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Quotes of the Day:
“Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world.”
- Albert. Einstein
“An intellectual? Yes. And never deny it. An intellectual is someone whose mind watches itself. I like this, because I am happy to be both halves, the watcher and the watched. ‘Can they be brought together?’ This is a practical question. We must get down to it. ‘I despise intelligence’ really means: ‘I cannot bear my doubts.’”
- Albert Camus
“Learn the rules like a pro, so you can break them like an artist.”
- Pablo Picasso
1. Whistling in the Dark: Why the Pentagon’s Joint Concept for Competing is Not Enough
2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2023
3. How scary is China? America must understand China’s weaknesses as well as its strengths
4. What Will Xi Jinping's 'Great Purge' Mean for China's Military?
5. U.S. needs containment, not engagement, to win the new Cold War with China
6. Taiwan Follows Ukraine’s Naval Strategy; Developing Kamikaze Boats To Keep China’s PLA-Navy At Bay
7. The Evolution of Intelligence Operations in Support of Irregular Warfare
8. Bill Hunt: Missing in action; never forgotten
9. How Green Berets Became the US Army's Elite Special Forces
10. Philippines, US start defense drill joined by Japan, S.Korea, UK
11. Mobile and resilient, the US military is placing a new emphasis on ground troops for Pacific defense
12. FBI Accuses Biden Appointee of Bias in Selection of Headquarters Site
13. These are 3 popular misconceptions about the Navy SEALs
14. The US media’s moral blindness over Hamas is showing, and it isn’t pretty
15. The Washington Post Really Wants You to Trust Hamas - Algemeiner.com
16. Iran Update, November 9, 2023
17. China has a sweeping vision to reshape the world — and countries are listening
18. Kennan: The Fallible Prophet We Need
19. What’s really at the root of anti-Jewish hate on college campuses
20. Israel agrees to humanitarian pauses, but gulf with U.S. remains
21. Waugh We Fight
1. Whistling in the Dark: Why the Pentagon’s Joint Concept for Competing is Not Enough
Thu, 11/09/2023 - 8:01pm
https://smallwarsjournal.com/node/142014
Whistling in the Dark
Why the Pentagon’s Joint Concept
for Competing is Not Enough
by Ryan Shaw
A tree fell in the Pentagon forest and, judging by the response, no one was around to hear it. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs signed the Joint Concept for Competing (JCC) in February and it was published without any formal announcement. Its release was noted in Small Wars Journal; only a few news outlets and analysts offered commentary. The muted response is surprising, because it is a serious and thoughtful document that aims to revolutionize the United States’ approach to employing military power in strategic competition—it is a big tree, indeed.
Given the stakes, which the Chairman identifies as a real risk that the United States will “lose without fighting,” the lack of buzz is more than curious—it’s deeply concerning. The JCC deserves a rigorous and open debate by all those concerned with U.S. national security. Further, it warrants serious investment toward implementation by the Defense Department and, indeed, by the whole of government. Because the most critical thing to know about the JCC is that it stands no chance of succeeding if it does not inspire as much action outside the department as inside. To make a real difference, the Joint Concept for Competing should be accompanied by an interagency National Concept for Competing.
What is the JCC for?
According to the Pentagon, “Joint concepts propose new approaches for addressing compelling challenges… for which existing approaches and capabilities are ineffective, insufficient, or nonexistent, thus requiring reexamination of how we operate and develop the future joint force.” By definition, they start with a problem. The problem the JCC sets out to address was most famously identified by George Kennan as far back as 1948: “We have been handicapped… by a popular attachment to the concept of a basic difference between peace and war… and by a reluctance to recognize the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.”
Three quarters of a century later, there is little doubt that when it comes to employing the military instrument to advance national interests outside a condition of declared hostilities, the United States’ existing approaches and capabilities are still ineffective, insufficient, or nonexistent. The JCC does not quote Kennan, but it does quote former Chairman General Joseph Dunford, who was surely channeling Kennan when he said, “We think of being at peace or war… our adversaries don’t think that way.” The JCC is noteworthy for recognizing that this misperception introduces a fundamental capability gap which will require for its resolution a paradigm shift for the Joint Force so profound as to be almost self-definitional.
Shifting the Mindset of the Joint Force
Effecting this comprehensive paradigm shift will require three supporting or enabling shifts of mindset, each of which is long overdue. While the JCC does not name them, it does address all three.
The first shift is away from short-termism toward a long view of strategic competition. The JCC defines strategic competition as a persistent and long-term struggle, repeatedly emphasizing that it is “an enduring condition to be managed, not a problem to be solved,” “often played out over decades,” requiring “planning horizons that go well beyond existing… thresholds.” “This indefinite nature of strategic competition,” it claims, “contrasts sharply with the more finite nature of armed conflict.”
This is an obvious nod to the work of philosopher James P. Carse, recently popularized by leadership guru Simon Sinek in his 2019 book The Infinite Game. (Neither is quoted in the JCC, but Carse is listed in the bibliography.) Interpreting Carse, Sinek argues that many leaders fail because they misunderstand the nature of the game they are playing, bringing finite mindsets to infinite games. Whatever their level of understanding, there is little doubt that short election cycles and even shorter command tours incentivize a finite mindset among American policymakers and military leaders, to the detriment of U.S. foreign policy and military strategy—for Exhibit A, see the common critique that in Afghanistan, the United States did not fight a single twenty-year war, but rather, twenty one-year wars. The JCC comes up a little short on identifying means of overcoming these structural incentives, but it will have done a great service if it at least starts to change the conversation and culture.
The second much-needed shift in mindset is from a reactive posture of merely countering adversary activities to proactively pursuing U.S. interests within the competition space. Like the finite mindset problem, this is rooted in that “popular attachment” Kennan diagnosed. Informed by what are truly noble traditions of civil-military relations and a historical antipathy to standing armies, Americans tend to view military activities outside of war as inappropriate, if not immoral. In the world we like to imagine, someone blows a whistle at the start of a war, the military kills people and breaks things until the whistle blows again and the war ends; then the troops, if they don’t lay down their arms and return to farms and factories, at least pack up and go back to cloistered bases where they refit, train, and wait for the next whistle. When adversaries use military force to press their advantages without blowing the whistle—in the grey zone, as it were—we see that as playing dirty, and while we might respond, we do so reluctantly, and only to the extent required to counter their aims.
This is, of course, an oversimplification. Combatant commanders have long conducted shaping operations during the period formerly known as “Phase 0,” the Navy patrols the global commons, and Americans are increasingly used to seeing the military deployed for disaster relief both at home and abroad. But these activities, we tell ourselves, are firmly focused on humanitarian efforts and enforcing the status quo, not proactively advancing our interests.
The JCC insists we must engage with the world we have, not the world we want, and this reactive stance is insufficient for the world we have. It explicitly “recognizes the Joint Force can use military capabilities outside armed conflict to shift the focus of strategic competition into areas that favor U.S. interests…” More specifically:
the Joint Force can create competitive opportunities by using military capabilities to proactively probe adversary systems for vulnerabilities; establish behavioral patterns joint forces can exploit in a crisis… shift the competition to sub-areas in which the United States can exploit its advantages… and attempt to divert adversaries’ attention and resources to sub-areas of secondary or tertiary importance to the United States.
If all of this must happen in that uncomfortable space where there are no whistles, that is something the American people and their leaders will have to get used to: “The central idea of this concept is to shift the Joint Force focus of strategic competition from reactive operational responses into proactive strategic actions that favor U.S. long-term interests.”
The third shift is from a mindset of “either/or” to “both/and” when it comes to irregular warfare versus large scale combat operations. As the United States transitions from the two-decade Global War on Terror and wakes up to the return of great power competition, the loudest voices are calling for rapid investment in the massive numbers of high-tech ships, planes, tanks, missiles, and other munitions required to win a conflict with a near-peer adversary. Retired Air Force Lt Gen David Deptula speaks for this crowd when he calls the last two decades the “era of the Great Distraction... We got too distracted from the real threats posed by China and Russia.” According to the diehards in this camp, the only task that matters now is preparing to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and everything else is a distraction—including supporting Ukraine against Russia, but especially any focus on retaining or improving irregular capabilities, which would just perpetuate the folly that got us here.
Opposing this consensus, a small but passionate chorus warns against spending billions preparing for a war that will never come. The lesson of the Cold War, they say, is that strategic competition will be decided by political warfare and proxies. They point to the persistent American tendency—as old as the U.S. Army itself—to insist that the most recent irregular conflict, whether the 19th century Indian campaigns, the Philippine Insurrection, Vietnam, or Afghanistan, was an aberration, the lessons from which are not worth institutionalizing because now it’s time to get back to the real business of preparing for conventional combat against another great power. The problem is not only that irregular threats have a pesky habit of demanding our attention and defying our vows of “never again,” but also, importantly, that irregular activities will necessarily be a part of any great power conflict before, during, and after conventional combat operations.
The obvious truth here is that both sides are right—and they’re both wrong, too. Whether motivated by crass bureaucratic parochialism or just a well-intended overreaction, both sides vastly oversimplify the current conundrum. Prevailing in strategic competition will require a two-part trick: the United States must maintain its advantage in conventional military capabilities such that adversaries know they cannot achieve their ends by force; simultaneously, it must win the contests that will then play out in the competition space, below the level of outright war. Neither is sufficient on its own; it has to do both. The United States will avoid the unthinkable big war only so long as its capabilities are sufficient to deter it. But even then, it is still possible to see strategic advantage; freedom of action; the ability to promote national interests, advance national values, and maintain a preferred vision for world order all eroded through an accumulation of minor setbacks. As the JCC says, “a competitive mindset begins with accepting that our adversaries have a very different conception of warfare; they intend to defeat the United States strategically without resorting to armed conflict to defeat the United States militarily.”
The zealots on both sides will probably never be satisfied. But for the thoughtful, open minds in the middle, the JCC offers a convincing argument that it is time to transcend dualistic thinking and embrace the inevitable:
The United States cannot forsake the military instrument; the potential for armed conflict remains a reality that the Joint Force cannot ignore. However, nuclear and conventional deterrence is not enough. The United States can and should develop a more holistic approach to strategic competition that recognizes and seizes upon the irregular, non-lethal, and non-military aspects of competing as fundamental to success…
A Civ-Mil Breach or a Cry for Help?
However daunting it might seem to change the culture of the military services in such fundamental ways, when it comes to making the JCC succeed, that’s actually the easy part. The real trick will be bringing the interagency along. A consensus has emerged in recent months about the inherently competitive nature of the international system—that is a good start. But every agency will require its own paradigm shifts akin to those outlined by the JCC. And then there are the structural barriers to integration.
It is worth remembering that the JCC was written by the Joint Staff—the uniformed side of the Pentagon. By calling for a reconsideration of the role of the military in American grand strategy, it might seem to be punching above its weight. To be sure, it does so very delicately, being careful to acknowledge the limits of its purview: “The Joint Force does not, and should not, have the authority or capability to require its interagency partners to coordinate, align, or integrate their competitive activities with those of the Joint Force.” Nevertheless, the requirement for someone to do so is clear. Near the top of the list in the JCC’s section on risk is the possibility that “Relevant interagency and allied partners may be unwilling or unable to align with the Joint Force… Current arrangements and relationships,” it explains, “are not well suited for integrated strategy development or campaigning with interorganizational partners.”
Perhaps this civil-military tension explains why the Chairman chose to release the concept so discreetly. In any case, there is an almost wicked problem at play here: the military cannot work in isolation to fix the fact that the military too often works in isolation. Like its 2018 predecessor, the Joint Concept for Integrated Campaigning, much of the JCC reads like a cry for help:
The Joint Force is an important actor in countering adversary competitive strategies, but cannot do so alone. The most effective counter to an adversary competitive strategy is a fully integrated U.S. competitive strategy that cohesively and comprehensively brings together the components of national power to deliver effects across the strategic competitive space.
Some may say the JCC goes too far on this count, but it doesn’t go far enough to fix the problem—because it can’t. Until that cry for help is answered, no amount of change in the culture or capabilities of the Joint Force will result in the outcomes the JCC aims to achieve, and the risk of “losing without fighting” will remain an existential one.
From Joint to National
The action section of the JCC, called Combat Required Capabilities, offers a set of design aspirations required to implement the concept. These are sensible and mostly achievable if the military decides to commit. But the fundamental limitation of the concept is evident here, too. For instance, the capability for “Continuous, Globally Integrated Competitive Strategy Design and Production” assumes a set of conditions, including: “The Joint Force and its [interagency] partners have the authorities and mechanisms in place to conduct integrated planning for a globally integrated competitive strategy.”
That is the crux of the issue, buried in an assumption. Quite obviously, assuming that will not make it so. Making that assumption a reality will require someone outside the Joint Staff—and the department—to prioritize it and invest in it. Independent initiatives in other departments or agencies would suffer from the same limitations, even if they could muster the resources; it is difficult to transcend bureaucratic silos from within those bureaucratic silos. White House platitudes about “integrated deterrence” do not compel action. Only Congress can mandate integration across the interagency and provide the resources and incentives to get it done.
Calls for a “Goldwater-Nichols for the Interagency” are not new, but current strategic challenges make them more urgent than perhaps at any time since the original Goldwater-Nichols Act imposed a culture of jointness on the services. Legislation of that magnitude may not be presently within reach. But as the JCC demonstrates, these things can start with just a concept.
Congress should commission an interagency National Concept for Competing to accompany the JCC. Such a concept would aim at a uniquely American approach to competitive statecraft—the integration and synchronization of all instruments of national power in deliberate campaigns during both peace and war to secure the nation’s interests by advancing its values.
The U.S. military recognized that its usual approaches are inadequate for present and future challenges, so it developed a new concept to propose new approaches. It is time to do the same at the whole-of-government level, for the same reasons.
About the Author(s)
Ryan Shaw
Ryan Shaw is a professor of practice in history and strategy and senior advisor to the president of Arizona State University. Prior to joining ASU, he served as a cavalry officer and strategist in the U.S. Army, leading strategic planning and assessment efforts and providing strategic advice to leaders at the highest levels of U.S. and multinational military organizations. A graduate of West Point and Yale University, Ryan has published widely in the fields of national security, grand strategy, strategic theory, and United States history.
2. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-9-2023
Key Takeaways:
- The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
- Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days.
- Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8.
- Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.
- Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan.
- Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
- Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas.
- Occupation authorities reportedly continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 9, 2023
Nov 9, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2023
Riley Bailey, Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, Amin Soltani, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 9, 2023, 6:55pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 9 that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and conducted assaults towards Russian positions south and southwest of the settlement.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are reports that Ukrainian forces advanced to forest areas south of Krynky.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and are trying to establish positions between Pidstepne and Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[3] Ukrainian military observer Konstyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have established continuous control of positions from the Antonivsky railway bridge north of Poyma to the Antonivsky roadway bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson and 4km from the Dnipro River) as of November 9 and have cut the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka (53km northeast of Kherson City) road in at least two areas.[4]
Elements of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army’s (CAA) 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) and 70th Motorized Rifle Division as well as the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) appear to be the main Russian forces responding to Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[5] The Russian military reportedly formed the 18th CAA from other units previously operating in the Kherson direction, and it is unlikely that new units of the 18th CAA are comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[6] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment previously defended positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast for almost the entirety of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 5 that unspecified elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Kherson direction, although the bulk of the 7th VDV Division appears to be committed to defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Mashovets claimed on November 2 and 9 that elements of the 7th VDV Division's 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) are operating near Pishchanivka and Poyma, but it is unclear if these reported elements have been present in the Kherson direction since the start of the counteroffensive or recently redeployed to the area.[9] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one its brigades to the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[10] Mashovets claimed that elements of the 49th CAA still comprise the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces in the Kherson direction, and elements of the 49th CAA’s 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade appeared to be operating on the left bank as of late August 2023.[11]
The Russian command will likely face significant challenges in redeploying units from other sectors of the front should relatively combat ineffective Russian formations and currently uncommitted Russian forces in the Kherson direction prove insufficient to respond to the Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Redeployments of considerable elements of the 7th VDV Division or other VDV formations and units in western Zaporizhia Oblast would likely disrupt Russian defensive operations there. Russian forces reportedly continue to accumulate forces for sustaining the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka and localized offensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts.[12] Any potential Russian redeployment to the Kherson direction will likely degrade the Russian ability to sustain these other operations and efforts.
Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted nearly 30 attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut between November 8 and November 9, which is notably a higher number of attacks than the Ukrainian General Staff typically reports for the Bakhmut area.[13] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces entered Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and pushed Ukrainian troops back from the railway that runs northeast and east of the settlement.[14] Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces have advanced towards Klishchiivka and hold positions just east of the settlement and west of the railway line.[15] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also drove Ukrainian forces out of positions in and around Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual evidence to substantiate these claims.[16] Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bakhmut in the Berkhivka-Bohdanivka direction (directly northwest of Bakhmut to 5km northwest of Bakhmut) south of the Berkhivka Reservoir towards the Vilyanova plant nursery.[17] Geolocated footage from around November 7 shows that Russian forces have advanced south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, about 3km northwest of Bakhmut.[18]
These localized offensive operations northwest and southwest of Bakhmut are likely opportunistic tactical ground attacks intended to take advantage of the reported reallocation of Ukrainian resources away from Bakhmut. Several milbloggers noted that the pace of Ukrainian artillery fire and ground activity in the Bakhmut direction has decreased in recent days, with some Russian sources remarking that this is partially because Ukrainian forces have redeployed to other areas of the front.[19] Russian forces are likely taking advantage of a decrease in Ukrainian activity on this sector of the front to launch localized and successful attacks. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to translate offensive efforts near Bakhmut into wider and more meaningful offensive operations, as the Russian force grouping around Bakhmut is weak and disorganized because Russian forces have been committing more manpower and materiel to deliberate and larger-scale offensive operations near Avdiivka and on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.
Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Kh-31P missile struck a civilian ship flying the flag of Liberia in a port near Odesa City, Odesa Oblast, injuring several people and killing the ship’s pilot.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 and 9 in an attempt to justify the strike that the ship was carrying military cargo.[21] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.[22]
Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.[23] The Kremlin canceled Putin's annual press conference in December 2022, which ISW assessed was likely in order to preempt the informational risks of Putin addressing difficult questions about the war and international situation live.[24] Similarly, in early June of 2023, Putin postponed the "Direct Line" until November or December 2023.[25] The vagueness with which Peskov announced the two live events suggests that the Kremlin may desire to have the flexibility to cancel them if they deem the informational risks of holding them to be too great. The Kremlin may hope for a wider operational victory in Ukraine to frame both the "Direct Line" and the press conference in a positive light and is likely trying to leave itself room to mitigate if Russian forces cannot secure meaningful battlefield success in Ukraine in the coming month.
Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan. Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara that Russia currently transports gas to Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan and seeks to further develop this transport.[26] Russia began exporting natural gas to Uzbekistan for the first time in October 2023, and Uzbekistan notably still exports its own domestically produced natural gas, including to Russia as recently as 2021, despite suffering domestic shortages in recent years.[27] Uzbekistan‘s continued export of gas while importing Russian gas for the first time suggests that Uzbekistan may not be the final destination for all its Russian gas imports. Uzbekistan is capable of providing Iran with direct access to other Central Asian as well as Russian and Chinese markets, as ISW-CTP previously reported.[28] Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, discussed reviving Iranian-Uzbek economic relations and signed agreements to increase bilateral trade with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tehran on June 18, 2023.[29] Iran has also increased its economic diplomacy efforts, including on gas supplies, with other countries in Central Asia. Raisi discussed increasing the volume of gas swaps with Turkmenistan during a meeting with Turkmenistan People’s Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Tehran on May 30.[30] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on May 30 that Iran and Turkmenistan will soon sign an agreement for Iran to import 10 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan each day, which will allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heat to its northern provinces.[31] Iran has consistently struggled with natural gas shortages in winter and summer 2023, and Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to secure further military cooperation with Iran.[32]
Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children. A Russian insider source claimed that Moscow authorities are investigating and charging members of the inner circle of an unspecified nephew of Kadyrov for various crimes including kidnapping, extortion, and organizing a criminal community in both Moscow and Chechnya.[33] The insider source claimed that two high-ranking Chechen security officials lead this inner circle, and that its other members include Chechen police officers and bureaucratic officials.[34] The source claimed that Russian authorities allowed this circle to commit these crimes for “quite a long time” but that “apparently, something is starting to change.”[35] It is possible that Russian authorities are targeting Chechen organized crime activities. This insider source’s specific reference to Kadyrov, however, suggests either that some Russian authorities may seek to target Kadyrov’s affiliates through criminal charges or that some actors may seek to target Kadyrov informationally by using this insider source to discredit him and his family. Kadyrov has notably awarded his children, many of whom are underage, with prominent Chechen governmental positions and awards in recent weeks following the Kremlin’s refusal to become involved when his 15-year-old son Adam was filmed beating a detained man in September 2023, sparking domestic outrage.[36]
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 9 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces recently marginally advanced south of Pershotravneve (24km east of Kupyansk).[37] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Kharkiv Oblast and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove) and Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) in Luhansk Oblast.[38] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk) and achieved unspecified ”tactical success” near Synkivka.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that there was also fighting near Kyslivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk).[40] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked near the Serebryanske forest area and captured several unspecified positions.[41] The milblogger claimed that there are also positional battles near Torske (15km west of Kreminna).
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Tymkivka (18km east of Kupyansk) and Synkivka, Kharkiv Oblast and Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast.[42] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked with Western-provided armored vehicle support northeast of Kupyansk and west of Svatove.[43] Russian milbloggers claimed that there is also fighting near Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna).[44]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
See topline text for updates on Bakhmut.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka direction on November 9 and reportedly advanced. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces made gains near Stepove (6km northwest of Avdiivka) and are consolidating new positions near the settlement.[45] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 1km beyond the railway line about 3km away from Berdychi (4km northwest of Avdiivka).[46] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces now hold positions within 500 meters of Avdiivka itself.[47] Russian sources additionally claimed that Russian forces are trying to break through Ukrainian lines southwest of Avdiivka near Vodyane.[48] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun noted that Russian forces have increased their use of aviation in the Avdiivka direction over the past few days and are using Ka-52 and Mi-8 helicopters and Su-25 attack aircraft.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces with aviation support conducted unsuccessful attacks southeast of Novokalynove (10km northwest of Avdiivka), and near Avdiivka, Keramik (10km northwest of Avdiivka), Stepove, Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka), and Pervomaiske (10km southwest of Avdiivka).[50]
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks in the Avdiivka direction on November 9.
Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 9 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. Shtupun noted that Russian forces in the Marinka direction (on the southwest outskirts of Donetsk City) are concentrating offensive efforts near Marinka and Novomykhailivka (10km south of Donetsk City), and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted 23 unsuccessful attacks near these two settlements over the course of the day.[51] One milblogger claimed that Russian forces have stopped active advances towards Novomykhailivka and are instead focusing on consolidating their new positions.[52] A Russian news aggregator claimed that the situation in Marinka remains unchanged and that there is fighting on the western outskirts of the settlement.[53] Russian sources also claimed that localized fighting is ongoing near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City), particularly east of Vuhledar near Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[54]
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west or southwest of Donetsk City on November 9.
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 9.
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 9 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and south of Prechystivka (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[55]
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 9 and recently made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 8 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[56] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[57] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (immediately south of Robotyne), and Verbove.[58]
Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 9 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Verbove and Robotyne.[59] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces did not conduct any assaults in the Zaporizhia direction on November 8.[60] A Russian media aggregator claimed that Russian forces counterattacked near Verbove on November 8 but did not specify an outcome.[61]
For details on Kherson Oblast see topline text.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian rear area in southern Ukraine and targeted occupied Crimea on November 9. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two missiles at Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast and that Russian air defenses only intercepted one of the missiles.[62] Russian sources claimed that the Ukrainian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Skadovsk.[63] A Ukrainian news outlet and a Ukrainian military observer stated that Ukrainian forces struck a hotel in Skadovsk that Russian forces used to quarter Russian officers.[64] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated that Russian forces used the hotel as a command post.[65] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted a Ukrainian Neptune anti-ship missile off the coast of Crimea on November 9.[66] Russian sources amplified imagery purporting to show smoke clouds near Sevastopol following the interception.[67]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas. Russian State Duma “Special Military Operation” Working Group Chairperson Andrei Turchak stated that the group submitted a bill for Duma consideration that will allow private security forces at Russian fuel and energy facilities to shoot down drones.[68] Turchak noted that only Russian law enforcement, security agencies, and certain private security companies with anti-terrorism specialties can legally shoot down drones.[69]
Russian National Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed that roughly 410,000 people entered service with the Russian military between January 1 and November 9, 2023.[70] Medvedev previously stated that 385,000 people entered service as of October 25; 357,000 as of October 12; 325,000 as of September 26; and 280,000 as of September 3.[71] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russia will likely have recruited 450,000-460,000 personnel by the end of 2023 based on Medvedev’s statements.[72]
Russian federal subjects continue efforts to incentivize contract service with Russian volunteer formations. Lipetsk Oblast Head Igor Artamonov proposed on November 8 that Lipetsk Oblast should eliminate the requirement that volunteers recruited into Lipetsk Oblast regional volunteer formations need to be residents of Lipetsk Oblast.[73] Artamonov also proposed raising the one-time recruitment bonus for contract personnel from 50,000 rubles ($542) to 250,000 rubles ($2,712).[74] Chuvashia Republic Head Oleg Nikolaev announced on November 8 that the government approved a draft law that will award free plots of land for personal housing or farming for distinguished participants from Chuvashia in the war in Ukraine.[75] Nikolaev also stated that the government supported a proposal providing two free meals a day to schoolchildren of Russian personnel who are fighting or who have died in Ukraine.[76]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Nothing significant to report.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Occupation authorities reportedly continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth. Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on November 8 that occupation authorities created a new “professional military orientation” program for students in educational institutions in occupied Donetsk Oblast.[77] Andryushchenko stated that the program encourages students to serve and die for Russia. Andryushchenko also published photos of Russian military personnel and authorities training and indoctrinating students at a school in occupied Demianivka, Donetsk Oblast.[78]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev met in Ankara for the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum on November 9, where they reiterated boilerplate rhetoric portraying Russia as a valuable ally to Central Asian states.[79] Putin stated that Russia and Kazakhstan have begun constructing a joint production plant for butadiene, a necessary component of rubber, and have agreed to construct a plant to produce polyethylene.[80] Putin also stated that Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to develop logistics routes through Kazakhstan to Central Asia and towards China, including constructing a total of 1,300 kilometers of railway in the next three years.[81] Putin promoted military cooperation with Kazakhstan and stated that Russian forces help train Kazakhstan personnel and that Russia has licensed the production and servicing of Russian military equipment on Kazakh territory.[82] Putin and Tokayev also emphasized Russia and Kazakhstan’s joint commitment to their states’ strategic partnership and signed numerous bilateral agreements on infrastructure, agricultural, technological, and cultural cooperation at the forum.[83]
Some elements of the Russian ultranationalist information space are unsatisfied with the Kremlin’s overly optimistic domestic portrayals of the war in Ukraine and failure to mobilize Russian society to a war-time footing. A prominent Russian milblogger criticized Russian media and television for falsely portraying the war as effectively won even though Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and larger-than-usual ground operations in Kherson Oblast.[84] The milblogger warned that this framing of the war may provoke shock and fear in the Russian information space if Ukrainian forces achieve a great victory because Russian media has not prepared its consumers for such reports. The milblogger also criticized the Russian government for failing to mobilize the production capacity of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB), particularly of naval assets to replace Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) losses and regain dominance in the Black Sea.
Russia continues defensive posturing in Central Asia amid the war in Ukraine. The agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan creating a joint regional air defense network as part of the unified Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) air defense network came into force on November 9.[85] Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov announced during Putin’s visit to the Russian military airbase in Kant, Kyrgyzstan on October 12 that the Kyrgyz parliament ratified this agreement on October 11.[86]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on November 9 that Belarusian missile and artillery forces will conduct management and combat trainings from November 9 to 11.[87]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
3. How scary is China? America must understand China’s weaknesses as well as its strengths
Excerpts:
Instead, America needs to calibrate its China policy for the long run. Regarding the economy, that means openness, not isolation. The Economist supports limited controls on exports of technology with possible military applications, but not the broad embrace of tariffs and industrial policy that began under President Donald Trump and has continued under Mr Biden. To maintain its economic and technological edge, America should stay open for business—unlike China.
Militarily, America should seek deterrence but not domination. The Biden administration has rightly sold more arms to Taiwan, built up forces in Asia and renewed defence alliances there. But America should avoid a nuclear arms race or being seen to support formal independence for Taiwan. Dealing with China requires a realistic view of its capabilities. The good news is that its weaknesses and Mr Xi’s mistakes give the West time to counter the threat it poses.
How scary is China?
America must understand China’s weaknesses as well as its strengths
Nov 9th 2023
The Economist
When Joe Biden meets Xi Jinping in San Francisco next week, the stakes will be high. Fighting in the Middle East threatens to become another theatre for great-power rivalry, with America backing Israel, and China (along with Russia) deepening links to Iran. In the South China Sea, China is harassing Philippine ships and flying its planes dangerously close to American ones. Next year will test Sino-American relations even more. In January a candidate despised by Beijing may win Taiwan’s presidential election. For most of the year, the race for the White House will be a cacophony of China-bashing.
America’s anti-China fervour is partly an overcorrection for its previous complacency about the economic, military and ideological threat the autocratic giant poses. The danger from China is real, and there are many areas where Mr Biden’s administration should stand up to its Communist rulers. But there is also a risk that America’s view of Chinese power slides into caricature, triggering confrontations and, at worst, an avoidable conflict. Even without war, that rush would incur huge economic costs, split America from its allies and undermine the values that make it strong. Instead, America needs a sober assessment not just of China’s strengths, but also of its weaknesses.
What are those weaknesses? Among the least understood are its military shortcomings, which we describe in a special report on the People’s Liberation Army (pla). After decades of modernisation, it is formidable—terrifying, even. With 2m personnel and an annual budget of $225bn, it has the world’s biggest army and navy and a vast missile force. By 2030 it could have 1,000 nuclear warheads. Mr Xi has ordered it to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027, say America’s spies. And the pla projects force more widely, too. It intimidates China’s neighbours in the South China Sea and skirmishes with India. It has a base in Africa and is seeking one in the Middle East.
Yet look more closely and the problems leap out. Drilled for decades on Soviet and then Russian military dogma, the PLA is trying to absorb the lessons from Ukraine and to co-ordinate “joint” operations between services, which would be key to any successful invasion of Taiwan. Recruitment is hard. Despite the efforts of films such as “Wolf Warrior” to glamorise dreary military careers with mediocre pay, the pla struggles to hire skilled people, from fighter pilots to engineers. It has almost no experience of combat—Mr Xi calls this “the peace disease”. Its most deadly engagement in the past four decades or so was massacring its own citizens around Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Although China has made technological leaps, from hypersonic missiles to stealth fighters, its military-industrial complex trails behind in areas such as engines for aircraft and ships, and still relies on some foreign parts. American embargoes on semiconductors and components could make it harder to catch up with the global technological frontier. Despite Mr Xi’s endless purges, corruption appears to be pervasive. It may explain why General Li Shangfu was sacked as China’s defence minister this year after only a few months in the job.
China’s military frailties exist alongside its better-known economic ones. A property crunch and the Communist Party’s growing hostility towards the private sector and foreign capital are impeding growth. China’s gdp will increase by 5.4% this year and by only 3.5% in 2028, says the imf. Investment by multinational firms into China turned negative in the third quarter, for the first time since records began in 1998. China’s $18trn economy is big. But despite its much larger population, its gdp is unlikely to exceed America’s by much or at all by mid-century.
Behind China’s military and economic weaknesses lies a third, and deeper problem: Mr Xi’s dominance of an authoritarian system that no longer allows serious internal policy debate. Decision-making is deteriorating as a result. Economic technocrats have been sidelined by loyalists. By one estimate, pla troops spend a quarter of their time on political education, poring over such inspiring works as “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military”. Mr Xi’s ideology is that the party, led by him, should command all things, always.
Personalised rule is bad for China—and perilous for the world. Lacking sound advice, Mr Xi might miscalculate, as Vladimir Putin did on Ukraine. However, he may be deterred by the knowledge that if he invades Taiwan but fails to conquer it, he could lose power. One thing is clear: despite periodic and welcome bouts of constructive diplomacy, such as recently resumed ministerial contacts with America, Mr Xi’s commitment to undermining liberal values globally will not diminish.
How should America respond? Judiciously. Trying to cripple China’s economy by isolating it could cut global gdp by 7%, reckons the imf. Closing America’s borders to Chinese talent would count as self-sabotage. Any excessively hawkish policy risks dividing America’s network of alliances. Worst of all, too rapid an American military escalation could provoke a disastrous war if Mr Xi mistakes it for the prelude to American aggression, or worries that unifying Taiwan with the mainland—peacefully or by force—will only grow harder should he continue to bide his time.
From complacency to confrontation to calibration
Instead, America needs to calibrate its China policy for the long run. Regarding the economy, that means openness, not isolation. The Economist supports limited controls on exports of technology with possible military applications, but not the broad embrace of tariffs and industrial policy that began under President Donald Trump and has continued under Mr Biden. To maintain its economic and technological edge, America should stay open for business—unlike China.
Militarily, America should seek deterrence but not domination. The Biden administration has rightly sold more arms to Taiwan, built up forces in Asia and renewed defence alliances there. But America should avoid a nuclear arms race or being seen to support formal independence for Taiwan. Dealing with China requires a realistic view of its capabilities. The good news is that its weaknesses and Mr Xi’s mistakes give the West time to counter the threat it poses.■
For subscribers only: to see how we design each week’s cover, sign up to our weekly Cover Story newsletter.
The Economist
4. What Will Xi Jinping's 'Great Purge' Mean for China's Military?
Conclusion:
When Stalin launched his purges, he took no offensive actions against another country until the 1939 Winter War against Finland. Because he purged his best generals, his forces initially were unable to overcome the stiff resistance of a heavily outnumbered Finnish army. Xi’s actions, on their face, may be geared toward both eliminating corruption and asserting the party (his) leadership. In doing both, his military also would be far better prepared to conduct successful operations against Taiwan, and thereby avoid the setbacks that Soviet forces faced in their 1939 war with Finland. Americans who worry about Taiwan’s future as a free society should take note.
What Will Xi Jinping's 'Great Purge' Mean for China's Military?
Published 11/09/23 08:30 AM ET
Dov S. Zakheim
themessenger.com · November 9, 2023
During Joseph Stalin’s Great Purge of the 1930s, the Soviet dictator consolidated his position as leader of the Soviet Union by eliminating all his potential rivals. Originally part of a Roman-style triumvirate with Lev Kamenev, a leading revolutionary and member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, and Grigory Zinoviev, the head of the Communist International and the leader of the Leningrad Communist Party, Stalin subjected both men to show trials and, accusing them of siding with extreme leftist Leon Trotsky, had them both shot.
He then turned on those to the political right of him, notably Nikolai Bukharin, and eliminated them too. And for good measure, he also liquidated his top generals, including the operational genius Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky and his colleagues and friends, Marshal Alexander Yegorov and General Iona Yakir.
China’s Xi Jinping has not held any show trials. But in the past several months, he has launched a Stalin-like purge of several of his leading officials and generals. Some have been simply dismissed from their posts. Others have disappeared. And at least one has died, rather conveniently.
In June, Chinese authorities detained the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Rocket Force (SRF) commander, Li Yuchao, his deputy, Liu Guangbin, and a former deputy commander, Zhang Zhenzhong. Although there was no explanation for their removal when it was announced in July, it appears that the men faced corruption charges. Though these accusations seemed plausible given the large influx of funding for the SRF in the past few years, it is also true that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is invariably targeting those he views as actual or potential opponents or dissenters.
Not long after the announcement of the generals’ removal, on July 25, Chinese news media announced that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress had dismissed Foreign Minister Qin Gang. No official reason was given for his departure, but it was later reported that it was related to his having had an extramarital affair while serving as ambassador to the United States. Qin has not been heard from since, though he remained, at least nominally, as one of the five State Councillors until Oct. 24.
On Oct. 24, the Standing Committee also removed Li Shangfu from the posts of Minister of National Defense and State Councillor and dropped him from the Central Military Commission, whose chairman is Xi Jinping. As in Qin’s case, the government offered no official explanation for Li’s dismissal. Again, like Qin, Li had disappeared from public view prior to the announcement of his dismissal; he had not been heard from in two months, and it appears that he is under investigation — or worse.
Li had served in his post for about seven months. Just as Stalin had accused Zinoviev and Kamenev as being exceedingly leftist, Li had been viewed to be to the left of Xi. Li was a hard-liner, sanctioned by the United States in 2018; he would not meet with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin until the sanctions were lifted. On the other hand, it appears that Xi was not prepared to fully rupture relations with the Pentagon — and Li had to go.
Finally, on Oct. 27, former prime minister Li Keqiang died of a heart attack at the relatively young age of 68. He had retired from his post about seven months earlier. Xi had sidelined him because he was not an enthusiastic supporter of the president's ideologically-driven economic policies.
In March 2023, state councilors (from left) Qin Gang, Wu Zhenglong and Li Shangfu swore an oath after their election at the fifth plenary session of the National People's Congress. Qin and Li have since been removed from their duties.NOEL CELIS/AFP via Getty Images
It is noteworthy that, not long before Li Shangfu’s dismissal, Xi met with leading military officials and stressed the importance of political loyalty, underscoring the Chinese Communist Party’s — meaning Xi’s — “absolute leadership” over the armed forces. That Xi, as chairman of the Central Military Commission that is the highest military command authority, nevertheless felt compelled to reiterate his “absolute leadership” appears to be an indication of his insecurity. That insecurity may be political. Xi may fear for his position, especially given that his statist orientation has been a major factor in China’s flagging economy.
Alternately, his actions may reflect a legitimate concern that even the Central Military Commission has insufficient visibility into the People’s Liberation Army’s daily operations, which creates a climate that is conducive to corruption, something that reportedly is nearly as rampant in the Chinese military as it was in Russia. Xi has seen how corruption undermined Moscow’s ability to pursue its military objectives in Ukraine and does not want a similar situation affecting any plans he might have to attack Taiwan.
When Stalin launched his purges, he took no offensive actions against another country until the 1939 Winter War against Finland. Because he purged his best generals, his forces initially were unable to overcome the stiff resistance of a heavily outnumbered Finnish army. Xi’s actions, on their face, may be geared toward both eliminating corruption and asserting the party (his) leadership. In doing both, his military also would be far better prepared to conduct successful operations against Taiwan, and thereby avoid the setbacks that Soviet forces faced in their 1939 war with Finland. Americans who worry about Taiwan’s future as a free society should take note.
Dov S. Zakheim is senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chair of the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s board of trustees. He is a former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense.
themessenger.com · November 9, 2023
5. U.S. needs containment, not engagement, to win the new Cold War with China
Excerpts:
So we’re left with balance: Use a mix of hard and soft power to contain and deter China.
We know how to do this; we work with allies and partners (Beijing only has clients) to identify, surround and eliminate China’s corrosive activities in our open systems. This is the same strategy that George Kennan proposed to isolate and contain Soviet malfeasance; we’ve just been loath to admit the return to great power competition. But the adversary gets a vote, and the time for soft diplomacy has expired.
It’s time to admit the failure of the many handcrafted, artisan strategies that haven’t survived in the real world and get busy with modernized deterrence and containment strategies. Churchill was right.
U.S. needs containment, not engagement, to win the new Cold War with China
By David R. Stilwell - - Wednesday, November 8, 2023
washingtontimes.com · by The Washington Times https://www.washingtontimes.com
America new Cold War with China illustration by Alexander Hunter/The Washington Times America new Cold War with China … more >
By David R. Stilwell - - Wednesday, November 8, 2023
OPINION:
Despite the Chinese Communist Party’s assertions to the contrary, and because of Beijing‘s deliberate actions, we are in another Cold War. Our strategy to win this one will require modernized deterrence and containment — not engagement — strategies to preserve our democracy and the current world order.
But first, two quotes: “Insanity is doing the same thing [engagement] over and over again and expecting different results,” Albert Einstein once said.
And Winston Churchill said: “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing [containment] — after they’ve tried everything else.”
The U.S.-China relationship models both of these. We have tried various forms of engagement for 40 years without success, until the last administration recognized the need for a different approach: containment. As much as we all hoped the Obama administration’s “engage, bind, balance” strategy would bring Beijing around to our way of thinking, after 40 years of failure, we have to recognize Einstein’s wisdom. Churchill would say a modernized containment is the right thing.
Chinese Communist Party gaslighters and influencers have done good work keeping us from acknowledging this, putting the blame on us with language like “that’s Cold War thinking” and “you’re trying to contain us,” to which well-meaning but naive interlocutors reflexively reply “no, it’s not so!”
It wasn’t until about 2018 that the U.S. began to abandon the effort to engage China in a global system that creates the most good for the most people, and moved toward containment, closing a Chinese Consulate that was grossly abusing its Vienna Convention privileges, kicking out 60 journalists (leaving 100 in place, when there were only 30 from the U.S. in China), limiting the activities of its diplomats — all in the name of reciprocity. Call it containment, call it reciprocity: The relationship is unbalanced and in need of tough love. We must find the lowest common denominator and rebuild from there.
Those who argue that containment is the wrong path should reflect on what Beijing is doing to box the U.S. and others out of resource-rich Africa and elsewhere. The more we brought China into international bodies like the World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization and the Human Rights Council, the more those bodies have come to serve Chinese interests. It is past time to isolate and contain this cancer of new-type communism.
The post-Soviet peace dividend was squandered through wishful thinking, exemplified by endless unproductive engagement (dialogue), revolving-door personnel policy, and a fear of returning to the tense days of mutually assured destruction. But ignoring the problem isn’t going to make it go away; on the contrary, it has made it worse.
After 40 years of failure, it’s time to dust off the proven body of knowledge on how two diametrically opposed governance concepts can exist simultaneously until the judgment of history decides a winner … again.
An updated version of Cold War deterrence strategy has been quietly gaining prominence in the Defense Department and elsewhere. There doesn’t seem to be the same allergy to deterrence, possibly because we’re thinking mainly in terms of nuclear deterrence. Given China‘s multipronged attack on liberal democracy and market economics, new Cold War deterrence thinking needs to be expanded to include information and economic deterrence (for example, mutually assured information destruction and an economic Article V).
So what do we have to show for the last 40 years of trying to engage China, hoping engagement would change it?
Through its superior influence tools, or “magic weapons” — kudos to New Zealand researcher Anne-Marie Brady for highlighting this — the Chinese Communist Party has operated unopposed in free and open democratic societies. Containment must begin with either getting reciprocal information access to China and its citizens or denying its political warfare entities access to our systems.
We did this well during the first Cold War — we recognized and contained Soviet disinformation (active measures) meant to weaken us. Yet today, we still allow TikTok unhindered access to American children and voters, even though we know it’s designed to create instability and undermine confidence in democracy. India banned it and 200 other Chinese apps in a week; we’ve been debating TikTok for three years. At least some of the modern world’s insanity can be attributed to political disinformation operations meant to mislead and divide us. It’s time to contain them.
The recent Biden administration idea of assertive transparency is a good first step toward Information containment. In the past, public diplomacy was reluctant to expose Chinese malfeasance, allowing Beijing to explain away the intentional violation of U.S. sovereign airspace as an errant weather balloon. We have the surveillance payload and should have exposed the disinformation for what it was, undermining China‘s credibility and legitimacy. Assertive transparency takes the initiative in the Information domain, leaving Beijing to react to us, exposing and containing Chinese disinformation.
A recent essay in Foreign Affairs asserts that the U.S. has been operating without a strategy to deal with China. During my time in the Obama administration, we gave the “engage, bind, balance” strategy our best effort, but it was doomed to fail since the engage and bind pillars both require China‘s cooperation, which was obviously not forthcoming.
So we’re left with balance: Use a mix of hard and soft power to contain and deter China.
We know how to do this; we work with allies and partners (Beijing only has clients) to identify, surround and eliminate China’s corrosive activities in our open systems. This is the same strategy that George Kennan proposed to isolate and contain Soviet malfeasance; we’ve just been loath to admit the return to great power competition. But the adversary gets a vote, and the time for soft diplomacy has expired.
It’s time to admit the failure of the many handcrafted, artisan strategies that haven’t survived in the real world and get busy with modernized deterrence and containment strategies. Churchill was right.
• David R. Stilwell is a retired Air Force brigadier general with extensive experience in national security affairs. He most recently served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs from 2019 to 2021.
Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.
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6. Taiwan Follows Ukraine’s Naval Strategy; Developing Kamikaze Boats To Keep China’s PLA-Navy At Bay
Excerpts:
While the US has maintained that the FMF does not remotely translate into any implied recognition of Taiwan as an independent country, it follows an old tactic by Washington to “sell just enough weapons so Taiwan could defend itself against possible Chinese attack.” “For decades, the US has relied on this so-called strategic ambiguity to do business with China while remaining Taiwan’s staunchest ally.”
But the FMF for Taiwan was activated, particularly considering how the “military balance across the Taiwan Strait has tipped dramatically in China’s favor…in the last decade.” It also felt the obsolete and woefully unprepared nature of Taiwan’s military. This ranges from World War 2 and Vietnam War-era tanks, artillery guns, outdated command and control structures, doctrines, and tactics.
The inconsistent military service policy — that was reduced from one year to four months in 2013 and reinstated again — combined with the unserious nature of both the Taiwanese youth and military instructors, also make a deadly combination, the CNN report added.
A EurAsian Times report talked about the overprotected and casual nature of Taiwanese youth, who prefer stable careers and, thereby, stable relations with the PRC, given the profound economic and commercial ties between the two.
An October 26, 2021, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report talks about young men deliberately gaining weight by stuffing themselves with McDonald’s hamburgers to avoid compulsory military conscription.
The frequent instances of Taiwan’s military officers caught spying for China are another instance of how political fissures define Taiwanese society and its relations with the mainland.
Taiwan Follows Ukraine’s Naval Strategy; Developing Kamikaze Boats To Keep China’s PLA-Navy At Bay
eurasiantimes.com · by Parth Satam · November 9, 2023
In continuation of its drone development campaign to have a series of military-purposed unmanned systems before the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan will soon commence production of a speed-boat-like uncrewed surface vessel (USV), following testing.
According to reports from the island, the project has been inspired by Ukraine’s use of kamikaze USVs against Russian warships in the Black Sea and naval bases in Crimea. These emerged as a massive irritant in Moscow’s military calculus.
Taiwan’s unprecedented domestic defense industrial stir also comes in the wake of the United States (US) allocating a grant of US$80 million to buy American military equipment.
The otherwise insignificant amount, compared to the existing US$14 billion of US defense hardware Taiwan would execute over the next few years, still stands out. This is because the sum comes from the US government’s coffers.
Additionally, it would be the first time the US would be spending its money to send weapons to a country it officially does not recognize. Washington officially follows the ‘One China’ policy, which recognizes the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the sole representative of all China and that Taiwan is a part of China.
Beijing has, however, of late been accusing Washington of “hollowing out” the ‘One China’ principle and “reneging” on its 1970s agreements to contain the PRC and discreetly backing “Taiwan independence forces.”
Taiwan’s NCSIST’s ‘Target Ship System’. Photo Credit: NCSIST
Taiwan’s New Drone Boat
According to the Taipei Times, the island could begin mass production of the “uncrewed surface vessel” developed by the National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) around 2026 after it passes “military tests.”
The USV, which “resembles a speed boat,” is described by the NCSIST as a “target ship system.” It primarily has electronic warfare (EW), electronic intelligence (ELINT), surveillance, reconnaissance, network-centric communication, and targeting data relay technologies. These can be used to simulate targets of radar, sonar, and electronic signatures for Taiwanese military crews to train on.
The target craft system is an “unmanned maritime vehicle” that also appears to possess semi-autonomous capabilities. It has “functions” like “remote control, preplanned routes, and real-time video transmission,” with devices like “radio frequency simulators, radio frequency interference simulation systems, heaters, flame launchers, and radar signal reflectors.”
“The system can simulate radio frequency signals, interference signals, thermal radiation signals, and scan cross-sectional areas of maritime targets. Multiple sets of target craft systems and project training courses would be combined in the military training to simulate various scenarios and effectively measure the weapon performance,” the institute said.
It can also perform combat and combat support roles. “The integral radar, weapons, sonar, and other modules in the target craft system can also be expanded to perform near-shore defense, attack, mine detection, submarine detection, and other tasks,” the NCSIST website said.
To counter “China’s military threat,” NCSIST plans an NT$812 million (US$25.14 million) investment to build two uncrewed attack craft with different sizes and bomb loads. The remote guidance and control distance of the two uncrewed attack craft would be increased from 60 to 70 kilometers.
Taiwan’s Drone Blitz
Under President Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan launched a massive state-funded drone development program this July to indigenously develop a diverse range of attack, kamikaze, and ISR UAVs. Reuters reported this “drone blitz” of enlisting Taiwanese defense and drone companies to have been “inspired” by Ukraine.
According to a government planning document reviewed by Reuters, the aim is to build more than 3,200 military drones by mid-2024. “These will include mini-drones that weigh less than two kilograms and larger surveillance craft with a range of 150 kilometers.” Another is to avoid relying on the so-called “red supply chain” – components sourced from China.
Before that, on March 14, the NCSIST unveiled five different types of drones. This included the Albatross II UAV, capable of conducting extended surveillance and tracking naval ships over the sea using artificial intelligence.
It can stay in the air continuously for 16 hours and has a maximum range of over 300 kilometers (186 miles). Another new surveillance drone was the portable Cardinal III UAV, capable of taking off and landing vertically and designed to monitor activities along the coastline. An essential combat drone was the Loitering Munition UAV, which a single soldier can operate. It has a warhead and can target individuals or vehicles from the sky.
File Image
US’s Unprecedented Funding For Taiwan
A report on BBC said that the US$80 million is under a program called Foreign Military Finance (FMF). It has been used to send around US$4 billion of military aid to Ukraine since Russia attacked in February 2022, besides Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and Egypt. “But until now, it has only ever been given to countries or organizations recognized by the United Nations. Taiwan is not,” it added.
While the US has maintained that the FMF does not remotely translate into any implied recognition of Taiwan as an independent country, it follows an old tactic by Washington to “sell just enough weapons so Taiwan could defend itself against possible Chinese attack.” “For decades, the US has relied on this so-called strategic ambiguity to do business with China while remaining Taiwan’s staunchest ally.”
But the FMF for Taiwan was activated, particularly considering how the “military balance across the Taiwan Strait has tipped dramatically in China’s favor…in the last decade.” It also felt the obsolete and woefully unprepared nature of Taiwan’s military. This ranges from World War 2 and Vietnam War-era tanks, artillery guns, outdated command and control structures, doctrines, and tactics.
The inconsistent military service policy — that was reduced from one year to four months in 2013 and reinstated again — combined with the unserious nature of both the Taiwanese youth and military instructors, also make a deadly combination, the CNN report added.
A EurAsian Times report talked about the overprotected and casual nature of Taiwanese youth, who prefer stable careers and, thereby, stable relations with the PRC, given the profound economic and commercial ties between the two.
An October 26, 2021, Wall Street Journal (WSJ) report talks about young men deliberately gaining weight by stuffing themselves with McDonald’s hamburgers to avoid compulsory military conscription.
The frequent instances of Taiwan’s military officers caught spying for China are another instance of how political fissures define Taiwanese society and its relations with the mainland.
eurasiantimes.com · by Parth Satam · November 9, 2023
7. The Evolution of Intelligence Operations in Support of Irregular Warfare
Download this essay in PDF a this link:
https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2023-11-01-I10_The_Evolution_of_Intelligence_Operations_in_Support_of_IW.pdf
Excerpts;
As we stand on the edge of tomorrow, the role of intelligence in IW seems destined for another transformation. Advanced artificial intelligence algorithms may sift through vast amounts of data, while human operatives ensure the contextual relevance of this data. Biotechnologies might offer novel ways of gathering intelligence, while space becomes a new frontier for reconnaissance. However, the essence will remain unchanged: understanding human terrain. Each conflict zone, be it in the dense jungles of Southeast Asia, the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, or the urban centers of Eastern Europe, has its unique human fabric. Deciphering this will be the perennial challenge and the undying essence of intelligence operations in irregular warfare.
In summary, tracing the arc of intelligence operations from Vietnam’s dense foliage to Ukraine’s digital frontlines provides a profound understanding of the evolution of intelligence. While methodologies and tools evolve with time, the quest for contextual, human-centric understanding in the realm of IW remains a constant. True art in intelligence lies not just in gathering information but in deciphering the stories, motives, and aspirations woven within it.
The Evolution of Intelligence Operations in Support of Irregular Warfare
irregularwarfarecenter.org
November 1, 2023
Sal Artiaga – Irregular Warfare Practitioner
Irregular warfare (IW), deeply interwoven with cultural, political, and sociological factors, has historically relied on the agility and adaptability of intelligence operations. As the fabric of warfare has evolved from the dense jungles of Vietnam to the digital frontlines of Ukraine, so too has the nature of intelligence shifted, from human-centric insights to technology-driven reconnaissance. Moving forward, the fusion of advanced technological innovations with intrinsic human understanding will redefine the essence of intelligence in IW, making it a more potent force in navigating the complexities of future unconventional conflicts. By delving into the distinct epochs of Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Ukraine, we can discern the shifting sands of intelligence in support of IW and envision what the future might hold. Many will claim that the future of intelligence lies in technology and this claim has taken the front stage in the past, but it was unequivocally refuted with many mishaps that could have been prevented. Let’s look at the evolution of intelligence and see what the future ahead looks like for it.
Compilation of images from Hizir Kaya, Joel Rivera-Camacho, and Dominik Sostmann on Unsplash.
Intelligence in Support of Irregular Warfare
Intelligence, in the context of IW, can be envisioned as the eyes and ears that illuminate the shadowy, often nebulous landscape of unconventional conflicts. At its core, intelligence goes beyond mere information gathering; it encompasses the deep understanding, processing, and analysis of data to discern patterns, motives, and vulnerabilities of adversaries who often shun traditional battle lines. In IW, where the lines between combatants and civilians blur and adversaries use asymmetry to their advantage, precise and actionable intelligence becomes the linchpin of effective operations. It equips forces with the nuanced understanding required to navigate the complexities of non-linear battlefields, ensuring that actions are both strategically sound and tactically adept. Without robust intelligence, operations in IW are akin to navigating treacherous waters blindfolded, emphasizing its paramount importance in these intricate theaters of conflict.
A Rude Awakening to Asymmetry
In the dense jungles of Vietnam, the United States grappled with a type of warfare that defied conventional wisdom. Vietnam’s dense foliage and labyrinthine terrains were more than just physical challenges. They were emblematic of the clandestine warfare the United States found itself immersed in. The ghostly presence of the Viet Cong, often melting seamlessly among civilians, required a paradigm shift in intelligence. Here, the Phoenix Program was born—a Central Intelligence Agency brainchild aiming to dismantle the Viet Cong’s covert infrastructure using informants, wiretaps, and captured documents. The initiative’s mixed results emphasized the indispensable role of human intelligence (HUMINT) in such conflicts, but it also underscored the moral quagmires and the difficulty of drawing clear lines in IW.
The Mirage of Technological Omnipotence
Several decades after the Vietnam experience, as the world entered the new millennium, the conflict in Afghanistan’s harsh terrains became emblematic of the blend of age-old warfare tactics and the digital era’s innovations. With the advent of cutting-edge technology, intelligence operations witnessed a metamorphosis. The skies above Afghanistan, once the domain of birds and stars, became populated with advanced drones, transmitting invaluable, detailed aerial imagery and enabling real-time monitoring of both urban centers and isolated mountainous regions. Meanwhile, signals intelligence (SIGINT) underwent significant enhancements. Sophisticated electronic equipment, stationed both on the ground and in orbit, constantly intercepted a flood of communications, from cellular conversations to encoded messages, painting a detailed tapestry of the adversary’s intentions and movements.
Yet, amidst this digital transformation, the ancient socio-cultural fabric of Afghanistan posed challenges reminiscent of epochs past. The nation, with its complex mosaic of tribes, clans, and shifting allegiances, defied easy categorization or prediction. In such a context, while drones could provide a bird’s eye view of the terrains and SIGINT could pierce through the veil of communication channels, truly grasping the intricate tribal nuances, understanding local sentiments, and deciphering the layered cultural allegiances necessitated a more organic approach. The indispensable value of HUMINT agents on the ground, embedded sources within communities, and liaisons with local leaders became starkly evident. These human operatives served as the bridge between advanced tech and ground realities, translating data into actionable insights.
Like so, Afghanistan became a poignant testament to a timeless truth: while technological advancements can redefine the scope and scale of intelligence, the nuanced, deeply human understanding of a region and its people remains paramount.
The Chessboard of Hybrid Warfare
Fast-forward to Ukraine, and the world witnessed Russia’s enigmatic hybrid warfare. It was not the first time Russia employed these techniques, as it employed some of them in the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, but it was the first time that the entire world paid attention. Russia’s hybrid warfare approach seamlessly wove conventional operations, guerilla tactics, cyber intrusions, and a disinformation blitzkrieg. The annexation of Crimea, followed by the tumult in Eastern Ukraine, signaled a new era of IW—one where intelligence would grapple with distinguishing fact from orchestrated fiction. Decoding the complex mosaic of state actors, mercenaries, proxies, and cyber warriors became the central challenge. Intelligence in this realm wasn’t just about gathering data; it was about piercing through a smokescreen of deliberate chaos. In 2022, the world bore witness to the declassification of intelligence by the U.S. to prevent Russia from controlling the narrative of the so-called “Special Operation.” This declassification opened the eyes of the world and presented a very different perspective from what the Russians tried to project. In this way, it acted as a torch illuminating the truth amid the purposeful shadows of misinformation.
A Synthesis of Tech and Human Insight
As we stand on the edge of tomorrow, the role of intelligence in IW seems destined for another transformation. Advanced artificial intelligence algorithms may sift through vast amounts of data, while human operatives ensure the contextual relevance of this data. Biotechnologies might offer novel ways of gathering intelligence, while space becomes a new frontier for reconnaissance. However, the essence will remain unchanged: understanding human terrain. Each conflict zone, be it in the dense jungles of Southeast Asia, the rugged mountains of Afghanistan, or the urban centers of Eastern Europe, has its unique human fabric. Deciphering this will be the perennial challenge and the undying essence of intelligence operations in irregular warfare.
In summary, tracing the arc of intelligence operations from Vietnam’s dense foliage to Ukraine’s digital frontlines provides a profound understanding of the evolution of intelligence. While methodologies and tools evolve with time, the quest for contextual, human-centric understanding in the realm of IW remains a constant. True art in intelligence lies not just in gathering information but in deciphering the stories, motives, and aspirations woven within it.
irregularwarfarecenter.org
8. Bill Hunt: Missing in action; never forgotten
I served with Master Sergeant's son, Ken Hunt. I wear MSG Hunt's POW/MIA bracelet on my wrist. Let us never forget. And let us hope the MOH will go through and be approved this time.
Photos at the link:
https://bonnercountydailybee.com/news/2023/nov/09/bill-hunt-missing-in-action-never-forgotten/?utm
Bill Hunt: Missing in action; never forgotten
bonnercountydailybee.com · November 9, 2023
Bill Hunt was 31 when he was last seen alive.
Leaning up against a tree, badly wounded, the Special Forces ranger provided cover for a wounded comrade that November in 1966.
He never came home.
Married with two kids, Hunt had served in the military before but got out after one enlistment to return home to Sandpoint.
A gypo logger, Hunt enjoyed hanging out with friends Kenny Mott, "Manny Finney," and Frank Miller. He liked beer, track, and football, playing a few years ahead of legendary Green Bay Packer great and Hall of Famer Jerry Kramer.
A logger, Hunt occasionally mined alongside his dad, Balt, on property owned by his granddad in the Baldy Mountain area.
It wasn't long after he left the service that Hunt re-enlisted in 1960 and became part of the 101st Airborne Division.
Hunt's son, Ken, followed him into the military, where he served for 27-plus years. Now the commander of the local Veterans of Foreign Wars post in Sandpoint, Hunt talked about his dad and other missing in action on the national POW/MIA Day in late September.
Held on the third Friday in September, National POW/MIA Day remembers those who served, who were prisoners of war, and those who are still missing in action. The local ceremony paid tribute to those missing in action, attracting several dozen family members, soldiers, and community members.
Established by Congress in 1998 as part of the Defense Authorization Act, the day honors those missing in action and is one of six days that the POW/MIA flag can be flown.
"I think it's a good thing that we finally took the initiative to remember our POWs and our MIAs," Ken Hunt said.
William Balt Hunt
Silver Star Citation
June 5, 1967
"The President of the United States of America, authorized by Act of Congress July 9, 1918 (amended by an act of July 25, 1963), takes pride in presenting the Silver Star (Posthumously) to Staff Sergeant William Balt Hunt (ASN: RA-19475676), United States Army, for gallantry in action while engaged in military operations involving conflict with an armed hostile force while serving with Detachment A-302, Company A, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, in the Republic of Vietnam. Staff Sergeant Hunt distinguished himself by exceptionally valorous actions on 4 November 1966 while serving as Special Forces Advisor to a Vietnamese unit during ground operations in Tay Ninh Province. Sergeant Hunt flew into a combat zone with a medical evacuation mission and helped load the aircraft with casualties. When the load proved to be too heavy for the helicopter, he volunteered to remain behind and joined the ground force. After two days of heavy fighting, his unit was surrounded by an overwhelmingly larger Viet Cong force and overrun. During the conflict, another soldier was blown by a grenade explosion out of his covered location and remained unconscious in a position to hostile weapons. Heedless of the intense hostile barrage, Sergeant Hunt left his cover and began to carry him to safety. He was severely wounded in the shoulder and upper back, but reached a protected spot and administered first aid to his comrade. He lost consciousness, and when both men revived, they found their weapons gone and only wounded soldiers nearby. Although they passed out from loss of blood periodically, they made their way towards friendly forces with three Vietnamese casualties. When Sergeant Hunt collapsed and could not be revived, he was left with a wounded soldier, while his comrade tried to reach help. An hour later, the wounded man appeared and reported that Sergeant Hunt had died. Sergeant Hunt is presently officially listed as missing in action. Staff Sergeant Hunt's gallantry in action was in keeping with the highest traditions of military service and reflects great credit upon himself, his unit, and the United States Army."
The first time he enlisted in the Army, Bill Hunt was just out of high school, joining up with his buddy, Kenny Mott. Hunt left after one tour.
He returned to logging for a few years before deciding he'd had enough. He re-enlisted in 1960 and became part of the 101st Airborne, his son said.
Bill Hunt volunteered for the Special Forces and was sent to Vietnam in 1962, again in 1964, and for a third time in 1966. He would be declared missing in action in November, a month before he was due to come home. His son said the family later learned he was on orders for a promotion with his next post in Germany.
Bill Hunt was awarded the Silver Star, two Bronze Stars, a Purple Heart, his Airborne Wings, Vietnamese Jump Wings, and Vietnamese Ranger School.
After his dad was reported missing, Hunt said his grandmother took the map given to her by a survival assistance officer assigned to help her by the military.
"I can't tell you how many times my grandmother would get this map out and talk about him being here, and this was where he was lost," Ken Hunt said, pointing to the area where his dad was last reported to have been seen. "To her dying day, she thought he was coming back."
At the time of the Vietnam War, the U.S. followed the domino theory — the notion that if countries in Asia fell to communism, others would follow to the point where it would take over the world. To prevent that, the U.S. adopted a containment strategy in the region, Ken Hunt said.
At first, soldiers were mostly VietCong guerrillas, but soon the North Vietnamese regular army was making regular incursions into the region. Special Forces like his dad were a big part of the strategy.
In talking to those with whom his dad served and reading books on Operation Attleboro, Ken Hunt said experiences from one soldier to the next could vary wildly, even though they were only feet apart.
"I can be right here," Hunt said, pointing to a map near where his dad was last reported to be seen. "But my story in the operation is totally different than the guy who fought over there."
Bill Hunt was on a helicopter on his way back from an R&R trip that ended up being diverted for a medivac mission.
"This pilot was just flying two guys back to a [Special Forces] base camp at Suoi Da," Ken Hunt said based on his research. "That's all he was doing when he diverted to pick up [the wounded soldiers]. It was a medivac bird and it wasn't armed. My dad didn't have a weapon; he didn't have any equipment."
Yet his dad jumped out and loaded the wounded soldiers onto the helicopter. After he got back in, the helicopter was too heavy to take off, Ken Hunt said.
The other soldier heading back to the Special Forces base later recounted that Bill Hunt stopped him when he tried to jump off as well.
"The last time I saw your dad, he took his big damn hand, put it on my shoulder, and said, 'I got this' and pulled me in, and Dad jumped off," Ken Hunt said.
Monaghan threw Bill Hunt what equipment he had, and as the helicopter took off — this time successfully — he later recounted that Hunt was trying to cross an open area to connect with American troops and Vietnamese troops friendly to the U.S. known to be nearby.
The company his dad ended up connecting with after volunteering to leave the helicopter was led by Sgt. First Class George Heaps, who cautioned against the operation, concerned there was too much activity by North Vietnamese Army and Viet Long troops.
It wasn't long before Hunt connected with Heaps, who warned him to stay with him because the troops knew him. Sometime between Nov. 4 and Nov. 5, the two Americans and the ethnic troops they were with had settled into a defensive perimeter when they were attacked. After Heaps was shot while on the radio, Hunt ran forward and drug him to safety. At some point, his dad was shot and critically wounded.
The pair passed out, and after coming to, they found they'd been stripped of everything and left for dead. They were able to find clothes after coming across dead soldiers as well as a pistol, and slowly, they made their way toward a landing zone.
"George was telling me they would walk 10 yards and then one of them would pass out," Ken Hunt said after connecting with Heaps many years later while researching what had happened to his dad. "Then they would walk another 10 yards, and the other would pass out."
Heaps said he would cuss out Hunt's dad to keep him moving, and Hunt would do the same.
Finally, the man said the pair crossed another stream, and Bill leaned against a tree and told him he couldn't go any further.
"'I'll cover; you go get to safety,' and George said he gave Dad the pistol and left one of the Nung with him," Ken Hunt said. "And the other Nung came running up, yelling, "Hunt dead. Hunt dead."
About that time, a helicopter landed and got the trio on board. Heaps passed out after being pulled into the helicopter, falling unconscious for an extended period of time.
By the time he awoke and relayed his tale, Hunt's body could not be found.
Based on who those looking for his dad talked to, the location where Bill Hunt was last seen varied. Four different people, four different reports, and four different spots where his dad's body might be located.
Bill Hunt was declared presumed dead in 1976. Ken Hunt said he later learned it was at his mother's request, something he understands.
"There was a little note in his file … handwritten, in pencil, from my mother that asked the Army to declare him dead, that it was too much for her after 10 years," Ken Hunt told those gathered. "
Every year, family members are invited to attend a gathering by the National League of POW/MIA Families for those whose loved ones are missing in action. They are also kept informed when there are traveling survival assistance meetings in the region. Hunt said he's been to several as part of his quest to find his dad.
He has also been to Vietnam several times but hasn't been able to find his dad. Adding to the complication is that part of the area where his body is believed to be has been flooded as part of a dam project.
On his second trip in 1999, he had to get permission because he was still active duty. After pleading his case, saying he just wanted to pay his respects to his dad in the closest area he could reach, Ken Hunt said he was finally given permission. However, it took getting Idaho's U.S. senators involved and talking to reporters at the Washington Times and the Army Times.
After arriving in Vietnam with a buddy, Hunt said he traveled back to the area. As they looked across the spill gate on the dam, Hunt said he noticed the area where he believes his dad's body to be is part of a peninsula jutting out into the lake. They contacted a pair of nearby fishermen, who ferried them over to the area.
"We got right close to where dad was missing," Hunt said. "He's out in that field somewhere."
Hunt said he figures, based on what George Heaps told him, that he was within 10 meters of where his dad was last seen.
"I buried [a coin with his dad's name on it]," Ken Hunt said. "There happened to be a tree in this field with no other trees. I buried this coin, poured some Southern Comfort on it, took a drink, and uncontrollably started crying. I just started weeping. I gave another pour [on the ground] for Dad and sat there for probably 10 minutes and then walked back to the group."
Despite getting off the helicopter to ensure the injured soldiers could be flown to safety, Bill Hunt was only given the Silver Star. In 2010, soldiers who served with his father submitted a request for him to receive a Medal of Honor.
"According to [Special Forces Commander Tom] Myerchin, they'd originally put him in for a Medal of Honor because he got off a helicopter knowing what he was getting into, without having the right equipment, and then he grabbed Heaps when Heaps was wounded, and then he volunteered to stay behind, although he probably couldn't have gone far, and covered them while they got to safety."
Unfortunately, the request never went forward.
Ken Hunt resubmitted the packet in 2020, but it got kicked back because the thinking was that a family member can't put a loved one in for a medal. However, he added that all he did was put a cover letter on the packet submitted by Heaps, Myerchin, and the others who served with his dad.
The application packet is scheduled to be resubmitted again, this time with the support of U.S. Sen. Jim Risch, R-Idaho. Ken Hunt said the application will likely be resubmitted in early 2024.
Sergeant Bill Hunt in 1964 working with South Vietnamese Rangers during his second tour
SSgt. Bill Hunt (no shirt) is pictured loading a Jeep in 1966 as he works with indigenous soldiers during his third tour in Vietnam.
bonnercountydailybee.com · November 9, 2023
9. How Green Berets Became the US Army's Elite Special Forces
How Green Berets Became the US Army's Elite Special Forces | HISTORY
history.com · by Christopher Klein
The U.S. Army Special Forces—better known as the “Green Berets” for their signature headgear—have undertaken some of the military’s most sensitive missions. Since their founding in 1952, they’ve operated in war zones from Vietnam to Afghanistan. Distinct from conventional forces, the elite Green Berets work in small teams and specialize in psychological and guerrilla operations.
Green Berets: Men of Honor
The Green Berets’ Mission and Training
The original mission of the Green Berets was to conduct unconventional warfare activities designed to disrupt or overthrow enemy governments or occupying powers—often by working with local insurgents. Their responsibilities have expanded to include counterterrorism, surveillance, counterinsurgency training for foreign armies and quick-strike actions such as hostage rescues. In addition, the Green Berets participate in combat search and rescue, counter-narcotic, humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations.
Green Berets undergo a rigorous training that begins with a six-week course focused on physical fitness and land navigation. That is typically followed by the Special Forces Assessment and Selection, a grueling three-week test of physical and mental stamina held at North Carolina’s Fort Liberty (formerly Fort Bragg). Selected candidates must then complete the year-long Special Forces Qualification Course that includes instruction in foreign languages, regional cultures, survival techniques and tactical combat skills. The “Q Course” culminates with a four-week training exercise in the forests of North Carolina in which candidates help a guerrilla force overthrow an illegitimate government in the fictional country of Pineland.
The Green Berets Form During the Cold War
The U.S. Army Special Forces originated in 1952 from the special operations units of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) that supported resistance movements in Europe and Burma during World War II. Their original Cold War purpose was to operate as a stay-behind guerrilla force to work with resistance groups in the event of a Soviet takeover of Western Europe. Initial recruits included OSS special forces veterans and Eastern European immigrants who spoke multiple languages and possessed skills ranging from parachuting to skiing to hand-to-hand combat. “Their skills are an almost-incredible mixture of those needed by the assassin, the frontiersman and the atomic-age soldier,” reported one newspaper.
To distinguish themselves from conventional forces, the U.S. Army Special Forces unofficially adopted green berets, which had been worn by elite U.S. Army Rangers upon their graduation from an intensive commando school in Scotland during World War II. Soldiers donned their berets surreptitiously—until they became part of the official uniform in 1961, when President John F. Kennedy requested they be worn when he visited the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School at Fort Bragg.
JFK Champions the Green Berets
Believing they could play a valuable role in the Vietnam War, Kennedy was a staunch proponent of the Green Berets. “Kennedy foresaw that wars in the future would not be pitched battles like in World War II and Korea and wanted an elite force of highly trained specialists,” says Marc Leepson, author of Ballad of the Green Beret: The Life and Wars of Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler from the Vietnam War and Pop Stardom to Murder and an Unsolved, Violent Death.
In a 1962 memorandum, Kennedy wrote that “the Green Beret is again becoming a symbol of excellence, a badge of courage, a mark of distinction in the fight for freedom.” Following her husband’s November 1963 assassination, Jacqueline Kennedy requested that the Green Berets join the honor guard at his funeral in recognition of their special bond with the slain president. After Kennedy’s burial, Command Sergeant Major Francis Ruddy placed his own hat on the grave as a sign of respect. “He gave the beret to us,” he said. “We considered it appropriate that it be given back to him.” The Special Warfare Center and School was renamed in Kennedy’s honor, and the Green Berets commemorate his death each year by placing a wreath and green beret on his grave.
The Green Berets Gain Fame in Vietnam
During the Vietnam War, the mission of the Green Berets grew from waging guerrilla warfare against conventional forces to assisting a foreign ally in thwarting a guerrilla insurgency. Among the first American troops committed to Vietnam, the Green Berets arrived in 1957 to train 58 members of the South Vietnamese army in counterinsurgency against Communist Viet Cong rebels. By 1967, they were assisting approximately 80,000 paramilitary troops and soldiers.
As part of the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program, the special forces recruited and trained indigenous Vietnamese in the remote highlands to form militias to counter the Viet Cong. In addition to fighting the insurgents and launching cross-border operations into Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam, the Green Berets built schools, dredged canals and provided medical care to civilians.
‘The Ballad of the Green Berets’ Tops the Pop Charts
One of those Green Beret medics, Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler, propelled the relatively unknown special operations force to fame by producing one of popular music’s most unexpected chart-toppers. Five months into his tour of duty in May 1965, Sadler was impaled by a fecal-covered punji stick planted by the Viet Cong and suffered a severe leg wound and infection that required him to return to Fort Bragg to recover. The lengthy convalescence allowed the aspiring songwriter to complete his patriotic hymn, “The Ballad of the Green Berets,” and land a record deal after recording a demo in a makeshift studio authorized by Special Warfare Center Commander William Yarborough.
Released in January 1966, the soldier’s song became a surprise hit, knocking Nancy Sinatra’s “These Boots Are Made for Walkin’” from the top of the Billboard chart and remaining there for five consecutive weeks. Named Billboard magazine’s #1 single for 1966, it sold an estimated 9 million copies. “The public was still overwhelmingly in support of the war at the time, but that soon changed,” Leepson says. “If the song had come out a year later, it’s very unlikely it would have become a hit. Timing is everything.”
“The Ballad of the Green Berets” proved a publicity bonanza. Although Sadler preferred another tour of duty, the military instead sent him on a recruiting tour of the country. “The Green Berets were a new concept and controversial. Yarborough was very PR-savvy and latched onto this song as a way to gain support among the public, and it worked,” Leepson says. Frustrated with being pulled from active duty, Sadler left the Army in May 1967 with an honorable discharge.
Green Berets Spearhead War on Terror
The Capture of Manuel Noriega
During the 1980s, the focus of the Green Berets shifted to Latin America. There, they trained El Salvador’s army in its civil war with leftist guerrillas, assisted Colombia in combatting narcotics trafficking and joined in the 1989 invasion of Panama that deposed dictator Manuel Noriega.
Just weeks after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Green Berets were among the first American troops deployed in the U.S.-led War on Terror. Infiltrating mountainous terrain in advance of the invasion of Afghanistan and sometime traveling on horseback, the special forces coordinated the initial bombing campaign. They also assisted the Northern Alliance and tribal forces in overthrowing the Taliban, which had sheltered the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for the attacks.
The Green Berets joined in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and, after the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein, they created and trained Iraqi special operations units to fight against the insurgency. In ensuing years, they supported counterterrorism operations in the Philippines, Africa and Latin America.
history.com · by Christopher Klein
10. Philippines, US start defense drill joined by Japan, S.Korea, UK
Philippines, US start defense drill joined by Japan, S.Korea, UK | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News
www3.nhk.or.jp
A joint coastal defense drill has begun in the Philippines with five countries participating, including the US and Japan.
The drill is part of efforts by Manila to strengthen multilateral security cooperation at a time when China is growing aggressive in the disputed South China Sea.
Marine forces of the Philippines and the US kicked off the joint exercise with a ceremony in Manila on Thursday. Combined with delegates from Japan, South Korea and Britain, over 2,700 personnel are taking part.
Major General Arturo Rojas, Philippine Marine Corps Commandant, said, "Together, we send a powerful message to the world, especially to those who may seek to disrupt the peace, that our partnership is unbreakable."
Major General Nashinoki Shingo, Commanding General of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade said, "We'll deepen our cooperation and contribute actively to realize a peaceful, free and open Indo-Pacific region."
The 12-day-long joint exercise aims to confirm methods of guarding coastal areas facing the South China Sea.
The participants also plan to simulate an operation to provide humanitarian aid to a remote island near Taiwan.
The drill comes as tensions between the Philippines and China are increasing. Manila and Beijing traded barbs last month over collisions involving their ships in the contested waters.
www3.nhk.or.jp
11. Mobile and resilient, the US military is placing a new emphasis on ground troops for Pacific defense
Excerpts;
That could give the Chinese navy a better ability to operate well beyond the second island chain and disrupt American supply lines or reinforcements coming from Hawaii -- making it even more important for forward units to buy time in the event of a conflict.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has not ruled out the use of force to take Taiwan, and while the American policy on whether it would come to Taiwan’s aid is that of “strategic ambiguity,” or not saying how far it is willing to go, U.S. President Joe Biden has said that Washington would intervene militarily.
With tensions rising over Taiwan, the U.S. use of the island chains could both deter China from considering an invasion, and also exact a heavy price if they tried, Graham said.
“Having long-range anti-ship missiles and long-range air defense missiles operated by small groups that are designed to be resilient, and logistically able to operate without resupply under distress, they could do a lot to deter the Chinese from ever thinking about operating in that scenario,” he said. “But if push comes to shove, they could impose a cost in terms of attrition of those forces as they move closer to Taiwan.”
Aircraft carrier groups would still likely play a large role in a conflict but would more likely be surged in and then quickly moved out, putting them at greater risk than in the past, he added.
“But then,” he said, “aircraft carriers are designed to be risked.”
Mobile and resilient, the US military is placing a new emphasis on ground troops for Pacific defense
BY DAVID RISING
Updated 4:04 AM EST, November 9, 2023
AP · November 9, 2023
BANGKOK (AP) — As Chinese missile testing in the waters around Taiwan grew increasingly aggressive in 1996, the U.S. sailed two aircraft carrier groups to the island that Beijing claims as its own, and China was forced to back down.
It employed a similar response to Hamas’ surprise attack on Israel a month ago, dispatching two carrier groups to the eastern Mediterranean in a rapid and massive show of force meant to deter other countries or Iran-backed proxy groups such as Hezbollah from joining the fight.
But what is still viable in the Mideast is increasingly less practical with China, which in 1996 had no carriers of its own and little means to threaten the American ships, but now has the world’s largest navy, including three aircraft carriers, and a coastline bristling with anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.
Instead, ongoing exercises in Hawaii, which conclude Friday, highlight part of a new American approach to Pacific defense and deterrence, with a focus on small groups of mobile land forces operating from islands like those off China’s coast.
In the exercises, the largest-scale training held in Hawaii so far, more than 5,000 troops from the 25th Infantry Division, along with units from New Zealand, Indonesia, Thailand and Britain and supported by the U.S. Air Force, have been practicing fighting in an island jungle environment against an advanced enemy force, with exercises including paratrooper drops, a long-range air assault, and re-supply by air and sea.
“All of those are examples of the importance of being able to project force here in the Pacific, which first requires seizing and holding ground and building up a base of operations where you can consolidate gains, secure and hold key infrastructure such as an airfield, and then introduce additional combat power,” said Maj. Gen. Marcus Evans, commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division, in an interview from Wheeler Army Airfield on Oahu.
While the exercises are not officially directed against a specific threat, the U.S. Department of Defense in its report last month to Congress reiterated that it considers China its “pacing challenge” as “the only competitor to the United States with the intent and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order.”
Even though China’s navy is now larger than that of the U.S. in terms of numbers of ships, the U.S. Navy is still more capable and has 11 carriers to China’s three, among other advantages. But where China’s main focus is on its nearby waters, the U.S. Navy operates globally and in the event of a Taiwan conflict, it would take time for many of its assets to get to the region.
As part of its “Operation Pathways” revamp of Pacific defense set in motion nearly a decade ago, the U.S. has been increasing its number of exercises with partners in the Indo-Pacific. It has also been re-thinking the way its soldiers and Marines operate in the first island chain off of China, which includes southwestern Japanese islands, Taiwan and the northwest Philippines, and the second island chain, which includes the Mariana Islands and the heavily fortified American territory of Guam.
Those islands give them platforms from which anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles can be launched by mobile units that can quickly relocate to avoid counter battery fire, said Euan Graham, a defense analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
“The U.S. already has a positional advantage by being forward deployed and having allies there, so it wants to utilize that geography in its favor,” Graham said. “And that helps the U.S. to overcome its numerical disadvantages as China’s navy is continuing to expand. The U.S. has to do what it can to try and close the gap, and land forces are part of the equation.”
Beyond just being able to take and hold positions, the military has to overcome what Evans called a “tyranny of distance” in the Pacific where troops may find themselves on remote islands many hundreds of kilometers (miles) away from new supplies of water, fuel and ammunition. Among several new technologies being tested in the ongoing exercises in Hawaii are three variants of an “atmospheric water generator” to produce potable water in field conditions.
Operating from the first and second island chains would require the consent of the countries they belong to, and the U.S. has also been working hard to shore up and expand alliances in the region.
It runs large-scale training exercises with the Philippines, where earlier this year it signed an agreement to expand its use of bases, as well as with South Korea, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Thailand and India.
The exercises provide experience in technical and procedural interoperability and also build human bonds that can be critical in times of crisis.
“We are just finishing up a defense here on the island of Oahu and watching soldiers from Indonesia, Thailand and New Zealand alongside soldiers from the United States Army dig fighting positions together, experience a crucible of privation -- that challenges, but most importantly forges relationships,” Evans said.
On the political level, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin is on his ninth trip to the Indo-Pacific this week with stops in India, South Korea and Indonesia, in which he is to “underscore the depth of the longstanding U.S. commitment to strengthening the Indo-Pacific’s dynamic security architecture.” Austin’s travels overlap with Secretary of State Antony Blinken ’s own visits to Tokyo, Seoul and New Delhi.
Planning and training by the U.S. and its allies have not been going on in a vacuum, and China has been working hard to extend the operational capability of its navy. It has also developed so-called “carrier killer” missiles able to hit targets at long distances, and a ballistic missile capable of striking Guam.
It launched its first domestically designed a nd manufactured aircraft carrier in 2022, and that same year signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands in the Pacific, which many say could be used as a port to re-supply Chinese navy ships.
That could give the Chinese navy a better ability to operate well beyond the second island chain and disrupt American supply lines or reinforcements coming from Hawaii -- making it even more important for forward units to buy time in the event of a conflict.
Chinese President Xi Jinping has not ruled out the use of force to take Taiwan, and while the American policy on whether it would come to Taiwan’s aid is that of “strategic ambiguity,” or not saying how far it is willing to go, U.S. President Joe Biden has said that Washington would intervene militarily.
With tensions rising over Taiwan, the U.S. use of the island chains could both deter China from considering an invasion, and also exact a heavy price if they tried, Graham said.
“Having long-range anti-ship missiles and long-range air defense missiles operated by small groups that are designed to be resilient, and logistically able to operate without resupply under distress, they could do a lot to deter the Chinese from ever thinking about operating in that scenario,” he said. “But if push comes to shove, they could impose a cost in terms of attrition of those forces as they move closer to Taiwan.”
Aircraft carrier groups would still likely play a large role in a conflict but would more likely be surged in and then quickly moved out, putting them at greater risk than in the past, he added.
“But then,” he said, “aircraft carriers are designed to be risked.”
AP · November 9, 2023
12. FBI Accuses Biden Appointee of Bias in Selection of Headquarters Site
Something seems rotten in Denmark.
Excerpts:
Wray said a panel of career officials—two from the GSA and one from the FBI—unanimously recommended the Springfield site, which isn’t far from a host of FBI operations at the Quantico Marine Base and other national-security agencies, and submitted a report supporting its top pick. But a senior political appointee at GSA, which manages the federal government’s real estate, overruled the panel and chose Greenbelt, he said.
Wray didn’t name the executive, but a GSA official confirmed he was referring to Nina M. Albert, a former vice president for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, which owns the land now slated for the headquarters site in Greenbelt. Albert worked as commissioner of the GSA’s public buildings service, until October, according to an online profile. She left the agency after being appointed as Washington’s acting deputy mayor for planning and economic development in October. She didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.
“We identified concerns about a potential conflict of interest involving the site selection authority and whether changes that individual made in the final stage of the process adhered to the site selection criteria,” Wray wrote, adding that he sent a letter to GSA leadership last month detailing the FBI’s concerns, but they were never addressed. “Our concerns are not with the decision itself but with the process.”
Wray’s note said Albert had unilaterally changed the criteria at the last minute in a way that would benefit Greenbelt.
FBI Accuses Biden Appointee of Bias in Selection of Headquarters Site
Panel of career officials picked Virginia site; GSA decision went with suburban Maryland
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/fbi-accuses-biden-appointee-of-bias-in-selection-of-headquarters-site-78ea26d2?st=n1jijyu3uxbsqth&utm
By Sadie Gurman
Follow
Updated Nov. 9, 2023 1:49 pm ET
‘We have concerns about fairness and transparency in the process and GSA’s failure to adhere to its own site selection plan,’ FBI Director Christopher Wray wrote to staff. PHOTO: CHRIS MACHIAN/ASSOCIATED PRESS
A final pick this week for a new Federal Bureau of Investigation headquarters in the Maryland suburbs was supposed to end a decadelong drama that had engulfed the site-selection process. Instead, it looks like it’s only heating up.
In a sharply worded note to employees Thursday, the usually taciturn FBI Director Christopher Wray blasted the General Services Administration’s decision-making process and said a Biden appointee might have inappropriately interfered with the outcome.
“We have concerns about fairness and transparency in the process and GSA’s failure to adhere to its own site selection plan,” Wray wrote in a message to the workforce, a day after GSA officials confirmed they had chosen to move the FBI from its crumbling headquarters downtown to a site in Greenbelt, Md., over another location in Springfield, Va.
A GSA official defended the agency’s process as fair and said ethics officials had signed off on the appointee’s involvement in the selection process.
“GSA and FBI teams have spent countless hours working closely together over many months, so we’re disappointed that the FBI Director is now making inaccurate claims directed at our agency, our employees, and our site selection plan and process,” said General Services Administrator Robin Carnahan. “Any suggestion that there was inappropriate interference is unfounded.”
Wray said a panel of career officials—two from the GSA and one from the FBI—unanimously recommended the Springfield site, which isn’t far from a host of FBI operations at the Quantico Marine Base and other national-security agencies, and submitted a report supporting its top pick. But a senior political appointee at GSA, which manages the federal government’s real estate, overruled the panel and chose Greenbelt, he said.
Wray didn’t name the executive, but a GSA official confirmed he was referring to Nina M. Albert, a former vice president for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, which owns the land now slated for the headquarters site in Greenbelt. Albert worked as commissioner of the GSA’s public buildings service, until October, according to an online profile. She left the agency after being appointed as Washington’s acting deputy mayor for planning and economic development in October. She didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.
“We identified concerns about a potential conflict of interest involving the site selection authority and whether changes that individual made in the final stage of the process adhered to the site selection criteria,” Wray wrote, adding that he sent a letter to GSA leadership last month detailing the FBI’s concerns, but they were never addressed. “Our concerns are not with the decision itself but with the process.”
Wray’s note said Albert had unilaterally changed the criteria at the last minute in a way that would benefit Greenbelt.
The back-and-forth marks a new dynamic in the tortured saga concerning the future of the bureau’s headquarters. Greenbelt is about 15 miles from the hulking, brutalist J. Edgar Hoover Building that has been the FBI’s home for nearly 50 years.
The J. Edgar Hoover Building, the FBI’s headquarters, in Washington, D.C., which the agency says no longer meets its needs. PHOTO: TING SHEN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
At the Hoover Building, officials have quick access to prosecutors in the Justice Department’s headquarters across Pennsylvania Avenue. But the bureau has complained that the current headquarters, named for the agency’s first and longest-serving director, no longer meets the needs of an organization that has grown since President Gerald Ford dedicated the building.
After officials had warned that the Hoover building failed to comply with security requirements, the GSA began exploring a relocation of the FBI building in 2013.
But the process ground to a halt in 2017, when the Trump administration scrapped the effort, sparking accusations that the move was an effort to bolster a nearby hotel the Trump family controlled. An inspector general report last month concluded that Trump didn’t improperly pressure the FBI to stay in its current location.
The GSA reopened the lobbying process for a new site in 2021, after that year’s omnibus bill called for the relocation effort to begin anew. FBI officials previously had argued that their headquarters should stay in Washington, but Maryland and Virginia lawmakers ensured that funding for a new campus would apply only to the suburbs, precluding the nation’s capital.
Maryland officials put their full weight into the fight, emphasizing economic and racial equity and what they described as a need for the Biden administration to deliver on promises to invest in historically underfunded communities. The selected site is located in majority-Black Prince George’s County.
Democratic Virginia Sens. Mark Warner and Tim Kaine, as well as Gov. Glenn Youngkin, a Republican, had pushed for the Springfield location. Some current and former FBI employees had argued that being closer to other national-security agencies in Northern Virginia would help the bureau’s ability to function and make classified, face-to-face meetings more efficient.
But Albert kept steering the decision toward Greenbelt over Springfield, Wray’s note said, even after bureau officials expressed concern that the selection process wasn’t being followed.
“The result of the senior executive’s one-directional changes was that Greenbelt became the most highly rated site,” his note said. “The FBI’s concerns were exacerbated by the fact that the senior executive rejected the recommendation of the unanimous site selection panel—something that, while not inherently inappropriate, is exceedingly rare.”
A GSA official said it was prudent to assign Albert as the decision-maker, adding: “We knew whoever ended up making the decision, regardless of what that decision was, was going to face intense scrutiny and potentially attacks on their integrity or their competence.”
Congress will decide the next steps, Wray said. That could open a new set of hurdles for the bureau, as Republicans have threatened to obstruct funding for a new facility as part of a broader swipe at the FBI, which they see as targeting their party, with some going so far as saying the agency should be dismantled.
Aruna Viswanatha contributed to this article.
Write to Sadie Gurman at sadie.gurman@wsj.com
Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the November 10, 2023, print edition as 'Wray Faults FBI Headquarters Selection Process'.
13. These are 3 popular misconceptions about the Navy SEALs
I concur. I have worked with a lot of great SEALs. The only "bad" ones are the ones I have read about in the press.
These are 3 popular misconceptions about the Navy SEALs
sandboxx.us · by Frumentarius · November 8, 2023
It has been a bit of a wild ride for the Navy SEAL community since the Global War on Terror kicked off in 2001. That conflict thrust the SEALs – some would say certain members willingly leaped – into a public limelight that was brighter and sometimes harsher than had ever before been experienced by Naval Special Warfare. One result of that increased public notoriety, which has reflected both positively and negatively on the SEALs, has been the growth of certain misconceptions held by the wider public about the Navy SEAL Teams.
The first erroneous view this author has noticed to be held fairly widely is that all Navy SEALs are self-promoting glory hounds. As one who has personally been accused of such behavior, I am well-placed to address this particular misconception. I can say with absolute certainty that the great majority of SEALs, both current and former, in no way seek to glorify their service, promote themselves as some sort of superhuman warrior elite, or even talk publicly at all about their service (again, this author notwithstanding).
Now, do some SEALs write or host podcasts talking about everything from self-improvement to physical fitness to politics to simply “SEAL stuff?” Of course they do. Do some even discuss their involvement in various military operations (as approved by the DoD’s review process)? Again, yes. And sure, there are even some shameless charlatans that exist amongst the community of former SEALs who seek to profit or acquire political power at any cost.
Sadly, the SEAL Teams are not immune to the presence of certain personality types, including self-aggrandizing blowhards. That being said, those are the exception, not the rule. The great majority of Navy SEALs have never and will never speak publicly about their service. Some don’t because they believe in the ethos of the “silent professional.” Others don’t because they simply move on from the SEAL Teams and have no desire to live in the past. And others are just too humble to speak at all about themselves publicly. The point is, do not fall prey to the cheap laugh and easy meme that all SEALs are out to write books, seek public fame, and glorify themselves. It just isn’t true, despite the irony of a former Navy SEAL telling you so in an article.
.S. Navy and Republic of Korea Navy SEALs clear out rooms during simulated close-quarters combat scenarios during a bilateral training exercise at Silver Strand Training Complex. NSW is the nation’s premier maritime special operations force, uniquely positioned to extend the fleet’s reach and deliver all-domain options for naval and joint force commanders, Coronado, CA, November 2022. (U.S. Navy Photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel Gaither/Naval Special Warfare Group ONE)
The second big misconception civilians tend to hold about SEALs is that they are all hand-to-hand combat experts – super-ninjas, even – adept at killing with a knife, their bare hands, or really, with just about any nearby kitchen utensil. That one has always made me chuckle as it simply is not the case. The number of military disciplines required to be mastered by each SEAL to simply form up a platoon adept at accomplishing its various SOF missions is pretty significant. Those skills range from combat diving to marksmanship to explosives to parachuting to land navigation to small unit tactics to close-quarters combat, and a bunch of others.
We used to say in my platoon that as SEALs we were jacks of all trades and masters of none. Yes, there is some hand-to-hand combat training and use of close-quarters defense and grappling-style techniques, but in no way can the average SEAL devote enough (official) training time to any particular fighting discipline to become an expert at it. Now, some do become expert fighters on their own time, and that is a different story. Also, each and every SEAL will absolutely fight to the death with whatever weapon is at hand if the need arises. However, that does not mean that the average SEAL could take the average UFC fighter in the octagon.
SEAL qualification training students from Class 268 take aim during a 36-round shooting test ranging from 100, 200 and 300 yards at Camp Pendleton. SQT is a six-month training course that all SEAL candidates must complete before being assigned to a SEAL team. (Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Michelle Kapica/U.S. Navy)
Finally, we have a misconception that is best illustrated by the following question that I’ve also been asked many times since leaving the SEAL Teams: “Oh, you were a Navy SEAL? What do you think of the [insert the name of any obscure German-made assault rifle]? I’m thinking of buying one.”
Apparently, many civilians think that all SEALs are “gunheads.” That’s the name we used to bestow on SEALs back in my day who could answer questions like the above. Yes, they do exist, but they are not the norm, even in the SEALs. While some Team Guys know everything about every weapon ever made, ballistics, various types of sights, the performance of various types of ammunition rounds, and everything else related to small arms, that was not the case for the average SEAL.
Your average Team Guy absolutely did know everything about his own issued weapons. Don’t be mistaken: he could tell you the rate of fire, operate and clear the weapon in the dark, recite the specs on the various optics, and disassemble and assemble it blindfolded – just like pretty much all infantrymen and women in the U.S. military could. The big difference is, SEALs usually get more range time, have access to more training rounds to fire, and get more hands-on access to their weapons than the average infantryman. At the end of the day, though, your average SEAL saw his weapon as a critical tool to do his job, and not as some object of weird fetish-like significance. It was a means to an end, and the love affair with the weapon was usually limited to its use on the battlefield.
With that, I hope I have helped clear up a few of the misconceptions about the Navy SEALs.
Read more from Sandboxx News
sandboxx.us · by Frumentarius · November 8, 2023
14. The US media’s moral blindness over Hamas is showing, and it isn’t pretty
The US media’s moral blindness over Hamas is showing, and it isn’t pretty
thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org
In the clearest moral test in a generation, much of the U.S. media is failing. And not just by a little — they are failing spectacularly.
On Oct. 7, the Palestinian terrorist organization Hamas murdered an estimated 1,400 Israelis, many of whom were civilians, and kidnapped nearly 250 others to use as hostages. From the air, land and sea, Hamas terrorists targeted men, women, children, infants and the elderly.
Some Israelis were shot. Some were burned to death. Some were killed with explosives. Some were tortured and maimed. Some were raped and then murdered. The list of atrocities, many of which have been confirmed independent of Israeli officials, goes on and on.
Israel has since responded with military force, vowing to root out and destroy Hamas.
In this specific moment, when Israel is responding militarily to the greatest single-day slaughter of Jews since Adolf Hitler’s suicide, the question of who committed evil and who is justified could not be any clearer. Indeed, it is rare that a story as clear-cut as this falls into one’s lap.
Yet despite the uncomplicated nature of this precise situation, and despite the universally shared principle that murder and terrorism are, in fact, wrong, many journalists and editors appear to be morally confused.
Some scribes seem to be losing sleep, agonizing over such deep ethical dilemmas as, “Is ethnic cleansing — sorry, ‘decolonization’ — a legitimate form of protest?”; “does the terrorist organization that rules the Gaza Strip really owe it to the people it governs to provide basic utilities, including clean water?”; “can we really say that an Israeli infant was ‘beheaded,’ when it’s probably more accurate to say that the infant’s head was blown off by a rifle or a grenade?”; “is there a way around the idea that the Palestinian slogan, ‘From the river to the sea’ is an explicit call for a genocide?”; “do we really need to vet or fact-check statements and accusations that come from Hamas?”
The approach of many journalists to the current moment — a combination of “both-sides-ism” and kid-gloves treatment for Hamas terrorists — is not just morally repugnant; it’s absurd. It’s absurd because many of these same journalists spent the last several years boasting about their own moral clarity and willingness to speak out against evil, while scolding the rest of us for failing to do the same. It wasn’t so long ago that many of these same journalists laid out, in explicit detail, why it’s so dangerous to say there are “very fine people on both sides” when the story is one of civilians versus violent extremists.
To be sure, as many say, the Oct. 7 attack did not occur “in a vacuum.” And Israel’s response to this massacre has already and will cause more loss of innocent life. There is, however, a key difference between Israel’s military-state struggle for self-preservation against armed enemies on the one hand, and Hamas’s wanton, intentional massacre of helpless civilians on the other.
War happens and can even be justified under certain circumstances. But the Oct. 7 atrocities were not acts of war that just had unfortunate side effects. They were deliberate, targeted atrocities. For anyone with a moral compass, there is nothing that could ever excuse or even explain them.
Yet many in our media would play nice with a group composed of rapists and killers who routinely use human shields in conflict to maximize civilian casualties, insisting that we appreciate the “context” of their atrocities and taking their word as fact. As for stateside supporters of Hamas, it is difficult to see the coverage of their activities as anything other than sympathetic.
Consider, for example, the New York Times’s recent coverage of the desperate plight of Palestinians misgoverned by Hamas since 2006. Gazans suffer greatly, in large part due to the terrorist group’s hoarding of all the humanitarian aid they are supposed to receive — the food, water and fuel — in underground tunnels, in preparation for a long conflict with Israel. In any other scenario, this would be recognized as an obvious evil. Yet, shockingly, a New York Times reporter deadpans: “Hamas’s stockpiles raise questions about what responsibility, if any, it has to the civilian population.”
What questions would those be, exactly? From any reasonable perspective, there is no question that Hamas owes it to the people it rules to provide them with the clean water, fuel and food that outsiders generously send in for humanitarian purposes. And as a government that has refused to allow another election since it took power in 2006, Hamas arguably bears even more responsibility than a legitimately elected government would for providing utility services and other things governments are supposed to provide.
So why is this a question? Better yet, how is it a question?
Elsewhere at the New York Times, an equally shocking headline states, “For decades, Iran has vowed to destroy Israel. Now that its ally Hamas is at war with Israel, will Iran and its proxies follow through?” The subhead reads, “With Israel bent on crushing Iran’s ally Hamas, Tehran must decide whether it and the proxy militias it arms and trains will live up to its fiery rhetoric.”
Aside from the euphemisms — “militia” for terrorists and “fiery rhetoric” for calls for genocide — the New York Times presents as a “Sophie’s Choice” Iran’s dilemma of whether to follow through with the promise to kill more Jews. Won’t someone please think of the poor ayatollah and the immense pressure he must be experiencing right now?
These stories appear against the backdrop of the New York Times re-hiring a Palestinian video journalist known chiefly for his publicly stated admiration for Adolf Hitler on social media. It’s almost as if the newspaper’s problems are deeper than mere ignorance.
At the Washington Post, the in-house fact checker sprang to life this week to scold President Joe Biden for saying, “I have no confidence in the number that the Palestinians are using.” The fact-check argues this is a “remarkably uninformed” position, given that the United Nations has, in the past, independently corroborated figures reported by the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health. It’s worth pointing out, however, that the UN concedes of the current conflict that it “has so far not been able to produce independent, comprehensive, and verified casualty figures,” and that the numbers it currently cites come directly from the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health. In other words, Biden is correct to be distrustful of uncorroborated figures. It’s strange certain journalists feel differently.
At smaller news outlets, there has been more of the same, including a piece from Vice, which includes the astonishing lines: “Hamas as an organisation is often compared to ISIS. Israel, the U.S. and multiple countries in Europe define it as a terrorist movement. However, Hamas defines itself as an Islamic resistance movement with a political party and military wing, and is seen that way by Palestinians and other Arab states.”
Note that use of “however.” Never before has that word been asked to do so much work for so little.
The piece continues, adding, “After all, Hamas has been running Gaza for 17 years, providing many regular services like any governmental administration would.”
Considering the well-documented lack of fuel, water, food and basic utilities inside Gaza, one cannot help but wonder which “regular services” Hamas has been providing. The author of the Vice article never says.
Tinier newsrooms have likewise engaged in this bizarre pro-Hamas crankery. This includes the Daily Dot, where an article asks whether it’s part of a Jewish conspiracy for people to put up missing persons posters for the 200 hostages that Hamas captured on Oct. 7. And no, this is not an ungenerous paraphrase. The headline reads, “‘Like a trap’: Are posters of Israeli hostages drawing awareness or baiting pro-Palestinians into getting canceled when they tear them down?”
No serious newsroom would play it this way if the story involved, say, the Westboro Baptist Church. No serious newsroom would tolerate similar behavior if the people tearing down missing persons posters were supporting white supremacist terrorism rather than Hamas terrorism. No one ran straight-faced news coverage pondering the “root causes” and “nuances” of the Charlottesville car attack, asking readers to keep an open mind and consider all points of view to “contextualize” the grievances on both sides.
In fact, Vice is downright irritated that people even notice the substantial overlap between the pro-Hamas crowd’s rhetoric and the “Kill the Jews” rhetoric of honest-to-goodness white supremacists.
Yet, for whatever reason, these same journalists who unflinchingly challenged white supremacism believe that Hamas and its supporters stateside deserve a gentle, understanding approach. “Let’s hear them out — they may have a point!”
They would rather play the fool, asking questions they would never ask in any other story involving an extremist group, than contemplate the possibility that Palestinian terrorists are in the wrong, and Israel justified in its response.
For an industry that thinks so highly of itself, and for one that boasts so often of its own bravery and clear-eyed morality, one would think it would be better prepared to meet this moment.
But one would be horribly, horribly wrong.
Becket Adams is a writer in Washington and program director for the National Journalism Center.
thehill-com.cdn.ampproject.org
15. The Washington Post Really Wants You to Trust Hamas - Algemeiner.com
The Washington Post Really Wants You to Trust Hamas - Algemeiner.com
algemeiner.com · by The Algemeiner · November 9, 2023
The former Washington Post building. Photo: Wikimedia Commons.
Hamas is a US-designated terrorist group responsible for the largest slaughter of Jewish civilians since the Holocaust. But for The Washington Post and many other media outlets, Hamas is something else: a trusted source.
On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas and participants from other Iranian-backed terrorist groups, invaded Israel, murdering more than 1,400 people, and taking hundreds hostage. The terrorists were proud of their barbarism, live streaming themselves torturing and murdering men, women, and children — many in their own homes.
After the massacre, operatives from the terrorist group fled to Gaza, taking an estimated 240 hostages, including children and raped women, with them. Hamas then proceeded to do what it has always done: hide and launch attacks while using Gazans as human shields.
As the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis (CAMERA) has highlighted, this is a key component of Hamas’ strategy.
Put simply, Hamas wants to kill as many Palestinians as possible, hoping to influence popular opinion against the Jewish State. Accordingly, the terror group uses mosques, schools, churches, and hospitals, to shelter operatives and munitions.
The tunnels that Hamas has built underneath Gaza — tunnels that run for miles, are reinforced and have air conditioning, and cost millions to build — are used only to protect Hamas operatives. As Hamas freely acknowledged in a recent interview, they are not to protect the Palestinian people. The terrorist group has threatened to shoot those Gazans seeking to flee and set up roadblocks to stop them.
Former Pentagon official Douglas Feith has pointed out that “while some of Hamas’s most brutal tactics, like systematic rape and beheading captives, are long-practiced atrocities for which the armies of Stalin, Hitler, and Genghis Khan are infamous, it is unprecedented for a party to adopt a war strategy to maximize civilian deaths on its own side.” It is, he notes, “innovative in the worst way.”
But for Hamas’ strategy to work it needs a compliant press — one that is willing to uncritically repeat casualty claims by the “Gaza Health Ministry,” which itself is controlled by the terrorist group. It needs a press that is willing to obfuscate and downplay Hamas’ strategy of human sacrifice.
Hamas didn’t even have to ask. Many mainstream media outlets were eager to regurgitate claims by the Islamist movement. As always, this led to spectacularly poor reporting.
On Oct. 17, several news outlets repeated the “Gaza Health Ministry’s” claims that the IDF struck Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza City, killing 500. In fact, US and other intelligence assessments have concluded that it was likely a Palestinian Islamic Jihad rocket that fell short, striking the hospital parking lot and killing from 10 to 50 people. But the damage was done; the decision to treat Hamas’ claims as credible led to rioting across the Middle East, including attacks on US embassies.
The decision to uncritically repeat Hamas’ claims was obscene and led to real bloodshed and danger. Hamas, it must be said, couldn’t do it without the press.
In an October 20 press conference, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told reporters: “I would not take anything that Hamas says at face value. I’m not sure anyone in this room would take at face value or report something that ISIS had said [and] the same applies to Hamas.”
Similarly, President Biden noted that he had “no confidence” in figures effectively supplied by Hamas.
Nor were they alone. In an Oct. 24 tweet on X, Luke Baker, formerly the Jerusalem Bureau Chief for Reuters, warned that “Hamas has a clear propaganda incentive to inflate civilian casualties as much as possible.” Baker noted that “the numbers that emerge from Gaza every day” are simply “not verifiable.” Indeed, they are “almost entirely uncheckable” and “the only source news organizations have for them is Hamas.”
The terror group has “now been in charge of Gaza for 16 years” and “has squeezed the life out of honesty and probity … any health official stepping out of line and not giving the death tolls that Hamas wants reported to journalists risks serious consequences,” he said.
Numerous outlets corrected their reporting on the Ahli Hospital incident. But many failed to learn. And some, The Washington Post foremost among them, even doubled down.
On Nov. 1, 2023, the Post’s designated “fact checker,” Glenn Kessler, rebuked Biden for his skepticism of Hamas-supplied casualty claims. Adam Taylor insisted in a Post “analysis” that the Hamas-run “Health Ministry” can sometimes be trusted with casualty counts — a curious standard that the Post doesn’t apply to other Islamist terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS. They noted that both the UN and the State Department have cited Hamas-figures in the past.
This is poor journalism and even worse logic. The UN’s history of anti-Israel bias has been a matter of record for decades. Indeed, the organization couldn’t even condemn the October 7 massacre when given the chance.
Members of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) have even been caught on Hamas’ payroll and, in recent days and weeks, colluded with Hamas to prevent Gazans from fleeing. UN Watch has documented numerous UN employees who even celebrated the October 7 massacre.
The State Department also has its own history of anti-Israel bias — indeed, even antisemitism. All of this is documented; it is even the subject of several documentaries and books. And none of it changes the fact that Hamas has a history — a very recent history as the Ahli Hospital incident shows — of lying and it has an incentive to do so.
The Post knows better. As recently as May 2023, the newspaper published a letter from CAMERA entitled “Don’t Trust Hamas.” CAMERA noted that in a 2018 interview, Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar admitted to Al Jazeera that the group believed in “deceiving the public” for propaganda purposes. As CAMERA pointed out — and the Post itself printed — “trusting a Hamas-run ‘ministry’ to provide reliable casualty counts is like trusting a fox to guard a henhouse.”
But the Post wants to be fooled, and is perfectly willing to serve as a conduit for Hamas propaganda. A Nov. 5, 2023 story, “As Gaza death toll soars, secrecy shrouds Israel’s targeting process,” again repeated casualty claims provided by Hamas.
In 1,596-words, reporters failed to note the terrorist group’s systemic use of human shields.” As IDF spokesperson Jonathan Conricus pointed out, the report even “leans on some quasi-experts with checkered past of hostility towards Israel for analysis.” This too is part of a documented pattern at the Post.
Nor is the Post alone. In several reports, USA Today repeated casualty claims by a nonprofit called Save the Children. But as CAMERA pointed out to USA Today editor-in-chief Terence Samuel, Save the Children is relying on Hamas-provided stats. The newspaper declined to correct this.
Others, such as Politico’s Alex Ward, have implied that owing to “Gaza’s density,” Hamas has little choice but to use human shields. This, of course, is nonsense. Islamist terrorists the world over, from barren Africa to urban Iraq, have done so. Indeed, during the 1930s Intifada, Palestinian Arab terrorists used mosques and schools to hide munitions and plot attacks.
This is a long-standing pattern. Hamas, CAMERA noted in 2018, “uses human shields and the Washington Post.” Both are key to its strategy of murdering Jews.
The writer is a Senior Research Analyst for CAMERA, the 65,000-member, Boston-based Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting and Analysis
algemeiner.com · by The Algemeiner · November 9, 2023
16. Iran Update, November 9, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-9-2023
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli forces advanced to a Hamas security headquarters in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
- Israeli forces conducted clearing operations west of Jabaliya city in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
- Hamas and other Palestinian militia fighters are continuing their attacks against the IDF behind the Israeli forward line of advance, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations.
- Palestinian militias launched the fewest number of indirect fire attacks into Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.
- Palestinian militia fighters clashed with Israeli forces six times in the West Bank.
- The Lions’ Den claimed its first attacks in the West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began. The Lions’ Den continues to emphasize its alignment with Hamas.
- Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed militias conducted three cross-border attacks into northern Israel.
- The United States conducted an airstrike on an IRGC weapons storage facility in eastern Syria in response to continued Iranian-sponsored attacks in Iraq and Syria, which injured three US servicemembers.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for an additional five attacks on US forces in Iraq, most of which occurred after the US airstrike in Syria. Abu Alaa al Walai—the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada—announced his group’s support for attacks against US forces in Iraq.
- The Houthi movement claimed that it fired multiple unspecified ballistic missiles targeting “sensitive sites” near Eilat in southern Israel on November 9, marking the sixth attempted Houthi attack on Israel.
- Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Tashkent to discuss the Israel-Hamas war.
IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 9, 2023
Nov 9, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, November 9, 2023
Ashka Jhaveri, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Brian Carter, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl
Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli forces advanced to a Hamas security headquarters in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
- Israeli forces conducted clearing operations west of Jabaliya city in the northwestern Gaza Strip.
- Hamas and other Palestinian militia fighters are continuing their attacks against the IDF behind the Israeli forward line of advance, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations.
- Palestinian militias launched the fewest number of indirect fire attacks into Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began.
- Palestinian militia fighters clashed with Israeli forces six times in the West Bank.
- The Lions’ Den claimed its first attacks in the West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began. The Lions’ Den continues to emphasize its alignment with Hamas.
- Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed militias conducted three cross-border attacks into northern Israel.
- The United States conducted an airstrike on an IRGC weapons storage facility in eastern Syria in response to continued Iranian-sponsored attacks in Iraq and Syria, which injured three US servicemembers.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for an additional five attacks on US forces in Iraq, most of which occurred after the US airstrike in Syria. Abu Alaa al Walai—the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada—announced his group’s support for attacks against US forces in Iraq.
- The Houthi movement claimed that it fired multiple unspecified ballistic missiles targeting “sensitive sites” near Eilat in southern Israel on November 9, marking the sixth attempted Houthi attack on Israel.
- Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Tashkent to discuss the Israel-Hamas war.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip
Israeli forces advanced to a Hamas security headquarters in the northwestern Gaza Strip. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) said that infantry, armor, engineering, and special forces units raided the security headquarters, which included intelligence and air defense headquarters.[1] The IDF killed 50 Palestinian fighters while clearing the infrastructure, which included an underground tunnel system. The IDF published a map of the area, detailing several tunnel shafts in close proximity to each other. These clusters of tunnels could enable the hit-and-run attacks on Israeli forces that CTP-ISW has observed.[2] An independent analyst on X (Twitter) geolocated footage that Hamas published on November 8 showing militia fighters firing rocket propelled grenades (RPG) at Israeli forces in the security headquarters.[3]
Israeli forces conducted clearing operations west of Jabaliya city in the northwestern Gaza Strip. The IDF located a Hamas weapons production and storage facility inside a residential building in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood. Israeli forces found drone parts, explosives, and operational plans in addition to a tunnel shaft with a cooling system.[4] IDF spokesperson Daniel Hagari said on November 8 that the militia fighters have connected the tunnels to water and oxygen systems in preparation for a prolonged stay in them.[5] The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed to destroy an IDF tank with an RPG north of Sheikh Radwan neighborhood on November 9.[6] An IDF combat team engaged in 10 hours of fighting in western Jabaliya on November 8, during which it seized weapons and exposed tunnel shafts.[7] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—launched mortars at Israeli forces operating in the area.[8]
Hamas and other Palestinian militia fighters are continuing their attacks against the IDF behind the Israeli forward line of advance, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations. Local media reported violent clashes east of Beit Hanoun on November 9 after the IDF reported that its forces conducted ground operations there the previous day.[9] The al Qassem Brigades claimed to ambush Israeli infantry forces near Juhr al Dik, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Palestinian militias are attempting to harass and disrupt Israeli ground lines of communication.[10] Palestinian militia fighters separately launched mortars at an Israeli command center in the northwestern Gaza Strip on November 8.[11] Fighting behind the Israeli forward line of advance is consistent with the doctrinal definition of "clear,” which is a tactical task that "requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.”
The National Resistance Brigades—the militant wing of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—claimed an RPG attack on an IDF personnel carrier northwest of Gaza city.[12] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades—the self-declared militant wing of Fatah—similarly claimed to fire mortars at Israeli forces in the northwestern Gaza Strip.[13]
Palestinian militias launched the fewest number of indirect fire attacks into Israel since the Israel-Hamas war began. The al Qassem Brigades claimed responsibility for two indirect fire attacks all in southern Israel. The al Quds Brigades claimed responsibility for one indirect fire attack. Hamas and PIJ have taken measures to prepare for a prolonged war, including reducing indirect fire attacks to conserve stockpiles.[14]
Hamas leaders met with officials from the Egyptian Intelligence Agency in Cairo to discuss a hostage exchange for humanitarian aid. Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Ismail Haniyeh, former Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Khaled Meshaal, and senior Hamas official Khalil al Haya met Egyptian Intelligence Agency chief General Abbas Kamal, according to reports on November 9.[15] Egyptian officials said that the group discussed a deal in which Hamas releases hostages in exchange for humanitarian aid.[16] Unnamed sources from Egypt, the United Nations, and a Western diplomat said that a three-day truce is being negotiated to allow humanitarian aid and fuel to enter the Gaza Strip in exchange for hostages.[17]
An unnamed source separately told Reuters that CIA Director William J. Burns and Mossad chief David Barnea met with Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al Thani in Doha to discuss hostage negotiations and releases.[18] The source stated that this meeting intended to bring all three sides of the deal together for a quicker process.[19]
US National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said that Israel will begin to implement a daily four-hour humanitarian pause in areas of the northern Gaza Strip.[20] Kirby said during a press briefing that there will be no military operations in these areas during the pause and that the process is starting on November 9.[21] A pause is temporary, localized, and for a specific purpose to help with hostage releases and for humanitarian assistance, according to Kirby.[22] The IDF said there have been three humanitarian pauses in the northern Gaza Strip at the request of the United States.[23] The United States and Israel have been clear that a ceasefire—a mutual agreement between warring parties to stop hostilities—is not in order.[24]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Palestinian militia fighters clashed with Israeli forces six times in the West Bank on November 9. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in four small arms clashes and conducted two IED attacks across the West Bank.[25] These attacks included an hours-long small arms engagement and IED attacks targeting Israeli forces in the Jenin refugee camp in the northern West Bank.[26] The al Qassem Brigades also clashed with Israeli forces in the Jenin camp.[27] The Jenin Battalion of the al Quds Brigade clashed with Israeli forces and conducted IED attacks targeting Israeli forces in unspecified areas in Jenin.[28] A Palestinian journalist reported that some forces from the Palestinian Authority (PA) joined the clashes against Israeli forces in Jenin but that the PA did not order these fighters to engage Israeli forces.[29] The IDF claimed to have killed 12 fighters during the raids in the Jenin camp and arrested two al Quds Brigade fighters on November 9.[30] The IDF also conducted a drone strike on fighters in Jenin who had "endangered” Israeli forces.[31] Hamas and the Lions’ Den—a West Bank-based Palestinian militia—released statements on November 9 calling for further mobilization against Israeli forces across the West Bank, especially in the Jenin camp.[32]
The Lions’ Den claimed its first attacks in the West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began in a statement on November 9. The Lions’ Den claimed that it had participated in 14 shootings in multiple areas near Nablus but did not specify the dates of the attacks.[33] Unspecified fighters have conducted shooting attacks targeting Israeli forces and civilians in October and November 2023 in the same locations that the Lions’ Den claimed it has attacked.
The Lions’ Den continues to emphasize its alignment with Hamas. The Lions’ Den said that the West Bank will be "a sword and a shield for Mohammed Deif and Saleh al Arouri” on November 9.[34] Mohammed Deif is the commander of Hamas’ al Qassem Brigades and Saleh al Arouri is Hamas Political Bureau deputy chairman. The Lions’ Den previously described itself as “a sword in the hand of Commander Mohammad Deif” on October 26.[35] These statements mark a departure from previous Lions‘ Den claims that described the group as being not affiliated with any specific Palestinian faction.[36]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed militias conducted three cross-border attacks into northern Israel on November 9. LH claimed a rocket attack targeting an Israeli mechanized infantry unit near the northern Israeli town of Shomera.[37] LH also conducted an anti-tank guided missile attack targeting an Israeli Merkava tank operating in Metula.[38] Unspecified fighters separately fired one anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli forces near Mitzpe Adi.[39]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
The United States conducted an airstrike on an IRGC weapons storage facility in eastern Syria in response to continued Iranian-sponsored attacks in Iraq and Syria, which injured three US servicemembers on November 8.[40] Unspecified Iranian-backed militias fired rockets targeting US forces in eastern Syria on November 8.[41] US officials reported that the attacks inflicted minor injuries on three US servicemembers, who quickly returned to duty after the attacks.[42] Iranian-backed militias again fired short-range rockets targeting US forces at al Omar oil field following the US airstrike.[43]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for an additional five attacks on US forces in Iraq, most of which occurred after the US airstrike in Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq and its affiliated groups have claimed 50 attacks targeting US forces in the Middle East since October 18.
-
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed two separate one-way attack drone attacks targeting US forces at al Harir Air Base in northern Iraq on November 8 and 9.[44] One attack occurred on November 8 before the US airstrike in Syria. The other occurred on November 9 after the US airstrike. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq released a video showing the launch of two unspecified drones.[45] Iraqi Kurdistan counterterrorism forces reported that the attack on November 9 destroyed one of the fuel depots at al Harir airbase.[46]
-
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed three separate missile and one-way drone attacks targeting US forces at Ain al Assad airbase in western Iraq on November 9.[47] The group released a video showing it launching two drones and three missiles. The missiles bared visual similarities to the group’s al Aqsa-1 missile.[48] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed on November 6 it launched its al Aqsa-1 missile at an unspecified US base in the Middle East for the first time.[49] The al Aqsa-1 missile bears visual similarities to the Iranian-built Fateh-313, which the Iranians used to target US positions in Iraq in January 2020 in retaliation for the US airstrike that killed IRGC Quds Force Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani.[50]
-
Unspecified fighters conducted an IED attack targeting a joint US-Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service patrol near the Mosul dam in northern Iraq on November 9.[51] A US official reported that the attack caused no casualties.[52]
Abu Alaa al Walai—the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada—announced his group’s support for attacks against US forces in Iraq. Walai stated that attacks on US forces would continue until there is a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.[53] Kataib Seyyed ol Shohada was formerly part of another Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah and has fought in Syria on behalf of Iran in Syria in recent years.[54]
The Houthi movement claimed that it fired multiple unspecified ballistic missiles targeting “sensitive sites” near Eilat in southern Israel on November 9, marking the sixth attempted Houthi attack on Israel.[55] The Houthi military spokesperson stated that these attacks would continue until Israel halts its military operations in the Gaza Strip.[56] The IDF used its Arrow anti-ballistic missile defense system to shoot down a missile south of Eilat.[57]
Unidentified fighters separately conducted a one-way drone attack into Eilat on November 9.[58] The attack caused no casualties, and no actor has claimed responsibility for the attack at this time.[59]
US officials confirmed that the Houthis shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone on November 8 in international airspace near Yemen.[60] The Houthi military spokesperson released a video on November 8 showing the shoot down of the drone.[61]
A Syrian journalist said that Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s Syria-based Golan Liberation Brigade announced that it is in a “state of full mobilization” on November 8.[62] Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba is active in Syria and formed the Golan Liberation Brigade in 2017 with the expressed mission of liberating the Golan Heights from Israel.[63] The Golan Liberation Brigade operates in Syria along the Israeli border.[64] CTP-ISW has not yet observed this brigade conducting attacks against US forces or into Israel, though Iraqi militias like Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba frequently have overlapping membership between the formal militia subordinated to the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PF) and covert action cells that conduct attacks against US forces.[65]
The reported announcement from Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba’s Golan Liberation Brigade is consistent with an effort by Iran’s Iraqi proxy network to mobilize its forces in preparation to fight the United States and Israel. The PMF Chief of Staff and Iranian proxy Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi previously said that the PMF is in a “state of emergency” on November 2 in response to ”American threats” to respond to attacks against US forces.[66] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed al Sudani that the United States would "protect its people" in response to Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks in a meeting on November 5.[67] Abu Fadak is also the secretary general of Iranian-backed Iraqi militia and US-designated foreign terrorist organization Kataib Hezbollah.[68] Abu Fadak replaced key Iranian proxy Abu Mahdi al Muhandis as head of Kataib Hezbollah in 2020.[69] KH has repeatedly threatened to attack US military positions in recent weeks and is part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.
Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi met with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Tashkent on November 9 to discuss the Israel-Hamas war.[70] Raisi emphasized Iranian-Turkish coordination ahead of the upcoming Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting on November 12 to ensure “effective action” to halt Israeli attacks into the Gaza Strip and to provide humanitarian aid. Other Iranian officials have been coordinating with other Arab and Muslim countries in anticipation of the OIC meeting, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[71] This is consistent with the Iranian effort to disrupt Israeli normalization with Arab states by concentrating attention on the Palestinian cause.[72] Iran has repeatedly used the OIC as a platform for uniting Arab and Muslim countries against Israel and impeding the Arab-Israeli normalization process, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[73]
17. China has a sweeping vision to reshape the world — and countries are listening
China has a sweeping vision to reshape the world — and countries are listening
By Simone McCarthy, CNN
15 minute read
Updated 10:14 PM EST, Thu November 9, 2023
cnn.com · by Simone McCarthy · November 9, 2023
Chinese leader Xi Jinping addresses visiting dignitaries during the Third Belt and Road Forum in Beijing last month.
Editor’s Note: Sign up for CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter which explores what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world.
Hong Kong CNN —
Xi Jinping has a plan for how the world should work, and one year into his norm-shattering third term as Chinese leader, he’s escalating his push to challenge America’s global leadership — and put his vision front and center.
That bid was in the spotlight like never before last month in Beijing, when Xi, flanked by Russian President Vladimir Putin, United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres, and some two dozen top dignitaries from around the world, hailed China as the only country capable of navigating the challenges of the 21st century.
“Changes of the world, of our times, and of historical significance are unfolding like never before,” Xi told his audience at the Belt and Road Forum. China, he said, would “make relentless efforts to achieve modernization for all countries” and work to build a “shared future for mankind.”
Xi’s vision — though cloaked in abstract language — encapsulates the Chinese Communist Party’s emerging push to reshape an international system it sees as unfairly stacked in favor of the United States and its allies.
Viewed as a rival by those countries as its grows increasingly assertive and authoritarian, Beijing has come to believe that now is the time to shift that system and the global balance of power to ensure China’s rise — and reject efforts to counter it.
In recent months, Beijing has promoted its alternative model across hefty policy documents and new “global initiatives,” as well as speeches, diplomatic meetings, forums and international gatherings large and small — as it aims to win support across the world.
For many observers, this campaign has raised concern that a world modeled on Beijing’s rules is also one where features of its iron-fisted, autocratic rule — like heavy surveillance, censorship and political repression — could become globally accepted practices.
But China’s push comes as American wars overseas, unstable foreign policy election-to-election, and deep political polarization have intensified questions about US global leadership. Meanwhile pressing issues like climate change, Russia’s war in Ukraine and Israel’s assault on Gaza have sharpened discussion over whether the West is taking the right approach to respond.
All this coincides with longstanding calls from countries across the developing world for an international system where they have more say.
Many of those countries have substantially enhanced their economic ties with Beijing during Xi’s rule, including under a decade of his up to $1 trillion global infrastructure building drive, which leaders gathered to celebrate last month in the Chinese capital.
It remains to be seen how many would welcome a future that hews to China’s worldview — but Xi’s clear push to amplify his message amid a period of unrelenting tensions with the Washington elevates the stakes of the US-China rivalry.
And as the procession of world leaders who have visited Beijing in recent months, including for Xi’s gathering last month, make clear: while many nations may be skeptical of a world order pitched by autocratic China — others are listening.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other leaders pose for a group photo during the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing last month.
‘Shared future’
A more than 13,000-word policy document released by Beijing in September outlines China’s vision for global governance and identifies what it sees as the source of current global challenges: “Some countries’ hegemonic, abusive, and aggressive actions against others … are causing great harm” and putting global security and development at risk, it reads.
Under Xi’s “global community of shared future,” the document says, economic development and stability are prioritized as countries treat each other as equals to work together for “common prosperity.”
In that future, they’d also be free of “bloc politics,” ideological competition and military alliances, and of being held responsible for upholding “‘universal values’ “defined by a handful of Western countries,” the document says.
“What the Chinese are saying … is ‘live and let live,’ you may not like Russian domestic politics, you might not like the Chinese political regime — but if you want security, you will have to give them the space to survive and thrive as well,” said Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center think tank in Washington.
World leaders are lining up to meet Xi Jinping. Should the US be worried?
This vision is woven through three new “global initiatives” announced by Xi over the past two years focusing on development, security and civilization.
The initiatives echo some of Beijing’s long-standing talking points and are largely short on detail and heavy on rhetoric.
But together, analysts say, they present a case that a US-led system is no longer suited for the current era — and signal a concerted push to reshape the post-World War II order championed by it and other Western democracies.
That current international framework was designed to ensure, in theory at least, that even as governments have sovereignty over their countries, they also share rules and principles to ensure peace and uphold basic political and human rights for their populations.
China has benefited from that order, supercharging its economy off World Bank loans and expanded opportunities under the World Trade Organization, which Washington backed Beijing to join in 2001 in the hope it would help liberalize the Communist country.
Just over two decades later, Beijing is chafing under it.
The US and its allies have watched warily as Beijing has not only grown economically competitive, but increasingly assertive in the South China Sea and beyond and more repressive and authoritarian at home.
This has driven Washington’s efforts to restrict Chinese access to sensitive technology and impose economic sanctions, which Beijing sees as bald-faced actions to suppress and contain it.
The US and other nations have decried Beijing’s intimidation of the self-ruling democracy of Taiwan and tried to hold it to account for alleged human rights violations in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, the latter of which a UN human rights office last year said could amount to “crimes against humanity” — a charge Beijing denies.
Riot police stand guard during a June 2019 protest in Hong Kong against a proposed extradition law that would have allowed extradition of fugitives to mainland China.
In response, Xi has ramped up longstanding efforts to undercut the concept of universal human rights.
“Different civilizations” had their own perceptions of shared human “values,” Xi told leaders of political parties and organizations from some 150 countries earlier this year as he launched China’s “Global Civilization Initiative.” Countries wouldn’t “impose their own values or models on others” if China were setting the agenda, he implied.
This builds on Beijing’s argument that governments’ efforts to improve their people’s economic status equates to upholding their human rights, even if those people have no freedom to speak out against their rulers.
It also links to what observers say is growing confidence among Chinese leaders in their governance model, which they see as having played a genuinely positive role to foster economic growth globally and reduce poverty — in contrast to a US that has waged wars, sparked a major global financial crisis and faces fraught politics at home.
“All this makes China think America is quickly declining,” said Shanghai-based foreign policy analyst Shen Dingli, who says this feeds Xi’s drive not to overturn the existing world order, but revamp it.
Beijing, he added, sees the US as merely “paying lip service” to the “liberal order” to hurt other countries.
“(China asks) ‘who is more prone to peace and who is less capable of leading the world?’ This has beefed up China’s self-image, (and this idea that) ‘We are great and we should be greater — and we should let the world realize it’s our time,’” he said.
Who’s listening?
For strongmen leaders and autocratic governments, Xi’s vision has obvious appeal.
While Russia’s Putin, accused of war crimes and continuing his brutal invasion of neighboring Ukraine, and Afghanistan’s Taliban leaders are shunned in the West, both were welcomed to Xi’s table of nations in Beijing last month.
Just weeks earlier, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad — who has been accused of using chemical weapons against his own people — was feted at the Asian Games in Hangzhou, where he arrived on a Chinese-chartered jet and visited a famous Buddhist temple.
A headline in the state-run Global Times portrayed Assad’s visit as one from the leader of a “war-torn country respected in China amid Western isolation” — providing a glimpse into the through-the-looking glass scenarios that could become the norm if Xi’s world view gains traction.
But Beijing’s broader argument, which implies that a handful of wealthy, Western countries hold too much global power — resonates with a wider set of governments than just those at loggerheads with the West.
Those concerns have come into sharper focus in recent weeks as global attention has focused on Israel’s relentless assault on Gaza following the October 7 attack on its territory by Hamas. The US has been in the minority opposed to broad global backing for an immediate humanitarian truce — and its support of Israel is seen in much of the world as enabling the country to continue its retaliation, despite mounting civilian casualties.
Russian President Vladimir Putin is welcomed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping during a ceremony at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing last month.
In recent years, even some countries that have for decades embraced a close partnership with the US have drawn closer to China and its vision.
“Pakistan aligns with Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s view that a new global era is emerging, characterized by multipolarity and a departure from Western dominance,” said Ali Sarwar Naqvi, a former Pakistani ambassador, now executive director of the Center for International Strategic Studies in Islamabad.
But there are also many governments that also remain wary of its politics and ambitions, or of appearing to side with Beijing over the West.
“We’ve kept our relationship with all nations open,” Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape told CNN on the sidelines of the Belt and Road Forum last month, where he delivered a speech calling for more green energy investment in his country under the China-led initiative.
“We relate to the West, we relate to the East … We maintain a straight line, we don’t compromise our friendship with all people,” he said.
And while others may be ready to back China in calling for a more representative international system — there are questions about what that means under Beijing’s leadership.
“China can count on Brazil day and night to say that multilateralism is important, and we have to revisit global governance … however, there’s a very important ‘but,’” according to Rubens Duarte, coordinator of LABMUNDO, a Brazil-based research center for international relations.
He points to questions circulating within some countries, like Brazil, about why China is now championing concepts promoted in the Global South for 70 years — and claiming them as its own.
“Is China really trying to promote multipolarity — or does China just want to (become a) substitute (for) US influence over the world?” he asked.
A passenger gets off a Chinese-funded high-speed train after its commercial operations launched last month in Indonesia.
Expanding ambitions
For decades, China has built its international influence around its economic clout, using its own rapid transformation from a deeply impoverished country to the world’s second largest economy as a model it could share with the developing world.
It was in this vein that Xi launched his flagship Belt and Road financing drive in 2013, drawing dozens of borrowing nations closer to Beijing and expanding China’s international footprint a year after he became leader with the pledge to “rejuvenate” the Chinese nation to a place of global power and respect.
“China’s traditional (foreign policy) thinking was very heavily focused on economic capability as the foundation for everything else. When you become an economic power, you also naturally acquire greater political influence and soft power, et cetera — everything else will fall in line,” said Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace think tank in Washington.
But as China’s economic rise has come alongside geopolitical friction with the US and its allies, Beijing has seen the need to expand its vision “and tackle geopolitical issues as well,” Zhao added.
The war in Ukraine has only heightened this dynamic. China’s key economic partners in Europe tightened ties with the US and reassessed their relationships with Beijing after it refused to condemn the Kremlin’s invasion, while at the same time Washington shored up relations with allies in Asia.
This “served as a wake-up call to the Chinese that the great power competition with the United States, ultimately, is about (winning over) the rest of the world,” said Sun from the Stimson Center in Washington.
A Chinese vessels operate near Scarborough Shoal in a disputed area of the South China Sea.
Then, faced with mounting pressure from the West to condemn Moscow’s invasion of a sovereign country, Beijing instead used the moment to argue its own view for global security.
Two months after Russian troops poured into Ukraine, Xi announced China’s “Global Security Initiative,” declaring at an international conference that “bloc confrontation” and “Cold War mentality” would “wreck the global peace framework.”
It was an apparent reference not to the Russian aggressor, but to NATO, which both Moscow and Beijing have blamed for provoking the war in Ukraine.
Xi’s words were far from new for Beijing, but Chinese diplomats in the following months ramped up their promotion of that rhetoric, for example calling on their counterparts in Europe’s capitals, as well as the US and Russia, to build a “sustainable European security architecture,” to address the “security deficit behind the (Ukraine) crisis.”
The rhetoric appeared to catch on, with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva days after returning from a state visit to China this spring calling on Washington to “to stop encouraging war.”
China and Russia criticize Israel as divisions with the West sharpen
This gets to the heart of Beijing’s aims, which experts say are not to build its own alliances or use its military might to guarantee peace in volatile situations, as the US has done.
Rather, it looks to cast doubt on that system, while projecting its own, albeit vague, vision for countries ensuring peace through dialogue and “common interests” — a phrasing that again pushes back against the idea that countries should oppose one another based on political differences.
‘“If a country … is obsessed with suppressing others with different opinions it will surely cause conflicts and wars in the world,” senior military official Gen. Zhang Youxia told delegations from more than 90 countries attending a Beijing-led security forum in the capital last month.
Beijing has said its model is already successful, pointing to its role brokering a restoration of ties between longtime rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran in March. It also dispatched an envoy to the Middle East following the outbreak of the latest conflict, pledging to “make active efforts” to de-escalate the situation — though Beijing’s readouts of his trip made no mention of any stop in Israel or Palestine.
But Xi’s rhetoric falls flat for many countries that see China and its rapidly modernizing military as the leading aggressor in Asia and which question its support for Russia despite Moscow’s flagrant violation of international law as it invaded Ukraine.
Speaking to CNN in September, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. accused China of bullying smaller countries as it expanded control of disputed areas of the South China Sea in violation of a ruling from an international tribunal.
“If we don’t (push back), China is going to creep and creep into what is within our sovereign jurisdiction, our sovereign rights and within our territory,” he said.
Alternative architecture
Beijing’s effort to broadcast its vision to reshape the world order is enabled by an extensive network of international organizations, regional dialogues and forums that it has cultivated in recent decades.
Bolstering those groups — and positioning them as alternative international organizations to those of the West — has also emerged as a key part of Xi’s strategy to reshape global power, experts say.
This summer both the China and Russia-founded Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) security grouping and the BRICS group of emerging economies increased their numbers – and acted as a platform for Xi to promote his brand of geopolitics.
Countries should “reform global governance” and stop others from “ganging up to form exclusive groups and packaging their own rules as international norms,” Xi told leaders from Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa after they invited Argentina, Egypt, Iran, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join BRICS — the group’s first expansion since 2010.
Weeks later, he appeared to underline his preference for his own alternative architecture — skipping out on the Group of 20 summit hosted by New Delhi, where US President Joe Biden and other Group of Seven leaders were in attendance.
But besides the splashy, high-profile events on China’s diplomatic calendar, officials are also broadcasting China’s vision and pitching its new initiatives throughout ministerial or lower-level regional dialogues with counterparts from Southeast Asia to Latin America and the Caribbean — as well as topical forums on security, culture and development with international scholars and think tanks, official documents show.
So far, China has appeared to have little trouble getting dozens of countries to at least cursorily back aspects of its vision — even if it’s typically not clear who all these supporters are or whether their backing comes with any tangible commitment.
BRICS leaders gather in Brazil in 2019.
China’s Foreign Ministry earlier this year claimed more than 80 countries and organizations had “expressed approval and support” for the Global Security Initiative.
According to Beijing, the economic-focused “Global Development Initiative,” launched in 2021 to support United Nations sustainability goals, boasts some 70 countries in its “Group of Friends” — hosted under the auspices of the UN.
This chimes with China’s long-held strategy to win broad backing for its position against that of Western countries in the UN and other international organizations, where Beijing has also been pushing for a bigger role.
But in addition to how much tangible support Beijing can garner, a key hanging question also remains over whether Xi’s ambitions are limited to efforts to dominate the global narrative and shift the rules in China’s favor or if he wants to truly assume a role as the world’s dominant power.
There is a broad gap between China’s power and military capacity relative to that of the US — and the potential for an ailing economy to slow its rise.
For now, experts say, China appears focused on shifting the rules to undercut American credibility to intervene or hold countries to account for domestic issues — be they civil conflicts or human rights violations.
Success doing that could have implications for how the world responds to any potential future move it could take to gain control of Taiwan — the self-ruled, democratic island the Communist Party claims.
But China’s actions in Asia, where its military has become increasingly assertive, while decrying US military presence, suggest to many observers that Beijing does hope to dominate the region.
They also raise questions about how a more militarily and economically powerful China would behave globally, if left unchecked.
China, however, has denied ambitions of dominance.
“There is no iron law that dictates that a rising power will inevitably seek hegemony,” Beijing said in its policy document in September. “Everything we do is for the purpose of providing a better life for our people, all the while creating more development opportunities for the entire world.”
Then, in an apparent reference to its own belief, or hope, for the trajectory of the US, it added: “China understands the lesson of history — that hegemony preludes decline.”
cnn.com · by Simone McCarthy · November 9, 2023
18. Kennan: The Fallible Prophet We Need
I missed thi when it came out last year. There are no reviews on Amazon. based on this essay I ordered the book.
As an aside I would like a synthesis of George Kennan and William Donovan.
Kennan: The Fallible Prophet We Need
https://kirkcenter.org/reviews/kennan-the-fallible-prophet-we-need/?utm
Nov 5, 2023
George Kennan for Our Time
By Lee Congdon.
Northern Illinois University Press, 2022.
Paperback, 232 pages, $19.95.
Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa.
T
he United States in the early 21st century, Lee Congdon writes, suffers from a wayward internationalist foreign policy and domestic cultural and moral decadence. This can be overcome, according to Congdon, by retreating to 18th century political philosophies once championed by the late American diplomat and historian George F. Kennan. In his new book George Kennan for Our Time, Congdon views Kennan as a “guide” whose wisdom and prudence can bring America back from the edge of international and domestic abyss.
This is Congdon’s second book about Kennan: in 2008 he wrote George Kennan: A Writing Life, which assessed Kennan’s literary skills and achievements in the context of his long life (he lived to age 101) and career as a Foreign Service Officer, diplomat, policy analyst, and historian. Congdon admiringly described Kennan’s writing style as “formal, graceful, unhurried, Gibbonesque,” and concluded that Kennan, when measured by his character, writing, wisdom, and diplomatic career “was the greatest American” of the 20th century. That is a bold claim and certainly unwarranted. Congdon is on much firmer ground in his new book where he uses Kennan’s political philosophies as a road map out of our current predicament.
Kennan’s life and political thought are literally an “open book,” which includes two-volumes of his memoirs, his remarkably introspective diaries, historical works, lectures, interviews, testimonies, policy planning documents, journalism, works of political philosophy, and some excellent biographies (the best being John Lewis Gaddis’ George Kennan: A Life). Congdon is familiar with all of them. Congdon’s greatest achievement in both of his books on Kennan is concision—they both come in at about 200 pages. No words are wasted.
C
ongdon divides George Kennan for Our Time into three main parts: a brief biography that includes a discussion of the writers and thinkers that most influenced Kennan (Anton Chekhov, Edward Gibbon, Edmund Burke, Alexis de Tocqueville, Raymond Sontag, and Reinhold Niebuhr), Kennan’s views on foreign policy, and Kennan’s diagnoses of, and proposed solutions for, our domestic problems. And although Kennan died in 2005, Congdon shows how Kennan’s approaches to both foreign and domestic issues resonate today.
For Kennan, history was the greatest teacher—it taught tragedy, irony, contingency, prudence, skepticism, humility, uncertainty, and the fallen nature of man. History and experience counseled “realism” and restraint in foreign policy, instead of crusading interventionism. The most that a wise foreign policy can achieve in the real world is a relatively stable balance of power. The United States, Kennan believed, should not concern itself with the internal structure of foreign governments unless that structure affected a country’s foreign policy in ways inimical to vital American interests. Even then, in most instances, a strong defensive policy would suffice to protect America’s vital interests. That is why Kennan, the intellectual architect of containment of the Soviet Union, emphasized containment’s political aspects over and above its military components. Kennan never counseled a crusade against communism—he thought all such crusades in foreign policy were dangerous—but instead thought the U.S. and its allies could contain its spread into important regions of the world while allowing communism’s internal contradictions to eventually cause its “mellowing” or collapse.
Congdon credits Kennan’s passive approach to containment for America’s victory in the Cold War, but in this instance the greater credit belongs to James Burnham who advocated the policy of “liberation” that President Ronald Reagan implemented in the 1980s. Kennan may have understood Russia better than Burnham did, but Burnham understood communism better than Kennan did.
W
hen the Cold War ended, Kennan did not celebrate and warned that U.S. policy should be geared to helping Russia develop a stable post-Cold War government. He applauded President George H. W. Bush’s managing of the end of the Cold War, especially Secretary of State Baker’s pledge not to expand NATO after German reunification. When President Bill Clinton went ahead with NATO expansion anyway, Kennan sounded the alarm in the pages of the New York Times. NATO expansion, he wrote, “would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.” He predicted that it would result in reviving the worst aspects of Russian nationalism and imperialism. Kennan’s warnings were ignored by Clinton and all of his successors as NATO relentlessly expanded toward Russia’s western borders. Russian imperialism, as Kennan predicted, once again reared its ugly head and Ukrainians paid the price.
Kennan also spoke out against the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as wasteful crusades to spread democracy across the Middle East. The follies of the George W. Bush administration and his successors in starting and continuing those wars proved Kennan right again. The foreign policies promoted by neoconservatives and liberal internationalists were the antithesis of Kennan’s prudent realism. And though Kennan did not live to see the deterioration in America’s relations with China, Congdon believes that Kennan would again counsel restraint and a recognition that as a great military and economic power China had vital interests of its own—including Taiwan—that we should recognize and accept.
K
ennan’s views on domestic policy are less well known. He was against mass immigration. He scorned the student radicals of the 1960s who later infiltrated important American institutions and continue to do so to America’s detriment. He lamented widespread drug use, the ubiquity of pornography, and the unrestrained “sexual revolution.” “Kennan lived long enough,” Congdon writes, “to witness the decadence of the young—and not of theirs alone.” He did not live long enough to witness our current cultural situation where the word “decadence” has no meaning. Congdon notes that Kennan envisioned the end of Western civilization as occurring by the year 2050 (he may be right about that, too). He was a believing Christian in an increasingly secular age. “He attributed [America’s] social pathologies,” Congdon notes, “to a loss of, or indifference to, the Christian faith.” He lost faith in democracy, instead favoring rule by an elite composed of well-educated, refined scholars like him.
Kennan sensed that his was a voice crying in the wilderness, yet he never stopped alerting “his countrymen to the fateful road on which they were traveling.” We have traveled even farther along that road since Kennan’s death 18 years ago. Congdon hopes that reacquainting Americans with Kennan’s views could help reverse the tragic course we are following. There may not be much time left.
Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century. He is an attorney and an adjunct professor of political science at Wilkes University. His work has also appeared in The American Spectator, the Claremont Review of Books, and Human Events.
19. What’s really at the root of anti-Jewish hate on college campuses
Spoiler alert: not college administrators (that is fighting at shadows), not K-12 administrators (that is still getting t shadows), it is the marriage of teacher's unions and the democratic party which are the true purveyors of Critical Race Theory, the Democratic Party's core ideology. Just wow.
Excerpts:
The Democratic Party is the ultimate purveyor of CRT; it is its core ideology, with teachers unions playing eager partners.
Whenever Democrats spout all-too-familiar racial dog-whistles like “underrepresented,” “marginalized,” “inequity,” “privilege,” “systemic” and the latest, a real juggernaut, “reparations,” we recognize the toxic marks of CRT.
And in CRT’s racial cauldron, Jews and Israel stand unequivocally in the wrong; the battle-cry “From Ferguson to Jerusalem” is no accident.
But that’s delusory, because with CRT as a core ideology, Democratic support for a pro-West, entrepreneurial, successful Israel that unapologetically rejects the oppressor-oppressed binary is necessarily conflicted.
What’s really at the root of anti-Jewish hate on college campuses
New York Post · by Wai Wah Chin · November 10, 2023
Pro-Hamas protests erupting on campuses across the country have shocked and dismayed Americans.
These protests are bone-headed and wrong for many reasons, but suffice to say it’s a monstrous failure in moral judgment to draw equivalence between deliberately targeting innocents for slaughter and the inevitable, often forewarned collateral killing of innocents, especially when they’ve been planted as human shields for terrorist installations in schools, mosques and hospitals.
And the rationalization that Israel should be wiped off the map because it is an apartheid state founded on settler colonialism — that’s as fabricated a race hoax as the 1619 Project.
Many Americans, having magnanimously acceded to the diversity-equity-inclusion narrative for “oppressed minorities,” feel betrayed.
How can kids who linked arms with their Jewish comrades Oct. 6 to demand every “inclusive” accommodation for every last LGBTQIA+ person so <chosen pronoun> would “feel safe” leave their Jewish friends cowering in fear Oct. 8 while they, flaunting paraglider posters, lustily celebrate terrorists who slaughtered kids and shout “Kill all Jews”?
For this betrayal, many Americans blame college administrators.
Indeed, college administrations can’t disown the students they enrolled after bragging that their “holistic admissions” evaluates not just scholastic promise — that would “not be inclusive” — but the “whole student,” for which they summoned the dark art of “personal scoring” to predict “integrity” and “courage.” Right.
Nor are administrators credible when they suddenly proclaim newfound love for “academic freedom” to coddle pro-Hamas campus militancy when their campuses are effectively no-free-speech-zones.
First prize for academic-freedom hypocrisy goes to Harvard President Claudine Gay, who notoriously led the witch-hunt against heterodox Professor Roland Fryer, though University of Pennsylvania President Liz Magill doesn’t lag far with her ongoing persecution of heterodox Professor Amy Wax.
Yet blaming college administrators is fighting shadows of the real culprit because kids didn’t lose their brains and morality when they stepped on campus.
That happened in K-12.
Indoctrinate kids in K-12 that America is irredeemably odious because it is an apartheid state founded on settler colonialism, and kids are primed to rally that Israel must be wiped off the map because it, too, is an apartheid state founded on settler colonialism.
This fabrication, straight from the oppressor-oppressed revolutionary ideology of critical-race theory, is equally weaponizable against any meritocratically earned success story: America, Israel, Jews, Asians.
But blaming the K-12 educracy is still fighting shadows — who made K-12 toxic?
While education schools come to mind, the 800-pound gorilla of CRT is the teachers unions.
But that’s still fighting shadows.
The teachers unions owe their outsized power to their heady marriage with the Democratic Party: The unions deliver manpower, donations and future Democratic activists while Democrats reciprocate with friendly legislation, policies and taxpayer dollars.
The Democratic Party is the ultimate purveyor of CRT; it is its core ideology, with teachers unions playing eager partners.
Whenever Democrats spout all-too-familiar racial dog-whistles like “underrepresented,” “marginalized,” “inequity,” “privilege,” “systemic” and the latest, a real juggernaut, “reparations,” we recognize the toxic marks of CRT.
And in CRT’s racial cauldron, Jews and Israel stand unequivocally in the wrong; the battle-cry “From Ferguson to Jerusalem” is no accident.
But that’s delusory, because with CRT as a core ideology, Democratic support for a pro-West, entrepreneurial, successful Israel that unapologetically rejects the oppressor-oppressed binary is necessarily conflicted.
It’s no accident Jimmy Carter already in 2006 called Israel an apartheid state, Obama sent billions to Hamas’ and Hezbollah’s paymaster Iran, Biden would have sent $6 billion to Iran but for Republican outcry, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first reaction to Hamas’ attack was to call for cease-fire, mainstream Democrats Dick Durbin and Chris Murphy call Israel’s campaign “unacceptable” and Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris noisily announced an “anti-Islamophobia” initiative last week.
As if further confirmation is needed, Gallup polling shows that Democratic sympathy for Israel, perennially weaker than Republican, finally swung deeply negative this year.
Mainstream Democrats’ support for Israel lives on borrowed time.
It is the DSA that enjoys coherence between core ideology and Jew-hatred; it has the upperhand and is surely gaining.
To our Jewish Democratic-voting friends: Are you ready for this future Democratic Party?
Wai Wah Chin is the founding president of the Chinese American Citizens Alliance Greater New York.
New York Post · by Wai Wah Chin · November 10, 2023
20. Israel agrees to humanitarian pauses, but gulf with U.S. remains
Israel agrees to humanitarian pauses, but gulf with U.S. remains
The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · November 10, 2023
Israel has agreed to daily “tactical, localized pauses” in its offensive against Hamas to allow the distribution of humanitarian assistance and the further evacuation of civilians as its troops move toward the center of Gaza City, Israeli and U.S. officials said Thursday.
The pauses, with three hours’ notice, will be declared “for four hours each day in a different area or neighborhood … to get medical supplies and food” to those in need and allow those who want to leave the intense fighting in northern Gaza to move to the south, according to a senior Israeli official. Israel has also agreed to continue to guarantee security along at least one of the two principal north-south highways for several hours each day for evacuations.
Since Sunday, tens of thousands of Palestinians, most of them on foot and many with their hands up as they walked by Israeli military vehicles and soldiers, have headed south in a massive exodus. A senior Biden administration official estimated that about 250,000 civilians remain in northern Gaza, where Israeli troops are advancing block by block in street fights against Hamas militants while using airstrikes to drive them out of underground tunnels.
Israel-Gaza war
Tens of thousands of Palestinians have fled northern Gaza after Israeli ground troops pushed into Gaza City and clashed with Hamas militants. Understand what’s behind the Israel-Gaza war.
End of carousel
The announcement was the result of a weeks-long effort by the Biden administration to get Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza. When he met with Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Tel Aviv last Friday, Netanyahu agreed to the pauses in principle, but a range of U.S. officials — including Biden himself — have been pushing him to commit.
Israeli forces have occasionally paused their ground assault in the north and airstrikes throughout Gaza, but U.S. officials said the agreement Thursday is an attempt to formalize and expand them — and to make the commitment public so that the Israelis are under more pressure to hold to it.
It came as CIA Director William J. Burns met in Doha with his Israeli counterpart, Mossad chief David Barnea, and top officials from the government of Qatar, which has been mediating indirect U.S. and Israeli talks with Hamas over the release of hostages held in Gaza.
Biden, boarding Air Force One for a trip to Illinois, told reporters he had discussed with Netanyahu the possibility of a three-day pause in hostilities to facilitate the release of some 239 hostages, 10 of them American citizens, taken during the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on southern Israel that left 1,400 dead. Hamas had earlier asked for a five-day pause to release nonmilitary hostages.
There was no public indication of progress in the Doha talks over hostages, which included a meeting between Burns and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, according to several U.S. and foreign officials, most of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss developments on humanitarian relief, Gaza exit corridors and the hostages. Israel has said it will not agree to a cease-fire until all hostages are freed. Biden has also said he does not think there should be a formal cease-fire until Hamas is defeated.
For Biden, the agreement with Israel for daily, localized pauses in the offensive is a small sign of progress in an expanding regional crisis that has left the United States trying to balance its unlimited support of Israel’s right to defend itself against Hamas with widespread and growing international criticism of how Israel is exercising that right.
More than 10,000 Palestinian civilians have been killed over the past month, according to Gazan health authorities, primarily in Israeli airstrikes. Israel’s self-described “siege” of the enclave has left the remaining population in dire humanitarian straits, with dwindling food and medical care and without electricity, according to both the United Nations and the United States.
Asked whether he was “frustrated” that Netanyahu hadn’t “listened more” to things Biden had asked of him, the president replied, “It’s taking a little longer than I hoped.” Confirming that he had asked for a three-day pause, Biden said “I’ve asked for an even longer pause” in some instances.
To enable more humanitarian aid to be distributed, “a pause is something more, in our view, than a couple of hours,” the senior Biden administration official said. “A pause has a duration of a day, a couple of days, long enough to move significant quantities of humanitarian things in that would not otherwise be doable, and to get more foreign nationals … out” of Gaza.
Biden has been under both domestic and international pressure to show that the United States has some leverage with Israel, although Netanyahu has not made it easy.
U.S. leverage, “if you want to use that term, is the fact that Israel understands at the highest levels” that even with the strong support the United States is extending to end the Hamas threat, and Israel’s absolute right to do it, “you can’t do it in kinetic fashion only. There has to be a strong humanitarian assistance component” that is “visibly seen impacting for the better the very, very difficult situation in Gaza,” the official said.
On Wednesday, an Israeli government spokesperson denied there was any food shortage at all in Gaza, in contrast with daily descriptions of desperation inside the enclave from the United Nations and other international organizations, as well as the United States and many other countries. “The situation is insupportable. To allow it to continue would be a travesty,” U.N. humanitarian chief Martin Griffiths said Thursday at summit on the Gaza crisis hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris.
Also on Thursday, David Satterfield, whom Biden appointed his special envoy for Middle East humanitarian issues shortly after the Hamas attack, told reporters that real need for food and medical supplies remains, although progress is being made.
“I want to note here we started just two and a half, three weeks ago at zero” in terms of truckloads of humanitarian assistance allowed to enter Gaza as Egypt, Israel and Hamas haggled over the terms. “We have moved the level of assistance up to now to around 100 trucks a day,” Satterfield said. “We understand that even 150 trucks a day just meets the bare minimum to provide basic survival humanitarian assistance. Much more is needed beyond that.”
The difficult negotiations, and laborious process of allowing both Egypt and Israel to vet every name on exit lists, have also delayed the egress of thousands of foreign nationals from Gaza into Egypt. Progress was slowed last weekend, when Hamas closed the Gaza side of the gate, demanding that more injured civilians be allowed to leave first. It opened again on Monday, only to close again on the Egyptian side for the day on Wednesday after an aid convoy and its International Committee of the Red Cross escort came under fire inside Gaza.
U.S. officials estimated that about 450 of about 1,000 people on a State Department list of American citizens and their eligible family members have left Gaza, while cautioning that numbers may be inexact because some do not check in with American consular officials before leaving the crossing.
The rising civilian toll in Gaza and the Biden administration’s support for Israel’s offensive have led to sharp political and public divisions in the United States. Massive pro-Palestinian demonstrations have been held in major cities, as Jewish Americans have reacted with both fear and anger to what they perceive as antisemitism. While a relatively small number of Democratic lawmakers have called on Biden to use more U.S. leverage with Israel on behalf of the Palestinians, others in both parties have charged Biden with not being supportive enough.
All five of the Republican presidential hopefuls at Wednesday night’s televised debate made little to no mention of the humanitarian crisis and instead called for the obliteration of Hamas. “Finish the job once and for all with these butchers,” Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis said he would tell Netanyahu.
In recent weeks, the administration has intentionally devoted increased attention to the privations in Gaza, both publicly and, according to officials, in its private conversations at all levels of the Israeli government. After rejecting calls for humanitarian pauses during the first weeks of the Israeli offensive, it has embraced the concept.
But even as U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby hailed Israel’s agreement to begin the daily pauses, crediting Biden’s intervention with Netanyahu and telling reporters it was a “significant step” that “we want to see … continued for as long as needed,” the prime minister’s spokesman in Israel initially declined to confirm there had been any agreement at all.
Pressed for details, spokesman Elyon Levy said only that Israel would continue to allow a “window” for evacuations from north to south Gaza along a specified corridor. He declined to address the details Kirby announced and it was only later in the day, at U.S. urging, that Israeli officials confirmed them.
Michael Birnbaum in New Delhi, John Hudson and Shane Harris contributed to this report.
The Washington Post · by Karen DeYoung · November 10, 2023
21. Waugh We Fight
Excerpts:
I first read Waugh’s classic in 2000 or so. About 16 with inklings of interest in military service, I plucked the green-covered 1979 printing off our basement shelf. I then had the good fortune to attend West Point while the cadet bookstore shelved Waugh’s books in the proto-Amazon era. I’ve now read nearly his entire catalog, but Men at Arms (and the Officers and Gentlemen and siblings) hits different. Waugh helps me make sense of my military service, and, by writing this piece, I hope it will help others also.
....
No matter how you consume Sword of Honour, you are sure to get uncomfortable with the complexities of military service and its impact on veterans. Veterans are not broken. Veterans are not heroes. Veterans are Americans who just might be hunting redemption, like everyone else.
Sword of Honour is the best war fiction you haven’t read — and one the modern military practitioner must read. Brave generals will add this to their reading lists for junior officers if they want them to think about the truth of war. While war may be necessary, the work is hard and dirty, and there’s neither honor nor redemption waiting for you when it ends.
So Waugh do we fight? I still don’t know. But I invite you to read Sword of Honour with me. Each time, I get a little closer to the truth.
Waugh We Fight - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Zachary Griffiths · November 10, 2023
Though it was December, we ate Labor Day cake.
The ceremony was normal. We dressed in combat uniforms and dark sunglasses. Two soldiers held the flag in front of the battalion crest just between the Chigos and the plywood door into our command post. The captain and first sergeant stepped out of their offices. Members of Trudel’s platoon bore witness. I said a few words, and we raised our right hands. I reenlisted Private First Class Trudel.
Serving this cake was a minor act of rebellion. The many cakes in our freezer came with the special food packages for holiday meals, like Thanksgiving, the Army’s birthday, and (of course) Labor Day. Despite our cake surplus, our brigade had recently sent down a memo authorizing only one promotion or reenlistment cake a month, but the cakes seemed good for morale, and we had plenty. As a minor act of rebellion, I served cake at each and every promotion and reenlistment. There’s no moral in that story, and there’s no honor in war.
I have a hard time telling the truth about my military experiences. Sure, I share lessons with lieutenants and tell tight vignettes when tasked. These lessons and vignettes are true war stories, but not like Tim O’Brien means. They aren’t embarrassing enough. They moralize. They have a lesson. And beyond that, I’m distant from fighting now, last returning fire in 2014.
Become a Member
But on days like Veterans Day, when I seek to make sense of my service, I read Men at Arms by British author and humorist Evelyn Waugh.
I first read Waugh’s classic in 2000 or so. About 16 with inklings of interest in military service, I plucked the green-covered 1979 printing off our basement shelf. I then had the good fortune to attend West Point while the cadet bookstore shelved Waugh’s books in the proto-Amazon era. I’ve now read nearly his entire catalog, but Men at Arms (and the Officers and Gentlemen and siblings) hits different. Waugh helps me make sense of my military service, and, by writing this piece, I hope it will help others also.
Men at Arms is the first book of the Sword of Honour trilogy. These books follow the adventures of Guy Crouchback, an English aristocrat who joins the British Army during World War II. Though critics debate how autobiographical the books are, Waugh’s trilogy is a record of his service in World War II. Like Waugh, the protagonist, Guy Crouchback, nearly landed in Dakar, survived the terrible rearguard retreat from Crete, found himself seconded to special operations, and even engaged in unconventional warfare in Yugoslavia. Men at Arms focuses on idealistic Guy’s struggle to serve as war looms and to navigate military training and military bureaucracy, and then recounts his early experience in North Africa. Officers and Gentlemen continues Guy’s quest for purpose as he joins a commando unit, witnesses the chaotic surrender of the British Army, and spends time in a psychiatric ward after his harrowing escape from Crete. Finally, Unconditional Surrender finds Guy supporting Yugoslavian partisans and ultimately being redeemed as the war ends. Despite this linear accounting of Sword of Honour, the broad weave includes themes of religion, love, morality, and a decline of traditional values. While Guy’s wartime experience as an upper-class late 30s Catholic divorcee is atypical of his time or ours, the breadth of his story covers a lot of ground.
Though not widely read anymore, Sword of Honour is routinely ranked as one of the finest pieces of World War II literature. Following its reprint in 2001, Penelope Lively pronounced in The Atlantic that Sword of Honour was “the finest work of fiction in English to emerge from World War II.” In 2009, the Wall Street Journal ranked Men at Arms alongside the Russian Life and Fate by Vasily Grossman and Catch-22 by Joseph Heller as the three best World War II books. Sword of Honour is certainly different from other semi-autobiographical pieces like Forgotten Soldier or Matterhorn in that it approaches the experience of World War II with satire, rather than seriousness.
Waugh’s opus also frequently makes military-focused reading lists. Elizabeth Samet frequently recommends Sword of Honour to graduating West Point cadets. In a survey of books that helped shape the professional perspectives of Warlord Loop participants published by U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, Sword of Honour appears three times. Finally, Mira Rapp-Hooper wrote in these pages that “for the WOTR reader, [Waugh’s] wartime trilogy is a must.”
I read Waugh as a soldier. While others read it for politics or religion, Sword of Honour helps me make sense of my service: noncommissioned officers, the way people unexpectedly wink in and out of military life, and tough times.
As a fresh lieutenant, West Point had told me to trust my noncommissioned officers. But I didn’t really know what that meant. Would they lead me? Did they need my help? Fortunately, Waugh clearly conveyed that noncommissioned officers would quietly and competently run things as junior officers (me) figured themselves out. Bringing experience to the training of conscripts in Men at Arms, Regimental Sergeant Major Rawkes set expectations early:
I am Company Sergeant Major Rawkes. Take a good look so you’ll know me again. I’m here to help you if you behave yourselves right. Or I’m here to make your life hell if you don’t. It’s for you to choose.
Later, as Waugh’s conscripts find themselves lost during incessant moves to and fro, the early discipline instilled by the noncommissioned officers keeps things under control. Asked which battalion they are in, the conscripts reply, “First it was one and then another, sir.” But when asked for the commander’s name, the conscripts know, “Oh yes, sir. C.S.M. Rawkes.” Rawkes might not have been the commander, but the enlisted soldiers knew the senior enlisted were their leaders in a world of incessantly moving officers.
The ability of sergeants to bring order in tough situations was on my mind when I did the wrong thing. Fresh from Fort Benning and flying into Afghanistan for the first time, I hesitated. Rather than take half my platoon to OP4, an isolated post along the Pakistani border, Sergeant First Class Wiley went. He was combat-tested. I was green. But really, despite my crisp Ranger tab, I was just scared. As Rawkes led, Wiley showed this lieutenant how to run an outpost.
Sword of Honour also expertly captures the incredible smallness of military service: People appear and disappear at random intervals to lend assistance or create surprising challenges. General Ritchie-Hook dominates Men at Arms (ending the book in Guy’s lap with a gunshot wound and clutching an African soldier’s head), hardly shows up in Officers and Gentlemen (he’s found “in western Abyssinia” leading a group of Italians at the end of that volume), and then dies abandoned by Yugoslavian partisans attacking a German outpost near the end of Unconditional Surrender. This same winking in-and-out has been at work throughout my Army career, most notably on my return home from that first tour in Afghanistan. Waiting at a Bagram bus stop, dark clouds rolled in. My friend, a Texas A&M grad, was hassling me about being a West Pointer. As the clouds turned to raindrops, Josh, my stroke from the Men’s Varsity 8 at West Point, appeared. We hugged. He pulled us out of the rain, drove us across the base in his Super Duty pickup, and went on his way. For both Waugh and me, it’s always “see you later” and rarely “goodbye.”
One place I have said goodbye to is Afghanistan. Now that we are more than two years from the withdrawal, the retreat from Crete in Officers and Gentlemen helps me make sense of my feelings. In that scene, Guy and Hookforce huddle in caves overhanging the beaches of Sphakia on Crete as the Germans close in. As it becomes clear that no more boats are coming to take troops off the island, not armies but individuals make decisions about their future.
Faced with defeat, Guy and his colleague Ivor debate the honorable choice. Is it to stay, fight, and surrender, or to leave their men behind so that they may train the next crop of conscripts? His colleague sees that “the path of honor lies up the hill,” facing, then surrendering to, the Germans. Guy, though, falls asleep, bathes in the sea, and escapes with some sappers on a jerry-rigged boat. Ivor ultimately chose the least honorable path — desertion — while Guy battled post-traumatic stress and returned to the war. To this reader, none of these paths clearly offer honor, just like the options of staying or going in Afghanistan. These three vignettes merely scratch the surface of how Waugh helps me think about war.
Despite the incredible strength of Sword of Honour, I struggle with the happy ending: Guy’s redemption. The final chapter ties up all the challenges facing Guy at the beginning. Guy sought redemption from his failed marriage, his wasting of an inheritance as a failed Kenyan farmer, and his failure to restore his family estate so ancient it was nearly unique in “having been held in uninterrupted male succession since Henry I.” Men at Arms starts with Guy’s rejoicing that the new war might rescue him from “eight years of shame and loneliness [as] … the enemy at last was plain in view … [and] there was a place for him in that battle.” Then, over 27 lines in the book’s last two pages, Waugh grants Guy redemption. Guy cashes in his Italian estate, acquires an heir and wife, turns a profit on his farm, and obtains an inheritance. Given Guy’s string of failures, his desire for redemption is understandable, but no writing on the truth of war should end on such a note.
Rather than redeeming, war destroys. While I’ve been lucky to return to a loving family and privileged education, many do not. The Taliban killed my friend Andy while I studied in graduate school. Three senior Special Forces noncommissioned officers killed themselves during my second stint at the 10th Special Forces Group. Blast trauma, adultery, depression, and separation wreak havoc on families. Both my narrative and Waugh’s largely ignore the civilians and bystanders whose lives were ruined by our wartime service.
But Waugh also knows that war destroys. Perhaps in honor of war’s enduring scars, he titles the second-to-last chapter of Unconditional Surrender “The Last Battle” and clarifies war’s terrible nature in two passages. First, when Guy parts ways for the final time with a Jewish displaced woman he had helped, she challenges him on the meaning of war and of the good men who “thought their private honor would be satisfied by war.” She forces Guy to admit, “God forgive me … I was one of them.” Second, just two pages before Guy’s 27-line redemption, Waugh acknowledges that soldiers at war’s end often returned “to problems more acute than any they had faced on active service.” Waugh himself may have felt redeemed by the war or compelled by a meddlesome editor to put a cheerful bow on the end of this novel, so I will not further belabor this point. Ignore the last four pages if you want the honest ending.
Despite my qualms with the conclusion, I turn to this trilogy in text each year. Sword of Honour is best consumed by reading Men at Arms, Officers and Gentlemen, and Unconditional Surrender separately. They each have their own narrative arcs and themes. Though both Sword of Honour and the novels are out of print, readers can borrow it at their local library (or on Libby), read it for free at Project Gutenberg Canada, or easily purchase used copies online. Likewise, Audible carries the audio book version for those who prefer to listen. I have not yet watched the video versions, but the BBC’s 2001 adaptation is easily watchable online and gets decent reviews. Finally, the Authoritative Edition, annotated and edited by Max Saunders of Kings College London, is under way.
No matter how you consume Sword of Honour, you are sure to get uncomfortable with the complexities of military service and its impact on veterans. Veterans are not broken. Veterans are not heroes. Veterans are Americans who just might be hunting redemption, like everyone else.
Sword of Honour is the best war fiction you haven’t read — and one the modern military practitioner must read. Brave generals will add this to their reading lists for junior officers if they want them to think about the truth of war. While war may be necessary, the work is hard and dirty, and there’s neither honor nor redemption waiting for you when it ends.
So Waugh do we fight? I still don’t know. But I invite you to read Sword of Honour with me. Each time, I get a little closer to the truth.
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Zachary Griffiths is an Army officer. He tweets at @z_e_griffiths.
The view expressed here is the author’s alone and does not represent the U.S. military or Department of Defense.
Image: Courtesy of the Author
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Zachary Griffiths · November 10, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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