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Quotes of the Day:
"Arm yourselves, and be ye men of valor, and be in readiness for the conflict; for it is better for us to perish in battle than to look upon the outrage of our nation and our altar."
- Winston Churchill
"We know why these men fought to keep our freedom -- and why the wars that save a people's liberties are wars worth fighting and worth winning -- and at any cost."
- Franklin D. Roosevelt
"In the end, the only way to maintain the peace is to be prepared in the final extreme to fight for our country -- and to mean it."
- John F. Kennedy
1. Proclamation 3071—Veteran's Day, 1954
2. A Proclamation on Veterans Day, 2023 | The White House
3. “You’re Telling Me That Thing Is Forged?”: The Inside Story of How Trump’s “Body Guy” Tried and Failed to Order a Massive Military Withdrawal
4. I’m a veteran of the special operations community. Here’s how Hollywood glamorized us–and deprived most troops of lifesaving donations | Fortune
5. The Fulbright Paradox: How the "Relic of the Second Zulu War" Continues to Undermine National Security, Part I
6. Green Berets bring annual tribute to JFK’s Arlington gravesite
7. The ‘Forever Wars’ Hidden Costs
8. Mapped: The U.S. states with the highest and lowest shares of veterans
9. China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion
10. Japanese Americans were jailed in a desert. Survivors worry a wind farm will overshadow the past.
11. Can a Soldier Ever Go Home From War?
12. Are We About To Experience 1914 Deja Vu?
13. Deals in Works to Free Hostages Held in Gaza: Reports
14. Elite universities get tougher on antisemitism
15. Russians rue war failures after maps "differ from tactical reality": ISW
16. Russia terminates agreement with Japan on dismantling nuclear weapons
17. Japan Grants Security Assistance to the Philippines, Looks to Enhance Military Cooperation
18. Isolationism Makes a Perilous Moment More So
19. Ordinary Russians Feel Wrath of Putin’s Repression
20. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 10, 2023
21. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2023
22. Iran Update, November 10, 2023
1. Proclamation 3071—Veteran's Day, 1954
34th President of the United States: 1953 ‐ 1961
Proclamation 3071—Veteran's Day, 1954
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-3071-veterans-day-1954#:~:text
October 08, 1954
By the President of the United States of America
A Proclamation
Whereas it has long been our custom to commemorate November 11, the anniversary of the ending of World War I, by paying tribute to the heroes of that tragic struggle and by rededicating ourselves to the cause of peace; and
Whereas in the intervening years the United States has been involved in two other great military conflicts, which have added millions of veterans living and dead to the honor rolls of this Nation; and
Whereas the Congress passed a concurrent resolution on June 4, 1926 (44 Stat. 1982), calling for the observance of November 11 with appropriate ceremonies, and later provided in an act approved May 13, 1938 (52 Stat. 351), that the eleventh of November should be a legal holiday and should be known as Armistice Day; and
Whereas, in order to expand the significance of that commemoration and in order that a grateful Nation might pay appropriate homage to the veterans of all its wars who have contributed so much to the preservation of this Nation, the Congress, by an act approved June 1, 1954 (68 Stat. 168), changed the name of the holiday to Veterans Day:
Now, Therefore, I, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, do hereby call upon all of our citizens to observe Thursday, November 11, 1954, as Veterans Day. On that day let us solemnly remember the sacrifices of all those who fought so valiantly, on the seas, in the air, and on foreign shores, to preserve our heritage of freedom, and let us reconsecrate ourselves to the task of promoting an enduring peace so that their efforts shall not have been in vain. I also direct the appropriate officials of the Government to arrange for the display of the flag of the United States on all public buildings on Veterans Day.
In order to insure proper and widespread observance of this anniversary, all veterans, all veterans' organizations, and the entire citizenry will wish to join hands in the common purpose. Toward this end, I am designating the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs as Chairman of a Veterans Day National Committee, which shall include such other persons as the Chairman may select, and which will coordinate at the national level necessary planning for the observance. I am also requesting the heads of all departments and agencies of the Executive branch of the Government to assist the National Committee in every way possible.
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.
DONE at the City of Washington this eighth day of October in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and fifty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and seventy-ninth.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
By the President:
JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Proclamation 3071—Veteran's Day, 1954 Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/308210
2. A Proclamation on Veterans Day, 2023 | The White House
Note the difference between the 1954 and 2023 proclamations.
A Proclamation on Veterans Day, 2023 | The White House
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 7, 2023
This Veterans Day, we honor the generations of women and men who have served and sacrificed — not for a person, a place, or a President — but for an idea unlike any other: the idea of the United States of America. For nearly 250 years, our veterans have defended the values that make us strong so that our Nation could stand as a citadel of liberty, a beacon of freedom, and a wellspring of possibilities.
Today, I am thinking of all our Nation’s veterans, who put their lives on the line to protect our democracy, values, and freedom around the world. We honor our wounded warriors, so many of whom the First Lady and I have met over the years, who are bound by a common sense of duty, courage, and optimism, and we remember those who are still missing in action or prisoners of war and renew my pledge to bring them home. Our military families, caregivers, and survivors also answer the call to serve. I remember so clearly the pride I felt in our son Beau during his service in Iraq as well as those mornings I saw the First Lady saying a prayer for his safe return. Our veterans and their families give so much to our Nation, and we owe them a debt we can never fully repay.
As a Nation, we have many obligations, but we only have one truly sacred obligation: to prepare and equip the brave women and men we send into harm’s way and to care for them and their loved ones when they return home. Since the beginning of my Administration, we have worked to make good on that promise, passing nearly 30 bipartisan laws to support our veterans and service members and their families, caregivers, and survivors. That includes the PACT Act — the most significant effort in our Nation’s history to help millions of veterans exposed to toxic substances during their military service. Since I signed the PACT Act into law last year, more than 478,000 veterans and survivors are already receiving benefits — ensuring that veterans exposed to burn pits and other harmful substances and their loved ones get access to the care and support they need.
My Administration is also committed to ending veteran suicide and homelessness and ensuring that our veterans have the resources they need to live full lives and thrive in their communities. We released a national strategy to reduce military and veteran suicide by improving lethal means safety and enhancing crisis care as well as by addressing the economic, legal, and mental health issues that impact veterans. The Department of Veterans Affairs is also funding community-led suicide prevention programs, which help connect veterans and their families to needed services. Every veteran deserves a roof over their head, which is why we have taken bold actions to end veteran homelessness, permanently housing more than 40,000 veterans last year and investing $1 billion to provide supportive services to help homeless and at-risk veterans and their families. My Budget also proposes tripling the number of rental-assistance vouchers for extremely low-income veterans to prevent homelessness. Further, we have taken steps to improve the economic security of veterans and their families by expanding job training programs for transitioning veterans and their spouses and issuing rules to protect them from predatory educational institutions. We are also working to ensure every veteran has access to the benefits and services they have earned.
Earlier this year, I signed an Executive Order directing more than 50 actions to improve access to child care and long-term care for Americans, including military and veteran families, and to support family caregivers, especially those who care for our veterans. Recognizing the talents and contributions of veteran and military spouses, caregivers, and survivors to our workforce, I signed an Executive Order establishing the most comprehensive set of administrative actions in our Nation’s history to support their economic security — increasing training and employment opportunities for military spouses in the workforce throughout the transition to veteran spouses status and encouraging all Federal agencies to do more to retain military and veteran spouses through flexible policies. The First Lady’s Joining Forces initiative is further supporting military and veteran families, caregivers, and survivors by improving economic opportunities and expanding resources to promote health and well-being for this community.
As we mark the 50th anniversary of an all-volunteer force and the 75th anniversary of the full integration of women in the Armed Forces and the desegregation of the troops, my Administration reaffirms our commitment to supporting everyone who serves in our Armed Forces. We have taken steps to ensure that the more than 918,000 women veterans enrolled in the Department of Veterans Affairs health care have equitable access to benefits and health services, in part by expanding access to reproductive health care. We have worked to proactively review the military records of veterans discharged under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and to modernize the process of upgrading discharges to help all veterans access their earned benefits. We will continue to support our LGBTQI+ veterans and veterans of color who have made innumerable contributions to our Nation and have truly made our military stronger, tougher, and more capable.
This Veterans Day, may we honor the incredible faith that our veterans hold, not just in our country but in all of us. They are the solid-steel backbone of our Nation, and we must endeavor to continue being worthy of their sacrifices by working toward a more perfect Union and protecting the freedoms that they have fought to defend.
In respect and recognition of the contributions our veterans and their families, caregivers, and survivors have made to the cause of peace and freedom around the world, the Congress has provided (5 U.S.C. 6103(a)) that November 11 of each year shall be set aside as a legal public holiday to honor our Nation’s veterans.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim November 11, 2023, as Veterans Day. I encourage all Americans to recognize the valor, courage, and sacrifice of these patriots through appropriate ceremonies and private prayers and by observing two minutes of silence for our Nation’s veterans. I also call upon Federal, State, and local officials to display the flag of the United States of America and to participate in patriotic activities in their communities.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this seventh day of November, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty-three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-eighth.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 7, 2023
3. “You’re Telling Me That Thing Is Forged?”: The Inside Story of How Trump’s “Body Guy” Tried and Failed to Order a Massive Military Withdrawal
Wow. Quite a read. I bet this will cause quite a stir.
This is a book review of a forthcoming book in Vanity Fair.
In short following the 2020 election there was a push to radically alter US national security (military) posture:
- Get us out of Afghanistan.
- Get us out of Iraq and Syria.
- Complete the withdrawal from Germany.
- Get us out of Africa.
Just wow.
Accurate? I have no knowledge. But if it is accurate it is very troubling.
“You’re Telling Me That Thing Is Forged?”: The Inside Story of How Trump’s “Body Guy” Tried and Failed to Order a Massive Military Withdrawal
In an excerpt from his new book, Tired of Winning, Jonathan Karl reveals how officials were stunned when a presidential directive pulling troops out of Afghanistan and Somalia landed on their desk. Of course, they’d later learn that it wasn’t exactly Trump’s idea.
BY
NOVEMBER 10, 2023
Vanity Fair · by Condé Nast · November 10, 2023
To understand what a second Trump administration would look like, consider Johnny McEntee, the cheerful and upbeat young aide who became Trump’s essential man in the waning days of his presidency. In McEntee, Trump had the ultimate loyalist: He never hesitated to carry out the president’s orders, and he made it his mission to find and remove anyone in the executive branch who was not as devoted to the president as he was. If Trump makes it back to the White House, it would likely be McEntee—or someone like him—doing the hiring and enforcing loyalty.
I reported extensively on McEntee’s role in my last book, Betrayal: The Final Act of the Trump Show. But in the years since Betrayal was published, I have come to learn McEntee’s role was even greater than I had realized—especially during the weeks after Trump lost the 2020 election and before he left office. At just thirty years old, McEntee had become such a powerful figure in the West Wing by late 2020 that one senior staffer described him to me as effectively the deputy president. Having finally realized many of his own advisors were thwarting his wishes—often because they considered them dangerous or illegal—Trump enlisted McEntee to do the things his more senior aides would not.
Johnny McEntee was just twenty‑five years old when he volunteered to work on the Trump campaign in 2015. He didn’t have much experience—he was a production assistant on the news desk at Fox News at the time—but he was eager, confident, and willing to work hard. Most importantly, he loved Donald Trump. A former quarterback at the University of Connecticut, he achieved short-lived internet fame in 2011 when a video of him throwing trick passes went viral. Trump liked having him around and soon made him his personal assistant, taking him along whenever he traveled. As the campaign ramped up, he became Trump’s “body guy,” carrying the candidate’s bags and relaying messages.
McEntee reprised the role in the White House after the 2016 election, but was fired in early 2018 by then-chief of staff John Kelly when a background check turned up a serious gambling habit that was considered to pose a national security risk. He didn’t leave for long, though. After Kelly himself was fired, McEntee returned to the White House in February 2020.
His second stint in the administration proved to be more consequential. McEntee resumed his role as Trump’s body guy with a seat just outside the Oval Office, but he was also named director of the Presidential Personnel Office, which is responsible for the vetting, hiring, and firing of the four thousand political appointees who serve in the executive branch. McEntee may have never hired or fired anybody before in his life, but he was fiercely loyal—and for Trump, that made him the perfect choice for the job.
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McEntee’s efforts to root out Trump infidels in the administration were often comically petty, but they came with the force of a presidential mandate. Just weeks before the 2020 presidential election, for example, somebody on McEntee’s staff discovered that a young woman in the office of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Ben Carson had liked an Instagram post by pop star Taylor Swift that included a photo of Swift holding a tray of cookies decorated with the Biden-Harris campaign logo. The transgression was brought all the way to White House chief of staff Mark Meadows, who placed a call to Carson’s top aide. The message: We can’t have our people liking the social media posts of a high‑profile Biden supporter like Taylor Swift.
When it wasn’t monitoring Trump administration staffers’ social media activity, McEntee’s office conducted interviews with employees throughout the federal government to gauge loyalty to the president. Months after Trump left office, Andrew Kloster, a member of McEntee’s staff who had helped conduct these loyalty interviews, described them as a way of identifying people who claimed to support Trump but weren’t really on the team. “I think the first thing you need to hire for is loyalty,” Kloster explained on a podcast. “The funny thing is, you can learn policy. You can’t learn loyalty.”
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McEntee’s Presidential Personnel Office had about thirty employees, many of them in their twenties and at least a couple without college degrees. In both attitude and mission, they were a Trumpian version of the Red Guard youth of Mao’s Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s who rooted out intellectuals and “class enemies” in the upper ranks of Chinese society. There also seemed to be another requirement: One senior White House official told me McEntee had hired “the most beautiful twenty-year-old girls you could find, and guys who would be absolutely no threat to Johnny in going after those girls.” Some inside the White House called McEntee’s staff “the Rockettes and the Dungeons and Dragons Group.” And in fact, one of McEntee’s assistants had performed with the Radio City Rockettes.
McEntee’s team reached the apex of its power after Trump lost the election in 2020. Within days, they orchestrated sweeping changes to the civilian leadership at the Pentagon that resulted in Defense Secretary Mark Esper and other top officials being fired. In preparing for Esper’s ouster, McEntee and his team created a memo listing the Pentagon chief’s sins against Trump, arguing he “consistently breaks from POTUS’ direction, and has failed to see through his policies.” Among Esper’s supposed transgressions:
- Vowing to be apolitical;
- Opposing the president’s direction to utilize American forces to put down riots;
- Barring the Confederate flag on military bases;
- Focusing the department on Russia;
- Actively pushing for diversity and inclusion; and
- Contradicting the reasoning for and disagreeing with the president’s decision to withdraw troops from Germany.
Trump fired Esper and replaced him with McEntee’s preferred successor, National Counterterrorism Center director and Army Special Forces veteran Christopher Miller. To serve as Miller’s senior advisor, McEntee recruited a retired Army colonel named Douglas Macgregor, whose regular appearances on Fox News had caught the White House’s attention. Chief among his qualifications was his penchant for praising Trump’s approach to US military involvement and calling for martial law along the US-Mexico border.
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Before leaving for the Pentagon, Macgregor sat down in McEntee’s office to go over the acting defense secretary’s sweeping agenda for the final seventy-three days of the lame-duck period before Joe Biden would be sworn into office. As first reported by Axios, on a piece of paper, McEntee jotted down four quick bullet points that, if carried out, would represent a dramatic shift in the global order:
- Get us out of Afghanistan.
- Get us out of Iraq and Syria.
- Complete the withdrawal from Germany.
- Get us out of Africa.
The January 6 Committee’s investigation unearthed the extraordinary story of what happened next—but the information didn’t make it into any of the committee’s hearings or its final report. What follows is based on the sworn testimony of the key players, including McEntee and Macgregor, as well as National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien and General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Three days after Macgregor arrived at the Pentagon, he called McEntee and told him he couldn’t accomplish any of the items on their handwritten to-do list without a signed order from the president.
“Hey, they’re not going to do anything we want, or the president wants, without a directive,” Macgregor told him, emphasizing the need for an official White House order signed by Trump. The Pentagon’s stonewalling made sense, of course: You don’t make major changes to America’s global defense posture based on a glorified Post-it note from the president’s body guy.
The order, Macgregor added, should focus on the top priority from McEntee’s list—Afghanistan—and it had to include a specific date for the complete withdrawal of all uniformed military personnel from the country. He suggested January 31, 2021.
McEntee and an assistant quickly typed up the directive, but they moved the Afghanistan withdrawal timeline up to January 15—just five days before Trump was set to leave office—and added a second mandate: a complete withdrawal of US troops from Somalia by December 31, 2020.
McEntee, of course, didn’t know the first thing about drafting a presidential directive—let alone one instructing the movement of thousands of servicemen and -women. He had two jobs in the White House—only one of which he was qualified for—and neither one had anything to do with national security or the military. An order even 10 percent as consequential as the one McEntee was drafting would typically go through the National Security Council with input from the civilian leadership at the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the military commanders in the region. Instead, the guy who usually carried Trump’s bags was hammering it out on his computer, consulting with nobody but the retired colonel the president had just hired because he had seen him on cable TV.
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The absurdity of the situation was captured in McEntee’s interview with the January 6 Committee:
Q: Is it typical for the Presidential Personnel Office to draft orders concerning troop withdrawal?
McEntee: Probably not typical, no.
Because they were so out of their depth, McEntee and his assistant ended up reaching out to Macgregor again—they didn’t know how to arrange the document they were working on. “I was called on the phone by one of McEntee’s staffers who was having trouble formatting the order and getting the language straight,” Macgregor recalled. The retired colonel told the thirty-year-old staffer to open a cabinet, find an old presidential decision memorandum, and copy it.
Easy enough. The duo wrote up the order, had the president sign it, and sent it over to Kash Patel, the new acting defense secretary’s chief of staff.
Chaos ensued.
Upon receiving the order from his chief of staff, Christopher Miller called Joint Chiefs chairman Mark Milley to his office to discuss next steps. After reading the order, Milley told the January 6 Committee, he looked at Patel, who had just started working at the Pentagon three days earlier.
“Who gave the president the military advice for this?” Milley asked him. “Did you do this?”
“No,” Patel answered. “I had nothing to do with it.”
Milley turned to the acting defense secretary. “Did you give the President military advice on this?” he asked.
“No. Not me,” Miller answered.
“Okay, well, we’ve got to go over and see the president,” Milley said, noting his job required him to provide military advice to the commander in chief. “I’ve got duties to do here, constitutional duties. I’ve got to make sure he’s properly advised.”
And with that, Miller and Milley went to the White House to see Robert O’Brien, Trump’s national security advisor.
“Robert, where’s this coming from?” Milley asked O’Brien. “Is this true?”
“I’ve never seen it before,” O’Brien told him.
They were joined in the meeting by retired lieutenant general Keith Kellogg, the national security advisor to Vice President Pence. “Something is really wrong here,” Kellogg said, reading through the order. “This doesn’t look right.”
“You’re telling me that thing is forged?” Milley responded in disbelief. “That’s a forged piece of paper directing a military operation by the president of the United States? That’s forged, Keith?”
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Despite McEntee’s best efforts—which included not only the advice from Macgregor but several minutes of searching the internet—the only part of the document that looked anything like an official presidential order was Trump’s signature at the bottom. But even that, Kellogg thought, could have been the work of an autopen used to mimic the president’s autograph on thousands of unofficial letters sent out by the White House.
“Let me see if I can get to the bottom of this,” O’Brien told the group, before heading to White House counsel Pat Cipollone’s office on the second floor of the West Wing.
Cipollone, whose office was responsible for reviewing all presidential orders, said he hadn’t seen the document and knew nothing about it. When Derek Lyons, the White House staff secretary responsible for filing and transmitting official presidential orders, told them he hadn’t seen the directive either, the group knew they needed to go see the president himself.
They found him where he spent most of his time after the November election—in his private dining room next to the Oval Office, where the television on the wall was almost always on. Once the president confirmed he had indeed signed the document, O’Brien and Cipollone explained to him that such an order should go through some sort of process, and that an abrupt movement of so many US troops would be dangerous and unwise without proper planning. At the very least, they told him, such an order should be reviewed by White House lawyers.
“I said this would be very bad,” O’Brien recalled telling Trump. “Our position is that because it didn’t go through any proper process—the lawyers hadn’t cleared it, the staff [secretary] hadn’t cleared it, NSC [National Security Council] hadn’t cleared it—that it’s our position that the order is null and void.”
According to O’Brien, the president didn’t object. Trump’s bold plan for ending the war in Afghanistan before the end of his term was dashed as quickly and apathetically as it was slapped together. “It’s rescinded. It’s over,” O’Brien said when he returned to his office, where the acting defense secretary and Joint Chiefs chairman had been waiting for about fifteen minutes. Milley breathed a sigh of relief. “Okay, fine,” he said. “So it doesn’t exist.”
Trump’s backers will likely read this story and see yet another example of the “deep state” thwarting the president on an issue important to him and the people who elected him. But in reality, the episode demonstrated once again that the president of the United States couldn’t get the people he appointed to carry out his policies because he couldn’t be bothered to learn how to implement them. As soon as he realized an Afghanistan withdrawal would require more work than having McEntee scribble up a note, he dropped it entirely.
From TIRED OF WINNING: Donald Trump and the End of the Grand Old Party, to be published on November 14th, 2023, by Dutton, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House, LLC. Copyright (c) 2023 by Jonathan D. Karl.
4. I’m a veteran of the special operations community. Here’s how Hollywood glamorized us–and deprived most troops of lifesaving donations | Fortune
I did not expect this kind of article but now that I read it, it does make sense.
Maybe it is time to rethink my donation strategy. What are we doing for our "Grunts?"
Excerpts:
The numbers tell a part of the story but they miss the details. While the Pararescue Foundation is poorly funded compared to the Navy SEAL Foundation, I am still part of “the club” since I’m a veteran of the special operations community. Doors are left open for me and where they aren’t I can whisper the magic words, “I was a PJ,” and the latch is pulled back. But my experience in combat was no more severe and, in many cases, less severe than conventional troops–collectively referred to as the Grunts–who neither have effective nonprofits to their name nor a brand beyond being the targets of patriotic sympathy.
What doesn’t come through in the numbers is that all veterans need the help of non-profit organizations to fill in the gaps left wide open by the VA. These are the avenues for accessing personalized mental healthcare, top-level career bridging, robust familial support, and focused counseling on how to navigate the VA’s labyrinthine disability system, which can mean the difference between transitioning into financial freefall or hopping into a comfortable cadence of monthly governmental stipends. It’s obvious why more equal access to these services is critical.
I’m a veteran of the special operations community. Here’s how Hollywood glamorized us–and deprived most troops of lifesaving donations | Fortune
Fortune · by Pat Gault
When I entered the special operations community in 2003, “veteran nonprofit services” meant partaking in cheap beers and drunken war myths, courtesy of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, a charitable organization that has been around for more than 120 years. Today, the term conjures other images: An obscure, tax-exempt industry that is fueled by the public’s frustration with the Department of Veteran Affairs and is leveraged to favor the elite within the armed forces.
Most Americans share a similar view of the veteran community. By and large, we are a sentimentalized, homogenous group of heroic victims. That is, unless we fall under recognizable categories such as “fighter pilot” or “Navy SEAL,” and are therefore deified in movies and books. This has broad ramifications: For decades, Hollywood and the publishing industry have aided the military in its recruitment efforts. However, the idealization of specialty groups within the military has also impacted the distribution of charitable donations to organizations aimed at helping veterans with healthcare (in areas where the VA falls short) and with the transition to the private sector.
In short, these “elite” groups, especially the ones who have enjoyed the most attention in popular culture, are attracting and absorbing a disproportionate amount of the country’s well-meaning donations to its veterans.
For example, I come from the Air Force Pararescue community, also known as the PJs. To become a PJ, an airman must first complete years of training which is among the most difficult in the military. The resulting gang of qualified PJs is a hyper-focused, agile, and subconsciously aligned tribe of operators who can carry out extremely complex rescue missions with a small team. There is a smattering of other groups within the military that are similar in their effectiveness, such as the SEALs, Green Berets, and others that you’ve heard of and many you haven’t. Each of these job-specific organizations can be distilled down to being a collection of highly effective, highly motivated individuals with a knack for getting what they want through creative and aggressive modalities.
We are ready-made networks of high performers–but not all of us are good at marketing ourselves and this is reflected in the funding of our associated nonprofits. The Pararescue Foundation is worth just under $400,000, which is not a lot, even for a community as small as ours (there are around 500 active PJs at any given time, in addition to a proportionate number of family members and living alumni). Compare that to the Navy SEAL Foundation, which serves SEALs and SWCCs (Special Warfare Combat Crewmen), a population estimated to be around 3,300 active members plus their proportionate family members and alumni–with current assets sitting comfortably at just under a staggering $135 million. And just to measure those numbers against a broad-spectrum organization serving all service members, veterans, and family members, the assets of the Wounded Warrior Project, which provides physical and emotional health services to all veterans, are at just under $450 million. (The Department of Defense’s 2021 report on demographics put the number of Guard, Reserve, active duty, and family members at 4.7 million and the U.S. Census put the number of living veterans at 18 million in 2018.)
The numbers tell a part of the story but they miss the details. While the Pararescue Foundation is poorly funded compared to the Navy SEAL Foundation, I am still part of “the club” since I’m a veteran of the special operations community. Doors are left open for me and where they aren’t I can whisper the magic words, “I was a PJ,” and the latch is pulled back. But my experience in combat was no more severe and, in many cases, less severe than conventional troops–collectively referred to as the Grunts–who neither have effective nonprofits to their name nor a brand beyond being the targets of patriotic sympathy.
What doesn’t come through in the numbers is that all veterans need the help of non-profit organizations to fill in the gaps left wide open by the VA. These are the avenues for accessing personalized mental healthcare, top-level career bridging, robust familial support, and focused counseling on how to navigate the VA’s labyrinthine disability system, which can mean the difference between transitioning into financial freefall or hopping into a comfortable cadence of monthly governmental stipends. It’s obvious why more equal access to these services is critical.
America obsesses over the heroics of special operators, specifically those who have developed a brand–the ones represented over and over again in countless movies and books. And while most of the country remains either unaware or apathetic to who is–and isn’t–the beneficiary of their help, their charitable contributions favor the veterans who are most visible, not the ones who might be most in need.
So, if you want to help a vet in need, focus on the ones silenced by their trauma and muted by the magic of marketing. The true heroes aren’t the ones getting book deals–and sometimes, not even the healthcare services they desperately need.
Pat Gault is a retired Air Force Pararescueman (PJ) and lives in Anchorage, Alaska.
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Fortune · by Pat Gault
5. The Fulbright Paradox: How the "Relic of the Second Zulu War" Continues to Undermine National Security, Part I
Very important read from Matt Armstrong. Again, as I usually say he is one of our nations' foremost authorities on public diplomacy and information and influence. He exposes Senator Fulbright and Smith Mundt and the myths surrounding them. Until I met and began learning from Matt I used to spout these myths (especially about Smith Mundt and USIA) and I thought Fulbright supported American influence. I continue to get things wrong and mistakenly perpetuate myths but now I have Matt to correct me (and believe me he does).
Pledge your support
The Fulbright Paradox: How the "Relic of the Second Zulu War" Continues to Undermine National Security, Part I
https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/the-fulbright-paradox-how-the-relic?utm_source=post-email-title&publication_id=773227&post_id=122026630&utm_campaign=email-post-title&isFreemail=true&r=7i07&utm_medium=email
The first of an occasional series
MATT ARMSTRONG
NOV 10, 2023
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A striking mythology surrounds Senator J. William Fulbright as a patron saint for US public diplomacy. It is found in many biographies – with some works arguably worthy of the label hagiography – and countless descriptions of US exchange programs. It is a narrative that is not just selective, it is built on inaccuracies and flagrant omissions. Understanding Fulbright’s true relationship with US public diplomacy reveals his actual lasting legacy: the kneecapping of US global engagement.
This is the first of an occasional series of posts that takes aim at the mythology of Fulbright’s contribution to US public diplomacy. The specific focus of this post is how Fulbright’s deliberate acts continue to have a deleterious effect on how we conceive, organize, and conduct international information programs.
It is profoundly ironic that scholarly and legal analyses, not to mention policy discussions, about confronting disinformation and misinformation are often filled with and rely on misinformation. Exposing this history often feels like tilting at windmills. But as a budding historian on the subject, the devils that lay in the detail reveal a trajectory at significant variance with the accepted narrative. Around the topic of the Smith-Mundt Act, discussions are remarkably deficient and often start with a post-Fulbright narrative and then work backward. The result is Fulbright’s intentions are filtered, laundered, ignored, or, more often, simply unrealized. A product of this distorted history can be found in a Gates Center report from 2022:
Yet, legislative restrictions inhibit America’s ability to cultivate a strong domestic constituency to advance U.S. reputational security. A 1972 revision to the Smith-Mundt Act (with the good intention of protecting the American people from being propagandized by their own government) separated foreign and domestic strategic communications, but with the unintended consequence of hurting the ability of the agencies tasked with these activities from engaging with the U.S. public to build their awareness, leverage their capabilities, or ensure that the government’s efforts are transparent and accountable.1
This paragraph tells us that Fulbright’s 1972 “revision” came from a “good intention,” but it didn’t. The accepted history here is wrong, reinforced by faulty arguments in law review articles like “Apple Pie Propaganda?” by Weston Sager and “The Smith-Mundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda” by Allen Palmer and Edward Carter.2 The “unintended consequences” were, in fact, Fulbright’s intended consequences. Reading this, it is difficult to imagine the scope of the “revision” was limited to the US Information Agency. Except it was. The USIA and its Voice of America operated under the authority of the Smith-Mundt Act. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (merged five years later into RFE/RL) were not established by the Smith-Mundt Act, nor did they fall under the Smith-Mundt Act’s purview, and thus were not affected at the time by the amendment. The same lack of applicability was true of the White House, the State Department, the Defense Department, or any other government agency. And yet, we are led to believe from the parenthetical and virtually every other reference to the Act in this context, including notably seemingly every law review article looking at the Smith-Mundt Act, that the application and intent was the whole of government. These analyses fail to distinguish between the vast information programs enabled by the Act (including increasing funding for public affairs officers in the field to do what they do) from the broadcast radio operation (Voice of America). It doesn’t take a close read to realize the law review articles focus on the radio operations rather than on the former, which were vastly more extensive in terms of dollars, audience, scope, and personnel.3
A tweet from an executive producer for CBS News
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The roots of his 1972 “revision” to the Act were on stark display in a Senate hearing five years earlier, but the seeds were evident in 1953 with his influence on what did and did not move from the State Department to USIA. However, his efforts to undermine international information engagement were not limited to USIA or Smith-Mundt and included killing an effort that enjoyed bipartisan support and broad public awareness and support to better defend the nation and its interests against foreign political warfare.4
The amendment resulted from Fulbright’s argument that simply allowing the US public to see what USIA produced for foreign audiences would make the agency an arbiter of truth and worse. To better grasp Fulbright’s position, see the dialogue snippet below from a 1967 hearing between Fulbright and Dr. Frank Stanton, the chairman of the US Advisory Commission on Information, the president of CBS, and, until a week before this hearing, also the chairman of the RAND Corporation.5
Chairman Fulbright: You, I think, are saying that all of our foreign propaganda is the truth, and I think this is very questionable. The truth is that most Government propaganda diverges from the truth…
Dr. Frank Stanton6: Is there not a better chance or a better opportunity, Mr. Chairman, if the press, the public, and the Congress can look over the shoulders and check what is being said? Is there not a better opportunity to make sure that we do not indulge in anything other than the truth as we see it?
Fulbright: It has been the common practice throughout history for governments to distort the truth for their own purposes, just as I think was done in the Defense Department film. Personally, I think the account, historically speaking, given by General Westmoreland before the Associated Press in New York yesterday had some grave inaccuracies in it. I do not think it is true that this is not a civil war. I think it is a civil war, and all the scholarly authorities in this field outside of the Government so state. There certainly is a difference of opinion. But here you have a recent example. Since CBS carried it, does that mean you thought it was the truth?
Stanton: No, I think when a responsible officer of Government or the military makes a statement, we cover it as news. We do not say that because we carry it, it is necessarily true.
Fulbright: Just because the USIA carries it does not make it necessarily true either, does it?
Stanton: No, but I did not think that was necessarily the issue here. I think there is a better chance of making sure that they tell the truth if the people here can judge it.
Fulbright: What people here? You mean the public generally?
Stanton: Yes.
…
Fulbright: It seems to me if the USIA tells the truth, as you seem to believe, then the U.S. public can know what the USIA is saying through the established media, through CBS, the Baltimore Sun, and the New York Times. Are they not truthful?
Stanton: I would be the last to say that they were not, but that is not the point of the exercise. It is to let the people see what our Government is saying to the rest of the world. It is not a question of testing the truth in each instance.
Fulbright: Then it is important to know what the USIA is saying by checking on whether they are telling the truth or not.
Stanton: That would be one of the by-products of the exercise [of clarifying “on request” to allow greater domestic access to USIA materials].
Fulbright: I think that is the reason it is made available to Members of Congress or members of the press. The members of the press can go to USIA and check the truth of the information. But to make it publicly available, I think, is turning it into propaganda. If a Communist country did it, we would call it brainwashing.7
Stanton: Only if the Government or only the agency active distributed the material. That is the distinction that would make.8
There is a crucial point of distinction that Fulbright refused to entertain and law review articles and the like ignore: the difference between accessibility and distribution. Stanton said before the above exchange: “It is not our suggestion that USIA product be made available to tell us about us, but that we may know what our government is telling others.”
Barring domestic oversight and awareness and policing domestic access to the content was, Stanton pointed out in his dual-hatted role of oversight and advocacy, problematic:
We are saying to the people in Indonesia or in Africa, “What you are hearing about the United States, the people in the United States are not allowed to hear about. We are telling you one thing, but the people in the States are not privy to this information.” If we are going to be persuasive, that our freedom means something to the people in the developing countries, and for that matter all over the world, I see no reason why we cannot let the people here see what we are saying outside the United States.
Pledge your support
It should be clear by now that Fulbright’s position was based on distrust and dislike of the executive branch’s public statements. He responded by attacking and trying to shutter or muzzle what he could. In 1972, the amendment was just one prong of a broader effort by Fulbright to eliminate funding for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and starve VOA while strangling USIA.9 Fulbright’s attempt to slash funding for these operations is a forgotten failure. However, his other line of attack, revising the Smith-Mundt Act’s provision that intentionally provided for transparency and oversight to erect significant barriers to both, was a success.
His broad brush strokes were not just because he didn’t want the US public to know what USIA and VOA sent abroad or that RFE requests for public donations should note funding also came from the US government. He felt these operations were inherently wrong. In 1953, he successfully argued to keep the exchange programs from moving from the State Department to the new USIA to avoid the taint of the information programs.
While seemingly a minor correction to the Smith-Mundt Act at the time, its harmful effects continue to be felt today. In another post, I’ll discuss Sen. Zorinsky’s 1985 amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act to close the “loophole” in Fulbright’s amendment, a change that led a federal court to rule USIA materials were exempt from Freedom of Information Act requests. I doubt Fulbright would have imagined the extent of the damage done by his 1972 amendment to the Smith-Mundt Act, but I am wholly confident he would be pleased.
The 1972 revision, furthered by the 1985 amendment, led to the “firewall” concept that was played up by USIA alumni after 1999 when most of USIA’s information operations returned to the State Department. The effort to maintain a separation between domestic and foreign engagement at the State Department was also evident in the title of the notional successor to the USIA Director, the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.10
But what happens now that the State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs, formerly the most significant yet ignored artifact of the former USIA, has returned to its original home of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, renamed the Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs? I don’t know, but we have something of a full circle. The Assistant Secretary for Public and Cultural Affairs, established in December 1944, was “to develop a program designed to provide American citizens with more information concerning their country’s foreign policy and to promote closer understanding with the peoples of foreign countries.” This meant this position owned both the domestic and foreign information and exchange portfolio until 1952.11 Today, instead of quality-based challenges resulting from oversight and awareness, we have the blanket Fulbrightian-based “anti-propaganda” narrative that denies awareness of intent, content, and value. This is fundamentally against the original and clear intent of the Smith-Mundt Act.
You’ve read this far, so you’re probably wondering about the title of this note. The Fulbright paradox is not just about his elitism, one expression of which was that “he considered democracy in many ways a dangerous experiment,” with another was his focus on elite university-level scholars.12 Or his atrocious civil rights record.13
The paradox is his antipathy to public diplomacy organizations and operations, outside of exchanges (or rather, exchanges as long as they didn’t have the Mundt name on them). During a budget hearing in 1971, Fulbright opined that “Radio Free Europe has done more to keep alive the cold war and prevent agreement with Russia and improved relations than good.” In 1972, on his way to passing the “revision” the Gates Center report recalled, Fulbright declared Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty should be “given the opportunity to take their rightful place in the graveyard of Cold War relics.”14
In 1973, Fulbright’s “political cliches” and “semantic blackmail” levied against the USIA, VOA, RFE, and RL over the prior decade led a witness in a Senate hearing to ponder why Fulbright wasn’t referred to as a “relic of the Second Zulu War.”
The Smith-Mundt Act was developed and designed to counter foreign disinformation, correct foreign misinformation, and fill in the gaps in the absence of information abroad about the US, its policies, and the society behind those policies to help audiences understand the nation’s intentions. It was also, it’s worth noting, to help promote the then-new United Nations as a means for international peace, though much of that language was removed before the final signing. Despite reality, and the clear text and purpose of the Smith-Mundt Modernization Act of 2012,15 there remains the irony of continuing misinformation around the legislation, its function, and the intentions of the original act and those who amended it.
This missive should provide some background for what will be an occasional series highlighting how Fulbright willfully hampered the nation’s non-military means of engaging with the world. Put another way, he helped militarize US foreign policy by denigrating, handicapping, and relegating non-military methods that were critical then and remain, if not more so, today.
The lament below, from 1963, followed an earlier, and totally forgotten, act of Fulbright’s against a similar effort to deal with foreign disinformation and subversion, and unrelated to USIA. The quote remains relevant today, just as it remains true that Fulbright is arguably the central cause of why we lack a solid comprehension of the tools, policies, support, and oversight we require today.
“Someday this nation will recognize that global non-military conflict must be pursued with the same intensity and preparation as global military conflicts”
1
Custer, Samantha. Reputational Security: The Imperative to Reinvest in America’s Strategic Communications Capabilities. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2022, p18. Download: https://www.aiddata.org/publications/reputational-security-the-imperative-to-reinvest-in-americas-strategic-communications-capabilities.
2
Sager, W. R. (2015). Apple Pie Propaganda? The Smith-Mundt Act Before and After the Repeal of the Domestic Dissemination Ban. Northwestern University Law Review, 109, 511-546. Palmer, A. W., & Carter, E. L. (2006). The Smith-Mundt Act’s Ban on Domestic Propaganda: An Analysis of the Cold War Statute Limiting Access to Public Diplomacy. Communication Law and Policy, 11(1), 1.
Interestingly, Palmer and Carter eventually arrive at a recommendation that aligns with the original intent of Congress, the State Department, and the press when the Smith-Mundt Act was debated and signed into law: “But, if taxpayers who fund the production of international propaganda desire to view the materials for themselves and initiate a request under the Freedom of Information Act, the government should not be allowed to keep the materials shrouded in secrecy.” On the other hand, while better at recalling history, Sager still misses critical details that undermine the propaganda of their “Apple Pie Propaganda” narrative. These not understanding “for dissemination abroad” was an explicit blanket authority requested by the State Department, not a restriction imposed by Congress. That the “on request” language was a mutually agreed upon budgetary and practical barrier not intended to prohibit domestic access. The concern was Members of Congress and the press would make blanket requests for materials that would never be read but would require more funding for the department for additional translators, typists, filing capacity, etc. The non-compete clause in the Act is inadequately considered in its domestic intent and effect on foreign operations. Further, the law review articles fail to distinguish between types of content as they often conflate source agencies while failing to distinguish between broad information programs and broadcast operations, instead relying on vague implications. There are other points, but this is a footnote.
3
Even as late as September 1947, the State Department’s objective was still to move the radio operations – Voice of America – out of the government. In a list of the State Department’s pending legislation near the end of the first session of the 80th Congress supported, number 3 was a bill to move the radio into a not-for-profit funded by the government. The top two bills were “Entry of Displaced Persons” and the World Health Organization, with the pending Smith-Mundt bill nowhere on the list. It was co-sponsor Smith, by the way, who primarily blocked the privatization of VOA.
4
See https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/the-past-present-and-future-of-the-war-for-public-opinion/.
5
The Smith-Mundt Act established the US Advisory Commission on Information to provide expert, timely, and relevant advice to Congress, the Secretary of State, and the White House. The commission was subsequently merged with its sister commission focused on exchanges to become the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. It requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to consider today’s commission relevant or capable of engaging in an even remotely similar discussion.
6
Stanton was then the chairman of the US Advisory Commission on Information. He was also the president of CBS and, until a week before the 1967 hearing this exchange is from, had been the chairman of the RAND Corporation. It requires imagination to pretend today’s commission might be viewed as relevant or capable in such a discussion today. I’m hard-pressed to imagine a commission member participating in a similar debate today. Further, I’m not aware that any of the present members of this commission have ever been asked for their input in a Congressional hearing.
7
“Brainwashing” here was Fulbright referring to the article “On the Way to 1984” by Henry Steele Commager, professor of history at Amherst College, published on April 15, 1967, in the weekly magazine Saturday Review. Commager opening included this line, which Fulbright clearly agreed with: “Now the information agencies of our own State and Defense Departments, the USIA, and the CIA, seem bent on creating an American Ministry of Truth and imposing upon the American people record of the past which they themselves write.”
8
Before the above exchange, Fulbright asks Stanton about Radio Free Europe. Fulbright took umbrage with the public line that RFE “was supported by private funds, send your contribution.” Fulbright objected that public solicitations did not say funding was “in part” by public donations, as in it also received government funding. “Do you know who really supports Radio Free Europe?” asked Fulbright. Stanton replied, “I believe it is one of the best-kept open secrets that we have.”
9
Fulbright's 25% cut to USIA’s budget was intended to fall heaviest on VOA. USIA anticipated reducing VOA’s language services from 35 to just 11. This reminds me of three conversations I participated in as a Governor on the Broadcasting Board of Governors. First was the salon dinner (8 people) at a DC-area home where Alec Ross, sitting next to me, argued the BBG should shrink to three or four languages and “surge” into other languages when necessary. Second, there was a meeting with the Office of Management and Budget about the BBG’s budget. The OMB suggested BBG start taking advertising sponsors to reduce the federal appropriation by as much as 50%. Another shocking display of ignorance of the BBG’s audiences and environments (i.e., generally not open to safe commercial trade, must build and maintain trust), not to mention the inevitable influence sponsors would have on content. The audience and environment issues seemed to have a lesser effect on the OMB than learning there would need to be a new internal bureaucracy at BBG to manage the advertiser/sponsor relationships. Third was an argument by a colleague at my level who felt BBG’s news operations were mere translators and could be shuttered, with the broadcast ops simply would forwarding NBC, CBS, Fox, CNN, etc, abroad.
10
Adopting the term “public diplomacy” in 1965 is a different story. See my chapter for a discussion on this: https://books.google.ch/books?id=kuYJEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT110#v=onepage&q&f=false
11
The office was established in December 1944 with Archibald MacLeish as the inaugural incumbent. William Benton, MacLeish’s successor, removed culture from the title because it was, he said, a lightning rod. The Assistant Secretary had this broad portfolio until 1952 when it was turned over to the Administrator of the newly established International Information Administration, a semi-autonomous unit in State. Technically, USIA came from ripping much of IIA from State rather than from the Assistant Secretary’s portfolio.
With the expanded Assistant Secretary for Global Public Affairs, I’m still wondering what the unique role of the notionally superior Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy is. Let’s not forget this under secretary has not had a confirmed incumbent for nearly half of the past two dozen years. See https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/r-changes-coming.
12
There is an interesting division between those involved in education that supported the information programs. Those who sought to engage students and teachers at elementary school and above supported the information programs (Rockefeller, Mundt, Benton). Those who opposed were focused only on university-level education (Cherrington, Fulbright).
13
Here’s how Fulbright biographer Randall Bennett Woods described Fulbright: “That J. William Fulbright was a racist is indisputable. He would claim throughout his career that his position on civil rights was a matter of political expediency… To his mind the blacks he knew were not equal to whites nor could they be made so by legislative decree.” But then Woods follows up: “On a personal level he judged people by their manners, personal cleanliness, and education, not by their skin color; but he did not feel compelled by Christian duty or social conscience to use the power of the state to remedy historical wrongs, correct maldistribution of wealth, or legislation equality of opportunity.” Woods, R. B. (1995). Fulbright: a Biography. Cambridge University Press, p115. In January 2009, I was on a panel of public diplomacy luminaries and had the chance to meet Harriet Fulbright, the wife of the late Senator. After the panel, I asked her about his views on race. “He had his faults,” she said. The quote about democracy is found on p110 of Woods's biography.
14
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations. (1973). Negotiation and statecraft hearings, Ninety-third Congress, first session. Pursuant to section 4, Senate resolution 46, 93d Congress. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, p66. For Fulbright’s statement, see Gwertzman, B. (1972, February 21) “Funding Near End for U.S. Stations Aimed at Red Bloc.” The New York Times, pA1. The whole sentence was, “These radios should be given an opportunity to take their rightful place in the graveyard of cold war relics.” (Cold war is indeed lowercase in the original.)
15
It continues to boggle my mind that Defense Department folks still cite the Smith-Mundt Act as blocking this, that, or the other of their planned or desired activities when the Modernization Act’s cause, purpose, and clear language affirms this Act has nothing to do with the Defense Department. Does anyone read this stuff?
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By Matt Armstrong · Launched 2 years ago
Discussing the past and present of political warfare and public diplomacy
6. Green Berets bring annual tribute to JFK’s Arlington gravesite
Another great ceremony conducted by the Special Forces Regiment.
Green Berets bring annual tribute to JFK’s Arlington gravesite
Stars and Stripes · by Carlos Bongioanni · November 10, 2023
A crowd including military leaders, members of Congress, Army Green Berets and honor guard members stand and salute during the playing of the National Anthem at Arlington National Cemetery, where a wreath-laying ceremony was held Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2023, to commemorate former President John F. Kennedy’s contributions to Special Forces. The ceremony took place at Arlington’s Eternal Flame, a memorial at JFK’s grave site. The former president was assassinated six decades ago on Nov. 22, 1963. (Carlos Bongioanni/Stars and Stripes)
ARLINGTON NATIONAL CEMETERY, Va. — The eternal flame was burning strong as a contingent of Army Green Berets descended on Arlington National Cemetery to pay homage to former President John F. Kennedy.
Wednesday’s tribute, three days before Veterans Day, came six decades after Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, and was in keeping with an annual pilgrimage members of the 1st Special Forces Command make to honor Kennedy’s legacy.
During the wreath-laying portion of the ceremony, Command Sgt. Maj. David Waldo, the senior enlisted leader of the 1st SF command, removed his beret and placed it on the pavement at Kennedy’s gravesite a few feet from the burning flame.
Army Green Berets and honor guard members salute at Arlington National Cemetery, where a wreath-laying ceremony was held Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2023, to commemorate former President John F. Kennedy’s contributions to Special Forces. The ceremony took place at Arlington’s Eternal Flame, a memorial at JFK’s gravesite. The former president was assassinated six decades ago on Nov. 22, 1963. (Carlos Bongioanni/Stars and Stripes)
Command Sgt. Maj. David Waldo, the senior enlisted leader of the 1st Special Forces Command, kneels as he places his beret on the pavement at the gravesite of former President John F. Kennedy during a wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery on Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2023. (Carlos Bongioanni/Stars and Stripes)
Army Green Berets stand at attention beside the John F. Kennedy Eternal Flame at Arlington National Cemetery, where a token green beret cover was placed during a wreath-laying ceremony on Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2023, to commemorate JFK’s contributions to Special Forces. The former president was assassinated six decades ago on Nov. 22, 1963. (Carlos Bongioanni/Stars and Stripes)
Taps is played on Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2023, at Arlington National Cemetery, where Army Green Berets held a wreath laying ceremony to commemorate former President John F. Kennedy’s contributions to Special Forces. The ceremony took place at Arlington’s Eternal Flame, a memorial at JFK’s gravesite. The former president was assassinated six decades ago on Nov. 22, 1963. (Carlos Bongioanni/Stars and Stripes)
Attending a wreath-laying ceremony at Arlington National Cemetery on Wednesday, Nov. 8, 2023, are from left, Chief Warrant Officer 5 Felix Mosqueda, Command Chief Warrant Officer for 1st Special Forces Command; Command Sergeant Major David Waldo, senior enlisted leader for 1st Special Forces Command; U.S. Rep. Sanford Bishop, D-Ga.; Sen. Markwayne Mulin, R-Okla.; Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, daughter of Robert Kennedy, niece of John F. Kennedy; Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth; Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro; Big. Gen Lawrence Ferguson, Commanding General 1st Special Forces Command; Maj. Gen. Patrick Roberson, Deputy Commanding General U.S. Army Special Operations Command. (Carlos Bongioanni/Stars and Stripes)
The beret placed at the gravesite and the presence of the special forces members is seen as a type of reenactment of the funeral ceremony held 60 years ago when the Kennedy family asked that Green Berets join the honor guard at the funeral.
It was at that funeral that then-Command Sgt. Maj. Francis Ruddy removed his beret and placed it on Kennedy’s grave, a tradition that has continued since.
Kennedy holds a special place of honor among the Army’s special forces in that he authorized in 1961 the green beret as their official headgear. Since then, those elite warriors of the U.S. military have been known as the Green Berets.
Stars and Stripes · by Carlos Bongioanni · November 10, 2023
7. The ‘Forever Wars’ Hidden Costs
Excerpt:
In the end, neither John Walker of Waters’ novel nor Miles Lagoze can leave their pasts behind them and just get on with their lives. The endless wars waged by successive U.S. presidents have had consequences that followed their participants home. “Soldiers,” Lagoze writes, “are instruments of the state.” Perhaps Carl Cannon summed it up best in his Forward to River City One: “[T]hose of us who . . . stand and cheer for veterans and their families at the ballpark, or who tell men and women in uniform, ‘Thank you for your service,’ can do more. For starters, we can read their memoirs and their novels. And after doing so, we can look with deep skepticism on elected officials who are too eager to send young Americans off to war.”
The ‘Forever Wars’ Hidden Costs
By Francis P. Sempa
November 10, 2023
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/11/10/the_forever_wars_hidden_costs_991949.html?mc_cid=f141467e78&mc_eid=70bf478f36&utm
SPECIAL SERIES:
Any true postmortems on the 21st century wars in Iraq and Afghanistan should factor in the domestic human costs of those conflicts. Not just the casualty lists--the dead, wounded, and missing that litter every war--but also the effect of the wars on those who survived. Two new books written by veterans of combat--one a memoir by a Marine combat cameraman who served in Helmand Province in Afghanistan, the other a novel about the postwar life of a survivor by a Marine combat veteran of both wars--shed light on the hidden costs of endless wars, and should be read by U.S. policymakers before they send more young Americans into harm’s way.
Miles Lagoze’s Whistles from the Graveyard: My Time Behind the Camera on War, Rage, and Restless Youth in Afghanistan is a raw, introspective look at the harsh realities of war, a vivid snapshot of some of the soldiers who were sent to fight the “Global War on Terror,” and a story of the human “costs” of endless wars at the micro level. Lagoze was not a “gung-ho” Marine when he joined-up, and his service there--what he saw and experienced--soured him even more on the Marine Corps and the “military-industrial complex” that sent young Americans to wage a “forever war” that seemed to have no real purpose. Officially, successive U.S. administrations said we were fighting in Afghanistan and later in Iraq to avenge the attacks of 9/11, to find and kill the terror-masters who planned the attacks, to find and destroy weapons of mass destruction, to prevent another 9/11 from occurring, to form stable democratic governments in Afghanistan and Iraq, to defeat insurgencies that arose in both countries after we “won” the wars. Some neoconservative writers and policymakers said we were fighting a “world war” against Islamic fascism. The goalposts kept moving. Soldiers, who endured multiple combat deployments, kept dying and suffering terrible wounds. Like in Vietnam, we were repeatedly told that there was light at the end of the tunnel, but we never seemed to reach the end of the tunnel.
To Lagoze and many of his fellow Marines on the ground in Afghanistan none of this made sense. They saw first-hand that Afghanistan wasn’t really a “country.” Apparently our policymakers forgot or never learned that Afghanistan was “the graveyard of empires.” Lagoze’s job was to film America’s victory in battles at the front--but in this war there wasn’t any “front” and there were no real victories. But among the troops he was supposed to film there was, according to Lagoze, a lot of drug and alcohol use, some suicides, some misogyny, some cruelty to animals--the endless war and multiple deployments had taken their toll. We had courageous heroes in Afghanistan, too, but they don’t make it into Lagoze’s memoir. The endless war took its toll on him, too. He was wounded during combat and received a Purple Heart, but the psychological wounds were more lasting. Especially when he filmed what he believed was an unnecessary killing by some of his fellow Marines of a wounded Afghan in Helmand Province. But that was something he was not supposed to film. He describes his job as a “propagandist” whose job was to build support at home for America’s war abroad. If Americans saw what war was really like, support would dry up--the politicians and the Pentagon and the arms producers (the “military industrial complex”) wouldn’t like that. I believe it was George Will who once wrote that if there had been film crews showing the fighting at Gettysburg or Antietam, America would be two nations today.
Some veterans, Lagoze writes, come to realize that they are “more comfortable at war than in the real active chaos of home.” That realization is at the heart of John Waters’ crisply-written, engaging and marvelously descriptive tale of post-Afghan War life, River City One: A Novel. Waters is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy who did combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. His novel is a fictional account told by his protagonist “John Walker,” a combat soldier in America’s endless wars turned lawyer in civilian life. Walker lives and works in River City. “River City One,” Waters writes, “was the code they used aboard ship whenever the internet and phone line went dead, whenever the ship shut off communications with the outside, leaving everyone onboard in quarantine from the world beyond.” For John Walker, “River City One” came home with him.
Waters begins the story with Walker, who was a sniper in Afghanistan, at a shooting range talking to an old military buddy about vets whose lives fell apart after they returned from the country’s endless wars--divorces, domestic abuse, broken families. Walker then recalls how he met his wife Grace at college before he left for basic training, then shifts to describing Tailor & Tines, the law firm he worked for after his tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq. On his office wall instead of his law degree, Walker placed a framed print of a soldier on duty at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Some at the firm asked him about his war experiences. Waters has a friend of Walker remark: “They can’t help themselves. They want that secondhand glory. ‘Tell me you’re a hero.’ ‘I’d be really freaked out if you killed somebody, but please, please tell me that you killed somebody.’”
Walker as a new young lawyer does the grunt work for the firm--reading and highlighting transcripts and other documents--and he doesn’t like it. He doesn’t much care for the business lunches he has to attend, either. Or the “war stories” told by the firm’s trial lawyers. In fact, very little about civilian life back home interests Walker. At one point, when asked whether he had shown an interest in an older lawyer, Walker reflects: “There was no interest to show. I had no respect for older men, older lawyers who hadn’t done anything noteworthy to earn respect.” What Walker respected was “action and purpose” --what he and his fellow soldiers did in Afghanistan.
A visit to a prison to review evidence with a client charged with drug trafficking--a client sporting “club” tattoos--reminded Walker of soldiers who took their deployment pay to cover themselves in tattoos with images of “names of friends written on tombstones and dog tags.” War, he recalled, produced “expectation and excitement,” but also images of death. Walker had become “a captive to memory, measuring today against what no longer existed.” In civilian life, he felt alone.
That feeling stayed with him even when he attended an event celebrating opera at a judge’s residence in an exclusive part of the city. There, he was reminded of what his old war buddy said about the wealthy in America: “[T]he only thing rich people loved more than other rich people was a war hero.” An opera singer--Ruth Ryan, the star of the evening--chatted with him after the event, asking him, “What did you do in the army?” His first thought was: “There were years spent hunched under an eighty-pound pack, dirty, shitting in plastic bags on training assignments, when carrying around a pile of your own shit could not be justified by explanations of war? Where to begin?,” but instead he said, “I was in the infantry.” They are both married but are obviously attracted to each other.
Like Lagoze’s memory of the killing of a wounded Afghan, Waters’ character John Walker is mentally scarred by the death in Afghanistan of a fellow sniper, Sgt. West. It is a memory he reveals in detail to Ruth Ryan, with whom he has a brief fling. Walker’s wife suspects that he strayed from her with Ruth, but while he acknowledges a flirtation he continues to lie to her. They stay together. “Grace and Charlie [their son] have their life,” Walker thinks, “and I have whatever is left of mine.” Walker and his wife stay together and he continued to profess his love for her, but he still emotionally clings to Ruth: “Every day had been stale and unimaginative,” he reflects, “until Ruth appeared.”
In the end, neither John Walker of Waters’ novel nor Miles Lagoze can leave their pasts behind them and just get on with their lives. The endless wars waged by successive U.S. presidents have had consequences that followed their participants home. “Soldiers,” Lagoze writes, “are instruments of the state.” Perhaps Carl Cannon summed it up best in his Forward to River City One: “[T]hose of us who . . . stand and cheer for veterans and their families at the ballpark, or who tell men and women in uniform, ‘Thank you for your service,’ can do more. For starters, we can read their memoirs and their novels. And after doing so, we can look with deep skepticism on elected officials who are too eager to send young Americans off to war.”
Francis P. Sempa writes on foreign policy and geopolitics. His Best Defense columns appear at the beginning of each month.
8. Mapped: The U.S. states with the highest and lowest shares of veterans
Please go to the link to view the interesting map. https://www.axios.com/2023/11/10/map-where-veterans-live-us?utm
23 hours ago -Politics & Policy
Mapped: The U.S. states with the highest and lowest shares of veterans
Data: Census Bureau. Map: Alice Feng/Axios
Veterans made up just over 6% of the U.S. adult civilian population last year.
The big picture: The nation observes Veterans Day on Friday, bringing awareness to the contributions of those who've served.
By the numbers: Alaska had the highest share of veteran residents at 10.1%, according to 2022 U.S. Census Bureau data.
-
Wyoming was second at 9.4%, while Virginia was close behind at 9.2%.
- California (4.3%), New Jersey (3.9%) and New York (3.7%) were among the states with the lowest shares of veterans.
9. China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion
Excerpts:
Although arms control breakthroughs between Washington and Beijing are highly unlikely, there are steps both could take to prevent greater escalation. For China, greater transparency about its nuclear posture and the rationale for its buildup could help alleviate some of the worst-case assumptions held by U.S. strategists. For defense strategists in Washington, understanding how the United States’s nuclear posture and missile-defense efforts shape Chinese threat perceptions may help them craft nuclear policies that Beijing would view as less provocative and hence less likely to require a response.
Unfortunately, the overall U.S.-Chinese rivalry and growing tensions over Taiwan suggest that these goals will be difficult to achieve. Indeed, China’s nuclear expansion is more likely to fuel those tensions than lead to any kind of détente. Even though Chinese leaders may view their nuclear modernization efforts as defensive, policymakers and strategists in Washington are calling for a strong response. With China very much in view, in October 2023, the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission recommended various changes to U.S. nuclear forces, such as preparing to upload warheads currently held in reserve to existing delivery vehicles, expanding the number and types of delivery systems, and deploying more theater-range systems to the Asia Pacific. Similarly, a bipartisan expert group convened by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory recently recommended that the United States “plan and prepare to deploy additional warheads and bombs.”
Such steps will almost certainly only strengthen China’s drive to expand its nuclear arsenal. Beijing could further increase its stockpile of nuclear weapons, deploy new delivery systems, and develop a low-yield nuclear warhead—all steps that the United States would view as threatening. Thus, the U.S. response to China’s recent plans, which are themselves heavily influenced by shifts in U.S. nuclear strategy, could speed up what has become a dangerous action-reaction cycle and potentially set off a major nuclear arms race.
China’s Misunderstood Nuclear Expansion
How U.S. Strategy Is Fueling Beijing’s Growing Arsenal
November 10, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by M. Taylor Fravel, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, Magnus Langset Trøan · November 10, 2023
Among the many issues surrounding China’s ongoing military modernization, perhaps none has been more dramatic than its nuclear weapons program. For decades, the Chinese government was content to maintain a comparatively small nuclear force. As recently as 2020, China’s arsenal was little changed from previous decades and amounted to some 220 weapons, around five to six percent of either the U.S. or Russian stockpiles of deployed and reserve warheads.
Since then, however, China has been rapidly expanding and modernizing its arsenal. In 2020, it began constructing three silo fields to house more than 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A year later, it successfully tested a hypersonic glide vehicle that traveled 21,600 miles, a test that likely demonstrated China’s ability to field weapons that can orbit the earth before striking targets, known as a “fractional orbital bombardment system.” Simultaneously, the Chinese government has accelerated its pursuit of a complete nuclear triad—encompassing land-, sea-, and air-launched nuclear weapons—including by developing new submarine- and air-launched ballistic missiles. By 2030, according to U.S. Defense Department estimates, China will probably have more than 1,000 operational nuclear warheads—a more than fourfold increase from just a decade earlier.
China’s nuclear expansion is unlikely to be a focus of U.S. President Joe Biden’s expected meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit next week, but it is too important to be left entirely to defense strategists. Rather than maintaining only enough forces to be able to retaliate if attacked—China’s policy for decades—many in the United States now fear China’s nuclear buildout will give it offensive options as well. In 2021, Charles Richard, then the leader of U.S. Strategic Command, described China’s nuclear expansion as a “strategic breakout” that will provide it “with the capability to execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy.”
To understand the rationale for this transformation, some in Washington have looked to the specific nature of the buildup. For example, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall has suggested that, regardless of China’s intentions, the construction of hundreds of ICBM silos amounts to developing a first-strike capability: having enough weapons to destroy an adversary’s nuclear arsenal by attacking first. But seeking to infer motivations from capabilities alone can produce misleading worst-case assumptions, especially given the tendency to project U.S. strategy onto potential adversaries, an analytical pitfall known as mirror-imaging.
In fact, China’s own nuclear strategists and experts provide a different view of Chinese thinking. Their writings and analysis since 2015 suggest that China’s nuclear expansion is less a shift in Chinese intentions than a response to what Beijing perceives as threatening changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, reflecting an acute security dilemma. Chinese analysts are worried that the United States has lowered its threshold for nuclear use—including allowing for limited first use in a Taiwan conflict—and that the U.S. military is acquiring new capabilities that could be used to destroy or significantly degrade China’s nuclear forces. Thus, many Chinese experts have concluded that China needs a more robust arsenal.
Given Chinese and U.S. fears about each other’s nuclear programs, increased communication may help to break the spiral. Based on Chinese fears, the United States should understand how changes in its nuclear capabilities and doctrine play a critical role in shaping China’s threat perceptions and perceived force requirements. Going forward, China will continue to respond to U.S. advances that are viewed as weakening China’s nuclear deterrent. Similarly, Beijing should understand that the lack of transparency surrounding its rapid nuclear expansion has fueled worst-case assessments by the United States. Continued lack of transparency will lead to even greater U.S. suspicion—and feed an intensifying arms race between the two countries.
REACTIVE AGENTS
Since around 2018, Chinese experts have concluded that Washington’s nuclear posture now poses increasing challenges to China’s deterrent. In particular, they have been concerned about shifts in U.S. strategy outlined in the Pentagon’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. Many Chinese experts have noted that the review highlighted China as a strategic competitor and that it argued for lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, including in response to certain kinds of nonnuclear attacks. They also noted the report’s emphasis on low-yield nuclear weapons, which could possibly be used to coerce China. Citing the views of analysts such as Elbridge Colby, who served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development in the Trump administration, Chinese experts saw the new U.S. posture as designed, in part, to compensate for the fact that East Asia’s conventional military balance was shifting in China’s favor.
More specifically, the 2018 review increased Chinese fears that the United States might engage in limited nuclear first use during a conventional conflict with China, most likely over Taiwan. According to Chinese arms control expert Li Bin, the document suggested that “the United States would use its nuclear weapons to respond to nonnuclear Chinese aggressions.” More pointed was the analysis of Luo Xi, an expert from the Peoples Liberation Army’s (PLA) Academy of Military Science, which reports directly to the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission and helps to formulate its military strategy and doctrine: “China cannot refrain from being concerned about the possibility of US nuclear first use in a regional crisis,” she wrote. A retired Chinese general, Peng Zhenqiang, was even blunter: “China must contemplate a war scenario in which the US may launch a nuclear attack, perhaps in a conflict over the Taiwan Strait,” he said in 2018. Another expert from the Academy of Military Science emphasized that by lowering the nuclear threshold, Washington could “promote the escalation of low-intensity conflicts to nuclear war.”
Beijing has also worried about the U.S. development of both offensive and defensive weapons systems that could negate China’s nuclear deterrent. First was the possibility that the United States was building new conventional weapons that could be used to attack China’s nuclear forces, a strategy known as conventional counterforce. In contrast to using nuclear weapons to destroy an adversary’s nuclear forces—a step that would almost guarantee nuclear retaliation—these arms allow the attacker to degrade or even destroy the adversary’s nuclear arsenal without crossing the nuclear threshold. The threat of a conventional attack on China’s arsenal is further heightened by the range of systems that might be deployed, especially long-range precision-strike weapons but also forms of cyberwarfare and electronic warfare. As one researcher from the PLA’s National Defense University noted, the United States’ growing conventional counterforce capabilities may “encourage the attacker to launch a first strike in situations where nuclear weapons are not used, undermining strategic stability.”
China fears new U.S. weapons systems will negate its nuclear deterrent.
At the same time, Chinese experts are also concerned that enhanced U.S. missile defenses could undermine China’s longtime strategy of “assured retaliation”—the ability to launch a nuclear counterattack after an enemy’s first strike. Although Chinese experts regard current U.S. missile defense as limited, their long-standing concerns about these systems intensified in the years before Beijing began building the new silo fields. To assuage China (and Russia), the United States has long justified missile defenses as aimed at threats from rogue states such as North Korea or Iran. But the U.S. Defense Department’s 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to regional missile threats, including from China, and stated that U.S. missile defense systems would be used to counter any missile attack on the United States, including presumably any Chinese counterstrike. According to Luo Xi, the Academy of Military Sciences scholar, the United States could use missile defenses to “destroy China’s second-strike capability.”
Taken together, these two developments suggested that the United States posed an elevated threat to China’s nuclear deterrent. In essence, the United States could use conventional weapons systems (or nuclear ones) to destroy most of China’s small nuclear arsenal and then use its missile defenses to limit China’s ability to retaliate with any surviving missiles. As two PLA Air Force scholars wrote in 2019, this “combined use of strategic offensive and strategic defensive systems will give the United States a monopolistic strategic advantage.”
Meanwhile, Chinese concerns have been exacerbated by the collapse of the 1987 U.S.-Soviet Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which had prohibited the use of ground-launched short- to intermediate-range nuclear and conventional missile systems. By removing range limits on ground-launched missiles, the treaty’s demise in 2019 led experts from China’s National University of Defense Technology to describe U.S. forward-deployed missiles as a “huge threat” to China’s mobile missiles, which they claim are vulnerable when in fixed positions during the launch phase. For this reason, an expert from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations warned that same year that U.S. deployment of intermediate-range missiles might cause great tension with China, perhaps even spurring an “Asian Cuban missile crisis.”
MORE WAYS TO RETALIATE
To be clear, China has not been transparent about the purpose and goals of its nuclear buildup. For example, its last defense white paper was published in 2019, before the construction of the new silo fields began. Nevertheless, indications from China differ in significant ways from the most alarmist U.S. interpretations. U.S. military leaders have argued that China’s buildup provides it with offensive options that make it far more threatening to the United States and that raise new challenges for U.S. nuclear strategy. But writings by Chinese analysts, as well as statements by Communist Party officials including Xi Jinping, suggest that the Chinese debate so far has revolved around how to better implement China’s existing strategy of assured retaliation—making sure it has sufficient nuclear forces to respond to a nuclear attack. If these indications are correct, they suggest that China’s expansion is less immediately threatening than it might appear and that a forceful U.S. response would only exacerbate unnecessary arms-race dynamics.
Consider, for instance, Xi’s remarks at the 20th National Party Congress in October 2022. During a speech, the Chinese leader called for the PLA to establish “a strong system of strategic deterrence.” The following month, the outgoing vice chair of the Central Military Commission, Xu Qiliang, noted that the PLA’s approach to strategic deterrence should be based on “asymmetric balancing”—suggesting that China would not seek nuclear parity with the United States or Russia.
Before China began building the new silo fields, Chinese strategists had also underscored the need to improve the country’s deterrent, noting that the size of its force has always been a relative figure based on what is required for a secure second strike. In 2018, for example, two arms control scholars at Tsinghua University argued that the relatively small size of China’s existing arsenal had created new opportunities for adversaries to “carry out nuclear threats.” These concerns were echoed by other Chinese experts, who argued that China’s second-strike capability was “far from assured.” Also noteworthy is what available Chinese writings omit: any discussion of moving toward a first-use strategy, even limited first use.
Many of the new capabilities China has been developing are intended to enhance survivability—the ability of its nuclear forces to withstand a first strike and be able to launch a retaliatory one. The U.S. Defense Department has acknowledged, for example, that a key purpose of China’s fractional orbital bombardment system is to evade U.S. missile defense radars, presumably for use in a potential retaliatory strike.
There have been calls in China to develop tactical nuclear weapons.
Similarly, starting in 2018, scholars affiliated with the PLA Rocket Force University of Engineering began publishing articles that examined how to better protect the land-based missiles that form the backbone of China’s deterrent. As one article described, by enhancing the country’s readiness to use nuclear weapons, silo-based forces can help “to ensure effective deterrence.” The 2020 edition of the PLA National Defense University’s Science of Military Strategy also described how combining missiles on mobile launchers, which can be widely dispersed, with silo-based missiles can give China more ways to retaliate.
Chinese experts have also discussed other ways to strengthen China’s nuclear deterrent. These include reducing reaction time—the time it would take for China’s nuclear forces to respond to an attack. Chinese strategists have debated the merits and drawbacks of a partial or complete “launch on warning” system, under which Beijing would fire its missiles after an opponent’s missiles have been launched but before impact and detonation. Another potential step includes deploying missile defenses to protect Chinese nuclear infrastructure. Chinese experts have also debated whether to contemplate strikes on systems that support the U.S. missile defense program, such as U.S. early-warning satellites—despite the potential that such a move could be highly destabilizing.
It is, of course, possible that the purpose of China’s nuclear expansion and modernization is to create a “nuclear shield” that would enable conventional offensive operations against Taiwan. In this view, by possessing a robust deterrent, China can initiate or escalate a conventional conflict against Taiwan while deterring U.S. nuclear coercion or limited nuclear strikes, thereby increasing the odds of victory for Beijing. But available Chinese sources written before the expansion began contain no direct discussion of such a goal.
There have also been calls in China to develop tactical nuclear weapons. Breaking with a past taboo, some prominent experts have publicly suggested that China may need to add tactical nuclear weapons to its arsenal to deter U.S. limited nuclear first use. If Chinese concerns about U.S. nuclear strategy continue to increase, Beijing could embrace this view, with the highly precise DF-26 theater-range missile offering a likely delivery vehicle for a lower-yield warhead. But most Chinese nuclear experts appear to oppose these weapons, and no open-source evidence has revealed any plans to field them.
SLOWING THE NEW ARMS RACE
China’s nuclear expansion has clearly been driven by its growing sense of vulnerability and insecurity in the face of evolving U.S. capabilities. But a larger and more diverse Chinese arsenal will also offer Beijing more options beyond a retaliatory strike. Suppose China develops low-yield nuclear weapons to deter U.S. limited use, for example. Chinese leaders might then have an irresistible temptation to use such weapons for coercion in a Taiwan crisis. The future trajectory of China’s nuclear strategy is uncertain, and it could shift in a more offensive direction.
Moreover, even if China’s overall strategy continues to focus on deterring a first strike instead of threatening one, several of its new systems will erode geopolitical stability. Perhaps most notably, if China adopts a launch-on-warning posture, the risks during a crisis would go up significantly. China’s limited experience operating nuclear forces that are on hair-trigger alert makes the potential for accidents or miscalculation even greater.
Although arms control breakthroughs between Washington and Beijing are highly unlikely, there are steps both could take to prevent greater escalation. For China, greater transparency about its nuclear posture and the rationale for its buildup could help alleviate some of the worst-case assumptions held by U.S. strategists. For defense strategists in Washington, understanding how the United States’s nuclear posture and missile-defense efforts shape Chinese threat perceptions may help them craft nuclear policies that Beijing would view as less provocative and hence less likely to require a response.
Unfortunately, the overall U.S.-Chinese rivalry and growing tensions over Taiwan suggest that these goals will be difficult to achieve. Indeed, China’s nuclear expansion is more likely to fuel those tensions than lead to any kind of détente. Even though Chinese leaders may view their nuclear modernization efforts as defensive, policymakers and strategists in Washington are calling for a strong response. With China very much in view, in October 2023, the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission recommended various changes to U.S. nuclear forces, such as preparing to upload warheads currently held in reserve to existing delivery vehicles, expanding the number and types of delivery systems, and deploying more theater-range systems to the Asia Pacific. Similarly, a bipartisan expert group convened by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory recently recommended that the United States “plan and prepare to deploy additional warheads and bombs.”
Such steps will almost certainly only strengthen China’s drive to expand its nuclear arsenal. Beijing could further increase its stockpile of nuclear weapons, deploy new delivery systems, and develop a low-yield nuclear warhead—all steps that the United States would view as threatening. Thus, the U.S. response to China’s recent plans, which are themselves heavily influenced by shifts in U.S. nuclear strategy, could speed up what has become a dangerous action-reaction cycle and potentially set off a major nuclear arms race.
Foreign Affairs · by M. Taylor Fravel, Henrik Stålhane Hiim, Magnus Langset Trøan · November 10, 2023
10. Japanese Americans were jailed in a desert. Survivors worry a wind farm will overshadow the past.
We must remember and learn from our history or we will commit the same crimes again in the future against another group of people we do not like at the current moment.
Excerpts:
While Tomita’s family was incarcerated, his father applied for an East Coast job with the Office of Strategic Services — a precursor of the CIA.
His assignment: Translating U.S. propaganda into Japanese flyers urging surrender that would be dropped in the South Pacific.
To return to life outside, Tomita, his older sister and his younger sister, then 2, needed a leave card with a fingerprint and photo.
At war’s end, the family returned to Seattle, where neighbors had safeguarded typesetting equipment that allowed them to restart the family printing business.
When the children entered high school, their mother presented them with their Minidoka exit cards.
After earning a master’s degree in rehabilitation counseling at Oregon State University, Tomita provided consulting and rehabilitation services to companies and government agencies on the West Coast. He and his wife adopted a daughter, now 53 with a child of her own.
In July, Tomita brought a copy of his exit card when he returned to the camp for an annual pilgrimage. He wants future generations to be able to visit this treasured site for Japanese-Americans.
“Because they dumped us there,” he said. “Like it or not, it is our sacred land.”
Japanese Americans were jailed in a desert. Survivors worry a wind farm will overshadow the past.
by: ED KOMENDA and LINDSEY WASSON, Associated Press
Posted: Nov 9, 2023 / 10:22 AM EST
Updated: Nov 9, 2023 / 10:24 AM EST
fox59.com · November 9, 2023
JEROME, Idaho (AP) — Behind the barbed wire, the little boy pressed his ink-covered index finger onto the mint-green exit card. And a photograph was snapped of his frightened face.
Paul Tomita was four.
It was July 4, 1943. Independence Day at Minidoka, a camp in the vast Idaho desert, where over 13,000 Japanese American men, women and children were incarcerated during World War II as security risks because of their ancestry.
The wallet-sized paper meant the scared boy in the photo could leave after 11 months living in a cramped barracks with his father, mother, two sisters and grandmother.
Eight decades later, he returned with West Coast pilgrims who think the life-changing atrocity should be remembered. But now another government decision looms as a new threat — a wind project the pilgrims worry will destroy the experience they want to preserve.
If approved by the Bureau of Land Management, the Lava Ridge Wind Farm would put up 400 turbines on 118 square miles (306 square kilometers) near Minidoka, where survivors say they are witnessing another attempt to bury the past.
“If Minidoka was a white memorial to white soldiers who died in whatever war it is, do you think that they would offer free land to Lava Ridge to develop their windmills there?” Tomita said. “Hell no.”
THE CAMP IN THE DESERT
Two months after the Japan’s Dec. 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066.
Roughly 120,000 people of Japanese ancestry were taken from their homes and incarcerated in camps as a potential threat against the U.S.
Thousands were elderly, disabled, children or infants. Desperate families sold belongings and packed what they could. Luckier ones had white friends care for houses, farms and businesses.
At Minidoka, they lived in wooden, tarpaper-covered barracks, braving summer heat and winter cold on 50 square miles (130 square kilometers) of remote, high desert. In tight quarters without much privacy, women waited until nighttime to use latrines. Up to eight family members shared rooms on cots without mattresses. For Christmas dinner, children ate hot dogs.
Under armed guard towers, Minidoka residents worked in fields cultivating crops for little pay. But they built a community in what was essentially a prison camp.
They organized churches and planted gardens. They created city of sorts with stores, watch and radio repair shops, a health clinic, a barbershop, an ice rink, a swimming pool and a baseball diamond.
Today, few original structures remain as reminders of a chapter in U.S. history the government worked to erase before issuing reparations and designating camps national historic sites decades later.
Now, a new project with fences of a different kind is envisioned for the wide-open public land dotted with sagebrush and cheatgrass.
WIND PROJECT OPPOSED
As the Biden Administration aimed to fight climate change by permitting 25 gigawatts of renewable energy on public lands within the decade, a company named Magic Valley pitched a wind farm that would be the second-largest in the U.S. and produce up to 1,000 megawatts.
Lava Ridge would erect towering turbines in parts of three counties and double Idaho’s wind energy production.
“There is a tremendous need, a market based need for clean energy in Idaho and across the West … being requested by utilities, by businesses, by state leaders, and really by many Americans who are trying to get this country toward energy independence,” said Luke Papez, project manager at Magic Valley, a subsidiary of New York-based LS Power. “This is a very good site to locate a project.”
With global warming, wind farms have been framed as avenues to increased economic activity, new local tax revenues — and a vital tool for the White House’s clean energy goals.
“Renewable wind projects are a critical component of the Biden-Harris administration’s commitment to confronting climate change, promoting clean air and water for our current and future generations, creating thousands of good-paying union jobs, and jump starting our country’s transition to a clean energy future,” said Interior Secretary Deb Haaland in a statement.
Magic Valley now hopes to win BLM approval next year and to begin construction in 2025 and start operations by 2026.
But opposition is nearly universal in the high desert where the company would build hundreds of miles of temporary fencing and roads, plus hundreds of concrete slabs for turbines.
There are fears the isolated landscape that draws travelers will be permanently scarred, explosives used for construction will damage an aquifer — and the project will cast shadows on the desert Minidoka survivors visit.
As the BLM nears a final decision, Minidoka survivors and descendants are declaring the site a place of healing that commemorates traumas their families still struggle to unpack and resolve.
“I don’t mean to take sides in history,” said Idaho Rep. Jack Nelson, a Republican. “But the reason we study history is so we don’t do those things again.”
THE BOY IN THE PHOTO
During his 11 months at the desert camp, Paul Tomita longed for his Seattle home surrounded by lush greenery. He asked his mother: What did we do wrong to end up here? When are we going home?
“Of course, my mom had to song and dance around it,” recalled Tomita, now 84. “Even though I was that young, I knew something was wrong.”
Tomita’s family and thousands of other Japanese Americans were under control of the Army’s War Relocation Authority. “They told us when we could eat, when we could sleep, when we could do anything,” he said.
Unrelenting dust in their single room worsened his asthma and sent him repeatedly to the hospital barracks.
When thick desert dust blew through holes in the family’s barracks walls, his mother dunked newspaper in water to plaster the biggest ones. But the material dried and crumbled.
“Dust on your face, dust in your ears, dust up your nose, dust in your mouth,” Tomita recalled.
Eventually, Tomita said, U.S. soldiers on the other side of the barbed wire knew the Japanese-Americans at Minidoka were not a threat. “Even if we got through the fences,” he said, “where are we going to go?”
LEAVING, BUT NEVER FORGETTING
While Tomita’s family was incarcerated, his father applied for an East Coast job with the Office of Strategic Services — a precursor of the CIA.
His assignment: Translating U.S. propaganda into Japanese flyers urging surrender that would be dropped in the South Pacific.
To return to life outside, Tomita, his older sister and his younger sister, then 2, needed a leave card with a fingerprint and photo.
At war’s end, the family returned to Seattle, where neighbors had safeguarded typesetting equipment that allowed them to restart the family printing business.
When the children entered high school, their mother presented them with their Minidoka exit cards.
After earning a master’s degree in rehabilitation counseling at Oregon State University, Tomita provided consulting and rehabilitation services to companies and government agencies on the West Coast. He and his wife adopted a daughter, now 53 with a child of her own.
In July, Tomita brought a copy of his exit card when he returned to the camp for an annual pilgrimage. He wants future generations to be able to visit this treasured site for Japanese-Americans.
“Because they dumped us there,” he said. “Like it or not, it is our sacred land.”
___
Associated Press climate and environmental coverage receives support from several private foundations. See more about AP’s climate initiative here. The AP is solely responsible for all content.
Suggest a Correction
fox59.com · November 9, 2023
11. Can a Soldier Ever Go Home From War?
Can a Soldier Ever Go Home From War?
Published 11/10/23 06:00 AM ET
John Waters
themessenger.com · November 10, 2023
Home: What does it mean? Homecoming football games, going home for the holidays?
For most of us, home is a refuge, a sanctuary, an escape from the world. Home is a fortress worth protecting from intruders and trespassers, an ideal dating at least to the Renaissance, if not even earlier.
More than a house, home is the place of our youth. The word conjures the memory of moments, hurts, friendships, struggles and triumphs. Home is a feeling, a time in our lives. We can move far away, start a new life, fill it with new places and new friends, with different struggles and accomplishments — but we can’t change the past or truly leave it behind. We never recover from childhood.
Some of us came of age during the era of the War on Terror, the post-9/11 generation, watching on television as planes crashed into skyscrapers and, later, as American rockets exploded like fireworks over a darkened city. Some of us wanted our share of that exceptional experience, perhaps without realizing then just how Hollywood and even history often idealize war.
War is real blood, real bones. Death and judgment are always around the corner. There’s no avoiding what war has to teach you. You confront what’s in front of you and make the best of the situation. You adapt continuously, over and over again, changing every day. Until one day — if you’re lucky — you go home to find that your life conventions are no longer the social conventions of the place you once called home. You begin to wonder: Does a soldier ever come home from war?
This is not an inconsequential question for the estimated 3.7 million veterans who served in combat or in support roles, many of them in repeated tours of duty, during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Nor is it so for their families or even for the nation at large, which is expected to spend $2.5 trillion or more on service-related health care over the next quarter-century.
For many of these veterans — like many of those from past wars — “coming home” is not an easy journey. A 2021 survey found that as many as three-quarters of the Afghanistan war’s more than 800,000 veterans felt angry, betrayed or humiliated by our withdrawal, and 76% of respondents said they felt “like a stranger in my own country” at times. Some 70% of the war’s veterans (and two-thirds of Americans at large) said they believed that veterans would “have a hard time processing the end of the war.”
This is not just a modern or a uniquely American phenomenon.
In Homer’s epic poem, it took 10 years for Odysseus to arrive home from the Trojan War. Ten years, and the death of every comrade and shipmate accompanying him on the arduous journey home to Ithaca. He reunites with his son, and together they deal with the suitors and traitors who stole from his household and harassed his wife, Penelope. But The Odyssey doesn’t end there: Odysseus persists in his warlike ways, until the goddess Athena stops the resulting slaughter.
In modern-day, Odysseus would have been diagnosed with shell shock, battle fatigue, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), adjustment disorder or any one of many abstract labels and diagnoses invented to describe warriors who can’t transition from war.
Once again, this is not simply an academic question or curiosity for today’s veterans, their families and communities. One Department of Veterans Affairs study concluded that 15.7% of those who deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq “screened positive for PTSD, compared to 10.9% of non-deployed Veterans.”
Adjustment disorder is of particular interest because of how this diagnosis “others” the person. Adjustment is what veterans must do because the world doesn’t adjust to them: Society is fixed, rigid and unforgiving. Either adjust, or you’ll find yourself alone and left behind.
But the poets see life differently. To many of them, the warring spirit dims but never dies.
Writing 150 years ago, Alfred, Lord Tennyson, locates Odysseus as an old man in his epic poem, Ulysses. An old man, “always roaming with a hungry heart” — a line, incidentally, adapted by Bruce Springsteen in his 1980 ballad, Hungry Heart.
Years after his return, Odysseus, now an old man, has not settled into the routine of life at home. He gives his crown and title to his son, Telemachus, and leaves his home and wife. Again, he turns to the sea, eyes tracking a ship leaving the harbor, and says: “that which we are, we are; one equal temper of heroic hearts, made weak by time and fate, but strong in will to strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.”
John Waters is a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, a Marine Corps veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq, and a former deputy assistant secretary of Homeland Security. He is the author of the newly published postwar novel, "River City One" (Simon & Schuster).
themessenger.com · November 10, 2023
12. Are We About To Experience 1914 Deja Vu?
Ominous words in these excerpts. I wish I could put my faith in Congress but I fear they remain central to the problem.
Excerpts:
Even though the war in Ukraine seems to be deadlocked, something that will be reinforced by the onset of winter, without the availability of American support, Russia’s tactical and strategic position will strengthen. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s options to continue the war could be constrained. Hence, Russia might escalate its attacks, despite the weather. During World War II, some of the most effective Soviet offensives were in winter.
In Israel, although the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would not likely experience critical shortages in weapons and support, would a U.S. government shutdown incentivize Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon that is already sparring with the IDF, to enter the war more fully? Israel would be caught in a two- or three-front war if the West Bank also exploded. And, with possible political chaos in America, Hezbollah and Iran might question Washington’s ability to intervene.
A diabolical footnote: If the hold by Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) on nearly 500 flag and general officers continues, the operational impact will be significant. For example, the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf is without a permanent fleet commander or deputy fleet commander. China factors into this discussion as well.
Our nation is more polarized than it was four years ago. The war in Israel has accentuated that polarization, and the ongoing legal trials of former President Donald Trump are high-octane political fuel that could inflame things.
Congress has the power to make these consequences disappear by keeping the government open, but will it exercise common sense? If a shutdown occurs and persists, prepare for dire consequences.
Are We About To Experience 1914 Deja Vu?
Published 11/10/23 09:00 AM ET
Harlan Ullman
themessenger.com · November 10, 2023
Is America as vulnerable as Europe was when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his pregnant wife Sophie were assassinated on June 28, 1914, on a small bridge in Sarajevo, an act that precipitated World War I? The answer may be, yes. The explosive ingredients appear to be in place. All that is needed is a spark to ignite a conflagration. And there are many possible sparks, including the potential for a government shutdown on Nov. 17.
Of course, the wars in Ukraine and Gaza could escalate into major conflicts, as happened in 1914. The scheduled talks between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jingping could falter, setting back even further the already rocky Sino-American relations.
And there are other sinister scenarios.
Here in America, soaring animosity toward Israel, as it continues its offensive in Gaza against the Iran-backed terrorist group Hamas, and anguish over the fate of Palestinian civilians there, have led to protests, marches and threats of violence against Jewish people. Could an explosive event turn these protests to the level of intensity and outrage seen during the Vietnam War years, given an even more politically divided nation today?
Protests abroad mirror those in America. Outpourings of support for Palestinians continue around the world. This weekend, on Remembrance Day in Britain, an anticipated 1 million marchers could assemble in London — not to celebrate a solemn holiday marking the end of World War I, but in support of the Palestinian cause.
In 1914, a bomb malfunctioned, momentarily sparing the archduke in Sarajevo. However, today’s time bomb in America could explode on Nov. 17, if Congress cannot pass legislation to keep the government open. Why might this be a “June 28, 1914, moment”?
First, the political and economic shock waves could be monumental. Although Social Security would not be affected by a government shutdown, other funding would end (except for “essential services” such as the military and public safety organizations, including air controllers and fire, rescue and emergency medical services teams).
Our nation is so polarized that even a short shutdown is likely to enrage many Americans who are already furious about governmental dysfunction. Could protests spill over from the anti-Israel, pro-Palestinian demonstrations?
Second, any shutdown would affect U.S. support for the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. How will the United States be able to fund its support for both countries for the long term? It likely cannot — will this make a difference in those conflicts? The answer is, very likely so.
Third, how would markets and U.S. friends and adversaries react? In the past, relatively short shutdowns had little negative effect on the U.S. stock markets. Indeed, some equities increased. Today, interest rates are already high, so the impact could be minimal.
The longest shutdown was 34 days, during the Trump administration (2018-19). But suppose Congress does not pass a spending bill for weeks or months? Surely the markets would be affected. And would public anger provoke riots like those we saw on Jan. 6, 2021, to threaten Congress again? This is not impossible, considering the depth of animosity and potential for violence in today’s politics.
Comparing an extended government shutdown to the death of an archduke may be a bridge too far. True, a world war is unlikely to break out because of U.S. government functions. Yet, consider what might happen abroad in Ukraine and Israel.
Storm clouds pass over the U.S. Capitol in Washington.JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images
Even though the war in Ukraine seems to be deadlocked, something that will be reinforced by the onset of winter, without the availability of American support, Russia’s tactical and strategic position will strengthen. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s options to continue the war could be constrained. Hence, Russia might escalate its attacks, despite the weather. During World War II, some of the most effective Soviet offensives were in winter.
In Israel, although the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would not likely experience critical shortages in weapons and support, would a U.S. government shutdown incentivize Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon that is already sparring with the IDF, to enter the war more fully? Israel would be caught in a two- or three-front war if the West Bank also exploded. And, with possible political chaos in America, Hezbollah and Iran might question Washington’s ability to intervene.
A diabolical footnote: If the hold by Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala.) on nearly 500 flag and general officers continues, the operational impact will be significant. For example, the Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf is without a permanent fleet commander or deputy fleet commander. China factors into this discussion as well.
Our nation is more polarized than it was four years ago. The war in Israel has accentuated that polarization, and the ongoing legal trials of former President Donald Trump are high-octane political fuel that could inflame things.
Congress has the power to make these consequences disappear by keeping the government open, but will it exercise common sense? If a shutdown occurs and persists, prepare for dire consequences.
Harlan Ullman is senior adviser at the Atlantic Council and author of “Shock and Awe” and his latest book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large.”
themessenger.com · November 10, 2023
13. Deals in Works to Free Hostages Held in Gaza: Reports
Deals in Works to Free Hostages Held in Gaza: Reports
Published 11/11/23 08:35 AM ET|Updated 42 min ago
Aaron Feis
themessenger.com · November 11, 2023
Israeli and Hamas officials are discussing multiple proposed deals for the release of hostages held in Gaza, including one that would free all civilians, according to reports.
Since their abduction during the October 7 terror attack on Israel, about 240 hostages are believed to be held by Hamas and other Palestinian groups in Gaza, nearly half of whom are civilians.
Israel and Hamas are negotiating two potential deals, the New York Times reported Friday, citing officials briefed on the talks who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The smaller of the two proposed deals would see the release of 10 to 20 hostages — including Israeli women and children, plus Americans and other foreign nationals — in exchange for a brief pause in combat, one official told the Times.
A protester looks at pictures of abductees hanging on a wall next to lit candles at the memorial service marking one month since the October 7 massacre at Israel's Knesset.Yahel Gazit/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images
In exchange for releasing all civilians, Hamas wants a brief break in the fighting, humanitarian aid including fuel for hospitals, and the release of women and children held in Israeli prisons, that official reportedly said.
The talks are reportedly being mediated by Qatar and the United States.
The office of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declined comment to the Times.
The ongoing war began on October 7 with Hamas terrorists’ brutal invasion of Israel, which saw approximately 1,400 people killed, over 200 more believed kidnapped and atrocities committed on unarmed civilians.
Since, Israel has responded with a tight brigade around Gaza, and a series of airstrikes and ground incursions. According to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry, over 11,000 people have been killed in Gaza, most of them also civilians.
Israel has previously rejected international calls for a ceasefire without the release of all hostages held by Hamas.
themessenger.com · November 11, 2023
14. Elite universities get tougher on antisemitism
Too little too late? Can a just initiated defensive IO campaign defeat a decades long IO campaign that has indoctrinated educators and gain the support of so many useful idiots?
We would not have to get tough on this if we did not turn a blind eye or willingly accept the funding of malign actors who have worked so hard to undermine the true liberal values of our universities and our nation. (not liberal in the progressive political liberal sense but liberal in the sense of the liberal democracy that our founding fathers envisioned).
29 mins ago -Politics & Policy
Elite universities get tougher on antisemitism
https://www.axios.com/2023/11/11/antisemitism-university-policies-2023
Axios AM
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On NYU's campus in Manhattan, Milton Cohen, a student from Israel, offers to speak about his home country. Photo: Spencer Platt/Getty Images
Top universities, under pressure for being silent or soft on antisemitism, are being forced to take tougher lines on verbal and physical violence against Jews.
- Columbia on Friday suspended two pro-Palestinian groups as official student groups through the end of the fall term.
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The university said Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) and Jewish Voice for Peace (JVP) "repeatedly violated University policies related to holding campus events, culminating in an unauthorized event Thursday afternoon that proceeded despite warnings and included threatening rhetoric and intimidation."
Why it matters: Frightened students complain that universities have done too little to support them since the Israel-Hamas war began five weeks ago. Irate megadonors contend Ivy League universities are being too timid in confronting antisemitism.
What's happening: Long-simmering tensions are erupting in violence — and shattering the sense of safety that makes colleges hubs of free discourse, AP reports.
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Jewish and Muslim students are witnessing acts of hate, leaving many fearing for their safety even as they walk to class.
Zoom in: In addition to Columbia's action, two other Ivies, Harvard and the University of Pennsylvania, this week took "more direct action" against antisemitism after their initial responses were condemned as weak, as The New York Times put it.
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Harvard president Claudine Gay said in announcing a board of advisers to "begin the vital work of eradicating antisemitism from our community": "The ancient specter of antisemitism, that persistent and corrosive hatred, has returned with renewed force."
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In Philadelphia, Penn President Liz Magill said this week that "vile, antisemitic messages were projected onto several campus buildings": "For generations, too many have masked antisemitism in hostile rhetoric. These reprehensible messages are an assault on our values and cause pain and fear for our Jewish community."
In Massachusetts, Brandeis University banned a pro-Palestinian student group over social media posts that defended Hamas.
Zoom out: Since the war began, antisemitic and Islamophobic incidents have been documented globally and coast to coast.
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The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) Center on Extremism on Oct. 25 reported a nearly 400% year-over-year increase in reports of antisemitic harassment, vandalism and assault.
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The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), America's largest Muslim civil liberties organization, this week reported an "unprecedented surge" in anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bias.
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The Islamic Society of Boston, which calls itself New England's largest mosque, told The Boston Globe that incidents of hate and harassment have primarily targeted students and women wearing hijabs or other head coverings.
The big picture: FBI Director Chris Wray warned in Senate testimony on Oct. 31 of a rising threat of domestic terrorism — "not just homegrown violent extremists inspired by a foreign terrorist organization, but also domestic violent extremists targeting Jewish or Muslim communities.
- "Here in the United States," he said, "our most immediate concern is that violent extremists — individuals or small groups — will draw inspiration from the events in the Middle East to carry out attacks against Americans going about their daily lives."
15. Russians rue war failures after maps "differ from tactical reality": ISW
In case you missed this in the daily ISW Russian reports.
Russians rue war failures after maps "differ from tactical reality": ISW
Newsweek · by Brendan Cole · November 9, 2023
The Russian General Staff is making decisions based on maps that do not reflect the battlefield reality, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has said, citing Russian military bloggers.
The claims about the discrepancy in maps followed questions among the pro-war Telegram channels as to why Russian troops were not striking frontline areas where large concentrations of Ukrainian forces were thought to be.
The U.S.-based think tank said that Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized Moscow's commanders throughout the chain of command "for delivering false and overly positive reports to their superiors."
The milbloggers have also "identified the Russian General Staff as fostering this widespread institutional dishonesty," the think tank added regarding the maps which "differ from tactical reality." Newsweek has contacted the Russian Defense Ministry for comment.
A Grad multiple rocket launcher unit of Ukraine's 59th Mechanised Brigade fires towards Avdiivka on October 10, 2023. Russian milbloggers have said that Russian personnel on the front are using different maps to the ones held by the Russian General Staff. Diego Fedele/Getty Images
The Telegram channel Roman Alekhin, for instance, said that Russian personnel on the front had access to a genuine map, while the commanders in the Russian General Staff have one "on which there are completely different layouts."
Russian commanders had been incentivized to make the gains that matched the more optimistic maps of the General Staff, which preferred positive reports from its frontline commanders, Alekhin said.
"So they are driving the fighters to bring the real map closer to the General Staff map," said that post, which added that the General Staff is demanding "more and more positive reports" and that its false map "is improving much faster than we are actually catching up with it."
"Embellishments are the most important enemies at the front," it said next to a screengrab of a post by milblogger Romanov Light, who noted that despite the buildup of Ukrainian air defenses and weapons on the east bank of the Dnieper River in the southern Kherson region, "everyone demands we fly there."
Another milblogger, Dva Mayora (Two Majors), said there had been previous cases of Russian battalion and regiment-level assault operations that aimed to comply with inaccurate maps but this was the first time he had heard of an operational imperative to comply with a different General Staff map. "It is impossible to make appropriate decisions based on unreliable data," the blogger posted.
The ISW think tank also noted in its Wednesday update that Ukrainian forces are continuing their counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut. Russian sources said that Kyiv's forces had also conducted assaults near Robotyne in the western Zaporizhzhia region, on the southern sector of the front.
On Wednesday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told the Reuters NEXT conference in New York by video link that his forces have a battlefield plan for next year for future advances in southern and eastern Ukraine, and particularly in the Kherson region.
Newsweek · by Brendan Cole · November 9, 2023
16. Russia terminates agreement with Japan on dismantling nuclear weapons
Russia terminates agreement with Japan on dismantling nuclear weapons | NHK WORLD-JAPAN News
www3.nhk.or.jp
Russia says it will terminate an agreement with Japan on cooperation to help Russia's dismantling of decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines.
The Russian government issued an order on Thursday to terminate the agreement on "Cooperation to Assist the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons Reduced in the Russian Federation."
The government instructed the Foreign Ministry to notify Japan of the decision.
The agreement was signed in October 1993 after the collapse of the Soviet Union with an aim to promote cooperation for nuclear nonproliferation and solving environmental issues.
Under the agreement, projects began to dismantle decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines that had been abandoned in the Russian Far East. Japan provided financial and technical assistance.
Russia has not mentioned the reason for the termination.
Russia has been objecting to sanctions imposed by Japan and Western nations due to its invasion of Ukraine.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsuno Hirokazu said on Friday that Japan did not receive prior notice about Russia's decision, and the unilateral announcement is very regrettable. He said Japan will confirm the matter through diplomatic channels.
www3.nhk.or.jp
17. Japan Grants Security Assistance to the Philippines, Looks to Enhance Military Cooperation
We need everyone giving way together, QUAD, AUKUS, JAPROKUS, ASEAN, Five Eyes, NATO, FIve Eyes, etc against the axis of authoritarians.
Japan Grants Security Assistance to the Philippines, Looks to Enhance Military Cooperation - USNI News
By: Aaron-Matthew Lariosa
November 9, 2023 1:45 PM
news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · November 9, 2023
BRP Jose Rizal conducts exercises with two Japan Maritime Self-Defense ships. Philippine Navy
Tokyo committed to strengthening its security relationship with the Philippines during Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit last weekend.
While in Manila, Kishida inked several agreements with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., including the first-ever transfer of defense aid under Japan’s new Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework. This aid program aims to transfer non-lethal equipment, such as patrol boats and radar systems, to the armed forces of “like-minded countries.”
Through the first OSA program, the Armed Forces of the Philippines will receive $4 million worth of coastal surveillance radars for the Philippine Navy, unlike previous Japanese assistance that gave radars to the Philippine Coast Guard.
The radars are a “vital addition to the AFP’s maritime defense capabilities and will bolster our ability to monitor and protect our extensive coastline, ensuring the safety and security of our seas,” Chief of Staff Gen. Romero Brawner said in a statement.
A Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs release on the OSA agreement also touched on the importance of enhancing the Philippines’ Maritime Domain Awareness in relation to monitoring the “important sea lanes” in the South China Sea and Luzon Strait.
The Japanese-Philippine relationship is in a “golden age,” Kishida said in his address to a joint session of the Philippine Congress. He further highlighted his country’s commitment to upholding the rule of law and freedom of the seas by detailing the new security and defense cooperation component of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) Strategy. Through the provision of maritime and aerial monitoring capabilities, Japan wishes to “extend efforts” that ensure the safe use of the sea and air.
Kishida also touched on Japan’s efforts to help the Philippines’ Air Domain Awareness capabilities through the supply of air surveillance radars. In 2020, Tokyo won a $103 million contract to provide the Philippine Air Force with four radars. Japan confirmed that the first of the four radars had been deployed in the Philippines ahead of Kishida’s visit. Of the four radars, three will be placed on Luzon, with one facing the South China Sea and another covering the strait between the Philippines and Taiwan.
In the backdrop of Kishida’s trip to the Philippines is the latest South China Sea incident between the Philippines and China, which involved a collision between Philippine and Chinese vessels during a resupply mission to BRP Sierra Madre (LT-57) at Second Thomas Shoal.
Tokyo has played an important role in building up Manila’s Maritime Security capabilities, most notably with its transfer of patrol vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard. Loans through the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s Maritime Safety Capability Improvement Project have provided a total of 12 Multi-Role Response Vessels (MRRV). These vessels are frequently deployed in the South China Sea, especially during BRP Sierra Madre’s resupply missions.
In a press release, the Philippine Coast Guard stated that Japan will be financing five more Teresa Magbanua-class MRRVs for the agency’s fleet. These patrol vessels are based on the Japan Coast Guard’s Kunigami-class and are the largest in the Philippine Coast Guard’s fleet. In his visit to the agency’s headquarters, Kishida boarded the leadship of the class, which was built at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ Shimonoseki Shipyard.
Both Tokyo and Manila committed to starting negotiations on a Reciprocal Access Agreement, a security pact that facilitates troop access for the purpose of training activities and exercises. Currently, neither country has a treaty with the other for this, which means that only limited contingents and observers could attend exercises on Philippine or Japanese soil. The Philippines has Visiting Forces Agreements with the United States and Australia, while Japan has Reciprocal Access Agreements with the United Kingdom and Australia.
Kishida also highlighted the growing cooperation between Washington, Manila and Tokyo as one of his closing points in his address to the Philippine Congress. Within the last year, the three countries have been deepening their cooperation through trilateral diplomatic and military exchanges.
“In the South China Sea, multilateral cooperation to protect the freedom of the seas is underway,” Kishida said referring to the recent participation of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Exercise Sama Sama and the first-ever trilateral Coast Guard exercise Kaagapay in June. “Through these efforts, let us protect the maritime order, which is governed by laws and rules. Not by force.”
Related
news.usni.org · by Aaron-Matthew Lariosa · November 9, 2023
18. Isolationism Makes a Perilous Moment More So
If you accept the "history" in the recent vanity Fair book review about the forthcoming book on the end of the previous administration, a future republican administration could really adopt an isolationist policy on a scale we have not seen since pre-World War One.
Isolationism Makes a Perilous Moment More So
Western civilization needs American leadership. Some on the right want to abdicate that role.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/isolationism-makes-a-perilous-moment-more-so-upbeat-pessimism-international-affairs-foreign-policy-national-security-7b9ec823?mod=hp_opin_pos_6#cxrecs_s
By Paul A. Gigot
Nov. 10, 2023 5:54 pm ET
Protesters stage a demonstration against U.S. involvement in World War II. PHOTO: BETTMANN ARCHIVE
I recently looked back at what my predecessor and mentor, Robert Bartley, said in 2002 upon his retirement. He surveyed his 30 years as Journal editor and the progress that had been made. America had won the Cold War, vanquished the stagflation of the 1970s, and quieted the social convulsions of the 1960s and ’70s.
“What I think I’ve learned over 30 years,” Bob wrote, “is that in this society, rationality wins out, progress happens, and problems have solutions. This, I like to think, is what happens when a society incorporates the editorial credo of my newspaper, free markets and free people. In that kind of a society, optimism pays.” He had cause to claim vindication.
Twenty-one years later, I wish I could say the same. Most of the victories that Bob celebrated have eroded or vanished. But then Bob predicted that too. His book, “The Seven Fat Years,” made clear that peace and prosperity are contingent, that the seven fat years in the Bible followed seven lean years. That the Belle Époque of the early 20th century soon gave way to World War I and Stalin, Hitler and Tojo.
This is a lesson that conservatives understand. Progressives—God bless them—believe that the arc of the moral universe is long and bends toward justice, as Barack Obama liked to quote Martin Luther King Jr. Sometimes it does, but not without much human agency. Progressives believe that human nature can be molded like soft clay. Conservatives, on the other hand, believe in—well, we believe in human nature.
We know that things can get worse, and they probably will. The essayist Joseph Epstein reviewed a book in the Journal some years ago about pessimism, and the headline summed up a certain conservative disposition: Upbeat pessimism, he called it. The world may get better, but you better not count on it.
This is the disposition another Journal editor, Vermont Royster, explained when I interviewed him for the 100th anniversary of the Journal in 1989. I asked if after all he had seen in his life he was an optimist or pessimist. He said, “Well, I’m a short-term pessimist, but a long-term optimist. As long as you define the long term as 500 years.”
With upbeat pessimism in mind, I want to address one of our current troubles, which is urgent but also solvable. That is the decline of America’s defenses—military and political. This weakness has been exposed in sharp relief in the last two years, and it is worse than most Americans know. We face an array of adversaries more formidable than at any time since World War II, and we aren’t prepared for the moment.
In 2019, in a visit to the White House, I met with a senior foreign-policy official. The conversation included his concern about Iran propping up Venezuela’s dictatorship with oil supplies. “Have you considered interdicting the tankers at sea?” I asked.
“We have,” he said, but the nearest ship we could find was a Dutch frigate in the middle of the Atlantic. “This isn’t Ronald Reagan’s Navy.”
Recently I spoke with a U.S. ambassador in Asia who, noting the balance of military power against China, said, “The way we have let our defenses decline is criminal.”
The war in Ukraine has taught us that our defense production lines are inadequate. Our long-range antiship missile stocks would run out in a week in a war over Taiwan. We trail Russia and China on hypersonic weapons. Or consider one example from the U.S. Navy.
The Navy’s attack submarines are the best deterrent we have against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The Navy says it needs 66 hulls, yet only 31 were “operationally ready” this past fiscal year. To satisfy the Navy’s needs, and meet our commitments under the Aukus accords, we would have to build an average of at least 2.3 subs a year. We are building 1.2. I could cite many such examples.
The relevant questions are: How did we get here? And what to do about it?
The answer to the first question is that we forgot the lesson of history. One of my military mentors was Andy Marshall, the legendary Pentagon strategist, who liked to say that peace is best understood as an interlude between wars. Robert Gates issued a similar warning as he retired as defense secretary in 2011 when he said that, when wars end, the U.S. always makes the mistake of drawing down defenses and leaving ourselves vulnerable. We ignored him.
So what do we do about it? The obvious initial answer is to spend more on defense, and soon. But that is the easy part; we know the policy solution. The harder issue is finding the political will to do it, while persuading adversaries that we are credible enough to restore American deterrence. As we have learned in Ukraine and now in the Middle East, U.S. deterrence has faded. And the world’s rogues are on the march.
On this score, my worry is less about the political left than some of our friends on the right. Modern progressives will always put the welfare state above defenses because that is their governing model and ideology. They believe in the restraining power of international treaties and arms control. They believe adversaries will be deterred by America’s forbearance and good example. They will never rebuild our defenses without pressure from the political right.
What worries me these days is the lack of unity and resolve on the right. That includes the return of conservative isolationism. The proponents of this view would not identify themselves with that term, but the policies they espouse justify it.
Senators, think-tank leaders, Silicon Valley billionaires with a podcast, even presidential candidates argue in some way or another in favor of a U.S. retreat from the world. They start by denying that defending Ukraine is in our interests. But listen and you can hear where this goes. Next they say we should consider withdrawing from NATO or South Korea. They are willing to support Israel, at least for now, but that won’t last if it means engaging more in the Middle East.
What is most striking is how much this isolationism of the right resembles the traditional isolationism of the left. Isolationists in the Vietnam era argued that America wasn’t good enough for the world. We were baby killers and imperialists. This is the view of today’s pro-Hamas left.
As Charles Krauthammer pointed out 20 years ago, the conservative isolationism that flourished in the 1930s argued the opposite—that America was too good for the world. Our republican values shouldn’t be tarnished by the bloody intrigues of Europe or Asia. But the new isolationists on the right now agree with the left that the U.S. doesn’t deserve to lead the world. They say we are too degraded culturally and too weak fiscally to play the role we did during the Cold War. They say we are too woke and too broke.
There is an element of truth to this critique. We are neither as culturally united nor as fiscally sound as we were in the 1980s. But this is not an adequate excuse for an American retreat from the world. And it cannot be an excuse for failing to protect national security, the first obligation of government.
The fiscal objection is simply false. Defense spending is at an historic post-World War II low as a share of the economy. We can afford to spend more on defense even at our present level of national debt. In two years alone the Biden Democrats spent $11.6 trillion on things other than defense. We can make spending choices. Yet the same conservatives who say we can’t spend more on defense because we are broke also say we can’t reform entitlements because it is too difficult. This is political surrender. It is exactly the corner that Barack Obama and the left have wanted to back us into.
As for being too woke, that battle is not lost. It is being fought by parents in school districts across the country. It is being fought by those who resist the ESG agenda in business. I suspect the shock of the pro-Hamas protests on college campuses will awaken more Americans to the anti-American corruption of many of our universities.
A CIA employee helps Vietnamese evacuees onto an America helicopter from the roof of a building near the U.S. Embassy in former Saigon, Vietnam. PHOTO: BETTMANN ARCHIVE
We have also been here before with the military. In the 1970s, after Vietnam, morale and recruiting hit a low point. But an officer corps that included Colin Powell and Jack Keane helped to revive the esprit and the reputation of the armed forces. Within a decade the military of dope and defeat was the military of “Top Gun.” Today the Marines are still meeting their recruiting quotas by resisting identity politics and putting sacrifice and discipline first.
I must acknowledge another problem here, and that is the legacy of failed interventions abroad, especially Iraq. Those of us who supported that intervention promised more than the U.S. delivered—more, it turned out, than we were capable of delivering to societies that didn’t want what we were selling.
Based on what we knew at the time, or what we thought we knew, there is still a reasonable defense for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Iraq is no longer a regional or global menace. The Gulf Arabs have had to choose between Iran and a U.S.-backed Israel, and they have been choosing Israel. But the Iraq occupation was botched, the cost was far too high, and the political consequences have been destructive.
I’ll admit my own role here. I spent my 20s in Asia as a reporter covering the democratic revolutions in South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines. Those successes filled me with too much optimism about the potential for democratic change. I knew too little about Arab and Muslim society and so underestimated the challenges in Afghanistan and Iraq. Those troubled interventions have now become a political veto the way Vietnam once was for the left. No more nation-building, as they say.
But we are not nation-building in Israel or Ukraine. Israel is trying to preserve itself as a nation. Ukrainians are fighting to preserve their nascent democracy and join the West. It is more than a little ironic that the same people who criticize the intervention in Iraq for seeking to promote democracy now criticize aid to Ukraine because it isn’t a perfect democracy.
As Arthur Herman has pointed out, in Israel and Ukraine we are also defending Western civilization. Israel is an outpost of the West, a descendant of the heritage of Athens and Jerusalem, among neighbors who would destroy it precisely because of that heritage. Ukraine aspires to be the same. In helping them defend themselves, we are defending our founding principles. And we are helping them with weapons, not with American troops.
Different interventions overseas need to be judged on their own terms. For two decades the left had its Vietnam Syndrome against U.S. intervention abroad. Now the right is developing an Iraq Syndrome that is equally as mistaken.
Which brings me to the politics of isolationism. History shows it is a political loser for whichever party adopts it. In the 1930s the Republicans resisted what they called foreign entanglements. Even as Hitler rose in Germany and the militarists rose in Japan, Sen. Gerald Nye and other Republicans devoted their energy to investigating U.S. weapons makers. They voted for the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937. They even opposed Lend-Lease to Britain.
When the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, Republicans were discredited politically for a decade. It might have been longer if they hadn’t nominated Dwight Eisenhower in 1952.
Democrats suffered a similar fate after they became the party of “come home, America” during and after Vietnam. They slashed aid to South Vietnam in 1975, and Saigon fell within weeks. Democratic hawks became Republican neoconservatives, and Republicans dominated the White House for a generation until the end of the Cold War.
Republicans are inviting a similar fate now if they abandon Ukraine to Russia. Or if they withdraw from NATO. Or if they signal to China that Taiwan is too distant to defend. The disorder that results from that abdication will be blamed on those who refused to deter it—and America will eventually be drawn into conflicts as a result of that disorder.
I am not arguing for willy-nilly intervention around the world. We must pick our spots. Prudence is a conservative virtue abroad as much as at home. We should also not fight wars that we are not willing to do what it takes to win. But when friends ask for help to defend themselves, we should make sure we have the strength and weapons to help them—and defend ourselves in the bargain.
I’ll end by addressing the popular new line of the new right. Perhaps you’ve heard it: “Do you know what time it is?” It’s intended as an insult, as in: Stop invoking Ronald Reagan, old man, and get with the 21st century. But it’s the wrong question. The right question is: What time do you want it to be?
Do you want it to be the 1930s, when America watched from afar as dictators began to march? We pretended we were safe, only to be attacked with our guard down. It took four years and 400,000 dead Americans to win World War II. This isn’t yet the 1930s, but they will arrive soon enough on our present course.
Or would you prefer this time to be like the 1970s and 1980s, when the American right united behind a mission of rearmament, economic revival and renewed national purpose? When we won the Cold War and ushered in two decades of prosperity.
Don’t believe the pessimists who say we can’t do it again. Stick with the upbeat pessimists, who know we can do it—if we rally the political will to do it.
Mr. Gigot is the Journal’s editorial page editor. This is adapted from remarks Tuesday at the annual Irving Kristol award dinner hosted by the American Enterprise Institute in Washington.
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Review and Outlook: In the third Republican presidential debate on Nov. 8, 2023, Nikki Haley, Ron DeSantis, Chris Christie, Tim Scott and Vivek Ramaswamy revealed the emerging GOP fault line on foreign policy. Images: Getty Images/Reuters Composite: Mark Kelly
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Appeared in the November 11, 2023, print edition as 'Isolationism Makes a Perilous Moment More So'.
19. Ordinary Russians Feel Wrath of Putin’s Repression
What is the resistance potential inside Russia? Is anyone doing a deep dive to assess that?
If I were advising the John S. McCain III Center for Security Studies in Irregular Warfare at a University Affiliated Research Center (UARC), one of the most important and ongoing projects I would recommend sustaining is an assessment of the resistance potential in every authoritarian country beginning with China, Russia, north Korea, and Iran. And then of course figuring out how to best exploit that resistance potential.
Ordinary Russians Feel Wrath of Putin’s Repression
Authorities seek to crush everyday opposition to the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine
By Ann M. SimmonsFollow
Nov. 11, 2023 10:00 am ET
https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/ordinary-russians-feel-wrath-of-putins-repression-2fa04ab4?mod=hp_lista_pos1
In a city in southern Siberia, security forces detained a man in October for reading antiwar poetry at a literary event. Authorities in Novosibirsk fined a woman 15,000 rubles around the same time for tearing down a poster exalting Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine.
In St. Petersburg, a man was briefly detained in September for holding a poster reading, “Wishing for peace is not a crime! I am against war.”
The cases, all documented by OVD-Info, a human-rights group that monitors police detentions and helps protesters find lawyers, speak to new levels of repression in Russia, as President Vladimir Putin seeks to crush even the most innocuous opposition to his war on Ukraine.
Prominent opposition politicians, human-rights activists and journalists have been jailed for lengthy terms, slapped with big fines or forced to flee the country.
But much of the crackdown on dissent has been directed against ordinary Russians, who constitute the majority of more than 20,000 people who have been arbitrarily detained since the start of the war in early 2022, according to local and international human-rights advocates as well as the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Russia.
Human-rights campaigner Oleg Orlov laying flowers at a Moscow monument to victims of political repression. PHOTO: EVGENIA NOVOZHENINA/REUTERS
Orlov speaking to reporters after a Moscow court last month found him guilty of discrediting Russia’s military. PHOTO: EVGENIA NOVOZHENINA/REUTERS
Artyom Belsky stood alone in front of the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg for about 30 minutes holding an antiwar sign. Several passersby stopped to shake his hand or hug him, he said.
Soon the police arrived. They detained him and charged him with an administrative offense for discrediting the Russian military. They told him he had “publicly called for obstruction of the military action” in Ukraine and warned that he would be imprisoned if he repeated the violation, Belsky said in an interview.
In August, the police had briefly detained Belsky after he hoisted a poster in the same location reading, “Russia is tired of corruption, repression and propaganda! Stop being silent about it!”
At that time, he was fined 4,000 rubles, roughly $44, for violating Covid-19 restrictions. Russia still bans protests on the pretext that mass gatherings are a health hazard.
“In Russia, people are imprisoned for simply wanting peace,” said Belsky, a 34-year-old specialist in decorative restoration. “I don’t think it’s a crime to want peace.” The police warning has scared Belsky from staging any further protests.
Artyom Belsky, displaying an antiwar sign in front of the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg. PHOTO: LIUBOV KUBYSHKINA
On Oct. 30, a court in Novosibirsk found Irina Bocharova guilty of discrediting Russia’s army, according to her docket at a court in the Siberian city. According to OVD-Info, Bocharova tore down and threw away a poster thanking the “heroes” of a local military unit deployed in Ukraine. She was slapped with an administrative penalty, according to the court, which didn’t provide further details in her docket.
Bocharova tore down the poster because “she didn’t want her child to see this propaganda,” OVD-Info said. Neither Bocharova nor her lawyer could be reached for comment.
Shortly after the law against discrediting Russia’s military was passed in March 2022, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters that the legislation was a response to the “information war that was unleashed against our country.”
“It was necessary to pass a law of appropriate severity,” he said.
But civil-rights activists say that the legislation is very broad and is wielded to punish a range of alleged violations.
Last month, Artyom Sakharov and some acquaintances organized a peace-themed poetry reading in front of a monument to Russia’s revered poet and playwright Alexander Pushkin in the Siberian city of Barnaul.
Sakharov, 18, said he submitted an application to hold a cultural event in early October. “But because at the end of the event I said the words ‘peace to the world,’ they credited me with organizing a rally and not an arts evening,” he said, responding to questions via VKontakte, a Russian social-media site similar to Facebook.
He was detained overnight and fined 75,000 rubles for holding an unauthorized public event, he said. In March, he had received another fine, of 20,000 rubles, for organizing an impromptu memorial to those killed in Ukraine.
“Antiwar and opposition activists are facing unprecedented pressure,” said Sakharov, a political-science student. “Fines, arrests and threats of prison. It’s definitely a form of intimidation and repression.”
The poetry reading that Artyom Sakharov helped to organize in Barnaul, Siberia. PHOTO: ARTYOM SAKHAROV
The Kremlin rejects allegations that Russia is repressing dissent. Peskov has said authorities are clamping down on what they view as foreign attempts to undermine the country’s stability.
But human-rights advocates and analysts who follow Russian domestic policy say the crackdown, even for the most minor offenses, reflects the paranoia and vulnerability of Putin’s regime. Any dissent threatens his rule, they say.
“He’s afraid,” said Oleg Orlov, one of the leaders of the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Memorial Human Rights Center, which Russian authorities closed. “Otherwise, why eliminate freedom of speech, why eliminate freedom to assemble?”
In December 2021, a Russian court dissolved Memorial, founded under Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to shed light on Soviet-era abuses. State prosecutors say the group neglected to indicate on its printed materials and its website its status as a “foreign agent.” Prosecutors also blamed the group for distorting “historical truth” and “creating a false image of the U.S.S.R. as a terrorist state,” state court-news agency Rapsi reported at the time.
Last month, a Moscow court ordered Orlov, who has publicly condemned the war in Ukraine, to pay a fine of 150,000 rubles, the equivalent of around $1,600, for “repeatedly discrediting Russia’s armed forces.”
According to Orlov, the prosecutor requested that the court order the 70-year-old human-rights defender to undergo a psychiatric assessment for having “an abnormally heightened sense of justice and lack of self-preservation instinct.” The court didn’t include the request in its verdict.
The prosecutor has since appealed the court’s judgment as being too lenient, demanding Orlov instead be jailed for three years. A hearing on the appeal is pending.
Almost weekly, the Russian legislature has been introducing new laws or amending old ones to further suppress views that don’t adhere to the official government propaganda.
New laws approved by Russia’s State Duma, the lower house of parliament, in October include criminalizing statements made against Russian National Guard officers fighting in Ukraine and the broadening of laws on extremism. Federal lawmakers proposed banning groups deemed as “undesirable” from being founders of nongovernmental organizations. Some regional legislators are calling for Russian citizens living abroad who discredit Russia’s military to be fined remotely, OVD-Info reported.
Nikolai Petrov, a consulting fellow on the Russia and Eurasia program at the British think tank Chatham House, said the repression in Russia appeared to be spiraling.
“It was initially designed by the Kremlin, but it’s developing by its own rules,” Petrov said, and “there’s no need for the Kremlin to stop it.”
Kate Vtorygina contributed to this article.
Write to Ann M. Simmons at ann.simmons@wsj.com
20. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 10, 2023
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-november-10-2023
CHINA-TAIWAN WEEKLY UPDATE, NOVEMBER 10, 2023
Nov 10, 2023 - ISW Press
China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 10, 2023
Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, and Ian Jones of the Institute for the Study of War
Editors: Dan Blumenthal and Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute
Data Cutoff: November 7 at 5pm ET
The China–Taiwan Weekly Update focuses on the Chinese Communist Party’s paths to controlling Taiwan and relevant cross–Taiwan Strait developments.
Key Takeaways
- The negotiations between the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) about forming a joint presidential ticket have stalled.
- The PRC instigated two aggressive encounters with US-allied militaries in the South China Sea between October 29 and November 6.
- The PRC is using the Israel-Palestinian conflict to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States.
- The PRC extended a naval deployment in the Middle East during the Israel-Hamas war, possibly as a means of increasing its influence in the Middle East.
Taiwanese Presidential Election
The negotiations between the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) about forming a joint presidential ticket have stalled. TPP presidential candidate Ko Wen-je and KMT chairman Eric Chu agreed on October 30 to inter-party cooperation for the January 13 legislative elections.[1] The parties have not agreed to a joint ticket since their initial meeting on October 31, however. Disagreement about how to determine the ticket order remains the key hurdle.[2] Each party favors the method that would most likely ensure it heads a joint ticket. The progress the parties make during future meetings will be the basis for future assessments, as ISW previously noted.[3] The fast-approaching November 24 candidate registration deadline will impose a practical constraint on the feasibility of implementing any selection process.
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KMT chairman Eric Chu proposed two options for selecting which candidate would lead the joint ticket during a phone call with Ko on November 2.[4] Chu’s first proposal entailed an anonymous vote by all opposition legislative candidates to decide the presidential candidate.[5] The second proposal would consider a calculation of party popularity as a factor.[6] The KMT offered to give equal consideration to a public poll in both cases. Ko rejected both proposals as disproportionately favoring the KMT.[7]
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Ko continues to insist on using a public poll to decide the order of a joint ticket and is messaging that he will not accept the KMT’s alternatives.[8] He cast doubt over the two parties’ ability reach a consensus during a campaign event on November 3.[9]
The impetus for TPP-KMT cooperation to form a joint presidential ticket remains, however. Polling data indicates that the parties will need a joint ticket to overcome Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate Lai Ching-te’s consistent lead.[10] A majority of polls suggest that a joint ticket would enable the parties to outperform the DPP in the elections regardless of who heads the joint ticket.[11] The entry of independent candidate Terry Gou into the presidential race is also an incentive for the parties to form a joint ticket, as Gou’s candidacy will draw support and votes from the TPP and KMT.
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An October 24 poll from the Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation (TPOF) showed Ko and Hou are trailing Lai by 4.1% and 8.6%, respectively, even though Lai’s lead has diminished during the last several weeks.[12]
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Terry Gou’s campaign office announced on November 2 it has collected over one million signatures, three times the required amount. Gou’s campaign is awaiting certification from the Central Election Commission (CEC).[13]
South China Sea military tensions
The PRC instigated two aggressive encounters with US-allied militaries in the South China Sea (SCS) between October 29 and November 6. Canada’s military disclosed on November 3 that PRC military aircraft confronted a Canadian Navy helicopter over international waters near the Paracel Islands on October 29.[14] The helicopter took evasive action in response. A People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) warship and militia vessels followed a US Navy ship within 12 nautical miles of the Taiwan-controlled Itu Aba (Taiping) Island in the South China Sea on November 6.
The PRC falsely blamed the United States and its allies for these types of aggressive interactions in the SCS. The PRC pointed to the United States’ “increased regional military deployment, close-up reconnaissance, and encouragement of other parties’ infringement” in the SCS.[15] A PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs official made the statement during bilateral maritime security talks on November 3, which followed US reassurances to the Philippines after PRC Coast Guard Vessels obstructed a Philippine resupply mission in the Second Scarborough Shoal.[16] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized Canada’s “so-called reconnaissance activities” as “inappropriate.”[17] Such statements that frame the US and allied military presence in the SCS as unlawful and provocative are consistent with ISW’s assessment that the PRC is shaping the information environment to blame the United States for geopolitical confrontations.
Israel-Hamas war
The PRC is using the Israel-Palestinian war to bolster its image as a fair, responsible broker in contrast to the “biased” United States. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and state propaganda outlets repeatedly condemned violence between Palestine and Israel since October 7 but never condemned Hamas. They repeatedly said the core of the conflict was the absence of a Palestinian state and promoted a two-state solution. [18] The PRC’s messaging indicates that it supports the Palestinian cause to gain diplomatic influence among Middle Eastern countries sympathetic to Palestine. Beijing’s diplomatic efforts in the UN and bilaterally show an effort to build an image as an important and fair mediator in the Middle East and to garner support as a leader in the international system.
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The MFA and state-owned outlets, such as The Global Times, criticized US support for Israel and re-iterated that the PRC has no “selfish interest” in the conflict and is committed to bringing peace and justice.[19] PRC officials also discussed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the United States, EU, and Middle Eastern countries including Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE.[20]
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The PRC assumed the rotating presidency of the UN Security Council on November 1 and stated that its top priority in that role would be to promote a ceasefire and an end to the Israel-Hamas war, prevent more civilian casualties, prevent larger-scale humanitarian disasters, and prevent the conflict from spilling over.[21]
The PRC extended a naval deployment in the Middle East during the Israel-Hamas war, possibly as a means of increasing its influence in the Middle East. The PLAN 44th Escort Task Force completed a routine escort mission in the Gulf of Aden on October 2 but remained in the vicinity to conduct a series of “goodwill visits” in Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE until November 3. The Oman and UAE visits included joint maritime exercises with the navies of those countries.[22] The task force’s departure on November 3 makes it unlikely that its extended presence was meant to respond to contingencies related to the Israeli-Palestinian violence since the violence is still ongoing. The establishment of PRC naval facilities in the Middle East would support future PLAN deployments.
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US President Joe Biden reportedly received a briefing about PRC-Oman negotiations in October to build a PLA military facility in an unspecified location in Oman. The facility would complement China’s other overseas base in Djibouti and would place a permanent PLA facility near a key chokepoint at the Strait of Hormuz.[23]
21. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2023
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-10-2023
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10.
- Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign.
- Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.
- The United Kingdom-led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations on November 10 along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
- Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline.
- Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 10, 2023
Nov 10, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2023
Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Stepanenko, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 10, 2023, 8:30pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:00pm ET on November 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10. The GUR published satellite imagery and reported that the Ukrainian surface attack drone strike on Uzka Bay near Chornomorsk, occupied Crimea sunk one Project 1176 Akula-class small landing ship and one Project 11770 Serna-class small landing ship.[1] The GUR reported that the Serna-class ship was carrying a crew and was loaded with armored vehicles, including BTR-82 armored personnel carriers, and that Russian forces previously used Serna-class ships to provide cover for Russian BSF ships during raids when Russian forces lacked naval air-defense equipment.[2] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike on Uzka Bay with four unmanned boats and that it was one of three series of Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea on November 10.[3] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attempted to conduct a drone strike on an oil depot in Feodosia and a Neptune cruise missile strike on BSF and Federal Security Service (FSB) bases in Chornomorsk.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Neptune missile over the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea and intercepted two drones over Crimea.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[6]
Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger reiterated common complaints about inadequate Russian counterbattery fire, electronic warfare, air defense, and assault operations along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[7] The milblogger especially complained about improper usage of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) to conduct frontal assaults like standard infantry against Ukrainian positions on the east bank even though these frontal assaults are ineffective in this area. The milblogger expressed concerns about possible future Ukrainian operations in the Kherson direction, but other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to achieve a breakthrough in this direction.[8]
Russian milbloggers are likely hyperfocusing on east bank Kherson Oblast due to the significant Russian information space neuralgia about Russian military issues in the area. Some Russian milbloggers appear to be less concerned about the possible near-term threat of Ukrainian operations on the east bank and are more upset about the poor Russian conduct of the war and mistreatment of military personnel.[9] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces struggle with the “ossification” of poor habits and conduct within the Russian military. These habits include poor communications, lack of proper preparations before or support during assault missions, conducting rotations in columns, Russian commanders selling frontline aid, and uninterest in learning from military mistakes and acknowledging poor battlefield realities.[10] The milblogger specifically emphasized the importance of Russian military professionalism and becoming the best army in the world. Other Russian milbloggers reiterated standard complaints about Russian military capabilities in Kherson Oblast but claimed that Russian forces still inflict high casualties on Ukrainian forces operating on the east bank.[11] Another prominent milblogger claimed that the situation near Krynky, Kherson Oblast is a “tactical problem” for Russian forces but not a strategic threat.[12]
Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on November 10 that Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 500 Shahed-131/-136 drones in September 2023 and several hundred drones in October 2023 but are currently launching drone strikes with fewer Shaheds almost every night.[13] Russian milbloggers noted on November 9 that Russian forces conducted large-scale Shahed strikes against Ukraine almost every night from the end of summer until mid-October 2023.[14] The milbloggers claimed that Russia’s Shahed strikes have been notably smaller and less frequent in the past month due to Russian forces planning to synchronize a new wave of intense combined strikes with the beginning of future large-scale ground operations. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 10 that Russian forces launched six Shaheds, a Kh-31 missile, and a Kh-59 missile at targets in Ukraine on the night of November 9 to 10.[15] Ukrainian air defenses downed five of the six Shaheds and the Kh-59 missile. Ihnat reported that the Kh-31 missile did not strike its target.[16]
Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and other unnamed commanders briefed Putin on the progress of the invasion and presented new models of Russian military equipment.[17] Russian state outlets published footage of Shoigu and Gerasimov showing Putin the Desertcross 1000-3 all-terrain vehicle.[18] Russian opposition outlet Meduza observed that an information stand displaying data about the Desertcross 1000-3 in the video claimed that the all-terrain vehicle is intended for patrol, reconnaissance, raid, search, and rescue operations, alongside transporting materiel in difficult road conditions.[19] The information stand also claimed that Russian forces are already using 537 Desertcross 1000-3 vehicles in combat and that Russia plans to purchase an additional 1,590 Desertcross vehicles in December 2023 and in the first quarter of 2024. Meduza noted that US-registered brand Aodes (which is headquartered in China) manufactures the Desertcross vehicles and advertises them as vehicles for hunters, farmers, and forestry workers.
Russian milbloggers have been consistently complaining about the lack of military equipment and vehicles in the Kherson direction, and it is possible that Putin is trying to appeal to Russian personnel fighting in this direction by providing them with hunting and farming vehicles rather than dedicated military vehicles.[20] A prominent Russian milblogger, for example, celebrated the news that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would provide Russian servicemen with light frontline vehicles.[21] Putin’s November 10 visit marks his fifth visit to the SMD headquarters since December 2022 after he last visited the headquarters on October 19.[22]
Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign. Russian news outlet RBK stated on November 10 that sources familiar with the matter indicated that the “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference will likely occur in tandem on December 14.[23] Russian opposition media outlet Verstka stated that sources within the Federation Council indicated that the upper chamber will announce the beginning of the campaign period for the 2024 Russian presidential elections on December 13, as required by Russian law.[24] Verstka stated that presidential candidates have 25 days to complete the nomination procedures after the Federation Council’s announcement.[25] Although it is unclear when Putin will announce his presidential campaign, he will likely use the “Direct Line” forum and press conference to promote his candidacy and platform, which a Russian opposition source has indicated will widely avoid highlighting the war in Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin likely decided to hold the two events at once in order to more tightly control and regulate the questions asked. Putin has consistently run as an independent candidate despite his affiliation with the United Russia party, and Russian law dictates that independent candidates must gather at least 300,000 signatures in order to submit their candidacy.[27] Russian opposition media outlets stated on November 10 that the United Russia party is preparing to collect signatures to demonstrate its support for Putin’s candidacy and asked employees of the Kursk Oblast Multifunctional Service Center, a state and municipal service provider, to fill out a survey with their personal information and up to three suggestions about how to improve IT services in Russia.[28] The employees reportedly received a letter with the survey stating that they could write one suggestion three times but to fill out the form by hand.[29]
Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.[30] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian authorities forcibly deported Yermokhin from Mariupol after Russian forces took occupied the city in May 2022 and placed him with a foster family in Moscow Oblast.[31] Yermokhin’s lawyer published a video on his behalf on November 9 pleading for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s help after Yermokhin received a summons for military service on November 8, weeks ahead of his 18th birthday.[32] Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed that Yermokhin testified in writing in August 2023 that he did not plan to return to Ukraine, but Yermokhin’s lawyer stated that Russian authorities forced the teenager to write the statement.[33] Meduza reported that Yermokhin previously attempted to escape Russia in March 2023, but that Russian border guards detained him.[34] Lubinets stated that Ukrainian authorities will reunite Yermokhin with his sister in Ukraine in the coming days.[35]
The United Kingdom–led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Operation Interflex, which initially included the United Kingdom but has added Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, and Sweden as partners since its launch in summer 2022, achieved its goal of 30,000 Ukrainian military personnel trained ahead of time on November 10.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff and UK government stated that the UK has trained over 52,000 Ukrainian soldiers since 2014.[37] The UK government stated that Operation Interflex is the largest military training program on UK territory since the Second World War.[38]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10.
- Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
- Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live “Direct Line” forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign.
- Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.
- The United Kingdom-led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations on November 10 along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
- Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline.
- Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 10 and recently made marginal confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 7 and 9 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced southwest of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk).[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk), and Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), and northeast of Petropavlivka in the Kupyansk direction, as well as near Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove) and the Serebryanske forest area (11km southwest of Kreminna) in the Lyman direction.[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces have slightly increased their focus on assault operations in the Kupyansk direction and are beginning to use more vehicles in ground assaults.[41]
Russian Western Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Sergei Zybinsky claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian assaults near Tymkivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and Synkivka in the Kupyansk direction on November 10.[42]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations on Bakhmut’s southern flank on November 10 and made confirmed marginal advances. A Russian milblogger published and claimed to have geolocated footage on November 9 indicating that Ukrainian forces slightly advanced north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[43] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations in the Bakhmut direction.[44]
Russian forces continued to attack Ukrainian positions on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks on November 10 and made confirmed territorial gains. Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows that Russian forces marginally advanced in the forested area north of Klishchiivka.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained some previously lost positions north of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) near a water feature and secured a position in a forest strip behind the railway track, pushing Ukrainian forces away from the T0513 highway.[46] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces continue to hold positions north of Klishchiivka behind the railway line and noted that mines, Ukrainian drones, and mutual artillery fire are complicating Russian attacks on Bakhmut‘s southern flank.[47] One Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian forces continue to counterattack near Klishchiivka and Berkhivka (directly north of Bakhmut) and have successfully pushed Ukrainian forces “several hundred meters” from the railroad near Klishchiivka.[48] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces continue to advance near the Berkhivka reservoir and are advancing further west along the railway north of Bakhmut.[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[50] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian 331st Guards Airborne Regiment (98th Guards Airborne Division) continue to operate in the Bakhmut direction.[51]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations around Avdiivka on November 10 but did not make confirmed advances. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces reached and entered the outskirts of Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) and continue to fight in the area.[52] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger added that Russian forces also secured positions on the railway line, allowing Russian forces to achieve tactical successes near Stepove.[53] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are trying to both create a cauldron around Avdiivka and deprive Ukrainian forces of the ability to maintain positions in rear areas in the Avdiivka direction.[54] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued to attack in the direction of the Avdiivka Coke Plant north of Avdiivka and that the main battles are ongoing in the directions of Stepove, Berdychi (5km northwest of Avdiivka), Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka), and Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka).[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults east and southeast of Novokalynove (7km north of Avdiivka); near Stepove, Avdiivka, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka); and south of Tonenke.[56] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces’ most important target is the Avdiivka Coke Plant because capturing the plant would allow Russian forces to establish defensive positions in an industrial area instead of in forested terrain.[57]
Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Avdiivka direction on November 10 and reportedly recaptured previously lost positions. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked northeast of Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka) and regained some of their previously lost positions.[58] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are consistently trying to counterattack to regain lost positions.[59]
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi reported that Ukrainian forces have destroyed over 100 Russian tanks and 100 armored vehicles, approximately 50 artillery systems, and seven Su-25 aircraft during Russian assaults on Avdiivka over nearly a month.[60] Zaluzhnyi added that Russian manpower losses in the Avdiivka direction total about 10,000 personnel. Shtupun reported that daily Russian casualties average between 400 to 600 personnel and noted that Ukrainian forces use aerial reconnaissance and intelligence to prevent Russian forces from reinforcing their troops operating in the Avdiivka direction.[61]
Russian forces attacked west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 10 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Marinka (on Donetsk City’s western outskirts) and Novomykhailivka (12km southwest of Donetsk City).[62] Shtupun stated that Russian forces continue to attack Marinka and Novomykhailivka with “Storm-Z” units, which are mostly composed of Russian convicts.[63] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on Ukrainian positions near Krasnohorivka (directly west of Donetsk City) and on Marinka’s western outskirts on November 9.[64]
A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces tried to advance near Vuhledar in western Donetsk Oblast on November 10 but did not specify the outcome of this attempt.[65]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) on November 10.[66] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled three Ukrainian attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area in the past week.[67]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske and south of Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) on November 10.[68]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) and Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) and that fighting is ongoing for the heights northwest of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[69] A Russian source claimed that there are meeting engagements near Robotyne.[70] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled 14 Ukrainian attacks near Verbove and Robotyne in the past week.[71]
Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on November 10. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne and Verbove.[72] A Russian news aggregator claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and advanced in the direction of Robotyne on November 9.[73]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted an MLRS strike on Kamianka-Dniprovska west of Enerhodar on November 10.[74]
Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 10. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Poyma (10km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km southeast of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), Pidstepne (18km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), and Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[75] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces partially gained a foothold south of Krynky on November 9 but later withdrew due to Russian shelling.[76] Russian sources claimed that gaps in Russian air defenses are allowing Ukrainian forces to operate attack and tactical aviation near the front near Krynky.[77]Geolocated footage published on November 10 indicates that Russian forces advanced south of Krynky.[78]
A Russian source claimed that the Ukrainian missile strike on Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast on November 9 struck the 126th Military Investigative Department of the Russian Investigative Committee. The source claimed that two Ukrainian HIMARS rockets struck the building during a meeting, killing eight to 10 Russian officers and personnel, including the acting head of the 126th Military Investigative Department.[79]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline. The Russian State Duma is considering a bill that would impose the same harsh criminal penalties on Russian military volunteers as on Russian mobilized personnel for refusing to comply with orders, voluntarily surrendering, damaging weapons, or deserting.[80] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that a group of mobilized personnel of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division (8th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) beat their regiment’s deputy commander, ”Lieutenant Muserbekov,” in occupied Simferopol on November 1 and that Muserbekov died from his injuries on November 7.[81] The GUR stated that the mobilized personnel subsequently fled to Krasnodar Krai dressed as civilians.
Russia continues to form new irregular formations to support combat operations in Ukraine. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 10 that the newly-formed “Volga” volunteer artillery brigade reinforced the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps in an unspecified area of Ukraine.[82]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
BBC’s Russia service reported on November 10 that Ukrainian drone pilots stated that Russian forces are using drones to seize the initiative near Bakhmut.[83] BBC’s Russia service stated that Russia is copying Ukraine’s use of maneuverable combat drones and expanding the use of these drones to include dropping explosives on the enemy. A Ukrainian drone platoon commander stated that Russian drones are operating in the air day and night, which he stated indicates that Russia has established mass production of drones for reconnaissance, surveillance, and strikes. The commander estimated that Russian forces have twice the number of drones that Ukrainian forces have in the Bakhmut sector.
Russia’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) is reportedly producing its own “Zhirinovsky” drone variant, likely to commemorate LDPR’s late leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Russian sources claimed that LDPR Chairman Leonid Slutsky presented 10 “Zhirinovsky” drones to an unspecified motorized rifle battalion during a visit to Crimea on November 9 and suggested that the drones will likely be used in the Kherson direction.[84] Vladimir Oblast’s Rokot-Center 33 reportedly manufactured LDPR’s drones, which can operate in inclement weather, switch frequencies in case of signal loss, and have a range of up to 12 kilometers. Rokot-Center 33 claimed on November 9 that the organization has been in contact with the LDPR party for almost five months.[85]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[86] Mariupol Resistance published photos showing the aftermath of the explosion and stated that partisans took advantage of “a convenient opportunity.”[87] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian authorities believe there are over 5,000 Ukrainian partisans in occupied Ukraine but have failed to suppress them.[88]
The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 10 that Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) authorities are distributing propaganda literature that justifies Russian occupation and denies the existence of Ukrainian identity in non-ROC churches in occupied Ukraine.[89] The Ukrainian Resistance Center noted that Russian authorities are persecuting representatives of all non-ROC faiths and have looted and co-opted all non-ROC churches in occupied Ukraine.
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov blamed Ukrainian officials for delaying a diplomatic resolution to the war, despite the fact that the Kremlin continues to pursue policies indicating that it is unwilling to negotiate in good faith. Peskov responded to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s statement that compromise is unacceptable for Ukraine and stated on November 10 that it is time for Ukraine to understand that it will not win this war on the battlefield.[90] Peskov stated that the preconditions for a negotiated settlement will arise as soon as Ukraine realizes that it cannot win militarily and that Russia will continue the war in the absence of the necessary preconditions. ISW continues to assess that the Kremlin is unlikely to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine except to buy time to reconstitute for future offensive operations.[91] ISW also continues to assess that pressure on Ukraine to prematurely negotiate an end to the war will likely remain meaningless, if not harmful, as long as Russian President Vladimir Putin believes that he can achieve his maximalist objectives on the battlefield.[92]
The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 10 that Russian actors are contacting Ukrainian citizens currently located in the Gaza Strip and alleging that the Ukrainian government will not evacuate them and will abandon them.[93] The GUR stated that Russian actors are sending messages offering evacuations to Ukrainian citizens in exchange for an interview with Russian media. Zelensky announced that Ukrainian authorities evacuated 160 Ukrainian citizens and nine Moldovan citizens from Gaza on November 10 and have rescued 203 Ukrainian citizens this week.[94]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported on November 9 that Iranian General Staff Department of International Relations Head Brigadier General Mohammad Ahadi led a delegation to Belarus as part of the First Joint Belarusian-Iranian Interdepartmental Commission on Military Cooperation.[95]
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko portrayed himself as the guarantor of Belarusian statehood ahead of Belarusian parliamentary elections in 2024 and presidential elections in 2025. Lukashenko stated on November 10 that incoming young Belarusian leaders should ascend to office with the goal of “saving the country [Belarus].”[96] Lukashenko claimed that the fate of Belarus depends on Belarusians and that no one will assist Belarus if the country makes a mistake.[97] Lukashenko’s statements reflect his likely desire to resist complete integration into the Russian-dominated Union State.
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
22. Iran Update, November 10, 2023
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-10-2023
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli forces advanced to the al Shifa Hospital, where Israel says Hamas maintains a critical command center. Local sources reported heavy armed clashes in the vicinity of the hospital along the Gaza Strip coast. Israeli forces and tanks also advanced inland in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood west of Jabaliya.
- Palestinian militants claimed seven indirect fire attacks into Israel. Palestinian fighters also clashed with Israeli forces a dozen times, primarily in Hebron and Jenin, in the West Bank.
- Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed fighters conducted nine cross-border attacks into northern Israel.
- The IDF reported that unidentified Iranian-backed militants based in Syria were responsible for the November 9 drone attack that hit the Tze’elim Elementary School in Eilat.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella term for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias – claimed one attack targeting US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison, Syria.
IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 10, 2023
Nov 10, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, November 10, 2023
Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Kathryn Tyson, and Peter Mills
Information Cutoff: 2:00pm EST
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Israeli forces advanced to the al Shifa Hospital, where Israel says Hamas maintains a critical command center. Local sources reported heavy armed clashes in the vicinity of the hospital along the Gaza Strip coast. Israeli forces and tanks also advanced inland in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood west of Jabaliya.
- Palestinian militants claimed seven indirect fire attacks into Israel. Palestinian fighters also clashed with Israeli forces a dozen times, primarily in Hebron and Jenin, in the West Bank.
- Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed fighters conducted nine cross-border attacks into northern Israel.
- The IDF reported that unidentified Iranian-backed militants based in Syria were responsible for the November 9 drone attack that hit the Tze’elim Elementary School in Eilat.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella term for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias – claimed one attack targeting US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison, Syria.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip
Israeli forces advanced to the al Shifa Hospital, where Israel says Hamas maintains a critical command center. The Wall Street Journal reported that the al Shifa Hospital is evacuating as Israeli forces converge on the medical compound after a series of explosions in the area.[1] The Hamas-run Ministry of Health claims that 50,000-60,000 people are sheltering inside and around the hospital.[2] The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Army Radio reported that the medical complex is surrounded.[3] A doctor inside the hospital said the situation is extremely dangerous.[4] A pro-Israel analyst on Twitter (X) reported on November 10 that IDF forces entered the compound, although CTP-ISW cannot independently verify Israeli activity within the compound at the time of this publication.[5] The IDF has repeatedly said that Hamas uses humanitarian infrastructure for its military activities.[6] Hamas uses underground compounds under the hospital to facilitate entry to headquarters and maintains an internal security control center from which it directs rocket fire and militia fighters, for example.[7] The IDF says that Hamas is using patients and staff at the hospital as human shields. The hospital has 1,500 beds and 4,000 staff members.[8]
Local sources reported heavy armed clashes in the vicinity of the al Shifa Hospital along the Gaza Strip coast. A Palestinian journalist said that IDF forces are operating inside several buildings in the vicinity of the hospital.[9] Local sources said there were clashes on Charles de Gaulle Street and near the al Abbas police station which is approximately one kilometer south of the al Shifa Hospital.[10] Local media said al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—militia fighters are clashing with advancing Israeli forces on the al Nasr Street northeast of al Shifa Hospital.[11] The media outlet also said senior al Qassem Brigades commanders have already fled the area.[12]
The al Qassem Brigades have employed a variety of capabilities to attack IDF forces and vehicles since the Israeli ground operations began. The militia fighters have claimed to attack IDF tanks and bulldozers with Yassin 105 rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and have engaged in small-arms combat with IDF ground forces.[13] The al Qassem Brigades claimed on November 9 to bomb a gathering of IDF soldiers using a drone in an unspecified location, which they previously claimed to do on November 1.[14] The al Qassem Brigades claimed to fire mortars at Israeli forces and RPGs at an Israeli military vehicle near Juhr al Dik, which is consistent with CTP-ISW's assessment that Palestinian militias are attempting to harass and disrupt Israeli ground lines of communication.[15]
The Palestinian Red Crescent reported that Israeli forces are operating near the al Quds Hospital in the Tal al Hawa neighborhood.[16] Locals reported that there are civilian injuries and that the IDF is besieging those in the hospital.[17]
Israeli forces and tanks advanced inland in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood west of Jabaliya. An independent analyst on X (Twitter) geolocated footage of Israeli tanks operating near the Rantisis Specialist Clinic in the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood.[18] An employee inside the al Nasr Hospital said that the hospital is surrounded by tanks and heavy gunfire.[19] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—launched mortars at Israeli forces operating near Karama.[20] The IDF conducted an operation to assassinate Nukhba operatives, who are the naval commandos of the al Qassem Brigades.[21] The IDF killed a company commander and platoon commander, one of whom was directing offensive activity in western Jabaliya.[22]
Palestinian militants claimed seven indirect fire attacks into Israel on November 10. The Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed its first indirect fire attack targeting US forces since October 31.[23] The al Qassem Brigades claimed two rocket attacks and one mortar attack targeting Miftahim, Nirim, and Tel Aviv on November 10.[24] The group also claimed a rocket attack targeting an Israeli base in southern Israel.[25] The al Quds Brigades claimed two rocket attacks targeting Nirim and Ein HaBsor.[26]
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said there is no timetable to defeat Hamas.[27] Netanyahu said in an interview that aired on November 9 with Fox News that Israel is proceeding in the Gaza Strip while trying to reduce and minimize civilian casualties and maximize Hamas casualties.[28] Netanyahu said that the fighting continues against Hamas despite the four-hour pauses in the northern Gaza Strip that allow civilians to evacuate.[29] Israeli media N12 reported that the IDF estimates fighting in the Gaza Strip will last a year while the intensity of military operations and combat methods will vary.[30] Netanyahu told Fox News that, ”We don’t seek to occupy Gaza. And we don’t seek to govern Gaza”.[31] Netanyahu said on November 10 in a meeting with mayors of towns bordering the Gaza Strip that the IDF will remain in control of the Gaza Strip after the current war ends and will not rely on international forces to oversee security along the border.[32]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Palestinian fighters clashed with Israeli forces a dozen times, primarily in Hebron and Jenin, in the West Bank on November 10. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades engaged Israeli forces in two small arms clashes and conducted one IED attack across the West Bank.[33] Palestinians demonstrated in support of Gaza in Nablus, Hebron, Ramallah, and Tulkaram, in the West Bank.[34] Palestinians also demonstrated in Jenin on November 10 following extensive clashes with Israeli forces on November 9 which killed 12 Palestinian fighters.[35] The IDF reported that Israeli forces arrested 41 people across the West Bank, of whom 14 were affiliated with Hamas.[36]
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) and other Iranian-backed fighters conducted nine cross-border attacks into northern Israel on November 10. LH launched three one-way drones in two attacks and conducted six anti-tank guided missile attacks targeting Israeli forces and civilians.[37] Unspecified fighters separately attacked an Israeli military position with anti-tank guided missiles.[38] The IDF said that the attacks injured five IDF soldiers and that the IDF struck LH sites in southern Lebanon with artillery in response.[39] LH announced on November 9 that seven of its fighters had been killed. It also said on November 10 that 70 LH fighters had been killed since the Israel-Hamas war began.[40] LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah is set to give a speech on November 11, which will mark his second public statement on the war.[41]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
The IDF reported that unidentified Iranian-backed militants based in Syria were responsible for the November 9 drone attack that hit the Tze’elim Elementary School in Eilat.[42] The IDF reported that its forces conducted airstrikes into Syria on November 9 in retaliation for the attack.[43] The Jerusalem Post reported that the same unidentified Iranian-backed militants fired a second drone into Israeli territory from Syria on November 10.[44] The Israeli open-source media outlet Israel Radar cited an unidentified Israeli defense official who claimed that the Iranian-backed Imam Hussein Division was responsible for both drone attacks into Israel.[45] The IRGC formed the Imam Hussein Division, also known as the Imam Hussein Brigades, in 2016. The Imam Hussain Division is armed with Iranian-made drones and surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, according to Israeli intelligence.[46] The Imam Hussein Division has conducted attacks into Israel from the Golan Heights and has targeted US forces stationed in eastern Syria.[47]
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq – an umbrella term for Iranian-backed Iraqi militias – claimed one attack targeting US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison, Syria on November 10.[48] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq stated that its militants launched a one-way attack drone at the base and claimed that the drone successfully hit its intended target.[49] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed 52 of the 63 reported attacks targeting US forces in Iraq and Syria since October 18. This is the sixth attack the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed targeting US forces stationed at al Tanf Garrison since October 18.[50]
An Iranian state media delegation traveled to Beirut on November 9 to meet with LH-affiliated media officials, likely as part of the Iranian regime’s ongoing effort to coordinate Axis of Resistance messaging and information operations.[51] Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) head Peyman Jebelli and IRIB World Service head Ahmed Norouzi met with LH-controlled outlet al Manar officials on November 10.[52] IRIB is a state-controlled outlet whose head is directly appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.[53] The US State Department banned al Manar from broadcasting in the United States in 2004 and the US Treasury Department designated it as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist Entity” in 2006.[54] Jebelli emphasized IRIB’s support for Axis of Resistance-affiliated media and praised al Manar’s “faithful representation” of the Israel-Hamas war during his meeting with al Manar officials. Iranian officials and media have repeatedly accused Western media of spreading lies about Hamas and “covering up Israeli crimes” since the start of the war on October 7.[55] Iranian officials have also accused Israel of killing journalists to prevent them from exposing “Israeli crimes.”[56] The IRIB delegation is slated to meet with Axis of Resistance leaders and Lebanese officials in the coming days. Unspecified Iranian media officials recently traveled to Beirut on November 2 to meet with representatives of Hamas and PIJ, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[57]
The Iranian regime is seizing on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pro-Hamas, anti-Israel stance on the Israel-Hamas war to try to undermine Turkish-Israeli rapprochement. President Ebrahim Raisi urged Turkey to cut its economic and political ties with Israel during a meeting with Erdogan on the sidelines of the Economic Cooperation Organization summit in Tashkent on November 9.[58] Raisi stated that Muslim countries, including Iran and Turkey, are facing a “divine test” to confront “Israeli crimes.”[59] Iranian state and IRGC-affiliated media separately highlighted student protests against Turkish exports of food and oil to Israel in front of the Turkish Embassy in Tehran on November 9.[60] The students chanted slogans such as “Turkish food and oil bring fire to the battle” and “Your barrels of oil are accomplices in the [killings] of children.”[61] Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Erdogan and Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on November 1, during which time he praised Erdogan’s “strong and accurate” positions on the Israel-Hamas war.[62]
Turkey and Israel have taken steps to improve relations in recent years. Israeli President Isaac Herzog met with Erdogan in Ankara in March 2022.[63] This meeting marked the highest-level engagement between Israeli and Turkish officials in 14 years.[64] Israel and Turkey additionally restored full diplomatic ties in August 2022.[65] Erdogan has adopted a pro-Hamas stance since the start of the Israel-Hamas war on October 7, however.[66] Erdogan described Hamas as a “liberation group” on October 25 and organized a pro-Palestine rally in Istanbul on October 28, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[67] The Iranian regime thus seeks to capitalize on the current strain in Turkish-Israeli relations to advance its objective to isolate Israel in the Middle East.
Moderate Iranian political figures are likely coordinating an attack on the regime’s conduct vis-à-vis the Israel-Hamas war to exploit domestic anti-Axis of Resistance sentiments in advance of the parliamentary elections in March 2024. Former President Hassan Rouhani warned the regime against taking any “imprecise action” that could draw Iran into a war with Israel while noting divisions between Iranians over support for the Palestinian resistance during a Moderation and Development Party Central Council Meeting in Tehran on November 9.[68] Rouhani’s former Foreign Affairs Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif similarly warned against Iran being drawn into the Israel-Hamas war during a panel on the application of international law to the war at the Central Bar Association in Tehran on November 8.[69] Zarif also argued that ordinary Iranians are “tired of paying the cost” of the regime’s support for regional proxies and criticized the overly enthusiastic support of regime officials for the Palestinian cause.
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Iranian protesters have long been critical of Iranian regime support for the Axis of Resistance, particularly in Lebanon and Palestine. These anti-Axis sentiments have resurfaced since the start of the Israel-Hamas war. Social media users claimed that unspecified individuals set fire to a propaganda banner expressing support for Hamas in Mashhad on November 6.[70] An unidentified Iranian individual published a video on his social media account that expressed support for Israel behind a homemade Israeli flag on November 5.[71] Unidentified individuals expressed contempt for the speaker voicing support for Hamas during a pro-Hamas rally in Tehran on October 18.[72]
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CTP-ISW previously assessed that Rouhani is trying to reestablish himself and other like-minded moderates in the domestic political arena ahead of the 2024 elections.[73] Rouhani has been consistently promoting his administration’s economic, foreign, defense, and health policies in publicized meetings with his former cabinet members. Iranian state media has reported that Rouhani will promote a list of moderate candidates in the 2024 elections, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[74]
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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