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Quotes of the Day:
"While there is a chance of the world getting through its troubles, I hold that a reasonable man has to behave as though he were sure of it. If at the end your cheerfulness is not justified, at any rate you will have been cheerful."
– H. G. Wells
"A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty."
– Winston Churchill
"There are two ways of spreading light... to be the candle, or the mirror that reflects it."
– Edith Wharton
1. How North Korea outsmarts US intelligence agencies—and what they should do to adapt
2. North Korea says denuclearisation is unrealisable ‘pipe dream’ before China, South Korea summit
3. Lee Jae Myung crosses the Rubicon
4. The Korean Crisis Began in 1945, Not 1950 – OpEd
5. Nvidia Uncertain if Return to China Is Closer After Trump-Xi Meeting
6. Why the U.S. is losing the battle for hearts and minds
7. Lee, China's Xi agree on efforts for peace on Korean Peninsula
8. Ending the Korean War: Interview With Former Deputy Commander of Pacific Command
9. Defense chiefs of S. Korea, U.S. meet at ASEAN defense forum ahead of key bilateral meeting
10. Lee says 'no longer worried' about S. Korea-Japan ties after summit with Takaichi
11. Lawmaker says China's Xi responded positively to idea of K-pop concert in Beijing
12. Defense chiefs of S. Korea, Japan reaffirm trilateral security cooperation with U.S.
13. Trump gifts baseball bat and ball to President Lee, symbolizing U.S.-Korea bond
14. APEC leaders adopt Gyeongju Declaration for renewed regional cooperation in trade, AI, demographic changes
15. US LNG through Korean eyes: From game changer to global mainstay
16. Philippine President Discusses Submarines with Hanwha Ocean
1. How North Korea outsmarts US intelligence agencies—and what they should do to adapt
All warfare is based on deception. But north Korea is the proverbial hard target given the great lengths the regime goes to remain hermetically sealed from the outside world and prying eyes and ears. north Korea is a master at deception.
Excerpt:
The failures of 2017 were not an aberration. North Korea will continue to advance its program, sometimes in secret, sometimes in plain sight. The United States will continue to watch, sometimes seeing clearly, often not. The challenge is to reform an intelligence system that is too reactive and too wedded to outdated frameworks. Deception succeeds not only because adversaries conceal, but also because institutions resist recalibrating to what little is revealed. If US intelligence is to keep pace with adversaries who thrive in the shadows, it must embrace humility and adaptability. Deception is inevitable but failure does not have to be.
Summary:
U.S. intelligence has repeatedly underestimated North Korea’s nuclear and missile progress because Pyongyang weaponizes strategic deception while Washington suffers from institutional inertia. The regime manipulates ambiguity – concealing enrichment programs, staging symbolic gestures, and exploiting diplomatic cycles – to mislead analysts anchored in outdated assumptions. Bureaucratic rigidity and a bias toward “safe” underestimates compound these failures, leaving policy makers unprepared for rapid advances. The article argues U.S. agencies must reform for agility, encourage dissenting analysis, integrate cultural-psychological expertise, and communicate uncertainty honestly. Only by treating deception as deliberate strategy can intelligence stay ahead of adaptive authoritarian adversaries.
How North Korea outsmarts US intelligence agencies—and what they should do to adapt
https://thebulletin.org/2025/10/how-north-korea-outsmarts-us-intelligence-agencies-and-what-they-should-do-to-adapt/?utm
thebulletin.org · Dawn Stover · October 27, 2025
By Lauren Cho | October 27, 2025
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un took his daughter to the launch of a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile in November 2022. Credit: Korean Central News Agency
In the summer of 2017, the United States learned a humbling lesson. For years, American intelligence agencies had assessed that North Korea would need several more years—until 2020 or even 2022—before it could field a missile capable of striking the continental United States. Then, on July 4, Pyongyang launched an intercontinental ballistic missile that reached deep space and re-entered at high velocity.
By that September, North Korea had detonated a hydrogen bomb more than 15 times stronger than the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima. The Central Intelligence Agency and its sister agencies had anticipated that this day would eventually come. But their inability to predict the rapid pace of advancement remains one of the starkest intelligence failures of recent decades. It was not simply a matter of bad luck or faulty technical analysis. It was the result of two forces that intersect again and again in the history of US assessments of North Korea’s nuclear program: Pyongyang’s deliberate use of strategic deception, and the institutional inertia of the US intelligence community.
From the first suspicions of a clandestine weapons program in the 1980s through the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, the inconclusive Six-Party Talks, and the dramatic summits of 2018–2019, a familiar cycle has emerged: Washington enters negotiations determined to halt or roll back North Korea’s program. North Korea agrees on paper but continues developing weapons in secret, denying violations and then unveiling new capabilities with a missile test or nuclear detonation. The agreement collapses, and Washington returns to the negotiating table with hopes of restoring momentum toward denuclearization.
Each turn of this cycle reveals a recurring blind spot. American analysts focus on observable indicators and static assumptions, while North Korea manipulates visual evidence and creates ambiguity to gain time.
Defining intelligence. To the public and political leaders, any unpleasant surprise is an intelligence failure. Scholars define it more precisely. Richard K. Betts, an American political scientist who is one of the leading thinkers on this issue, has argued that failures are not rare anomalies but inevitable outcomes of systemic, cognitive, and organizational barriers. Intelligence agencies must operate under conditions of uncertainty and ambiguous evidence. The greater the ambiguity, the greater the influence of preexisting beliefs.
In the case of North Korea, ambiguity is not simply an accident involving limited information. It is a condition carefully constructed by the regime. Strategic deception—deliberate manipulation of information to influence an adversary’s perceptions—has become a central component of North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy. American intelligence agencies have repeatedly struggled to adapt to this strategy, because they are weighed down by bureaucratic norms that prize continuity over change and reactivity over anticipation.
Strategic deception is most effective when the target already wants to believe a certain narrative. Intelligence analysts, like all humans, are vulnerable to cognitive shortcuts: anchoring to past estimates, searching for information that confirms expectations, and discounting anomalies. North Korea exploits these tendencies. It has mastered the art of ambiguity management, controlling what is observable so analysts fill gaps with assumptions rather than evidence. It uses propaganda and signaling—statements in the ruling party’s official newspaper Rodong Sinmun, broadcasts from the Korean Central News Agency—to sometimes exaggerate capabilities and other times downplay them, always keeping opponents guessing.
Pyongyang has repeatedly manipulated the cycle of diplomacy itself, agreeing to freeze or dismantle programs while continuing clandestine development, thereby advancing its program while sowing confusion among US analysts and policy makers. This interplay has shaped almost every major episode in the US-North Korea nuclear saga. While experts such as Siegfried Hecker have argued that North Korea was often a willing diplomatic partner and the United States squandered opportunities to negotiate, a seeming willingness to negotiate can also be part of a broader strategy of deception.
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Politics of illusion. The 1994 Agreed Framework is a telling example. The agreement with the United States was intended to freeze North Korea’s plutonium production at Yongbyon in exchange for heavy fuel oil and the promise of light-water reactors. For several years, the deal appeared to hold, and intelligence analysts cautiously reduced their estimates of plutonium production. But while inspectors had limited access, Pyongyang pursued a parallel uranium enrichment effort in secret. By the early 2000s, evidence of this hidden program surfaced, shattering American assumptions and exposing how US agencies had been lulled into complacency by a formal agreement that North Korea never fully honored. The framework collapsed, but not before Pyongyang had gained years of breathing space.
The Six-Party Talks in the 2000s followed a similar trajectory. These negotiations—involving China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the United States, and North Korea—were designed to create a multilateral path toward denuclearization. North Korea agreed in principle to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs” in exchange for aid and normalization of relations. For a moment, optimism surged. But Pyongyang simultaneously maneuvered to maintain covert capabilities, exploiting gaps in verification and capitalizing on disagreements among the negotiating parties. North Korea did dismantle Yongbyon’s cooling tower, which was a highly visible and symbolic measure, widely publicized to demonstrate commitment to denuclearization. However, this action did not eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, nor did it address concerns over uranium enrichment, a critical pathway to nuclear weapons that remained largely outside the scope of verification.
Even as US intelligence raised warnings, Pyongyang denied enrichment altogether, declaring, “We do not currently have, nor will we ever have, a highly enriched uranium program.” In reality, work on enrichment had begun by the late 1990s. When evidence of enriched uranium traces emerged in 2007, the discovery reignited debate but produced no consensus within the intelligence community. Some analysts pointed to active enrichment inside North Korea, while others attributed the traces to contaminated equipment imported from abroad. The inability to establish a coherent judgment limited US options and eroded diplomatic leverage during the later stages of the Six-Party Talks. By turning ambiguity into a weapon, North Korea delayed scrutiny and divided analysts, ultimately securing valuable time to advance its program.
Institutional inertia. Deception alone cannot explain repeated misjudgment. The other half of the equation lies within Washington itself. Institutional inertia is the resistance of established organizations to change, even when facing new challenges. The US intelligence community is vast, fragmented, and deeply rooted in practices that value continuity. Change tends to occur reactively—after scandal or failure—rather than proactively. Analysts are overburdened by the demands of immediate reporting, with reduced capacity for long-term strategic thinking. Bureaucratic rivalries between agencies encourage competition for influence, not experimentation in methodology.
This inertia shapes how new evidence is processed. Analysts struggle to reconcile emerging data with outdated frameworks. They lean on conservative estimates, preferring to be “wrong on the safe side,” underestimating adversaries rather than risking alarmist overstatement. But when dealing with a deceptive and fast-moving opponent like North Korea, this conservatism becomes self-defeating. It guarantees that estimates lag behind reality.
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The consequences of this dynamic are not limited to intelligence assessments. They ripple outward into US policy. When policy makers are working with assessments that understate North Korea’s capabilities, they make decisions that are misaligned with reality. When US intelligence agencies assured leaders in early 2017 that an operational intercontinental ballistic missile was still years away, the Trump administration initially assumed there was time for maximum pressure to work. Within months, North Korea shattered that assumption. The administration pivoted to high-stakes summitry with Kim Jong-un, but by then Pyongyang had already secured a new level of deterrent credibility.
Other scholars have traced US intelligence failures to politicization, cultural bias, and bureaucratic rivalry. All of these play roles. Policy makers sometimes pressure analysts to produce conclusions that fit preferred policies. Analysts sometimes project American cultural assumptions onto adversaries. Agencies sometimes dilute estimates to achieve consensus. But none of these explanations fully captures the recurring pattern in North Korea. It is the interaction between external deception and internal inertia that produces repeated misjudgments. Deception exploits inertia; inertia magnifies the effects of deception.
Rethinking US intelligence on North Korea. What, then, is to be done? Absolute accuracy in intelligence is unattainable, but incremental improvement is possible. The patterns seen in previous US-North Korean relations suggest several possible reforms. First, intelligence organizations must build for adaptability, not stability. They must prioritize agility, encourage analysts to test assumptions, reward dissenting perspectives, and treat ambiguity as a strategic variable. Rather than forcing ambiguous evidence into existing frameworks, agencies must recognize that adversaries actively manipulate ambiguity.
Also, analysts need more than satellite imagery and signals intercepts. They need linguistic, cultural, and psychological expertise to decode the narratives that adversaries craft. Deception is a cognitive process, not just a technical one. Countering it requires cognitive tools. Intelligence that is accurate but ignored is still a failure.
Finally, agencies must improve communication with policy makers, making uncertainty clear and resisting the urge to present false precision. The goal is not to eliminate ambiguity but to help decision makers understand it and prepare for multiple scenarios.
These lessons extend beyond the Korean Peninsula. Other adversaries such as Iran, Russia, and China also employ deception to mask their capabilities and intentions. Non-state actors with access to emerging technologies can do the same. In an era defined by ambiguity and surprise, intelligence failure is not a matter of poor tradecraft alone. It is the predictable result of adversaries that weaponize deception against bureaucracies predisposed to inertia. Recognizing this interaction is the first step toward breaking the cycle.
The failures of 2017 were not an aberration. North Korea will continue to advance its program, sometimes in secret, sometimes in plain sight. The United States will continue to watch, sometimes seeing clearly, often not. The challenge is to reform an intelligence system that is too reactive and too wedded to outdated frameworks. Deception succeeds not only because adversaries conceal, but also because institutions resist recalibrating to what little is revealed. If US intelligence is to keep pace with adversaries who thrive in the shadows, it must embrace humility and adaptability. Deception is inevitable but failure does not have to be.
thebulletin.org · Dawn Stover · October 27, 2025
2. North Korea says denuclearisation is unrealisable ‘pipe dream’ before China, South Korea summit
I am not sure how many times the regime has to tell us before we believe that KJU has no intention of ever negotiating away his nuclear weapons. What is it going to take for pundits, policy makers, and the press to believe KJU? That is why we need a new strategy that is not solely focused on denuclearization. We must solve the "Korea question" (i.e., the unnatural division of the peninsula).
Summary:
North Korea’s Vice-Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho declared that denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula is an unrealisable “pipe dream,” dismissing South Korea’s agenda for its summit with China’s President Xi Jinping. Through KCNA, Pyongyang reaffirmed its nuclear weapons state status and mocked Seoul’s “lack of common sense” in pursuing denuclearisation talks.
North Korea says denuclearisation is unrealisable ‘pipe dream’ before China, South Korea summit
straitstimes.com · November 1, 2025
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/north-korea-says-denuclearisation-is-unrealisable-pipe-dream-before-china-south-korea-summit
North Korea will show that denuclearisation is a ‘pipe dream’ which can never be realised,' its Vice-Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho said.
PHOTO: REUTERS
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Published Nov 01, 2025, 06:21 AM
Updated Nov 01, 2025, 07:23 AM
SEOUL - North Korea said on Nov 1 that denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula, which South Korea said would be discussed in a summit with China later that day, is an unrealisable “pipe dream”, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).
Chinese President Xi Jinping and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung are set to hold a summit meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum held in Gyeongju, South Korea.
Mr Lee’s office said on Oct 31 that Mr Xi and Mr Lee will discuss the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula.
“The ROK is still unaware that struggling to deny the DPRK’s position as a nuclear weapons state and talking about its daydream of realizing the denuclearization just reveal its lack of common sense,” the state news agency said, using the abbreviations for Republic of Korea, South Korea’s official name, and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, North Korea’s official name.
“We will show with patience that denuclearisation is a ‘pipe dream’ which can never be realised,” KCNA said, citing a statement by Vice-Foreign Minister Pak Myong Ho. REUTERS
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straitstimes.com · November 1, 2025
3. Lee Jae Myung crosses the Rubicon
Did POTROK agree to fully align Korea's security and economy with the U.S.? Actions speak louder than words but there are a number of actions that seem to point in this direction.
Summary:
At the U.S.-Korea summit, President Lee Jae Myung shocked observers by publicly requesting U.S. nuclear-submarine fuel, signaling a decisive strategic shift toward Washington. Rejecting past “balanced diplomacy,” Lee aligned South Korea’s security and economy with America, challenging Beijing ahead of his summit with Xi Jinping and ending Seoul’s era of strategic ambiguity.
Voices Oct. 31, 2025 / 11:15 AM
Lee Jae Myung crosses the Rubicon
By Nohsok Choi
upi.com
Oct. 31 (UPI) -- "President Trump, I ask you to make a bold decision so that South Korea can receive fuel for nuclear-powered submarines."
When President Lee Jae Myung suddenly uttered those words during the second U.S.-Korea summit in Gyeongju on Wednesday, many Koreans watching on live television gasped.
What startled them even more than the bold ask was his reasoning. Lee explained that "diesel-powered submarines have limited underwater endurance, restricting our ability to track North Korean and Chinese vessels," and that if South Korea deployed nuclear-powered submarines, "it would also substantially reduce the operational burden on U.S. forces."
It was, by any standard, a statement fraught with risk -- a security issue so sensitive that every word could be seized upon as a diplomatic provocation. Yet, Lee voiced it publicly before an audience that included not only his own citizens, but also the entire watching world.
Among those "citizens" were progressives critical of the United States, and within that "world" was China itself.
No hesitation
Even so, Lee showed no hesitation. His tone revealed a determined will to press Trump for what he called a "bold decision." It was a perilous remark -- one that seemed to disregard how his own supporters or his longtime partners in Beijing might interpret it.
Yet, he nonetheless requested, in full view of the public, that Washington supply nuclear-submarine fuel so that South Korea could track Chinese submarines for extended periods underwater.
Anyone can understand why the remark appeared dangerous once Lee's position is taken into account. Lee had invited President Xi Jinping of China to South Korea as a state guest for the Gyeongju APEC Summit -- the first Korea-China summit in 11 years.
And just two days before that meeting, he openly sided with Washington, now in strategic confrontation with Beijing, by calling for U.S. assistance on nuclear-powered submarines. What, one wonders, would Xi have thought if he had heard those words?
A calculated gamble
Still, Lee's statement was almost certainly not a spontaneous remark. It bore every sign of careful calculation. Otherwise, he could not have spoken with such conviction -- and on a domain of the alliance that no previous progressive leader had dared to touch.
From the start of his presidency, Lee has signaled that his foreign policy compass is anchored in realism. In his inaugural address, he vowed to strengthen the U.S.-Korea alliance, deepen trilateral cooperation with Japan and pursue relations with neighboring powers "from the standpoint of national interest and pragmatism."
Skeptics -- both in Seoul and Washington -- doubted his sincerity. But Lee has stayed the course, even flipping the long-held progressive formula of "security with America, economy with China" into a new doctrine: "security with America, economy with America."
During his August visit to Washington, Lee declared, "It's true that South Korea once relied on the U.S. for security and China for the economy, but that posture is no longer sustainable."
That statement came one day after Chinese Ambassador Dai Bing warned that Seoul must demonstrate "the wisdom and ability to maintain balanced diplomacy" between Washington and Beijing.
Lee's response -- firm and immediate -- left little doubt about where he stood. In an era of escalating U.S.-China rivalry, his position made one thing clear: Seoul's ambiguity was over.
The alliance redefined
Seen in that light, Lee's nuclear-submarine request was a logical extension of his declared vision -- a reaffirmation of alliance solidarity through tangible deterrence. By signaling a willingness to patrol not only North Korean but potentially Chinese waters with U.S. cooperation, Lee effectively fixed South Korea's coordinates alongside Washington, not Beijing.
He went further still. During the summit, Lee proposed building multiple nuclear-powered submarines armed with conventional weapons, with South Korea covering the entire cost.
The United States, he said, would not need to spend a penny. For Trump, who has promoted an Indo-Pacific containment strategy against China, such an offer was pure strategic gold. Some analysts even suggested that Lee's surprise proposal helped break an impasse in the subsequent U.S.-Korea tariff negotiations, which were resolved far more smoothly than expected.
The urgency of Lee's concern is not misplaced. The Yellow Sea (West Sea) has grown perilous since China's 2010 declaration of the area as its "internal waters."
Beijing has since deployed more than 70% of its maritime buoys near choke points to obstruct allied naval access. Since 2022, it has erected unapproved metal structures named Shenlan 1 and 2 inside the provisional maritime zone, blocking Korean coast-guard vessels from approaching.
In September, a Chinese warship even chased off a South Korean survey boat. In such volatile waters, threats lurk not only above but beneath the surface, making Lee's call for undersea endurance sound less like provocation and more like precaution.
Trump's response was swift. Within 24 hours, he posted on Truth Social, announcing that the United States had approved South Korea's construction of nuclear-powered submarines "to be built at the Philly Shipyard." Reuters noted that this was "technology previously shared only with Britain in the 1950s -- and not even with Australia."
The China question
Now all eyes turn to China. As Xi Jinping arrives in Seoul for a long-delayed state visit, friction seems inevitable. Beijing is expected to raise the nuclear-submarine issue, and possibly Lee's "security-and-economy-with-America" remarks, as provocations. Yet, it is hard to imagine that Lee made his request without a contingency plan in place.
South Korea, after all, recognizes China as a vital partner. Since normalizing ties in 1992, Seoul and Beijing have upgraded relations through successive frameworks -- from "friendly cooperation" to "strategic cooperative partnership."
Bilateral trade surpassed $300 billion in 2021, making China Korea's second-largest trading partner after the United States. Korean conglomerates and small and medium-sized enterprises are investing heavily in high-tech and new-energy sectors, underpinned by free-trade and investment-protection agreements.
Still, obstacles remain -- from Beijing's lingering "Hallyu ban" on Korean cultural content after the deployment of the THAAD anti-missile system in 2017 to deep-seated distrust over regional security.
Those tensions help explain why the two neighbors have not held a full summit in more than a decade. As Lee meets Xi in the coming days, Koreans hope he will negotiate confidently, guided by national interest and diplomatic principle.
No matter the outcome, one reality is now unmistakable: Lee Jae Myung has left the shores of strategic ambiguity. He has crossed the Rubicon.
Nohsok Choi is the former chief editor of the Kyunghyang Shinmun and former Paris correspondent. He currently serves as president of the Kyunghyang Shinmun Alumni Association, president of the Korean Media & Culture Forum and CEO of the YouTube channel One World TV.
upi.com
4. The Korean Crisis Began in 1945, Not 1950 – OpEd
Cumings has also written that the US started the Korean War. I do not accept his scholarship.
That said, was the division of the peninsula the original sin or did it save the South from Communist domination? If Colonels Rusk and Bonesteel did not get the Soviets to agree to take the surrender of Japanese forces north of the 38th parallel in 1945 would the Soviet Army have gone all the way to Pusan? And if so, would there ever have been a Republic of Korea and the Miracle on the Han?
And another counterfactual: What is the entire population in the north and South participating in elections in 1948? What if Kim Il Sung did not prevent the Koreans in the north from voting?
But I guess it is so much more interesting for some scholars to try to blame the US for the current situation.
Summary:
Historian Bruce Cumings argues Korea’s conflict began in 1945 with U.S.-Soviet division, not the 1950 war. Partition created rival regimes claiming sole legitimacy, embedding structural hostility. True reconciliation requires addressing sovereignty, economic disparity, and social separation, not just treaties, through step-by-step confidence-building, humanitarian cooperation, and regionally balanced, historically grounded diplomacy.
The Korean Crisis Began in 1945, Not 1950 – OpEd
eurasiareview.com · Simon Hutagalung · October 31, 2025
From Liberation to Partition: The Hidden Origins of Korea’s Cold War Divide
https://www.eurasiareview.com/31102025-the-korean-crisis-began-in-1945-not-1950-oped/?utm
The ongoing conflict on the Korean Peninsula receives incorrect representation from public figures, including President Donald Trump, who states the conflict started during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Trump has framed the peninsula’s challenges as direct consequences of the war.
Historian Dr Bruce Cumings explains that the war emerged from internal conflicts between different political and social groups during the late 1940s. Rather than a sudden outbreak in 1950 devoid of context, Cumings explains that the crisis originated from the externally imposed division of 1945, which followed Japan’s liberation and was quickly succeeded by the occupation and partition by the United States and the Soviet Union.
Historians like Cumings emphasise the importance of the period between 1945 and 1950. After Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to administer the peninsula provisionally, roughly along the thirty-eighth parallel. The military agreement started as a short-term solution, which established a permanent political separation between the two territories. By 1948, two rival governments had emerged: the Republic of Korea in the South and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the North. The two groups fought for control of the peninsula because they believed only one of them should rule, which resulted in a necessary conflict to prove their right to rule.
The conflict started in 1945, revealing its fundamental structural causes that become invisible when we only study the wartime period. The postwar period brought about two different administrative systems, which included economic programs and socialisation processes and security alliances with foreign nations. The two regimes solidified their mutual rejection of each other through their claims to represent the Korean people while labelling the opposing regime as illegitimate and controlled by foreign powers. The Korean War introduced extreme violence to existing disputes, which separated North and South Korea.
The historical context requires new policy development to fulfil its essential needs. The policymakers who start their analysis from 1950 will focus on creating a peace treaty as their main goal. The treaty establishment would represent a significant achievement, yet it would not resolve the eighty-year period of independent growth and developing identities, and disputed leadership control. The process of reconciliation needs to address problems which treaties fail to solve because it requires handling sovereignty disputes and economic differences and restoring social bonds that separation has damaged.
The post-1945 geopolitical environment created permanent obstacles which blocked nations from achieving a permanent peace. North Korea continues to operate its nuclear program because it serves as a survival tool to protect against ongoing security threats and outside dangers. The failure to grasp the basic essence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will result in unstable agreements because these agreements do not resolve the fundamental trust issues. The current situation becomes more complex because of the existing alliances between different parties. The United States treaty functions as South Korea’s primary security base, but China maintains its position as North Korea’s vital diplomatic and economic partner. The different age groups between South Koreans and North Koreans create obstacles because South Korean youth doubt the value of unification, while North Koreans have not experienced various civic values. The ongoing family separations across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) continue to cause human suffering, which makes reconciliation more difficult to achieve.
The wider international political situation limits the ability of Korea to make independent decisions. The increasing competition between China and the United States has turned the peninsula into a critical strategic area, which could potentially disregard Korean national interests. East Asian economic connections between nations create potential for mutual benefit, yet they make the region more susceptible to risks because military security issues are linked with its extensive trade networks. Korean policymakers need to take back control of diplomacy by focusing on domestic needs and actual situations instead of following foreign instructions.
What might a pragmatic path forward entail? The solution requires problem origin identification to create policies which solve existing structural problems instead of following legal procedures. The solution to the nuclear problem requires functional solutions because sustainable progress depends on three essential components, which include effective deterrence systems and crisis response tools, and step-by-step rewards that reduce survival danger feelings. The process of building confidence needs to continue through step-by-step measures, which include scheduled family reunions and specific humanitarian aid delivery and joint environmental and infrastructure work, and economic development projects that support local populations without creating immediate political control.
The implementation of these measures needs to happen through open tracking systems, and outside organisations should assist when needed, and laws must exist to defend susceptible groups throughout economic unification processes. The two Koreas need to establish cultural and educational programs because these initiatives will help reduce their information differences and create more personal connections between them. Regional diplomacy needs to operate with strategic and practical methods which will connect China and the United States and Japan and Russia to Korean goals while preventing them from using the peninsula for competitive aims. The first step for practical implementation requires economic pilot projects in areas that do not face political challenges and professional license recognition between countries and joint commissions to handle common environmental and humanitarian issues. The political process requires both Koreas to decrease security measures in everyday life so people can establish cross-border connections, which will transform their identities and perceptions.
These measures will not create immediate unification, and they should avoid making such promises. The solution will establish conditions for peaceful coexistence through fear reduction and crisis management systems, which promote mutual understanding between different groups. The current political and social situation allows for peaceful coexistence as a short-term goal because it maintains possibilities for future substantial agreements.
The Korean Peninsula conflict remains unsolved because of the choices and power struggles which started in 1945. The Korean War established an existing separation between the two regions, which already existed before the conflict began. The lack of crisis origin understanding will result in solution development that lacks strategic direction. The development of functional solutions depends on historical knowledge because it allows us to establish effective plans for nuclear security management and strategic regional actor involvement, and Korean requirements near the DMZ border. Solutions that concentrate on wartime alone will generate unstable and uncompassionate outcomes because they fail to understand the complete historical context.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own.
References
- Chang, K. (2025). A Fractured Liberation: Korea under U.S. Occupation. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Kim, D.-C. (2025). Maintaining national identity through division: What Korea may learn from its post-1945 separation. Warsaw Institute Research Series 04 (2025).
- Millett, A. R. (2025). The war for Korea, 1945-1950: A house burning. Ohio State University Press.
- Cumings, B. (2010). The Korean War: A History. New York: Modern Library
eurasiareview.com · Simon Hutagalung · October 31, 2025
5. Nvidia Uncertain if Return to China Is Closer After Trump-Xi Meeting
What will happen to Nvidia in China? I think all investors want to know but it is a national security issue as well.. But Nvidia is also focusing on its South Korea relationship.
Excerpts:
Since arriving in South Korea, Mr. Huang has been on a nonstop charm offensive. On Thursday, his night out in Seoul with two of the country’s most prominent businessmen, Samsung Electronics’ executive chairman, Lee Jae-yong, and Hyundai Motor Group’s executive chairman, Euisun Chung, was covered with paparazzi-like fanfare. Swarms of reporters filmed them at a restaurant eating fried chicken and drinking beer.
At his much anticipated speech at the summit on Friday, Mr. Huang ditched his trademark black leather jacket for a navy blue suit. Then, Nvidia announced that South Korea and a handful of its biggest companies, including Samsung and Hyundai Motor, had agreed to purchase more than 250,000 specialized computing chips to advance the country’s efforts in developing A.I. technology.
The Nvidia chips will be used for next-generation data centers as well as to propel South Korea’s efforts to build so-called sovereign A.I., a nationalized effort to make the breakthrough technology available to local businesses and institutions that cannot afford to build their own infrastructure.
Later at a news conference, he handed out snacks to journalists and signed the white dress shirt of a reporter with a black marker. Even as his security detail tried to usher him out of the venue, swarms of reporters begged Mr. Huang for selfies.
Summary:
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang said he remains unsure whether the Trump-Xi summit brought the company closer to resuming chip sales in China. Despite Trump hinting at semiconductor talks, no policy change emerged. Nvidia’s China business has fallen to zero after U.S. export bans and Beijing’s push for domestic alternatives, leaving Huang urging renewed access to preserve America’s AI leadership. He argued that Nvidia’s technology benefits both countries and should set global standards. While promoting AI partnerships in South Korea, Huang warned that excluding U.S. firms from China’s vast market risks ceding technological dominance in the next great industrial revolution.
Nvidia Uncertain if Return to China Is Closer After Trump-Xi Meeting
NY Times · Daisuke Wakabayashi · October 31, 2025
Amid skyrocketing demand for artificial intelligence systems, the chip-making giant has been thrust into the economic feud between Beijing and Washington.
By Daisuke Wakabayashi
Reporting from Gyeongju, South Korea
Oct. 31, 2025
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/31/business/jensen-huang-nvidia-china.html
Jensen Huang, chief executive of Nvidia, speaks during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju, South Korea, on Friday.Credit...Kim Soo-Hyeon/Reuters
By
Reporting from Gyeongju, South Korea
Oct. 31, 2025Updated 1:59 p.m. ET
Jensen Huang, the head of Nvidia, said again on Friday that he was eager for the Silicon Valley chip-making giant to resume selling advanced semiconductors in China, but expressed uncertainty about whether this week’s meeting between President Trump and China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, brought the company any closer to achieving that goal.
Mr. Huang arrived in South Korea shortly after the face-to-face summit of the two leaders in the country on Thursday. Mr. Trump told reporters that the leaders had discussed semiconductors without addressing Nvidia’s most advanced A.I. technology. He added that Chinese officials would talk to Nvidia about “taking chips,” with the United States playing “referee.”
The remarks created confusion because Mr. Trump had suggested before the meeting that he would discuss Nvidia’s most powerful A.I. semiconductors with Mr. Xi, fueling speculation that the United States might ease restrictions limiting access to the technology.
“I don’t have any new insight from the meeting,” Mr. Huang said at a news conference on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on Friday. “I hope that we will have new policies that allow Nvidia to go back into China, for China to welcome Nvidia back.”
Amid skyrocketing demand for technology infrastructure to power artificial intelligence systems, access to Nvidia’s chips has become a national security issue. Nvidia has been thrust into the middle of the economic feud between China and the United States.
Before Mr. Trump came into office, the U.S. government had already imposed rules to limit the sales of Nvidia’s most powerful chips in China. The Trump administration initially banned exports of Nvidia’s H20 chip, a downgraded version of the company’s Hopper chips, which were made particularly for China. It reversed that decision in July, when Mr. Trump said that the H20 chip could be sold and that the federal government would take a 15 percent cut of that revenue.
But before Nvidia could move forward, China closed off the company’s access to its market. In July, China’s internet regulator summoned Nvidia to explain security risks associated with one of its chips. Beijing also discouraged Chinese companies from using the H20 chip, pushing them to try domestic alternatives.
Mr. Huang said Nvidia’s business in China was now at “zero,” after once holding near total market share.
He repeated some of his familiar arguments for why Nvidia should be allowed to sell chips in China. Some of America’s national security concerns are overblown because the Chinese military does not need Nvidia’s chips to develop A.I. technology, he said. And the United States risks conceding leadership in one of the most significant technological breakthroughs known to humanity by closing itself off from the vast Chinese market.
“It’s critically important for America to be back in the China market,” Mr. Huang said. “As an American company, we would like to see American A.I. technology be the global standard.”
He argued that Nvidia would be “very beneficial” for China, as its technology is superior to that of Chinese competitors. He was careful to avoid disparaging the Chinese technology giant Huawei, which has developed its own A.I. semiconductor technology, but emphasized Nvidia’s superiority.
“We are miles ahead, but it is foolish to underestimate the might of China,” he said.
Since arriving in South Korea, Mr. Huang has been on a nonstop charm offensive. On Thursday, his night out in Seoul with two of the country’s most prominent businessmen, Samsung Electronics’ executive chairman, Lee Jae-yong, and Hyundai Motor Group’s executive chairman, Euisun Chung, was covered with paparazzi-like fanfare. Swarms of reporters filmed them at a restaurant eating fried chicken and drinking beer.
At his much anticipated speech at the summit on Friday, Mr. Huang ditched his trademark black leather jacket for a navy blue suit. Then, Nvidia announced that South Korea and a handful of its biggest companies, including Samsung and Hyundai Motor, had agreed to purchase more than 250,000 specialized computing chips to advance the country’s efforts in developing A.I. technology.
The Nvidia chips will be used for next-generation data centers as well as to propel South Korea’s efforts to build so-called sovereign A.I., a nationalized effort to make the breakthrough technology available to local businesses and institutions that cannot afford to build their own infrastructure.
Later at a news conference, he handed out snacks to journalists and signed the white dress shirt of a reporter with a black marker. Even as his security detail tried to usher him out of the venue, swarms of reporters begged Mr. Huang for selfies.
Daisuke Wakabayashi is an Asia business correspondent for The Times based in Seoul, covering economic, corporate and geopolitical stories from the region.
A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 1, 2025, Section B, Page 5 of the New York edition with the headline: Nvidia’s Future in China Uncertain After Summit
See more on: Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
NY Times · Daisuke Wakabayashi · October 31, 2025
6. Why the U.S. is losing the battle for hearts and minds
Minds and will not hearts and minds.
I suppose where you stand depends on where you sit. Mr. Berman does not mention our beloved Korean Service and what north Korea is doing in terms of internal propaganda and how Voice of America made significant contributions to counter regime propaganda.
But I suppose we now have to take the "I" out of DIME since we no longer are employing the information instrument of national power.
Excerpts:
In other words, even before the Trump administration’s decision to gut the country’s informational capabilities, America’s adversaries were outspending it.
And the situation is significantly worse at present: China, Russia and Iran are ramping up informational activities in places where the United States is now noticeably absent, like Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Over the past six months, Russia’s RT has expanded Spanish-language broadcasting to encompass Chile, while its Sputnik multimedia outlet launched Portuguese-language radio broadcasting in Rio de Janeiro. RT has also boosted collaboration with the African Union of Broadcasting, creating a “strategic partnership” that will allow Moscow to message more forcefully throughout the continent. China, meanwhile, has inked multiple memorandums of understanding to share its informational content (and ideological worldview) with media organizations in Turkey, Belarus and assorted other countries. As for Iran, it recently concluded a series of cooperation deals with Russian media outlets like Ruptly and Mir TV, paving the way for Russian propaganda to better access the Iranian populace — and vice versa.
The Trump administration is not even acknowledging this trend, far less ramping up a strategy to counter it. Nine months in, the White House remains focused simply on dismantling USAGM and its functions. There is little evidence that any administration official has thought deeply about how to best promote core U.S. information priorities: honestly telling America’s story and explaining its priorities and policies while effectively countering the distortions and falsehoods being spread by others.
Summary:
Ilan Berman warns that as China, Russia, and Iran vastly expand global propaganda operations, the U.S. is retreating from the information battlefield. The Trump administration’s plan to dismantle the U.S. Agency for Global Media—overseeing Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and others—abandons critical tools of strategic communication. Adversaries are spending billions to shape narratives in Africa, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific, while U.S. influence wanes. Russia’s RT and China’s state media are rapidly expanding partnerships and language services. Berman argues that without a revitalized information strategy, America risks ceding the global contest for hearts and minds to authoritarian rivals.
Opinion | Why the U.S. is losing the battle for hearts and minds
As rivals flood the world with propaganda, Washington is dismantling its best tools to respond.
Washington Post · Ilan Berman
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/10/30/us-voa-disinformation-tools-usagm/
Ilan Berman is senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council. He sits on the boards of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.
If the Gaza war taught us anything, it is that information truly is power. The ability to shape perceptions, to win “hearts and minds,” and to define the terms of national (and international) debate is as important as battlefield success. That’s why the militants of Hamas, while losing on the battlefield against Israel’s superior military capabilities, managed so adroitly to capture and manipulate the public discourse surrounding the conflict.
It’s therefore deeply surprising that the United States has chosen to quit this field of battle. Since this spring, the Trump administration has taken a hatchet to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), the federal entity responsible for overseeing American international broadcasting. The administration’s plans call for the agency to be shuttered outright and for its constituent parts — from federal services like Voice of America to “grantees” like Radio Free Asia — to be either eliminated or eventually repackaged in minimalist form.
Many of the administration’s criticisms of USAGM are apt. The agency has suffered for years from an array of serious problems. But the decision to destroy rather than reform it is having real-world consequences abroad, where U.S. adversaries are expanding their informational reach.
The numbers tell the story. China, for instance, is spending billions of dollars annually on propaganda, false narratives and fake news. Back in 2021, Rand researchers estimated that figure to be “at least $10 billion a year.” And this might be just the tip of the iceberg. National security officials familiar with the information warfare portfolio have suggested that the Rand number is very much a lowball and the true amount China is spending in this domain could be three times that. This surge can be seen in Africa, where Beijing is busy buying up local media channels to better control the narrative about the Chinese Communist Party, and in ramped-up disinformation targeting political and social cohesion in Taiwan and throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Second is Russia. From 2024 to 2025, the Kremlin’s spending on propaganda rose by 13 percent, to approximately $1.4 billion. Russia made this change in the middle of a protracted and costly conflict with Ukraine, one that has progressively driven the nation toward recession. That figure, however, accounts only for Russia’s “white budget” — that is, the Kremlin’s official declared expenditures. European officials assess Russia is spending considerably more, perhaps as much as an additional $1 billion annually, by drawing on black budgets and hidden coffers. Moscow has used this money to undermine European societies, to promote itself as a reliable partner in the Middle East and Africa, and to expand its appeal in the Americas.
Then there is Iran. The Islamic Republic’s spending on informational activities is more modest, because its economy is significantly smaller than that of either Russia or China. Nevertheless, its expenditures are significant, recently estimated at $400 million, an increase of more than 30 percent over last year. All this while the country’s currency has cratered and drought conditions have become so severe that officials have suggested they might have no choice but to move the capital from Tehran to another part of the country.
In other words, even before the Trump administration’s decision to gut the country’s informational capabilities, America’s adversaries were outspending it.
And the situation is significantly worse at present: China, Russia and Iran are ramping up informational activities in places where the United States is now noticeably absent, like Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Over the past six months, Russia’s RT has expanded Spanish-language broadcasting to encompass Chile, while its Sputnik multimedia outlet launched Portuguese-language radio broadcasting in Rio de Janeiro. RT has also boosted collaboration with the African Union of Broadcasting, creating a “strategic partnership” that will allow Moscow to message more forcefully throughout the continent. China, meanwhile, has inked multiple memorandums of understanding to share its informational content (and ideological worldview) with media organizations in Turkey, Belarus and assorted other countries. As for Iran, it recently concluded a series of cooperation deals with Russian media outlets like Ruptly and Mir TV, paving the way for Russian propaganda to better access the Iranian populace — and vice versa.
The Trump administration is not even acknowledging this trend, far less ramping up a strategy to counter it. Nine months in, the White House remains focused simply on dismantling USAGM and its functions. There is little evidence that any administration official has thought deeply about how to best promote core U.S. information priorities: honestly telling America’s story and explaining its priorities and policies while effectively countering the distortions and falsehoods being spread by others.
If the Trump administration wants to remain competitive on the world stage, it will need to start thinking. And if Chinese, Russian and Iranian efforts are any indication, it will need to do so soon.
Washington Post · Ilan Berman
7. Lee, China's Xi agree on efforts for peace on Korean Peninsula
They appeared to have covered a lot of ground. Note they both agree the US should take the lead in nuclear negotiations with north Korea.
Excerpts:
During the talks, Lee outlined his government's initiatives for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and asked for Xi's constructive efforts to help resume dialogue with North Korea. Xi, in turn, said China would continue its efforts to promote peace and stability on the peninsula, Wi told reporters.
"The two leaders shared the view that the U.S. is the most important country to resume talks with North Korea," Wi said.
The discussions also covered sensitive issues, including China's recent sanctions on U.S. subsidiaries of Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean, which Beijing accused of cooperating with a U.S. investigation into China's maritime and shipbuilding industries.
"There were productive discussions regarding Hanwha Ocean, which is linked to the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S. and China," he said. "I sensed that if tensions between Washington and Beijing ease, Hanwha Ocean could also see productive progress in that atmosphere."
Summary:
At their Gyeongju summit, Presidents Lee Jae Myung and Xi Jinping agreed to cooperate for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and strengthen strategic communication. They signed seven MOUs, including a renewed $48.9 billion currency swap and trade cooperation. Both emphasized pragmatic diplomacy, regional peace, and restoring Seoul-Beijing relations.
(4th LD) [APEC 2025] Lee, China's Xi agree on efforts for peace on Korean Peninsula | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 1, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251101004954315?section=national/diplomacy
(ATTN: UPDATES with briefing by S. Korea's security adviser; CHANGES headline; TRIMS)
By Kim Eun-jung
GYEONGJU, South Korea, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed Saturday to make efforts to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said, as Seoul hopes Beijing will play a role to resume talks with Pyongyang.
Lee also asked Xi to play a "constructive" role for South Korea to seek peace and co-prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, Wi told reporters, after Lee welcomed Xi's first visit to South Korea in 11 years to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held in the southeastern city of Gyeongju.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping ahead of their summit at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Nov. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
During the summit, Lee noted that high-level exchanges between North Korea and China have recently become more active, calling it a positive development that creates conditions for renewed engagement with Pyongyang.
"I hope that the Republic of Korea and China will strengthen their strategic communication, make use of these conditions and work toward resuming dialogue with North Korea," he said in his opening remarks, referring to South Korea's official name. "It can never be overstated how important regional security is."
On economic ties, Lee said bilateral economic cooperation has shifted from a "vertical structure" to a "horizontal one," emphasizing the need to build a "mutually beneficial" relationship.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) holds a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping (L) at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Nov. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
Xi said China values its relations with South Korea and will maintain policy consistency and stability, expressing Beijing's willingness to deepen communication with Seoul.
"(China) is willing to deepen communication with South Korea and jointly address challenges, while promoting the stable and long-term development of the bilateral strategic relationship and contributing greater energy to peace and development in the region," Xi said through a translator.
Xi described South Korea and China as "close neighbors who cannot move apart and inseparable partners in cooperation," saying the two countries have achieved co-prosperity through sustained exchanges and collaboration.
"Promoting the healthy and stable development of China-South Korea relations has always been in the interests of both peoples and is a choice in line with the spirit of the times," he said.
President Lee Jae Myung (R) and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend a state dinner at a hotel in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Nov. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
Following the summit, Lee said he and Xi agreed to work together in pursuit of peace, noting that the two countries share a common goal of promoting stability and prosperity.
"I and President Xi have agreed to move forward unwaveringly together on the path toward peace," Lee said during a state dinner with Xi. "As our government works to open a new era of peaceful coexistence and shared growth, I expect that China will also play a constructive role in this process."
On the sidelines of the talks, the governments of the two nations signed seven memorandums of understanding (MOUs) to broaden cooperation in practical areas.
The central banks of the two countries signed an agreement to renew their currency swap deal worth 70 trillion won (US$48.9 billion) for another five years.
The two sides also signed an MOU on strengthening exchanges and services and trade to make progress in negotiations to upgrade their free trade agreement.
Another agreement paved the way for cooperation between the two nations' law enforcement agencies to collaborate on responses to voice phishing and online scam crimes.
President Lee Jae Myung (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (R) walk on the red carpet during an official welcoming ceremony for Xi at the Gyeongju National Museum in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Nov. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
Wi evaluated that the summit marked the "full restoration" of Seoul-Beijing ties achieved through the Lee administration's "pragmatic" diplomacy centered on national interests.
During the talks, Lee outlined his government's initiatives for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and asked for Xi's constructive efforts to help resume dialogue with North Korea. Xi, in turn, said China would continue its efforts to promote peace and stability on the peninsula, Wi told reporters.
"The two leaders shared the view that the U.S. is the most important country to resume talks with North Korea," Wi said.
The discussions also covered sensitive issues, including China's recent sanctions on U.S. subsidiaries of Korean shipbuilder Hanwha Ocean, which Beijing accused of cooperating with a U.S. investigation into China's maritime and shipbuilding industries.
"There were productive discussions regarding Hanwha Ocean, which is linked to the ongoing trade dispute between the U.S. and China," he said. "I sensed that if tensions between Washington and Beijing ease, Hanwha Ocean could also see productive progress in that atmosphere."
Other points of contention, such as China's installation of steel structures in overlapping areas of the Yellow Sea and Beijing's restrictions on Korean cultural imports, were also discussed, Wi said, without elaborating on the details.
"Both sides shared the understanding that the issues needed to be resolved through continued communication," he said.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 1, 2025
8. Ending the Korean War: Interview With Former Deputy Commander of Pacific Command
Of course I fully support peace on the Korean peninsula. But we must pursue peace in a way that does not lead to conflict, which secures South Korea, and which protects US interests in the region.
I have a very different view than Lt Gen Leaf. A unilateral purist of an end of war declaration plays right into KJU's political warfare strategy to split the alliance and drive US forces from the peninsula. The only path to peace is solving the "Korea question" as noted in paragraph 60 of the Armistice and reaffirmed in Geneva a later and the resultant UNSCR 811.
But we should keep in mind a few things:
1. The key question is will an end of war declaration contribute to peace?
- If there is no change to the conventional and nuclear and missiles forces in the north, how can we have peace?
- How will the security of the ROK be maintained by an end of war declaration?
- Paper and rhetoric do not trump steel
- The amount of north Korean steel north of the DMZ is an existential threat to the South
- The only acceptable “end state” is a free and unified Korea
2. The Korea, War and the UN
- The north illegally attacked the South in 1950
- These are belligerents in the Korean Civil War - with emphasis on the conflict being a civil war between north and South
- UN Security Council resolutions of 1950 (82-85) shows that the UN clearly identified the North as the hostile aggressor who attacked South Korea
- The UN called on member nations to come to the defense of freedom in South Korea.
- It established the UN Command and designated the United States as executive agent or the UN Command which included providing the commander
- Hostilities were suspended in 1953 with an Armistice signed by the military leaders of the UN Command, the north Korean Peoples’ Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers
3. Koreans Must Solve the "Korea question"
- 1953 Armistice Agreement – Para 60
- The unnatural division of the peninsula
- The military commanders understood that there was no military solution to the “Korea question.”
- There are only two options:
- A peace treaty between north and South
- Korea unification
- KJU likely will not accept either - though it may accept a peace treaty if it results in an end of the ROK/US alliance, and the removal of US troops and the nuclear umbrella. or extended deterrence. And that will surely result in conflict initiated by the Kim family regime. We need to be careful what we ask for.
Summary:
Retired Lt. Gen. Dan “Fig” Leaf argues the U.S. should lead a unilateral initiative to formally end the Korean War before pursuing multilateral peace talks. He urges shifting from deterrence to peacemaking, deferring denuclearization, engaging China constructively, and preparing detailed negotiations to prevent instability and create conditions for lasting peace.
Ending the Korean War: Interview With Former Deputy Commander of Pacific Command - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
38north.org · 38 North · October 30, 2025
https://www.38north.org/2025/10/ending-the-korean-war-interview-with-former-deputy-commander-of-pacific-command/
Trump and Kim signing joint statement at Singapore summit in 2018.
Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue remains as elusive as ever, despite more than three decades of diplomatic efforts by key stakeholders to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula and pursue the normalization of US-North Korea relations through denuclearization. The first and second US-DPRK summits in Singapore (2018) and Hanoi (2019) appeared to offer a potential breakthrough, yet ultimately failed to yield progress. Since the collapse of the Hanoi summit, North Korea has significantly advanced its weapons of mass destruction programs. Meanwhile, the shifting geopolitical landscape has gifted Kim Jong Un with a new heyday in North Korea’s relations with Russia. In sum, North Korea has been empowered, reinforcing the prevailing view that the Korean Peninsula’s security situation may be now at its most precarious since the Korean War.
President Trump has not given up on engagement and has expressed a willingness to meet with the North Korean leader during his current trip to Asia. Given Kim’s refusal to discuss denuclearization, the US will need to find other avenues of approach to the DPRK leader.
Against this backdrop, 38 North spoke with General (Ret.) Dan “Fig” Leaf to gain his perspective on the current situation on and around the Korean Peninsula, his proposal to formally end the Korean War, and the opportunities and challenges that such an initiative entails. General Leaf is former deputy commander and acting commander of US Pacific Command and former director of the Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).
38 North: You have been a strong advocate of a US “peacemaker” role on the Korean Peninsula and ending the Korean War. Could you elaborate on your thinking behind this proposal?
Dan Leaf: There are three premises to my concept. First, decades of well-intentioned US policy have failed to deter North Korean provocations, prevent nuclear development, and improve human rights in the DPRK. It is time to try something different.
Secondly, the risk of potential nuclear conflict with the DPRK is real, and that should make finding a new, more effective approach to this US national security problem an urgent priority.
Lastly, the nation that leads the United Nations Command (UNC) and that signed the Armistice Agreement in that capacity must take a leading role in establishing a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. Given the difficulties of reconciling competing interests at the outset illustrated by failure of the Six Party Talks, the new effort should begin with a unilateral US effort that takes a principled approach to preparation for any opportunity to replace the Armistice with a peace treaty.
There is real work to be done prior to embarking on formal treaty negotiations. In a discovery phase, the US government should seriously study past failures and successes in peacemaking. There are no perfect parallels to the 73-year standoff since the Armistice was signed, but we can learn from US-Vietnam reconciliation and our participation in Northern Ireland conflict resolution. Negotiators must be prepared to address Korean War Armistice compliance and violations by both sides. Understanding situations where the agreement has succeeded or failed will inform effective negotiation and guide development of a sustainable treaty.
US negotiators must enter the room with vetted national positions on key issues likely to arise in the peace process such as which nations deserve a seat at the table and with what role. They need to have a plan for the process and substance normalized post-Armistice land and sea boundaries. The transition of Armistice-related organizations like the United Nations Command and Military Armistice Commission and their responsibilities will be complicated and must be accomplished in a way that does not create a security vacuum. Without a plan for a formal Truth and Reconciliation process, peace will not be possible—nor will it if the United States is unprepared to guide and participate in that endeavor. These preliminary stances cannot be set in stone; they will necessarily evolve through negotiations with both Koreas.
38 North: What would a process for ending the Korean War look like? What role would the United States, South Korea, and each China play?
DL: The first and most necessary step is for the United States to reimagine its role regarding the Koreas. For decades, the preeminent focus has been war prevention. No doubt we must continue to deter North Korean aggression with our South Korean allies. At the same time, while maintaining peace through strength, we should also make peacemaking our primary objective.
Prioritizing peace is consistent with the Trump administration’s policies. Secretary of War Hegseth has emphasized warfighting readiness, citing a decline in focus within the military. I agree—readiness is the foundation of credible deterrence. President Trump has touted his considerable peacemaking successes, some of which would not have been possible without compelling combat capability. In Africa, Europe, Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia, US street cred was built on the big stick of American military might.
The initial US only initiative will naturally transition to a multilateral solution. Our interagency preparation should not be intended to supplant the ROK role, rather to enable success. Once adequately prepared for substantive negotiation of a peace treaty to finally, formally end the war, South and North Korea must be drawn into the discussion, and the United States role may or may not shift from principal to interlocutor.
China will understandably insist on participation. Beyond Chinese participation in the Korean War, they have valid strategic considerations in the future of the Peninsula. Those are complex—from reducing nuclear risk, to trade with South Korea, to a desire to counter US influence. In some cases, their goals will be contrary to ours, but they still must be dealt with directly.
38 North: You have written extensively about the need for a lasting peace, and have spoken publicly about it many times. You have shared with 38 North that you also pursue behind-the-scenes engagement with US officials and other interested parties. For example, you recently returned from a trip to China. I understand you met with some of the scholars there who study North Korea. Based on your latest exchange with them and your own reading of open-source reporting, what is your assessment of North Korean stability and the security situation on and around the Korean Peninsula?
DL: My travel to China leverages relationships built on active military duty and as the Director at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI APCSS). It is important to note that I visit at their invitation, and as a private citizen, not as a US official or employee of the government. That allows me to speak freely on a variety of issues of concern to both countries, and I think my hosts appreciate that. I work to stay informed on American policy and perspectives. I support United State policies, and the discussions are frank but collegial.
On Korea matters, I try to emphasize areas where US and Chinese interests can be served by the pursuit of a permanent peace. Writ large both countries will be well-served by the kind of paradigm shift a formal end to the Korean War would bring. The devilish details must be addressed, but for US attempts at progress to succeed, China must at least not impede our initiatives and better still, could play a constructive role.
I will not attempt to speak for the Chinese, but I did gain valuable perspectives in my most recent trip by sitting down with policy influencers and academics, some who have recently traveled to the DPRK. This is what I concluded from the discussions:
-
There is significant development activity in North Korea as part of Kim Jong Un’s 20×10 project.
- That development is likely enabled by Russia’s compensation for North Korean armaments and troops to assist the war against Ukraine.
-
Positive relations with Russia and North Korea are important to PRC.
- That said, I sense that Beijing is uneasy about the expanded Russia-North Korea ties and sees them as a potentially destabilizing factor in the Northeast Asia security environment.
- Therefore, China may be inclined to tolerate and perhaps assist US efforts and engagement with Kim Jong Un.
38 North: Let’s talk about the role of the UN. What more could and should the UN be doing to try to settle the war? Who at the UN should be leading this initiative? From a UN perspective, where does the nuclear issue fit into war settlement efforts?
DL: The United Nations and its member states will have a role, but at the outset, I expect it to be ancillary. The Security Council has imposed numerous sanctions on the DPRK that will be key considerations on the path to a treaty. However, the competing interests and priorities of the antagonists and other interested parties, particularly Russia, make it unlikely that the UN can play a central role in negotiations.
38 North: As you know, Kim Jong Un announced a two Koreas policy at the end of 2023, defining South Korea as a permanent hostile state and altogether ruling out peaceful unification. Kim also indicated that North Korea would be defining its “territory” in the constitution. How might North Korea’s changed policy on South Korea and unification, and possibly its future territorial claims, affect any effort to end the Korean War?
DL: Two issues have served the primary barriers to peace. The first, denuclearization, must remain a US imperative, but needs to be deferred in favor of establishing an environment where it will eventually be achievable. The second Gordian knot is reunification of the two Koreas.
Kim’s declaration that unification is not possible provides an opening. It will be far easier to transition from his designation of North and South as distinct enemy states to separate friendly states. Korean reunification may or may not be an eventual outcome of a permanent peace, but proceeding from a state of war to peaceful reunification has proven to be the ultimate bridge too far.
Even though South Koreans’ support of reunification is lower than ever according to a recent government poll, this is still an emotionally charged issue for a vocal minority in those who advocate and lobby regarding US policy on North Korea. A conservative cabal argues that a free and unified Korea is the only acceptable end state. “Free” in this context presumes the demise of North Korea, and it is difficult to imagine this would be a winning talking point with Kim Jong Un.
Reunification advocates see return to a single Korea as an imperative, necessary to right the historical wrong of division by external powers. The Soviet Union and the United States agreed to partition the Peninsula into two occupations zones, adding lasting injury to the insult of 35 years of brutal occupation by Imperial Japan. Morally sound as that rationale is, a practical path from the precarious situation today to a utopian end state does not exist.
38 North: Now, let us turn to the challenges and limitations of your proposal. A number of scholars and practitioners have warned against replacing the Korean Armistice with a peace agreement, fearing that a premature settlement could destabilize the region further. What is your response to this perspective? What do you see as the key challenges and limitations of your proposal?
DL: Opponents of a peace agreement generally emphasize possible second-order consequences. They worry that a treaty will lead to a precipitous withdrawal, abandonment of denuclearization, and possible North Korean attack on South Korea. None of these need to be foregone conclusions, and US preparation for peace must address risk-mitigation. The American government should also study the failures of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Agreed Framework, Six Party Talks, and policy of Strategic Patience. The tragic aftermath of the Paris Peace Accords merit special consideration. By learning and applying these lessons, the US can significantly decrease the potential for post-Treaty disaster.
I worry more about the consequences of a failure to make peace—the potential for an intentional or accidental nuclear exchange, and the perpetuation of our ineffectiveness at addressing human rights within the North. Is there risk to negotiating the end of the Korean War? Of course. But the risk of sustaining the dangerous status quo is much greater.
There will be nothing easy about the US-only preparation for crafting a peace treaty to the actual arbitration of an agreement. Nor is success guaranteed. But inaction—failure to do this hard work—will doom the Koreas and the rest of the world to an unacceptably dangerous future.
Lt. Gen. Dan “Fig” Leaf is a retired three-star Air Force general and combat fighter pilot who last served on active duty as Deputy Commander of the US Pacific Command. He later returned to public service as the Director of the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies under the Department of Defense. Leaf is the Managing Director of Phase Minus 1, a conflict resolution and security consulting company.
38north.org · 38 North · October 30, 2025
9. Defense chiefs of S. Korea, U.S. meet at ASEAN defense forum ahead of key bilateral meeting
Chance contact only? I think this will be an interesting Security Consultative meeting next week.
Excerpts:
The defense chiefs are set to meet in Seoul on Tuesday for the 57th SCM to discuss a range of alliance issues, such as their policy coordination on North Korea and combined defense posture.
This year's meeting comes as the decadeslong South Korea-U.S. alliance faces a changing security environment amid speculation over a possible readjustment in the role and scope of the U.S. Forces Korea in the face of an increasingly assertive China.
It also comes as South Korea has vowed to regain wartime operational command from Washington within President Lee's five-year term.
Summary:
South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth met at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur ahead of next week’s Seoul Security Consultative Meeting. They reaffirmed alliance cooperation on North Korea, defense posture, and wartime operational control amid shifting regional dynamics and China’s assertiveness.
Defense chiefs of S. Korea, U.S. meet at ASEAN defense forum ahead of key bilateral meeting | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 1, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251101004800315?section=national/defense
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- The defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States met at an annual ministerial meeting led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on Saturday, just days ahead of their planned defense talks in Seoul next week, the defense ministry said.
The brief encounter between Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth took place on the occasion of the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, according to the ministry.
In the meeting, which marked their first in-person encounter, Hegseth congratulated Ahn on the successful hosting of the South Korea-U.S. summit talks held on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit. The Pentagon chief also said he looks forward to their annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) next week.
Ahn thanked Hegseth and called for close cooperation between the two sides to further develop the successful discussions held at summit talks between President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump.
The defense chiefs are set to meet in Seoul on Tuesday for the 57th SCM to discuss a range of alliance issues, such as their policy coordination on North Korea and combined defense posture.
This year's meeting comes as the decadeslong South Korea-U.S. alliance faces a changing security environment amid speculation over a possible readjustment in the role and scope of the U.S. Forces Korea in the face of an increasingly assertive China.
It also comes as South Korea has vowed to regain wartime operational command from Washington within President Lee's five-year term.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (L) and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shake hands during the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur on Nov. 1, 2025, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 1, 2025
10. Lee says 'no longer worried' about S. Korea-Japan ties after summit with Takaichi
Quite a statement from POTROK. The question remains: can both POTROK and the PM overcome the domestic politics and put mutual nationals security and national prosperity ahead of the historical issues? That is real leadership.
Excerpts:
"I had a very good feeling (about the meeting)," Lee said, when asked by a Japanese media reporter about his talks with Takaichi. "I am no longer worried."
Lee added that he believes South Korea and Japan can develop a mutually beneficial relationship by "squarely facing pending issues" and working "hand-in-hand" toward the future.
Summary:
After his first summit with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, President Lee Jae Myung said he is “no longer worried” about South Korea-Japan relations. He praised Takaichi as an “outstanding politician” and emphasized building mutually beneficial ties by confronting historical issues and continuing “shuttle diplomacy” to sustain bilateral cooperation.
[APEC 2025] Lee says 'no longer worried' about S. Korea-Japan ties after summit with Takaichi | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · November 1, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251101003900315?section=national/diplomacy
By Yi Wonju
GYEONGJU, South Korea, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung voiced optimism about South Korea's relations with Japan on Saturday after his first summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, saying the two countries can advance into mutually beneficial ties by "squarely facing" their pending issues.
Lee made the remarks during a press conference after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in the southeastern city of Gyeongju came to an end, noting that the two leaders agreed on the need to deepen bilateral cooperation during their meeting on Thursday.
"I had a very good feeling (about the meeting)," Lee said, when asked by a Japanese media reporter about his talks with Takaichi. "I am no longer worried."
Lee added that he believes South Korea and Japan can develop a mutually beneficial relationship by "squarely facing pending issues" and working "hand-in-hand" toward the future.
Takaichi's election last month raised concerns that South Korea-Japan ties, which had improved significantly under her two predecessors, could deteriorate as she is widely known for her hawkish stance on historical issues stemming from Japan's 1910-45 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.
On such concerns, Lee said Takaichi's actions "will be and should be" different as the prime minster than when she was a politician.
"After meeting her in person and taking considerable time speaking with her, I found her to be a truly outstanding politician who shares the same views," Lee said.
Lee said he suggested holding their next talks in Takaichi's hometown of Nara, to which the Japanese prime minister responded positively.
At Thursday's meeting, both leaders agreed to continue reciprocal visits, known as "shuttle diplomacy," to maintain momentum in bilateral coordination.
South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi ahead of their talks in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, southeastern South Korea, on Oct. 30, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Yi Wonju · November 1, 2025
11. Lawmaker says China's Xi responded positively to idea of K-pop concert in Beijing
Korean Soft Power.
Summary:
A South Korean lawmaker said Chinese President Xi Jinping responded positively to President Lee Jae Myung’s proposal to hold a large K-pop concert in Beijing. The idea, raised during their Gyeongju summit, aims to boost cultural exchanges and symbolize improving Seoul-Beijing relations after years of tension over THAAD deployment.
[APEC 2025] Lawmaker says China's Xi responded positively to idea of K-pop concert in Beijing | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · November 1, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251101007100315
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping responded positively to the idea of holding a K-pop concert in Beijing, a lawmaker said Saturday, referring to a conversation at a state dinner hosted for the leader.
Rep. Kim Young-bae of the ruling Democratic Party made the claim in a Facebook post after attending the dinner held in the southeastern city of Gyeongju as part of Xi's state visit to South Korea.
"President Lee Jae Myung, President Xi and Park Jin-young, co-chair of the Presidential Committee on Popular Culture Exchange, were speaking briefly, and President Xi responded positively to a proposal to hold a large concert in Beijing and called over (Chinese) Foreign Minister Wang Yi to give him instructions," Kim wrote.
South Korean entertainment was widely popular in China before Beijing imposed a blanket ban on all such content as part of a broader economic retaliation campaign following Seoul's 2016 decision to host a U.S. missile defense system on its soil.
The lawmaker expressed hope that the moment he witnessed during the state dinner would lead to not just a lifting of the ban, but K-culture's full-scale expansion.
During a press briefing on Lee's summit with Xi earlier in the day, National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac said the two leaders agreed to "have many exchanges and a large amount of cooperation on culture" and that the two sides will be able to "coordinate through working-level communication in the future."
President Lee Jae Myung (seated, R) and Chinese President Xi Jinping (seated, C) attend a state dinner for Xi at a hotel in the southeastern city of Gyeongju on Nov. 1, 2025. (Yonhap)
hague@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Haye-ah · November 1, 2025
12. Defense chiefs of S. Korea, Japan reaffirm trilateral security cooperation with U.S.
This of course is very much in US interests. Korea and Japan are really in the center and very much the strength of the silk web of alliances, partners, and friends. This is how we compete with China and secure the Asia-Indo-Pacific.
Summary:
South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi reaffirmed trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. during talks in Kuala Lumpur amid North Korea’s advancing nuclear threats. They pledged future-oriented defense ties, regional peace efforts, and a “two-track” strategy combining deterrence and dialogue to manage inter-Korean tensions.
Defense chiefs of S. Korea, Japan reaffirm trilateral security cooperation with U.S. | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 1, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251101006200315
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Nov. 1 (Yonhap) -- The defense chiefs of South Korea and Japan met in Malaysia on Saturday and reaffirmed the importance of their trilateral security cooperation with the United States in the face of advancing North Korean nuclear and missile threats, the defense ministry said.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back held talks with new Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi on the occasion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur, according to the ministry.
Ahn congratulated Koizumi on his inauguration and highlighted the importance of bilateral coordination and cooperation to strategically deal with geopolitical uncertainties and complex security crises facing the two nations.
In response, Koizumi emphasized that South Korea is an important neighboring country and a partner for his country in responding to various tasks facing the international community.
Both ministers agreed to continue with efforts to advance their bilateral defense ties in a future-oriented manner, according to the ministry.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (L) poses with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (C) and Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi during the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur on Nov. 1, 2025, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
Their first in-person meeting came as North Korea continues to develop its nuclear and missile weapons, disclosing the new Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile and firing short-range ballistic missiles in October.
Meanwhile, Ahn highlighted South Korea's efforts to denuclearize and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula during the defense ministerial gathering, calling for joint international efforts for such a goal.
"North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and modernization of conventional weapons systems is a grave challenge to regional peace and stability and the international non-proliferation regime," Ahn said in a speech.
"Not only South and North Korea, but nearby countries, including China, and the international community should together establish peace on the Korean Peninsula," he said.
He said South Korea will seek a "two-track" approach in dealing with North Korea by maintaining firm deterrence on the back of a powerful South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture while seeking to ease inter-Korean military tensions and building trust, the ministry said.
The defense chief also pledged to expand cooperation with ASEAN members and contribute to regional peace and stability by expanding personnel exchanges and education and strengthening the arms industry and technology cooperation.
Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (C) attends the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus in Kuala Lumpur on Nov. 1, 2025, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 1, 2025
13. Trump gifts baseball bat and ball to President Lee, symbolizing U.S.-Korea bond
I did not see this reported anywhere else.
I thought this should have gone to the Japanese PM given the play of Yamamoto and Ohtani for the Dodgers in the World Series.
Perhaps golf clubs should have gone to POTROK since Korea has so many golf greats ( or he could have re-gifted the golden golf ball he received in Japan!)
Apologies For the attempts at humor.
Trump gifts baseball bat and ball to President Lee, symbolizing U.S.-Korea bond
en.asiatoday.co.kr
https://en.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20251030002207158
Sunday, Nov, 2, 2025
Oct 31, 2025, 07:49 am
0A baseball bat signed by Washington Nationals player Dylan Crews and a baseball engraved with U.S. President Donald Trump’s seal, presented to South Korean President Lee Jae-myung during the U.S.-Korea summit on October 30. / Source: Presidential Office
The presidential office revealed on October 30 that U.S. President Donald Trump presented South Korean President Lee Jae-myung with a baseball bat and ball to mark their summit, describing the gifts as symbols of the deep cultural and historical bonds between the two nations.
According to presidential spokesperson Kim Nam-joon, the bat bears the autograph of Washington Nationals player Dylan Crews, while the baseball carries President Trump’s personal seal.
“The U.S. side explained that the gifts represent the longstanding cultural ties and shared values between our two nations, tracing back to the history of American missionaries who first introduced baseball to Korea,” Kim said.
#Trump #Lee Jae-myung #baseball bat #U.S.-Korea alliance #cultural diplomacy
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14. APEC leaders adopt Gyeongju Declaration for renewed regional cooperation in trade, AI, demographic changes
The first initiatives on AI. This is a key challenge for the future.
Summary:
APEC leaders adopted the Gyeongju Declaration, reaffirming multilateral cooperation in trade, innovation, and inclusive growth. The declaration emphasizes creative industries as new growth drivers and includes the first APEC initiatives on AI (2026–2030) and demographic change. Leaders pledged to strengthen economic integration, resilient labor systems, and equitable development. President Lee Jae Myung highlighted peace, coexistence, and inter-Korean trust-building, urging diplomacy over confrontation with North Korea.
APEC leaders adopt Gyeongju Declaration for renewed regional cooperation in trade, AI, demographic changes - The Korea Times
By Anna J. Park
- Published Nov 1, 2025 2:02 pm KST
- Updated Nov 1, 2025 3:50 pm KST
Member economies affirm multilateralism, cultural industry growth
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20251101/apec-leaders-adopt-gyeongju-declaration-for-renewed-regional-cooperation-in-trade-ai-demographic-changes
GYEONGJU, North Gyeongsang Province — Leaders of 21 Asia-Pacific Economic (APEC) member economies adopted the Gyeongju Declaration, Saturday, reaffirming their commitment to a multilateral and cooperative framework.
The declaration is seen as a significant step toward restoring the spirit of solidarity and collaboration, laying the foundation for shared efforts to promote economic prosperity across the Asia-Pacific region.
In particular, the declaration recognizes the cultural and creative industries as a new driver of growth for the Asia-Pacific region, underscoring the need for enhanced cooperation in this field. It marks the first APEC leaders’ statement to explicitly include the cultural and creative sectors, providing an opportunity for K-culture to further establish itself as a key growth engine within the region.
President Lee Jae Myung greets Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi during a commemorative photo session after the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting at the Hwabaek International Convention Center in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Saturday. Yonhap
The Presidential Office explained that the Gyeongju Declaration reflects this year’s three key APEC priorities — Connect, Innovate and Prosper — and encompasses major discussions on trade and investment, digital innovation and inclusive growth.
After prolonged negotiations over the wording on trade and investment, member economies reached agreement early this morning. The final declaration affirms that all 21 members view strong trade and investment ties as essential to the Asia-Pacific’s growth and prosperity, and highlights the need for an inclusive trade and investment environment.
"We acknowledge the importance of a trade and investment environment that promotes resilience and benefits for all. We note the
various discussions on the current state and future of global trade and recognize the need for cooperation among economies in this regard," the statement reads. "We will advance economic integration in the Asia-Pacific region in a manner that is market driven, including through work on the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) agenda."
President Lee Jae Myung looks at Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto during a commemorative photo session after the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting at the Hwabaek International Convention Center in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Saturday. Yonhap
As member economies acknowledged that the current global trading system faces significant challenges amid transformative forces such as artificial intelligence (AI) and demographic shifts, they adopted two additional key documents: the APEC Artificial Intelligence (AI) Initiative (2026–2030) and the APEC Collaborative Framework for Demographic Changes.
In the AI initiative, leaders recognized AI’s transformative potential to enhance competitiveness and innovation. The initiative outlines three core objectives: promoting secure and reliable AI ecosystems that support resilient growth; strengthening members’ participation through cooperation; and encouraging AI development and adoption through investment in efficient technologies and robust infrastructure.
"The initiative reaffirms our commitment to harnessing AI's transformative potential while respecting flexible implementation approaches and varying developmental contexts across member economies, and complementing existing APEC efforts," the statement reads.
President Lee Jae Myung delivers his opening remarks at the second session of the APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting at the Hwabaek International Convention Center in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Saturday. Yonhap
The framework for demographic changes is a joint strategy to address the region’s evolving population trends, including declining birthrates, aging societies and rapid urbanization.
Under this framework, APEC economies will focus on building resilient labor markets and health systems, promoting lifelong education and expanding intergenerational participation through innovation and inclusive policies. The plan also emphasizes fostering a "silver economy," strengthening care infrastructure and empowering women, youth and other vulnerable groups.
"This document, as APEC’s first comprehensive population cooperation initiative, establishes a foundation for collaboration to respond to future employment and industrial structural changes and to turn demographic shifts into new growth opportunities through youth empowerment and technological innovation," the presidential office said.
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a press conference at the International Media Center for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Saturday. Yonhap
North Korea issue
After the two-day APEC summit concluded with a commemorative photo session with participating leaders, President Lee Jae Myung held a press conference with hundreds of journalists from Korea and abroad.
During the briefing, Lee once again reached out to North Korea, saying that Seoul will take its most proactive measures to build inter-Korean trust through all possible means.
As to Pyongyang's bellicose rhetoric toward Seoul, Lee said the level of bellicosity seems to have been lowered. "Even though North Korea doubts the South Korean government (about its peace overture) and shows hostility, it will take considerable efforts to reverse this doubt and confrontational stance," he said, adding he will continue his role as a "pacemaker" along with U.S. President Donald Trump's role for "peacemaker."
"Peace does not mean a state suppressed by force, nor does it mean winning a war through military power," Lee emphasized. "What meaning would there be in victory after massive destruction and loss of life? Winning through war is the worst option; avoiding conflict is the better one; but creating a peace in which there is no need to fight is the most solid form of peace and security."
Lee added that the Korean Peninsula issue has always been complex and difficult, but underscored that “while peace and stability require strong deterrence, the final stage must always involve dialogue, compromise and a commitment to coexistence and shared prosperity.”
President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a press conference at the International Media Center for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings in Gyeongju, North Gyeongsang Province, Saturday. Yonhap
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
15. US LNG through Korean eyes: From game changer to global mainstay
Win win for the ROK and US?
Summary:
SK Innovation’s Lee Jong-soo writes that U.S. LNG has transformed global energy from a domestic resource to the world’s top exporter. The shale revolution brought flexible, transparent pricing and supply security, reshaping Asia’s energy market. For Korea, U.S. LNG ensures stability, supports decarbonization, and anchors cooperation in the emerging AI-driven energy economy.
US LNG through Korean eyes: From game changer to global mainstay - The Korea Times
By Lee Jong-soo
- Published Oct 31, 2025 10:43 am KST
How US LNG is reshaping Asia’s energy security, powering AI era
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/apec2025/20251031/us-lng-through-korean-eyes-from-game-changer-to-global-mainstay
Lee Jong-soo, SK Innovation E&S president
Decades ago, few experts anticipated that U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG) would become a cornerstone of the global energy market. In the 1980s and 1990s, America’s natural gas industry was abundant, yet focused on domestic consumption, with its role as an exporter very limited.
However, the Shale Revolution and the emergence of large-scale export terminals such as Freeport during the first wave fundamentally reordered the global gas market. Today, the U.S. supplies 100 million tons of LNG per year to the world, standing as the largest exporter on the global stage.
US LNG innovation: Turning point for Asian market
Historically, the Asian LNG market was shackled by the burdens of long-term contracts, oil-linked pricing and destination restrictions. Any disruption in a single supply region would immediately translate into an energy security risk.
The introduction of U.S. LNG has completely rewritten the paradigm. Destination flexibility and Henry Hub-linked pricing have offered Asian importers unprecedented transparency, price competitiveness and the ability to diversify suppliers. As a result, the concept of energy security has evolved further, and procurement strategies have changed dramatically.
SK Innovation’s experience: 3 core strengths
SK Innovation was able to directly experience the value of this new LNG paradigm through a liquefaction tolling agreement with the Freeport LNG project in the U.S. and investment in the Woodford shale gas field via a joint venture with Continental Resources.
Even under long-term contracts, the contractual flexibility allowed SK Innovation to expand trading opportunities.
The Henry Hub-based price structure provided more transparency and competitiveness compared to the traditional oil-linked pricing.
By diversifying our resources portfolio, we strengthened our ability to respond to both supply and price risks.
These advantages of U.S. LNG, along with its supply reliability, have made a direct contribution to Korea’s energy security.
Outlook: US LNG as global energy hub
The second wave of large-scale LNG projects is underway in the U.S., with over 100 million tons of new projects under construction or awaiting final investment decisions.
This will further expand U.S. export capacity and global influence. Simultaneously, the rapid growth in artificial intelligence (AI), data centers and cloud computing are driving skyrocketing electricity demand. LNG will be an essential “partner energy” — not only complementing the intermittency of renewables but also providing stable power for the AI economy.
For Korea and other Asian importers, U.S. LNG is far more than a commodity: It is a strategic partnership guaranteeing price and supply stability, supporting decarbonization and paving the way toward a secure and sustainable future.
Building on our accumulated experience and expertise, SK Innovation will further strengthen collaboration with the U.S., lead the energy transition and diversify our portfolio. The story of U.S. LNG is far from over. What began as an experimental challenge is now at the heart of global trade and will continue to underpin an intelligent and sustainable future.
Lee Jong-soo is president of SK Innovation E&S. He has more than 18 years of experience in the global LNG industry, covering planning, management and corporate strategy across Korea, Australia and the United States.
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
16. Philippine President Discusses Submarines with Hanwha Ocean
The ROK is a partner in the arsenal of democracies.
Summary:
At the APEC summit, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos discussed acquiring Hanwha Ocean’s 3,000-ton Dosun Ahn Changho-class submarines featuring lithium-ion batteries. The talks support Manila’s ₱2 trillion military modernization program to strengthen South China Sea defense. South Korea, France, Spain, and Italy are potential suppliers amid expanding Korean defense exports.
Industry
Philippine President Discusses Submarines with Hanwha Ocean
During APEC summit, Marcos explores 3,000-ton class submarines under military modernization program
By Kim Gwan-rae(ChosunBiz)
Published 2025.11.01. 21:52
https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2025/11/01/XLBTIAOGWJBFJLYOORXV4LXMGI/
On the 22nd in the afternoon, the launch ceremony for the Jang Yeong-sil, the first Batch-II vessel of the Jang Bogo-III class, is held at the Hanwha Ocean Geoje site in Geoje, South Gyeongsang Province. /News1
A Hanwha Ocean official also reportedly discussed with President Marcos the deployment plan for the ‘Dosun Ahn Changho-class’ submarine (SS-III, 3,000-ton class), which is equipped with low-noise lithium-ion battery technology. The official explained the submarine’s sonar (sound navigation and ranging) system, combat capabilities, and submerged operation duration.
President Marcos is pushing to acquire the Philippine military’s first submarines through the Third Modernization Program for the Armed Forces, a 2 trillion Philippine peso (approximately 48.8 trillion Korean won) project approved in February last year to strengthen military capabilities in the South China Sea. At the time, President Marcos stated that countries including South Korea, France, Spain, and Italy had expressed interest in supplying submarines.
Earlier, the Philippines introduced 12 FA-50 multirole fighter jets from Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and plans to purchase an additional 12. It also ordered 10 frigates, patrol ships, and offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) from HD Hyundai Heavy Industries.
Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on the 30th of last month that he had approved South Korea’s plan to build nuclear-powered submarines. President Trump stated that the nuclear-powered submarines would be constructed at a Hanwha Ocean subsidiary shipyard in Philadelphia, U.S.
On the same day, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Hanwha Ocean’s Geoje site in Gyeongnam Province alongside Prime Minister Kim Min-seok. Prime Minister Carney toured the shipyard’s robotic welding process and the interior of the Jang Young-sil submarine, a newly launched submarine for the South Korean Navy. Canada is currently pursuing a next-generation submarine acquisition project worth up to 60 trillion won.
· This article has been translated by Upstage Solar AI.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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