Quotes of the Day:

"Arm yourselves, and be ye men of valor, and be in readiness for the conflict; for it is better for us to perish in battle than to look upon the outrage of our nation and our altar." 

- Winston Churchill

"We know why these men fought to keep our freedom -- and why the wars that save a people's liberties are wars worth fighting and worth winning -- and at any cost." 

- Franklin D. Roosevelt

"In the end, the only way to maintain the peace is to be prepared in the final extreme to fight for our country -- and to mean it." 

- John F. Kennedy

1. Deterrence is crumbling in Korea: How we can fix it2.

2. A Nuclear North Korea Presents Opportunity for Global Leadership in a Complicated World

3. US and South Korea close ranks on common global issues during Blinken visit

4. Pyongyang reconfirms stronger ties with Russia despite warning

5. South Korea to help Ukraine produce drones - Lviv mayor

6. N. Korea pulls out of Nepal in series of diplomatic mission closures

7. Korea to provide $300,000 worth of humanitarian aid to quake-hit Nepal

8. NIS to beef up cybersecurity cooperation with US CISA

9. Peace Corps couple recalls service at Korean mixed-race orphanage

10. Korean ethnocentrism and Ihn

11. South Korean lawmakers join global human rights alliance against China

12. S. Korean lawmaker, US Congress members meet over China’s forced return of North Korean defectors

13. President’s War Against ‘Fake News’ Raises Alarms in South Korea

1. Deterrence is crumbling in Korea: How we can fix it

A very important report that must be read, studied, considered, and discussed. It is a long read so please go to this link to read the entire report to include all the findings, detailed recommendations and the appendices. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/deterrence-is-crumbling-in-korea-how-we-can-fix-it/

Even though the report postulates that a full scale attack is the least likely scenario we must remember the dictum, "never assume the enemy will not attack, make yourself invincible." If we do anything less we leave the ROK and US vulnerable and we will demonstrate our irresponsibility at the highest cost of blood and treasure. This is why we must make deterrence work in all forms. The report does a great service in identifying many possible scenarios that we must be able to deter while keeping in mind Sir Lawrence's admonition.

I have pasted the introduction and findings summary below.

However, what I think is the most important part of this report is in the Appendix by Skip Vincenzo on "subnational deterrence." 

Please consider and think deeply about these two paragraphs. These are very dangerous ideas and if left to fester is what will undo all our deterrence efforts. Accepting these ideas plays into the regime's political warfare strategy.  

What is to stop Kim from attempting far more dangerous courses of action if he believes that, by holding US cities at risk, he can keep the United States from escalating militarily? It is not hard to imagine that Kim Jong Un, if he felt his nuclear threat was credible enough, would believe that Washington could be deterred from intervening as he used his newly acquired precision short-range missiles to launch a devastating but limited precision strike against ROK military bases. This is where traditional deterrence fails to protect American interests. A decade ago—before North Korea could hold New York, Washington, or even London at risk—international outrage would almost certainly have resulted in a regime-ending military response. However, under these circumstances, and in the absence of large civilian collateral damage or direct damage to US interests, it is hard to believe that the United States would be eager for a full-scale conflict regardless of how existential a crisis South Korea might perceive the situation to be.

A limited but violent precision strike against South Korean military facilities accompanied by external messaging that makes it abundantly clear these actions are not part of a larger invasion could create a fatal rupture in the alliance—if the US hesitates on supporting meaningful retaliation that Seoul would almost certainly demand. As egregious as Pyongyang’s actions might be, would Washington risk its cities by escalating unless it was clear that North Korea was invading South Korea or directly threatening core US interests? Pyongyang has never had the leverage to force this kind of conundrum on the United States, but the rapid pace at which it is developing advanced weaponry means it soon might. Pyongyang has seldom hesitated to use its leverage when it felt it had a clear upper hand.

First, if we accept Kim will conduct a limited war scenario and we devise measures to deal with them as if they will happen, then all is lost. Accepting such scenarios assumes a lack of understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime (the author has a complete understanding of these and because he has posited these scenarios does not mean he accepts them - he is pointing these scenarios out because there are some in the national security community accept them - this is why it is important that they be addressed).

Anyone who advocates that we should or would not trade Seattle (or New York, Washington, or London) for Seoul is clearly supporting Kim's political warfare strategy and is at least a useful idiot. If we are unwilling to demonstrate the strategic resolve to defend Seoul then Kim is very likely to attack the South, and not in any limited way. Second, from a practical perspective what actions could be taken to prevent trading Seattle for Seoul? Do we remove US troops, withdraw extended deterrence, aborgte the Mutual Defense Treaty, and end the alliance? Will that prevent Kim from attacking the US anyway? Will he believe we will not come to the defense of Seoul if he attacks and that in believing we will, would he still not take preemptive action to try to keep us from doing so, e,g., attack Seattle as a warning? We should keep in mind that whatever happens in the Korean peninsula will have global effects. Korea is at the nexus of the 2d and 3d largest economies, (and the 10th to 12th with the ROK, the nexus of 2 nuclear powers (PRC and RUssia) and a rogue nuclear regime, i.e., nK, and the largest concentration of conventional military forces in any region of the world. Even if the US tried to remain "neutral" the effects of war or regime collapse and instability would have significant effects on the US.

Second, the idea that the regime could or would conduct a precision limited attack accompanied by messaging to tell us it was only a limited attack and that it would be true again does not have a sufficient understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. And we forget the fundamental principle of all war: all warfare is based on deception. And the Kim family regime is masterful at deception. Kim surely wants us to believe this is true because as the author speculates there will be different views on how to respond whether you are in Seoul or DC and this could cause a catastrophic split in the alliance. Of course this scenario fits neatly among the nuclear warfare theories postulated by academics. But does the nature of the Kim family regime allow it to fit neatly into these scarniors? I think not and this is the problem we have with those who want to apply theory without the necessary understanding of the realities and true nation for the Kim family regime. In reality this precision strike scenario is simply a "shaping operation" to set the conditions for the final use of force to dominate the peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State. REgardless of the messages transmitted about minimum objectives, the intention of the regime remains complete victory and nothing less.

So what do we do? First, our messages (and our actions) must demonstrate that we will never abandon Seoul and that we will defend Seattle, New York, DC, and the UK will defend London as well. We have to be able to do both and we can never ever give the appearance that it is either/or. We need to expose the north's strategy that this idea of trading Seattle for Seoul is a key part of the regime's political warfare strategy. 

Second, we must expose this limited objective strategy for the shaping operation that it is and remind the world of the regime's true intention is to dominate the peninsula.

Third, we must discuss these strategies with our allies and ensure our ROK counterparts that we are fully committed to the defense of the South and will not abandon it despite the north's threats. We must ensure that neither the ROK nor the US will fall victim to the regime's blackmail diplomacy and political warfare strategies or its use of force.

This is why it is so important to include the above scenarios and expose them to inoculate the Korean and American people as well as our political and military leaders against them. We must ensure we have a most thorough understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and do not allow unprovien and untested theories about the regime's potential nuclear use to make us lose before fighting.

November 9, 2023

Deterrence is crumbling in Korea: How we can fix it

By Markus Garlauskas and Lauren D. Gilbert

Introduction

Deterrence works, until it doesn’t.

Sir Lawrence Freedman1

The time is now ripe to revisit the future of deterrence on and around the Korean Peninsula.

The Korean Peninsula is frequently held up as an example of the effectiveness of US extended deterrence guarantees, and of deterrence in general. Since the signing of the military armistice that brought an end to the Korean War in 1953 without a peace treaty, deterrence has been the watchword in maintaining an uneasy de facto peace. Though North Korea has engaged in threatening rhetoric and saber-rattling, development of weapons of mass destruction in defiance of United Nations (UN) resolutions, and even occasional acts of limited violence, deterrence of a major attack has held firm for nearly seventy years. While some skeptics question whether a nuclear-armed North Korea can be reliably deterred at all, the consensus among national security experts and politicians alike seems to be that deterrence will continue to hold in Korea.2

As a result, US efforts to shore up deterrence are primarily focused elsewhere, where deterrence seems to be much more at risk. When deterrence in Korea is mentioned at all by Americans, it is typically in terms designed to reassure allies that deterrence is strong rather than convey concern.3 In line with this perspective, a study by a prominent US research organization projected deterrence in Korea as “healthy,” in marked contrast to the “mixed” situation in the Taiwan Strait.4 Deterring aggression against Taiwan is becoming an increasingly central focus of US public discussions on defense issues, with some high-level defense officials suggesting that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) might attempt forcible reunification before the close of the decade if not deterred.5 Meanwhile, with Russia having successfully conducted a land grab of Crimea in 2014, and now threatening nuclear escalation in the midst of a full-scale war against Ukraine, deterrence in Eastern Europe appears to be teetering on a knife’s edge, perhaps more fragile than in the Taiwan Strait.

In comparison to the might of Russia and the PRC, and the ambiguity of US defense commitments to Taiwan and Ukraine, effective deterrence in Korea appears simple—at first glance. It is hard to imagine why North Korea, a destitute country, with half the population and a tiny fraction of the wealth of the Republic of Korea (ROK; South Korea)—also backed by the United States—would not be deterred. Given that the Pyongyang regime seems vastly outmatched, so long as Washington or Seoul does not start a conflict, the conventional wisdom is that Pyongyang would not dare risk war or nuclear weapons use for the foreseeable future. As is typical of conventional wisdom, this premise’s logic is simple, its implications are comforting, and it is hard to disprove.

However, this conventional wisdom on deterrence in Korea could prove wrong—disastrously so. Upon examination, confidence in the strength of deterrence in Korea is based on a backward look at long-standing assumptions that are no longer tenable and politico-military conditions that have already begun to shift and are very likely to change even more dramatically in the next five to ten years. As a result, even when deterrence in Korea is examined in depth, such assessments are typically based on the premise of reinforcing it against erosion, not a fundamental re-look.

To address this analytic gap, we undertook the “Preventing Strategic Deterrence Failure on the Korean Peninsula” study to instead look forward at the future conditions for deterrence in Korea five to ten years from now, assess the challenges, and recommend actionable mitigation measures. By convening more than one hundred outside experts and stakeholders, consulting extensive existing literature, and conducting a virtual tabletop exercise, this study identified and examined key variables expected to drive the potential for escalation on the Korean Peninsula over the next decade and provided actionable analysis to help avoid a strategic deterrence failure on the Korean Peninsula.

It is infeasible to deter every possible North Korean transgression, so this study was designed to focus on the risk of strategic deterrence failure, defined by this study as “adversary escalation to nuclear weapons strikes and/or to full-scale armed conflict against the United States or the Republic of Korea.” To keep its scope manageable, the study concentrated on deterrence of military action involving the mass deaths of US and/or allied citizens, excluding less lethal scenarios such as major cyberattacks.

This report summarizes the study’s findings, including analysis of the evolving threat capabilities and intentions of North Korea and the PRC, layered against the future deterrent posture of the United States and its allies, to synthesize new insights. The main body of the report concludes with a series of five analytic key findings and corresponding actionable recommendations for the US government and military.

Findings summary

The study found that ongoing changes in North Korean and PRC capabilities and intentions are very likely to drive a dramatically increased risk of strategic deterrence failure on or around the Korean Peninsula in the next five to ten years while the current trajectory of South Korean and US deterrence capabilities and approaches looks unlikely to effectively mitigate these risks. If the United States, in concert with South Korea, does not undertake major adjustments to its capabilities and approaches to strengthen deterrence and resilience in the face of aggression in and around the Korean Peninsula—changes that would admittedly incur significant political and economic costs—to counteract these drivers and mitigate these risks, the probability of strategic deterrence failure will increase in comparison to today, while the likely operational and strategic consequences for such failure will also increase.

Five key findings of the study are summarized below and are explored later in greater detail along with corresponding recommendations to address the implications of these findings.

1. Of all the potential scenarios for strategic deterrence failure in the next decade, Pyongyang seizing an opportunity to launch a full-scale attack to reunify the Korean Peninsula is one of the least plausible. The path toward strategic deterrence failure is far more likely to begin with limited North Korean coercive escalation. Such coercion could result in an escalation cycle fueled by limited South Korean or US responses that lead Pyongyang to escalate further to retake the initiative, which would then drive escalation dynamics that trigger North Korea to launch a preemptive or preventive attack and motivate Beijing to intervene.

• This study focused on strategic deterrence failure and made no judgment as to the other strategic risks of adversaries’ coercion. However, these risks comprise an important subject for future study, as the US 2023 North Korea National Intelligence Estimate identifies coercion as the Kim regime’s most likely strategy for achieving its foreign policy objectives through 2030.6
• We assessed that US and South Korean concessions as a tactic to de-escalate a confrontation are probably not a viable long-term approach, or one that could be used repeatedly without incurring high risks and costs. Such concessions would probably undermine deterrence and fuel a high-risk pattern by generating overconfidence in Pyongyang and Beijing.

1. A combination of more precise and capable conventional options for North Korea with a more robust second-strike nuclear deterrent will challenge the credibility of US deterrence by punishment over the next five to ten years, increasing the level to which North Korea believes it can escalate without triggering a regime-ending response. As Pyongyang grows more confident in its own nuclear deterrent and in the likelihood of assertive PRC involvement in Korea to counter its strategic rival, the United States, Pyongyang’s perceived viable escalatory options to either press its advantage or retake the initiative will increase in intensity and diversity.
2. The likelihood of PRC intervention and interference in a Korea crisis will increase in the coming decade, as PRC military capabilities grow and the PRC-US strategic rivalry heightens. The ROK-US alliance is not yet politically or militarily postured to deter or defeat PRC intervention, and both partners seem unwilling to pay the political costs to confront this growing challenge more directly. This is likely to encourage North Korean adventurism and complicate ROK-US deterrent responses, particularly in the Yellow Sea (also known as the West Sea) near China.
3. The ROK-US alliance military posture (including authorities, capabilities, command structure, readiness, and training) has not been designed for the full spectrum of conflict from limited provocations to full nuclear war, and that is not on a path to change in the next ten years. This posture is designed almost exclusively for two possibilities: ROK self-defense against small-scale “provocation” by North Korea or a deliberate transition to combined ROK-US war operations in a large conventional war with North Korea. This posture is unsuited for a rapid, but limited, response to an attack beyond a provocation but short of full-scale war. It is also unsuited for deterring or defeating PRC intervention, or for fighting a war that includes nuclear strikes—all possibilities that the United States and its allies should prepare for.
4. Pyongyang’s regime almost certainly knows it cannot survive if it triggers an all-out nuclear exchange, but it will probably see greater viability for limited nuclear employment in the next five to ten years. If North Korea were to employ a nuclear weapon, it would most likely be in a limited manner intended to pose a dilemma for and constrain the ROK-US (and PRC) response. North Korea’s increasing capability to conduct a limited nuclear “demonstration” or tactical strike will give North Korea options that could undermine US extended deterrence globally, even if the immediate US response to such use prevents a catastrophic near-term strategic deterrence failure.

2. A Nuclear North Korea Presents Opportunity for Global Leadership in a Complicated World

Excerpt:

Next week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco from November 11 to 17, during which President Joe Biden will meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, will be an opportune time for the two leaders to show the world that the U.S. and China can again cooperate on subjects as important as North Korea. Both want North Korea to denuclearize, completely and verifiably, in return for security assurances and other deliverables. Progress with China on the issue of North Korea, on the twentieth anniversary of the Six-Party Talks, should be high on the list of priorities for President Joe Biden.

A Nuclear North Korea Presents Opportunity for Global Leadership in a Complicated World

NOVEMBER 9TH, 2023 BY JOSEPH DETRANI | 0 COMMENTS

thecipherbrief.com  · November 9, 2023

OPINION / EXPERT PERSPECTIVE — This is the twentieth anniversary of the Six Party Talks, established in 2003, to resolve the nuclear issue with North Korea. It’s an auspicious time for China, the host of the Talks, to put aside tension with the U.S. and encourage North Korea to return to negotiations. Ideally, the subject of North Korea will be discussed when President Joe Biden meets President Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in San Francisco later this month.

Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine – and the ongoing bloody war there – and Hamas’s terrorist attack on Israel on October 7 – and the ongoing war in Gaza – have diverted attention away from North Korea, although North Korea reportedly is providing Russia with artillery shells and rockets for its war in Ukraine and Hamas is reportedly using North Korean F-7 rocket-propelled grenades in its war with Israel.

Hamas, a proxy of Iran, receives training, funding, and support from Iran for its terrorist activities. And North Korea continues to have a close relationship with Iran, having provided Tehran with rockets, missiles, and weaponry over the years, in return for needed cash for their nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea’s Kim Jong Un has been transparent in his relatively recent embrace of Russia, with his public visit to Russia for meetings with Vladimir Putin and the recent visit of Russia’s Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to Pyongyang for meetings with Kim.

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The warming of Russia-North Korea relations comes at a time when North Korea has already in 2023, launched three Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), the latest in July – a solid fuel missile with a range of 15,000 kilometers, capable of targeting the entire U.S. What followed was Kim Jong Un enshrining nuclear weapons in North Korea’s constitution and last year proclaiming a “first use” policy for nuclear weapons if there is an imminent or perceived to be an imminent threat to the North’s leadership or its command-and-control infrastructure.

Since the failed Hanoi Summit in 2019, North Korea has eschewed any talks with the U.S. or South Korea, while building more nuclear weapons and launching more sophisticated ballistic missiles, to include hypersonic and cruise missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

South Korea’s Defense Minister, Shin Won-sik, recently publicly expressed concern that North Korea could conduct a surprise attack on South Korea, like the surprise attack on Israel by Hamas. Shin said South Korea would have to enhance its surveillance of North Korea and suspend a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement – with buffer zones along sea and land boundaries and no-fly zones – in order to resume surveillance of an unpredictable North Korea.

Any intentional or accidental flare-up on the Korean Peninsula could escalate quickly, with the potential to destabilize the whole of Northeast Asia. And given the current alignment of North Korea with a revanchist Russia and Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism, the chances are that North Korea may now feel emboldened to challenge South Korea and, as they did in March 2010, with the sinking of the South Korean naval vessel Cheonan, killing 46 seamen, they may perpetrate another act of aggression against the South.

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In early 2003, when North Korea quit the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and started to produce plutonium at its Yongbyon nuclear reactor, for nuclear weapons, former Secretary of State Colin Powell reached out to his Chinese counterpart and persuaded China to convince North Korea to enter into Six-Party Talks negotiations hosted by China and including the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and Russia. China’s current Foreign Minister and Politburo member, Wang Yi, hosted the talks and on September 19, 2005, North Korea agreed to dismantle all nuclear weapons and facilities in return for security assurances, economic development assistance and a path to normal relations with the U.S., South Korea, and Japan.

Next week’s Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in San Francisco from November 11 to 17, during which President Joe Biden will meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, will be an opportune time for the two leaders to show the world that the U.S. and China can again cooperate on subjects as important as North Korea. Both want North Korea to denuclearize, completely and verifiably, in return for security assurances and other deliverables. Progress with China on the issue of North Korea, on the twentieth anniversary of the Six-Party Talks, should be high on the list of priorities for President Joe Biden.

This column by Cipher Brief Expert Ambassador Joe Detrani first appeared in The Washington Times

The Cipher Brief is committed to publishing a range of perspectives on national security issues submitted by deeply experienced national security professionals. Opinions expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of The Cipher Brief.

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thecipherbrief.com · by Suzanne Kelly · November 9, 2023

3. US and South Korea close ranks on common global issues during Blinken visit

Despite other reports I think there is very little daylight between the ROK and US on all major issues.

US and South Korea close ranks on common global issues during Blinken visit

BY MATTHEW LEE AND KIM TONG-HYUNG

Updated 6:47 AM EST, November 9, 2023

AP · November 9, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — The United States and South Korea closed ranks behind common approaches to North Korea, Russia and China on Thursday, vowing to continue to support Ukraine against Russia’s invasion and boosting humanitarian aid to Palestinian civilians in Gaza caught in Israel’s war against Hamas.

In talks with South Korea’s leadership, including President Yoon Suk Yeol, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken discussed the growing threat posed by North Korea and its alleged provision of military equipment and munitions to Russia to help it wage war on Ukraine, the State Department said. They also spoke of the importance of U.S.-South Korea cooperation on global challenges, including China’s assertiveness and the instability in the Middle East.

“They shared concerns about the DPRK’s provocations in the region and strongly condemned the provision of military equipment and munitions by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the Russian Federation for use in its war against Ukraine,” the State Department said of Blinken’s meeting with Yoon, referring to North Korea by its formal name. The Blinken-Yoon meeting also covered improving relations between South Korea and Japan as well as the importance of three-way cooperation between Washington, Tokyo and Seoul, the State Department said,

At a news conference later with South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, Blinken said they discussed unspecified further actions the countries could take to intensify pressure on Moscow not to transfer military technology to North Korea in violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.

North Korea has been supplying artillery shells and other munitions to Russia in recent months to fuel its war efforts in Ukraine, U.S. and South Korean officials have said, and they suspect that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un could be seeking Russian technologies and other assistance in return to upgrade his own military.

“We’re seeing a two-way street. We’re seeing the DPRK provide military equipment to Russia for its brutal aggression against Ukraine but we’re also seeing Russia provide technological support to the DPRK for its own military programs and that’s a real concern for the security of Korea,” Blinken said.

Blinken also criticized North Korea’s ramped up missile testing activity in recent months, which included events it characterized as simulated attacks on South Korea involving tactical nuclear weapons, saying the North is “increasingly engaged in threatening irresponsible rhetoric.”

“We’ve seen the DPRK missile launches, pursue weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile capabilities all of which are in violent violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions. They’re also dangerous and destabilizing,” he said.

Both diplomats urged China — North Korea’s main ally and economic lifeline — to take a greater role in pulling the North back from destabilizing behavior, with Park arguing that the potential arms alignment between Russia and North Korea would go against Beijing’s interests.

Park also addressed concerns that North Korea could consider providing weapons and other assistance to Hamas, a possibility that has been raised by South Korean officials in recent weeks.

North Korea, which has blamed the United States for the violence in Israel and Gaza, has a history of selling weapons to Hamas. South Korea’s military told reporters last month that North Korean-made rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons were likely used by Hamas during their Oct. 7 assault on Israel.

During a closed-door briefing to lawmakers last week, South Korea’s main spy agency said it believes that Kim, the North Korean leader, instructed officials to “comprehensively support” the Palestinians and that the North could be considering selling weapons to militant groups in the Middle East, according to Yoo Sang-bum, one of the lawmakers who attended.

“If any relationship between North Korea and Hamas is revealed then North Korea should be condemned accordingly,” Park said. “This crisis that is unfolding in the Middle East is related potentially to the situation on the Korean Peninsula.”

The surprise attack on Israel by Hamas has raised concerns in South Korea about the possibility of a similar assault by North Korea and prompted the Yoon government to openly discuss suspending a 2018 inter-Korean military agreement on reducing border tensions to strengthen front-line surveillance on the North. Without elaborating on what was discussed, Blinken said he talked about the inter-Korean agreement during his meetings with South Korean officials and that the allies may further discuss the issue when U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin comes to Seoul for a security meeting next week.

Tensions between the Koreas are at their highest point in years as the pace of both North Korea’s weapons tests and South Korea’s combined military exercises with the United States have intensified in a tit-for-tat cycle. Before Blinken’s arrival, North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency condemned the visit as well as the upcoming one by Austin, describing them as “warmongers” bringing a “new war cloud” to Asia.

Blinken arrived in Seoul following a G7 foreign ministers meeting in Japan that previewed much of what he was to discuss.

“We reiterate our call for the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and demand that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, and any other WMD and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions,” the G7 ministers said.

Both North Korea and Russia have denied the accusations that North Korea has been providing Russia with munitions.

On China, the G7 adopted a very similar line to that held by the U.S. — that members are willing to work productively with Beijing as long as it respects international rules and regulations.

“We underscore that China has a responsibility to uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter in their entirety,” the ministers said. “We remain seriously concerned about the situation in the East and South China Seas, strongly opposing any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion,” the G7 said.

U.S. President Joe Biden is expected to meet with Chinese leader Xi Jinping next week on the sideline of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum summit in San Francisco.

AP · November 9, 2023

4. Pyongyang reconfirms stronger ties with Russia despite warning

So the China and north Korea relationship is "closer than lips and teeth." Perhaps the Russia and north Korea relationship can be described as "colaser than dentures and bleeding gums."

Pyongyang reconfirms stronger ties with Russia despite warning | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Sang-soo · November 11, 2023

SEOUL, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korea said Saturday that its relations with Russia will remain strong despite the United States' warning against their arms transfers.

In a statement issued by a spokesperson for the North's foreign ministry, Pyongyang also said the U.S. should be accustomed to the new reality of growing relations between the North and Russia.

On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in Seoul that Russia is providing "technology and support" for North Korea's military programs, as Pyongyang is believed to be trying to make yet another attempt to launch a military satellite.

After talks with Seoul's foreign minister Park Jin, Blinken also said the two sides discussed ways to intensify pressure on Moscow not to transfer military technology to Pyongyang.

Pyongyang said, "the irresponsible and provocative remarks of Blinken only escalate the dangerous political and military tension in the Korean peninsula and the region and, moreover, do not help relieve the U.S. of its "concern"."

The talks between the top diplomats from Seoul and Washington came after revelations that the North provided Russia with a large amount of munitions and weapons for use in the war in Ukraine under an arms deal apparently reached at the rare September summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin.

The deeper military cooperation between the North and Russia has given rise to the prospect that Pyongyang could be receiving Moscow's technical assistance for its long-range missile program. Seoul officials said the North appears to be readying for a third attempt to launch a military spy satellite after failed attempts in May and August.

Blinken also highlight the importance of China's "constructive role" at a time when Pyongyang appears to be getting closer to Moscow.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken (L) shakes hands with South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin ahead of their bilateral talks in Seoul on Nov. 9, 2023. (Yonhap)

sam@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Sang-soo · November 11, 2023

5. South Korea to help Ukraine produce drones - Lviv mayor

The Arsenal of Democracy steps up.

South Korea to help Ukraine produce drones - Lviv mayor

ukrinform.net

Lviv Mayor Andriy Sadovyi stated this in a video commentary following a foreign tour, Ukrinform reports.

"We have great contact with drone manufacturers. We connect them with our producers. There will be more drones, and they will be of higher quality," said Sadovyi.

The mayor of Lviv also said that Korean businesses are interested in investing in Ukraine. Another industrial park is set to be created in Lviv "with Korean money, for Korean business".

In addition, with the support of South Korean partners, another hospital will be built at the premises of St. Luke's Hospital.

According to Sadovyi, South Korea supports Ukraine because the nations understands the “importance of our fight against Russia, the country that cooperates with North Korea”.

Also, the mayor noted that such foreign visits are very important for attracting investment to Ukraine, adding that no budget funds were spent during the tour as it was fully paid for by the host party.

ukrinform.net

6. N. Korea pulls out of Nepal in series of diplomatic mission closures

N. Korea pulls out of Nepal in series of diplomatic mission closures | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 10, 2023

SEOUL, Nov. 10 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has decided to shut down its embassy in Nepal, a news report said Friday, the latest in a series of the reclusive regime's moves to shut down diplomatic missions due apparently to economic difficulties worsened by global sanctions.

A foreign relations adviser to Nepal's Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal was quoted saying that the North made the decision in line with its "changed priority" and "deepening financial crisis," according to the Kathmandu Post.

The report said the North Korean Embassy in New Delhi will instead take over diplomatic affairs going forward.

In a separate post on X, formerly known as Twitter, the prime minister's office said North Korean Ambassador to Nepal Jo Yong-man paid a "farewell call" to the prime minister on Monday.

North Korea established diplomatic ties with Nepal in 1974 and opened its mission in Kathmandu the same year.

This screenshot of the prime minister's office of Nepal shows North Korean Ambassador to the country Jo Yong-man paying a "farewell call" to Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal on Nov. 6, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

North Korea recently gave notice of the shutdown of its embassies in Angola, Spain and Uganda to the respective countries, while Beijing has confirmed Pyongyang's decision to pull out from Hong Kong.

South Korea's unification ministry, which handles inter-Korean affairs, attributed the move to the North's faltering economy.

"The flurry of measures appears to show that it is no longer feasible for the North to maintain diplomatic missions as their efforts to obtain foreign currency have stumbled due to strengthened sanctions," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity on Oct. 31.

Rather than receiving funds from Pyongyang, the North's diplomatic missions are known to secure funds for operations through illicit trade and commercial activities and send remittances to their home country, according to former North Korean diplomats who have defected to South Korea.

The North's foreign ministry has still claimed the shutdowns are part of efforts to efficiently rearrange its diplomatic capacity in line with the "changed global environment" and "national diplomatic policy."

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 10, 2023

7. Korea to provide $300,000 worth of humanitarian aid to quake-hit Nepal

​north Korea takes. South Korea gives. There was nothing left for north Korea to take in Nepal so it has withdrawn its diplomatic mission. South Korea steps up as a Global Pivotal State. Recall that South Korea is the only OECD nation to go from a major aid recipient to a major donor nation. All that north Korea has become is a global proliferation state selling tools of war and terrorism to malign actors in conflict zones around the world.

Korea to provide $300,000 worth of humanitarian aid to quake-hit Nepal

The Korea Times · November 10, 2023

A woman sits in front of her earthquake damaged house in Jajarkot district, northwestern Nepal, Nov. 5. AP-Yonhap

Korea will provide $300,000 worth of humanitarian assistance to Nepal to help the country cope with the aftermath of a deadly earthquake that has killed more than 150 people, the foreign ministry said Friday.

The government hopes the provision will help Nepalese people who have suffered damage from the earthquake quickly resettle and the country with recovery efforts, the ministry said.

At least 153 people died and hundreds of others were injured after a 6.4 magnitude quake struck the Jajarkot district northwest of Kathmandu last Friday. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · November 10, 2023

8. NIS to beef up cybersecurity cooperation with US CISA

​One of the most important areas for alliance cooperation.

NIS to beef up cybersecurity cooperation with US CISA

The Korea Times · November 10, 2023

Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) Deputy Director Baek Jong-wook, left, shakes hands with Jen Easterly, director of the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in Washington, D.C. Nov. 9, after signing a memorandum of ynderstanding outlining areas for collaboration under the bilateral Cyber Framework signed by President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol in April, 2023. Courtesy of NIS

South Korea's spy agency said Friday it has signed an agreement with the U.S. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) to strengthen bilateral cooperation in cybersecurity.

Under the memorandum of understanding (MOU), the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and CISA will conduct joint cyber training and share information about cyber threats.

The two agencies will also work together to protect critical infrastructure, formulate related policies and guidelines and explore new cybersecurity technologies.

The MOU is a followup to the Seoul-Washington summit in April, in which the two countries agreed to establish a bilateral Strategic Cybersecurity Cooperation Framework to expand joint efforts against cyber adversaries, according to the NIS. (Yonhap)

The Korea Times · November 10, 2023

9. Peace Corps couple recalls service at Korean mixed-race orphanage

On the one hand a heartwarming story of service by two great American but one that also is a story reminding us of one of the negative, terrible, and sad legacies of the American military presence in Korea.

Peace Corps couple recalls service at Korean mixed-race orphanage

The Korea Times · November 11, 2023

Children smile together at St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children in Incheon's Bupyeong District, sometime in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

Heartbreaking, heartwarming times at St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children in 1979-80

By Jon Dunbar

It had been over 40 years since Bow and Ann Seltzer had last set foot in Korea. They were pretty sure the orphanage where they had volunteered was long gone, but they held out hope they would find some familiar traces in Incheon’s Bupyeong District of their 21-month posting here with the Peace Corps, from March 1979 to November 1980.

"Our understanding is that the orphanage closed in the mid-1980s," Ann wrote in a document for the Korea Foundation (KF) shared with The Korea Times. "We lived in the home of a Korean woman that worked at the orphanage named Elizabeth. She lived a couple of blocks away from the orphanage; it would be wonderful to see her if she is still alive. There was another Korean woman named Monica who worked at the home. She spoke very good English and she and I often went to the U.S. Embassy together to try to secure visas for the kids who had been adopted by families in the U.S."

Unfortunately, those two English names weren't enough to help KF track the women down. All the Seltzers had to go on was a photo of the muddy, unpaved street where St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children once stood, housing children of mixed-race heritage who had been given up by their birth mothers.

A dirt road in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980 / Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

During their site visit, the Seltzers encountered an elderly woman who had lived in the area for 40 years, who told them that this particular area now housed a Hyundai factory. How did that make them feel, to know that the physical evidence of their service area in Korea had been erased? Maybe a bit sentimental, but also perhaps a sensation of a burden being lifted, as Korea was healing from the deep wounds of its past.

The couple also visited nearby Camp Market, a former U.S. Forces Korea installation that served primarily as a logistics depot. Much of the land has been returned to Korea in recent years, and part of it was reopened as a public park in 2020. When they found an old baseball diamond in one corner of the park, all the emotions came flooding back. This was where, over 40 years ago, they had occasionally had the opportunity to bring the Amerasian children of the orphanage on post for a game of baseball.

The Seltzers were back in Korea last month for a Peace Corps Revisit program hosted by KF. Peace Corps volunteers in Korea typically were posted as English teachers at middle schools or universities, or in health education or care, especially working on either tuberculosis control or with leprosy patients. None of the other volunteers had ever worked at an orphanage in Korea, and most were quite surprised that any of their colleagues had.

Children sit on tricycles at St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

In an informal introduction during the Revisit's orientation event on Oct. 22, the Seltzers thanked Jim Mayer, the country director for Peace Corps Korea from 1979 until the end of its mission here in 1981, for the unique opportunity.

"Regarding Ann and Bow — my memory is sketchy — basically the Peace Corps had never placed volunteers at an orphanage before, to my memory/understanding)," Mayer, now in his early 80s but still going strong, told The Korea Times afterward. "At that time, Amerasians were not accepted in Korean society (strong prejudice against them). The Peace Corps wasn't all that keen in having two volunteers assigned to an Amerasian orphanage. I went to HQ to make my case of why I thought it was a good assignment. After some hemming and hawing, HQ signed off... and Ann and Bow did the rest. That's about all I recall."

K-48 group

Bow and Ann, who just celebrated their 45th wedding anniversary on Nov. 6, had been married just four months before moving to Korea.

Bow and Ann Seltzer pose in front of their home in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

"I had wanted to join the Peace Corp since I was in high school," Bow said in a document shared with The Korea Times by KF. "I wanted to serve in the tropics and work with children. I was scheduled to leave for the Peace Corps in the Philippines when I met the woman I was to marry. She had also wanted to join the Peace Corps so I stepped back from the Philippine assignment, married Ann and together we applied for an assignment together! Four months after we married, we were sent to Korea with a group of other volunteers. "

Bow and Ann Seltzer pose with a child in Incheon's Bupyeong District sometime in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer.

They were part of the K-48 group of Peace Corps volunteers, arriving in 1979. Their first six weeks here were spent in Chuncheon, Gangwon Province.

"Our six weeks in Chuncheon was the best," Bow said. "Our host family was so kind and wanted to please us. The mother had practiced making eggs and toast to serve us for breakfast. The first night in their home we wanted to have a bath since we had been traveling for 20 hours. They showed us to the bathroom, just off the living room, and there was already water in the tub. We got in the tub! We later learned the correct way to bathe: scoop water from the tub and pour over the body and onto the floor. We learned that the family had to drain all the remaining water after we had got in, wash the tub and then refill it with fresh water. Oops!"

After that, he said they did most of their bathing at bathhouses, which they learned to love, especially during winter. "At first the ladies stared at me and poked at my skin, but eventually they welcomed me to their bathing world," Ann said.

Their time in Chuncheon was spent with language training, which was geared toward preparing them for work at a tuberculosis clinic, their initial assignment in Korea.

"The one Korean phrase that still leaps to my mind if we meet a Korean is 'please cough up sputum into this cup.' I always catch myself before I let it out of my mouth. It is not a useful phrase for general conversation!" Ann said.

But in their seventh or eighth week of training, before they could set foot in a TB clinic, they got the new assignment at St. Vincent.

"We were thrilled to be reassigned to the orphanage," Ann said. "These children were born into a world that did not want them and it was our honor to meet the mothers that gave up their children for a better world. At the time, Korea was a patriarchal society. A mixed-race child with a non-Korean father simply would never be accepted into Korean society."

As to what exactly was expected of the American couple, either according to the needs of the orphanage or a Peace Corps mission objective, neither Mayer nor the Seltzers could remember any specifics.

"I don't believe there was a real 'vision' in assigning them to St. Vincent," Mayer clarified. "I think it was more a matter of wanting to find a proper fit for their service. To my memory it was intended for them to simply provide help — and I imagine English language classes — not necessarily preparing the orphans for transition to a new home (abroad) but help to better prepare them for life."

They may not have set out with a list of deliverables to accomplish, but just being present could reasonably be expected have made a difference in the children's lives.

"Perhaps as a young married couple we also served as an example of some kind of normalcy in a husband/wife relationship, but maybe that didn’t matter at all," Bow said. "I just recall we did the best we could in everything we tried to accomplish as part of this large, thrown-together family that was constantly losing and gaining members."

Children sit around a picnic table at St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

But they provided more than just a domestic presence.

They also worked with the U.S. government in an effort to change the immigration status of these children from "non-preferred" to "preferred." The law was later changed in 1982 to make it possible for Amerasian children to attain U.S. citizenship. "One of our kids from the orphanage was at President Reagan's side when he signed the bill into law," Ann added.

Ann admitted that she and Bow weren't great at speaking Korean, despite the six weeks spent preparing in Chuncheon.

Bow Seltzer teaches an English class for children from St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

"At the orphanage, the kids gradually learned our Koreanglish," she said. "Supposedly we spoke in banmal but even that distinction is generous. Really it was a combination of Korean and English mashed together. The kids at the orphanage quickly learned our 'language.' They understood what we said with lots of giggles and pantomime. As new children were brought to the orphanage, the kids who were there 'translated' what we were saying. Gradually the new kids learned our 'language' and eventually translated for the next group of kids. It was always sweet to watch them gently explain what the heck we were saying."

Ann Seltzer works in the kitchen at her home in Incheon's Bupyeong District sometime in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

Ann said working at the orphanage gave her insights into Korean daily life.

"We all participated making kimchi (yum), scrambling for the hard rice at the bottom of the pot and serving ramen to 30 kids," she said. "I loved shopping for meat and vegetables in the market and helping to cook for a huge household."

Pigpen

"Working at St. Vincent Home for Amerasians meant doing many things through the course of a day," Bow said. "But, one day was different."

On that day, he was tasked with riding a bus to the Busan area, where he would pick up an 18-month-old girl who was being given up for adoption by her young Korean mother. The father was a Black American soldier who had returned to the U.S.

"It was a cultural fact that mixed-race kids would have a difficult life in Korea," Bow said. "This was especially true for Black/Korean children."

He recalled the handoff being extremely difficult and emotional for the mother, the child and for himself.

"The child and I boarded the bus for a six-hour ride north. I was a young white American with an inconsolable mixed-race little girl," he said.

Halfway back to Incheon, he was desperate for a pit stop.

"I carried the child with me to the front of the bus and begged the bus driver to stop," he said. "It took sign language and pantomime but eventually he understood my request and pulled over. I handed him the child and he refused to hold her. I handed her to several others who all refused to help me. Finally, I just set her in someone's lap and dashed out of the bus. I stood as close as I could to the bus thinking I could have some privacy and then I realized the bus was leaning towards me. Everyone on the bus moved to that side to watch me!"

After he finished, he returned to the bus and took the girl back to their seat at the back.

"I don't remember much more about that adventure, but I certainly grew to love that sweet child until she left the orphanage for her new life and family in the U.S.," he said. "Sadly, I don't remember her real name, but my wife and I affectionately called her Pigpen because she was happiest playing in the dirt!"

A child plays on a mound of dirt in a road somewhere in Incheon's Bupyeong District, in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

Made in Korea

In their time at the orphanage, they had many farewells with the children once they were placed with adoptive families. Children that were adopted to the U.S. would have to be flown to their new families accompanied by a guardian, usually another American headed back to the U.S.

This was a widespread practice at the time, with Americans heading stateside being offered discounts on their flight tickets in exchange for accompanying the children and looking after them on the flight. The Seltzers saw many children from their orphanage depart with American guardians headed overseas to meet their new adoptive families.

When it was the the Seltzers' time to leave Korea, they also traveled with children from other orphanages. They accompanied 12 children who were being sent to their new adoptive families waiting on the other side of the ocean.

Additionally, Ann was eight months pregnant at the time of their departure. "Somewhere we have a photo of our daughter wearing a T-shirt that says 'Made in Korea,'" she said.

Children play on a jungle gym at St. Vincent's Home for Amerasian Children in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

Whenever possible, the Seltzers tried to provide children being adopted overseas with as much information about their histories as they could. This information was accepted with gratitude by the adopting families in all cases except one memorable time, in which a family refused the information, not wanting their adopted child to have anything to do with the homeland that had cast them out.

Children play basketball at St. Vincent Home for Amerasian Children in Incheon's Bupyeong District in 1979 or 1980. Courtesy of Bow and Ann Seltzer

After over 40 years have passed, the kids at St. Vincent are still in the Seltzers' hearts — and many remain in their lives.

"These kids now are in their 50s and have children of their own," Ann said. She and her husband have even attended the weddings of some of the kids. She said one of the children grew up to become a professor at Harvard University.

"I am grateful for the opportunity to have served in Korea," Ann said.

"We are so grateful for the time we spent in Korea," Bow added.

As far as they know, nobody else from the Peace Corps was ever assigned to St. Vincent again after them.

Bow and Ann Seltzer pose during the farewell dinner for the Peace Corps Revisit program at Some Sevit in Seoul, Oct. 27. Korea Times photo by Jon Dunbar

The Korea Times · November 11, 2023

10. Korean ethnocentrism and Ihn

Korean ethnocentrism and Ihn

The Korea Times · November 9, 2023

By Bernard Rowan

For the longest time, I’ve considered the idea of adoption and its wonder. In particular, I think about how “outsiders” become “insiders” through adoption. Adoptions happen for many reasons. It can occur necessarily or accidentally or neither. Many movies in one way or another tell the story of someone who experiences adoption by a culture or social institution in particular. The form of adoption may vary. Humanity uses adoption to exceed its normal or particular boundaries, usually for the better. Adoption may set a precedent more widely practiced by others.

I say all of this to share some thoughts about the spate of stories involving Ihn Yo-han. The story surprises me. I’m happy to learn Ihn is the first special naturalized Korean. His name has been and still prints at times as John Linton. Ihn is a director at Yonsei University Severance Hospital International Health Care Center. He currently chairs the innovation committee of the ruling People Power Party. As one can learn from The Korea Times, he developed the first Korean-customized ambulance.

I don’t know if Ihn would share the idea that Korea has adopted him. To my mind, it makes sense. It also provides a way to address certain nagging resonances of rejection. Ihn entered life and grew up in Korea. He has devoted his life to various works in his country. However, people in some quarters don’t think he’s Korean. Perhaps that’s because of his work for a particular party and national administration in South Korea, more or less. However, Ihn provides one of a growing number of opportunities for Koreans to widen their understanding of culture, nation and family.

South Korea is an advanced nation, but troubling are the occasional signs and symptoms of nativism or ethnocentrism. I can recall various primers in Korean culture that I read before my first visit. They praised the virtues of Korean monists and uniformity. They described Korean homogeneity as factual and as related to the country’s nationalism. It all sounded wonderful and nonthreatening.

Of course, Korean nationalism is wonderful and necessary for self-preservation and the national interest. It's not uniform: divisions between West and East are well-known. These divisions don’t address ethnicity and those which Korea (should) adopt.

I can remember Korean friends past and present and how they and their parents approached or interacted with me. The experiences were uniformly positive. However, for some reason as I grew more involved or noticeably interested in Korea, a few told me, “You’re not Korean.” While I had never thought that, it still hurt, I’ll also say that my closest friends consider me a member of their family. That is deeply humbling and loving. Korea should extend greater openness including to those whom it adopts as citizens, even if they aren’t ethnically Korean or native-born.

As Korea continues to face a falling birthrate and many challenges from a shrinking working-age population, South Korea will have to supplement its workforce. The economy and society need to adopt more workers, and among them, it would be a good idea to adopt more as citizens, should that status suit their work, commitment and regard for South Korea. This occurs widely elsewhere.

As more Koreans study, work and live abroad, the beautiful identities of those who live on earth and are of Korean ethnicity and descent continue to multiply and assume indefinite variety. What it means to “look” Korean changes all the time. “Korean uniformity” is an abstraction. If one even looks at the multiplicity of ancestor cultures and ethnicities that formed Korea, such uniformity is revealed to be an ideal or just plain fiction.

Paik Wan-ki and Jung Jae Hung have written about familism and emotional humanism in Korean culture. Koreans are inclined to emotions of affection and loyalty to their felt in-group. The Korean tendency to prefer the familiar and or networks of felt kin isn’t unusual or bad. However, the treatment of Ihn in some quarters shows familism and loyalty have gone too far.

I admire Ihn’s steady and steadfast commitment to his homeland and the Korean people. In the face of those voices who say, think or act out, “You’re not Korean,” he hasn’t quit or abandoned his love of Koreans and Korea. His work and contributions continue to shine forth, to save lives and to inspire generations of Koreans and foreigners alike to the next steps in Korea’s wonderful story of progress.

Bernard Rowan (browan10@yahoo.com) is associate provost for contract administration and academic services and professor of political science at Chicago State University. He is a past fellow of the Korea Foundation and former visiting professor at Hanyang University.

The Korea Times · November 9, 2023

11. South Korean lawmakers join global human rights alliance against China

Human rights upfront.

Images at the link: https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20231110000661

South Korean lawmakers join global human rights alliance against China

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · November 10, 2023

By Kim Arin

Published : Nov. 10, 2023 - 21:19

• Link copied

Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China

South Korea’s National Assembly recently became the 32nd legislature to be represented in the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an association of lawmakers concerned about Beijing’s increasingly hostile behaviors.

The first South Korean lawmakers to join the cross-parliamentarian alliance are the ruling People Power Party’s Rep. Ji Seong-ho and the opposition Democratic Party of Korea’s Rep. Oh Yeong-hwan. The two lawmakers will serve as inaugural co-chairs until their tenure in the Assembly ends in April next year.

Ji, a North Korean defector who was elected to the 21st Assembly as a proportional representative in 2020, told The Korea Herald that he hoped to rally more international support against China’s forced repatriation of North Korean defectors detained there.

Oh, who was a firefighter before entering the Assembly, also in 2020, told The Korea Herald that he is taking part in the alliance to make a more definitive stand for human rights.

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · November 10, 2023

12. S. Korean lawmaker, US Congress members meet over China’s forced return of North Korean defectors

​I hope s can sustain ROK General Assembly-US Congress alignment and support on human rights issues (among others).

S. Korean lawmaker, US Congress members meet over China’s forced return of North Korean defectors

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · November 10, 2023

By Kim Arin

Published : Nov. 10, 2023 - 22:22

South Korean Rep. Tae Yong-ho meets with US senator Ted Cruz to discuss China’s forced return of North Korean defectors. (courtesy of Tae’s office)

Rep. Tae Yong-ho, a former North Korean diplomat, met with five members of the US congress during his trip to Washington on Nov. 7-8 to jointly raise concerns about China forcibly repatriating North Koreans who defected into its territories.

The South Korean lawmaker with the ruling People Power Party said in a release Friday that he discussed the issue of China’s forced repatriation of North Korean defectors in meetings with Sen. Ted Cruz and House of Representatives members Chris Smith, Michelle Steel, Tim Burchett and Scott Perry.

Tae said in the meetings that he asked the US senators and House members to urge the Joe Biden administration to call on China to respect the principle of non-refoulement guaranteed under international law and stop its forced return of escapees from North Korea.

He said that the US Congress could introduce and adopt a resolution asking the Chinese government to end forced repatriation of North Korean defectors. He added that he hoped for more actions from the Biden administration to increase pressure on Beijing in bilateral dialogues and at the United Nations General Assembly on the issue.

Tae also noted that a delegation of escapees whose family members were forcibly sent back to North Korea -- whom he invited to travel with him -- also spoke at the meetings, and told US Congress members about the likely human rights abuses that North Korean defectors would be subject to upon being returned.

According to Tae, the US Congress members reciprocated by saying they were willing to pursue more efforts to campaign against China’s forced repatriation of North Korean defectors.

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · November 10, 2023

13. President’s War Against ‘Fake News’ Raises Alarms in South Korea

​No responsible leader of a liberal democratic nation should ever be using the term fake news.​ This is troubling in South Korea as it is in the US because those who use fake news expose their authoritarian feelings when they know they have them or not.

President’s War Against ‘Fake News’ Raises Alarms in South Korea

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · November 10, 2023

He calls fake news an enemy that threatens democracy. Critics of President Yoon Suk Yeol say he is silencing journalists in the name of fighting disinformation.

President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea answering reporters’ questions as he arrived for work last year. He has since ended the practice and adopted a more guarded stance toward the news media.Credit...Yonhap/EPA, via Shutterstock

By

Reporting from Seoul

Nov. 10, 2023

Allies of President Yoon Suk Yeol are attacking what they see as an existential threat to South Korea, and they are mincing few words. The head of Mr. Yoon’s party has called for the death sentence for a case of “high treason.” The culture ministry has vowed to root out what it called an “organized and dirty” conspiracy to undermine the country’s democracy.

In this case, the accused is not a foreign spy, but a Korean news outlet that has published articles critical of Mr. Yoon and his government.

The president, a former prosecutor, is turning to lawsuits, state regulators and criminal investigations to clamp down on speech that he calls disinformation, efforts that have largely been aimed at news organizations. Since Mr. Yoon was elected last year, the police and prosecutors have repeatedly raided the homes and newsrooms of journalists whom his office has accused of spreading “fake news.”

Some South Koreans accuse Mr. Yoon of repurposing the expression as justification for defamation suits and to mobilize prosecutors and regulators to threaten penalties and criminal investigations. Many are exasperated that their leader has adopted the phrase, a rallying cry for strongmen around the world that is also further dividing an increasingly polarized electorate at home.

South Koreans are proud of the vibrant democracy and free press they won after decades of military dictatorship, and, more recently, of their country’s growing soft-power influence.

Mr. Yoon may be best known overseas for aligning his country more closely with the United States​ — and for his rendition of “American Pie” at ​the White House. He espouses “freedom” in speeches, but his 18-month-old presidency has been characterized by a near-constant clash with the opposition and fears of censorship and democratic backsliding.

President Biden cheered Mr. Yoon’s performance of “American Pie” at a state dinner at the White House in April. Mr. Yoon may be best known overseas for aligning South Korea more closely with the United States​.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Leaders of the democratic world have all grappled with how to counter the corrosive effects of disinformation online. But Mr. Yoon’s critics, including the liberal opposition and journalists’ associations, accuse him of suppressing speech in the name of fighting disinformation. In a survey this year, a majority of local journalists said they felt press freedom was regressing under Mr. Yoon.

“It’s dangerous to leave it to the government to decide what fake news is,” said Pae Jung Kun, a journalism professor at Sookmyung Women’s University in Seoul. “It undermines the news media’s ability to hold the government to account.”

Mr. Yoon’s crackdown intensified in September, when his office singled out an independent news organization for a report it published last year.

Prosecutors ransacked the homes and offices of two reporters from Newstapa, which ran the article. Journalists from other outlets were also targeted, their cellphones and files​ confiscated to collect criminal evidence of defamation. The authorities have rarely taken such measures since South Korea democratized in the 1990s, though that has changed under Mr. Yoon. Government regulators fined three cable and TV channels​ that had picked up the Newstapa article​, also accusing them of spreading “fake news.”

The article that earned Newstapa the ire of Mr. Yoon was published three days before ​his election, in March 2022. It described an allegation that Mr. Yoon, as a prosecutor in 2011, had decided not to indict Cho Woo-hyung, a man ​involved in a banking and real-estate scandal, because of​ lobbying by a prosecutor turned lawyer. Mr. Yoon denied the claim during presidential debates​ and still does​.

Other news organizations had reported on the controversy before. But Newstapa acquired an audio file of a conversation between one of its freelance researchers and Kim Man-bae, a former journalist and a key figure in the scandal, who claimed that he had introduced Mr. Cho to the lawyer, who then used his influence with Mr. Yoon to get the case against Mr. Cho dropped. Newstapa said the freelancer was not on assignment when the conversation took place in 2021 and provided the audio only days before the vote.

Mr. Yoon celebrating with party members after his election in March 2022. A few days before the vote, a news outlet published a story that placed him at the center of a controversy from his days as a prosecutor.Credit...Woohae Cho for The New York Times

After Mr. Yoon was elected, the Newstapa article was largely forgotten — until prosecutors raided the freelancer’s home in September, accusing him of taking $122,000 in bribes from Mr. Kim. The freelancer and Mr. Kim both denied bribery, and Newstapa said it was not aware of any financial transactions between the two when it published the article. But it stood by the decision to report the contents of the audio file and accused ​the president of trying to silence an outlet that refused to toe ​his line.

Mr. Yoon’s justice minister demanded accountability and called for a thorough investigation. The Korea Communications Standards Commission, which typically blocks websites featuring gambling, pornography or North Korean propaganda, said it intended to screen all online media to eliminate “fake news” after its new chairman, a Yoon appointee, called it “a clear and present danger.”

“If we don’t stop the spread of fake news,” Mr. Yoon told his staff in September, “it will threaten free democracy and the market economy built on it.”

Newstapa was started in 2012 by journalists disgruntled with what they viewed as the collusion of politics, business and the news media. South Korea’s democracy appears rollicking, but its news organizations have long suffered low public trust, as people viewed them as kowtowing to corporate interests and pandering to partisan bias. Newstapa depends on donations to support its staff of 50 and has published investigative reports critical of South Korea’s elites, ​including big businesses and prosecutors.

“We have been a thorn in the eye for Yoon and prosecutors,” said Sim In-bo, a director of content at Newstapa. ​

​Analysts said the outlet had exposed itself to criticism by running an unsubstantiated allegation so close to a hotly contested election. (Mr. Yoon won by the thinnest margin of any free presidential election in South Korea.) But they also called the government’s response over the top.

“President Yoon, a prosecutor all his life with little experience in politics, has developed a narrow and stern political perspective,” said Kang Won-taek, a political science professor at Seoul National University. “He still acts like a prosecutor. What should be resolved through the political process is taken to law.”

Mr. Yoon ​started as a media-friendly president. He was the first South Korean leader to allow journalists to ask questions when he arrived for work ​in the morning. But that openness did not last long.

At Mr. Yoon’s appearance at a Global Fund conference in New York last year, a South Korean broadcaster caught what it called a hot-mic clip of him using an expletive to describe American ​lawmakers.

After the South Korean broadcaster MBC published what it called a hot-mic clip of the president using an expletive to describe American ​lawmakers last year, he adopted a more hostile stance. Two months later, the next time Mr. Yoon traveled overseas, he banned MBC reporters from his presidential plane. The organization’s “fake news” report, he said, was a “malicious” attempt to create a rift in the alliance with ​Washington.

He also stopped taking questions in the morning.

In South Korea, conservatives and their rivals have both been accused of cracking down on critical news reports when they are in power. When the liberal opposition was in office, it also called fake news “a public enemy” and tried to introduce legislation that would allow hefty financial penalties. The attempt foundered after conservatives pushed back, calling it a “dictatorial” effort to muzzle unfriendly news outlets.

Under Mr. Yoon, the two sides swapped stances. The difference is that the conservative government, rather than trying to introduce a new law, is resorting to an old weapon.

“The government and public figures used libel and slander laws, which broadly define and criminalize defamation, to restrict public discussion and harass, intimidate or censor private and media expression,” the U.S. State Department said in its​ annual human rights report on South Korea in March.

Convictions on defamation charges in South Korea, which are based on whether what was said was “in the public interest” and not on its veracity, can result in fines or up to seven years’ imprisonment.

Mr. Yoon’s office said it had to take legal action to prevent disinformation from spreading and being accepted as fact. But the government’s definition of fake news has raised questions about how to draw lines between disinformation and free speech.

The Foreign Ministry sued MBC after it refused to retract its hot-mic report. Since Mr. Yoon took office, the police have repeatedly raided the offices and homes of reporters and producers at The Tamsa, a YouTube channel that reported on corruption allegations involving Mr. Yoon, his wife​, his mother-in-law (who is in prison for forgery) ​and his justice minister. And in September, prosecutors raided the office of JTBC, a cable channel that reported the same allegation against Mr. Yoon as Newstapa. The authorities have searched the homes or offices of four other journalists who reported similar claims before the election.

Employees of the South Korean broadcaster MBC protested a visit by ruling party lawmakers to their office in Seoul in September 2022. Credit...Pool photo by Yonhap

South Koreans, distrustful of traditional media, have increasingly migrated to YouTube and other online sources for news. These platforms wielded huge influence during the last presidential election, spreading openly partisan views.

“The so-called new media outlets are more aggressive in gathering and distributing facts on key issues of the moment than traditional media,” said Ahn Soo-chan, a journalism professor at Semyung University. “And political power becomes more aggressive in trying to control them.”

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

A version of this article appears in print on , Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: South Korea Targets ‘Fake News,’ But Journalists Fear Censorship

The New York Times · by Choe Sang-Hun · November 10, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

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