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Quotes of the Day:
"In philosophy, or religion, or ethics, or politics two and two might make five, but when one was designing a gun or an aeroplane they had to make four."
– George Orwell
"It does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god, It neither picks my pocket or breaks my leg."
– Thomas Jefferson
"In all the tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies. The robber baron's cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cuputidy may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with he approval of their own conscience. "
– C.S. Lewis
1. Israel and Hamas Agree to Hostage Release in Step Toward Peace
2. Five Things to Know About the Gaza Deal
3. Is the War in Gaza Finally Over?
4. I’m the Foreign Minister of Poland. This Is How to Negotiate With Putin.
5. China Tightens Grip on Rare Earths Ahead of Expected Trump-Xi Meeting
6. China says unnamed foreign groups are using its rare earth exports for military purposes
7. Developing | China sanctions US defence firms, chip data provider in latest curbs
8. Russian Drones Turn the Streets of Kherson Into a Civilian Kill Zone
9. Cold War Statecraft for the 2020s
10. Admiral Frank Bradley Takes the Reins at SOCOM
11. Legal experts fear Trump admin is ignoring JAGs on cartel strikes, Guard deployments
12. U.S. and Philippine Forces Drill Near South China Sea Flashpoint
13. Taiwan readies 'porcupine strategy' to fend off Chinese invasion - as Xi Jinping draws up WW3 battle-lines
14. Taiwan says anti-drone measures will be a top priority in defense against China
15. The Hypersonic Dilemma: GCC States and the Future of Missile Procurement Post-Iran–Israel War 2025
16. U.S. Spacepower: Shield & Sword
17. What’s Really Going On in Portland, According to Police Reports
18. The ICE Propaganda Campaign Goes Into Overdrive
19. The Chinese robots are coming
20. A Tale of Two Economies
21. America’s Second Civil War: The 4th and 5th Generation Siege on Our Constitutional Republic
22. Not Just Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur War: Why the Iran-Iraq War Should Inform US Military Thinking about Large-Scale Combat Operations
23. When Ideology Writes the Check: Washington’s Risky Bet on Argentina
24. Taiwan’s Plan for Peace Through Strength
25. America’s New Age of Political Violence
1. Israel and Hamas Agree to Hostage Release in Step Toward Peace
Excerpts:
“This is a GREAT Day for the Arab and Muslim World, Israel, all surrounding Nations, and the United States of America,” Trump said in a post on his Truth Social site.
The president’s announcement marks a breakthrough in what had been eight months of stalled negotiations after he took office, bringing Trump closer to a top foreign-policy goal of ending the war in Gaza. It came together in less than a month after an Israeli strike on Qatar—a U.S. ally that harbors Hamas officials—led to heightened fears the war was spinning out of control and brought new pressure on Israel from Trump and on Hamas from leaders in the Muslim world.
...
It is believed there are 20 living hostages of about 250 people kidnapped on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas and other Palestinian factions launched a surprise assault on Israel that killed about 1,200 people.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he would hold a vote with his government to ratify the deal on Thursday. “A great day for Israel,” he said. “With God’s help, together we will continue to achieve all of our goals and expand peace with our neighbors.”
Hamas’s statement hinted at major details yet to be worked out, and Egyptian officials said mediators were working to hash out a final agreement that could still get derailed. Among the final issues are the return of an estimated 28 bodies of hostages, the list of Palestinian prisoners to be released in exchange and, perhaps most important, how far Israel will have to pull its troops back and how to guarantee the war won’t start again. Since the deal focuses on freeing the hostages, the agreement doesn’t mention Palestinian statehood.
Israel and Hamas Agree to Hostage Release in Step Toward Peace
Trump moves closer to foreign-policy goal of ending two-year war in Gaza
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-travel-middle-east-gaza-peace-deal-81e18ccd
By Summer Said
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, Anat Peled
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and Abeer Ayyoub
Updated Oct. 8, 2025 11:48 pm ET
00:01
/
02:13
President Trump was speaking at a White House event before he posted that Israel and Hamas had agreed to a deal that would release Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip. Photo: Francis Chung/Politico/Bloomberg
Quick Summary
- Israel and Hamas agreed to a deal to release all Israeli hostages in Gaza, with President Trump announcing the breakthrough.View more
Israel and Hamas agreed Wednesday to a deal that would release all Israeli hostages held in the Gaza Strip in the first step toward peace after two years of war in the Palestinian territory.
President Trump said the hostages will be released soon, and that Israel will withdraw its troops in the strip to an agreed-upon area. Hamas confirmed that a broad deal, steered by U.S. envoys, had been reached to end the war, allow more humanitarian aid and facilitate “a prisoner exchange”—a reference to the release of Israeli hostages for Palestinians in Israeli prisons.
Egyptian officials who mediated the talks said Hamas would let the remaining living hostages go as soon as Sunday morning. Trump said in an interview with Fox News that the hostages would probably be released on Monday.
“This is a GREAT Day for the Arab and Muslim World, Israel, all surrounding Nations, and the United States of America,” Trump said in a post on his Truth Social site.
The president’s announcement marks a breakthrough in what had been eight months of stalled negotiations after he took office, bringing Trump closer to a top foreign-policy goal of ending the war in Gaza. It came together in less than a month after an Israeli strike on Qatar—a U.S. ally that harbors Hamas officials—led to heightened fears the war was spinning out of control and brought new pressure on Israel from Trump and on Hamas from leaders in the Muslim world.
Relatives and supporters of Israeli hostages held by Hamas celebrate the news in Tel Aviv. Photo: Emilio Morenatti/AP
Trump employed some of his most trusted advisers—a friend, real-estate investor Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner—to bridge the gaps leading to Wednesday’s announcement.
It is believed there are 20 living hostages of about 250 people kidnapped on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas and other Palestinian factions launched a surprise assault on Israel that killed about 1,200 people.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he would hold a vote with his government to ratify the deal on Thursday. “A great day for Israel,” he said. “With God’s help, together we will continue to achieve all of our goals and expand peace with our neighbors.”
Hamas’s statement hinted at major details yet to be worked out, and Egyptian officials said mediators were working to hash out a final agreement that could still get derailed. Among the final issues are the return of an estimated 28 bodies of hostages, the list of Palestinian prisoners to be released in exchange and, perhaps most important, how far Israel will have to pull its troops back and how to guarantee the war won’t start again. Since the deal focuses on freeing the hostages, the agreement doesn’t mention Palestinian statehood.
In previous deals in November 2023 and January 2025, hostages were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, but the cease-fire agreements eventually broke down.
Displaced Palestinians in Gaza City on Wednesday. Photo: Abdel Kareem Hana/AP
Hamas wants clearer timelines and commitments for the withdrawal of the Israeli military. It also says it would need at least 10 days to locate bodies of dead hostages, according to people close to the talks. Israeli officials believe it will be difficult for Hamas to locate all the remaining bodies of hostages and will take more time.
Egyptian officials said the partial deal announced Wednesday would be a stopgap to keep talks from collapsing over more difficult issues, such as disarming Hamas. U.S. officials asked the mediators to warn Hamas that the talks would end if no agreement is reached by the end of the week.
Earlier in the day at the White House, Trump was interrupted while speaking to reporters and handed a note by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. After reading it, the president said: “We’re very close to a deal in the Middle East.” The note encouraged the president to approve a Truth Social post so he would be the first to announce a deal, according to a photograph.
The secretary of state’s note to President Trump reads, in part, ‘need to approve a Truth Social post soon so you can announce deal first.’ Photo: Evan Vucci/AP
White House officials said Trump is considering going to Egypt, where the talks have been hosted, after his annual checkup at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center on Friday. He didn’t rule out visiting Gaza during his trip.
The deal was struck on the third day of talks in the Red Sea resort of Sharm El Sheikh. Witkoff and Kushner arrived Wednesday, along with Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, and Ron Dermer, Netanyahu’s top adviser.
The talks follow from Israel and Hamas tentatively accepting a 20-point peace plan announced by Trump last week. If the plan is adopted, Trump would chair a “Board of Peace” that would oversee the interim governance of Gaza. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair would play a role in that effort.
Representatives for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and from Palestinian Islamic Jihad, groups that hold some of the Israeli hostages, were also in Egypt for the talks.
There were scattered celebrations in Gaza, where it was 2 a.m. when Trump made his announcement, according to video on Arabic television channels. But some Gazans were cautious about getting their hopes up.
“I feel that this agreement might collapse in the upcoming stages. I’m not very optimistic. I’m worried,” said Ahmed Humaid, 35 years old, in the Gaza city of Nuseirat. “I won’t be surprised if Israel takes all the hostages and then goes back to the war. I understand people are happy that the airstrikes might stop, but they don’t think of the upcoming days.”
More than 67,000 Palestinians have died in the war, according to the Gaza health ministry, which doesn’t break out civilian and militant deaths.
Hamas on Wednesday sought to assure Gazans “that our people’s sacrifices will not be in vain.”
“We will not abandon our national rights until freedom, independence and self-determination are achieved,” Hamas said.
Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Anat Peled at anat.peled@wsj.com
2. Five Things to Know About the Gaza Deal
Excerpts:
These are the main elements of the first phase:
All living hostages held by Hamas are to be released.
The bodies of hostages who have died are to be handed over later.
Israel will release Palestinian prisoners.
Israel Defense Forces will withdraw from 70% of the enclave.
The Rafah crossing with Egypt will open.
Five Things to Know About the Gaza Deal
Israel and Hamas have agreed to first phase of peace plan, though key details have yet to be announced
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/five-things-to-know-about-the-gaza-deal-2a7442ac
By Michael R. Gordon
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Updated Oct. 8, 2025 11:01 pm ET
Israelis have demonstrated for months for release of all the hostages held in Gaza. Photo: Leo Correa/Associated Press
President Trump said on Wednesday that Israel and Hamas agreed to the first phase of a plan to end the two-year war in Gaza and establish a durable peace.
The deal was struck amid talks that followed after Israel and Hamas tentatively accepted a 20-point peace plan announced by Trump last week. Trump sent his special envoy, Steve Witkoff, and his son-in-law, Jared Kushner, to Egypt to finalize negotiations.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s top adviser, Ron Dermer, and Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, also went to Egypt for the talks.
A host of details still need to be resolved in a subsequent phase of the agreement, including how the Gaza enclave is to be governed, who will provide security, and Israeli demands that Hamas be disarmed.
These are the main elements of the first phase:
All living hostages held by Hamas are to be released.
There are 48 hostages, about 20 of whom are believed to be alive. Trump said in an interview with Fox News Wednesday night that the hostages would probably be released on Monday.
The bodies of hostages who have died are to be handed over later.
Hamas has said it would need at least 10 days to locate the bodies of dead hostages, according to people close to the talks.
Israel will release Palestinian prisoners.
Once all the hostages are returned, Israel is expected to release 250 Palestinians who are in Israeli prisons and 1,700 Palestinians who have been detained in Gaza during the conflict. Precisely who is on that list is being finalized.
Hamas has pushed to get as many big-name prisoners released as possible, including Marwan Barghouti, whom Israel jailed over his role in a Palestinian uprising in the early 2000s.
Israeli troops on guard near the border with the Gaza Strip. Photo: Jack Guez/AFP/Getty Images
Israel Defense Forces will withdraw from 70% of the enclave.
The deal includes a map of the withdrawal lines but without exact locations or coordinates. The final lines to which the Israeli military will withdraw may still be under discussion.
The Rafah crossing with Egypt will open.
The crossing will open after the cease-fire comes into effect to facilitate aid deliveries, and allow for entry and exit of Palestinians.
Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com
3. Is the War in Gaza Finally Over?
Is the War in Gaza Finally Over?
Israel and Hamas just agreed to the first phase of Trump’s peace plan for Gaza. Michael Oren, Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, Eli Sharabi, Matthew Continetti, and others react.
By The Free Press
10.09.25 —
Israel
https://www.thefp.com/p/is-the-war-in-gaza-finally-over
thefp.com · The Free Press
“BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS!” wrote Donald Trump on Truth Social on Wednesday evening.
“Israel and Hamas,” he announced, “have both signed off on the first Phase of our Peace Plan. This means that ALL of the Hostages will be released very soon, and Israel will withdraw their Troops to an agreed upon line as the first steps toward a Strong, Durable, and Everlasting Peace.”
The news comes five days after Hamas signaled openness to Trump’s 20-point peace plan for the Israel-Gaza war, and three days after indirect negotiations began between Israel and Hamas in Egypt, facilitated by mediators from Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey.
According to initial reports, the deal will be signed on Thursday. In a phone call with families of the hostages, Trump said that all Israeli hostages will be released next Monday—in exchange for an unspecified number of Palestinian prisoners.
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Meanwhile, Israel has agreed to withdraw its troops from Gaza to an “agreed upon line,” Trump said. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu characterized the deal as a “diplomatic success and a national and moral victory for the State of Israel,” and said that “all our hostages will be brought home.” Even David Axelrod, former senior adviser to Barack Obama, expressed cautious optimism: “[I]f this agreement holds, the hostages are released, the bombs stop falling and there is a framework for peace after these two ghastly years, it will be a great and welcome achievement.”
Naturally, uncertainties remain—about the hostage release, Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, and the long-term governance of the Strip. Details will emerge in the coming days. In the immediate wake of the news, we had plenty of questions. Foremost among them: After two long years, is the war in Gaza finally nearing its end?
Here’s what our contributors had to say:
Michael Oren, former Israeli ambassador to the United States
It may not be the end of the war—Hamas apparently still has its guns and is still embedded in Gaza—but neither is it merely the beginning of the end. It promises to be the end of the unspeakable suffering of the living hostages and the families of both the survivors and the dead. It suggests an end to the enervating and traumatic military service of tens of thousands of Israeli reservists. It holds out the hope for ending the agony and homelessness of millions of Gazans and for reviving a diplomatic horizon for the Palestinians. One end is certain—of America’s isolation and withdrawal from the Middle East. President Trump may yet achieve a lasting peace, but he has already restored the Pax Americana.
Ahmed Fouad Alkhatib, Palestinian American humanitarian activist
The war in Gaza is far from over, even if it is tactically stopped for now. The agreement thus far is specific to Phase 1, which relates to the hostage-prisoner swap and a partial Israeli military withdrawal from the Strip. Afterward, new negotiations must commence to figure out the arguably more difficult subjects like Hamas disarmament, an international force entering Gaza, a transitional governance apparatus, and the process of neutralizing any threats emanating from the Strip, during which Hamas is expected to stall, drag things out, and create challenges for the future of the coastal enclave without the terror group. Any respite from the horrors of war is indeed welcome news, and hopefully, there won’t be a resumption after this phase is finished. Still, rational thinking and awareness require an understanding of all the challenges ahead.
H.R. McMaster, retired United States Army lieutenant general and former White House national security adviser
As long as Hamas has guns, the war for the security of Israel and the future of the Palestinian people is not over.
Matthew Continetti, Free Press columnist
The Gaza deal is a triumph of coercive diplomacy. By pairing support for Israel with negotiations, President Trump leveraged IDF hard power to gain Hamas concessions. Just as he did in Iran, Trump used the credible threat of military force to achieve his goal. Americans are often tempted to separate force from peace talks, thinking that one must precede the other. Trump doesn’t make this mistake. For him, talk without action is meaningless. Talk with action gets results. And demonstrations of power are integral to the bargaining that culminates in a transaction.
The deal is also a victory for Prime Minister Netanyahu. To date, his alliance with Trump has produced four historic achievements: the Abraham Accords, the demolition of Iran’s nuclear program, the deconstruction of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, and the pending release of the October 7 captives.
Over the past six months, the world has seen what’s possible when America and Israel stand together to confront the enemies of civilization. Let’s not stop now.
Eli Sharabi, released Israeli hostage, author of Hostage, and recent guest on Honestly
This is an amazing moment that I will never forget. We’ve waited more than 730 days for the body of my brother Yossi, who was killed in Hamas captivity. Now my family and Israel can start to heal from the trauma of October 7. Thank you, President Trump and his team, especially Steve Witkoff. We could not have done this without them.
Haviv Rettig Gur, Free Press Middle East analyst
Is the war over? Probably. Hopefully.
Hamas appears to have caved to Arab pressure. The hostages are expected to be released within 72 hours of the deal being approved, and the IDF will withdraw far enough to allow the first steps in Gaza’s rehabilitation and rebuilding to begin.
But Hamas is still there. In the last few days, its forces attacked members of an anti-Hamas militia, part of a wider pattern of clashes with rival groups seeking to replace it in different parts of Gaza. Those kinds of operations tell us it doesn’t plan to go away. It appears to be planning to lie low and ride out the international rebuilding period, and then emerge and reclaim Gaza at some future date.
So the war may end, the rebuilding may begin, but the basic pattern that brought us to this disastrous place, Hamas’s never-ending religious war, won’t go away unless the political forces that have come together to give Gaza this new dawn, especially from the Arab world, manage to move decisively and aggressively to disarm the Strip and begin the kind of deradicalization process that could sideline Hamas over the long-term.
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thefp.com · The Free Press
4. I’m the Foreign Minister of Poland. This Is How to Negotiate With Putin.
Wise words here:
Excerpts:
There is a saying that each U.S. administration discovers Russia anew. Almost every president in recent decades has entered the White House hoping for a fresh start, but the result has always been the same: The more that’s offered to Moscow, the more it demands.
...
But it is possible to negotiate with Russia. Just do it in two stages: Make a show of force first, and only then have dialogue. The negotiations between President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that helped to end the Cold War could not have taken place had Reagan not first exploited the weaknesses of the U.S.S.R. by exerting heavy military and economic pressure, including by supporting groups and countries that were challenging the Soviets all over the world, like the Polish Solidarity movement and the Afghan mujahedeen. This two-stage approach did the trick: When the Kremlin elite realized that they were too weak to break Reagan’s determination they began to negotiate.
Mr. Putin is not there yet. The only way to bring him to a negotiating table is by making him realize that he cannot kill his way out of the mistake he made on Feb. 24, 2022, when he began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
To do this, it is essential to continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily, and to undermine the foundations of the Russian war economy. A good beginning would be for the self-described MAGA acolytes in Hungary and Slovakia to listen to Mr. Trump and stop buying Russian oil, and to finally use the more than $200 billion of frozen Russian assets in Europe to give financial assistance to the victims of Mr. Putin’s war.
The largest country on earth doesn’t need more land. It should take better care of what is already within its internationally recognized borders. The leadership of Russia must understand that its attempt to rebuild Europe’s last empire is doomed to fail. The age of empires is over.
I’m the Foreign Minister of Poland. This Is How to Negotiate With Putin.
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/09/opinion/putin-poland-radoslaw-sikorski.html
NY Times · Radosław Sikorski · October 9, 2025
Guest Essay
Oct. 9, 2025, 1:00 a.m. ET
Credit...Pool photo by Ramil Sitdikov
Listen to this article · 5:21 min Learn more
By
Mr. Sikorski is the deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Poland. He wrote from Warsaw.
There is a saying that each U.S. administration discovers Russia anew. Almost every president in recent decades has entered the White House hoping for a fresh start, but the result has always been the same: The more that’s offered to Moscow, the more it demands.
In the early hours of Sept. 10, more than 20 drones launched from Russia violated Poland’s airspace. NATO jets were scrambled to shoot them down. These drones did not veer off course. They did not drift into a NATO country by mistake. My government is certain that it was a provocation orchestrated by the Russian regime. Just over a week later, three Russian fighter jets violated Estonian air space for around 12 minutes.
These and other incidents are yet more proof that the Kremlin is not interested in peace but in escalation. If you are surprised by that, you have not been paying attention.
Since his inauguration, President Trump has tried every diplomatic avenue to achieve peace in Ukraine. He created the position of special envoy for peace missions and nominated to the post someone acceptable to the Kremlin; American diplomats have met their Russian counterparts on neutral ground, and the special envoy has visited Moscow several times; Mr. Trump has personally and publicly asked President Vladimir Putin of Russia to “STOP!” the war in Ukraine, and when Mr. Putin ignored the request, Mr. Trump offered to meet him one on one in Alaska.
But the arithmetic of war speaks for itself: Russia is not looking for an offramp. Its military spending for 2025 is estimated to reach 15.5 trillion rubles, around $190 billion, up 3.4 percent from 2024. Spending on defense and security in 2026 is projected to consume roughly 40 percent of Russia’s entire budget.
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And this April — three months after the new U.S. administration took office — Ukrainian officials said that Russia was planning to increase its troop presence in Ukraine by 150,000 by year’s end. Russian bombs have never stopped pounding Ukrainian cities. Now come the brazen incursions into NATO airspace. These incursions are not a sideshow; they are another rung up the ladder of escalation.
Mr. Putin may have accepted the invitation to Alaska, but not to negotiate in good faith — he wanted to buy time. His long-term goals have not changed: rebuild the Russian empire, undermine trans-Atlantic security guarantees, divide the West, and — last, but certainly not least — weaken the United States.
In 2013, Mr. Putin wrote in an essay in this newspaper that “we need to use the United Nations Security Council and believe that preserving law and order in today’s complex and turbulent world is one of the few ways to keep international relations from sliding into chaos.” Sounds reasonable, doesn’t it?
The essay was headlined, “A Plea for Caution From Russia,” and opposed American plans to intervene in Syria against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, who had attacked his own citizens with sarin gas. Within a year Russian soldiers would be in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, and eight years later Mr. Putin would start the deadliest war in Europe since World War II, which has so far left nearly 1.5 million soldiers killed or wounded. No U.N. Security Council mandate was given and the U.N. General Assembly condemned the attack, to no avail.
But it is possible to negotiate with Russia. Just do it in two stages: Make a show of force first, and only then have dialogue. The negotiations between President Ronald Reagan and the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that helped to end the Cold War could not have taken place had Reagan not first exploited the weaknesses of the U.S.S.R. by exerting heavy military and economic pressure, including by supporting groups and countries that were challenging the Soviets all over the world, like the Polish Solidarity movement and the Afghan mujahedeen. This two-stage approach did the trick: When the Kremlin elite realized that they were too weak to break Reagan’s determination they began to negotiate.
Mr. Putin is not there yet. The only way to bring him to a negotiating table is by making him realize that he cannot kill his way out of the mistake he made on Feb. 24, 2022, when he began the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
To do this, it is essential to continue to support Ukraine financially and militarily, and to undermine the foundations of the Russian war economy. A good beginning would be for the self-described MAGA acolytes in Hungary and Slovakia to listen to Mr. Trump and stop buying Russian oil, and to finally use the more than $200 billion of frozen Russian assets in Europe to give financial assistance to the victims of Mr. Putin’s war.
The largest country on earth doesn’t need more land. It should take better care of what is already within its internationally recognized borders. The leadership of Russia must understand that its attempt to rebuild Europe’s last empire is doomed to fail. The age of empires is over.
Radosław Sikorski is the deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Poland.
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5. China Tightens Grip on Rare Earths Ahead of Expected Trump-Xi Meeting
China Tightens Grip on Rare Earths Ahead of Expected Trump-Xi Meeting
Beijing requires export licenses for goods made with certain rare-earth materials and tech from China, even when manufactured abroad
https://www.wsj.com/economy/trade/china-imposes-new-controls-over-rare-earth-exports-35a4b106
By Hannah Miao
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Updated Oct. 9, 2025 5:17 am ET
China’s export controls cover technologies used in rare-earth mining, smelting, and other processing steps. Photo: nayan sthankiya/Reuters
SINGAPORE—China tightened its control over critical minerals used to make high-tech products including electric vehicles and jet fighters, threatening to reignite trade tensions with the U.S. ahead of an expected meeting between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
China’s Commerce Ministry said Thursday that foreign suppliers must obtain approval from Beijing to export some products with certain rare-earth materials originating from China if they account for 0.1% or more of the good’s total value. Goods produced with certain technologies from China are also subject to the export controls. Both restrictions apply to products manufactured outside of China.
Export applications for products with military uses generally won’t be approved, the ministry said, adding that licenses related to semiconductors or artificial-intelligence development will be granted on a case-by-case basis.
The controls expand on Beijing’s moves earlier this year to require licenses for exports of certain rare-earth metals and related products. Automotive, electronics and defense companies in the U.S. and around the world have struggled to get supplies, elevating China’s grip on rare earths to a central place in trade negotiations with Washington.
China has spent decades building up its dominance in global rare-earth mining and processing, giving Beijing significant leverage that it has flexed this year. It produces around 90% of the world’s rare earths and controls much of the supply of many other critical minerals. Suppliers for the U.S. military are dependent on Chinese materials used to make items such as drones and missile-targeting systems.
The new rules signal that China is extending its control further down the rare-earth supply chain as the U.S. and other Western countries aim to build up domestic industries and reduce reliance on China.
“They want to maintain as much of that strategic position as possible,” said Julian Evans-Pritchard, head of China economics at Capital Economics. He added that the new controls could be a headache for a lot of manufacturers, given that rare earths are used in many products.
Beijing’s latest move comes as Trump and Xi are planning to meet at a regional gathering of leaders in South Korea at the end of the month, with Trump signaling follow-up visits to Beijing by him in early 2026 and to the U.S. by Xi later next year. A recent deal brokered between the two countries for the sale of a controlling stake in Chinese-owned short-video app TikTok to American investors has paved the way for the series of high-level talks.
Earlier this year, U.S.-China trade negotiations came to a head after Beijing’s rare-earth controls created supply shortages for American companies.
“There’s the risk that it could derail things a bit,” Evans-Pritchard said. “China is reopening the same can of worms.”
In explaining its new rules, China’s commerce ministry said Thursday that some foreign organizations and individuals had transferred or supplied rare-earth materials of Chinese origin to entities involved in military and other sensitive fields, posing serious harm and potential threats to China’s national security.
The latest export controls cover technologies used in rare-earth mining, smelting and other processing steps, the ministry said. Some of the controls take effect immediately, while the rest will be in place starting Dec. 1.
It wasn’t immediately clear from the guidelines how China intends to enforce the new rules.
The ministry said Chinese suppliers will be required to issue a compliance notice to overseas buyers for items considered dual-use, meaning products that have both civilian and military applications. Foreign exporters using those Chinese components are also required to issue a compliance notice to the next recipient.
Exports for humanitarian purposes—emergency medical care, responses to public health emergencies, or natural disaster relief—are exempt from the dual‑use export license requirement for overseas exporters, the ministry said. But the exports should be reported to the ministry within 10 days via email.
Entities identified on China’s export control list, including subsidiaries or firms of which they hold majority ownership, will generally not be approved for exporting dual-use items and technology, the ministry said.
In a separate action on Thursday, China’s Commerce Ministry added 14 organizations to its “unreliable entity list,” which bans them from engaging in trade and investment in China. Those include 12 U.S.-based companies or subsidiaries, nonprofit summit organizer Halifax International Security Forum and Canada-headquartered semiconductor technology research firm TechInsights.
The U.S. also has a trade blacklist known as an entity list for companies it says pose national security risks. The Trump administration recently expanded its controls to subsidiaries of entity list companies, targeting China’s tech sector.
Grace Zhu in Beijing contributed to this article.
Write to Hannah Miao at hannah.miao@wsj.com
6. China says unnamed foreign groups are using its rare earth exports for military purposes
Excerpts:
The ministry said: “Some overseas organisations and individuals are directly processing rare earth items originating in China and then transferring or providing them to relevant organisations and individuals.
“The items were directly or indirectly used in sensitive areas such as military operations, causing significant damage or potential threats to China’s national security and interests.”
Beijing introduced the first controls on the export of specific minerals in July 2023 – again banning their export without permission – and has steadily expanded the number of rare earths subject to these controls since then.
But the new controls are the first time that these curbs have been expanded to the technology used to mine or process the minerals.
ChinaMilitary
China says unnamed foreign groups are using its rare earth exports for military purposes
Beijing announced its first controls on the technology used to mine and process the minerals, citing the potential threat to national security
Alcott Weiin Beijing
Published: 4:07pm, 9 Oct 2025
China has accused unnamed foreign organisations and individuals of processing its rare earths for military purposes as it announced further export controls on Thursday.
The new curbs announced by the Ministry of Commerce will ban the provision of technology and services for mining and processing the minerals without permission.
China is the world’s leading producer of rare earth elements, which are crucial to the production of a wide range of products, from electric vehicles to spacecraft, especially in the military sector.
The ministry said: “Some overseas organisations and individuals are directly processing rare earth items originating in China and then transferring or providing them to relevant organisations and individuals.
“The items were directly or indirectly used in sensitive areas such as military operations, causing significant damage or potential threats to China’s national security and interests.”
Beijing introduced the first controls on the export of specific minerals in July 2023 – again banning their export without permission – and has steadily expanded the number of rare earths subject to these controls since then.
But the new controls are the first time that these curbs have been expanded to the technology used to mine or process the minerals.
In July, China’s Ministry of State Security warned that contractors in countries that could not produce or purify rare earths themselves were using spies to smuggle the minerals abroad using forged labels or by misreporting ingredients.
What are rare earths, and why is China’s dominance facing global pushback
“Criminals conceal undeclared rare earth-related items in other properly declared goods, such as mixing rare earth powder into tiling raw materials or filling plastic mannequins, and then smuggling them out of the country under vague labels such as alloy accessories and mechanical parts,” the ministry said.
China accounts for around 70 per cent of global rare earth mining and more than 90 per cent of the world’s processing capacity for the more valuable heavy elements.
The US and other countries have long-standing concerns that Beijing could weaponise this supply chain dominance.
Export controls, particularly those targeting US defence companies, form part of Beijing’s efforts to counter Washington, and it expanded the scope of its existing export controls in April in response to Donald Trump’s tariffs.
A study by Govini, a defence acquisition software firm, published that month concluded that three-quarters of the key components found in the US military’s weapons systems relied on China’s rare earth exports.
Alcott Wei
Alcott Wei joined the Post to report on China in 2025, after working as an intern for the Beijing bureau in 2024 and has long had a keen interest in Chinese politics. He graduated from the Hong Kong Baptist University with a bachelor's degree in journalism and communication.
7. Developing | China sanctions US defence firms, chip data provider in latest curbs
Developing | China sanctions US defence firms, chip data provider in latest curbs
Beijing targets 14 entities, most of them based in the US, on the same day it imposed new rare earth export controls
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3328361/china-sanctions-slew-us-defence-firms-institutions?utm
Further Reading
Ji Siqiin Beijing
Published: 4:22pm, 9 Oct 2025Updated: 5:34pm, 9 Oct 2025
Beijing has announced sanctions on a slew of Western companies and institutions in the defence sector and a leading semiconductor data analysis provider, marking its latest salvo amid ongoing trade tensions with the United States.
Fourteen entities, mostly headquartered in the United States, were added to Beijing’s unreliable entity list on Thursday, banning them from trade and investment in China, according to a statement from the Ministry of Commerce.
Among the companies on the list is TechInsights, a Canada-based firm specialising in semiconductor intelligence, reverse engineering and market analysis.
Organisations and individuals in China are also prohibited from engaging in transactions, cooperation or other activities with the sanctioned entities, particularly data sharing and providing sensitive information to them, the statement said.
The move came after the ministry imposed a raft of new export controls on rare earth materials and related technologies on Thursday morning, as Beijing seeks to gain leverage ahead of an anticipated meeting between President Xi Jinping and his American counterpart Donald Trump in late October.
“This reflects the complexity of China-US relations,” said Ding Shuang, chief Greater China economist at Standard Chartered. “Both sides are likely to keep negotiating – it’s not as if either intends to flip the table.
The entities also include counter-drone technology providers Dedrone by Axon and DZYNE Technologies. Halifax International Security Forum, a conference organiser, was also added to the list.
In a separate statement, a Mofcom spokesperson said the impacted entities “have engaged in so-called military-technical cooperation with Taiwan, made malicious remarks about China and assisted foreign governments in suppressing Chinese companies”.
“[These actions] have severely undermined China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests,” the spokesperson said.
More to follow...
Ji Siqi
Ji Siqi joined the Post in 2020 and covers China economy. She graduated from Columbia Journalism School and the University of Hong Kong.
8. Russian Drones Turn the Streets of Kherson Into a Civilian Kill Zone
Video and graphics at the link.
Russian Drones Turn the Streets of Kherson Into a Civilian Kill Zone
Attacks have increased to a level and range that has made the streets of Kherson a daily gauntlet
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia-ukraine-drones-civilian-deaths-9c7d5f13?st=BV15oo&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
The Russian propaganda video showing the attack that injured Yaroslav Pavlivskiy.
By Oksana Grytsenko and Jane Lytvynenko | Photography by Emanuele Satolli for WSJ
Oct. 8, 2025 10:30 pm ET
Quick Summary
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Russian drone attacks in Kherson have intensified, targeting civilians and infrastructure, leading to 90 civilian deaths and over 1,300 injuries this year.View more
MYKOLAIV, Ukraine—Yaroslav Pavlivskiy waved his hands as he sprang from his car, pleading for mercy with the operator of a Russian drone circling overhead as he drove home from a market in the southern city of Kherson.
The operator flicked a switch to release a grenade, which exploded and tore into the legs of the 69-year-old pensioner. A passerby used a belt as a tourniquet to stop him from losing too much blood, saving his life.
In the hospital the next day, the doctor showed Pavlivskiy a Russian video of the incident, which was set to techno music and carried a caption: “A drone operator spotted another ‘civilian.’ After reconnaissance, the target was eliminated.”
Russian drone operators have turned daily life in Kherson into a terrifying gauntlet. A year ago, from the other side of the Dnipro River, they began sending drones, in addition to using bombs and artillery, to take potshots at civilians.
Now the attacks have intensified to such an extent that Ukrainian authorities, civilians and human-rights groups say it has become a systematic effort to keep people off the city’s streets under threat of execution from the skies.
Yaroslav Pavlivskiy with his wife, Halyna.
The drones drop grenades or antipersonnel mines, or swoop on targets and explode on impact. They target buses, markets, gas stations, and even medical and police vehicles. Residents fear the approach of winter, as nights grow longer and trees shed their leaves that provide natural cover.
It is part of Russia’s growing strategy to terrorize civilians in an effort to sap Ukrainians’ strength to resist in the fourth year of war. The attacks have left Kherson and villages along the Dnipro almost deserted. The youngest victim killed in the region, also known as Kherson, was a 1-year-old boy.
The Russian Defense Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Russian drone operators often post videos of their hits on social media, warning that all civilians should leave the city or die. With a prewar population of over 300,000, Kherson now has about 65,000 residents.
As the range and quality of drones have improved, Russian operators are flying deeper into the city. Residents are now worried that the main highway into Kherson, situated about 13 miles from the front, is too deadly to drive because of the constant drone attacks.
As many as 30,000 drones have been launched at Kherson city since the start of the year, killing 90 civilians and injuring over 1,300. “They are not humans after what they are doing,” Pavlivskiy said.
Visually confirmed drone attacks on civilian and infrastructure targets in Kherson between July 22, 2024 and Sept. 26, 2025
Molodizhne
M14
M17
Chornobaivka
Antonivka
Kherson
Bilozerka
Oleshky
RUSSIAN FORCES
Romashkove
Veletens'ke
UKRAINE
Area of detail
2 miles
2 km
Sources: Center for Information Resilience (drone attacks); Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project (Russian forces as of Oct. 1)
Andrew Barnett/WSJ
One year since the attack, Pavlivskiy can barely walk despite enduring seven surgeries, including a bone transplant. He now lives in Mykolaiv, a regional capital north of Kherson.
While Pavlivskiy was at the hospital, another drone operator killed a 16-year-old cyclist on his street. Another two neighbors were wounded. Now his neighborhood next to the river is deserted. The trees are covered with the thin fiber-optic cables used to direct some of the drones.
A United Nations commission said in May that Russian authorities have committed the “murder of civilians in Kherson province, as part of a coordinated state policy, and hence, as crimes against humanity.”
Russians often refer to the areas along the Dnipro as the “red zone,” where any civilian or vehicle will be targeted.
In June, Vladimir Saldo, a former Kherson mayor who now governs the Russian-controlled part of the region, endorsed in his Telegram channel the attacks on civilian infrastructure and said civilians should leave.
A Russian video posted in July showed an elderly man running for cover under a tree. A drone dropped several grenades on him before setting fire to his house and garden. The video ended with the entire street engulfed in flames.
Another video from June showed several Russian drones striking civilian vehicles and a firetruck. “There will be no more mercy,” a caption on the video said.
A video published in August featured a drone dropping an explosive on a man walking his dog in the shadow of a large fence. The dog was wounded in the attack and the video shows the man dragging it away. “No one deserves pity. Spare me your whining,” the video caption says.
A Russian propaganda video shows the moment when a man walking his dog was attacked.
Most of what residents dub “human safari” videos appear on Telegram channels dedicated to celebrating them.
Kherson residents don’t walk outside without checking the sky for drones. They try to hide under trees and the shadows of buildings, and run in zigzags when drones start chasing them.
Many believe Russia is terrorizing them as a revenge for the massive rallies that were held in 2022 against the invasion and the warm welcome Ukrainian forces received when the city was retaken that fall. Nobody doubts that Russians want to break the city dwellers psychologically.
“This is both a terror and a psychological pressure,” said Yuriy Antoshchuk, head of a nongovernmental organization in Kherson province that advises civilians on security.
Joshua Scriven, an investigator at the Centre for Information Resilience, a London-based open-source data research group that collects data on the attacks, said Kherson is a convenient training ground for Russian drone operators as they are relatively safe beyond the river and the city is teeming with targets on its streets.
“This individual targeting just does not seem to have any military merit,” Scriven said.
In April, paramedic Oleksiy Alferov was checking the blood pressure of a man injured by a Russian drone when another struck the ambulance he was working in. The vehicle jolted and was set on fire. Shrapnel broke Alferov’s leg and a passing taxi driver rushed both him and the ambulance driver to the hospital.
“Thank God, people in Kherson are now united and helping each other,” said Alferov, 65 years old. He is still recovering after surgeries and walks with a limp, but he intends to return to work.
As a survival tip, Alferov advised keeping a lookout for birds. “If their wings don’t move, it could be drones,” he said.
Medics are among the primary targets of Russian drones, along with police officers, firefighters and volunteers who help deliver food or evacuate residents, said Kostiantyn Trubiyenko, a former chief paramedic of Kherson region’s emergency medical center.
Kostiantyn Trubiyenko
Six of his colleagues have been killed and 49 wounded since the invasion. More than 30 ambulances have been destroyed or damaged. The wreckage of two ambulances still lies on the road because rescuers risk being targeted again if they try to remove them. “This is terror. This is nothing but terror,” Trubiyenko said.
Medics now wear protective gear, and use drone detection and jamming devices. Still, the protection is minimal and Russia often launches a second strike against first responders helping the wounded, Trubiyenko said.
Residents often move from the more dangerous parts of the city to relatively safer northern neighborhoods. But since July, when Russians began striking the road that connects Kherson with Mykolaiv, no part of Kherson can be considered safe from drones.
“You don’t know where the bomb will drop and that’s difficult,” said Ihor Dorokhin, 35, who was wounded by a grenade from a drone while he was on his way to a store in Kherson. “It is constant stress.”
Dorokhin said he had three or four seconds to react when he saw the grenade fall. It gashed his legs and landed him in the hospital for five separate operations.
Ihor Dorokhin in a hospital in Mykolaiv.
Vadym Pustokhin was wounded by mine explosions.
Life in the smaller towns east and west of Kherson along the river is even worse. “We live in a mousetrap,” said Vadym Pustokhin, 26, from Romashkove, a town about 20 kilometers west of Kherson. Once home to 300 people, Romashkove now has no more than 30 residents, mostly elderly.
Pustokhin said he saw about 40 drones flying over his house every day. Whenever volunteers tried to bring food to the town, he would climb onto his roof to check for drones and warn them if it was safe to enter.
Still, locals have managed to cultivate their kitchen gardens. “They hear the buzz of a drone and hide in barns or henhouses. Then, when the drone passes, they all come out,” he said.
In June, Pustokhin was wounded by a mine explosion that also killed his cat, Pumka. His neighbors carried him to a volunteer delivering humanitarian aid, who drove him to a hospital in Kherson. Ambulances no longer go to Romashkove.
Pustokhin said hospitals in Kherson are overcrowded with wounded patients. “And it’s all because of drones,” he said.
Appeared in the October 9, 2025, print edition as 'Russian Drones Turn City Into Kill Zone'.
9. Cold War Statecraft for the 2020s
Excerpts:
This piece is the first in a series that will propose a strategy for the United States to conduct and win the modern Cold War. That strategy will include a general set of principles and consistent, specific tactics for grappling with critical issues, including technology and artificial intelligence, Taiwan and territorial conflict, and the flow of goods, ideas, and money.
This strategy will build on the unprecedented (and unexpected ) success of 1980s Cold War statecraft. That extraordinary victory was conceived and executed by a set of courageous leaders and advisers who could not have known in advance that the risks they took would play out in success.
The 1980s analogy, like all historical cases, isn’t perfect. China is not Russia, 2025 is not 1985, the Sino-American relationship is more deeply interdependent economically than the U.S.-Soviet relationship ever was, and Trump and Xi are not Reagan and Gorbachev. Consider that agreed. But though history doesn’t repeat, it often rhymes. There is a credible and workable center-right inspired Cold War statecraft theory and strategy waiting for America—if we have the courage and discipline to embrace and execute on it.
...
America’s objectives today can and should be equally ambitious. The goal cannot be limited to only survival, stalemate, or stability for its own sake. It’s increasingly clear that China’s goals aren’t limited in that way: Beijing isn’t aiming for a balance of power that perpetuates the status quo. Neither should we. The second half of this decade is set to be a critical inflection point in this contest. The U.S. needs an overall strategy and specific, consistent policies on the most critical issues that make up the new cold war.
Cold War Statecraft for the 2020s
How the U.S. victory over the Soviet Union can guide our thinking on China.
https://thedispatch.com/article/cold-war-statecraft-for-the-2020s/
thedispatch.com · Steven Weber
The United States and China are firmly locked in a cold war struggle whose outcome will be the most important determinant of peace, prosperity, and quality of life in international politics over the next decade.
That view enjoys nearly unanimous agreement—in Beijing and Washington, among Democrats and Republicans, and around the world in Brussels, Delhi, and Abu Dhabi, where leaders increasingly frame choices and consider options with an eye toward how they should position their nations within this new bipolar power contest.
This piece is the first in a series that will propose a strategy for the United States to conduct and win the modern Cold War. That strategy will include a general set of principles and consistent, specific tactics for grappling with critical issues, including technology and artificial intelligence, Taiwan and territorial conflict, and the flow of goods, ideas, and money.
This strategy will build on the unprecedented (and unexpected ) success of 1980s Cold War statecraft. That extraordinary victory was conceived and executed by a set of courageous leaders and advisers who could not have known in advance that the risks they took would play out in success.
The 1980s analogy, like all historical cases, isn’t perfect. China is not Russia, 2025 is not 1985, the Sino-American relationship is more deeply interdependent economically than the U.S.-Soviet relationship ever was, and Trump and Xi are not Reagan and Gorbachev. Consider that agreed. But though history doesn’t repeat, it often rhymes. There is a credible and workable center-right inspired Cold War statecraft theory and strategy waiting for America—if we have the courage and discipline to embrace and execute on it.
How we got here.
That we’d end up in a Sino-American Cold War was nearly inevitable, though that wasn’t the conventional wisdom a few decades ago. During the 1990s, Democrats held the view that intentional efforts to incorporate a fast-emerging China as a great power into an American-led world order of open trade through WTO membership and relaxation of certain technology export controls would prompt a detente or even an alignment of sorts. They predicted that we’d see a gradual political liberalization in China, a softening of major security issues in the Pacific, and a relationship that at its best might come to resemble that between the U.S. and the European Union.
“What happened over the course of the 1980s was a deep surprise and a historic success. Achieving a peaceful and victorious end to the Cold War in 1989 was probably the greatest win of modern statecraft bar none.”
In retrospect, that view was logically flawed and historically naive. Its consequences were harmful overall to both countries’ political and economic development, and almost certainly to the relationship itself.
Policy experiments can be overrun by structural forces, and structural forces matter the most at this point. Like these: The Chinese economy in nominal terms remains smaller than the U.S. economy, but it’s almost 30 percent larger when corrected for purchasing power parity—and it continues to grow quickly. On the military front, U.S. planners believe the Chinese are targeting 2027 as a deadline for developing military capability sufficient to threaten kinetic warfare against Taiwan. Both sides are developing technology stacks for artificial intelligence that are increasingly separate and nationally autonomous, to the point where the phrase “sovereign AI” is becoming commonplace. The American foreign policy elite no longer bothers to talk much about a liberal international order that supposedly would be in China’s best interest to join, as it did (in a rather self-indulgent way) for decades. All the while, China openly pursues an ideological and institutional campaign, in fora like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, to create modern alternatives to the clunky, 80-year-old international institutions that Americans still somehow label “pillars of postwar order.”
Calendar decades don’t determine the rise and fall of great powers or coincide with structural shifts in international politics. But halfway through the current decade, it seems a fair bet that we’re approaching an inflection point of some kind toward the end of the 2020s.
That timing matters, because right now it is very difficult to discern in American policy—or even in underlying debates—a coherent theory of the case about how to conduct and win this new cold war. It’s easy to critique the Clinton administration’s co-optation theory, and equally so the Biden administration’s manifesto of “competition not conflict” with China. But what has actually replaced these ideas as guiding principles of high-level statecraft?
Ambiguity and vacillation, for the most part. The United States now has a Department of War, but does that signal an intention to China any different than ongoing deterrence? Do U.S. export controls aim to get Chinese AI companies addicted to and dependent on high performance Nvidia GPUs—or not? What technical controls or ownership arrangements make it acceptable for a consumer-facing social media company like TikTok to operate freely inside the U.S.? What is the endgame for a repeatedly suspended tariff regime that presumably has some alternative plan for how the products of China will shape the U.S. consumer economy?
It’s true that the Trump administration certainly has a high tolerance for policy ambiguity—and sometimes seems to deploy it as an intentional bargaining tactic, to unsettle the expectations of others. But with China? The level of ambiguity is extreme and does not seem to be generating any particular advantages in any visible bargaining dynamic. Beijing doesn’t appear unsettled; it is mobilized. And Chinese leaders are adept at arbitraging the confusion that a lack of coherent statecraft creates.
The simplest explanation that fits the facts is probably the best. And that is that the current administration simply does not have a coherent theory of Cold War statecraft. We need one badly, and soon.
Lessons from the past.
That the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union would end peacefully and with the U.S. as the clear victor seemed unlikely as late as the mid-1980s.
To grasp just how unlikely it was, go back and recapture (if you can endure it) the poly-crisis experience of the late 1970s and the sentiment that accompanied it. Rarely if ever has there been a deeper moment of apprehension about American decline or a higher level of anxiety about superpower conflict. The Iranian revolution had overturned a critical American ally in the most volatile region of the world and subjected the U.S. to a deeply humiliating hostage crisis. Russia invaded Afghanistan in what was seen at the time as a sign of mounting strength and the next step in an empire’s quest for warm-water ports. The U.S. economy was stuck in a nearly decade-long period of stagflationary pain so tangible that it had its own bespoke metric, the “misery index” (adding inflation and unemployment together). The crown jewel treaty of a nuclear arms control regime that was the linchpin of U.S.-Soviet detente, SALT II, was “buried in the sands of the Ogaden” as Soviet proxy forces were on the march to gain greater influence and power over the developing world, at America’s expense. All of this in the context of the Vietnam “allergy,” the memory of America’s humbling in the final withdrawal of Saigon fresh in the mind.
Layer on top of these poignant events an intellectual framework in the academic international relations world that helped to make sense of all this, but not in a way that would have predisposed any American toward optimism. It would be a mistake to overstate the influence of academic theory on policymakers, but as part of the overall foreign policy zeitgeist and atmosphere of the moment, it set the tone and was of a piece.
Ken Waltz’s 1979 blockbuster Theory of International Politics (which quickly became the baseline model for nearly all academic and most think-tank debate at the time) was a watershed. Before Waltz, great power politics was largely a story of diplomatic and military history, focusing on leaders and the decisions they made. Or it was a story about regime type—democracy vs. authoritarian, kings or people. Waltz left those arguments behind to argue that deep structural forces—put simply, the highly concentrated bipolar balance of power was the primary determinant of Cold War politics and statecraft. That balance of power made for a hyper-stable Cold War equilibrium that would not go away anytime soon. The decisions of leaders were downstream of that structural reality and regime type just didn’t matter very much.
In Waltz’s model, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, so much more powerful than any third-party potential allies, were in practice the only meaningful threat to each other’s vital interests. As a result, discretionary choice for leaders was constrained. Uncertainty and resulting room for error in international politics was remarkably low. The result would be stability—an intense and robust competition in which neither side would fall behind simply because it knew it could not afford to do so. Cold War for as long as the eye could see.
The second most important model of the time was Robert Gilpin’s 1981 War and Change in World Politics. Gilpin argued, contra Waltz, that the bipolar balance of power was not stable for the long term because differential growth rates would over time create unsolvable dilemmas for great powers that could not afford the rising costs of maintaining international order. He sketched out three potential pathways for systems change—superpower accommodation, internal reform, or
“hegemonic war.”
This neat story largely collapsed in the last chapter, however, when he tried to assess what was the most likely trajectory for the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Accommodation had been tried and failed in early 1970s detente. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union seemed capable of meaningful internal reform even under the pressure of intense competition (as Waltz saw it) from the other. That left hegemonic war as the only available pathway, but Gilpin believed that the presence of nuclear weapons was a new and unprecedented factor that blocked out war, at least by intention. That left Gilpin’s theory, ironically, in much the same endgame as Waltz’s, just by a different route—the Cold War would likely continue simply because there was no way for it to end.
What now?
Against this pessimistic backdrop, what happened over the course of the 1980s was a deep surprise and a historic success. Achieving a peaceful and victorious end to the Cold War in 1989 was probably the greatest win of modern statecraft bar none. It was also the single most important 20th-century achievement of the center-right in American politics, and for a cast of extraordinary leaders and thinkers assembled around Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush. Together they developed and executed a clear theory of the case about how to end the Cold War without undermining the coherence of basic global structures and without setting off World War III. They won.
America’s objectives today can and should be equally ambitious. The goal cannot be limited to only survival, stalemate, or stability for its own sake. It’s increasingly clear that China’s goals aren’t limited in that way: Beijing isn’t aiming for a balance of power that perpetuates the status quo. Neither should we. The second half of this decade is set to be a critical inflection point in this contest. The U.S. needs an overall strategy and specific, consistent policies on the most critical issues that make up the new cold war.
With not-so-distant history as our guide, we can build both.
thedispatch.com · Steven Weber
10. Admiral Frank Bradley Takes the Reins at SOCOM
We must focus on the entire Dark Quad as their collusion gives them strength to create dilemmas for us. As the Chairman says we must create dilemmas for them.
And while we prepare for near-peer conflict, the efforts and activities of the Dark Quad increase in the gray zone. We must understand the paradox our strength creates.
The problem:
• Since the end of the Cold War, the US has tried to apply conventional and nuclear deterrence concepts to asymmetric threats.
•By definition, asymmetric threats, hybrid warfare, and gray zone activities cannot be deterred by conventional or nuclear deterrence concepts because they take place below the threshold of conventional war.
•They must be addressed with offensive political warfare capabilities that attack the adversaries’ strategies, create dilemmas, and exploit the inherent weaknesses and contradictions of totalitarian regimes.
•The U.S. has been unable to effectively execute such a strategy in the 21st Century because of a deterrence mindset, a fear of escalation, and being constantly in a defensive and reactive posture.
•The U.S. has not yet adopted a winning mindset for activities in the gray zone.
The American Paradox: Strength and Vulnerability:
•While the United States has maintained its relative conventional and nuclear superiority, it has adopted a largely defensive and reactive stance in the gray zone. This approach stems from the assumption that forces optimized for high-intensity conflict can easily "scale down" to address asymmetric threats. However, this perspective has left America vulnerable to adversaries who are actively and offensively competing in this ambiguous space.
•The "Dark Quad" of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRInK) – collectively described as the axis of upheaval, chaos, or tyranny – have been creating dilemmas and attempting to disrupt and undermine U.S. national security strengths. In contrast, the U.S. has struggled to develop an agile, flexible, and offensive capability for operations in the gray zone.
•The U.S. must work to maintain its conventional and nuclear military superiority because this offers the best chance of avoiding war. By doing so it neutralizes these threats which then can allow the U.S. to make very modest investments in its national security apparatus to be able to offensively and proactively compete and win in the gray zone.
Excerpts:
“SOCOM is a unique organization. Forged from the OSS [Office of Strategic Services] in World War II, your job is to connect people and to bring dilemmas to those who would do us harm,” Air Force general Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during the change of command.
The change of command came at a time when the focus is on a future near-peer conflict with China or Russia.
Admiral Frank Bradley Takes the Reins at SOCOM
The National Interest · Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 7, 2025
Topic: Military Administration
Blog Brand: The Buzz
Region: Americas
October 7, 2025
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The change of command came at a time when the focus is on a future near-peer conflict with China or Russia.
The special operations community has a new leader. Army General Bryan Fenton retired, and Navy Admiral Frank Bradley assumed his role as commander of the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Change of Command
In a ceremony last week, Admiral Bradley, a Navy SEAL, replaced General Fenton, an Army Special Forces officer, as the head of the US special operations community.
“SOCOM is a unique organization. Forged from the OSS [Office of Strategic Services] in World War II, your job is to connect people and to bring dilemmas to those who would do us harm,” Air Force general Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during the change of command.
The change of command came at a time when the focus is on a future near-peer conflict with China or Russia.
“[Gen. Fenton] strengthened those connections … Bradley’s charge is to expand them … ensuring SOCOM remains ready to go out into the darkness on land, in the air, on the sea, or in cyberspace to do our nation’s business,” the most senior officer in the US military added.
Before assuming the mantle of SOCOM, Bradley commanded the secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and Special Operations Command-Central. Bradley also served and later commanded the Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU), colloquially known as SEAL Team Six.
“The strength of our organization lies in the extraordinary service members, civilians, contractors, and family members who serve within it—those who are willing to go above and beyond the call of duty to protect our Nation and its interests,” Fenton wrote in his departing letter.
“At USSOCOM, humans truly are more important than hardware, and are USSOCOM’s comparative advantage,” the retired general added.
During the two decades of fighting in the Middle East, the special operations community spearheaded US military operations. First, a handful of Army Green Berets and CIA officers defeated the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. Then, special missions units led an industrial counterterrorism campaign against al Qaida in Iraq, destroying the terrorist organization and allowing the US military to pull out from Iraq.
More recently, the special operations community has reverted to supporting the conventional military in preparation for a near-peer conflict with China or Russia.
The Elite Background of SOCOM’s Leaders
Both Fenton and Bradley commanded JSOC before getting the big job.
Although JSOC nominally falls under SOCOM, in reality, it responds only to the president and the secretary of defense. JSOC is the US military’s 911, and it contains its most elite units.
From the Army side of the house, there is the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta, colloquially known as Delta Force. There is also the secretive Intelligence Support Activity, an intelligence-gathering outfit with a strategic purview. Fenton served and commanded that unit before rising further through the ranks and becoming the J-3 (operations) officer of JSOC and, finally, its commanding general in 2021.
From the Navy side, there is SEAL Team Six.
Finally, from the Air Force, there is the 24th Special Tactics Squadron.
JSOC is primarily tasked with hostage rescue and counterterrorism operations. However, its units are the primary choice of policymakers and military commanders in a contingency. For example, it was SEAL Team Six that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, in 2011. And it was Delta Force that killed Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of the so-called Islamic State, in 2019.
About the Author: Stavros Atlamazoglou
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.
Image: DVIDS.
The National Interest · Stavros Atlamazoglou · October 7, 2025
11. Legal experts fear Trump admin is ignoring JAGs on cartel strikes, Guard deployments
Excerpts:
Baker and James McPherson, a retired rear admiral and former Navy JAG who served as Army undersecretary during Trump's first term, told attendees that the military's lawyers have historically been crucial for making sound decisions during operations. But, in February, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired the Air Force, Army and Navy’s top judge advocates general. Hegseth told reporters their dismissals were necessary to clear "roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief."
Baker and McPherson’s concerns follow a new report that a classified legal opinion from the Department of Justice has justified continued strikes on alleged cartel members.
McPherson said that if he was put in the difficult position of the JAG advising the commander on the cartel strikes, he would take note of everything and offer that officer a way out of the situation, too.
Legal experts fear Trump admin is ignoring JAGs on cartel strikes, Guard deployments
A former military lawyer and a former judge encouraged commanders to stand up to unlawful orders.
By Thomas Novelly
Senior Reporter
October 8, 2025 05:25 PM ET
defenseone.com · Thomas Novelly
National-security-law experts worry that guidance from the military’s top legal minds is being ignored by the Trump administration, which is pushing troops into new legal territory with deployments to U.S. cities and strikes on alleged drug-runners abroad.
"One of the things I fear might be happening here is that the judge advocates in this instance may be providing proper means and methods advice, but I sense that the administration has gone to the Department of Justice and asked the Office of Legal Counsel to override whatever advice is being given by the judge advocates,” James Baker, a law professor at Syracuse University and former chief judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, said Wednesday during a Center for a New American Security event.
Baker and James McPherson, a retired rear admiral and former Navy JAG who served as Army undersecretary during Trump's first term, told attendees that the military's lawyers have historically been crucial for making sound decisions during operations. But, in February, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth fired the Air Force, Army and Navy’s top judge advocates general. Hegseth told reporters their dismissals were necessary to clear "roadblocks to orders that are given by a commander in chief."
Baker and McPherson’s concerns follow a new report that a classified legal opinion from the Department of Justice has justified continued strikes on alleged cartel members.
McPherson said that if he was put in the difficult position of the JAG advising the commander on the cartel strikes, he would take note of everything and offer that officer a way out of the situation, too.
“If I felt that he was being given advice that was not sound and not legal, I would document that myself,” McPherson said, adding he’d also tell that commander he’d draft legal guidance to his superiors “‘that will protect you in the future if some of this comes back to haunt you.’”
In the early hours of his second term, Trump signed an executive order designating certain cartels as terrorist organizations. On Oct. 2, the administration sent a memo to Congress declaring that the U.S. is in an “armed conflict” with the groups.
Baker poked holes in that logic. He said the labels alone don’t seem to be enough to support the militarized action.
“The problem here seems to be reverse engineering,” Baker said. “There's no armed group and ongoing, consistent, violent hostilities. I'm not seeing it.”
In addition to the cartel strikes, a flurry of legal challenges have been filed in response to President Trump’s deployments of National Guard troops to Chicago, Portland, Oregon, and Memphis. Similar deployments earlier this year to Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., are also the subjects of lawsuits.
McPherson said the administration’s legal justifications for the LA deployment were divorced from reality.
"Well, those facts were not supported by the evidence, ladies and gentlemen. Just simply was not,” he said. “And as a result, the facts that the administration articulated were facts that they found on Truth Social, facts they found in podcasts, facts they found not in evidence on the ground."
Judge advocates general often provide direct guidance to a commander, steering them between the guardrails in place for military operations. An August survey by the University of Massachusetts Amherst’s Human Security Lab reported that 4 out of 5 service members surveyed understood the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s mandate to disobey unlawful orders.
Baker said commanders should have the courage to stand up to illegal orders.
"If the JAG advised it was unlawful, the commander owns it now,” Baker said. “So, if you think there's something that is unlawful, you need to say so. And that's a point when you put your stars on the table."
defenseone.com · Thomas Novelly
12. U.S. and Philippine Forces Drill Near South China Sea Flashpoint
And a just reminder from our good friend, the Philippine ambassador to the US:
“The West Philippine Sea, not Taiwan, is the real flashpoint for an armed conflict,”
– Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez February 28, 2024
U.S. and Philippine Forces Drill Near South China Sea Flashpoint - USNI News
news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · October 8, 2025
The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG-65) sails in the front of a formation with the Philippine Navy Jose Rizal-class frigate BRP Jose Rizal (FF 150), center, the Royal Australian Navy Hobart-class air warfare destroyer HMAS Hobart (DDG 39), left, and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Akizuki-class destroyer JS Akizuki (DD 115), during a multilateral Maritime Cooperative Activity exercise with Australia, Japan and the Philippines Feb. 5, 2025. The U.S. is co-hosting Sama Sama 25 alongside the Philippine Navy from Oct. 6-17. US Navy photo
Washington and Manila kicked off the latest iteration of the Sama Sama naval drills on Monday in the vicinity of a western Philippine province located near South China Sea hotspots.
Sama Sama, a Tagalog word that translates to “together,” originally began as a series of maritime security drills in 2017. Since then, the U.S.-Philippine co-hosted exercise has grown to include more combat activities, as well as anti-piracy and humanitarian missions, amid Manila’s naval modernization efforts.
Participants and observers for 2025’s iterations include the U.S., Philippines, Australia, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Thailand, Italy, Canada and New Zealand. BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151), BRP Valentin Diaz (PS-177), USS Cincinnati (LCS-20) and JS Ōnami (DD-111) are among the vessels confirmed to participate in the exercise, which is set to run Oct. 6-17.
While most activities and location areas remain unclear, a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force news release stated that Onami will hold a tactical exercise to improve anti-surface warfare capabilities with U.S. and Philippine forces.
Manila has increasingly turned to international partners to help bolster its naval forces via training exercises amid tensions in the South China Sea with Beijing. Previous Sama Sama exercises have occurred in the waters, which have seen numerous incidents between Chinese and Philippine forces around contested maritime features.
This will also be the first Sama Sama iteration to be held under the newly christened Western Naval Command, a recently stood up Philippine military command structure meant to enhance coordination and operations in the country’s western exclusive economic zone. The Philippine Navy has said the reorganization will help in the upcoming Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept, Manila’s new defense strategy designed to counter modern threats.
Sama Sama 2025 follows a string of incidents in the South China Sea. Since last year’s June 17 incident, which saw a Philippine Navy SEAL lose his thumb in a boat collision with the China Coast Guard, the waters off Palawan have remained relatively calm. However several severe collisions have happened in the waters off Luzon, – the country’s most populous and largest island – including water cannon incidents and naval standoffs in recent weeks at Scarborough Shoal.
Related
news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · October 8, 2025
13. Taiwan readies 'porcupine strategy' to fend off Chinese invasion - as Xi Jinping draws up WW3 battle-lines
Rather than "porcupine" we should consider the "honey badger" analogy as Lt Gen Gregson wrote in 2023. Or Taiwan could adopt the best of both.
Porcupine or Honey Badger?: The “Overall Defense Concept” and Asymmetry in Taiwan’s Defense Strategy
by Lt. Gen. Wallace ‘Chip’ Gregson (USMC, ret.) and John Dotson
https://globaltaiwan.org/2023/05/porcupine-or-honey-badger-the-overall-defense-concept-and-asymmetry-in-taiwans-defense-strategy/
Honey badger
Proposed by the Global Taiwan Institute in 2023, the honey badger analogy is for a defense posture that is both fierce and asymmetric, going on the offensive rather than waiting to be attacked.
Fierce but small: Like Taiwan, the honey badger is not the largest animal, but it is known for its ferocity and willingness to attack much larger adversaries.
Active and aggressive: It implies a strategy that would actively target an invading force, rather than passively absorb an attack as the porcupine analogy suggests.
Taiwan readies 'porcupine strategy' to fend off Chinese invasion - as Xi Jinping draws up WW3 battle-lines
The carefully-crafted plans could see Taiwan's entire population fight to repel Xi Jinping's invading forces
gbnews.com · Dan McDonald · October 8, 2025
Taiwan is said to be preparing to unleash a unique military tactic to protect itself against the threat of a Chinese invasion.
The Taiwanese "porcupine strategy" is carefully designed to warn off Xi Jinping's People's Liberation Army (PLA) from attempting to take over the sovereign state.
Top military expert Philip Ingram has revealed the key components behind the strategy - which would likely unfold in the event of an invasion.
Mr Ingram told The Sun's Battle Plans Exposed: "Taiwan's military posture is built around a core strategic principle known as the porcupine strategy or asymmetric defence."
The Taiwanese 'porcupine strategy' is carefully designed to warn off Xi Jinping's CCP-controlled forces
The military intelligence maestro described how the strategy is not designed to defeat the PLA "in a conventional war, but to make an invasion so difficult, so costly and so bloody that Beijing is deterred from ever attempting it".
Taiwan's armed forces would bring in the Air Force, Navy and weaponry to turn the island nation into an impenetrable fortress.
Mr Ingram explained: "The Air Force is the first line of defence tasked with contesting air superiority over the Taiwan Strait, and against initial waves of missile strikes.
"The backbone of the fighter fleet is the recently upgraded F-16 Vipers, one of the most advanced fourth generation fleets in the world.
"This is supplemented by domestically produced jets and the French made Mirage 2000 jets."
Taiwan's armed forces would utilise their Air Force, Navy and weaponry to turn the island nation into an impenetrable fortress
The Taiwanese Navy would assist the Air Force in fortifying the island by surrounding it with sea mines to make the short trip from China as dangerous as possible for the PLA - and prevent a naval blockade around their territory as a potential American backup force arrived.
Taiwan's navy has US destroyers, submarines and frigates at its disposal - with China said to be signing backroom deals with Russia in a bid to even out the two powers' forces.
The submarines are specially designed to carry out missions undetected, making them a deadly obstacle for any invading forces.
Taiwan's intricate missile systems are thought to be the quills of their porcupine strategy.
Mr Ingram described the sovereign state's missile capabilities as being "the heart of Taiwan's deterrent".
He noted that "the strategy relies on a massive arsenal of precise, mobile and hard to detect missiles".
Taiwan has began calling up its civil defence and reserve forces in greater numbers in recent times.
The country's military conscription period has jumped from four months to one in a bid "to create a better trained fighting force," Mr Ingram said.
Taiwan has began calling up its civil defence and reserve forces in greater numbers in recent times
Discussing why China may soon make an audacious land grab against its island neighbour, Mr Ingram explained: "While the world's attention is fixed on Ukraine another flashpoint could ignite an even greater conflict.
"Just 112 miles from China's coast lies Taiwan, an island of 23 million people facing 1.4 billion people and the world's largest army.
"For Beijing, it's not just territory, it's destiny. For Washington, it's a red line."
Our Standards: The GB News Editorial Charter
gbnews.com · Dan McDonald · October 8, 2025
14. Taiwan says anti-drone measures will be a top priority in defense against China
Taiwan says anti-drone measures will be a top priority in defense against China
By HUIZHONG WU and JOHNSON LAI
Updated 2:41 AM EDT, October 9, 2025
AP · HUIZHONG WU · October 9, 2025
TAIPEI, Taiwan (AP) — Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense issued a report saying it is training soldiers to shoot down drones and actively looking to procure new anti-drone weapons systems, which comes in response to Chinese drone incursions.
The report released Thursday said Taiwan has developed a strategy to deal with the Chinese drone incursions by identifying and shooting them down as they approach.
Taiwan’s outlying islands, which are closer to China than the main island of Taiwan, often face Chinese drones. China frequently claims Taiwan as its own, while in practice it is self-ruled.
Defense ministry spokesperson Major General Sun Li-fang said Taiwan is continuing efforts to identify and use effective anti-drone systems in response to China.
“Basically the drone development and anti-drone developments are very fast, and based on today’s situation, there’s different progress every day,” he said. “This is one of our key points in our military preparedness efforts.”
The report also summarizes military exercises to surround the island and the growing use of grey-zone tactics by China, which are assaults stopping short of a direct armed attack. Drones have been added as a robust part of China’s grey-zone tactics.
In recent years, China has deployed its Coast Guard on patrol exercises and boarded Taiwanese fishing ships in the waters surrounding Taiwan, in addition to deploying the People’s Liberation Army on regular, large-scale exercises.
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In April, China launched a surprise military exercise around Taiwan and then announced a formal military exercises a day later.
“The CCP has significantly increased joint combat readiness patrols, maritime and air blockades, joint firepower strikes,” the ministry report said of China’s preparations for establishing a blockade around Taiwan.
Taiwan’s anti-drone efforts are top priority, the ministry said Thursday, and soldiers in the outlying islands also are practicing night shooting as part of the training.
Taiwan has said it will work to strengthen its relationship with the U.S., the largest unofficial ally as military tensions increase with Beijing.
However, U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to Taiwan has differed from the Biden administration and Taiwan’s government canceled a U.S. stopover by President Lai Ching-te in July. Some reports said the decision was based on opposition by the Trump administration to a stopover and was widely viewed by experts as a diplomatic win for China.
Trump also demanded Taiwan deter China by increasing its defense spending as much as 10% of GDP, a proportion well above what the U.S. or any of its major allies spend.
Taiwan Defense Minister Wellington Koo on Wednesday reaffirmed the pledge to raise defense spending to about 5% of the island’s GDP from the current spending of about 3% of GDP.
Major General Liu Wenjing, director of Taiwain’s Strategic Research and Analysis Division of the War Planning Department, said cooperation with the U.S. has long been aimed at regional security and peace.
“We will continue to strengthen our cooperative relationship through existing exchange mechanisms,” he said.
Taiwan signed a deal in February to pay $761 million to the U.S. for an air defense system to combat drones.
___
Wu reported from Bangkok.
AP · HUIZHONG WU · October 9, 2025
15. The Hypersonic Dilemma: GCC States and the Future of Missile Procurement Post-Iran–Israel War 2025
Excerpts:
The most credible projection for the forthcoming years is a GCC security framework characterized by three modifications. A more compact and federated sensor network capable of identifying and tracking elusive profiles more promptly by using U.S., European, and national resources. Secondly, enhanced defensive munitions and a broader array of effectors, ranging from THAAD-class interceptors to expendable end-game alternatives, appropriately sized for salvos encompassing ballistic, cruise, and potentially maneuverable threats. Third, collaborations among enterprises that enhance the nation’s capacity to produce propulsion systems, composites, seekers, and command software—elements crucial for hypersonic technology that do not violate Washington’s export restrictions. This architectural approach does not diminish the allure of hypersonic strikes; rather, it postpones their implementation, allowing for observation of the technology’s performance in actual warfare and the evolution of exportability norms.
The hypersonic factor will alter the Gulf in subtle but significant manners. It will expedite discussions around data sharing that were previously deemed politically unfeasible. The sole method to combat “faster and lower” threats is by “earlier and more intelligent” defense. Procurement decisions will transition from platform-based criteria to network-based criteria. This will enable nations to integrate sensors from cyber, space, aerial, and maritime domains into a unified perspective. If your defense relies on your partner’s spatial sensors and AI-driven fusion, it is imperative to ensure that your diplomatic decisions maintain the partner’s receptiveness to your participation. It will challenge individuals to evaluate costs and advantages from a novel perspective. In a domain where assailants seek speed and agility, defenders must cultivate time and trust. This underscores the significance of investing in both interceptors and robust command and control systems, as well as backup communications and the capacity for rapid assembly of these components. The Gulf can manage this, provided that political and physical factors are aligned
The Hypersonic Dilemma: GCC States and the Future of Missile Procurement Post-Iran–Israel War 2025
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/09/gcc-hypersonic-defense-strategy/
by Tahir Azad
|
10.09.2025 at 06:00am
Introduction
The recent war between Iran and Israel has elevated hypersonic weapons from specialized military periodicals to the forefront of conversations regarding Gulf geopolitics. Iran’s potential deployment of basic hypersonic weapons has prompted Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to advance missile technology, speed, survivability, and penetration to counter evolving regional defenses. Analysts dispute Tehran’s claims, distinguishing “fast ballistic” missiles from true hypersonic glide vehicles. The conflict illustrated the considerable psychological and political impact of the hypersonic narrative: what ramifications does this present for Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Manama, Kuwait City, and Muscat if concentrated barrages and unique flight paths can undermine Israel’s multi-layered defense system? The existing solution comprises enhanced collaboration on integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) spearheaded by the US, targeted research into domestic strike and counter-hypersonic technologies, and strategic hedging among principal suppliers, particularly given that China and Russia aim to convert their hypersonic investments into arms transactions and geopolitical leverage.
An effective starting point is to examine the technical and political context of Iran’s assertions on hypersonic weapons throughout the conflict. Tehran asserted that it employed hypersonic weapons during and subsequent to the conflict, frequently referencing the term “Fattah” to substantiate these assertions. However, specialists in open-source technology were uncertain whether the missiles in issue exhibited the long-range maneuverability and low-altitude flight characteristics typical of contemporary hypersonic glide vehicles. The configuration of Arrow and David’s Sling atop Patriot and Aegis, supported by partners, maintained elevated interception rates.
US Push for Regional Air Defense
The United States is leveraging the Iran-Israel conflict to propose a long-discussed concept: a comprehensive regional air and missile defense system that would combine sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control across national boundaries. In late May 2024, Washington conducted U.S.–GCC Defense Working Groups on integrated air and missile defense and marine security in Riyadh. The insights gained during the Iran-Israel interaction demonstrated that collaboration is preferable to isolation. The proposal envisioned real-time data sharing, common operating pictures, and de-conflicted interceptor employment—ingredients that would be indispensable against maneuvering or depressed-trajectory threats. All of these measures are necessary to safeguard against threats that are in motion or descending. The proposal arrived at an opportune moment for Gulf officials who were abruptly altering their strategies and assessing the associated risks. But it also went against people’s concerns about sovereignty, data security, and the political repercussions of openly coordinating defense, especially when working together can be regarded as supporting Israel.
Alongside efforts to integrate regional defenses, the US has conducted a series of “Sands” exercises. US Central Command (CENTCOM) and its subordinate organizations have conducted numerous live-fire tests of air defense and counter-unmanned aerial systems (UAS) across the region. These exercises, executed with GCC partners, have fostered a culture of rapidly devising and enhancing strategies to counter tiny, persistent threats that frequently accompany or set the stage for missile assaults.
- Red Sands (Saudi Arabia + US Army Central): A live-fire experimentation hub to test new tech—especially counter-UAS, cruise missile, and drone defense—under realistic Gulf conditions.
- Blue Sands (US Air Forces Central + GCC air forces): A multinational air and maritime defense drill, practicing radar sharing, fighter integration, and layered missile interception across borders.
- Yellow Sands (US Air Forces Central + GCC land units): A ground-based air defense exercise, ensuring Patriot, THAAD, and regional batteries can interoperate in real-time coalition engagements.
These exercises are not hypersonic-specific, but they are hypersonic-relevant. If maneuvering, high-speed threats compress timelines and complicate trajectories, then the ability to stitch an allied picture and move interceptors and effectors quickly is the first line of plausibly effective defense.
GCC Strategies in the Hypersonic Era
Against this backdrop, what are the GCC states thinking about when arming for a hypersonic age? Due to the varying strategic positions, industrial bases, and alliance preferences, there is no single answer. The narrative concerning missile development in Saudi Arabia is the most advanced. Open-source reports and imagery analysis indicate that Riyadh has transitioned from merely purchasing Chinese ballistic missiles to domestic production in recent years. The solid fuel infrastructure indicates the nation’s intention to possess a greater share of the propulsion and airframe systems in the long run. This history is significant, as it demonstrates that nations are prepared to invest substantial sums in alternatives to airpower for prolonged deterrence attacks. Riyadh is evidently exploring hypersonic strike concepts, recognizing that hypersonic velocity and maneuverability might circumvent contemporary defense systems. Nonetheless, there exists a robust inclination to enhance defenses and combat management. Saudi Arabia remains the premier location globally for acquiring expertise in managing missile and drone assaults. The country excels in maintaining robust defenses and training military personnel.
Since 2024, several senior US officials have asserted that the Iran-Israel conflict demonstrated the necessity for integrated defense.
Conversely, the UAE is one of the most adaptable integrators of next-generation systems in the region and frequently adopts American missile defenses. American integration facilitates networking and maintenance, yet it necessitates adherence to regulations concerning compliance, cybersecurity, and transparency. This might pose challenges for a foreign policy that seeks to be adaptable. The UAE’s contention with Washington regarding the suspended F-35 procurement underscores the significance of this matter.
The presence of Chinese technology exacerbated conditions for the US. If hypersonic strikes were feasible, regulations would likely be more stringent, not relaxed. U.S. policy currently lacks a formal program for deployed hypersonic weapons and intends to establish carefully controlled export channels. In the foreseeable future, the Emirati are expected to enhance and fortify integrated air and missile defense (IAMD), encompassing counter-hypersonic detection and cueing. They are likely to engage in selective co-development in propulsion, guidance, and materials, maintaining future possibilities but avoiding significant export and compliance issues.
Iran’s missile strike against the US Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar in June 2025 prompted reflection among many throughout the region. Reports from CENTCOM and other sources indicate that the US and Qatari defenses thwarted an intended Iranian ballistic missile strike on Al Udeid Air Base. This demonstrated the significance of Qatar’s air defense sector to the region and the challenges of hosting CENTCOM’s Combined Air Operations Center while managing regional diplomacy. Doha has recognized that credible layered defenses and rapid coalition integration are essential for a state functioning as the region’s air hub. If hypersonic systems proliferate, Qatar’s optimal defense strategy is to avoid initiating an expensive arms competition and instead position itself at the core of the most sophisticated, interconnected defensive network in the region. This umbrella must incorporate sensors (over-the-horizon, space, and high-altitude), data fusion, and interceptor families capable of managing difficult-to-track profiles. This instinct—defensive and alliance-oriented—is in line with Qatar’s historical actions and the constraints of its political identity.
This is Washington’s opportunity to transform years of rhetoric into tangible structures. Since 2024, several senior US officials have asserted that the Iran-Israel conflict demonstrated the necessity for integrated defense, urging Gulf nations to acquire additional interoperable sensors and weapons capable of sharing early warning and employing uniform tactics. However, challenges persist; certain GCC nations continue to seek procurement from diverse sources, including the U.S., Europe, and Asia, whilst others remain reluctant to disclose sensitive information that may reveal vulnerabilities or political rifts. Transitioning from practice and communication to a comprehensive, routine regional IAMD is challenging, particularly if the threat of hypersonic weapons prompts Gulf states to consider alternatives to US partnerships.
External Partnerships and Technical Barriers
China and Russia are alleged to have tested and demonstrated hypersonic weapon systems. The Chinese DF-17 and extended-range DF-27 weapons serve as the foundation for a narrative concerning credible, maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicles integral to the doctrine of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Russia is attempting to market the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. However, their deployment in conflict and the mixed outcomes observed in Ukraine complicate their sales proposition. For GCC nations, collaboration with China or Russia on hypersonic technologies entails not only acquiring hardware but also gaining leverage—demonstrating to Washington the existence of alternatives and indicating to Tehran that its deterrent capabilities may evolve. However, the barriers are exceedingly significant. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) exemplify US and multinational export-control frameworks. These controls do not impose a legal obligation on Beijing or Moscow to collaborate, and Washington would likely react severely to any Gulf hypersonic co-development with those capitals, potentially resulting in fines, program cancellations, and a reduction in intelligence-sharing akin to the previous F-35/Huawei disputes.
Even if the policy issues were more manageable, the technical challenges would remain exceedingly difficult. Hypersonic weapons require unconventional materials, including thermal protection that can endure prolonged flights at elevated Mach speeds, guidance and control systems capable of managing aerothermal effects, plasma-induced blackouts, and robust midcourse and terminal updates, as well as specialized testing infrastructure such as wind tunnels, flight corridors, telemetry, and range safety measures. The United States’ hypersonic arsenal remains predominantly in the pre-program-of-record phase, despite years of augmented funding. This illustrates the difficulty of implementing the capability in practice. To transition from a cold start to a credible hypersonic strike capability, the GCC requires more than mere financial resources, of which they possess an abundance. They would also require access to appropriate design knowledge, supply chains for solid-rocket motors, scramjets, and composite fabrication, as well as instrumented test ranges. These typically present options for aligning initiatives that have enduring political implications.
Opportunities and Implications
The rationale for GCC interest in hypersonic strike capabilities is evident: deterrence through punishment, the capacity to threaten high-value, well-defended targets, and the intention to undermine opposing defenses or complicate Iranian strategic calculations. The arguments opposing the initiative are as compelling: the expense, the ambiguous military advantage relative to concentrated conventional strikes, the potential for escalation, and the risk of jeopardizing IAMD partnerships with the US that ensure daily security. Furthermore, if one party experiences a hypersonic strike, the opposing party must adjust by employing additional decoys, enhancing dispersion, and fortifying bunkers. They must also more actively target the enablers required for hypersonic use (ISR, navigation, and communications) in cyberspace and space. Hypersonic do not represent a miraculous remedy; they only constitute an additional increment on an already congested ladder of escalation.
The rationale for GCC interest in hypersonic strike capabilities is evident: deterrence through punishment, the capacity to threaten high-value, well-defended targets, and the intention to undermine opposing defenses or complicate Iranian strategic calculations.
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are optimally positioned to spearhead a counter-hypersonic initiative due to their substantial size, robust affiliations with the United States, and extensive expertise in acquiring advanced air-defense technologies. Riyadh’s domestic missile production, even if limited to conventional ballistic systems, enhances capabilities in materials, solid propulsion systems, and quality assurance, which could be advantageous for future glide-vehicle initiatives or, more plausibly, for fortifying defensive arsenals to improve reload speed and interception efficacy amidst high volumes. Abu Dhabi’s systems-engineering culture and openness to innovative effectors render the UAE an advantageous location for testing novel sensor fusion and command-and-control methodologies, particularly those that integrate allied airborne sensors and maritime assets into the coastal defense framework.
The trajectory of Qatar is evidently focused on self-defense. The defense of Al Udeid underscored the significance of maintaining several US Patriot deployments and the necessity of preparedness and collaboration with the United States. Doha is expected to invest further funds in early warning systems, command-and-control systems, and potentially advanced interceptors such as the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to enhance battlefield challenges. This is particularly accurate when adversaries employ quasi-ballistic or maneuvering terminal trajectories to circumvent or evade outdated interceptors. Given that Qatar’s diplomatic initiatives prioritize peace and assistance to host nations, a hostile hypersonic strike would be inconsistent with its ethos and could result in significant political ramifications. Doha’s strategic advantage derives from its capacity to integrate the defensive assets of its neighboring states. This further solidifies the U.S. commitment to ensuring Qatar’s security.
As hypersonic technology proliferates, the strategic dynamics of the GCC will evolve in both advantageous and detrimental ways. Iran’s leaders will need to allocate funds for defense and expansion if Gulf countries employ or threaten hypersonic strikes. This will complicate their ability to finance and execute expeditionary operations via intermediaries. This may contribute to maintaining stability in deterrence within the region. Conversely, the development of hypersonic weapons may exacerbate crisis instability by facilitating decision-making and prompting pre-emptive actions, particularly in regions prone to errors. The rapid and directional mobility of firearms complicates the detection and notification of individuals. Their fundamental architecture exploits vulnerabilities in detection and command systems. The result may induce significant stress, prompting executives to feel compelled to immediately employ advanced techniques when issues arise.
The Gulf’s hypersonic challenge presents a distinct opportunity for Russia and China. Beijing can leverage its established advancements to offer a customizable selection of components—materials, expertise, and computational fluid dynamics assistance—while retaining complete systems. This will facilitate profit generation and electricity acquisition while mitigating excessive blowback from the MTCR. The sales of conventional armaments by Moscow have significantly declined due to the conflict in Ukraine. They possess ample justification to profit from hypersonic branding—whether through whole systems or through research alliances and test-bed cooperation that sustain Russian design bureaus. Both capitals recognize the diplomatic leverage derived from being perceived as the final source of supply when U.S. export capacity is diminished. Discussions between the GCC and Russia or China would complicate the U.S. efforts to establish a cohesive IAMD network, as Washington would be reluctant to incorporate non-U.S. elements.
Hypersonic proliferation pathways are likely to occur through “grey” channels, including dual-use materials and instruments, computational tools, and university collaborations that facilitate skill acquisition for local engineers. Consequently, US policy employs both incentives (enhanced collaboration on integrated air and missile defense, access to advanced defensive technology) and deterrents (export controls, potential sanctions) to ensure alignment among partners. The MTCR and HCOC are not universally binding and have limited membership; yet they still influence compliance with regulations and the reputational consequences of unrestricted transfers. Their objective is not to “prohibit” hypersonic—numerous hypersonic technologies do not align precisely with MTCR Category I classifications—but to render unfavorable agreements more costly and more transparent. GCC planners recognize that to secure US early warning, cyber defense, space support, and weapons resupply during a crisis, they must likely cease engagement with non-aligned hypersonic programs.
What implications does this have for the primary inquiry: are GCC nations considering the acquisition of hypersonic missile technology following the Iran-Israel conflict? They are undoubtedly approaching the matter analytically: examining flight profiles and defense ramifications, soliciting briefings from vendors, and exploring R&D collaborations to develop requisite competencies. However, “acquisition” of the rapid deployment of hypersonic strike missiles represents a significantly greater challenge. The current emphasis appears to be on fortifying defenses, especially counter-hypersonic capabilities and operational integration, rather than procuring costly offensive systems that entail significant political ramifications. U.S. policymakers are embracing this rationale by advocating for regional missile defense systems and establishing IAMD working groups to ensure Gulf resources are allocated towards unified designs rather than fragmented offensive strategies.
Conclusion
The most credible projection for the forthcoming years is a GCC security framework characterized by three modifications. A more compact and federated sensor network capable of identifying and tracking elusive profiles more promptly by using U.S., European, and national resources. Secondly, enhanced defensive munitions and a broader array of effectors, ranging from THAAD-class interceptors to expendable end-game alternatives, appropriately sized for salvos encompassing ballistic, cruise, and potentially maneuverable threats. Third, collaborations among enterprises that enhance the nation’s capacity to produce propulsion systems, composites, seekers, and command software—elements crucial for hypersonic technology that do not violate Washington’s export restrictions. This architectural approach does not diminish the allure of hypersonic strikes; rather, it postpones their implementation, allowing for observation of the technology’s performance in actual warfare and the evolution of exportability norms.
The hypersonic factor will alter the Gulf in subtle but significant manners. It will expedite discussions around data sharing that were previously deemed politically unfeasible. The sole method to combat “faster and lower” threats is by “earlier and more intelligent” defense. Procurement decisions will transition from platform-based criteria to network-based criteria. This will enable nations to integrate sensors from cyber, space, aerial, and maritime domains into a unified perspective. If your defense relies on your partner’s spatial sensors and AI-driven fusion, it is imperative to ensure that your diplomatic decisions maintain the partner’s receptiveness to your participation. It will challenge individuals to evaluate costs and advantages from a novel perspective. In a domain where assailants seek speed and agility, defenders must cultivate time and trust. This underscores the significance of investing in both interceptors and robust command and control systems, as well as backup communications and the capacity for rapid assembly of these components. The Gulf can manage this, provided that political and physical factors are aligned
Tags: Air defense, CENTCOM, China, hypersonic, IAMD, Integrated deterrence, Middle East, Middle East security, Persian Gulf, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE)
About The Author
- Tahir Azad
- Dr. Tahir Mahmood Azad is currently a research scholar at the Department of Politics & International Relations, the University of Reading, UK. He previously served as an Affiliate Researcher at King’s College London and held fellowships at Sandia National Laboratories (USA), the University of Bristol, the University of Georgia USA, the Graduate Institute Geneva, ISDP Stockholm, and PRIF Germany. He completed a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Leicester and holds a PhD in Strategic & Nuclear Studies from National Defence University (NDU), Pakistan. Azad also worked as a Research Fellow and Programme Coordinator at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), Pakistan. His research focuses on nuclear politics, missile proliferation, China’s military modernisation, politics & security in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East regions, and South Asian strategic affairs.
16. U.S. Spacepower: Shield & Sword
Excerpts:
The accelerating militarization of space demands that the United States transition from a predominantly reactive posture to one of deliberate, proactive control in both orbital and inter-celestial domains. As the competition for strategic high ground intensifies, the ability to combine offensive systems – capable of imposing denial and seizing initiative – with robust defensive architectures – engineered to protect and sustain critical capabilities – will determine the balance of power in the space domain. Offensive measures such as hunter-killer satellites, agile maneuver platforms, and prepositioned orbital minefields offer decisive options for shaping the battlespace and deterring aggression. Still, they must be paired with resilient, layered defenses like “guardian angel” constellations, porcupine and armadillo designs, and active protective measures to preserve freedom of action.
Ultimately, sustained U.S. strategic advantage will hinge on integrating these capabilities into a coherent doctrine that preserves deterrence stability, assures allies, and constrains adversary escalation. This requires not only technical innovation and intelligent redundancy but also the deliberate shaping of norms and operational expectations before competitors define them to their advantage. Local control of space is no longer a theoretical objective but an operational imperative. The nation that masters both the art of denying adversary use of space and the science of defending its own will dictate the strategic calculus in the emerging era of space warfare.
U.S. Spacepower: Shield & Sword
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/09/u-s-spacepower-shield-sword/
by Joseph L. Puntoriero
|
10.09.2025 at 06:00am
Abstract
Space is no longer a sanctuary but a contested domain where the United States must achieve local, time-bound control of key orbital inclinations and celestial lines of communication. This article proposes an operational framework that integrates a shield and sword approach – layered resilience, active/passive satellite self-protection, and guardian-escort constellations paired with agile co-orbital and non-kinetic counterspace options – to enable deterrence by denial and punishment while managing escalation, debris, and attribution risks. Furthermore, grounding in the theories presented by Corbett and Clausewitz translates theory into practical guidance, enabling campaigns to be conducted effectively in orbit without ceding strategic initiative.
Introduction
The transition of space from a sanctuary to a contested domain marks a pivotal shift in global security dynamics. Orbital regimes – Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) – and the vast expanses of inter-celestial space are now arenas of strategic competition. The rapid proliferation of space-faring nations, commercial entities, and dual-use technologies compressed strategic maneuver space in orbit and intensified competition for control over critical orbital regimes. Nations like China and Russia are rapidly advancing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, co-orbital systems, and cyber capabilities, challenging the United States’ dominance. Sustained strategic advantage for the United States in the emerging era of space warfare will depend on the urgent development, integration, and perfection of offensive and defensive satellite capabilities capable of asserting control and proactive denial in contested orbital regimes and inter-celestial space. These systems must be paired with resilient force composition, intelligent redundancy, and tailored doctrine to ensure deterrence stability, safeguard critical assets, and shape the norms of engagement before adversaries dictate them.
The United States has long recognized the strategic importance of space and thus attempted to guide the global community in establishing global norms. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) established the principle that space should be used for peaceful purposes, prohibiting the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit. However, the OST did not prevent the development of conventional military capabilities in space, nor did it define “peaceful” in a way that precluded military uses. The United States and the Soviet Union both pushed this boundary during the Cold War. Each country conducted rudimentary ASAT testing, including co-orbital interceptors that approached targets to disable or destroy them. These tests demonstrated that space could be contested, but technological limitations and the desire to avoid debris-generating incidents dissuaded significant advancements. Today, technological advancements, integration of space into joint force operations, and the rise of peer competitors have removed many of these constraints, creating a need to establish control in localized orbital slots and defend them.
Control
Control must be defined for the space domain if the United States is to attempt to re-establish dominance. The preeminent view for control in space falls in line with the maritime view on control of the sea, more specifically with Julian S. Corbett’s analysis of sea command and control. Corbett put forth that absolute control of the sea could not be maintained due to the disposition required, the vast size of the sea, and the command-and-control issues that would arise due to time and distance. Moreover, control in space cannot be achieved through occupation in the terrestrial sense; it requires maneuver dominance, persistent space domain awareness (SDA), and the ability to deny or degrade adversary access to critical orbits and deep space corridors. Adapting Corbett’s view of sea control for space while incorporating SDA and focusing on space corridors, or celestial lines of communication (CLOCs), an approach to local, temporary control of specific portions of space and space-enabling locations could be undertaken.
If the United States is to gain control of CLOCs or even specific orbits in any of the orbital regimes, understanding what is at stake is critical. Orbital regimes are space highways, crowded with military, commercial, and civilian satellites essential for navigation, communication, and intelligence. While each orbital regime – Low-Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium-Earth Orbit (MEO), Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO), and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) – has its advantages and disadvantages, they share a common trait in that they are all contested. The United States must therefore adopt a nuanced approach – balancing persistent control with targeted denial of adversary capabilities. The U.S. must develop and integrate offensive and defensive satellite systems to assert dominance and deter aggression in these contested zones.
Sword
Securing control within an orbital regime demands the same strategic calculus as seizing key terrestrial terrain: offense. An offensive posture enables the aggressor to determine the time and place of engagement, shaping the conditions under which conflict unfolds or is avoided. Such an approach advances political and strategic objectives either by employing force to seize a contested asset or by preemptively occupying an unclaimed one. Drawing on Corbett’s concept of command of the sea and Clausewitz’s general theory of war, offensive action amplifies the inherent advantages of the attacker by initiating operations, thereby increasing the likelihood of transforming local and temporary control into general and enduring dominance. Implicit in this is the centrality of surprise as a decisive factor in seizing and maintaining the initiative.
Hunter-killer satellites, dubbed “celestial demons,” are essential for seizing the initiative in orbital warfare. Primarily, hunter-killer satellites would possess the capability to identify, discriminate, coerce, and degrade targets through a spectrum of offensive measures. The Defense Intelligence Agency warns that China and Russia maintain operational co-orbital ASAT capabilities, including systems designed for surveillance, jamming, and destructive effects. Armed with non-kinetic systems such as directed-energy weapons, these “celestial demons” could impair adversary intelligence-gathering, disrupt command-and-control networks, or hold critical assets at risk without contributing to orbital debris. Alternatively, when equipped with projectile weapons or rendezvous mechanisms, such platforms could disable essential components to render a satellite inoperable or physically seize and reposition it outside its assigned orbit [see Figure 1]. Moreover, these systems could be fielded in swarms, enabling concentrated action against a single high-value target or coordinated operations to degrade an entire constellation.
Figure 1: Six proposed space-based weapons that can deliver temporary or permanent damage
Offensive satellites can also function as instruments of deterrence, signaling the capability and intent to respond decisively to hostile acts against friendly assets. When designed for maneuver across multiple inclinations or orbital regimes, their rapid responsiveness and mobility can dissuade adversaries through the implied threat of timely reprisal. The significant fuel expenditure and operational time required for such maneuvers, however, impose a high cost that must be weighed carefully before committing these forces. Offensive satellites could be maintained in a constant state of readiness as an “on-orbit Isaiah,” poised for immediate activation and prepared to be “sent into battle.” A fleet of such assets, concealed in the shadows of space, could serve as a psychological and physical deterrent to hostile activity or as a trigger for decisive action.
However, deploying hunter-killers risks escalation. Visible forces may provoke pre-emptive strikes, while concealed systems could violate transparency norms, feeding escalation spirals. The U.S. must balance these capabilities with explicit signaling and attribution frameworks to maintain deterrence stability.
Shield
This fragile balance may be maintained simply by developing defensive countermeasures ahead of offensive strike capability. John Klein describes these as the “guardian angel” satellite to juxtapose the offensive “celestial demons.” Although increased separation from terrestrial anti-satellite systems offers some protection for communications, navigation, imagery, and intelligence-collection constellations, an active defense approach may also be viable. Advances in CubeSat technology – small, standardized satellites analogous to nanosatellites – combined with reduced launch costs, enable the deployment of defensive CubeSat networks around high-value space assets. For instance, a critical U.S. satellite could be encircled by a micro-constellation of two to three CubeSats operating cooperatively and autonomously to monitor the immediate orbital environment while maintaining a protective formation. Such an SDA micro-constellation would, at a minimum, provide early warning of any anomalies or potential threats in the vicinity. The ability “to predict, detect, and characterize natural and human-made events and, when appropriate, attribute an attack to an adversary” builds the foundation for active and passive defense on orbit.
The active defense capability of these “guardian angels” could originate from the co-orbital CubeSat micro-constellation or from the protected asset itself. In the former case, the constellation would execute a reactive countermeasure if its formation were threatened or penetrated, collapsing onto the intruding system before it could engage the primary target. If equipped with directed-energy weapons and sensors capable of distinguishing friend from foe, such platforms could disable hostile satellites at a predetermined standoff range. However, both this approach and the broader use of blocker CubeSat micro-constellations raise concerns over increased orbital congestion and the potential generation of debris. Where congestion risk is significant, the defended satellite itself could be configured to serve as its own active protective system.
One option for self-defense is turning the target satellite bus into a spiny bastion or “porcupine satellite.” The satellite is designed with built-in or deployable defensive systems to counter physical intrusion attempts. Szymanski suggests that such defenses could incorporate “optically absorptive materials so the threatening satellite would have trouble detecting them.” Thereby adding a critical element of deception and stealth to on-orbit protective measures. Extending the porcupine concept to encompass more dynamic defenses, the “barbs” could be electrically charged to disrupt adversary satellites upon contact. Alternatively, if designed as tendrils with friction points – similar to octopus tentacles – that can extend and ensnare encroaching spacecraft, they could also provide an opportunity to capture and exploit adversary satellite technologies for intelligence purposes [see Figure 2].
Figure 2: Example Research Satellites with Long Aerial Whip Antennae, analogs for ‘porcupine quills’
The porcupine satellite defense need not rely exclusively on kinetic means. At its core, the concept establishes a protected zone around an individual satellite. Rather than outfitting the platform with physical weaponry, it could employ directed-energy weapons or localized electromagnetic pulses to disrupt or disable hostile spacecraft. This approach offers the advantage of minimizing orbital debris, resulting in a single defunct satellite rather than multiple fragments created by a collision. The trade-off, however, lies in the increased power demands and mass that such systems impose. Directed-energy weapons and electromagnetic pulse generators require substantial battery capacity, additional hardening of onboard electronics, and increased payload weight.
An alternative is the armadillo design philosophy. In this model, the satellite bus and payload operate normally until passive detection systems identify a threat. At that point, the payload’s external components – sensors, radiators, antennas, and similar appendages – retract into the bus, which then seals itself against intrusion. This cloistering could deny an adversary the ability to grapple or dock with the satellite. The limitation is operational: the armadillo cannot execute mission tasks while cloistered, and determining when it is safe to redeploy its systems is difficult without external observation from another on-orbit asset. Moreover, if the bus incorporates integral shielding capable of withstanding kinetic impacts, the resulting mass increase would be significant. Nonetheless, this inherent protection could enhance survivability in debris-rich environments or when transiting through a potential space minefield.
Expanding on the concepts of control and denial, an orbital minefield could pose a substantial challenge to any actor seeking to operate within a given orbital regime around a celestial body. Functionally analogous to terrestrial and naval mines, space-based mines would be armed, capable of detonating upon contact or within a predetermined proximity, and readily detectable to reinforce their deterrent effect. From an offensive perspective, U.S. Space Force Brigadier General Kristin L. Panzenhagen, then U.S. Air Force Major, suggested that “Space mines could be positioned near [a] target well ahead of the time for attack” as a trap lying in wait. Conversely, an orbital minefield could serve as a defensive measure to block direct access to a high-value asset. However, kinetic or projectile-based space mines carry the risk of producing vast quantities of debris, potentially exacerbating Kessler syndrome and rendering the celestial body’s orbit hazardous. While non-kinetic minefields – employing electromagnetic interference or directed-energy effects – could reduce the likelihood of unintended conjunctions or collisions, they would still leave disabled satellites adrift and incapable of maneuvering, thereby continuing to jeopardize the orbital environment.
Orbital minefields present the danger of substantially increasing debris in Earth’s orbit or around any human-inhabited celestial body. Yet, in select circumstances, deliberately contaminating an orbit could serve as an effective tool of strategic denial. In Deep Space Warfare: Military Strategy Beyond Orbit, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John C. Wright notes that conflict in space will most likely begin as a contest between human adversaries. While he acknowledges that it is unwise to disregard other potential threats, his emphasis underscores the necessity of planning for and countering the actions of other nation-states as the primary strategic concern. Taking Wright’s perspective into account, an orbital minefield could be employed offensively above an adversary’s celestial body to restrict egress and threaten the deliberate degradation of its orbital environment should a breach be attempted. While the same tactic could theoretically be used against Earth, Mars, or any other future human-inhabited location, the more immediate concern lies in how rival states or coalitions might leverage such capabilities against one another in pursuit of strategic dominance.
Conclusion
The accelerating militarization of space demands that the United States transition from a predominantly reactive posture to one of deliberate, proactive control in both orbital and inter-celestial domains. As the competition for strategic high ground intensifies, the ability to combine offensive systems – capable of imposing denial and seizing initiative – with robust defensive architectures – engineered to protect and sustain critical capabilities – will determine the balance of power in the space domain. Offensive measures such as hunter-killer satellites, agile maneuver platforms, and prepositioned orbital minefields offer decisive options for shaping the battlespace and deterring aggression. Still, they must be paired with resilient, layered defenses like “guardian angel” constellations, porcupine and armadillo designs, and active protective measures to preserve freedom of action.
Ultimately, sustained U.S. strategic advantage will hinge on integrating these capabilities into a coherent doctrine that preserves deterrence stability, assures allies, and constrains adversary escalation. This requires not only technical innovation and intelligent redundancy but also the deliberate shaping of norms and operational expectations before competitors define them to their advantage. Local control of space is no longer a theoretical objective but an operational imperative. The nation that masters both the art of denying adversary use of space and the science of defending its own will dictate the strategic calculus in the emerging era of space warfare.
(The views and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The author prepared this material in a personal capacity, outside the scope of official duties. All information discussed is derived from unclassified, publicly available sources. Reference to any specific commercial product, process, or service does not constitute or imply endorsement by the Department of Defense.)
Tags: Clausewitz, co-orbital systems, Satellites, Space Domain, Strategic Competition
About The Author
- Joseph L. Puntoriero
- Major Joseph L. Puntoriero is a Space Operations Officer at 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He holds a Master of Arts in International Relations and a Master’s in Operational Studies from St. Mary’s University and the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, respectively. He additionally holds Certificates of Graduate Studies from Harvard University in Humanitarian Response to Conflict and Disaster and from Kansas State University in Space Systems and Operations. His military career spans diverse roles, including service on the United Nations Command Military Armistice Commission in Korea and various operational deployments throughout the Middle East.
17. What’s Really Going On in Portland, According to Police Reports
Some data and analysis from the Wall Street Journal.
https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/whats-really-going-on-in-portland-according-to-police-reports-be02370f?st=H1cdr1&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink
What’s Really Going On in Portland, According to Police Reports
Protests outside ICE facility were dwindling and ‘low energy’ before Trump called in troops, law-enforcement logs show
By Zusha Elinson
Follow
Oct. 9, 2025 5:30 am ET
Demonstrators protesting Trump administration immigration policies, outside an ICE facility in Portland, Ore., in early September. Photo: john rudoff/Reuters
On Sept. 5, President Trump described ongoing protests in Portland as “unbelievable” and “the destruction of the city.”
Later that day, a sergeant from the Portland Police Bureau filed his daily observations of the demonstrations outside an ICE facility.
“Saw 8 people out front and couldn’t even get one of them to flip me the bird,” he wrote. “Very low energy.”
Daily reports from Portland police in the month leading up to Trump’s decision, on Sept. 27, to send federal troops into the city paint a different picture than public statements by Trump and others in his administration.
The White House has said the ICE facility is “under siege.” Newly released police reports filed in federal court describe how the protests that began in June were dwindling before Trump’s order.
The official logs shed light on the events this September, and how the nightly protests at the ICE facility unfolded.
The Journal reviewed reports for the month of September, leading up to Trump’s order late that month. Below is a timeline of key observations by local authorities, who also cite their regular interactions with the Federal Protective Service, a Homeland Security division that was at the facility.
“Any attempt by The Wall Street Journal to downplay the safety of America’s law enforcement officers after the horrific shooting at the ICE Field Office in Dallas, Texas, and vehicle rammings in Chicago is disgraceful and disgusting,” said Tricia McLaughlin, the assistant secretary for public affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. “The fact is that the Federal Protective Service memo from a select few nights does not paint the full picture of these violent riots outside the ICE facility in Portland, Oregon—where violence has been ensuing and escalating for months.”
Monday, Sept. 1 (Labor Day)
Largest number of demonstrators: 125
ICE agents charge toward demonstrators during a Sept. 1 protest at the ICE facility in Portland; a protester holds a makeshift guillotine.
John Rudoff/Reuters
A group of about 125 marched to the ICE facility and stood outside with “little to no energy,” according a police summary. A Federal Protective Service official “was not concerned about the group,” according to the report. Some demonstrators brought a makeshift guillotine that generated “significant media coverage,” police noted.
Thursday, Sept. 4
Largest number of demonstrators: 20
Federal officials reported that homeless people were being coerced by demonstrators into rattling the gate outside the ICE facility, Portland police said. The Federal Protective Service detained an elderly man “after he asked the agents if he could just come up to the gate and rattle it so the antifa instigators would leave him and others alone.” He was cited and released.
Friday, Sept. 5
Largest number of demonstrators: 8
Speaking to reporters, Trump said he might send troops to Portland. He described the continuing protests in Portland as “unbelievable” and lamented “the destruction of the city.” Police in Portland described the following scene that night:
Email correspondence between a Portland police lieutenant and sergeant on Sept. 5, filed by Oregon and Portland in a lawsuit against the Trump administration.
Thursday, Sept. 11
Largest number of demonstrators: 20
“Nothing much to note tonight,” a police summary said, describing how a small group of counterprotesters showed up.
Email correspondence filed by Oregon and Portland in a lawsuit against the Trump administration.
Wednesday, Sept. 24
Largest number of demonstrators: 10
All was quiet at the ICE facility where less than 10 people gathered, according to Portland police. “No assaults, no calls for service,” police said.
Thursday, Sept. 25
Largest number of demonstrators: 20
Trump escalated his attacks on Portland, telling reporters that “nobody’s ever seen anything like it.” Trump said there were professional agitators and crazy people who are trying to “burn down buildings, including federal buildings.” He vowed to do a “pretty big number” on the “people in Portland that are doing that.”
Friday, Sept. 26
Largest number of demonstrators: 15
A small group was observed outside the ICE facility “mostly sitting in lawn chairs and walking around,” according to a Portland police report. “Energy was low, minimal activity. As officers drove through the area the group would often flip us off but as the night went on they stopped acknowledging the police.”
Saturday, Sept. 27
Largest number of demonstrators: 60
Protesters outside the Portland ICE facility on Sept. 27, after President Trump's earlier announcement that he would send troops to the city. Photo: Samantha Swindler/The Oregonian/Associated Press
Trump posted to Truth Social that he was “directing Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, to provide all necessary Troops to protect War ravaged Portland, and any of our ICE Facilities under siege from attack by Antifa, and other domestic terrorists. I am also authorizing Full Force, if necessary.”
That night the demonstrations grew, and federal officials arrested one person for blocking vehicles as they tried to leave the ICE facility, according to Portland police.
Sunday, Sept. 28
Largest number of demonstrators: 200
Wall Street Journal reporter Joe Barrett reported that the Sunday night rally drew a crowd to protest the potential troop deployment. There was a naked woman, a retired manufacturing worker with an “I AM ANTIFA” sign, about six to 12 people dressed in black with covered faces, and signs with message like “F— ICE,” “Release the EPSTEIN FILES! NOW!” and “THERAPY LLAMAS NOT TRAUMA.”
They chanted, drummed and urged passersby to honk before blocking the street entirely. After dark, someone set up a sound system. People danced and sprayed bubbles. Officers in tactical gear would occasionally emerge to push the crowd back for vehicles entering and exiting. At least twice, they pepper-sprayed demonstrators. The smell of pepper spray and marijuana was pervasive.
Portland police say that a vehicle attempted to drive into the crowd that night at one point and was surrounded by demonstrators.
Monday, Sept. 29
Largest number of demonstrators: 40
Protesters outside the ICE facility in Portland. Photo: Joe Barrett/WSJ
Barrett reported that a much smaller group of protesters held signs saying “DUE PROCESS ISN’T OPTIONAL” and “WHAT’S YOUR FAMILY STORY.” A person wearing a chicken suit and stylized American-flag cape appeared to be the ringleader.
Local and state authorities say protests have intensified since Trump’s Sept. 27 post, and more counterprotesters have joined the fray. “The criminal activity in the last couple of days has been counterprotesters having arguments and fights with protesters,” Oregon Gov. Tina Kotek said in a televised interview this week.
Saturday, Oct. 4
On Saturday, U.S. Judge Karin Immergut, a Trump appointee, issued a temporary restraining order blocking the deployment of troops to Portland, citing concerns of federal overreach. In her order, the judge also said, the state provided “substantial evidence that the protests at the Portland ICE facility were not significantly disruptive in the days—or even weeks—leading up to the President’s directive.”
There were sporadic events requiring either police or federal law-enforcement intervention, she wrote, but “nowhere near the type of incidents that cannot be handled by regular law enforcement forces.”
Judge Immergut said Trump’s portrayal of the situation on the ground “was simply untethered to the facts.”
Trump vowed to fight, and the court battle continues. On Sunday, he said “Portland is burning to the ground. It’s insurrectionists all over the place.”
Write to Zusha Elinson at zusha.elinson@wsj.com
18. The ICE Propaganda Campaign Goes Into Overdrive
Sigh... not what we need from either side.
Note on the Bulwark:
The Bulwark is a center-right news and opinion website launched in 2018 by "Never Trump" conservatives and former Republicans. While its contributors largely hold moderate-to-conservative views, the platform is unified by its staunch opposition to Donald Trump and what it views as authoritarian tendencies within the Republican party
The ICE Propaganda Campaign Goes Into Overdrive
MAGA commentators are stepping up as soldiers in Trump’s culture war to provoke confrontations against “Antifa” with the backing of DHS.
https://www.thebulwark.com/p/ice-propaganda-campaign-goes-into-overdrive-portland-chicago-dhs?r=7i07&utm
Adrian Carrasquillo
Oct 08, 2025
substack.com · Adrian Carrasquillo
(Composite / Photos: GettyImages / Twitter)
TWO WEEKS AGO, THE X ACCOUNT for the Department of Homeland Security was being, all things considered, relatively normal.
There was a repost of a video about law enforcement at the Charlie Kirk memorial, a video on how the Secret Service had dismantled a digital network that could have carried out attacks near the United Nations General Assembly, a video of part of Trump’s tone-deaf, chest-beating speech at the U.N., and posts and news updates on the Dallas ICE field office shooting that left two immigrant detainees dead. The account did not shy away from making overtly partisan arguments—they claimed rhetoric from Democrats demonizing ICE agents had contributed to the shooting—but even in this, it was operating within expected parameters.
Then things took a turn.
Over the past week and a half, @DHSgov has amped up the rate, intensity, and belligerence of its content, posting or reposting nearly two dozen highly produced videos in that time. There were videos about the administration’s plans to forcefully impose order on Chicago, then Portland, by putting down violent protests by anarchists. There was also an attention-grabbing propaganda campaign, produced in coordination with MAGA commentators, meant to ensure the administration’s narrative about immigration reached even larger audiences.
The full canon of footage has made evident one of the defining features of the president’s deportation campaign: He wants it publicized far and wide, literally shouted from rooftops, and in ominous tones. It’s not enough to round up and detain those here illegally, video of it must be shot, edited, dramatized, and disseminated. ICE isn’t just doing immigration enforcement, it is now firmly in the content creation business.
Much of this seems geared toward maintaining the narrative that Trump used to justify his planned deportation ramp-up during his campaign last year: that the goal has always been simply to remove the most violent criminal interlopers from the United States.
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But it also provides insight into the way this administration views modern political warfare. The Trump team wants to swarm the information ecosystem with media of its own, knowing full well that they are competing with other videos, often shot by average citizens, that depict the nasty underbelly of ICE’s operations. Some Democratic lawmakers have even gone so far as to argue that the administration is proactively creating footage as a means to justify more aggressive operations.
DHS’s aggressive media-generation efforts come at a time when there are increasing questions about its mission. It’s not just an electorate that’s wondering why prices are still sky high. It’s also voters who are curious as to why the administration apparently has less and less to show for ICE’s staggering recent injection of $45 billion, which made it the best-funded law enforcement agency in the nation.
The administration has responded by depicting ICE as a noble, patriotic, singleminded agency whose agents are cast in heroic, Sicario-like scenarios of daring and risk. The videos they produce show those agents rappelling onto building rooftops from helicopters, deploying flash-bang grenades, and so forth, each bit of footage implying that overwhelming force is necessary.
But simply producing cinematic footage is not enough. DHS has also turned to MAGA’s strongest soldiers in the culture wars to help them spread it. And those right-wing influencers, in turn, have focused their efforts on one platform: Elon Musk’s X.
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Perhaps the clearest distillation of this strategy came during recent protests outside an ICE facility in Portland. While a tense scene played out on the ground, several incendiary right-wing influencers and media figures—Nick Sortor, Katie Daviscourt, Honey Badger Mom, and Julio Rosas—were stationed on the building’s rooftops. They were there not just to watch but to record as well—a bird’s-eye view of the scuffles breaking out below.
Clad in a black protective vest inscribed with the word PRESS, Rosas was filmed sipping what appeared to be an orange Jarritos while bantering with acquaintances. Hydration choices aside, these commentators had a clear purpose: advancing the story that ICE—and Trump—wants. When Daviscourt went on Fox News sporting a black eye that she said she received from Antifa protesters who hit her with a flagpole, she was doing just this, subtlety be damned. And when the right-wing website she works for tweeted out a slick compilation of Daviscourt’s footage depicting Portland as a war zone in which what Trump calls “paid terrorists” were antagonizing brave law enforcement officers, the tweet noted that the video had been produced and posted by the White House. The fact that they were part of a propaganda operation could not have been stated more explicitly.
This was not the only time that flagpoles have played a role in the pro-ICE media campaign emanating from Portland. Sortor snatched an American flag away from protesters trying to burn it; Fox News reposted the moment on TikTok, where it received 218,000 likes and nearly 10,000 comments. Sortor soon regaled MAGA-friendly interviewers with the story of the flag later being stolen from him, and his brave decision to get it back. He said Trump, who signed an executive order to stop desecration of the flag, supports his actions.
“Trump has my back on this,” he said, adding that the president “texted me and said ‘Let me know what I can do, you have my full support.’”
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Sortor wasn’t just walking around with an American flag like some sort of misplaced Boy Scout troop leader. He was looking for confrontations with protesters he claims are Antifa. This behavior got him into some trouble with local law enforcement: He was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct before being released on his own recognizance. Video has since come out that shows Sortor pushing a woman of color before being separated by bystanders.
In case you’re wondering how this escalation is playing out, Illinois Gov. JB Pritzker has said Trump’s use of the military in American cities is part of his authoritarian march, while Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson called this week for “ICE-free zones.” Trump on Wednesday morning said they should both be jailed.
But Sortor and his peers aren’t just in the middle of the scrums, they have become vectors for distributing the footage of them, both posting it to their channels or accounts and then appearing on adjacent media networks to talk about it.
Miles Taylor, the former Trump chief of staff of the Department of Homeland Security who in 2018 penned a famous anonymous New York Times piece about anti-MAGA resistance within the administration, told me that it’s been clear to him for years that Trump benefits from this feedback loop. It allows the administration to establish a narrative of left-wing domestic terrorism to provide a pretext for invoking emergency powers and bringing the military into cities that oppose him.
“The folks at the White House were very disappointed that the entrance into L.A. in June didn’t provoke more violence,” Taylor said. “I genuinely think that was their intent, they saw that deployment sputter, and were hoping to create the pretext for a more extensive crackdown because they thought going into the Hispanic neighborhoods of L.A. was one of the most provocative things they could do. . . . What they didn’t have was the thing that they wanted, like they saw in Portland in 2020, which were protests that did grow unruly and out of control.”
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Kristi Noem’s Own Personal Baghdad Bob
WHILE THE CURRENT friendly media and influencer campaign has reached new levels of intensity, some aspects of it aren’t exactly new. Early in Trump’s term, immigrant rights advocates were shocked and confused to see Dr. Phil showing up at ICE raids and doing sympathetic interviews with Tom Homan as the L.A. deployment began. On TikTok, influencer Tyler Oliveira posted an ICE ridealong in June titled “I Deported Illegal Immigrants With ICE!” The video, which he crossposted to all of his social media channels, has 410,000 views on TikTok, 269,000 on Instagram, and 2.6 million views on YouTube. For Trump’s deportations-obsessed administration, the benefits of this kind of close coordination should be obvious.
And as for its own content creation, DHS has been posting YouTube shorts since early this year depicting some of the arrestees they deem the worst of the worst. These clips routinely get hundreds of thousands of views each.
Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem has even found her own personal Baghdad Bob. MAGA commentator Benny Johnson has taken to following her around gleefully lapping it up as she surveys immigration enforcement operations, rails against liberals, and chastises Democratic leadership. He recently posted a video in which he sympathetically framed her attempt to visit a public building in Illinois to give her team a bathroom break. (The DHS group was turned away at the door.) The video invested the abortive pee break with such gravity that it seemed as though Johnson was trying to evoke cultural memories of civil rights pioneers being denied service at segregated lunch counters in the 1950s, or maybe even Mary and Joseph being told there was no room at the inn.
Johnson’s latest fawning Noem post, as of this writing? Noem—on a roof, of course—staring down an “army of Antifa and a guy in a chicken suit.” In a further post sharing a Fox segment that incorporated his clip, Johnson called Noem’s hostile banter with the protesters far below “Straight savage.”
In terms of reach and engagement, this is a step up from the right’s media operation during the ramp-up of the so-called Operation Midway Blitz in September, which featured right-wing influencer Ben Bergquam on ridealongs during ICE raids.
Andrew Herrera, who handles communications for the immigration arm of the Chicago advocacy group the Resurrection Project, told me that in moments of genuine confusion about the actions of DHS agents and protesters—as when CBP claimed that a woman they shot five times had aggressively driven towards them, a version of events that reportedly conflicts with body-camera video—right-wing agitators have proven eager to amplify and corroborate the government’s lies.
“When you have right-wing influencers jump in and boost it, it gives it a veneer of credibility,” Herrera told me. “If you’re in the right-wing ecosystem, you see 40 accounts boosting it, which makes it feel more real. You’re laundering the truth by putting a lie out there and having it repeated by so many quote-unquote ‘independent’ sources.”
Herrera likened it to a version of a social media brand partnership program, where a company gives influencers exclusive content for their feeds that their followers will eat up. But instead of selling skincare products, the influencers are selling government propaganda.
“Provocateurs are a thing people in power have used forever,” Herrera said. “You get the mob riled up, someone throws the first stone, and it justifies an extremely violent government response. Let’s not forget: We have a WWE president, and all this theater and pageantry is something he has excelled at throughout the years. Kash Patel: He’s a performer. Hegseth: He’s a performer. People leading a lot of these agencies are performers. Everything we’re seeing is a performance, but with real guns and destroying real people’s lives.”
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substack.com · Adrian Carrasquillo
19. The Chinese robots are coming
Excerpts:
A December analysis from Citi GPS projected that the world would be populated by 648 million humanlike bots by 2050, unlocking an enduring production advantage and immense economic potential as robots manufacture more robots — better, cheaper, faster.
Much ink has been spilled about how the U.S. can reindustrialize. When it comes to robotics, the U.S. needs to invest in infrastructure to power the industries of the future — from building a better electrical grid to joint ventures with allies that can onshore manufacturing expertise for critical robotics components. America also needs to double down on its strengths in ways that could prove difficult in this turbulent political moment: university-driven fundamental research, immigration policies that welcome the best talent from abroad, and a vibrant entrepreneurship ecosystem that’s not mired in regulatory hurdles.
The robot race isn’t over. But unless the United States ups its game, it seems clear that this is a race China will dominate.
The Chinese robots are coming
China is miles ahead in the race to dominate a technology that could define the 21st century.
By Selina Xu and Helen Zhang
36 minutes ago
Washington Post · Selina Xu
Selina Xu leads China and AI research in the office of former Google chief executive Eric Schmidt. Helen Zhang is deputy chief of staff and director of research and projects there. Schmidt invests in a variety of emerging technologies, including in the robotics industry.
Robot dogs. Humanoid helpers. Entirely automated dark factories without human workers. These might seem straight out of a sci-fi novel, but they are arriving full force in China as we speak. After years of patient investment, China is on the cusp of a robotics revolution.
If embodied intelligence — think AI-powered robots that can navigate the real world — is the next frontier of AI, then China appears poised to dominate. Though the United States still has distinct advantages in software, advanced AI chips and foundational research, China leads in robot hardware, deployment and policy support.
Last year, China installed nearly 300,000 robots in its factories, more than the rest of the world combined, according to a September report by the International Federation of Robotics. More thanhalf were made domestically. The United States installed only 34,000 robots, with most of these imported from Japan and Europe.
A rising new era of Chinese technological supremacy has been proclaimed repeatedly over the past two decades, but we had never felt it more acutely than on our trip this summer to China. There, we took the high-speed train from Shanghai to Hangzhou — a city that has emerged as a global powerhouse for AI and robotics (in large part thanks to DeepSeek). Speaking to founders and engineers from Hangzhou’s “Six Little Dragons” — an online moniker for the city’s best-known tech start-ups — we could feel the ground beneath our feet shifting.
Part of the reason is sheer manufacturing prowess. From actuators to sensors to batteries, China has built a comprehensive supply chain that allows start-ups to rapidly fine-tune robot prototypes until a viable, affordable and scalable product emerges. Most of the companies we visited build their robots close to their research labs, creating fast feedback loops. Companies are also prioritizing vertical integration, with many producing key components in-house and procuring base materials domestically. Entry prices for humanoid robots are dropping drastically. In July, Unitree released its R1 bot for under $6,000, about a third of the price of its G1 robot from a year earlier.
The world’s second-largest economy is eager to deploy this technology. With an aging population, China hopes to address its labor shortage with AI and robotics. Most of the start-ups we learned about were already deploying their robots on factory floors, spurring data collection that’s necessary to train the robots’ brains.
Public enthusiasm is growing, too, in part driven by policymakers’ support and high-profile showcases of the technology. At the glitzy World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai this summer, the exhibition halls were filled with humanoid boxers fighting in the ring, quadruped dogs on their hind legs and robots serving popcorn. A few weeks later, Beijing hosted the first World Humanoid Robot Games, where droids raced, danced, played soccer and navigated obstacle courses.
Chinese robot companies are running at full speed. Founders we spoke to talked about going from double-digit unit counts to tens of thousands within months. China is full of hubs — from Shenzhen to Hangzhou — that are “communities of engineering practice” where entrepreneurs, investors and engineers can mingle with the world’s most experienced manufacturing workforce to innovate quickly. As China analyst Dan Wang writes in his recent book, “Breakneck,” “In China … tech innovation emerges from the factory floor, when a new product is scaled up into mass production.”
Expect these innovations to charge abroad. Almost every founder we met wanted to expand overseas, including into the United States. Part of the reason is brutal price wars at home, with razor-thin profit margins amid competition against a glut of other companies (what some dub neijuan, or “involution”). Despite these headwinds, the founders’ zeal was notable — they sincerely believed that “Made in China” was the sign of world-class quality, especially in high-end manufacturing. Already, Chinese companies such as BYD, CATL, DJI and Huawei are global leaders in electric vehicles, batteries, consumer drones and 5G networks, respectively. The emerging crop of start-ups in robotics and AI are determined to follow in their footsteps.
Born in the 1990s, this new generation of entrepreneurs and engineers appears to be starkly different from the more Westernized previous generation. While China’s older tech pioneers tend to idolize Silicon Valley, younger founders find their role models in people such as DeepSeek’s Liang Wenfeng and Unitree’s Wang Xingxing — both of whom studied exclusively at Chinese universities and are known to predominantly hire domestic talent.
A December analysis from Citi GPS projected that the world would be populated by 648 million humanlike bots by 2050, unlocking an enduring production advantage and immense economic potential as robots manufacture more robots — better, cheaper, faster.
Much ink has been spilled about how the U.S. can reindustrialize. When it comes to robotics, the U.S. needs to invest in infrastructure to power the industries of the future — from building a better electrical grid to joint ventures with allies that can onshore manufacturing expertise for critical robotics components. America also needs to double down on its strengths in ways that could prove difficult in this turbulent political moment: university-driven fundamental research, immigration policies that welcome the best talent from abroad, and a vibrant entrepreneurship ecosystem that’s not mired in regulatory hurdles.
The robot race isn’t over. But unless the United States ups its game, it seems clear that this is a race China will dominate.
Washington Post · Selina Xu
20. A Tale of Two Economies
A Tale of Two Economies
https://thedispatch.com/newsletter/morning/is-americas-economy-strong-or-stalling/
A trader works at his desk on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange on October 7, 2025. (Photo by TIMOTHY A. CLARY/AFP via Getty Images)
Gen Z is making jokes about “recession indicators,” gold has hit record highs, Steve Carell’s character from The Big Short is doing podcast appearances, JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon is “far more worried than others” about a serious market correction, and people are feeling—to use the president's term—“yippy.” If you go looking for economic red flags, you'll see a lot of crimson. Readers of TMD might then be wondering whether the time has finally come to stock up on those jugs of potable water, and trade all that cash hidden under your mattress for cartons of cigarettes, a pallet of multi-ply toilet paper, and crates of canned vegetables.
TMD is not an investment adviser, but our answer is “probably not,” at least not yet. While the U.S. economy doesn’t appear to be on the precipice of a steep and destructive crash, it isn’t shooting into the stratosphere either. In a tug-of-war between expansive tech investment and contractive labor and trade policy, the country is showing both promising signs of resilience and concerning signals of stagnation.
“It’s hard to figure out what’s happening with the economy right now,” Michael Strain, economist at the American Enterprise Institute, told TMD. “More than is usually the case, to get a handle on what’s happening right now really does require you to look at a pretty broad range of indicators.” Mark Gertler, professor of economics at New York University and co-director of the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Economic Fluctuations and Growth Program, said that uncertainty stems from pressures that are pushing the economy in both positive and negative directions. “The situation is not clear,” he told TMD. “There are offsetting forces.”
On one hand, the Trump administration’s sweeping tariffs are beginning to drive up costs for businesses across the country, especially in sectors such as manufacturing. That cost pressure is keeping inflation stubbornly above the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent target and is giving the Federal Open Market Committee a headache as it weighs lowering interest rates. Coupled with tariffs, the administration’s clampdown on both legal and illegal immigration is challenging industries like agriculture and construction that rely heavily on migrant labor. “There’s no question in my mind that the administration’s economic policies, including most prominently the tariffs, the clampdown on immigration, and the challenging of Fed independence, are creating headwinds for the economy,” Kimberly Clausing, professor of tax law and policy at the University of California, Los Angeles, told TMD.
On the other side of the ledger is the investment boom in artificial intelligence, which is already filtering billions of dollars into the American economy. “AI has contributed to keeping investment up, and potentially keeping the stock market up as well,” Gertler said. “So there is hope there.”
While the narrative surrounding tariffs, immigration, and AI is compelling, how that story is actually unfolding across the economy is a bit more complicated. For one, traditional indicators of economic health, such as GDP growth, unemployment, new job creation, inflation, and stock and bond market performance, are currently a mixed bag. For example, even though August’s 2.7 percent annualized PCE rate—the Federal Reserve’s favored measure of inflation—shows an upward trend in prices, and markets are pointing to inflation remaining above the Federal Reserve’s target for at least the next five years, that rate is still relatively low—and stable—by historic standards. Similarly, while the country’s unemployment rate—4.3 percent in August—remains low, it is still slowly ticking up, especially for black Americans, which could be an early indicator of an economic slowdown. Job creation numbers are also well below expectations, with the country adding only 22,000 new nonfarm jobs in August, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, down from 142,000 new jobs during the same period in 2024. (September jobs numbers have not yet been released because of the ongoing federal government shutdown.)
On the GDP front, the Bureau of Economic Analysis announced in September that the U.S. economy grew at a 3.8 percent annualized rate in the second quarter of 2025—a stronger-than-normal pace bolstered by robust consumer spending and falling imports (which detract from GDP). However, economic forecasters expect that growth rate to drop significantly through 2026, with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s August Survey of Professional Forecasters estimating that GDP growth would be only 1.6 percent next year.
While the diversity of the U.S. economy always complicates the overall picture, that’s especially true right now as the Trump administration’s approach to economic policy creates an environment with substantial variability among different sectors. “There are periods of boom and bust in the U.S. economy, where pretty much everything’s rising or falling together, where there’s a common dynamic. People are expanding because other people are expanding, or people are fearful and holding back because other people are fearful and holding back,” Adam Posen, president of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, told TMD. “This is not one of those times.” Instead, Posen explained, the U.S. economy is in an abnormal, yet not unheard-of, period when the performance of different parts of the economy is increasingly divergent. “And, absent financial shock or huge shift in Fed policy or tax policy, that can go on for a long while,” he said.
This divergence, and economists’ uncertainty about the economy, is heightened further by the fact that many of the administration’s policies are only beginning to make themselves felt across the country. “The president’s trade and immigration policies have not hit the economy with full force, and when they do, that’s going to slow the growth rate of the economy, it’s going to slow consumer spending, and it’s going to increase the unemployment rate,” Strain said. “But it’s good news that hasn’t really happened yet.”
According to Yale University’s Budget Lab, the average effective tariff rate on goods imported into the U.S. was nearly 19 percent in August—the highest the country has seen since the Great Depression. But because firms typically price their goods and services based on the cost of their existing inventories, that price pressure hasn’t fallen on consumers yet. “A number of [firms] have inventories that haven’t been affected by the tariffs,” Gertler said. “But as the year goes on, you’re going to feel the effects of the tariffs more and more.” Just how long it will take for those effects to peak depends on who you ask. Posen, for one, doesn’t think the inflationary effects of the administration’s first wave of tariffs will crest until the middle of next year. “It was always going to take a while,” he said.
As those effects take hold, the country will look toward its soaring tech industry, driven by massive investments in artificial intelligence, to make up the difference. “At any given time of strong economic growth, that growth is coming from a small number of sectors,” Strain said. “So to say growth is strong in the third quarter of 2025, but ignoring where the growth is coming from, is not a reasonable way to analyze the economy.” Even if the AI boom turns out to be a bubble, the investment stemming from it is real, and not every tech company with soaring valuations will get burned as the race for AI dominance chugs ahead. “I don’t get worried when one part of the economy is being the locomotive for a given period, I get worried if that part of the economy is doing it either on the basis of huge leverage or on the basis of obviously incorrect valuations, or is heavily dependent on some kind of input or specialized niche market,” Posen said. “None of those are true for the AI-associated investment.”
If TMD could accurately predict exactly where the U.S. economy will be a year from now, we would all be working as hedge fund analysts in Connecticut, not writing this newsletter. But in September economic outlook reports from Ernst & Young, S&P Global, and Wells Fargo all put the odds of the U.S. entering a recession over the next 12 months at between 30 and 40 percent. That’s around twice as high as in a typical year, but still overall far from certain.
Trust seems to be falling among many participants in the U.S. economy, regardless of how American industry performs over the next year and beyond. The value of gold and cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum are at an all-time high—signals that Americans are increasingly wary of traditional assets and worried about inflation. “It tells us that the fundamental breakdown in trust of government and lasting institutions and of government money, whether for fiscal or monetary doubts, is very real and widespread,” Posen said. Since the beginning of the year, consumer sentiment has again been trending downwards following a brief period of recovery in 2022 and 2023. Americans now feel about as negatively about the economy as they did during the stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Great Recession, and the COVID-19 pandemic.
But for now, the American economy continues to show its resilience, even in the face of policies that many mainstream economists view as self-inflicted harms. “While we’re not in a recession, clearly, I think growth would be a lot stronger if the administration hadn’t enacted their economic agenda,” Clausing said. “The growth we are seeing is something that was sort of baked in due to the AI revolution.” But, in Clausing’s eyes, there is at least some long-term upside to the Trump administration’s tariff and immigration agenda. “I actually think one of the only good things about this chapter is people are going to get a big economics lesson, and they’re going to realize, well, if we care about grocery prices and all these things we claim to care about, we probably shouldn’t drive away labor and raise tariffs,” she said. “Those are, I think, useful lessons that might allow better policy down the road.”
21. America’s Second Civil War: The 4th and 5th Generation Siege on Our Constitutional Republic
Don Vandergriff vehemently disagrees with my essay and thinks the real threat to America is within (e.g., "Cultural Marxism) while I think the greater threat is from the Dark Quad that is manipulating our political divides to cause internal fracture and decay i.a., subversion, - "exaggerated grievances communicated well."
America’s Attack on the Enemy Within: Victory for the Dark Quad’s Political Warfare Strategy
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/10/08/americas-attack-on-the-enemy/
Donald Vandergriff
America’s Second Civil War: The 4th and 5th Generation Siege on Our Constitutional Republic
This is America’s second civil war, a insidious 4th and 5th generation warfare (4GW/5GW) campaign that pits cultural saboteurs against the Judeo-Christian foundations of our Constitutional Republic.
https://substack.com/inbox/post/175547494?r=8bhs2&triedRedirect=true
Donald Vandergriff
Oct 08, 2025
As a retired enlisted Marine, Army Major and lifelong student of warfare’s evolution, I’ve spent decades dissecting how conflicts morph from battlefield clashes to shadowy battles for the soul of a nation. The American Civil War of 1861-1865 was a brutal affair of massed infantry, cannon fire, and state armies—a classic second-generation war, where lines were drawn, uniforms donned, and victory measured in acres of blood-soaked earth.
But what we’re witnessing today is no such spectacle.
This is America’s second civil war, a insidious 4th and 5th generation warfare (4GW/5GW) campaign that pits cultural saboteurs against the Judeo-Christian foundations of our Constitutional Republic. It began not with musket shots, but with the quiet docking of a ship in New York Harbor in 1933, carrying the exiles of the Frankfurt School to Columbia University.
Their mission?
A calculated “long march through the institutions” to erode Western culture from within, one classroom, one headline, one policy at a time.
This isn’t hyperbole; it’s the distilled essence of my analyses on Substack, where I’ve chronicled how Democratic elites and their cultural Marxist allies wield 4GW tactics—non-kinetic, decentralized assaults on legitimacy, identity, and cohesion—to fracture the body politic.
William S. Lind, the godfather of 4GW theory (along with retired Marine Colonel G.I. Wilson) and a frequent contributor to Traditional Right, warned us of this in his seminal works like On War, a collection of columns from the Iraq debacle onward. Lind described 4GW as warfare by non-state actors who collapse states through cultural subversion, not conquest—precisely the playbook unfolding here.
In my own posts, such as “4th Generation Warfare: The Insidious Evolution of Far-Left Strategies in American Politics”, by (Donald E. Vandergriff, 27 August 2025). I detailed how this war exploits divisions via relentless propaganda, turning neighbors into enemies without firing a shot. Lind echoes this in his Traditional Right essays, like “The View from Olympus” (June 13, 2025), where he laments the military’s drift into ideological quicksand, mirroring the societal rot he first diagnosed in the 1980s.
The Frankfurt School’s Blueprint: A 92-Year Cultural Revolution
The spark ignited in 1933 when Adolf Hitler shuttered the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt, Germany, forcing its Marxist intellectuals—thinkers like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse—to flee to Columbia University in 1934. There, they rebranded as the Frankfurt School, shifting from economic Marxism to “critical theory”—a velvet-gloved assault on family, faith, and freedom.
Their goal: a “Marxist cultural revolution” to dismantle the West’s Judeo-Christian pillars, as outlined in a 1923 Frankfurt meeting attended by György Lukács and others, where they plotted to corrupt youth through sex, atheism, and anti-nationalism.
This evolved into what critics call their “9-point plan” for cultural hegemony:
(1) corrupt family structures;
(2) undermine religion;
3) control education with relativism;
(4) dominate media with propaganda;
(5) erode patriotism;
(6) promote sexual deviance;
(7) foster class envy;
(8) centralize power; and
(9) weaponize minorities against the majority.
It’s no conspiracy; it’s documented in their own writings, like Adorno’s The Authoritarian Personality (1950), which pathologized traditional values as “prejudice.”
Over nine decades, this plan has metastasized. Public schools now prioritize “diversity, equity, and inclusion” (DEI) over civics—by 2024, 93% of the largest U.S. districts mandated DEI training, per the Heritage Foundation, echoing Marcuse’s call to “make the revolution permanent.”
Universities, once bastions of free inquiry, churn out graduates steeped in critical race theory, a Frankfurt offshoot; a 2023 survey by the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression found 66% of students self-censor on campus.
The federal government? Infiltrated via the “administrative state”—bureaucrats implementing Biden-era policies like the 2021 executive order on “advancing racial equity,” which Lind decries as 4GW’s “immersion in the enemy’s culture.”
Entertainment? Hollywood’s output is a Frankfurt fever dream: from Disney’s gender-fluid cartoons to Netflix’s anti-family dramas, 2024 Nielsen data shows 78% of top-streamed content pushes progressive narratives.
Even the U.S. military, once a conservative redoubt, has fallen. Under the Obama and Biden regimes, “woke” policies proliferated—mandatory “extremism” trainings that equated patriotism with fascism, leading to a 2023 retention crisis where 24,000 troops didn’t re-enlist, per Pentagon reports. Younger officers and NCOs, wanting a career in the military witnessed what happened to their conservative superiors who did not comply.
In my Substack piece “Cultural Marxism’s March Through the Pentagon” (July 22, 2024), I highlighted how DEI quotas sidelined merit, echoing Lind’s warnings in Maneuver Warfare Handbook about ideological rot eroding combat effectiveness. By 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth vows a purge of this “cultural Marxism,” citing Space Force Lt. Col. Matthew Lohmeier’s 2021 firing for exposing Marxist infiltration.
The Flashpoint: Assassination, Rhetoric, and Unchecked Anarchy
This 4GW war turned kinetic on September 10, 2025, when Charlie Kirk, the fiery conservative activist and Turning Point USA founder, was gunned down mid-speech at Utah Valley University in Orem, Utah. A 22-year-old suspect, Tyler Robinson, was arrested days later on capital murder charges, but the real story is the aftermath: a torrent of online glee from the left.
Facebook erupted with posts celebrating Kirk’s death—”Rest in peace, you piece of shit,” one viral screed read—prompting a backlash that saw over 30 firings, from teachers to Secret Service agents, by September 13. Vice President JD Vance condemned it as “celebration of political assassination,” while sites like “Expose Charlie’s Murderers” doxxed posters, amassing 30,000 submissions. No wonder: Kirk’s final debate on transgender mass shooters had him in the crosshairs of the cultural revolutionaries he railed against. Charlie was murdered for telling the factual truth.
Fueling this?
Democratic elites’ non-stop violent rhetoric, a 4GW hallmark Lind calls “propaganda of the deed.” Since Trump’s 2024 victory, MSM and Dems have branded conservatives “Nazis,” “Fascists,” and “Gestapo.”
Examples abound:
In May 2024, Biden’s White House likened Trump’s “Gestapo administration” barbs to “appalling rhetoric of fascists.”
Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN) repeatedly called ICE “Nazis” and “Gestapo” in 2025 X posts.
Gov. Gavin Newsom dubbed advisor Stephen Miller a “fascist,” while House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries echoed it on law enforcement.
Post-Kirk assassination, not one elite Dem— from senators to mayors—called for de-escalation.
Instead, they doubled down: Chicago Mayor Brandon Johnson, on October 6, 2025, claimed Trump supporters crave a “rematch of the Civil War,” amid Antifa attacks on ICE vehicles where police stood down per sanctuary orders.
This rhetoric births action. Soros-funded groups, via dark-money conduits like the Indivisible Project, poured $20 million into 2025 protests against Trump’s DC crime crackdown and deportations—despite 1,000+ arrests halving violent crime in the capital by September.
In LA, misinformation-fueled riots targeted ICE raids breaking human trafficking rings, with Soros-backed “No Kings” training 1 million activists in “mass mobilization.”
Meanwhile, leftist judges and AGs’ “soft-on-crime” policies—bail reform in New York, zero-prosecution in San Francisco—unleashed repeat offenders. In Charlotte, NC, a Ukrainian immigrant was stabbed to death in September 2025 by Decarlos Brown Jr., a violent felon freed multiple times under progressive edicts. Federal drug prosecutions plummeted 10% in 2025 as resources shifted to immigration, yet overall U.S. violent crime dipped—proof that enforcing laws works, until sabotaged.
Half the populace buys the lies—Pew polls show 48% of Democrats view Republicans as a “threat to democracy” in 2025—while radicals assault federal law enforcement, from Antifa sieges in Chicago to threats against judges ruling on deportations (562 threats by September 30, up from 509 in 2024). This is 5GW: perception warfare, where truth dies hourly on CNN and MSNBC.
What Can the Trump and Follow-On Republican Administrations Do to Turn Back the Tide?
Victory demands counter-4GW: dismantle the institutions, enforce the law, and reclaim the narrative. Facts guide the path.
First, purge the military: Hegseth’s 2025 directive to root out “cultural Marxism” has already boosted recruitment by 15% via merit-based reforms, per DoD stats—expand it to fire DEI commissars and reinstate warriors like Lohmeier. Trump’s first-term Space Force creation showed ideological cleansing works; repeat it across branches.
Second, defund the saboteurs: Cut Soros-tied grants—Open Society Foundations funneled $50 million to immigration NGOs in 2024 alone—via executive orders, as Trump did with sanctuary cities, slashing their federal aid by 20%. Prosecute riot funders: 2025 DOJ indictments of Indivisible leaders for “No Kings” violence deterred 30% of planned protests.
Third, reform education: Voucher programs in red states like Florida expanded school choice to 1.5 million kids by 2025, reducing DEI exposure by 40% and boosting test scores 12 points (EdChoice data). Federally, tie Title I funds to curriculum audits, echoing Reagan’s 1980s successes.
Fourth, amplify truth: Trump’s X platform, with 500 million users by mid-2025, bypassed MSM lies—his deportation announcements cut illegal crossings 60% via deterrence. Mandate transparency on rhetoric: Post-Kirk, Vance’s calls for accountability fired 50+ celebrants, chilling incitement.
Finally, enforce borders and crime laws: Trump’s 2025 DC surge deported 140,000 criminals, dropping murders 25%—scale it nationally, overriding rogue AGs via federal overrides, as in the 2024 Texas border wins. These aren’t wishes; they’re proven tactics from my Substack playbook and Lind’s 4GW countermeasures.
The Republic hangs by a thread, but we’ve routed Marxists before—from McCarthy’s era to Reagan’s dawn. Fight like it’s 1776, because in this civil war, surrender means oblivion.
Notes:
Adorno, T. W., Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper, 1950.
Biden, Joe. “Executive Order 13985: Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government.” Federal Register 86, no. 15 (January 25, 2021): 7009–7016. https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/25/2021-01753/advancing-racial-equity-and-support-for-underserved-communities-through-the-federal-government.
Cohen, Eliot A. “The Sword and the Book: Pete Hegseth Is Wrong to Think That Civilians Have Little Role to Play in Military Education.” The Atlantic, August 19, 2025. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2025/08/pete-hegseth-military-education/681234/.
EdChoice. “2025 EdChoice Share: Exploring Where America’s Students Are Educated.” Washington, DC: EdChoice, April 16, 2025. https://www.edchoice.org/2025-edchoice-share-exploring-where-americas-students-are-educated/.
EdChoice. “School Choice Surge: Private School Program Use Up 25% Nationwide.” Washington, DC: EdChoice, September 10, 2025. https://www.edchoice.org/2025-families-are-voting-with-their-feetand-their-tax-dollars/.
Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE). “Silence in the Classroom: The 2024 FIRE Faculty Survey Report.” Philadelphia: FIRE, 2024. https://www.thefire.org/facultyreport.
Hegseth, Pete. In March 2025, then-Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth issued a memorandum ordering the removal of content promoting Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI), including material related to “cultural marxism”. The memo was officially titled the “Pentagon Releases Digital Content Refresh Memorandum”., DC: U.S. Department of Defense, March 2025.
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Heritage Foundation. “Dismantle DEI Act of 2024.” Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2024. https://www.heritage.org/government-regulation/report/dismantle-dei-act-2024.
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22. Not Just Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur War: Why the Iran-Iraq War Should Inform US Military Thinking about Large-Scale Combat Operations
Excerpts:
The same three forces—internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance—also shaped Saddam Hussein’s postwar choice to invade Kuwait. Iraq ended 1988 on offense after the al-Faw reversal and a string of summer counterblows, and Saddam’s personalist system equated retrenchment with weakness; a swollen army and triumphalist narrative cast him as the Arab bulwark that had held back revolutionary Iran. At the same time, Iraq’s balance sheet was dire: Baghdad had financed the war largely on credit, owing about $37 billion to Gulf states, including roughly $14 billion to Kuwait—a creditor Saddam now accused of overproducing oil, depressing prices, and even pilfering the Rumaila oil field. Coercing a write-off looked, to Saddam, like strategy—threaten one’s largest creditor (Kuwait) and posture against the next (Saudi Arabia) to transform debt into leverage. He also read the external environment as permissive. In July 1990, US Ambassador April Glaspie told him, according to the Iraqi transcript cited at the time, “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait,” a line he could plausibly have read as a green light, however unintended. Within weeks he crossed the border. The road from al-Faw’s liberation to August 2, 1990 thus ran through the same channels that had shaped Iraq’s wartime behavior: a regime that prized demonstrations of strength, patrons and great-power ambiguity he believed he could game, and a debt overhang that made coercion appear cheaper than repayment.
Tehran’s postwar impulse, by contrast, was to build staying power. The three forces of internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance also shaped Iran’s choices, but toward hedging rather than overreach. The war entrenched the IRGC as a permanent pillar alongside the army and canonized the “Sacred Defense” narrative, which valorized endurance and self-reliance. Isolated from major-power patrons and constrained by sanctions and cash-flow volatility, Tehran invested in capabilities it could control, afford, and scale: a ballistic-missile enterprise, an early and expanding drone industry seeded in the 1980s and matured for mass production, and a proxy network—later branded the “Axis of Resistance”—able to impose costs far from Iran’s borders at modest financial outlay. These choices also supported a nuclear hedge—capability short of a declared weapon—to deter existential threats without inviting the costs of overt weaponization. In short, internal regime incentives favored parallel security institutions and an endurance doctrine; external isolation rewarded asymmetric tools over prestige platforms; and finance favored cost-effective coercion and deniable partners over capital-intensive forces. The postwar posture that followed—missiles, drones, proxies, and a hedge—flows directly from that triad.
The Iran-Iraq War is a compelling case study on large-scale combat operations. It shows how internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance determine mobilization and employment, escalation choices, and postwar judgments. Those drivers yielded Iraq’s credit-enabled, quality-first force and vertical coercion and Iran’s cash-financed, quantity-first mobilization and horizontal pressure, ending in overreach in Baghdad and hedging in Tehran. The mechanics are not relics; they usefully help decode dynamics in the Russia-Ukraine War and offer a disciplined lens to consider future large-scale combat operations, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Analytically, the payoff is a disciplined frame anchored in that triad. When thinking about current or future large-scale combat scenarios the salient questions follow: What must the combatants’ political systems demonstrate domestically? Which external actors will underwrite, constrain, or veto combatants’ choices? By what means—cash revenues, credit, or industrial capacity—will they finance recurring combat power? Read in this light, the Iran-Iraq War merits a place in military education and planning—not to revisit 1988, but to refine indicators, wargaming assumptions, and decision points for current and emerging conflicts.
Not Just Desert Storm and the Yom Kippur War: Why the Iran-Iraq War Should Inform US Military Thinking about Large-Scale Combat Operations - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · Harrison Morgan · October 9, 2025
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Across an eight-year war and a thousand-mile front, Iran and Iraq mobilized hundreds of thousands of troops, fought with thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, and flew hundreds of combat aircraft and helicopters—an archetypal crucible of large-scale combat that killed roughly half a million people and scarred cities on both sides. The war began in September 1980, when Baghdad abrogated the 1975 Algiers Agreement and invaded after months of border clashes, betting that Iran’s postrevolution turmoil would yield quick concessions. By 1987, Iraq fielded about 800,000 troops, more than 4,500 tanks, and over 500 fighters, while Iran mustered roughly 850,000 troops, about 1,000 tanks, and only dozens of serviceable fighters. The 1988 campaign—culminating in Iraq’s swift recapture of the al-Faw Peninsula with an assault force of roughly 100,000 and heavy armor—set the conditions for Tehran’s acceptance of a ceasefire under UN Security Council Resolution 598. Yet despite its scale, the war remains relatively underrepresented among studies of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), particularly when compared with the 1973 Yom Kippur War or 1991’s Operation Desert Storm. It should not be. This war demonstrated how internal political dynamics, external alignments, and wartime finance determine how states mobilize and employ forces, how they escalate, and how they assess and posture after the guns fall silent. Iraq’s leadership, backed by supportive foreign governments and ample foreign loans, built a quality-first force with foreign equipment, training, and advisers; Iran, short on credit but rich in people, mobilized through parallel revolutionary institutions that converted manpower into endurance. The same three forces also shape today’s wars: They help explain why Russia and Ukraine mobilize and escalate so differently, and they offer the right lens for thinking about the next large-scale war—whether in Europe or the Indo-Pacific.
Mobilization and Employment: How Politics and Credit Shape the Ways States Fight
A personalist autocrat who rose by purge, Saddam Hussein launched a war of choice in September 1980 and then managed it to project strength without losing domestic control. He avoided a hasty, society-wide call-up and staged mobilization—about 30,000 conscripts a year from an annual cohort of around 135,000 until 1985, then roughly 70,000 a year through the war’s end. Simultaneously, he financed modernization on credit. After Iranian strikes destroyed Iraq’s oil terminals at Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-Amaya, Iraqi oil revenue fell from around $26 billion in 1980 to $7 billion in 1983. However, Gulf monarchies and the Soviet Union filled Iraq’s wartime funding gap with roughly $110 billion in loans and supplier credits—nearly three-quarters of Iraq’s war financing—letting Baghdad buy at scale: T-72 tanks and BMP infantry fighting vehicles; MiG and Su strike fighters; a helicopter fleet that dwarfed Iran’s; and the training, spares, and advisers to keep them combat-ready. On the ground, Iraq fought mostly on the defensive for much of the war behind layered, combined-arms belts east of Basra—minefields, wire, berms, and water obstacles tied to radar-guided artillery, attack helicopters, and chemical fires that bled repeated Iranian assaults at Shalamcheh and across the Basra approaches. By 1988, the compounding effects of Iraq’s maturing force, its sustained credit-backed kit and training, and Iran’s mounting casualties and revenue strain flipped the ledger. In the Tawakalna offensive of 1988, Iraq retook the critical al-Faw Peninsula in thirty-six hours, shattered Iranian lodgments along the southern front, and recovered all Iraqi territory, setting the conditions for Tehran’s acceptance of a ceasefire. According to most scholarly estimates, Iran’s losses exceeded Iraq’s—often cited as approximately 500,000 Iranian dead versus 180,000 Iraqi dead, with total wounded well above one million—underscoring how Baghdad’s credit-enabled, quality-first approach paired with defense in depth could impose attrition until conditions favored decisive counteroffensives.
On the other side of the war, Tehran’s revolutionary leaders distrusted the prerevolution army and built parallel power in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) while mobilizing the Basij, a paramilitary militia, to convert population into staying power. Iran’s international isolation and thin credit reinforced that choice. Tehran largely self-financed the war with oil export revenue that rose from about $10.5 billion in 1980 to roughly $21.5 billion in 1983, then fluctuated with prices and interdiction. Cash in hand—rather than foreign loans—funded eclectic procurement from China, North Korea, Libya, and Syria, with clandestine Western-origin spares when opportunities appeared. The regime matched this resource picture with scale: From an initial force near 290,000, Iran added 100,000–120,000 troops annually through 1984, then about 70,000 a year as mobilization tapered, reaching a force of around 850,000 by the war’s end. That surge let Iran flood sectors of the front, often massing a force ratio of two-to-one or better against Iraqi defenses. Basij volunteers attacked in waves to breach minefields and wire, identify seams, and enable IRGC and army formations to exploit them. The model produced early operational returns—Khorramshahr’s liberation in 1982, the seizure of Majnoon Island in 1984, and deep lodgments that threatened Kirkuk in the north and Basra and access to the Persian Gulf in the south. Buoyed by those gains, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini rejected ceasefire proposals for years, only to see the approach exact mounting costs in set-piece battles such as Karbala-5 and, by 1988, lose momentum as casualties rose and oil revenues tightened. Iran’s path illustrates the thesis: Internal political dynamics (parallel institutions), external relations (isolation with a narrow supplier set), and financing (cash rather than credit) combined to favor a quantity-first mobilization and employment model—one that could generate pressure and endurance, but at a steep human price that ultimately narrowed strategic options.
Considering Iraq during the war alongside Ukraine today further illustrates how internal politics, external alignments, and financing channels drive a quality-first mobilization and employment model. Saddam’s personalist regime avoided early mass conscription to preserve domestic control, then substituted credit for manpower—leveraging loans and supplier financing to import training-intensive platforms, maintenance capacity, and advisers. The force he built fought largely from prepared belts and executed carefully sequenced combined arms blows once maturity and readiness caught up. Ukraine, though democratic and much better aligned with the West, faces a parallel triad: political incentives that privilege casualty discipline and economic continuity; an external coalition willing to underwrite sophisticated systems, training pipelines, and sustainment; and financing that arrives as grants, loans, and equipment rather than vast mobilizable labor. The result is a mobilization approach that supplements selective call-ups with accelerated quality—NATO-standard training, integrated air defense, precision-strike networks, and limited numbers of modern armored formations—and an employment concept that emphasizes coordinated, high-payoff operations over mass attrition. The cases differ—Kyiv’s partners and industrial on-ramp are far deeper than Baghdad’s ever were—but the causal chain is the same: Regime imperatives at home, patrons abroad, and how a state pays the recurring costs of war determine whether it builds primarily for quality or quantity, and these factors shape how it actually fights.
Escalation: How Politics, International Alignment, and Finance Shape Escalation Pathways
The same three forces that determined how Iran and Iraq mobilized and employed their armies—internal political dynamics, external alignments, and wartime finance—also shaped how each chose to escalate. In strategic studies, vertical escalation raises the intensity of violence by introducing more destructive means or striking more valuable targets, while horizontal escalation widens the scope of conflict across geographies or domains. In this war, Baghdad went vertical; Tehran went horizontal.
The same forces that shaped Iraq’s mobilization—personalist politics, permissive external alignments, and ample wartime credit—also pushed Baghdad to escalate vertically, raising the intensity of coercion against Iran’s cities and economic lifelines. First, beginning in 1984 Saddam initiated the war of the cities, a sustained campaign of air and then ballistic-missile strikes against major urban centers designed to signal resolve at home and cause pain in Iran. By late February and March 1988, Iraq was firing extended-range al-Husayn Scud missiles in concentrated salvos—about 189 missiles in six weeks—at Tehran, Qom, and Isfahan, yet the bombardment did not crack civilian will. This choice depended on external suppliers and financing: Soviet Scuds, Iraqi modifications, and a logistics system underwritten by Gulf and European credit. Second, that same year Iraq launched the tanker war, a protracted interdiction of Iran’s oil economy that concentrated strikes on Iran’s oil terminals at Kharg Island and later Sirri and Larak. With French help—five Super Étendard strike aircraft on loan and large stocks of French AM39 Exocet missiles—Iraqi pilots hit Iranian oil vessels and terminals repeatedly; by early 1988 Lloyd’s tallied 375 damaged vessels. Third, Iraq normalized large-scale chemical weapons use to blunt Iranian mass assaults and terrorize Kurdish areas—drawing UN Security Council Resolution 612’s condemnation but little punitive follow-through. Declassified reporting indicates US intelligence also flowed to Baghdad late in the war despite awareness of Iraqi chemical employment, reinforcing Saddam’s expectation of limited international penalty.
The same three forces—internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance—also steered Tehran toward horizontal escalation. Tehran’s revolutionary leadership—split between the IRGC and the regular army, isolated from major-power patrons, and reliant on cash-based financing—favored deniable, distributed, and comparatively inexpensive instruments. First, Iran exploited hostage diplomacy in Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah, backed by Tehran’s security services, kidnapped dozens of Westerners between 1984 and 1986, including Beirut CIA station chief William Buckley. The abductions pried open an arms-for-hostages channel that delivered 504 TOW antitank missiles via Israel in 1985 and a direct US sale of 1,000 TOWs in February 1986, plus HAWK air defense parts—significant and cost-effective gains for Iran that later became a scandal for Washington, known as the Iran-Contra Affair. Second, Iran used bombings to extract further international concessions. In Beirut on October 23, 1983, an Iran-backed network executed twin truck-bomb attacks that killed 241 US service members and 58 French paratroopers, precipitating the withdrawal of both contingents from the Multinational Force in Lebanon within months. In France, cells linked to Hezbollah conducted a sustained campaign of eleven bombings in 1985–86, killing roughly twenty and wounding about 255—while allied groups seized French nationals in Beirut. Over time Paris eased pressure on Tehran, expelled Iranian opposition figures, and moved to resolve the Eurodif dispute—concessions Iran achieved at low financial cost. Third, Tehran expanded the war’s geography through Iraq’s north. The IRGC leveraged Iraqi Kurdish insurgents and built the Badr formation from Iraqi Shia volunteers, forcing Baghdad to commit and recommit formations to the northern Kurdistan region rather than the decisive southern front near Basra. These moves tracked directly to Iran’s constraints and advantages: They leveraged ideological mobilization and proxy networks, minimized capital outlays that isolation made hard to replace, and produced discrete political and military effects—from targeted arms inflows to coalition withdrawals—without the platform costs of vertical escalation.
The Russia-Ukraine War reflects the same vertical/horizontal escalation logic seen in the Iran-Iraq War. Ukraine has largely pursued vertical escalation, particularly after Western capitals judged that Moscow was unlikely to widen the war into NATO countries and loosened restrictions on deeper strikes. Kyiv then employed long-range drones and missiles against refineries, airbases, logistics hubs, and Black Sea Fleet targets in Crimea. That choice followed the same three drivers: internal incentives to conserve manpower and sustain public resolve, external alignment that supplied training, intelligence, and strike enablers, and financing—aid and loans—that supported a technology-heavy approach. As in Iraq’s case, politics, patrons, and how the war is financed narrowed the feasible escalation menu and made a vertical strategy both permissible and effective.
Postwar Posture: Iraq’s Overreach Versus Iran’s Hedging
The same three forces—internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance—also shaped Saddam Hussein’s postwar choice to invade Kuwait. Iraq ended 1988 on offense after the al-Faw reversal and a string of summer counterblows, and Saddam’s personalist system equated retrenchment with weakness; a swollen army and triumphalist narrative cast him as the Arab bulwark that had held back revolutionary Iran. At the same time, Iraq’s balance sheet was dire: Baghdad had financed the war largely on credit, owing about $37 billion to Gulf states, including roughly $14 billion to Kuwait—a creditor Saddam now accused of overproducing oil, depressing prices, and even pilfering the Rumaila oil field. Coercing a write-off looked, to Saddam, like strategy—threaten one’s largest creditor (Kuwait) and posture against the next (Saudi Arabia) to transform debt into leverage. He also read the external environment as permissive. In July 1990, US Ambassador April Glaspie told him, according to the Iraqi transcript cited at the time, “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait,” a line he could plausibly have read as a green light, however unintended. Within weeks he crossed the border. The road from al-Faw’s liberation to August 2, 1990 thus ran through the same channels that had shaped Iraq’s wartime behavior: a regime that prized demonstrations of strength, patrons and great-power ambiguity he believed he could game, and a debt overhang that made coercion appear cheaper than repayment.
Tehran’s postwar impulse, by contrast, was to build staying power. The three forces of internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance also shaped Iran’s choices, but toward hedging rather than overreach. The war entrenched the IRGC as a permanent pillar alongside the army and canonized the “Sacred Defense” narrative, which valorized endurance and self-reliance. Isolated from major-power patrons and constrained by sanctions and cash-flow volatility, Tehran invested in capabilities it could control, afford, and scale: a ballistic-missile enterprise, an early and expanding drone industry seeded in the 1980s and matured for mass production, and a proxy network—later branded the “Axis of Resistance”—able to impose costs far from Iran’s borders at modest financial outlay. These choices also supported a nuclear hedge—capability short of a declared weapon—to deter existential threats without inviting the costs of overt weaponization. In short, internal regime incentives favored parallel security institutions and an endurance doctrine; external isolation rewarded asymmetric tools over prestige platforms; and finance favored cost-effective coercion and deniable partners over capital-intensive forces. The postwar posture that followed—missiles, drones, proxies, and a hedge—flows directly from that triad.
The Iran-Iraq War is a compelling case study on large-scale combat operations. It shows how internal politics, external alignments, and wartime finance determine mobilization and employment, escalation choices, and postwar judgments. Those drivers yielded Iraq’s credit-enabled, quality-first force and vertical coercion and Iran’s cash-financed, quantity-first mobilization and horizontal pressure, ending in overreach in Baghdad and hedging in Tehran. The mechanics are not relics; they usefully help decode dynamics in the Russia-Ukraine War and offer a disciplined lens to consider future large-scale combat operations, from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. Analytically, the payoff is a disciplined frame anchored in that triad. When thinking about current or future large-scale combat scenarios the salient questions follow: What must the combatants’ political systems demonstrate domestically? Which external actors will underwrite, constrain, or veto combatants’ choices? By what means—cash revenues, credit, or industrial capacity—will they finance recurring combat power? Read in this light, the Iran-Iraq War merits a place in military education and planning—not to revisit 1988, but to refine indicators, wargaming assumptions, and decision points for current and emerging conflicts.
Major Harrison (Brandon) Morgan is a US Army foreign area officer aligned to the Middle East and North Africa and a former Modern War Institute nonresident fellow.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Amir Ali Javadian
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mwi.westpoint.edu · Harrison Morgan · October 9, 2025
23. When Ideology Writes the Check: Washington’s Risky Bet on Argentina
Excerpts:
None of this necessarily argues for a financial rescue that could very well end with Argentina defaulting on U.S. taxpayers. The country is on its twenty-third International Monetary Fund bailout, a global record. After its last economic meltdown, in 2001, the U.S. government and U.S. bondholders were among the creditors it stiffed. That could happen again should Axel Kicillof, the influential Peronist governor of Buenos Aires province, end up succeeding Milei.
Nevertheless, greater cooperation with Argentina, including U.S. mining and energy investments and reduced trade barriers, would rightly reward Milei’s sensible economic strategy and foreign policy partnership, and demonstrate the dividends for regional leaders who wager on Washington in great-power competition.
When Ideology Writes the Check: Washington’s Risky Bet on Argentina
Benjamin Gedan
October 9, 2025
warontherocks.com · October 9, 2025
Last month, Javier Milei, Argentina’s flashy libertarian leader, arrived in New York City not with his trademark chainsaw, but with his hat in his hand. He left with a stunning pledge from the U.S. government to loan $20 billion to stop a run on the peso that threatens to wreck Milei’s pro-market revolution.
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For the United States, there is no economic logic to the rescue, to be ironed out at Milei’s Oval Office meeting on Oct. 14. Indeed, President Donald Trump and his Treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, hardly hid the ideological motivations behind the risky bailout of Trump’s “favorite president.” That is unfortunate, because there is a foreign policy case for lending Argentina a hand, though perhaps not one stuffed with hundred-dollar bills.
The Trump administration’s formal reason for the bailout is that Argentina, in Bessent’s words, is “systemically important” to the U.S. economy. It obviously is not. Argentina buys just 12 percent of its imports from the United States. Last year, U.S. goods exports to the country totaled a meager $9.1 billion, compared to $334 billion to neighboring Mexico, the last country to receive a similar U.S. rescue package, in 1995. Yet another economic collapse in Argentina would hardly reverberate in the United States, 5,000 miles away.
The more likely explanation for the rescue — Trump’s admiration for Milei — is an even less persuasive reason to hazard so much taxpayer money. Milei has gone to great lengths to befriend Trump and portray himself as a far-right fellow traveler. He visited Mar-a-Lago to congratulate the president-elect last November, and later was one of just two world leaders on stage at Trump’s second inauguration. His recent trip to New York was his twelfth to the United States since his swearing-in in December 2023.
Milei is a celebrity on the Make America Great Again circuit. In February, he headlined the Conservative Political Action Conference in Maryland, where on stage he delivered a chainsaw to Elon Musk, a symbol of Milei’s fight against Argentina’s profligate public spending and bloated bureaucracy. In December, he hosted the conservative gathering in Buenos Aires, where Trump’s daughter-in-law, Lara, was among the speakers.
Like the Trump administration’s fondness for the far-right Alternative for Germany, the National Rally in France, Nigel Farage of the United Kingdom, and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, its support for Milei reflects largely ideological interests. Bessent has said the United States should help conservatives win elections in Latin America, and suggested U.S. companies shared his hope for a “positive” outcome in Argentina’s Oct. 26 midterms. Trump went further, writing on Truth Social that Milei had his “Complete and Total Endorsement for Re-Election.”
None of that was lost on the opposition Peronists, a party that already viewed the United States with suspicion. In the 1940s, U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden’s opposition to the original Peronist helped secure the election for Juan Perón, who campaigned under the slogan, “Braden o Perón.” This time around, Peronist leader Cristina Kirchner has described the promised $20 billion U.S. loan as a campaign contribution for Milei.
Whatever the real reason for the rescue — and it will likely be a Treasury line of credit — it is unlikely to help very much. In the short term, it calmed investors and reduced pressure on Argentina’s currency. On Monday, Bessent met in Washington with his Argentine counterpart, amid renewed market instability in Buenos Aires. But most economists say the bigger problem is Milei’s unwillingness to devalue the peso — a policy that helped vanquish inflation, but has slowed economic growth, depressed exports, and made it tougher to build up hard currency reserves to repay the country’s sizable debt, more than $450 billion. Milei also needs to build greater public support for his reforms. Voters are increasingly annoyed by rising joblessness and budget cuts that have led to higher prices for buses, electricity, and natural gas. A corruption scandal involving Karina Milei — the president’s sister and chief of staff, whom he compares to Moses — did not reassure voters. As a result, the libertarian party lost badly in local Buenos Aires elections last month, triggering the run on the peso.
The Trump administration’s ideological cheerleading, and the riskiness of the bailout, have made it easy to ridicule, by both liberals and conservatives. Democratic Sen. Elizabeth Warren urged Trump to stop “giving away our money to his corrupt buddies.” Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley criticized any bailout of a country that supplies China with soybeans to make up for the food it no longer buys from U.S. farmers.
The irony is that Trump could have made a foreign policy case for supporting Argentina that might have won bipartisan support. After all, the United States has few friends in the region these days. The three largest countries — Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia — are led by leftists who are mistrustful of U.S. power. Virtually every leader in Latin America, regardless of party, favors nonalignment in the U.S.-Chinese rivalry.
That is not true in Argentina. Even before the last U.S. election, Milei had plainly stated his alignment with the United States, and his low opinion of China. In his presidential campaign, Milei criticized Argentina’s decision to join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a source of infrastructure finance, insisting that he would not make deals with “communists and murderers.” Last year, he welcomed President Joe Biden’s secretary of state to the Casa Rosada, Argentina’s presidential palace. Democratic and Republican lawmakers have also met with Milei in Buenos Aires.
Admittedly, Argentina is a not a serious player on the international stage. Nor is it relevant to the White House’s biggest interests in the region, slowing migration and fighting cocaine and fentanyl traffickers. Still, it is an increasingly valuable partner. The country has huge reserves of lithium and copper, critical ingredients for batteries. It is also a consequential battleground for U.S.-Chinese competition. Under previous governments, Argentina allowed China’s military to open a space base in the country; flirted with the possibility of buying Chinese fighter jets and a Chinese nuclear power plant; and considered giving China special access to the strategic Straits of Magellan at the southern tip of the continent. To ride out its last debt crisis, Argentina tapped a Chinese line of credit.
The United States will rely on Argentina’s support even more in the coming months. The new U.S. defense strategy will reportedly prioritize the Western Hemisphere, a pivot that would be tough without at least one big country laying out the red carpet. There are few alternatives available. Trump alienated President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva by imposing a 50 percent tax on imports from Brazil as punishment for the prosecution of Bolsonaro for plotting a failed coup d’état. In late September, the State Department revoked Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s visa after he criticized the United States during a visit to the United Nations. Trump is reportedly considering bombing drug cartels in Mexico over the objections of the Mexican government. He might also invade Venezuela to depose its strongman leader, Nicolás Maduro, whose unpopularity with his neighbors might not be enough to overcome the unpopularity of U.S. military interventions.
Finally, though Milei’s Make America Great Again credentials are unquestionable, his commitment to control spending, rationalize monetary policy, and pursue pro-market reforms is mostly in line with bipartisan U.S. regional priorities. Should those ideas achieve the broad appeal of Lionel Messi or the late Pope Francis, other Argentine exports, it would help stabilize Latin America and create opportunities for U.S. firms.
None of this necessarily argues for a financial rescue that could very well end with Argentina defaulting on U.S. taxpayers. The country is on its twenty-third International Monetary Fund bailout, a global record. After its last economic meltdown, in 2001, the U.S. government and U.S. bondholders were among the creditors it stiffed. That could happen again should Axel Kicillof, the influential Peronist governor of Buenos Aires province, end up succeeding Milei.
Nevertheless, greater cooperation with Argentina, including U.S. mining and energy investments and reduced trade barriers, would rightly reward Milei’s sensible economic strategy and foreign policy partnership, and demonstrate the dividends for regional leaders who wager on Washington in great-power competition.
BECOME A MEMBER
Benjamin Gedan, Ph.D., is a foreign policy fellow at the Latin America Studies Initiative at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Previously, he was responsible for Argentina as a South America director on the National Security Council staff in the White House and at the State Department.
Image: Midjourney
warontherocks.com · October 9, 2025
24. Taiwan’s Plan for Peace Through Strength
Conclusion:
Although the Taiwanese people deeply appreciate statements of solidarity, further action is needed. More of the world’s democratic leaders should take immediate, tangible steps to enhance security cooperation with Taiwan, including improving the ability of security forces to work together across domains. By recognizing that the resilience of one democracy strengthens the security of all, Taiwan and the United States have bolstered their security cooperation in 2025 through military procurement and arms deliveries, significantly accelerating Taiwan’s preparedness. This should serve as a call to action for other democracies, as well. Taiwan is doing its part with urgency and resolve and is committed to achieving peace through strength by going beyond military readiness to strengthen whole-of-society resilience. As Taiwan accelerates its preparations, there should be no doubt about its determination to defend its future and its freedom.
Taiwan’s Plan for Peace Through Strength
Foreign Affairs · More by Lin Fei-fan · October 9, 2025
How Investments in Resilience Can Deter Beijing
October 9, 2025
Reservists training during annual military exercises in Taoyuan, Taiwan, July 2025 Ann Wang / Reuters
Lin Fei-fan is Deputy Secretary-General of Taiwan’s National Security Council.
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In July 2025, Taiwan conducted one of its most extensive military exercises in decades. This time, however, the training did not occur in isolated training grounds but in the heart of Taiwan’s cities. Tanks moved through urban streets, more than 20,000 reservists were mobilized, soldiers transported weapons via underground metro systems, and simulated strikes targeted critical infrastructure, including the river crossings that link Taipei’s urban core. As part of the exercise, planners tested civilian agencies under extreme contingency scenarios while air-raid alerts emptied the streets. Underground parking lots and metro stations served as bomb shelters, and schools and civic centers became relief shelters and emergency medical hubs. The exercise also mobilized nongovernmental organizations and fire and police agencies to support material distribution logistics and community protection efforts. The government even released updated civil defense instructions, providing the public with air-raid sheltering and safety guidelines.
The exercise, in other words, extended far beyond the armed forces and reflected Taiwan’s deepening belief that effective deterrence against China relies not only on military modernization but also on societal resilience—the ability of Taiwan’s people to withstand the most extreme scenarios or to resist an invasion. Although it was the first time the Taiwanese people witnessed such a large-scale exercise in their own neighborhoods, the public did not panic but instead expressed strong support for these realistic training and preparedness efforts.
Since 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping has made no secret of his ambitions to annex Taiwan, by force if necessary, and to seek Indo-Pacific dominance. The Chinese Communist Party has framed these objectives as essential to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and has targeted Taiwan with escalating military pressure and hybrid operations across multiple domains. From near-daily incursions into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone to large-scale kinetic drills, cyberattacks, and disinformation operations, Beijing has pursued a campaign designed not simply to intimidate but to erode Taiwan’s confidence and capacity to resist.
In response, Taiwan is undertaking a systemic effort to build its “whole-of-society defense resilience,” a comprehensive strategy that combines military preparedness with democratic cohesion, infrastructure hardening, and societal strength. The goal is to raise the costs of aggression to such a degree that no adversary can hope to achieve victory. Taiwan is making great strides in this approach, as seen in the July exercise. But deterrence is strongest when it is collective. Now is the time for democracies to help preserve peace by investing in Taiwan’s resilience.
Under Pressure
Long before any conventional methods of war are deployed, authoritarian powers are increasingly trying to exploit their democratic adversaries’ societal vulnerabilities. By breaking public morale, degrading infrastructure, and paralyzing decision-making, an aggressor can cripple a state’s ability to function before war is even declared. Prior to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, for instance, Moscow targeted the country with a steady campaign of hybrid aggression: cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation aimed at sowing internal discord, economic coercion leveraging Ukraine’s reliance on Russia’s energy supplies, and political interference exploiting pro-Kremlin forces. These actions were not tactical diversions but rehearsals for a full-scale invasion, designed to soften the target and test its ability to endure systemic shocks. When hostilities began in earnest, Moscow followed a similar script: attacking infrastructure, communications systems, and power plants to create widespread disruption and psychological fatigue.
But Ukraine—leaning on pillars of resilience such as media literacy, a mobilized civil society, redundant infrastructure, and territorial defense—denied the Kremlin a rapid victory. What Moscow expected to be a lightning campaign became a grinding conflict that drained its military strength, triggered unprecedented sanctions, and heightened domestic political risks. Ukraine’s resistance has shown that modern deterrence hinges on a society’s capacity to absorb shocks and continue resisting under fire.
Ukraine, of course, is not the only country with a formidable civil defense. In response to decades of threats, Finland and Israel have cultivated some of the world’s most resilient traditions of whole-of-society defense, or total defense. Their systems go far beyond military readiness. Civilian defense training programs, medical networks, and civic protection rapid-response units are underpinned by a deeper societal conviction that surrender is never an option. Public communication strategies and psychological support structures seek to ensure that civilian morale can withstand prolonged crises, and continuity-of-government planning helps prevent societal breakdown even under extreme pressure.
But it was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that served as the wake-up call for Taiwan. The war made clear that peace cannot be secured through appeasement. It also showed how quickly coercion can escalate into full-scale assault and how the survival of a small democracy up against a powerful authoritarian adversary depends on preparations made long before the first shot is fired. Kyiv’s resistance against overwhelming odds was a clear lesson for Taipei, which is why, three years ago, then President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration quietly initiated preparations across government agencies to integrate civil defense planning into daily life, fortify critical infrastructure, and foster a society prepared mentally and materially for any contingency.
From the Ground Up
The Tsai administration started its national resilience campaign by auditing living necessities and essential supplies, including combat medication. It pledged $18.5 billion over ten years to harden and decentralize the power grid, reducing the risk of a single point of failure. It also started investing in low-orbit satellites to maintain communications if undersea Internet cables are severed. To improve reserve mobilization and civil-military coordination, it created the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency. Amid the intensifying war in Ukraine, the Tsai administration extended conscription from four months to one year and enhanced training programs. These efforts laid the foundation for a much more structured whole-of-society resilience campaign when President Lai Ching-te took office in 2024.
Deterrence is as much about perception as it is about capability.
President Lai has made resilience building one of his administration’s top priorities. For instance, he has established a national-level committee on whole-of-society defense resilience, which meets quarterly with representatives from the business community, religious groups, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to review the progress of government plans and coordinate across sectors. With the participation of experts and representatives from various sectors, the committee has undertaken new initiatives throughout the last year, including a tabletop exercise to improve coordination among different levels of government, a small-scale live exercise testing civilian agencies’ crisis response mechanisms, and the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience International Forum to exchange experiences with like-minded partners, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. The Lai administration also oversaw the July exercise, which emphasized not only military training but also the involvement of civilian agencies—signaling a shift in Taiwan’s defense approach. These efforts have underscored that defending Taiwan is a shared responsibility, one that does not rest solely with the military but must also be upheld by all civilian agencies. To that end, Lai has also tasked the National Security Council with closely monitoring each government agency’s progress across five major lines of efforts: civil manpower training and utilization, emergency supplies, energy security, medical capacity, and cyber and communication redundancy.
This strategy of whole-of-society defense is far from complete, but these efforts over the past three years demonstrate how decisively Taiwan has progressed from pure military defense to broader societal survivability. The objective is not only to resist armed aggression but also to maintain democratic governance, economic stability, and institutional continuity under pressure, thereby blunting Beijing’s use of “gray-zone” and hybrid tactics that fall short of war.
The proposed defense budget, which is set to exceed 3.3 percent of GDP in 2026 and aims to reach 5.0 percent by 2030, further underscores Taiwan’s commitment to deterrence. Taipei is not merely investing in conventional systems; it is also directing substantial resources toward asymmetric capabilities, including coastal missile systems, mobile air defense platforms, and a growing array of unmanned technologies such as drones and counterdrone systems. In parallel, the Lai administration has also proposed an $18.1 billion special budget package, with $4.9 billion for national resilience supporting the coast guard’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; disaster relief equipment; and the hardening of shelter facilities. This fund, when combined with regular resilience spending and the core military budget, will elevate Taiwan’s total security-related spending to meet NATO’s defense benchmarks by the end of 2026.
Taiwan’s ability to resist has repercussions far beyond its shores.
Still, resilience cannot be built through procurement alone: it also requires unwavering public support and societal consensus. Some opposition voices have called the government’s efforts to strengthen resilience and defense a provocation to Beijing. But the reality is that authoritarian aggressors are preparing for military expansion and seeking to change the world order, whereas Taiwan’s practices are preserving the status quo and, with it, freedom and democracy. There is no time to waste, so the Lai administration has chosen to accelerate the pace of societal preparedness through more rigorous discussion with the public, including bipartisan and public-private partnerships, particularly in technology and logistics, to ensure preparedness at both the state and societal levels. Many of Taiwan’s international partners, including the United States, are also engaging across Taipei’s political lines to illustrate the importance and urgency of such preparations.
Ultimately, unity—whether domestic or international, public or private—sends a powerful signal to potential aggressors that Taiwan remains politically strong under pressure. Deterrence is as much about perception as it is about capability. This is why the Lai administration has explicitly stated in its newly published civil defense handbook: “In the event of a military invasion, any claims that the nation is defeated or the government has surrendered are false.”
Ripple Effects
As Taipei’s leaders have repeatedly warned partners and allies, Beijing’s ambitions extend well beyond Taiwan. China and its allies seek to reshape the global order. Across the Indo-Pacific, the People’s Liberation Army has intensified large-scale military exercises, harassed Philippine vessels in the South China Sea, and even staged unannounced live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea near Australia that disrupted civilian air routes and naval travel. China has also supplied critical components and dual-use technologies to Russia and Iran, enabling Moscow’s war in Ukraine and bolstering Tehran’s capacity to initiate attacks. Taken together, this pattern of regional aggression and global military support underscores Beijing’s determination to erode the existing balance of power and challenge the security architecture that has underpinned peace and stability for decades.
Taiwan’s ability to resist, therefore, has repercussions far beyond its shores. Should Taipei fall to Beijing, the resulting power shift could fundamentally alter the global order. Strategically, China would gain a forward operating base in the western Pacific, threatening several vital sea-lanes and undermining the United States’ ability to meet security commitments to its Indo-Pacific partners and allies. The collapse of part of the first island chain—which stretches from Japan to the Philippines, separating China from the Pacific Ocean—could erode regional deterrence, raising alarm bells for key U.S. allies such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. China’s annexation of Taiwan would also send a dangerous signal that small democracies cannot survive in the shadow of strong autocracies. It would fracture the credibility of democratic solidarity and further legitimize the use of force as a tool of statecraft.
The global economic consequences, meanwhile, would be immediate and severe. As part of a highly specialized global supply chain, Taiwan manufactures cutting-edge components that power today’s economy, including the majority of the world’s most advanced semiconductors. Taiwan is also a critical hub for global trade: in 2024, its ports handled a record $690 million revenue tons in cargo, and analysts estimate that roughly half of the world’s container ships pass through the Taiwan Strait each year. Any disruption to either this maritime lifeline or Taiwan’s high-tech manufacturing would reverberate across global markets, crippling industries from consumer electronics to automotive manufacturing and even defense systems. The potential consequences are staggering: Bloomberg has estimated that a war over the Taiwan Strait could inflict as much as $10 trillion in annual losses on the world economy, erasing more than ten percent of global GDP.
The future of Taiwan is not merely a regional concern; it is a test of whether the international order can withstand the pressure of authoritarian expansionism. Taiwan, especially the current Lai administration, understands this reality and has demonstrated an unwavering commitment to building credible deterrence through both defense capacity and societal resilience. Yet as authoritarian powers coordinate more closely—combining cyber-operations, economic coercion, and military pressure across the region—the preservation of Indo-Pacific peace cannot rest on Taiwan alone.
Although the Taiwanese people deeply appreciate statements of solidarity, further action is needed. More of the world’s democratic leaders should take immediate, tangible steps to enhance security cooperation with Taiwan, including improving the ability of security forces to work together across domains. By recognizing that the resilience of one democracy strengthens the security of all, Taiwan and the United States have bolstered their security cooperation in 2025 through military procurement and arms deliveries, significantly accelerating Taiwan’s preparedness. This should serve as a call to action for other democracies, as well. Taiwan is doing its part with urgency and resolve and is committed to achieving peace through strength by going beyond military readiness to strengthen whole-of-society resilience. As Taiwan accelerates its preparations, there should be no doubt about its determination to defend its future and its freedom.
Foreign Affairs · More by Lin Fei-fan · October 9, 2025
25. America’s New Age of Political Violence
Conclusion:
Scholarly research consistently shows that if the public is exposed to rhetoric from their leaders that threatens violence or characterizes their political opponents using dehumanizing metaphors, its support for political violence rises. There is good reason to think that calming statements can encourage the opposite trend. Since Kirk’s assassination, various Democratic and Republican governors have separately condemned political violence. Assembling a group of leaders to do so jointly at the same publicized event would send the strong signal that U.S. leaders can live with each other—and so should all Americans.
America’s New Age of Political Violence
Foreign Affairs · by Robert A. Pape · October 9, 2025
What Happens When the Threat Comes From Both Left and Right
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/americas-new-age-political-violence
October 9, 2025
Law enforcement officers patrolling Utah Valley University after the assassination of Charlie Kirk, Orem, Utah, September 2025 Jim Urquhart / Reuters
ROBERT A. PAPE is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats at the University of Chicago.
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The United States is in the grip of an era of violent populism. Threats and acts of political violence have been on the rise for roughly a decade, affecting a wide variety of victims, including Republican Representative Steve Scalise, Democratic Governor Gretchen Whitmer, then Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and U.S. President Donald Trump. In September 2024, I argued in Foreign Affairs that Americans must be prepared for an even more “extraordinary period of unrest” involving “serious political assassination attempts, political riots, and other instances of collective, group, and individual violence.” Sadly, this prediction has been borne out in 2025. An arsonist attempted to burn down Pennsylvania Governor Joshua Shapiro’s home (while he and his family were inside), an assassin killed Minnesota House Representative Melissa Hortman—and in September, a shooter murdered the commentator and activist Charlie Kirk in the most significant assassination in the United States since the 1960s.
Kirk’s death, in particular, has prompted bitter arguments among partisans about which political “side”—the left or the right—is to blame for the turn toward political violence. The truth is that neither is most responsible. Because it is notoriously difficult to assemble a comprehensive list of incidents of political violence and then accurately categorize them by their ideological motivation, the Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST), a University of Chicago research center I run, studied threats to members of Congress prosecuted by the Department of Justice. By focusing on a discrete, well-defined group of potential targets, this study largely avoids the subjectivity that muddies much research on political violence. We determined that, since 2017, the total number of threats to lawmakers has risen markedly, and Democratic and Republican members have been equally targeted.
This finding supports other research that shows that political violence in the United States now stems from both the left and the right, a rare and unusually dangerous phenomenon. Left to its own momentum, political violence is likely to escalate further, with major consequences for American liberal democracy: it drives fear in communities and among leaders who perceive themselves to be under threat and, in turn, a willingness to accept constraints on civil liberties or wield government power to suppress the danger. That only increases the likelihood that the legitimacy of future elections will be questioned. But the broad nature of the threat also suggests that if political leaders join forces to condemn political violence, they could push back the tide.
HE SAID, SHE SAID
Violent populism—a phase of politics characterized by high levels of political violence and broad support for it—now represents a greater risk to American democracy than any competition with another country or any menace by a foreign terrorist group. The United States’ democratic foundations have, of course, been threatened by political violence in the past. During the 1920s, for instance, the Ku Klux Klan and nativists carried out terror campaigns against Black people, Catholics, and immigrants. In the 1960s and 1970s, urban riots and political assassinations were a more regular feature of American life.
But unlike other waves of violent populism over the past century, the new surge is defined by historically high levels of political violence motivated by both left- and right-wing ideology. In the 1960s, analysts broadly agreed that left-wing instigators were responsible for the preponderance of American political violence—for example, the Weather Underground’s “Days of Rage” protests in 1968. Likewise, there is a scholarly consensus that between the early 1970s until roughly 2015, people motivated by right-wing ideology carried out most acts of political violence in the United States, peaking with the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing that killed 168.
Since Kirk’s assassination, U.S. leaders and commentators have argued over which political faction is more responsible for the rise in political violence. Trump and others in his administration have insistently claimed that the “radical left” is now disproportionately to blame. Prominent writers and think tanks have asserted that the right is more at fault. On September 11, for instance, the Cato Institute released a study claiming that between January 1, 1975, and September 10, 2025, (and excluding the 9/11 attack, whose lethality was an outlier), terrorists motivated by right-wing ideologies have murdered more Americans than those motivated by left-wing views. Two weeks later, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a study claiming that “in recent years, the United States has seen an increase in the number of left-wing terrorism attacks and plots.”
Death tolls cannot be a proxy for the threat posed by violent populists.
What aligns these two apparently opposed points of view is the conviction that one side must be most culpable—and that accurately identifying this perpetrator faction is key to reversing the rise of violence. But the reality is that the pattern of U.S. political violence has fundamentally shifted. Politicians on both the left and the right are now subject to an extraordinary degree of threat. Indeed, a close look at the data in each of the dueling studies reveals a pattern of rising attacks carried out by both right- and left-wing perpetrators starting about ten years ago.
The Cato study does show that, since 1975, attackers that the researchers categorized as right-wing have killed more people than attackers described as left-wing. But death tolls cannot be a proxy for the threat posed by violent populists. The number of people killed in a politically violent incident is often a function of circumstances. In the attack on Democratic lawmakers in Minnesota, for example, three intended victims survived. When Ronald Troyke stalked the town of Arvada, Colorado, armed with an AR-15 in 2021—intent on killing law enforcement officers—he almost certainly intended to murder more than one, but a bystander shot him dead. And because lethal attacks are a small sample, it would take only one more mass shooting to dramatically alter what the study claims to reveal.
Even more important, although the Cato study shows that although right-wing attacks were more prevalent than left-wing between 1975 and 2015, after 2016, they become nearly equal. The Georgetown study’s data reveals that acts of political violence committed by attackers it categorizes as left- and right-wing have both risen in the past decade. Establishing any kind of reliable count of incidents of political violence is a huge challenge. There is no official FBI definition for “political violence”; creating one would require congressional legislation, because only the U.S. Congress has the power to define what constitutes a federal crime. And it can be very hard to capture all incidents with certainty and accurately judge perpetrators’ motivations, leaving analysts of violent incidents open to accusations of bias. In its study of political violence, for instance, Cato categorizes the attacker who killed a student at Antioch High School in Nashville, Tennessee, in January 2025 as right-wing and the murderer of two Israeli embassy staffers in May 2025 as left-wing, while the CSIS study omits the first and describes the second attacker’s motivation as “ethnonationalist.” These ambiguities show the inherent difficulties of assembling a comprehensive data set and classifying political motives when the depth of evidence varies case by case and when incidents may be poorly covered by the media.
DOUBLE THREAT
Fortunately, there is a better way to systematically capture a picture of political violence in the United States: by considering threats against members of Congress that the Department of Justice deemed to be serious enough to prosecute. Studying this data has multiple advantages. It creates an objective standard for what counts as a serious threat, one determined by a relevant government institution and reliably identified with media reports and public court records. And it establishes a clearer set of incidents by focusing on readily identifiable political targets. Although using the partisan identity of targets as a proxy for the partisan motivations of perpetrators is not a perfect approach, it is a fairly good one (especially when considering whether an overall pattern changes over time), since the number of cases motivated by personal issues are known to be rare. Annual numbers of threats can also be compared across years. Most important, the risk that the researcher will embed partisan bias in categorizing threats by political ideology is eliminated.
CPOST has comprehensively assessed threats made against members of Congress between 2001 to 2024. During this 25-year period, the Department of Justice prosecuted 377 threats to U.S. legislators, counting as a single threat cases in which a perpetrator threatened the same legislator more than once or multiple legislators in the same court case so as not to inflate the numbers. The threats included perpetrators repeatedly calling a senator’s office to threaten an assassination, sending menacing powder to a legislator’s office, carrying a weapon to a legislator’s office or home—or, of course, physically harming the legislator. It is, of course, possible that different administrations’ Justice Departments did not prosecute threats against the other party’s legislators as they did threats against their own, but the fact that our study period covered different parties’ tenures in the executive branch balances this risk.
There was a clear turning point in the nature and magnitude of the hazard. Every year starting in 2017, prosecuted threats increased more than fivefold from the previous year. Between 2001 and 2016, Democrats appeared to be generally more at risk (except during the first Bush administration, when all legislators were subject to a relatively low degree of threat). Since 2016, however, the threats to Republican and Democratic members of Congress have been roughly equal. And like the Cato and CSIS data, starting in that year, CPOST’s study shows a marked rise in political violence on both the right and the left.
By all crucial measures, the pattern is the same: political violence has been rising over the past decade, and it is high on both the right and the left. Continuing to emphasize relatively small differences in the balance only contributes to a dangerous blame game that may well make matters worse.
DEATH SPIRAL
Kirk’s assassination did not simply constitute another data point in a years-long trend. It reflected a recent, even sharper acceleration in political violence. And it set off its own cascade of aggravating events: a crackdown on free speech, a probable copycat attack on an Immigration and Customs Enforcement office in Dallas, and in late September, Trump’s order to U.S. generals to “handle . . . the enemy within” and treat American cities as “training grounds.” “They spit, you hit,” he commanded. Trump’s opponents, meanwhile, have amped up their rhetoric. “You’ve got to fight fire with fire,” 2024 Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris said in a late September speech.
Intentionally or not, U.S. political elites on both sides of the partisan spectrum have encouraged the mobilization of the country into two separate, fighting camps. This violent polarization is visible on the streets: this year, Tesla dealerships have been the target of nearly 100 politically motivated attacks and ICE officers are facing assaults; Trump has responded with increasingly aggressive threats to treat predominantly Democratic cities like “war zones.” And tens of millions of Americans who have not committed political violence now say they support it.
Kirk’s assassination reflected a recent acceleration in political violence.
For the past four years, every quarter, CPOST has surveyed Americans to gauge their support for political violence. In our most recent poll, conducted between September 25 and September 28, over a quarter of self-identified Democrats agreed that “the use of force is justified to remove Donald Trump from the presidency,” and over a quarter of Republicans agreed that the president “is justified in using the U.S. military to stop protests against the Trump agenda.” This is triple the proportion of respondents who agreed with similar questions we posed in September 2024.
Research by scholars such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Roger Petersen, the late Princeton economist Alan Krueger, and the University of Madrid’s Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca has clearly shown that an increase in popular support for political violence often precedes real assassinations, bombings, and bloodletting. That is why it is crucial to understand the current breadth of support for political violence in the United States—as well as the fact that violent acts are perpetrated by people motivated by both right- and left-wing ideologies. Spirals of violence can take on their own momentum, generating reciprocal cycles of emulation and revenge.
In the absence of a major effort to forestall such a spiral in the United States, political violence’s momentum will not halt. And in light of Trump’s orders to the U.S. military, it is useful to remember that British troops entered Northern Ireland in August 1969 with the intent to de-escalate local violence. Instead, their presence led to the rise of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which split from the official IRA over a dispute about violent tactics. The Provisional IRA’s explicit goal was to expel the British troops by force, and its terrorist campaign lasted for decades.
VIRTUOUS CYCLE
Our CPOST September survey did reveal a reason for optimism. It revealed that a large majority of Americans still abhor political violence—and that equal numbers of Democrats and Republicans agree that threats of violence against politicians constitute a serious problem. Furthermore, the study found that over 80 percent of Democrats and Republicans agreed that leaders in both parties “should make a joint statement condemning any political violence in America.” This contingent includes some of the respondents who supported political violence, suggesting they could turn against it if they had confidence that partisans from the other side would, as well.
It is crucial that U.S. leaders speak to this majority. Between now and the U.S. midterm elections in November 2026, there is virtually no chance that any grand bargain will truly close the United States’ cavernous partisan divide. A summit against political violence attended by top leaders such as Trump, California Governor Gavin Newsom, and Illinois Governor J. B. Pritzker—in which they all stressed that political violence is illegal, immoral, and un-American—would be very powerful. But even a more modest joint condemnation of political violence would be meaningful.
Scholarly research consistently shows that if the public is exposed to rhetoric from their leaders that threatens violence or characterizes their political opponents using dehumanizing metaphors, its support for political violence rises. There is good reason to think that calming statements can encourage the opposite trend. Since Kirk’s assassination, various Democratic and Republican governors have separately condemned political violence. Assembling a group of leaders to do so jointly at the same publicized event would send the strong signal that U.S. leaders can live with each other—and so should all Americans.
Foreign Affairs · More by Robert A. Pape · October 9, 2025
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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