​Quotes of the Day:

"While there is a chance of the world getting through its troubles, I hold that a reasonable man has to behave as though he were sure of it. If at the end your cheerfulness is not justified, at any rate you will have been cheerful." 

– H. G. Wells

"A pessimist sees the difficulty in every opportunity; an optimist sees the opportunity in every difficulty." 

– Winston Churchill

"There are two ways of spreading light... to be the candle, or the mirror that reflects it." 

– Edith Wharton

​1. Will Trump’s Critical Minerals Blitz Pay Off?

2. Why Are China’s Generals So Quiet as Xi Purges Them?

3. The Latest Buzzy Tech Investment: Ukrainian Drones

4. Experts react: What does the Trump-Xi meeting mean for trade, technology, security, and beyond?

5. With China Truce, U.S. National Security Controls Now Appear Up for Negotiation

6. Trump Says He’s Not Planning Venezuela Strike

7. Putin Brandishes Menacing Nuclear Weapons as Talks With U.S. Falter

8. Xi Delivers Veiled Warning to Nations Not to Take the U.S.’s Side

9. NATO ally Estonia urges preparation for "different kind of war" with Putin

10. Beijing’s New Approach to Taiwan

11. Opinion | Zelensky Is Winning Trump Voters Over

12. Trump’s Pacific Pivot – OpEd

13. The U.S. Military's Great Reboot to Fight a War Against China Has Arrived

14. Nvidia Uncertain if Return to China Is Closer After Trump-Xi Meeting

15. Confronting China's pervasive maritime gray zone campaign

16. The West needs to draw the line on Russian, Chinese grey-zone provocations

17. The Trade War Couldn’t Change China’s Economy

18. General tells industry to bring more prototypes to help forces move at speed

19. China’s De-Americanization Strategy

20. As U.S. ramps up pressure, Venezuela pleads with Moscow and Beijing for help

21. Opinion | China’s trade bullying calls for an Article 5

22. White House to Announce Resumption of Auto Chip Shipments From China

23. Colin Gray, the RMA, and the Rise of Drone Warfare

24. Why the U.S. is losing the battle for hearts and minds

25. The Free World is Losing the Information War. Here’s How It Can Win.

26. We’ve Forgotten What ‘Soft Power’ Is

27. Top Trump Officials Are Moving Onto Military Bases

28. FMS Reform -- Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Moving to DoD Acquisition

29. Dual-Theater Competition: How the US Avoids Being Stretched Thin and Wins Where It Matters

1. Will Trump’s Critical Minerals Blitz Pay Off?

​The supply chain must include refining. If refining rare earths is the long pole in the tent, what are we doing to develop refining infrastructure?

Excerpts:

“The Chinese have an enormous amount of leverage over the United States, certainly with the magnets,” said Chris Berry, the president of House Mountain Partners, an independent metals analysis consultancy.

It will likely take at least “five to seven years, under the best of circumstances, to have some sort of a rare-earth magnet supply chain that does not touch China,” he added.

Desperate to slash U.S. dependence on Beijing, the Trump administration has eagerly sought out new mineral deals abroad. From Ukraine to Pakistan, Trump has struck agreements or secured commitments over critical minerals with at least eight countries, many of which have used the deals to curry favor with the U.S. leader.

Yet with many details still unknown, it remains unclear just how effective these agreements will be. “We just won’t know how strong or robust these deals are until we actually start seeing money, capital, deployed,” Berry said.

Summary:

Trump’s second-term push for critical minerals has become a centerpiece of his economic and strategic agenda. Facing China’s dominance in rare-earths, Trump has accelerated U.S. efforts to secure alternative supplies, striking deals with Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan while taking equity stakes in domestic firms like Trilogy Metals and MP Materials. The administration’s interventionist strategy mirrors aspects of China’s state-driven model—picking industrial “winners” to bolster national resilience. Despite a temporary truce with Beijing over export controls, experts warn it will take years to build independent supply chains. Trump’s hands-on “minerals blitz” signals an assertive new industrial policy reshaping U.S. economic statecraft.

Will Trump’s Critical Minerals Blitz Pay Off?

Foreign Policy · Christina Lu

The U.S. president has been on a mission to secure new supply chains—and counter China’s grip.

By Christina Lu, a staff writer at Foreign Policy.

October 31, 2025, 11:11 AM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/31/trump-china-rare-earth-critical-mineral-asia-equity-stake/

As China flexes its rare-earth muscle in trade talks, U.S. President Donald Trump has been waging an all-out effort to ramp up domestic critical mineral production and secure new partnerships abroad.

That campaign has kicked into high gear in recent weeks as the Trump administration has chased minerals in its diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific, striking a raft of deals in just this past month with Australia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan. At home, the U.S. leader has also embraced a more unorthodox—and hands-on—approach to resuscitating a domestic mining industry as his administration increasingly takes equity stakes in private companies.

“The acceleration of efforts to counter China has been at breakneck speed,” said Gracelin Baskaran, director of the Critical Minerals Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank.

Few issues have imbued the second Trump administration’s agenda quite like critical minerals—a group of around 50 mineral commodities that the U.S. Geological Survey has deemed critical to U.S. national and economic security. Among those commodities are the not-so-rare rare earths, which are 17 metallic elements that underpin everything from F-35 fighter jets to wind turbines.

China maintains a powerful grip on global supply chains for rare earths, commanding around 85 percent of rare-earth processing and 92 percent of magnet production—giving it key leverage in negotiations with Washington.

Those tensions came to a head this week when Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met for rare talks in Busan, South Korea, resulting in a temporary truce that will see both countries dial back some of their harshest measures in the immediate future.

China agreed to walk back some of its most expansive rare-earth export controls, which were issued three weeks ago but had yet to take effect. But Beijing’s earlier export controls—including restrictions targeting gallium and germanium, two crucial semiconductor inputs, as well as a sweeping licensing system—appear to remain in place, ensuring that the country still has a powerful card to play in future trade talks.

“The Chinese have an enormous amount of leverage over the United States, certainly with the magnets,” said Chris Berry, the president of House Mountain Partners, an independent metals analysis consultancy.

It will likely take at least “five to seven years, under the best of circumstances, to have some sort of a rare-earth magnet supply chain that does not touch China,” he added.

Desperate to slash U.S. dependence on Beijing, the Trump administration has eagerly sought out new mineral deals abroad. From Ukraine to Pakistan, Trump has struck agreements or secured commitments over critical minerals with at least eight countries, many of which have used the deals to curry favor with the U.S. leader.

Yet with many details still unknown, it remains unclear just how effective these agreements will be. “We just won’t know how strong or robust these deals are until we actually start seeing money, capital, deployed,” Berry said.

Domestically, the Trump administration is taking a far more hands-on approach to boosting mining. While the United States was once home to a robust mining industry, that industry was beset by environmental and financial challenges in the 1970s, and U.S. lawmakers came to see the sector as one that should be outsourced to other countries.

To reverse that trend, the Trump administration announced this month that the U.S. government would take a 10 percent stake in Trilogy Metals, a Canadian firm with projects in Alaska. Trilogy is the third mining company that the U.S. government under the Trump administration now owns equity stakes in, alongside Lithium Americas and rare-earth miner MP Materials.

“Equity is arguably the highest level of engagement, and what we’re really seeing is a doubling down of the unprecedented public-private cooperation in minerals,” Baskaran said.

More could come soon. U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC earlier this month that the Trump administration planned to harness price floors and “forward buying” across “a range of industries” to back American companies in strategic sectors.

“When you are facing a nonmarket economy like China, then you have to exercise industrial policy,” he said. “We’re not going to come in and take stakes in nonstrategic industries, but we’ve identified seven industries,” he added later.

For some industry experts, the new strategy resembles Beijing’s.

“You could argue that the United States is becoming more like China in its investment approach, where—for lack of a better phrase—winners are picked and subsidized and pushed forward to achieve some sort of a national goal,” Berry said.

And as Trump’s campaign picks up speed, mining firms across the United States are hoping they’ll be chosen next. Just as other countries are courting Trump with their own mineral deals, a growing number of miners are making pitches to his administration.

Mining companies didn’t use to flock to Washington, said Christopher Ecclestone, a mining strategist at the financial advisory firm Hallgarten & Company. That’s changed.

Now “you’d be battering them off like mosquitoes in the summer,” he said.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · Christina Lu

2. Why Are China’s Generals So Quiet as Xi Purges Them?

The party must maintain control of the army to survive. It appears that these moves are ensuring total control of the military. Is that the reality? What is happening inside the military? Can we determine the stability of the PLA? Will "structural inevitably" ensure loyalty and prevent internal resistance?

Excerpts:

The generals’ refusal to resist is thus not simply a matter of personal fear but a structural inevitability. The CCP’s political logic does not rely on the will of individuals; it relies on organizational control. The PLA’s stability arises not from genuine unity of conviction but from the prior elimination of any alternative.

Xi’s system of command represents the final form of “the party commands the gun”—power no longer divided between party and army but fused into a single core. For the regime, this ensures the highest degree of political security. For outside observers, it reveals something deeper: In a fully party-controlled military, rebellion is not merely unlikely. It is conceptually impossible.

​Summary:

Xi Jinping’s sweeping purge of China’s military—removing senior leaders including CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong and political chief Miao Hua—has provoked no resistance because the People’s Liberation Army is a party army, not a national one. Under the doctrine that “the party commands the gun,” the PLA’s loyalty is institutionalized to the Chinese Communist Party and Xi personally. His 2015 reforms centralized all authority in the CMC chairman, dismantling regional power bases and enforcing political obedience. Through anti-corruption campaigns, ideological surveillance, and fear-based discipline, Xi has eliminated autonomy and dissent, making rebellion structurally impossible within China’s militarized party-state system.

Why Are China’s Generals So Quiet as Xi Purges Them?

Foreign Policy · Deng Yuwen

The PLA is a politically neutered army.

By Deng Yuwen, a Chinese writer and scholar.

October 30, 2025, 2:04 PM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/30/xi-purges-china-military-pla-ccp-power-control/

China’s military recently expelled nine top leaders from both the Communist Party and the armed forces, including Central Military Commission Vice Chairman He Weidong and chief political commissar Miao Hua.

In the past few years, successive defense ministers, Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, were purged; before them, former Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong fell. Counting the many other officers expelled since President Xi Jinping came to power more than a decade ago, one could almost line up a platoon of purged generals.

The ousted leaders have come from the very core of China’s defense establishment. Such sweeping purges should have provoked fierce institutional backlash or political shock waves. Yet, despite the flood of coup rumors circulating in overseas Chinese media, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has remained placid, perhaps even more politically uniform than before.

The PLA’s official mouthpiece published several commentaries before and after the recently held Fourth Plenum, an important Chinese Communist Party meeting, reiterating that “the party commands the gun, and the gun must never command the party.” It stressed that the entire military must obey the leadership of the chairman of the Central Military Commission. The paper portrayed the recent investigations of senior officers as evidence that the CMC remains the ultimate source of political authority within the armed forces.

Many observers find this puzzling. Questions often surface in my conversations with Chinese scholars and across Chinese-language discussions on X: Why do the kind of coups that erupt in semi-authoritarian or immature democratic regimes never seem to occur in China?

Perhaps the downfall of the Gang of Four in 1976 could be seen as an exception, but the purge of this group of radical leaders who had risen during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) occurred in the unique historical vacuum that followed Mao Zedong’s death. Even then, it hardly qualified as a military coup.

Those arrests were carried out under the authority of Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying—at the time, the legitimate leaders of both the party and the People’s Liberation Army—thereby reaffirming the norm that the gun serves the party, not the other way around. Are Chinese generals simply cowards, afraid to die? Fear, of course, is a factor—but not the decisive one.

The PLA’s failure to act is a result of institutional structure, not personal psychology. The Communist Party’s doctrine that “the party commands the gun” makes it impossible for the PLA to evolve into an independent political entity, and Xi has taken this dependence to its absolute extreme.

Strictly speaking, the PLA is not a national army, although it acts as one. It is a party army—the private armed force of the Chinese Communist Party. From the very beginning, when Mao created the Red Army, he inscribed the dominance of the party into its DNA. That principle has remained intact for nearly a century and is the PLA’s political foundation.

But this is not a mere slogan; it is a fully institutionalized and tightly sealed system. It ensures that the soldier’s ultimate loyalty is not to the constitution or the state but to the Central Committee and, ultimately, its supreme leader. Every decision on operations, promotions, training, and political education must serve the party’s needs.

This logic is built into the very architecture of command: From the CMC down to theater commands, group armies, and brigades, every level has political commissars and political officers responsible for ideology, organization, and personnel. In a system copied directly from the Soviet Union, these commissars report directly to higher-level party committees, not to military commanders.

This dual-leadership structure guarantees that military action is always subordinate to political intent. The PLA is not a neutral national institution but, rather, the armed wing of the party; its real center of gravity lies in its political work system. Even on the battlefield, a political commissar has the power to veto a commander’s order. Such an arrangement erases the possibility of autonomous military authority—the concrete meaning of “the party commands the gun.”

The purpose of this principle is to keep the army firmly under party control and prevent soldiers from meddling in politics. Although the CCP came to power by armed struggle, after 1949, the military was kept strictly subordinate to the party, forbidden to intervene in intraparty disputes over policy or leadership—except in rare moments such as parts of the Cultural Revolution.

To institutionalize this subordination, China’s top leader has almost always served simultaneously as both party general secretary and commander in chief of the party’s armed forces. CMC Chairman Deng Xiaoping was a partial exception, but even then, the party elite reached a tacit consensus that Deng was the ultimate decision-maker in party affairs. Thus, he remained the de facto supreme leader, even without holding every formal title.

For officers in the PLA, career advancement depends entirely on the party organization within the armed forces. Political departments keep exhaustive records of each officer’s ideological attitude, family ties, and behavior; any deviation can destroy a career. Over time, this has bred a deep psychological dependency. Through vertical control of appointments, the party has bound the military into its political system, turning it into an extension of party power.

This mechanism has erased the army’s internal autonomy and horizontal cohesion, leaving no foundation for collective dissent. The experience of Lin Biao—the marshal once designated as Mao’s successor and the PLA’s deputy commander—illustrates this perfectly. When Lin’s son, Lin Liguo, discovered in 1971 that Mao had turned against his father and that the family’s future was in peril, he plotted to assassinate Mao. Yet even he dared to confide only in a handful of associates; he could not risk alerting other loyalists. Today’s generals command nothing like the networks or loyalties that Lin Biao once possessed. Their careers are entirely at the party’s mercy.

After Xi came to power, this system was pushed to its political extreme. The sweeping military reforms launched in 2015—the most far-reaching since the founding of the People’s Republic—were presented as an effort to enhance the PLA’s joint-combat capability, but they also entailed a major redistribution of military power.

The old seven military regions were replaced by five theater commands whose commanders report directly to the CMC. The four powerful general departments—General Staff, Political Department, Logistics, and Armaments—were abolished and replaced by 15 CMC departments. All authority was recentralized under the CMC.

On the surface, these were administrative reforms; in reality, they were deeply political. They shattered the regional patronage networks that had formed over decades, and prevented any general from building an independent base. The old internal balance of power was destroyed and replaced by a single, centered structure: All authority flows upward to the CMC chairman himself.

Within this framework, Xi turned his supremacy as CMC chairman into the PLA’s ultimate political rule and an operational reality. Previously, while the CMC chairman nominally held ultimate authority, vice chairmen and the general departments enjoyed significant autonomy, and major decisions were made collectively. Xi changed that. All matters—military, political, personnel, or disciplinary—must now be submitted for the chairman’s personal approval; other members may advise but cannot veto.

The chain of command has become a straight vertical line, eliminating lateral checks. After the reforms, officers’ promotions, assignments, and even family privileges depend directly on their loyalty to Xi. Political performance has overtaken professional merit as the key criterion for advancement. The slogan “absolute loyalty, absolute purity, and absolute reliability” is drilled into every officer and has nearly replaced the traditional code of military honor. In effect, Xi has not only restructured the army but also reshaped the political character of its personnel.

Given this institutional setup, even the harshest purges will not trigger rebellion. There are three further factors at work.

First, Xi’s purge has been cloaked in the legitimizing banner of anti-corruption. The PLA’s corruption has long been an open secret. While public enthusiasm for Xi’s broader anti-graft drive has waned, no one sympathizes with generals accused of trading promotions or pocketing arms-procurement kickbacks. Xi’s “tiger hunts” thus align with the public’s moral sense and with the party’s own definition of political rectitude.

Regardless of his true motives, once a target is branded “corrupt,” he loses any claim to fairness or solidarity. Within the party’s political language, anti-corruption equals purity; opposing it equals disloyalty. The logic is self-sealing. Purges become opportunities to reassert discipline, and any misgivings within the ranks find no legitimate outlet. The anti-corruption narrative is politically bulletproof.

Second, Xi has reinforced ideological control across both the party and the military. Since the 18th Party Congress in 2012, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the CMC’s own discipline commission, the propaganda apparatus, and the political work system have collaborated to monitor ideological trends among officers. Internal regulations forbid “improper discussion of the Central Committee” and “the dissemination of unverified information.”

Political discipline and political rules now override all others. Cadre evaluation systems have been reengineered so that political loyalty is the decisive measure. Even an inadvertent slip can end an officer’s career. In this environment, the organization produces its own muting effect: dissent is preemptively self-censored. Soldiers learn to be silent—and to find safety in silence. Public professions of loyalty are the safest speech. Over time, this creates a political culture of outward unanimity and inward caution. What outsiders might call intellectual paralysis is, within the system, the very logic of survival.

Third, the purge operates as a mechanism of institutionalized fear. Each time a senior officer is felled, the military launches new “self-inspection” and “warning education” drives. Cadres must write repeated self-criticisms and declarations of loyalty to prove their political firmness. These ritualized campaigns remind everyone that any ambiguity of attitude can be interpreted as betrayal.

The effect is the opposite of defiance: It is a race to display obedience. Political security becomes synonymous with personal safety, and loyalty becomes the most rational form of self-preservation. Through this cycle, fear becomes normalized as a governing tool. The asymmetry between risk and reward is overwhelming—silence guarantees survival, speech guarantees destruction. The generals are not ignorant of this dynamic; they understand it perfectly.

Seen through this logic, Xi’s ability to purge so many generals without provoking institutional backlash is neither accidental nor the product of exceptional charisma. It is the natural consequence of the CCP’s system of control. The party’s principle that “the party commands the gun” eliminates the army’s political subjectivity, the institutionalization of the chairman responsibility system completes the personalization of command, the moral authority of anti-corruption provides the legal and ideological cover, and the party’s centralized discipline leaves no room for dissent. These elements interlock to form a closed political order in which the army is not an autonomous force but an institutional embodiment of the supreme leader’s authority.

The generals’ refusal to resist is thus not simply a matter of personal fear but a structural inevitability. The CCP’s political logic does not rely on the will of individuals; it relies on organizational control. The PLA’s stability arises not from genuine unity of conviction but from the prior elimination of any alternative.

Xi’s system of command represents the final form of “the party commands the gun”—power no longer divided between party and army but fused into a single core. For the regime, this ensures the highest degree of political security. For outside observers, it reveals something deeper: In a fully party-controlled military, rebellion is not merely unlikely. It is conceptually impossible.

Foreign Policy · Deng Yuwen

3. The Latest Buzzy Tech Investment: Ukrainian Drones

​If investors are putting money into Ukrainian companies they must have some confidence in the outcome of Putin's war. 

​Excerpts:

In Ukraine, the added financial firepower is helping professionalize outfits that began in garages and military units—giving them a chance to compete abroad with Western players. The Ukrainian startups also offer the U.S. possible solutions for its shortcomings in drone technology.

“Are they scrappy? Yes. Are they all working in bombed-out buildings with pliers found on the side of the road? No,” said Justin Zeefe, a founding partner at Los Angeles- and Kyiv-based Green Flag Ventures. “They know what they are doing.”

Green Flag was set up in 2023 to invest in Ukrainian companies, and the venture-capital firm says that in recent months there has been growing interest in its inaugural $20 million fund.

Western investors see Ukrainian drone makers as less risky after many companies generated a couple of years of revenue, secured customers outside their home country and added governance controls, Zeefe said. Kyiv has also recently said it would allow defense companies to export for the first time.

​Summary:

Since Russia’s 2022 invasion, Ukraine has emerged as a global leader in drone warfare, and Western venture-capital firms are rushing in to invest in its startups. Ukrainian firms like Swarmer have raised millions (Swarmer alone raised $15 M) to scale up drone swarm and AI technologies. Investors from the U.S. and Europe are backing these companies despite risks of corruption and conflict. The Ukrainian government has opened exports of defense tech, attracting partnerships and acquisitions abroad. Although the unmanned-aerial-vehicle market is crowded, analysts believe that the most capable firms stand to dominate and revolutionize global drone production.

The Latest Buzzy Tech Investment: Ukrainian Drones

WSJ

Foreign money is helping Ukraine’s defense-tech startups expand abroad and compete with Western rivals

By Alistair MacDonald

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 and Heather Somerville

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Nov. 1, 2025 7:00 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/the-latest-buzzy-tech-investment-ukrainian-drones-8e455819

Ukraine has been at the forefront of drone warfare since Russia’s 2022 invasion. gleb garanich/Reuters

• Foreign investment in Ukrainian drone and defense technology companies has increased, driven by the prospect of military spending.
• Ukrainian drone makers are attracting Western investors due to battle-tested technology, lower costs and recent revenue generation.
• The U.S. and Ukraine are negotiating a deal for Ukrainian companies to share drone technology in exchange for compensation.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Foreign investment in Ukrainian drone and defense technology companies has increased, driven by the prospect of military spending.

Ukraine has pioneered the use of drones in battle. Now Western investors are trying to get a piece of the action.

Foreign investment in Ukrainian drone makers and other defense technology has risen this year, founders and investors say, driven by the prospect of the battle-tested technology winning a slice of rising military spending.

In Ukraine, the added financial firepower is helping professionalize outfits that began in garages and military units—giving them a chance to compete abroad with Western players. The Ukrainian startups also offer the U.S. possible solutions for its shortcomings in drone technology.

“Are they scrappy? Yes. Are they all working in bombed-out buildings with pliers found on the side of the road? No,” said Justin Zeefe, a founding partner at Los Angeles- and Kyiv-based Green Flag Ventures. “They know what they are doing.”

Justin Zeefe, a founding partner Green Flag Ventures, said Western investors now see Ukrainian drone makers as less risky. Harry Murphy/Sportsfile/Getty Images

Green Flag was set up in 2023 to invest in Ukrainian companies, and the venture-capital firm says that in recent months there has been growing interest in its inaugural $20 million fund.

Western investors see Ukrainian drone makers as less risky after many companies generated a couple of years of revenue, secured customers outside their home country and added governance controls, Zeefe said. Kyiv has also recently said it would allow defense companies to export for the first time.

Ukraine has been at the forefront of drone warfare since Russia’s 2022 invasion, with the war serving as a testing ground for new technology. Most of the unmanned aerial vehicles in action are made by local startups, whose products are often considered more effective than those of their U.S. and European counterparts. Their UAVs also cost a fraction of the price of those made in the West.

Kyiv-based Swarmer in September raised $15 million in a funding round—including U.S. investors—that the startup said was the single-largest investment in a Ukrainian defense-tech business since the start of the war.

The company, which started out of a garage in 2023, makes artificial-intelligence software that has been used by Ukraine to coordinate drone swarm attacks on Russian positions. It plans to use the fresh funds to open offices in Warsaw and Austin, Texas, as well as to develop new software.

While investments are small compared with the riches flowing into American defense-tech companies and other hot sectors such as AI, the number of deals is increasing rapidly and Ukraine-focused funds are raising more money.

Ondas Capital, an American fund, said recently that it expected to invest at least $150 million in combat-proven technology, mostly in Ukraine. Four European venture-capital firms said at a September defense-technology conference in Ukraine that they plan to invest a combined $100 million.

The conference attracted 5,000 investors and executives, its organizers said, up from 1,000 the year before.

Much of the money arriving in Ukraine so far is European. That is partly because the startups are too small for mammoth American funds.

Kyiv-based Swarmer, which makes software for drones, recently raised $15 million in a funding round. Justyna Mielnikiewicz for WSJ

Swarmer plans to use funds from fresh investments to open offices in Warsaw and Austin, Texas, and to develop new software. Justyna Mielnikiewicz for WSJ

Investing in Ukrainian drones also comes with risks. The country has a history of corruption, the UAV market is crowded, and simply visiting to scout deals is arduous and potentially dangerous.

“There is a business opportunity here, and that is why people are jumping in,” said Eveline Buchatskiy, managing partner of D3, referring to the potential for these companies to capitalize on increased European military spending. The fund, which counts former Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt among its backers, was established at the start of the war to invest in Ukrainian defense technology.

Attracting venture capital in the first two years of the war was “almost impossible,” according to Yevhen Zhebko, co-founder of Teletactica, which makes drone communication systems. “Everyone tried to understand, will we survive?” he said.

In July, Teletactica raised $1.5 million from investors including Green Flag. The funding has helped the company scale up production for the front lines. It is also expanding in Latvia and Estonia, where officials have requested small batches of the firm’s technology, Zhebko said.

Foreign money is already shaking up the sector. U.S. investment firm MITS Capital recently consolidated four Ukrainian defense businesses into one larger company, called MITS Industries. The new entity is to be based in Denmark to address investor concerns about Ukrainian governance and capitalize on Scandinavian demand for equipment.

Western companies are also investing. Germany’s Quantum Systems in July agreed to acquire a 10% stake in Frontline, a Kyiv-based drone maker, and said it would help scale up manufacturing in Ukraine. Terms of the agreement weren’t disclosed.

The investment comes just two years after Frontline began in an unheated, abandoned building. Now it has more than 100 employees and is rapidly boosting production. One key selling point: At $3,000 a piece, its flagship drone costs less than a sixth of the price of what the company sees as its nearest Western competitor.

Germany’s Quantum Systems is among Western companies investing in Ukrainian drone makers. Frank Hoermann / Sven Simon/ZUMA Press

In “Europe and the U.S. there are [comparable] companies but they offer the same capability for a much higher cost,” said Mykyta Rozhkov, Frontline’s chief marketing officer.

Lower production costs are encouraging Western governments to look to Ukraine too.

The Pentagon has already awarded a small number of contracts to Ukrainian startups for technology including long-range drones and counterdrone systems. Now, the U.S. and Ukraine are negotiating a deal under which Ukrainian companies would share their drone technology in exchange for royalties or other forms of compensation.

The U.K. and Denmark have signed their own deals with Kyiv, aimed at getting Ukrainian drone makers to manufacture in their countries.

To be sure, the sector is crowded. Ukraine already has more than 300 drone makers, according to the Ukrainian Council of Gunsmiths, a trade organization. Hundreds more are springing up across Europe and the U.S.

Industry executives predict a shakeout when the war ends.

Employees of Plural, a venture-capital firm whose investments include German defense startup Helsing, recently attended a defense conference where Ukrainian startups pitched investors.

“The vast majority won’t make it,” said Khaled Helioui, a partner at the London-based firm. But, he added, as long as some of the startups make it, “you have winners.”

Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com and Heather Somerville at heather.somerville@wsj.com

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WSJ

4. Experts react: What does the Trump-Xi meeting mean for trade, technology, security, and beyond?

From 10 experts the Atlantic Council.

Summary:

Reactions following the meeting between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, noting that while the summit yielded some near-term outcomes, such as a tariff reduction and China’s increased U.S. soybean purchases, the fundamental structural issues remain unresolved. The consensus: this is a tactical truce, not a substantive reset. China retains leverage through critical-minerals and export controls; the U.S. faces espionage, tech decoupling, and supply-chain vulnerabilities. Without deeper strategy and clearer U.S. advantage, the relationship may deteriorate before improving.

Experts react: What does the Trump-Xi meeting mean for trade, technology, security, and beyond?

atlanticcouncil.org · jcookson · October 30, 2025

https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/experts-react/experts-react-what-does-the-trump-xi-meeting-mean-for-trade-technology-security-and-beyond/?utm

On a scale of zero to ten: “twelve.” That’s how US President Donald Trump rated his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at an air base in Busan, South Korea, on Thursday. The two leaders agreed to pull back some trade measures and work together on other pressing issues. After the meeting, Trump said that he agreed to cut tariffs on Chinese imports to the United States, while China agreed to increase purchases of US soybeans. Other issues discussed include trade measures on rare earths and computer chips, as well as US concerns over ownership of the social media platform TikTok. To see if a more positive US-China relationship has indeed gotten off the ground at Gimhae air base, or if we should expect turbulence ahead, Atlantic Council experts are lined up on the runway below with their insights.

Click to jump to an expert analysis:

Josh Lipsky: A trade truce, if they can keep it

Matthew Kroenig: This relationship will get worse before it gets better

Melanie Hart: Beijing is wielding the power of the calendar to its advantage 

Jeremy Mark: China has the advantage as talks continue—and the US risks losing the leverage it has

Tressa Guenov: The US needs to up its game to counter Chinese espionage

Markus Garlauskas: With “Taiwan is Taiwan,” Trump dispels fears he will fold to Xi on Taiwan

Reed Blakemore: The G7 must be ready for China to try this export control tactic again

Kit Conklin: A floor for the US–China trade relationship—for now

Joseph Webster: Promises of an Alaska-to-China energy acceleration may be overblown 

Dexter Tiff Roberts: Even the biggest victories from the meeting could prove hollow

A trade truce, if they can keep it

The long-awaited meeting between Trump and Xi delivered real results—and a lot of stepping back from ledges both sides created over the past year. China walks away with approximately the same tariff rate as most of its Asian neighbors, a welcome victory that will ensure its exports continue to provide ballast to a struggling domestic economy. The United States gets soybean purchases, which will alleviate some of the pressure the administration had been feeling from farmers—as a bipartisan vote against tariffs in the Senate showed this week. Key questions surround China’s one-year pause on rare earth export controls, including whether US allies will get the same exemption. Europe will be trying to negotiate a similar arrangement this week, but without the tariff leverage Trump has wielded effectively.

Meanwhile, it appears at least at this point there is no loosening of US export controls on high-end chips, something that was rumored throughout the day yesterday and created fears in Washington (as well as London, Tokyo, and Brussels) that China would be able to supercharge its artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities.

But many of these wins just get us back to where we were before the US-China trade wars of the spring. In fact, China still faces higher tariffs than it did when Trump came into office. And many of the most difficult issues in the relationship were left to be discussed another day. But will that day come? As we’ve seen over the past six weeks, it only takes one misstep or misinterpretation on either side for another round of tit-for-tat escalation and a full-blown trade war between the world’s largest economies.

Next week brings a critical Supreme Court hearing on the challenge to the president’s tariff authority—the very authority he’s used to levy tariffs on China and dozens of other countries. China and the rest of the world will be watching closely. But no matter what happens, Trump won’t fully relinquish what he sees as the best tool in his economic arsenal—and that means a trade truce is likely the best either side can hope for in the near future.

—Josh Lipsky is the chair of international economics at the Atlantic Council and the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He previously served as an advisor at the International Monetary Fund.

This relationship will get worse before it gets better

The United States and China are locked in what will likely be a decades-long rivalry that includes significant economic, technological, ideological, diplomatic, and military dimensions. Whether China buys a “tremendous amount of soybeans” is not the central issue and will not resolve the significant underlying issues at dispute between Washington and Beijing.

As just one example, shortly before meeting with Xi, Trump made an unspecified threat to start nuclear testing in response to the nuclear activities of China and Russia. It is unclear whether Trump meant nuclear explosive tests (which the United States has not done in decades) or the testing of nuclear delivery systems (which the United States does regularly).

Either way, expect the bilateral relationship to get worse before it gets better.

—Matthew Kroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the Council’s director of studies.

Beijing is wielding the power of the calendar to its advantage

The Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing delivered no surprises. As expected, China is rolling out the fentanyl measures it offered earlier this year, and the US side is ratcheting down tariffs accordingly. Both sides are pausing planned measures, with more clarity on the US side than the Chinese side on what that pause really means. China maintains the ability to yank back every concession it provided to the United States.

The real story is a forward-looking one, and a major win for Beijing: China’s biggest concern with Trump is his unpredictability, and they are using an extraordinary line up of pre-scheduled 2026 meetings to box him in and force a degree of, if not quite predictability, at least plannability in US-China relations. We now know what 2026 will look like. Trump plans to visit Beijing in April, and Xi will visit the United States for the Group of Twenty (G20) summit in December (or at least dangle the possibility of that visit). The next fourteen months will be consumed with preparations for those two meetings. Moreover, Trump’s planned visit to Beijing gives China the opportunity to script the next interaction and to press for a new wave of US concessions over the coming months to lay groundwork for a “good” meeting. A similar dynamic will play out next fall.

Chinese leaders are strategic, and their diplomats are strong. Just as in the run-up to this week’s meeting, they will know exactly what they want ahead of these 2026 summits, and exactly where their red lines are. There is still no indication that the US side has the same strategic clarity. The White House will need to prioritize developing it—fast.

—Melanie Hart is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub.

China has the advantage as talks continue—and the US risks losing the leverage it has

The relatively bland readout issued by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the meeting contained one profound understatement attributed to Xi: “China-U.S. economic and trade relations have experienced ups and downs recently, and this has also given the two sides some insights (italics mine).” For Xi, one core insight since Trump launched his campaign of punitive tariffs and export controls against China has been how much leverage his country has over the US economy and the US president himself. Beijing’s tight grip on rare-earth exports revealed the depth of US industrial vulnerability in a globalized economy. And the cutoff of Chinese soybean purchases underscored Trump’s own political exposure at a moment in which polls reveal Americans’ deepening unhappiness with the state of the economy.

However the White House chooses to portray the agreement in the coming weeks, there is no avoiding the fact that Beijing has tremendous advantages in the ongoing negotiations. The United States certainly still has its own leverage with China—especially in the realm of advanced semiconductors. But with semiconductor powerhouses such as Nvidia pressing the Trump administration to loosen controls on chip exports and China making rapid gains in the field, that US advantage could quickly evaporate.

—Jeremy Mark is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center. He previously worked for the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Wall Street Journal.

The US needs to up its game to counter Chinese espionage

Spying was not front and center at the meeting between Xi and Trump—at least according to the public readouts—but this should be an opportunity for Trump to take a clear and redoubled stance against China’s pernicious espionage activities and information operations against the United States and its allies. That adversaries spy on each other is, of course, not news (China recently accused the United States of a breach of its systems), but the diffuse nature of the Chinese espionage threat remains a serious challenge to US national and economic security that the Trump administration must address along with traditional trade and economic issues.

On any given day, it is reasonable to assume that China is almost certainly conducting multiple espionage attacks or operations against US national security infrastructure, personnel, or other critical infrastructure. There are hundreds of open-source documented cases of traditional espionage by China or its apparent agents in recent decades. On the cyber side, massive Chinese telecommunications breaches such as Salt Typhoon—assessed by multiple US agencies to be ongoing to this day—may have netted data from every single American and affected some eighty countries worldwide, according to experts. China’s sustained cyber breaches of US water, energy, transit, and other critical infrastructure systems are also well documented.

It is not hard to imagine China’s potential disruptive or coercive intentions with those infiltrations in the event of a military contingency or diplomatic crisis. China’s vast spying is not new, but AI’s exponential acceleration raises the stakes for the Trump administration. The Trump-Xi meeting is a reminder that the United States is behind and needs to up its game now against a determined and effective foe.

—Tressa Guenov is the director for programs and operations and a senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. She previously served as the principal deputy assistant secretary of defense (PDASD) for international security affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

With “Taiwan is Taiwan,” Trump dispels fears he will fold to Xi on Taiwan

TAIPEI—For days leading up to the summit, some commentators took it as a given that Taiwan would be on the agenda, while highlighting the risk that Xi would seek to use trade issues as leverage to extract concessions from Trump on Taiwan. Their speculation appeared to be validated when a Chinese government spokesperson warned just a day before the meeting that China would not rule out the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control—an ominous formulation that was not new, but a departure from a softer tone that Beijing had struck days before.

Meanwhile, international media reporting was rife with worries that Trump might change the US position on the status of Taiwan, even citing the fears of unnamed officials in the White House, despite Secretary of State Marco Rubio having already dismissed the idea of Taiwan being a bargaining chip in the talks. Taipei wisely played it cool, with Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung projecting confidence and dismissing these fears as unfounded.

Then, when Trump himself was pressed by a reporter not long before the meeting, he also spoke dismissively: “I don’t know that we will even speak about Taiwan . . . There’s not too much to ask about. Taiwan is Taiwan.” After the summit, Trump related that “Taiwan never came up,” suggesting that Xi hesitated, perhaps realizing that he did not have the leverage to get his way.

Though there may now be a “truce” of sorts on trade, as Josh Lipsky assesses, there is no “truce” in the ongoing struggle for the future of Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party’s intimidation campaign to subjugate the small, but strategically key, island democracy will therefore continue. Fortunately, it also seems that Washington’s support for maintaining the status quo of Taiwan’s self-rule will do so as well.

—Markus Garlauskas is the director of the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

The G7 must be ready for China to try this export control tactic again

Trump returns to Washington having secured an important pause in China’s exploitation of its leverage in rare earth element supply chains. An agreement to walk back China’s export controls to pre-September 29 levels for one year provides some urgently needed relief.

Yet while a cooling of temperatures in the rare earth supply chain is critical, there is a lesson to be learned in how China used export restrictions as a valuable lever in trade negotiations. Not only can one expect Beijing to use a similar tactic should US-China trade tensions resurface over the course of the next year, but it appears for now that the walk back applies strictly to the United States, with Europe and other Western partners still exposed to Beijing’s supply chain leverage as they negotiate their own deals. Further still, the scale of supply chain influence China displayed earlier this month by implementing export controls well beyond raw ores and precursors to manufactured components will likely remain a source of uncertainty for the private sector. The durability of this temporary pause and the subsequent risks of supply chain controls emerging once more will remain a top-of-mind issue.

This underscores the need to treat this deal as a moment of relief, but not a solution. Expect this administration to continue to aggressively pursue supply chain partnerships such as those recently announced with Australia and Japan. Meanwhile, as Group of Seven (G7) energy ministers meet this week in Toronto, critical mineral supply chains will be at the top of the agenda, with ambitions to better coordinate supply chain security among the G7 members becoming a major priority. If the G7 can find the right mix of coordinated investment, trade tools, and market supports, the opportunity for true supply chain resilience is possible. Otherwise, negotiating with Beijing to secure these brief moments of supply chain relief will become the norm—and come at the expense of a number of other priorities in the US-China relationship.

—Reed Blakemore is director with the Atlantic Council Global Energy Center, where he is responsible for the center’s research, strategy, and program development.

A floor for the US–China trade relationship—for now

Welcome to the new era of supply chain warfare, where geoeconomics are the frontlines of great power competition. The new US–China trade deal is a temporary cease-fire, not détente. Beijing has agreed to suspend its planned export controls on rare-earth elements—a move that had threatened to severely disrupt global manufacturing and reaffirmed China’s dominance in critical mineral supply chains. In exchange, Washington has paused the expansion of export restrictions on Chinese subsidiaries and eased select measures targeting the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors.

The deal sets a temporary floor for the US–China trade relationship, restoring a measure of predictability for industries navigating two competing economic systems. Yet it leaves the structural imbalances of that relationship largely intact. China retains significant leverage over rare-earth refining and processing, while the United States will continue to deploy economic security tools to safeguard control over critical and emerging technologies. These enduring realities point toward the eventual return of trade and national security barriers that will surpass the scope of this agreement. For example, there is no scenario in which the US Department of Defense and US defense industrial base should rely on China for critical minerals, even if Beijing’s export controls are delayed for twelve months.

As the Trump administration recalibrates its economic security strategy, both sides are likely to reimpose targeted restrictions—driven less by market efficiency than by strategic necessity. In the months ahead, the contest will continue to unfold in the gray zone between trade and security, where control over supply chains increasingly defines hard power. Global policymakers and industry leaders should prepare for renewed volatility in the year ahead.

—Kit Conklin is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s GeoTech Center.

Promises of an Alaska-to-China energy acceleration may be overblown

Many in the energy community will breathe a temporary sigh of relief at Beijing’s pausing of critical mineral controls for a year. But elsewhere, the Trump-Xi meeting in Busan produced more sizzle than steak.

Trump stated that “a very large scale transaction may take place concerning the purchase of Oil and Gas from the Great State of Alaska.” There are many reasons to be skeptical that a transaction will occur, or that it will be large-scale, however.

Even if such an oil deal materializes, it would be insignificant: Alaska produced only 421,000 barrels per day of crude oil in 2024, or 3 percent of total US output. Any deal with China over Alaskan crude won’t materially impact the US oil and gas complex.

China is also very unlikely to make large purchases of Alaskan liquefied natural gas (LNG). While an Alaskan project would enjoy advantages due to lower shipping distances and canal fees, industry analysts at Rapidan Energy hold that the Alaskan LNG project is not viable, as the second phase alone is projected to cost sixty billion dollars. That’s because Alaska lacks the infrastructure to compete with other players, such as US Gulf Coast states. Alaska has limited natural gas production, challenging geography, a small labor pool, and would require a long greenfield pipeline plus imported steel for both the pipeline and liquefaction facility.

Additionally, China never fulfilled its “Phase 1” purchase commitments, including for LNG, in a prior iteration of the trade war. US-to-China LNG shipments may well rise in the coming months and years, but they will be determined by market factors such as supply and price, not optics.

—Joseph Webster is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Center, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, and editor of the independent China-Russia Report.

Even the biggest victories from the meeting could prove hollow

A temporary trade truce with no real breakthroughs. That’s the best characterization of the first Xi-Trump face-to-face meeting since 2019.

That hasn’t stopped the US president from trying to spin it as a grand success, calling the meeting “amazing” and rating it a “twelve” on a scale from one to ten, speaking to reporters on the plane back to Washington. Even in his introductory comments before discussions began, Trump exuded positivity, calling Xi “a great leader of a great country” and a “great friend.”

Xi had a much less enthusiastic demeanor, barely smiling during the meeting. And when he stressed the importance of cooperation, he also cautioned that the two countries must avoid “falling into a vicious cycle of mutual retaliation.”

Xi’s most transparent attempt to make nice was his comment that China’s development “goes hand in hand” with the US president’s “vision to ‘make America great again.’”

The biggest victories—Beijing delaying for a year its plans to radically expand its controls over rare earths and Washington postponing plans to implement the “50 percent rule,” a move that would have put sanctions on a far larger list of Chinese companies by including their subsidiaries—could prove hollow.

The United States can always sanction new companies. And the rare earth licensing rules that Beijing put in place earlier this year haven’t gone away, which allows China to slow-walk permits for exports once again. Other supposed victories, such as China’s promise to purchase soybeans, just return things to the status quo of the last few years.

Finally, Trump’s comment that Chinese officials would be talking more to Nvidia going forward, and that Washington would only serve as a “referee,” hinted of a possible further loosening of restrictions on the sale of advanced semiconductors, which would be a huge win for Beijing.

— Dexter Tiff Roberts is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative, which is part of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He previously served for more than two decades as China bureau chief and Asia News Editor at Bloomberg Businessweek, based in Beijing.

5. With China Truce, U.S. National Security Controls Now Appear Up for Negotiation

​Are national security interests really on the table for negotiation?

​Excerpts;

People familiar with the situation said that the Commerce Department had described the change to others in the administration as correcting a loophole, and that officials in the Treasury Department and elsewhere had been surprised by the ultimate impact of the policy. A U.S. official said that Commerce and Treasury were coordinated in their actions.

Some U.S. officials and analysts argue the change has been needed to stop targets of the entity list from easily sidestepping the impact of U.S. sanctions by shifting business to their subsidiaries instead. Mr. Padilla said the standard was used for other government sanctions lists, like controls on military hardware administered by the State Department and financial sanctions administered by the Treasury Department.

“If you’re going to sanction a company but you don’t at the same time sanction majority-owned subsidiaries, that doesn’t make a lot of sense,” he said. “From a practical point of view, this was a loophole that needed to be closed.”

​Summary:

President Trump and Xi Jinping’s trade truce paused a key U.S. export-control rule expanding restrictions on Chinese tech firms. Analysts say it’s the first time national security measures became negotiable in trade talks—a win for Beijing. The U.S. also eased tariffs while China lifted rare-earth curbs and pledged fentanyl action.

With China Truce, U.S. National Security Controls Now Appear Up for Negotiation

NY Times · Ana Swanson · October 30, 2025

Some analysts say Beijing won a major victory in its trade talks: Getting the U.S. to withdraw a national security measure that previously was not under discussion.

By Ana Swanson

Ana Swanson covers international trade and the U.S.-China economic relationship.

Oct. 30, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/30/us/politics/china-trump-trade-security-chips-minerals.html

The Trump administration agreed to pause a new rule that would restrict trade with foreign companies that pose a national security threat.Credit...Gilles Sabrie for The New York Times

By

Ana Swanson covers international trade and the U.S.-China economic relationship.

Oct. 30, 2025

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Rather than advancing the U.S.-China relationship, the concessions that President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China agreed to in their meeting in South Korea on Wednesday appear to have largely rolled back the clock, returning to the terms of an earlier truce.

Mr. Trump agreed to reverse some of his tariffs and paused new fees on Chinese ships. China said it would suspend the rollout of rare earths restrictions introduced in October, and return to buying U.S. soybeans, in addition to a newer promise to crack down on shipments of chemicals used to make fentanyl.

But one of the reversals from the United States was more notable in the precedent it set. The Trump administration agreed to pause for one year a rule that expanded the number of Chinese companies restricted from access to advanced technology. The rule, issued just four weeks ago, extended the reach of the “entity list,” a kind of trade blacklist for foreign companies that pose a national security threat.

Former officials and analysts said Thursday that the move appeared to be one of the first concessions the United States had made on national security-related technology controls as part of a trade negotiation. They called it a potential breakthrough for the Chinese side, which has long pushed to negotiate with the United States over these types of measures, known as export controls.

Christopher Padilla, who served as an export control official in the George W. Bush administration, said it was a significant shift for U.S. policy. Chinese officials have consistently asked in talks with many presidential administrations for export control measures to be rolled back, he said.

“We all had the talking points,” Mr. Padilla said. “The first one is: ‘That’s a national security issue, and we’re not going to discuss it in a trade negotiation.’”

“Export controls have now become a tradable item in the relationship,” Mr. Padilla added. “You’ve discarded decades of precedent.”

Brett Fetterly, a principal at the Asia Group consultancy and the former national security adviser to Ben Sasse, the Republican former senator, said that Beijing had succeeded in this summit in its long-term goal of tying national security-focused export controls to broader trade negotiations.

“Technology competition now defines the U.S.-China relationship, and on this point President Xi secured key U.S. concessions,” Mr. Fetterly said.

A White House spokesman pushed back on the idea that the agreement was out of step with negotiations under prior administrations. “Any notion that President Trump is willing to make trade-offs between our national and economic security is flat-out false,” said Kush Desai, the deputy press secretary. “The administration made no reversals to America’s decades-old export control policies on any specific product or for any countries.”

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The administration appeared not to have made larger concessions on U.S. export controls that some critics had feared. As he flew to South Korea on Wednesday, Mr. Trump suggested that he would discuss the sale of Nvidia’s cutting-edge Blackwell with Mr. Xi, a proposal that drew swift rebukes from Republican and Democratic lawmakers. In remarks on his return flight, Mr. Trump said that he and Mr. Xi had discussed Chinese chip purchases, but “not the Blackwell.”

Many business groups praised a return to greater stability in the U.S.-China relationship, which would help encourage trade and growth. But some analysts said the Trump administration may have had little choice but to roll back U.S. technology controls given China’s chokehold on critical minerals. Last December, Beijing introduced its first curbs on rare earth mineral exports, which it expanded in April and again in October in response to Mr. Trump’s trade war.

China dominates the mining and processing of rare earth minerals, and the magnets made from them that are common in batteries and motors. The Chinese curbs threatened the supply chains of global makers of cars, planes, munitions and semiconductors, and some companies were forced to halt production lines. Scott Bessent, the Treasury secretary, had called the restrictions “a bazooka at the supply chains and the industrial base of the entire free world.”

With the renewed tensions with China this fall, industry executives say supplies of minerals and magnets have once again been running short.

Some analysts say that China’s decision to limit exports of rare earths was a natural consequence of Washington’s technology controls, which used a similar global licensing system to limit China’s access to advanced chips. After so many years of being the target of restrictions, China sought to develop powerful controls of its own, they say.

Ana Swanson

Times reporter covering the Trump tariffs

“I have been reporting on economics, trade and international relations for over a decade, from both China and the U.S. I aim to underpin my work with data and numbers, as well as give voice to the personal stories of people I encounter in my reporting.”

Here’s our latest reporting on economic policy and tariffs.

Emily Benson, the head of strategy at Minerva Technology Futures, a consultancy, said it was “sort of surprising” that the United States didn’t seem to anticipate that other countries would develop similar systems. She added, “It was just a matter of time.”

Other have pointed fingers at the Trump administration’s behavior toward China. They say it was Mr. Trump’s aggressive threats of tariffs this spring that gave the Chinese the opportunity to try out their new approach, and the administration’s lack of a coherent strategy that gave the Chinese an opening to press for long-desired changes.

Some have pointed to the waning influence of the National Security Council, which would typically coordinate strategy and policies on China. The N.S.C.’s influence has been greatly reduced in the Trump administration, after multiple officials were fired for suspicions of political disloyalty.

Various U.S. departments have sometimes appeared uncoordinated in their measures against China this year. And Chinese actions in response have seemed designed to telegraph the message that any measures taken by the United States to clamp down on China will now be aggressively matched by Beijing.

After Mr. Trump introduced high tariffs in April and China put in place its rare earth curbs, the two countries reached a tentative truce in Geneva in May. But the day after that meeting, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued new guidance saying that the use of A.I. chips made by Chinese tech firm Huawei anywhere in the world was an export control violation. The announcement rankled China and led it to clamp down on rare earth exports again.

The countries held a series of meetings in other European capitals this summer to try to stabilize the relationship. But shortly after a phone call between Mr. Trump and Mr. Xi in September, the United States released its rule extending the impact of the entity list to majority-owned subsidiaries, and the Chinese once again responded angrily. In October, Beijing imposed expansive global controls on the trade in minerals and products made with them.

Chinese officials claimed that U.S. measures like the 50 percent entity list rule had violated a consensus struck in their bilateral meetings. Some U.S. officials privately grumbled about the Commerce Department’s timing and lack of coordination. But publicly, the United States insisted it had not made promises to withhold the imposition of export controls.

In an interview on CNBC last week, Jamieson Greer, the U.S. trade representative, said that the Chinese were “trying out a lot of different narratives when the reality is, they just want to exert economic control on the world.”

“They’re using anything else that has happened as a pretext,” he said. He added that the United States had promised to reduce its tariffs in return for China allowing the free flow of rare earths. “We kept that promise, and they have not kept theirs.”

With the president’s meeting with Mr. Xi, the U.S. side appears to have made more explicit concessions. A White House spokesman confirmed Thursday that the United States had agreed to pause the expansion of the entity list to cover majority-owned subsidiaries for one year.

For some, the move is welcome. Some tech executives and lobbyists had criticized the 50 percent rule, saying the due diligence it requires is onerous or impossible.

Sean Stein, the president of the U.S.-China Business Council, which represents American companies doing business in China, said in a statement that the 50 percent rule’s reversal, and Beijing’s decision to pause its October rare earth controls, was “especially welcome news.” He also called the broader trade announcement “very encouraging.”

“America’s reduction of the fentanyl-related tariffs and China’s commitment to take strong action to curb fentanyl precursors have paved the way for a reopening of China’s market for U.S. agriculture and energy and a wider, mutually beneficial trade agreement,” Mr. Stein said.

The 50 percent rule greatly expanded the reach of the entity list, freezing trade for some companies. According to Wirescreen, a data platform focused on China, the rule means that the entity list has grown from roughly 1,300 China-related parties to more than 20,000.

People familiar with the situation said that the Commerce Department had described the change to others in the administration as correcting a loophole, and that officials in the Treasury Department and elsewhere had been surprised by the ultimate impact of the policy. A U.S. official said that Commerce and Treasury were coordinated in their actions.

Some U.S. officials and analysts argue the change has been needed to stop targets of the entity list from easily sidestepping the impact of U.S. sanctions by shifting business to their subsidiaries instead. Mr. Padilla said the standard was used for other government sanctions lists, like controls on military hardware administered by the State Department and financial sanctions administered by the Treasury Department.

“If you’re going to sanction a company but you don’t at the same time sanction majority-owned subsidiaries, that doesn’t make a lot of sense,” he said. “From a practical point of view, this was a loophole that needed to be closed.”

Ana Swanson covers trade and international economics for The Times and is based in Washington. She has been a journalist for more than a decade.

See more on: Donald Trump, Xi Jinping

NY Times · Ana Swanson · October 30, 2025

6. Trump Says He’s Not Planning Venezuela Strike

​Summary:

President Trump said he isn’t considering strikes on Venezuela, retracting earlier talk of potential ground attacks. Despite reported target planning and a Caribbean force buildup—including the USS Gerald R. Ford and F-35Bs—Congress pressed for oversight documents. Democrats criticized selective briefings, while officials framed actions as counter-narcotics pressure on Nicolás Maduro.

Trump Says He’s Not Planning Venezuela Strike

President had said recently the U.S. was considering strikes against targets in the country

By Lara Seligman

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Oct. 31, 2025 4:03 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/trump-says-hes-not-planning-venezuela-strike-d091c2fa

President Trump speaks to the media after arriving at Palm Beach International Airport on Friday. Elizabeth Frantz/Reuters

Quick Summary

• President Trump said he’s not considering military attacks in Venezuela, retracting earlier suggestions of possible ground strikes.View more

President Trump on Friday said he isn’t considering ordering military attacks in Venezuela, two weeks after suggesting ground strikes were possible.

Asked by reporters on Air Force One about reports that he is weighing airstrikes against Venezuela, Trump responded: “No, it’s not true.”

Trump said in the Oval Office on Oct. 15 that he was eyeing ground strikes. “We are certainly looking at land now because we’ve got the sea under control,” Trump said at the time. 

The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that the U.S. military has identified targets in Venezuela that include military facilities used to smuggle drugs. If Trump decides to move forward with airstrikes, the targets would be chosen to send a clear message to Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro that it is time to step down, U.S. officials said.

The Trump administration has been particularly focused on unsettling Maduro in recent weeks, ramping up efforts to cast the Venezuelan leader as the leader of a drug trafficking network, building up U.S. military forces in the region, and stepping up attacks on boats allegedly carrying drugs in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean.

In June, the president stated that he would wait two weeks before deciding to take military action against Iran, then ordered bomber strikes on Iranian nuclear sites two days later.

The carrier USS Gerald R. Ford will join warships already in the Caribbean. jonathan klein/AFP/Getty Images

The Trump administration has rapidly built up its military forces in the Caribbean in recent weeks, most recently sending America’s most advanced aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, and its accompanying warships. The carrier strike group will join eight warships already deployed to the region, as well as a squadron of F-35Bs in Puerto Rico, special operations forces and other military hardware. The Ford was still in the Mediterranean on Thursday.

In a rare bipartisan effort, the Senate’s leading defense lawmakers are demanding answers from the Pentagon, pressing for documents related to the strikes against the alleged drug boats.

Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Roger Wicker (R., Miss.) and Ranking Member Jack Reed (D., R.I.) said on Friday they have twice written to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth seeking copies of the execute orders, legal justifications and lists of designated terrorist organizations tied to the Defense Department’s actions against drug trafficking cartels.

In letters sent on Sept. 23 and Oct. 6, the senators cited statutory requirements under multiple National Defense Authorization Acts for congressional oversight of such operations. The Pentagon hasn’t yet provided the requested documents, the senators said in a statement.

Senate Democrats, including Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Mark Warner (D., Va.), this week also criticized the administration for briefing only Republicans on recent Caribbean strikes, saying the exclusion of Democrats undermines Congress’s oversight responsibilities and leaves them in the dark. “It’s not optional. It’s our freaking duty,” Warner told reporters Thursday, calling the administration’s explanation “bulls—.”

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com and Anvee Bhutani at anvee.bhutani@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 1, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Isn’t Planning Strike on Venezuela, President Says'.

7. Putin Brandishes Menacing Nuclear Weapons as Talks With U.S. Falter

​How close are we to seeing nuclear weapons employed? Did POTUS' testing comments influence Putin to think that he can justify the use of nuclear weapons or at least threaten the use?

Excerpts:

The timing may not have been coincidental, analysts say, and Mr. Putin’s point was clear: Given the serious threat of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the United States will ultimately need to respect Moscow’s power and negotiate — like it or not.

It’s a message the Kremlin has relied on in its brinkmanship with the United States dating back to the days of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union regularly emphasized that for the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, negotiation was a necessity, not an option. More recently, Moscow has underscored that attempts to isolate Russia, including with the recent U.S. sanctions on Russian oil producers, were doomed to fail.

“What they are trying to say is you cannot just sanction us in any way you please, we are a major nuclear power and you need to engage in talks,” said András Rácz, a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

Summary:

After President Trump canceled a planned summit and imposed new sanctions on Russia, Vladimir Putin announced tests of two nuclear-capable weapons—the Burevestnik cruise missile and the Poseidon underwater drone—signaling Moscow’s enduring nuclear leverage. Analysts see the timing as deliberate, underscoring Russia’s message that Washington must negotiate despite sanctions. The Kremlin seeks to fold nuclear and economic issues into a broader “package deal,” reviving Cold War–style brinkmanship. While the tests do not alter the strategic balance, their “doomsday” designs project menace and aim to compel engagement. Trump’s response hinting at renewed U.S. testing highlights the deepening nuclear tension between both powers.

Putin Brandishes Menacing Nuclear Weapons as Talks With U.S. Falter

NY Times · Paul Sonne · November 1, 2025

News Analysis

Touting new weapons tests, Moscow signals to Washington that it must contend with the Kremlin’s power and negotiate.

By Paul Sonne

Reporting from Berlin

Nov. 1, 2025, 5:03 a.m. ET

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/01/world/europe/putin-trump-ukraine-russia-nuclear-weapons.html

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and President Trump at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Anchorage in August.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By

Reporting from Berlin

Nov. 1, 2025, 5:03 a.m. ET

First came President Trump’s scrapping of a proposed summit in Budapest on the war in Ukraine and his imposition of sanctions on Russia.

Then came the announcements by President Vladimir V. Putin that Russia had successfully tested two menacing nuclear-capable weapons designed for possible doomsday combat against the United States.

The timing may not have been coincidental, analysts say, and Mr. Putin’s point was clear: Given the serious threat of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the United States will ultimately need to respect Moscow’s power and negotiate — like it or not.

It’s a message the Kremlin has relied on in its brinkmanship with the United States dating back to the days of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union regularly emphasized that for the world’s two biggest nuclear powers, negotiation was a necessity, not an option. More recently, Moscow has underscored that attempts to isolate Russia, including with the recent U.S. sanctions on Russian oil producers, were doomed to fail.

“What they are trying to say is you cannot just sanction us in any way you please, we are a major nuclear power and you need to engage in talks,” said András Rácz, a senior fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations.

Mr. Trump returned to the White House early this year determined to broker an end to the war in Ukraine. In the days since, Moscow has tried unsuccessfully to turn those talks into a wider negotiation that would encompass business, energy and nuclear matters, looking to strike a “package deal” that could be more beneficial to the Kremlin.

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“The only sector in which Russia is in near parity with the United States is of course weapons of mass destruction,” Mr. Rácz said. “So in order to have leverage, they have to include the nuclear question in the package deal. The Soviets did the same. The Soviet economy was incomparable to the scale of the U.S. economy in world trade. The real bargaining chip the Soviets had was their nuclear arsenal.”

So far, the effort by the Kremlin has failed, and Mr. Trump has signaled he won’t strike business or energy deals until Moscow ends the war. But nuclear weaponry is one area where Moscow may see an opening to draw in Washington.

In September, Mr. Putin proposed that Russia and the United States extend caps on long-range nuclear weapons for a year beginning in February 2026. Mr. Trump responded by calling the offer a “good idea.”

This week, Mr. Putin touted his new weapons first unveiled in 2018, which are designed to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. They would ensure that Russia can continue to threaten the United States with mutually assured destruction, regardless of Mr. Trump’s plans for an enhanced “Golden Dome” missile defense shield.

Last weekend, Mr. Putin described the results of a test on Oct. 21 of the Burevestnik, a low-flying, nuclear-propelled Russian cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Then, on Wednesday, the Russian leader said Moscow had tested the Poseidon, a long-range, nuclear-powered underwater drone.

The tests may have been planned well before the negative turn in relations between Mr. Putin and Mr. Trump.

“I don’t think that was linked to any kind of recent political developments,” said Pavel Podvig, an analyst based in Geneva who directs the Russian Nuclear Forces Project. He noted that Mr. Putin could have more directly threatened the United States in announcing the test results but did not.

Russia’s nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile was launched in Russian territory, in 2018, in this handout still image from video footage made available by the Russian Defense Ministry.Credit...Russian Defense Ministry Press Service

The weapons do not change the strategic balance between the United States and Russia.

“Russia since the mid ’60s has had the ability to destroy the United States with nuclear weapons,” said James M. Acton, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “That vulnerability is a fact not a choice.”

“And the fact that Russia is inventing other ways of doing that shouldn’t concern us any more than the basic reality of the nuclear balance always has,” he said.

But the design of the Burevestnik and the Poseidon, which both rely on nuclear reactors for propulsion, are particularly menacing. The Burevestnik has been called a “flying Chernobyl,” a reference to the power plant in Soviet Ukraine that became synonymous with nuclear disaster after a meltdown in 1986. A botched test of the weapon in 2019 off the coast of northern Russia caused nuclear contamination and killed several Russians.

The threat of nuclear contamination may also be designed to prompt Western leaders to engage. “I think this is kind of a madman strategy,” Mr. Rácz said. “You start developing really doomsday weapons, and you pretend you are really ready to use them.”

Vladimir M. Dzhabarov, deputy chairman of the international affairs committee in Russia’s upper chamber of Parliament, said in a state news interview on Friday that the tests have shown Western leaders that they must engage with Moscow.

“We demonstrated a desire to sit down and negotiate with the West, to end the confrontation, which had essentially become endless, and to begin to hear and listen to each other,” Mr. Dzhabarov said. “Because with a weapon like the Burevestnik in its arsenal, Russia essentially becomes invincible.”

Mr. Dzhabarov pointed to the demands the Kremlin had made before invading Ukraine and said that the West, faced with weapons like the Burevestnik, will need to come around to the idea “that maybe it’s time to listen to Russia’s arguments.”

It’s unclear whether Washington got that message. After Mr. Putin’s announcements, Mr. Trump wrote on social media that the United States would restart nuclear weapons testing “on an equal basis.” The comment started a round of speculation about whether Washington would test its first nuclear warhead explosion since 1992.

But Mr. Putin’s announcements this week were about testing delivery systems for nuclear warheads, not exploding the warheads themselves. Moscow last tested a nuclear warhead in 1990.

Paul Sonne is an international correspondent, focusing on Russia and the varied impacts of President Vladimir V. Putin’s domestic and foreign policies, with a focus on the war against Ukraine.

See more on: Russia-Ukraine War, Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump

8. Xi Delivers Veiled Warning to Nations Not to Take the U.S.’s Side

​A kind of bipolar world in Cold War 2.0? The Dark Quad or CRInk versus the US and Democratic nations with each side trying to compete for supporters?

Excerpts:

Mr. Xi’s remarks on supply chains, Mr. Song continued, were a way to urge governments not to follow in America’s footsteps in using tariffs, imposing export restrictions and making excessive appeals for national economic security.

“Was the stability of the rare earth supply chain a concern for most regional members before?” Mr. Song said. “Clearly not. So when did it become an issue? It arose after the United States continuously imposed trade suppression and export controls on China.”

​Summary:

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Gyeongju, Xi Jinping warned nations against aligning with the U.S. and urged them to “resist unilateral bullying,” promoting cooperation and stable supply chains. His message, however, contrasted sharply with China’s own economic coercion, especially proposed export controls on rare earth minerals. While fresh from a trade truce with President Trump that paused those controls and resumed U.S. soybean purchases, Xi sought to reinforce China’s centrality in global trade through initiatives like Belt and Road and regional trade pacts. Japan’s new prime minister challenged Xi on human rights and militarization, highlighting persistent regional distrust.

Xi Delivers Veiled Warning to Nations Not to Take the U.S.’s Side

NY Times · Berry Wang · October 31, 2025

At an Asia-Pacific summit, the Chinese leader urged countries to “resist unilateral bullying,” an appeal that seemed at odds with his country’s recent actions.

By David Pierson and Berry Wang

David Pierson reported from Gyeongju, South Korea, and Berry Wang from Hong Kong

Oct. 31, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/31/world/asia/china-apec-trump-trade.html

President Trump and Xi Jinping, China’s leader, on TV at a restaurant in Gyeongju. Mr. Xi was the sole superpower leader at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit with Mr. Trump gone.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

By David Pierson and

David Pierson reported from Gyeongju, South Korea, and Berry Wang from Hong Kong

Oct. 31, 2025Updated 7:51 a.m. ET

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China’s leader Xi Jinping, the de facto geopolitical heavyweight at an Asia-Pacific economic summit, on Friday courted countries for trade and investment, but also implicitly warned them not to join the United States in reducing the world’s reliance on Chinese supply chains.

President Trump’s departure from South Korea a day earlier meant that Mr. Xi was the sole superpower leader at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in the city of Gyeongju. At the opening of the meeting, Mr. Xi could be seen smiling and shaking hands with world leaders and economic and finance ministers who came up to greet him.

Mr. Xi seized his time in the spotlight to pitch China, the world’s second-largest economy and a manufacturing powerhouse, to a room that included the leaders of Japan, Canada, Australia and the host, South Korea. (But not everyone in the room was an easy sell.)

He met with Prime Minister Mark Carney, recently spurned by President Trump, and invited him to visit China. He even had what sounded like a candid meeting with Japan’s new leader, Sanae Takaichi, an outspoken critic of China, who appeared to show the limits of Mr. Xi’s outreach.

Leaders and other representatives of the member-economies of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation gathered in Gyeongju.Credit...Yonhap News Agency, via Reuters

Earlier, in a speech at the opening of the summit, Mr. Xi called for the strengthening of industrial supply chains, making a veiled criticism of attempts by the West to shift factories away from a dependence on China. He said that China would “adhere to the principle of ‘joining hands’ rather than ‘letting go,’ and ‘extending chains’ rather than ‘breaking chains.’”

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in East Asia, North America and Oceania? , and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

In a separate speech to business leaders that was read out by a Chinese representative, Mr. Xi also took an indirect swipe at the United States, saying that APEC economies should “oppose protectionism, resist unilateral bullying, and prevent the world from returning to the law of the jungle.”

That appeal for solidarity, however, was somewhat undercut by China’s recent actions. Earlier this month, China proposed sweeping new export controls on rare earth minerals that would have given Beijing extraordinary power over other nations. China dominates about 90 percent of the world’s supply of the minerals, which are vital for the production of virtually all modern technologies like semiconductors, batteries and jets.

China had introduced those rare earth controls in response to U.S. trade measures, but the moves drew alarm in other countries.

Mr. Xi was arriving at the regional summit on something of a diplomatic high, a day after talks with Mr. Trump that resulted in a truce, and, importantly, China had agreed to put on hold the new export controls on rare earths. Mr. Trump left the talks almost effusive with praise for Mr. Xi, effectively bolstering Mr. Xi’s argument that he is a steady hand seeking stability.

On Friday, though, Mr. Xi may have met a more openly critical interlocutor in Japan’s new prime minister. Ms. Takaichi told reporters that she raised Japan’s concerns about the export controls on rare earths; territorial disputes in the East China Sea; and the detention of Japanese nationals in China on espionage charges.

She said she had expressed “serious concerns” about China’s militarization of the South China Sea and about human rights abuses in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang region.

“It is true that there are outstanding issues and differences of opinion,” Ms. Takaichi said, “but that is why it is important that we speak directly and frankly.”

Dylan Loh, an associate professor of public policy and global affairs at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said that China’s rare earth controls were “an exercise of geopolitical leverage in the context of the U.S.-China economic conflict which will have not gone unnoticed.”

Song Guoyou, an expert on U.S.-China economic relations at Fudan University in Shanghai, defended China’s rare earths export regime as a necessary response to U.S. tariffs on China and restrictions on American technology.

“These actions have destabilized the regional flow of trade and production,” Mr. Song said. “This is precisely why China is calling for joint efforts to maintain the stability and smooth operation of these chains.”

Mr. Xi’s remarks on supply chains, Mr. Song continued, were a way to urge governments not to follow in America’s footsteps in using tariffs, imposing export restrictions and making excessive appeals for national economic security.

“Was the stability of the rare earth supply chain a concern for most regional members before?” Mr. Song said. “Clearly not. So when did it become an issue? It arose after the United States continuously imposed trade suppression and export controls on China.”

China’s leader Xi Jinping at the meeting on Friday, where he called for the strengthening of industrial supply chains, subtly chiding attempts by the West to shift factories away from depending on China.

Mr. Xi’s meeting with Mr. Trump on Thursday in Busan, a city roughly 50 miles south of Gyeongju, resulted in a reduction in some U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods, a suspension of port fees on Chinese ships and the delay of U.S. export controls that would have prevented more Chinese companies from acquiring American technology.

In return, China agreed to restart purchases of American soybeans and pause its new export controls on rare earths. The United States said China also agreed to do more to curb the flow of precursor chemicals used in making fentanyl.

Mr. Loh, the expert in Singapore, noted that Mr. Xi used the forum to promote “practical cooperation” in the region that would have included China.

Mr. Xi pointed to the Belt and Road, a Chinese global infrastructure project, and two trade agreements, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Such pacts would help China counter U.S. efforts to cut Chinese companies out of trade.

Many regional countries find themselves caught between the demands of Washington and Beijing. Their best bet is often to improve ties with both sides in the hopes of extracting more benefits, analysts said.

In just the last week, Mr. Trump signed trade deals with Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia, while China enhanced its trade pact with a Southeast Asian group of 11 countries.

“It’s a question of Southeast Asian countries doing what they always do: Make whatever accommodations are needed to ensure robust relations with both the United States and China,” said Stephen Olson, a former U.S. trade negotiator who is now a senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.

Javier C. Hernández and Kiuko Notoya contributed reporting from Tokyo.

David Pierson covers Chinese foreign policy and China’s economic and cultural engagement with the world. He has been a journalist for more than two decades.

NY Times · Berry Wang · October 31, 2025

9. NATO ally Estonia urges preparation for "different kind of war" with Putin

​All the buzzwords come to mind: hybrid warfare, gray zone, irregular warfare, political warfare, etc.. Terminology aside, the question is can the free world and democratic nations defend against these threats short of war effectively? Is the 5% defense spending goal going to be sufficient for defending against these malign activities?

Excerpts:

One issue that remains at the forefront of discussions between the U.S. and European allies is the defense spending commitment among NATO allies. Trump even in his first administration took issue with the lack of defense spending among NATO members, which initially was 2 percent of a country's GDP, then increased to 3 percent before NATO members in June agreed to a new minimum spend of 5 percent.

Estonia and the other Baltic states are among the highest spenders in NATO on defense developments, but some members, such as Spain, have lagged on meeting those targets. Trump specifically took issue with Spain's shortfall, saying that NATO should reconsider the country's membership if it does not meet its commitment.

​Summary:

Estonian President Alar Karis warned that Europe must prepare for a “different kind of war” with Vladimir Putin—one fought through hybrid tactics, not conventional invasion. Russia’s drone incursions, GPS jamming, and airspace violations over NATO countries like Estonia and Lithuania exemplify this ongoing gray-zone aggression. Karis said Putin continually “tests” the West but is unlikely to trigger NATO’s Article 5 directly. He urged vigilance, deterrence, and stronger defense spending as Europe adapts to new forms of warfare. Skeptical of Trump’s stalled peace efforts with Putin, Karis stressed that while Ukraine and the West seek peace, “Putin doesn’t want peace.”

NATO ally Estonia urges preparation for "different kind of war" with Putin

Oct 26, 2025 at 06:00 AM EDT

By Peter Aitken

Politics Weekend Editor

https://www.newsweek.com/nato-ally-estonia-urges-preparation-for-different-kind-of-war-with-putin-10939809

Newsweek

Europe must meet the challenges of Russian aggression as a “different kind of war,” Estonian President Alar Karis said during an interview with Newsweek.

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 after claiming the defense of the breakaway regions Luhansk and Donetsk, launching an attack across the Eastern European country. Should no peace deal materialize in the next few months, the war will enter its fourth year, with both countries losing tens of thousands of men to the conflict.

Ukraine has relied heavily on NATO assistance, receiving weapons and training on weapons including F-16 fighter planes, while seeking an additional boost with U.S.-produced Tomahawk missiles that would allow it to strike deep into Russia, although the United States has so far resisted that step.

Estonia borders Russia as part of the Baltic States, which also includes Latvia and Lithuania. The country is a little over 400 miles from Moscow and around just 97 miles from St. Petersburg.

Russia over the past two months has allegedly harassed neighboring countries that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), most recently flying aircraft over Lithuania and Estonia’s airspace in what has been labeled a blatant breach of sovereignty and international law.

The lack of any direct military action against those nations has raised questions about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s long-term goals and thinking, which Karis said is merely part of the unusual way that Russia now wages war.

President of the Republic of Estonia Alar Karis, pose during the Artificial Intelligence Action Summit at the Grand Palais in Paris on February 11. (P...

“I think Russia generates anxiety everywhere,” Karis said, adding that “these drones are already in Denmark and other places, so we should all be prepared” for “a different kind of war.”

“Of course, we have certain experience from the past with Russia, we know something, but nevertheless…it's our concern as a Western world, and this war in Ukraine, it is not only a war against Ukraine, it's against Europe, it's against the whole Western world,” the Estonian president said.

“Putin is testing all the time,” Karis said. “We have his drone in Poland, drones in Romania, in Denmark. We have this fighter jet inclusion in Estonia—this is a hybrid war. There's also GPS jamming and so forth. This is what Russia is doing.”

“I don't believe that Russia is going to attack a NATO country or any other country in Europe, but still, we have to be prepared to deter, but Russia doesn't test Article 5 on any country,” he noted.

Karis also highlighted that “there are certain elements” of war in play, but that life has generally continued as if there is no war —even in Ukraine.

Estonia's President Alar Karis holds a joint press conference with the NATO secretary general at the NATO headquarters in Brussels on September 3. (Ph...

President Donald Trump has pursued a peace deal between Russia and Ukraine since before even returning to office earlier this year. Trump reached out to Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the weeks following his victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election.

But no deal has materialized, and Trump at times over the past few months has mused whether Putin is “tapping me along” and actually seeks peace. Most recently, Trump had agreed to meet with Putin in a second face-to-face meeting after their August summit in Alaska, but he called the meeting off just days later.

Trump told reporters aboard Air Force One on Saturday that he would only seek a meeting with Putin if he believed he could walk away with a deal, having come away from the August meeting empty-handed, a move that brought Trump heavy criticism following the lavish red carpet treatment he provided to Putin for the visit.

Karis remains skeptical a deal will materialize, telling Newsweek that “Putin, we know it already for a long time, Putin doesn't want peace, that's for sure.”

“It's very difficult to predict what's the next step, but one is sure – Ukraine wants peace, we want peace … everybody wants peace, but Putin doesn't,” Karis said.

Estonia's President Alar Karis (C) chairs the 20th Arraiolos Group Meeting in Tallinn on October 10. (Photo by Raigo Pajula/AFP via Getty Images)

One issue that remains at the forefront of discussions between the U.S. and European allies is the defense spending commitment among NATO allies. Trump even in his first administration took issue with the lack of defense spending among NATO members, which initially was 2 percent of a country's GDP, then increased to 3 percent before NATO members in June agreed to a new minimum spend of 5 percent.

Estonia and the other Baltic states are among the highest spenders in NATO on defense developments, but some members, such as Spain, have lagged on meeting those targets. Trump specifically took issue with Spain's shortfall, saying that NATO should reconsider the country's membership if it does not meet its commitment.

Spanish Defense Minister Margarita Robles said earlier this month that the U.S. armed forces were “well aware” of Spain's commitment to NATO.

Karis urged patience with NATO members and their timeline to meet their commitments, noting that Germany just a few years ago was not meeting even the 2 percent minimum, but that the country "changed completely the attitude of defense and defense industry" and is now building up its military capabilities to meet its commitments.

"It's probably the same with Spain," Karis said, adding that Estonia has met the 5 percent commitment "not because it is a nice number, but because it in our NATO defense program...and what we can do as a small country is lead as an example."

"I'm telling my Portugal colleagues and to others that you should also put more on resources," he said, stressing that "different countries are in different situations, so things won't happen overnight" and "these countries and leaders are smart enough to move in the right direction."

Newsweek

10. Beijing’s New Approach to Taiwan

​Unrestricted warfare and the three warfares (psychological, legal and media/public opinion warfare) plus military power are operationalized for Taiwan.  

Are the Chinese demonstrating for us a whole of government holistic, interagency approach to execution its strategy through campaigning?

​Excerpts:

Across legal, military, social, and political dimensions, Beijing has engineered a shift in its approach to Taiwan. It is difficult to gauge what level of coordination exists between the PLA/CMC, the TAO, the MPS, and other relevant parts of the system on a unified strategy. But in each of these areas—with the possible exception of military gray-zone activity (though not overall PLA pressure)—the ratchet has tightened. Whether this constitutes a “new starting point,” in TAO director Song Tao’s words, remains to be borne out. For now Beijing is making its intentions clear, seeing no reason to stop forging ahead in its pursuit of unification.

​Summary:

Arran Hope writes that Beijing has intensified its multiple domain campaign (as opposed to the new US doctrine of multi-domain) against Taiwan in 2025, combining legal warfare, information control, political influence, and military recalibration. China’s first criminal probe of a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker marks an escalation in lawfare, while PLA tactics have shifted from constant gray-zone pressure to a buildup phase under Vice Chair Zhang Youxia. The Taiwan Affairs Office expanded propaganda, promoting “Taiwan’s inevitable return” and courting Taiwan’s new Kuomintang chair, Cheng Li-wun, who seeks engagement with Beijing. Coordinated or not, these efforts signal a tightening coercive strategy: legal intimidation, cognitive warfare, and political manipulation aimed at advancing unification.

Beijing’s New Approach to Taiwan

Publication: China Brief Volume: 25 Issue: 20

By: Arran Hope

October 31, 2025 05:32 PM Age: 15 hours

https://jamestown.org/program/beijings-new-approach-to-taiwan/

jamestown.org · Arran Hope ·

Executive Summary:

• In 2025, Beijing has intensified its approach to Taiwan across legal, military, discourse, and political dimensions.
• In October, a local public security bureau opened investigation into a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker for the first time, enhancing its legal warfare tactics against the democratic state.
• Purges at the top of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may have precipitated a tactical switch away from He Weidong’s approach, which emphasized persistent gray-zone activities, toward Zhang Youxia’s expressed preference for buying time to build up military capacity.
• The Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) has ramped up its media and social media presence in recent weeks, while other parts of the messaging apparatus are foregrounding the phrase “Taiwan’s inevitable return” across official media channels.
• The new chair of the Kuomintang, Cheng Li-wun, has shown a willingness to engage with Beijing. She exchanged letters with General Secretary Xi Jinping, and sent a newly appointed vice chair to meet with TAO director Song Tao, who announced a “new starting point” in their relations.
• Beijing sees its relationship with the United States as a key variable influencing its behavior toward Taiwan.

Beijing is shifting its approach to Taiwan. Over the course of 2025, it has intensified legal and cognitive pressure toward its small democratic neighbor, advanced a strategy of political warfare, and adapted its military posture. Several factors have informed this shift. Personnel changes within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may have played a role. Political developments within Taiwan also likely contributed. And behind all these considerations are the position of the United States under the new administration of President Donald Trump. As General Secretary Xi Jinping has often pointed out, U.S.-PRC relations are “one of the most important bilateral relations in the world” (世界上最重要的双边关系之一) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 16, 2024).

A question remains about whether Beijing’s evolving approach constitutes a change of degree or of kind. Some of the actions taken this year, especially in the legal domain, have relied on instruments that the PRC has created over the past few years for this purpose. Shifts in military posture may similarly have as much to do with the availability of new capabilities coming—or current capabilities meeting capacity limits—than with tactical changes. Possible avenues for political influence, chiefly through the nationalist Kuomintang, similarly are just now becoming clear following the election in October of a new party chair. Whichever the case may be, the general trend of Beijing’s actions is the same: toward greater coercion and a ratcheting up of pressure across all domains.

Beijing Steps up Lawfare With Puma Shen Investigation

On October 28, Chongqing City’s public security bureau announced that it was opening an investigation into the “diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ activist Puma Boyang [Puma Shen]” (“台独”顽固分子沈伯洋). Shen is a member of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. He is also a co-founder of the Kuma Academy (Black Bear Academy; 黑熊學院), a Taiwanese non-profit civil defense organization. [1] According to the bureau’s announcement, public security officials will “resolutely crack down on Puma Shen’s criminal activities aimed at splitting the nation” (为坚决打击沈伯洋 … 分裂国家犯罪活动) (People’s Public Security News, October 28).

This is the first time PRC authorities have opened a criminal investigation into a sitting Taiwanese lawmaker. But it is not the first time that the PRC has sought to use lawfare to harass Puma Shen or his family. In October 2024, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) added Puma Shen to a list of “diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ activists,” according to the announcement. In March 2025, the TAO relaunched a webpage (originally introduced the preceding year) for reporting “malicious acts of ‘Taiwan independence’ separatists and accomplices persecuting fellow Taiwanese” (‘台独’打手、帮凶迫害台湾同胞恶劣行) (TAO, August 2, 2024). And in June, the office unveiled sanctions against a company owned by Shen’s father (TAO, June 5). This latter measure is part of Beijing’s long history of using intimidation and coercive techniques against the family members of its critics in an attempt to silence them (The Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2018; Council on Foreign Relations, November 23, 2021; Human Rights Watch, May 4; Amnesty International, accessed October 31).

PRC authorities have used law enforcement to pursue additional targets this year. In June, a separate Public Security Bureau, this time in Guangzhou, offered a reward of renminbi (RMB) 10,000 ($1,400) for information leading to the apprehension of 20 retired and active personnel in Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). This was the first known instance of PRC public security authorities targeting Taiwanese military personnel via law enforcement framework (China Brief, July 25).

The legal basis for the bureau’s investigation into Puma Shen include provisions of the PRC’s Criminal Law (刑法) and the Opinions on Punishing Diehard ‘Taiwan Independence’ Activists for Crimes of Secession and Inciting Secession (关于依法惩治“台独”顽固分子分裂国家、煽动分裂国家犯罪的意见) (China Law Translate, June 21, 2024). The latter opinions were drafted collectively by the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of State Security, and Ministry of Justice and released in mid-2024. Laws invoked in other cases include the Cybersecurity Law (网络安全法), the Counter-Espionage Law (反间谍法), and the Anti-Secession Law (反分裂国家法). The PRC has little ability currently to enforce its laws extraterritorially in Taiwan. But as with other legal instruments drafted to apply beyond the PRC’s borders, these opinions have symbolic force and psychological weight. And while they may have little effect on dampening Puma Shen’s individual efforts to enhance Taiwan’s resilience, they may well affect the considerations of others who might wish to speak out against Beijing.

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) now fears that the next step Beijing could take is to leverage Interpol and issue an arrest warrant for Puma Shen (CNA, October 30). This would not be unprecedented. The PRC’s Ministry of Public Security has issued a number of “red notices” in recent years, not against criminals, but against critics of its regime (Human Rights Watch, September 25, 2017; Safeguard Defenders, October 23, 2024; Red Notice Monitor, February 24; International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, April 25).

Personnel Changes Behind PLA’s Tactical Switch

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also appears to have changed its approach in recent months. In 2024, the percentage of aerial sorties by the PLA Air Force that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait was not markedly higher than the previous year. The same was true for the frequency of peak incursion periods. Analysts have argued that this plateauing could indicate that the operational capacity of the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command Air Force had reached its limits (China Brief, January 17). PLA activity so far in 2025 has not provided dispositive evidence of this thesis. Instead, there has been a notable slowdown in recent PLA air and maritime activities around Taiwan, according to Ma Cheng-kun, director of the Research Project on China’s Defense Affairs (RCDA). [2] Not only have the scale and frequency of activity around the Taiwan Strait decelerated, but August—a typical peak time for drills and exercises—was relatively quiet this year.

One potential reason for this change relates to personnel changes. In March, Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice Chairman He Weidong (何卫东) disappeared (his expulsion from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was confirmed on October 17) (China Brief, October 17). He had been responsible for planning and executing the PLA’s exercises encircling Taiwan following U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to in August 2022, after which he was promoted to CMC vice chair. Following his promotion, He oversaw the military’s Political Work Department, which emerged as a key driver of the PLA’s gray-zone operations. But his tenure also coincided with heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the election in Taiwan of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) president for a third consecutive term, and worsening relations with the United States, including over Taiwan. He’s downfall may not be a direct result of his handling of PLA activities toward Taiwan, but Xi Jinping may not have appreciated heightened instability in the Taiwan Strait and a lack of success in intimidating Taiwan’s public.

Since He’s disappearance, the CMC’s other vice chair, Zhang Youxia (张又侠), likely has had more influence over the PLA’s approach to Taiwan. Ma Cheng-kun argues that Zhang is more pragmatic than He, and sees buying time to build capabilities as a priority, instead of escalating tensions through persistent gray-zone operations. New capabilities have been detected in recent months, which lends credence to this argument. Some have been deployed for testing and others used for training. These include a Type 072 tank landing ship, pontoon-style landing barges, a Chinese-flagged tug boat circumnavigating Taiwan, and large roll-on/roll-off cargo ships repositioned to Fujian Province, across the strait from Taiwan.

Influence Operations Intensify

If military gray-zone operations have reduced in salience in recent months, the same cannot be said for the PRC’s approach in the social media and discourse domains. Influence efforts on social media stepped up on October 18, when the Taiwan Affairs Office launched a Facebook page. Across its first two weeks, the TAO has been active, posting multiple times daily; though most of the comments and reactions under its posts suggest that it will not succeed in winning the hearts and minds of Taiwanese (Facebook/TAOspokesperson, accessed October 23). [3] The office has also doubled the frequency of its press conferences and appointed a new spokesperson, Peng Qing’en (彭庆恩), who has been working on Taiwan issues since 1995 (CNA, October 29). In traditional media, the TAO also published a trilogy of articles with Xinhua under the pseudonym Zhong Taiwen (钟台文) to coincide with “Taiwan Retrocession Day” (Xinhua, October 26, October 27, October 28). These changes within the TAO could signal a desire to emphasize the material benefits of warmer cross-strait ties. For instance, Peng, the new spokesperson, remains head of the office’s economic bureau. One of the Xinhua articles, meanwhile, highlighted the positive economic returns that national unification would bring.

These supposed carrots are also coupled with rhetorical sticks. A PRC television drama about Taiwan has recently popularized the phrase “Taiwan’s inevitable return” (台湾必归) (Xinhua, October 24). The phrase has been around for a number of years. Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) used it at a press conference in 2022. And CCTV unveiled a poster featuring the phrase in mid-2024. But its use in the show “Silent Honor” (沉默的荣耀) has driven its promotion, to the extent that it has now been used by an official at the Ministry of National Defense (MND). Its mention came at a press conference hosted by the Office for International Military Coordination (OIMC; 国际军事合作办公室). The OIMC is in part responsible for foreign intelligence and information operations and is directly subordinate of the CMC. [4] The office spokesperson used a question about the TV show to state that “Taiwan’s inevitable return is an unstoppable force. The unfinished cause of our martyrs shall be fulfilled” (台湾必归，势不可挡，先烈们未竟的事业必将完成). He also argued that President Lai Ching-te (賴清德) was positioning himself “on the opposite side of history” (到历史的对立面) and would “inevitably be buried by the tide of history and face the most severe judgment of justice” (必将被历史潮流埋葬，受到正义最严厉的审判) (MND, October 30).

The press conference also provided an opportunity for further intimidation. A state media journalist noted that a commercial satellite had recently released multiple high-definition satellite images of Taiwan, in which “every street in Taiwan is clearly visible” (台湾的每条街道都清晰可见). The journalist then wondered whether, given such clear images were available from commercial satellites, the PLA’s military satellites are even more precise. The spokesperson simply responded that it is “perfectly normal for Chinese satellites to observe the beautiful landscapes of Taiwan, China” (中国的卫星看看中国台湾的大好河山很正常) (MND, October 30).

The KMT’s ‘New Starting Point’ With the CCP

Taiwan’s domestic politics has also provided fertile ground for advancing influence. October saw a former spokeswoman for the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), Ma Chih-wei (馬治薇), handed a two-year sentence for taking CCP money to run as a legislator in 2024 and providing information to her CCP handlers, including a list of contacts for central government agencies and business cards for personnel involved in national security (UDN, October 16). But perhaps the most significant change this year is the KMT’s recent election of a new party chair.

The arrival of Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) as chairwoman of the KMT could herald a new approach for the CCP. Cheng, who identifies as Chinese (“我是中國人”), received a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping, to which she responded in kind. According to Xinhua, in her letter she called for “opening up a grand future for national rejuvenation (为民族复兴开辟宏伟前程) (China Brief, October 4; Xinhua, October 19). To provide a sense of Cheng’s politics, she used her first interview with international media to double down on her stance that Russia is a democracy and Putin a “democratically elected” (民主選舉產生的) leader (DW, October 30). Her first appointments also indicate her desire to engage with the CCP. At an October 28 meeting with the TAO’s director Song Tao (宋濤), her new vice chair Hsiao Hsu-chen (蕭旭岑) echoed the language from her letter to Xi and criticized Taiwan’s administration. Song responded by saying that they were “Standing at a new starting point” (站在新的起点上).

Cheng is content to call for unification, but her statements to date suggest that she believes unification can be achieved on terms other than those dictated by Beijing. This is not what the CCP means when it talks of unification. As laid out in a recent op-ed by the PRC’s consul in Denpasar, Indonesia, reunification means “fully sharing the dignity and honor of the People’s Republic of China on the international stage” (将来海峡两岸实现统一后，海内外台湾同胞将更能够与全国各族人民一道，充分共享中华人民共和国在国际上的尊严与荣誉) (PRC Consulate in Denpasar, Indonesia , October 25). The Republic of China is not mentioned.

Conclusion

Across legal, military, social, and political dimensions, Beijing has engineered a shift in its approach to Taiwan. It is difficult to gauge what level of coordination exists between the PLA/CMC, the TAO, the MPS, and other relevant parts of the system on a unified strategy. But in each of these areas—with the possible exception of military gray-zone activity (though not overall PLA pressure)—the ratchet has tightened. Whether this constitutes a “new starting point,” in TAO director Song Tao’s words, remains to be borne out. For now Beijing is making its intentions clear, seeing no reason to stop forging ahead in its pursuit of unification.

Notes

[1] Puma Shen has previously written for China Brief (China Brief, February 16, 2024).

[2] The information in this section comes from a paper that Ma Cheng-kun titled “China’s Military Posture Toward Taiwan” delivered at the International Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in 2025: Implications for China and Cross-Strait Relations. The conference, hosted by the MAC, was held in Taipei on October 21, 2025.

[3] Most comments either troll the TAO or contain pro-Taiwan content. And on the account’s first post, by far the largest proportion of engagements were “angry” reactions.

[4] Miller, Frank, Tung Ho, Kenneth Allen, and Arran Hope, eds. The People’s Liberation Army as Organization Volume 3.0. Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown Foundation; Vienna: Exovera, 2025. p.85.

[5] The press conference also provided an opportunity for further intimidation. A state media journalist noted that a commercial satellite had recently released multiple high-definition satellite images of Taiwan, in which “every street in Taiwan is clearly visible” (台湾的每条街道都清晰可见). The journalist then wondered whether, given such clear images were available from commercial satellites, military satellites are even more precise. The spokesperson simply responded that it is “perfectly normal for Chinese satellites to observe the beautiful landscapes of Taiwan, China” (中国的卫星看看中国台湾的大好河山很正常).

jamestown.org · Arran Hope ·

11. Opinion | Zelensky Is Winning Trump Voters Over

​Summary:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has successfully regained support among former President Donald Trump voters by shifting his outreach toward conservative media—such as the Ben Shapiro Show and Newsmax—and emphasizing Ukraine’s strategic importance aligned with U.S. interests. Polls show a notable uptick in approval and military-aid support from religious conservatives and Trump-leaning Republicans

Opinion | Zelensky Is Winning Trump Voters Over

WSJ

Polling shows Ukraine re-emerging as a Republican priority.

By Steven Moore and Colby Barrett

Oct. 30, 2025 12:27 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/zelensky-is-winning-trump-voters-over-72d5f6c1?mod=hp_opin_pos_6

Volodymyr Zelensky, Oct. 24. Thomas Krych/Zuma Press

Support for military aid for Ukraine is surging among President Trump’s voters, due in part to a shift in President Volodymyr Zelensky’s strategy.

In March 2022, 67% of Trump voters viewed Mr. Zelensky favorably. But between millions of dollars of Russian disinformation directed against him, Mr. Trump’s unflattering accusations and Mr. Zelensky’s own missteps, that figure dropped to 19% by March 2025.

The most obvious misstep came last year, when Mr. Zelensky appeared with Kamala Harris surrogates at a campaign-style event in Pennsylvania, 44 days before the election and 155 days after House Speaker Mike Johnson put his job on the line to pass the $61 billion Ukraine aid bill.

Mr. Zelensky’s team ignored Mr. Trump’s voters. For years certain conservative media personalities turned conservatives against Ukraine, while pro-Ukraine forces respond on CNN, MSNBC or “60 Minutes.”

Now Mr. Zelensky gives interviews on “The Ben Shapiro Show,” “Special Report with Brett Baier” and Newsmax. In August, the Ukrainian president hosted an American-style prayer breakfast in Kyiv, attracting thousands of believers from Ukraine, America and across the globe. Soon after, the well-liked Trinity Broadcasting Network host Joel Rosenberg interviewed Mr. Zelensky in Kyiv.

Since June, Ukraine Freedom Project polling has shown a 22-point swing in support for military aid among religious conservatives and an 18-point swing among Republicans who attend church weekly. Mr. Zelensky’s change in tactics more than doubled his rating among Trump voters in the last seven months. Why is this important? Our poll of Republican primary voters in October found that 78% of Republicans who like Mr. Zelensky also favor military aid to Ukraine.

What Mr. Zelensky didn’t say to Trump voters is as crucial as what he did. Earlier this year, every time Vladimir Putin proved he was the obstacle to peace, a conflict between Messrs. Zelensky and Trump would divert attention away from Russia’s indiscriminate bombing or kidnapping of Ukrainian children. With Mr. Zelensky now communicating more strategically, Republicans are clear on who is obstructing Mr. Trump’s diplomacy. Some 64% of Republican voters view Mr. Putin as the obstacle to a cease-fire. Only 13% point to Mr. Zelensky.

Despite massive spending on disinformation to sway conservatives against Ukraine, Mr. Putin has done Mr. Zelensky a lot of favors recently. His actions have shown Republicans that Russia is a threat. Ninety-two percent of Republican primary voters are concerned about Russian drone incursions into Europe. Additionally, 76% are concerned that Russia or China may attack the U.S. with drones.

How can Mr. Zelensky lock in Republicans? Win. Keep winning and talk about winning with conservative media. Only 11% of Republican voters say they think Ukraine is winning before they’re told about Ukrainian victories. Ukraine barely has a navy and has taken out 35% of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. Ukraine’s strikes deep into Russia have destroyed as much as 27% of Russian refining capacity. Operation Spiderweb took out $7 billion in Russian aircraft at four air bases with $100,000 in Ukrainian drones. When given information like this, half of Republicans recognize Ukraine is winning, and 85% of them favor military aid to Ukraine.

By engaging with American conservatives, Mr. Zelensky has learned what many Americans have not—talking with people who disagree with you creates allies.

Mr. Moore is founder of the Ukraine Freedom Project and is a former congressional Republican chief of staff. Mr. Barrett is producer of “A Faith Under Siege,” a documentary about Russian atrocities against Ukrainian Christians.

"They know we have a nuclear submarine...right off their shore" says Donald Trump, after claims Russia has successfully tested a nuclear-powered cruise missile, which according to Gen. Valery Gerasimov, "flew for several hours, covering a distance of 14,000 kilometers."

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the October 31, 2025, print edition as 'Zelensky Is Winning Trump Voters Over'.

WSJ

12. Trump’s Pacific Pivot – OpEd

​Come on. Does anyone really believe that POTUS or what Feffer describes as hardliners in the administration, really want war "with a real civilizational enemy, China?"

Excerpts:

For Trump, it’s an example of his successful mafioso trade policies and further proof that he can go mano a mano with the big boys. But he still expects a showdown at some point in the future. He’s not content for the United States to be a junior partner or even first among equals. Trump wants supremacy, full stop. He can overcome a pesky Venezuela or a proud Canada. But China is an entirely different matter.

These trade deals are just necessary accommodations until the United States achieves mineral independence from China. After that, the MAGA crowd wants full decoupling from China, regardless of the economic consequences. And then the path will be clear for the hardliners to push for what they’ve long dreamed of: a war with the real civilizational enemy, China.

​Summary:

Feffer argues that President Trump’s “Pacific Pivot” reflects his restless strategy and fixation on China as the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy. Having sidelined Ukraine and the Middle East, Trump seeks economic leverage over Beijing through transactional deals on soybeans, rare earths, TikTok, and fentanyl, while threatening heavy tariffs. His upcoming talks with Xi Jinping aim to stabilize trade but mask deeper rivalry. China, treating Trump as an equal, preserves its strategic poise, while Trump pursues dominance and decoupling. Feffer concludes that Trump’s short-term deals foreshadow a longer U.S.-China confrontation, with hardliners envisioning eventual economic and geopolitical conflict.

Trump’s Pacific Pivot – OpEd

eurasiareview.com · John Feffer · November 1, 2025

https://www.eurasiareview.com/01112025-trumps-pacific-pivot-oped/

Donald Trump loves to pivot. He is restless, he has some form of attention deficit disorder, and he likes to keep his enemies and adversaries guessing. Sometimes he pivots so many times, as he has on the war in Ukraine, that he completes a full circle with his pirouette.

This week, Trump is pirouetting through Asia. He has abandoned for the moment his efforts to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table, though negotiations with the Chinese might prove useful in this regard. He has also left Israel and Hamas to work it out among themselves to implement the peace deal in Gaza—which seems to be in the process of unravelling—though he stopped off in Doha on the way to Asia to refuel and chat with the Qatari political leadership about regional peace.

Like the last several U.S. presidents, Trump wants to leave behind the problems of the Old World and the mess of the Middle East. Europeans, now being prodded by Trump (and Russia’s Vladimir Putin) to spend more on their own defense, are braced for U.S. troop reductions. In the Middle East, Trump has talked about withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria and getting the last American soldiers out of Iraq. The president, or at least some of his advisors, see peace deals in Ukraine and Gaza as opportunities to once again reorient U.S. policy around the Orient.

Now that the Nobel Peace Prize is no longer dangling in front of his face like a carrot, Trump is focused on the foreign policy that matters the most to him: dealing with China. Sure, other Asian issues draw his attention, like a potential fourth meeting with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un and closer cooperation with Japan’s new conservative prime minister, Sanae Takaichi. But even here, the Nobel pushes the president forward, just like the donkey who doggedly pursues its unobtainable carrot. Negotiating a deal to end the Korean War—frozen in armistice for 75 years—could be another bid to win the prize. And Takaichi has sycophantically offered to nominate Trump just as her predecessor Shinzo Abe did.

But it’s China that holds the key to ensuring some measure of economic stability for the United States. Boiled down to a single vulgar economic transaction, Trump needs to buy China’s minerals and sell China soybeans. The economic relationship is, of course, more complicated than that—involving computer chips, TikTok, EVs, and the like—but minerals and soybeans will be at the heart of any economic deal that comes out of Trump’s trip.

Tariff War Returns

Two weeks ago, after a truce in place since the summer, it looked as though the trade war with China was coming back with a vengeance.

In mid-October, China issued export controls on rare earth elements, the class of minerals that appear in a variety of products from phones and windmills to F-35 fighter jets. Even though many countries are trying to develop their own sources of rare earth minerals, China continues to control about 60 percent of production and 90 percent of processing. Now China is using, for the first time, the “foreign direct product rule,” which allows the country to regulate any foreign trade that uses the rare earth elements or processes on its list—even if it’s a non-Chinese company engaged in the trade. It’s a tactic the United State has long used around semiconductors.

As Gracelin Baskaran of CSIS explains:

Under the measures announced today, foreign firms will now be required to obtain Chinese government approval to export magnets that contain even trace amounts of Chinese-origin rare earth materials—or that were produced using Chinese mining, processing, or magnet-making technologies. The new licensing framework will apply to foreign-produced rare earth magnets and select semiconductor materials that contain at least 0.1 percent heavy rare earth elements sourced from China.

Trump responded with his usual tactic: more tariffs. He threatened an additional 100 percent tariffs on Chinese products, on top of the 57 percent already in place, plus some tit-for-tat export controls on software.

It’s not just rare earth elements. In September, China imported zero soybeans from the United States. That’s down from 1.7 million metric tons the year before. American farmers have been hit so hard by Trump’s tariffs—and the reciprocal tariffs that have ensued— that the president has been considering a $10 billion bailout of the sector. If China resumes importing soybeans, it could lessen the pain and possibly reduce the bailout as well.

So, on the eve of Trump’s trip to Asia to attend the latest ASEAN meeting, the stage was set for either a bruising showdown with China or a kiss-and-make-up.

The Deal on the Table

Trump loves quick and bold agreements. Most of his deals, whether it’s peace or trade, are big on the headline elements and light on the details. The trade deal Trump’s negotiators strong-armed South Korea into making this week is a case in point. Achieved quickly, it’s a basically a shakedown. Seoul has to pay about $350 billion to get tariff relief on cars and semiconductors.

U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators, meanwhile, have been hard at work in Malaysia trying to thrash out their own “framework” agreement. Apparently, Trump’s 100 percent tariffs are now off the table, and China has promised to make large purchases of soybeans.

There will be “some kind of deferral” on the issue of rare earth minerals, according to Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, which will amount to a year’s pause in China’s licensing arrangement while they “study” the issue. That will only kick the issue down the road until the next series of export controls and tariffs reignite the bilateral conflict.

The two sides also have prepared a deal on TikTok for the two leaders to sign that will allow the application to function in the United States with majority U.S. stock ownership and an algorithm outside of Chinese control. Trump will likely cut fentanyl-linked tariffs in exchange for China reducing the export of chemicals that go into the production of the drug. And Xi will probably push Trump to clarify his position on Taiwan, and who knows what Trump will say. An off-the-cuff remark about Taiwanese independence or America’s military commitment to the island could take on a life of its own and set new parameters for the trilateral relationship.

Taiwan aside, what China really wants is access to the latest high-tech computer chips, the processes for making them, and the software that runs on them. The key bargaining chip is Nvidia’s B30A, which can run the latest AI applications. China ultimately wants to make such chips domestically, but for the time being it wants access to what the West is producing. It’s the reverse of the rare earth element situation, where the United States ultimately wants to source the mineral domestically but needs access in the meantime.

Whatever the ultimate terms of the agreement, the most important take-away from the Trump-Xi meeting will be the success of China’s strategy. Xi didn’t kowtow to Trump, and, as a result, Trump has treated him as an equal. That should be a lesson for other countries, even if they don’t have the military and economic firepower of a China.

What Trump Really Wants

Despite a lot of knee-bending and gushing rhetoric from national leaders, much of the world stubbornly refuses to conform to Trump’s wishes. Putin refuses to negotiate a ceasefire in Ukraine. Venezuela’s Nicolas Maduro refuses to step down and go into exile. Canada refuses to be the beta to Trump’s alpha. Fentanyl producers have refused en masse to wrap up their operations and produce black-market Ozempic instead.

But the most frustrating of Trump’s adversaries has been China. Xi Jinping has calmly responded to every Trump move—tariffs, export restrictions—with reciprocal moves of his own. China refuses to play the fool with Trump. Its economy is formidable, and it has become the principal trade partner of more than 120 countries. It’s military, too, is big league—or bigly, as Trump likes to say—second only to what the Pentagon deploys.

Of course, Xi doesn’t want a war with the United States. He has to maintain economic growth—and that requires, at the very least, stable relations with the United States—or else he’s at risk of a palace coup or a popular revolt. The Communist Party’s chief source of legitimacy is its capacity to grow the economy. Take that away and China goes the way of the Soviet Union.

But Xi also must demonstrate China’s power in the world. This reassures nationalist sentiment within the country, China’s allies in the BRICS, and the less powerful participants in its Belt and Road investment consortium.

What Trump and his advisors care about above all is China’s challenge to American power. They worry about China’s influence in Latin America around the Panama Canal, in Venezuela, through the Belt and Road Initiative. They worry about China’s control over mineral resources, and not just rare earth elements. They’re concerned about the expansion of Chinese control near its own borders, for instance over the South China Sea. Most of the big-ticket items in the Pentagon budget are designed for an eventual war with China.

So, this latest economic deal means something very different for China and the United States. For China, it’s a necessary compromise to maintain economic performance and its business empire abroad.

For Trump, it’s an example of his successful mafioso trade policies and further proof that he can go mano a mano with the big boys. But he still expects a showdown at some point in the future. He’s not content for the United States to be a junior partner or even first among equals. Trump wants supremacy, full stop. He can overcome a pesky Venezuela or a proud Canada. But China is an entirely different matter.

These trade deals are just necessary accommodations until the United States achieves mineral independence from China. After that, the MAGA crowd wants full decoupling from China, regardless of the economic consequences. And then the path will be clear for the hardliners to push for what they’ve long dreamed of: a war with the real civilizational enemy, China.

• This article was published at FPIF

eurasiareview.com · John Feffer · November 1, 2025

13. The U.S. Military's Great Reboot to Fight a War Against China Has Arrived

​The U.S. Military or the Navy and Marine Corps? Nothing in this article about the Army, Air Force (except a mention of the B-1 Bomber), Space Force, Cyber Forces, or Special Operations Forces.

Excerpts:

In addition to force posture adjustments; closer relations with friends and allies; and an anticipated offensive capability boost, particularly regarding anti-ship weaponry, both the Navy and Marine Corps are experimenting with strengthening logistics chains.

These can be bolstered via supply prepositioning and rearming at sea, as well as tighter cooperation with allies in the region. Doctrinal adaptations, tough procurement decisions, and budgetary limitations mean some of these capabilities will continue to change in the future.

​Summary:

Larson writes that the U.S. military is undergoing a major transformation to counter China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Indo-Pacific. Central to this “fight and win” reboot are Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) with 1,000-pound warheads, enhanced Marine Corps “Force Design 2030” expeditionary units for sea denial, and expanded allied cooperation through AUKUS, which gives Australia nuclear-powered submarines. These efforts aim to restore freedom of maneuver, strengthen deterrence, and modernize logistics and operational doctrine. Together, the Navy, Marine Corps, and allies are adapting force structure, technology, and partnerships to ensure readiness for high-end conflict against a rapidly modernizing China.

The U.S. Military's Great Reboot to Fight a War Against China Has Arrived

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Caleb Larson · October 31, 2025

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/the-u-s-militarys-great-reboot-to-fight-a-war-against-china-has-arrived/

Key Points and Summary – To counter China’s formidable A2/AD threat, the U.S. is retooling its forces for a “fight and win” strategy in the Indo-Pacific.

-This includes deploying new, stealthy Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) with 1,000-pound warheads, although this compromises the F-35’s stealth by requiring external carriage.

F-35 Fighter With LRASM Missiles. Image Credit: Lockheed Martin.

AGM-158 Extreme Range LRASM. Image Credit: Industry Handout.

-The Marine Corps is implementing “Force Design 2030,” creating small, dispersed, low-signature units for sea denial.

-The most significant pillar is the AUKUS pact, which will provide Australia with nuclear-powered submarines, representing a “massive leap” in allied undersea capability and industrial cooperation.

The U.S. Military Has Big Plans to Ensure it Can Fight China

It is so well known in defense circles that it’s almost a trope: China’s navy is the largest in the world; Beijing is intent on reinforcing its posture in the western Indo-Pacific; and the proliferation of People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) weaponry, especially its anti-ship missiles, will greatly hamper the freedom of movement of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.

These themes are well-worn but ignore the adjustments that the U.S. services are making in response.

This is a time of great upheaval for the Navy and Marine Corps, but it is also a time of great opportunity, as the services retool to fight and win in the Indo-Pacific.

Forget the Torpedos, Full Speed Ahead

Speaking at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, then-Commander of Pacific Air Forces and Air Component Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, General Kenneth S. Wilsbach, emphasized the need for air superiority to wear down PLAN ships in the Indo-Pacific. “A part of air superiority will be being able to attrite those [PLAN] ships,” the general said. “We need better and more weapons.”

The general—as well as other lawmakers and Pentagon leaders—explains that Navy warships operating east of Taiwan could find their freedom of maneuver significantly hampered by Chinese warships brimming with recently developed surface-to-air and anti-ship weapons.

But the United States is not standing still either. The centerpiece of the next generation of U.S. anti-ship weapons is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), an air-launched cruise missile with stealthy, radar-mitigating characteristics.

The LRASM is already certified for use with the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and the Air Force’s Rockwell B-1B Lancer, but the Navy would also like to see the missile mated to its F-35C stealth fighters.

Compared to Boeing’s AGM-84N Harpoon Block II+—the most advanced Harpoon anti-ship missile variant—the LRASM offers several distinct advantages. Not only does its 1,000-pound high-explosive warhead dwarf that of the Harpoon’s comparatively modest 500-pound warhead, but the LRASM’s approximate 230-mile range allows the missile to reach out further than Harpoon’s 155-mile range. However, the LRASM cannot be carried internally by F-35Bs and F-35Cs. Consequently, this missile, though powerful, will compromise the stealth characteristics of those aircraft.

First to Fight: The United States Marine Corps

Should a war erupt in the Indo-Pacific, the Marine Corps would be the first to fight. Cognizant of the growing challenge in that theater presented by an increasingly bellicose Chinese posture in the region, the Marine Corps developed a radical new force posture in 2020, presented by then-Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger’s, Force Design 2030.

That guiding document identifies China as the United States’ pacing threat. Though it has been adjusted in content and scope several times since its first publication, the goal of fighting and winning in the Indo-Pacific has remained constant in the doctrine.

Just this month, the Marine Corps released its Force Design Annual Update, a document outlining the progress made toward transforming the force.

At 24 pages, the Force Design update document is not especially long, but it is replete with descriptions of the progress made toward transforming the Marine Corps.

Although a number of new weapon systems, including new vehicles, a remotely-controlled anti-ship weapon platform, and other firsts are described in the document, its essence is to describe a move toward expeditionary, low-signature units that can conduct sea denial operations, hampering the ability of enemy warships to operate freely in the Indo-Pacific. Small, dispersed units operating independently but cooperating toward that goal is a key component of Force Design 2030, as is the retooling to hold wide swaths of the Indo-Pacific at risk.

International Cooperation

A crucial component of any American response to aggression in the Indo-Pacific would be the reactions of allies.

The United States’ acknowledgement of this reality is perhaps best exemplified by Washington’s increasingly close relationship with Canberra under the AUKUS agreement.

That awkwardly named document is a tripartite agreement that will see nuclear-propelled submarines—the crown jewels of America’s nuclear deterrence—passed on to the Australians, with the assistance of the United Kingdom.

Under the terms of the agreement, the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy will train Australian sailors on the intricacies of operating a nuclear-powered submarine by providing them with several ex-U.S. nuclear attack submarines ahead of yet-to-be-built AUKUS-class submarines that will also serve with the Royal Navy in the future.

Crucially, the submarines provided to Australia will not be nuclear-armed. But the protracted underwater endurance afforded by their onboard nuclear reactors will greatly expand Australia’s naval presence in the Indo-Pacific—a clear win for Washington.

To sweeten the deal, Australia is investing billions of dollars into U.S. shipyards to spark the submarine industrial base and preempt costly project overruns or delays.

Australia is also investing in its Henderson Defense Precinct, the site of a naval base, which will open access to its facilities to future U.S. Navy nuclear-powered submarines.

What Happens Now?

In addition to force posture adjustments; closer relations with friends and allies; and an anticipated offensive capability boost, particularly regarding anti-ship weaponry, both the Navy and Marine Corps are experimenting with strengthening logistics chains.

These can be bolstered via supply prepositioning and rearming at sea, as well as tighter cooperation with allies in the region. Doctrinal adaptations, tough procurement decisions, and budgetary limitations mean some of these capabilities will continue to change in the future.

About the Author: Caleb Larson

Caleb Larson is an American multiformat journalist based in Berlin, Germany. His work covers the intersection of conflict and society, focusing on American foreign policy and European security. He has reported from Germany, Russia, and the United States. Most recently, he covered the war in Ukraine, reporting extensively on the war’s shifting battle lines from Donbas and writing on the war’s civilian and humanitarian toll. Previously, he worked as a Defense Reporter for POLITICO Europe. You can follow his latest work on X.

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​14. Nvidia Uncertain if Return to China Is Closer After Trump-Xi Meeting

​What will happen to Nvidia in China? I think all investors want to know but it is a national security issue as well.. But Nvidia is also focusing on its South Korea relationship.

Excerpts:

Since arriving in South Korea, Mr. Huang has been on a nonstop charm offensive. On Thursday, his night out in Seoul with two of the country’s most prominent businessmen, Samsung Electronics’ executive chairman, Lee Jae-yong, and Hyundai Motor Group’s executive chairman, Euisun Chung, was covered with paparazzi-like fanfare. Swarms of reporters filmed them at a restaurant eating fried chicken and drinking beer.

At his much anticipated speech at the summit on Friday, Mr. Huang ditched his trademark black leather jacket for a navy blue suit. Then, Nvidia announced that South Korea and a handful of its biggest companies, including Samsung and Hyundai Motor, had agreed to purchase more than 250,000 specialized computing chips to advance the country’s efforts in developing A.I. technology.

The Nvidia chips will be used for next-generation data centers as well as to propel South Korea’s efforts to build so-called sovereign A.I., a nationalized effort to make the breakthrough technology available to local businesses and institutions that cannot afford to build their own infrastructure.

Later at a news conference, he handed out snacks to journalists and signed the white dress shirt of a reporter with a black marker. Even as his security detail tried to usher him out of the venue, swarms of reporters begged Mr. Huang for selfies.

​Summary:

Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang said he remains unsure whether the Trump-Xi summit brought the company closer to resuming chip sales in China. Despite Trump hinting at semiconductor talks, no policy change emerged. Nvidia’s China business has fallen to zero after U.S. export bans and Beijing’s push for domestic alternatives, leaving Huang urging renewed access to preserve America’s AI leadership. He argued that Nvidia’s technology benefits both countries and should set global standards. While promoting AI partnerships in South Korea, Huang warned that excluding U.S. firms from China’s vast market risks ceding technological dominance in the next great industrial revolution.

Nvidia Uncertain if Return to China Is Closer After Trump-Xi Meeting

NY Times · Daisuke Wakabayashi · October 31, 2025

Amid skyrocketing demand for artificial intelligence systems, the chip-making giant has been thrust into the economic feud between Beijing and Washington.

By Daisuke Wakabayashi

Reporting from Gyeongju, South Korea

Oct. 31, 2025

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/31/business/jensen-huang-nvidia-china.html

Jensen Huang, chief executive of Nvidia, speaks during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Gyeongju, South Korea, on Friday.Credit...Kim Soo-Hyeon/Reuters

By

Reporting from Gyeongju, South Korea

Oct. 31, 2025Updated 1:59 p.m. ET

Jensen Huang, the head of Nvidia, said again on Friday that he was eager for the Silicon Valley chip-making giant to resume selling advanced semiconductors in China, but expressed uncertainty about whether this week’s meeting between President Trump and China’s top leader, Xi Jinping, brought the company any closer to achieving that goal.

Mr. Huang arrived in South Korea shortly after the face-to-face summit of the two leaders in the country on Thursday. Mr. Trump told reporters that the leaders had discussed semiconductors without addressing Nvidia’s most advanced A.I. technology. He added that Chinese officials would talk to Nvidia about “taking chips,” with the United States playing “referee.”

The remarks created confusion because Mr. Trump had suggested before the meeting that he would discuss Nvidia’s most powerful A.I. semiconductors with Mr. Xi, fueling speculation that the United States might ease restrictions limiting access to the technology.

“I don’t have any new insight from the meeting,” Mr. Huang said at a news conference on the sideline of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit on Friday. “I hope that we will have new policies that allow Nvidia to go back into China, for China to welcome Nvidia back.”

Amid skyrocketing demand for technology infrastructure to power artificial intelligence systems, access to Nvidia’s chips has become a national security issue. Nvidia has been thrust into the middle of the economic feud between China and the United States.

Before Mr. Trump came into office, the U.S. government had already imposed rules to limit the sales of Nvidia’s most powerful chips in China. The Trump administration initially banned exports of Nvidia’s H20 chip, a downgraded version of the company’s Hopper chips, which were made particularly for China. It reversed that decision in July, when Mr. Trump said that the H20 chip could be sold and that the federal government would take a 15 percent cut of that revenue.

But before Nvidia could move forward, China closed off the company’s access to its market. In July, China’s internet regulator summoned Nvidia to explain security risks associated with one of its chips. Beijing also discouraged Chinese companies from using the H20 chip, pushing them to try domestic alternatives.

Mr. Huang said Nvidia’s business in China was now at “zero,” after once holding near total market share.

He repeated some of his familiar arguments for why Nvidia should be allowed to sell chips in China. Some of America’s national security concerns are overblown because the Chinese military does not need Nvidia’s chips to develop A.I. technology, he said. And the United States risks conceding leadership in one of the most significant technological breakthroughs known to humanity by closing itself off from the vast Chinese market.

“It’s critically important for America to be back in the China market,” Mr. Huang said. “As an American company, we would like to see American A.I. technology be the global standard.”

He argued that Nvidia would be “very beneficial” for China, as its technology is superior to that of Chinese competitors. He was careful to avoid disparaging the Chinese technology giant Huawei, which has developed its own A.I. semiconductor technology, but emphasized Nvidia’s superiority.

“We are miles ahead, but it is foolish to underestimate the might of China,” he said.

Since arriving in South Korea, Mr. Huang has been on a nonstop charm offensive. On Thursday, his night out in Seoul with two of the country’s most prominent businessmen, Samsung Electronics’ executive chairman, Lee Jae-yong, and Hyundai Motor Group’s executive chairman, Euisun Chung, was covered with paparazzi-like fanfare. Swarms of reporters filmed them at a restaurant eating fried chicken and drinking beer.

At his much anticipated speech at the summit on Friday, Mr. Huang ditched his trademark black leather jacket for a navy blue suit. Then, Nvidia announced that South Korea and a handful of its biggest companies, including Samsung and Hyundai Motor, had agreed to purchase more than 250,000 specialized computing chips to advance the country’s efforts in developing A.I. technology.

The Nvidia chips will be used for next-generation data centers as well as to propel South Korea’s efforts to build so-called sovereign A.I., a nationalized effort to make the breakthrough technology available to local businesses and institutions that cannot afford to build their own infrastructure.

Later at a news conference, he handed out snacks to journalists and signed the white dress shirt of a reporter with a black marker. Even as his security detail tried to usher him out of the venue, swarms of reporters begged Mr. Huang for selfies.

Daisuke Wakabayashi is an Asia business correspondent for The Times based in Seoul, covering economic, corporate and geopolitical stories from the region.

A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 1, 2025, Section B, Page 5 of the New York edition with the headline: Nvidia’s Future in China Uncertain After Summit

See more on: Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

NY Times · Daisuke Wakabayashi · October 31, 2025

​15. Confronting China's pervasive maritime gray zone campaign

​Can the free world and democratic nations compete in the gray zone in all dominas, not just the maritime domain?

​Excerpt:

The integrity of the maritime domain hinges on a coordinated, transparent, and resolute response to these deceptive and persistent gray zone tactics.

​Summary: 

Rear Admiral Lin Chauluen warns that China’s maritime gray zone campaign—blending civilian and military power—seeks to erode sovereignty and reshape regional order without open conflict. Through its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, Beijing exploits dual-use oil platforms, weaponized civilian ships, and deceptive maritime militias to “advance without attacking.” This layered coercion, seen around Taiwan and the Philippines, undermines law, security, and stability. Lin urges democratic nations to respond through coordinated diplomacy, enhanced satellite and maritime surveillance, constant Coast Guard presence, and public exposure of China’s tactics. Only unified, transparent, and sustained countermeasures can deter Beijing’s coercive maritime expansion.

Confronting China's pervasive maritime gray zone campaign

spacenews.com · Lin Chauluen

by Lin Chauluen

October 30, 2025

https://spacenews.com/confronting-chinas-pervasive-maritime-gray-zone-campaign/

China’s persistent use of maritime gray zone tactics poses a fundamental challenge to regional stability and the international order. These actions are designed to achieve strategic aims — territorial advancement and sovereignty erosion — without crossing the threshold of conventional armed conflict. Using ambiguity and indirect coercion, China seeks to “advance without attacking” and shape a favorable strategic environment under the guise of civilian activity.

The modus operandi of gray zone intrusion

China’s “gray zone “ activities refer to a campaign of coercive actions that are aggressive in nature but deliberately kept below the threshold of overt military conflict. These tactics, such as economic coercion, disinformation, and quasi-military harassment, aim to gradually alter the status quo and achieve strategic goals without triggering a conventional war.

China primarily executes these strategies through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) strategy, deliberately blurring the line between civilian and military roles. The intrusion patterns manifest in several critical ways:

Exploiting dual-use commercial assets: China deploys assets like oil and gas exploration platforms, owned by state-owned enterprises such as the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, deep within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of its neighbors. These platforms are installed without consent and possess dual-use potential, capable of being equipped with various sensors (surface search radar, optical, SIGINT, acoustic devices) to enhance surveillance, or even fitted with weapons systems.

Weaponizing civilian shipping: China utilizes large Roll-on/Roll-off (RO-RO) ferries, built to military standards, as key civilian vessels under the MCF strategy. These vessels can rapidly convert to military transports, filling gaps in the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) amphibious transport capability. Anomalous behaviors associated with these ships include prolonged, low-speed loitering in sensitive areas (such as Taiwan’s northwest EEZ), frequent, suspicious changes to

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destinations and estimated arrival times and suspicious draft changes while in open sea, which could indicate the loading or unloading of military equipment or personnel.

Deceptive maritime militia activity: China’s maritime militia frequently uses fishing vessels to conduct illicit activities (such as hydrographic surveys and battlefield preparation) under the cover of fishing. These militia boats often engage in deceptive practices, such as frequently manipulating their Automatic Identification System (AIS) status (“going dark”) to conceal their true positions and constantly changing their ship names, sometimes over 1,000 times a year, to confuse observers.

Layered coercive presence: In contested areas like the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island), China employs a tiered maritime force structure to maintain control and reduce the risk of direct military escalation. This structure positions maritime militia and civilian public service vessels as the first line of contact, the China Coast Guard (CCG) as the second line and the PLA’s naval and air forces as the third line of deterrence.

Consequences for Taiwan and the Philippines

These gray zone activities cause severe complications for regional democracies like Taiwan and the Philippines.

For Taiwan, the intrusions directly undermine sovereignty. Activities like unauthorized oil and gas exploration in Taiwan’s EEZ are intended to advance territorial claims, reject Taiwan’s jurisdiction and normalize the encroachment upon its sovereign rights. Furthermore, the military potential of dual-use platforms and the blurring of roles between civilian and military vessels create significant early warning challenges for Taiwan’s security forces. The PLA’s increasing use of civil ships for quasi-military exercises (such as those involving RO-RO ferries near Taiwan’s sea space and in the South China Sea) tests Taiwan’s vigilance and reaction thresholds.

In the South China Sea, particularly around the Scarborough Shoal, China’s actions against the Philippines and others demonstrate overt coercion. The deployment of security officers, aircraft and patrol vessels, combined with aggressive enforcement tactics (such as the reported boarding and beating of Vietnamese fishermen by Chinese enforcement ships), signals a clear intent to assert sovereignty. China’s comprehensive, three-in-one maritime force structure (PLA, CCG and maritime militia) provides a flexible and massive resource advantage that exceeds the capacity of any single neighboring nation to counter. These constant maneuvers increase the potential for incidents, such as the collision between a PLA destroyer and a CCG vessel observed in August 2025, which escalate the risk of a military crisis.

Essential countermeasures

To effectively respond to this evolving gray zone threat, democratic nations must adopt a multi-faceted approach focusing on international cooperation, enhanced surveillance and consistent presence.

Diplomacy and international condemnation: States like Taiwan must continuously issue strong diplomatic protests against unilateral actions, emphasize that such behaviors violate international law (including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS) and threaten regional peace and stability. Crucially, affected nations must strengthen international coordination and cooperation with like-minded countries facing similar threats to collectively address China’s lawfare and cognitive warfare.

Technological superiority and transparency: We must enhance maritime surveillance and early warning capabilities by utilizing international intelligence sharing, satellite imagery (currently Taiwan is insufficient in space surveillance, so is working with two foreign countries to monitor China’s gray zone activities around Taiwan’s waters. These two friend countries provide their space surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities through confidential APP to Taiwan, so we are able to trace the “dark vessel” which turns off the AIS. Taiwan is building up its own space monitoring capabilities within a few years. This is also a tremendous part to deter China’s gray zone activities.) and air/sea patrols. Crucially, nations should reference methods used by experts, such as the data analysis framework integrating AIS data, to systematically identify and expose suspicious civil vessel activities. This is essential for distinguishing between legitimate commercial activities and secret operations. Furthermore, states should collect complete evidence of MCF vessels’ movements to build a comprehensive legal justification based on UNCLOS, demonstrating the illegality of the intrusive actions.

Strategic presence and deterrence: Affected countries must maintain a constant, visible presence in their EEZs, primarily through Coast Guard patrols, to assert jurisdiction and prevent Chinese vessels from operating arbitrarily. Recognizing the overwhelming resource advantage of China’s layered deployment, relevant nations (including Taiwan) should explore “existence against existence” cooperation models to jointly balance the security dynamics in the region. Finally, by actively monitoring and publicly exposing these gray zone operations, we can impose political costs on China, potentially prompting caution from their managing organizations.

The integrity of the maritime domain hinges on a coordinated, transparent, and resolute response to these deceptive and persistent gray zone tactics.

Rear Admiral Lin Chauluen (Ret.) served in the Taiwan Navy and Coast Guard for more than 35 years, during which time he was responsible for strategy planning, force build-up, and net assessment. He used to be captain of four warships, including a 10,000-ton guided-missile destroyer. Currently, he is working in a Taiwan defense think tank (INDSR) as a research fellow.

SpaceNews is committed to publishing our community’s diverse perspectives. Whether you’re an academic, executive, engineer or even just a concerned citizen of the cosmos, send your arguments and viewpoints to opinion@spacenews.com to be considered for publication online or in our next magazine. The perspectives shared in these opinion articles are solely those of the authors.

​16. The West needs to draw the line on Russian, Chinese grey-zone provocations

A view from Australia. ​Should that be a "red line?" What does a red line look like in the gray zone?

Excerpt:

This sea power is a serious regional threat to Australia and many East and Southeast Asian states whose maritime trading routes could be easily disrupted. Australian Director-General of National Intelligence Andrew Shearer has warned that we are already engaged in grey-zone warfare with our adversaries. The task now for Western governments is to set the rules of engagement and build a deterrence that is immediate, integrated, and unconventional.

Summary:

Thrupp argues that the West must clearly define and enforce red lines against Russia’s and China’s escalating grey-zone provocations, aggressive but sub-warfare tactics like drone incursions, undersea cable sabotage, and maritime militia operations. Strategic ambiguity has eroded deterrence, letting authoritarian powers exploit Western restraint. Thrupp urges new unconventional deterrence tools and continuous surveillance, including naval drones and pre-positioned cable-repair ships, to protect critical infrastructure. He cites repeated Russian airspace violations and China’s militarized fishing fleets as examples of unchecked coercion. Without decisive thresholds and credible responses, he warns, Moscow and Beijing will continue dictating the limits of Western resolve.

The West needs to draw the line on Russian, Chinese grey-zone provocations | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · Jake Thrupp

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-west-needs-to-draw-the-line-on-russian-chinese-grey-zone-provocations/

The West must draw clear red lines for responding to grey-zone aggression by China and Russia. Both adversaries have mastered operating below the threshold of open conflict to achieve their strategic aims with little consequence from Western governments. This ambiguity has eroded Western deterrence and emboldened authoritarian states to keep testing the limits of restraint.

Western leaders must define where provocation ends and aggression begins. And they must match that clarity with credible deterrent capability. Until the West decides where its red line lies, Russia and China will continue to draw it for us, as is currently the case in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.

ASPI’s report Unconventional deterrence in Australian strategy shines a light on this challenge, urging Australia to adopt new tools of deterrence suited to unconventional threats. The report highlights that grey-zone tactics—low-intensity actions designed to intimidate, coerce or collect intelligence—sit deliberately below the threshold of a conventional military response.

Such tactics are firmly embedded in Chinese and Russian warfare doctrine, yet Western governments have still not defined a threshold for when a response is required to such threats. As a result, authoritarian states exploit, almost daily, the West’s instinct for restraint.

Definition of a threshold is long overdue. Armed incursions into NATO airspace, deliberate interference with undersea cables, or even state-directed attacks on Western soil, such as Russia’s 2018 Salisbury poisoning, illustrate the kind of actions that should no longer be treated as ambiguous.

Strategic ambiguity is tying the West in knots. In recent months, Russian drones have repeatedly entered NATO airspace—a totally brazen act. Poland even invoked NATO’s Article 4, which allows member states to bring an issue to the organisation’s council for discussion and potentially resulting in allied decision or action. It was just the eighth time the article had been invoked in the organisation’s history. Yet little has followed.

Since then, drones have crossed into Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Norway and Romania. The crescendo came when three Russian fighter jets entered Estonian airspace for 12 minutes, before retreating when Italian jets scrambled to intercept them. Again, what has NATO’s formal response been?

China and Russia also use other grey-zone tactics to target undersea cables, threatening vital global connectivity. Damaging or cutting a cable can disable communication lines between entire continents. An accidental cut would not only disrupt data traffic but would leave the West vulnerable during any conflict.

At present, Russian vessels are loitering near Taiwan, and Chinese vessels are in the Baltic Sea. In December 2024, a Chinese vessel severed subsea cables in the Baltic while dragging its anchor along the seabed. It is not cynical to think China and Russia are colluding. More troubling still, the British government concedes it has only ‘limited capabilities’ to monitor seabed traffic.

So again, where do Western governments stand on responding robustly to such tactics? At the very least they should be developing an urgent civilian-military plan for round-the-clock maritime surveillance of vulnerable undersea cable networks. This could include naval drones to monitor and guard the seabed, as well as pre-positioned cable-repair ships ready to restore connectivity.

ASPI’s report also highlights China’s growing use of maritime militia—fishing vessels operating under direct government control—to conduct what Beijing calls the ‘people’s war at sea’. Since taking power, Chinese President Xi Jinping has subsidised provincial and local governments to significantly increase local fleets. These vessels are deployed in the South China Sea, alongside Chinese navy and China Coast Guard vessels, to promote Chinese expansionism.

This sea power is a serious regional threat, to Australia and many East and Southeast Asian states whose maritime trading routes could be easily disrupted. Australian Director-General of National Intelligence Andrew Shearer has warned that we are already engaged in grey-zone warfare with our adversaries. The task now for Western governments is to set the rules of engagement and build a deterrence that is immediate, integrated, and unconventional.

aspistrategist.org.au · Jake Thrupp

17. The Trade War Couldn’t Change China’s Economy

​So how do we shape the future trade environment? 

Excepts:

When Beijing released the blueprint for its next five-year plan earlier this month, it made clear it has little intention of deviating from a path that has, in Beijing’s eyes, worked exceptionally well. Chinese leaders reemphasized their commitment to technological self-sufficiency, pledging to pour more investment into advanced manufacturing and boosting exports.

If anything, the trade war has taught China the opposite of what the U.S. had hoped. Rather than prod Beijing to rebalance the economy, it showed Xi how essential it is for China to reduce its reliance on the U.S. in critical areas such as semiconductors and to develop economic weapons that allow it to hit back, such as its stranglehold on rare earths, said Henry Farrell, a professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

That calls for more industry-led growth, not less. China’s goal, Farrell said, is to “maximize its freedom to do what it wants to do without the United States being capable of determining its destiny.”

​Summary:

 Years of U.S. trade wars have failed to change China’s economic model or push it toward liberalization. Despite tariffs and pressure under Trump and Biden, Beijing has doubled down on state-driven industrial policy, self-sufficiency, and global supply-chain dominance. Rather than reforming, China adapted, diversifying suppliers, strengthening manufacturing, and weaponizing rare earths. Xi Jinping’s strategy now emphasizes technological independence and export-led growth, rejecting Western prescriptions for consumer rebalancing. Analysts conclude the U.S. can no longer influence China’s macroeconomic trajectory; instead, the trade war reinforced Beijing’s determination to reduce reliance on America and pursue economic sovereignty.

Essay | The Trade War Couldn’t Change China’s Economy

American hopes for political reform in China faded years ago, and now hopes for economic liberalization are fading too.

By​ Jonathan Cheng

 and

Jason Douglas

Oct. 31, 2025 9:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/the-trade-war-couldnt-change-chinas-economy-25c464d8

Trump and Xi shake hands after leaving trade talks on Oct. 30, their first face-to-face meeting in six years. andrew caballero-reynolds/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have walked back from the ledge—again. But even as the world’s two superpowers deescalate a trade fight that had threatened to destabilize the global economy, a new reality is setting in—that Washington may finally have to give up on its long-standing aim of pushing Beijing to restructure its economy.

For years and through successive U.S. administrations, senior officials in Washington had hoped that bringing China into the global trading system would open up the country’s political system. In the decades since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, those hopes of political liberalization have largely been dashed. The sense of disappointment has only grown as Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who took power in late 2012, has tightened his control over the domestic political system and civil society more broadly.

Still, many in President Trump’s circle of senior advisers had held out hope for China’s economic liberalization. White House officials spoke of using America’s economic might to move China away from what they regarded as a mercantilist trade policy that privileged exports, subsidized manufacturing and discouraged its own 1.4 billion people from spending.

U.S. strategists imagined that tariffs would squeeze exports and encourage China to find new sources of growth at home, perhaps by overhauling its health and social welfare systems to allow consumers to spend more and save less. By pressuring Beijing to boost consumption, the idea went, China would start buying more goods from the U.S. and the rest of the world, its trade surplus would shrink and U.S. businesses and farmers could tap a consumer market of unparalleled potential.

But while Trump’s first-term tariff assault resulted in Chinese pledges to buy more American-made goods, it didn’t accomplish any of these larger structural aims. The Biden administration, though rhetorically committed to many of these broader economic liberalization goals, focused most of its efforts on constraining China’s technological ambitions.

This time around, Trump’s sky-high tariffs have failed to move China. Unlike virtually every other trading partner hit with tariffs, Beijing retaliated with stiff countermeasures of its own, using its grip on rare-earth metals to bludgeon American companies that rely on the critical minerals, while halting purchases of U.S. soybeans in a bid to punish America’s agricultural sector.

Workers produce electronic components for export in Suqian, China, March 2025. China remains ideologically attached to industrial production as the wellspring of prosperity. Xu Changliang/ddp/Zuma Press

China’s “shock and awe” approach left the two superpowers mired in months of a tactical tit-for-tat, resulting in dramatic displays of brinkmanship and Thursday’s meeting between Trump and Xi—but leaving big-picture American concerns about China’s economic structure unaddressed.

“Trade talks with China this time around are more focused on stabilizing the relationship versus advancing it by addressing structural matters, which appears to be a lost cause,” said Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. trade negotiator now at the Asia Society Policy Institute in Washington.

With the two sides bogged down in horse-trading on tariffs and critical minerals, structural matters have been entirely set aside, Cutler added. “The reality is that deescalation has become the objective of the trade talks with China, rather than breaking new ground.”

Even today, some Chinese officials acknowledge that the country’s consumption is too weak and nod to the desire for some rebalancing. Yet efforts have been piecemeal, stymied by an ideological attachment to industrial production as the wellspring of prosperity and wariness of the painful reforms—in taxation, healthcare and social welfare—needed to make a durable shift.

When Trump was first elected in 2016, the U.S. adopted a more aggressive approach to force the issue, threatening a trade war that sought in part to change China’s model. But rather than adopt the Western prescriptions, Beijing took advantage of Trump’s exit from the Oval Office to instead make itself more impervious to pressure from Washington.

Beijing systematically identified perceived “chokepoints”—that is, sectors where it was reliant on the U.S.-led West—and worked to disarm Washington’s points of leverage. China did this by building up domestic industries, developing alternative sources for scarce inputs and carefully husbanding its strengths in areas where they saw a chance to seize control.

More broadly, China has shifted its manufacturing model toward components and not just finished products—a change that has more deeply embedded the country in global supply chains, said Dinny McMahon, head of markets research at Trivium China, a research and consulting firm.

An Illinois farmer holds soybeans during harvest, Oct. 17, 2025. China halted its purchases of U.S. soybeans in a bid to punish America’s agricultural sector. Christopher Dilts/Bloomberg News

“Xi Jinping has been talking about this since at least 2019—strengthening global supply chains,” McMahon said. Now, he said, “almost any manufactured good you buy, no matter where it comes from, has some exposure to Chinese supply chains.”

By finding ways to effectively hit back against the U.S., Xi forced Trump repeatedly onto the defensive—and in the process, established China as a peer rival to the U.S., able to defy the world’s longtime superpower on trade, technology and, increasingly, geopolitics.

“The U.S. has very little ability to influence China’s macroeconomic strategy,” said Oliver Melton, a director at China-focused consulting firm Rhodium Group. “They have a different ideological understanding of what causes growth and economic development.”

Whether Beijing sticks to its current program—of pursuing manufacturing and technological dominance at all costs—will resonate far beyond China’s shores. Already, Chinese import growth has stagnated, and its surplus in goods has ballooned to more than $1 trillion. China has refused to cede significant ground in lower-value manufacturing to less developed economies, even as it gains expertise in making cars, aircraft, chips and other high-value goods.

The result, said Eswar Prasad, a professor of trade policy at Cornell University and a former head of the IMF’s China division, is that China is stifling manufacturing in other countries, whether they’re poorer economies trying to nurture a domestic factory sector or advanced economies facing a growing competitive threat. Trade barriers to Chinese goods are rising, and its own economy is menaced by deflation, the outgrowth of its rampant production.

“In the absence of aggressive reforms to restructure the economy, China’s growth will slow while friction with its trade partners will increase,” said Rhodium’s Melton, who recently wrapped up five years as the U.S. Treasury Department’s financial attaché in Beijing.

When Beijing released the blueprint for its next five-year plan earlier this month, it made clear it has little intention of deviating from a path that has, in Beijing’s eyes, worked exceptionally well. Chinese leaders reemphasized their commitment to technological self-sufficiency, pledging to pour more investment into advanced manufacturing and boosting exports.

If anything, the trade war has taught China the opposite of what the U.S. had hoped. Rather than prod Beijing to rebalance the economy, it showed Xi how essential it is for China to reduce its reliance on the U.S. in critical areas such as semiconductors and to develop economic weapons that allow it to hit back, such as its stranglehold on rare earths, said Henry Farrell, a professor of international affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

That calls for more industry-led growth, not less. China’s goal, Farrell said, is to “maximize its freedom to do what it wants to do without the United States being capable of determining its destiny.”

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 1, 2025, print edition as 'The U.S. Thought a Trade War Would Change China. It Was Wrong.'.

WSJ

​18. General tells industry to bring more prototypes to help forces move at speed

​Programs of record: help or hindrance? Of course we need programs of record but....

Excerpts:

It started off as an amalgamation of prototypes that had promise and were thrown together to create a capability. It didn’t matter at the time that it wasn’t a program of record, Glynn said.

“I don’t care. It’s what we’re using, it’s what we’re going to have to use, we have to move at speed,” he said.

“What’s my biggest concern,” he added, “your ability to provide those prototypes, your trust to leave those prototypes, and our ability to continue to turn prototypes into programs of record and program a record to deliver on the timelines that we believe we need. You know the timeline. We’re working in in weeks and months, not years out here in the Indo-Pacific.”

​Summary:

Lt. Gen. James Glynn, commander of U.S. Marine Corps Forces Pacific, urged defense industry partners to accelerate innovation by bringing multiple prototypes to Indo-Pacific exercises—and leaving some behind for continued testing. Speaking at AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific, Glynn emphasized that speed, not perfection, defines modern warfare. He encouraged collaboration through experimentation and failure, citing the Joint Fires Network as a model born from rapid prototyping rather than formal acquisition. Glynn said forces operate on timelines of “weeks and months, not years,” and need industry’s trust to deliver, refine, and field technologies fast enough to meet dynamic operational demands in the region.

General tells industry to bring more prototypes to help forces move at speed - Breaking Defense

"If we have the prototypes, prototypes can move very quickly to what we actually operate on," Marine Corps Forces Pacific Commander Lt. Gen. James Glynn said.

By Mark Pomerleau on October 31, 2025 12:33 pm

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/general-tells-industry-to-bring-more-prototypes-to-help-forces-move-at-speed/

breakingdefense.com · Mark Pomerleau

WASHINGTON — One top general in the Indo-Pacific region had a message for industry: Bring more prototypes to events and exercises.

“When you come with it [a prototype], don’t come with one with the intention to take it home with you and all the data that was collected while we conducted an exercise together,” Lt. Gen. James Glynn, commander of Marine Corps Forces Pacific, said Thursday at AFCEA’s TechNet Indo-Pacific in Hawaii.

The forces want the opportunity to keep working with a system even after a set delivery or exercise to really run it through its traps.

“Come with five. Take one or two home and leave three with us and we’ll continue to work on it,” he added. We’ll give you access to all the data that’s coming off of it and we’ll do everything we can to break it with the goal of making it better.”

Glynn said in the future dynamic operating environment, the name of the game is speed. Forces don’t have time to wait for perfect solutions or the acquisition community to take years to develop something.

“Partner with us to fail. Got no problem when it doesn’t work,” he said. “If we have the prototypes, prototypes can move very quickly to what we actually operate on.”

Glynn cited the Joint Fires Network — a prototyping effort that sought to addresses the immediate needs of combatant commands for battle management and to display real-time, fused, actionable threat information to joint and partner forces — as a perfect example.

It started off as an amalgamation of prototypes that had promise and were thrown together to create a capability. It didn’t matter at the time that it wasn’t a program of record, Glynn said.

“I don’t care. It’s what we’re using, it’s what we’re going to have to use, we have to move at speed,” he said.

“What’s my biggest concern,” he added, “your ability to provide those prototypes, your trust to leave those prototypes, and our ability to continue to turn prototypes into programs of record and program a record to deliver on the timelines that we believe we need. You know the timeline. We’re working in in weeks and months, not years out here in the Indo-Pacific.”

breakingdefense.com · Mark Pomerleau

19. China’s De-Americanization Strategy

​Again does this create a bi-plar world construct the US versus China?

Excerpts:

Across trade, technology, finance, ideology, and education, China is building the capacity to engage the world on its own terms. China’s de-Americanization is not anti-globalization or anti-American. It is a strategic recalibration aimed at creating an independent, resilient China capable of participating in global cooperation with greater equality.

China’s de-Americanization is part of a broader shift from a unipolar U.S.-dominated system toward a more multipolar global order. From the BRICS expansion to Belt and Road projects, from independent 5G deployment to sharing poverty alleviation strategies, China is asserting an alternative model of development that is neither strictly Western nor American.

The goal is not confrontation but strategic autonomy. In this evolving framework, emerging economies can participate in global governance without relying on a single dominant power. De-Americanization is less a rebellion than a quiet repositioning ‒ laying the foundation for what might be called re-globalization, in which a diverse, balanced, and multipolar world order becomes the new standard.

Summary:

China’s “de-Americanization” strategy marks a decisive effort to achieve self-reliance and reduce vulnerability to U.S. pressure across five domains: trade, technology, finance, ideology, and education. Beijing has diversified trade toward Asia and the Global South, accelerated domestic innovation despite U.S. sanctions, expanded yuan-based financial systems, and promoted its governance model through BRICS and Belt and Road. In technology, China leads in 5G, AI, and semiconductors; in education, it is retaining top talent. Rather than isolationist or anti-American, the campaign aims for “strategic autonomy,” positioning China at the center of a multipolar world order built on resilience, equality, and diversified globalization.

China’s De-Americanization Strategy

As the U.S. pursues “de-risking,” China is charting its own course from reliance to autonomy

asiasentinel.com · Oct 31, 2025∙ Paid

By Wang Wen, The Diplomat

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/china-de-americanization-strategy?publication_id=23934&utm

China is no longer waiting to see whether Washington will decouple. It is moving first ‒ and fast. While U.S. strategists still debate whether China is being isolated, Beijing has already been quietly reshaping its economic and technological foundations.

What began a decade ago as talk of “de-Americanization” has become a steady, data-backed shift toward self-reliance and global diversification.

This is not a Cold War replay or an attempt to cut ties. Instead, it reflects a broader effort by China to redefine its path of development and reduce exposure to U.S. pressure. The results are most visible in five key areas, starting with trade.

1. Trade: From Dependence to Diversification

China’s trade rebalancing is more pragmatic than political. Facing tariffs and protectionism from Washington, Beijing has built new trade routes through Asia, Europe, and the Global South.

In 2018, the United States made up 19.3 percent of China’s total foreign trade. By the first eight months of 2025, that share had fallen to 9.2 percent ‒ even as China’s total trade expanded 45 percent. The numbers tell the story: China is trading more, just not as much with the U.S.

Imports and exports of specific goods are also shifting. Once, 85 percent of China’s soybeans came from the United States; today, 68 percent come from Brazil, with U.S. imports down to 22 percent. Exports of high-tech goods to the U.S. have dropped to 28 percent of China’s overall exports, while sales of high-end equipment to Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) countries ‒ a trade bloc spanning Asia and the Pacific ‒ jumped to 41 percent.

Beijing isn’t cutting itself off from the U.S. market so much as ensuring it no longer depends on it. Call it China’s version of “de-risking.”

2. Science and Technology: From Follower to Contender

If Washington hoped sanctions and export controls would slow China down, the opposite seems to have happened. Since 2018, the United States has blacklisted more than 1,700 Chinese entities, aiming to block their access to advanced technologies. The result has been a surge in state-led innovation and a race to build domestic alternatives.

China now holds 42 percent of global 5G standard-essential patents, and by September 2025, it is expected to operate more than 4.6 million 5G base stations ‒ about 60 percent of the world’s total. The scale of that rollout has underpinned new industries such as the industrial internet and the Internet of Vehicles.

The same pattern is visible in artificial intelligence and frontier technologies. China accounts for 61.5 percent of global generative AI patents, and its research papers in autonomous driving and quantum computing now exceed U.S. publications in citation impact.

Research and development spending reached 2.55 percent of GDP in 2024, with basic research rising to 6.8 percent of that total. This reflects China’s shift toward long-term capacity rather than fast commercial wins.

China’s trend toward technological independence is showing up in hardware, too. The Kirin 9000S chip, developed by Huawei and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation ‒ China’s leading chip foundry ‒ is produced without the extreme ultraviolet lithography tools made by Dutch firm ASML, long considered indispensable for cutting-edge semiconductors.

Other milestones are visible across sectors: the Beidou satellite network now serves more than 200 countries and regions. The C919 jetliner has entered commercial service. The Fendouzhe submersible reached a depth of 10,000 meters. The Chang’e 6 lunar probe returned samples from the far side of the moon.

From drones and quantum computers to new battery systems, these examples show how China’s tech ecosystem is increasingly self-contained ‒ and determined to stay that way.

3. Finance: Diversifying Beyond the Dollar

China is seeking to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar and build a more resilient global financial network.

Washington has used the dollar as a tool of influence through SWIFT sanctions, long-arm jurisdiction, and asset freezes, exposing the vulnerabilities of a dollar-centric system. China’s response has been methodical and gradual.

China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System now supports transactions in 185 countries. Renminbi (RMB)-denominated trades for liquefied natural gas at the Shanghai Oil and Gas Exchange are growing, while the Shenzhen Qianhai Joint Trading Center routinely handles offshore soybean transactions in RMB. China has signed local currency settlement agreements with more than 40 countries.

By 2023, cross-border RMB payments reached 52 trillion yuan, representing 58 percent of total cross-border flows in multiple currencies: a historic milestone that surpassed the U.S. dollar in comparable measures. In China’s trade with Russia, over 95 percent of transactions are settled in local currencies.

China is not aiming to displace the U.S. dollar. Instead, it is creating a system where the dollar remains central but is supplemented by other currencies, strengthening financial security and reducing exposure to unilateral sanctions.

4. Ideology: Building up the China Model

China is moving away from the idea that the U.S. model is the only path to development. Instead, it is cultivating its own approach to governance, knowledge, and global engagement. For decades, Western theories such as democratic peace theory framed global discourse and promoted a single standard. China’s experience challenges that assumption.

China has lifted more than 100 million people out of extreme poverty over the past decade, achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 10 years ahead of schedule. In comparison, about 15 percent of the U.S. population remains uninsured, and debates over health coverage have led to a government shutdown.

At home and abroad, China is promoting its governance system as an example of “whole-process people’s democracy.” Internationally, China advocates multilateralism, opposing exclusive trade and security blocs.

The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) grouping has expanded from 5 to 15 countries, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization includes states representing 40 percent of the global population, and over 150 countries participate in the Belt and Road Initiative.

Through these mechanisms, China is shifting from a recipient of U.S.-led global rules to an active participant in shaping new governance structures.

Its strategy is not anti-Americanism. Rather, it reflects a push to participate on a more equal footing in global decision-making and to promote a model of development informed by Chinese experience.

5. Education: From Brain Drain to Domestic Talent

China is reshaping its higher education system to reduce reliance on American universities and cultivate homegrown expertise. Before 2010, many of China’s top universities modeled curricula and research evaluation systems on U.S. standards.

At one point, a significant share of Chinese science and engineering graduates stayed in the United States, limiting domestic capacity for innovation. To reverse this trend, China launched the Strengthening Basics Plan, enrolling 180,000 students over five years in fields such as semiconductors and nuclear science.

By 2024, 92 percent of graduates remained in China.

The country has also moved away from using the Science Citation Index as the sole metric for research evaluation, emphasizing innovation and practical impact instead.

International student flows have balanced: By 2024, China hosted 520,000 foreign students, while the number of Chinese nationals studying in the United States dropped from a peak of 400,000 to under 200,000.

Toward a Multipolar World

Across trade, technology, finance, ideology, and education, China is building the capacity to engage the world on its own terms. China’s de-Americanization is not anti-globalization or anti-American. It is a strategic recalibration aimed at creating an independent, resilient China capable of participating in global cooperation with greater equality.

China’s de-Americanization is part of a broader shift from a unipolar U.S.-dominated system toward a more multipolar global order. From the BRICS expansion to Belt and Road projects, from independent 5G deployment to sharing poverty alleviation strategies, China is asserting an alternative model of development that is neither strictly Western nor American.

The goal is not confrontation but strategic autonomy. In this evolving framework, emerging economies can participate in global governance without relying on a single dominant power. De-Americanization is less a rebellion than a quiet repositioning ‒ laying the foundation for what might be called re-globalization, in which a diverse, balanced, and multipolar world order becomes the new standard.

Wang Wen is a professor and dean at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University. This article is the result of a cooperative sharing agreement with The Diplomat, a Tokyo-based current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region.

asiasentinel.com · Oct 31, 2025∙ Paid

20. As U.S. ramps up pressure, Venezuela pleads with Moscow and Beijing for help

Is it all about oil?

​Excerpts:

Russia is still a major player in Venezuelan oil, a thick sludgy crude product requiring substantial processing. The Russians provide essential inputs for processing that crude as well as supplies of gasoline to keep the industry running.

Russian state companies have direct investments in three Venezuelan joint ventures that produce 107,000 barrels of crude per day, or about 11 percent of Venezuela’s total current production, and generate approximately $67 million a month, said Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin American Energy Program at Rice University.

Russia also owns lucrative exploration and export rights to Venezuela’s Patao and Mejillones offshore gas fields. Its rights to proved but untapped reserves of Venezuelan crude are additionally worth as much as $5 billion, Monaldi said.

But Venezuelan crude — under sanctions in the U.S. — is a competitor of Russia’s domestic oil industry, which is also under U.S. sanctions and therefore shares some clients, like China.

“The Russians are not investing in Venezuela anymore. That’s the bottom line,” Monaldi added.

​Summary:

Facing a U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has appealed to Russia, China, and Iran for military aid—seeking radar systems, aircraft repairs, and missiles. Letters to Putin and Xi urged expanded defense cooperation. Moscow, though distracted by Ukraine, reaffirmed support but offers limited help. Venezuela’s forces remain outdated despite decades of Russian arms deals. Analysts say Russia’s reduced capacity and overlapping oil interests limit engagement, yet Moscow still values Caracas as a strategic foothold and energy partner. Maduro’s outreach underscores his regime’s isolation and reliance on authoritarian allies amid intensifying U.S. pressure and regional instability.

As U.S. ramps up pressure, Venezuela pleads with Moscow and Beijing for help

Documents show Maduro drafted letter asking Russia for missiles, radars and upgraded aircraft as U.S. forces amass in the Caribbean.

Updated

October 31, 2025 at 2:16 p.m. EDTyesterday at 2:16 p.m. EDT

Washington Post · Anthony Faiola

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/10/31/russia-venezuela-oil-trump/

Amid a buildup of American forces in the Caribbean, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is reaching out to Russia, China and Iran to enhance its worn military capabilities and solicit assistance — requesting defensive radars, aircraft repairs and potentially missiles — according to internal U.S. government documents obtained by The Washington Post.

The requests to Moscow were made in the form of a letter meant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and was intended to be delivered during a visit to the Russian capital by a senior aide this month.

Maduro, according to the documents, also composed a letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping seeking “expanded military cooperation” between their two countries to counter “the escalation between the U.S. and Venezuela.”

In the letter, Maduro asked the Chinese government to expedite Chinese companies’ production of radar detection systems, presumably so Venezuela could enhance its capabilities.

The documents say Transport Minister Ramón Celestino Velásquez also recently coordinated a shipment of military equipment and drones from Iran while planning a visit to that country. He told an Iranian official that Venezuela was in need of “passive detection equipment,” “GPS scramblers” and “almost certainly drones with 1,000 km [600 mile] range,” the documents state.

“In the missive, Maduro emphasized the seriousness of perceived U.S. aggression in the Caribbean, framing U.S. military action against Venezuela as action against China due to their shared ideology,” the U.S. documents said.

Russia remains the primary lifeline for Maduro. On Sunday, an Ilyushin Il-76 — one of the Russian aircraft sanctioned in 2023 by the United States for participating in the arms trade and transporting mercenaries — arrived in Caracas, Venezuela’s capital, after a circuitous route over Africa to avoid Western airspace, according to Flightradar24. The Kremlin declined to comment on the letter, but the Foreign Ministry on Friday evening said that Moscow supports Venezuela “in defending its national sovereignty” and stands “ready to respond appropriately to the requests of our partners in light of emerging threats.”

Moscow also just ratified a new strategic treaty with Caracas.

The machinations show how much Moscow stands to lose should the embattled Venezuelan leader fall. High-profile projects between the two countries continue to roll out, including a Kalashnikov munitions factory that opened in July in the Venezuelan state of Aragua, about 20 years after it was pledged. Moscow also has exploration rights for potentially billions of dollars in untapped natural gas and oil reserves.

Yet despite the optics, observers say, Moscow’s means and interest in supporting Maduro may be reduced compared with years past. The standoff between Washington and Caracas could even offer the Russians some unexpected benefits as it turns American attention away from Europe.

Mired in a war in Ukraine, and eyeing closer cooperation with other Latin American partners, Moscow has gradually curtailed its interest in Venezuela in recent years with little sign of a surge in support because of the current crisis.

“The fact that we’ve moved over 10 percent of our naval assets to the Caribbean is already a win, in some regards, for Putin,” said James Story, a former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela and founding partner of Global Frontier Advisors, a geopolitical consultancy. “Our renewed interest in all things Western Hemisphere divides our attention on Ukraine. And that’s a good thing for Putin.”

The political and economic ties between Russia and Venezuela date to Hugo Chávez, the father of its socialist state, following his rise to power in 1999. The relationship flourished during the 2000s, 2010s and early 2020s. Today, it spans the vital petrochemicals sector, weapons purchases, shared propaganda operations and opaque cryptocurrency deals, according to analysts.

The U.S. military buildup in the Caribbean is presenting perhaps the greatest challenge to Maduro, Chávez’s successor, since he took over the country’s leadership in 2013. More than a dozen U.S. strikes on alleged drug traffickers, largely departing from Venezuelan shores, have killed at least 61 people since September. The administration has not presented proof that the ships were involved in drug trafficking, and Maduro has denied they were.

The USS Gerald Ford, the Navy’s heaviest and most modern aircraft carrier, has been dispatched to the region.

In early October, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov “expressed serious concern over the increasing escalation of Washington’s activities in the Caribbean Sea” in a call with his Venezuelan counterpart.

On Wednesday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that Moscow “respects Venezuela’s sovereignty” and believes the issue should be resolved in accordance with “international law” — a talking point the Kremlin often employs to sidestep sensitive geopolitical questions.

But Russia is now more occupied closer to home, fighting a war and Western sanctions of its own. Defense analysts say Moscow has shifted some of its key Latin American listening posts from Venezuela to Nicaragua, where the pro-Russian authoritarian president, Daniel Ortega, has solidified his grip on power.

“The reality is that Russia has been relatively quiet on Venezuela,” said Douglas Farah, president of the national security consulting firm IBI Consultants. “And they’ve spent very little political capital defending Maduro.”

The Venezuelan president, however, is in the midst of shoring up his defenses and needs Moscow.

Appeal to Russia

In mid-October, Velásquez, the transportation minister, traveled to Moscow for a meeting with his Russian counterpart, according to Russia’s Transport Ministry. According to documents obtained by The Post, he was also meant to deliver the letter from Maduro to Putin.

In the letter, Maduro requested that the Russians help boost his country’s air defenses, including restoring several Russian Sukhoi Su-30MK2 aircraft previously purchased by Venezuela. Maduro also asked for assistance overhauling eight engines and five radars in Russia, acquiring 14 sets of what were believed to be Russian missiles, as well as unspecified “logistical support,” according to the documents.

Maduro emphasized that Russian-made Sukhoi fighters “represented the most important deterrent the Venezuelan National Government had when facing the threat of war,” according to the U.S. records.

Maduro asked Russia for a “medium-term financing plan of three years” through Rostec, the Russian state-owned defense conglomerate. The documents did not specify an amount.

The documents also indicate that Velásquez was slated to meet with and deliver a second letter to Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov. They do not state whether or how the Russian government responded to Maduro’s outreach or whether the trip took place.

‘Pure junk’

Chávez began what would become years of Russian weapons purchases, including Russian-made tanks, Sukhoi fighters and surface-to-air missiles.

Analysts and officials familiar with the Venezuelan military say much of what was purchased is nonoperational or outdated. One former Venezuelan military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity out of fear of reprisals, said that by 2018, Venezuela had fewer than five Russian-built Sukhois operating.

Chávez also bought Russian helicopters and stocked Russians missiles, he said. But many of them are old and represent no real threat against the U.S. military.

“Chávez bought, or Russia sold Venezuela, pure junk,” he said.

Maduro, however, claimed this month that Venezuela had deployed 5,000 Russian-made Igla-S portable surface-to-air missiles nationwide.

A regime change in Venezuela would be a major blow to Moscow, potentially representing the loss of a major ally while significantly weakening another, Cuba — an even longer-standing ally of Moscow’s whose intelligence community is closely intertwined with Maduro’s Venezuela — who observers say could be next on Washington’s list.

But some observers question Russia’s dedication to Maduro. The public signaling now is different from in 2019, when, in a visible show of force at the U.S.-backed Maduro opposition, about 100 Russian troops led by Gen. Vasily Tonkoshkurov arrived in Venezuela on an AN-124 military transport.

Even the cooperation treaty with Venezuela stops short of a real military pledge. Victor Jeifets, editor in chief of the Russian journal Latin America, said the treaty — which covers topics including money laundering and nuclear proliferation — is vague on military cooperation, simply suggesting that the two parties “improve ties in the field of defense.”

With its forces tied up in Ukraine, Russia is also less capable of assisting a friendly leader across the Atlantic, even if it wanted to.

“Would Russia do anything [in case of a U.S. operation]? I think it is not in the immediate plans of the Russian authorities,” Jeifets said.

Oil ties

Russia is still a major player in Venezuelan oil, a thick sludgy crude product requiring substantial processing. The Russians provide essential inputs for processing that crude as well as supplies of gasoline to keep the industry running.

Russian state companies have direct investments in three Venezuelan joint ventures that produce 107,000 barrels of crude per day, or about 11 percent of Venezuela’s total current production, and generate approximately $67 million a month, said Francisco Monaldi, director of the Latin American Energy Program at Rice University.

Russia also owns lucrative exploration and export rights to Venezuela’s Patao and Mejillones offshore gas fields. Its rights to proved but untapped reserves of Venezuelan crude are additionally worth as much as $5 billion, Monaldi said.

But Venezuelan crude — under sanctions in the U.S. — is a competitor of Russia’s domestic oil industry, which is also under U.S. sanctions and therefore shares some clients, like China.

“The Russians are not investing in Venezuela anymore. That’s the bottom line,” Monaldi added.

Washington Post · Anthony Faiola

21. Opinion | China’s trade bullying calls for an Article 5

An Article 5 for trade bullying? Can we create "collective economic deterrence?"

Excerpt:

Importantly, collective economic deterrence would only be used if China acts out. In this sense, it is a strategy aimed not at starting a trade war, but at stopping China’s destruction of the free-trade order. To do nothing, or to cave to China’s demands, only ensures more intimidation.

Summary:

Victor Cha, Ellen Kim and Andy Lim argue that China’s escalating economic coercion demands a novel collective response akin to NATO Treaty’s Article 5. China has long used trade tools of tariffs, export bans, and market access threats to force policy changes in others on issues ranging from Taiwan to human rights. Because individual nations struggle to resist China’s leverage, the authors propose a pact where any member under economic attack by China triggers unified retaliation. The mechanism would raise the political and economic cost of China’s bullying and shore up the rules-based trading system.

Opinion | China’s trade bullying calls for an Article 5

Washington Post · Victor Cha

Trade interdependence is a two-way street, and China is not the only one with leverage.

By Victor Cha, Ellen Kim and Andy Lim

October 27, 2025

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/10/27/china-trade-rare-earth-minerals-leverage/

Victor Cha is president of the geopolitics and foreign policy department at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a professor at Georgetown University. Ellen Kim is director of academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America. Andy Lim is a CSIS fellow. They are co-authors of “China’s Weaponization of Trade: Resistance through Collective Resilience,” to be published in January.

It’s been a busy month for Chinese trade weaponization. Last week, Beijing slapped punitive sanctions on five U.S. subsidiaries of a Korean shipping company. This followed its Oct. 9 announcement imposing sweeping export controls on rare earth minerals. Chinese officials cited national security concerns for the moves and this week could agree to pause China’s restrictions for a year, but in truth they were just the latest act in a three-decade-long power play.

As President Donald Trump tours Asia, he should consider a way to work with allies and partners to stop the bullying. Individually, the targets of Chinese economic pressure find it difficult, if not impossible, to hold their ground against the second largest economy in the world. But if they act collectively, they can deter China’s coercion once and for all.

This is especially vital given how China deploys its economic might to achieve aims beyond the economic sphere. Leveraging its massive market, China uses tariff and nontariff barriers to infringe on the sovereign political choices of others. The goal is not the conventional one of protecting domestic markets; rather, Beijing seeks to change the target’s policies on Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and other areas deemed core interests by the Chinese Communist Party.

This trade weaponization has increased dramatically under President Xi Jinping. The three of us have compiled a dataset tracking instances of Chinese economic coercion over the past 28 years, and the pattern is clear: Worldwide since 1997, there have been 23 cases of targeted pressure by China against governments and 582 against individual companies.

In 2012, China stopped importing Philippine bananas over a territorial dispute. In 2020, it slapped tariffs as high as 218 percent on Australian wine and blocked beef imports from 10 processors because Canberra called for an independent investigation into the origins of covid-19. U.S. companies Apple, Amazon, FedEx, Google, Intel, McDonald’s, Microsoft, Nike and Walmart have all faced retaliation by China for myriad supposed transgressions, including objections to labeling of Hong Kong and Taiwan on websites and products or actions, such as sending packages or selling T-shirts, perceived as supporting Hong Kong protests.

In almost all cases, the government or company quickly conceded in order to minimize losses. China pocketed the win and moved on to the next target.

However, what if Trump, rather than tariffing European and Asian partners, tried to bring them into a collective economic deterrence pledge? In the spirit of NATO’s bedrock Article 5 mutual defense commitment, such a pledge would treat economic coercion against one as economic coercion against all — to be answered with retaliation by the whole group.

Trade interdependence is a two-way street, and China is not the only one with leverage. Indeed, targets of China’s coercion export almost 600 goods and raw materials that China is heavily dependent on.

The Group of Seven countries plus Australia and South Korea together produce about 600 items, worth $37 billion, that China is heavily dependent on. The U.S. exports 132 of these items, Japan 147 items, South Korea 48, Canada 26 and Australia 22. These exports range from intermediate goods such silver powder (used for solar panels) and spodumene (used for lithium batteries) to luxury items like lobster, fine brandies and cold-weather Kentucky blue grass seeds for soccer pitches.

Currently, China sees no vulnerability in this trade dependence because it assumes that no target would dare retaliate against it. A collective pledge to use high-dependence items to answer Chinese economic intimidation tit-for-tat would make China think twice.

A coalition of exporters could even deter China’s persistent leveraging of critical minerals. While China dominates this market, it is largely dependent on international trade for nickel and nickel-related by-products for its steel and electric vehicle industries. More than 80 percent of China’s imports of nickel alloys, bars, rods and profiles come from United States, Japan and Germany, while 57 percent of nickel catalysts and 55 percent of nickel articles imported by China come from the U.S. and Germany and the U.S. and Korea, respectively. Because its nickel reserves constitute only 4 percent of the world’s total reserves, China lacks a viable domestic alternative.

Collective economic deterrence has already been shown to work. In response to China’s sanctions against Lithuania in 2021 for opening a Taiwan office, the European Union created a list of retaliatory measures and an adjudication system for identifying China’s coercion. Since its inception in December 2023, the E.U.’s Anti-Coercion Instrument has been relatively successful at deterring further bullying by Beijing. No such mechanism currently exists in Asia or involves the United States. It is time to create one.

Importantly, collective economic deterrence would only be used if China acts out. In this sense, it is a strategy aimed not at starting a trade war, but at stopping China’s destruction of the free-trade order. To do nothing, or to cave to China’s demands, only ensures more intimidation.

Washington Post · Victor Cha

22. White House to Announce Resumption of Auto Chip Shipments From China

​Summary:

The White House will announce that Dutch chipmaker Nexperia will resume auto-chip shipments from China under a new U.S.–China framework deal. Shipments paused after the Netherlands seized control from Chinese owner Wingtech, disrupting car production. Restarting exports eases shortages as Trump–Xi talks yield a trade truce and limited tariff relief.

White House to Announce Resumption of Auto Chip Shipments From China

WSJ

Nexperia hasn’t shipped chips for weeks, putting car production around the world at risk

By​ Ryan Felton

Updated Oct. 31, 2025 6:02 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/white-house-to-announce-auto-chip-shipments-to-resume-from-china-88ef4db0

Wafers on a Nexperia production line. Fabian Bimmer/Reuters

• The White House will announce a Dutch semiconductor company will resume chip shipments under a U.S.-China framework trade agreement.
• Nexperia had paused chip shipments after the Dutch government seized control from its Chinese owner, impacting auto production.
• Shipments from a Nexperia facility in China, previously suspended, will restart as part of the U.S.-China deal.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The White House will announce a Dutch semiconductor company will resume chip shipments under a U.S.-China framework trade agreement.

The White House is set to announce that the Dutch semiconductor company that paused shipments weeks ago and risked upending global car production will resume sending chips under a framework agreement reached during talks between President Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, people familiar with the plans said.

The new policy on the Dutch chips is part of a forthcoming document from the White House laying out the details of the U.S.-China trade deal signed this week, according to the people.

The company, Nexperia, stopped shipping chips to customers several weeks ago after the Dutch seized control of the company from its Chinese owner. The decision had begun to limit auto production and threatened widespread industry disruption. Nexperia’s semiconductors are found in various auto parts from speedometers to climate control.

China had ordered shipments from a Nexperia facility there to be suspended, but they will restart as part of the agreement reached this week between the U.S. and China, the people said. The details were set to be included in a statement on the deal that is expected to be released late Friday by the White House.

Nexperia has factories in Europe and Asia. About 70% to 80% of its products are processed in China before being delivered to customers.

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The lack of Nexperia’s diodes and transistors was starting to limit auto production around the world. Honda this week began stopping production across North American facilities in response to the semiconductor crunch.

The first face-to-face meeting between Trump and Xi in six years resulted in a temporary trade truce, highlighted by a reduction in stiff U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods in exchange for a pledge by China to crack down on the export of chemicals used to produce fentanyl.

The U.S. agreed to put on hold for one year a decision to apply export restrictions on certain subsidiaries, the Chinese Commerce Ministry said Thursday. But automakers and suppliers were left guessing what, if anything, that meant for resolving the situation involving Nexperia.

The extraordinary dispute began in late September after the Dutch government wrested control of the company from Wingtech, which is on a U.S. trade blacklist, citing a need to keep Europe from losing “technological knowledge and capabilities” necessary for its economic security.

The Dutch government acted after the U.S. expanded the trade blacklist to include subsidiaries that are 50% owned by listed entities. Shortly after, the Chinese government ordered Wingtech to suspend Nexperia’s exports from China.

Nexperia, which generated about $2 billion in revenue last year with about 60% coming from applications in the auto industry, had a substantial share of the market for basic chips found in hundreds of car components. That widespread usage complicated efforts to source a sufficient supply of replacements, executives and analysts said.

U.S. auto industry groups didn’t immediately comment late Friday.

Write to Ryan Felton at ryan.felton@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 1, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Sees Auto-Chip Shipments Resuming'.

WSJ

​23. Colin Gray, the RMA, and the Rise of Drone Warfare

​We need the late Colin Gray to assess the current strategic environment. Is the current drone warfare a revolution in military affairs?

But the age old question remains: Can technology change the nature of war? Or only the character of war?

Excerpts:

It is not surprising if all of this sounds familiar. While keeping in mind Gray’s admonition to use analogies cautiously, the rise of drones does appear to be the next phase of the information-based RMA that was first identified by Soviet theorists in the 1970s. As the impact of Moore’s Law spreads across science, industry, and militaries globally, new domains opened by new technologies will be filled by war and information-enabled weapons. The fact that drones are relatively inexpensive and, for the time effective against conventional weapons and conventionally equipped infantry makes them even more attractive, reducing the opportunity costs involved in fielding thousands or even tens of thousands of autonomous weapons as quickly as possible. As Colin warns us, it is hard to say what strategic problem or technology will come down the road next – hypersonic weapons armed with extremely lightweight, low-yield nuclear warheads made possible by computational advances in modeling and simulation would be my guess. Nevertheless, just as battlefield necessity led to the rapid eruption and dynamism of drone warfare, the interaction of the demands of some future battlefield and emergent technology will push drones into the background.

What about the elephant in the room? Milley and Schmidt reassure us that it is “an illusion to think that technology will change the underlying human nature of conflict.”[28] To this, one can add that technology is also unlikely to change the nature of war itself. What remains to be determined is how autonomous weapons – and rest assured, they will possess increasing autonomy as computational power grows, and programming improves – will transform the character of war.[29] Will drones act as a mobile minefield on land, at sea, or in the air, attracted to some type of signature with a lethal payload? Or will drones battle to seize “command of the drone domain” so they can exploit it for their purposes while denying the domain to the opponent’s drones? Or will the drone bring us something completely different? To paraphrase Wylie, will the ultimate determinant in war be the drone on the scene with the gun?

Summary

Gray cautioned that while the RMA, driven by new technologies, organizations, and doctrines, might change the character of war, it would not change its nature. He warned of over-reliance on techno-solutions, diffusion of technology, new vulnerabilities, and the persistence of human and political factors. The article argues that drone warfare, especially in the Russo‑Ukrainian War, represents a new phase of the information-based RMA: cheap, proliferated unmanned systems, enabled by AI and miniaturisation, are altering the battlefield. However, Wirtz echoes Gray: even these innovations cannot replace the political and human foundations of war, and their strategic impact remains uncertain.

Colin Gray, the RMA, and the Rise of Drone Warfare - Military Strategy Magazine

James J. Wirtz - Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey

James J. Wirtz is a Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He recently co-authored War, Peace, and International Relations, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2024).

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not reflect the position of any government, government agency, commercial firm, or other organization.

militarystrategymagazine.com

https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/article/colin-gray-the-rma-and-the-rise-of-drone-warfare/

Thirty years ago, strategists were buzzing about a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which was largely created by the integration of emergent information age technologies into military establishments. For proof of the revolution, one had to look no further than the Coalition victory in the 1991 Gulf War. Precision targeting and precision-guided weapons disabled Iraqi command and control, while a satellite-based Global Positioning System enabled American armored divisions to navigate across a trackless desert to catch the Republican Guard by surprise. Ground combat in that war lasted about 100 hours. In 1993, John Arquilla and David Rondfelt announced that “Cyber war is coming,” that is, conflict and competition were about to fill a new “virtual domain” of human reality created by the software, hardware, and wetware (people) that were communicating exploding amounts of data across an increasingly global Internet.[1] Much like radio communications led to a war for and in the “ether,” the growing reliance on information age technology would lead to a war for and within the Internet. By 1996, William Owens had advanced the idea of a “system of systems,” or the emergence of a reconnaissance-strike complex that could identify, track, and destroy targets in a tactical, theater, or even global setting.[2] The elements of today’s techno-strategic environment were coming into place.

The RMA was about more than technology: it posited that a fundamental change in warfare was underway, produced by the convergence of three developments: new organizations, new weapons/technologies, and new doctrines governing the use of force.[3] Or, as Michael Vickers and Robert Martinage noted, RMAs “are periods of discontinuous change that render obsolete or subordinate existing means of conducting war.”[4] Scholarly discussions about the nature and impact of the RMA continue, although after thirty years, what once appeared to be revolutionary is now increasingly viewed as rather mundane.[5] Ever more exotic technologies – artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, hypersonic vehicles, space systems, stealth – now seem poised to produce another “discontinuous change” in the conduct of war.

Not everyone, however, was completely swept away by the RMA. In a 1996 article published in the Naval War College Review, Colin Gray offered several reservations about the scope and impact of the RMA.[6] In typical fashion, Gray, one of the leading strategists of our age who dealt with nuclear weapons, arms control, sea power, cyber power, space, special operations, technology, defense planning and planners and the theoretical and practical facets of strategy writ large, offered a nuanced and sometimes even equivocal assessment of the claims made by RMA enthusiasts.[7] Nevertheless, it is informative to consider how these observations have stood the test of time and what they have to say about the burst of disruptive military innovation currently underway over the Ukraine Steppe, drone warfare.

Calculating the Scope and Nature of Change

Gray dealt with the elephant in the room first. He noted that the RMA would not change the nature of war (“War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”). Nevertheless, he ventured that it might lead to a change in the character of war, that is, an “information-based” RMA might alter how wars would be conducted.[8] Those who are familiar with Gray’s work would not be surprised by his assessment, but our disciple of Clausewitz went one step further by suggesting that the RMA’s emphasis on information warfare was not particularly novel — Sun Tzu in The Art of War had a similar perspective. He did pay RMA advocates a backhanded compliment by noting their discovery of the importance of information in war was akin to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s “discovery” of “sea power.” Both codified a reality that was recognized intuitively. Ironically, contemporary critics of Mahan sometimes noted that his notion of sea power also captured the obvious, while admitting that things became especially obvious after reading his work.[9]

Gray also complained that the discussion of the RMA focused too heavily on technology, which ignored war as both a “political phenomenon and a social institution.” As a result, he suggested that the way the RMA would play out would be influenced by ideas about the changing character of war, the strategic culture of the American polity, and the dynamic challenges posed by international relations. This would be highly prescient in at least three ways. First, scholars have observed that strategic culture influenced how the RMA unfolded in various national settings; different militaries viewed its importance and impact differently.[10]

Second, Americans might have had a special penchant for the RMA because it addressed developments set in motion for them following the end of the Cold War. It promised to minimize the personal and material costs of using force at a time when threats to U.S. national security barely appeared to merit a response.[11] Or, as Edward Luttwak suggested, no more than limited force and minimal risks could be justified in responding to small wars and other minor disturbances facing the United States during the “unipolar moment.”[12] It also held out the promise of “more bang for the buck,” as several administrations cut Cold War force structure and military expenditures in search of a “peace dividend.” The RMA did not produce a smaller, less-expensive military, but a smaller military increased the appeal of the RMA.[13] Politicians, defense officials, and defense intellectuals find it hard to resist the siren song of cost efficiency.

Third, the RMA vectored attention towards high-intensity conventional operations, the type of operation that the denizens of the Pentagon liked to contemplate. Gray noted that this focus on “making a better job of waging Desert Storm,” was odd given that many observers at the time believed that “low-intensity conflict” was the wave of the future: “the ‘reconnaissance-strike’ centerpiece of ‘I-war’ thinking may have only a distinctly adjunct role to play in most contexts of deeply political, low-intensity conflict.”[14] One of my students put the idea somewhat differently: “Precision strikes are not effective when the opponent’s ideology is the target.”[15]

These observations suggest that strategic assessments of emergent technology and novel weapons are shaped by several cognitive biases: (1) a tendency to assume the future techno-strategic setting will resemble the present; (2) the belief that strategic assessments are universal and are not driven by the somewhat idiosyncratic influence of strategic culture and the pressing political and bureaucratic imperatives of the moment; and (3) a tendency to embrace a “one-size fits all” attitude that fails to consider how black swan events could upset the applecart. Indeed, that black swan took flight on September 11, 2001, a few short years after Gray tapped into another strategic theme of the day — that low-intensity conflict was on the strategic horizon.

Factors that Temper the RMA

In hindsight, Gray seems to have believed that advocates of the RMA depicted it as a “silver bullet”: an information-based weapon, in the form of a system of systems, that would dominate the battlefield for the foreseeable future.[16] It offered a techno-strategic theory of victory, or in the words of Hilarie Belloc, “Whatever happens, we have got the Maxim and they have not.”[17] Gray believed that the reconnaissance-strike complex envisioned by the RMA would be impactful, even at times strategically determinative; nevertheless, he suggested that the dominant advantage offered by the RMA would not last long for the reasons listed below.

1. Nothing Fails Like Success. Gray suggested that it was unlikely that opponents would take the RMA lying down, so to speak. According to Gray, “War, in common with sport, has the characteristic that what worked yesterday might not work tomorrow, precisely because it worked yesterday.”[18]
2. The Diffusion of Technology/Weaponry. The diffusion of technology and innovative weapons is a constant in history; no one has yet devised a way to prevent the opponent from copying the technological innovations of others. Gray even noted that because the RMA was largely dependent on technologies pioneered by the commercial sector, techno-diffusion would be especially rapid in the case of the I-war-enabled RMA.
3. New Capabilities Bring New Vulnerabilities. The more dependent one becomes on information superiority, the more vulnerable one becomes to data interruption.
4. Persistence of the Tried and True. Although he acknowledged that the impact of information dominance in war is highly ubiquitous, Gray saw the resulting systems of systems not as a “stand-alone” capability, but also as an enabler of existing (traditional?) weapons and operations. Gray quoted J.C. Wylie to communicate this point: “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with the gun.”[19]
5. Change is Nonlinear. Gray stated, “you cannot predict reliably some significant characteristic of the world ten years hence from today through a ‘surprise-free’ future. 2006 may not be ‘like’ 1996 only more so.”[20] This observation should be qualified to reflect the fact that some trends, for example, demographics or urbanization, are more resilient than others.[21]
6. Beware of Dubious Historical Analogy. Gray included in this admonition his use of analogies to understand the RMA, although his article offered no systemic or deliberate comparison of the present to past moments of technological churn. Instead, he seemed to be suggesting that explaining war’s outcome was complex and that care had to be taken in using analogies to highlight some factors (e.g., information dominance, technological innovation) over others.

Gray had an uncanny ability to describe how just about everything is related to everything else when it comes to strategy, and he used this talent to critique the RMA project. This list of caveats responded to the techno-enthusiasm voiced by RMA proponents by suggesting that claims about the effectiveness of the RMA focused on its technological novelties, not the permanent embodiment of techno-military superiority. Novelty, almost by definition, is short-lived, especially when placed in the innovation accelerator created by wartime.

The Rise of Drone Warfare

“Elbit Systems 900 takeoff” (Israel)

Attribution: Ronite, CC BY-SA 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons

Today’s reader might be forgiven for wondering what all the fuss was about back in 1996. In many ways, Gray was prescient, but his reservations about the RMA reflected well-known observations drawn from military history. The Global War on Terror vectored the U.S. reconnaissance-strike complex towards the use of long-range, remote-controlled drones to target individual miscreants and small bands of terrorists. Although no one predicted this technological turn of events in the mid-1990s, there was an inkling of low-intensity hostilities on the horizon, which was reflected in Gray’s musings about the future. The RMA also played out unevenly among militaries around the planet as the weaponization of new technologies was shaped by individual strategic cultures and security challenges. For Americans, a tactical, theater, and even a limited global reconnaissance-strike complex became a reality, but as it matured, it seems to have lost some of its luster as a stand-alone “war-winning” capability. Increasing costs, technological diffusion, and vexing target sets, that is, opponents motivated by religion or ideology, all serve to limit its availability and effectiveness. The RMA could not prevent the demise of the unipolar moment.

Nevertheless, I-War has recently been vectored along a new path – ongoing miniaturization of various electrical components and growing computational power have led to the rise of drones, semi-autonomous systems that are creating a new domain of warfare in the Russia-Ukraine War. A kinetic expression of cyberspace that operates at low altitude to hunt personnel and vehicles, drones were the stuff of science fiction back in the last century. To the best of my knowledge, the RMA debates of the 1990s did not touch upon the possibility of a weaponized singularity, that is, the subject of the 1984 movie The Terminator and a current issue of plausible concern.[22]

Today’s drones are a far cry from the Terminator (one hopes), but they are wreaking havoc, especially on the conventional battlefield. In the most spectacular demonstration of the drone’s potential, Ukraine recently smuggled aerial drones deep inside Russia to destroy irreplaceable long-range bombers that were used to launch cruise missiles against urban targets.[23] With only slightly less fanfare, Israeli special forces launched drones from inside Iran to degrade air defenses at the outset of its June 2025 counterproliferation campaign against Tehran.[24] While the success of these operations was based more on ingenuity and daring than the drones themselves, there is no doubt that semi-autonomous weapons are now a fixture of the contemporary battlefield.

Observers are sounding the tocsin as they offer competing characterizations of what is on full display in the Russia-Ukraine war. Michael Horowitz, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, suggests that an era of “precise mass” has arrived: “War will be defined in large part by the deployment of huge numbers of uncrewed systems, whether fully autonomous and powered by artificial intelligence or remote-controlled, from outer space to under the sea. The pioneering breakthroughs evident in today’s conflicts merely foreshadow how wars will be waged in the years and decades to come . . ..[25] Former Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs Mark Milley and former CEO of Google Eric Schmidt take a somewhat broader perspective: artificial intelligence not only powers the drones, it is increasingly being used to exploit a deluge of multi-source data to identify and track targets with precision in real-time. They also note that drones are cheap, or at least cheaper than the weapons they target. For example, they note that “a simple first-person-view drone can cost just $500. A team of ten of them can immobilize a $10 million Russian tank in Ukraine.”[26] They cite the fact that two-thirds of the Russian tanks destroyed in the war were destroyed by drones to make the point that artificial intelligence, especially its kinetic manifestation in drone warfare, “is rapidly changing the character of war.”

“Ukrainian FPV drone with fiber-optic communication channel”

Attribution: АрміяІнформ, CC BY 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons.

It is probably too early to judge the general effectiveness of drone warfare across a full range of tactical or operational scenarios. Against a fully functional combined-arms operation benefiting from a superior reconnaissance-strike complex, electronic or physical countermeasures, or even drone killing drones, it is possible to envision a force blowing through the drone opposition before it can have much effect. Dispatches from the front already report that drones are more effective when accompanied by artillery barrages to disrupt electronic warfare, cripple air defenses, and send infantry to ground.[27] The strategic and political impact of drone use is also an open question, that is, how will drones interact with war as a “political phenomenon and a social institution.” Nevertheless, there is no doubt that drones are both a multifaceted opportunity and a dynamic problem that manifests at the blistering pace of wartime innovation.

Conclusion

It is not surprising if all of this sounds familiar. While keeping in mind Gray’s admonition to use analogies cautiously, the rise of drones does appear to be the next phase of the information-based RMA that was first identified by Soviet theorists in the 1970s. As the impact of Moore’s Law spreads across science, industry, and militaries globally, new domains opened by new technologies will be filled by war and information-enabled weapons. The fact that drones are relatively inexpensive and, for the time effective against conventional weapons and conventionally equipped infantry makes them even more attractive, reducing the opportunity costs involved in fielding thousands or even tens of thousands of autonomous weapons as quickly as possible. As Colin warns us, it is hard to say what strategic problem or technology will come down the road next – hypersonic weapons armed with extremely lightweight, low-yield nuclear warheads made possible by computational advances in modeling and simulation would be my guess. Nevertheless, just as battlefield necessity led to the rapid eruption and dynamism of drone warfare, the interaction of the demands of some future battlefield and emergent technology will push drones into the background.

What about the elephant in the room? Milley and Schmidt reassure us that it is “an illusion to think that technology will change the underlying human nature of conflict.”[28] To this, one can add that technology is also unlikely to change the nature of war itself. What remains to be determined is how autonomous weapons – and rest assured, they will possess increasing autonomy as computational power grows, and programming improves – will transform the character of war.[29] Will drones act as a mobile minefield on land, at sea, or in the air, attracted to some type of signature with a lethal payload? Or will drones battle to seize “command of the drone domain” so they can exploit it for their purposes while denying the domain to the opponent’s drones? Or will the drone bring us something completely different? To paraphrase Wylie, will the ultimate determinant in war be the drone on the scene with the gun?

References

[1] John Arquilla and David Rondfelt, “Cyberwar is Coming!” Comparative Strategy Vol. 12, No. 2 (1993), pp. 141-165.

[2] Vice Admiral William A. Owens, USN, “The Emerging U.S. System of Systems,” Strategic Forum, No. 63, February 1996. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA394313.pdf?ref=stratagem.no

[3] Eliot Cohen, “Technology and Warfare,” in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen (eds.) Strategy in the Contemporary World 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 141-160.

[4] Michael Vickers and Robert Martinage, The Revolutions in War (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, December 2004), p. 2.

[5] Andrew Futter and Jeffrey Collins (eds.) Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs: Transformation, Evolution and Lessons Learnt (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); and Barry D. Watts, “The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2011. https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2011.06.02-Maturing-Revolution-In-Military-Affairs1.pdf

[6] Colin S. Gray, “The Changing Nature of Warfare?” Naval War College Review Vol. XLIX, No. 2, Sequence 354, (Spring 1996), pp. 7-22.

[7] For a brief discussion of Gray’s contributions and interests, which also serves an annotated bibliography of some of his key works see David J. Lonsdale, “Colin S. Gray: Reminiscence,” War on the Rocks June 22, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/colin-s-gray-a-reminiscence/#:~:text=In works such as Nuclear Strategy and,first generation of cultural theorists in strategy.&text=Over his long career%2C Colin cast his,technology%2C defense planning%2C small wars%2C and more.

[8] Gray quoted Karl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. By Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75.

[9] Nicholas A. Lambert, The Neptune Factor: Alred Thayer Mahan and the Concept of $eapower (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2024), pp. 330-331.

[10] Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).

[11] For this position see Donald Snow, When America fights: The Uses of Military Force (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000).

[12] Edward N. Luttwak, “Towards Post Heroic Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, pp. 109-122.

[13] James J. Wirtz. RMA Caveat Emptor,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. August 27-30, 1997 and at the Conference “The Revolution in Military Affairs: Historical Perspectives and Policy Implications, Embassy Suites, Monterey, CA August 26-29, 1996., p. 9.

[14] Gray, p. 12.

[15] I would like to thank Maj. Tyler Thompson, USA for this observation.

[16] James J. Wirtz, “A Strategist’s Guide to Disruptive Innovation,” Military Strategy Magazine, Volume 8, Issue 4, spring 2023, pp. 4-9.

[17] Hilaire Belloc, The Modern Traveller (London: E. Arnold, 1898). N.p.

[18] Gray, 14.

[19] J.C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p. 72 (Emphasis removed)

[20] Gray, 14.

[21] James J. Wirtz and Roger Z George, “Assessing Futures Intelligence: Looking Back on Global Trends 2025,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 135, Iss. 3. Fall, 2022. pp. 481-510.

[22] Robert B. Tucker, The Singularity is Coming Soon. Here’s What it May mean,” Forbes, August 22, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertbtucker/2024/08/22/the-singularity-is-coming-soon-heres-what-it-may-mean/ 2024.

[23] Masaao Dahlgren and Lachlan MacKenzie, “Ukraine’s Drone Swarms re Destroying Russian Nuclear Bombers. What Happens Now?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 4, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-drone-swarms-are-destroying-russian-nuclear-bombers-what-happens-now

[24] Maziar Motamedi, “How Israel launched attacks from inside Iran to sow chaos during war,” Aljazerra June 26, 2025. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/26/how-israel-launched-attacks-from-inside-iran-to-sow-chaos-during-the-war

[25] Michael C. Horowitz, “Battles of Precise Mass: Technology is Remaking War and America Must Adapt,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 103, No. 6, November/December 2024), p. 35.

[26] Mark Milley and Eric Schmidt, “America Isn’t Ready for the Wars of the Future,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 103, No. 5 September/October 2024, p. 33.

[27] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Tactical Developments During the Third Year of the Russo-Ukrainian War (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, February 2025), p. 11. Some judgments about the utility of cheap drones are harsh see Jakub Jajcay, “I Fought in Ukraine and Here’s Why FPV Drones Kind of Suck,” War on the Rocks, June 26, 2025. https://warontherocks.com/2025/06/i-fought-in-ukraine-and-heres-why-fpv-drones-kind-of-suck/

[28] Milley and Schmidt, p. 37.

[29] If you do not want to take my word on it see Raj M. Shah and Chrostopher Kirschoff, “A.I. Is Changing War. We are not Ready,” The New York Times, September 13, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/opinion/ai-drones-robot-war-pentagon.html

militarystrategymagazine.com

24. Why the U.S. is losing the battle for hearts and minds

​Minds and will not hearts and minds.

I suppose where you stand depends on where you sit. Mr. Berman does not mention our beloved Korean Service and what north Korea is doing in terms of internal propaganda and how Voice of America made significant contributions to counter regime propaganda.

But I suppose we now have to take the "I" out of DIME since we no longer are employing the information instrument of national power.

Excerpts:

In other words, even before the Trump administration’s decision to gut the country’s informational capabilities, America’s adversaries were outspending it.

And the situation is significantly worse at present: China, Russia and Iran are ramping up informational activities in places where the United States is now noticeably absent, like Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Over the past six months, Russia’s RT has expanded Spanish-language broadcasting to encompass Chile, while its Sputnik multimedia outlet launched Portuguese-language radio broadcasting in Rio de Janeiro. RT has also boosted collaboration with the African Union of Broadcasting, creating a “strategic partnership” that will allow Moscow to message more forcefully throughout the continent. China, meanwhile, has inked multiple memorandums of understanding to share its informational content (and ideological worldview) with media organizations in Turkey, Belarus and assorted other countries. As for Iran, it recently concluded a series of cooperation deals with Russian media outlets like Ruptly and Mir TV, paving the way for Russian propaganda to better access the Iranian populace — and vice versa.

The Trump administration is not even acknowledging this trend, far less ramping up a strategy to counter it. Nine months in, the White House remains focused simply on dismantling USAGM and its functions. There is little evidence that any administration official has thought deeply about how to best promote core U.S. information priorities: honestly telling America’s story and explaining its priorities and policies while effectively countering the distortions and falsehoods being spread by others.

​Summary:

Ilan Berman warns that as China, Russia, and Iran vastly expand global propaganda operations, the U.S. is retreating from the information battlefield. The Trump administration’s plan to dismantle the U.S. Agency for Global Media—overseeing Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and others—abandons critical tools of strategic communication. Adversaries are spending billions to shape narratives in Africa, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific, while U.S. influence wanes. Russia’s RT and China’s state media are rapidly expanding partnerships and language services. Berman argues that without a revitalized information strategy, America risks ceding the global contest for hearts and minds to authoritarian rivals.

Opinion | Why the U.S. is losing the battle for hearts and minds

As rivals flood the world with propaganda, Washington is dismantling its best tools to respond.

Washington Post · Ilan Berman

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/10/30/us-voa-disinformation-tools-usagm/

Ilan Berman is senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council. He sits on the boards of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks.

If the Gaza war taught us anything, it is that information truly is power. The ability to shape perceptions, to win “hearts and minds,” and to define the terms of national (and international) debate is as important as battlefield success. That’s why the militants of Hamas, while losing on the battlefield against Israel’s superior military capabilities, managed so adroitly to capture and manipulate the public discourse surrounding the conflict.

It’s therefore deeply surprising that the United States has chosen to quit this field of battle. Since this spring, the Trump administration has taken a hatchet to the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM), the federal entity responsible for overseeing American international broadcasting. The administration’s plans call for the agency to be shuttered outright and for its constituent parts — from federal services like Voice of America to “grantees” like Radio Free Asia — to be either eliminated or eventually repackaged in minimalist form.

Many of the administration’s criticisms of USAGM are apt. The agency has suffered for years from an array of serious problems. But the decision to destroy rather than reform it is having real-world consequences abroad, where U.S. adversaries are expanding their informational reach.

The numbers tell the story. China, for instance, is spending billions of dollars annually on propaganda, false narratives and fake news. Back in 2021, Rand researchers estimated that figure to be “at least $10 billion a year.” And this might be just the tip of the iceberg. National security officials familiar with the information warfare portfolio have suggested that the Rand number is very much a lowball and the true amount China is spending in this domain could be three times that. This surge can be seen in Africa, where Beijing is busy buying up local media channels to better control the narrative about the Chinese Communist Party, and in ramped-up disinformation targeting political and social cohesion in Taiwan and throughout the Indo-Pacific.

Second is Russia. From 2024 to 2025, the Kremlin’s spending on propaganda rose by 13 percent, to approximately $1.4 billion. Russia made this change in the middle of a protracted and costly conflict with Ukraine, one that has progressively driven the nation toward recession. That figure, however, accounts only for Russia’s “white budget” — that is, the Kremlin’s official declared expenditures. European officials assess Russia is spending considerably more, perhaps as much as an additional $1 billion annually, by drawing on black budgets and hidden coffers. Moscow has used this money to undermine European societies, to promote itself as a reliable partner in the Middle East and Africa, and to expand its appeal in the Americas.

Then there is Iran. The Islamic Republic’s spending on informational activities is more modest, because its economy is significantly smaller than that of either Russia or China. Nevertheless, its expenditures are significant, recently estimated at $400 million, an increase of more than 30 percent over last year. All this while the country’s currency has cratered and drought conditions have become so severe that officials have suggested they might have no choice but to move the capital from Tehran to another part of the country.

In other words, even before the Trump administration’s decision to gut the country’s informational capabilities, America’s adversaries were outspending it.

And the situation is significantly worse at present: China, Russia and Iran are ramping up informational activities in places where the United States is now noticeably absent, like Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Over the past six months, Russia’s RT has expanded Spanish-language broadcasting to encompass Chile, while its Sputnik multimedia outlet launched Portuguese-language radio broadcasting in Rio de Janeiro. RT has also boosted collaboration with the African Union of Broadcasting, creating a “strategic partnership” that will allow Moscow to message more forcefully throughout the continent. China, meanwhile, has inked multiple memorandums of understanding to share its informational content (and ideological worldview) with media organizations in Turkey, Belarus and assorted other countries. As for Iran, it recently concluded a series of cooperation deals with Russian media outlets like Ruptly and Mir TV, paving the way for Russian propaganda to better access the Iranian populace — and vice versa.

The Trump administration is not even acknowledging this trend, far less ramping up a strategy to counter it. Nine months in, the White House remains focused simply on dismantling USAGM and its functions. There is little evidence that any administration official has thought deeply about how to best promote core U.S. information priorities: honestly telling America’s story and explaining its priorities and policies while effectively countering the distortions and falsehoods being spread by others.

If the Trump administration wants to remain competitive on the world stage, it will need to start thinking. And if Chinese, Russian and Iranian efforts are any indication, it will need to do so soon.

Washington Post · Ilan Berman

25. The Free World is Losing the Information War. Here’s How It Can Win.

​Minds and will rather hearts and minds.

The question is, are we going to invest in developing serious and effective capabilities to win the information war?

​Excerpts:

Winning the information war requires a stalwart defense of the past and present. A bipartisan effort to counter the disinformation that has inflamed and distorted debate in democratic societies would aid in the pursuit of sound policy, both foreign and domestic. Moreover, by reducing a key irritant in our polity, a bold endeavor to actively present the truth would aid in the resumption of good-faith civil discourse across the United States.

​Summary:

Artur Kalandarov warns that the free world is losing the information war as China, Russia, and Iran bankroll vast disinformation networks undermining faith in democracy, NATO, and U.S. aid. He proposes four strategies to reclaim the narrative: amplify fact-based messaging through coordinated, proactive communication; revive and resource legacy media like Voice of America; use “prebunking” and media literacy to inoculate citizens against falsehoods; and highlight the free world’s historical and humanitarian successes. Winning requires bipartisan resolve, honest storytelling, and defense of democratic values to restore credibility, rebuild civil discourse, and reclaim leadership in the global battle of ideas.

The Free World is Losing the Information War. Here’s How It Can Win. - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Artur Kalandarov · October 31, 2025

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-free-world-is-losing-the-information-war-heres-how-it-can-win/

In the global battle for hearts and minds, sophisticated networks of disinformation pose a serious threat to free societies and their aspirations for a better future. China, Russia, and Iran have funded a global web of news sites, podcasters, media platforms, and influencers to support authoritarianism and perpetuate narratives of Western corruption and decline. As a result, political fringes have gone mainstream, leading to the years-long persistence of patently false narratives about the decisions and policies of democratic states. Disinformation, consisting of intentionally false content, has fostered a broader cesspool of misinformation spread by unwitting actors. If the information space continues to be dominated by America’s adversaries and their partners, nearly all the domestic and foreign policy challenges facing the United States today will likely persist or worsen.

Polls of citizens in free countries repeatedly show that narratives rooted in disinformation are succeeding. A third of Americans do not believe the media should be able to report news without state censorship. Nearly one in five believe the NATO alliance is no longer necessary. And 37 percent do not support the provision of US aid to for the economic development of developing states. At the core of each of these beliefs and many others are disinformation campaigns that overstate the dangers of free speech, distort imbalances among partners in US-led alliances, and misrepresent the costs and benefits of US foreign aid initiatives. Without a concerted effort to combat these harmful narratives, the United States risks losing the global information war, which will have deleterious effects on its ability to ensure a stable, prosperous, and rules-based global order.

To maintain and expand the positive influence of the free world on its own citizens and those in authoritarian and partly free societies, the United States and its partners must play an active role in combating the disinformation tropes perpetrated by its adversaries. There is no silver bullet that will guarantee victory in the information battle, but there are four organizing principles that can increase the chance of success.

The first is the need to ensure fact-based narratives are clearly and frequently expressed to frame global developments in an accurate manner favorable to the United States and its partners. Often, earnest efforts to correct the record are restrained by poor messaging and muddled public responses. The ties between Moscow and Beijing, for instance, are often heralded by both states as a mutually beneficial partnership among equals. The reality of Russia’s status as a junior partner with an outsized reliance on its neighbor is not raised by the United States and partners often enough. Concerted international coordination is necessary to call out Chinese, Russian, and Iranian narratives and change public perceptions.

Secondly, free societies must harness tools already in existence to expand access to their perspectives. Through press offices, social media accounts, and international gatherings, leaders can elevate their viewpoints above the noise of adversarial misinformation campaigns. Government-owned legacy media, such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Liberty / Radio Europe, have lost funding at a time when some authoritarian systems are experiencing a period of weakness. Russia’s abandonment of the Assad regime in Syria is one of many recent examples of a geopolitical defeat that has been underutilized by the United States in the international court of public opinion.

Public policies must be developed to intentionally limit the spread of demonstrably false information. Fortunately, there is a growing field of research on the psychology of misinformation to aid in this effort. A 2022 UK-based study found that explaining how false news is structured—a tactic called “prebunking”—has been shown to inoculate some media consumers from believing and sharing misinformation when they see it. Likewise, reminding viewers to consider whether a headline was accurate has been shown to increase the likelihood that they will not share misinformation with others, thereby constraining the spread of false narratives. Another recent study found that explaining the concept of active open-mindedness helps individuals discern misinformation and conspiracy theories. A bipartisan effort to encourage social media companies to implement the guidance being developed in academia would likely help contain the lies that have roiled America’s political landscape.

Lastly, the information battle must not seek to only counter negative depictions of America and its allies. While historical errors by the West must be acknowledged, they need to be considered alongside the great successes of the free world over the past century. Among them are the post–World War II rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan, the democratization of Japan, and the successful political and economic integration of former communist states in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. There have also been recent accomplishments that have not received the recognition they deserve; President George W. Bush’s successes in reducing HIV in Africa and Operation Warp Speed’s production and donation of COVID-19 vaccines in record time offer two instances from this century that exemplify the free world’s capacity and willingness to work for the common good.

Winning the information war requires a stalwart defense of the past and present. A bipartisan effort to counter the disinformation that has inflamed and distorted debate in democratic societies would aid in the pursuit of sound policy, both foreign and domestic. Moreover, by reducing a key irritant in our polity, a bold endeavor to actively present the truth would aid in the resumption of good-faith civil discourse across the United States.

Artur Kalandarov studied misinformation narratives at Stanford’s Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies. He has previously been published in Defense One, Newsweek, The National Interest, RealClearDefense, and The Hill. Artur is a senior associate at The Cohen Group, where he advises companies on their operations in Eastern Europe. His views do not necessarily reflect those of his firm.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

mwi.westpoint.edu · Artur Kalandarov · October 31, 2025

26.  We’ve Forgotten What ‘Soft Power’ Is

​I think in the current environment "soft power " is denigrated because it sounds "soft." It is not lethal, kinetic, tough, or hard. 

I would like to read Matt Armstrong's comments on this article regarding the history of US information capabilities.

But let's go ahead and reinvent soft power. We have experienced the disruption. What is the plan for what comes next? Are we going to wield all the instruments of national power holistically and effectively and in support of US interests around the world?

Excerpts:

It may be hard to get excited about a constrained, less aspirational future for U.S. engagement. But policymakers’ job is to craft approaches to advancing U.S. interests that match the moment and look to the future. Devotees of U.S. soft power know that helping others globally can stir the country’s better angels. For those who believe that Washington should stand for treasured values, and that the American people are compassionate at heart, the reset of soft power will offer an opportunity to rekindle those flames so that they may again gradually help to warm a cold world.

Summary:

Suzanne Nossel argues that while Trump’s second term has gutted traditional U.S. “soft power” tools such as foreign aid, public diplomacy, and international broadcasting, the concept itself needs reinvention, not nostalgia. Originating in the Cold War, soft power once embodied America’s moral leadership and global appeal but grew bloated, politicized, and detached from strategy. Nossel contends that future U.S. influence must be rebuilt around pragmatic goals—alliances, markets, technology, and security—through leaner, measurable, and interest-driven programs. With China expanding its global image campaign, Washington must modernize its outreach, blending investment, partnerships, and credible values to restore admiration and advance American interests in a changed world.

We’ve Forgotten What ‘Soft Power’ Is

Foreign Policy · Suzanne Nossel

Internationalists are mourning the loss of soft power. Do they even know what that means anymore?

By Suzanne Nossel, the Lester Crown senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy and international order at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

October 28, 2025, 3:11 PM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/10/28/soft-power-united-states-trump-usaid-history/?utm

Since U.S. President Donald Trump returned to office in January, there has been no shortage of liberal internationalists mourning the downfall of U.S. soft power. Trump’s moves to pull back from the United Nations, ravage foreign aid, and mute the Voice of America have dismantled the government’s soft power tool set, while his often derisive and self-interested approach to global engagement—coupled with rapid democratic decay at home—have dimmed the United States’ glow in the eyes of the world.

But as Americans eulogize soft power, they should push past nostalgia to consider what precisely has been lost. Although opinion surveys show that Washington’s global reputation has indeed suffered since Trump’s second term began, the connection between this downturn and the mothballing of soft power instruments is less clear.

Joseph S. Nye, who coined “soft power” in Foreign Policy in 1990, defined it as “the ability to affect others and obtain preferred outcomes by attraction.” Over time, as the concept was embraced by policymakers and analysts, it grew into an amorphous umbrella term for a wide array of policies, programs, and expenditures. These came to include a country’s alliances, international broadcast capabilities, participation in global institutions, development aid, advancement of science, support for universities, diplomacy, funding for think tanks, academic exchange programs, and tariff policies. Outside the realm of government, soft power is also used to refer to global sporting activities, tourism, business, and cultural influence.

Not all of these have equal value as diplomatic tools, nor have they necessarily deserved decades-long government support. Even ardent defenders of defunct programs and institutions, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), acknowledge that decades of bureaucratic inertia and mission drift had made them less effective.

The constellation of soft power projects that existed at the end of U.S. President Joe Biden’s term will not return in its prior form—nor should it. Those who believe in the potency of soft power need to begin reckoning with that reality now in order to begin to reimagine the field for the future.

The idea of investing in programs to promote goodwill toward the United States dates back to the Cold War with the founding of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in 1950, the U.S. Information Agency in 1953, USAID and the Peace Corps in 1961, and the National Endowment for Democracy in 1983. (Voice of America, or VOA, was created earlier but expanded significantly during the Cold War.)

With passage of the 1961 Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, the State Department also funded cultural outreach projects, which included creating U.S. libraries abroad and sending jazz musicians on global tours. Efforts to counter Soviet influence, promote liberal values, and win friends around the world were widely seen in Washington as vital investments.

This visionary Cold War push reflected the United States’ self-image as a nation astride the globe. That boundless sense of enlightened self-interest, encompassing the fate of liberal values and ordinary people everywhere, was inspiring but also unsustainable.

As the Cold War slipped into the rearview mirror, the rationale for these programs grew fuzzier. When the Clinton administration folded the U.S. Information Agency—charged with “telling America’s story to the world”—into the State Department in 1999, it was a sign that times had changed and that waging a public relations offensive on behalf of the United States no longer seemed essential. Still, many other soft power institutions endured or even grew, adopting missions, including democracy promotion and economic development, that were less clearly grounded in U.S. national security interests.

Proponents of soft power rightly point out that these programs account for a minuscule fraction of U.S. overseas spending. But they still required tens of billions of dollars in annual investment, even as solid markers of progress were sometimes elusive. Global freedom has been sliding for 18 years straight as political rights and civil liberties have deteriorated, according to Freedom House. In nearly every year since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the majority of Americans polled by Gallup have said they are dissatisfied with the United States’ role in the world. While the situation might be even worse without U.S. expenditures, this record hardly makes a clear case for continuing to invest in the same soft power programs.

The blending together of widely varying activities under common headings has compounded the problem. For instance, the U.S. Agency for Global Media, which supervises VOA, has suffered from a split personality, functioning partly like a U.S. version of the BBC seeking to project credible journalism worldwide, partly as an information lifeline for closed societies, and partly as counterprogramming to Russian and Chinese disinformation. The tension among these ambitious but distinct objectives rendered the agency less effective than it should have been, even far before Trump set out to dismantle it this year.

USAID’s activities also spanned the gamut, with the agency lumping together programs that served manifestly vital U.S. interests with those that did not. Since its founding, USAID tussled with the State Department, as its leaders often sought to promote development aid as an independent moral imperative rather than as an instrument serving other goals.

In 2023, around $16 billion of USAID spending went to Ukraine. This funding was not meant to promote Washington’s appeal but to fortify an ally in an existential war through direct support for the government that would fund repairs after Russia’s attacks on the power grid and other essential lifelines. But for many programs—such as those highlighted by the agency’s Republican antagonists, including support for circumcision in Mozambique and diversity, equity, and inclusion in Myanmar—the connections to U.S. interests were less obvious, to say the least.

Over time, partisan fights in Congress and proposed legislation to scale back USAID laid bare a political foundation too thin and weathered to support the hefty programs on which lives depended. Decrees and reorganizations gradually tightened the State Department’s control, with the absorption of USAID by the department earlier this year marking a final step in this progression.

For Trump lieutenants such as Russell Vought and Vice President J.D. Vance, soft power agencies such as USAID were part of a nefarious deep state, corrupted by progressive values. They were also the bailiwick of a more traditional internationalist wing of the Republican Party that had expanded VOA and created the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief—a flank that the Make America Great Again movement has aimed to vanquish. By the time that Trump’s billionaire former advisor, Elon Musk, came hunting for bureaucratic scalps, this hostility—coupled with the absence of a well-understood logic behind soft power—made these institutions easy prey.

While it arrived with an unwelcome jolt, the opportunity to reinvent U.S. soft power is timely. The United States does not just have limited will to reach into the workings of other societies—it also lacks credibility. In the 21st century, “nation-building” is a thing of the past, and any whiff of colonialism or political meddling has become taboo. Some leaders, including Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, have reacted to the cutoffs in U.S. assistance by saying, in essence, good riddance to programs that were shadowy, intrusive, and failed to yield self-reliance. Moreover, the United States’ liberal credentials have been sullied by rising populist authoritarianism at home.

And yet, hearts and minds still matter. Nye’s coinage of soft power resonated because it named an innate truth: Being liked and admired is important. Perceptions of strength, competence, technological prowess, economic clout, and general benevolence continue to shape geopolitics.

Beijing understands this well: As the United States has turned away from its traditional tools of reputation-building, China has waged an aggressive, expensive effort to style itself as a reliable global player, problem solver, and transactional partner. For any Trump successor, a soft power charm offensive will be essential to repair strained relationships and earn back seats at tables that Trump abandoned or overturned.

If U.S. soft power is to resurge, it will require grounding in a hardheaded logic that is responsive to the imperatives of today’s geopolitics. To reinvent soft power, Washington will need to articulate clear and compelling objectives; set out effective, resource-conscious, and measurable tactics for advancing those goals; and ensure that Congress—and to some extent, the general public—understand why it matters. Above all, future soft power investments will need to be tightly tied to U.S. national security and economic interests, such as the cultivation of specific allies, access to certain markets, or the promotion of U.S. technologies.

A reboot of U.S. development aid, in particular, must be more focused and strategic. This could be done on a leaner budget, especially if Washington pools aid with allies that share common aims. Of note, the European Union seems to be moving in a similar direction, proposing a budget that emphasizes private sector collaboration and eliminates binding development spending targets in favor of more flexible funding that can be used to advance varied interests. Cooperation with diaspora constituencies, corporations, philanthropic organizations, universities, and U.S. cities seeking new markets and investments could help stretch shrunken resources. By partnering with these institutions, Washington could co-create hubs for cultural and civic activities focused on U.S. values in addition to co-funding international exchanges. Such efforts would also help expose more Americans to the benefits of soft power diplomacy.

The future of development assistance could also build on one aspect of the development agenda that Biden accelerated and Trump seeks to turbocharge: the shift toward investment and finance as an alternative to aid. During his first term, Trump merged the Overseas Private Investment Corporation with USAID’s Development Credit Authority to create the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The Biden administration used the new agency to accelerate its climate agenda and help African countries leverage critical mineral resources.

The Trump administration is now proposing to vastly expand the agency and raise its financing capacity from $60 billion to $250 billion, motivated in large part by the drive to compete with China. While its approach is mercantilist rather than humanitarian, the agency can be a tool to deepen U.S. relationships globally and provide economic benefits to foreign populations by bringing in U.S. capital and expertise. A larger, more empowered DFC could even be a key building block for future soft power strategies.

In his 1961 inaugural address, then-President John F. Kennedy promoted development aid, proclaiming, “If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.” He spoke at a time of mostly robust economic growth at home, when income inequality was modest. Nearly 65 years later, Kennedy’s quote could be applied to the divides in the United States today. But as long as the United States remains a rich nation, there must be room for largesse and humanitarianism. Even the Trump administration has made exceptions to its slash-and-burn strategy, sustaining some funding for AIDS relief and emergency relief assistance.

It may be hard to get excited about a constrained, less aspirational future for U.S. engagement. But policymakers’ job is to craft approaches to advancing U.S. interests that match the moment and look to the future. Devotees of U.S. soft power know that helping others globally can stir the country’s better angels. For those who believe that Washington should stand for treasured values, and that the American people are compassionate at heart, the reset of soft power will offer an opportunity to rekindle those flames so that they may again gradually help to warm a cold world.

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · Suzanne Nossel

27. Top Trump Officials Are Moving Onto Military Bases

​Summary:

Former Trump officials, including Stephen and Katie Miller, Marco Rubio, Kristi Noem, and Pete Hegseth, have moved into Washington-area military housing amid escalating security threats and protests following right-wing activist Charlie Kirk’s assassination. Their relocation—unprecedented in scale—blurs civilian-military boundaries as senior political appointees now occupy residences traditionally reserved for top officers. The moves highlight deepening polarization and fears of political violence, as activists target Trump figures while the administration brands antifa a terrorist group. Critics warn the practice politicizes the armed forces and isolates Trump’s inner circle inside a fortified “Green Zone,” widening the gulf between government leaders and the public.

Top Trump Officials Are Moving Onto Military Bases

Stephen Miller, Marco Rubio, Kristi Noem, and others have taken over homes that until recently housed senior officers.

By Michael Scherer, Missy Ryan, and Ashley Parker

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2025/10/trump-officials-military-housing-stephen-miller/684748/

The Atlantic · Michael Scherer, Missy Ryan, Ashley Parker · October 30, 2025

The former White House adviser Katie Miller—mother of three young children, and wife of the presidential right-hand man Stephen—walked out of her front door one Thursday morning last month and was confronted by a woman she did not know. When she told this story on Fox News, she described the encounter as a protest that crossed a line. The stranger had told Miller: “I’m watching you,” she said. This was the day after Charlie Kirk’s assassination. It also wasn’t anything new.

For weeks before Kirk’s death, activists had been protesting the Millers’ presence in north Arlington, Virginia. Someone had put up wanted posters in their neighborhood with their home address, denouncing Stephen as a Nazi who had committed “crimes against humanity.” A group called Arlington Neighbors United for Humanity warned in an Instagram post: “Your efforts to dismantle our democracy and destroy our social safety net will not be tolerated here.” The local protest became a backdrop to the Trump administration’s response to Kirk’s killing. When Miller, the architect of that response who is known for his inflammatory political rhetoric, announced a legal crackdown on liberal groups, he singled out the tactics that had victimized his family—what he called “organized campaigns of dehumanization, vilification, posting peoples’ addresses.”

Stephen Miller soon joined a growing list of senior Trump-administration political appointees—at least six by our count—living in Washington-area military housing, where they are shielded not just from potential violence but also from protest. It is an ominous marker of the nation’s polarization, to which the Trump administration has itself contributed, that some of those top public servants have felt a need to separate themselves from the public. These civilian officials can now depend on the U.S. military to augment their personal security. But so many have made the move that they are now straining the availability of housing for the nation’s top uniformed officers.

Kristi Noem, the Homeland Security secretary, moved out of her D.C. apartment building and into the home designated for the Coast Guard commandant on Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, across the river from the capital, after the Daily Mail described where she lived. Both Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth live on “Generals’ Row” at Fort McNair, an Army enclave along the Anacostia River, according to officials from the State and Defense Departments. (Rubio spent one recent evening assembling furniture that had been delivered to the house that day.) Although most Cabinet-level officials live in private houses, there is precedent for senior national-security officials, including the defense secretary, to rent homes on bases for security or convenience. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, whose family is in Washington only part-time, now shares a home on Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, a picturesque site next to Arlington National Cemetery. His roommate is another senior political appointee to the Army. (When Driscoll moved in, his washing machine wasn’t working, so for the first few weeks of his stay on base, he lugged his laundry over to the home of the Army chief of staff, General Randy George.)

Read: Holy warrior

Another senior White House official, whom The Atlantic is not naming because of security concerns related to a specific foreign threat, also vacated a private home for a military installation after Kirk’s murder. In that case, security officials urged the official to relocate to military housing, according to people briefed on the move, who like many others who spoke with us for this story were not authorized to do so publicly. So many senior officials have requested housing that some are now encountering a familiar D.C. problem: inadequate supply. When Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s team inquired earlier in Donald Trump’s second term about her moving onto McNair, it didn’t work out for space reasons, a former official told us.

There are scattered examples from previous administrations of Cabinet members residing on bases. Both Robert Gates, defense secretary under presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and Jim Mattis, Trump’s first Pentagon chief, lived in Navy housing at the Potomac Hill annex, a secure compound near the State Department. Mike Pompeo, CIA director and secretary of state during Trump’s first term, lived at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall. The grand homes they occupied, some of which date back more than a century, offer officials an additional layer of security and ample space for official entertaining.

But there is no record of so many political appointees living on military installations. The shift adds to the blurring of traditional boundaries between the civilian and military worlds. Trump has made the military a far more visible element of domestic politics, deploying National Guard forces to Washington, Los Angeles, and other cities run by Democrats. He has decreed that those cities should be used as “training grounds” in the battle against the “enemy within.”

Read: Stephen Miller triggers Los Angeles

Adria Lawrence, an associate professor of international studies and political science at John Hopkins University, told us that housing political advisers on bases sends a problematic message. “In a robust democracy, what you want is the military to be for the defense of the country as a whole and not just one party,” Lawrence told us.

But the threat assessment has also changed in recent years. Trump has survived two attempted assassinations; Iran has stepped up its efforts to kill federal officials; and political violence—such as the June shooting of two Democratic Minnesota lawmakers, the murder of Kirk in September, and the shooting at a Texas immigration facility two weeks later—is a real danger.

The result is straining the stock of homes typically allotted to senior uniformed officers on Washington-area bases. Some of those homes, designed for three- and four-star generals, lack sufficient bedrooms for families with young children. Many have lead-abatement issues and require significant repair. The Army notified Congress in January that it planned to spend more than $137,000 on repairs and upgrades to Hegseth’s McNair home before he moved in. Both Hegseth’s predecessor, Lloyd Austin, and Austin’s State Department counterpart, Antony Blinken, faced protesters at their northern-Virginia homes, which were not on bases. Gaza protesters who set up camp outside Blinken’s house, where he lived with his young children, spattered fake blood on cars as they passed by.

Robert Pape, a political-science professor at the University of Chicago, told us that the threat of political violence is real for figures in both major parties. He noted that Trump has revoked the security details for several of his critics and adversaries, including former Vice President Kamala Harris and John Bolton, the former national security adviser from Trump’s first term who has been the target of an Iranian assassination plot. “The correct balance would be: Trump should stop canceling the security detail of former Biden officials,” said Pape, who is also the director of the university’s Chicago Project on Security and Threats. “The issue is both sides are under heightened threat; therefore the threat to both should be taken seriously.”

In most cases, the civilian officials pay “fair market” rent for their base home, a formula determined by the military. Hegseth, in keeping with a 2008 law that aimed to make Gates’s Navy-owned housing arrangement more affordable, pays a rent equivalent to a general’s housing allowance plus 5 percent (in this case, totaling $4,655.70 a month). The moves, however, can also save the government money. In some cases, base living can reduce the cost of providing personal security to officials, one person familiar with the relocations told us, because protective teams do not need to rent a second location nearby as a staging area.

Base living—in the unofficial Trump Green Zone—has also become something of a double-edged status symbol among Trump officials. No one wants to deal with threats; both the Millers and the unnamed senior official were not looking to leave their homes. But the secure housing does confer upon the recipient a certain sheen of importance that sets them apart from all of the other officials ferried about in armored black SUVs. Administration officials now find themselves vying for the largest houses, not unlike the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that has long played out among senior military officers.

The isolation of living on a military base, at least for civilians, has also created a deeper division between Trump’s advisers and the metropolitan area where they govern. Trump-administration officials, who regularly mock the nation’s capital as a crime-ridden hellscape, now find themselves in a protected bubble, even farther removed from the city’s daily rhythms. And they are even less likely to encounter a diverse mix of voters—in their neighborhoods, on their playgrounds, in their favorite date-night haunts.

After the Kirk assassination, the Trump administration designated antifa a domestic terrorist organization, even though there is no centralized antifa organization, no organizational ties have been established to Kirk’s alleged killer, and the category of domestic terrorist organization has no meaning in federal law. The identities of the activists behind the harassment campaign that helped persuade the Millers to leave their home have not been publicly disclosed.

Arlington Neighbors United for Humanity—ANUFH, pronounced, they say, enough—has organized protests near the homes of Miller and Office of Management and Budget Director Russell Vought. Its website calls for “strategic, nonviolent action,” and its efforts appear to have stopped short of making any explicit threats of violence. (A representative of the group declined to comment, as did the Millers.) But the protests were designed to make the Miller family take notice. Stephen Miller has been an architect of Trump’s deportation policy, invoking a centuries-old law to send migrants to a Salvadoran prison and urging immigration-enforcement officers to aggressively find and arrest as many immigrants as possible. He regularly derides Democrats with inflammatory language, calling judicial rulings against the administration a “legal insurrection” and calling the Democratic Party “a domestic extremist organization.”

Read: Stephen Miller has a plan

“Will we let him live in our community in peace while he TERRORIZES children and families? Not a chance,” ANUFH captioned one Instagram post in July that shows a photograph of the Millers and their children. (The Millers have both posted family photos online that show their children’s faces.) Weeks later, the group took credit for covering the sidewalk near the Miller home with chalk messages such as Miller is preying on families, although it said in a post that it had spoken with Stephen Miller’s security beforehand to make sure that the group wasn’t violating any laws. Katie Miller responded with an Instagram post of her own, a video of the chalked words STEPHEN MILLER IS DESTROYING DEMOCRACY! being washed away with a hose. She argued in a subsequent appearance on Fox News that although the protesters may not be violent themselves, they were inciting the kind of violence that killed Kirk. “We will not back down. We will not cower in fear. We will double down. Always, For Charlie,” Katie Miller wrote, echoing her husband’s rhetoric.

“WE ARE PEACEFULLY RESISTING TYRANNY,” ANUFH responded in a post. “GUNS KILL PEOPLE. CHALK SCARES FASCISTS.”

Earlier this month, the Millers put their six-bedroom north Arlington home on the market for $3.75 million. The listing promised “a rare blend of seclusion, sophistication, and striking design.”

Nancy A. Youssef and Vivian Salama contributed reporting.

The Atlantic · Michael Scherer, Missy Ryan, Ashley Parker · October 30, 2025

28. FMS Reform -- Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Moving to DoD Acquisition

​I have not seen any other reporting on this other linkedIn post.

The Irregular Warfare Center falls under DSCA though ASD/ASW SO/LIC has oversight over the IWC.

Summary:

Secretary of Defense Hegseth’s decision to move DSCA from Policy (USD-P) to Acquisition & Sustainment (USD-A&S) marks a major shift in U.S. Foreign Military Sales oversight—from a foreign-policy focus to a business-driven model. The change could streamline FMS management but risks overloading A&S amid broader acquisition reforms and unclear command roles.

FMS Reform -- Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Moving to DoD Acquisition

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/fms-reform-defense-security-cooperation-agency-dsca-frank-kenlon-ybaie/?trackingId=NuhlvvNh3JctbVaHOkRsZA%3D%3D

Frank Kenlon 

Defense Educator and Consultant

October 30, 2025

Politico reports that Secretary of Defense Hegseth has decided to transfer DSCA from Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)) to Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Sustainment (USD(A&S)).

For observers of DoD Security Cooperation (SC) and International Acquisition & Exportability (IA&E) efforts, this represents a major tectonic shift within the Pentagon that will have long-term ramifications for how Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and other SC efforts are conducted.

Until now, SC and FMS efforts have historically been viewed within the U.S. Government (USG) as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. This perspective resulted in DSCA being nested within the USD(P) organization. One of the persistent criticisms of this aspect of DoD's organizational structure over the years is the lack of business acumen shown by USD(P) and DSCA, particularly with respect to FMS oversight and management.

USD(A&S) has historically played a key supporting role SC and FMS efforts within the defense acquisition domain through its IA&E activities. However, many observers have criticized USD(A&S) and the DoD Component acquisition organizations — the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Agencies — for prioritizing domestic acquisition efforts over FMS in their overall priorities to the detriment of FMS performance.

Shifting DSCA from USD(P) to USD(A&S) will 'flip the script' on the FMS 'foreign policy versus business interests' debate by placing the DoD Acquisition community in the driver's seat for future SC FMS efforts.

That said, new USD(A&S) already has a full plate addressing historic criticisms over poor domestic acquisition performance, cost, and schedule issues at the program and enterprise level. Moreover, the Politico article also mentions the SecDef's acquisition organizational reforms, which will reportedly consolidate existing Program Executive Officers into "Portfolio Acquisition Executives" reporting directly to the Secretary of the DoD Component to "give top leaders a clearer view of their most important programs." Where the current DoD Component Service/Acquisition Executives will fit within this new architecture, as well as their role in FMS acquisition oversight and management, is unclear.

Adding FMS reform to USD(A&S)'s list of things to fix will pose additional defense acquisition challenges as well as expand their responsibility beyond the acquisition realm into SC and FMS transaction oversight and management. As Steven Covey has observed, "When you have too many top priorities, you effectively have no top priorities."

My Naval Aviation mentors joked that when higher-ups gave them too many tasks to accomplish reasonably, they were in a "target-rich environment." Since all these targets were shooting back at them, the key principle to follow in such situations was "survive first, engage the enemy, when possible." It will be interesting to see how this DSCA move to DoD Acquisition unfolds over the coming months, and whether the short-term pain of reorganization will result in long-term gain in overall USG/DoD FMS performance.

P.S. - Thanks to my colleague Marc Meeker, who brought this Politico article to my attention earlier today! FK

P.P.S. - I note that moving DSCA to USD(A&S) was not included in the White House EO on Reforming Defense Sales. If you would like more thoughts on this topic, please read my earlier LinkedIn article https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/reforming-us-defense-sales-comparative-analysis-frank-kenlon-hkr7e/. Many of the actions in this EO regarding FMS reforms will likely also be transferred to USD(A&S) as a result of the DSCA move.

29. Dual-Theater Competition: How the US Avoids Being Stretched Thin and Wins Where It Matters

​A view from India for us to ponder over the weekend. I think we should understand and pursue "allied industrial ecosystems."

Summary:

Khyati Singh argues the U.S. must balance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific while sustaining resilience elsewhere through distributed forces, allied industrial ecosystems, and endurance-focused force design. Prioritizing logistics, joint production, and burden sharing, rather than overextension, will strengthen deterrence, multiply allied power, and prevent strategic surprise in a dual-theater global competition.

Dual-Theater Competition: How the US Avoids Being Stretched Thin and Wins Where It Matters

by Khyati Singh

 | 

11.01.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/01/indo-pacific-deterrence-allied-industrial-ecosystems/

At times, the strategic conversation of the United States appears to be a zero-sum bargaining exercise: push the majority of assets to the Indo-Pacific Region, do away with other theaters such as the Middle East. This is an incorrect template for questioning. The right approach is not about where to invest all the assets, but rather how to best organize American power and allied industrial capabilities so that the US can deter high-end war in the Indo-Pacific while also being meaningfully involved and resilient in other regions. The alternative, however, is brittle: either to be overcommitted or to invite strategic surprise.

The 2022 US National Defense Strategy explicitly laid out the core fact claiming China to be the primary pacing threat, and the Pentagon must work to build “enduring advantages” along with integrated deterrence to beat the odds. However, words alone cannot drive the country to success; doing so will leave it vulnerable to simultaneous crises. Therefore, the US must accept the fact that it need not, and in reality, cannot achieve every objective everywhere. Rather, it should opt for a balanced, deliberate strategy that gives primacy to deterrence in the Indo-Pacific while delegating risk and responsibility in other theaters through smarter burden sharing, a retooled industrial base, and a distributed force posture.

Three Pillars of a Resilient Defense Posture

Three concrete moves will produce leverage far greater than marginal increases in ship or brigade counts. First, around the First Island Chain, commit to a distributed force and decisively make investments in forward logistics. Dispersed allied forward-basing, distributed maritime operations, and resilient logistics make it difficult for an adversary to generate rapid strategic effects while allowing the US to sustain a protracted contest. The operational concepts are well-established but lack the political will and funding commitments necessary to harden hubs, pre-position supplies, or expand expeditionary maintenance and munitions capacity in allied ports. Distributed operations are not only a preferred mode for the Navy, they are the sinews of deterrence by denial.

Second, increase the production capability of allies and foster joint industrial ecosystems. AUKUS and other cooperative ventures are not merely terms on paper; they are templates for shifting points of production and sustainment into allied hands so that their fleets are more organized, larger, interoperable, and survivable. The US should consider expanding its partnerships in shipbuilding, sustainment hubs, and munitions production with allies across the Indo-Pacific. These investments should be tied to shared training and surge plans. This approach would bring down the risks associated with the US’s single points of failure, while also increasing the cost for any adversary contemplating coercion.

Third, design forces for both attrition and endurance, and not just for short, decisive campaigns. Deterrence will be attached to the perception that any attempt to seize territory would become prolonged and costly. According to expert literature on war, the ideal positioning is to convince potential aggressors that wars over Taiwan, for instance, would be futile, unwinnable, and protracted in strategic terms. Posture and procurement must reflect that logic. That suggests more distributed sensors, long-range fires in allied hands, attributable platforms, stockpiled munitions, and avoiding a return to a large expeditionary force modelled on past wars.

Addressing the Objections

Objections to this model include its prohibitively expensive nature, the risk of entangling alliances, and the potential vulnerability of other theaters. Each objection has an answer. In terms of financial cost, investing in the capacity building of allies is an expensive venture, but still cheaper than trying to deploy and maintain massive US expeditionary forces across multiple theaters. Shared production also creates economic and political buy-in from partners. Congress should fund force multipliers, such as resilient logistics nodes and munitions factories, rather than symbolic platforms. The 2022 strategy’s call to build “enduring advantages” provides the programmatic framing for that reprioritization.

Regarding the issue of strategic entanglement, some fear that commitments will drag the US into unwanted conflicts. That risk is reduced by making allied capabilities sovereign and resilient (so partners can defend themselves) and by building clear escalation management and decision-sharing mechanisms. Clarity in policy and public communications, rather than ambiguity, strengthens deterrence. Lastly is the fear of neglecting other regions. Though the primary focus is shifting to the Indo-Pacific, other theaters such as the Middle East and other regions still matter. The correct model is not abandonment but a lighter, smarter footprint: diplomatic leadership, coalition air and maritime surveillance, targeted capabilities for counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation, and robust partner capacity building. That approach accepts risk where necessary, but does so within a conscious, prioritized strategy rather than ad hoc crisis management.

The Path to Implementation

Operationalizing this plan does not require grand gestures. It requires bureaucratic discipline and sustained political will. The Pentagon must reallocate budget lines to prioritize logistics resilience and munitions. Meanwhile, the State Department must lock in basing and industrial cooperation agreements as Congress seeks ways to reward permanence in surge production. Lastly, the White House must make a public case for a pragmatic strategy that acknowledges limits. The payoff is strategic flexibility: a US posture that deters high-end aggression, absorbs shocks, and scales up without immediate, politically costly mobilization.

Washington’s leaders must make hard choices—not a misguided decision in distant theaters but a series of practical, prioritized investments that multiply allied power and hedge American risk. If the US commits to distributed forces, allied industrial ecosystems, and endurance-oriented force design, it will be far better placed to defend friends, preserve deterrence, and deter a future that otherwise looks perilously narrow.

Tags: allied burden-sharing, competitive strategy, defense industrial base, dual-theater competition, Force Design

About The Author

• 
  
• Khyati Singh
• Khyati Singh is a Research Analyst at the Center for North America and Strategic Technologies, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. Khyati is currently a Doctoral Candidate at the Center for the Study of the Americas, School of International Relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com