Quotes of the Day:

“It was miraculous. It was almost no trick at all, he saw, to turn vice into virtue and slander into truth, impotence into abstinence, arrogance into humility, plunder into philanthropy, thievery into honor, blasphemy into wisdom, brutality into patriotism, and sadism into justice. Anybody could do it; it required no brains at all. It merely required no character.”

- Joseph Heller, Catch-22

"The only thing that makes like possible is permanent, intolerable uncertainty; not knowing what comes next."

- Ursula Le Guin

"Liberty is the prevention of control by others. This requires self-control and, therefore, religious and spiritual influences; education, knowledge, well-being." 

- Lord Acton

1. [Voice of America – Washington Talk] “Korea takes the ‘right approach’ to China... “North Korea’s collapse is inevitable.”

2.  New defense chief calls for firm readiness posture against N. Korea

3. Former S. Korean POW who escaped from N. Korea dies at 92

4. U.S. eases export controls on chip equipment for Samsung, SK factories in China

5. NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’

6. Seoul's nuclear envoy meets with Sweden's special envoy for Korean Peninsula

7.  Seoul sees no major disruptions in oil, gas imports amid Israel-Palestine conflict

8. Dark clouds of war casting over Israel give a lesson to South Korea

9. Three Pyongyang-based trade officials executed for corruption last month

10. US expert redoubles calls for sturdier deterrence against NK ICBM threats

11. Then and Now: A Naval Officer's Camera Captured Seoul During the Korean War

12. [World and Us] North Korea-China-Russia military cooperation and the role of the UNC

13. The life and death of Confucianism in Korea

14. Korean 'jeong' keeps people together through thick and thin

15. How the Travis King Saga Relates to the North Korea-Russia Summit

16. She squared off against a North Korean assassin – and lived to tell the tale

17. Peace Group's Application For Booth Rejected By NoVA Korea Festival

18. Inside North Korea’s plot to assassinate South Korean leader with explosives

1. [Voice of America – Washington Talk] “Korea takes the ‘right approach’ to China... “North Korea’s collapse is inevitable.”

A fascinating interview with a lot of key points. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oseWKgT-zY

But at about 9 minutes Dr. Cha says this:

“North Korea Collapse and Unification are inevitable.”

Perhaps now that Dr. Cha has said this, people will start taking this seriously. He is really sending the alarm about possible collapse.

But he went on to say that the only hypothetical that militaries plan for is war. I guess he never heard of CONPLAN 5029.

I wrote this in 1996: CATASTROPHIC COLLAPSE OF NORTH KOREA IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES MILITARY https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/ADA314274

Four possible scenarios for collapse are advanced; two “soft landing” and two

“hard landing.” The “soft landing” scenarios result in gradual reunification in accordance

with the Republic of Korea’s three phase reunification plan. The “hard landing”

scenarios cause tremendous suffering, increased instability, and require intervention in

order to stabilize the peninsula and prevent spillover both to the north and south as well

as massive migration of the north’s population.

​...

It is possible that North Korea is near collapse. Recent statements by key officials

show that US and ROK national leadership are becoming increasingly concerned with

this possibility, although the focus remains on the possibility that such disintegration may

lead to a desperation attack. In a recent article in Jane's Defence Weekly, the Director of

the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Kenneth Minihan said, "North

Korea is collapsing economically. North Korea is implosion and explosion going on at

the same time."5 His premise is that the situation is so complex that a new analytical

process is required to determine when the North will attack. However, this condition of

simultaneous implosion and explosion may also lead to the catastrophic collapse of North

Korea resulting not in conventional or nuclear attack but in a non-conventional conflict.6

Additionally, the current Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (CINCUNC)

General Gary E. Luck believes that the question is not if North Korea disintegrates but

when it disintegrates will it be by implosion leading to catastrophic collapse or explosion

leading to a desperation attack?7 Furthermore, a recent report from the Korean Advisory

Council on Democratic and Peaceful Reunification (ADCDP) states that North Korea is

facing greater internal instability than ever and that its imminent collapse may not result

in an attack of the ROK because the regime is unlikely to receive the military and

economic aid necessary from Russia or China.8 If such a collapse occurs, the question to

be answered is: What action should the US military take and what action can it take

given the political and military realities of the region? This, then, is the fundamental 

purpose of this monograph: to examine a potential scenario that does not appear to be

often discussed in either the media or academic writing (at least until very recently),

attempt to determine possible issues resulting from such a scenario, and recommend a

possible response for the US and ROK military forces and the UNC as well.

Here is a 2013 article from Dr. Peter Hayes at the Nautilus Institute that provides a useful overview of the "collapsists" and early collapse planning. (Foster-Carter,Bennett, Collins, Maxwell, and Robert Kaplan. "Thinking About The Thinkable: DPRK Collapse Scenarios Redux" https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/thinking-about-the-thinkable-dprk-collapse-scenarios-redux/ 

COLLAPSIST ANTECEDENTS

Bennett’s report is the latest, perhaps best, in a long lineage of collapsists. I first came across the collapsist thesis in 1991 when Aidan Foster-Carter argued that North Korea-as-we-know-it would cease to exist within five years. [9]  One of the more nuanced collapsist analyses was developed at US Forces Korea in 1995 by Robert Collins, at the time that famine overwhelmed the DPRK. It presented 7 phases of collapse (see Table 1). [10]

 Table 1: Seven Phases of DPRK Collapse

Phase One: resource depletion

Phase Two: the failure to maintain infrastructure around the country because of resource depletion

Phase Three: the rise of independent fiefs informally controlled by local party apparatchiks or warlords, along with widespread corruption to circumvent a failing central government

Phase Four: the attempted suppression of these fiefs by the KFR once it feels that they have become powerful enough

Phase Five: active resistance against the central government

Phase Six: the fracture of the regime

Phase Seven: the formation of new national leadership.

David Maxwell, formerly on the Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea CJ3 staff and later Director of Plans, Policy, and Strategy (J5) for Special Operations Command Korea, followed in 1996 with his “Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military. [11] He foresaw four collapse scenarios, two soft and two hard, but no scenario in which the DPRK regime would continue (see Table 2).

Table 2: Maxwell’s Four Collapse Scenarios

In 1996 the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) appears to be on the verge of disintegration due in large part to Kim Il Sung’s philosophy of juche or self-reliance (which is nothing more than the political, economic, and social isolation of North Korea), the disastrous flooding of 1995 resulting in widespread famine, and disproportionate military spending at the expense of economic development and social welfare.

4 possible scenarios for collapse were advanced; two soft landing and two hard landing.

The two soft landing scenarios result from either KJI’s capitulation; or KJI-removal by coup, leading to gradual reunification in accordance with the Republic of Korea’s three phase reunification plan. 

The “hard landing” scenarios (complete collapse and disintegration of the national government; multiple factions, attempted coup, civil war, cause tremendous suffering, increased instability, and require intervention in order to stabilize the peninsula and prevent spill-over both to the north and south as well as massive migration of the north’s population. 

Twelve years later, Maxwell asked himself: “Why the North Korean People Don’t Rebel?” [12] The answer, he concluded, is: “regime collapse will only occur when it loses its central governing effectiveness and the coherency of its military and security forces. As long as those two conditions exist the regime will remain in power with the people sufficiently oppressed (and their horrendous suffering continuing).”

The DPRK did not collapse at this time of extraordinary stress, but collapsists lived on. In 1997, a CIA expert panel averred (in a then-classified report) that the DPRK “Endgame” was nigh. The CIA panel warned that the North Korean regime could not remain “viable for the long term,” with the majority doubting the “current, deteriorating status could persist beyond five years.” Citing the “steady, seemingly irreversible economic degradation in the North,” the panel concluded that “the current situation in North Korea appears beyond corrective actions that do not fundamentally threaten the regime’s viability.” [13]

Collin’s 1995 scenarios—which he characterized to me as “an article, not a manuscript. It is not worth your time. Please ignore it” [14]—resurfaced as the core argument of Robert Kaplan’s widely read October 2006 “When North Korea Falls,” in The Atlantic. [15]

With collapsists updating their prediction roughly every 5-7 years (for example, in 2009, Foster Carter stated that “I don’t see the change necessary in North Korea, so I still feel it will fall at any moment…I have been saying this for a long time“ [16]), his recantation in 2011 is worth recalling.  “I’m not a collapsist any more,” he states, [17] calling himself “A Former Collapser.” Noting that he has been characterized as a a long-running collapsist, he states:

Guilty as charged, your honour. (Pauses to wipe egg from face.)

In perhaps slight mitigation, I would plead as follows:

1. My main point was always the converse: that hopes of a peaceful evolution are, unfortunately, improbable.

I nonetheless still believe that we must try to achieve this.

2. The German precedent warns us to expect the unexpected.

3. Not before time, I have recently rethought the matter. I now expect that China will step in to prevent any risk of collapse. [18]

In recent years, many reports—too many to list here–from academia and governments funded by philanthropy and states, have beaten the collapse drum, especially when Kim Jong Il died and his young son Kim Jong Un was installed as DPRK leader.

[Washington Talk] “Korea takes the ‘right approach’ to China... “North Korea’s collapse is inevitable.”

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9oseWKgT-zY

13,298 views Premiered Oct 7, 2023 #WashingtonTalk #VOA​ #70th Anniversary of the US-ROK Alliance

Former senior U.S. officials assessed that the Korean government is moving on the right track in its relations with China. The suggestion is that China should never be dealt with alone and should be approached based on the strong US-Korea-Japan relationship. Former officials also said that despite North Korea's remarkable survivability, regime collapse and unification were inevitable, but expressed concern that neither the United States nor South Korea were prepared for any other stabilization measures beyond military planning. Host: Eunjung Cho / Interview: Victor Cha (CSIS Korea Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies), Sydney Seiler (former National Intelligence Analyst for North Korea) #Washington Talk #VOA​ #70th Anniversary of the US-ROK Alliance #North

Korea and Russia #ICBM # US-Korea -Japan #Korea-China -Japan #Nuclear Force Policy #Nuclear Armament #Extended Deterrence #Tactical Nuclear #Biden #Seok -yeol Yoon #Kishida #Kim Jong - un #Putin #Xi Jinping #Denuclearization #North Korea #South Korea #United States #Japan #China #Russia #VictorCha #SydneySeiler #WashingtonTalk #VoiceofAmerica » More VOA Korean YouTube videos:   / Korean  

VOA is America's largest international broadcaster, providing radio, TV, web and mobile content in 47 languages ​​to 278 million viewers each week, including in areas where free speech is limited or limited. VOA Korean broadcasting provides news from around the world, news from the Korean Peninsula, and various special programs targeting Koreans in North and South Korea as well as various regions of the world. » VOA Korean website: https://www.voakorea.com/

» VOA Korean Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/voakorea

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2.  New defense chief calls for firm readiness posture against N. Korea

Readiness, deterrence, and defense are the foundation for all policies and strategies for dealing with north Korea while the Kim family regime is in power. Whether you seek engagement, concessions, negotiation, a human rights upfront approach, an information campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea, the foundation of readiness, deterrence, and defense is absolute. To argue otherwise is to argue to put the ROK, the region, and the US at an unacceptable risk.

(LEAD) New defense chief calls for firm readiness posture against N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 9, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with comment in para 3)

SEOUL, Oct. 9 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Shin Won-sik called Monday for a strong readiness posture against North Korea as he made his first visit to a front-line military unit in his new role.

Shin, who took office Saturday, was briefed on border operations at the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Paju, just south of the Demilitarized Zone, and ordered a firm military readiness posture.

"We should make North Korea feel that they stand to lose more than they gain in order to deter provocations," Shin said.

If North Korea provokes, Shin said, "First, retaliate immediately. Second, retaliate strongly. Third, retaliate until the end."

Last week, President Yoon Suk Yeol vowed to defend the nation from North Korea's provocations by strengthening its ability to respond "immediately and overwhelmingly."

Tensions linger on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea's evolving nuclear and missile threats.

In the past, North Korea has conducted large-scale provocations two or three years after a new South Korean government takes office, Shin said.

In 2010, two years after President Lee Myung-bak took office, North Korea torpedoed a South Korean warship and shelled a South Korean border island, killing 50 people, mostly soldiers.

Defense Minister Shin Won-shik is briefed on the security posture at the Army's 1st Infantry Division in Paju, just south of the Demilitarized Zone, on Oct. 9, 2023, in this photo provided by his ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Shin, a ruling People Power Party lawmaker who retired as a three-star Army general, is known for his expertise in defense policy and military operations.

He served as the head of the defense ministry's Policy Planning Bureau in 2011 and 2012 before leading the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Chief Directorate of Operations from October 2013 to April 2015.

Shin capped off his military career as the JCS vice chairman before his discharge in January 2016.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 9, 2023

3. Former S. Korean POW who escaped from N. Korea dies at 92

The suffering of these ROK POWs who were never returned is just unimaginable. And the suffering continues with their descendants in north Korea. I wrote about them last year here: "The Forgotten South Korean Prisoners Of War Who Sacrificed And Suffered For Seven Decades For Korean Freedom,"  https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-forgotten-south-korean-prisoners-of-war-who-sacrificed-and-suffered-for-seven-decades-for-korean-freedom/

I am glad to see the photo of the Vice Minister of Defense paying respects.

Let me reprise what I wrote yesterday here:

In addition to all the internal human rights issues in north Korea from the gulags, to the rule of three, to Songbun, to forced isolation from information there are some external human rights issues that the human rights community should focus on holistically.

These influence the illegally detained, the abductees (not only those from Japan but from South Korea as well, the forced repatriation of refugees in China, the 93,000 Japanese Korean "returnees" who were duped into returning by the Kim family regime, and the 78,000 ROK soldiers who were POWs and not returned. And for both the 93,000 and 78,000 we have to consider their decenedents because due to their low Songbun descendents are living the lives of slaves. The international community must address all these issues collectively and holistically.

Former S. Korean POW who escaped from N. Korea dies at 92 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 9, 2023

SEOUL, Oct. 9 (Yonhap) -- Han Byung-soo, a former South Korean prisoner of war who was held in North Korea for five decades before escaping to his home country, has died at the age of 92, the defense ministry said Monday.

Han enlisted in the South Korean Army in 1951, when he was 20, and became a prisoner of war in June 1953, a month before the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a cease-fire, not a peace treaty.

In North Korea, he was forced into hard labor in Tanchon, South Hamgyong Province, and escaped to South Korea via China in 2002, according to the ministry.

Tanchon is identified as the site of the Kumdok Laborers' District and is home to the Kumdok Mine.

South Korean POWs were in many cases forced to work as diggers or coal miners, according to South Korea's Ministry of Unification, which handles inter-Korean affairs.

Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul burns incense at the memorial altar for Han Byung-soo, a former prisoner of the Korean War, at a hospital in Ansan, south of Seoul, on Oct. 9, 2023, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

Vice Defense Minister Shin Beom-chul paid his respects at the memorial altar for Han at a hospital in Ansan, 29 kilometers south of Seoul.

Han will be buried in Seoul National Cemetery in central Seoul on Tuesday.

Since the Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, 80 South Korean POWs in North Korea have fled to their home country. With Han's death, the number of former POWs in South Korea fell to 11.

South Korea estimates that more than 500 POWs are still alive in the North as of late 2016. Still, North Korea denies holding any POWs.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 9, 2023

4. U.S. eases export controls on chip equipment for Samsung, SK factories in China

(LEAD) U.S. eases export controls on chip equipment for Samsung, SK factories in China | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 9, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS background in last 2 paras, photo)

SEOUL, Oct. 9 (Yonhap) -- The United States has decided to allow exports of its semiconductor manufacturing equipment to Samsung Electronics and SK hynix factories in China without a separate approval process, the presidential office said Monday, a much-needed relief to the Korean chipmakers.

The U.S. government has designated Samsung Electronics and SK hynix's chip factories in China as "verified end users (VEU)," which would reduce the licensing burden on them by allowing U.S. exporters to ship designated items to preapproved entities.

"The U.S. government's decision means that the most significant trade issue of our semiconductor companies has been resolved," Choi Sang-mok, senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, said during a briefing.

Choi Sang-mok, senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, speaks during a briefing at the presidential office in Seoul on Oct. 9, 2023. (Yonhap)

The U.S. government has already notified its decision to the two South Korean companies, and it takes effect immediately, according to Choi.

In October last year, the U.S. announced a set of rules that restrict exports of certain advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and items to companies in China in an apparent bid to slow Beijing's technological advances in the key sector.

Samsung Electronics and SK hynix received a one-year waiver amid concerns that the move would disrupt their businesses in China, but the latest decision clears uncertainties over their chip production in China, which partly relies on U.S. equipment.

Samsung, the world's largest memory chip maker, runs a chip manufacturing plant in the Chinese city of Xian, which accounts for some 40 percent of its global NAND flash production. In Suzhou, the chipmaker runs a semiconductor packaging factory.

Its smaller rival SK hynix currently operates multiple plants in China, including one in the eastern city of Wuxi, where it manufactures about half of its global DRAM chips.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · October 9, 2023

5. NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’

​From one of our nation's experts on north Korean human rights. When Greg speaks we all should listen.

Conclusion:

What further international support do diaspora activists need?

North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.

NORTH KOREA: ‘It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach’

civicus.org · by Kgalalelo Gaebee

CIVICUS speaks about the activism of North Korean escapees with Greg Scarlatoiu, Executive Director of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Founded in 2001 and based in the USA, HRNK is a human rights organisation with the principal objective of raising international awareness of North Korea's human rights situation.

Is it possible to carry out any form of activism in North Korea?

No form of activism is possible in North Korea. There is no civil society due to an overwhelming and unprecedented level of coercion, control, surveillance and punishment. The markets that emerged following the famine of the 1990s and the newly created domestic mobile phone network allow North Koreans to engage in limited forms of market activity, but even this is subject to state surveillance and control. Every North Korean, regardless of whether they are a member of the ruling party or a government official, belongs to a party-controlled organisation, such as the Youth League or the Women’s Union. Anecdotal information from sources inside the country suggests that there is sporadic opposition and resistance to state agents at the local level, but the regime has gone to extreme lengths to prevent the emergence of any organised opposition.

Have there been any recent changes in how the North Korean regime responds to dissent?

Under the pretext of COVID-19 prevention, the North Korean regime has intensified its crackdown on those attempting to smuggle in information from the outside world or attempting to access such information. In December 2020 the Supreme People’s Assembly, North Korea’s highest legislative body, passed the ‘Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law’. This law imposes severe criminal penalties on those who access or disseminate foreign content, including movies, dramas, music and books. The penalties are especially severe, up to a life sentence of hard labour, for those who smuggle in or disseminate South Korean media.

How do people manage to escape North Korea?

Leaving the country without official authorisation is regarded as treason in North Korea. To escape, North Koreans need the assistance of religious networks, international civil society organisations (CSOs) and brokers who operate in the China-North Korea border region. The author and journalist Melanie Kirkpatrick has called this escape route ‘Asia’s underground railroad’. In some cases, family members or relatives who have already escaped pay brokers to arrange the escape. The most common route is through China and Southeast Asia. Upon arrival in Thailand, the escapees either choose to go to South Korea or apply for asylum in other countries.

However, since Kim Jong-un came to power in late 2011, the North Korean regime has intensified border security. The Chinese government has also taken steps that make it more difficult for the escapees to move inside China. In addition, the Chinese government has a longstanding policy of forced returns, whereby it repatriates any North Korean refugees arrested in its territory. This violates China’s obligations as a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, since North Korean refugees face a credible fear of persecution upon return.

This, combined with the COVID-19 border lockdown, means the number of escapees reaching South Korea has plummeted. The highest annual recorded number of arrivals to South Korea was 2,914 in 2009, but this fell to only 67 in 2022. The easing of COVID-related measures is likely to result in a greater number of attempts to flee.

What kind of help do escapees receive?

Most escapees choose to go to South Korea, as they are granted citizenship upon arrival under South Korea’s constitution. The South Korean government provides various forms of economic, educational and job training assistance to North Korean refugees. International and local CSOs also help them adjust to life in South Korea.

The situation is still difficult for many escapees, given how different the two societies have become in over seven decades of division. According to the latest available data from South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, a total of 34,000 escapees have resettled in South Korea to date. Refugees who choose to go to other countries, including the UK and the USA, primarily receive help from CSOs and other escapees who have already relocated there.

How do escapees work to document and denounce human rights violations in North Korea?

North Korean escapees play a critical role, given their first-hand experience of life under the regime. Many refugees, including those who are survivors of North Korea’s detention facilities, provide vital testimony to CSOs that seek to document and raise awareness of human rights violations in North Korea. Escapee testimony has also played a critical role in the work of the United Nations (UN) Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, whose 2014 report concluded that the North Korean regime has committed crimes against humanity pursuant to policies determined at the highest levels of the state. Both the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea and the Seoul office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights continue to work closely with North Korean escapees.

Some refugees operate their own organisations. In addition to documenting and raising global awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea, they are often involved in sending outside information to North Korean people. Methods they use include radio broadcasts, leaflet balloons flown across the Korean demilitarised zone and rice and micro-SD cards in plastic bottles that are floated across the maritime border between the two Koreas. It is also common for individual escapees to send money to family members in North Korea with the help of brokers.

How does HRNK support escapees?

HRNK works closely with North Korean escapees to document and raise awareness of the human rights situation in North Korea. Given the lack of on-the-ground access inside North Korea, we employ a methodology that combines satellite imagery analysis, witness testimony and open-source investigation.

Testimonies are often given by escapees who have already resettled in South Korea, although HRNK has sometimes obtained information through refugees with contacts inside North Korea. HRNK has held consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council since April 2018 and reports to various UN bodies and hosts side events in Geneva and New York. We have facilitated the participation of North Korean escapees at these events to amplify their voices on the international stage.

What further international support do diaspora activists need?

North Korean activists need support from both private and public sources of funding. In general, North Korean human rights activists are overworked and underfunded. ‘Like-minded’ governments such as those of Japan, South Korea, the USA and others display interest in the issue but have often sidelined human rights concerns to focus solely on negotiating military, political and security matters. It is time for the international community to adopt a ‘human rights up front’ approach to North Korea, ensuring that human rights concerns are integrated into every aspect of its interactions with North Korea. Escapee activists will play a critical role in this effort.

Civic space in North Korea is rated ‘closed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor.

Get in touch with HRNK through its website or its Facebook page, and follow @committeehrnk on Twitter.

civicus.org · by Kgalalelo Gaebee

6. Seoul's nuclear envoy meets with Sweden's special envoy for Korean Peninsula

Seoul's nuclear envoy meets with Sweden's special envoy for Korean Peninsula | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · October 9, 2023

SEOUL, Oct. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top nuclear envoy on Monday met with Sweden's special envoy for the Korean Peninsula to discuss the recent release of an American soldier from North Korean custody and other key developments surrounding the peninsula, Seoul's foreign ministry said.

Kim Gunn, special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, met with Peter Semneby, the visiting Swedish envoy, in Seoul and exchanged views on the release of Pvt. Travis King, the U.S. soldier who was released late last month after having voluntarily crossed the inter-Korean border into the North in July.

Sweden has provided consular and other support for the United States on matters related to North Korea, representing American interests in cases such as the King situation, as Washington does not have diplomatic relations with Pyongyang.

According to the ministry, the two sides also exchanged views on the apparent recent strengthening of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.

During the meeting, Kim requested that Sweden, given its role in communicating with the North, take active steps to clearly convey the international community's stance on denuclearization to North Korea.

Semneby, who previously served twice in the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang, said he will carry out his duties by closely cooperating with the South Korean side, the ministry said.

This photo provided by Seoul's foreign ministry shows Kim Gunn (R), special representative for Korean Peninsula peace and security affairs, with Peter Semneby, Sweden's special envoy for the Korean Peninsula, in Seoul on Oct. 9, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Chang Dong-woo · October 9, 2023

7.  Seoul sees no major disruptions in oil, gas imports amid Israel-Palestine conflict

I am not sure I would be making such predictions so soon. But I guess it depends on how you define "major."

(LEAD) Seoul sees no major disruptions in oil, gas imports amid Israel-Palestine conflict | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · October 9, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with details in 7th para; CHANGES headline, lead)

SEOUL, Oct. 9 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has seen no major impact from the Israel-Palestine conflict on the country's imports of crude oil and natural gas, the trade ministry said Monday.

Officials from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, the state-run Korea National Oil Corp. and the Korea Gas Corp held an emergency meeting earlier in the day to look into the supply of the two key fuel sources following the conflict, the ministry said.

The government expects no delays or disruptions in importing oil and gas from the Middle East given that the site of the conflict is located away from the Strait of Hormuz islands, a critical maritime route through which Korea imports oil and gas.

It found most of the crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) carriers heading to South Korea are operating as usual in the Middle Eastern areas, the statement said.

"We will make all-out efforts to avoid any disruptions in securing the key energy sources amid the conflict that has just flared up," a ministry official said.

South Korea is closely watching the situation in the Middle East, as Korea relies on the region for 67 percent of its overall crude oil purchases and 37 percent of its total gas deals.

"The government will make every effort to minimize the impact on our economy by keeping all possibilities open while strengthening market monitoring with heightened vigilance, as it is highly uncertain how things will unfold," Choi Sang-mok, senior presidential secretary for economic affairs, said during a briefing.

South Korean stock markets were closed Monday for the Hangeul Day holiday, which celebrates the proclamation of the Korean alphabet.

Oil prices were trading at US$87.7 as of 9:00 a.m. Monday, up 3.6 percent from a day earlier as the military conflict between Israel and the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas increases political uncertainties across the Middle East and raises concerns about supplies.

This Reuters photo shows a Palestinian mosque attacked by Israel in the southern part of the Gaza Strip on Oct. 8, 2023. (Yonhap)

kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Choi Kyong-ae · October 9, 2023

8. Dark clouds of war casting over Israel give a lesson to South Korea

One could argue that Israel had much better intelligence capabilities and opportunities to infiltrate Hamas than the ROK or any country has of infiltrating north Korea. Israel should have had a better understanding of Hamas' plans and timing.

And Korea must consider the full range of threats from the north.

Excerpt:

In the country that always faces North Korea's threat of invasion, the unfolding war situation in Israel comes across as a palpable risk. The Hamas attacks are just one of the many examples where not only nuclear arms and ballistic missiles but also asymmetric conventional actions can erode national security. That is why the South Korean government and military authorities should beef up their efforts to strengthen the Three-Axis System, including the Kill Chain, and develop the Korean version of the Iron Dome against North Korea's long-range artillery pieces deployed along the military demarcation line. Looking closely at how international affairs are developing, Seoul should also double-check intelligence networks centering on the National Intelligence Service.

Dark clouds of war casting over Israel give a lesson to South Korea

donga.com

Posted October. 09, 2023 08:11,

Updated October. 09, 2023 08:11

Dark clouds of war casting over Israel give a lesson to South Korea. October. 09, 2023 08:11. .

Airstrikes by Palestine's militant Hamas left more than 500 lives dead and 3,000 injured in Israel. Firing up to 7,000 rockets, the militant group in control of the Gaza Strip penetrated Israeli defense systems, according to global news agencies. What's worse, Palestinian armed agents wearing parachutes to invade by land, sea, and air have fought in cities, holding Israeli citizens hostage. As Israel declared war to fire back, the bloody clash on both sides has gotten out of control.

News reports of how the conflict is unfolding depict one of the planet's most horrendous, gruesome scenes. Amid monstrous blazes are left buildings fallen into ashes with bodies cruelly torn apart and abandoned on the streets. The large-scale airstrike action secretly taken early on holiday struck down the Iron Dome, the Israeli air defense system. Reportedly, not only Israeli domestic intelligence Mossad but also the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency did not see it coming. Appallingly, this Hamas-planned sudden asymmetric warfare made the systems and agencies that had boasted the world's best levels of intelligence and technological advancement useless in the blink of an eye.

The antagonism-driven military conflict between Israel and Palestine has a long history. The Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip is generally described as the world's largest open-air prison due to the suffocating Israeli blockade. Presumably, the calculus behind the military action is that the group intends to prevent itself from being isolated as Israel has begun solidifying relationships with its neighboring Arab countries. Nevertheless, the indiscriminate airstrikes that cost many lives must be strongly condemned and cannot be justified for any reason.

The Israel-Palestine conflict that is turning into a full-scale war is indeed of enormous concern in that it affects not only the Middle East but also the landscape of global security. If Iran and other countries join the ongoing war in the powder keg of the Middle East that has just exploded, there is a possibility that the situation will head onto a long downward spiral of war in the recent new Cold War. The Western world is already stretching its military forces to the limit due to the prolonged Russia-Ukraine war. If the United States extends its front lines through Europe to the Middle East, it will unavoidably pay less attention to security issues in other regions, including Asia. Furthermore, political volatility and uncertainties across the Middle East can accelerate the soaring oil prices, a critical blow to the global economy.

In the country that always faces North Korea's threat of invasion, the unfolding war situation in Israel comes across as a palpable risk. The Hamas attacks are just one of the many examples where not only nuclear arms and ballistic missiles but also asymmetric conventional actions can erode national security. That is why the South Korean government and military authorities should beef up their efforts to strengthen the Three-Axis System, including the Kill Chain, and develop the Korean version of the Iron Dome against North Korea's long-range artillery pieces deployed along the military demarcation line. Looking closely at how international affairs are developing, Seoul should also double-check intelligence networks centering on the National Intelligence Service.

한국어

donga.com

9. Three Pyongyang-based trade officials executed for corruption last month

Corruption. Harsh punishment. Direct party control over trade. This is life in north Korea.

Excerpts:

Since placing a ban on smuggling while closing the national border because of the pandemic, the North Korean government has maintained direct control over trade. Premier Kim Tok Hun openly announced the government’s centralized approach to trade in the 6th session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly last February.

“We will continue working to restore the state-managed trade system in the external sector of our economy,” Kim said at the time.

Although North Korea’s trade with China has now returned to pre-pandemic levels, the government continues to regulate smuggling and strictly prohibits imports or exports of unapproved items.

The execution of the three trade officials has made North Korean trade officials operating both domestically and internationally very anxious.

“Trade officials complain that everybody involved in trade tacks on a few items to sell on the side. They’re all nervous because they think the government executed those three trade officials to send a message to the rest of them,” the source said.

Following the execution of the three trade officials, all their assets were confiscated by the state, and their families were banished to rural areas, the source said.

Three Pyongyang-based trade officials executed for corruption last month

The execution of the three trade officials has made North Korean trade officials operating both domestically and internationally very anxious

By Seulkee Jang - 2023.10.06 3:36pm

https://www.dailynk.com/english/three-pyongyang-based-trade-officials-executed-corruption-last-month/

FILE PHOTO: The Sino-North Korean Friendship Bridge, which connects the Chinese city of Dandong with the North Korean city of Sinuiju. (Daily NK)

Three officials at a trading company in Pyongyang were executed last month. While the ostensible reason given was that they had misappropriated party funds for their private use, it was widely rumored that their execution was intended to serve as a warning to refrain from importing personal items not approved by the authorities.

Speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, a source in North Korea told Daily NK on Tuesday that the execution took place prior to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia last month.

The three trade officials’ downfall began when they failed to meet their quota for submitting funds to the Workers’ Party of Korea. When the officials remained delinquent after several reminders, the prosecutors launched an investigation and searched their homes. The authorities then took issue with large amounts of gold and foreign currency that turned up at all their homes.

While announcing their execution, the North Korean authorities accused the three trade officials of “only thinking about their own profit while pursuing state-approved trade activities at a time of such national difficulty” and of “embezzling money from the state.”

“The economy is getting worse because officials who are supposed to be working for the government are intent on lining their own pockets,” the authorities were said to have announced. 

Speculation abounds over real reason for executions

But rumors have been rife among trading officials that the failure to meet the party funding quota was only the nominal reason for their execution and that the real reason lies elsewhere. “Almost any official who’s working on orders from the party would have that much money at their home,” one official remarked.

Since the North Korean authorities have tolerated the fact that officials have some amount of private assets in their possession, the three trade officials in question were probably not executed simply for having gold or foreign currency at their homes, the source said.

For that reason, some trade officials speculate that the real issue was that the three trade officials had shipped in items other than those approved by the government.

Since placing a ban on smuggling while closing the national border because of the pandemic, the North Korean government has maintained direct control over trade. Premier Kim Tok Hun openly announced the government’s centralized approach to trade in the 6th session of the 14th Supreme People’s Assembly last February.

“We will continue working to restore the state-managed trade system in the external sector of our economy,” Kim said at the time.

Although North Korea’s trade with China has now returned to pre-pandemic levels, the government continues to regulate smuggling and strictly prohibits imports or exports of unapproved items.

The execution of the three trade officials has made North Korean trade officials operating both domestically and internationally very anxious.

“Trade officials complain that everybody involved in trade tacks on a few items to sell on the side. They’re all nervous because they think the government executed those three trade officials to send a message to the rest of them,” the source said.

Following the execution of the three trade officials, all their assets were confiscated by the state, and their families were banished to rural areas, the source said.

Translated by David Black. Edited by Robert Lauler. 

Daily NK works with a network of sources who live inside North Korea, China and elsewhere. Their identities remain anonymous due to security concerns. More information about Daily NK’s reporting partner network and information gathering activities can be found on our FAQ page here.  

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

10. US expert redoubles calls for sturdier deterrence against NK ICBM threats

Victor Cha, the dean of the Korean watchers.

US expert redoubles calls for sturdier deterrence against NK ICBM threats

The Korea Times · October 8, 2023

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at CSIS headquarters in Washington, Oct. 5. Yonhap

A prominent U.S. security expert has renewed his calls for a risky yet calibrated and stronger deterrence policy signaling the possibility of preemptive military action to counter North Korea's growing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threats.

In a recent interview with Yonhap News Agency, Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), made the case as the North is expected to attempt a third space rocket launch this month amid concerns about its burgeoning military cooperation with Russia.

On Washington's stepped-up export controls on China, the scholar said that the restrictions are requiring countries to "pick a side" as America is worried about "what the world will look like" if China dominates sectors related to artificial intelligence and other technological fields.

"If we know that North Korea is fueling an ICBM and we have a reason to believe that they will launch it not on a lofted trajectory but on a flattened trajectory in the direction of Hawaii, we should be very clear that we have the right to take out that missile either in the mid-course intercept or on the launch pad," he said.

Cha outlined the policy proposal during congressional testimony on Wednesday, describing it as a "declaratory" policy that signals the possibility of preemptive action against the North while reassuring American allies that the United States takes North Korean threats "seriously."

"It's a risky thing to do. But right now, there is nothing deterring North Korea from shooting missiles," he said, pointing to inaction by the U.N. Security Council, where the North's traditional partners, China and Russia, wield veto powers.

Asked whether his proposal includes a "left-of-launch" strategy using electromagnetic, cyber and other technologies to disrupt and defeat a missile launch at a prelaunch stage, the American academic said, "Whatever you need to do."

"It could be anything," he said. "It may not be realistic in the sense that North Korea now has mobile launches with solid fuel. It may be very hard to actually try to take it out before it takes off."

In a CSIS report in January, Cha's research team also advocated for a working-level "preliminary" dialogue about what would be infrastructure prerequisites for the possible redeployment of nuclear arms to South Korea in order to send a clear deterrence signal to Pyongyang.

"We are not talking about shipping the weapons right away. We are talking about what it would take if we were to do this ... what would be the preliminary, non-decisional working-level assessment of what it would take if we were to consider doing this," he said.

Cha's renewed call for such deterrence measures comes as the outlook for reengagement with North Korea remains bleak with the regime showing little interest in dialogue. In addition, the security prospects are muddled by the pursuit of stronger armaments by China and other regional players.

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at CSIS headquarters in Washington, Oct. 5. Yonhap

"The war in Europe, China's drive for a thousand nuclear warheads, Japan's military buildup, South Korea's military buildup and all the exercising ... This is not an environment in which North Korea is interested in disarming," he said.

The North's recent release of Pvt. Travis King, detained for crossing the DMZ, was another sign reflective of the regime's unwillingness to engage in dialogue with the U.S., Cha noted.

"They weren't trying to drag it out to get something out of this ... They didn't even do it with the U.S. They did it with the Swedes and the Chinese," he said, referring to the assistance that Sweden and China provided to help bring King out of the North.

In the face of North Korea's growing threats and China's increasing assertiveness, South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have been stepping up trilateral security coordination, which culminated at their Camp David summit in August.

The historic summit produced a series of landmark agreements, including their "commitment to consult" each other in the event of a common threat.

Cha said that the "best-case" scenario for trilateral cooperation would be South Korea and Japan issuing a bilateral security declaration ― similar to the one between Japan and Australia ― so as to lock in and promote progress in their tripartite security efforts.

Victor Cha, senior vice president for Asia and Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), speaks during an interview with Yonhap News Agency at CSIS headquarters in Washington, Oct. 5. Yonhap

"It is not a treaty but a political declaration between the two sides," he said.

Regarding an increasingly intricate web of U.S. export controls on China, Cha said that on semiconductors, artificial intelligence and quantum computing, the U.S. is trying to "decouple" despite its "de-risking" mantra.

"I think that in return for the U.S. granting waivers (from the restrictions), the Koreans have to commit to maintaining considerable distance between the technology they are working on with the U.S. and what they are willing to provide China," he said.

Commenting on the South Korea-U.S. alliance, Cha portrayed the decades-old partnership as one that does not just stand against a common threat but also stands for shared values, supply chains and other principles in a broader global context.

"By a global alliance, we mean an alliance institution that does not just benefit the U.S.and Korea, but it is benefiting the world through thins like cooperation on emerging technology, climate change, space exploration and public health," he said.

Cha also touted South Korea's transition from a country "on the margins" to one that is now "central." In particular, interest in Korea has surged, driven by the power of Korean cultural products like K-pop, he noted.

"To me, the important thing is how do you go from that interest in Korea to creating lifelong friendships with these people," he said.

"They often refer to K-pop popularity as being soft power, but that is not. Soft power is not just you are popular, but those people start to think about how to support Korea without you having to coerce them to support Korea," he added. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · October 8, 2023

11. Then and Now: A Naval Officer's Camera Captured Seoul During the Korean War

Excerpt:

The title of the book, The War That Still Has Not Ended, does more than evoke the tragedy of the Korean War. It’s also a warning of the flames that might again envelop the country, undoing the civilization, the culture, the business and industry that has burst into bloom during the past 70 years of peace, prosperity and finally democracy in the South since the signing of the armistice.

Then and Now: A Naval Officer's Camera Captured Seoul During the Korean War

Published 10/08/23 09:00 AM ET

Donald Kirk

themessenger.com · October 8, 2023

Rare, newly discovered pictures provide graphic evidence of how the South Korean capital of Seoul, and the region up to the truce village of Panmunjom on the North-South Korean line, looked in the bleak period before the Korean War armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.

These images, taken on old-fashioned Kodachrome film, were shot by a U.S. Navy officer with the United Nations Military Armistice Commission while the war raged on, during two years of negotiations among Americans, North Koreans and Chinese. (South Korea’s then-President Syngman Rhee wanted no part of talks that he feared would result in permanent division of the peninsula.) The officer, George Fowler, died after returning to the United States, leaving his rolls of undeveloped film to Navy friends, who gave them to his long-lost Japanese girlfriend, Kimi Nagai. Eventually, she contacted Koichi Yamamoto, a Japanese photojournalist, who got in touch with a Korean, Shin Kwang-soo, with Japan’s Jiji Press.

Fowler took many of the pictures from lumbering helicopters, introduced for the first time in warfare in Korea. Shin and Yamamoto, getting the film developed decades after Fowler’s death, have put them together in a display in Seoul City Hall and in a sumptuous, privately-printed book. The book includes black-and-white images that the late Horace Underwood, a legendary professor at Seoul’s Yonsei University, who worked as an interpreter at the negotiations, gave Shin, along with images that Yamamoto shot during visits to North Korea. Among these are scenes from the April 1995 Pyongyang Sports and Cultural Festival that I also attended. One shot shows the Japanese wrestler Antonio Inoki fist-pumping boxer Muhammad Ali, by then suffering from Parkinson’s disease, whom I had spied high in the stands.

There are no portrayals of war, of troops in action, dead or alive. Instead, Fowler’s camera captured negotiators amid the tents and flimsy structures at Panmunjom, and Korean life as observed from the air and the ground. Among the most arresting shots are those of rows of shacks, from which office buildings and apartment blocks have sprung. Beyond modern structures, trees now cover what then were ugly splotches of barren, red-brown dirt.

A familiar sight that survives from those days is Tapgol Park, or Pagoda Park, birthplace of the March 1, 1919, uprising against Japanese rule. The small circular park, with the multi-sided pavilion at the center and the spire-like Wongaksa monument on one side, remains a memorial to lives lost in a bloody revolt against Japanese imperialism. Surrounded by rows of shops and homes, as seen from Fowler’s helicopter, Tapgol survives as an oasis of reverence in a sea of soaring skyscrapers. Not far away, the ponderous Japanese governor-general’s building, built in neo-classical Greek or Roman style and torn down in 1996, is shown blocking the view of the Gyeongbok Palace, where Korean kings reigned for 500 years before succumbing to the Japanese in 1910.

The title of the book, The War That Still Has Not Ended, does more than evoke the tragedy of the Korean War. It’s also a warning of the flames that might again envelop the country, undoing the civilization, the culture, the business and industry that has burst into bloom during the past 70 years of peace, prosperity and finally democracy in the South since the signing of the armistice.

The landmark Seoul City Hall, shown in a September 2023 photo, is home to a display of rare photos taken by a U.S. Navy officer during the Korean War (1950-1953).ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images

The latest outbursts from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un above the demilitarized zone are reminders of the fragility of the truce that emerged from those talks in Panmunjom. The faces of stern-looking generals in some of the photographs betray the frustrations — and the danger of South Korea again plunging into chaos. The next time, if Kim lives up to his threats of a nuclear holocaust, the tragedy will be infinitely worse and the ruins far more devastating.

Not least, Fowler’s camera caught scenes that reveal the mood of a people who had seen and heard the sights and sounds of war. The Koreans in these pictures are serious, unsmiling. Nobody is waving, mugging for the camera. The children — girls in rough hanbok, boys in baggy pants — look as grim as their parents. Occasional traces of fun shine on their faces, but mostly they reveal the hardships of a time when food was scarce and death never far away.

Nobody is smiling other than occasional American officers, feigning politeness in breaks from talks that stopped the bloodshed but not the war.

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, covering conflict in Asia and the Middle East. Now a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea, he is the author of several books about Asian affairs.

themessenger.com · October 8, 2023

12. [World and Us] North Korea-China-Russia military cooperation and the role of the UNC

This is a google translated article.

Another call for a Far East Command (FEC) (or Northeast Asia Command (NEACOM).

Excerpts:

The South Korean government should minimize security and military cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia through the Korea-China-Japan summit and the Chinese president's visit to Korea, and strengthen diplomatic efforts with the United States and Japan to manage stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. At the same time, we must quietly prepare a security and military response posture assuming the worst-case scenario. Recently, former ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Commander Vincent Brooks proposed the creation of a Far East Command that would jointly command U.S. forces in Korea and Japan. The Korean Peninsula is not an independent place, and a crisis on the Korean Peninsula is a crisis in the Asia-Pacific region and a global crisis linked to all regions, including China, Russia, and Japan. The recent launch of a NATO office in Japan, security cooperation between Korea, the United States, and Japan, and security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) show a response to this urgent situation.

We have a strong ally who has protected the Republic of Korea in the United Nations Command, along with the strong ROK-US alliance and Camp David security cooperation between Korea, the US, and Japan. Because the United Nations Command aims for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, solidarity and cooperation with UNC member states are even more urgent in the face of the current diverse and complex crises. The birth of the Republic of Korea began with strong supporters and gifts: the ROK-US Alliance (ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty) and the United Nations Command. This is a time when Korea and the UNC need more wisdom and practice to develop the UNC in a desirable direction and expand its role.

[World and Us] North Korea-China-Russia military cooperation and the role of the UNC

https://m.segye.com/view/20231005519853?utm_source=pocket_saves

Article entered 2023-10-05 23:22:02

Article modified 2023-10-05 23:22:01

Select font size

It cannot be seen only as a diplomatic event

. Close ties between China and Russia have an impact on the security landscape . There is an urgent need to expand the role of the UNC as a

peace and safety valve on the Korean Peninsula for the ROK-US alliance.

In Washington, D.C., what has attracted the attention of major media and policy communities regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula in recent years is mainly related to three things. These are the emergence of a war crisis on the Korean Peninsula related to North Korea's nuclear weapons, progress in North Korea-US denuclearization negotiations, and the possibility of security solidarity between North Korea, China, and Russia.

North Korea's nuclear and denuclearization negotiations were in fact issues limited to North Korea or the Korean Peninsula. However, as the possibility of solidarity between North Korea, China, and Russia has recently grown, its meaning has expanded beyond the Korean Peninsula to Northeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region, and largely to changes in the global security landscape, and the reaction of Western countries, including the United States, has been fierce. In general, there were two reactions. It was an intentional disregard and cold treatment of what North Korea and Russia, isolated countries subject to international sanctions, would do with each other. This response was a cynical attitude, hoping that the two countries would stop at the level of a one-time political event or arms sale. Another reaction was the hopeful expectation that North Korea-Russia solidarity without China's participation would not have much of a repercussion in a situation where China, where North Korea and Russia gather, has not traditionally welcomed cooperation between North Korea and Russia. In the West, it was an extension of the traditional wishful thinking that China and Russia had always been rivals in the traditional Eurasian region, and that the solidarity between China and Russia was very weak because both China and Russia had a deep desire to restore relations with the United States.Youngjun Kim, Professor, Graduate School of Security and Security, National Defense University

However, in recent years, the joint military exercises between China and Russia, the expansion of the BRICs, and the series of situations in which Russia proposed joint military exercises with North Korea have led to this traditional wishful thinking, that is, China and Russia will eventually be able to easily depend on what the United States does. It is shaking up the stereotype that things will crack. The joint military training between China and Russia, which expanded in earnest from the joint training in the Russian Far East in 2018, is developing into training that is similar to the joint training between Korea and the United States that confirms interoperability, despite cynicism that it is a political event or a one-time diplomatic event. The participation of the North Korean People's Army in joint training centered on China and Russia is no longer a fantasy but a reality.

Security must be prepared for the worst, not the best-case scenario. It is not a surprising change that after the Hanoi summit, North Korea decided to minimize the effects of sanctions and expand its national interests in economy and security by cooperating with its traditional allies, China and Russia, rather than the United States or South Korea. In this regard, this situation, in which North Korea is actively emphasizing military cooperation and joint training with China and Russia, leaving behind the 70 years in which it focused only on developing nuclear missiles after the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers following the sectarian incident in the late 1950s, is an important factor in the security of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. It is a game changer. Beyond the transfer of North Korea's nuclear missile, submarine, and fighter aircraft technology, the militaries of North Korea, China, and Russia are moving into a situation where they will conduct integrated firepower training, cyber attack training, counterattack training in the South Korean region, and nuclear submarine training off the coast of Wonsan at any time.

The South Korean government should minimize security and military cooperation between North Korea, China, and Russia through the Korea-China-Japan summit and the Chinese president's visit to Korea, and strengthen diplomatic efforts with the United States and Japan to manage stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. At the same time, we must quietly prepare a security and military response posture assuming the worst-case scenario. Recently, former ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Commander Vincent Brooks proposed the creation of a Far East Command that would jointly command U.S. forces in Korea and Japan. The Korean Peninsula is not an independent place, and a crisis on the Korean Peninsula is a crisis in the Asia-Pacific region and a global crisis linked to all regions, including China, Russia, and Japan. The recent launch of a NATO office in Japan, security cooperation between Korea, the United States, and Japan, and security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) show a response to this urgent situation.

We have a strong ally who has protected the Republic of Korea in the United Nations Command, along with the strong ROK-US alliance and Camp David security cooperation between Korea, the US, and Japan. Because the United Nations Command aims for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, solidarity and cooperation with UNC member states are even more urgent in the face of the current diverse and complex crises. The birth of the Republic of Korea began with strong supporters and gifts: the ROK-US Alliance (ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty) and the United Nations Command. This is a time when Korea and the UNC need more wisdom and practice to develop the UNC in a desirable direction and expand its role.

Youngjun Kim, Professor, Graduate School of Security and Security, National Defense University

Copyrights ⓒ Segye Ilbo Unauthorized reproduction and redistribution prohibited

13. The life and death of Confucianism in Korea

And perhaps a rebirth? Interesting analysis from the author.

Excerpts:

The problem is all the cultural accretions over the years, mostly the male dominance and the patrilineal orientation of the family. We see this in the genealogy — it is a table showing how men are related to men through men. The women are barely recognized, in spite of being half the population and the means by which more men are born!

Korean Confucianism from earliest times (sixth century) to the late 17th century existed in a society that was not male dominated. Women had equal inheritance rights, owned property, hosted ancestry ceremonies in turn with their brothers, and in all ways but politics, had an equal share of social and economic activity.

So, if Korea once had a Confucian society that was not male dominated, it can do it again.

The life and death of Confucianism in Korea

The Korea Times · October 9, 2023

By Mark Peterson

On a recent trip to Korea, I was afforded one of the great honors of my life when I was asked to visit with the head of the only nationwide Confucian organization to discuss my views on how to “save” Confucianism.

The meeting was held at the headquarters located at the Sungkyungwan, next to the modern Sungkyungwan University in Seoul.

I am constantly surprised at the comments on my YouTube broadcasts about Confucianism. I “grew up” in Korea, and in Korean Studies really, with great respect for Confucianism. It was the heart of the history and the cultural behavior that I was studying. And I learned to respect Confucianism, and though an active Christian, I consider myself a Confucian as well.

So, to read comments of all kinds criticizing Confucianism from many different angles is quite shocking to my system. Commonly seen comments include “Confucianism was the downfall of our country,” and “traditional society suppressed women’s activities because of Confucianism,” and “Confucian hierarchy is anti-democratic and counter productive.” Recently I have written in this space about Kakao requiring employees to take on American names for use in the office. This, it seems is a way to break down the “Confucian” hierarchies that inhibit creativity in the office.

Perhaps the paragon of criticism of Confucianism is a book written several years ago with the title “Confucianism Needs to Die so That the Nation Can Live.”

Well, I’m a voice on the other side of the issue. I’m interested in finding ways that Confucianism can live. And I have allies, but some of them need to re-arm for battle, because if they wish to argue for the old hierarchies, including male dominance, they are going to lose and lose big. And they will lose my support.

The way for Confucianism to survive, and indeed revive, is to strip it of its social mistakes, the hierarchies, male dominance, and thus return to regarding Confucianism primarily the way Confucius taught, as ideology. Even as religion.

There is always a great rush to point out that Confucianism is not a religion, whenever the topic comes up. But Confucianism’s strength is in its philosophy and teachings. It’s not necessary to run away from the idea of being a religion because when we look at religions around the world, indeed, in “World Religions” classes and textbooks at universities, Confucianism is one of the “world’s five great religions”. Five, or six, or seven — different textbooks and different classes take different approaches. But Confucianism is always there! — as a religion.

There are all kinds of religions. One does not need to worship on Sunday, to have a religion. In fact, one need not worship on any day to have a religion. There are “this worldly” religions, and “other worldly” religions. I think the pro-Confucianists out that are making a mistake to run away from being a “religion”. I think they would be strong to own up to it — to say, Confucianism is a religion. It is a religion and a philosophy and a set of teachings to make people better and to help people treat each other in better ways. It is a religion without a god, but with ethics and values and teachings of how to respect and appreciate one another.

Confucianism will survive when it returns to its core teachings and abandons all the social practice that it has accumulated. The teachings — filial piety, loyalty are center, and benevolence, justice, politeness, knowledge. Indeed, it is the Confucian desire for knowledge that has made Korea great, historically and recently. The seonbi used to study to pass the exams, and today, the students study to pass the exams.

And the Confucian virtues espoused in the first lines of the Analects — first, there is no greater pleasure than to study, and second, what is more enjoyable than treating a guest who has come from afar. And the third line in that first paragraph, to not be disappointed when you are not recognized for what you have done. These are principles that have guided Korean values in the past, and I hope they will in the future.

The problem is all the cultural accretions over the years, mostly the male dominance and the patrilineal orientation of the family. We see this in the genealogy — it is a table showing how men are related to men through men. The women are barely recognized, in spite of being half the population and the means by which more men are born!

Korean Confucianism from earliest times (sixth century) to the late 17th century existed in a society that was not male dominated. Women had equal inheritance rights, owned property, hosted ancestry ceremonies in turn with their brothers, and in all ways but politics, had an equal share of social and economic activity.

So, if Korea once had a Confucian society that was not male dominated, it can do it again.

Mark Peterson (markpeterson@byu.edu) is a professor emeritus of Korean, Asian and Near Eastern languages at Brigham Young University in Utah.

The Korea Times · October 9, 2023

14. Korean 'jeong' keeps people together through thick and thin

Another important insight on Korean culture.

Korean 'jeong' keeps people together through thick and thin

The Korea Times · October 9, 2023

By John Alderman Linton

When my youngest son was in his second year of middle school, I got a call from the international school he was attending.

Stepping into the teacher’s room, I couldn’t help feeling a little nervous. Any parent who gets called in to talk to their kid’s teacher can’t help feeling humble, as well as responsible for whatever their kid did wrong.

It turned out my son — who was 170 centimeters tall and weighed 80 kilograms — had shoved another boy hard enough to knock him down, and now the other boy’s parents were upset. In all honesty, I was a bit relieved to learn my son hadn’t punched anyone.

But my next task was teaching my son how to avoid creating this kind of situation in the future. We sat down on a bench in front of the school for what must have been the most serious and intense conversation we’d ever had.

“Son, I’m sure you know that while I’m white, I don’t slavishly follow the Western obsession with putting rules above everything else. Given their Anglo-Saxon heritage, America and England put the priority on rules. But what I learned in my childhood in Jeolla Province is that personal relationships come first.”

That’s what I’d always been taught by my friends’ grandparents on their heated ondol floor back in Jeolla Province. In the years since, that has become my basic approach to life.

When I asked my son if he really wanted to be expelled from the school and say goodbye to his friends, he was horrified by the idea.

“Son,” I continued, “if you want to keep your school friends, your only choice is to abide by the rules imposed by the people at this school. Do you think you can manage that — for your friends’ sake?” I was reasoning that for the sake of your valued relationships, son could you obey the rules?

As I spoke with my son, I thought back to what had been important to me at his age. My son didn’t cause any more problems from that point until he graduated from high school, and our communication improved as well.

The practice of viewing relationships as more important than rules or laws is a cherished aspect of Korean culture, as well as the aspect I value most. One day, my older brother told me that many of the Korean values I prize are on their way out. His remark nearly threw me into a panic, but I soon regained my cool. “The people who share those cherished Korean values grew up with me and are getting old along with me. Surely those values will stick around at least as long as I do!”

That conversation with my brother reminded me of an experience I’d had in my second year of middle school, when I’d attended an international school, just like my own son.

My international school in Daejeon was parochial and strictly conservative, and the dormitory had rules that were nearly as strict as a military academy. Four pieces of paper were posted with the rules we were expected to follow printed in a tiny font.

I felt stifled by life at the dormitory and desperately missed my childhood in Suncheon, where I’d been free to play with other kids in the neighborhood. I never missed my parents, but I missed those childhood friends so much that I often cried myself to sleep at night.

The hardest part about the dormitory was the rules that had obviously been made by Westerners. I was supposed to ask permission each and every time I wanted to use a little bit of my friend’s toothpaste in the morning. That kind of Western culture was a serious source of stress for a kid like me who had grown up in Jeolla Province, sharing everything and having little concept of “mine” and “yours.”

While I was struggling with dormitory life, something happened that became a major source of comfort for me. There was an upperclassman in the dormitory named Choi Ki-ho — my hyeong, or “older brother.” I was a little intimidated by the older Korean boy, but I also adored him.

My sole pleasure at the international school was going downtown on the weekend to watch the latest James Bond film or whatever else was showing at the cinema. That particular weekend, I borrowed Ki-ho’s suit and dress shoes with those stylish pointed toes and had a splendid time at the cinema and out on the town. The only problem: I’d taken them without asking.

It was with a heavy step that I walked back to the dormitory that night. Since I’d gone off with the older boy’s clothes and dress shoes without permission, I figured I was in serious trouble.

As soon as I was back, I stepped into Ki-ho’s room, where he was busy doing his calculus homework. I made my confession in a small voice. “Ki-ho hyeong, I took your suit when you weren’t looking and went to the movies in it.”

“Good for you,” Ki-ho said without even looking up. “You can take it off and leave it there.”

When I told him I’d taken his dress shoes, too, he said the same thing. “Good for you. Just take it off and leave it there.”

And I’d assumed I was in for a beating! That’s when I made up my mind to spend the rest of my life around Koreans.

Which are more important — people or rules? Are people here to follow the rules, or are the rules here to benefit people?

Korea has a relational concept called "miun jeong" (literally, “hateful affection”) that doesn’t have a direct parallel in the West. Koreans never stop caring about friends and family regardless of the resentment, pain and loss those relationships entail.

Westerners are apt to say that social order is maintained through rules. But what my experience living in Korea has taught me is that Koreans’ stubborn affection keeps human relationships orderly and makes them even stronger.

It’s not very easy to explain miun jeong to non-Koreans, and I don’t deny that affection of that sort can bring some people to grief. But that relational dedication is what has kept me in Korea for more than 60 years now, and I’m confident that Korea’s jeong culture is more mature and, dare I say, more Biblical than Western culture.

John Alderman Linton, an American-Korean whose Korean name is Ihn Yo-han, is a director at Yonsei University Severance Hospital International Health Care Center.

The Korea Times · October 9, 2023

15. How the Travis King Saga Relates to the North Korea-Russia Summit

Interestinging analysis.

Excerpts:

King’s journey back home took him from Pyongyang to the Chinese border city of Dandong, where U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns awaited. From Dandong, King was whisked away to Shenyang, a major regional air traffic hub in northeastern China. A U.S. military aircraft then transported him to the Osan Air Base in South Korea, before his final return to the United States.

The U.S. government has stated that there was “no quid pro quo” to secure this release, and given the circumstances, this seems to be true. For over two months, while King was in detention, there was no direct negotiation between North Korea and the United States – purportedly because North Korea consistently avoided contact.

“North Korea acted as if the U.S. was invisible,” according to a source with knowledge about the situation.

This approach can seen as North Korea sending a “dismissive” signal to Washington by indicating they “don’t particularly want anything” to do with the United States, the source continued.

What’s notable is that this is part of a wider trend: Since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea has been quite consistently choosing to ignore the United States and shun direct contacts. Since the start of the Biden administration, Washington has reached out to Pyongyang at least 20 times for dialogue, but these attempts reportedly fell on deaf ears.

How the Travis King Saga Relates to the North Korea-Russia Summit

There are shifting dynamics in North Korea’s diplomatic strategy, particularly concerning its relationships with the U.S. and Russia. 

thediplomat.com · by Seong-Hyon Lee · October 9, 2023

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North Korea is reported to have treated the United States as if it were “invisible” during the process of releasing Travis King, an American soldier who was detained in North Korea. Unlike in the past, North Korea did not demand a visit by high-ranking U.S. officials as a condition for King’s release, nor did it attempt to leverage the situation under the pretext of discussing “the method of expulsion.” This stark contrast from its past behavior underscores what could be a profound shift in North Korea’s diplomatic strategy.

Some speculate that there must have been backdoor discussions between the United States and North Korea regarding the American soldier’s release. The most optimistic wondered if these presumed diplomatic contacts might lead to a thaw in North-U.S. relations. Yet North Korea reportedly navigated the issue of King’s release solely through the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang and the Chinese authorities, eschewing any direct contact with Washington.

King, an enlisted cavalry scout stationed in South Korea, crossed into North Korea after joining a tour group at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom, which is located within the Demilitarized Zone. Since the United States does not have formal diplomatic relations with North Korea, whenever an American citizen is detained, the Swedish embassy in Pyongyang mediates communication between the U.S. and North Korea.

King’s journey back home took him from Pyongyang to the Chinese border city of Dandong, where U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns awaited. From Dandong, King was whisked away to Shenyang, a major regional air traffic hub in northeastern China. A U.S. military aircraft then transported him to the Osan Air Base in South Korea, before his final return to the United States.

The U.S. government has stated that there was “no quid pro quo” to secure this release, and given the circumstances, this seems to be true. For over two months, while King was in detention, there was no direct negotiation between North Korea and the United States – purportedly because North Korea consistently avoided contact.

“North Korea acted as if the U.S. was invisible,” according to a source with knowledge about the situation.

This approach can seen as North Korea sending a “dismissive” signal to Washington by indicating they “don’t particularly want anything” to do with the United States, the source continued.

What’s notable is that this is part of a wider trend: Since the breakdown of the Hanoi summit in 2019, North Korea has been quite consistently choosing to ignore the United States and shun direct contacts. Since the start of the Biden administration, Washington has reached out to Pyongyang at least 20 times for dialogue, but these attempts reportedly fell on deaf ears.

The Hanoi Summit Setback and Kim’s “New Path”

After the North Korea-U.S. Hanoi Summit’s disappointing conclusion in 2019, North Korea urged the United States to “change its calculation,” challenging Washington’s reliance on sanctions as leverage. When Washington remained unmoved, North Korea announced a pivotal shift in its strategy towards the U.S.

By July, North Korean leaders proclaimed they would no longer obsess over sanction relief. Later, in December, during a pivotal Workers’ Party meeting led by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, a commitment was made to “strengthen the nation’s strategic position and national power in harmony with evolving domestic and international scenarios.” The Workers’ Party Central Committee Plenary Session is the highest decision-making body that deliberates and determines North Korea’s core strategies and policy directions. The announcement solidified Kim’s cryptic warning that the country would go down a “new path,” as highlighted in his New Year’s speech.

The unfolding of events post-Hanoi has revealed Kim’s “new path” in action – a deliberate pivot away from U.S.-negotiated nuclear resolutions. This trajectory, disturbingly, steers Pyongyang closer to its nuclear ambitions. North Korea proclaimed itself a “nuclear state” and stipulated it in the nation’s constitution in 2012. In September, 11 years after formally committing to nuclear possession, North Korea amended the constitution on nuclear policy to emphasize “nuclear weapon advancement” and endorse preemptive nuclear use. Kim Jong Un stressed “the need to push ahead with the work for exponentially boosting the production of nuclear weapons and diversifying the nuclear strike means and deploying them in different services.”

But the “new path” doesn’t stop at nuclear ambitions; it has led North Korea to Russia’s doorstep. While the White House may be dismissive of the recent summit between Kim and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, labeling it an “arms-for-food deal,” such a cursory assessment might overlook intricate geopolitical dynamics.

Russia’s new foreign policy, as articulated in “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” in March, showcases a profound departure from the U.S.-led global order, with aspirations to bolster anti-U.S. and anti-Western alliances. When both North Korea and Russia, united by their mutual discontent with the United States, stride down their respective “new paths,” the global community has reasons to be alarmed.

Both Pyongyang and Moscow share a common goal: to challenge the U.S.-led security framework in the region. Just as South Korea and the United States promote values-based solidarity, there is no reason to underestimate the growing intimacy between North Korea and Russia. The solidarity between Russia and North Korea, which have found common ground in their political regimes and hostility toward the U.S., is more likely to strengthen in the future than to weaken.

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The Kim-Putin summit was also noteworthy for the attendance of the “missile trio,” the three top individuals in North Korea’s missile program, thus emphasizing the military-centric nature of the summit. Kim said that his selection of Russia for his first overseas trip since the COVID-19 pandemic underscored the “strategic significance” of their nations’ relationship.

Moreover, as the Russia-U.S. power competition intensifies over the protracted war in Ukraine, Moscow may see a fortified North Korea as an increasingly useful counterbalance to U.S. power in Northeast Asia. Former White House National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien, when asked about the evolving ties between North Korea and Russia during a webinar where this author also participated, responded: “I am very concerned.”

After the summit, North Korea has started sending artillery to Russia. This comes as the Russian invasion of Ukraine nears the 20-month mark. Meanwhile, North Korea, which has been making efforts to launch a military reconnaissance satellite, has experienced two satellite launch failures this year. However, it publicly declared its intention to launch another reconnaissance satellite in October. During the summit, Putin publicly stated that Russia would assist North Korea in building satellites. Certainly, Russia could provide North Korea with the much-needed technological advancement in this regard.

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Siegfried Hecker, a former director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and a longtime observer of North Korea’s nuclear development, also expressed concern that Moscow may secretly supply plutonium to Pyongyang to help build more nuclear bombs.

The Kim-Putin summit could harbor significance beyond North Korea securing just another patron besides China. In particular, it is crucial to carefully analyze whether Putin’s Russia has undergone a fundamental shift in its strategy, opting for a “new path” similar to North Korea, one that abandons engagement policies with the United States. An adversary that perceives its worldview as fundamentally incompatible with the United States and anticipates sustained conflicts with Washington in the future, thus deeming engagement with the U.S. as futile, would result in an unstable regional security environment. When there are two such adversaries, the situation becomes even more precarious. Kim and Putin are pursuing their “new paths” away from engagement with Washington, and now it seems their paths are converging in a strategic synergy against the United States.

GUEST AUTHOR

Seong-Hyon Lee

Seong-Hyon Lee, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations and a visiting scholar at the Harvard University Asia Center.

thediplomat.com · by Seong-Hyon Lee · October 9, 2023

16. She squared off against a North Korean assassin – and lived to tell the tale

She squared off against a North Korean assassin – and lived to tell the tale

• Dar San Ye helped capture an agent of Pyongyang in a river in Yangon 40 years ago after he had attempted to kill a former South Korean president
• The 87-year-old recalls interrogating the man in English – before he pulled out a grenade that failed to detonate fully, blowing off his own hand

Agence France-Presse

+ FOLLOWPublished: 4:31pm, 9 Oct, 2023

By AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE South China Morning Post4 min

October 9, 2023

View Original

Forty years ago, Myanmar barmaid Dar San Ye stood in a river running through Yangon, squaring up to a North Korean agent gripping a live grenade.

Hours earlier on October 9, 1983, a huge explosion had shattered the peace of the capital city as a Pyongyang hit team detonated bombs to try to assassinate visiting South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan.

Seventeen Korean officials, including the foreign minister, and four Myanmar nationals died when the blast ripped through a mausoleum housing the remains of the Southeast Asian nation’s founding father and independence hero Aung San.

President Chun himself was not there, however, having been delayed at a previous engagement.

The bombers fled the scene, with Yangon plunged into chaos.

Dar San Ye shows photos of herself in her younger days. Photo: AFP

Now 87 years old, she spoke about the drama in her home on the outskirts of the city, recalling her role as she puffed on a cigar.

“I heard the Martyrs’ Mausoleum had been blown up by some foreigners,” she said.

Customers in her bar on the banks of the Pazundaung River could talk of little else, she said. “I asked people if they [the attackers] had been captured … They said no,” she recalled.

“I told them the bombers will be captured later because we are Buddhist Myanmar and our good spirits will guard us.”

Little did she know she would be the one to do it.

Can Asean stay united and work with stakeholders to end Myanmar crisis?

Dar San Ye finished her shift and returned home as evening began to fall, with the city still on edge and a hunt for the perpetrators under way.

Suddenly, she heard shouts that there was a thief in the river. She rushed out and saw a crowd of around 100 people gathered on the bank.

Pausing only to hitch up her nightdress, she waded in, not quite sure who the man in the water was.

“The guy was standing waist-deep in water,” she said. “I called him: ‘Come here! Come here!’”

“He just stared at me. I realised he wouldn’t understand Burmese. I remembered an English phrase that I used to use to make fun of English people.

A still image of the 1983 bombing attack by North Korean agents on then-South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan’s entourage in Yangon. Photo: AFP

“I asked him: ‘Are you my friend?’” Desperate for sympathy as he found himself surrounded, he replied: “Yes, yes! Are you Chinese?”

The barmaid recalled that he then reached out to try to shake her hand.

But when three men from the crowd joined in to help Dar San Ye, he began to fight back, pushing her and the others away and running to the end of a pier. There he took out a grenade and pulled the pin, but it failed to detonate fully.

“His left hand was blown off. On his right hand, four fingers were blown off and only the thumb remained,” she said.

“After that, he jumped into the water again and I also jumped in … When he appeared above the water again, I punched him in the neck.”

Myanmar’s ‘little regard’ for Asean on show as it turns to China, India, Russia

The agent, Kim Jin-su, was one of the three-man hit team. Thanks to Dar San Ye, he was captured by authorities. He refused to cooperate with interrogators and was hanged after a trial.

The two other assassins, Shin Ki-chol and Kang Min-chol, were tracked down by security forces just outside Yangon.

Shin died in the ensuing firefight but Kang was captured alive and sentenced to life in prison after confessing. He died there after almost 25 years behind bars.

A CIA report said there was “very strong circumstantial evidence” linking Pyongyang to the mausoleum bombing.

It said alleged North Korean agents had used similar radio-detonated explosives in a 1970 plot to kill then-president Park Chung-hee as he visited a cemetery in Seoul.

A 1997 photo of Chun Doo-hwan, the late former South Korean president who was the target of a 1983 assassination attempt by North Korean agents in Myanmar. Photo: AFP

A delegation from Pyongyang had also visited the mausoleum less than two months before – “an excellent opportunity to survey the scene and plan an operation”, the report said. A North Korean ship unloading aid equipment in Yangon port two weeks earlier “would be consistent with the dispatch of an agent team,” it said.

A court in Myanmar – then called Burma – ruled that the attack was “the work of saboteurs acting under instructions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea”.

Its then junta cut off diplomatic ties with Pyongyang that were not restored until more than 20 years later.

Shortly after the bombing Dar San Ye and the three men who helped her were feted at a government ceremony and given clothes and money in compensation.

“Since then, they have never come to see me,” she said, with a copy of a faded and creased “Record of Honour” certificate all she has left to link her to the day.

With most of her family dead and little other support Dar San Ye now lives off donations from well-wishers. Photo: AFP

Under the current junta, the rebuilt Martyr’s Mausoleum is all but closed off – barring select diplomats invited to pay their respects to Myanmar’s independence hero.

Dar San Ye is a well-known figure in Yangon, and has been the subject of several documentaries and feature articles in Myanmar media.

‘We can kill you here’: inside the lawless Chinese-run scam hubs of Myanmar

But with most of her family dead and little other support she lives off donations from charitable neighbours that come to around 30,000-40,000 kyat (US$15-19) per day.

She has no regrets about the risk she took in the river that day.

“I tried to catch him just for my country. Once, our General Aung San was assassinated. Then his grave was destroyed again. So I went down to catch him.”

“I can’t let them insult my country.”

17. Peace Group's Application For Booth Rejected By NoVA Korea Festival

I vehemently disagree with the positions of PeaceNow! as they are dangerous to the security of the ROK and US. However, by denying them the ability to express their views we give them strength and legitimacy. Let them tell their story and let people decide for themselves. I am confident most critically thinking people will see through their arguments.

Let us stand by our values.  As Voltaire said: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."

Peace Group's Application For Booth Rejected By NoVA Korea Festival

Organizers of an upcoming Korean festival in Northern Virginia rejected the vendor application of the D.C. chapter of Korea Peace Now!

Mark Hand,

Patch Staff

Posted Sun, Oct 8, 2023 at 9:24 am ET

Patch3 min

October 8, 2023

View Original

Organizers of an upcoming Korean festival in Northern Virginia rejected the vendor application of the D.C. Chapter of Korea Peace Now! over a disagreement with the group's political positions, according to the peace group.

ANNANDALE, VA — Organizers of an upcoming Korean festival in Northern Virginia rejected the vendor application of the D.C. chapter of Korea Peace Now! over a disagreement with the group's political positions, according to the peace group.

The Korea Peace Now! Grassroots Network D.C. chapter submitted an application for a booth at the KORUS Festival 2023, a community event managed by the Korean American Association of Greater Washington Metropolitan Area. The festival, in its 20th year, will take place in the K-Market parking lot in Annandale from Friday, Oct. 13 through Sunday, Oct. 15.

“KORUS Festival organizers rejected the Korea Peace Now! Grassroots Network vendor application, citing the political nature of our work,” the group wrote in a letter to the event organizers on Friday. “Yet you are allowing both Democratic and Republican groups to table at your event.”

Two years ago, members of the Korea Peace Now! Grassroots Network D.C. chapter attended the 2021 festival to hand out leaflets "without incident" and with many festival attendees signing up to learn more about the group’s efforts, the group said. This year, the group decided to apply to be a vendor at the festival.

“It seems that your stated reasons for rejecting our application are disingenuous and instead based on a difference in political beliefs,” Elizabeth Hyunsook Cho, coordinator of the group’s D.C. chapter, wrote in the letter, a copy of which was provided to local news media outlets.

"Freedom of speech is one of the guaranteed rights in this country, and I urge you to support freedom of expression in order to strengthen our democracy," Cho said. "I am calling on you to reverse your decision and allow the Korea Peace Now! Grassroots Network DC chapter to have a table at your event."

Steve Lee, president of the Korean American Association of Greater Washington, said in an email to Patch that the KORUS planning committee reviewed its festival vision and decided not to allow individuals "to engage visitors on their own views when visitors are at KORUS to enjoy and have fun."

Representatives from the local Democratic and Republican parties purchased booth space, Lee said, and "are both recognized and established groups" and "are not similar to the individuals of KoreaPeaceNow."

"Our officers and volunteers are working very hard to bring a festival to Annandale, where it originated 20 years ago," he said. "This event is being prepared by hours of volunteers as it itself is a financial loss project. Yet there are some people like Ms. Cho, who believe if she does not get what she wants, it is bad and should be criticized."

Korea Peace Now! has worked for years organizing in communities across the U.S. and lobbying members of Congress to try to change U.S. policy toward Korea.

The group has raised awareness in Congress about divided families who cannot see each other because of the U.S. ban on travel to North Korea implemented by the Trump administration in 2017 and has worked with organizations of Korean War veterans that seek engagement with the government of North Korea, so they can retrieve bodies of U.S. soldiers killed in the North during the Korean War from 1950 to 1953.

“We believe that the root cause of tensions and militarism on the Korean Peninsula is the unresolved state of the Korean War, which is why we advocate for replacing the armistice with a peace agreement through H.R.1369, the Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act,” Cho wrote in the letter.

The House bill, titled "Peace on the Korean Peninsula Act" and introduced by Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), has 35 co-sponsors in Congress.

“As a passionate supporter of peace in Korea, I believe that the Korean American Association of Greater Washington Metropolitan Area is doing a great disservice to the community by silencing the important work of this grassroots organization,” Cho wrote in the letter.

Cho, who has worked on organizing the KORUS Festival in previous years, said she will be boycotting the festival if the organizers do not reverse their decision. She also said she will tell others in her network about the festival's decision "to silence the important work of these Korea peace activists."

In response to the boycott threat, Lee said Cho "should allow others to have their own thoughts and not force it or make threats."

"She should find other venues for her own motives, but not at a festival where people come to enjoy and have fun," Lee said.

​18. Inside North Korea’s plot to assassinate South Korean leader with explosives

About one of the national heroes of Korea.

Inside North Korea’s plot to assassinate South Korean leader with explosives

Retired ROK Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum tells NK News about his experiences of deadly DPRK bombing in Burma 40 years ago

https://www.nknews.org/2023/10/inside-north-koreas-plot-to-assassinate-south-korean-leader-with-explosives/

James Fretwell October 9, 2023

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South Korean leader Chun Doo-hwan and his wife Lee Soon-ja departing the U.S. on Feb.4, 1981, after a visit to Washington D.C. | Image: National Archives Catalog

Forty years ago today, North Korea attempted to assassinate then-South Korean leader Chun Doo-hwan during a trip to Burma. However, the assassins killed several of Chun’s top cabinet members and other officials instead.

“There was no fireball. It was like huge earth exploding upwards,” retired ROK Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum, who narrowly escaped the blast that day, told NK News.

On Oct. 9, 1983, Chun Doo-hwan and his entourage were scheduled to kick off an 18-day tour to Asia and the Pacific by laying a wreath at the Martyrs’ Mausoleum in Yangon, the Burmese capital. The mausoleum commemorated Aung San — an activist who sought Burma’s independence from the British — who was assassinated along with his provisional cabinet in 1947.

Chun In-bum, then a 25-year-old ROK army lieutenant, was chosen to accompany Gen. Lee Ki Baek, chairman of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), on the trip.

“They were looking for a colonel who could speak English and that the general would be comfortable with. And no colonel came forward,” Chun said.

“They looked for a lieutenant colonel and then it went down to major,” he recalled. “And they said, ‘Oh, to heck with this, let’s just take Lieutenant Chun, who’s the aide anyway and who speaks perfect English.’” 

“It was exciting,” Chun, who spent some of his early years in the U.S., said. “But at the same time, I was quite nervous because I was responsible for everything now. Scheduling, making sure everything went right, every little detail.”

On the first day of the tour, Lee and other high-profile figures, such as foreign minister Lee Bum-suk and deputy prime minister Suh Suk-joon, gathered at the mausoleum ahead of the president’s arrival.

Along with his other duties, Chun had also been asked to take photographs of the ceremony. However, Burma’s warmer climate meant the camera batteries were running out more quickly than he expected, so he headed back to his car to get more.

But on the walk to the parking lot, Chun saw several cars with South Korean and Burmese flags escorted by motorcycle police pull up to the mausoleum — Chun Doo-hwan had arrived.

The sound of a bugle marked the South Korean leader’s entrance.

And then, an earth-shattering explosion.

Republic of Korea President Chun Doo Hwan (center) views a display of tactical equipment as Major General William H. Schneider, Commander of the 25th Infantry Division, escorts him on a tour of the 25th Infantry Division headquarters during the joint ROK/U.S. training Exercise TEAM SPIRIT ’83 on March 11, 1983. | Image: National Archives Catalog

EARTH EXPLODING UPWARDS

Chun “did what a soldier would do,” running toward the blast to check on Lee, even though he was terrified that there could be a second explosion.

“I noticed that everybody else was running the other way. It was really, really scary,” he said. “The last 100 yards, I had to fight my instincts.”

Chun found Gen. Lee in the rubble. “His scalp had opened up; it was from one side to the other. I mean, nearly ear to ear,” he remembered.

Shrapnel had also pierced the JCS chairman’s left shoulder, and Chun said that “he had holes in his feet the size of quarters.”

The young lieutenant carried the general, who was drifting in and out of consciousness and in a lot of pain, out of the wrecked mausoleum and into a car to take him to the hospital.

“This guy [at the hospital] came over, and he asked who he was,” Chun said. “I told him, ‘Look, he’s the chairman of the Korean military. All these people are important, but this is a man that if he dies, you’ll have a serious military-diplomatic problem.’”

The hospital staff immediately took Lee away for an X-ray and decided they’d have to operate. But Chun refused to let the general out of his sight.

“At this point, I did not think it was North Koreans. Or even South Koreans. I thought it was one of the factions in Burma who wanted to embarrass the Burmese government,” he explained.

“I said, ‘Look, if my general is going into the operating room, I’ll have to go with him.’ And of course, they said that’s absurd and I said, then you’re not going to operate on him.”

“They agreed, so I was with him in the operating room for about three and a half, four hours,” he said.

Lee regained consciousness around two hours after the surgery was completed. “‘Where’s the president?’ That was the first question he asked,” Chun recalled.

Standing near the helicopter pad as Korean President Chun Doo Hwan departs after observing the joint U.S./South Korean Exercise TEAM SPIRIT ’85 are, left to right, Major General (MGEN) Claude M. Kicklighter, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, General Chung Ho Youg, Chief of Staff, Korean army; General (GEN) Lee Sang Hoon; General (GEN) William J. Livsey, Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Admiral (ADM) William J. Crowe Jr., Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet; and U.S. Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Walker on March 22, 1985. | Image: National Archives Catalog

NORTH KOREAN ASSASSINS

Chun Doo-hwan quickly returned to South Korea after the explosion. It turned out that he was stuck in traffic when the blast happened — the assassins had mistakenly assumed that the bugle was being played to mark the president’s arrival and detonated one of the three bombs.

Still, the explosion killed 17 South Koreans, including four ministers and four Burmese.

Chun immediately accused North Korea of being behind the attack, even though he admitted that he didn’t have any proof: “I’m sure evidence will come to light,” he said.

The dictator was proven right. An investigation found evidence of explosives used by North Korea in the past and Burma also quickly captured the three men responsible.

After watching the explosion, three North Korean operatives ran to the Yangon River to board a speedboat that would take them to a DPRK freighter to make their escape.

However, the speedboat wasn’t there. The Burmese police and military eventually caught up with the North Koreans, a gunfight ensued and one of the operatives died in the shootout.

The other two were captured but lost their arms when grenades exploded in their hands. North Korea may have modified these grenades to detonate immediately, killing the user and destroying any evidence linking them to Pyongyang.

The Burmese government executed one of the two North Korean operatives after he refused to cooperate with interrogators. The other confessed and received a suspended death sentence, ultimately passing away from cancer in prison in 2008.

It’s unclear exactly why North Korea carried out the bombing. Pyongyang might have been trying to spark a revolution, or at least confusion, in the South by capitalizing on resentment against the South Korean leader following the Gwangju Uprising in 1980, when Chun’s crackdown on pro-democracy protestors resulted in around 200 deaths.

However, the bombing failed to kill Chun and prompted Yangon to cut diplomatic ties with Pyongyang. The two countries didn’t reestablish relations until 2007.

Retired ROK Lt. Gen. Chun In-bum | Image: Facebook

SOUTH KOREAN OUTRAGE

South Koreans were livid following the bombings, with around a million mourners in central Seoul to show their respects to the victims and denounce Pyongyang.

There was also strong support in the military to take revenge, with Chun’s defense minister suggesting bombing the North. At the same time, other high-ranking military officials were also eager to conduct a retaliatory strike.

U.S. Ambassador Richard Walker was ready to convince Chun not to lash out. However, the South Korean leader told him he had “no intention of doing anything foolish or anything without full consultation with your government.”

As tensions were flaring, Chun In-bum accompanied Lee onboard a U.S. medivac aircraft that flew them from Burma to a facility in the Philippines.

Chun said he “wanted to be where the drums were beating and where the gunfire was,” not stuck in a hospital in a different country.

“But I was a young officer,” he added. “Young people, they think of very simple things.”

Nevertheless, Chun said he was relieved that war didn’t break out: “No soldier in his right mind wants to go to war — the crazy ones do, but the sane ones don’t.”

Lee survived his wounds and publicly credited Chun with saving his life. Many years later, when Chun In-bum retired in 2016, the general even presented him with a medal at his retirement ceremony.

When Lee passed away three years later, when he was 88 years old, his family, which didn’t have a direct male descendent old enough to take on the responsibility, asked Chun to act as the chief mourner at the funeral.

“It was a very somber experience for me, personally,” he said. “It’s beyond my ability to express in words.”

Edited by Alannah Hill

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com