Quotes of the Day:
“The key American shortcoming, in the early twenty-first century as in the 1960s, was the inability to constructively guide the leaders of allied states in the direction desired by Washington”
― Max Boot, The Road Not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam
Lansdale quoted Robert Taber (The War of the Flea): "There is only one means of defeating an insurgent people who will not surrender, and that is extermination. There is only one way to control a territory that harbours resistance, and that is to turn it into a desert. Where these means cannot, for whatever reason, be used, the war is lost." Lansdale thought this was the situation in Vietnam and wrote to a friend that if the solution was to "kill every last person in the enemy ranks" then he was "not only morally opposed" to this strategy but knew it was "humanly impossible".
“It's not given to people to judge what's right or wrong. People have eternally been mistaken and will be mistaken, and in nothing more than in what they consider right and wrong.”
― Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace
1. Lessons from the Philippines: Irregular Warfare in Action
2. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September (August 28 – October 6, 2021)
3. Why China Is Alienating the World
4. We Must Support Taiwan
5. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Economic Consequences of Default on National Security and Military Families
6. Navy secretary’s new strategic guidance focuses on deterring China from invading Taiwan
7. How a misguided Vietnam analogy sealed the Afghanistan disaster
8. As China stumbles, the West must ask: what if its rise is not inevitable?
9. Don’t Arm the Afghan Resistance
10. The Fatal Flaw in the West’s Fight Against Autocracy
11. French senators visit Taiwan despite China protests
12. The hidden enemies in Xi’s midst
13. All calm in Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats
14. New Bond Can’t Take On Beijing’s Supervillains
15. Taiwan Says U.S. Commitment Is 'Rock Solid' After Biden Remark on China's Xi
16. FDD | The news from UNGA
17. FDD | An Iraqi Perspective on Israel
18. What’s At Stake In The Indo-Pacific
19. Why the World Can’t Abandon Taiwan
20. Japan, a Sleeping Giant of Global Affairs, Is Waking Up
21. Debate on ‘no first use’ of nukes mushrooms in Washington
22. World War III and IV? Why a U.S.-China War Might Have a Sequel
23. Desperate China backflips on Australia
24. The 9/11 Commission Said National Security Vacancies Were A Problem. Biden’s Pentagon Is ‘Far Worse’
1. Lessons from the Philippines: Irregular Warfare in Action
I think Congress has described Irregular warfare in the best way in the 2017 NDAA: Irregular Warfare is conducted “in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.”
Lessons from the Philippines: Irregular Warfare in Action - Modern War Institute
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the world watched as the United States began a punitive expedition to Afghanistan to kill or capture Osama bin Laden, oust the Taliban, and prevent the use of Afghanistan as a continued terrorist safe haven. But the counterterrorism missions triggered by 9/11 were not limited to operations in Afghanistan, and on the other side of Asia, US forces simultaneously prepared for a counterterrorism mission of an entirely different character. Here, 1st Special Forces Group and Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) leveraged existing relationships and conducted intensive planning to support the government of the Philippines—a sovereign nation—in operations against terrorists and insurgents within its borders.
Though Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines (OEF-P) is one of the lesser-known efforts in the global war on terrorism, it had relative success in achieving the US objectives of reducing terrorist operations and improving local governance. The security environment in the Philippines—and the role of US forces there—had distinct characteristics from that of Afghanistan, and it is difficult to say that the counterterrorism approach in one theater should be applied directly in another. However, OEF-P offers some enduring lessons for the US national security community. As the United States considers the lessons of the past twenty years, with no indication that terrorist threats are decreasing worldwide, strategists and policymakers should study OEF-P as they prepare for future irregular warfare campaigns against terrorists and insurgents around the globe.
New Plans Built on Years of Engagement
Throughout Philippine history, election violence, clan conflict, and separatist insurgencies have threatened stability. Beginning in the 1970s, insurgent groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front leveraged the grievances of the Moro population to pursue independence in the southern region of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Other terrorist and insurgent groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group—which formed in the early 1990s as an offshoot of MNLF—and Jemaah Islamiyah led violent attacks and abductions in the region with a similar aim of establishing an Islamic state. The United States assisted Philippine forces in countering these groups in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and after 9/11, US interest in Philippine operations increased due to the Abu Sayyaf Group’s and Jemaah Islamiyah’s close links to al-Qaeda. These US advisory efforts evolved into Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines (JSOTF-P), which began operations under the OEF-P campaign in January 2002.
It was soon apparent to US policymakers that OEF-P was a critical component of the global war on terror. Thus followed an expansion of US assistance to execute OEF-P, which was made possible not only by high-level decisions by national leadership, but by close cooperation among multiple stakeholders within the US government and between the US and Philippine governments and militaries.
OEF-P was built on years of relationships between US special operations forces (SOF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines. This planning effort included a strategic assessment that identified the full range of threats to stability and sovereignty in the Philippines and ensured understanding of the problems the Philippine government faced in the south in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The result was a campaign plan that conducted foreign internal defense through a special warfare approach and employed all of the major elements of special operations, including Special Forces, psychological operations, civil affairs, naval special warfare, and special operations aviation (Army and Air Force). In addition, enabling elements from all of the services, the US intelligence community, US law enforcement, the US Agency for International Development, the US embassy country team in Manila, and civilian contractors supported the operation.
The campaign plan employed four lines of effort executed by JSOTF-P. First, JSOTF-P trained, advised, and assisted host-nation security forces (military and law enforcement) in their defense against lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorism. Second, it conducted targeted civil-military operations to gain access to contested areas and to reduce the population’s support of insurgents and terrorists. Third, it provided intelligence support to enhance the effectiveness of host-nation operations. Fourth, JSOTF-P conducted influence operations to separate the population from insurgents and terrorists and to ensure the legitimacy of both the host nation and US support.
Sustained operations continued throughout Mindanao through 2014, at which point the effort transitioned to a steady state of US SOF advice and assistance and JSOTF-P stood down. While threats continue to persist in the Philippines and throughout Southeast Asia from violent extremist organizations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines have matured with the support of the United States and, in particular, US SOF.
Success Hinges on Individual People
This operation would likely never have happened if not for those working behind the scenes. The late Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan and the late General Wayne A. Downing each played a unique role in making OEF-P possible. In addition, personal relationships between US and Philippine military personnel provided important foundations for trust.
When Ambassador Sheehan was the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, he recognized the persistent terrorism problem in the Philippines and the inability of the Philippine government to effectively counter the threat. He took the initiative and secured funding to stand up a Philippine national counterterrorism force in 2000–01. SOCPAC received the mission and ordered the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group based in Okinawa to plan and conduct a mobile training team mission to organize, train, and equip what came to be called the Light Reaction Company. This company then deployed to Basilan—the northernmost island of the Sulu Archipelago—to participate in operations against the Abu Sayyaf Group. At that time, US advisors were prohibited from deploying with them and were therefore unable to continue advising and assisting the Light Reaction Company through its mission. However, this training and the continued development of close working relationships both with the Light Reaction Company and throughout the Philippine military paved the way for the eventual execution of OEF-P, which did include advisors assigned to the Light Reaction Company.
Meanwhile, the OEF-P campaign plan likely would not have been executed without the influence of General Downing. Once the strategic assessment was complete and Colonel David Fridovich, commander of 1st Special Forces Group, briefed the campaign plan to the combatant commander, it was sent to the Pentagon and then ultimately to the White House for approval. At that time, General Downing was the counterterrorism advisor to the national security advisor, and he recommended approval of the campaign plan in the Philippines to Dr. Condoleezza Rice. However, when the plan was presented to the president, the late Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued against execution. Rice reminded the president of the US-Philippine mutual defense treaty and prior US commitments to the Philippines, and the president ultimately approved the plan based on a promise he had made to then Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo that he would assist her with the fight against terrorism.
Thus, without the vision and behind-the-scenes support of both Sheehan and Downing, OEF-P would likely not have been approved and executed.
In addition, US Special Forces noncommissioned officers built the foundation for trust through their long-term, on-the-ground relationships. As military officials made plans for training the Light Reaction Company, a noncommissioned officer who had relationships with Philippine general officers facilitated the agreements that led to the successful establishment of the national counterterrorism force. In another case, a relationship established through the International Military Education and Training program in the United States fifteen years prior to the mission between a US commander and a future Philippine general officer was instrumental in providing initial access during the post- 9/11 planning and assessment efforts and later for support to JSOTF-P operations. Such local-level personal relationships, not only with tactical military leaders but also with civilian village officials, also resulted in superior force protection through early warning from the local population.
Lessons for the Future
Although the Department of Defense appears to be shifting away from counterterrorism and counterinsurgency due to the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and a growing emphasis on great power state competitors, the National Defense Strategy’s Irregular Warfare Annex highlights the need for the United States to sustain irregular warfare capabilities and employ them as a component of great power competition. This competition is really a form of political warfare, and irregular warfare is the military’s contribution to a whole-of-nation political warfare effort. OEF-P provides many lessons that can be applied to irregular warfare in the context of great power competition.
First, when working with a host nation, respect for and protection of sovereignty is key to sustaining the legitimacy of the host nation, its military, and the US military and interagency commitment. The JSOTF-P mission statement stressed this and guided operations, and it may provide a template for future irregular warfare operations.
Second, operations in the Philippines took place in the human domain, and irregular warfare is first and foremost a human endeavor—and training efforts should reflect this reality. The pre-9/11 focus on developing unconventional warfare capabilities through Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs unit-level training enabled US advisors to assist the US interagency and the host nation in solving complex political-military problems. It was this unconventional warfare training that allowed the force to deploy into a complex political-military environment, develop a campaign plan, and support US national security objectives.
Third, all planning for OEF-P was based on thorough and continuous area assessment, which is a fundamental SOF capability. From developing the initial campaign plan to extending operations in conflict areas throughout the southern Philippines, assessments provided the deep knowledge and understanding necessary for effective operations. Host-nation training, targeted civil-military operations, and influence operations all relied on these detailed assessments.
With the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State could seek to expand their presence in Southeast Asia and try to replicate al-Qaeda’s efforts from the 1990s and 2000s, as well as the Islamic State’s activity after the drawdown of JSOTF-P in 2014. Lessons from OEF-P provide a starting point to support not only the Philippines against these threats, but also to support other countries in Southeast Asia if these threats expand again.
David Maxwell is a retired US Army Special Forces colonel who commanded the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, in Okinawa and on Basilan Island, and later the Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philippines. He is the editor of Small Wars Journal and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. David was also a guest, along with Deak Roh, on an episode of the Irregular Warfare Podcast, “Breaking the Boom-Bust Cycle of Irregular Warfare.”
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Petty Officer 1st Class Edward G. Martens, US Navy
2. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September (August 28 – October 6, 2021)
October 6, 2021 | FDD Tracker: August 28 – October 6, 2021
Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: September
Trend Overview
Edited by David Adesnik
Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch. While Americans observed the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terror attacks, the Taliban gave key ministerial posts to U.S.- and UN-designated terrorists, including close allies of al-Qaeda. Iran’s ultra-hardline president also unveiled his Cabinet, which includes terrorists wanted by Interpol as well as a dozen individuals under U.S., UN, or European sanctions. While it seemed that U.S. relations with Europe were destined to improve under President Joe Biden, Paris recalled its ambassador to the United States for the first time in the history of the alliance, outraged by Washington’s disruption of a $66 billion French arms deal with Australia. In contrast, the regime of Bashar al-Assad also made major strides toward diplomatic rehabilitation after Washington signaled its readiness to waive sanctions that would otherwise prevent Syrian participation in regional energy markets. Meanwhile, Beijing employed hostage diplomacy to secure the release of Meng Wanzhou, a top Huawei executive detained in Canada. Washington dropped plans to extradite Meng in exchange for the release of two Canadians held on false charges in China. As a candidate, Biden pledged that he would “rally the free world” and “champion liberty and democracy.” It is proving far more difficult than expected.
Trending Positive
Trending Neutral
Trending Negative
Trending Very Negative
3. Why China Is Alienating the World
Interesting. But we should not get our hopes up too high. (though as Napoleon said , "Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake." Maybe Xi and the CPP are making some mistakes.)
Excerpts:
The rise of Wolf Warrior diplomacy in China has rendered regular diplomatic channels with the United States ineffective. Formal meetings have become little more than opportunities for Chinese officials to publicly dress down their U.S. counterparts, while backchannels through former officials or on the sidelines of official meetings have also become less effective, since Chinese officials recite well-worn talking points out of a fear of being labeled weak or even landing in political trouble. Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador in Washington until earlier this year, stopped meeting alone with foreign counterparts in the final years of his posting, always meeting with another diplomat on hand to keep tabs. Today, most in-person contacts have been suspended because of the pandemic, and online Track II dialogues between former officials feature little more than the stilted repetition of talking points.
Not that China’s diplomats have the ability to restore China’s global reputation by themselves. Previous recalibrations of Chinese foreign policy have been backed up by domestic policy changes that made the country more appealing to the outside world. Its charm offensive in the 1990s, for example, was accompanied by a commitment to economic liberalization ahead of its accession to the World Trade Organization, a willingness to set aside border disputes, and even tentative steps toward domestic political reform.
But Xi’s government has shown no sign that it is willing to alter the state-led industrial policies that have alienated multinational companies, to soften the crackdowns in Xinjiang or Hong Kong, or to compromise on territorial disputes from the Himalayas to the South China Sea. That leaves Chinese diplomats and propagandists with a difficult if not impossible message to sell. But as long as they use Wolf Warrior tactics, they don’t even need to try.
Why China Is Alienating the World
Backlash Is Building—but Beijing Can’t Seem to Recalibrate
In early 2017, China appeared to be on a roll. Its economy was beating estimates. President Xi Jinping was implementing the country’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative and was on the cusp of opening China’s first overseas military base in Djibouti. Most important, Xi seemed poised to take advantage of President Donald Trump’s determination to pick fights with U.S. allies and international institutions. In a speech in Davos in January of that year, Xi even compared protectionism with “locking oneself in a dark room.”
Nearly five years on, Beijing is facing its biggest international backlash in decades. Negative views of China are near record highs across the developed world, according to a Pew Research Center survey from June, which showed that at least three-quarters of respondents in Australia, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States now hold broadly negative views of the country. The European Union, which Beijing worked to court during the Trump era, has officially branded China a “systemic rival,” and NATO leaders have begun to coordinate a common response to Beijing. On China’s doorstep, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States have revitalized the “Quad” grouping of nations in response to concerns over Beijing’s intentions. And most recently, the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to share sensitive nuclear secrets with Australia to help it counter China’s naval ambitions in the Pacific.
Yet Beijing shows no sign of shifting course. Unlike previous eras of backlash against China, such as the one that followed the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, this one has not prompted a recalibration in Beijing. For now, China’s leaders appear to have decided that their newfound national strength, combined with the general malaise of the West, means that the rest of the world will have to adapt to Beijing’s preferences.
WOLF WARRIORS
In recent years, China has faced mounting international criticism of everything from its apparent detention of more than one million Muslim Uyghurs in “reeducation” camps to its sweeping crackdown in Hong Kong, its controversial industrial policies, and its role in the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. But increasingly, it is China’s diplomats who are doing the most damage to the country’s reputation. Popularly known as “Wolf Warriors,” after a series of blockbuster movies that depicted Chinese heroes vanquishing foreign foes, they have picked fights everywhere from Fiji to Venezuela. In March 2020, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian outraged U.S. officials when he claimed that the COVID-19 pandemic began only after American athletes had brought the virus to Wuhan. Last November, Zhao tweeted an illustration of an Australian soldier holding a knife to the throat of an Afghan child, prompting Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison to demand an apology. And in September, China’s new ambassador to the United Kingdom, Zheng Zeguang, was banned from the British Parliament over Chinese sanctions against British lawmakers.
China’s foreign policy elites have noticed the problem. As early as 2018, Deng Pufang, the son of former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, warned that China should “know its place” and “keep a sober mind” in its foreign policy. In May 2020, Reuters reported that the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations—a think tank affiliated with China’s primary intelligence agency—had warned the country’s leadership that anti-China sentiment was at its highest since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. And in September 2020, Yuan Nansheng, China’s former consul general in San Francisco, warned against “extreme nationalism” in Chinese foreign policy. Xi himself has at least tacitly acknowledged the problem, warning in a Politburo study session in June that China needed to present a “lovable” image to the world.
Increasingly, it is China’s diplomats who are doing the most damage to the country’s reputation.
But even more striking than the backlash against China has been the country’s inability to recalibrate. Beijing’s response to the rapid deterioration in ties with Canberra was to confront Australia with a list of demands that it said were prerequisites for improving relations. China’s leaders have also repeatedly stressed that any improvement in relations with the United States must begin with concessions from Washington and issued Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman a similar list of demands when she visited Tianjin in July.
Officials in Washington have begun to see Beijing’s inability to shift course as an advantage in the emerging competition between the two countries. During bilateral talks in March, China’s top diplomat, Yang Jiechi, lectured his U.S. counterparts on the United States’ moral failings, including police killings of Black citizens. In response, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan reminded Yang of what he called the United States’ “secret sauce”: the ability to acknowledge and fix mistakes. “A confident country,” Sullivan said, “is able to look hard at its own shortcomings and constantly seek to improve.” The implication, of course, was that China seemed unable to do the same, at least in its foreign policy.
FEAR AND AMBITION IN BEIJING
It is tempting to see Beijing’s inability to adapt as an intrinsic feature of the Chinese system. Certainly, individual Chinese officials often fear the consequences of admitting mistakes. But in the past, Beijing has actually been quite skilled at course correction. In the 1950s, China undertook a charm offensive that won it friends in the developing world and helped build support for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as the internationally recognized government of China. In the period after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, Chinese diplomats helped rehabilitate their country in the eyes of the world, kick-starting a nearly two-decade run of successes that culminated in China’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing.
Rather than an inherent flaw in China’s model of governance, the failure to recalibrate this time is a product of the current political atmosphere in Beijing. Overconfidence is a major part of the problem. In the aftermath of the 2008–9 global financial crisis, Beijing began a shift toward a more assertive style of diplomacy, buoyed by the belief that its system had been validated by its swift response to the financial meltdown. That shift accelerated dramatically after Xi became head of the CCP in 2012: by 2017, top Chinese leaders were pointing to “changes unseen in a century” and Xi had publicly declared that China was “approaching the center of the world stage” and “[stood] tall in the East.”
Paired with Beijing’s newfound self-confidence was a belief in Western—and especially American—weakness and decadence. Washington’s foreign policy mistakes in the Middle East, its indecisive response to the global financial crisis, and its fumbling response to the current pandemic have all reinforced this view. In February 2020, Xi told party cadres that the COVID-19 crisis had demonstrated the “remarkable advantages of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist system with Chinese characteristics.”
For Chinese foreign policy officials, the safest course is to follow Xi’s lead and to add a little extra zeal for good measure.
Xi has long favored a more assertive posture for China on the world stage. Even before he became president, Xi complained about “foreigners with full bellies who have nothing better to do than point the finger” at China’s human rights record. One of his first acts as leader of the CCP in 2012 was to lay out an agenda for “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” signaling his ambitions for the country to retake its rightful place in the world. Since then, he has repeatedly instructed diplomats to defend China more aggressively, even crafting handwritten notes directing them to show more “fighting spirit.” The message for any ambitious Chinese diplomat or propagandist is clear: to get ahead, it is important to match Xi’s assertive tone.
But Chinese officials have followed Xi’s lead out of fear as well as ambition. Since 2012, more than 1.5 million officials have been punished in a sweeping anticorruption campaign that treats political disloyalty as a kind of graft. Diplomats have had to sit through “self-criticism” sessions in the Foreign Ministry and “inspection tours” that test their loyalty to the party and willingness to follow orders. Old rules relating to secrecy and discipline have also been implemented with a new zeal: one dating back to 1949, which forbids Chinese diplomats from meeting alone with foreigners, has been imposed on everyone from ambassadors to junior diplomats in study abroad programs.
Chinese diplomats know how to interpret these signals. Over the decades, China’s foreign policy apparatus has endured multiple rounds of purges in which colleagues informed on one another and were sanctioned for being insufficiently loyal to the regime’s agenda. During the Cultural Revolution, ambassadors were locked in cellars, forced to clean toilets, and beaten until they coughed up blood. Large numbers of Chinese diplomats were sent off to reeducation camps in rural China. For Chinese foreign policy officials, the safest course is to follow Xi’s lead and to add a little extra zeal for good measure.
IN XI’S HANDS
The rise of Wolf Warrior diplomacy in China has rendered regular diplomatic channels with the United States ineffective. Formal meetings have become little more than opportunities for Chinese officials to publicly dress down their U.S. counterparts, while backchannels through former officials or on the sidelines of official meetings have also become less effective, since Chinese officials recite well-worn talking points out of a fear of being labeled weak or even landing in political trouble. Cui Tiankai, China’s ambassador in Washington until earlier this year, stopped meeting alone with foreign counterparts in the final years of his posting, always meeting with another diplomat on hand to keep tabs. Today, most in-person contacts have been suspended because of the pandemic, and online Track II dialogues between former officials feature little more than the stilted repetition of talking points.
Not that China’s diplomats have the ability to restore China’s global reputation by themselves. Previous recalibrations of Chinese foreign policy have been backed up by domestic policy changes that made the country more appealing to the outside world. Its charm offensive in the 1990s, for example, was accompanied by a commitment to economic liberalization ahead of its accession to the World Trade Organization, a willingness to set aside border disputes, and even tentative steps toward domestic political reform.
But Xi’s government has shown no sign that it is willing to alter the state-led industrial policies that have alienated multinational companies, to soften the crackdowns in Xinjiang or Hong Kong, or to compromise on territorial disputes from the Himalayas to the South China Sea. That leaves Chinese diplomats and propagandists with a difficult if not impossible message to sell. But as long as they use Wolf Warrior tactics, they don’t even need to try.
4. We Must Support Taiwan
Conclusion:
Ultimately, the latest intimidation efforts fit with the party’s broader effort to isolate Taiwan by picking off its few diplomatic allies, blocking it from all participation at the U.N., launching an economic bullying campaign, and flooding the island with disinformation. This stepped-up military harassment puts the prospect of Taiwan’s engulfment by the Chinese party-state front and center. Beijing couldn’t be clearer about its intentions, and we need to respond accordingly.
We Must Support Taiwan
An illustration of military aircraft behind the Chinese and Taiwanese national flags, April 9, 2021. (Dado Ruvic/Reuters)
In July, Xi Jinping marked the Chinese Communist Party’s centenary with an ominous pledge. “Solving the Taiwan question and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland are the unswerving historical tasks” of the party, he said.
If anyone questioned his sincerity, recent events have, unsurprisingly, eliminated all doubt. As Beijing celebrated another anniversary this week, the 72nd year of the CCP’s control of China, a record-shattering number of Chinese military aircraft crossed into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.
Since the start of October, a total of 150 military planes have flown into the zone. This figure includes sorties by an incredible 56 aircraft, including twelve nuclear-capable bombers, on Monday alone. That’s a sharp uptick since September of last year, when the Taiwanese defense ministry began publicly releasing information on the sorties. Last month, 117 aircraft made incursions, according to a tally by defense analyst Gerald Brown.
These flights have yet to be accompanied by the sort of mass military mobilization that would suggest an imminent invasion of the island. But Xi and party officials are broadcasting their intent, including through a broader military buildup that has taken decades and is tailored to the task of taking Taiwan and preventing us from defending it. The recent air defense zone incursions serve at least one clear, near-term purpose — wearing down the Taiwanese military, which it forces to scramble jets, burning precious resources and presumably taking a toll on morale.
The message is unmistakable. “Threatening? Of course. It’s strange the #PRC doesn’t bother faking excuses anymore,” Taiwanese foreign minister Joseph Wu wrote on Twitter.
Indeed, Chinese mouthpieces are completely transparent and unabashed. The CCP newspaper the Global Times quoted “experts” who said, “More will come as the PLA stands ready to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity,” repeating the lie that the CCP is sovereign over Taiwan.
Chinese officials cite other grievances, including U.S. efforts to shore up Taiwan’s defenses through arms sales, increased diplomatic contacts, including the arrival of U.S. officials to the island via military aircraft, and ongoing freedom of navigation operations in the Taiwan Strait. Elsewhere, the People’s Daily has claimed that a State Department statement issued Sunday denouncing Beijing’s aggression violates the “One-China principle,” although Washington never agreed to the idea that Beijing has a rightful claim over Taiwan.
Taken together, all of this indicates that the heightened threat is the new normal and that Beijing will only be placated by total accommodation of its designs on Taiwan.
For its part, the Biden administration has sounded the appropriate notes. In the statement that irked Beijing, the State Department had reaffirmed America’s “rock solid” commitment to Taiwan and called on Beijing to end its pressure campaign.
Meanwhile, U.S. officials are still talking to the Chinese: White House press secretary Jen Psaki disclosed that officials are “in touch privately” with the Chinese. As a risk-mitigation measure, this dialogue might make sense; as a long-term solution, only a stepped-up effort at military deterrence can work.
Two U.S. aircraft carriers were in the region for exercises in the Philippine Sea last week that included a British aircraft carrier and a Japanese helicopter destroyer, among other countries’ vessels, and Taipei is certain to watch their next moves anxiously. And overall, officials still have their work cut out for them. Growing Japanese and Australian focus on participating in the defense of Taiwan are encouraging. However, unless the status quo changes, including an urgent effort to arm the Taiwanese with missiles, mines, and unmanned vehicles to make a cross-strait invasion riskier, the People’s Liberation Army stands a disturbingly high chance at succeeding at swallowing Taiwan.
Ultimately, the latest intimidation efforts fit with the party’s broader effort to isolate Taiwan by picking off its few diplomatic allies, blocking it from all participation at the U.N., launching an economic bullying campaign, and flooding the island with disinformation. This stepped-up military harassment puts the prospect of Taiwan’s engulfment by the Chinese party-state front and center. Beijing couldn’t be clearer about its intentions, and we need to respond accordingly.
National Review
5. Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Economic Consequences of Default on National Security and Military Families
Statement by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III on the Economic Consequences of Default on National Security and Military Families
Immediate Release
Oct. 6, 2021
The United States reached the debt limit at the end of July. Since then, the U.S. Treasury has been taking extraordinary measures to prevent the United States from defaulting on its obligations.
If the United States defaults, it would undermine the economic strength on which our national security rests.
It would also seriously harm our service members and their families because, as Secretary, I would have no authority or ability to ensure that our service members, civilians, or contractors would be paid in full or on time.
Here are some other potential impacts:
- The benefits earned by and owed to 2.4 million military retirees and 400,000 survivors would also be at risk.
- Federal contractors, including large firms and thousands of small businesses, that provide our military with world-class services, technology, and equipment could have their payments delayed, jeopardizing their operations and many American jobs.
- A default risks undermining the international reputation of the United States as a reliable and trustworthy economic and national security partner.
- A default also risks undermining the stature of the U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency of choice.
Our service members and Department of Defense civilians live up to their commitments. My hope is that, as a nation, we will come together to ensure we meet our obligations to them, without delay or disruption.
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6. Navy secretary’s new strategic guidance focuses on deterring China from invading Taiwan
Is the Navy getting out ahead of the yet to be published NSS and NDS? Or did the interim guidance provide sufficient direction for the new Navy strategy? Apparently so based on this except:
“We’re building on Secretary of Defense [Lloyd] Austin’s vision of integrated deterrence, with an agile and a ready force. We’re building on [Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David] Berger’s Force Design 2030 to modernize the expeditionary posture of the Marine Corps. And we’re implementing [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike] Gilday’s Navigation Plan to expand our fleet capabilities for distributed operations. We’re making tough decisions today, to make sure future officers like you in this room have the right combination and the number of platforms and weapons for the full spectrum of threats tomorrow,” Del Toro said in his speech.
He added the Navy was making investments in shipyards and maintenance depots and other readiness enablers, as well, to ensure those platforms and weapons could remain in the fight.
“Artificial intelligence. Cybersecurity. Unmanned platforms. Directed energy. Hypersonic weapons. Distributed power. These are the frontiers that will define your advantage against the People’s Republic of China, and it’s crucial that we field them expeditiously,” he said to the midshipmen.
Following his remarks, Del Toro told a small group of reporters that he had reviewed Gilday’s distributed maritime operations concept and Berger’s Force Design 2030 plans and was satisfied that both were the right directions for the services to move in. Now he just needs to put the right resources behind those plans.
Navy secretary’s new strategic guidance focuses on deterring China from invading Taiwan
ANNAPOLIS, Md. — The Navy secretary will release a strategic guidance document this week outlining how the U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps will maintain maritime dominance globally, strengthen strategic partnerships and empower people to succeed against China.
Carlos Del Toro, who has led the department for two months, previewed the strategic guidance to the Brigade of Midshipmen during a lecture at the U.S. Naval Academy Tuesday night.
“The desired goal, quite frankly, is not to fight China. No one wants to enter into a conflict. … It’s our ultimate responsibility to deter them from what they’re trying to accomplish, including taking over Taiwan. So it’s incredibly important … that we make the investments now, this year, as necessary to actually be able to focus more so on China and many of the other threats that we sometimes face around the world,” he said.
With that overarching goal in mind, Del Toro said the first priority in his strategic guidance is to make tough decisions today about how to spend limited defense funds in ways that will deter China.
“We’re building on Secretary of Defense [Lloyd] Austin’s vision of integrated deterrence, with an agile and a ready force. We’re building on [Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David] Berger’s Force Design 2030 to modernize the expeditionary posture of the Marine Corps. And we’re implementing [Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike] Gilday’s Navigation Plan to expand our fleet capabilities for distributed operations. We’re making tough decisions today, to make sure future officers like you in this room have the right combination and the number of platforms and weapons for the full spectrum of threats tomorrow,” Del Toro said in his speech.
He added the Navy was making investments in shipyards and maintenance depots and other readiness enablers, as well, to ensure those platforms and weapons could remain in the fight.
“Artificial intelligence. Cybersecurity. Unmanned platforms. Directed energy. Hypersonic weapons. Distributed power. These are the frontiers that will define your advantage against the People’s Republic of China, and it’s crucial that we field them expeditiously,” he said to the midshipmen.
Following his remarks, Del Toro told a small group of reporters that he had reviewed Gilday’s distributed maritime operations concept and Berger’s Force Design 2030 plans and was satisfied that both were the right directions for the services to move in. Now he just needs to put the right resources behind those plans.
Del Toro confirmed that the Navy, even as it awaits a fiscal 2022 spending plan from Congress, has already submitted its FY23 plan to the Pentagon and the White House for review and has starting early planning efforts for FY24.
He called it a “complicated kabuki dance” to deal with three fiscal years at once, but he said all three efforts keep China at the forefront. He said he was hopeful lawmakers would pass a version of the spending plan that adds in $25 billion for defense, which could support additional naval capacity and modernization to keep China in line. After submitting the FY23 plan, he and the Biden administration will now “work through the different issue papers that present the areas that we believe need additional investment in, for example. And some of those, as you can imagine, are investments that are critical to deter China in the Indo-Pacific.”
And for FY24, he again said he’s looking to balance readiness, capacity and modernization in a way that has the best return on investment in deterring China.
“We’re looking at all options in terms of what’s the existing size of the fleet; are there ships that perhaps we were planning on decommissioning in the past that we want to try to retain; and we’re looking at all those options actually to try to provide the most agile and capable force that we can to do the job that the combatant commanders have to do in the Pacific today,” he said.
He later told reporters he would like to put the Navy on a path to reach 355 manned ships, in line with previous Navy goals and legislation that Congress passed in December 2017.
“But whether it’s 355, whether it’s 330, whether it remains 300 obviously depends on how you continue to modernize, how you continue to invest in new technologies that do make a difference. Our ability to invest in cyber, for example, is extremely critical to the fight: if I can prevent the Chinese fleet from actually getting underway from the pier, wouldn’t that be a great thing,” the secretary said, noting he cares about the lethality the Navy brings to the fight more than the exact number of ships in the fleet.
He added China has proven it has greater shipbuilding capacity than the U.S. in recent years and is making smart investments in space and cyberspace, making smart U.S. investments critical.
The United Kingdom’s carrier strike group led by HMS Queen Elizabeth (R 08), and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces led by (JMSDF) Hyuga-class helicopter destroyer JS Ise (DDH 182) joined with U.S. Navy carrier strike groups led by flagships USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) to conduct multiple carrier strike group operations in the Philippine Sea on Oct. 3, 2021. The integrated at-sea operations brought together more than 15,000 Sailors across six nations and demonstrate the U.S. Navy’s ability to work closely with its unmatched network of alliances and partnerships in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific. (MC3 Gray Gibson/US Navy)
Given the threat China poses not just to the U.S. but to allies and partners and the overall set of norms that have promoted peace since the end of World War II, Del Toro said the second priority in his strategic guidance was shoring up alliances and partnerships around the globe.
When asked how to handle China and specifically its continued threats towards Taiwan, Del Toro said it was “critically important” for the Navy to build up partnerships with “countries like Australia, India, the Philippines, Indonesia, many of the other countries in the Indo-Pacific who are being threatened, and to provide the necessary arms and weapons and technology necessary for Taiwan to be able to defend itself as well, so that China can look around and basically say, we don’t have any friends, we don’t have any maritime allies who will work with us; perhaps this isn’t the right choice to make. And hopefully that will deter them from what some believe is their ultimate goal, which is to take Taiwan.”
The Navy needs to be present not just in the South China Sea but across the globe, Del Toro told reporters.
“The Chinese are everywhere: they’re down the Pacific coast of Central and South America, they’re down the West Coast of Africa, for example, and it’s so important for us to be able to continue to engage with our maritime partners around the world to better understand why is it their countries are making the investments they’re making” with China under its Belt and Road initiative and if there are safer ways the U.S. can help these countries solve their problems without becoming economically or militarily beholden to China.
“Our hope really is to deter conflict in every possible way, and [what] better way to do it than to build a 600-ship navy or a 1,000-ship navy with all your allies and partners, to be able to support them where they need the biggest amount of help. But first it begins with trying to understand your partners, what they’re going through and what struggles they have and how can we work together to get to a better place,” he said, noting the Navy has an important role in this effort.
“I think this is part of President Biden’s plan, basically, when he said that America is back and we’re trying to do everything we can to engage our partners in a very sincere, engaging way.”
Third, Del Toro said, is a focus on empowering people. He spoke several times during his speech, the question-and-answer session and the media roundtable about the need for good leadership and embracing diversity, with the Navy drawing power from its young leaders understanding and caring about who they are leading, what the sailors’ and Marines’ strengths are based on their distinct backgrounds, and how to bring the team together in the strongest way.
Del Toro told reporters that his guidance would also call for increased investments in the Naval War College and the Naval Postgraduate School, where sailors can find specialties to study beyond simply surface warfare or aviation — something that Del Toro said would help the Navy become more lethal while also boosting retention and job satisfaction.
Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs, and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she’s filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.
7. How a misguided Vietnam analogy sealed the Afghanistan disaster
Conclusion:
It is clear that Biden concluded the United States never should have fought the war; rather, he thought the United States should have invaded to kill and capture as many al-Qaeda leaders as possible, but then it should have withdrawn to avoid getting bogged down in Vietnam-like counterinsurgency and reconstruction. He appears to have concluded this despite the obvious probability that al-Qaeda would return upon the United States’ departure if Afghanistan remained under Taliban control, as is happening now.
The Vietnam analogy is a tempting one, and in using it, Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops catalyzed the collapse of the Afghan army, the Taliban’s victory, and the Saigon-like images of evacuation at the US embassy and the Kabul airport. The Vietnam analogy proved to be the self-fulfilling prophecy the international community feared; it would be policymakers’ gravest mistake to allow the analogy to wield that power again. In the end, the Vietnam analogy was deeply unhelpful for assessing the war in Afghanistan on its own terms or charting a way toward victory, but it did vindicate itself as a roadmap to defeat.
How a misguided Vietnam analogy sealed the Afghanistan disaster
October 5, 2021
The scenes of a helicopter evacuating diplomats from the US embassy in Kabul and of Afghan civilians desperately clinging to a US Air Force C-17 as it took off from Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport in August triggered irresistible comparisons to the US evacuation from Saigon in 1975.
It wasn’t the first time those kinds of flashbacks emerged. Long before the Taliban’s recent takeover, some policymakers, scholars, and journalists have looked at Afghanistan and seen Vietnam. Given how the war ended, were those analogies prescient? In fact, a review of the analogy’s influence on decision-making suggests the opposite. Policymakers wielding the analogy failed to recognize the dangers it posed to their strategy-building: Not only was it historically inaccurate, but it was a self-fulfilling prophecy that helped bring about, rather than avoid, a catastrophic end to the war in Afghanistan.
How the analogy landed on Biden’s desk
The Vietnam analogy said less about the similarities and differences between the wars and more about the state of mind of those using it—a state of mind that ultimately led policymakers to make decisions based on a faulty view of the war.
In 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell worried as war plans shaped up that they looked too much like war plans from Vietnam. Bob Woodward later wrote in his 2002 book Bush at War that as the National Security Council met eighteen days after September 11, “they were developing a response, an action, but not a strategy. It was Powell’s worst nightmare—bomb and hope. Vietnam kept flooding back.” Later, they debated pausing the bombing to invite the Taliban to negotiate. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld adamantly refused. Woodward wrote that Rumsfeld thought the “bombing pauses smacked of Vietnam. No way.” The Vietnam analogy ultimately colored President George W. Bush’s approach to his duties as commander in chief. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice later recounted in her book No Higher Honor that Bush “had read many histories of Vietnam, and he did not want to be Lyndon Johnson, picking targets from the basement of the White House.”
The media also picked up on the complex situation and the Vietnam analogy. In September 2001, the Associated Press reported: “Now it may be the United States’ turn to try a foray into the Afghan quagmire.” On October 14 of that year, Newsweek headlined a story “The Quagmire that Awaits.” On October 31, weeks into the US bombing campaign, the New York Times ran a prominent news analysis by R.W. Apple Jr. entitled “A Military Quagmire Remembered: Afghanistan as Vietnam.” In it, Apple asked “Could Afghanistan become another Vietnam? Is the United States facing another stalemate on the other side of the world? Premature the questions may be, three weeks after the fighting began. Unreasonable they are not… For all the differences between the two conflicts, and there are many, echoes of Vietnam are unavoidable.”
The Vietnam analogy said less about the similarities and differences between the wars and more about the state of mind of those using it—a state of mind that ultimately led policymakers to make decisions based on a faulty view of the war.
The Vietnam analogy returned in 2009 with the change of administrations and a review of US policy and strategy in Afghanistan. Woodward wrote in his 2010 book Obama’s Wars that as the Obama administration debated options, then Vice President Joe Biden was “more convinced than ever that Afghanistan was a version of Vietnam,” and as President Barack Obama was about to order more troops, Biden warned that the United States might get “locked into Vietnam.” Woodward also wrote that, similarly, Deputy Secretary of State Jim Steinberg told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that “he was worried they were on the path to another Vietnam.” Richard Holbrooke, the special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the president that forty-four years earlier, Johnson debated the same issues surrounding troop deployment for Vietnam with his advisers. “History should not be forgotten,” Woodward quoted Holbrooke as saying. When Holbrooke warned that the United States had a moral responsibility to the Afghans who had worked with US troops as translators and spies and that the United States could not abandon them, Biden disagreed. Holbrooke, in George Packer’s 2019 book Our Man, reported that Biden said “F— that, we don’t have to worry about that. We did it in Vietnam, [President Richard] Nixon and [National Security Advisor Henry] Kissinger got away with it,” illustrating again that Biden saw the war in Afghanistan through the lens of Vietnam.
As before, scholars, pundits, and the media echoed policymakers’ concerns. In April 2009, Andrew Bacevich—a retired US Army colonel, Vietnam War veteran, and prominent scholar of US military history—testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He argued that the central lesson of the Vietnam War was that the United States should never “embark on an open-ended war lacking clearly defined and achievable objectives.” Nonetheless, he claimed, that is exactly what the United States had done. Quoting General Bruce Palmer’s 1984 book The 25 Year War, Bacevich said that “we once again find ourselves mired in a ‘protracted war of an indeterminate nature with no foreseeable end to the US commitment,’” later adding, “We are in our own day repeating [Johnson]’s errors.” Bacevich concluded: “Just as in the 1960s we possessed neither the wisdom nor the means needed to determine the fate of Southeast Asia, so too today we possess neither the wisdom nor the means necessary to determine the fate of the Greater Middle East.”
Similarly, in 2010, Neil Sheehan, a Pulitzer-Prize winning author and former Vietnam War correspondent, wrote in a review of Woodward’s Obama’s Wars that “a new president may well have embroiled himself in a war that could poison his presidency—just as his predecessor, George W. Bush, destroyed his with a foolhardy war in Iraq and Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were ruined by the war in Vietnam.” In 2012, Sheehan drew the parallel again, arguing “what the Obama administration is attempting to do in Afghanistan bears a striking resemblance to what the United States attempted in Vietnam.”
Why the analogy can’t stand up—and why it lets policymakers down
Was the war in Afghanistan similar to the one in Vietnam? There is a superficial similarity: In both cases, the United States waged a counterinsurgency campaign against a foreign nonstate actor on behalf of a corrupt and incompetent local government. Both wars involved foreign internal defense and security assistance alongside reconstruction and development to support US war efforts. The similarities might suggest that the United States could learn useful lessons about how to wage counterinsurgency and conduct state-building in Afghanistan by examining its performance in Vietnam (and also in Iraq, which shared those similarities). Some scholars and policymakers, especially in the Department of Defense, attempted that comparison.
But saying Afghanistan is like Vietnam because both involved counterinsurgency is as insightful as saying the US Civil War was like Rome’s Second Punic War because both were conventional wars. Almost nothing else about the two wars was similar. In 2004, a Strategic Studies Institute report employed the Vietnam analogy in the case of Iraq: “There is simply no comparison between the strategic environment, the scale of military operations, the scale of losses incurred, the quality of enemy resistance, the role of enemy allies, and the duration of combat.” The same could be said of Afghanistan and Vietnam.
The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam were fought in different strategic environments. Like the Soviet-Afghan War, Vietnam was a proxy war between two superpowers overlaid on top of a national liberation movement. As a consequence, the North Vietnamese had the almost limitless resources and public support of the Soviet Union and China behind them, and the risk of escalation was a very real danger. US intervention in Vietnam was unilateral and lacked broad international legitimacy. In contrast, the conflict in Afghanistan was an international counterterrorism operation mixed up in a tribal civil war. The Taliban had comparatively few resources and there was no risk of escalation with a sponsoring superpower.
The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam also took place in different operational and tactical environments. The North Vietnamese fielded a conventional army with tanks, artillery, and air power as their main effort. The unconventional Viet Cong insurgency was a supporting effort that faded away or was defeated after 1968; Saigon fell in 1975 to the North Vietnamese Army, not the Viet Cong. In Afghanistan, the Taliban insurgency never fielded a conventional force and won through bribery, intimidation, and negotiations with local Afghan commanders who refused to fight after the withdrawal of US and international assistance, not through combat.
The wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam took place in different ideological environments. The Vietnam War was a civil war between two rival nationalist visions (a communist version and a nationalist version), both seeking unity and independence. Both claims were marred by autocracy. The communists’ claim was also marred by their brutality, while the South Vietnamese’s claim was also marred by their corruption. The Taliban, in contrast, was a minority sect that was unpopular and scarcely perceived to be legitimate, even when it governed Afghanistan, because of the group’s extremism and incompetence. It advocated Deobandi Islamism—which differs from the Hanafi school of Islam prevalent across Afghanistan—persecuted and excluded all non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and presided over the complete collapse of most state institutions. The various anti-Taliban factions, parties, and militias included almost all of Afghanistan’s major ethnic, religious, and regional groups, including Pashtuns and political Islamist groups. The government in Kabul had a much stronger claim to legitimacy and broad-based representation than did the military government in Saigon.
And finally, the wars in Afghanistan and Vietnam were fought on vastly different scales. Vietnam was one of the largest wars in American history, after the world wars and the Civil War. The United States deployed over a half-million troops; over 58,000 were killed, and over 300,000 were wounded. The North and South Vietnamese fielded armies of several hundred thousand each, and more than two million Vietnamese were killed. Compared to Vietnam, Afghanistan was a minor conflict. Taliban fighters, according to some estimates, numbered in the tens of thousands. And even at its peak, the US military deployment was only one-fifth the size of the deployment in Vietnam. About 3,500 coalition troops perished, which is one of the smallest figures of any major war in US history—that is not to make light of the loss of life but to highlight that there is no comparison to Vietnam. From December 2014 until the evacuation from Kabul, just seventy-nine US service members were killed in action; fewer troops were killed over the final six-and-a-half years in Afghanistan than were lost every two days in Vietnam in 1968, on average.
Some of the most important factors that led to the United States’ defeat in Vietnam—the scale of US casualties, the presence of a large and vocal anti-war movement in the United States, the existence of a well-armed conventional opponent, and the Cold War dynamic—were not present in Afghanistan. Likewise, some of the causes of the United States’ loss in Afghanistan—the Taliban’s access to money from the drug trade and the support from a global network of jihadist groups—were largely unique to that conflict and not shared with the one in Vietnam. Afghanistan did not resemble Vietnam in its strategic, operational, tactical, or ideological environments. It did not resemble Vietnam in why or how the war was fought, the type and number of enemies, or even the role of US allies and rivals. Frankly, it did not resemble Vietnam in any other respect. That means reflecting on Vietnam yields little insight applicable to the conflict in Afghanistan—aside from highlighting counterinsurgency best practices.
Invoking the shadow of Vietnam to inform the debate over Afghanistan is a sure way of paying more attention to the image of the war than the reality of it. Policymakers who reason by historical analogy are almost always wrong in doing so. Jeffrey Record’s study of the use of Vietnam as a historical analogy in US foreign policy decisions concluded that it has rarely served policymakers well. Using the Vietnam experience as a warning against replicating its errors is redundant: As Record noted (years before the fall of Kabul), “The very experience of the Vietnam War remains the greatest obstacle to its repetition.” Moreover, the international environment has changed. The end of the Cold War has diminished the stakes for US national-security interests in peripheral theaters around the world, and at the same time, it deprived would-be US adversaries of the funding and armaments they would need to mount a challenge of the scale of the North Vietnamese. US involvement in another foreign war that combines conventional warfare against a superpower-backed enemy state with counterinsurgency warfare against a resilient rural insurgency is extremely unlikely. “There are probably no more Vietnams… lying in wait for the United States,” Record wrote. Using Vietnam as a cautionary tale, therefore, only cautions against something that is unlikely to happen anyway.
Invoking the shadow of Vietnam to inform the debate over Afghanistan is a sure way of paying more attention to the image of the war than the reality of it.
Indeed, the Vietnam metaphor can be outright harmful to sound military planning. It can encourage excessive, even unrealistic, concern for minimizing casualties. It can create an unrealistic expectation that policymakers determine beforehand what their exit strategy will be (for a war whose course they cannot, in reality, predict or control). It can artificially separate force from diplomacy and even prompt calls for deploying overwhelming force in every situation, even when small, tailored deployments might be more appropriate. Record further warned that the “Vietnam War analogy is an unreliable, even dangerous, guide to using force in the post-Cold War era.” While it might have served a useful purpose in helping military planners learn best practices for counterinsurgency, it seems more often to have served as a largely groundless cautionary tale about the perils of unconventional warfare.
Where the analogy had merit: The aftershocks
And yet, regardless of how inappropriate the analogy was in describing the course of the war, it seems to describe almost too perfectly how the wars ended. Does that suggest there was merit to the analogy all along?
The fall of Kabul seems likely to have similar political, diplomatic, and psychological effects as the fall of Saigon. Both evacuations were international public humiliations for the United States, regarded as demonstrative of the limits of American power and resolve. To use the language of chess, in Vietnam the United States lost a tempo to the Soviet Union; the latter gained the initiative and confidence to act with more stridency on the international stage for the several years that followed. In the twenty-first century, the free world is again in a contest with rising authoritarianism around the world and again lost a tempo. To that extent, the Saigon analogy, unfortunately, has merit.
But if so, it was merit created by the very policymakers who invoked the analogy as a cautionary tale. Earlier, the Obama administration tried to negotiate with the Taliban while unilaterally withdrawing US forces—motivated in part by their fear that Afghanistan would turn into another Vietnam. But in doing so, they replicated the dynamic of the Paris Peace talks with North Vietnam. In both cases, US adversaries understood that they would achieve their principal aims by waiting and thus had no need to concede anything through negotiation. Obama administration officials, who feared Afghanistan would turn into another Vietnam, ensured it would do so through their insistence on withdrawal timetables.
Later, invoking the analogy in 2021, Biden engineered the Vietnam-like scenario he had wanted to avoid as vice president by appealing to the past war in justifying his decision to withdraw all remaining US forces. “I wasn’t going to ask [US troops] to continue to risk their lives in a military action that should have ended long ago,” he said the day after Kabul fell. “Our leaders did that in Vietnam when I got here as a young man. I will not do it in Afghanistan.” Biden, fearing another Vietnam, withdrew US forces before the Afghan army was ready for independent operations—the decision most directly responsible for Kabul’s collapse and the ignominious, Vietnam-like end to the United States’ war in Afghanistan.
Biden believed that wars like Vietnam are unwinnable and, if the United States finds itself in a Vietnam-like war, the administration should end it as quickly as possible. Biden believed this despite the dramatic differences between the North Vietnamese Army and the Taliban, between the Cold War and the war against jihadist terrorism, and between a war that killed 2,500 Americans every two months at its peak and a war that killed 2,500 Americans in twenty years. Even more surprisingly, Biden believed the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable despite the military progress of Obama’s 2009-2010 surge, when Biden was vice president, and the slow progress building a new Afghan army.
It is clear that Biden concluded the United States never should have fought the war; rather, he thought the United States should have invaded to kill and capture as many al-Qaeda leaders as possible, but then it should have withdrawn to avoid getting bogged down in Vietnam-like counterinsurgency and reconstruction. He appears to have concluded this despite the obvious probability that al-Qaeda would return upon the United States’ departure if Afghanistan remained under Taliban control, as is happening now.
The Vietnam analogy is a tempting one, and in using it, Biden’s decision to withdraw US troops catalyzed the collapse of the Afghan army, the Taliban’s victory, and the Saigon-like images of evacuation at the US embassy and the Kabul airport. The Vietnam analogy proved to be the self-fulfilling prophecy the international community feared; it would be policymakers’ gravest mistake to allow the analogy to wield that power again. In the end, the Vietnam analogy was deeply unhelpful for assessing the war in Afghanistan on its own terms or charting a way toward victory, but it did vindicate itself as a roadmap to defeat.
Paul D. Miller is a nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council and a professor of the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University. His most recent book is Just War and Ordered Liberty, from Cambridge University Press. Follow him on Twitter @PaulDMiller2.
8. As China stumbles, the West must ask: what if its rise is not inevitable?
Nothing is inevitable. (except death and taxes I suppose).
Conclusion:
These challenges all suggest that China has not managed to reconcile prosperity and authoritarianism as smoothly as the bullish accounts of its ascent suggest. Unfashionably bearish books that have warned about China’s future – Magnus’s Red Flags and Carl Minzer’s End of an Era – are now looking strikingly prescient.
What, then, if China’s problems turn out to be more than minor setbacks? This would demand the rethinking of many other assumptions too. Western corporate leaders and finance ministers reliant on Chinese growth would need to find a way to survive without it. Western strategists expecting a new Asian superpower would have to contemplate the prospect of a stagnating one. A Western order seemingly threatened by Chinese aggression and overconfidence might find that Chinese insecurity and instability pose the greater risk. Certainly, these are only possibilities. But possibilities surely momentous enough to warrant the question: “What if?”
As China stumbles, the West must ask: what if its rise is not inevitable?
Photo by NICOLAS ASFOURI/AFP via Getty Images
It was the biggest misconception of the post-1989 era: as it became richer, China would become more liberal and a “responsible stakeholder” in a US-led global order. As the country has become richer but more authoritarian, especially since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, that stock theory has been replaced with a very different one: that China has detached prosperity from liberalism and that its upwards trajectory as a state-capitalist autocracy is all but certain.
This new assumption is so inherent to our understanding of the world that we rarely question it. I am guilty of this, often dropping the term “China’s rise” into my own writing about world affairs without troubling to justify or explain it.
The habit is near-ubiquitous. In the White House under Joe Biden, almost every big decision is viewed through the prism of an ever-mightier China that, the president has said, threatens to “eat our lunch”. When Biden joined forces with Boris Johnson and the Australian prime minister Scott Morrison to announce the “Aukus” submarines deal on 15 September, the three did not mention China, but they did not need to; the imperative to unite to contain the rising superpower before it becomes uncontainable was implicit. Other governments seek more of a middle way between the US and China, but one still predicated on the expectation that the latter will end up at least as powerful as the former.
Beijing obligingly furnishes this expectation with awe-inspiring detail, from the staggering proportions of its economy (its property market is valued at $52trn) and the glittering, vertiginous skylines of its cities, to the cowing of Hong Kong, and the bombast with which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) marked its 100th birthday in July – at which Xi warned the country’s enemies would “find their heads broken and bashed bloody against the great wall of steel forged by the blood and flesh of 1.4 billion Chinese people”. How could you not be daunted by such fierce vigour?
Yet when so many decisions by the West especially – economic, military, diplomatic – rest on that premise, it is worth asking what it would mean if the assumptions about China’s inexorable rise are disproved over the coming decades.
The months since the regime’s strutting display in July give ample reason to stress-test the idea. China is entering a politically sensitive time: the run-up to the CCP’s congress in November 2022, at which Xi will seek another five years at the helm, making him China’s longest-serving leader since Mao. The party wants to resolve some of the negative effects of the country’s sustained growth: reining in inequalities and corporate excess under the slogan “common prosperity”; squeezing the powerful tech firms that serve the retail and social-networking appetites of a burgeoning middle class; cleaning up a coal-heavy economy; and managing the demographic fallout produced by the combination of increased prosperity and a one-child policy relaxed only in 2013. On all of those fronts it is facing difficulties.
Today, China’s Evergrande – the world’s most indebted property developer with $300bn of liabilities – is on the verge of a default as Beijing tightens rules on leverage and the country’s long real estate boom tilts towards bust. As the China expert George Magnus wrote on newstatesman.com, the firm’s unravelling could send a shock through the financial system of a country that has “never experienced a meaningful decline in property prices”. The crackdown on technology giants such as Alibaba and Tencent, also part of Xi’s war on excess, has wiped more than $1trn combined off tech firms’ stock prices and spooked investors. China’s marriage of market economics and political Leninism appears to be faltering.
Rolling power cuts in recent weeks have prompted coal production to be ramped up, demonstrating the awesome scale of the challenge of decarbonising the Chinese economy. Combined with new outbreaks of the Delta Covid variant leading to local lockdowns, the energy crisis is slowing the economy. Manufacturing activity contracted in September.
Then there is that other long-term threat to Chinese prosperity: its rapidly ageing population. A census published in May showed China’s birth rate had dropped to 1.3 children per woman (compared with 1.6 in the US), while a new study by medical journal the Lancet projects that China’s population will halve by 2100.
These challenges all suggest that China has not managed to reconcile prosperity and authoritarianism as smoothly as the bullish accounts of its ascent suggest. Unfashionably bearish books that have warned about China’s future – Magnus’s Red Flags and Carl Minzer’s End of an Era – are now looking strikingly prescient.
What, then, if China’s problems turn out to be more than minor setbacks? This would demand the rethinking of many other assumptions too. Western corporate leaders and finance ministers reliant on Chinese growth would need to find a way to survive without it. Western strategists expecting a new Asian superpower would have to contemplate the prospect of a stagnating one. A Western order seemingly threatened by Chinese aggression and overconfidence might find that Chinese insecurity and instability pose the greater risk. Certainly, these are only possibilities. But possibilities surely momentous enough to warrant the question: “What if?”
Topics in this article: China
This article appears in the 06 Oct 2021 issue of the New Statesman, Unsafe Places
9. Don’t Arm the Afghan Resistance
A very expected argument.
I do not mean to be flippant here. But what about one of our core values, the right of self determination of government? Do we have any kind of moral responsibility for helping a people seek freedom? (and I am not talking about uUS military intervention to do so. ). Before we make any rash decisions I hope someone is conducting a thorough assessment of the resistance potential
Don’t Arm the Afghan Resistance
An expert's point of view on a current event.
Supporting anti-Taliban fighters will spark a return to civil war, antagonize Pakistan, and draw the United States back into a conflict it sought to put behind it.
By Bilal Y. Saab, a senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute.
Afghan resistance movement and anti-Taliban uprising forces take rest as they patrol on a hilltop in Darband area in Anaba district, Panjshir province on Sept. 1, 2021. AHMAD SAHEL ARMAN/AFP via Getty Images
U.S. President Joe Biden is convinced that exiting Afghanistan was the right thing to do. But even he knows that putting the country in Washington’s rearview mirror is something the United States cannot afford to do.
Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan is likely to turn into a magnet for terrorism, as it was pre-9/11. Top U.S. intelligence officials estimate that in a year or two, al Qaeda could regroup.
Protecting the U.S. homeland from terrorists including the Islamic State, who could use Afghanistan as a launchpad for attacks against the West, remains a top U.S. concern.
U.S. President Joe Biden is convinced that exiting Afghanistan was the right thing to do. But even he knows that putting the country in Washington’s rearview mirror is something the United States cannot afford to do.
Under Taliban rule, Afghanistan is likely to turn into a magnet for terrorism, as it was pre-9/11. Top U.S. intelligence officials estimate that in a year or two, al Qaeda could regroup.
Protecting the U.S. homeland from terrorists including the Islamic State, who could use Afghanistan as a launchpad for attacks against the West, remains a top U.S. concern.
But how can the United States most effectively meet this priority moving forward? Now that U.S. forces have departed and the Afghan military, which Americans trained and equipped for 20 years, has disintegrated, the options range from bad to worse.
One of these options is over-the-horizon strikes, attacks launched from nearby countries, which the United States has already exercised. But the risks of this tactic are clear. On Aug. 29, the U.S. military tragically killed 10 innocent Afghan civilians, seven of whom were children, because its members couldn’t tell the difference between an aid worker and an Islamic State operative. Of course, not all over-the-horizon operations are unreliable; in fact, they can be incredibly precise and effective. But they do require local intelligence and patient target development, which the U.S. military didn’t have for the Aug. 29 strike.
Sen. Lindsey Graham and Rep. Mike Waltz, along with a growing number of conservative American lawmakers, have presented another option: arming the so-called Afghan resistance. “We’re going to lead and drive this from Congress if the White House and the administration refuses to,” Waltz said. Meanwhile, Graham has been active in his efforts to build support in Washington for Amrullah Saleh, an Afghan opposition leader.
Putting aside the political motivations of Graham and Waltz, one can see why the idea of providing weapons to Afghans who could restrain the Taliban and fight terrorism sounds attractive.
The premise is that by applying military pressure against the Taliban through local parties, the group’s worst instincts can be checked. More specifically, such leverage might push the group to meaningfully cooperate on counterterrorism and pursue more inclusive governance.
Arming the Afghan resistance also would seek to cultivate local partners on the ground who could provide the United States with critical human intelligence and thus enable more effective over-the-horizon operations.
Lastly, helping an Afghan faction that opposes the Taliban’s radicalism and ostensibly supports women’s rights, it is assumed, helps atone for America’s sins and protect previous investments in Afghan human development.
However, none of these arguments is convincing.
More than 20 years of experience in Afghanistan have clearly shown that military pressure against the Taliban didn’t succeed in taming them one bit or in forcing them to cut ties with al Qaeda.
If Washington pursues this policy, U.S. officials are almost guaranteeing a return to civil war in Afghanistan.
The case for arming local Afghan rebels in the present circumstances of post-American withdrawal is not only based on questionable assumptions but also fraught with tremendous risks.
If Washington pursues this policy, U.S. officials are almost guaranteeing a return to civil war in Afghanistan. The United States can militarily defeat the Taliban by proxy with the right level of support, but it won’t be able to uproot them or win the peace.
Some might argue that a stalemate between the Taliban and the Afghan resistance would be enough. But threading that needle in the absence of U.S. troops on the ground will be very difficult given the Taliban’s determination to establish uncontested governance.
It’s also worth learning lessons from history. An internal CIA study from previous years found that arming rebels rarely works, and the approach was even less effective without any direct U.S. support on the ground. Of course, the United States did succeed in kicking the Soviet Army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s without a U.S. military presence, but Washington relied on Pakistani intelligence officers who partnered with the Afghan mujahideen to make it work.
If the United States arms Afghan insurgents today, Pakistan will intensify its support to the Taliban until they regain control. The last thing Washington needs in Afghanistan is an even more strained relationship with Islamabad.
Even if Afghan fighters in Panjshir Valley manage to prevent the Taliban from taking over their lands with U.S. military help, this will in no way promote human rights or improve the plight of women in Kabul.
It’s also not entirely clear who these rebels are. They’re not the Taliban, but that doesn’t mean they’re model citizens either. According to reports by international human rights organizations and America’s own Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, some (not all) of these militias have behaved terribly, raping women, using violence against ethnic minorities, stealing land, and turning underaged boys into soldiers. With no U.S. personnel on the ground, how will Washington vet and exert control over them once it arms them?
Equally important, does the Biden administration want to send sophisticated U.S. weapons to a place awash with terrorists who could seize those weapons? There’s already a boatload of arms left by the Americans that were supposed to be used by the Afghan military but now have been seized by the Taliban. The additional proliferation of arms will also further militarize Afghan society, permit more aggressive forms of warlordism, and worsen a bad humanitarian crisis.
None of this suggests that the reign of the Taliban will produce peace or eradicate terrorism emanating from Afghanistan. Nor does it imply that Washington should tolerate the Taliban’s proven misconduct and treachery.
But there are other tools, including regional diplomacy, economic statecraft, and better-crafted remote strikes, to try to influence the Taliban’s behavior and achieve long-term U.S. objectives.
Arming Afghan rebels does not constitute a comprehensive Afghanistan strategy, which the United States desperately needs. It’s a feel-good tactic more than anything else. America has caused enough suffering in Afghanistan. The least the U.S. government can do is not make the situation worse.
Bilal Y. Saab is a senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute and a former senior advisor in the U.S. Defense Department with oversight responsibilities for security cooperation in the broader Middle East. His upcoming book, Rebuilding Arab Defense, will be published in 2022.
10. The Fatal Flaw in the West’s Fight Against Autocracy
It was enlightening to see the role of the US in these papers.
Excerpts:
We already know what needs to be done; none of it is especially complicated, and smart policy proposals have been put forward by groups across the political spectrum. Transparency is the key. Transparency as it pertains to shell companies, trusts, and foundations. Transparency as it pertains to real estate, artwork, and luxury goods. Combined with new and increased regulations targeting the so-called enablers in the West who open these financial secrecy doors—the lawyers, accountants, consultants, and public relations spin doctors—transparency will help bring these secret financial networks out of the shadows.
We’ve seen some progress in recent years, including the British government creating a public registry of certain companies and the United States and Canada recently taking strides to clean up their shell-company sectors. The European Union, likewise, has continued pushing for far greater regulatory oversight for things like lawyers and trust operators.
These are all welcome steps, but they can hardly end there. The rest of the solutions proposed above will require significant political will—and enough realization of just how central the West’s role in these offshore networks remains. The United States and the United Kingdom, Canada and France, Germany and the Baltics: All are pillars in their own rights of the offshore economy. All have been used and abused by the kleptocrats of the world. And there’s no reason to think that’s going to end with the Pandora Papers leak.
The Fatal Flaw in the West’s Fight Against Autocracy
An expert's point of view on a current event.
The Pandora Papers reveal the critical role Western countries play in enabling autocrats.
By Casey Michel, an investigative reporter based in New York.
An office building in central London reportedly owned by Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev on Oct. 5. Leon Neal/Getty Images
To hear Western politicians tell it, liberal democracies are in an existential fight against the forces of autocracy, despotism, and dictatorship around the world. That framing has found a home in U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent rhetoric and is the raison d’être for his upcoming Summit for Democracy.
Biden and the other Western politicos echoing his calls are correct in their diagnosis. Rising illiberalism, swelling autocracies, and increasingly muscular dictatorships from Beijing to Moscow are smothering democratizing efforts on the ground and threatening the broader liberal order.
But their efforts to thwart rising autocracy have overlooked a critical way Western democracies themselves enable such regimes to thrive: by providing anonymous financial secrecy tools that allow kleptocrats around the world to move, hide, and launder their ill-gotten wealth, safely away from the prying eyes of their own people.
To hear Western politicians tell it, liberal democracies are in an existential fight against the forces of autocracy, despotism, and dictatorship around the world. That framing has found a home in U.S. President Joe Biden’s recent rhetoric and is the raison d’être for his upcoming Summit for Democracy.
Biden and the other Western politicos echoing his calls are correct in their diagnosis. Rising illiberalism, swelling autocracies, and increasingly muscular dictatorships from Beijing to Moscow are smothering democratizing efforts on the ground and threatening the broader liberal order.
But their efforts to thwart rising autocracy have overlooked a critical way Western democracies themselves enable such regimes to thrive: by providing anonymous financial secrecy tools that allow kleptocrats around the world to move, hide, and launder their ill-gotten wealth, safely away from the prying eyes of their own people.
These tools by now form a familiar playbook. On the one hand, you have such devices as shell companies and trusts that effectively anonymize wealth, stripping the money from any identifying information. On the other hand, you have an entire range of industries more than happy to process the proceeds of this now-anonymous wealth, from real estate and luxury vendors to auction houses and the art market writ large.
And all of it remains broadly legal, providing a perfect launching pad for kleptocrats and illiberal figures around the world to burrow their finances into the West, effectively using Western financial secrecy against the democratizers, the reformers, and anyone looking for just a bit of better governance.
The newly released Pandora Papers reveal in stark detail the critical role major Western countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Germany play in enabling dictators and autocrats by allowing illicit transnational flows of cash to flourish. With nearly 12 million documents, the release pulled back the curtain on a huge number of kleptocratic networks.
There was, for instance, the discovery that Azerbaijan’s dictatorship has moved hundreds of millions of dollars through London. It was hardly the first time London—a city that increasingly appears built on money laundering services—found itself at the center of these kinds of illicit flows. If anything, the funds linked to Azerbaijan’s brutal ruling family followed a well-established pattern: anonymous shell companies, anonymous real estate purchases, and British legal professionals helping move the process along—all of it perfectly legal. (The twist to the latest revelations in the Pandora Papers: Apparently Queen Elizabeth II ended up unwittingly involved.)
There was the revelation that British shell companies had also helped Russian President Vladimir Putin’s alleged lover lead a life of Mediterranean luxury, yet another story linking those close to the Kremlin—including those specifically trying to evade Western sanctions—to an entire potpourri of Western financial secrecy tools.
Likewise, Jordan’s King Abdullah II—a man who promotes an award for transparency (seriously)—saw his secret nine-figure real estate purchases in the United States and United Kingdom spill out into the public eye, even while the West continues to bankroll financial aid efforts in Jordan.
And former Kazakh dictator Nursultan Nazarbayev, a man who pioneered so much of the modern kleptocratic playbook, saw the financial secrecy vehicles used by his “unofficial third wife” revealed. Nazarbayev, of course, is hardly a stranger to offshore financing, nor is his family, who have turned up time and again when it comes to allegations of laundering their illicit wealth across the West.
Speaking of Nazarbayev, one of his former speechwriters—none other than former U.K. Prime Minister Tony Blair—also saw his internal finances revealed thanks to the Pandora Papers. Blair may not be the first person who comes to mind when one thinks of modern kleptocracy, but the former British premier has transformed into something of a lodestar for other Western politicians looking to take full advantage of these kleptocratic flows.
Rather than act as a force for, say, democratization or financial transparency, Blair has spent his post-premier years taking funds to whitewash regimes in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Serbia, among an entire range of other autocracies. Little surprise, then, that the Pandora Papers revealed that Blair was involved with an offshore vehicle tied directly to the upper rungs of Bahrain’s dictatorship.
But maybe it’s not fair to pick on Blair. After all, he’s simply working alongside many other former democratic leaders who have apparently tossed democratizing efforts to the side in their pursuit of kleptocratic funds. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has become one of Putin’s biggest cheerleaders, while former Austrian Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer, former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, and former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski have likewise taken funds ostensibly to advise rising dictators.
Over and again, democratic leaders have dropped any pretense of working for the West’s—for democracy’s—best interests. Instead, they’ve created an entire cottage industry of former Western leaders hopping in the pockets of these kleptocratic figures—all while those same figures use and abuse industry after industry in the West for their needs.
Meanwhile, all that seems to matter to the Western financiers themselves—the real estate, private equity, auction house, and other professionals looking to get a slice of this kleptocratic wealth—is that the tap remains open and that they get a nice commission along the way. And their consultants, lobbyists, and lawyers work hard to make sure no regulations impinge on these transnational financial flows.
We already know what the results of these financial networks are. These Western financial secrecy tools—the anonymous shell companies and anonymous trusts, these industries built on the backs of anonymous finance without any regulatory oversight—allow oligarchs and anti-democratic figures to continue stripping as much wealth as they want from their domestic populations, immiserating local populaces, destabilizing entire regions, and bankrolling their illiberal efforts however they need.
On the other hand, even when the West does work up the courage to finally take on these despots—say, via sanctions programs that aim to block and upend their financial networks—these financial secrecy tools allow them to evade those very sanctions. They allow these figures to dodge investigations, thwart any efforts at returning looted assets, and enjoy the fruits of their brutality, even after they’re overthrown.
These elements are two sides of the same kleptocratic coin. And they’re hardly limited to any particular regime; even—or perhaps especially—regimes opposed to the Western liberal order take advantage of these financial tools.
Red princelings in China and oligarchs in Russia, pro-regime businesspeople in Venezuela and officials buttressing the government in Iran, far-right networks in Hungary and gangsters-cum-politicians in Azerbaijan: All of them rely on the same services, the same networks, the same offshoring and financial secrecy tools found in the West. All of them spout their anti-Western, anti-democratic diatribes to their domestic populations and then rely on the same Western, democratic countries to shield their wealth, launder their finances, and stash their money, and to then use those finances for anything they need.
We already know what needs to be done; none of it is especially complicated, and smart policy proposals have been put forward by groups across the political spectrum. Transparency is the key. Transparency as it pertains to shell companies, trusts, and foundations. Transparency as it pertains to real estate, artwork, and luxury goods. Combined with new and increased regulations targeting the so-called enablers in the West who open these financial secrecy doors—the lawyers, accountants, consultants, and public relations spin doctors—transparency will help bring these secret financial networks out of the shadows.
We’ve seen some progress in recent years, including the British government creating a public registry of certain companies and the United States and Canada recently taking strides to clean up their shell-company sectors. The European Union, likewise, has continued pushing for far greater regulatory oversight for things like lawyers and trust operators.
These are all welcome steps, but they can hardly end there. The rest of the solutions proposed above will require significant political will—and enough realization of just how central the West’s role in these offshore networks remains. The United States and the United Kingdom, Canada and France, Germany and the Baltics: All are pillars in their own rights of the offshore economy. All have been used and abused by the kleptocrats of the world. And there’s no reason to think that’s going to end with the Pandora Papers leak.
Casey Michel is an investigative journalist and the author of the forthcoming book American Kleptocracy: How the U.S. Created the World’s Greatest Money Laundering Scheme in History.
11. French senators visit Taiwan despite China protests
French senators visit Taiwan despite China protests
Beijing opposes Taipei having official diplomatic exchanges and tried to dissuade politicians from visiting
A delegation of French senators led by a former defense minister arrived on Wednesday in Taiwan, where they will hold talks with President Tsai Ing-wen, despite strong protests from China.
Beijing opposes Taipei having any official diplomatic exchanges and has aggressively tried to dissuade politicians from visiting in recent years.
The Chinese embassy warned that the visit would damage the interests of China, Chinese-French relations and “the image of France” in recent comments on its website.
France’s foreign ministry has dismissed China’s protests, saying the senators were free to make their own decisions about their travel plans.
The delegation will meet Tsai on Thursday before wrapping up their trip on Sunday, according to Taiwan’s foreign ministry.
“The senators are making the visit despite threats from the Chinese ambassador to France, showing their steadfast commitment to the spirit of freedom and democracy,” the ministry said in a statement on Tuesday.
The Chinese ambassador wrote to the leader of the French delegation, Alain Richard, in February, saying his visit would “clearly violate the one-China principle and send the wrong signal to pro-independence forces in Taiwan.”
Richard chairs the French senate’s Taiwan Friendship Group and previously visited the island in 2015 and 2018.
Beijing has ramped up pressure on self-ruled democratic Taiwan since Tsai came to power in 2016, as she views the island as a de facto sovereign nation and not part of its territory.
– AFP
12. The hidden enemies in Xi’s midst
A Chinese game of thrones? The first paragraph is quite provocative. But purges do have an effect.
Excerpts:
Here there is another turn to China’s complex conundrum. If Xi were to try to solve his power issues by democratizing the political system, many in the party would call him a “traitor.” The party structure is actually the big problem here. In many domestic and international issues, the interests of the Party trump those of the country.
For instance, would China benefit from a freely convertible currency and a freer market? Long-term, yes, but this would endanger the Party’s hold on power, as a possible financial crisis would shake the party’s rigid grip.
People stand next to a display commemorating the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party of China on its eve in Shanghai on June 30, 2021. Photo: AFP / Hector Retamal
If the country were a democracy, the government would step down in case of financial turmoil, likely because of capital flight with a convertible currency. Another one would be chosen through an election.
Similarly, the interests of Party elders—keeping the bloated and ineffective privileged caste with its fingers in the cake of power—are against Xi who would like a more effective and responsive rule. In theory, comprehensive reform of the party structure would be necessary to have a clear “rule of law.”
But some retired veterans are not actually interested in the state’s long-term interests but in recovering their half-lost dominance. If Xi doesn’t solve the issue, the many contradictions could make the system stall or even explode in time.
The hidden enemies in Xi’s midst
Ex-vice minister of security Sun Lijun is the latest to fall in a wider purge of top-ranking Chinese security officials
On the eve of China’s October 1 National Day celebrations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) expelled former vice minister for public security Sun Lijun – not for corruption but serious political crimes almost tantamount to something like an attempted coup.
Specifically, he was accused of “serious violations of discipline” and building cliques and cabals to take over a key government department.
Sun, apprehended about a year ago, is guilty of “overweening political ambitions” and “arbitrarily disagreeing with central policy guidelines,” the mighty party disciplinary committee CCDI wrote in a statement on its official website.
The ex-vice minister had “created and spread political rumors, taken actions against others, wove a web of deceit to obtain political capital and … used unscrupulous means … to form gangs, cliques, and interest groups within the party and build his personal power,” the statement said, thus implying he had gravely violated party centralism and allegiance to the top leadership.
“He formed a cabal to take control over a key department(s), seriously jeopardizing political security and party unity,” the CCDI statement added. Sun is also said to have been “harboring hugely inflated political ambitions” and having “evil political qualities.”
Sun Lijun had been under investigation since last year. Photo: YouTube screengrab
Meanwhile, the Chinese media reported that his former colleague, the ex-minister of justice and ex-head of the Public Security Bureau Fu Zhenghua, is being investigated for “serious violation of discipline and law,” according to a statement from the authorities.
Fu led the investigation into former security czar Zhou Yongkang, jailed in 2015. Zhou was a rival of president Xi Jinping and an ally of ex-Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai, arrested in 2013. Bo’s and Zhou’s arrests helped to consolidate Xi Jinping’s ascendence to power.
The news of Fu and Sun come weeks after their close ally, Peng Bo, a former top Chinese internet censor, was accused by the CCDI of disloyalty to the Party.
Peng, deputy chief of the Cyberspace Administration of China, was expelled from the Party in August. Peng and Fu crossed paths when the latter headed the Central 601 office, which in 1999 was in charge of the crackdown against the Falun Gong, ordered by ex-party chief Jiang Zemin. Peng was his deputy.
Fu is the fourth former deputy public security minister to be detained by the CCDI in recent years.
In 2016, Li Dongsheng, a former deputy national police chief and ally of ex-security tsar Zhou, was jailed for 15 years on corruption charges. Last year, the former head of the international policing agency Interpol, Meng Hongwei, was sentenced to 13 and a half years in jail for corruption.
The plot against Xi
The thinly veiled accusation is of plotting against Xi. But these officers are relatively junior to be scheming against the almost almighty party leader. They must have had the support of some superiors. In the present party structure, they can likely be retired former leaders.
Xi is in an unprecedented and almost impossible position. Mao didn’t have any other senior leader lurking behind his back because he had won power through a war against his rival, nationalist generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
Deng promptly eliminated his opponents, the “Gang of Four”, putting them on public trial and thus warning anybody else against trying anything funny.
Besides, none of his adversaries had his seniority and clout in handling party businesses. When Jiang Zemin effectively came to power, after Deng’s demise, he had to deal with the mighty shadow of his rival Qiao Shi over his shoulder.
Still, the Falun Gong protest was blamed on Qiao; he was sidelined, and allegedly soon after, he suffered from some kind of breakdown that impaired his faculties. All in all, Mr. Qiao’s power disappeared. Hu Jintao had to live under Jiang’s cloud.
A woman takes a selfie as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech is being broadcasted on a large screen in Beijing during the 100th Anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, July 1, 2021. Photo: AFP / Noel Celis
Xi has been trying to cut off Jiang and all previous leaders, but there are simply too many. There are people from Hu’s generation, from Jiang’s generation, and even some rare survivors of Deng’s times. They have privileges, political access, a network of friends and allies, and shield one another.
To isolate them totally would deprive Xi of part of his own legitimacy, derived from being born into this elite. But to keep them around undermines Xi’s power.
Jiang and Hu’s solution was to have former leaders consult for major and minor decisions. But the process was cumbersome, opaque, and led to the massive corruption that was halting the Chinese economy and that Xi tried to address.
Xi’s solution has been to have them live in a bubble, with money but no power, away from the limelight. But there are thousands of them, many relatively healthy and energetic, and in a society where personal bonds are vital, they still command loyalty from their former underlings.
Sure, Xi is trying to cut these bonds, stressing the need to rule the country according to the unsentimental “laws” 法. Still, the switch is not easy in a place where personal connections have always been the backbone of survival in the face of a ruthless state. Neither is it now possible to physically eliminate or incarcerate all past leaders.
The traditional system put all imperial consorts and riotous princes under house arrest; the Turkish sultan would kill all his brothers upon his ascendancy to the throne. The method was cruel but rational. The supreme leader had to make sure nobody with clout would conspire behind his back.
Democratic systems do not remove this institutional risk but minimize it by making the political process transparent. You can openly argue against the present top leader, but you can’t secretly conspire against him; besides, leaders are practically ordinary citizens after retirement.
In that case, Xi should have an objective interest in making the system more transparent and democratic. His enemies could not hide, and the power struggle would be in the open.
Here there is another turn to China’s complex conundrum. If Xi were to try to solve his power issues by democratizing the political system, many in the party would call him a “traitor.” The party structure is actually the big problem here. In many domestic and international issues, the interests of the Party trump those of the country.
For instance, would China benefit from a freely convertible currency and a freer market? Long-term, yes, but this would endanger the Party’s hold on power, as a possible financial crisis would shake the party’s rigid grip.
People stand next to a display commemorating the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the Communist Party of China on its eve in Shanghai on June 30, 2021. Photo: AFP / Hector Retamal
If the country were a democracy, the government would step down in case of financial turmoil, likely because of capital flight with a convertible currency. Another one would be chosen through an election.
Similarly, the interests of Party elders—keeping the bloated and ineffective privileged caste with its fingers in the cake of power—are against Xi who would like a more effective and responsive rule. In theory, comprehensive reform of the party structure would be necessary to have a clear “rule of law.”
But some retired veterans are not actually interested in the state’s long-term interests but in recovering their half-lost dominance. If Xi doesn’t solve the issue, the many contradictions could make the system stall or even explode in time.
This story first appeared on the Settimana News website and is republished with permission. To see the original, please click here.
13. All calm in Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats
Similar to the South Koreans, they have lived with the threat for a long time.
But they need to remember Sun Tzu: "Never assume your enemy will not attack. Make yourself invincible."
All calm in Taiwan in the face of Chinese threats
Many Taiwanese see China's recent fighter jet incursions as more of a show than preparation for an all-out invasion
China has been flying a record number of military aircraft into Taiwan’s “air defense identification zone” in recent days, heightening regional concerns about the risk of military escalation or even outright war.
Taiwanese people are largely alert, but not alarmed. So, why are the Taiwanese not losing their minds over what seems to be intensifying “drums of war”?
It comes down to familiarity with China’s pattern of military pressure tactics, as well as a general alarm fatigue from decades of exposure.
Why is China flying so many jets near Taiwan?
Many Taiwanese see the Chinese military display as more of a show than a preparation for an all-out invasion. There are several reasons being China’s “show of force” in recent days, pointing to short- and medium-term goals.
Domestically, the military pressure serves Chinese President Xi Jinping’s propaganda and political agenda. Xi’s defining political idea is promoting the “China Dream” to his people, which partly entails becoming “a strong nation with a strong army.”
China had just had its National Day celebration on October 1 and a public show of force is a visual embodiment of that narrative. China’s nationalist Global Times newspaper even went so far as to call the flight incursions a form of a National Day “military parade.”
Patriotism is always running high on National Day in China. Photo: AFP / Hector Retamal
Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party is at a key period in terms of its leadership reshuffle. Next month, it will hold its Sixth Plenum, an important meeting where party heavyweights will discuss and build consensus on forming a de facto shortlist for the next generation of party leadership, to be installed in late 2022.
At this critical juncture, as Xi faces significant internal dissent, a muscular show of force seems to be a natural instrument to generate pro-incumbent, rally-around-the-flag sentiment.
Xi will likely remain supreme leader no matter what. But such a nationalist display increases the chances his preferred proteges will be on the shortlist for other key positions just below him.
The China policy of Taiwan’s opposition
Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), has also just elected a new leader after a party campaign focused primarily on Taiwan’s policy towards China.
The new chairman, Eric Chu, who ran on an American-friendly foreign policy platform, won a humble victory with 45% of the votes in a tight, four-way race. Chu has since promised to be a unifier who will listen to other voices in his party and has pledged to renew stalled talks with China.
As such, Beijing has good reason to impose military pressure at this moment in the hope of nudging the KMT’s new policy in Beijing’s preferred direction.
Notably, while Beijing sent a total of 149 military jets into Taiwan’s vicinity from October 1-4, it reportedly sent only one on October 5 – the day the KMT’s new leader assumed office.
Military threat faces diminishing returns
Another reason why Taiwanese people are not very alarmed by the increasing number of Chinese warplanes is simply the law of diminishing impact over time.
People are used to this type of low-intensity Chinese military provocation. In fact, they have been living in the near-constant presence of Chinese military and diplomatic pressure for more than a quarter of a century.
In the run-up to Taiwan’s first direct presidential election in 1996, China’s People’s Liberation Army conducted massive missile tests in the waters near Taiwan, which strongly hinted at a possible invasion.
Since then, China has frequently staged military exercises around Taiwan, including flying military jets into the island’s vicinity. These are intended to underscore the risks of potential war and caution Taiwan against crossing Beijing’s “red lines.”
Chinese state television, for example, once published a video of the Zhurihe training drills of 2015, which included footage of Chinese soldiers assaulting a building that bore a remarkable resemblance to Taiwan’s presidential office.
Is China in a hurry to invade?
This long-standing Chinese strategy of brinkmanship theatre has been a double-edged sword. It has encouraged pragmatism in Taiwan’s pursuit of a stronger identity on the global stage, but it has also alienated many Taiwanese from Beijing.
For example, polls consistently show less than 10% of Taiwanese favor unification with China, and a negligible 2.7% self-identify as primarily “Chinese” in their national identity.
Then why does Beijing still resort to these alienating tactics, if unification is the ultimate goal?
Demonstrators hold the flags of Tibet and ‘Free Hong Kong – Revolution Now’ during an anti-China rally outside the Parliament in Taipei on October 1, 2021. Photo: AFP / Sam Yeh
One explanation is Beijing places a higher priority on deterring Taiwan’s further movement towards independence than promoting unification, so it is willing to trade the latter for the former. In other words, Beijing may simply not be as zealous about pursuing unification in the near-term.
Instead, keeping an eye on the long game, Beijing is willing to risk short- to medium-term costs in losing hearts and minds in Taiwan.
The hope is, in time, it can eventually regain the initiative. For this reason, being able to deter further movement towards independence may be sufficient to buy China much-needed time.
So what is Beijing’s ultimate plan?
This means waiting until the cross-strait military balance tilts further in China’s favor, using the military option only when it can comprehensively overwhelm Taiwan and disincentivize or even deny American military intervention.
And politically, Beijing aims to use the gravity of its economy to attract Taiwanese youth opinion leaders and slowly build back Taiwanese support for eventual unification. In this approach, economic incentives replace soft power, which Beijing is lacking at the moment.
This is in line with Marxist logic, which is fundamental to Chinese communism. In this line of thinking, connections built on “infrastructure” (material and economic common interests) are longer-lasting than connections based on “superstructure” (ideational or emotional alignment).
The challenge for Taiwan and like-minded societies in the West is both to prove the resiliency of their shared liberal democratic values and build a concerted voice that prevents China from mistaking Taiwan for a soft target.
Only through closer cooperation with other like-minded democracies can Taiwan mitigate the risk of military escalation and ensure China’s development will remain peaceful into the future. This is ultimately in the interest not only of the region, but China itself.
14. New Bond Can’t Take On Beijing’s Supervillains
Does Hollywood have to kowtow to China?
Conclusion:
No Time to Die will open in China later this month. The desire for further Chinese releases in the future means Bond’s geopolitical conundrum remains hard to resolve. Deepening great-power rivalry could eventually create space for more critical portrayals of China. But until then, China remains off limits to Bond and everyone else. On screen, 007 could, of course, win a new Cold War single-handedly. Until then, his inability to grapple with the central geopolitical challenge of our age should leave Western strategists—and anyone who enjoys a good espionage thriller—both shaken and stirred.
New Bond Can’t Take On Beijing’s Supervillains
A whole genre of geopolitical spy thrillers is now off limits.
By James Crabtree, a columnist at Foreign Policy and the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia.
Daniel Craig as James Bond in No Time to Die. MGM
James Bond has returned to the screen as actor Daniel Craig dusts off his tuxedo for his final outing in No Time To Die. Early reviews are glowing, which is odd, given 007’s latest escapade is a messy, overstuffed affair. Rather than taking lessons from Jason Bourne, Craig’s finale seems more inspired by the melodrama and incoherent action of the Fast and Furious series. At a numbing runtime of 2 hours and 43 minutes, Bond is also given—spoiler alert—far too much time to die.
Yet this 25th installment of the spy series highlights a deeper problem, namely a Bond franchise now untethered from geopolitical reality. Craig sank his first vodka martini back in 2006 at the height of the so-called war on terror. Now the world is entering an era of great-power competition with a particular focus on China. This second Cold War should be good for Bond, given most of his finest outings took place against the backdrop of the first. Yet Hollywood’s fear of Beijing means Bond has a China problem—and one that should worry cinema fans and the West alike.
Hollywood’s China troubles are well known. Only a few U.S. movies get released each year in the world’s largest film market. Negative portrayals of China risk bans, not just for individual films but entire studios. Plot lines involving China’s government, let alone Chinese spymasters, are thus off limits. 2001’s Spy Game did feature a rare plot linked to China. But in general, no major Hollywood release has portrayed China’s government in a negative light since 1997’s Seven Years in Tibet, as analyst Matt Schrader has shown.
No surprise, then, that China does not feature in No Time to Die. Its plot, if you can call it that, involves deadly nanotechnology robots released by the villain, played by Rami Malek, whose character is less Ernst Stavro Blofeld and more a creepy reprise of his earlier role as Freddie Mercury. Elsewhere, there are bulletproof Aston Martins, sexy sidekicks, and secret island lairs. Such silliness is, of course, a Bond staple. But as producer Barbara Broccoli ponders how to reboot the franchise with a new leading man, the impossibility of Bond deploying Q branch’s gadgets against Beijing’s Ministry of State Security ought to be a serious cause for concern.
Part of the problem is to remain interesting, Bond must exist within a vaguely plausible social and geopolitical milieu—an area where Craig has actually been a notable reformer. His movies replaced a tired and sexist mid-20th century archetype with something grittier. As far back as 1995’s GoldenEye, Judi Dench’s M decried Bond as “a sexist, misogynist dinosaur. A relic of the Cold War.” Craig’s character is now less suave and sadistic and more bruised and fallible—and much the better for it.
Recent outings have tried to grapple with other problems too, not least Britain’s waning influence. The idea of a world-saving British spy has grown less plausible over time. Indeed, as Dhruva Jaishankar, director of the Observer Research Foundation’s U.S. initiative, noted, Bond’s “enduring appeal is based in part on his inverse relationship with British power.” But this tension has long been true: Bond arrived in the 1960s, when Britain was already a diminished global player. And Craig’s Bond does at least nod to his country’s limitations, most recently in the opening credits of No Time To Die, which feature unsubtle crumbling statues of Britannia, the mythical helmeted warrior often used to represent British power.
Such evidence that Bond can move with the times only makes his China problem more troubling. Meanwhile, the latest film comes after a spell in which Bond’s improbable plots were actually buttressed by shifting geopolitical trends. Both actor Pierce Brosnan and Craig reinvented the role for a post-9/11 era, in which terrorist masterminds in the style of Bond villains were suddenly major global concerns. Put another way, during the 1990s and 2000s, the world caught up with Bond rather than the other way around.
Now, the problem is reversed as geopolitical realities and Bond drift further apart. Alex Younger, the recently retired “M” of the actual British MI6, argued in March “there’s no doubt China represents a generational threat,” summing up a common view in Western intelligence agencies. During the Cold War, tensions with the Soviet Union birthed a slew of brilliant espionage thrillers, from The Spy Who Came in From the Cold to The Third Man. Yet the odds of Bond—or anyone else—now doing the same with China remain close to zero.
China does occasionally appear as a Bond backdrop, as was true in 2012’s Skyfall, when Craig turns up in Shanghai and Macao. Sometimes, 007 even interacts with Chinese spies, as in 1997’s otherwise forgettable Tomorrow Never Dies, when Brosnan teamed up with Wai Lin, a glamorous Ministry of State Security operative. Such visions of unlikely cooperation appear in earlier films too, as when actor Roger Moore romanced a KGB counterpart in The Spy Who Loved Me. Yet Hollywood’s desire to please China means Bond’s owners at MGM would now likely balk at even portraying Bond within the context of a rivalry between Washington and Beijing, let alone battling Chinese foes.
At one level, this is clearly a shame for cinemagoers. A new era of geopolitical realism, in which Bond grapples with shadowy forces from China and Russia, would be one sure route to refresh a franchise whose latest outing looks badly out of ideas. At another, Bond’s cinematic problems form part of a much deeper dilemma for the West as it enters a new moment of global competition with its film industry, supposedly a powerful form of soft power, cowed and intimidated.
The contrast with China is notable. American villains turn up fairly often in Chinese films, not least the former Navy SEAL who featured in 2015’s Wolf Warrior, the jingoistic action spectacular whose name inspired a generation of aggressively nationalist Chinese diplomats. Beijing is now also pushing a variety of measures designed to combat what it views as a socially destructive celebrity fan culture, which includes gradually limiting the reach of Hollywood films. To give just one example, only 13 major U.S. studio titles have been given the green light for release in China so far this year, slightly less than half as many as this time last year.
No Time to Die will open in China later this month. The desire for further Chinese releases in the future means Bond’s geopolitical conundrum remains hard to resolve. Deepening great-power rivalry could eventually create space for more critical portrayals of China. But until then, China remains off limits to Bond and everyone else. On screen, 007 could, of course, win a new Cold War single-handedly. Until then, his inability to grapple with the central geopolitical challenge of our age should leave Western strategists—and anyone who enjoys a good espionage thriller—both shaken and stirred.
James Crabtree is a columnist at Foreign Policy, the executive director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Asia, and the author of The Billionaire Raj. Twitter: @jamescrabtree
15. Taiwan Says U.S. Commitment Is 'Rock Solid' After Biden Remark on China's Xi
Taiwan Says U.S. Commitment Is 'Rock Solid' After Biden Remark on China's Xi
By U.S. News & World Report3 min
FILE PHOTO: Flags of Taiwan and U.S. are placed for a meeting in Taipei, Taiwan March 27, 2018. REUTERS/Tyrone SiuReuters
WASHINGTON/TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan's Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday Washington had reassured them that its approach to the island had not changed, a day after President Joe Biden said that he and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to abide by the "Taiwan agreement."
The Foreign Ministry said it had sought clarification from the United States about Biden's comments and were reassured the commitment to Taiwan was "rock solid" and that Washington will continue to help Taiwan maintain its defenses.
"Facing the Chinese government's military, diplomatic and economic threats, Taiwan and the United States have always maintained close and smooth communication channels," it said.
In his comments on Tuesday evening, Biden appeared to refer to a 90-minute call https://www.reuters.com/world/china/biden-chinas-xi-discuss-managing-competition-avoiding-conflict-call-2021-09-10 he held with Xi on Sept. 9 and the long-standing policy under which Washington officially recognizes Beijing rather than Taipei, as well as Taiwan Relations Act.
"I've spoken with Xi about Taiwan. We agree ... we'll abide by the Taiwan agreement," Biden told reporters. "We made it clear that I don't think he should be doing anything other than abiding by the agreement."
The comments sent Taiwanese officials in search of explanations for what signal Biden was sending at a time of high tensions between Taipei and Beijing. One Taiwanese official messaged a Reuters reporter to ask what Biden meant.
Taiwan's defense minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, was asked by reporters in parliament if he had any further information about the Biden remark and he said he "didn't know" about it.
In Paris, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated on Wednesday that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is rock solid and they are concerned about what they described as China's provocative military activity in the region.
China claims Taiwan as its own territory, which should be taken by force if necessary. Taiwan says it is an independent country and will defend its freedoms and democracy.
Beijing has dramatically ramped up military flights into Taiwan's air defense identification zone over the past year.
Taiwan has reported 148 Chinese air force planes in the southern and southwestern part of its air defense zone over a four-day period beginning on Friday, the same day China marked a key patriotic holiday, National Day.
The Taiwan Relations Act makes clear that the U.S. decision to switch official diplomatic recognition to Beijing from Taiwan in 1979 rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.
While the act binds the United States to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, Washington acknowledges China's stance that the island belongs to it and that there is "one China," and takes no position on Taiwan's sovereignty.
Biden's national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, and China's top diplomat Yang Jiechi began talks in Switzerland on Wednesday, in a bid to improve communication despite a deepening strategic rivalry and tensions over hotspots including Taiwan.
Biden's September call with Xi marked their first talks in seven months.
China has become increasingly nationalistic and assertive under Xi, who is poised to break with precedent and secure a third five-year term next year and is widely seen to be the country's most powerful leader since Mao Zedong.
Beijing has also made territorial claims in the South China Sea and is engaged in a rapid modernization of its military. Its crackdown on Hong Kong, once considered a possible model for a "one country, two systems" arrangement under which Taiwan would peacefully join with China, has made a military resolution appear more likely if Beijing were ever to act on its commitment to reunite Taiwan with the mainland.
Bonnie Glaser, a Taiwan expert at the German Marshall Fund, said the spike in military activity is "destabilizing, but not alarming" and "undoubtedly intended to intimidate Taiwan."
U.S. State Department spokesperson Ned Price on Sunday urged China to stop its military activities near Taiwan.
"The United States is very concerned by the People's Republic of China's provocative military activity near Taiwan, which is destabilizing, risks miscalculations, and undermines regional peace and stability," Price said in a statement.
(Reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei and Jeff Mason in Washington; Writing by Trevor Hunnicutt; Editing by Sonya Hepinstall)
Copyright 2021 Thomson Reuters.
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16. FDD | The news from UNGA
Excerpts:
So, what was achieved at the 76th Session of UNGA? I’d say nothing. To my surprise, two influential political commentators (who moonlight as comedians) appeared to agree. Jimmy Fallon said: “Next, the U.N. is gonna be, like, ‘We believe further conflict with the Taliban will be avoided thanks to our latest pinkie promise.’”
And Trevor Noah noted: “BTS gave a speech and filmed a music video from inside U.N. headquarters. Completely real. Yeah. Old people were probably watching this, like, ‘What the hell is a BTS?’ And young people were watching it, like, ‘What the hell is the U.N.?’”
Full disclosure: I’m one of those old people. But I’ve done my research, so I now know that BTS is a K-Pop sensation. If you don’t know what a “K-Pop sensation” is, you must be really old!
FDD | The news from UNGA
Everything you didn’t want to know
fdd.org · by Clifford D. May Founder & President · October 6, 2021
Over recent days, foreign leaders, rulers, and tyrants flocked to New York City for the 76th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, also known as UNGA (pronounced uhng-guh). Did you listen to their speeches? I thought not. So, it occurred to me that I should provide you with the highlights. Only I couldn’t find any. So, instead, I will treat you to some lowlights – lies, evasions, boilerplate, and insults to your intelligence.
Start with Xi Jinping, president of the People Republic of China, who pledged “to fight COVID-19 in solidarity” and “always put people and their lives first and care about the life value and dignity of every individual.”
Those nodding and/or applauding must know that Mr. Xi has blocked serious investigations into the origin and spread of the virus because such inquiries would build on the abundant evidence that Beijing, through incompetence or worse, let loose the global pandemic that has killed millions of people and devastated economies around the globe.
Mr. Xi’s propagandists have attempted to convince the credulous that the altered virus came from somewhere else – like, hey, maybe America! Or Australia! Nevertheless, Mr. Xi wants you to know he “stands firmly opposed to political maneuvering in whatever form.”
Let’s move on to Sergey Lavrov, foreign minister of Russia which has sliced territory from neighboring Georgia and Ukraine while helping Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad slaughter hundreds of thousands of his subjects. He assured us that “threats and challenges can be countered effectively only through concerted efforts in strict compliance with the universally recognized norms of the international law, first and foremost, the goals and principles of the UN Charter.”
It’s widely believed that the Kremlin has used chemical weapons to eliminate critics. Mr. Lavrov’s solution: “We are awaiting a response to the Russian initiative to elaborate a Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism.”
He’s dismayed, also, that “a number of countries” are attempting to “weaken” what he termed “the UN-centric world order.” America’s “hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan,” he added, should be regarded as “a further demonstration of the rules the West is going to build its world order on.”
Picking up on that theme, the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ebrahim Raisi, whose involvement in the mass execution of dissidents in the 1980s earned him the nickname, “Butcher of Tehran,” gleefully pointed out that “today, the U.S. does not get to exit Iraq and Afghanistan but is expelled.”
He made clear that his regime has as little regard for President Biden as it did for President Trump: “Today, the world doesn’t care about ‘America First’ or ‘America is Back.’”
Ambassador Kim Song, spokesman for the dynastic dictatorship in North Korea, took issue with President Biden’s claim to have terminated America’s longest war. “The reality,” he said, is “that the Korean War has not ended for over 70 years.”
He’s correct. America neither won nor ended that conflict. Instead, in 1953, we settled for a stalemate. Since then, we have maintained a presence in the South – currently about 28,000 troops – tasked with ensuring that the Beijing-allied dictatorship does not overrun the peninsula.
For decades, South Korea suffered from dreadful governance. Over time, however, it became increasingly democratic, free, and prosperous. Afghanistan might have followed a similar path – with the Taliban prevented from re-conquering the country – had American leaders not decided that maintaining a much smaller military presence in that country was an unbearable burden.
Which brings us to President Biden who, in his address to UNGA, insisted that unconditionally surrendering to the terrorist organization that hosted al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, and which remains AQ’s strategic partner, closed “a period of relentless war” – notwithstanding statements to the contrary made under oath to Congress by his top military advisors.
He boasted that he had opened “a new era of relentless diplomacy” – whatever that might mean. He said he has “prioritized rebuilding our alliances,” ignoring the fact that the French government, feeling slighted by him, had just days before withdrawn its ambassador to the U.S. for the first time ever.
He announced his intention to turn “our focus to the priorities and the regions of the world, like the Indo-Pacific.” When he came into office, the U.S. had one significant base in the Indo-Pacific: at Bagram in Afghanistan. He abandoned it.
He patted himself on the back for “re-engaging” with the World Health Organization and the U.N. Human Rights Council. Neither of those dysfunctional organizations have initiated any meaningful reforms.
While giving shoutouts to “proud Moldovans” and “the young people of Zambia,” he said not a word about Hong Kong where longstanding freedoms have been erased by Beijing in violation of its treaty obligations. Nor did he mention Beijing’s escalating threats to the Taiwanese.
So, what was achieved at the 76th Session of UNGA? I’d say nothing. To my surprise, two influential political commentators (who moonlight as comedians) appeared to agree. Jimmy Fallon said: “Next, the U.N. is gonna be, like, ‘We believe further conflict with the Taliban will be avoided thanks to our latest pinkie promise.’”
And Trevor Noah noted: “BTS gave a speech and filmed a music video from inside U.N. headquarters. Completely real. Yeah. Old people were probably watching this, like, ‘What the hell is a BTS?’ And young people were watching it, like, ‘What the hell is the U.N.?’”
Full disclosure: I’m one of those old people. But I’ve done my research, so I now know that BTS is a K-Pop sensation. If you don’t know what a “K-Pop sensation” is, you must be really old!
Clifford D. May is founder and president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and a columnist for the Washington Times. Follow him on Twitter @CliffordDMay. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, non-partisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Clifford D. May Founder & President · October 6, 2021
17. FDD | An Iraqi Perspective on Israel
FDD | An Iraqi Perspective on Israel
fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · October 6, 2021
Growing up in Iraq, my curriculum in Baghdad’s elementary school included a “nationalism class” and required that we read a text by the Governor of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein’s maternal uncle, Khairallah Tulfah. It said that three things should not have been created: “Persians, Jews and flies.”
Most Iraqis are Shiites, who traditionally view Palestine as a Sunni issue. Because of animosity toward the Sunnis, Shiites rarely sympathize with the “Palestinian cause.” In fact, the holiest Islamic spots in Jerusalem, Masgid Omar and the Dome of the Rock, were both constructed by people that Sunnis revere and Shiites hate.
But last month, in the predominantly Kurdish city of Erbil in the north, 312 Iraqis — both Shiite and Sunni — participated in a conference that called for peace with Israel. Some drove to Erbil from the province of Babel, approximately 250 miles to the south.
One of the most prominent voices, Sunni tribal chief Wissam Al-Hardan, wrote that the conference “issued a public demand for Iraq to enter into relations with Israel and its people through Abraham Accords.”
Al-Hardan described participants as “an assembly of Sunnis and Shiites, featuring members of the (Sunni) Sons of Iraq Awakening movement,” in addition to “intellectuals, tribal elders, and youth activists of the 2019-21 protest movement.”
The Head of Research at the Education Ministry, Sahar al-Taii, said “we can live under repression or die with courage,” adding that “we will push for peace with Israel until the leaders act.”
As al-Taii predicted, it did not take long before repression came knocking. Based on bogus charges, a Baghdad court issued arrest warrants for both Hardan and Taii, and added one for a former legislator, Mithal Al-Alusi, who had called for peace with Israel in the past and had even visited the Jewish state. For doing so, Alusi’s two sons were killed by a bomb.
Even though Alusi was in Germany for medical treatment, his name was shoved into the mix, not to truly go after him, but to remind Iraqis of the fate that awaits those who call for normalization with Israel.
Facing government harassment and threats from pro-Iran militias, most participants in the Erbil conference recanted. Al-Hardan was seen in a video claiming that he was duped and did not know what he was doing, even though his speech and op-ed were clear. Under duress, Hardan reversed himself, an act reminiscent of the days when Iraqis used to recant on TV, during the days of Saddam Hussein, and still lost their lives.
In a statement, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi described the “concept of normalization” with Israel as “unconstitutional, illegal and politically unacceptable in the Iraqi state.”
Notwithstanding that the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government exports oil to Israel, Kadhimi’s statement showed how most Iraqis have yet to understand how a modern state works. That a prime minister thinks that any constitution deals with a policy of normalization with Israel, is a problem. It is also a problem that Kadhimi equates politically unacceptable with illegal. Iraqi tyrant Saddam Hussain has long been gone, but tyranny has remained.
Iraqi tyranny is driven by many factors. Like many Arabs, most Iraqis have yet to understand what liberty and freedom mean. That many Arabs, including Iraqis, get offended over cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed, and think that they can censor such works, is proof that these Arabs have a long way to go to fully grasp what freedom of expression means.
Another driver of tyranny in Iraq is the Iranian regime, which sows discord in Iraq, and uses the “Palestine cause” as a battle cry to rally the Muslim world behind it. Iraq, too, is supposed to endorse Iranian slogans, such as “O Jerusalem, we are coming.”
During his campaign, President Joe Biden promised to support and expand the Abraham Accords.
Iraq is a predominantly Arab country, where popular opinion is ripe for peace and normalization with Israel. Non-Arabs, such as most Kurds, who make up one quarter of the population, have been friends with Israel for decades. If given a chance without fear of repression, anti-Iran Shiites and many Sunnis can join the Kurds. The real number of Iraqis who call for peace with Israel will then be significant.
But until Iraqis can enjoy freedom of expression, many of them — even the most liberal — will run for the exits every time the word Israel is mentioned. Iraqis want peace with Israel, but are not willing to sacrifice their lives for it.
President Biden should push for such peace between Iraq and Israel, while keeping in mind that whatever opposition Iraqis might express would be mostly under duress, and often at gunpoint, with Iranian operatives and their Iraqi militias threatening to pull the trigger any minute.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a research fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @hahussain. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Hussain Abdul-Hussain Research Fellow · October 6, 2021
18. What’s At Stake In The Indo-Pacific
Excerpts:
Some academics have made the case for essentially stopping here, building a network of U.S. and allied A2/AD systems that mirrors China’s, albeit on a smaller scale, and adopting a purely “defensive defense” posture.12 Advocates argue that such an approach would be less expensive, less provocative, and less prone to escalation than the alternatives. Although the idea is appealing in many ways, there are reasons to be skeptical that, in itself, a maritime Maginot Line would be sufficient to deter aggression or to bring a war to a successful conclusion. If PLA planners were confident that the United States and its allies would forgo strikes against targets in or close to China, they might believe they could wear down their opponents with repeated attacks, eventually punching holes in any defensive line. To degrade the PLA’s ability to continue to conduct offensive operations, and to impose costs that could compel its leaders to cease hostilities, the United States will likely need to maintain and possibly expand its ability to launch precision conventional attacks on targets inside China.13
If, despite their best efforts, allied forces fail to deny China its initial objectives, political leaders will demand options other than capitulation or catastrophic escalation. Maritime blockade will be high on the list of possibilities. Civilian U.S. analysts differ widely on the feasibility and impact of various types of blockade; military professionals have, for the most part, been notably silent.14
Despite Western ambivalence, Beijing’s investments in alternative transportation routes, commercial shipping capacity, overseas port facilities, and, recently, in a blue-water navy suggest that Chinese planners take the possibility of a blockade very seriously indeed. Building and exercising the kinds of forces that would make this threat even more credible could therefore help to bolster deterrence. It might also have an impact on how the Chinese regime allocates scarce national resources, encouraging it to spend more on uneconomical infrastructure projects and to invest more in domains of military competition (such as undersea warfare and long-range power projection) where it lags behind and the United States and its allies can expect to continue to enjoy a significant advantage. As U.S. naval strategists ponder how best to deter and, if necessary, fight and win a future war in the Indo-Pacific, they also need to think about how their choices may shape what is likely to be a protracted military rivalry with China.
What’s At Stake In The Indo-Pacific
What happens at sea will determine what happens on land across the region.
By Aaron L. Friedberg
October 2021 Proceedings Vol. 147/10/1,424
The Indo-Pacific region is the central front in the new Sino-American cold war. What started 30 years ago as a slowly evolving and comparatively low-key peacetime military competition centered on Taiwan has grown in intensity and scope and is now playing out across the vast arc that extends from the Japanese home islands, down through the narrow straits of Southeast Asia, and then west to the Persian Gulf and the east coast of Africa. If war comes, this is where it is likely to break out and where it will be fought. With land-based forces in supporting roles, the outcome of such a struggle will be determined by what happens on, over, and under the surface of these waters.
Geopolitically, the United States finds itself in the familiar position of trying to rally a coalition of mostly democratic nations along the Eurasian periphery to counterbalance the growing strength of an aggressive, authoritarian, continental power. There are some obvious differences with the past, however. In contrast to the Cold War, most current and likely future U.S. partners in this new rivalry are insulated either by water or by significant terrestrial barriers from the territory of their potential opponent. In the event of war, such circumstances should favor the defense—but they also may complicate efforts to organize and hold together a countervailing coalition that might be able to deter war. When thousands of miles of open ocean separate the potential members of such a grouping, it can be harder to persuade the members to agree in advance that an attack on one should be regarded as an attack on all.
Cold War with Chinese Characteristics
For the Soviet Union, as for Imperial and Nazi Germany, sea power was optional rather than essential. Indeed, the belated pursuit of substantial naval capabilities proved to be, at best, a wasteful diversion and, at worst, an alarming provocation to wary rivals.1 China’s situation is obviously different. Since the start of “reform and opening up” in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the nation’s explosive economic expansion has propelled it into the world in search of technology, capital, markets, and investment opportunities. Trade remains the essential engine of China’s growth, and the vast majority of its trade travels by sea. In short, China today is a great power because it has become a seafaring nation.
Retired Admiral Scott Swift has proposed that China’s investments across the Indo-Pacific are intended to secure the so-called first and second island chains. He also proposed a more extensive definition of those chains (shown), based on review of Chinese publications on the topic, than Western analysts typically suggest. Credit: U.S. Naval Institute / Shutterstock
China’s turn to the outside world and its growing dependence on maritime commerce coincided with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the start of a period in which the United States enjoyed unchallenged command of the seas. The confluence of these developments created a vulnerability of which Chinese naval strategists and political leaders were painfully aware, but
about which—at first—they could do very little. U.S. power, especially naval power, also stood in the way of Beijing achieving its regional goals of absorbing Taiwan and asserting its
maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. Despite these dangers, in keeping with its overall strategy, the Communist Party regime chose, in Deng Xiaoping’s words, to “hide its capabilities and bide its time,” relying on the prospect of mutual economic gain to check the aggressive impulses of the United States and its allies while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the West’s engagement to build up all the elements of its own comprehensive national power.
Since the early 1990s, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planners have sought to develop weapons and operational concepts with which to counter any future U.S. effort to project power into the western Pacific.2 Beijing has put in place an extensive antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) complex: a combination of reconnaissance systems and conventional precision-strike weapons capable of targeting fixed bases and mobile platforms at ever-increasing ranges from China’s coasts. These are backed by, among other things, antisatellite and cyber capabilities designed to disrupt U.S. and allied command and control, an integrated air-defense system to protect the Chinese mainland, and a modernizing, mobile nuclear force meant to deter potential attackers while broadening the array of options available to China’s leaders. Beijing also has used unconventional means creatively, building islands and deploying a sizable seaborne militia to strengthen its position and assert its maritime claims.
All this activity is clearly intended to deter U.S. intervention in a possible future conflict off China’s coasts and to delay and defeat it should deterrence fail. In the long run, Beijing evidently hopes to “win without fighting,” undermining the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, weakening its alliances, and clearing the way for China to resume its rightful place as the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia.
Trade and Risk
Starting around the turn of the century, China’s leaders and military strategists began to look beyond their immediate neighborhood and contemplate the implications of becoming a global power. The nation’s economy grew even faster after its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, driving demand for imports of ever-increasing volumes of oil, minerals, and agricultural products. These cargoes virtually all arrived by ship, many of them traveling from parts of the “global South,” especially Africa and the Persian Gulf. Around this time, China also began to encourage the practice of “going out,” urging Chinese companies to invest a portion of the nation’s fast-accumulating supply of foreign exchange in mines, farms, factories, and other assets in the developed and the developing worlds.
China’s burgeoning involvement in the global economy fueled its growth and put more resources at the disposal of its leaders, but it also heightened feelings of vulnerability. Reflecting these concerns, in 2004 President Hu Jintao charged the PLA with responsibility for fulfilling the “new historic mission” of protecting China’s now far-flung interests.3 More pointedly, Hu also expressed anxiety about the so-called Malacca Dilemma—the fact that a large portion of the nation’s imports, and especially its imports of energy, must pass through narrow straits in Southeast Asia, rendering them susceptible to interdiction by the navies of the United States and its allies.4
Beijing’s response to these dangers has consisted of several interlocking parts. The investments the regime has made over the past two decades in trans-Eurasian pipelines, roads, and railways sometimes appear irrational when assessed in purely economic terms. Under normal peacetime conditions, ships can carry far greater volumes of cargo much more cheaply. In the event of conflict, however, overland links could provide a vital lifeline, potentially enabling the delivery of enough energy and raw materials to keep a wartime economy running.
Similarly, many of the ports and other facilities China has bought or built along the maritime axis of Xi Jinping’s much-touted Belt and Road Initiative appear to be operating at a loss and may never turn a profit.5 Control of these logistical hubs could nevertheless ensure that, in a crisis, China-bound cargo (much of it carried on vessels built, owned, and operated by Chinese state-owned enterprises) would receive top priority. Some of the facilities springing up around the rim of the Indian Ocean also could eventually handle visiting naval vessels and military aircraft.
Finally, in addition to infrastructure, Beijing has begun to invest in the kinds of ships, planes, air-mobile and marine ground force units, logistics, and communication systems it will need to project power thousands of miles from home. With more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines, and underway replenishment vessels planned, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is on its way to becoming a true blue-water navy and could be moving toward building a dedicated Indian Ocean fleet.6
Security Dilemma at Sea
Whereas China’s capabilities in the Pacific are already quite mature and their intended purpose clear, the opposite is true in the Indian Ocean. The PLAN may have the capacity to evacuate civilians and conduct counterpiracy patrols off Africa. But it still is not ready to project significant increments of force ashore to intimidate or support local governments, still less to inflict a decisive defeat on the navy of a peer competitor such as India, to say nothing of going toe-to-toe with the United States. While less capable forces may be useful for a variety of purposes and for less extreme contingencies, unless and until it can acquire such strength, Beijing cannot be confident of its ability to secure its sea lines of communication to South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.
Even if, from Beijing’s perspective, its aims are purely defensive—preventing Taiwan independence, preparing to break a blockade of China’s coast, guarding maritime claims against encroachment by other states, and protecting trade and investments around the Indian Ocean—its actions in pursuit of these ends cannot help but appear deeply threatening to the interests of the United States and its allies. In this sense, at least, the two sides are locked in something resembling a classic security dilemma, in which each side’s efforts to enhance its own security intensifies the other’s feelings of insecurity. Of course, what constitutes a defensive posture is in the eye of the beholder. The United States and its regional partners believe preserving the status quo is essential to their security; China’s leaders are equally convinced the survival of their party and nation depends on its revision.
If the Chinese Communist Party regime can fulfill its long-standing promise to “reunify” Taiwan with the mainland, it will have achieved multiple goals simultaneously: snuffing out a second Asian democracy (after Hong Kong), thereby removing a living refutation of its claim that self-government is not suitable for Chinese people; demonstrating its own iron resolve and irresistible power while calling into question the value of U.S. security commitments; and seizing or destroying industrial and technological assets that would otherwise contribute to the strength of its rivals. Taking control of Taiwan also would help clear a path through the first island chain, making it easier for the PLAN to surge into the western Pacific to engage the fleets of its enemies and threaten the sea lines of communication running north to South Korea and Japan.
If it can enforce its maritime claims against those of its neighbors, Beijing will be able to control use of the natural resources of the East and South China Seas. Having the capacity to regulate traffic through the South China Sea also would enable the regime to apply diplomatic pressure, and perhaps to inflict economic pain, on its Northeast Asian neighbors. At a minimum, it could compel U.S. ships and others to take longer, costlier routes to reach their destinations. Similarly, if China acquires the ability to interdict shipping and dominate choke points at either end of the Indian Ocean, it would be in position not only to threaten India, but also to disrupt commercial flows to and from Western Europe, as well as East Asia and the United States.
Ultimately, if Beijing can undermine U.S. alliances in East Asia, push U.S. forces back to the second island chain, and assert control over the waters of the western Pacific, it will be well-positioned to construct a new Eurasian order. What China’s strategists evidently have in mind is a Sino-centric system in which its continental and maritime neighbors are economically dependent on China and politically subordinate to it, and from which the Unites States is largely excluded.7 Should this come to pass, U.S. access to the world’s most dynamic region would be limited, harming its future growth; its long-standing alliances would likely be dissolved, constraining its ability to project military power; and the prospects for the future spread and perhaps even the survival of liberal democratic values and institutions in Asia would dwindle, damaging their luster and lending credence to Beijing’s claim that its authoritarian system represents the wave of the future. For its part, China would have gained a secure base from which to project power into other parts of the world, perhaps including the Western Hemisphere. It is worth recalling that the United States fought two world wars and waged a 40-year Cold War to ensure no hostile Eurasian power could attain such a position of regional preponderance.
Win with Fighting, if Necessary
China’s leaders obviously would prefer to achieve their objectives in the Indo-Pacific through the incremental accumulation of positional advantages and without the costs and risks of a direct clash of arms. But they also are acquiring the forces and developing the doctrine they believe will give them the best chance of winning, should war become necessary. Unfortunately, Beijing’s preparations are pushing it toward a posture in which the chances of success would depend heavily on preemption.
In the western Pacific, China is building the capabilities necessary to carry out massed conventional precision strikes on the bases, forces, and reconnaissance and communication systems of the United States and its regional allies. The PLA’s theory of victory appears to envision a first strike that would effectively knock the United States out of the theater in the opening stages, accompanied by the seizure of key maritime terrain and establishment of a defensive perimeter along the first island chain, after which Beijing would presumably depend on economic suasion and threats of escalation to bring U.S. allies to terms and to discourage Washington from continuing the war.8
At least for now, China’s Indian Ocean posture will remain quite fragile. Any forces deployed there at the start of a conflict would risk being cut off if the United States and its allies can control the narrow straits around the Indonesian archipelago. Without marked improvements in defensive capabilities, PLAN surface ships would be vulnerable to attack by missiles and torpedoes, while its submarines would be susceptible to being tracked and targeted. Whatever bases or dual-use facilities support China’s presence in peacetime would likely not survive the early stages of a war against a major power.9
The Philippine Navy ship Ramon Alcaraz sails past the fleet replenishment vessel HMAS Sirius during a March exercise. China’s theory of victory appears to envision a first strike that would effectively knock the United States out of the western Pacific, accompanied by the seizure of key maritime terrain. Economic suasion and threats of escalation might then bring U.S. allies to terms and discourage Washington from continuing the war. Credit: Royal Australian Navy
On the other hand, if Chinese forces can get in the first blow, they might be able to do serious damage to the ships and facilities of the United States and its partners, attacking commercial shipping, temporarily closing major choke points such as the Suez Canal, and perhaps compelling the shift of some U.S. forces from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. It stands to reason that PLA planners should prefer, if they are going to lose forces in the secondary theater, to use them first. It follows that, if they are going to initiate hostilities in the Pacific, China’s leaders will have strong incentives to do so simultaneously in the Indian Ocean.
To judge by official statements, it is not yet clear how the United States and its allies and partners propose to deal with these rapidly evolving challenges. While some parts of a possible countervailing strategy have been discussed and seem to have gained widespread acceptance, important questions remain (publicly) unanswered. First, general agreement exists on the importance of trying to achieve deterrence by denial, building forces and command networks that, through some mix of mobility, dispersal, deception, and active and passive defenses, can survive an initial strike, blunt the accompanying offensive, and prevent China from rapidly achieving its initial objectives. Failure could enable Beijing to impose a fait accompli, leaving few good options in response and possibly creating pressure for nuclear escalation.10
Second, rough consensus has emerged regarding the desirability of deploying many long-range antiship and antiaircraft missiles to islands along the first island chain and using these, presumably in combination with submarines and antisubmarine warfare capabilities, to complicate the PLAN’s efforts to move into the open waters of the Pacific. This is an important part of the motivation behind the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, and Japanese defense planners have also embraced the idea.11
Some academics have made the case for essentially stopping here, building a network of U.S. and allied A2/AD systems that mirrors China’s, albeit on a smaller scale, and adopting a purely “defensive defense” posture.12 Advocates argue that such an approach would be less expensive, less provocative, and less prone to escalation than the alternatives. Although the idea is appealing in many ways, there are reasons to be skeptical that, in itself, a maritime Maginot Line would be sufficient to deter aggression or to bring a war to a successful conclusion. If PLA planners were confident that the United States and its allies would forgo strikes against targets in or close to China, they might believe they could wear down their opponents with repeated attacks, eventually punching holes in any defensive line. To degrade the PLA’s ability to continue to conduct offensive operations, and to impose costs that could compel its leaders to cease hostilities, the United States will likely need to maintain and possibly expand its ability to launch precision conventional attacks on targets inside China.13
If, despite their best efforts, allied forces fail to deny China its initial objectives, political leaders will demand options other than capitulation or catastrophic escalation. Maritime blockade will be high on the list of possibilities. Civilian U.S. analysts differ widely on the feasibility and impact of various types of blockade; military professionals have, for the most part, been notably silent.14
Despite Western ambivalence, Beijing’s investments in alternative transportation routes, commercial shipping capacity, overseas port facilities, and, recently, in a blue-water navy suggest that Chinese planners take the possibility of a blockade very seriously indeed. Building and exercising the kinds of forces that would make this threat even more credible could therefore help to bolster deterrence. It might also have an impact on how the Chinese regime allocates scarce national resources, encouraging it to spend more on uneconomical infrastructure projects and to invest more in domains of military competition (such as undersea warfare and long-range power projection) where it lags behind and the United States and its allies can expect to continue to enjoy a significant advantage. As U.S. naval strategists ponder how best to deter and, if necessary, fight and win a future war in the Indo-Pacific, they also need to think about how their choices may shape what is likely to be a protracted military rivalry with China.
19. Why the World Can’t Abandon Taiwan
Conclusion:
But no one believes that Taiwan can repel a Chinese attack by itself. Tsai’s article explains why the U.S. and likeminded countries must join a potential future effort to defend the country, if they are to avert the national-security catastrophe that would result from a dominant Chinese position in the Indo-Pacific.
Why the World Can’t Abandon Taiwan
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen speaks at the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York during a visit to the U.S., in New York City, July 11, 2019. (Jeenah Moon/Reuters)
Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen has written a tour de force essay making the case for why Taiwan’s ability to defend itself from Chinese aggression matters to the world, as Chinese warplanes swarm her country.
“A failure to defend Taiwan would not only be catastrophic for the Taiwanese; it would overturn a security architecture that has allowed for peace and extraordinary economic development in the region for seven decades,” wrote Tsai in a new piece for Foreign Affairs magazine.
She’s clearly right. If Beijing successfully took the island, Chinese forces would cut straight through the first island chain that blocks Beijing from projecting power into the pacific. It would weaken key U.S. allies in the region, potentially forcing them to accept some sort of settlement with China and obliterate U.S. influence over the region.
Perhaps just as important, as Tsai also emphasizes at length in the piece, the party would also kill a thriving modern, democratic society that embodies everything the party strives to delegitimize.
Tsai’s essay seems initially to have been written to align with the Taiwanese government’s annual push to reverse Taiwan’s exclusion from the U.N. Much of the piece deals with how the country has contributed to solving international problems, such as climate change, global public health, and more.
But the article has taken on a slightly different significance in the aftermath of a spike in Chinese military incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone at the start of this month. Fighting pandemics and manufacturing critical technologies are important, and particularly relevant to the question of Taiwan’s U.N. exclusion. What’s more pertinent in light of China’s recently stepped up aggression is what Tsai bills as her country’s role “as a liberal democracy on the frontlines of a new clash of ideologies.”
That ideological dimension has a massive bearing on the strategic element of this conflict. The democratic world, for the most part, is locked into a struggle with Chinese authoritarianism, which sees fit to corrupt and stamp out anything that stands in the way of the party’s ability to perpetuate its rule. Taiwan demonstrates that there can be Chinese democracy, and for this reason, among others, Beijing seeks to conquer its neighbor.
Tsai wrote that her country is making the necessary investments in its security:
In addition to investments in traditional platforms such as combat aircraft, Taiwan has made hefty investments in asymmetric capabilities, including mobile land-based antiship cruise missiles. We will launch the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency in 2022, a military reform intended to ensure that a well-trained and well-equipped military reserve force stands as a more reliable backup for the regular military forces. Such initiatives are meant to maximize Taiwan’s self-reliance and preparedness and to signal that we are willing to bear our share of the burden and don’t take our security partners’ support for granted.
But no one believes that Taiwan can repel a Chinese attack by itself. Tsai’s article explains why the U.S. and likeminded countries must join a potential future effort to defend the country, if they are to avert the national-security catastrophe that would result from a dominant Chinese position in the Indo-Pacific.
20. Japan, a Sleeping Giant of Global Affairs, Is Waking Up
Conclusion:
Beijing’s belligerence is making it more likely that Japan will experience another foreign policy revolution — which would, once again, come at China’s expense.
Japan, a Sleeping Giant of Global Affairs, Is Waking Up
Beijing’s threat and Washington’s ambivalence are pushing Tokyo’s fourth foreign-policy revolution of the modern era.
October 5, 2021, 6:00 PM EDT
Three times in the modern era, Japan has reacted to profound international shifts with a sweeping remake of its foreign policy — in ways that drastically altered global history.
The nation is now undergoing a leadership transition, as the job of prime minister passes from Yoshihide Suga to Fumio Kishida. This may seem like “more of the same,” as both men — like nearly all of Japan’s postwar prime ministers — represent the Liberal Democratic Party. But the bigger story is that Japan is also tentatively approaching a fourth foreign policy revolution, thanks to the combined shock of an aggressive China and an uncertain U.S.
All three of Japan’s prior revolutions followed epic geopolitical disruptions. The first came after the forced opening of the country by the West in the 1850s. The result was the Meiji restoration, the construction of a modern economy and strong military, and the emergence of Japan as a great power that thrashed China and then Russia in major wars.
The second revolution occurred during the 1930s. The collapse of the world economy and rising challenges to Japanese objectives in China led Japan to embrace militarism, violent expansion and the quest for economic autarky in Asia — thereby helping to spark World War II.
The third revolution followed Japan’s crushing defeat and occupation by American forces. Japan’s postwar leaders responded by renouncing an independent foreign policy and outsourcing security to the U.S. That allowed Japan’s reconstruction as an engine of regional prosperity and helped propel East Asia into an era of relative stability and peace.
The era of Japanese quiescence is ending, however, and the primary reason is China’s bellicosity. Beijing is challenging Tokyo’s control of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and it is menacing Taiwan, which shields Japan’s southern flank. China is building naval and air capabilities designed to overawe Tokyo and other U.S. allies; its leadership gives every indication that it would love to teach Japan, which ravaged China during World War II, a painful lesson.
Japanese security is simultaneously being challenged by an unreliable U.S.
President Donald Trump withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade deal intended in large part to keep China from dominating the region economically, and periodically threatened to blow up the bilateral alliance.
President Joe Biden has restored a more normal rhythm in U.S.-Japanese relations, but has not yet brought America into a major Pacific trade deal or found a formula for reversing a deteriorating regional military balance. Also looming is the fear that Biden’s presidency may simply be an interlude between Trump’s abrasive unilateralism and a return to “America First.”
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Japan isn’t sitting by as threats gather. In 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government originated the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Japan was a central player in reviving the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, with Australia, India and the U.S. For years, Tokyo has been slowly unwinding constitutional constraints on its ability to project military power. The U.S.-Japan alliance has taken on an anti-Chinese character, as Japanese air and naval forces help American forces patrol potential maritime flashpoints.
Perhaps most notably, Japanese leaders have begun hinting that Tokyo might assist the U.S. in a regional war to defend Taiwan, or otherwise beat back Chinese aggression. Japan is placing antiship missiles on the Ryukyu Islands, an archipelago running south nearly to Taiwan, and making plans to use its submarines to choke off China’s access to the open Pacific in case of war.
All of this is happening as Tokyo works with Washington to secure supply chains and speed innovation by democratic countries in key technologies such as semiconductors; offer high-quality infrastructure assistance to developing nations, and otherwise contest Chinese influence. In response to China’s rise, Japan has quietly begun its own resurgence as a great power.
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Yet as Japan hopes for U.S. revival, it is also hedging against American retrenchment. Abe’s government held TPP together after the U.S. withdrawal (a scaled-down version, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, was launched in 2018). Kishida now faces the challenge of keeping China out of that pact while perhaps bringing Taiwan in. Tokyo has inked a major trade deal with the European Union and inaugurated a supply chain alliance with Australia and India, to decrease economic reliance on China at a time when U.S. foreign economic policy still looks doubtful.
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So far, the changes are more evolutionary than revolutionary, as the scholar Adam Liff observes. Defense spending is still capped around 1% of gross domestic product. Open talk of developing a nuclear arsenal remains taboo. But the trendline runs, unmistakably, toward a more “normal” Japanese foreign policy — which is to say, toward a larger and less abashed role in the world.
There’s great opportunity here, from America’s perspective. Due to its geographic position, economic and military strength, technological sophistication, and democratic values, Japan could be as important an ally in this century as Britain was in the last.
Yet getting the most out of the alliance will require the U.S. to demonstrate its staying power in the Pacific, whether through creative security arrangements such as the recent Aukus pact with Australia and the U.K., or through economic initiatives, such as a regional digital trade agreement, that can give Washington a central role in the region’s future prosperity.
For the Chinese, by contrast, Japan’s resurgence looks ominous. One hyperbolic Chinese propaganda video promised that Beijing would “continuously” strike the country with nuclear weapons if it joined a war over Taiwan. Chinese officials warn of a newly aggressive, militaristic Japan; the irony is that a democratic Japan is mostly responding defensively to Chinese threats.
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Beijing’s belligerence is making it more likely that Japan will experience another foreign policy revolution — which would, once again, come at China’s expense.
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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21. Debate on ‘no first use’ of nukes mushrooms in Washington
Cute headline.
How would no first use really enhance our security? I concur with the DEPSECDEF and Senator Kin makes some important points. Of course this is all theoretical until.....
Excerpts:
At Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks’ confirmation hearing in February, she reiterated her past position that, “I don’t believe that no-first-use policy is necessarily in the interests of the United States,” but also said, “those will be decisions ultimately made by the president.”
More recently, the Biden administration’s removal of the Pentagon official who had been leading the Nuclear Posture Review has prompted non-proliferation advocates to publicly ask whether the move was aimed at stifling views that challenge the status quo on nuclear arms.
Pentagon officials say it was part of a routine reorganization. “We’re going to continue to consider and include a wide range of viewpoints in the Nuclear Posture Review, including those from administration officials, military leaders, academics and all others,” chief Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby told reporters at the time.
A number of Republicans in Congress, like Risch and Cruz, have pushed back on the idea of adopting a declaratory nuclear weapons policy, but lawmakers to their left are split. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith and Sen. Elizabeth Warren reintroduced a measure to codify “no first use” policy in law, but Sen. Angus King ― a Maine independent who caucuses with Democrats ― has come out publicly against any change to a declaratory policy.
“I don’t support it myself. To me the whole idea of deterrence is to make our adversaries nervous,” King, who chairs the Senate’s strategic forces subcommittee, told Defense News. “I’m also concerned our allies will feel it’s an abdication of the nuclear umbrella [of protection the U.S. provides non-nuclear armed allies], and then they’ll feel they have to develop their own nuclear capacity ― which I feel would be very problematic.”
WASHINGTON ― Five years after President Barack Obama turned back from declaring a “no first use” as U.S. policy for nuclear weapons, opponents say the Biden administration is considering it too, and warn that it risks alienating allies.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s ranking member, Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho, said that he believes America’s allies are “very, very upset” with the idea President Joe Biden might reverse decades of U.S. nuclear policy as part of his administration’s sweeping Nuclear Posture Review, expected in 2022. The U.S. has historically maintained ambiguity about whether it would carry out a first strike with a nuclear weapon, but the policy would expressly rule it out.
“It gives more comfort to the enemy that they can plan an attack and do whatever they want to and not worry about us using a first strike,” Risch said of a “no first use” policy. “Nobody wants to use a first strike, but there are scenarios where you can imagine a first strike, and the best thing you can do is keep [adversaries] off balance.”
Risch said Tuesday that he is opposing confirmation of Biden’s nominee for assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, Mallory Stewart, in connection with the matter. That complicates but doesn’t necessarily sink confirmation for Stewart, who serves as the arms control lead for the National Security Council.
Proponents of “no first use” argue it reduces the chances that China or Russia, mistakenly fearing a U.S. nuclear attack, would launch their own first strike. However, allied leaders in Europe and Asia are likely to see it as an erosion of America’s guarantee to protect them, and it would put the U.S. at odds with the strategic-ambiguity policies of NATO and nuclear-armed U.K. and France.
Some within the administration are said to be arguing the Pentagon-led Nuclear Posture Review should seek foreign input from across the political spectrum because there are diverse views within allied countries when it comes to nuclear weapons policy.
“With the NPR, the question is how broad the representation will be from our allies,” said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear arms control expert and professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. “The conservatives and the Pentagon want to talk to the same small group of people they always talk to, who tell them what they want to hear. And the people in the Biden administration who want to take a fresh look [at nuclear arms policy] want to talk to a broader range.”
NATO allies, along with Japan and South Korea have likely been speaking out against the possibility of a “no first use” policy, either to visiting U.S. lawmakers, or through their embassies in the U.S., said William Alberque, the former director of NATO’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and WMD Non-Proliferation Centre. Were the high-level Nuclear Posture Review to seek out views beyond foreign government leaders, it would invite diplomatic rebukes, he said.
Declaring that nuclear weapons are only to answer nuclear weapons, it would worry Asian allies fearful of China and North Korea and push South Korea toward fielding its own nuclear arms, Alberque said. In Europe, it would signal to Russia that it can invade its neighbors without fear of a nuclear response ― and gain Washington nothing in planned arms control talks with Moscow.
“If the United States comes in and says, ‘If Russia invades NATO, we promise not to use nuclear weapons unless you nuke us,’ I think, after the Russians pull themselves off the floor from laughing hysterically, they’re going to say, ‘Wait, are you serious,’” Alberque said. “What kind of goodwill gesture is that when Russia has short-range nukes all along its border?”
On Tuesday, Risch grilled Mallory at her nomination hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, pressing her to agree with him that allies would strongly object to potential policy change. But Mallory said it would be hard to concede that allies are objecting to the results of the Nuclear Posture Review while it was ongoing ― and that the administration was still engaging with allies to address their concerns.
“I’m not sure if I understand the term ‘strenuous objection.’ I think they’re concerned,” Stewart told Risch, adding: “I don’t even know if it’s an ‘objection.’ The point is perhaps through our engagement, we hope to explain and understand, and really hear from them further.”
Risch was frustrated, saying: “If we on the Republican side of the committee have an understanding that our allies have strong, strong objections to what you’re considering, how is it that you can’t concede that?”
Senate Foreign Relations ranking member Sen. James Risch, R-Idaho, asks questions during a hearing on Sep. 14, 2021 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Jabin Botsford - Pool/Getty Images)
Asked by Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, if she personally believes in a “no first use” policy, Stewart deferred to the ongoing review and said the country has to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in a way that “extended-deterrence commitments to our allies remain strong and credible.”
“It’s important to make sure our allies and parters understand that whatever steps we take, our commitment to their defense is unshakeable,” Stewart said.
After the hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez told reporters that he had not heard any objections like the ones Risch mentioned.
“I have not heard from any ally in any of my engagements, directly with heads of state or foreign ministers, or at a staff level ― I have not heard that,” said Menendez, D-N.J.
Neither was he personally troubled either. “We’re going to be looking at [the administration’s] posture review to see what their ultimate decision is, but I’m not going to prejudge something before they say that this is what they’re going to do,” he said.
Under the Obama administration in 2016, an internal “no first use” proposal died amid opposition from the Cabinet as well as allies in Europe and Asia, the Wall Street Journal reported at the time. Reportedly, Secretary of State John Kerry cited concerns raised by U.S. allies that rely on the American nuclear triad for their security and Defense Secretary Ash Carter said it would risk provoking insecurity about the U.S. deterrent among allies.
While on the campaign trail, Biden expressed a desire to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy, and his website says their “sole purpose” is to deter and, if needed, retaliate against a nuclear attack. However, since Biden took office and in the run up to the Nuclear Posture Review, there have been competing cross-currents both inside the administration and politically.
At Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks’ confirmation hearing in February, she reiterated her past position that, “I don’t believe that no-first-use policy is necessarily in the interests of the United States,” but also said, “those will be decisions ultimately made by the president.”
More recently, the Biden administration’s removal of the Pentagon official who had been leading the Nuclear Posture Review has prompted non-proliferation advocates to publicly ask whether the move was aimed at stifling views that challenge the status quo on nuclear arms.
Pentagon officials say it was part of a routine reorganization. “We’re going to continue to consider and include a wide range of viewpoints in the Nuclear Posture Review, including those from administration officials, military leaders, academics and all others,” chief Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby told reporters at the time.
A number of Republicans in Congress, like Risch and Cruz, have pushed back on the idea of adopting a declaratory nuclear weapons policy, but lawmakers to their left are split. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith and Sen. Elizabeth Warren reintroduced a measure to codify “no first use” policy in law, but Sen. Angus King ― a Maine independent who caucuses with Democrats ― has come out publicly against any change to a declaratory policy.
“I don’t support it myself. To me the whole idea of deterrence is to make our adversaries nervous,” King, who chairs the Senate’s strategic forces subcommittee, told Defense News. “I’m also concerned our allies will feel it’s an abdication of the nuclear umbrella [of protection the U.S. provides non-nuclear armed allies], and then they’ll feel they have to develop their own nuclear capacity ― which I feel would be very problematic.”
Joe Gould is the Congress reporter for Defense News.
22. World War III and IV? Why a U.S.-China War Might Have a Sequel
I am reminded of this quote that is sometimes attributed to Einstein: “I do not know with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”
World War III and IV? Why a U.S.-China War Might Have a Sequel
A war between China and the United States is horrible to contemplate, but we might hope that such a war would bring a degree of closure to US-China competition, and peace to the region. “The object in war is a better state of peace,“ or so said British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart. But what if a better peace does not result?
Competition between the United States and China might look less like a single sharp, decisive conflict between Washington and Beijing, and more like a series of militarized conflicts in a broader context of trade and cooperation. This would represent more of an 18th-century appreciation of international conflict, seeing no wars as particularly decisive in themselves, but rather each as a step to improving a state’s position for the next conflict. As Paul von Hindenburg said of annexing the Baltic States into the German Empire during World War I, “I need them for the manoeuvring of my left wing in the next war.”
The idea that long-term great power competition must end in a single decisive conflict is recent, and wrong. World War I seemed to end decisively in that it eliminated two of the Central Powers, led to regime change in another, and produced a new international settlement, but of course, Germany’s ambitions were not quenched. World War II decisively ended the expansionist aspirations of Germany, Japan, and Italy, replacing the existing authoritarian governments with democratic systems (in Japan, Italy, and ¾ of Germany, at least), and made a replay of the war exceedingly difficult. However, both World War I and World War II were followed by long periods of disorder, civil war, and proxy conflict even after the guns of the primary combatants fell silent.
During the Cold War, not much thought was given to the prospect of multiple, iterated wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, largely because of the belief that nuclear weapons would come into play and possibly destroy both combatants, if not the entire world. At the same time, the sharply clashing ideological nature of the combatants led many to imagine that a US-Soviet fight would be resolved quickly and decisively, with the victorious ideology reigning supreme.
But the situation with China and the United States is different. Although Washington and Beijing have sharp ideological differences, neither puts much weight in the idea that it can topple the other. Each can inflict severe damage on the fielded military forces of the enemy, but is unlikely to cause much destruction to the industrial and economic foundations of the other’s military power. Weapons that a destroyed or expended can be rebuilt, quickly in the case of cruise missiles and slowly in the case of aircraft carriers.
The disputes that might spur conflict have similarly indecisive potential. A US defeat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan obviously won’t settle the question of Taiwan in the Chinese mind, and quite possibly won’t even unsettle the hold of the Chinese Communist Party over mainland China. It is entirely conceivable that the United States and China could fight a short, sharp war over Taiwan, resume relatively normal political and commercial relations, then fight another short, sharp war over Taiwan.
PACIFIC OCEAN (Nov. 10, 2015) – The guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) fires an SM-2 missile during a live-fire exercise. Sailors from the John C. Stennis Strike Group are participating in a sustainment training exercise (SUSTEX) to prepare for future deployments. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jonathan Jiang/Released) 151112-N-DA737-424.
Even if China won such a conflict, the fundamental issues that divide Washington and Beijing would not disappear. While the regional reaction to a successful Chinese conquest of Taiwan context dependent and difficult to predict, countries such as Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea might well try to bind themselves more tightly to the US military, immediately creating the conditions for future conflict.
Any imaginable military conflict in the Western Pacific would be catastrophically destructive, not simply to the theaters of conflict but also to the financial and trade networks that have developed between Asia and North America. But we should take care with the notion that China and the United States will fight just one war. Hopefully, they will fight none. If they fight one, they are likely to fight more.
23. Desperate China backflips on Australia
A reason why China is seeking coal from north Korea as well.
Desperate China backflips on Australia
A bitter trade dispute between China and Australia helped spark a coal shortage — and now Beijing has been forced into a backflip.
China, caught in the grips of a power crunch, has begun unloading Australian coal shipments despite an unofficial import ban.
Extreme weather, a surge in demand and strict orders from Beijing to reduce carbon emissions have sparked an electricity crisis in China.
Aluminium smelters, textiles producers and soybean processing plants were ordered to slow activity or shut altogether last week as soaring demand pushed electricity prices to record highs.
More than a dozen provinces and regions have been forced to impose curbs on energy usage in recent months.
And China’s thermal coal inventory – which is used to generate electricity – is at a record low.
The sun sets behind electricity power pylons in Beijing. Picture: AFP
The crisis has seemingly forced China into a massive backflip.
Nick Ristic, lead dry cargo analyst at Braemar ACM Shipbroking told the Financial Times that a handful of Australian ships waiting outside Chinese ports had headed into berth last month and there were signs that coal had been unloaded.
He said 450,000 tonnes of coal had been discharged. Meanwhile energy research company Kpler reported five vessels discharged 383,000 tonnes of Aussie thermal coal into China last month.
China-Australia trade war
“While China unambiguously needs as much coal as it can get its hands on to avert a slowdown due to the tyranny of rolling power shortages, geopolitical tensions with Australia have waylaid the most convenient source of high-calorific coal from Down Under,” head of economics at Mizuho, Vishnu Varathan, told CNBC.
The increasingly acrimonious trade dispute between the China and Australia has spiralled, with both countries launching actions with the World Trade Organisation.
China was annoyed when Australia imposed anti-dumping duties on Chinese stainless steel sinks. It became incensed when Huawei was barred from Australia’s 5G rollout and Australia called for an independent probe into the origins of Covid-19.
Beijing imposed steep tariffs on Australian barley, wine and other products, heavy restrictions on beef and warned students not to study in Australia. Even Aussie beer has been targeted by China.
An excavator moving coal onto a truck at a port in Yichang, central China's Hubei province. Picture: AFP
It also ordered state-owned energy companies and steel mills to stop importing Aussie coal last year, blowing a huge hole in Australia’s export market. Australian coal exports to China were worth $14 billion in 2019.
Australia’s coal exports to China dropped to “effectively zero”, according to Wood Mackenzie.
And many ships with Australian coal were left stranded outside Chinese ports.
In December last year, an estimated 1600 seafarers aboard 80 ships carrying coal were suffering with “no end in sight”.
But now China has started quietly unloading coal that has been stranded in Chinese terminals for months.
There are also reports that the coal in China is being onsold to India.
High quality Aussie coal is being sold — at a $12-$15 discount — to Indian cement makers and sponge iron plants, mining.com reports.
Indian firms have reportedly bought nearly 2 million tons of Australian thermal coal from Chinese warehouses.
‘Strong signal’ China is concerned
Meanwhile, China’s top state-owned energy companies have been ordered to ensure there are adequate fuel supplies for the approaching winter at all costs.
Bloomberg News, citing people familiar with the matter who did not want to be named, reported that Vice Premier Han Zheng had told energy companies to make sure there is enough fuel to keep the country running and that Beijing would not tolerate blackouts.
Mr Han, who supervises the nation’s energy sector and industrial production, was speaking at an emergency meeting this week with officials from Beijing’s state-owned assets regulator and economic planning agency, the people said.
Smoke billows from a large steel plant in Inner Mongolia, China. Picture: Kevin Frayer/Getty Images
“It is probably a strong signal about how concerned China is regarding keeping industry going, and more importantly, the winter that is just around the corner,” said Jeffrey Halley, senior market analyst at OANDA.
Nearly 60 per cent of the Chinese economy is powered by coal. It’s also the planet’s biggest emitter of carbon dioxide.
The country’s environmental agenda is further adding to the crisis, with pressure to dampen down coal burning and cap the growth of coal mining after President Xi Jinping pledged his country would become carbon neutral by 2060.
Data released on Thursday showed China’s factory activity contracted last month for the first time since February 2020, when the country was essentially closed by lockdowns as authorities battled the first coronavirus outbreak.
24. The 9/11 Commission Said National Security Vacancies Were A Problem. Biden’s Pentagon Is ‘Far Worse’
Excerpts:
It’s also critical to get people into national security roles more quickly to keep the country safe, according to the 9/11 Commission report, which found that a shortened presidential transition in 2000 “hampered the new administration in identifying, recruiting, clearing, and obtaining Senate confirmation of key appointees.” It recommended that Congress speed up the process of national security confirmations, but data shows that timelines are only growing.
One idea for how to get national security officials on the job faster is to decrease the number of Senate-confirmed positions, which is now at about 1,200 roles, Schulman said. Jobs that currently require action from the Senate could either become roles for career civilians or remain political appointments that the president could make unilaterally.
Another idea is to limit Congressional recesses until they have gotten through a certain number of confirmations, Tenpas said. During the first 300 days of the Biden administration, Congress will spend about 90 days in their home districts, Tenpas said. However, establishing some threshold of confirmations that Congress must consider before they get a break would establish an incentive to move faster, she suggested.
The 9/11 Commission Said National Security Vacancies Were A Problem. Biden’s Pentagon Is ‘Far Worse’
The Senate is “falling far behind” as Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees consider 14 nominees this week.
Senate committees this week are considering more than a dozen national security and foreign policy officials in what experts hope is an effort to pick up the pace on a sluggish confirmation process that is dangerous for the country.
Many national-security positions remain vacant nearly nine months into the Biden administration due to a historically slow-moving confirmation process. But quickly getting people on the job after a presidential transition is critical to the country’s safety. The 9/11 Commission Report found that the lack of confirmed national security appointees on Sept. 11, 2001, hurt the nation’s ability to respond to the terrorist attacks.
By Oct. 5, 2001, the Bush administration had 34 Pentagon officials confirmed, according to data provided by Loren DeJonge Schulman, who leads the research, analysis and evaluation team at the Partnership for Public Service. Today, at the same point in his presidency, Biden has just 21.
“We are far worse off compared to the Bush administration,” Schulman said. “If the Senate considers part of its role to be national-security responsibilities, they are falling far behind.”
The Senate Armed Services Committee is considering seven nominees at two confirmation hearings on Tuesday and Thursday. Those hearings will be the first for Defense Department political appointees since July, though the committee has considered two military officers to lead combatant commands since then. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also met twice on Tuesday to consider seven nominees, including ambassadors to Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Andorra, Austria, and Bahrain.
“It is critical for our national security and foreign policy that the Senate move forward with these qualified, experienced nominees as quickly as possible,” White House spokesperson Chris Meagher said. “While hearings are a step forward, these nominees cannot get to work until confirmed on the Senate floor. We hope the Senate Republicans who are using delay tactics – even for nominees with strong bipartisan support – to slow the confirmation process will stop their obstruction and let these public servants help support our armed forces and advocate for American interests abroad.”
Confirmation hearings in the Senate Armed Services Committee were stalled in part because lawmakers decided to hold hearings about Afghanistan withdrawal when they returned to Washington after a month-long August break, a Republican aide told Defense One.
“Afghanistan is a huge reason there hasn’t been anything,” the aide said.
The Senate Armed Services Committee held two open hearings on Afghanistan last month, but Ranking Member Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., has called for additional oversight hearings with Gen. Scott Miller, the last commander of the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, and Colin Kahl, the defense undersecretary for policy.
A Senate Armed Services Committee aide agreed that Afghanistan oversight took precedence over nominations, but that it did not cause a “significant setback.” The committee is now on track and working through nominations at its normal pace, the aide said.
“Neither SASC nor DOD has a logjam with its nominees,” the aide said. “The committee is working at an expected pace. We’re on schedule.”
But experts outside of government denied that this is a normal pace. The Senate has confirmed just 21 officials that Biden nominated to serve at the Defense Department, lagging behind the past three administrations, according to data from the Brookings Institution. Biden will hit 300 days in office on Nov. 16. In each of their first 300 days, the George W. Bush Administration had 41 confirmed officials at the department, the Obama administration had 29 and the Trump administration had 26.
The problem is the Senate, not the White House, Schulman said. At this point in their presidencies, Bush, Obama and Biden had nominated 39, 31, and 39 people respectively. But Bush and Obama had 34 and 26 people confirmed, compared to just 21 under the Biden administration. Biden, however, is ahead of this point in Trump’s presidency, where he had nominated 39 people, but only had 15 confirmed.
It’s not clear whether these hearings will accelerate the confirmation process on Capitol Hill. Presidents historically see the highest number of confirmations between their 200th and 300th day in office, according to Kathryn Dunn Tenpas, a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Even though Biden is in a period where past presidents have not had much luck pushing their team through Congress, Tenpas speculated that the current administration might not fit these historical trends since it has been behind overall.
“The optimistic part of me thinks there will be a regression to the mean and a surge to the 200-to-300-day point,” she said. “Maybe they’re just getting more pressure from people at the Defense Department and stakeholders of the Defense Department” that “you have to start confirming these people.”
The pace of confirmation is even worse at the State Department, where Biden has submitted 99 nominations and has just 20 confirmed officials, according to the data from Schulman. For comparison, Bush had 101 confirmed officials at State, Obama had 90 and Trump had 30. In August, Ken Salazar became the first confirmed ambassador in the Biden administration.
The very slow rate at the State Department is due, at least in part, to Sen. Ted Cruz, R-Texas, who blocked every State Department nominee over concerns about the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline built by Russia and the lack of sanctions imposed on Moscow by the Biden administration.
Sen. Josh Hawley, R-Mo., has also said he’ll hold up “every single civilian nominee” at the State and Defense Departments until Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken resign over the Afghanistan withdrawal.
It’s not just Republicans. Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass., previously blocked two Defense Department nominees over their ties to industry, but lifted the holds in July when they agreed to not return to industry for at least four years after leaving for the Pentagon.
Acting officials can be extremely qualified and competent, but they don’t command the same authority as someone selected by the president, said Schulman, who likened it to having a substitute teacher. Those in an acting capacity are not well positioned to launch new priorities or sign off on major policy changes.
“No matter how great these folks are, things are going to be slowed down because we have acting officials,” she said.
There’s also a legal reason to get people permanently in their seats. Under the Vacancies Reform Act, someone may only serve in an acting capacity for 300 days after a presidential transition, a deadline that Biden will face next month. The time limit is paused while the Senate considers the appointee if a nomination is made.
It’s also critical to get people into national security roles more quickly to keep the country safe, according to the 9/11 Commission report, which found that a shortened presidential transition in 2000 “hampered the new administration in identifying, recruiting, clearing, and obtaining Senate confirmation of key appointees.” It recommended that Congress speed up the process of national security confirmations, but data shows that timelines are only growing.
One idea for how to get national security officials on the job faster is to decrease the number of Senate-confirmed positions, which is now at about 1,200 roles, Schulman said. Jobs that currently require action from the Senate could either become roles for career civilians or remain political appointments that the president could make unilaterally.
Another idea is to limit Congressional recesses until they have gotten through a certain number of confirmations, Tenpas said. During the first 300 days of the Biden administration, Congress will spend about 90 days in their home districts, Tenpas said. However, establishing some threshold of confirmations that Congress must consider before they get a break would establish an incentive to move faster, she suggested.
“It’s a completely pie-in-the-sky idea…[but] there’s just a lot on their plate,” she said.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
