryla” (Wings) special unit of the Ukrainian General Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) discovered and destroyed a Russian Osa (‘Wasp’) anti-aircraft missile system, as reported by HUR via Telegram.

According to the report, the air defense system is valued at $10 million, while the FPV drone used by the scouts to destroy the “Wasp” cost only several hundred dollars.

“Lessons in interesting mathematics will continue!” read the caption accompanying the released video.

In the footage – which Kyiv Post could not independently verify – the drone camera shows the “Wasp” stationed in a tree line. The video then cuts to a Ukrainian kamikaze drone flying toward the anti-aircraft missile system and crashing into it. Thick clouds of black smoke soon rise from the “Wasp,” followed by intense flames as the fire spreads.

The report did not specify the exact location of the strike.

The Osa is a Soviet-era, all-weather automated military air defense system designed to protect motorized rifle and tank divisions in various combat scenarios. Development began in 1960 with the goal of creating the Soviet Union's first fully mobile air defense system.

Deployed in 1971, the Osa underwent continuous modernization. In 1977, the improved Osa-AKM variant was introduced, featuring six upgraded 9M33M3 missiles. Production continued until 1989, making it the most widely produced anti-aircraft missile system in the USSR.

The Osa-AKM is equipped with six 9M33M3 missiles, each weighing 128 kg and carrying a 15-kg warhead. The system has a range of 1.5 to 10 kilometers and can engage targets at altitudes between 10 and 5,000 meters. The probability of hitting a fighter-type target with one missile ranges from 50% to 85%.

According to open-source data, a single Osa missile costs around $56,000, compared to $400,000 for a missile from the modern German IRIS-T system. The total cost of the Osa system varies widely, with estimates ranging from $1 million to $10 million.

In mid-January, the Ukrainian military destroyed another Russian Osa using an American-made HIMARS rocket launcher. According to a report from the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO), while conducting reconnaissance in the southern sector, operators from the 73rd Maritime Center of the SSO – despite poor visibility – discovered a Russian anti-aircraft missile system being used against Ukrainian troops.

The SSO aerial reconnaissance team provided the coordinates to HIMARS operators, who successfully destroyed the Russian anti-aircraft missile system with precise fire.

Kyiv Post

The Kyiv Post is Ukraine’s English-language newspaper and proud winner of the 2014 Missouri Honor Medal for Distinguished Service in Journalism. The newspaper’s first print edition came out on Oct. 18, 1995, and went online in 1997.

kyivpost.com · by Kyiv Post · October 6, 2024

9. After the deluge, the lies: Misinformation and hoaxes about Helene cloud the recovery

Not unexp[ected. But i'm still amazed at some of the conspiracy theories I see on social media and unfortunately many of them fit into the preconceived notions and world views of people of all political persuasions. 

As they say, if something fits neatly into your worldview you might benefit from questioning it.

After the deluge, the lies: Misinformation and hoaxes about Helene cloud the recovery

AP · October 5, 2024

WASHINGTON (AP) — The facts emerging from Hurricane Helene’s destruction are heartrending: Businesses and homes destroyed, whole communities nearly wiped out, hundreds of lives lost, hundreds of people missing.

Yet this devastation and despair is not enough for the extremist groups, disinformation agents, hucksters and politicians who are exploiting the disaster to spread false claims and conspiracy theories about it and the government’s response.

According to former President Donald Trump, the federal government is intentionally withholding aid to Republican disaster victims. Far-right extremist groups warn on social media that officials plan to bulldoze affected communities and seize the land from residents. A tale straight from science fiction asserts that Washington used weather control technology to steer Helene toward Republican voters in order to tilt the presidential election toward Democratic nominee Kamala Harris.

The claims, according to experts and local officials dealing with disaster response, say less about the reality of the widespread damage from Helene than they do about America’s fractured politics and the fear and distrust shadowing an election year marked by assassination attempts and escalating global tension.

Debunking conspiracy theories takes time away from recovery efforts

As rescue work continues and authorities try to separate fact from fiction, the conspiracy theories are not helping. Elected leaders from both parties have had to set the record straight and urge people not to give into fear and rumor.

“If everyone could maybe please put aside the hate for a bit and pitch in to help, that would be great,” posted Glenn Jacobs, the retired professional wrestler known as Kane, who is now the Republican mayor of Knox County, Tennessee. Jacobs’ post was intended to rebut rumors that workers from the Federal Emergency Management Agency were seizing relief supplies from private citizens.

Many of the conspiracy theories focus on hard-hit North Carolina, a state key to winning the White House. Rumors circulated that FEMA was raiding storm donations and withholding body bags, forcing local hospitals to stack the bodies of victims. One claim suggested federal authorities would condemn the entire town of Chimney Rock and prohibit resettlement in order to commandeer a valuable lithium mine nearby.

False claims of blocked relief flights and aid withheld from Republicans

Elon Musk, the owner of Tesla, X and SpaceX, posted that private relief flights to North Carolina were being blocked by the Federal Aviation Administration, a claim dismissed as false by Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg.

Despite the tradition of Democrats and Republicans putting aside politics for disaster response, many conspiracy theories suggest Democrats such as President Joe Biden or North Carolina Gov. Roy Cooper are intentionally withholding aid from Republicans. Trump has pushed the claim, as has North Carolina’s lieutenant governor, Mark Robinson, the embattled GOP nominee for governor.

“They’re being treated very badly in the Republican areas,” Trump told Fox News, ignoring reports and photo and video evidence of recovery efforts underway throughout the region. “They’re not getting water, they’re not getting anything.”

Conspiracy theorist Alex Jones endorsed Trump’s fact-free allegation. Jones, the founder of InfoWars, popularized the idea that the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting in Connecticut that killed 20 children in 2012 was faked. “Exclusive: Victims of Hurricane Helene Confirm The Federal Government is Purposely Blocking Rescuers and Stealing Aid In an Attempt to Keep Deep Red Areas From Voting,” Jones posted Thursday on X.

Disinformation campaigns by China and Russia amplify the misleading claims

State-run media and disinformation campaigns run by China and Russia have amplified false and misleading claims about the response to the storm. Both countries have used social media and state news stories to criticize responses to past U.S. natural disasters, part of a larger effort to stoke division and distrust among Americans.

State and local officials from both parties have condemned the conspiracy theories as rumors, saying the focus should be on recovery, not political division and hearsay. Responding to the hoaxes is taking up time that should go toward assisting victims, said North Carolina state Sen. Kevin Corbin, a Republican who urged his constituents not to give into hoaxes.

“Friends can I ask a small favor?” Corbin posted Thursday on Facebook. “Will you all help STOP this conspiracy theory junk that is floating all over Facebook and the internet... Please don’t let these crazy stories consume you.”

After Robinson, the GOP candidate for North Carolina governor, posted that state officials had not prepared for the storm, a spokesman for the governor accused Robinson of mounting “an online disinformation campaign.” North Carolina officials say the response to Helene is the largest in state history, including thousands of members of the National Guard and other recovery workers, millions of meals, dozens of aircraft and more than 1,000 chainsaws.

Trump has tried to tie the hurricane’s aftermath to immigration, a leading issue of his campaign. He falsely claimed that FEMA had run out of money because all of it had gone to programs for undocumented immigrants.

The agency’s funding for disaster aid is stretched, but that is because of the many parts of the country dealing with the effects of hurricanes, wildfires and other calamities. Disaster aid is funded separately from other Department of Homeland Security programs that support immigration-related spending.

Far-out tales of space lasers, fake snow and weather control technology

Bizarre stories proposing that the government used weather control technology to aim the hurricane at Republican voters quickly racked up millions of views on X and other platforms.

Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, R-Ga., endorsed the idea, posting Wednesday on X: “Yes they can control the weather. It’s ridiculous for anyone to lie and say it can’t be done.”

Far-out tales of space lasers, fake snow and weather control technology -- sometimes tinged with antisemitism — have spread after recent natural disasters, including a snowstorm in Texas and last year’s wildfire in Maui.

Experts who study conspiracy theories say big events like disasters — or the Sept. 11 attacks or the COVID-19 pandemic — create perfect conditions for conspiracy theories to spread because large numbers of anxious people are eager to find explanations for shocking events.

Responding to the volume of false claims about Helene, the Red Cross urged people to consult trustworthy sources of information and to think twice before reposting conspiracy theories.

“Sharing rumors online without first vetting the source and verifying facts ultimately hurts people — people who have just lost their homes, neighborhoods, and, in some cases, loved ones,” the organization wrote in a public plea.

AP · October 5, 2024

10. China’s Balancing Act With the ‘Axis of Upheaval’

But China is a card carrying central member of the Dark Quad. It is not the trilateral axis of upheaval plus China. Unrestricted Warfare is a doctrine of upheaval. It has an "anti-US bent" just as much as the other three.

China’s Balancing Act With the ‘Axis of Upheaval’

thediplomat.com

There’s an obvious anti-U.S. bent to China’s ties with Russia, Iran, and North Korea, but Beijing must tread carefully lest it be pulled deeper into conflict than it is willing to go.

By François Godement

October 04, 2024

Credit: Gemini Generated Image

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Everyone remembers former U.S. President George W. Bush’s 2002 designation of an “axis of evil,” at the time comprising Ali Khamenei’s Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. Today, experts at the the Center for a New American Security refer to an “axis of the upheaval” and former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster to an “axis of the aggressors” in order to describe the dynamics between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.

Europe is also concerned by the ties between the Asian and European strategic theaters. China is in a state of quasi-alliance with Russia, which has invaded Ukraine, as demonstrated by Marcin Kaczmarski, in “strategic cooperation” with Iran, which entertains its own axis of disruption through the Middle East as evidenced by Pierre Pinhas. Meanwhile, Beijing in 2021 renewed a mutual defense treaty with North Korea – the only such formal alliance that China entertains, as Adam Cathcart explains.

As always in these links, one must wonder who is really in control, and who is being driven. Junior partners may also pursue autonomy in their decisions, and even bring their senior partner down a road it did not wish to travel.

Junior and Senior Partners: Who Has the Lead?

That question is particularly acute for China. North Korea uses almost any burning international crisis to advance its own agenda. There is increasing suspicion – even in China – that Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic program benefits from Russian technology obtained against the delivery of weapons and ammunition, though the overt quid pro quo is North Korea’s access to food.

Russia may or may not have informed Beijing of its intentions against Ukraine, and its blustering with nuclear threats does not sit well with Beijing.

Iran itself, drawn into further conflict by its Hamas proxy and the need to support Hezbollah, has hurt the balance that China was seeking to keep in its relations with Israel. China has been forced to choose Iran over Israel – an opportunistic move that could in the end prove less than opportune.

More broadly, China has built important and profitable economic relationships with nearly every country squaring off against these questionable partners. Russia’s war on Ukraine is today the number one security concern of Europe, increasingly described as a European “core interest.” China has built profitable relations throughout the Near and Middle East, including all Gulf states and Israel, with which relations had been blooming. China has also achieved a positive trade balance with Japan and recently with South Korea. There is even deeper trade integration of South Korea’s economy into China’s trade sphere.

Yet China’s global export drive is meeting new barriers and de-risking is becoming a widely shared policy among China’s trade partners. There is a distinct possibility of being drawn by geopolitics into a downward economic spiral. This is not fully recognized by Chinese leaders, who see their impressive export success as the result of their own policies, and not as that of more prudent predecessors.

China’s assertive and even aggressive posture in its neighborhood is already creating a backlash as seen in the surge of military spending across Asia and the renewed vigor in defense partnerships with the United States. Still, does Washington have enough military strength and will power to deter China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if they combine forces? China evidently believes that projecting strength and strong-arming neighbors is as effective as making itself economically irreplaceable.

But how far does this strategy extend to other partnerships, if it has undesirable consequences for China? Where to draw the line? China’s responses to this dilemma reflect a balancing act. One should often distinguish between words and deeds. In its public diplomacy, China presents itself as a promoter of peace and a mediator, as a paragon of stability. It acknowledges national sovereignty and territorial integrity – but does not apply explicitly these values to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Lately, it has become a vocal critic of the division of the world in “two camps,” a general designation that intends to be broader than its traditional rejection of alliances. The term implies that crises must be solved bilaterally or regionally, avoiding escalation and prioritizing the agency of individual states over strategic alignment. Against this, China’s proclamation of a “friendship without limits” with Russia only days before the invasion of Ukraine does not sit well, nor does its lack of balance in statements concerning specific crises. While there is professed neutrality on Russia’s war with Ukraine, China puts the blame for the conflict with a faulty European security architecture and with NATO eastward’s expansion, while never actually condemning Russia’s moves.

A New Doctrine on Sanctions

Similarly, China proclaims respect and support for the United Nations as the arbiter of international disputes. Yet, beyond the abstract mention of international law, this respect is no longer accompanied by support for international sanctions. In principle, China may sign up to sanctions endorsed by the U.N. In practice, it stands with Russia in blocking any such decision at the Security Council and has effectively neutered the U.N. committee created to oversee their implementation in the case of North Korea.

Indeed, the increased sanctions against Russia starting in 2022 – including the seizure of financial state holdings abroad – have changed China’s calculus. Technological export controls by some of China’s partners are viewed by Beijing as sanctions. It systematically opposes their adoption, while busily creating mirror legislation enabling similar bans.

In truth, China has always used the opportunity of U.S. or Western sanctions to improve its own economic relations with the states coming under these sanctions. And this has in some cases been tacitly accepted by Washington. In the interest of global oil supply, China’s continuing purchases from Iran were tolerated, including a never fully implemented agreement to develop the South Pars Iranian gas field. Today’s sanctions against Russia have even larger loopholes for oil and gas. China has vastly increased its exports with Russia while displacing Europe as a major energy buyer from Moscow.

Rhetorically, Beijing is blurring its stand regarding the most questionable partners by adopting and using the notion of a “Global South.” The term originated in the West but is now used by Chinese public diplomacy to its advantage on the Ukraine file. A key claim is that China’s response to the war in Ukraine, including the view that this is both an issue of regional European security and the result of a faulty European security architecture – not to mention U.S. influence – is shared by all countries in the so-called Global South. This includes the rejection of sanctions designated as Western, even though states such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore in Asia actually implement such sanctions.

Strikingly, on the refusal or circumvention of sanctions against Russia, China indeed finds itself in good company. Apart from European and East Asian allies, no nation follows them, except when compelled to do so. Much of China’s trade with Russia flows through countries as diverse as Kazakhstan and Turkey, while re-exported liquified natural gas finds its way to Europe.

But is this the consequence of the “historical change unseen in a century” that China claims in its favor? Is the Global South the safe anchor for China’s most questionable partnerships? This remains doubtful. Even without resurrecting the notion of the Third World, emerging and developing countries – with the exception of directly concerned nations – have never joined Western alliances or formal coalitions, whether during the Korean, Vietnam, or Gulf wars. The problem for the United States and its transatlantic and its Pacific allies today is not so much the change of doctrine in the Global South. It is rather the global shift in economic growth that has given much more importance to states often grouped under the mantra of neutrality or non-alignment.

Support Without Crossing the Red Lines

Still, China is aware of the risks it runs by exceeding red lines with the quasi-allies in a revisionist axis. Published expertise from China shows awareness of the fault lines in Russia, Iran, and North Korea, even if this is said in very restrained ways. North Korea’s aid dependence is cited. There is particular criticism of a new North Korea-Russia alliance, including potential nuclear technology transfer, and also because it would spark stronger action by the United States and Asian allies.

On Iran, while experts minimize the impact of the “headscarf protests” and of Masoud Pezeshkian’s election, they acknowledge mounting social woes and do not hesitate to mention enemy infiltration in Iran’s security apparatus. Interestingly, in December 2022 and June 2024, China has issued statements supporting the United Arab Emirates in efforts to solve the issue of Persian Gulf islands (Abu Musa and Tunb) occupied by Iran.

Apart from the reluctance toward Russia’s ever tighter relationship with North Korea, it is hard to find any distancing away from Moscow. Often cited by others, but not so much in China, is Xi Jinping’s statement with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz against the use, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons. Any mention of weapon transfers to Russia or trade in dual-use goods – whether by China itself, or by Iran and North Korea – is generally taboo in Chinese analysis. Is this restraint in words, or restraint in action? Abundant trade in semiconductors flows through Hong Kong and third countries.

But even the United States treads lightly on these issues, perhaps persuaded that practical restraint is better obtained through silence – or by not accusing China of crossing red lines. As for Europe, it has not yet found the key to contain China’s support for Russia.

In the coming weeks and months, it will be very interesting to observe any change in China’s relations with Iran as hostilities with Israel mount. Will the sudden and huge strategic loss for the ayatollahs in Lebanon and beyond change China’s calculus? As the benefits of supporting Iran dwindle, will its costs be reevaluated? This is an important test of the real motivations of China’s relations with the new “axis of upheaval” countries.

This article was originally published as the introduction to China Trends 21, the quarterly publication of the Asia Program at Institut Montaigne. Institut Montaigne is a nonprofit, independent think tank based in Paris, France.

Authors

Guest Author

François Godement

Prof. François Godement is Institut Montaigne’s special advisor and resident senior fellow on Asia and the United States He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and an external consultant at the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs. He graduated from the École normale supérieure de la rue d’Ulm, where he specialized in history, before studying at Harvard University.

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thediplomat.com

11. Ishiba’s Integrated Deterrence: What Japan’s New Prime Minister Means for Taiwan

Excerpt:

In conclusion, while Taiwan may face challenges in achieving significant diplomatic breakthroughs with Japan under Ishiba’s leadership, given his focus on integrated deterrence, there is a path forward. For Taiwan to improve its relationship with Japan, it is not solely about engaging directly with Tokyo. Taiwan must also enhance its visibility and role within the Japan-U.S. alliance by strengthening its cooperation with the United States. By positioning itself as a more integral and visible actor in the broader Japan-U.S. strategic framework, Taiwan can indirectly foster deeper ties with Japan.

Ishiba’s Integrated Deterrence: What Japan’s New Prime Minister Means for Taiwan

thediplomat.com

A former defense minister, Ishiba’s victory will have important implications for the future of Japan-Taiwan relations.

By Victor Lin

October 04, 2024

Ishiba Shigeru (standing) speaks during a meeting with Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te (right) as part of a Japanese parliamentary delegation, Taipei, Taiwan, Aug. 13, 2024. Ishiba became Japan’s prime minister on Oct. 1, 2024.

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The Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election concluded on September 27 with the highest number of candidates in the party’s history. It was a closely contested race, and while Takaichi Sanae nearly made history by becoming Japan’s first female prime minister, it was the veteran politician Ishiba Shigeru who ultimately emerged victorious, securing crucial votes from the Kishida faction.

Ishiba is no stranger to Japanese politics. His career was inspired by his family’s friend, former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, who was instrumental in establishing China-Japan diplomatic relations.

However, Japan now faces heightened tensions with China. The tragic murder of a 10-year-old Japanese child on his way to school in southern China has sent shockwaves through the country, prompting companies like Panasonic to allow their China-based staff to relocate to Taiwan. Additionally, in late August a Chinese reconnaissance aircraft breached Japan’s territorial airspace for the first time.

Shortly before the LDP election, a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (SDF) destroyer sailed through the Taiwan Strait alongside Australian and New Zealand naval forces, highlighting the complex geopolitical landscape.

A former defense minister, Ishiba is well known as a defense policy wonk. His victory will have important implications for the future of Japan-Taiwan relations.

In August, just a month before the election, Ishiba visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te. During his Taiwan visit, Ishiba reaffirmed his intention to run for LDP president and stressed that “today’s Ukraine might become tomorrow’s East Asia.” He emphasized the importance of developing “integrated deterrence” through Japan-Taiwan cooperation, though he notably avoided repeating former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s statement that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency.”

Instead, Ishiba highlighted his vision for creating a NATO-like framework for Asia. In a televised discussion on Fuji Television with the other LDP candidates, he proposed that the defense treaties between Japan and the United States, as well as between the U.S. and the Philippines, could evolve from bilateral agreements into a collective security arrangement similar to the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty.

On the same show, when asked whether a Taiwan contingency would be categorized as an “important influence situation” or a “survival-threatening situation,” Ishiba suggested it would, at the very least, fall under the former category. The distinction is significant: In an “important influence situation,” the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) could only provide rear logistical support to U.S. forces, while a “survival-threatening situation” would permit the JSDF to exercise collective self-defense.

Ishiba also raised a critical issue: If the United States were to request Japan to allow Taiwan’s air force to use the Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, Japan’s refusal could end the Japan-U.S. security alliance. Under the current framework, any use of U.S. bases by forces other than U.S. troops requires prior consultation with the Japanese government, as stipulated in Article 3 of the security treaty. Such a decision would place Japan in a difficult position vis-à-vis China, as it would effectively align Japan with the U.S. and Taiwan, potentially making Japan a target of Chinese retaliation.

Despite these complexities, Ishiba’s comments suggest that his concept of “integrated deterrence” remains rooted in the Japan-U.S. alliance. However, at the same time he has also called for a more equal partnership, labeling the current arrangement as “asymmetrical.” Achieving this balance could prove challenging if Donald Trump returns to power in the United States, given his previous rhetoric about alliances being a “burden” and his insistence that Japan should shoulder more responsibility and cover more of the expenses incurred at the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.

In conclusion, while Taiwan may face challenges in achieving significant diplomatic breakthroughs with Japan under Ishiba’s leadership, given his focus on integrated deterrence, there is a path forward. For Taiwan to improve its relationship with Japan, it is not solely about engaging directly with Tokyo. Taiwan must also enhance its visibility and role within the Japan-U.S. alliance by strengthening its cooperation with the United States. By positioning itself as a more integral and visible actor in the broader Japan-U.S. strategic framework, Taiwan can indirectly foster deeper ties with Japan.

Authors

Guest Author

Victor Lin

Victor Lin holds a Master of Arts in International Relations from the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University, with his research focusing on evolving Japan-Taiwan relations. He earned his Bachelor of Arts in Journalism from the College of Communication at National Chengchi University, Taiwan's leading media school. Victor has previously contributed to The Diplomat, Taipei Times, and Taiwan's Storm Media, covering various Japan-related issues. He is currently based in Tokyo.

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thediplomat.com

12. Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

Download the14 page report at this link: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-10/241004_Byman_Escalating_War.pdf?VersionId=V_i5ezhAdtA6IcqKOIcCiHxt4l9QqOEY

Escalating to War between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran

Brief by Daniel Byman, Seth G. Jones, and Alexander Palmer

Published October 4, 2024

csis.org

Photo: Jalaa Marey/AFP/Getty Images

Table of Contents

Available Downloads

• Download the Brief 5193kb

Remote Visualization

The Issue

There is a serious risk of all-out war between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran. According to new CSIS analysis, both the scale and geographic scope of violence have dramatically increased. The number of violent incidents related to the Israel-Hezbollah conflict increased 4.5 times in the last week of September from the weekly average between October 7, 2023, and August 31, 2024. In addition, the attacks are targeting a much larger geographic area. Israeli and Hezbollah attacks struck an average of 27–28 km from the Blue Line in the last week of September, up from an average of about 3–4 km between October 7, 2023, and August 31, 2024. The number of strikes and the geography of the conflict are likely to grow and include a larger swath of Lebanon and Israel as well as potentially Iran, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

Introduction

Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah continue to escalate in what Israel has called Operation Northern Arrows.1 In mid-September 2024, Israeli intelligence sabotaged thousands of Hezbollah beepers and walkie-talkies, detonating them in an operation that killed dozens of group members and wounded thousands more. On September 27, 2024, Israel killed Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah in an airstrike on the group’s Beirut headquarters—the culmination of a campaign against Hezbollah’s leaders that led to the killing of numerous senior group leaders in September 2024. Two days before the Nasrallah assassination, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, chief of the general staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), told Israeli troops from the Seventh Brigade deployed along the northern border, “We are preparing the process of a manoeuvre, which means your military boots . . . will enter enemy territory.”2 The IDF also called up two reserve brigades for what it referred to as “operational missions in the northern arena.”3 Israeli commandoes have conducted cross-border operations to gather intelligence and otherwise prepare for a ground invasion, and Israel has done limited operations so far in southern Lebanon.4 Iran responded by launching waves of ballistic missiles and other stand-off weapons at Israel.

To better understand the prospect of further escalation, this brief asks four questions: What are Israel’s and Hezbollah’s objectives? How has violence evolved over the past several months? What are plausible scenarios for further escalation? What options do the United States and other countries have to mitigate or prevent escalation? To answer these questions, this analysis draws on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative information. It compiles data on Israeli and Hezbollah strikes along the Israel-Lebanon-Syria border and geolocates Hezbollah attacks against Israel in the demilitarized zone between the Blue Line and Litani River.

The data show the increased scope and scale of Israeli and Hezbollah operations in recent months. Although most strikes by both sides have been within a relatively narrow area along the Israel-Lebanon border, the nature of the limited war between Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel is rapidly changing. Israel has escalated the number of strikes and the depth of its targeting. Hezbollah too has increased strikes, though in a far more limited way than Israel. And Iran has become directly involved in the conflict by firing ballistic missiles at Israel.

Despite the growing risk, an all-out war is not inevitable. Israeli attacks might successfully coerce Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire and move forces away from the border, or they might significantly weaken Hezbollah’s capabilities to strike Israel. But if negotiations fail to establish a buffer zone along the Israel-Lebanon border, there is a heightened possibility of all-out war. Escalation could lead to significant casualties for both Hezbollah and the Israeli military, put Israeli civilians throughout the country at risk, lead to hundreds and perhaps thousands of Lebanese civilian casualties, and spread to Iran, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries.

To explore the implications of escalation, the rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first examines likely Israeli and Hezbollah objectives. The second assesses the evolution of violence. The third explores plausible scenarios of further escalation, and the fourth explores U.S. policy options.

13. Israel’s Decapitation Strikes Leave Russia Trembling

As they should (and north Korea too)

Israel’s Decapitation Strikes Leave Russia Trembling

By Kseniya Kirillova

October 4, 2024

Russians fear the country may be vulnerable to the sort of attacks employed by Israel against Hezbollah. Their proposed responses are unsubtle.

cepa.org · by Kseniya Kirillova · October 4, 2024

The sheer audacity and scale of Israel’s attacks on the Hezbollah militant group are unprecedented. They have not only done very serious damage to the organization, but they have also achieved a staggeringly successful penetration — whether through human agents or signals intelligence — of an instinctively secretive group.

The whole world has taken notice, Russia included. And it’s anxious.

The September attacks on members of the Iran-backed militant group in Lebanon killed at least 62 people and left at least 1,500 fighters maimed and blinded, a Hezbollah official told Reuters. Soon afterward, Israel launched a long series of decapitation strikes aimed at destroying Hezbollah’s senior command structure, with considerable success.

Russia’s military is now discussing whether it, too, is vulnerable and how best to protect itself.

Russian propaganda sites, especially the most conservative, drew parallels between Hezbollah (which the US and the UK have branded a terrorist group) and Russia, warning that Moscow must draw lessons from what has happened.

Russia now has a pre-primed choir of extreme nationalists who respond to almost any development with proposals for acts of aggression and, sometimes, acts of war. They are prominent, noisy, and have access to mass media. And while their talk sometimes seems mildly deranged, it is sanctioned by the regime.

The self-described philosopher and ultra-nationalist Aleksandr Dugin, who is close to the Kremlin, said the attack, and the subsequent death of Hezbollah leader Sayid Hassan Nasrallah, was a “colossal blow against the entire structure of Middle Eastern ‘Resistance’” and “the beginning of the end of the world.”

His colleagues seconded Dugin’s argument that Russia should use its most dangerous (i.e., nuclear) weapons to avoid a similar fate. Such outspoken radicals were joined by military analysts echoing his words.

On the Military Review website, which is also close to Vladimir Putin’s regime, several articles suggested a range of “preventive strikes” to avoid the grisly fate of Nasrallah and his lieutenants.

Yevgeniy Fedorov, a regular contributor to the site, declared that “Israel’s acts of terror in Lebanon raise questions about the safety of Russians” and warned that imported technology may be life-threatening.

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Russia has no formal alliance with Middle Eastern terrorist groups, but it has a long association with them, just like the Soviet Union, which trained and armed militants. The Putin regime has expressed solidarity with the world’s outcasts, including a burgeoning alliance with Iran, and growing anti-Semitism has contributed to the perception of Israel as an enemy. Even if this anti-Semitism is not officially proclaimed by officials, it slips into their public statements.

The conspiracy theory that Jews unleashed the Russo-Ukrainian war to cleanse the land of Slavs and settle there themselves is also popular in radical patriotic circles. The spread of such sentiments may have influenced the anti-Semitic pogroms in Dagestan last fall.

Another contributor to Military Review, Mikhail Nikolayevskiy, claimed the West is deliberately “pushing” Russia and Iran “into the most severe scenario: Russia to use nuclear weapons, Iran to enter full-scale hostilities with Israel.”

He argued the two countries should jointly develop an “unexpected and non-trivial solution” in response.

His colleague, Andrey Mitrofanov, came up with options for such “non-trivial solutions,” including a massive missile strike on government buildings in Kyiv or attacks on some NATO countries — albeit under a foreign flag.

He proposed using drones “without identification marks or with Ukrainian identification marks” to strike the American Globus-3 and Globus-2 radar sites in Norway. One option could be to strike from Finland, he said.

Mitrofanov also suggested oil and gas production facilities in Norway and the Finnish satellite company ICEYE as possible targets. Romania, too, could be hit, he wrote, as it is “a country hostile to Russia.” The targets there would be the radars and launchers stationed there as part of the American Aegis Ashore missile defense system.

He also suggested strikes on Baltic states which “create problems,” writing that “the proximity and limited territory of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia allows for the large-scale use of small kamikaze UAVs, including FPV drones, including those with incendiary munitions. The targets are ammunition depots, fuel, and other similar objects.”

In a further provocation, he suggested that British ships should be sunk under the pretense that “Russia has nothing to do with it.”

Such proposals have been repeated across the pro-Kremlin media. Writers at the business newspaper Vzglyad devoted an article to justifying why “Russia’s small neighbors would be dangerous in a big war.”

The Baltic countries have a trained and organized armed forces reserve, complementary units, and armored vehicles, as well as “excess port and airfield infrastructure that permit them to receive large NATO contingents,” they wrote. All of these war plans are accompanied by articles about the strategic disadvantage for Russia of any peace talks on Ukraine.

The question is how seriously such plans should be taken. On the one hand, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated that Putin’s Russia is unable to defeat even a smaller neighbor and defend its own territory, and therefore lacks the resources for a full-scale war with NATO.

On the other hand, however, acts of sabotage under false flags or no flags should be taken seriously. Western intelligence services have detected an increase in the number of Russian sabotage attacks in Europe aimed at disrupting arms supplies to Kyiv, including arson and explosions at military factories.

Judging by the plans proposed by Russian military analysts, such activities will continue with renewed vigor.

Kseniya Kirillova is an analyst focused on Russian society, mentality, propaganda, and foreign policy. The author of numerous articles for CEPA and the Jamestown Foundation, she has also written for the Atlantic Council, Stratfor, and others.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

Europe's Edge

CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America.

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cepa.org · by Kseniya Kirillova · October 4, 2024

​14. New US missile built to pierce China's A2/AD bubble

New US missile built to pierce China's A2/AD bubble - Asia Times

AIM-174 air-to-air missile will extend US Navy’s reach and better protect carrier strike groups in a potentail fight with China

asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · October 5, 2024

The US has unveiled a next-generation air-to-air missile, signaling a potent new weapon to counter China’s expanding Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategies around Taiwan and the wider South China Sea.

This month, The War Zone reported the US Navy has confirmed the existence of the AIM-174 missile, an air-launched variant of the SM-6 surface-to-air missile that marks a new chapter in its long-range defense capabilities.

The missile was first publicly acknowledged following sightings during US Navy exercises in 2024, including photographs of Super Hornet aircraft carrying the weapon during Hawaii’s Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) war games.

The AIM-174, with an estimated range of 320 kilometers, provides enhanced air-to-air, anti-ship and ballistic missile interception capabilities, extending beyond the reach of legacy naval missile systems.

The War Zone says the missile is part of the US Navy’s broader strategy to counter China’s increasing ability to deny US forces access to critical areas through a network of anti-ship weapons, long-range ballistic missiles and hypersonic threats.

According to the source, the AIM-174 allows US Navy aircraft to engage targets at extreme ranges beyond sensor visibility, leveraging advanced “kill web” systems that utilize networked sensor data from various air, sea and space-based platforms.

While The War Zone states that the missile’s full capabilities remain classified, its introduction significantly boosts the US Navy’s defensive and offensive capabilities in the Pacific theater, particularly in scenarios involving a potential conflict with China over Taiwan or the South China Sea.

As the AIM-174 enters operational service, it is expected to be crucial in extending the US Navy’s reach and protecting carrier strike groups from increasingly sophisticated Chinese threats.

The AIM-174 may be employed according to a “shooting the archer” doctrine, taking out missile carriers before they can come into strike range to target US carrier battlegroups or Pacific bases.

Asia Times mentioned in November 2022 that China’s Xian H-6K strategic bomber has been spotted carrying a new air-launched hypersonic ballistic missile, potentially derived from the CM-401, emphasizing its A2/AD and standoff strike capabilities against US bases and forces in the Pacific. The missile has formidable combat characteristics, including a speed of up to Mach 6 and a range of 290 kilometers, with the ability to perform terminal diving attacks.

The H-6 K’s air launch capability significantly extends the missile’s range and performance. Similar to Russia’s Kinzhal hypersonic missile, the H-6K underscores China’s strategy to diversify its hypersonic weapon platforms, including ship and road-mobile launchers, to counter US and allied forces.

China’s hypersonic advancements aim to deter adversaries by penetrating modern air defenses, posing a significant threat to US military installations in Guam and Wake Island.

Aside from targeting missile carriers, the AIM-174 can be used to hit large, slow and vulnerable high-value aerial targets such as tankers, airborne warfare and control (AEW&C) and special mission aircraft. Sophisticated airborne electronic warfare platforms may be among such targets.

Last month, Asia Times mentioned that China’s Y-9LG airborne electronic warfare platform, with its “balance beam” radar, can disrupt enemy communications, radar and navigation systems while gathering intelligence on threat emitters.

This platform, which entered service with the People’s Liberation Army-Air Force (PLAAF) in early 2023, operates from a standoff position similar to the US Air Force’s EC-37B Compass Call.

The Y-9LG’s deployment underscores China’s strategic investment in airborne standoff intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems. This development is part of China’s broader strategy to enhance its electronic warfare capabilities and achieve information dominance in potential conflict scenarios, particularly in the Pacific.

However, the AIM-174’s reliance on kill webs may also be its vulnerability. In a January 2021 RAND report, Nicholas O’Donoughue and other writers mention that the vulnerabilities of US kill chains and kill webs are rooted in their reliance on networked systems and information sharing across diverse platforms.

O’Donoughue and others emphasize that a break in any part of this chain, such as sensors, communication links or decision-making processes, could disrupt the entire chain’s functionality.

They say that vulnerability makes US kill chains and kill webs susceptible to electronic warfare, cyber-attacks and other disruptive technologies that target the chain’s weakest links. The US’s traditionally linear kill chains are increasingly evolving into more complex “kill webs,” where information from multiple sensors and shooters is shared across domains to create more adaptable and resilient systems.

However, O’Donoughue and others point out that these kill webs are also vulnerable due to their increased complexity. They point out that distributed kill chains involving multiple platforms and sensors require effective real-time data integration and synchronization. They stress that failures in these areas can lead to delays or inaccuracies in targeting, potentially allowing adversaries to exploit gaps in the system.

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In line with targeting US kill chains or kill webs, Joel Wuthnow, in a March 2023 presentation for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), mentions that China’s “system destruction warfare” concept represents the core of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modern operational strategy.

Wuthnow notes that the doctrine aims to incapacitate an enemy by dismantling its ability to conduct coordinated operations. According to Wuthnow, it targets critical operational systems, including command structures, reconnaissance intelligence, firepower and support capabilities, using both kinetic and non-kinetic methods.

He mentions that China’s goal is to paralyze the flow of information and disrupt key decision-making processes in adversary systems through integrated strikes, which could involve advanced precision munitions to destroy key command and control nodes, electronic warfare and cyberattacks.

He notes that the PLA’s focus on “multi-domain precision warfare” further exemplifies its reliance on emerging technologies, such as AI and big data, to enhance these attacks.

Wuthnow points out that the PLA’s modernization efforts, including new hardware like the J-20 stealth fighters, Type-055 cruisers and advanced missiles equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles, are geared toward enhancing its system destruction capabilities.

He says these developments align with China’s strategic objectives for 2027-2049, underscoring a shift toward informationized and joint warfare as critical elements of its military operations.

However, he says that while the PLA advances in these areas, institutional legacies like centralized decision-making and limited joint experience may still present hurdles.

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asiatimes.com · by Gabriel Honrada · October 5, 2024

15. US needs a solution to China's problem 

Critical of both candidates.

US needs a solution to China's problem - Asia Times

Trump wants higher tariffs and Harris tax credits for new factories but risk of a China Shock 2 calls for a national strategy not mere tactics

asiatimes.com · by Urban C. Lehner · October 5, 2024

Donald Trump and Kamala Harris are both promising to preside over a manufacturing renaissance and whoever wins will have the wind at their back.

A lot of new factories are already under construction in the United States thanks in part to subsidies provided by the Chips and Science Act, the Inflation Reduction Act and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. With continued focus from Washington, the country could see ground broken on still more new factories.

But don’t underestimate the threat China poses to the rejuvenation of American industry. China has a lot of industrial overcapacity and its government is investing in additional overcapacity. That will put pressure on prices of a wide variety of manufactured goods, making it more difficult for new factories outside China to make profits.

China denies it has overcapacity. The Chinese say foreigners who use that word are trying to thwart China’s rise by suggesting there should be limits on how much it can produce and export.

But China already dominates world manufacturing. It produces 35% of the world’s factory output. That’s more than the combined shares of the next nine largest manufacturing countries and nearly six times the 12% share of the number two producer, the US.

Economist Richard Baldwin calls China “the world’s sole manufacturing superpower.”

Foreign economists say China’s obsession with manufacturing has left its economy dangerously unbalanced, heavily overreliant on investment at the expense of consumption. They say this underlies the country’s slowing growth, rising unemployment and real-estate debt problems.

China’s leaders reject that analysis. They’re doubling down on investment in manufacturing and planning to export what the domestic market can’t absorb. They’re pushing to move upstream and trying to dominate the high-tech industries of the future.

“China’s excessive investments will not be a small wave, but rather a US$450 billion tsunami over the next three years,” says Harry Moser, president of the Reshoring Initiative, a non-profit dedicated to bringing manufacturing jobs back to the US.

According to the Wall Street Journal, the Chinese government’s support for its manufacturers was in a league of its own even before the recent doubling down. In 2019, China spent 1.7% of its GDP on industrial policy. The US spent 0.4%.

And China’s 1.7% doesn’t take into account a variety of indirect subsidies – cheap loans from state-owned banks, tax breaks of various kinds, cheap steel from state-owned steel companies and cheap energy from state-owned utilities. One estimate cited by the Journal puts China’s actual industrial-policy spending close to 5% of national income.

And China’s spending isn’t just deep, it’s broad. “Ninety-nine percent of publicly listed companies report some kind of subsidy,” the Journal reports.

The doubling down is as much about power as economics. China wants to become less reliant on other countries. It wants them to be more reliant on China.

Other countries, especially the US, don’t want to be more reliant on China. They fear further unemployment and deindustrialization, but that’s not their only worry.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war with Hamas have reminded Washington that a strong industrial base is critical to national defense. Covid taught the US that it’s unwise to rely on other countries for critical supplies in a crisis.

Government policymakers in the US, Europe and elsewhere are struggling to come up with solutions to this China problem. The last two US administrations have tried tariffs and subsidies to varying degrees and with varying degrees of success.

Trump is promising even higher tariffs and threatening companies such as John Deere that are moving manufacturing offshore. Harris says she’ll give tax credits to encourage investments in new factories. How serious these efforts would be is unclear.

Anyway, these are tactics. As I’ve argued previously, what the country needs is a strategy. Let’s convene a bipartisan commission of experts to study the problem and recommend a way forward.

Rather than continue with the ready-fire-aim approach both parties have been taking, we need first to agree on answers to some key questions.

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How much manufacturing does the country need to avoid overreliance on China? How much new manufacturing can be developed without government support? Which industries deserve support? Which are the best of many possible ways to give that support?

Yet another important question for this commission would be whether to work with other countries in reducing reliance on China or to go it alone. I’ll discuss that question in my next post.

A foundation has been laid for this commission: Both parties agree there’s a problem. It’s worth trying to see if they can agree on solutions. The potential dangers of China Shock 2 are serious enough that a united national effort is imperative. Let’s give bipartisanship a chance.

Former longtime Wall Street Journal Asia correspondent and editor Urban Lehner is editor emeritus of DTN/The Progressive Farmer.

This article, originally published on October 2 by the latter news organization and now republished by Asia Times with permission, is © Copyright 2024 DTN/The Progressive Farmer. All rights reserved. Follow Urban Lehner on X @urbanize

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asiatimes.com · by Urban C. Lehner · October 5, 2024

16. For a more lethal joint force, answer the 'Five Ws' of climate change

This will surely stimulate some critical comments (but will it stimulate critical thinking?).

Is it climate change? Or should we simply be factoring in the effects of weather and climate on military operations and considerations? Has "climate change" become so politicized that we cannot effectively assess the impact of climate and weather on military operations now and in the future? Are we cutting off our nose to spite our face from both sides of the politics of this issue?

For a more lethal joint force, answer the 'Five Ws' of climate change - Breaking Defense

In this op-ed, Caroline Baxter lays out why climate change needs to be integrated into military preparations.

breakingdefense.com · by Caroline Baxter · October 4, 2024

Debris litters Tyndall Air Force Base following Hurricane Michael on October 17, 2018 in Panama City, Florida. the base experienced extensive damage from the storm. Hurricane Michael slammed into the Florida Panhandle on October 10, as a category 4 storm causing massive damage and claiming nearly 30 lives. (Photo by Scott Olson/Getty Images)

After China became the focus of American defense in the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies, the Pentagon got busy preparing its forces by breaking down the so-called “China challenge” into smaller, manageable pieces.

Professional military education (PME) scoped learning outcomes for intermediate and senior schools, while services created standalone courses and ensured training regimens factored in Chinese tactics. It might not have been easy to do, but the rationale behind the effort was clear: A “one size fits all” approach to complex threats provides inadequate preparation. When the Pentagon said that the military needed to be able to counter China, it was understood that individual servicemembers’ missions, functions, and roles would guide what they needed to know and do in order to execute that mission.

Lessons from that approach now need to be applied towards building the military’s understanding of another existential threat: climate change.

A threat so systemic may seem too difficult to disaggregate, but, as with competition with China, there are clear ways to break the issue down and tackle it — despite entirely misguided assertions from some quarters that climate change distracts from the “real” military mission and leapfrogs higher priorities. Through keeping a focus on what it takes to execute that mission, it’s possible to empower our forces to tackle multiple threats at the same time.

I ran the Pentagon’s Office of Force Education and Training for three years, during which time we deepened mission-critical knowledge of China and climate change simultaneously. One did not come at the expense of the other — on the contrary, an understanding of climate realities enhanced the ability to plan for a China scenario. The approach wasn’t about turning on a firehose of climate change information at the expense of other topics. Rather, it was about answering the five Ws: Who needs to know what information when to do which job, and why.

Large and complex as it may be, the military’s mission is extremely narrow: Preserve US national interests and security through the threat or use of overwhelming lethal force against any enemy, anywhere, any time. Each job and career path in the military ultimately contributes to that mission. So the question then naturally follows: How does climate change complicate that specific job and that specific career path? The answers to that question are what needs to be taught.

For example, to effectively prepare for potential aggression from China, a surface warfare officer needs to understand the order of battle for the Chinese navy and how a Luyang III-class works. She also needs to understand what can affect the accuracy of her ship’s sonar. Ocean salinity is one cause, and salt levels are changing globally as the climate warms. Knowing how to account for that makes her more effective at her job.

Or, to pick a ripped-from-the-headlines example, the installation commander of Tyndall Air Force Base needs to understand the impact of increasingly more intense hurricane seasons on his base so he can make climate-informed decisions when preparing and rebuilding. If he is expected to be able to flow forces forward for a China conflict, he needs to understand if his base is going to be unusable for stretches of time each fall and plan accordingly.

Integrating climate change into overall preparations, while keeping the focus on the essential knowledge required to execute the mission, is a question of scope. Of course it can be complicated. So is modern warfare. But it can and must be done. And here are five proposals for how to do it well.

First, make action, not knowledge, the purpose behind any dissemination of climate change information. Military education and training prepares those who wear the uniform to do something; it’s not a consciousness-raising regimen. Service members across the joint force today are facing operational challenges made worse — or in some cases created — by climate change, from nuclear-powered aircraft carriers unable to cool their equipment and reactors with hot seawater, to soldiers sickening and dying from the heat, to fighting wildfires instead of human adversaries. Information on climate change needs to help people know how to execute the mission, no matter the type or source of the obstacle.

Second, tailor that information wisely: Dispense with the misperception that everyone in uniform needs a deep understanding of why the climate is changing. Beyond units like the 14th Weather Squadron that are trained climatologists and oceanographers, fluency in the details of anthropogenic change is not mission-essential knowledge. Moreover, delivering that information competes for time that is already overtaxed by the ballooning number of Common Military Training modules. Dispense too with the misperception that everyone in uniform needs to know the same thing about climate change. A Foreign Area Officer in Japan and one in Germany need to appreciate different climate effects; so too a missileer versus an installation commander versus a sub driver.

Third, resist the temptation to “set it and forget it” in professional military education (PME). Use PME and its subset, Joint PME, for what they are best suited for: an early foundation-builder for new officers and a cognitive chiropractor as they rise in the ranks. PME teaches leaders how to think by introducing students to complex issues, such as how to account for the effects of climate change in military strategy and operations (like factoring in warmer oceans when planning carrier deployments). However, PME only reaches a small portion of the total force at set touch points throughout a career, and it only sets the stage for the problems future leaders will face. A static dispensary of information is not an on-demand problem solver — and the problems today’s servicemembers will face are dynamic and fluid.

Fourth, support the growth of and access to places that provide answers for dynamic and fluid problems, like the DoD Climate Resilience Portal. Such a website helps provide the sorting function for what a vast and complex military needs to know to achieve the mission in a climate-informed way.

Finally, ensure that the places created to provide job-specific training include climate realism. A tank driver attempting to navigate a washed-out bridge with a 68-ton Abrams should be able to rely on the preparation she got at Ft. Moore. Build muscle memory early for the likely scenarios servicemembers will face over their careers.

The US military is not only the greatest fighting force the world has ever seen, but also a world-class risk mitigation organization. Integrating climate information into how they perform their jobs only makes them better at them.

Service and DoD leadership should deliver practical, climate-informed education and training that helps them know what to do. Then they can get after solving any problem.

Caroline Baxter is a Senior Advisor at the Center for Climate and Security. From 2021 to 2024, she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Education and Training working as the principal senior authority on the development of DoD policy on all issues relating to military education, training, and exercises across the Joint Force. She also led DoD’s Climate Literacy Sub-Working Group (CLSWG) that devised a methodology to baseline and grow mission-centric knowledge of climate change through tailoring information to job functions and roles. For her work in DoD, Ms. Baxter was awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.

17. Israel Launches New Offensive in Northern Gaza, Orders Mass Evacuation

Israel Launches New Offensive in Northern Gaza, Orders Mass Evacuation

Operation aims to stop militant resurgence in Gaza, says Israeli military, as it also targets Beirut area with heavy bombardment

By Carrie Keller-Lynn

Updated Oct. 6, 2024 9:31 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-launches-new-offensive-in-northern-gaza-orders-mass-evacuation-786f2fff?mod=latest_headlines

TEL AVIV—Israel’s military said it opened a new offensive into northern Gaza to combat militants who have resurfaced in the area, issuing sweeping evacuation orders after residents reported heavy artillery shelling overnight.

The military said two of its armored brigades encircled part of Jabalia, a longtime Hamas stronghold in northern Gaza in which it has fought several times over the past year, as an infantry division began an operation in the area on Sunday.

Oct. 6 evacuation order for northern Gaza

West

Bank

Beit Lahia

Gaza

Beit Hanoun

Israel

Gaza City

Jord.

Egypt

GAZA

Mediterranean Sea

Designated

displacement

zone

Blocks for

evacuation warnings*

Khan Younis

ISRAEL

Rafah

EGYPT

5 miles

5 km

Source: Israeli military

Ahead of what is expected to be a broader push, the military called on the 300,000 residents estimated to still be living in northern Gaza to move through evacuation corridors to an expanded humanitarian zone in the south of the Gaza Strip, threatening to exacerbate already dire living conditions in the enclave. It is one of the most sweeping evacuation calls since Israel first urged residents of Gaza’s north to clear out last October, in the weeks ahead of its ground invasion.

The operation came as Israel, now fighting on an additional front, also pressed its air campaign against Lebanon’s Hezbollah militants with a night of heavy strikes on southern Beirut.

Dr. Hussam Abu Safiya, head of Kamal Adwan Hospital in northern Gaza, said the facility received the bodies of 30 people, and residents reported intense artillery shelling that recalled the earliest days of the war, which began almost one year ago. 

Hiba Baghdadi, 35, said the attacks in Gaza overnight reminded her of the first week of the war, when Israel launched a punishing air campaign after Hamas led a surprise attack on Israel on Oct. 7 last year that left 1,200 people killed and 250 taken hostage, according to Israeli authorities. 

Palestinians arrive in Gaza City after evacuating their homes in the Jabalia area. Photo: Omar Al-Qattaa/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

“People had to leave Jabalia under fire,” said Baghdadi, who lives in the Al-Tuffah neighborhood of nearby Gaza City. Baghdadi said she wouldn’t abide by the evacuation orders. “We aren’t going to go south, it is terrible there and people are suffering,” she said. “If we are to be killed, let us be killed in our homes.”

A day before the first anniversary of war between Israel and Hamas-led militants in Gaza, Israel is back to fighting in one of the first areas where it clashed with Hamas in late 2023, underscoring the difficulty of converting Israel’s tactical wins on the battlefield into a decisive victory. 

Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack in southern Israel started a devastating war that has left most of Gaza’s over two million residents displaced amid widespread concerns about hunger, access to clean water, sanitation and spread of disease. Palestinian health authorities say the fighting has killed more than 40,000 people in the enclave.

Hadeel Kaheel, 29, from the Daraj neighborhood in Gaza City, fled twice within the city but says this time she won’t leave her home. “There’s no safe place, no humanitarian zone,” she said.

Flyers ordering people to evacuate the area fell Sunday over Jabalia, near Gaza City.

OMAR AL-QATTAA/AFP/ GETTY IMAGES

Israel wants to move civilians from north to south Gaza to isolate militants in the north, whom Israel doesn’t think will chance crossing military checkpoints to the south for fear of getting caught, said Amir Avivi, a former senior military official who heads a security-oriented think tank in Israel.

Tensions are running high around the war’s one-year mark. An assailant killed a woman and wounded at least 10 other people in a bus station in the southern city of Beersheba on Sunday, said emergency services, in what local police characterized as a suspected terrorist attack. The attack came just hours after Israel’s military said it was reinforcing the Gaza border region with additional forces.

Israel said it has degraded Hamas’s military to the point that it no longer operates with organized command-and-control systems. However, without a plan for alternative leadership of the Gaza Strip, Hamas and other militants continue to reconstitute themselves, requiring Israeli forces to return multiple times to fight in areas they have previously cleared and left, including several operations in Jabalia.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has resisted efforts to commit to a plan for Gaza’s long-term governance. His defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has for nearly a year pushed the cabinet to consider fresh leadership for Gaza, to prevent the erosion of Israeli military gains and head off the option of a return to Israel’s civil occupation of the strip, which it ended in 2005.

Israel remains mired in this cycle as its war has expanded to multiple fronts. Fighting with the Hezbollah militant group in Lebanon is now demanding most of its resources, after fighting largely slowed in Gaza apart from the need for repeated clearing operations, while efforts to reach a cease-fire-for-hostages deal have stalled.

Residents of Beirut’s southern suburbs reported heavy strikes overnight on Sunday, as the Israeli military said it was attacking weapons-storage facilities and infrastructure tied to Hezbollah.

Lebanon’s state-run National News Agency reported that dozens of Israeli airstrikes pummeled Beirut’s southern suburbs in one of the most intense bombings of the area, which has been targeted daily since the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah there on Sept. 27. 

Smoke rose Sunday from a building destroyed by an Israeli airstrike in Dahiyeh in Beirut. Photo: Bilal Hussein/Associated Press

An Israeli army spokesman overnight warned residents of four districts in the southern suburbs, where Hezbollah has a heavy presence, to move 500 meters away from particular buildings it alleged were Hezbollah facilities.

Many of the area’s residents have already fled, adding to a humanitarian crisis in Lebanon where hundreds of thousands of people across the country have been displaced by Israel’s bombing campaign, which has launched 3,000 airstrikes in recent weeks and more than 150 in the past day.

The Israeli military said it engaged militants in close-quarter fighting over the past day, while conducting targeted raids that began earlier this week close to the Israel-Lebanon border. Militants in Lebanon fired more than two dozen projectiles into Israel on Sunday, the military said, in addition to three drones launched from the east toward Israel in the early morning.

Abeer Ayyoub, Stephen Kalin and Dov Lieber contributed to this article.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com