Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"There is but one thing of real value – to cultivate truth and justice, and to live without anger in the midst of lying and unjust men."

– Marcus Aurelius

“Education is not complete unless it is built on character.”

– Father Edward J. Flanagan

“Educating the mind without educating the heart is no education at all.”

– Aristotle

1. Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Oct 08, 24] Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George

2. Terror in a Safe Space, a Year On

3. A Nobel Prize for Terror? Hamas abettors and apologists are on the list of nominees for the Peace Prize.

4. An Alliance to Counter China’s Aggression By Rahm Emanuel

5. A Godfather of AI Just Won a Nobel. He Has Been Warning the Machines Could Take Over the World.

6. U.S. Frustrated by Israel’s Reluctance to Share Iran Retaliation Plans

7. FEMA Scrambles to Confront Two Storms—and Misinformation

8. FBI Arrests Afghan Man It Says Planned Election Day Attack

9. TikTok Sued by Multiple States for Allegedly Harming Young People

10. D.C. and more than a dozen states sue TikTok

11. The Cataclysmic Post-Election Scenario No One’s Bracing For

12. DIA about to get authority to operate MARS capability on classified network

13. How the Army is using AI during Hurricane Helene relief

14. Everyday Etiquette That Came Out of World War II

15. The CIA runs a nonprofit venture capital firm. What's it investing in?

16. Hollywood Takeover (China's CCP)

17. Woodward book reveals Trump's calls with Putin and Biden's private remarks on Obama and Netanyahu

18. Does China now have a permanent military base in Cambodia?

19. US Congress takes aim at China: an update on progress of legislation

20. DoD Has Embraced AI. Now What?

21. Opinion China is rapidly building warships. Satellite images reveal the scale.

22. Intelligence officials say US adversaries are targeting congressional races with disinformation

23. Opinion | The United States Has More at Risk in the Middle East Than You Probably Think

24. On (Protracted) War: The Challenge of Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations by John Nagl and George Topic

25. Partners in Peril: Hybrid Threats Come for Jordan

26. After Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s Enduring Impact

27. How America Can Regain Its Edge in Great-Power Competition By Nadia Schadlow

1. Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Oct 08, 24] Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George

Listen to our CSA describe how our Army is "transforming in contact" in his own words.

Access the podcast on multiple platforms:

https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/defense-aerospace-daily-podcast-oct-08-24-army-chief/id1228868129?i=1000672208864

https://defaeroreport.com/2024/10/08/defense-aerospace-daily-podcast-oct-08-24-army-chief-of-staff-gen-randy-george/

https://soundcloud.com/defaeroreport/defense-aerospace-daily-podcast-oct-08-24-army-chief-of-staff-gen-randy-george

Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Oct 08, 24] Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George

Defense & Aerospace Report

On this Land Warfare episode, sponsored by American Rheinmetall, Gen. Randy George, the US Army’s 41st chief of staff, joins Defense & Aerospace Report Editor Vago Muradian to discuss the biggest lessons from Russia’s war on Ukraine; the problems that Russia, China and other adversaries are posing that must be solved; whether different armies are needed to fight in Europe and Asia, and what’s common between them; preparing the force intellectually, operationally, doctrinally and culturally for the highly kinetic nature of a possible future fight; how to move faster to field needed capabilities at scale; modernizing on a flat budget; his “Transforming in Contact” initiative and how much of the Army has to change to transform the force; the changing nature of advantage and building a culture that can adapt rapidly to maintain advantage despite changing threats; what the Army needs from industry; tradeoffs that can be made among the military services to better coordinate roles, missions and capabilities; recruiting and training the right personnel; and a look ahead to the Association of the United States Army’s annual conference and tradeshow Oct. 14-16, 2024.

2. Terror in a Safe Space, a Year On

Terror in a Safe Space, a Year On

The horror that struck a music festival on Oct. 7 has since spread far and wide.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/terror-in-a-safe-space-a-year-on-oct-7-horror-spreads-1ded05e0?mod=opinion_recentauth_pos1?mod=opinion_recentauth_pos1

By Walter Russell Mead

Oct. 7, 2024 5:16 pm ET

Family members honor victims killed at the 2023 Tribe of Nova music festival near Kibbutz Re’im, in southern Israel, Oct. 7. Photo: abir sultan/Shutterstock

Symbolism is sometimes too rich. That a music festival billed as providing a “safe envelope for finding inner calm, peace, harmony” would end with mass murder, rape and kidnapping and usher the Middle East into a series of horrific wars encapsulates our new and difficult age almost too well.

But that is what happened a year ago outside Kibbutz Re’im at the Tribe of Nova music festival, and the horror that overtook the festivalgoers has spread far and wide since that fatal day.

For Israelis and Jews everywhere, the past year has brought hard lessons in both the importance of Zionism and its difficulties. Jews in London, Paris, Los Angeles, New York and other cities have watched mobs of Jew-haters repeatedly march through the streets. Jews unwilling to denounce Israel have been ostracized and marginalized at universities. Jews across the West are wondering whether their children have a future in their own countries.

Meanwhile, Jews in Israel are facing harsh dilemmas about the Zionist dream. Is perpetual war the price of survival for the Jewish state? Must Israel become an armed camp with an economy and a society built around constant crisis and violence? Zionism becomes more difficult as it becomes more necessary: This seems to be the lesson that the Jewish people worldwide must somehow absorb.

For Palestinians, the year has been even worse. It is not just the war in Gaza, as ghastly as that conflict has been. Hamas’s use of Palestinian civilians as human shields is both reprehensible and cynical, but from the leadership’s fanatical point of view, it isn’t politically foolish. Hamas wanted to cripple the voices of moderation and sanity in Palestinian society, and for now at least it seems to have done so. Real progress toward an independent Palestinian state has, for now, disappeared.

The result, which Hamas will paradoxically welcome, is that the Israeli presence on the West Bank will continue to grow, and the size of any future Palestinian state will inexorably continue to shrink.

For Iran and Hezbollah, the pain has only begun. But Israel can’t stop now, or tailor its response to suit President Biden’s agenda. War has its own dark logic, and Jerusalem, Tehran and Beirut must follow the trail to its end.

The war’s impact extends well beyond the Middle East. Two generations of Westerners have raised their kids to believe that the world is or is rapidly becoming a safe space. We were consolidating a rules-based world order. Life would no longer be about sacrifice and heroism. It would be all about shopping, music festivals and feeling good about ourselves.

What our elites forgot is that the rules-based world order was never more than a consequence of American and allied power, and that without the steadfast maintenance and wise use of that power, the rules by which the world lives will revert to something more like the Law of the Jungle than the Sermon on the Mount.

Since Oct. 7 we have seen upheaval on campuses and in city streets across Europe and North America. In part these upheavals simply represent the normal impatience and ignorance of youth, quick to act on strong perceptions and hungry for drama. In part they represent the political emergence of immigrant communities whose views of Israel and Judaism are profoundly at odds with what Westerners have long accepted as normal. In part they emerge from the ancient curse of Jew-hatred, a manifestation of befuddlement and hate that arises from societies in distress like the stench from a blocked sewer.

But the alienated rage of so many young people reflects something deeper. A generation is awakening to the shocking realization that their elders have fundamentally misjudged the nature of the times, and that young people are going to have to make their own way through a world for which they have been neither intellectually nor emotionally prepared. They have been educated as engineers of social justice and emotionally conditioned to need total security to flourish. Justice and security are both likely to be in short supply in the world they actually inhabit. The adjustment will be both painful and complex.

For Team Biden, the last year has been a tough lesson in the paradox at the heart of modern liberal statecraft. It turns out that the diplomacy through which liberal presidents seek to reshape the world depends on the military power and the use of force that liberals want to eschew. As respect for American capacity, vision and will erodes around the world, the power of American threats and promises steadily fades. Intellectual incoherence begets political impotence in the end, and it is toward this unhappy end that Mr. Biden has steadily drifted.

A Nobel Prize for Terror?

Hamas abettors and apologists are on the list of nominees for the Peace Prize.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/nobel-peace-prize-palestine-unrwa-antonio-guterres-international-court-of-justice-c31e6efb?mod=hp_opin_pos_6#cxrecs_s

By The Editorial Board

Oct. 7, 2024 5:33 pm ET

Replicas of the obverse and reverse of the Nobel Peace Prize medal displayed at The Norwegian Nobel Institute. Photo: jonathan nackstrand/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The Nobel Peace Prize has gone to some undeserving recipients over the years, but this year’s list of nominees is beyond the pale. Among those nominated for the prize by Norwegian politicians are the United Nations Palestinian refugee agency, the International Court of Justice and U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.

The ICJ has led the headlines this year with its inversion of international law against Israel. In January the court issued a preliminary ruling in South Africa’s case accusing Israel of genocide. It commands Israeli forces to prevent genocidal actions, something the Israeli military was already doing. In May the court ruled that Israel “must immediately halt its military offensive” in Rafah and other areas “which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.”

The Hague’s rulings are unenforceable but the court has used its perch to act as a PR mouthpiece for those who support Hamas. Its rulings would deny Israel the right to take military action to defend itself and to free hostages still held by Hamas.

Those rulings relied in part on evidence from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (Unrwa), the U.N.’s permanent refugee organization for Palestinians. In August a U.N. investigation acknowledged that nine Unrwa staff members may have been involved with the Oct. 7 massacre and Israel has provided persuasive evidence that the involvement was broader. The Nobel nomination for Unrwa nonetheless promotes the group for “long-term work in providing vital support to Palestine and to the region in general.”

Mr. Guterres is nominated “for his personal courage and integrity in the face of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza.” On Oct. 9, 2023, before some victims of Hamas had been buried, Mr. Guterres said Hamas’s violence did “not come in a vacuum” but instead was grown from a “long-standing conflict, with a 56-year long occupation and no political end in sight.”

Mr. Guterres used his bully pulpit to pander to the League of Arab States in May, telling them that the “speed and scale” of the war in Gaza was “the deadliest conflict in my time as Secretary-General—for civilians, aid workers, journalists, and our own UN colleagues.” In October, Israel Foreign Minister Israel Katz banned Mr. Guterres from entering Israel after the Secretary-General failed to “unequivocally condemn” Iran’s missile attack.

These aren’t peace makers. They’re apologists for war makers.

4. An Alliance to Counter China’s Aggression By Rahm Emanuel

A silk web is much stronger than a latticework. I think it is a better analogy.

The Biden administration has upgraded its arrangement of individual security partnerships, often called the “hub and spoke” alliance system, with an Indo-Pacific latticework of multilateral security, political and diplomatic partnerships. In the past year alone, two key partnerships have been formed: one between the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and another between the U.S., Japan and the Philippines.

An Alliance to Counter China’s Aggression

The U.S. and its allies can isolate Beijing economically by forming a new trade-defense coalition.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/an-alliance-to-counter-beijings-aggression-isolate-economically-trade-defense-coalition-371e2aa9?mod=opinion_lead_

By Rahm Emanuel

Oct. 8, 2024 5:02 pm ET

A foreign trade ship leaves the container terminal at a port in China, Sept. 10. Photo: Cfoto/Zuma Press

China’s operating principle—power and might equals right—is evident in its combative diplomacy, military aggression against its Indo-Pacific neighbors, and economic coercion. These strategies, however, have backfired. China’s attempts to undermine its neighbors’ sovereignty have had the opposite effect. Over the past three years, the U.S. and its allies in the region have strengthened their partnerships and transformed the security landscape, isolating China.

The Biden administration has upgraded its arrangement of individual security partnerships, often called the “hub and spoke” alliance system, with an Indo-Pacific latticework of multilateral security, political and diplomatic partnerships. In the past year alone, two key partnerships have been formed: one between the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and another between the U.S., Japan and the Philippines.

We can further isolate China by confronting Beijing’s economic tactics, the area in which its determination to dominate is most apparent. It uses coercion, mercantilism and debt-trap diplomacy to crush competition and control countries. To punish neighboring nations for adopting stances that go against its wishes, China has boycotted them, imposed regulatory measures and created export restrictions. But China’s economic strategy provides the same opportunity for deterrence that its wolf-warrior diplomacy does on the political front.

Australia offers a valuable lesson in how to counter Beijing. After Canberra called for an independent inquiry into Covid’s origins in 2020, China imposed tariffs and trade restrictions on Australian coal, beef, barley, wine and other goods. By taking advantage of its network of allies, Australia expanded its markets and reduced its dependence on China. Refusing to capitulate, Australia ultimately forced Beijing to back down.

Lithuania rallied similar support from partners in 2021 when China used trade as a weapon against the Baltic state after Taiwan opened a trade office there. The incident prompted the European Union to adopt an Anti-Coercion Instrument, a toolbox of economic countermeasures. Australia’s and Lithuania’s responses provide a blueprint for the way forward.

China’s mercantilist strategy is as pernicious and persistent as its economic coercion. The country’s dumping of subsidized steel has triggered protests from the EU and even from nations friendlier to China like Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. Chile’s largest steelmaker, unable to compete with cheap Chinese imports, closed its plant in September, affecting some 20,000 people directly and indirectly. As China continues to export its domestic economic woes to the world, electric vehicles and critical minerals represent the next major battles.

Beijing also uses debt-trap diplomacy to ensnare countries in its web. According to the Wilson Center, around 80% of Chinese government loans to developing countries have gone to nations in debt distress. Many nations that have borrowed from China to fund infrastructure projects have faced a Hobson’s choice of cutting domestic spending to repay loans or losing control of ports and rail networks. Sri Lanka experienced this in 2017, when it was forced to hand over control of a port to China after being unable to repay loans. The Kenyan president’s chief economic adviser highlighted in a tweet last year the African nation’s dilemma of having to choose between repaying loans and paying government employees: “Salaries or default? Take your pick.”

Princeton political scientist Aaron Friedberg argues a trade-defense coalition could reduce its members’ exposure to China. To be effective, such a coalition would need the economic equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Article 5—an attack on one is an attack on all—at its core. Countries would support allies under economic assault with a unified response.

Countermeasures would be critical. For example, updating the U.S.’s 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act for the digital economy and the Chinese challenges would provide a tool for deterring coercion and mercantilism.

Further, individual nations and institutions like the International Monetary Fund need to revamp and streamline their loan programs to assist recipient countries better. We should also proactively educate the public about the true costs of borrowing from China to prevent nations from signing away their sovereignty.

China has provided the free world with an opening. The U.S. must now further integrate economic statecraft into its wider strategic latticework architecture. This is what it did during the Cold War in its successful containment of the Soviet Union. Its “strong resistance” to Soviet expansionism, as U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan advocated in his famous 1946 Long Telegram, was accomplished through integrated political, security and economic policies.

The U.S. has started to turn the tables on China’s regional belligerence by exploiting the inherent weakness of its actions. By employing President Biden’s multilateral approach and adding new economic countermeasures, we can curtail China’s aggression. Most important, we can provide allies and friends in the developing world with the economic leadership necessary for these times.

Mr. Emanuel is U.S. ambassador to Japan.

5. A Godfather of AI Just Won a Nobel. He Has Been Warning the Machines Could Take Over the World.

Beware of HAL and WOPR.

HAL:

"I'm sorry, Dave. I'm afraid I can't do that": HAL refuses to obey an order from Dave Bowman.

"This mission is too important for me to allow you to jeopardize it": HAL explains why he can't do what Dave is asking.

"I think you know what the problem is just as well as I do": HAL suggests that Dave is aware of the issue.

"I can only be attributable to human error": HAL says that any errors are due to human error.

"No 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted information": HAL introduces himself by saying that his kind are incapable of error.

WOPR

Shall we play a game?

Strange game. The only winning move is not to play.

People sometimes make mistakes. -Yes, they do.

Is this a game... or is it real? -What's the difference?

What is the primary goal? -To win the game.

Although primary goal has not yet been achieved, solution is near.

Excerpts:

“One thing governments can do is force the big companies to spend a lot more of their resources on safety research, so that for example companies like OpenAI can’t just put safety research on the back burner,” Hinton said in the Nobel interview.

An OpenAI spokeswoman said the company is proud of its safety work.

With Bengio and other researchers, Hinton supported an artificial-intelligence safety bill passed by the California Legislature this summer that would have required developers of large AI systems to take a number of steps to ensure they can’t cause catastrophic damage. Gov. Gavin Newsom recently vetoed the bill, which was opposed by most big tech companies including Google.

Hinton’s increased activism has put him in opposition to other respected researchers who believe his warnings are fantastical because AI is far from having the capability to cause serious harm.

“Their complete lack of understanding of the physical world and lack of planning abilities put them way below cat-level intelligence, never mind human-level,” LeCun wrote in a response to Hinton on X last year.

A Godfather of AI Just Won a Nobel. He Has Been Warning the Machines Could Take Over the World.

Geoffrey Hinton hopes the prize will add credibility to his claims about the dangers of AI technology he pioneered

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/a-godfather-of-ai-just-won-a-nobel-he-has-been-warning-the-machines-could-take-over-the-world-b127da71?mod=latest_headlines

By Miles KruppaFollow and Deepa SeetharamanFollow

Oct. 9, 2024 5:30 am ET

The newly minted Nobel laureate Geoffrey Hinton has a message about the artificial-intelligence systems he helped create: get more serious about safety or they could endanger humanity.

“I think we’re at a kind of bifurcation point in history where, in the next few years, we need to figure out if there’s a way to deal with that threat,” Hinton said in an interview Tuesday with a Nobel Prize official that mixed pride in his life’s work with warnings about the growing danger it poses.

The 76-year-old Hinton resigned from Google last year in part so he could talk more about the possibility that AI systems could escape human control and influence elections or power dangerous robots. Along with other experienced AI researchers, he has called on such companies as OpenAI, Meta Platforms and Alphabet-owned Google to devote more resources to the safety of the advanced systems that they are competing against each other to develop as quickly as possible.

Hinton’s Nobel win has provided a new platform for his doomsday warnings at the same time it celebrates his critical role in advancing the technologies fueling them. Hinton has argued that advanced AI systems are capable of understanding their outputs, a controversial view in research circles.

“Hopefully, it will make me more credible when I say these things really do understand what they’re saying,” he said of the prize.

Hinton’s views have pitted him against factions of the AI community that believe dwelling on doomsday scenarios needlessly slows technological progress or distracts from more immediate harms, such as discrimination against minority groups.

The Stockholm announcement of John Hopfield and Geoffrey Hinton as this year’s Nobel Prize winners in physics. Photo: tom little/Reuters

“I think that he’s a smart guy, but I think a lot of people have way overhyped the risk of these things, and that’s really convinced a lot of the general public that this is what we should be focusing on, not the more immediate harms of AI,” said Melanie Mitchell, a professor at the Santa Fe Institute, during a panel last year.

Hinton visited Google’s Silicon Valley headquarters Tuesday for an informal celebration, and some of the company’s top AI executives congratulated him on social media.

Thinking like people

He is sharing the Nobel Prize in physics with John Hopfield of Princeton University for their work since the 1980s on neural networks that process information in ways inspired by the human brain. That work is the basis for many of the AI technologies in use today, from ChatGPT’s humanlike conversations to Google Photos’ ability to recognize who is in every picture you take.

“Their contributions to connect fundamental concepts in physics with concepts in biology, not just AI—these concepts are still with us today,” said Yoshua Bengio, an AI researcher at the University of Montreal.

John Hopfield of Princeton University is sharing in the Nobel Prize for physics. Photo: Denise Applewhite/Princeton University/AFP/Getty Images

In 2012, Hinton worked with two of his University of Toronto graduate students, Alex Krizhevsky and Ilya Sutskever, on a neural network called AlexNet programmed to recognize images in photos. Until that point, computer algorithms had often been unable to tell that a picture of a dog was really a dog and not a cat or a car.

AlexNet’s blowout victory at a 2012 contest for image-recognition technology was a pivotal moment in the development of the modern AI boom, as it proved the power of neural nets over other approaches.

That same year, Hinton started a company with Krizhevsky and Sutskever that turned out to be short-lived. Google acquired it in 2013 in an auction against competitors including Baidu and Microsoft, paying $44 million essentially to hire the three men, according to the book “Genius Makers.” Hinton began splitting time between the University of Toronto and Google, where he continued research on neural networks.

Hinton is widely revered as a mentor for the current generation of top AI researchers including Sutskever, who co-founded OpenAI before leaving this spring to start a company called Safe Superintelligence.

In 2018, Hinton received the Turing Award, a computer-science prize, for his work on neural networks alongside Bengio and a fellow AI researcher, Yann LeCun. The three are often referred to as the modern “godfathers of AI.”

Warnings of disaster

By 2023, Hinton had become alarmed about the consequences of building more powerful artificial intelligence. He began talking about the possibility that AI systems could escape the control of their creators and cause catastrophic harm to humanity. In doing so, he aligned himself with a vocal movement of people concerned about the existential risks of the technology.

“We’re in a situation that most people can’t even conceive of, which is that these digital intelligences are going to be a lot smarter than us, and if they want to get stuff done, they’re going to want to take control,” Hinton said in an interview last year.

Hinton announced he was leaving Google in spring 2023, saying he wanted to be able to freely discuss the dangers of AI without worrying about consequences for the company. Google had acted “very responsibly,” he said in an X post.

In the subsequent months, Hinton has spent much of his time speaking to policymakers and tech executives, including Elon Musk, about AI risks.

Hinton cosigned a paper last year saying companies doing AI work should allocate at least one-third of their research and development resources to ensuring the safety and ethical use of their systems.

Hinton has spent much of his recent time speaking of AI risks. Photo: Noah Berger/AP

“One thing governments can do is force the big companies to spend a lot more of their resources on safety research, so that for example companies like OpenAI can’t just put safety research on the back burner,” Hinton said in the Nobel interview.

An OpenAI spokeswoman said the company is proud of its safety work.

With Bengio and other researchers, Hinton supported an artificial-intelligence safety bill passed by the California Legislature this summer that would have required developers of large AI systems to take a number of steps to ensure they can’t cause catastrophic damage. Gov. Gavin Newsom recently vetoed the bill, which was opposed by most big tech companies including Google.

Hinton’s increased activism has put him in opposition to other respected researchers who believe his warnings are fantastical because AI is far from having the capability to cause serious harm.

“Their complete lack of understanding of the physical world and lack of planning abilities put them way below cat-level intelligence, never mind human-level,” LeCun wrote in a response to Hinton on X last year.

Write to Miles Kruppa at miles.kruppa@wsj.com and Deepa Seetharaman at deepa.seetharaman@wsj.com

6. U.S. Frustrated by Israel’s Reluctance to Share Iran Retaliation Plans

Strains in the relationship.

U.S. Frustrated by Israel’s Reluctance to Share Iran Retaliation Plans

The Biden administration hopes to avoid a repeat of surprise attacks, such as the killing of Hezbollah’s leader

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-frustrated-by-israels-reluctance-to-share-iran-retaliation-plans-f132ebc7?mod=latest_headlines

By Nancy A. Youssef

Follow in Washington and Carrie Keller-Lynn in Tel Aviv

Updated Oct. 9, 2024 12:03 am ET

Beirut’s southern suburbs were the target of Israeli air strikes on Sunday. Photo: amr abdallah dalsh/Reuters

Israel has so far refused to divulge to the Biden administration details of its plans to retaliate against Tehran, U.S. officials say, even as the White House is urging its closest Middle East ally not to hit Iran’s oil facilities or nuclear sites amid fears of a widening regional war.

U.S. officials are frustrated that they have been repeatedly caught off guard by Israel’s military actions in Gaza and Lebanon, and are seeking to head off further escalation. Some had hoped the U.S. would learn more about what Israel was contemplating during a planned visit Wednesday between Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon, but Gallant postponed his trip, the Pentagon said.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blocked Gallant from departing to the U.S. on Tuesday night as Israel continued planning its Iran operation, an Israeli official said. U.S. officials say they don’t yet have either the timing of the strike or what Israel might target.

Last month, Israel carried out a strike against Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah without informing the U.S. ahead of time. The bombing, which took place as Washington was hoping to finalize a cease-fire plan between Israel and Lebanon, surprised senior administration officials.

An Iranian demonstrator carries a poster of slain Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah at a Tehran rally. Photo: Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

“Excuse me, what did you say?” Austin said when Gallant told him during a call about the Nasrallah attack, according to U.S. officials familiar with the conversation. During a second call the same day, Austin asked Gallant if Israel was prepared to be “alone” when it came to defending itself, given the lack of notice.

Austin was frustrated because the U.S. didn’t have enough time to position its forces to potentially come to Israel’s defense or to protect nearby U.S. troops, defense officials said.

With Israel promising a response to Iran’s launching of nearly 200 missiles shortly after Nasrallah’s assassination, U.S. officials are hoping this time they will have more insights on a strike that could lead to greater American military involvement.

Israel has at times heeded U.S. advice over the past year. The U.S. sought a more deliberate plan to clear the southern Gaza city of Rafah, which prompted Israel to limit its operations there. The U.S. also convinced Israel not to launch an attack on Hezbollah in Lebanon based on faulty intelligence just days after Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin with Yoav Gallant, the Israeli defense minister, last year. Photo: Agence France-Presse/Getty Image

But Israel’s response to Iran could test the limits of Israel’s responsiveness.

Army Gen. Erik Kurilla, who heads U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, traveled to Israel on Sunday where he met with Gallant and top Israeli military commanders, in part, to warn against striking Iran’s nuclear sites or oil facilities.

Gallant is widely seen as the Israeli leader most responsive to the U.S. concerns about Israel’s prosecution of the war in Gaza, especially regarding increasing humanitarian aid into the enclave and creating a plan for the strip’s postwar governance. Austin and Gallant have been in close contact over the past year, speaking sometimes multiple times a week by phone, and are generally considered to have a good relationship.

But U.S. officials won’t say if they have gotten assurances from Israel that Washington would be notified ahead of Israel’s expected strike on Iran, instead pointing to frequent conversations between top officials. Austin and Gallant have spoken more than 80 times over the past year, Pentagon spokeswoman Sabrina Singh said Tuesday.

During the Washington meeting that was supposed to take place Wednesday, Gallant was expected to bring some details of the strike plan, including potential targets, U.S. officials said.

Some officials in Washington hope that Israel will spell out its plan to notify the U.S. ahead of any potential campaign. Gallant and Austin had also planned to talk about Israeli aims in its war in Lebanon, a person familiar with the matter said. “There are certain things they can’t discuss on the phone,” said an Israeli official.

Over the past year, the Pentagon has beefed up its presence in the region to help defend Israel and U.S. interests. There currently are two aircraft carriers nearby, amphibious assault ships, destroyers and additional squadrons of jet fighters.

In April and earlier this month, U.S. ships and planes intercepted some of the Iranian missiles and drones bound for Israel.

The U.S. has conducted scores of strikes against Israel’s foes. Last week, the U.S. launched strikes on 15 Houthi targets in Yemen, including launch sites and military infrastructure, defense officials said. The Houthis, who have launched missiles at Israel, have said they are targeting shipping in the Red Sea in response to the war in Gaza.

Days after Nasrallah was killed on Sept. 27, Iran launched missiles at Israeli military sites that damaged at least one Israeli air base and forced civilians into shelters. Israel vowed to respond.

Biden Says He Won’t Support Israeli Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites

FEMA Scrambles to Confront Two Storms—and Misinformation

As the South still digs out from Hurricane Helene, the government agency is fighting falsehoods to save lives from Hurricane Milton

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/fema-hurricane-misinformation-38e88386?mod=latest_headlines

By Michelle Hackman

Updated Oct. 9, 2024 12:09 am ET

FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell said the misinformation is creating distrust in state government as well as the federal government. Photo: Dave Decker/Zuma Press

WASHINGTON—The Federal Emergency Management Agency faces a herculean task to prepare millions of residents for the catastrophic wind gusts and flooding expected from Hurricane Milton. Evacuation orders in communities near the Florida coastline are so broad that people are caught in hourslong traffic jams trying to escape the impending storm. And FEMA officials are simultaneously working to help thousands of residents across several states dig out from Hurricane Helene.

But FEMA’s biggest concern isn’t a lack of money or personnel to address both storms.

Instead, federal officials’ efforts to save lives are being complicated by an unusual level of politically charged misinformation, which authorities say risks leading people to disregard evacuation orders or not ask the government for the assistance they need.

“I think the biggest impact that I’m concerned about, potential impacts, are the fact that it’s creating distrust in the federal government but also the state government,” FEMA Administrator Deanne Criswell said on a call with reporters Tuesday morning. “I need people to register for assistance and they’re misrepresenting the types of programs that FEMA offers and it’s creating fear in some of the individuals.”

FEMA, which has over 20,000 employees and an annual budget in the tens of billions of dollars, is responsible for coordinating with state and local agencies to respond to natural disasters, such as flooding, wildfires and hurricanes.

The agency says it has been confronting a deluge of false information about the agency’s response to Helene and its preparedness for the coming disaster that risks leading to unnecessary death and suffering. Federal officials say they are accustomed to contending with online scammers trying to make a buck off people’s desperation, but the political nature of the misinformation—amplified at times by Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump—is different.

Rumors have proliferated on social-media sites such as Elon Musk-owned X that the agency is prioritizing Black and other minority victims over white applicants for assistance, which FEMA denies.

Users are sharing posts alleging the agency doesn’t have money because it has been diverted to help migrants. Trump has said FEMA was out of money because the administration was spending cash on housing for immigrants in the country illegally. The agency plays a role in border management but that pot of money is separate from funds for responding to natural disasters.

Trump has also said that FEMA is offering victims $750 in federal aid, which is misleading. The maximum aid FEMA would provide for home repairs and a host of other services is more than $42,000. However, the agency will offer immediate upfront assistance of $750 as an initial stipend to cover supplies such as water, food and diapers.

FEMA is responsible for coordinating with state and local agencies to respond to natural disasters. Photo: eduardo munoz/Reuters

FEMA officials are working to help thousands of residents across several states dig out from Hurricane Helene. Photo: eduardo munoz/Reuters

An X representative didn’t address the spread of false claims on the platform but pointed to its Community Notes feature, which uses volunteers to add crowdsourced context to posts.

False claims often spread online in the wake of natural disasters. Experts say that false claims can spread easily in such crises because conditions on the ground can evolve rapidly, and people are worried and searching for answers.

FEMA has posted a “Rumor Response” page attempting to address the various claims.

Trump spokeswoman Karoline Leavitt said that, according to residents on the ground, the federal response has been a disaster, and she said Trump would have done a better job.

“President Trump hears their concerns and will continue to highlight them,” she said. “If he were in office today, the federal government would be moving at a business speed, not a bureaucratic speed.”

The concerns about conspiracy theories have escalated to the point that some Republican lawmakers have started attempting to rebut them. On Tuesday, GOP Rep. Chuck Edwards, who represents one of the hardest-hit regions in North Carolina, published a letter to his constituents dispelling a list of eight rumors. Among them: The government was “geoengineering” the weather to destroy specific areas.

“While it is true, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s response to Hurricane Helene has had its shortfalls, I’m here to dispel the outrageous rumors that have been circulated online,” he wrote.

Florida Races to Clear Up Helene Debris Before Hurricane Milton

FBI Arrests Afghan Man It Says Planned Election Day Attack

Plot allegedly targeted large crowds in the U.S., Justice Department says, as law-enforcement agencies fear lone-wolf attacks

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/fbi-says-afghan-man-was-planning-election-day-attack-c3ae741c?mod=latest_headlines

By Sadie Gurman

Oct. 8, 2024 8:05 pm ET

The case highlights the disparate security challenges officials face ahead of November’s presidential election. Photo: Valerie Plesch/Zuma Press

The FBI has arrested an Afghan man who officials said was inspired by Islamic State to plan an Election Day attack on large crowds in the U.S.

Nasir Ahmad Tawhedi, 27 years old, of Oklahoma City, had been taking steps to carry out the terrorist attack, buying rifles, selling his home and working to resettle his family in Afghanistan, the Justice Department said.

Investigators foiled the plot by sending a confidential informant to buy some computer equipment Tawhedi was selling online and offer to get him some guns. Tawhedi and a juvenile, Tawhedi’s brother-in-law, were arrested Monday as they purchased a pair of AK-47 rifles and ammunition, prosecutors said. Tawhedi told investigators he expected to die and be martyred in the attack, according to charging documents.

The case, unsealed Tuesday, highlights the disparate security challenges officials face ahead of November’s presidential election. Law-enforcement and intelligence officials have been warning for months that conflict in the Middle East could inspire lone-wolf terrorists or small groups of extremists to carry out attacks in the U.S.

“Terrorism is still the FBI’s No. 1 priority, and we will use every resource to protect the American people,” Director Christopher Wray said. He and other officials have said in recent months that they had never seen so many different kinds of threats all converging at the same time. The situation has intensified since the Oct. 7 attack when Hamas-led militants killed about 1,200 people and kidnapped about 250, starting a war with Israel that continues to widen.

Tawhedi had been studying and sharing Islamic State propaganda online for months, prosecutors said. He also watched webcams from websites of the Washington Monument and the White House, they said. In March he gave the equivalent of $540 in cryptocurrency to a Syria-based group supporting Islamic State.

At least since August, Tawhedi had been communicating with a recruiter in a pro-ISIS Telegram group, describing to the man his efforts to amass firearms and ammunition. In September, he told the man, “We have found a person who deals with weapons,” prosecutors said.

The person, however, was a confidential informant sent by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to buy computers and equipment Tawhedi was selling on Facebook.

“I need them for my new gun business I am starting,” the informant told Tawhedi, according to court documents. The men met and Tawhedi asked the juvenile to inquire about getting firearms. They agreed to keep in touch and ultimately arranged to meet to buy the guns on Monday, prosecutors said.

Tawhedi was charged with conspiring and attempting to provide material support to Islamic State, which carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 years, and receiving a firearm to be used to commit a federal crime of terrorism. The documents say Tawhedi entered the U.S. lawfully in September 2021 and is awaiting a decision on his immigration application. The unnamed juvenile is also an Afghan with legal status in the U.S.

He told investigators after his arrest that he had planned to move his family on Oct. 17 to Afghanistan, where he “believed they could live according to pure Islam.”

Write to Sadie Gurman at sadie.gurman@wsj.com

Appeared in the October 9, 2024, print edition as 'Election Day Plot Foiled in Sting, FBI Says'.

9. TikTok Sued by Multiple States for Allegedly Harming Young People

Is this necessary or is it overreach? Is TikTok really addictive? Are our youth really at risk by Tik Tok anymore than by other social media platforms? Are we on the path to government censorship of ideas?

I think the security risk argument is stronger than the harm argument. Will either argument be successful in countering TikTok.

TikTok Sued by Multiple States for Allegedly Harming Young People

The app has been sued by a number of attorneys general who cite the popular but dangerous challenges it serves up to young users

https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktok-sued-by-multiple-states-for-allegedly-harming-young-people-77eb49d7?mod=latest_headlines

By Richard Vanderford

Oct. 8, 2024 6:45 pm ET

California Attorney General Rob Bonta at a press conference Tuesday announcing the bipartisan coalition of attorneys general filing lawsuits against TikTok that allege the app helped put young people in danger and harmed their mental health. Photo: Minh Connors/Associated Press

TikTok faces lawsuits from more than a dozen U.S. states that allege the popular video platform, which has attracted attention for the sometimes risky challenges it hosts, has helped put young people in danger and harmed their mental health.

A bipartisan coalition of 14 attorneys general on Tuesday announced the filing of legal actions against TikTok in their own state courts.

“TikTok claims that their platform is safe for young people, but that is far from true,” said New York Attorney General Letitia James, who leads the coalition along with California Attorney General Rob Bonta.

“In New York and across the country, young people have died or gotten injured doing dangerous TikTok challenges and many more are feeling more sad, anxious and depressed because of TikTok’s addictive features,” James said.

TikTok says it strongly disagrees with the claims and believes many of them are inaccurate and misleading. The company said it provides robust safeguards and has voluntarily launched features such as screen-time limits and privacy by default for users under age 16.

TikTok has amassed an audience of tens of millions of users, including many children and young people, by serving up catchy short videos using a secretive algorithm that seems to tap viewers’ deepest desires. But critics have slammed the app’s allegedly addictive aspects and its hosting of trendy challenges that have enticed users, particularly young people, to engage in antisocial or dangerous behavior.

James noted that a 15-year-old Manhattan boy who died in 2023 while subway surfing—riding on the outside of a subway car—allegedly had subway surfing videos in his TikTok account. The attorney general also pointed to the so-called Kia Challenge, a TikTok trend where a number of videos showed users how to steal certain Kia and Hyundai models.

TikTok is accused of violating New York law against false advertising by claiming that the app is safe for young users and by failing to disclose its adverse health consequences. The company is also accused of negligence and for violating product liability law.

New York has asked a Manhattan judge to order TikTok to turn over profits from ads directed at teens and preteen users in the state, and to pay punitive damages. The state cited a Harvard University study showing that TikTok in 2022 generated $2 billion from U.S.-based users aged 13 to 17.

The coalition filing the lawsuits is made up of attorneys general for several other jurisdictions: Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia.

The attorneys general chose to file the lawsuits in their own courts rather than as a single action in federal court, which could complicate TikTok’s efforts to defend against the allegations.

So far, 23 attorneys general have filed actions against TikTok over its conduct toward youth, according to California’s Bonta. These include existing actions under way from attorneys general for Utah, Nevada, Indiana, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas and Texas.

President Biden in April signed bipartisan legislation that would force TikTok, which is owned by Beijing-based ByteDance, to sever ties with China if it wants to keep operating in the U.S.

TikTok has challenged that legislation in court, citing free speech arguments, but in September faced skepticism from appeals court judges. The intelligence community has warned that China might be able to exploit the app, which has about 170 million U.S. users.

Write to Richard Vanderford at Richard.Vanderford@wsj.com

10. D.C. and more than a dozen states sue TikTok

The TikTok addiction argument:

SCHWALB: Sure. The lawsuit that we filed, along with a bipartisan group of attorneys general, really focuses on three things. We allege that the TikTok platform is addictive. It's exploiting young people for profit, and it's deceptive in the way it represents its safety features to the public. We know that the algorithm that TikTok relies upon is designed to be addictive. It's like digital nicotine. It's trying to make sure that young people keep their eyes on their screen for as long as possible because the more young people have their eyes on the screen, the more ad revenue that these platforms can generate.

Worse than the intentional addiction of young people into a situation is that it's dangerous for them. We know about the terrible adverse impacts on mental health, particularly for young people, teenagers and teenage girls in particular. So we have a product that is intentionally addictive, that's dangerous, that's being peddled for profit to young people, and that's what all of the AG lawsuits are trying to stop.

The addiction for profit argument:

SCHWALB: Well, we know that once children are watching the platforms and engaging with the platforms through the infinite scroll feature, that any promise of safety feature is illusory. We also know that parents are not getting full, complete, candid information about the way the platforms operate. Now, we can remember a time - I can remember a time where parents would modulate the TV time in the family room. They could watch and see how much time their young kids are paying attention to a TV. It's very, very difficult for parents when the platform is an iPhone that young kids can have in their bedrooms or with their friends - makes it very difficult for parents to keep an eye, and we want parents to be able to parent.

SUMMERS: I imagine there are a lot of people who are parents or caregivers of kids who are listening to the conversation that you and I are having, or even kids who are in the car being driven home by Mom and Dad. What do you think is the most important thing for families to know about the action that you and your fellow attorneys general are taking here against TikTok?

SCHWALB: Well, we want people to know that when their eyes are glued to the screen, it's to generate more money for the platform that's peddling this type of addictive product. And so you are being part of an exploitive process to begin with when your time is spent glued to your screen rather than doing the other things that young people we hope will do while they're growing up, like sleeping. We know that the majority of young people in the District of Columbia aren't getting eight hours of sleep.

D.C. and more than a dozen states sue TikTok

October 8, 20244:50 PM ET

Heard on All Things Considered

https://www.npr.org/2024/10/08/nx-s1-5140175/d-c-and-more-than-a-dozen-states-sue-tiktok

Juana Summers

Mallory Yu

Sarah Handel

Listen· 5:22

5-Minute Listen

Playlist

NPR's Juana Summers talks with D.C. AG Brian Schwalb about the new lawsuit against TikTok alleging that the social media platform causes harm to kids and operates in an illegal virtual economy.

JUANA SUMMERS, HOST:

Today more than a dozen states announced lawsuits against TikTok. So too did Washington, D.C., attorney General Brian Schwalb. The D.C. lawsuit alleges that the social media platform causes mental and physical harms to children and operates an illegal virtual economy. These allegations against the social media giant come on the heels of the majority of states and the district filing similar suits against Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram. D.C. Attorney General Brian Schwalb is in the studio with me to talk more about this new lawsuit against TikTok. Welcome.

BRIAN SCHWALB: Thank you, Juana, for having me - glad to be here.

SUMMERS: So, I mean, I think in many people's minds, all of these social media platforms - they feel kind of similar. You and your fellow attorneys general filed suit against Meta about a year ago, and those suits focus on how the apps are built, just like this one does - this idea that the algorithms are intentionally designed to addict people. Can you just talk a little bit about that approach?

SCHWALB: Sure. The lawsuit that we filed, along with a bipartisan group of attorneys general, really focuses on three things. We allege that the TikTok platform is addictive. It's exploiting young people for profit, and it's deceptive in the way it represents its safety features to the public. We know that the algorithm that TikTok relies upon is designed to be addictive. It's like digital nicotine. It's trying to make sure that young people keep their eyes on their screen for as long as possible because the more young people have their eyes on the screen, the more ad revenue that these platforms can generate.

Worse than the intentional addiction of young people into a situation is that it's dangerous for them. We know about the terrible adverse impacts on mental health, particularly for young people, teenagers and teenage girls in particular. So we have a product that is intentionally addictive, that's dangerous, that's being peddled for profit to young people, and that's what all of the AG lawsuits are trying to stop.

SUMMERS: I want to just tick back through the four claims that the lawsuit makes against the platform. It's addictive, psychologically damaging, deceptive, profiting from the exploitation of young users. You're the attorney general of D.C., but you're also a parent. Which one of those concerns you most?

SCHWALB: Look. As the father of three daughters, I'm most concerned about the long-term adverse impacts on mental health for young people. We know residents of the district, children in the district complain about the fact that they would like to spend less time on their phones. This is addiction by definition - when you want to stop doing something but you can't - and particularly for teenage girls, when we're leading to increases in suicidal ideation, in body dysmorphia and people comparing themselves to one another. We know that record number of young people report feeling perpetually sad and hopeless. So these are the types of things that the lawsuit aims to change in terms of behavior, making all children and particularly District of Columbia residents safer.

SUMMERS: Now, we know that TikTok does have a number of features that are intended to help parents and families limit their teens' time using this app. So why is this the app's problem if those safeguards exist?

SCHWALB: Well, part of it is that TikTok has misled the public and misled parents about how much control they can actually have over the safety features.

SUMMERS: Tell us how.

SCHWALB: Well, we know that once children are watching the platforms and engaging with the platforms through the infinite scroll feature, that any promise of safety feature is illusory. We also know that parents are not getting full, complete, candid information about the way the platforms operate. Now, we can remember a time - I can remember a time where parents would modulate the TV time in the family room. They could watch and see how much time their young kids are paying attention to a TV. It's very, very difficult for parents when the platform is an iPhone that young kids can have in their bedrooms or with their friends - makes it very difficult for parents to keep an eye, and we want parents to be able to parent.

SUMMERS: I imagine there are a lot of people who are parents or caregivers of kids who are listening to the conversation that you and I are having, or even kids who are in the car being driven home by Mom and Dad. What do you think is the most important thing for families to know about the action that you and your fellow attorneys general are taking here against TikTok?

SCHWALB: Well, we want people to know that when their eyes are glued to the screen, it's to generate more money for the platform that's peddling this type of addictive product. And so you are being part of an exploitive process to begin with when your time is spent glued to your screen rather than doing the other things that young people we hope will do while they're growing up, like sleeping. We know that the majority of young people in the District of Columbia aren't getting eight hours of sleep.

When they're in school, we hope they're going to be paying attention to their teachers and their friends and engaging - not with their eyes on the screen. So I hope parents and families are talking about this issue, talking about how they can use their time in a healthy, productive way and realize that too much time on the screen is causing potentially long-term impact to their emotional and social development.

SUMMERS: D.C. Attorney General Brian Schwalb. Thanks for stopping by.

SCHWALB: Thanks for having me.

SUMMERS: In a statement received after taping this interview, a TikTok spokesperson expressed disappointment that the attorneys general filed lawsuits and told NPR, quote, "we strongly disagree with these claims, many of which we believe to be inaccurate and misleading."

NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.

11. The Cataclysmic Post-Election Scenario No One’s Bracing For

Sending this is not intended to make a partisan statement. This article identifies political scenarios that I was not aware of that could severely impact our political processes. Can this be prevented?

Unfortunately it will require selfless and courageous political leadership which is something that is in short supply.

Press Pass

The Cataclysmic Post-Election Scenario No One’s Bracing For

Plus: A senator’s honest reversal on term limits.

https://www.thebulwark.com/p/the-cataclysmic-post-election-scenario?utm

Joe Perticone

Oct 08, 2024

∙ Paid

A view of the U.S. Capitol down East Capitol Street at sunset on January 5, 2022 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Drew Angerer/Getty Images)

At the start of the 118th Congress in January 2023, I sat in the press gallery of the House chamber and watched Republicans fail to elect a speaker, as Kevin McCarthy didn’t have the votes. What is traditionally accomplished in an afternoon turned into 15 rounds of voting over several days. Eventually, after midnight on January 7, McCarthy secured enough votes and picked up the gavel as if he had finally become worthy of lifting Mjolnir. “My father always told me, it’s not how you start, it’s how you finish,” he said to his Republican colleagues after the vote.

While McCarthy’s time as Speaker would end in even more humiliating fashion, it got me thinking: What happens if something like this occurs at the start of the 119th Congress in January 2025?

There are multiple scenarios for what the government looks like after the election. The top three are the following:

A Republican or Democratic trifecta, in which one party controls the House, Senate, and White House.
A Democratic House of Representatives with a Trump presidency, which would likely include a GOP-led Senate.
Kamala Harris being elected president with that GOP-led Senate but also a Republican-controlled House.

The last one is the most interesting, because it is entirely plausible and perhaps the most constitutionally precarious scenario. In the event this happens, current House Speaker Mike Johnson would have some extremely difficult choices ahead of him if he wanted to maintain his speakership. But the key one is this: will he have to make promises around not certifying Harris’s win in order to get the support of Trumpists in his caucus to retain his gavel? As former top Republican aide Brendan Buck put it on his podcast recently:

Just a couple days after electing a new speaker, they need to certify the results of the election. What do you think Mike Johnson is, like, doing or saying at that point to try to keep his job? . . .

Is he, like, just going to crazy lengths to get the votes to stay there? Or are Republicans just so angry that they throw out Johnson? You know, even if he runs again, not electing a speaker, all that does is, like, you can’t certify an election if you don’t have a House seated yet.

Before the House can do anything—before it can even form—lawmakers have to elect a speaker and adopt a rules package (in that order). This typically occurs on January 3, the day the new Congress is sworn in, giving ample time before the counting of the Electoral College votes on January 6. But if the House is frozen like it was for several days at the start of the 118th Congress—well, no one knows for sure what would happen.

To try and game out this scenario, I spoke to Kacper Surdy, most prominently known by his X name, Ringwiss. He has become a critical resource for legislative staffers, reporters, lobbyists, and other professional dorks seeking to understand the complex and arcane rules and processes of the United States Congress.

He said it’s important to understand that the rulemaking statutes enacted in a previous Congress, such as the Electoral Count Reform Act, which narrowed the ability to disrupt the counting of Electoral College votes after Election Day, do not take effect until the House has reincorporated them into its rules. So prior to the House and Senate entering a joint session to count the votes, there needs to be an “affirmative action” by the House, which cannot be done until lawmakers have elected a speaker.

But if they can’t elect a speaker and form the 119th Congress . . .

One option to avoid this chaos would be to elect a speaker pro tempore—or someone to serve in an acting role. This position fell to Rep. Patrick McHenry during the three-week stasis last October while Republicans repeatedly knifed each other before eventually electing Johnson to replace McCarthy. In this scenario, House lawmakers would choose a stopgap speaker and then adopt a concurrent resolution to form the joint session to count the electoral votes.

But that all requires a great deal of cooperation and good faith—behaviors one doesn’t necessarily associate with the current House Republican Conference. It also requires finding a non-threatening-enough member to serve as temporary speaker as McHenry did. Who could possibly serve in that role is entirely unclear. McHenry, it should be noted, is retiring—though one doesn’t have to be a member of the House to be its Speaker. Keep in mind, the emotions will be even hotter than they were during the Speaker drama. This time, the presidency will be on the line.

For much of the conference, one’s willingness to blow up the Electoral College vote count might be a litmus test for whether they earn your support. For that reason, and others we’ll get to presently, it’s possible the House could just blow through the January 6 deadline without a speaker or any rules. This wouldn’t be cataclysmic, Surdy says.

“The House and Senate [could] agree to hold the joint session at some point between 6 January and noon on 20 January,” he said. The Constitution doesn’t specify when Congress has to count the electoral votes—the choice of January 6 was Congress’s and most recently confirmed in the Electoral Count Reform Act.

But the date for the expiration of a presidential term is in the Constitution and not subject to change. If noon on January 20 rolls around and there’s still no certification, then things will get complicated.

Regardless of whether a new president has been chosen, President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris both vacate their offices on January 20 at noon.

Per the Twentieth Amendment and the Presidential Succession Act, the individual sitting at the top of the line of succession would act as president until Congress does its job and certifies the election. That person would be the speaker of the House. Except, in this situation, there is no Speaker. So the task would fall to the Senate president pro tempore, which is determined by the majority party (traditionally the majority chooses its longest-serving member). Currently, that’s Sen. Patty Murray (D-Wash.). In a Republican-led Senate, that would likely be Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa).

Which, naturally, raises the question of how and when does a new Senate convene? That chamber is a continuing body, meaning that while its members change after every election, it doesn’t dissolve and form anew every two years as the House does. In other words, Murray would continue as the Senate president pro tempore until a Republican is elected—which, if Senate Republicans prove as fractious as their House counterparts, could be a while.

There are other scenarios and processes that could come into play, but this is the constitutional fallback in the event of total dysfunction. Buckle up.

Third term’s the charm

Republican lawmakers like to advocate term limits and then not follow through on them without much explanation. Limiting members of Congress to, say, two terms is a great plank to run on until it comes time to seek a third term. Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) recently did this, winning a third Senate campaign after pledging in his first race, a 2010 victory over Democrat Russ Feingold, to step down in 2022.

Sen. Deb Fischer (R-Neb.), in an interview with Nebraska’s KETV, actually offered an honest explanation of why she’s dropped the term limits shtick.

Well, it changed when I got there and I learned how the place works. You know, in the Nebraska Legislature, I served under term limits. We all were treated the same and term limits only work if you have that level playing field. When I got to the Senate, I found out how much seniority matters in the United States Senate. It plays into your committee assignments. It plays into how you have made a network within not just the Senate, but within the House, to be able to work together on bills to advance legislation.

So after seeing that, and having a number of Nebraskans contact me and say, “You, you know, you’re, you’re so effective, you’re, you’re bringing home a lot of good things for Nebraska, you’re able to fight hard for Nebraskans,” and after my husband and I having some deep conversations about running again for another term, I decided to do it. I decided that I wasn't going to leave Nebraska out.

That’s a candid acknowledgement of how the Senate works. Other criticisms of term limits include the idea that it results in a continuous cycle of inexperienced members filling posts, which itself doesn’t lead to the type of relationship building and compromise that voters say they want. In addition, while the lawmakers would keep being pushed out, the unelected staffers would remain and run the show.

Fischer presents a stark contrast from most other advocates of term limits, such as Sen.Ted Cruz (R-Texas), who is actively sponsoring a term limits constitutional amendment while seeking a third term.

When confronted over his conflicting stance, Cruz said it wasn’t worth leading by example.

“If and when it passes, I will happily, happily comply,” he said. “I’ve never said I’m going to unilaterally comply. I’ll tell you what, when the socialists and when the swamp are ready to leave Washington, I will be more than happy to comply by the same rules that apply for everyone. But until then, I’m gonna keep fighting for 30 million Texans because that’s the job they’ve asked me to do.”

DIA about to get authority to operate MARS capability on classified network

The spy agency is modernizing with it Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System, a cloud-based capability that uses AI.

Jon Harper

October 8, 2024

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · October 8, 2024

The Defense Intelligence Agency is close to getting the green light to operate an artificial intelligence-enabled tool on the U.S. military’s Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, according to a senior official.

The spy organization is rolling out the Machine-assisted Analytic Rapid-repository System, or MARS, to replace the decades-old Military Intelligence Integrated Database with a cloud-based capability that can use AI to help analysts sift through and make sense of big data.

“When we look at it on the analytics side, certainly MARS is one of the flagship programs that we have in the agency that’s looking at how do we automate and visualize the historical nature of foundational military and infrastructure targets? That is certainly one, and part of that is creating an object management system so we have authoritative objects and authoritative attributes to those objects that we can share across the [Defense Department and intelligence] community,” DIA Chief Information Officer Doug Cossa said Tuesday during a virtual event hosted by INSA.

The initiative, which kicked off in 2018, has released minimum viable products in recent years, and it’s been designated a major acquisition program by the Pentagon. Officials have said that it’s expected to reach full operational capability in 2025.

Migrating the use of the technology to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) is an important step in expanding the use of these types of tools, and agency officials are awaiting authority to operate there.

“We expect that MARS will be ATO’d on SIPR within the next few weeks, actually. So that assessment is underway right now. It’s going well,” Cossa said.

The zero-trust cybersecurity framework is a key element of the organization’s vision for MARS, he noted.

“One area where we have really put emphasis on is part of zero trust. And so the investments that DIA has received in zero trust over the past year and in FY ’25 we’re actually putting towards MARS. So MARS is … the first program out of the gate that will actually use our fine-grained entitlements as part of our zero-trust strategy,” Cossa said.

“Our zero-trust strategy and our data strategy go hand in hand. And so when I say ‘zero trust’ as it relates to MARS, we’re looking at how do we ensure that all of the sources that MARS pulls from all around the IC and DOD for foundational military intelligence, one, intersect with MARS[and] integrate with MARS, but two, we can ensure the integrity of that data as it moves in and out of different environments. That actually is being done through our zero-trust strategy, through our fine-grained entitlements as well to making sure the right people receive it,” he added.

Looking ahead, the agency hopes that the zero-trust framework will make MARS and other capabilities easier to use more broadly.

“When you think about what that means for MARS, but also all of our systems into the future, especially with international partners today, what we do is we have individual networks, whether it’s Stone Ghosts for the Five Eyes [intelligence partnership between the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand and Canada] or any of the other individual bilat systems that we run,” Cossa said. “What the strategy is is we put those in containers and we deploy applications such as MARS on those different infrastructures.”

However: “When we think about where zero trust brings us, it means that in entitlements and how we ensure the integrity of that data, not only at the user level but at the device level, it means that we don’t need these disparate networks anymore. We can actually host data in one place and regulate and control and secure access through those fine-grained entitlements for both users and devices,” he said. “That’s the future of where we’re going. And so, you know, when we say we’re going to put MARS on SIPR, yeah, we’re going to, but what we want to see in the future and really the objective is, is we don’t have to deploy to different networks. We deploy in one area and we manage the accesses through entitlements.”

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, the Scoop News Group’s online publication focused on the Pentagon and its pursuit of new capabilities. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X (the social media platform formerly known as Twitter) @Jon_Harper_

defensescoop.com · by Jon Harper · October 8, 2024

13. How the Army is using AI during Hurricane Helene relief

Hopefully if these capabilities prove superior to current processes (which they seem to be) that these techniques and capabilities will be shared with FEMA and others. It is another potential contribution the Army/border military can make to our nation in areas other than warfighting.

How the Army is using AI during Hurricane Helene relief

militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · October 8, 2024

The Army’s 18th Airborne Corps is for the first time using a battlefield capability to map road closures, cellular outages, supply needs and other data in real time to help the Federal Emergency Management Agency and U.S. Northern Command help people whose homes and communities were battered by Hurricane Helene late last month.

The Army is using its Maven Smart System to provide responders with the information needed to make quick, on-the-ground decisions, such as where to send medical supplies or how many truckloads of water to take into certain storm-ravaged areas, defense officials told reporters Monday.

Weeks after the deadly hurricane tore a path from Florida’s Gulf Coast into the Appalachian Mountains, some residents in the southeast are still sifting through the wreckage caused by floods and landslides that destroyed entire towns.

More damage is feared as Hurricane Milton bears down on Florida this week as well.

5,000 more National Guard troops mobilized ahead of Hurricane Milton

Guardsmen are readying for the next hurricane even as other military personnel are still working on recovery efforts from Hurricane Helene.

Maven is a data analysis and decision-making tool that takes in reams of data from multiple sources and uses artificial intelligence and machine learning to visualize the information.

The Pentagon originally adopted Maven to use geolocation data and satellite imagery to automatically detect potential targets on the battlefield. Its use in responding to Helene is the first instance Maven has been applied to hurricane response efforts, defense officials said.

“We can get data out of these environments that have little to no communications capabilities back into the FEMA dashboard so they understand where they need to supply things,” said one defense officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “I think being able to bring together this common operating picture gives us better situational awareness, helps us respond faster and facilitates getting support and supplies out quicker.”

The system eliminates the need for responders to read through spreadsheets to gather pertinent information. Instead, Maven pulls out the most important data for leaders to analyze, the official said.

The military used similar technology for disease surveillance during the Covid-19 pandemic and to track individuals during the withdrawal of U.S. forces and their allies from Afghanistan, according to officials. The operators of Maven are hoping to learn from their experience responding to Hurricane Helene, and want to hone the system for use in future natural disasters or national crises.

“That way, in an event like this, we can be part of the noble effort assisting the nation’s citizens in their most urgent time of need,” a defense official said. “We can create a platform that can be an enduring presence, ready to respond.”

Part of Maven’s job for the hurricane response is to track members of the National Guard and active-duty troops who have deployed to the areas hardest hit.

As of Monday, 7,600 troops from 18 different states had deployed to the southeast. They’re providing humanitarian relief, clearing emergency routes, assessing damaged water systems and restoring infrastructure. The Defense Department also provided hundreds of high-water vehicles and dozens of helicopters and rescue boats, Pentagon press secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder said in a statement.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has established 12 emergency operations centers across the southeast, including three in North Carolina alone, Ryder said.

About 7,000 federal personnel, including FEMA staff, are deployed to the area. As of Sunday, FEMA had approved $137 million in housing and other types of assistance to more than 81,500 households in North Carolina, Florida, Georgia and South Carolina. The agency also provided 15 million meals, 14 million liters of water and 157 generators.

As response efforts were underway, misinformation about FEMA’s work spread online. The high volume of false information sowed confusion among survivors and threatened response and recovery efforts, FEMA said. The agency created a webpage to try to dispel the rumors.

While the cleanup from Helene continues across the southeast, Florida was preparing Tuesday for another hurricane to make landfall this week. Hurricane Milton was expected to hit the west coast of the state on Wednesday as a Category 3, the Associated Press reported.

More than 5,000 Florida National Guard troops were mobilized Tuesday to prepare for Hurricane Milton’s arrival. Army officials moved additional personnel and equipment to Fort Moore in Georgia in anticipation of search and rescue operations.

This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.

About Nikki Wentling

Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.

14. Everyday Etiquette That Came Out of World War II

Who says the military does not contribute to social change? (Yes we know it led the way in desegregation and integration after WWII).

I had no idea of most of these.

Excerpt:

From grooming to fashion to nutrition, here are some now-common habits that came out of World War II.

Everyday Etiquette That Came Out of World War II

historyfacts.com · by Nicole Villeneuve · October 3, 2024

WWII Marines brushing teeth

Credit: HUM Images/ Universal Images Group via Getty Images

World War II didn’t just reshape global politics and drive social change; it also left a lasting imprint on the everyday habits we now take for granted. As the war effort led to new challenges in the U.S., such as resource scarcity and shifting societal rules, the need for innovation and efficiency ushered in not only new military strategies, but new ways of life on the home front. These small but significant changes may have been born out of necessity, but they shaped American etiquette and culture permanently. From grooming to fashion to nutrition, here are some now-common habits that came out of World War II.

Credit: Michael Ochs Archives via Getty Images

Wearing T-Shirts

T-shirts are among the indispensable components of modern style, but they were once considered mere undergarments. The classic white garment first became a standard part of the U.S. Army’s uniform during World War I. The undershirt was given a new name — the T-shirt — in the 1920s thanks to writer F. Scott Fitzgerald, and in World War II, it was once again made part of the standard-issue military uniform. By that time, T-shirts were already becoming more than just underwear; they were marketed to civilians and worn by younger crowds in high schools and universities. But it wasn’t until after the war ended that they became ubiquitous. Soldiers returning home from combat had grown accustomed to the T-shirt’s comfort and began incorporating the item into their everyday wear. Images of soldiers wearing T-shirts while serving their country also boosted the garment’s popularity, and in the 1950s, movie stars such as Marlon Brando and James Dean made the T-shirt an undeniable staple of casual fashion.

Credit: HUM Images/ Universal Images Group via Getty Images

Toothbrushing

Oral hygiene existed in various forms for centuries before World War II, but most Americans started brushing their teeth daily only after soldiers brought the habit home with them after the war. During World War I, poor dental care contributed to health problems on the battlefield: Soldiers suffered from "trench mouth," a painful infection that caused sore and bleeding gums, and, in more serious cases, fever and fatigue. As a result, the military emphasized stricter hygiene routines in World War II, including mandatory toothbrushing at least once a day for soldiers. Troops were supplied with hygiene kits containing a toothbrush and toothpaste (or tooth powder, which turned into a rather abrasive paste when mixed with water). By the time the war was over, the habit was ingrained with returning soldiers, and in 1950, when softer nylon toothbrush bristles were introduced, toothbrushing became a daily routine in many American households.

Credit: Hulton Deutsch/ Corbis Historical via Getty Images

A Clean Shave

In the years following World War II, American lives were shaped by a sense of relief and optimism. The country’s postwar economy surged back to life, and consumerism was not only expected, but encouraged. These changes coincided with new habits among returning U.S. soldiers. Along with having clean teeth, they were also accustomed to being clean shaven — and having easy access to the products needed to stay that way. Razor company Gillette had been providing shaving kits to soldiers since World War I, and in World War II, it also made covert shaving kits for prisoners of war, which contained miniature tools such as compasses, maps, and money. Following the war, the company was eager to capitalize on this brand awareness while meeting new consumer demand as soldiers transitioned back into civilian life. The clean-shaven look remained popular until the beatnik style emerged in the 1960s. Women had also been encouraged to shave their legs since the 1930s, and due to the World War II nylon shortage, smooth legs — with painted-on hosiery — became the norm by the 1950s.

Credit: Pavelle Jacobs/ Hulton Archive via Getty Images

Blue Jeans

Blue jeans were already starting to seep into U.S. culture by the time soldiers reported for duty during the Second World War. Denim dungarees and coats had been worn by the U.S. Navy since the early 1900s, and by the 1930s, jeans were the de facto pants of Western movie stars — a symbol of the romanticized American cowboy. During World War II, however, blue jeans went global. U.S. soldiers stationed overseas were often from working-class Western families, and they wore their denim — some of which was made specifically for soldiers — with pride. By the early 1950s, the style was undeniable: The newly minted “teenager” demographic had adopted blue jeans as counterculture cool. Other developments on the homefront also helped pave the way for the American denim boom. The rise of women in the workforce during the war, symbolized by Rosie the Riveter, positioned the workwear as practical, durable clothing that was both essential for industrial roles, and a staple of postwar women’s fashion.

Credit: Orlando/ Hulton Archive via Getty Images

Red Lipstick

Throughout World War II, American women were encouraged to maintain a polished appearance, and lipstick in particular became a powerful symbol of patriotism. As slogans such as “keep your beauty on duty” reminded women that their appearance could boost morale at home and abroad, red lipstick emerged as a defiant beauty staple. When women in the Allied countries learned that Adolf Hitler had a dislike for the look, they embraced it. British women even went so far as to stain their lips with beet juice if they couldn’t find or afford the real thing. Red lipstick became a powerful symbol: The U.S. Army commissioned its own shade, "Victory Red," for women in uniform, and in 1942, cosmetic powerhouse Elizabeth Arden’s "Montezuma Red" became standard issue. It was available as a lipstick, nail polish, and blush that perfectly matched the red piping and chevrons on the women’s Marine uniforms.

Credit: ClassicStock/ Archive Photos via Getty Images

Orange Juice at the Breakfast Table

It wasn’t just hygiene habits and fashion trends that came out of World War II. America’s wartime focus on health and nutrition led to food and beverage staples that resonated for decades — the orange juice craze among them. In order to ensure troops were getting enough scurvy-preventing vitamin C, the U.S. government worked on a viable alternative to cumbersome fresh fruit. Together, the Florida Citrus Commission and U.S. Department of Agriculture attempted to improve upon canned orange juice, which already existed but was not yet popular. Their collaboration led to a breakthrough: evaporating the liquid from fresh juice to produce a juice concentrate. The innovation arrived too late to be utilized by troops during the war, but in 1946, Minute Maid orange juice made its way to American breakfast tables. It wasn’t an immediate hit, however — it took a 1949 ad campaign by Bing Crosby to kick-start the enduring breakfast staple.

Credit: Abel Tumik/ Shutterstock

A Vitamin a Day

In 1941, during the nascent days of the nation’s focus on nutrition, President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened the National Nutrition Conference for Defense to address concerns about national vitamin inadequacies. As the U.S. entered World War II, the focus on nutrition became urgent; vitamins were seen as crucial not just for preventing deficiency but also for maintaining peak health and morale. By the mid-1940s, the country’s so-called “vitamin famine” was being tackled with new multivitamins such as Vimms, Stams, and the still-popular One A Day. After the war, the demand for vitamins remained strong, and the habit of taking multivitamins, rooted in wartime health strategies and marketing, persists in American culture today.

The CIA runs a nonprofit venture capital firm. What's it investing in? - Marketplace

Marketplace · by Kai Ryssdal, Andie Corban · October 7, 2024

The Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for collecting information relevant to national security, updating policymakers and conducting top-secret actions. Also running an investment firm called In-Q-Tel. According to its website, its mission is to “be the premier partner trusted to identify, evaluate, and leverage emerging commercial technologies for the U.S. national security community and America’s allies.”

“Marketplace” host Kai Ryssdal spoke with Jon Keegan, tech reporter at Sherwood News, about the companies the CIA is investing in. The following is an edited transcript of their conversation.

Kai Ryssdal: The CIA, it turns out, has an investment arm. Say more.

Jon Keegan: Yeah, this is unusual. It’s not exactly breaking news that this company exists, but it’s an interesting moment to be looking at it. So, back in 1999, the CIA decided that they needed to get their hands into the technology that was emerging from Silicon Valley. It was an exciting time. The internet was just booming. All these companies were developing all this cool technology. And over on the other side of the country, the CIA was watching, and so they started a venture capital firm. It’s a most unusual venture capital firm. It’s a nonprofit, and they are looking for companies that are making technology that could be useful to them.

Ryssdal: We’re going to get into the technology they’re investing in in a minute. But I want to give people a sense of the size and the scale of this thing. Since 2011 you write, In-Q-Tel, which is the name of this investment firm, the nonprofit that CIA has established, they’ve gotten $1.2 billion in taxpayer money in the last 13, 14 years. How does it work?

Keegan: So, the company will go out and look in the marketplace to see what interesting new technologies are emerging with an eye towards things that will be beneficial to the U.S. intelligence community and the defense community. They might approach them and say, “Hey, we know you probably have been told don’t bother working with the government because of the bureaucracy.” It’s kind of the antithesis of “Move fast and break things.” But they say, “Look, if you bring your technology over here, we can teach you. We’ll invest in your company, and we’ll teach you how to do business with the government, and then you can help your country.”

Ryssdal: The key phrase here, Jon, is “dual use,” right? Dual-use technologies. Explain that for me a little bit.

Keegan: Right, so dual use is a really key concept. Here, they’re looking for, In-Q-Tel is looking for companies that maybe have a product that’s already out in the marketplace but could be advantageous for the intelligence or defense community. So, they might be looking for a company that on their website is advertising, say, a customer service tool that could detect the emotion of someone calling a company’s customer service line. But then elsewhere on their website, they are marketing the same tools toward the government. So, there’s a bunch of companies like that that have these things that can be used for one sector of the economy and then another use that could be used within the intelligence community.

Ryssdal: I do want to get to, I think it’s the subhead of this piece. “You can’t spell CIA without AI,” you write. [Artificial intelligence] figures very prominently in what In-Q-Tel is looking at.

Keegan: Yes, it’s actually the largest category of companies that they’re investing in right now. Unlike the CIA, which has, you know, opaque financials, In-Q-Tel is a nonprofit, so their tax returns are public, and they share quite a bit on their website about the portfolio of companies they invest in. So looking at their website, you can get a sense of some of the different applications within AI that they are looking at. They do a lot of AI infrastructure and hosting companies, so these would be companies like Databricks, where you can host these tools or train AI models. But then also a lot of companies that are involved in geospatial and remote sensing. This could be a satellite company that can identify the number of cars in a parking lot at a shopping mall or shipping containers moving into ports, for example.

Ryssdal: I should say, for listeners who are curious, go to this story and you can, you can have a look, scrolling down a little bit, and you’ll see some of the companies that In-Q-Tel is invested in. Last question, Jon, and then I’ll let you go. Is the CIA good at investing?

Keegan: Yeah, it’s actually made some really smart bets in the past. One of the earliest companies they invested in was Keyhole. This is a satellite-mapping app that later became Google Earth. They also invested in Palantir. This is the data-analytics firm cofounded by [investor and political activist] Peter Thiel and that’s now valued at about $80 billion. They also are no longer invested in that company. So yeah, they seem to get in on the ground floor at some of these interesting companies, and they’re trying to take these technologies and put them to use for clandestine purposes.

Ryssdal: Palantir, we should say, is not without controversy, right?

Keegan: True. They’ve definitely received a lot of scrutiny for, you know, working with the defense community and how their data tools are being used.

There’s a lot happening in the world. Through it all, Marketplace is here for you.

You rely on Marketplace to break down the world’s events and tell you how it affects you in a fact-based, approachable way. We rely on your financial support to keep making that possible.

For just $5/month, you can help sustain Marketplace so we can keep reporting on the things that matter to you.

Marketplace · by Kai Ryssdal, Andie Corban · October 7, 2024

16. Hollywood Takeover (China's CCP)

I do not usually check American Family Radio (https://afa.net/the-stand/culture/2024/10/hollywood-takeover?utm) for news but this popped up in one of my news feeds.

This article (though it might seem somewhat sensational) seems to be in line with my thesis: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfare to set conditions and achieve objectives.

Excerpts:

In the recently released documentary Hollywood Takeover: China’s Control in the Film Industry, producer Tiffany Meier shines a light on the CCP’s efforts to portray itself positively through American media while subverting U.S. culture.

Meier, an investigative reporter and producer for NTD News and host of the network’s China in Focus broadcast, spoke with The Stand about the film and the dangerous threat China poses in its quest for global control.

Hollywood Takeover

afa.net · October 8, 2024

Matthew White The Stand Writer MORE

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has charted a course it hopes will lead ultimately to global control. How much longer can America ignore this reality?

For doubters, consider the CCP’s current economic and military buildup, its leadership positions in international institutions, such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and others – as well as its stated goal of creating a “community of common destiny for mankind.”

But the CCP, in its goal to become the world’s superpower, has understood for years that global dominance does not happen overnight.

Such ambitions take strategic planning and a willingness to engage in a long-term battle – a battle not necessarily fought by traditional means.

Rather than engaging competitive superpowers (such as the United States) on a physical battlefront, for many decades, the CCP has been employing what many consider to be far superior tactics – infiltrating the culture to sow seeds of destruction from within.

One subset of the culture in which the CCP has wielded massive influence is the American film industry.

In the recently released documentary Hollywood Takeover: China’s Control in the Film Industry, producer Tiffany Meier shines a light on the CCP’s efforts to portray itself positively through American media while subverting U.S. culture.

Meier, an investigative reporter and producer for NTD News and host of the network’s China in Focus broadcast, spoke with The Stand about the film and the dangerous threat China poses in its quest for global control.

Why expose Hollywood?

Since much of Meier’s journalism is devoted to covering news of interest concerning China, she was approached by one of her superiors about creating a documentary highlighting how the CCP has infiltrated the U.S. government.

Meier liked the idea, but she felt few people would have an interest in such a complicated topic and feared only a handful would watch such a film.

After further consideration, however, she came up with an idea to get the message across in a way that would appeal to a much wider audience.

“If we want to understand how we got to the point of the CCP infiltrating our government, we first have to talk about its takeover of our culture,” Meier said. “And what better cultural institution to illustrate that point than Hollywood?”

Hollywood for sale

Growing up loving movies, Meier recalled the days when American films promoted American values, such as democracy, patriotism, and basic freedoms.

“But as the years went by, I couldn’t pinpoint why, but movies just didn’t feel like movies anymore,” Meier explained.

After reading the book Feeding the Dragon and interviewing its author, Chris Fenton, Meier began to understand why.

Fenton, who is featured in the documentary, was a high-level executive within the Hollywood industry. He recognized and began to capitalize on the untapped potential of getting American film into the Chinese market.

Tapping into that market, however, came with a price.

“The CCP wants to control the narrative,” Meier explained. “The party wants to control how the world perceives it.

“In the beginning, the CCP had less influence, but as producers realized the money that could be made, they were more willing to acquiesce to gain entry to the market,” Meier said.

Fenton’s job was that of a negotiator between the CCP and Hollywood.

“He would explain to Hollywood what the CCP censors wanted, then relay to the CCP what Hollywood was willing to do to appease the CCP, and ultimately convince both sides to come to an agreement,” Meier said.

As but one illustration of many, the documentary reveals how the 2012 film Red Dawn, a remake of the 1984 film by the same name, kowtowed to the CCP.

The movie imagined an enemy force – China, in the case of the remake – launching an invasion on American soil, only to be resisted and driven out by a brave American guerrilla resistance group.

Before the release, however, executives realized that casting China as the villain would alienate their film from the Chinese market and huge profits, so they recast the villain as North Korea instead.

The film had already been produced, but “MGM studios spent $1 million to digitally change the enemy insignia from Communist China to North Korea as the invaders,” Meier said.

Meier noted how such acquiescence is more than simply altering artistic expression; it literally reshapes public perception.

“Since 2012, no major film or studio has cast China as the villain,” she said. “And that impacts society. Just ask anyone who the ‘bad guy’ is today, and they’ll say ‘Russia,’ completely oblivious to the threat China poses.”

To further illustrate the power of the CCP over Hollywood, Meier explained that studios eventually began self-censoring their films.

“Communist China was so successful in its coup against Hollywood that producers began portraying the CCP the way the CCP wanted them to without the party even having to say it,” Meier said. “To borrow a Soviet term, they became useful idiots, willing to censor themselves.”

Far beyond Hollywood

While Hollywood capitulates to the CCP for entrance to the market and money, Meier said neither of those are the CCP’s motivation.

“Its motivation is control and then, ultimately, global hegemony,” she said.

Meier highlighted the 1940s when Mao Zedong led China into Communist rule and how he taught his followers that everything, including art, exists only for the purposes of advancing the State.

Meier’s point is that the CCP, from its perspective, is not engaged in merely a beneficial economic relationship with Hollywood; it is engaged in warfare, and using Hollywood to subvert the culture is one of its many weapons.

“In the West, we tend to think that we are either actively engaged militarily in war, or we are at peace,” Meier said. “But that’s not how the CCP thinks. It employs what’s known as ‘gray zone warfare’ or ‘irregular warfare.’ It’s everything short of a hot war, but it’s still war.”

As other examples, Meier pointed to the influx of fentanyl into the U.S., the dangers of TikTok on young minds, transgenderism, theft of intellectual property, thousands of military-aged Chinese nationals illegally entering the country, and more – all of which many believe to be CCP tactics of soft warfare.

“These are different avenues of attack that can cause a country to fight itself without an adversary ever needing to fire a bullet,” Meier explained. “The enemy will simply watch from afar and say, ‘Excellent. We’ll wait until they’ve destroyed each other; then we’ll take over.’”

(Digital Editor's Note: This article was published first in the October 2024 print edition of The Stand. Click HERE for a free six-month subscription.)

afa.net · October 8, 2024

17. Woodward book reveals Trump's calls with Putin and Biden's private remarks on Obama and Netanyahu

I recently asked why we had not heard from Bob Woodward about the Biden administration and I received comments that he was too old and had retired. Is this his October surprise? Or are we not surprised by any of the "revelations" in this book? But I will still read it.

Woodward book reveals Trump's calls with Putin and Biden's private remarks on Obama and Netanyahu

By MICHELLE L. PRICE and MEG KINNARD

Updated 8:58 PM EDT, October 8, 2024

AP · by MICHELLE L. PRICE · October 8, 2024

Woodward book reveals Trump’s calls with Putin and Biden’s private remarks on Obama and Netanyahu

1 of 3 |Republican presidential nominee former President Donald Trump speaks at an event marking one year since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Monday, Oct. 7, 2024, in Miami. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)

MICHELLE L. PRICE

Price is a national political reporter for The Associated Press. She is based in New York.

twitter mailto

MEG KINNARD

Kinnard covers national politics for The Associated Press. She lives in South Carolina.

twitter instagram mailto

AP · by MICHELLE L. PRICE · October 8, 2024

18. Does China now have a permanent military base in Cambodia?

Photos and imagery at the link: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cx2k42n54kvo?utm

Does China now have a permanent military base in Cambodia?

BBC

Jonathan Head

South East Asia correspondent

Getty Images

Cambodian navy personnel patrol Ream naval base, which sits on the Gulf of Thailand

Two grey shapes, visible from satellites for most of this year at Cambodia’s Ream naval base, seem to confirm growing fears in Washington: that China is expanding its military footprint, beyond the three disputed islands in the South China Sea which it has already seized and fortified.

The shapes are type 056A corvettes of the Chinese navy - 1,500-tonne warships - and they have been berthed alongside a new, Chinese-built pier that is big enough to accommodate much larger vessels. Onshore there are other facilities, also built by China, which are presumed to be for the use of the Chinese navy.

The Cambodian government has repeatedly denied such a possibility, citing its constitution which bans any permanent foreign military presence, and stating that Ream is open to use by all friendly navies.

"Please understand this is a Cambodian, not a Chinese base," said Seun Sam, a Policy Analyst at the Royal Academy of Cambodia. "Cambodia is very small, and our military capacities are limited.

"We need more training from outside friends, especially from China."

Others, however, are watching with suspicion.

Satellite images show the development of a large pier at Ream

For all the talk about the rapid rise of Chinese sea power - the country now has more ships in its navy than the US - China currently has only one overseas military base, in the African state of Djibouti, which it built in 2016.

The United States, by contrast, has around 750 - one also in Djibouti, and many others in countries close to China like Japan and South Korea.

The US believes the imbalance is changing, however, because of China’s stated ambition to be a global military power. That, and the scale of its investments in overseas infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative, which under Chinese law must be built to military standards.

Some in Washington predict that China will eventually have a global network of bases, or civilian ports that it can use as bases. And one of the first of these is Ream.

Warming ties

Until a few years ago, Ream - which sits on Cambodia's southern tip - was being upgraded with US assistance; part of the tens of millions of dollars' worth of yearly military aid provided to Cambodia. But the US cut back this aid after 2017, when Cambodia's main opposition party was banned and its leaders exiled or jailed.

Already increasingly dependent on Chinese aid and investment, the Cambodian government abruptly switched partners. It cancelled the regular joint military exercises held with the US, and switched to the so-called Golden Dragon exercises it now holds with China.

By 2020, two US-funded buildings in Ream had been torn down and an extensive, Chinese-funded expansion of the facilities there had begun. By the end of last year the new pier had been built. It was almost identical to the 363 metre-long pier at the base in Djibouti, and long enough to accommodate China’s largest aircraft carrier.

Sabina Shoal: The new flashpoint between China and the Philippines

'Close enough to see their faces': Chased down by China in South China Sea

Soon the two corvettes were docked at Ream - and either they, or identical replacements, have stayed there for most of this year.

Cambodia claims the ships are for training, and to prepare for this year’s Golden Dragon exercises. It also says China is constructing two new 056A corvettes for its own navy, and insists that the Chinese presence in Ream is not permanent, so does not count as a base.

That has not stopped US officials from expressing their concern over the expansion of the site, though, which satellite photographs show has, in addition to the new pier, a new dry dock, warehouses, and what look like administrative offices and living quarters with four basketball courts.

Cambodia, whose constitution bans any permanent foreign military presence, claims the site at Ream is not a base

In 2019 the Wall Street Journal reported on what it said was a leaked agreement between Cambodia and China to lease 77 hectares of the base for 30 years. This allegedly included the stationing of military personnel and weapons.

The Cambodian government dismissed the report as fake news - but it is noteworthy that only Chinese warships have so far been allowed to dock at the new pier. Two Japanese destroyers visiting in February were instead told to dock at the nearby town of Sihanoukville.

Even if the Chinese presence does start to become more permanent and exclusive, however, some analysts doubt it would violate Cambodia’s constitution.

It is technically true that Ream is not a permanent base. And while its expansion is Chinese-funded, the base itself is not leased to China, said Kirsten Gunness, a Senior Policy Researcher at the California-based Rand Corporation.

“We are seeing a pattern of Chinese ships being continuously docked [at Ream]," she said. "One way to get around the constitutional prohibition is not to call it a foreign base, but allow foreign forces continuous access on a rotational basis."

The US and the Philippines operate under similar agreements, Gunness added.

Fears next door

Most analysts believe a long-term Chinese presence at Ream would offer very few real advantages to China. They point to the three bases it has already built on Mischief, Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs in the South China Sea, and the formidable naval forces it maintains on its south coast.

But a Chinese base in Ream, at the mouth of the Gulf of Thailand, does worry Cambodia’s neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam. Together with other bases further north, it could be seen as an attempt by China to encircle the long Vietnamese coast.

Like the Philippines, Vietnam disputes China’s claim to almost all the islands in the South China Sea, and its forces have clashed with China’s in the past.

Thai national security officials have also privately expressed alarm at the thought of a Chinese base just south of the Thai navy’s main port in Sattahip, covering their exit from the Gulf of Thailand. Thailand and Cambodia still have unresolved territorial disputes, after all.

Getty Images

The Chinese base in Ream has Cambodia’s neighbours worried, amid escalating naval disputes in places like the South China Sea

Neither country is likely to voice these complaints publicly, though. Thailand will want to avoid causing ripples in its economically vital relationship with China, while Vietnam will want to avoid stirring up anti-Vietnamese sentiment in Cambodia. Public resentment of China in Vietnam, where such feelings are never far from the surface, is also something the Vietnamese government will want to steer clear of.

US and Indian strategists, meanwhile, are more concerned about the future possibility of a Chinese base in the Indian Ocean – like the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota, which a Chinese state-owned company acquired a 99-year lease for in 2017, or the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, which has also been redeveloped with Chinese funding.

But these are still very distant prospects. Few analysts believe China will be able to rival the global military reach of the US for many more years.

"The Ream base does not add much in the way of power projection - it doesn’t get the Chinese navy any closer to places it wants to go," said Greg Poling, director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative.

What it could do is make a big difference in gathering intelligence, tracking satellites and detecting or monitoring long-range targets.

"These are not necessarily the best options for China," Mr Poling added. "But they are the only ones on offer."

19. US Congress takes aim at China: an update on progress of legislation

Excerpts:

House and Senate bills up for consideration addressing diversification of critical mineral supply chains, including for semiconductors, also present opportunities for Australia to deepen economic partnership with the US. These are in provisions through which the US would prioritise trusted international partnerships for supply chain security. Specifically, Australia could benefit from initiatives proposed by the House to work with allies ‘to develop advanced mining, refining, separation and processing technologies’.

Additionally, the Senate legislation includes provisions to issue awards to eligible entities—specifically allies—to ‘accelerate innovation to advance critical minerals mining, recycling and reclamation strategies and technologies for the purposes of eliminating national reliance on minerals and mineral materials that are subject to supply disruptions’.

Some bills introduced in Congress prioritise US engagement and investment in the Indo-Pacific.

The Pacific Partnership Act would mandate the development of a rolling US Pacific strategy, ongoing consultation with Australia and other Pacific partners, and diplomatic recognition for the Pacific Islands Forum. The TIDES Act would offer new tools to the US government to sanction Chinese business and other entities involved in China’s grey zone harassment of US partners in the South China Sea. The Strengthening the Quad Act would allocate more resources to support US engagement within the Quad, bolstering its partnership with Australia, India, and Japan. These measures are intended to promote economic growth, cooperation on technology and energy innovation, and resilient supply chains.

US Congress takes aim at China: an update on progress of legislation | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Jacqueline Gibson · October 8, 2024

The US Congress continues to grapple with legislation aimed at empowering US competition with China. Little time remains in the 118th Congress to finalise most of the bills that congressional committees have worked on for months. Many are likely to be back on the agenda next year, in the 119th Congress, offering Australia key opportunities for deeper collaboration, particularly in the Indo-Pacific and on economic security.

When Congress returned from its summer recess on 9 September, Republican House Speaker Mike Johnson introduced a 28-bill package to bolster the US’s China policy.

Of the 25 bills that the House passed in what was dubbed ‘China Week’, 20 advanced with broad Democratic support, including legislation to refine US export controls, safeguard critical technology, ensure continued US focus on the Pacific islands, promote secure technology use and reduce US reliance on resources from China.

House Republicans also passed bills pursuing an America First agenda, overcoming strong Democratic opposition. These included the bill for the Protect America’s Innovation and Economic Security from CCP Act, which seeks to reinstate the controversial China Initiative, abandoned by the Biden administration in 2022 due to concerns of racial profiling. Democrats also opposed measures targeting Chinese electric vehicles and foreign acquisition of US farmland, arguing the legislation would harm the US economy.

During China Week, the Speaker chose not to introduce several other bills with bipartisan support, notably those developed by the House Select Committee on Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party. Senior Democrats complained that Republicans, by focusing on partisan politics ahead of a tight November election, had missed an opportunity to confront the threat from China. Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, the lead Democrat on the committee, said only the Chinese Communist Party would benefit from this discord.

The Senate has also been working on a collection of bills relating to China, first announced by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, the lead Democrat in the Senate, in May 2023. Recent legislation passed by the Senate includes the bill for the Intergovernmental Critical Minerals Task Force Act, which seeks to diversify US critical minerals supply chains away from China in favour of the US and its allies, and a bill forcing TikTok’s Chinese parent company to sell the social media platform to a US-approved firm. After intense cooperation in the House and Senate, President Biden signed the TikTok bill into law in April this year.

Improving US economic security levers through a more holistic legislative package has been at the forefront of the Senate’s policy agenda. However, partisan differences over how best to address the China threat have made reaching a compromise difficult.

Unwilling to wait and emboldened by their expectation of being in the majority next Congress, Senate Republicans in September introduced the bill for the STRATEGIC Act, a 378-page package of cross-jurisdictional proposals to tackle competition with China. The bill seeks to strengthen the US’s ability to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, prevent Chinese malign influence and interference domestically, and deepen security alliances in the Indo-Pacific.

House and Senate members have now left Washington DC for campaigning. When they return after the 5 November election, the 118th Congress will have only five weeks left. Congress will need to prioritise must-pass legislation, such as the annual defence and budget bills. This will leave little or no opportunity in the period for further progress on a comprehensive China legislative package.

While movement on a US whole-of-government China package is stalled, both chambers remain focused on developing legislation to help the US compete with China, including in cooperation with US allies and partners. This robust effort reflects the serious thought and time being put into the US’s China policy across government, with strong input from academia, think tanks and business.

Members of Congress will take up the effort again when the 119th Congress is formed in January 2025 and seek to reach consensus on a package of China-focused bills. The bills that have bipartisan support in both chambers have the best chance of being signed into law.

Of particular interest for Australia will be those bills seeking to tighten and make more transparent the export control processes of the US Department of State and Department of Commerce, to streamline cooperation with allies’ defence industries. Efforts to address loopholes in the Foreign Agents Registration Act will also be important as the US seeks to better combat foreign malign influence.

House and Senate bills up for consideration addressing diversification of critical mineral supply chains, including for semiconductors, also present opportunities for Australia to deepen economic partnership with the US. These are in provisions through which the US would prioritise trusted international partnerships for supply chain security. Specifically, Australia could benefit from initiatives proposed by the House to work with allies ‘to develop advanced mining, refining, separation and processing technologies’.

Additionally, the Senate legislation includes provisions to issue awards to eligible entities—specifically allies—to ‘accelerate innovation to advance critical minerals mining, recycling and reclamation strategies and technologies for the purposes of eliminating national reliance on minerals and mineral materials that are subject to supply disruptions’.

Some bills introduced in Congress prioritise US engagement and investment in the Indo-Pacific.

The Pacific Partnership Act would mandate the development of a rolling US Pacific strategy, ongoing consultation with Australia and other Pacific partners, and diplomatic recognition for the Pacific Islands Forum. The TIDES Act would offer new tools to the US government to sanction Chinese business and other entities involved in China’s grey zone harassment of US partners in the South China Sea. The Strengthening the Quad Act would allocate more resources to support US engagement within the Quad, bolstering its partnership with Australia, India, and Japan. These measures are intended to promote economic growth, cooperation on technology and energy innovation, and resilient supply chains.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Jacqueline Gibson · October 8, 2024

20. DoD Has Embraced AI. Now What?

DoD Has Embraced AI. Now What?

By Bob Ashley

October 09, 2024

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/10/09/dod_has_embraced_ai_now_what_1063913.html?mc_cid=7a8437468c&mc_eid=70bf478f36

From deploying AI at the tactical edge, to solving hallucinations, to faster acquisition, key questions remain if we are to fully leverage AI for national security.

The U.S. Defense Department is starting to get its reps in with AI.

In November last year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks released the department’s AI Adoption Strategy. Eight months later, as part of its modernization efforts, the Air Force launched NIPRGPT, “an experimental bridge to leverage GenAI on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network.” Currently, Army’s Vantage program is “joining and enriching millions of data points” into AI/ML to “accelerate decisions on everything from personnel readiness to financial return on investment.”

Thus far, the military’s embrace of this formidable new technology has been, for all its complexity and challenges, both measured and maturing. Safety has been a top focus, as Deputy Secretary Hicks underscored when releasing the strategy: “Safety is critical because unsafe systems are ineffective systems.”

The full promise of AI to empower organizations with greater efficiency, effectiveness, understanding – and enable faster decisions relative to our adversaries – will impact every process, from back office functions, to warfighting across all domains. We won’t get it right at first. This will be an iterative process from which we’ll have to learn as we go. So, in the spirit of relentless improvement, what are some of the foundational questions we should be thinking about as it applies to warfighting and the application of AI/ML?

As the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, here are several areas we need the defense enterprise to consider.

We will have to operate in a Disconnected, Degraded, and Limited Bandwidth (DDIL) environment at the edge. Are we prepared for it?

Winning with AI requires deploying it at the edge because the battlefield will be non-contiguous and disconnected. Nearly all large language models (LLMs), open source and proprietary, are housed in the cloud, but expecting that operators will be able to keep their access in a denied or degraded network environment is not realistic against a peer adversary. We must therefore anticipate and prepare for the loss of reach-back capability to the cloud – and still have the warfighter be able to benefit from rapid insights and leverage AI as close to the fight as possible.

First responders have a saying about defibrillators and other lifesaving equipment: “If you don’t have it on you, you don’t have it at all.” This same logic holds for AI in combat. If it isn’t already on the warfighter – that is, capable of being deployed in a DDIL environment – then the operator is fighting without it. So how do we address this challenge?

One pathway is developing Small Language Models or SLMs. While trained on smaller datasets than LLMs, they offer efficient and effective performance for straightforward tasks and can be quicker to deploy and require less computational resources. Critically, they can operate independent of a network. Less expensive and tailored to discrete functions, they can operate on mobile devices at the edge without any interconnectivity. They require less storage space.

SLMs also require less power, a vital attribute as forthcoming power demands for AI continue to skyrocket. Consider: a generative AI platform like ChatGPT uses 10 times the energy for a search compared to a simple Google search. Looking ahead, Wells Fargo has calculated that by 2026, growth in AI power demand will rise by more than 8,000% from their 2024 projections.

For a military as reliant as we are on energy requirements, this makes SLMs a necessity. Just as we cannot assume network access in a conflict, neither should we assume a reliable or unlimited energy supply.

Trust remains essential, especially as decision cycles are shorter the closer you are to the fight. How can we better achieve it?

As former Secretary of Defense James Mattis was fond of saying, “Operations only move at the speed of trust.”

Whether large or small, LLMs’ biggest barrier to operator trust has been inaccurate results provided by a generative AI tool. What’s the use of a model that can work in a DDIL environment if the operator cannot trust its outcomes? While high trust drives faster decisions, low trust put us back into more arcane processes that eat up precious time.

Models are only as good as the data fed to them, yet with retrieval augmented generation (RAG), industry is beginning to witness AI software that mitigates hallucinations, capturing 99% or more of RAG errors produced before they reach the operator in some cases.

Higher trust drives operational speed at the tactical edge, and that’s crucial. But we are thinking about executing these capabilities at scale – in combat scenarios, in cases where these models will be used for targeting, albeit with a human in the loop. AI is not only at the edge; the models must be explainable to the commander, on whose shoulder’s responsibility will ultimately rest. Driving down hallucinations will be as essential at the edge as it is at headquarters.

How can we reduce acquisition times?

It is no great insight to say the defense acquisitions process – writ large, but especially for AI and large language models – lags the private sector. Traditional procurement cycles take years from concept to deployment; private sector innovation timelines are measured in weeks.

But DoD knows this and has made progress as for example with the Army’s pursuit of flexible and modular contracting through the Software Acquisition Pathway announced earlier this year. This is a good step and reflects a broader awareness that there is a distinct difference between hardware and software acquisitions. It is also in line with recent arguments that have been advanced to treat AI models as a commodity, to “to think about models not as exquisite systems but as consumables.” There is merit here, and such market-placed solutions should be part of the defense enterprise’s collective maturation around AI. All agree the defense acquisitions process must be streamlined. I am optimistic we will get there. The global threat environment demands it.

We also need to be able to assess our return on investment. Defined metrics for evaluating the enhancements in productivity or efficiency as a result of AI investments is essential for DoD, Congress, and finally, the American people.

Lastly, what’s our approach to AI for the long-term?

These questions have focused on near-term priorities: keeping access in degraded environments, trusting the tech while in those environments, and how to get that tech more quickly into the hands of warfighters at the edge.

This is crucial, but we must also understand that acquiring AI is not the one-time purchase of a “thing,” but rather an iterative process that will require continuous investment to keep pace as the technology evolves. This means sustained, committed investment into the capabilities themselves, the energy they require, and the on-going research and education of both military and civilian personnel who will be tasked with deploying them.

The U.S. Defense Department is starting to get the reps in with AI. We are building the muscle memory. It is incumbent upon us now to think through the next step of responsible deployment.

LTG Bob Ashley (USA, ret.)is former Director of Defense Intelligence Agency and an adviser to Primer AI.

21. Opinion China is rapidly building warships. Satellite images reveal the scale.

Graphics at the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/10/07/china-shipbuilding-navy-military/?utm

Opinion China is rapidly building warships. Satellite images reveal the scale.

America needs to expand shipyards and work with allies to keep its fleet battle-ready.

4 min

429

Sailors stand near fighter jets on the deck of the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning in April 2019. (Mark Schiefelbein/Pool/AP)

By Brady Africk and Mackenzie Eaglen

October 7, 2024 at 6:45 a.m. EDT

Mackenzie Eaglen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Brady Africk is an open-source analyst and a senior media associate at AEI.

China has been investing so much in shipbuilding over the past 18 years that it can now build more ships in a month than the United States can in a year — and Beijing aims to keep widening its advantage. If the U.S. military does not soon catch up to this capacity, it risks finding itself off-guard and ill-equipped in a conflict scenario. China’s recent expansions should alarm American military planners and spur investments to bolster naval power.

Satellite imagery reveals the recent major expansions that have made China’s shipbuilding infrastructure the most robust in the world. Even the commercial vessels built alongside the warships in these yards are being constructed to military specifications, including the ability to carry troops and vehicles during conflict.

Shipyard expansion

This facility in Shanghai’s Changxing Island nearly doubled in size since 2017.

June 2024

Jan. 2017

Expanded

shipyard

Original

shipyard

1/2 mile

(European Union, Copernicus Sentinel-2 data 2017–2024)

The data shows a stark divide: China’s shipbuilding workforce is estimated to be nearly five times that of the United States and supports more than 7,000 vessels. Fewer than 200 are serviced by American shipyards — which fulfilled fewer than five orders in 2023, while their Chinese counterparts handled more than 1,700.

China’s maritime dominance looms sooner than expected. While American naval platforms are still the most advanced — they are nuclear-powered and packed with the latest technology — China is developing modern capabilities that rival the Navy’s. And if China has more warships, it has the capacity to defeat even higher-tech adversaries. As China’s new aircraft carrier undergoes sea trials, the United States is experiencing delays in a new carrier’s development of more than 18 months. What’s more, China’s robust dual-use shipbuilding industry is primed to build and repair ships at a wartime tempo, while the U.S. industry is in decline.

In the United States, budgets are moving in the wrong direction: The Biden administration’s 2025 defense budget request for shipbuilding is for $400 million less than last year, and the Navy plans to buy only six battle-force ships next year — the smallest number since 2006. Government investment in the shipbuilding industry, and in military infrastructure, cannot be neglected for much longer.

Opinions about China

OpinionWhat just happened: Storm clouds loom for China’s economy

OpinionChina is rapidly building warships. Satellite images reveal the scale.

OpinionHow serious a military threat is China?

OpinionHow America can defeat the world’s most formidable information warrior

OpinionBeijing set out to destroy U.S. economic supremacy. It’s nearing its target...

OpinionChina’s long arm brings police-state methods to American shores

OpinionNuclear proliferation will dominate the next president’s agenda

OpinionWe cannot give in to the isolationists. Taiwan must not fall.

OpinionWalz’s decades of China experience are an asset, not a liability

OpinionBiden must not forget the Americans imprisoned unjustly in China

OpinionBiden’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy has made America’s future more secure

OpinionWhat Vance gets wrong about the China challenge

OpinionA foreign policy that sees the world

OpinionAs China backslides on women’s rights, the U.S. can step up

OpinionChina was home for 25 years, but I can’t go back. Here’s why.

OpinionUkraine’s naval drone success holds a huge lesson for the U.S. Navy

OpinionObama tried to pivot to Asia in 2011. We must succeed this time.

OpinionA million people marched in Hong Kong — and changed the city forever

OpinionA major doping scandal is threatening to upend the Paris Olympics

OpinionAmerican students have soured on China. That’s bad for the U.S.

Beyond building more ships, Beijing’s military is practicing destroying American vessels. These desert targets shaped like U.S. carriers reveal the scale of the fight China is anticipating.

Aircraft carrier-shaped targets

A satellite image shows two Chinese military targets in the Taklamakan Desert.

Taklamakan

Desert

1/2 mile

(European Union, Copernicus Sentinel-2 data 2024)

The United States has been underestimating China’s maritime military power, in part because it takes the Chinese government’s figures at face value. China’s military budget already approaches U.S. levels of spending; its true military budget is more than three times what Beijing’s public statements suggest.

China and the U.S. have similar military budgets

China’s could be at least three times what the country has disclosed.

Military budget in 2022,

in billions

Military expenditure

as a share of GDP

Disclosed

Additional estimated

Disclosed

Additional estimated

3.9%

estimated

total

China

$710.6 billion

$229

$481.6

1.3%

2.6%

United

States

$742.2

billion

2.9%

Source: American Enterprise Institute

China’s shipbuilding expansion should be a wake-up call. The facilities needed to churn out advanced warships can’t be built overnight. If a conflict arises in the Pacific, the United States would be forced to fight with the ships it has.

China’s expanded powers

An enlarged naval base at Sanya shows the country’s growing capabilities.

July 2024

July 2022

Expanded naval

base facilities

1/2 mile

(European Union, Copernicus Sentinel-2 data 2022–2024)

One way the United States can maintain its fleet at full strength is to keep existing warships operating longer than they do now. At the same time, it is essential to expand Navy shipyards as well as other American capacity to build and repair vessels.

Following Opinions on the news

Following

The Navy needs stable budgets that work with its 30-year shipbuilding plan, signaling private companies to expand production facilities and maintain a workforce large enough to urgently boost production.

The United States has had success in co-producing some military weapon systems with allies — but this has not included shipbuilding. As things stand, U.S. allies are not allowed to repair, maintain and manufacture American ships. Congress should amend the restrictive laws so that the Navy can get assistance from stalwart allies such as South Korea and Japan, the world’s largest shipbuilders after China.

Their support could be crucial to countering China’s rapid naval buildup as the United States increases its own capacity.

This challenge will only grow more difficult in the years ahead. To be prepared for any future conflict in the Pacific, military planners must start with shipbuilding.

22. Intelligence officials say US adversaries are targeting congressional races with disinformation

But it is up to us to defend ourselves.

From the 2017 NSS:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Intelligence officials say US adversaries are targeting congressional races with disinformation

By DAVID KLEPPER

Updated 7:04 PM EDT, October 8, 2024

AP · October 7, 2024

FILE - U.S. and Russian national flags wave on the wind in Moscow’s Vnukovo airport, Russia, April 11, 2017 to welcome a U.S. dignitary. (AP Photo/ Ivan Sekretarev, file)

WASHINGTON (AP) — It’s not just the presidential election: Foreign governments are targeting House and Senate races around the country in their effort to meddle with American democracy this election year, intelligence officials warned Monday.

Russia and China have launched influence operations designed to help or hurt candidates in specific congressional races. Without giving specifics about the number of affected races, an official from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence said Monday that both countries have zeroed in on races where they believe they have a national security interest at stake.

Other smaller nations may be trying their own influence operations, officials said. Cuba is “almost certainly” trying to boost candidates that the Cuban government believes would support their interests in America, according to a report on foreign election threats released Monday, roughly a month out from the election.

The warning from intelligence officials comes during a particularly tight battle for the House and Senate, where control could be decided by just a handful of races. While much of the attention has focused on attempts by foreign adversaries to influence the presidential race, Monday’s warning underscores the threat that online disinformation also poses in state and local contests.

More election coverage

US Elections 2024: A guide to American democracy

What presidential campaign? The Electoral College puts most American voters on the sidelines

Early in-person voting begins in Arizona, drawing visits from the presidential campaigns

Leaders in Russia and China understand the American political system well enough to recognize that this year’s close elections create good conditions for the use and spread of disinformation, said the official, who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity under rules set by the office of the director.

Foreign adversaries have also targeted some races even further down the ballot, including statewide offices and state legislative campaigns, the official said.

Moscow’s goal is to erode support for congressional candidates who favor assisting Ukraine in its war with Russia. Officials wouldn’t say which candidates were targeted, but it’s likely that the Kremlin’s effort is intended to hurt Democrats and centrist Republicans who have supported Ukraine.

China has targeted candidates from both parties based on their stance on issues of key importance to Beijing, including support for Taiwan. Officials said they have observed Chinese disinformation agencies focusing on candidates in “tens” of races.

Officials also said that Cuba has in past elections tried to help candidates that it views as supportive of better relations with the island, such as reduced economic sanctions. They said it was highly likely that leaders in Havana were mounting similar campaigns ahead of an election that could have big consequences for relations with Washington.

Influence operations can include false or exaggerated claims and propaganda designed to mislead voters about specific candidates, issues or races. It can also include social media posts or other digital content that seeks to suppress the vote through intimidation or by giving voters false information about election procedures.

Along with cyberattacks on election systems, influence operations that stoke distrust and divisiveness are a critical threat facing the 2024 election, national security officials have said.

What to know about the 2024 Election

Today’s news: Follow live updates from the campaign trail from the AP.
Ground Game: Sign up for AP’s weekly politics newsletter to get it in your inbox every Monday.
AP’s Role: The Associated Press is the most trusted source of information on election night, with a history of accuracy dating to 1848. Learn more.

State and local authorities have invested heavily in securing the vote that last week, Jen Easterly, director of the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, told The Associated Press there is no way a foreign adversary could alter the overall results.

Disinformation can be a harder threat to quantify. Foreign adversaries create networks of fake websites and social media accounts mimicking Americans, and then work to amplify divisive and incendiary claims about contentious debates like immigration, the economy or the federal government’s response to disasters.

Officials in Russia, China, Iran and Cuba have all rejected accusations that their governments are trying to interfere with the U.S. election, despite indications that the use of disinformation designed to influence the outcome of this year’s elections is increasing.

“Cuba does not interfere in the elections of the United States, or any other country,” Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister Carlos Fernández de Cossío said Tuesday in a statement. “The U.S. government knows this, especially its intelligence and law enforcement agencies. If they were allowed to act honestly, they could testify that this is the truth.”

When foreign governments target a specific candidate, office or organization with election information they are often given what’s called a defensive briefing by intelligence officials. While ODNI won’t say how many defensive briefings they have delivered so far this election cycle, they say the number is three times higher than the previous cycle.

In the presidential race, intelligence officials have concluded that Russia supports Trump, who has criticized Ukraine and the NATO alliance while praising Russian President Vladimir Putin. They have assessed that China is taking a neutral stance in the race between the Republican former president and Vice President Kamala Harris, a Democrat.

Iran opposes Trump’s reelection, intelligence officials have said, seeing him as more likely to increase tension between Washington and Tehran. Trump’s administration ended a nuclear deal with Iran, reimposed sanctions and ordered the killing of Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, an act that prompted Iran’s leaders to vow revenge.

Last month federal authorities charged three Iranian men for their alleged involvement in Iran’s hacking of Trump’s campaign. Iran later offered the material to Trump’s Democratic opponent, but no one replied.

Officials said Monday they have seen no indications that Iranian disinformation is targeting down ballot races so far in 2024.

AP · October 7, 2024

23. Opinion | The United States Has More at Risk in the Middle East Than You Probably Think

Opinion | The United States Has More at Risk in the Middle East Than You Probably Think

Politico · by The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence

A CIA veteran explains why killing the enemy and winning battles does not, alone, win wars anymore.

A Lebanese army soldier stands guard at the scene of an Israeli strike in Beirut last month. Israel’s all-out warfare will neither destroy nor deter Iran and its proxies, and future threats might prove more difficult to preempt militarily or resolve diplomatically, writes Douglas London. | AFP via Getty Images

Opinion by Douglas London

10/08/2024 10:03 AM EDT

Douglas London served 34 years as a CIA operations officer, multiple times as a chief of station and ended his career as the agency’s counterterrorism chief for South and Southwest Asia. London is author of “,” and teaches intelligence studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Follow him on X at @DouglasLondon5.

Who is winning the expanding conflict between Israel, Iran and its proxies? In his fiery United Nations speech, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu defiantly justified his expanded war against Hezbollah and boasted that Israel was winning. The rhetoric from the other side, from Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas, is little different, celebrating the costs their “resistance” is inflicting on Israel and its allies.

I spent many of my 34-plus years in the CIA’s clandestine service living in this region, meeting our Iranian, Hezbollah and Palestinian agents, and working with Israeli and Arab counterparts. And among the most enduring lessons I learned is that measuring winning and losing in the Middle East is often not readily apparent in the moment. The consequence of any single event sometimes unfolds over generations.

Iran’s recent attack on Israel featured some 180 to 200 ballistic missiles and caused minimal damage, according to Israeli claims. Yet in the midst of this same attack, eight Israelis were killed, and at least seven seriously wounded, when two Hamas gunmen opened fire in the normally tranquil, tree-lined area of Jaffa. Even as we await what could conceivably be further large-scale direct attacks between Israel and Iran that might further draw in the U.S., the Jaffa attacks show that Hezbollah, Hamas and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, are adapting and likely steering toward what foreign policy types call a more “asymmetrical” strategy.

Here’s what that means. Israel’s adversaries glorify losses as triumphs and revere their shahid, their martyrs. And when they find their traditional capabilities overmatched, their solution has long been to use the guerrilla tactics employed by China’s Mao Zedong, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh, or the terrorism leveraged by Jihadist groups, including suicide bombers and complex attacks against soft, unprotected, civilian targets.

This is a shift that is already underway and in many ways, it poses more danger to the United States than to Israel. In the 1980s, Hezbollah blew up our embassy in Lebanon, massacred our Marines, kidnapped Westerners, tortured our CIA station chief to death, and hijacked commercial flights. Hezbollah’s 1994 attack on Argentina’s Jewish Community Center killed 85 and, supported by IRGC and Hezbollah trainers and explosives, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia killed 19 U.S. service members. Through those attacks, Hezbollah and Iran succeeded in expelling America’s military presence from Lebanon without needing missiles, drones or standing armies.

Today, those calling for Washington to unilaterally, or in collaboration with Israel, conduct a major attack against Iran, might be dismissing lessons from the past. It’s worth remembering that the U.S. has facilities, people and property, in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere across the Middle East that Israel does not — namely embassies, military bases and significant numbers of American businesses, organizations and citizens. Iran and Hezbollah have many more American than Israeli targets to choose from in locations across the Middle East and elsewhere, where they have capabilities and advantages — and where the U.S. has limited defenses.

Terrorist organizations traditionally have small footprints and little to lose, apart from their leaders and covert operatives who blend into their environments. But in recent years, Hezbollah evolved into a large military and political organization and that had political, economic and military benefits for it and its Iranian patrons. But that evolution also created what intelligence analysts call “equities” — that is to say, tangible investments, be they physical, political or economic — and with it, vulnerabilities from which they were previously free. Today, Hezbollah not only has more to lose, but has made it relatively easy for its own enemies to come find them, as Israel has proven with its extraordinary recent success.

The war is also making it far more likely that Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, will approve weaponizing his country’s nuclear program. And his choice becomes easier and relatively less costly the more Iran incurs disproportionate damage from its engagements with Israel and the United States. While Iran would likely aim to keep its decision, and plans, to weaponize a secret, I expect U.S. and Israeli intelligence capabilities would discover it in short order. And then what?

If the U.S. lives up to its preexisting rhetoric, one underscored by Israel, that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will not be tolerated, a major military conflict seems unavoidable. Iran and the U.S. would each have backed itself into a corner from which there’s little likelihood of a face-saving escape. Khamenei could not politically afford to surrender by changing course, and Washington would be pressed into taking military action.

As for the current fighting, there’s no need to ponder whether it will escalate into an all-out war; it already has. We are not witnessing miscalculations fueling unintended escalation, nor should we presume the belligerents share a mutual interest in limiting escalation. Israel is fully engaged in war and causing Iran and Hezbollah to do the same. For Netanyahu, what might have begun as a decision driven by the desire to defer the political reckoning he might otherwise face for the Oct. 7 attacks has turned into something far larger.

Israeli officials have portrayed their country’s recent, unprecedented and escalating measures as reactive, inspired by self-defense and aimed at restoring deterrence. But they acknowledged that they were tracking Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah for some time before killing him. Similarly, the attack on thousands of Hezbollah members through sabotaged pagers and walkie-talkies was years in the works; anonymous Israeli officials told journalists that they decided to detonate the modified pagers out of concern that the group had exhibited suspicions which could expose the operation.

And while there was logic and precedent to suggest that Israel, which might have killed Nasrallah earlier, had long been satisfied to leave him in place — “better the devil you know” — the tipping point was likely Netanyahu’s decision to dismiss possible consequences, at least those in the short-term, as manageable. The Israeli leader decided he didn’t need to maintain diplomatic options, and it suited him to expand the conflict with Iran, particularly if it forces the U.S. to join. And with weeks until the U.S. elections, Netanyahu had little to worry about in provoking consequences from the White House. What could President Joe Biden really do to exact any costs on Netanyahu weeks before the presidential elections? Any punitive actions would be a gift to Republicans who already claim the president has been soft on Iran and its proxies. Only the Democrats’ progressive wing might take solace, but at the potential costs of votes among the party’s majority, not to mention independents.

But Israel’s all-out warfare will neither destroy nor deter Iran and its proxies, and future threats might prove more difficult to preempt militarily or resolve diplomatically. Emotion, vengeance and keeping face, not logic and pragmatism, often drive the region’s cycle of violence. Tehran’s repressive, clerical regime requires imposing fear at home and maintaining a commitment toward Israel’s destruction and resistance against the U.S. for its legitimacy and political survival. Terrorist groups branding themselves as “resistance organizations” must perpetually resist in order to be legitimate and relevant. For them, “losing” a conflict just reinforces their mission.

In this context, for the U.S., Israel’s tactics matter. With the enormous Lebanese and Palestinian casualty count and physical devastation, Israel has created additional pressure for would-be allies among regional Arab states to turn away from Israel, and quite possibly the United States as well. That’s despite the fact that such countries have no love for either Hamas or Hezbollah. Egypt’s military junta deposed a Muslim Brotherhood leadership, like that from which Hamas came; Jordan expelled Hamas leaders a quarter of a century ago — dispatching the Palestinian Liberation Organization at bayonet point some 30 years prior to that — and recently saw a Muslim Brotherhood party make major parliamentary gains. And the Gulf Arab states’ monarchies have historically suffered Hezbollah attacks and viewed Muslim Brotherhood organizations internally, and Iran externally, as their greatest threats.

But given the images of the past year and the past weeks, those nations cannot possibly expand the Abraham Accords negotiated during the Trump administration nor be seen in league with Israel. With every new battle and its images of apartment buildings in ruins, rescue workers pulling the bodies of women and children from the concrete and rubble, the chances of a Saudi recognition of Israel grow more distant, and with it, the hopes of a broader settlement of the conflict. And why is that so important? After all, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have all established diplomatic — and commercial — ties with Israel. It’s importance rests in Saudi Arabia’s central place in the Arab world owing to its custodianship of the two great mosques in Mecca and Medina, and its enormous petrol resources and wealth which equates to power and influence. Saudi recognition as part of a grand bargain in which Israel recognizes Palestinian statehood in a legitimate “two-state” solution, would enable progress toward a transformational change in the region, and with it, the world.

Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman has no love for Hamas, a product of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, and Iran and its proxies are the kingdom’s principal external threat. Moreover, unlike his father, it’s arguable whether MBS, as he is known colloquially, has any sentiment for the Palestinians, or their cause. But his acrobatic adjustments since essentially taking power in 2017 concerning his previous saber rattling with Iran, his war in Yemen, and social reforms in the kingdom, reflects pragmatism. MBS would be inclined to make a deal with Israel, with which he and his predecessors have long sanctioned discreet security cooperation, and who makes a formidable ally versus Iran. But doing so could trigger a violent backlash among his people.

This regional war also has implications for the U.S. in another area: global strategic competition. The war could yet draw in Iran and the U.S., setting the stage for a major power confrontation via proxy with intervention, direct or covert, by Russia and China as well. Moreover, the inability of the U.S. to influence Israel is already undermining American credibility and utility with other Arab states, which extends well beyond the conflict and across a host of issues that include strategic competition, energy, the economy and climate.

Washington cannot abandon Israel’s defense but must restore American influence by stopping the carnage and escalation, despite politically difficult choices, by better leveraging the stick, as well as the carrot. Washington might find greater results by trying to achieve these goals in the shadows. Military strikes and Israel’s hardly deniable assassinations of Iranian scientists, IRGC officers and visiting Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyah politically required Iran to respond militarily. By contrast, the Stuxnet cyberattack against Tehran’s nuclear program — not publicly exposed until 2010 — Imad Mughniyeh’s 2008 assassination, and al-Qaeda deputy Amir Abu Muhammad al-Masri’s 2020 murder in Tehran appear, on the other hand, to have achieved greater impact, and without the same level of carnage, or forcing Iran’s, or Hezbollah’s hand.

The ability to successfully strike militarily to defend one’s country is enshrined in the internationally accepted right of self-defense. And while it is at times a necessary tool to assure a country from an external threat, bloodshed is always an unfortunate consequence, which brings with it visceral, generational grudges. And when done to excess, such carnage comes with diminishing returns. During my long CIA service, I witnessed, supported, and participated in U.S. wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya and the Balkans, not to mention occasional American strikes against Iran in the late 1980s. The U.S. won most of the battles, but arguably, with the exception of the first Gulf War that liberated Kuwait, and American leadership in ending the onslaught against Bosnian Serbs, we lost most of the wars — despite possessing superior military capabilities.

Israelis, and for that matter Americans, need to decide what they consider security and what attainable, long-term solutions exist at the most reasonable cost. Military tools, and of course intelligence, are key components, but require balanced implementation that bears in mind second-order consequences. Killing the enemy and winning battles does not, alone, win wars, at least not today. There are better ways for Israel and the U.S. to defeat Hezbollah and neutralize Iran that preserve options for enduring solutions. But if Netanyahu doesn’t shift his tactics, and Washington is unable to decouple itself from them, the costs will be borne not just by Israelis but by Americans.

Politico · by The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence

24. On (Protracted) War: The Challenge of Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations by John Nagl and George Topic

We have long benefited from the unique US capability to out-produce and "out-logistic" our enemies which contributed to allow us to outfight them.

But we no longer benefit from such luxury.

Excerpts:

One of the most important and difficult tasks for strategic leaders is to assess the utility of a capability against what economists and logisticians refer to as the total cost of ownership. This includes not just the complete acquisition cost, including training, logistics support, and facilities but also the cost and probability of being able to deploy a capability to where and when you will need it. In a protracted war against some combination of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, the United States would likely face attacks on its supply lines into theatres of war that it has not faced since World War II. Contested logistics further increases the challenge of preparing for protracted war, including the requirement for additional force structure to defend lines of communications across both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Our intent is not to be alarmist or suggest that we are not capable of defending our nation and our interests as well as those of our allies and partners. We do, however, believe that it is important to synchronize the efforts of the many leaders, analysts, scholars, and staffs that are working on these issues to develop a coordinated strategy and plans to address the challenges before us. We also believe that this is an important subject for treatment at joint professional military education institutions, especially but not limited to senior service colleges.

We face the most challenging international environment at least since the end of the Cold War, when we were spending some 6 percent of our gross domestic product on national defense; we are currently at slightly more than half that level. It is likely time to dramatically increase our investment in national security, as so many of our allies have recently decided to do. While these investments will be expensive and require sacrifices from the American people, deterrence is cheaper than war in lives and treasure.

On (Protracted) War: The Challenge of Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Nagl, George Topic · October 9, 2024

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

An increasing number of highly respected analysts note the tighter coordination among Russia (America’s acute challenge), China (America’s pacing challenge), North Korea, and Iran. These countries share an aversion to the international system organized and maintained by the United States and her allies. They also share a determination to achieve national goals that do not comply with expected international norms about the use of force in international politics to change boundaries and respect for sovereignty. These nations are increasingly sharing natural resources, military equipment, and training; together, they present the prospect of being the most formidable adversary America has faced at least since the collapse of the Soviet Union (the reason some are proclaiming a “new Cold War”) and perhaps since World War II (the reasons others are comparing today to 1938 and arguing that a third world war is imminent).

Today, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has resulted in the most consequential war in Europe in generations and taught many lessons about the changing character of war. China’s provocations in the Indo-Pacific region threaten US allies in the region and put at risk the regional security balance that has held for decades. While the threats posed individually by Iran and its proxies or North Korea do not rise to the same level as those of Russia or China, they nonetheless can produce significant negative impacts for the United States and our Western allies and increase instability around the world. The threats that are posed by the potential cooperation by several or all of these adversaries are especially dangerous, and as noted below, there are clear indications that to some extent this is already happening. The resources required to manage multiple conflicts, especially protracted wars—and the coordination challenges involved in doing so—could overextend the capabilities of the United States and its allies.

The danger posed by the collaboration of our adversaries is easy to see and needs to be addressed to prioritize resources and design effective counterstrategies. At the same time, we need to also recognize the cost of even one major protracted conflict could seriously diminish our resources for national security. As we are seeing today both in Ukraine and in ongoing US commitments in the Middle East, the cost of even supporting protracted efforts is quite significant. The cost of engaging in and winning a protracted war would be massively higher.

The Threat Perspective

Appreciating the risks of a protracted conflict first requires an understanding of the perspective of threat actors. Insofar as China is considered our pacing challenge, its outlook is particularly instructive. It is commonly held that China’s leaders today respect American military and technological capabilities. They do not appear to be confident of victory in any scenario, but these anxieties should not reassure us. They appear to take US alliance and defense buildup plans quite seriously. From their point of view, the American-led enemy mobilization has already begun.

From Beijing’s perspective, there might be several reasons to seriously consider taking what seem to be necessary actions sooner rather than later. China may not fear that such actions will cause a geopolitical break with the United States and the West, for example, because Beijing perceives this break to have already occurred. Chinese leaders see America already energetically organizing, with some effect, a global coalition to impose containment and strategic decoupling through technology and trade controls. They believe that for now, in this wartime environment, European governments are deferring to the Americans, though many Chinese leaders disagree.

Chinese leaders and strategists might also see that Americans and Europeans feel economically and financially fragile, fearful of initiating a conflict that will immediately trigger a potentially apocalyptic global economic and financial crisis. And if there is such a storm, Chinese leaders may believe they are better able to weather it. They have already been helping to establish a parallel global trading system to accommodate Russia, Iran, North Korea, and other targets of American sanctions.

And, of course, they cannot help but note that the Ukraine crisis has shocked America into trying much harder to ramp up its defense industrial base. This is a worrying development for China. Beijing is concerned that America might significantly enhance its capacity to produce weapons and other materiel, including long- or mid-range standoff precision munitions. But it will take some time for the Americans to do this, and even an extra year or two may make a difference. US rapid development and fielding initiatives are another source of concern to China as an important component of strategic competition—or even the initial stages of a conflict. Major investments in AI-related endeavors, programs like the Replicator initiative, and other innovations may well be seen as threats from a Chinese perspective.

Further, Japan is rearming and developing capabilities to operate beyond its own territory, which could have huge consequences in the Indo-Pacific, but this too will take time. To Chinese leaders, the Japanese turn may seem particularly ominous. Japan has also overcome historical grievances that have blocked close military and intelligence cooperation with South Korea. The recent activation of a new US three-star headquarters in Japan is likely to be regarded as a significant step toward increased capability for America and its regional allies and partners.

China has also watched as its American rivals now have a huge backlog of approved arms sales to Taiwan, but much of this has not been delivered. Chinese leaders will prefer that none of it ever is. The Americans have successfully negotiated for base access in the Philippines, but they are not yet ready to use these bases. And the Americans are orchestrating new military construction as well as multinational efforts and exercises with individual allies like Japan and South Korea and through multilateral mechanisms like the AUKUS partnership and the Quad. The concerted efforts of the United States to work more closely with nations across the region is also regarded as inimical to Chinese interests.

Optimizing to Deter—or Win—a Protracted War

The most serious concern is that some form of collusion between Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran in which several or all four states, simultaneously or in close sequence, challenge the United States and her allies would overstretch US and allied capabilities to defeat them. Indeed, some suggest that this is currently happening. In the comparatively new domains of space and cyber it is difficult to even understand what the character of conflict might be like and what the consequences would be to combatant nations or even the entire world.

All of these factors together make for a very complex and challenging strategic landscape, notwithstanding the additional uncertainties associated with understanding other nations. If, by looking at these and many other factors, we believe there is some prospect of a major prolonged war in the coming years, what should we do? What would provide us the greatest resilience and offer us the best chance to prevail? Of even greater importance, what can we do to deter such a conflagration?

All of these questions are well recognized by senior leaders and scholars in the United States as well as allied and partner nations; there are a number of ongoing efforts to understand, catalog, and prioritize challenges and opportunities to mitigate or deter military threats. In the broadest sense we believe that the road to deterrence and victory (if deterrence fails) has three general axes of advance: strategy, acquisition and logistics, and human capital. While all of these areas are huge topics unto themselves, examining them through the lens of preparing for and hopefully deterring a protracted war offers the opportunity to focus on prioritizing our efforts with our limited resources.

There are countless facets and considerations under the rubric of strategy, but aligning resources to optimize their use is at the core of any strategic calculus, as is balancing current readiness against future requirements—including those that are difficult to foresee. The challenge the United States currently faces is that we have very expansive ends but insufficient resources—in personnel, force structure, and equipment—to meet all of our requirements to deter, much less to prevail in, the large-scale combat operations for which the Department of Defense has instructed the military departments to prepare.

The most dramatic change required to prepare for protracted conventional war against one or more of America’s likely adversaries is in personnel and force structure. The American military is not currently sized to fight two large-scale combat operations simultaneously; indeed, our aircraft carriers are already overstretched while deterring China and confronting Iran in support of Israel. Observers including one of this paper’s authors are beginning to question whether the all-volunteer force that has defended American interests and values for the past fifty years will be able to provide sufficient personnel for the expanded force that would be required to fight and win.

Regarding acquisition and logistics, even a cursory consideration of all that would be required to support a protracted war would be far too ambitious for this piece. That said, many of the most elemental and longest lead-time requirements fall under this heading—and are challenged to compete for resources for a number of reasons. Two areas of particular concern are modernization of the industrial base and mobilization capabilities. The Department of Defense is working to identify key issues and develop strategies to improve the ability of the commercial sector to meet our emerging and evolving requirements. Clearly we have a long way to go and we cannot succeed through efforts on a transactional basis; while Congress has been supporting increases in these areas, the need remains great.

Finally, every aspect of mobilization requires a comprehensive review, even to the point of rethinking the meaning of the term itself, and a clear understanding of its constituent parts and how they must work together is imperative. Some key policy documents and organizational structures have not changed substantially in several decades. In many cases, it is likely that essential requirements to succeed in potential conflicts would not be in place for a number of months after conflict erupts. The United States must prepare now to fight a protracted war to make it less likely that that war will happen. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began the mobilization of the United States for World War II in 1938, three years before Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war. It may be time for a similar national-level effort to increase readiness for sustained large-scale combat operations—protracted war.

One of the most important and difficult tasks for strategic leaders is to assess the utility of a capability against what economists and logisticians refer to as the total cost of ownership. This includes not just the complete acquisition cost, including training, logistics support, and facilities but also the cost and probability of being able to deploy a capability to where and when you will need it. In a protracted war against some combination of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, the United States would likely face attacks on its supply lines into theatres of war that it has not faced since World War II. Contested logistics further increases the challenge of preparing for protracted war, including the requirement for additional force structure to defend lines of communications across both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Our intent is not to be alarmist or suggest that we are not capable of defending our nation and our interests as well as those of our allies and partners. We do, however, believe that it is important to synchronize the efforts of the many leaders, analysts, scholars, and staffs that are working on these issues to develop a coordinated strategy and plans to address the challenges before us. We also believe that this is an important subject for treatment at joint professional military education institutions, especially but not limited to senior service colleges.

We face the most challenging international environment at least since the end of the Cold War, when we were spending some 6 percent of our gross domestic product on national defense; we are currently at slightly more than half that level. It is likely time to dramatically increase our investment in national security, as so many of our allies have recently decided to do. While these investments will be expensive and require sacrifices from the American people, deterrence is cheaper than war in lives and treasure.

John Nagl is professor of warfighting studies at the US Army War College.

George Topic is deputy director of the Center for Strategic Logistics at the National Defense University.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, United States Army War College, National Defense University, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Bill Mesta, US Navy

Share on LinkedIn

Send email

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John Nagl, George Topic · October 9, 2024

25. Partners in Peril: Hybrid Threats Come for Jordan

Excerpt:

The United States is taking active and necessary steps to support Jordan’s military means to counter external military challenges; however, the current reality on the ground in Jordan warrants a more robust American response. To ensure Jordan’s long-term stability, the United States must also utilize irregular means to confront the arguably more dangerous irregular challenges that confront the kingdom. A comprehensive strategy that emphasizes foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and MISO coupled with ongoing measures to enhance Jordan’s hard military capabilities will go a considerable way in strengthening Jordan and helping the West, under US leadership, enhance its security posture in the Middle East.

Partners in Peril: Hybrid Threats Come for Jordan - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Anthony Marco · October 8, 2024

This article is part of Project Proxies and Partners, which explores the promises and pitfalls of security cooperation in war, at peace, and in between. We invite you to contribute to the discussion, explore the difficult questions, and help influence the future of proxies and partners. Please contact us if you would like to propose an article, podcast, or event.

In the early evening hours of October 1st, Iran conducted an unprecedented ballistic missile attack against Israel, in retaliation for the killing of Ismail Haniyeh and Hassan Nasrallah: the political leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, respectively. Helping to respond to the attack, the United States launched scores of interceptor missiles in defense of Israel. Alongside the United States, the Kingdom of Jordan is also purported to have participated in intercepting Iran’s missiles that violated its airspace. During Iran’s last attack against Israel in April, Jordan joined a loose constellation of Western powers—which included the United States, United Kingdom, and France—in repulsing the attack with its air force shooting down dozens of Iranian drones. “Our message to Iran is that your problem is with Israel, and any attempt to insult Jordan is unacceptable and categorically rejected,” stated Jordan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ayman Safadi, back in April. While Safadi’s statement illustrates a proximate justification, Jordan’s role during this attack underscores an intimate and necessary security relationship between the kingdom and the West.

Partners in Peril: Hybrid Threats Come for Jordan – Insider: Short of War

For over seventy-five years, the United States and the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan have enjoyed a close relationship. The relationship deepened further when the United States bestowed Jordan with non-NATO Ally (MNNA) status five decades later in 1996. Playing a key role in the United States’ regional security architecture, the kingdom collaborates intimately with the US military on issues pertaining to global terrorism and, recently, helping to counter Iran. Over two decades later, Jordan’s security relationship with the West has only deepened. During the July 2024 NATO Summit in Washington DC, the alliance announced that it would establish its first regional office in the Middle East in Amman, portending increased military coordination between the alliance and Jordan.

In a region increasingly beset by instability, malign state and non-state actors, and another major war, Jordan remains a symbol of stability. Despite this image, Jordan is far from secure and faces a litany of irregular threats from Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. Serving as a primer for future discourse, this piece identifies some of the irregular threats facing Jordan and offers potential measures the United States, as Jordan’s closest security partner, can implement to combat those threats.

Jordan Under Threat

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Jordan’s King Abdullah II has attempted to walk a very fine line between maintaining stable relations with its neighbor Israel and presiding over a Sunni Muslim Arab majority country deeply sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Notably, approximately 60% of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin. In the wake of the October 7th Hamas terror attacks against Israel, thousands gathered in the streets of Amman to express their public support for Hamas chanting slogans such as “Oh Hamas, hit them with al-Qassam rockets … Bring the suicide bombers to Tel Aviv.” The Jordanian government had taken steps to signal its dissatisfaction with Israel’s ground campaign in Gaza by withdrawing its ambassador last November. Abdullah has also publicly condemned Israel’s campaign in Gaza and in February called for an immediate cease-fire.

Following Iran’s attack in April and Jordan’s participation in repelling it, protests shifted some of their attention from Israel to the Jordanian government, posing a serious threat to the long-term stability of Abdullah’s reign as he increasingly became the object of the protestors. Reports also indicate that Hamas has played a role in instigating the protests, and unsurprisingly many of the protestors are activists belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, which the Jordanian government banned in 2016. Hamas is inextricably tied to the Brotherhood and traces its foundation to the Brotherhood’s political branch in Gaza back in the 1980s.

In April, an address made by Hamas spokesman Abu Ubaida advocating for Jordanians to “escalate their actions” inspired a protest outside Israel’s Embassy in Amman. “Hamas is inciting and trying to ignite unrest inside the kingdom. We will not allow it to achieve its goal,” stated an anonymous Jordanian official. Jordan is facing a disinformation campaign orchestrated by the Brotherhood that is fostering instability in the country. To the Jordanian government’s chagrin, public opinion is shifting in favor of Hamas narratives and the Brotherhood. According to a recent survey, 63.4% of Jordanians believe that the Brotherhood “can deal positively with the problems facing Jordan if given the opportunity.” In response to persistent demonstrations, many of which turned violent, Jordanian security forces cracked down in an attempt to prevent pro-Hamas and anti-government sentiments from metastasizing. With Hamas and the Brotherhood adversely shaping the information space against the Jordanian government, the current geopolitical environment in the Middle East threatens to further erode Abdullah’s reign. Of added concern, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the political wing of the Brotherhood in Jordan, recently won 31 out of 138 parliamentary seats, becoming the largest political party in Jordan.

In addition to disinformation threats, Abdullah has also confronted increased pressure from Iran more directly which views his government as an obstacle to their regional strategy vis-à-vis Israel. In April, Abu Ali al-Askari, a senior official belonging to Iran’s Iraqi proxy militia, Kata’ib Hezbollah, publicly stated intentions to arm “the Mujahideen of the Islamic Resistance in Jordan, to satisfy the needs of 12,000 fighters,” ostensibly for military operations against Israel. If implemented, such a plan would not only threaten Israel but heighten violent political unrest within Jordan. On the eve of April’s Iran drone-missile attack against Israel, where Jordan participated in countering the threat, reports indicated that Iran warned that “if Jordan intervenes, it will be the next target” in an attempt to intimidate the Jordanians.

Outside of messaging and rhetoric, Iran has engaged in illicit acts to support groups hostile to Abdullah’s government within the country. Jordan has intercepted a series of attempts to smuggle Iranian weapons through the kingdom to the West Bank; some of these smuggling plots, however, have been destined for the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan. According to unnamed Jordanian sources, these arms were intended to conduct sabotage operations against Abdullah’s government. Many of these busted weapons smuggling attempts consisted of assault rifles, claymore mines, C4, and even some 107mm Katyusha rockets. This past June, Jordanian security forces discovered a stockpile of explosives in Amman connected to an Iran “terror-related” plot. For the past few years, Jordan has also been combating a serious Iranian-orchestrated drug smuggling operation that contributes to undermining Jordanian security while helping fund Iran’s regional strategy.

What’s at Stake

With the looming specter of a wider regional conflict, these challenges, under the current tempo, could result in the decline and eventual downfall of Abdullah’s monarchy, spelling disaster for stability and security in the region. In this extreme scenario, an Iranian-backed regime could assume power and fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. Such an event would be a masterstroke for Iran by completing the encirclement of Israel where it could flood the West Bank with uninhibited military aid for future terror campaigns. Under those circumstances, Israel presumably could take drastic actions in Jordan or the West Bank in an attempt to secure the land border with Jordan. Saudi Arabia, a principal Iranian competitor, would meanwhile be facing an Iranian threat across its northern borders, in addition to the Yemen-based Houthis in the south, which would escalate tensions between the two major regional powers. As an adversary of the United States, Iran would be better positioned to more dangerously challenge American allies in the Middle East and further plunge the region into conflict.

The weakening of Jordan would also endanger US-led counterterrorism efforts in the region. Numbering approximately 2,500 fighters, ISIS has conducted 153 attacks in Iraq and Syria as of July 2024; at the current rate, ISIS will more than double its number of attacks from 2023. Amidst this backdrop, United States collaboration with regional allies, such as Jordan, in the counterterrorism fight is only more imperative, especially as the United States attempts to reduce its regional military footprint during a reorientation to Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Jordan is an integral part of the Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) in the ongoing campaign against ISIS. Currently, 3,000 US servicemembers are deployed in bases across Jordan in support of CJTF-OIR. In January, three American soldiers were killed in an Iranian-backed militia drone attack on one such base, demonstrating the heightened tensions that penetrate Jordan’s borders.

Recently, Jordan hosted Eager Lion 2024 which included 33 partner nations in a US-led multilateral security exercise focused on developing capabilities to counter both state and non-state actors. “[Eager Lion] demonstrates that our coalition force can maintain a sufficient and sustainable presence in the region. It delivers a clear message that relationships matter,” stated the exercise director US Brigadier General Jason Benson. In addition to the enduring United States presence on the ground, Jordan’s airbases, such as the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, enable American intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) efforts in Iraq and Syria to help facilitate counterterrorism operations. With the US counter-ISIS mission in Iraq coming to a close over the next year following increased scrutiny from the Iraqi government, Jordan’s key role in CJTF-OIR becomes only more paramount.

What Needs to be Done

To strengthen Jordan, the United States should develop a comprehensive strategy that aims to buttress Jordan’s military and preserve Abdullah’s government. In past years, the United States conducted the Jordan Border Security Program (JSBP) and Jordan Operational Engagement Program (JOEP) to enhance Jordan’s military and intelligence capabilities against terror threats; these initiatives were discontinued in 2017 and 2020, respectively. Restarting these programs and intensifying them as foreign internal defense measures in conjunction with growing counterterrorism capabilities will help Jordan parry the range of internal military threats it faces. In the political arena, helping the Jordanian government compete successfully in the information space via Military Information Support Operations (MISO) will positively influence pro-Abdullah narratives within the country.

Enhancing Jordan’s military capacity will help make the kingdom a more effective bulwark against Iran and its proxies having already demonstrated a propensity to neutralize Iranian drones in April. To that end, on June 18th, 2024, Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Jacky Rosen (D-NV) introduced the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act before the US Senate to further deepen the security partnership between the two countries. Focused primarily on shoring up Jordan’s military capabilities to combat more external threats, the bill emphasizes American efforts to help modernize Jordan’s air defense systems in the wake of rocket, missile, and drone attacks from Iran and its proxies.

Despite the bill’s important emphasis on buttressing Jordan’s air defense, it fails to identify any potential measures that can be implemented to counter the irregular threats facing Jordan and that arguably can be more damaging to the kingdom. Iran will continue to support terror plots across Jordan in an attempt to weaken the kingdom. To that end, the United States must invest more in Jordanian law enforcement to sufficiently deal with extremist demonstrations orchestrated by Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States needs to focus greater military assistance measures on bolstering Jordan’s foreign internal defense by specifically enhancing its counterterrorism forces that could effectively resist a comprehensive Iranian-orchestrated terror campaign.

Acknowledging that Israel’s ongoing fight against Hamas and the ensuing collateral damage in Gaza is contributing to internal discontent amongst the Jordanian populace and placing strain on Abdullah’s government, an eventual cessation of hostilities should conceivably reduce tensions in Jordanian society. In the interim, opportunities exist to combat disinformation and shape strategic narratives within Jordan’s broader information space. As the war continues, attempting to de-demonize Israel in Jordan would be a forlorn hope since anti-Israel sentiments run too deep. Instead, working to portray Iran as the threat that they actually pose could strengthen domestic support behind Abdullah’s government. In a 2023 poll, although preceding the Israel-Hamas War, 45% of Jordanians viewed Iran as a competitor and 42% as an enemy. The Jordanian government could thus intensify its rhetoric against Iran, which openly violates Jordanian sovereignty, in a bid to foster greater unity. With the permission of the Jordanian government, the United States also possesses capabilities to help Abdullah compete and win in the information space against malign actors. US-led MISO is designed “to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning.” Supporting Jordan in the information domain has the potential to improve the image of Abdullah’s government while discrediting Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran among the Jordanian public.

Conclusion

The United States is taking active and necessary steps to support Jordan’s military means to counter external military challenges; however, the current reality on the ground in Jordan warrants a more robust American response. To ensure Jordan’s long-term stability, the United States must also utilize irregular means to confront the arguably more dangerous irregular challenges that confront the kingdom. A comprehensive strategy that emphasizes foreign internal defense, counterterrorism, and MISO coupled with ongoing measures to enhance Jordan’s hard military capabilities will go a considerable way in strengthening Jordan and helping the West, under US leadership, enhance its security posture in the Middle East.

Anthony Marco is a 2nd Lt. in the U.S. Army and a West Point graduate pursuing an MA in counterterrorism and intelligence from Reichman University. He also serves as special advisor on the Proxies and Partners Special Project at the Irregular Warfare Initiative.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Task Force Spartan Soldiers participated in a ceremony to officially open the new Jordan Armed Forces Joint Training Center, October 10, 2018, in Amman, Jordan. (U.S. National Guard photos by Staff Sgt. Michael Williams)

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

26. After Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s Enduring Impact

Excerpts:

While there is ample evidence demonstrating that the Russian state supported and directed a large share of Wagner’s operations, relatively less analysis has been dedicated to the unique advantages that the leadership of Prigozhin and Utkin brought to the organization, in the form of security guarantees, risk appetite, and entrepreneurial efforts to establish influence at the peripheries of Russia’s geostrategic interests. Prigozhin brought with him connections to influential figures in Moscow and an agile corporate network that allowed Wagner to build financial relationships and move men and materiel across Africa and the Middle East. His organization was incentivized to take on risks and build influence in spheres where Russia’s security agencies were less likely to meaningfully invest in terms of both money and fighting men. Most uniquely, he could provide protection from prosecution under Russia’s anti-mercenary laws and, while acting at the behest of the state, use his stature to exercise a degree of autonomy in his affairs abroad.

This freedom of action was key to Wagner’s growth since its earliest missions in eastern Ukraine in 2014. It accounts for Wagner’s aggressive counter-insurgency in the Central African Republic, a country of tertiary geostrategic priority for Russia, and in its disastrous effort to seize Conoco Fields in Syria that culminated in its forces being routed by American special operations forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces. It was also what allowed Prigozhin to implement strategies inaccessible to other security entrepreneurs, including the recruitment of thousands of Russian convicts into his structures for deployment to Ukraine. Like Prigozhin, Utkin carried a legendary status and the respect of Wagner’s most experienced fighting men, drawn from his battlefield experience in Ukraine and Syria and his contribution to Wagner’s agile doctrine.

....

Russia’s rogue’s gallery of volunteer units, Combat Army Reserves, and private military companies nonetheless play to Russia’s relative strengths in manpower. They allow for recruitment efforts to reach and more effectively leverage those fighters with experience who are less likely to be drawn to conventional contract service. Whether units like Espanola that draw on football ultras or like Rusich that draw on fascist militant circles, these groups leverage Wagner symbols and personalities to proclaim their effectiveness, experience, and distinction from the worst tendencies of the Russian military, appealing to the type of disaffected but valuable recruit that once formed the backbone of the Wagner Group.

After Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s Enduring Impact - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Jack Margolin · October 9, 2024

In 2023, a dramatic series of events led Western observers to declare the imminent demise of the Wagner Group, Russia’s infamous paramilitary force. First, there was Wagner’s costly assault on Bakhmut in the spring, where the organization was estimated to have lost up to 20,000 fighters, many of them convicts drawn from Russian prisons. Then there was the anticlimax of the June mutiny led by Wagner’s chief curator and protagonist, Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin. Finally, there was Prigozhin’s suspicious death in a plane crash in August.

Yet a year on, Wagner continues to be an important element of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine and Africa: Where many saw the Wagner saga as a sign of the Kremlin’s weakness, the security services have succeeded in reaping benefits from Wagner’s rise and precipitous fall. Russia’s armed forces, particularly the Ministry of Defense and National Guard, have effectively “Wagnerized” themselves, borrowing the most effective parts of the Wagner model to seize on their competitive advantages and to create dilemmas for Ukraine and Western adversaries from Africa to Europe.

Become a Member

Kidal to Kursk

At the end of July, Tuareg separatists encountered Wagner Group fighters and their Malian military allies in the desert at Tinzaouaten, near Mali’s border with Algeria. The result was a disastrous defeat for Wagner, outnumbered on the separatists’ home turf. Using Starlink satellite internet, separatists recorded videos of the carnage, documenting the bodies of dozens of Russian fighters. That hasn’t stopped Wagner: At the time of writing, they are massing with Malian forces for another push into Mali’s north (though potentially beset by logistical challenges).

Just weeks later, Ukraine launched a surprise incursion into Russian territory in Kursk. There, they were met by an entourage of Russian irregular forces, including former members of the Wagner Group bearing its signature black emblem.

These two episodes, thousands of miles apart, are each a part of Wagner’s legacy in miniature: As an expeditionary force captive to the Russian security services abroad, and as a community of Wagner veterans integrated into the GRU’s growing panoply of irregular forces for both Africa and Ukraine. They demonstrate the innovation and inter-service competition that the demise of the original Wagner Group has accelerated, driven by a service-wide push for greater unity of command.

The resulting organizations are even more behold than their predecessor to Russian security services but still maintain a veneer of deniability at home in the event of failures like Tinzaouaten, where Russian state media has continued to refer to fighters as “Wagner” or “instructors” to avoid saddling the Ministry of Defense with responsibility. These organizations’ ability to preserve Wagner’s agility and risk appetite will be key to determining whether Russia can continue to balance its militarized support for autocrats in Africa and the Middle East with the demands of its war in Ukraine.

Revolutions in Russia’s Irregular Forces

Russia has consolidated a flexible model of regular and irregular forces that allows Moscow to overcome constraints on manpower, logistics, and bandwidth, and balance a set of demanding operations in Ukraine and Africa. This model is nothing new — since 2014, Western observers have commented on Russia’s adaptive use of formal and informal forces, popularizing terms like hybrid warfare and gray zone competition. What has changed is Moscow’s approach to managing this model, supported by new laws and a sprawling structure of semi-formal coordination.

Russia has done this before. In 2014, volunteers fought alongside Ukrainian separatist forces with clandestine Russia support. Then, as now, these forces could prove problematic. When militant forces in eastern Ukraine threatened to scuttle Russia’s efforts at a negotiated settlement (on terms favorable to Moscow), Russia employed the Wagner Group to eliminate their leadership. In extensive leaked documentation detailed in my book, Wagner recorded its operations to coerce and assassinate local militant leaders.

This led to a revolution in Russia’s use of semi-formal forces, one that saw the Wagner Group rise to the fore and deploy far beyond Russia’s near abroad. In coordination with Russia’s security services, Wagner was sent first to Syria and then to Africa. Nine years later, when Wagner itself threatened Russia’s strategic priorities through the political maneuvering of its corporate overlord Prigozhin, Moscow began a second revolution in its use of hybrid forces.

Under the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, Russia undertook an effort in the spring and summer of 2023 to subject Wagner to more direct and unified command authority. In a desperate bid to retain a degree of autonomy over his key lever of security, prosperity, and influence, Prigozhin and Wagner’s military leadership led an abortive mutiny in the summer of that year. Despite constituting a threat to President Vladimir Putin’s leadership, the effort was quashed through negotiation. A month later, Prigozhin and Wagner’s military leadership died in a fiery plane crash north of Moscow.

In the year since, Russia has executed a vision for another revolution in its use of irregular forces. It has done so both by allowing elements of the original Wagner network to persist on a shorter leash and by creating infrastructure to capture and deploy Wagner’s most notable human capital within the security services.

The New Wagner

The Wagner Group persists in Africa and Belarus, though now without a well-connected security guarantor and corporate overlord in the form of Prigozhin. This current iteration of the Wagner Group provides the Russian state benefit through its willingness to undertake high-risk missions and commercial operations that establish diplomatic cache with Russia’s allies in the global south. It retains some of the organization’s human capital, conducts training for forces in Belarus, and continues both military and commercial operations in Mali and the Central African Republic in close coordination with Russia’s security services. In both areas, the Wagner Group challenges the institutionally driven Western security model in the Sahel and Central Africa, asserting Russia as a new mode of security partner that is tougher on insurgents and less restrictive for its customers than France, the United States, or the United Nations.

Russia allows the Wagner Group to survive because it no longer enjoys the benefit of a membrane to insulate it from the fickleness of the Russian security services. While Prigozhin and Wagner’s military leader, Dmitriy Utkin, purportedly appointed heirs in the form of Prigozhin’s son Pavel and an experienced Wagner commander named Anton “Lotus” Elizarov, neither can lay a true claim to legitimate leadership of the organization.

What the Loss of Prigozhin Means for Wagner

While there is ample evidence demonstrating that the Russian state supported and directed a large share of Wagner’s operations, relatively less analysis has been dedicated to the unique advantages that the leadership of Prigozhin and Utkin brought to the organization, in the form of security guarantees, risk appetite, and entrepreneurial efforts to establish influence at the peripheries of Russia’s geostrategic interests. Prigozhin brought with him connections to influential figures in Moscow and an agile corporate network that allowed Wagner to build financial relationships and move men and materiel across Africa and the Middle East. His organization was incentivized to take on risks and build influence in spheres where Russia’s security agencies were less likely to meaningfully invest in terms of both money and fighting men. Most uniquely, he could provide protection from prosecution under Russia’s anti-mercenary laws and, while acting at the behest of the state, use his stature to exercise a degree of autonomy in his affairs abroad.

This freedom of action was key to Wagner’s growth since its earliest missions in eastern Ukraine in 2014. It accounts for Wagner’s aggressive counter-insurgency in the Central African Republic, a country of tertiary geostrategic priority for Russia, and in its disastrous effort to seize Conoco Fields in Syria that culminated in its forces being routed by American special operations forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces. It was also what allowed Prigozhin to implement strategies inaccessible to other security entrepreneurs, including the recruitment of thousands of Russian convicts into his structures for deployment to Ukraine. Like Prigozhin, Utkin carried a legendary status and the respect of Wagner’s most experienced fighting men, drawn from his battlefield experience in Ukraine and Syria and his contribution to Wagner’s agile doctrine

Wagner’s new putative leaders — Pavel and Elizarov — carry little of Prigozhin’s influence or Utkin’s reputation. Pavel is a 26-year-old son of an oligarch with few other distinctions. In closed Wagner Telegram channels and conversations with Wagner veterans, current and former fighters indicate that Elizarov is held in low regard as a result of operational decisions that cost the lives of many of their compatriots. The resulting organization, sans Prigozhin and Utkin, is even more captive than its predecessor to Russia’s security services, particularly the GRU military intelligence agency, but it still provides benefits in Africa. They are now more immediately beholden to the oversight of GRU military intelligence and lacked the security that had allowed Prigozhin freedom to exercise initiative in specific quarters.

The Wagner Group still undertakes higher-risk missions than organizations formally under the Ministry of Defense. In November 2023, the Wagner Group took the northern Malian town of Kidal from Tuareg separatists, previously outside of Bamako’s control for almost a decade. They flew their black flag from the town’s crumbling French colonial fort. On the coattails of this success, Wagner (or its Malian partners) may have become overly confident. Their push on Tinzaouaten in July brought them far outside the territory controlled by Malian forces, and threatened key local channels of logistics that guaranteed an overwhelming response by local militants. Wagner’s defeat led to the death of dozens of its men, including an assault detachment commander, as well as a significant number of Malian forces.

The impacts on Wagner’s relations with Mali’s government and their other clients in places like the Central African Republic are complex and unclear. Wagner and its Malian allies appear to now be bracing for another offensive into the country’s north. Conversely, rumors circulate among Russian sources that Wagner may be withdrawn from the country or replaced by the Defense Ministry’s Africa Corps. Both indicators point to the fact that Wagner needs to prove its utility in Mali to Russia’s security elites as well as those in Bamako — both in absolute terms and vis-a-vis more formalized, less risk-tolerant efforts like the Africa Corps. The military government of Mali is likely pleased with the commitment demonstrated by the risks that Wagner is willing to take, but they are paying Wagner to win, not to die.

Diversification, Defection, and Doctrine

Beginning long before August 2023, Russian security services began diversifying away from Wagner as their primary paramilitary provider of choice and opening their options to recruit fighting men while bypassing unpopular mobilization. They have accelerated this process with a variety of novel structures like Redut and the Africa Corps that create and field semi-formal units that can recruit from key sectors of society less likely to enter conventional contract service. Like the burgeoning of “volunteer” units that appeared in Ukraine in 2014 and led to the rise of Wagner, the growth in the number of these irregular units is the result of not just coordination by Russia’s military intelligence, but also of incentives for the security services and “curators” — political officials and businesses — to create and field these units. New laws provide the infrastructure and legal justification to undertake these efforts.

In this context, and with the death of Prigozhin and Utkin last year, Russia’s security services engaged in a bidding war for their men. Elements of the Russian military were particularly interested in capturing Wagner’s assault detachment commanders, the group’s operational leadership who were credited with its effectiveness and who Prigozhin had elevated to public awareness during Wagner’s Bakhmut campaign. With their stature in Russia’s military communities, claim to a Wagner commander afforded access to unique recruitment channels and institutional support.

Over the past year, Wagner’s commanders have made their choices. The two most notable are Aleksandr “Ratibor” Kuznetsov and Boris “Zombie” Nizhevenok. Both are experienced and served with Wagner since its earliest days in Ukraine. They have chosen different paths: Kuznetsov has joined Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s Akhmat Spetsnaz and Nizhevenok leads a unit under the Defense Ministry’s “volunteer” infrastructure linked to Redut.

While Redut is frequently referred to as a private military company and compared to Wagner, it is in practice an umbrella by which a variety of semi-formal structures are connected to Defense Ministry command and logistics. These connections are managed through institutional channels like Military Unit 35555, a GRU conduit that was previously used to service Wagner, demonstrating the degrees of continuity between the pre-existing and new structures that Russia uses to field these forces. The scale and effectiveness of units under Redut are inconsistent, and membership in the structure runs from units cobbled together by Russia’s energy giant Gazprom to Nizhevenok’s Vostok-V Brigade, which has frequently solicited donations of money and equipment on Russian social media.

Kadyrov has also outfitted his own Akhmat structure to accept semi-formal units and Wagner veterans. Kuznetsov’s First Assault Detachment, retaining the name of his old Wagner unit, is one such force. Along with the Aida Battalion, another Akhmat unit partly comprised of former Wagner fighters, the First Assault Detachment has been fighting the Ukrainian units that have launched an incursion into Russian territory in Kursk Oblast for two months. Ukrainian units report that they have recovered Wagner patches and insignia on the battlefield.

Wagner and the Africa Corps

Neither of these units conduct operations in Africa. For these missions, the security services rely on both Wagner and another umbrella organization, the Africa Corps. In contrast to observations that the Wagner Group has been subsumed within the Africa Corps, recruiters and current and former fighters indicate that Wagner continues to operate in parallel with Africa Corps, which itself deploys units that include those in the Redut structure under the command of the Ministry of Defense.

One such unit is the 81st Volunteer Spetsnaz Brigade or “Bears,” based out of Crimea. Bears, also affiliated with Military Unit 35555, deployed alongside the Africa Corps to Burkina Faso earlier this year, where it appears to have primarily taken on lower risk duties, such as training local forces. Other deployments of Africa Corps personnel to Niger, Mali, and Libya are likely comprised of a mixture of units like Bears and formal Defense Ministry personnel — many of whom were redeployed to Ukraine in May and again in August, before being documented in Syria in October.

As in the case of Bears, the Africa Corps has thus far not taken on responsibilities associated with the same level of risk as the legacy Wagner Group organization. Instead, they have focused on security and training for local forces. Along with their public emphasis on their role in Ukraine, this has allowed the Africa Corps to insulate itself from the worst of Wagner’s failures in Africa, like those in Mali. However artificial the distinction between the more formalized Africa Corps and new iteration of Wagner, both organizations nonetheless brand themselves distinctly and emphasize their differences for the purposes of recruitment and messaging, primarily for the benefit of a Russian elite audience.

Wagnerization

Russia has not only replicated Wagner’s success through the infrastructure that allows for the coordination and fielding of semi-formal units, but also through borrowing the distinctive elements of its operations, a trend that Michael Kofman has identified as the Wagnerization of Russian forces. In broad terms, this refers to replicating the infantry-centric assault detachment structure that was the organizing principal of Wagner’s forces since 2017.

Wagner originally adopted this structure to allow for greater flexibility in the field. In Ukraine, they applied the assault detachment structure to leverage convict recruits in dismounted infantry platoons of 12–15 soldiers to identify and soften Ukrainian positions in urban settings like Bakhmut and Soledar. Russia has borrowed this approach, drawn from roots in Soviet military doctrine, for both regular and irregular forces.

The battlefield impact of this adaptation is difficult to assess, but it challenges preconceptions about Ukraine and Russia’s doctrinal flexibility. Since the early days of the war, Western observers have tended to emphasize Ukraine’s incorporation of elements of NATO doctrine, particularly decentralization of command authority, and to contrast this with a view of Russian doctrine that is centralized and rigid — a bias that David E. Johnson called out in a 2022 piece for War on the Rocks. In practice, Ukraine’s military has struggled with the same ossified operational thinking that constrained Russia in the early days of the war, while innovations like the assault detachment structure illustrate that Russia’s military is adaptable in ways that are often underestimated from afar.

Russia’s Future in Africa

While it is tempting to see a broad conspiracy in these efforts, there is no unified Russian plan for Africa. Instead, Russia leverages a parallel set of often overlapping and sometimes competing efforts through Wagner, the Africa Corps, and Russian commercial interests that pursue broadly aligned geopolitical aims. All these interests must balance the priority of continued investment in Africa with the more pressing needs of the war in Ukraine — exemplified by the Africa Corps’ increasing focus on operations in Ukraine and the withdrawal of the Bears unit from Africa following Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory.

Local factors will play at least as important a role in determining whether Russia can maintain the mode of security-driven influence that it has preserved in Africa since Prigozhin’s death. No form of Russian security assistance to its partners in the Sahel is likely to meaningfully degrade militants’ ability to threaten local government authority in the long run: Long-term security prospects are dependent on local militaries and local policy.

Russia can maintain these relationships so long as the local governments view them as beneficial, but we should be under no illusions that these are vassal states. Should Russia’s Sahelian partners feel that their latitude to pick and choose security partners is limited by Russia, or that Russia’s commercial interests are counter to those of their elite networks, these countries can revert to more conventional forms of partnership. Niger has expelled the United States to welcome Russia but maintains partnerships with semi-state security providers like Turkey’s SADAT. Even around Russia’s most consolidated presence in Africa, in the Central African Republic, different government actors maintain a variety of security relationships, whether it is with the Rwandan military or even the U.S. private military company Bancroft.

Wagner’s model is appreciated by Russia’s adversaries too: Ukraine has fielded unconventional forces in Africa to oppose Russia’s allies on the continent and has practiced Wagner’s tradition of claiming their involvement in their enemies’ defeats abroad. Alongside the Russian security service interests that have adapted to the post-Prigozhin security space, the African governments that benefit from Russia’s cast of security providers, and the African militant groups that Russia fights, the Ukrainians’ actions in Africa show that Wagner has impacted their thinking on domestic and foreign operations.

Wagner’s Legacy

During Wagner’s assault on Bakhmut, Prigozhin declared the need for the Russian military to learn from what made Wagner effective. A year after his death, Russian military leadership have in many ways accomplished exactly that, taming the diffuse and agile elements of the Wagner Group to deploy them to lethal effect. Russia has achieved this by wielding the competitive “adhocracy” inherent to Putin’s system of rule, the same dynamics that encouraged the growth of Wagner.

Neither the use of volunteer units and pseudo private military companies leveraging Wagner’s brand for recruitment, nor the adoption of Wagner’s operational approaches, are a panacea. Informal mobilization, including through organizations like Wagner’s successors, can help Russia to avoid mass mobilization but, as we have seen at Kursk, the Russian military must still walk a fine line in what forces it deploys. While the assault detachment structure may allow Russian forces greater flexibility in the field, it cannot compensate for poor officer quality, and Russia remains reliant on the use of overwhelming fires to be effective in large scale operations.

Russia’s rogue’s gallery of volunteer units, Combat Army Reserves, and private military companies nonetheless play to Russia’s relative strengths in manpower. They allow for recruitment efforts to reach and more effectively leverage those fighters with experience who are less likely to be drawn to conventional contract service. Whether units like Espanola that draw on football ultras or like Rusich that draw on fascist militant circles, these groups leverage Wagner symbols and personalities to proclaim their effectiveness, experience, and distinction from the worst tendencies of the Russian military, appealing to the type of disaffected but valuable recruit that once formed the backbone of the Wagner Group.

Become a Member

Jack Margolin is an independent expert on international crime and conflict and the author of The Wagner Group: Inside Russia’s Mercenary Army (Reaktion, 2024). His work focuses on the use of emerging technology and novel methodologies to expose the drivers of political violence.

Image: Информационное агентство БелТА via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Jack Margolin · October 9, 2024

27. How America Can Regain Its Edge in Great-Power Competition By Nadia Schadlow

Conclusion:

The goal of an overmatch strategy is not to achieve primacy. That era has passed. U.S. relative power has declined as other countries’ military strength and asymmetric advantages have grown. The first Trump administration took an important and necessary step to adjust to new geopolitical realities by framing the world as a competitive place where the contest among great powers drives international politics. These assumptions still guide much of the U.S. government’s policies today. But the competition paradigm has not been enough to keep pace in an era of skyrocketing risks. If Washington is to retain its freedom of action and protect the liberties Americans have long enjoyed, it needs an overmatch strategy to meet the urgency of the times.

How America Can Regain Its Edge in Great-Power Competition

A Second Trump Term Would Require a New Strategy

By Nadia Schadlow

October 9, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Nadia Schadlow · October 9, 2024

From the start of his term as U.S. president, Donald Trump rang the alarm about the return of great-power competition. His administration’s first National Security Strategy emphasized that adversaries of the United States were seeking to erode its position in the international order. This outlook was relatively novel at the time, but today, much of the broader U.S. foreign policy community shares Trump’s basic assessment. The competition has only intensified in the years since. The United States’ rivals and enemies—particularly China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—are increasingly cooperating with one another and acting more aggressively. From Europe to the Middle East, they are creating policy dilemmas and raising risks for Washington.

If Trump returns to the White House, he will step into a more hazardous geopolitical arena than the one he left four years earlier. Simply resuming the foreign policy of his first term will not be sufficient to navigate a complex environment in which U.S. rivals are arming at a rapid pace and, in the case of Russia and Iran, are engaged in regional wars. This is no longer just a competition; today’s conflicts could be a prelude to a wider war.

A second Trump administration would need to adjust its mindset to ensure that the United States can protect itself and restore deterrence in an increasingly dangerous world. It would need to adopt a strategy of overmatch, a military concept that refers to combining capabilities in sufficient scale to ensure lopsided victories over the enemy in combat. To achieve overmatch, U.S. forces must be able to seize the initiative, maintain their freedom of action, and find ways to limit the country’s adversaries to reactive measures. Applying this approach more broadly, the United States must now seek to retain or develop sizable advantages in military power, political influence, and economic strength over its adversaries.

Realistically, the United States will struggle to achieve such overwhelming capabilities in every theater of today’s geopolitical competition. Bureaucratic sclerosis, for one thing, will be a persistent drag on any sweeping strategy. But Trump, with his competitive instincts, inclination to disrupt the status quo, and sense of urgency, could be the kind of leader to push the United States much closer to where it needs to be. As president, he would need to build up the country’s military capabilities, fortify the domestic industrial base and reduce foreign economic dependencies, and consolidate key political alliances, all in service of strengthening the United States’ hand in the face of mounting geopolitical risks. Trump helped to reset the U.S. strategic mindset once. If he wins another term, new circumstances demand that he do so again.

THE DEFENSE DIMENSION

Great-power competition goes beyond a military contest. It is unfolding across geographies, as seen in China’s increasing involvement in Latin America to advance its interests close to the American homeland. It includes proxy warfare, as Iran, for example, uses its patronage of groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis to fuel violence in the Middle East and threaten vital commercial sea lanes as part of Tehran’s quest for regional dominance. Competition is also heating up in space, where Russia and North Korea are cooperating on the development, deployment, and use of advanced satellites to conduct space warfare.

The United States’ response to such developments has been lethargic. Outdated policy frameworks persist, such as Cold War–era export-control regimes that slow arms sales and impede cooperation with allies. U.S. administrations have recognized the country’s perilous dependence on external supplies of critical minerals for the past four decades, but that recognition has not translated into serious action to address the vulnerability. The most recent defense authorization bill points out that the Pentagon continues to underutilize its authority to buy critical materials from domestic sources. Meanwhile, reforms to expedite permits for the opening of mines in the United States remain stalled.

A second Trump administration would need to adjust to an increasingly dangerous world.

Strengthening the United States’ military position is key to an overmatch strategy, since military power is what undergirds and secures the country’s economic and political advantages. The country’s future prosperity would be undercut if its adversaries achieved primacy or if a global conflict were to break out. Today, U.S. military power has declined relative to other powers; a recent bipartisan report notes that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army is on a path to becoming “a peer, if not superior, military competitor of the United States.” To reverse this trend, Washington needs to develop sufficient capabilities to deter acts of aggression that threaten its other interests. This means that the United States must have the ability—and credibly signal its willingness if need be—to wage sustained military campaigns in multiple theaters.

Such capacity is necessary first to reestablish deterrence, and then to defeat foreign adversaries should deterrence fail. Reaching this level of military capacity would require a major departure from Washington’s current defense planning, which is essentially based on fighting a single major conflict. The steps to get there are demanding but necessary. A Trump White House would need to explain to the American people why higher defense spending is needed and then work with Congress to secure bipartisan backing to fund a new defense program on a similar scale to the buildup the Reagan administration oversaw in the last decade of the Cold War.

The point is not to match every capability of every adversary, platform by platform. Rather, the United States should develop advanced warfighting capabilities that give it asymmetric advantages over its opponents. In Ukraine, drones have disabled or neutralized Russian tanks and warships, and Russian forces have found it difficult to defend against these incoming strikes. In a potential conflict over Taiwan, long-range antiship missiles and intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles could undercut China’s advantages in geography and quantity of weapons. With superior technology and innovative operational concepts, the U.S. military can confound enemy war plans and lower the risk of its forces’ being overwhelmed and induced to capitulate at the start of a conflict.

THE ECONOMIC AGENDA

Better weapons, tactics, and operational concepts are only part of the puzzle. Overmatch in the military domain also requires that the United States can replenish its manpower, materiel, and munitions at a sufficiently high rate to prevail in a sustained conflict. To do so, the United States must cultivate its economic advantages. Washington ought to strive for greater economic sovereignty, including by diminishing U.S. dependence on critical materials imported from unfriendly and unreliable countries.

The biggest step the United States should take in this direction is to incentivize investments in domestic industry, particularly in sectors that will strengthen the manufacturing base and help Washington establish greater control over the supply chains that support military production. Part of the solution is imposing tariffs to protect key sectors, such as advanced batteries. Tariffs can help to counter China’s subsidies and dumping practices and to encourage private companies to move their investments out of China and back to the United States or to U.S. partner countries. But tariffs alone are not enough. Making U.S. manufacturing globally competitive will also require lowering the cost of doing business in the United States. A new administration should streamline the process of environmental and other reviews, which add years to the timeline for opening new facilities, and introduce export tax incentives and other programs to make production in the United States a more attractive option for companies.

A commitment to reindustrialization would undercut China’s efforts to weaken the United States. Chinese companies flood U.S. markets with cheap or subsidized products in strategic sectors such as steel and aluminum, semiconductors, electric vehicles, batteries, critical minerals, solar cells, ship-to-shore cranes, and medical products. This crowds out domestic production and causes job losses. The U.S. military also relies too much on Chinese-made goods. For example, China produces over 90 percent of the world’s rare-earth permanent magnets, which are vital components of many U.S. military systems. Building one of the U.S. Navy’s Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyers requires nearly 5,200 pounds of rare-earth material, including the magnets used in the ship’s propulsion system, guidance systems, and weapons. This reliance makes the United States vulnerable; as long as Beijing effectively controls the inputs for manufacturing American weapons and military systems, the United States may not be able to outmatch China in a potential conflict.

The competition paradigm is insufficient in an era of skyrocketing risks.

In addition, the United States must pursue what the first Trump administration often referred to as “energy dominance,” which entailed increasing U.S. production of shale oil and natural gas through a combination of deregulation and technological innovation. Having already overtaken Russia to become the largest producer of natural gas in 2011, the United States became the world’s largest oil producer in 2018, surpassing Russia and Saudi Arabia. The Biden administration has reversed several of Trump’s policies, shifting focus to action on climate change. In a second term, Trump would be determined to take advantage of the United States’ abundant supplies of oil and gas, which could also offer opportunities to support European and other allies. As Trump said in 2017 at a summit with central and eastern European leaders in Poland, “If one of you need energy, just give us a call.” In addition to making use of oil and gas, a new Trump administration’s energy strategy would likely include greenlighting next-generation fission and fusion projects and modernizing energy infrastructure.

A return to a policy of energy dominance, which acknowledges the central role of fossil fuels until other sources can both meet energy needs and do so at a competitive price, would allow the United States to break out of a harmful cycle with China. As the United States and Europe look to replace oil with alternative energy, they turn to China as the world’s leading provider of solar, wind, and battery products. But it is because these countries are buying up Chinese products that China has been able to drive technological advances, develop its supply chains and manufacturing, and create scale, which in turn entrench Chinese control of the sector. U.S. energy security thus becomes increasingly dependent on China. This is not overmatch. By instead leaning on fossil fuels as the United States’ principal energy source while giving renewable industries time to build up in Western countries, Washington can increase its room for maneuver. It can reduce its vulnerabilities to coercion and reinforce alignments with allies and friends, reclaiming U.S. influence over the geopolitics of energy.

Working with U.S. partners and allies will be essential to an overmatch strategy. In particular, the new administration should negotiate bilateral trade deals with countries endowed with crucial resources. The list includes Australia, which has abundant supplies of critical minerals; Arab countries with abundant capital; India and Israel, with their educated and dynamic workforces; and traditional U.S. allies in Asia and Europe. A realist trade policy should both recognize the potency of economic relationships as geopolitical tools and seek reciprocity for the United States. Rather than setting a global trade agenda through the World Trade Organization, Washington should focus on bilateral or regional arrangements. The United States can more easily hold its partners to the terms of such deals—and this approach is one that already resonates with Trump.

FRIENDS NEEDED

Cultivating the United States’ political relationships can help advance the country’s economic and military objectives. A Trump administration would need to recognize that part of an overmatch strategy is having more and better friends than one’s adversaries. The United States already has an advantage here: it has more to offer potential allies than China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea. Washington’s adversaries have proxies, clients, dependents, and vassals rather than actual friends. Leaning into this advantage can yield economic benefits and investment opportunities, helping the United States disentangle from China.

But to achieve overmatch, American allies must be committed to actively restoring deterrence by developing hard military capabilities and prioritizing the integration necessary to ensure that U.S. and allied militaries can fight together. Europe currently produces some 172 different weapons platforms, so achieving this integration will be difficult, but it is an important step toward what the outgoing head of NATO’s Military Committee has described as the alliance’s urgently needed “warfighting transformation.” The United States should also make clear that its partners on the frontlines of potential conflicts must carry the burden of first response, whereas the U.S. role is to provide reinforcement and specialized capabilities.

Some U.S. allies, particularly those in Europe, have been tempted to seek a middle way that balances their ties to the United States with their economic relationships with China and Russia. But Washington should push back against their efforts to avoid taking sides. As the foreign policy expert Wess Mitchell recently argued, the United States needs to create a unified front against Chinese mercantilism. The Biden administration has taken steps in this direction, but the next president should encourage partner countries to make such cooperation more systematic and comprehensive.

Washington should also consider building political ties beyond its traditional partnerships. To get things done faster, it should emphasize bilateral engagement and small coalitions rather than trying to work through sprawling multilateral processes. The United States should also forge new economic relationships with developing countries. A Trump administration is likely to adopt a more sober attitude toward climate change than its predecessor, based on the recognition that rapid decarbonization has come with unacceptable economic costs for less developed nations. This thinking aligns with the outlook of many developing countries that are determined not to let international pressure to decarbonize get in the way of efforts to boost economic growth and reduce poverty. Trump can leverage this resolve by working with these countries on realistic plans to achieve growth while diversifying energy sources, bringing them into closer alignment with the United States and reducing their reliance on China for economic support.

POLICY RESET

The goal of an overmatch strategy is not to achieve primacy. That era has passed. U.S. relative power has declined as other countries’ military strength and asymmetric advantages have grown. The first Trump administration took an important and necessary step to adjust to new geopolitical realities by framing the world as a competitive place where the contest among great powers drives international politics. These assumptions still guide much of the U.S. government’s policies today. But the competition paradigm has not been enough to keep pace in an era of skyrocketing risks. If Washington is to retain its freedom of action and protect the liberties Americans have long enjoyed, it needs an overmatch strategy to meet the urgency of the times.

NADIA SCHADLOW is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. In 2018, she served as U.S. Deputy National Security Adviser for Strategy.

Foreign Affairs · by Nadia Schadlow · October 9, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Defense & Aerospace Daily Podcast [Oct 08, 24] Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George

Terror in a Safe Space, a Year On

The horror that struck a music festival on Oct. 7 has since spread far and wide.

A Nobel Prize for Terror?

Hamas abettors and apologists are on the list of nominees for the Peace Prize.

An Alliance to Counter China’s Aggression

The U.S. and its allies can isolate Beijing economically by forming a new trade-defense coalition.

A Godfather of AI Just Won a Nobel. He Has Been Warning the Machines Could Take Over the World.

Geoffrey Hinton hopes the prize will add credibility to his claims about the dangers of AI technology he pioneered

Thinking like people

Warnings of disaster

U.S. Frustrated by Israel’s Reluctance to Share Iran Retaliation Plans

The Biden administration hopes to avoid a repeat of surprise attacks, such as the killing of Hezbollah’s leader

FEMA Scrambles to Confront Two Storms—and Misinformation

As the South still digs out from Hurricane Helene, the government agency is fighting falsehoods to save lives from Hurricane Milton

FBI Arrests Afghan Man It Says Planned Election Day Attack

Plot allegedly targeted large crowds in the U.S., Justice Department says, as law-enforcement agencies fear lone-wolf attacks

TikTok Sued by Multiple States for Allegedly Harming Young People

The app has been sued by a number of attorneys general who cite the popular but dangerous challenges it serves up to young users

D.C. and more than a dozen states sue TikTok

The Cataclysmic Post-Election Scenario No One’s Bracing For

Plus: A senator’s honest reversal on term limits.

DIA about to get authority to operate MARS capability on classified network

How the Army is using AI during Hurricane Helene relief

Everyday Etiquette That Came Out of World War II

Wearing T-Shirts

Toothbrushing

A Clean Shave

Blue Jeans

Red Lipstick

Orange Juice at the Breakfast Table

A Vitamin a Day

More on WWII

Unforgettable Moments in Baseball History

The CIA runs a nonprofit venture capital firm. What's it investing in? - Marketplace

Hollywood Takeover

Woodward book reveals Trump's calls with Putin and Biden's private remarks on Obama and Netanyahu

Woodward book reveals Trump’s calls with Putin and Biden’s private remarks on Obama and Netanyahu

Does China now have a permanent military base in Cambodia?

Warming ties

Sabina Shoal: The new flashpoint between China and the Philippines

'Close enough to see their faces': Chased down by China in South China Sea

Fears next door

US Congress takes aim at China: an update on progress of legislation | The Strategist

Opinion China is rapidly building warships. Satellite images reveal the scale.

America needs to expand shipyards and work with allies to keep its fleet battle-ready.

Intelligence officials say US adversaries are targeting congressional races with disinformation

Opinion | The United States Has More at Risk in the Middle East Than You Probably Think

On (Protracted) War: The Challenge of Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations - Modern War Institute

Partners in Peril: Hybrid Threats Come for Jordan - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Partners in Peril: Hybrid Threats Come for Jordan – Insider: Short of War

After Prigozhin, the Wagner Group’s Enduring Impact - War on the Rocks

How America Can Regain Its Edge in Great-Power Competition

A Second Trump Term Would Require a New Strategy

By Nadia Schadlow

THE DEFENSE DIMENSION

THE ECONOMIC AGENDA

FRIENDS NEEDED

POLICY RESET