Quotes of the Day:
The demagogue Is one who preaches doctrines he knows to be untrue to men he knows to be idiots.
- H.L. Mencken
“What man actually needs is not a tensionless state but rather the striving and struggling for some goal worthy of him.”
- Viktor Frankl
"Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace. In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives."
- George Kennan
1. N. Korea quietly marks 76th founding anniversary of ruling party
2. Gyeonggi Gov. Lee named presidential candidate for ruling party amid swirling corruption scandal
3. Finalization of PPP’s presidential contenders
4. What Makes North Korea's New Hypersonic Missile So Terrifying
5. Victims of North Korea’s ‘Paradise on Earth’ Campaign Demand Justice (Japanese abductees)
6. What is Kim Jong Un thinking?
7. North Korea employs charm offensive for leverage with U.S.
8. The Nobel committee’s warning (A view from Korea)
9. North Korea's Special Forces: 200,000 Shock Troops Ready for War
1. N. Korea quietly marks 76th founding anniversary of ruling party
Maybe the regime is starting to really feel the pressure and it now has to prioritize its scarce resources so that it cannot even support a parade. (said only half tongue in cheek - this could be an indicator of the pressure on the regime and the knowledge that ideological indoctrination and public displays of military might and adoration for the party and the regime are not going to help the solve the problems the north faces).
N. Korea quietly marks 76th founding anniversary of ruling party | Yonhap News Agency
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea appears to be marking the 76th founding anniversary of its ruling Workers' Party on Sunday without a military parade or any other provocative show of force.
State media carried several articles stressing the ruling party and leader Kim Jong un's devotion to the country, but no major celebrations or party meetings were reported as of early Sunday morning.
The Rodong Sinmun, the organ of the North's ruling party, rallied support for Kim and highlighted his efforts in helping people recover from economic challenges, such as recent flooding and the border closure due to COVID-19.
No signs of the North preparing for a military parade were detected, according to military sources.
Pyongyang may be skipping the military parade as this year's anniversary does not fall on a fifth or 10th anniversary and as it staged a scaled-down parade last month to mark the country's founding anniversary.
The North tends to mark every fifth and 10th anniversary with larger events, such as military provocations, including missile launches and parades of troops, newly developed strategic weapons and other military hardware.
At the 75th founding anniversary last year, leader Kim vowed to continue to strengthen its self-defense "war deterrent," and showed off a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and other weapons during a massive military parade.
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
2. Gyeonggi Gov. Lee named presidential candidate for ruling party amid swirling corruption scandal
The big domestic political news in South Korea. It will be interesting to speculate how Kim Jong-un might try to influence the outcome of the March election (northern wind) and to know which candidate he might want to be the new ROK President.
(3rd LD) Gyeonggi Gov. Lee named presidential candidate for ruling party amid swirling corruption scandal | Yonhap News Agency
(ATTN: ADDS details of election result in paras 4-6; CHANGES photos)
By Park Bo-ram
SEOUL, Oct. 10 (Yonhap) -- Gyeonggi Gov. Lee Jae-myung won the ruling Democratic Party's nomination for president Sunday, a widely expected victory for a man championing universal basic income and other sweeping welfare programs amid concern a deepening corruption scandal involving a close aide could dog him through the race.
The 56-year-old human rights lawyer-turned-politician won 50.29 percent of all votes cast in the course of the party's 11-round primary since early last month, followed by former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon with 39.14 percent.
Ex-Justice Minister Choo Mi-ae won 9.01 percent and two-term lawmaker Park Yong-jin won 1.55 percent.
The governor narrowly secured a majority of the votes needed to avoid a runoff.
He was largely projected to garner about 56 percent of the total votes but barely surpassed the threshold by a razor-thin margin of less than 0.3 percentage point after Lee Nak-yon made a surprise landslide victory in the party's third primary vote among ordinary citizens.
The governor had 28.3 percent of the votes, as opposed to Lee Nak-yon's 62.3 percent, a result widely presumed to be related with the corruption scandal surrounding a 2015 land development project in Seongnam, south of Seoul, that he pushed for when he was Seongnam's mayor.
Lee pledged a powerful reform of real estate policy and efforts to root out corruption.
"As soon as I am elected, I will carry out powerful real estate reforms so as to rid the country of the stigma of 'a republic of unearned real estate income,'" Lee said in an acceptance speech, referring to widespread voter discontent with skyrocketing housing prices that have made the rich richer.
Branding next year's presidential election as "the ultimate battle against the corrupt establishment," Lee said, "We have to decide whether we will go back to the dark past or start off as a new country of hope."
The governor said he will also push for policies to achieve a powerful state-led economic renaissance, universal welfare programs, as well as investment in science and technology, and future-oriented education.
"Being president means representing everyone ... I will make a unified nation where everyone can enjoy fair opportunities regardless of political inclination or regions of origin, without drawing a line between us, your side and my side," he added.
In the March 9 presidential vote, Lee is expected to be pitted against either former Prosecutor-General Yoon Seok-youl or five-term lawmaker Hong Joon-pyo, the leading candidates in the main opposition People Power Party's presidential primary.
The scandal remains a source of a potential political firestorm for Lee's presidential run.
It centers on revelations that a previously unheard-of asset management firm, Hwacheon Daeyu, and its seven affiliates reaped profits of more than 1,000 times their investments after the firm was selected as a civilian partner for the 2015 project.
One of Lee's associates has been arrested on charges of playing key roles in the selection process as well as designing the profit distribution arrangements in a way that benefits the firm while inflicting losses on the city.
The main opposition party has accused Lee of masterminding the whole scheme, and called for an independent counsel investigation into the scandal while urging Lee to step down as presidential candidate.
Lee has categorically rejected all allegations as "fake news," including his relationship with Yoo, arguing that he gained not a single penny from the project and that the opposition party is raising allegations against him in an attempt to cover up its own wrongdoing.
Despite the scandal, Lee has led opposition candidates in opinion polls.
According to a joint survey by four pollsters published this week, Lee had 26 percent of support. Following him were PPP candidates Yoon and Hong with 17 percent and 15 percent, respectively. In a hypothetical two-way race between Lee and Yoon, Lee had 44 percent of support against Yoon's 33 percent.
The upcoming election is also seen as a referendum both on the five-year reign of liberal President Moon Jae-in and his ruling party amid widespread voter frustrations with runaway housing prices, considered the biggest policy failure of the Moon government.
Lee has pledged to sharply increase home supply to provide more than 2.5 million housing units during the five-year presidential term if he is elected, an ambitious goal that critics say is unrealistic.
Lee has been best known for his calls for universal basic income and other welfare measures. He pledged to give up to 1 million won (US$838.30) to each citizen and an additional 1 million won to every young adult per year, if elected.
Lee has pledged to mostly inherit President Moon Jae-in's foreign policy, saying he would play a more active role in brokering a deal between the United States and North Korea. He said he would meet with U.S. President Joe Biden and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to resolve the problem.
Lee said the U.S. is South Korea's "only ally" and pledged to further strengthen relations between the two countries. Still, he also said he would bolster ties with China, arguing there is no reason for South Korea to "narrow the room for maneuver" by taking sides between the U.S. and China.
On Japan, he said he would seek a two-track strategy of dealing with history and other issues separately.
Lee is projected to resign from his Gyeonggi governorship as early as late October to commit himself entirely to presidential campaigning ahead of the opposition nomination.
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
3. Finalization of PPP’s presidential contenders
And the major political opposition in South Korea.
Finalization of PPP’s presidential contenders
Posted October. 09, 2021 07:16,
Updated October. 09, 2021 07:16
Finalization of PPP’s presidential contenders. October. 09, 2021 07:16. by Kyung-Suk Kang coolup@donga.com.
The People Power Party has shortlisted four final candidates in preparations for the forthcoming presidential election – Former Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-youl, Rep. Hong Joon-pyo, former lawmaker Yoo Seung-min and former Jeju Governor Won Hee-ryong. The four candidates will compete in a race for 28 days until the final decision is made on Nov. 5.
Chairman Chung Hong-won of the PPP election commission on Friday announced results of the 2nd primary, saying that public enragement and despair are only soaring up as irregularities and self-righteousness prevail as shown in the example of the Hwacheon Daeyu scandal, asking the four candidates to provide solutions. The PPP did not reveal rankings and the number of votes as per the Public Official Election Act. The 2nd “cutoff” primary is based on votes of responsible party members and public opinion surveys by three to seven.
Right after the party’s announcement, two front runners – both Yoon and Hong – said confidently that a landslide victory was theirs, only adding more heat to an already heated war of nerves. Meanwhile, the rest four candidates failed to continue their race - Choi Jae-hyung, former chairman of the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea who garnered attention when he left office in June to run for presidency, former United Future Party Chairman Hwang Kyo-ahn, Rep. Ha Tae-kyung and former Incheon Mayor Ahn Sang-soo.
Starting from Monday, the PPP will have a debate tour in seven regions and three one-on-one presidential debates. Following party members’ votes and public opinion surveys from Nov. 1 to Nov. 4, the main opposition party will reflect the results by five to five to determine who will represent the party in the presidential election.
4. What Makes North Korea's New Hypersonic Missile So Terrifying
Excerpts:
It was therefore inevitable that North Korea would pursue hypersonic weaponry, an inescapable buzzword in today’s arms race between China, Russia, and the United States. The former two countries have boasted loudly about their early adoption of such weapons, and the U.S. military-industrial complex has obligingly sought to catch up by pursuing numerous hypersonic programs to match.
But while North Korea engineers may still need to iterate quite a bit on Hwasong-8, the KCNA announcement implies another advance that arguably could do more to boost deterrence: the development of a fuel ampoule that allows delivery and deployment of long-range missiles with their gas tanks already full.
Despite having greater energy density and throttle-ability than solid fuel, liquid rocket fuel is considered so volatile and corrosive that it’s ordinarily used to only fuel the rockets just prior to launch. And that fueling process can take hours, during which the missile battery is extremely vulnerable to attack.
What Makes North Korea's New Hypersonic Missile So Terrifying
Data from South Korean and Japanese radars did not identify anything all that impressive in the missile’s performance as it flew eastward out to a distance of around 124 miles (200 km) arcing shallowly to a relatively low peak altitude of just 100,000 feet (30 km) and then vanishing, presumably having plunged into the Sea of Japan.
The KCNA news agency subsequently announced North Korea had successfully tested its first hypersonic weapon, the Hwasong-8 developed by its Academy of Defense Science, consistent with a claim made by Kim Jong-un earlier in January that his scientists had completed research into hypersonics.
A lone photo in the press release showed looked like the familiar booster section of a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range missile with indeed what appeared to be a conical hypersonic glide vehicle on its tip. Such boost-glide missiles are designed to release the armed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) just after exiting the atmosphere. The glider then skips a considerable distance across the denser particles of the upper atmosphere before descending on its target.
The KCNA announcement described the Hwasong-8 as a ‘strategic weapon’—ie. capable of carrying nuclear warheads—and asserted the test “…confirmed the navigational control and stability of the missile in the active section and also its technical specifications including the guiding maneuverability and the gliding flight characteristics of the detached hypersonic gliding warhead.”
But statements from South Korea and the United States did not betray much alarm, or even certainty that a hypersonic glider had been tested as they apparently didn’t detect a glider separating from the booster.
The Hwasong-12 upon which the Hwasong-8 is apparently based is a liquid-fuel rocket with a range estimated to lie between 2,300 and 3,720 miles, but a South Korean missile specialist told Reuters that the Hwasong-8 appears to be a short-range system. He added that South Korean intelligence estimated the missile achieved a peak velocity of only Mach 2.5, well short of hypersonic speeds (Mach 5+) and even North Korea’s old, short-range Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles based on the Soviet Scud-C.
To be fair, failed tests are a necessary byproduct of developing missiles and rockets. The Hwasong-12 failed three flight tests in a row in April 2017, but then performed successfully in three tests between May-September the same year.
Arms control expert Jeffrey Lewis noted that the failure to detect a separating HGV could reflect a failure of the glide vehicle to separate properly—or sensors to detect said glide vehicle. He elaborated:
“The first cut at a modeling suggests that a shortened Hwasong-12 on a depressed trajectory (less than 30 km apogee) could fall around 200 km downrange while giving a heavy [3,300 lb.] glider a credible push at 3 kilometer per second [ie. Mach 8.7]… Either the glider crashed close to the booster or ground-based radars missed the HGV after separation. The North Koreans claimed the system “met the design requirements” but didn’t say how far the glider flew. That makes me suspect it didn’t glide very far…”
The Pentagon Press Secretary stated its analysts had concluded the new missile “does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. personnel or territory, or to our allies,” while South Korea’s Joint Chief of Staff dryly opined the purported hypersonic weapon would “require a considerable amount of time” before amounting to a viable weapon.
HGVs aren’t actually faster than a traditional ballistic missile as is often claimed, but they do benefit from greater maneuverability and approach their targets from a shallower vector, and thus have some potential to circumvent ballistic missile defense systems designed to detect and intercept higher-flying missiles that follow predictable trajectories. That doesn’t pose an insurmountable missile defense challenge, but it does require adaptation of tactics and technology, such as expanding sensor coverage to angles of approach previously considered “safe.”
The KCNA announcement also briefly mentions that the test validated the “stability of the engine as well as of missile fuel ampoule that has been introduced for the first time.”
That innocuous-sounding technology may be altogether more concerning to the U.S. and South Korean militaries, as it could allow North Korea to launch its liquid-fuel missiles—not just the Hwasong-8—before they can be struck preemptively.
Hypersonic Hype and Fuel Ampoules
North Korea is undoubtedly pursuing more new weapon systems than it can hope to deploy in quantity. But Pyongyang’s external and internal messaging is better served by debuting lots of new weapons—even if only prototypes produced in limited numbers—than to double down on mass production of “finished” solutions like, say, Hwasong-15 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
Externally, Kim Jong-un wants to convince the United States that there will always be some new trick up North Korea’s sleeve to undermine advanced countermeasures like the United States’ Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAADS) and Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) missile defense systems or South Korea’s Kill Chain pre-emptive strike apparatus. And constant testing helps maintain pressure on Seoul and Washington to engage diplomatically and creates additional bargaining chips for securing sanctions relief which could alleviate North Korea’s economic isolation.
It was therefore inevitable that North Korea would pursue hypersonic weaponry, an inescapable buzzword in today’s arms race between China, Russia, and the United States. The former two countries have boasted loudly about their early adoption of such weapons, and the U.S. military-industrial complex has obligingly sought to catch up by pursuing numerous hypersonic programs to match.
But while North Korea engineers may still need to iterate quite a bit on Hwasong-8, the KCNA announcement implies another advance that arguably could do more to boost deterrence: the development of a fuel ampoule that allows delivery and deployment of long-range missiles with their gas tanks already full.
Despite having greater energy density and throttle-ability than solid fuel, liquid rocket fuel is considered so volatile and corrosive that it’s ordinarily used to only fuel the rockets just prior to launch. And that fueling process can take hours, during which the missile battery is extremely vulnerable to attack.
However, the Soviet Union earlier developed techniques to hermetically seal ballistic missiles full of liquid rocket fuel in a canister. Furthermore, the missile’s fuel tanks were insulated through redundant welding and a membrane to eliminate the risk of leakage. Such ampoule missiles could be delivered to military units in a fully-fueled state and remain actively deployed fully-fueled for decades, ready for relatively prompt launch. (There is some disagreement between nuclear arms experts as to what extent ampoule modifications focused on external or internal containerization.)
U.S. and South Korean strategy in the contingency of a war with North Korea would especially focus on detecting and destroying North Korea’s liquid-fueled missiles while they gas up for launch. But if North Korea has indeed developed technology to safely transport and maintain liquid-fuel missiles on indefinite standby, then those rockets could be set up for launch in minutes rather than hours, drastically reducing the preemptive strike window.
As nuclear arms expert Vipin Narang noted, that implies a “…big leap in survivability and promptness” while Lewis likewise observed, “If the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) fuels the missiles in the factory, military units don’t have to spend time doing it in the field when the U.S. Air Force is doing its level best to kill them.”
Of course, it’s hard to know for certain how far along North Korea really is in creating fuel ampoules, or how extensively it could be applied to both its older and future liquid-fuel missiles. However, this technology arguably poses greater near-term challenges to U.S. and South Korean security strategy than a hypersonic glid vehicle in the early stages of development.
Sébastien Roblin holds a Master’s Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring.
5. Victims of North Korea’s ‘Paradise on Earth’ Campaign Demand Justice (Japanese abductees)
Victims of North Korea’s ‘Paradise on Earth’ Campaign Demand Justice
hrw.org · by Kanae Doi Japan Director @kanaedoi @kanaedoi · October 8, 2021
Escapees from North Korea and their supporters march to the Tokyo District Court to file a lawsuit against the North Korean government for violating their human rights, August 20, 2018. © 2018 The Asahi Shimbun via Getty Images
An historic court hearing is set to begin next week in Tokyo as five North Korean escapees in Japan seek compensation for human rights abuses they suffered in North Korea after joining a resettlement program based on the false premise that North Korea was a “Paradise on Earth.” The five plaintiffs sued the North Korean government in 2018 and have been awaiting a hearing ever since.
Between 1959 and 1984, approximately 93,000 ethnic Koreans (Zainichi) and Japanese migrated from Japan to North Korea under the so-called “repatriation program.” The North Korean government, mostly through Chongryon, a pro-Pyongyang organization based in Japan, proclaimed that North Korea was a “Paradise on Earth,” and “anything needed for life including housing, food, clothes are fully guaranteed.”
The plaintiffs maintain that the North Korean government intended to attract ethnic Koreans to meet its labor shortage and to support a campaign to demonstrate North Korea’s political superiority to the world by encouraging Zainichi, most of whom originally had roots in South Korea, to choose to relocate to North Korea. While program participants quickly realized the North Korean government’s promises were false, often upon arrival, the authorities prevented them from returning to Japan.
The 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry report on human rights in North Korea found that authorities there committed crimes against humanity. The commission concluded that “[t]he gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a State that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world.” However, accountability has been an uphill battle and this case is one of the few attempts being made to bring justice to survivors of North Korea’s human rights abuses.
Japan’s new prime minister, Fumio Kishida, should find inspiration from the five courageous survivors and demand that Kim Jong Un allow those remaining in North Korea to return to Japan. Hundreds of thousands of victims of the “Paradise on Earth” program and their family members languishing in North Korea await that opportunity. The international community should recognize this decades-long atrocity and support this effort.
6. What is Kim Jong Un thinking?
I do not often agree with the author on north Korea but I do agree with this concluding paragraph. This is the north Korean paradox. The Biden administration (and most of the word) want to give Kim Jong-un a chance to act as a responsible member of the international community and negotiate in good faith. But Kim wants to use political warfare, diplomatic coercion, and blackmail diplomacy to force his way into being accepted by the international community as he is, with his nuclear weapons while he pursues a strategy to dominate the Korean peninsula.
So, what is Kim Jong Un thinking?
Probably what he has been thinking ever since he assumed power from his late father a decade ago: If you, the U.S., think I’m dumb enough to give away my nuclear insurance policy, then you might as well go home. But if you are open to dropping denuclearization as the end goal, perhaps we may have something to talk about.
I am glad the author did not fall into the "Kim knows" trap. As I have written previously:
I think when we use “Kim knows” we lose the debate. People will say “Kim knows" he cannot win a war against the South. “Kim knows” he cannot absorb and rule South Korea. “Kim knows” China will not let him attack the South. “Kim knows” but we cannot know what he knows.
We can only know what the Kim family regime has said and done over the past 70 years and that is what we must assess - not one what we think "Kim knows."
No one knows what Kim knows or believes. That said, we should start with Occam’s Razor. The simplest answer is the regime has been telling us and the Korean people it’s strategy for 7 decades. We spin that at our peril.
The essence of the KFR strategy is political warfare supported by blackmail diplomacy.
As we examine what the regime has said and done with great consistency over the past seven decades it is important to answer the following questions.
Do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the seven decades old strategy of subversion, coercion-extortion (blackmail diplomacy), and use of force to achieve unification dominated by the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State in order to ensure the survival of the Kim regime?
In support of that strategy do we believe that Kim Jong-un has abandoned the objective to split the ROK/US Alliance and get US forces off the peninsula? Has KJU given up his divide to conquer strategy - divide the alliance to conquer the ROK?
We should never forget that north Korea is a master of denial and deception in all that it does from military operations to strategy to diplomatic negotiations.
nK engages in active subversion of the ROK as well as the ROK/US Alliance (See UFD and 225th Bureau mission statements).
The root of all problems in Korea is the existence of the most evil mafia- like crime family cult known as the Kim family regime that has the objective of dominating the Korean Peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State.
Those are my completely biased views of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.
What is Kim Jong Un thinking?
There are some very smart, experienced people in the U.S. intelligence community whose jobs center on this very question.
North Korea is a highly reclusive country. So, to the extent the United States has access to what is actually going on within the corridors of power in Pyongyang, the information largely comes from the occasional high-profile defector. The last two months, however, have been especially dizzying for U.S. intelligence.
The circus-like ride started in late July, when the North Koreans decided to reopen their communication hotlines with South Korea. Those hotlines were severed last summer in protest of anti-Kim leaflets flying across the border. Then, just as soon as the hotlines were up and running, North Korea refused to answer the phone as South Korean officials were calling on the other line. It appeared to be a message that no calls could occur while the U.S. and South Korea were engaging in military exercises.
In September, Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s younger sister, blasted South Korean President Moon Jae-in for calling the North’s latest missile launches a provocation. This is the same Moon who has done nearly everything in his power to try to reconcile Seoul’s bilateral relationship with the North, a personal project since he assumed the presidency in 2017. It was also a busy month on the missile front. North Korea launched cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic missiles over a span of two to three weeks.
Then, just when you thought North-South relations would have been strained for the rest of the year, the mood lifted somewhat.
On Sept. 22, Moon addressed the U.N. General Assembly and proposed a negotiation about a possible end-of-war declaration. Days later, the Kim dynasty appeared to turn the other cheek. Kim Yo Jong, who has made a career out of mocking Moon at every opportunity, didn’t entirely dismiss the end-of-war proposal, calling such a signing possible if Seoul did its part to establish a degree of trust.
The dynamics between the U.S. and North Korea have been just as topsy-turvy.
Between 2018 and 2019, one could be excused for believing that Washington and Pyongyang were a few inches short of making history and moving into a new era where constructive relations were possible. Kim Jong Un and President Donald Trump were meeting in person, writing letters filled with flowery compliments to one another and talking as if peace was around the corner. Of course, by the time Trump left office, U.S.-North Korea relations remained stuck in a rut; the North had its nuclear weapons and was working to improve its missile capabilities. The U.S. continued to prosecute a strong sanctions regime toward Pyongyang.
The negativity has only gotten worse since then.
At least during Trump’s term, U.S. and North Korean officials were talking. Now, there is not even a whimper of dialogue on the horizon. The Biden administration reached out to the North Koreans during their first month in office, but the entreaties were ignored. Sung Kim, President Joe Biden’s special envoy on North Korea, has spent months speaking with his colleagues in the region. He has stressed that Washington is willing to meet with North Korean officials anytime. The Kim regime, however, is not in the mood for direct diplomacy. For U.S. officials, Pyongyang’s cold silence is enormously frustrating.
We tend to explain all of this away by telling ourselves that Kim Jong Un is extremely unpredictable, if not irrational. To many U.S. politicians, the back-and-forth, hot-and-cold rhetoric blowing from the North over the last two months is a reconfirmation that it’s all but impossible to deal with the Kim dynasty.
Yet, this assessment is mistaken. The missile tests, the insulting statements, the tentative olive branches, and the quasi-flirtation with an inter-Korean peace agreement are not a series of disjointed, random acts. Far from it — this is how North Korea negotiates, flexing muscle to demonstrate it wouldn’t be coming to the table empty-handed, even as it keeps the flame of diplomacy lit for another day.
So, what is Kim Jong Un thinking?
Probably what he has been thinking ever since he assumed power from his late father a decade ago: If you, the U.S., think I’m dumb enough to give away my nuclear insurance policy, then you might as well go home. But if you are open to dropping denuclearization as the end goal, perhaps we may have something to talk about.
Daniel DePetris (@DanDePetris) is a contributor to the Washington Examiner's Beltway Confidential blog. His opinions are his own.
7. North Korea employs charm offensive for leverage with U.S.
A charm of effort is one of the tactics that is part of Kim's political warfare strategy.
North Korea employs charm offensive for leverage with U.S.
North Korean streets are plastered with colorful posters marking the 76th founding anniversary of its ruling Workers' Party, as reported in its state-run Rodong Sinmun Sunday. [YONHAP]
Despite indications of North Korea's continued activity at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, leader Kim Jong-un appears to be engaging in a charm offensive to lure both South Korea and China to increase negotiating leverage with the United States.
Pyongyang restored cross-border communication lines last Monday and indicated willingness to improve inter-Korean relations but has simultaneously been demanding a change in attitude from Seoul and a withdrawal of what it claims to be "hostile" policies. Likewise, Pyongyang has been flaunting its friendly ties with Beijing amid signs of increased trade with China.
This comes after a series of new missile tests, including a hypersonic weapon, by Pyongyang in recent weeks and as North Korea analysis website 38 North reported that Pyongyang still appears to be operating its uranium enrichment plant and nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon complex.
The website reported Friday that satellite imagery shows "water being discharged from Aug. 25 to at least Sept. 9" at the key five-megawatt reactor. No water was observed on Oct. 1, but it was detected again the next day.
It added that while no other indicators of reactor operations, such as steam emissions from the generator building, had been observed, "intermittent discharge is not uncommon when the reactor is operating."
On Wednesday, 38 North also found that recent satellite imagery indicated continued construction activity at the uranium enrichment plant at Yongbyon. Satellite imagery from earlier on Oct. 1 showed that previously reported construction in an area north of the plant's Cascade Hall 2 has recently been covered.
It analyzed that assuming the North is producing low-enriched uranium at two enrichment halls, the extension at the building "could also be used to enrich low-enriched uranium to weapons grade (high-enriched uranium) as it becomes available from those two cascade halls."
North Korea didn't appear to hold a military parade or any major show of force during its 76th founding anniversary of its ruling Workers' Party Sunday, said Seoul military sources.
The North's state-run Rodong Sinmun instead stressed leader Kim Jong-un's efforts to help his people recover from economic challenges, the recent flooding and Covid-19 restrictions.
This contrasts to North Korea's major military parade held on Oct. 10, 2020, to mark the Workers' Party's 75th founding anniversary, which showcased strategic weapons including a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).
North Korean state media reported Sunday that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party sent a floral basket to the North's ruling Workers' Party's Central Committee to mark the 76th founding anniversary.
A floral basket sent by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to North Korea’s Central Committee to mark its ruling Workers’ Party’s 76th founding anniversary, pictured in the state-run Rodong Sinmun Sunday. [NEWS1]
Likewise, North Korea last Wednesday vowed to do its "utmost to continuously strengthen and develop" its friendly relations with China, as the two countries marked the 72nd anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic ties.
The North's Foreign Ministry in a report posted on its website heralded the birth of a "new-type" of bilateral relations with China.
The traditional friendship between North Korea and China "personally forged by the leaders of elder generations of the two countries" is being further developed into "a new strategic level as required by the new era thanks to the deep personal relations" between leader Kim and Chinese President Xi Jinping, said the statement.
China, which has been under strict lockdown because of Covid-19 quarantine measures, has recently lifted some of its restrictions on its border with North Korea.
According to a report from the South's Korea International Trade Association (KITA), trade between North Korea and China recorded $28.8 million in August, up 37.8 percent from the previous month. North Korea bought cooking oil, sugar, and seasonings from China, which has been in short supply in the country for a long time. North Korea-China trade has maintained an upward trend for the third consecutive month.
The World Health Organization (WHO) said in a report earlier this month that it has begun shipping Covid-19 medical supplies to North Korea through the Chinese port of Dalian.
This also indicates that North Korea, which likewise has been under strict lockdown since the beginning of the pandemic last year, may finally be easing its border controls.
Analysts point out that North Korea may be laying the groundwork for when it eventually enters "unconditional dialogue" with the United States. Seoul and Washington have held working-level discussions on humanitarian support for the North, which could include Covid-19 vaccines.
Washington also said it supports efforts to "expedite" humanitarian aid to North Koreans, including getting exemptions through the UN Security Council sanctions committee.
"Even when we disagree with a particular regime, we believe that we must work to the best of our ability to do all we can to alleviate the suffering of the people," said Ned Price, spokesman of the U.S. State Department, in a briefing Thursday. "And so we continue to support international efforts aimed at the provision of critical humanitarian aid" to North Korea.
Price did stress, however, that North Korea is "responsible for the humanitarian situation in the country" and "continues to exploit its own citizens, to violate their human rights, to divert resources from the country's people to build up its unlawful WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and ballistic missiles program."
He continued, "We are involved in efforts to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to the neediest in North Korea. This is most evident, I would say, in our ongoing work to expedite approvals in the UN 1718 Committee for organizations from around the world to deliver lifesaving aid" to the North.
Seoul's Unification Ministry said Thursday it had approved three requests by civilian organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea, expected to help boost cross-border cooperation.
South Korea's National Security Council (NSC) convened Thursday and noted that the inter-Korean communication lines have been restored and are operating normally and said that it "decided to further strengthen communication and cooperation with the concerned countries while continuing to seek for ways to resume dialogue with the North as soon as possible."
The NSC, convened under Suh Hoon, director of the National Security Office, also reviewed the recent changes in the Korean Peninsula situation and emphasized that "stability at the current stage is very important" and stressed that "military tensions not be created," said the Blue House.
Andrew Kim, former director of the U.S. CIA's Korea Mission Center, said in a webinar hosted by the Washington Times Foundation Tuesday that Pyongyang was "disappointed" by the Joe Biden administration's middle-ground "calibrated" approach as it had wanted an "action-for-action" approach.
"I'm sure Pyongyang was patiently waiting to hear what the new U.S. administration's North Korea policy would look like, but I believe they were eventually disappointed," said Kim. "The reason I'm saying that is that Pyongyang was probably hoping to see a more concrete road map from the U.S. side, adopting an action-for-action approach, with giving some credit to North Korea for what they have done for the last four years."
North Korean officials, he said, had relayed that they wanted more recognition from the United States for its moratorium on nuclear and long-range missile tests since late 2017.
On China's role in negotiations with North Korea, he said, "The key question is: Do we want China to be our leverage dealing with North Korea?"
Kim said "the last thing the United States would like to see" is have Kim Jong-un travel to China for the Beijing Winter Olympics next February at the same time as President Moon Jae-in "and having Xi Jinping brokering a meeting with the three of them," without the United States.
BY SARAH KIM [kim.sarah@joongang.co.kr]
8. The Nobel committee’s warning (A view from Korea)
And we need to heed its warning.
Sunday
October 10, 2021
The Nobel committee’s warning
The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize this year to two journalists — Maria Ressa of the Philippines and Dmitry Muratov of Russia — carries extraordinary significance. Above all, the awards translate into the Nobel Committee’s special compliment of and encouragement to all reporters fighting dictatorships around the world to safeguard the freedom of speech and human rights, a pivotal mission of the press. Explaining the reasons for giving the prize to the two journalist, the Norwegian Nobel Committee in Oslo, said, “At the same time, they are representatives of all journalists who stand up for this ideal in a world in which democracy and freedom of the press face increasingly adverse conditions.”
The Peace Prize for journalists is the first since German Carl von Ossietzky won it in 1935 for revealing his country’s secret post-war rearmament program after World War I. The awarding of the prize to journalists after 86 years ironically signifies a real crisis the press faces today.
As the committee said, Ressa and Muratov staked their lives to find the facts and report them in an uphill battle against dictators in their own countries. Ressa, the founder and CEO of the investigative journalism website Rappler, has been relentlessly running shocking stories about the murder of over 20,000 people by Rodrigo Duarte’s government in his war on drugs. In the process, six of her colleagues were killed in shootings and poisonings by the police. Nevertheless, she went on reporting the atrocities the government committed in the name of social order.
International organizations, including Reporters Without Borders and the United Nations, interpreted the awarding of the prize as evidence for the freedom of the press and democracy being threatened and weakened around the globe. Journalists in Hong Kong suffer from the Chinese Communist Party’s methodical crackdown on their freedoms while those in Thailand cannot speak freely after a military coup. Journalists are increasingly exposed to the danger of detention and murder as seen in UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres’ concerns about the increasing attacks on media workers.
Korea’s situation is no different given the government’s growing threats to the press for producing “fake news.” The ruling Democratic Party still attempts to enact a draconian law aimed at gagging the press after it criticized the administration for its undemocratic governance. The government had to take a step back in the face of opposition. It must not ignore the warning from the Nobel Committee: “Without freedom of expression and freedom of the press, it will be difficult to successfully promote fraternity between nations, disarmament and a better world order to succeed in our time.”
9. North Korea's Special Forces: 200,000 Shock Troops Ready for War
A key supporting warfighting capability but also with capabilities within some of the force to operate in the gray zone.
North Korea's Special Forces: 200,000 Shock Troops Ready for War
One of the most vital parts of North Korea’s war machine is one that relies the most on so-called “soldier power” skills. North Korea has likely the largest special-forces organization in the world, numbering two hundred thousand men—and women—trained in unconventional warfare. Pyongyang’s commandos are trained to operate throughout the Korean Peninsula, and possibly beyond, to present an asymmetric threat to its enemies.
For decades, North Korea maintained an impressive all-arms force of everything from tanks to mechanized infantry, artillery, airborne forces and special forces. The country’s conventional forces, facing a long slide after the end of the Cold War, have faced equipment obsolescence and supply shortages—for example, North Korea has very few tanks based on the 1970s Soviet T-72, and most are still derivatives of the 1960s-era T-62. The rest of Pyongyang’s armored corps are in a similar predicament, making them decidedly inferior to U.S. and South Korean forces.
In response, North Korea has upped the importance of its special forces. The country maintains twenty-five special-forces and special-purpose brigades, and five special-forces battalions, designed to undertake missions from frontline DMZ assault to parachute and assassination missions. The Light Infantry Training Guidance Bureau, part of the Korean People’s Army, functions as a kind of analog to U.S. Special Operations Command, coordinating the special forces of the Army, Army Air Force and Korean People’s Navy.
Of North Korea’s two hundred thousand “commandos,” approximately 150,000 belong to light infantry units. Foot mobile, their frontline mission is to infiltrate or flank enemy lines to envelop or mount rear attacks on enemy forces. North Korea’s hilly terrain lends itself to such tactics, as does the network of tunnels that the country has dug that cross the DMZ in a number of places. Eleven of North Korea’s special forces brigades are light-infantry brigades, and there are smaller light-infantry units embedded within individual NK combat divisions.
A further three brigades are special-purpose airborne infantry. The Thirty-Eighth, Forty-Eighth and Fifty-Eighth Airborne Brigades operate much like the Eighty-Second Airborne Division, conducting strategic operations including airborne drops to seize critical terrain and infrastructure. NKPA airborne forces would likely target enemy airfields, South Korean government buildings, and key roads and highways to prevent their sabotage. Each brigade is organized into six airborne infantry battalions with a total strength of 3,500. Unlike the Eighty-Second, however, NKPA airborne brigades are unlikely to operate at the battalion level or higher, and due to a lack of long-range transport cannot operate beyond the Korean Peninsula.
In addition, North Korea has an estimated eight “sniper brigades,” three for the People’s Army (Seventeenth, Sixtieth and Sixty-First Brigades), three for the Army Air Force (Eleventh, Sixteenth and Twenty-First Brigades), and two for the People’s Navy (Twenty-Ninth, 291st). Each consists of approximately 3,500 men, organized into seven to ten sniper “battalions.” These units fulfill a broad variety of roles and are roughly analogous to U.S. Army Rangers, U.S. Special Forces and Navy SEALs. Unlike their American counterparts, it appears some these units are capable of fighting as conventional airborne, air assault, or naval infantry.
Sniper brigades are trained in strategic reconnaissance and so-called “direct action” missions including assassination missions, raids against high-level targets military and economic targets, sabotage, disruption of South Korea’s reserve system, covert delivery of weapons of mass disruption (including possibly radiological weapons), and organizing antigovernment guerrilla campaigns in South Korea. They will frequently be dressed in civilian, South Korean military, or U.S. military uniforms. One platoon of thirty to forty troops per Army sniper brigade consists solely of women, trained to conduct combat operations dressed as civilians.
Finally, the Reconnaissance Bureau maintains four separate reconnaissance battalions. Highly trained and organized, these five-hundred-man battalions are trained to lead an army corps through the hazardous DMZ. They likely have intimate—and highly classified—knowledge of both friendly and enemy defenses in the demilitarized zone. A fifth battalion is reportedly organized for out-of-country operations.
Special forces are generally meant to operate behind enemy lines, and North Korea employs considerable, though often obsolete, means of getting them there. For ground forces, one obvious means of infiltrating South Korea is through the 160-mile-long and 2.5-mile-wide DMZ. Undiscovered cross-border tunnels are another means. By sea, Pyongyang has the ability to deliver an estimated five thousand troops in a single lift, using everything from commercial vessels to Nampo-class landing craft, it’s fleet of 130 Kongbang-class hovercraft and Sang-O coastal submarines and Yeono midget submarines.
By air, North Korea has a notional fleet of two hundred elderly An-2 Colt short-takeoff and -landing transports. Capable of flying low and slow to avoid radar, each An-2 can carry up to twelve commandos, landing on unimproved surfaces or parachuting them on their targets. The regime also has a fleet of about 250 transport helicopters, mostly Soviet-bloc in origin (and age) but also including illicitly acquired Hughes 500MD series helicopters similar to those flown by the Republic of Korea. Pyongyang also appears bent to acquire modern, long-distance transports such as this aircraft, manufactured in New Zealand. Aircraft such as the P-750 XSTOL would allow North Korean special forces to reach as far as Japan and Okinawa, both of which would serve as forward bases for U.S. forces in wartime.
In the event of war, North Korea would likely launch dozens of separate attacks throughout South Korea, from the DMZ to the southern port of Busan. Whether or not these forces can make their way through Seoul’s considerable air and sea defenses is another question. Valleys, passes and waterways that could be used by low-flying aircraft and watercraft are already covered with everything from air-defense guns to antitank guided missiles. Given proper warning, South Korean defenders would inflict heavy losses on North Korean commandos on the way to their objectives.
North Korean special forces have evolved from a nuisance force designed to stage attacks in the enemy’s rear into something far more dangerous. Their ability to distribute nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons could, if successful, kill thousands of civilians. They have even trained to attack and destroy a replica of the Blue House, the official resident of the South Korean president. Although many would undoubtedly die en route to their destination, once on the ground their training, toughness and political indoctrination make them formidable adversaries.
Kyle Mizokami is a defense and national-security writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in the Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and the Daily Beast. In 2009, he cofounded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
