Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Never before have men crossed the seas to a foreign land to fight for a cause which they did not pretend was peculiarly their own but knew was the cause of humanity and of mankind.”

– Woodrow Wilson

“Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same.”

– Ronald Reagan

“The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him.”

– G.K. Chesterton

History of Veterans Day

World War I – known at the time as “The Great War” – officially ended when the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, in the Palace of Versailles outside the town of Versailles, France. However, fighting ceased seven months earlier when an armistice, or temporary cessation of hostilities, between the Allied nations and Germany went into effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. For that reason, November 11, 1918, is generally regarded as the end of “the war to end all wars.”

Veterans Day continues to be observed on November 11, regardless of what day of the week on which it falls. The restoration of the observance of Veterans Day to November 11 not only preserves the historical significance of the date, but helps focus attention on the important purpose of Veterans Day: A celebration to honor America’s veterans for their patriotism, love of country, and willingness to serve and sacrifice for the common good.

Complete Veterans Day history timeline at this link:

https://department.va.gov/veterans-day/history-of-veterans-day/

1. HRNK: 35 Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Korean Unification, Problems and Prospects

2. HRNK: Taken but not Forgotten: International Cooperation on the Abduction Issue

3. Sending monitoring team to Ukraine necessary for national interest: defense chief

4. U.S. activist funds intensify focus on S. Korea, sparking wave of investor actions

5. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

6. Defectors' group delivers leaflets encouraging defection among N. Korean troops in Russia to Ukraine

7. N. Korea's Hwasong-19 ICBM launch did not involve new engine test: lawmaker

8. Will Trump Rekindle a Bromance With Kim Jong-un? South Koreans Worry.

9. Russia may have helped North Korea develop latest ICBM: South's defense chief

10. Capitol Policy Forum – U.S. Support for a Free and Unified Korea

11. Ukraine reveals ‘intercepted’ radio communications of North Korean soldiers in Russia

12. What to do to build a ‘bromance’ with Trump

13. North Korean military police launch crackdown on AWOL soldiers

14. President Yoon practices golf in case of possible round with Trump

15. Trump 2.0 & North Korean refugees

16. Push for Seoul getting own nuclear arms gains steam after Trump win

17. Commentary: Trump’s biggest impact in East Asia will be in Korea

1. HRNK: 35 Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Korean Unification, Problems and Prospects

Please RSVP HERE

35 Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Korean Unification, Problems and Prospects

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)

Jointly with:

The Republic of Korea Ministry of Unification (MoU)

Hosted by:

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)

November 13, 2024, 15:00 – 17:00 U.S. Eastern Time

DACOR Bacon House

1801 F St. NW, Washington, DC 20006

The event will be held in person at DACOR Bacon House.

Please RSVP by clicking on this link or the button below.

RSVP

2. HRNK: Taken but not Forgotten: International Cooperation on the Abduction Issue

Please RSVP HERE

Taken but not Forgotten: International Cooperation on the Abduction Issue

Virtual Event

Hosted by:

Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK)

November 15, 2024

9 AM ET – 10:30 AM ET (Washington, D.C.)

3 PM – 4:30 PM CET (Brussels)

11 PM - 12:30 AM JST (Tokyo)

11 PM ~ 12:30 AM KST (Seoul)

HRNK will share the Zoom link with guests who have confirmed their participation.

Please RSVP by clicking on this link or the button below.

RSVP

Background:

The abduction of Japanese and other foreign citizens by North Korea remains a grave and unresolved issue, impacting the lives of abductees and their families for decades. Since the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea has abducted foreign nationals to use them for espionage training and other purposes. Despite international efforts, including bilateral negotiations and UN resolutions, the fate of many abductees remains unknown.

The U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) is organizing a virtual event to provide an update on the North Korean abduction issue and to suggest innovative effective approaches under the Trump-47 administration.Keynote remarks (recorded)

Her Excellency Yamatani Eriko, Member of the House of Councillors, Japanese Diet and former Minister in charge of the Abduction Issue

[Part 1] Tackling the North Korean Abduction of Japanese Nationals: The Potential for Increased Cooperation under the Trump-47 Administration

Nishioka Tsutomu, Professor at Reitaku University and Chairman of the National Association to Rescue the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN)

“The North Korean Abduction of Foreign Nationals: Is There Room for a Zone of Possible Agreement with North Korea and Subsequent Solution?”

Susan Komori, Deputy Chief Editor of JAPAN Forward and advisor to the National Association to Rescue the Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea (NARKN)

“The Role of Civil Society in Seeking a Resolution to the North Korean Abduction Conundrum”

Moderator: Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea

[Part 2] International Efforts to Address the Abduction Issue and Pathways for a Resolution

Melanie Kirkpatrick, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and author of Escape from North Korea: The Untold Story of Asia’s Underground Railroad

“North Korean Abductions, a Crime Against Humanity: An Overview of International Efforts since the February 2014 UN COI Report and the Road Ahead”

James Sneddon, brother of Mr. David Sneddon

“Twenty Years since the Disappearance of David Sneddon, Can Trump-47 Seek Truth and Resolution for the Sneddon Family?

Greg Scarlatoiu

“The Tragic Case of Romanian Abductee Doina Bumbea and the Role and Responsibility of International Civil Society in Resolving the Abduction Issue”

Moderator: Susan Komori

[Part 3] Q&A session

Moderator: Rick Herssevoort, HRNK International Outreach Associate

3. Sending monitoring team to Ukraine necessary for national interest: defense chief

Yes. Send them ASAP.

Sending monitoring team to Ukraine necessary for national interest: defense chief | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 11, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun on Monday said sending a team of observers to Ukraine is essential for national interest, emphasizing that such a team would be different from deploying troops to Kyiv.

Kim made the remark in a parliamentary defense committee session as the government mulls sending a monitoring team to Ukraine that could possibly take part in analyzing North Korean combat tactics and interrogations of captured troops.

"A monitoring team is different from the deployment of troops," Kim said. "The team is not a military unit that operates under a command system and is deployed unarmed. It will consist of a small number of professionals who make a short-term visit."

Kim stressed that the deployment of such a monitoring team would be based on Seoul's needs rather than upon the request of the United Nations or the country in war, in a reference to Ukraine.

In a meeting with reporters in Washington, D.C., last month, Kim ruled out the possibility of sending troops to Kyiv and said that dispatching a team of observers would be essential as they would be bringing back useful information to help guard the nation.

Last week, a South Korean government delegation, consisting of senior intelligence and military officials, returned home after visiting Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels to discuss the North's troop deployment to Russia.

Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun (R) attends a parliamentary committee meeting at the National Assembly in Seoul on Nov. 4, 2024. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 11, 2024

4. U.S. activist funds intensify focus on S. Korea, sparking wave of investor actions

My learned friends always tell me that investment activity is an important indicator to track to understand what the future holds.

U.S. activist funds intensify focus on S. Korea, sparking wave of investor actions

https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2024/11/11/QYVQ7N7TFFABLB4DJ3EVW5IMXA/

By Park Soon-chan,

Lee Jung-soo

Published 2024.11.11. 11:06

U.S. activist funds are intensifying their influence over South Korean companies, launching campaigns aimed at reshaping corporate governance and increasing shareholder returns in a rapidly growing trend. /Graphic by Lee Chul-won

United States’ Activist funds are ramping up their focus on South Korean companies, sparking a wave of efforts aimed at influencing corporate governance and boosting shareholder returns.

Activist funds, which typically buy shares in a company and influence its decision-making processes, often seek short-term gains over long-term value. They employ a range of strategies, including pushing for dividend increases, share buybacks, and corporate restructuring. While some argue that these funds enhance shareholder returns by advocating for minority shareholders’ interests, others criticize them for pursuing short-term profits at the expense of the company’s future value.

Dalton Investments, a U.S.-based investment firm, disclosed on Nov. 6 that it holds a 5.02% stake in Kolmar Holdings, the parent company of S. Korean cosmetics firm Kolmar Korea. Dalton had been quietly increasing its stake since the beginning of the year but was required to disclose its identity upon crossing the 5% threshold for listed companies.

While Dalton stated that the acquisition was for “investment purposes only,” industry insiders anticipate the firm may soon launch an activist campaign to expand shareholder returns. Dalton has a history of demanding enhanced shareholder returns, having previously targeted Hyundai Home Shopping in 2019, Samyoung Trading in 2020, and SK Group in 2022.

The next day, Nov. 7, S. Korean tobacco giant KT&G effectively rejected an unsolicited offer from local activist fund Flashlight Capital Partners (FCP). Last month, FCP submitted a proposal to KT&G’s management to acquire a 100% stake in its subsidiary Korea Ginseng Corporation (KGC) for $1.4 billion. KT&G had not listed KGC for sale and had only a year ago announced plans to develop KGC as one of its three core businesses. Despite this, FCP claimed KGC’s performance had been weakening and presented an abrupt acquisition proposal. KT&G responded, urging FCP to refrain from creating confusion among stakeholders and the market.

As the 2025 proxy season approaches, activist funds are ramping up their actions. Activist funds typically acquire substantial shares in companies to influence corporate decisions and increase profit returns. These funds may push for board restructuring, propose shareholder meeting agendas, or initiate proxy battles to negotiate various changes in corporate governance.

The number of activist campaigns targeting S. Korean companies has surged from 8 in 2019 to 77 last year. Experts suggest the trend targets Korean conglomerates, where shareholdings are fragmented due to third- or fourth-generation transitions, and the high inheritance tax burdens hinder proactive efforts to boost stock prices. Additionally, closed-off boards and complex cross-shareholding structures, often created with inheritance planning in mind, are seen as factors leading to corporate undervaluation and attracting activist attention.

In the past month alone, U.K.-based Palliser Capital and Korea’s Align Partners acquired over 1% stakes in SK Square and Doosan Bobcat, respectively, demanding improved shareholder value. SK Square, an intermediate holding company of SK Group, holds a 20% stake in semiconductor giant SK Hynix. Meanwhile, Doosan Bobcat faces demands to allocate $1.1 billion, initially intended for a subsidiary merger, toward shareholder returns instead.

On the S. Korean stock exchange, funds are flowing into exchange-traded funds (ETFs) focused on shareholder return targets, stocks likely to attract activist attention. A product managed by Korea Investment Trust Management has recorded a 22.4% return year-to-date, featuring shares of Seah Steel Holdings, Youngone Holdings, and W Games.

Industry watchers are also noting the potential for activists to form alliances with minority shareholders. By joining forces, these coalitions could secure crucial votes on key issues or in corporate control disputes. In March, five activist funds united at Samsung C&T’s annual shareholder meeting to propose a $3.7 billion stock buyback and a $3.40 per-share dividend increase, although the motion ultimately failed.

5. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The world is getting smaller. How should we think about working across Geographic Combatant Commands?

Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_230355.htm

08 Nov. 2024 -
|
Last updated: 08 Nov. 2024 15:24
English
French

Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine associate themselves with this statement

NATO Allies strongly condemn the decisions by the leaders of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to dangerously expand Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine.

In addition to the DPRK’s already substantive support to Russia’s war effort, through the provision of millions of rounds of ammunitions and ballistic missiles, the thousands of combat troops deployed by the DPRK constitutes a dangerous expansion of its ongoing support for Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.

The deepening military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK deeply impacts Euro-Atlantic security, with implications also for the Indo-Pacific.

Increasing military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is a breach of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, including 2270 (2016), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009). This is particularly egregious given Russia’s status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. We call on Russia to return to compliance with these resolutions and to uphold its international obligations.

Russia’s statement on 26 September asserting that the denuclearisation of the DPRK is “off the table” is unacceptable, as it undermines the global non-proliferation regime, directly contradicts relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and further exacerbates regional tensions. The Russian statement forms part of its wider effort to undermine the global non-proliferation regime and to dismantle UN sanctions.

We urge all countries not to provide any kind of assistance to Russia’s aggression, and condemn all those who are facilitating and thereby prolonging Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.

NATO will continue to work with its partners, in particular in the Indo-Pacific, to promote peace and stability, and prevent Russia and those facilitating its war effort from undermining regional and global stability.

Allies continue to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence against all threats and challenges, in all domains, and in multiple strategic directions across the Euro-Atlantic area.

Allies remain as resolute as ever in supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail. Allies and partners continue to step up vital political, military, financial, economic, and humanitarian assistance as Ukraine exercises its inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Allies are determined to support Ukraine in building a force capable of defeating Russian aggression, in line with the pledge of long-term security assistance for Ukraine.

6. Defectors' group delivers leaflets encouraging defection among N. Korean troops in Russia to Ukraine

Good initiative from the north Korean diaspora.

Excerpt:

The "Defectors' Propaganda Corps," comprising North Korean soldiers-turned-defectors and defectors whose sons served in the North Korean military, delivered the propaganda leaflets to the Embassy of Ukraine in Seoul for the distribution to North Korean soldiers in Russia, the group said.

But we need the ROK and US militaries to begin aggressive PSYOP focused on the nKPA.

Influencing Minds and Will: A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/a-psychological-operations-strategy-for-the-korean-peninsula-from-lessons-learned-in-ukraine/

Defectors' group delivers leaflets encouraging defection among N. Korean troops in Russia to Ukraine | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 11, 2024

SEOUL, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- A group of North Korean defectors delivered propaganda leaflets to Ukraine on Monday, encouraging North Korean soldiers deployed in Russia to defect, as thousands of North Korean troops have been sent to support Russia's war against Ukraine.

The "Defectors' Propaganda Corps," comprising North Korean soldiers-turned-defectors and defectors whose sons served in the North Korean military, delivered the propaganda leaflets to the Embassy of Ukraine in Seoul for the distribution to North Korean soldiers in Russia, the group said.

The leaflets carry messages encouraging North Korean troops to defect, along with instructions on how to defect. Audio files with similar messages were also delivered to the embassy.

The group's leader, Jang Se-yul, was scheduled to deliver similar leaflets to Ukrainian military officials in Brussels, Belgium, later in the day (local time), along with a letter advising Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to utilize psychological warfare against North Korean soldiers.

In the letter, Jang would stress that "the Ukrainian military could secure mass surrender and defection among North Korean soldiers if proactive psychological warfare is mobilized."

The United States has confirmed that as many as 10,000 North Korean troops have been sent to Russia's western border region of Kursk with the possibility of engaging in combat against Ukrainian forces.

A group of North Korean defectors deliver propaganda leaflets to the Embassy of Ukraine in Seoul on Nov. 11, 2024, in this photo provided by their group, called the "Defectors' Propaganda Corps." (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 11, 2024

7. N. Korea's Hwasong-19 ICBM launch did not involve new engine test: lawmaker

Excerpts:

North Korea confirmed it had successfully test-fired the new Hwasong-19 ICBM on Oct. 31 and called it an "ultimate" version of its long-range missile series. The missile reached the highest altitude and flew for the longest time.

State media photos showed the missile being fired from an 11-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL) -- assessed to be about 30 meters long -- apparently bigger than any of the North's existing missile launch vehicles.

"Considering the increase in the length and diameter of the missile's fuselage and enhanced maximum altitude, the Hwasong-19 is assessed as a new type of ICBM that is different from the Hwasong-18," Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the ruling People Power Party said, citing a report by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

(LEAD) N. Korea's Hwasong-19 ICBM launch did not involve new engine test: lawmaker | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 11, 2024

(ATTN: RECASTS 1st 2 paras; UPDATES with minor edits throughout)

SEOUL, Nov. 11 (Yonhap) -- North Korea does not appear to have carried out a new engine test before launching the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month, a South Korean lawmaker said Monday, citing the military intelligence agency.

The assessment came amid suspicions that Russia may have provided technical assistance to North Korea for the missile launch as the two nations have been bolstering military cooperation.

North Korea confirmed it had successfully test-fired the new Hwasong-19 ICBM on Oct. 31 and called it an "ultimate" version of its long-range missile series. The missile reached the highest altitude and flew for the longest time.

State media photos showed the missile being fired from an 11-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL) -- assessed to be about 30 meters long -- apparently bigger than any of the North's existing missile launch vehicles.

"Considering the increase in the length and diameter of the missile's fuselage and enhanced maximum altitude, the Hwasong-19 is assessed as a new type of ICBM that is different from the Hwasong-18," Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the ruling People Power Party said, citing a report by the Defense Intelligence Agency.

This photo, carried by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 1, 2024, shows the North firing the new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile the previous day, guided by its leader Kim Jong-un. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea disclosed its test of new engines for missiles in the past, but the military said it has not detected signs of additional tests for solid-fuel engines since March 20, when the North's state media carried a report on a claimed ground jet test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile.

"It is assessed that the possibility of North Korea receiving support from Russia on technologies that can be applied to the development of ballistic missiles, under the name of 'space technology cooperation,' cannot be ruled out," the military was quoted as saying in the report.

Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun agreed with the assessment, saying that "such a possibility cannot be ruled out," when asked about Russia's suspected technical assistance over the engine for the Hwasong-19.

"Signs of (North Korea) conducting an engine test were not detected," Kim said at a parliamentary defense committee meeting.

North Korea appears to be accelerating its missile development with a focus on solid-fuel ICBMs that are considered to be harder to detect ahead of a launch compared with liquid-fuel ones as they require fewer preparation procedures, such as the injection of fuel.

North Korea launched the solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM three times last year -- in April, July and December.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 11, 2024

8. Will Trump Rekindle a Bromance With Kim Jong-un? South Koreans Worry.

I remain skeptical that some sort of bromance will be rekindled (if there ever was one).

Arms control negotiations will mean victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.

Excerpts:

Some fear that Mr. Trump will once again threaten to withdraw American troops from South Korea unless it greatly increases its share of the costs, and that he will rekindle an ill-calculated diplomatic bromance with Mr. Kim.

“South Korea-U.S. relations will sail into a storm,” said Lee Byong-chul, a North Korea expert at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “But we will likely see Kim Jong-un and Trump exchanging love letters again.”

....

“Kim Jong-un wants the United States to accept his nuclear weapons as a fait accompli and engage him in arms-reduction talks,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former head of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification. “If such negotiation happens, it will cause shock and confusion in South Korea because it will be tantamount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons power.”

Will Trump Rekindle a Bromance With Kim Jong-un? South Koreans Worry.

Donald J. Trump’s second term brings uncertainty to the Korean Peninsula as nuclear tensions run high. North Korea’s leader may see a chance to re-engage.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/11/world/asia/south-korea-trump-kim-jong-un.html

President Donald J. Trump and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, met for the first time in 2018 on Sentosa Island in Singapore.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

By Choe Sang-Hun

Reporting from Seoul

Nov. 11, 2024, 12:01 a.m. ET

During his 2024 election campaign, Donald J. Trump described the United States’ alliance with South Korea as a terrible bargain for his country, accusing the Asian ally of not paying enough for the 28,500 American troops stationed on its soil.

But when he mentioned Kim Jong-un, the leader of North Korea who has threatened to use nuclear weapons against the South, he talked as if Mr. Kim were a long-lost friend.

“It’s nice to get along when somebody has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise,” Mr. Trump said about Mr. Kim in July. “He’d like to see me back, too. I think he misses me, if you want to know the truth.”

South Koreans are bracing themselves for Mr. Trump’s return to the White House with growing anxiety and uncertainty, as it raises the specter of the diplomatic roller coaster ride on the Korean Peninsula they endured during his first term.

Some fear that Mr. Trump will once again threaten to withdraw American troops from South Korea unless it greatly increases its share of the costs, and that he will rekindle an ill-calculated diplomatic bromance with Mr. Kim.

“South Korea-U.S. relations will sail into a storm,” said Lee Byong-chul, a North Korea expert at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul. “But we will likely see Kim Jong-un and Trump exchanging love letters again.”

Image

A man paused at a train station in Seoul on Wednesday to watch a broadcast of Mr. Trump speaking during an election night event.Credit...Anthony Wallace/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

North Korea has not reacted to Mr. Trump’s election. But analysts say Mr. Kim may see it as an opportunity to restart negotiations with the United States — with more bargaining power than he wielded when he first met Mr. Trump. Between then and now, North Korea’s nuclear and missile abilities have expanded significantly, allowing Mr. Kim to demand a higher price tag for making a concession on his nuclear program, the analysts said.

Since 2019, Mr. Kim has developed and tested more nuclear-capable missiles. He signed a mutual defense treaty with Russia in June. In September, North Korea for the first time unveiled a weapons-grade uranium-manufacturing site, where Mr. Kim vowed to produce “exponentially” more nuclear weapons.

After launching a new Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile last week, Mr. Kim said North Korea would “never change its line of bolstering up its nuclear forces.” South Korean officials warned that Mr. Kim may even conduct his country’s seventh nuclear test, which would be its first since 2017, to further elevate his leverage before negotiating with Mr. Trump.

Mr. Trump will most likely begin his second term with more political clout, too, after a big election win and with the Republicans on track to control both chambers of Congress, though he also faces foreign policy challenges including the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine. If he takes on North Korea, he will confront a decades-old riddle that successive American governments have tried to solve but failed. The last time he did, he veered between applying pressure and unleashing insults against Mr. Kim to more friendly, toned, one-on-one diplomacy, but he, too, failed.

If Mr. Kim and Mr. Trump were to restart talks, Mr. Kim would be widely expected to try to persuade Mr. Trump to ease sanctions and reduce the American military footprint on the peninsula in return for freezing North Korea’s long-range ballistic missile program and limiting — but not eliminating — its nuclear arsenal. For decades, Washington and its allies have pushed for a “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement” of North Korea’s nuclear program.

“Kim Jong-un wants the United States to accept his nuclear weapons as a fait accompli and engage him in arms-reduction talks,” said Cheon Seong-whun, a former head of the Seoul-based Korea Institute for National Unification. “If such negotiation happens, it will cause shock and confusion in South Korea because it will be tantamount to recognizing North Korea as a nuclear weapons power.”

Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim spent much of 2017 exchanging personal insults and threats of nuclear war. Mr. Trump threatened to rain down “fire and fury” and “totally destroy” North Korea in the aftermath of its nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests. He sent long-range bombers and aircraft carriers toward the peninsula to warn Mr. Kim, whom he referred to as the “little Rocket Man.” Mr. Kim called Mr. Trump a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.”

Image

In a photograph provided by North Korean state media, the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile undergoes a test launch at an undisclosed site in North Korea in October.Credit...Korean Central News Agency, via Associated Press

Then they did an about-face, meeting in Singapore in 2018 in the first summit meeting between their nations. Mr. Trump facilitated his diplomacy with Mr. Kim by canceling or scaling down joint military drills with South Korea, which had long symbolized the alliance’s will to deter North Korea and, more recently, China. Mr. Trump later said he and the North Korean dictator “fell in love.”

South Koreans had watched their meetings with both skepticism and hope, many wishing that the two leaders would negotiate a history-making peace deal on the peninsula, one of the world’s most enduring flash points since the 1950-53 Korean War ended with a truce and left the two sides technically at war. But negotiations between Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim fell apart in 2019, as they disagreed on how far North Korea should roll back its nuclear program in return for relief from international sanctions that Mr. Kim badly needed for economic development.

Mr. Kim has since found a new way, rapidly expanding his nuclear arsenal while cutting off all dialogue with Washington and Seoul. He also forged a new alliance with Russia, shipping both weapons and troops to aid in its war against Ukraine.

Since he took office in 2022, President Yoon Suk Yeol of South Korea has worked with the Biden administration to restore and expand the joint military drills involving the allies. He will find his legacy at risk if Mr. Trump again diminishes those military exercises, which he has called “very expensive,” and resumes diplomacy with Mr. Kim at a time when North Korea has rejected South Korea as a dialogue partner.

When Mr. Trump talked with Mr. Yoon on the phone on Thursday, he showed “interest in North Korea,” kicking off discussions of the country, including its recent missile tests and its offensive of “trash balloons” sent into South Korea, Mr. Yoon said. The two leaders agreed to meet soon, he added.

South Korea’s leader said American politicians told him that he and Mr. Trump may share “chemistry,” perhaps because both entered politics after spending a lifetime in other fields.

Mr. Trump and Mr. Kim appeared to have such chemistry when they first met in Singapore, reveling in the global publicity their rare meeting generated. But their second summit, in 2019 in Hanoi, Vietnam, proved an extraordinary embarrassment for Mr. Kim, whose propagandists had built up expectations at home that he would achieve a monumental deal with the United States. Instead, he risked looking weak by returning empty-handed.

Image

Mr. Trump meeting with Mr. Kim in 2019 in the border village of Panmunjom in the Demilitarized Zone.Credit...Susan Walsh/Associated Press

Although the two leaders met a third time — when Mr. Trump became the first sitting U.S. president to set foot in North Korea by briefly crossing the demarcation line with the South — the dialogue petered out and Mr. Kim later declared he had no interest in further talks.

“This time, he will be more careful, trying to set strict preconditions for meetings, in order not to repeat the humiliation of the first round of negotiations with Trump,” said Park Won-gon, a political scientist at Ewha Womans University in Seoul.

Complicating matters for South Korea and its leader is Mr. Trump’s tendency to see alliances in transactional terms. Mr. Trump has said that if he won the election, he would make Seoul pay $10 billion for keeping U.S. troops in South Korea. It currently pays a little over $1 billion, having signed an agreement with the Biden administration to increase its annual contribution to $1.13 billion by 2026.

“They have a money machine,” Mr. Trump told Bloomberg last month. “We protect them from North Korea and from other people.”

Mr. Trump could make more South Koreans wonder how much and for how long they can rely on the alliance for their defense and ask whether they should also build nuclear weapons to deter North Korea. Around 70 percent of South Koreans already believed that their country should have its own nuclear weapons, according to surveys.

“The more likely Trump’s re-election, the more likely our fears will be realized that we will confront nuclear-armed North Korea alone and without nuclear weapons,” Park In-kook, South Korea’s former ambassador to the United Nations, said during a forum in July.

Image

President Yoon Suk Yeol signed a Biden administration plan to increase South Korea’s payment to station U.S. troops from $1 billion to $1.13 billion by 2026.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Mr. Yoon once warmed up to the idea of arming South Korea with nuclear weapons. But he shelved that option last year when he and President Biden signed the “Washington Declaration,” in which South Korea recommitted itself to nonproliferation while the United States reaffirmed its promise to protect its ally with all its military resources, including nuclear.

“Trump will turn the Washington Declaration into a piece of waste paper,” said Cheong Seong-chang, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute in South Korea. “South Korea will have to have a fundamental review of its diplomatic and security policies. And we will see more South Koreans supporting nuclear armament.”

Choe Sang-Hun is the lead reporter for The Times in Seoul, covering South and North Korea. More about Choe Sang-Hun

9. Russia may have helped North Korea develop latest ICBM: South's defense chief

If true, we should not be surprised. Perhaps we would be more surprised if the Russians did not help them.

Russia may have helped North Korea develop latest ICBM: South's defense chief

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-11-11/national/northKorea/Russia-may-have-helped-North-Korea-develop-latest-ICBM-Souths-defense-chief/2175365

Published: 11 Nov. 2024, 19:08

MICHAEL LEE
lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr

A Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile is launched in this photo released by Pyongyang's state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Nov. 1, a day after the KCNA reported the test took place. [YONHAP]

South Korea's defense minister told lawmakers on Monday there were no signs that the North tested a new rocket engine before launching the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) last month, raising suspicions that it received technical assistance from Russia amid mounting military cooperation between the two countries.

Speaking at a meeting of the National Assembly’s Defense Committee, Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun said that “signs of the North conducting an engine test were not detected” and that the possibility that Moscow provided Pyongyang with the technology to leapfrog development of the new ICBM “could not be ruled out.”

Launches of previously untested missiles by the North have typically been preceded by announcements from its state media about combustion tests for new engine systems.

Ukraine intercepts coded North Korean military communications in Kursk

North behind 331 GPS jamming attacks this month: Science Ministry

Over 3,700 North Koreans visited Russia in Q3 for 'studies': report

North Korean troops suffered combat losses in Kursk, Zelensky says

South Korean and U.S. military intelligence have also discerned whether the North tested new propulsion systems through satellite images of the regime’s Sohae Satellite Testing Ground in Dongchang-ri, North Pyongan Province.

However, South Korean military intelligence said it detected no such signs ahead of the launch of the Hwasong-19 ICBM, which the North’s state media described as the “ultimate” addition to its long-range missile series.

The last test detected by the South’s military took place on March 20, when the North's state media said the regime had conducted a ground test of a solid-fuel engine for a new type of intermediate-range hypersonic missile.

The 11-axle transporter erector launcher used in the launch of the Hwasong-19 intercontinental ballistic missile is seen in this photograph released by the North's state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) on Nov. 1. [YONHAP]

Photos released by Pyongyang’s state media showed that the Hwasong-19 was fired from an 11-axle transporter erector launcher (TEL). By comparison, the Hwasong-18 ICBM first tested in April last year was launched from a nine-axle TEL.

According to Rep. Yu Yong-weon of the conservative People Power Party, Seoul’s Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issued a report assessing the Hwasong-19 as a “new type of ICBM that is different from the Hwasong-18 ICBM” based on “the increase in the length and diameter of the missile's fuselage and enhanced maximum altitude.”

According to Pyongyang’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency, the Hwasong-19 reached an altitude of 7,687.5 kilometers (4776.8 miles) and traveled 1,001.2 kilometers over 85 minutes and 56 seconds. Both its peak altitude and flight time exceeded previous records set by North Korean ICBMs.

In its report, the DIA said the possibility of the North receiving support from Russia “regarding technologies that can be applied to the development of ballistic missiles under the guise of ‘space technology cooperation’ cannot be ruled out.”

At his first summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in September last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin hinted that Moscow might be willing to lend technical assistance to Pyongyang’s space program as the two regimes pledged to deepen their ties.

Following their second summit in Pyongyang in June, where the two leaders signed a so-called comprehensive strategic treaty that included a mutual defense clause, Kim has alarmed South Korea and NATO by deploying troops to Russia, where they are expected to join the fight against Ukraine.

According to U.S. and Ukrainian officials who recently spoke to Western media outlets, Russia has amassed a large force of 50,000 troops, including a large contingent of North Koreans, to carry out an assault on Ukrainian positions in the Kursk region of western Russia in the coming days without having to relocate troops from eastern regions of Ukraine.

Sabrina Singh, the deputy Pentagon press secretary, said on Thursday that Washington “fully expects” the North Korean soldiers “could be engaged in combat.”

South Korean intelligence believes that the 10,000 troops sent by the North have been drawn from the Korean People’s Army’s 11th Corps, which comprises the regime’s special operations forces.

BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]

10. Capitol Policy Forum – U.S. Support for a Free and Unified Korea

The Capitol Policy Forum for a Free and Unified Korea was convened on June 6, 2024.

Conveners:

Global Peace Foundation
Action for Korea United
One Korea Foundation
Alliance for Korea United, U.S.A.

The compendium of papers from the presenters can be downloaded here. https://globalpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Capitol-Policy-Forum-2024-Compendium.pdf

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background and Concept (Page 2)

Forum Summary: “International Forum on One Korea 2024

Explores U.S. Support for a Free and Uniﬁed Korea” by Robin McDonough (Page 4)

Video: One Korea Forum: Capitol Policy Forum June 2024 (Page 19)

“The Economics of Korean Uniﬁcation: Thinking the Unthinkable?” by Nicholas Eberstadt (Page 21)

“Step Back, Door Closing, Move Forward,’’ by William B. Brown (page 42)

“An Argument for Korean Reuniﬁcation: The Economic Case and Need for U.S. Support of South Korean Policy to Create Favorable Conditions for a Free and Uniﬁed Korea: by George Hutchinson (Page 50)

“Talking Points: Capitol Hill Forum, One Free Korea,” by Robert Joseph (Page 52)

“National Strategy for Countering North Korea,” by Robert Joseph, et al. (Page 55)

“Uniﬁcation, Information, Human Rights,” by Greg Scarlatoiu (Page 74)

“10 Point Promise to the North Korean People,” by Fredrick “Skip” Vincenzo (Page 80)

Feed the World the Truth about North Korea by Dr. Sung-Yoon Lee (84)

Power Point Presentation: “The Economics of Korean Uniﬁcation: Thinking the Unthinkable?” by Nicholas Eberstadt (Page 91

Korea Taking Points by David Maxwell (Page 115)

Speaker Biographies (Page 119)

11. Ukraine reveals ‘intercepted’ radio communications of North Korean soldiers in Russia

Excerpts:

Ukraine and the United States estimate that North Korea has sent 11,000 troops to help Russia in its war against Ukraine, with these forces reportedly stationed in the Russian border region of Kursk, which Ukrainian forces aided in early August. Moscow has faced challenges in reclaiming territory from Ukrainian forces.

Ukrainian troops have held parts of Kursk since then and Russia has struggled to re-take them.

The Ukrainian military suggests that the North Koreans may engage in combat in the coming days. The Pentagon has also confirmed the presence of a “small number” of North Korean soldiers on the front lines, speculating they may be deployed in “some type of infantry role.”

The New York Times, citing U.S. and Ukrainian officials, reported on Sunday that the Russian military has assembled about 50,000 soldiers, including North Koreans, to launch an assault to reclaim territory in Kursk.

Similarly, CNN quoted an unidentified U.S. official as saying Russia has gathered a “large force of tens of thousands” of troops and North Korean soldiers to participate in an imminent assault.

Ukraine reveals ‘intercepted’ radio communications of North Korean soldiers in Russia

Russia has amassed 50,000 soldiers in Kursk, including North Korean troops, for assault.

https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2024/11/11/north-korea-soldiers-communication/

By Taejun Kang for RFA

2024.11.11

Screenshot of the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine’s YouTube clip that shows intercepted radio communications between North Korean soldiers in Russia. (Defense Intelligence of Ukraine)

TAIPEI, Taiwan – Ukraine has released an audio clip of what it says are intercepted radio communications between North Korean soldiers in Russia, as media reported that Russia had gathered 50,000 soldiers in its Kursk region, including North Korean troops, to attack Ukrainian positions there.

In the audio, uploaded by the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, or DIU, on YouTube on Sunday, soldiers can be heard exchanging coded terms in North Korean-accented Korean.

“Mulgae hana, Mulgae dul,” was one exchange, which translates as “Seal one, Seal two”.

In another recording, a soldier says, “wait,” apparently giving an instruction to a subordinate.

The DIU said it intercepted the radio communications on Saturday, adding that the signals were about “ordering them to return immediately.”

Ukraine and the United States estimate that North Korea has sent 11,000 troops to help Russia in its war against Ukraine, with these forces reportedly stationed in the Russian border region of Kursk, which Ukrainian forces aided in early August. Moscow has faced challenges in reclaiming territory from Ukrainian forces.

Ukrainian troops have held parts of Kursk since then and Russia has struggled to re-take them.

The Ukrainian military suggests that the North Koreans may engage in combat in the coming days. The Pentagon has also confirmed the presence of a “small number” of North Korean soldiers on the front lines, speculating they may be deployed in “some type of infantry role.”

The New York Times, citing U.S. and Ukrainian officials, reported on Sunday that the Russian military has assembled about 50,000 soldiers, including North Koreans, to launch an assault to reclaim territory in Kursk.

Similarly, CNN quoted an unidentified U.S. official as saying Russia has gathered a “large force of tens of thousands” of troops and North Korean soldiers to participate in an imminent assault.

Strategic partnership

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law to ratify a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty with North Korea, which includes a mutual defense clause in the event of “aggression” against either signatory, Russia’s state news agency TASS said on Saturday.

Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech during a plenary session as part of the 21st annual meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Krasnodar region, Russia, Nov. 7, 2024. (MAXIM SHIPENKOV/Pool via Reuters)

The treaty was signed in Pyongyang on June 19 as Putin was visiting North Korea. Commenting on the treaty, Putin said on Thursday that it did not contain anything new but the two countries had returned to a similar arrangement that they had during the Soviet era.

“The treaty we signed with North Korea was the one we’ve signed with other countries. It was with the Soviet Union, then of course it ceased to exist, and we actually returned to it. That’s all. There is nothing new there,” said Putin, as cited by TASS in a separate report.

Putin also mentioned the possibility of Russia and North Korea holding joint military exercises.

“Why not? We’ll see,” Putin was cited by TASS as saying, without commenting on reports about North Korean troops in Russia.

Possible Russian support

South Korea and its allies have speculated that North Korea could get Russian assistance with its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for its help for Russia to fight Ukraine, which has included large volumes of weapons including missiles and artillery shells.

The South Korean military said that an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, that North Korea tested on Oct. 31, was launched without the test of a new engine, which could suggest Russian assistance.

North Korea test fired what it said was a Hwasong-19, a new model, not an improved version of an existing missile. It was launched without testing a new engine, said South Korean lawmaker Yoo Yong-won, who was briefed by the South’s Defense Intelligence Agency.

“Considering the increased length and diameter of the missile’s fuselage and the increased maximum altitude, we can say the Hwasong-19 is a new ICBM that is different from the Hwasong-18,” the agency said, cited by Yoo.

The agency said that the fact that North Korea developed and launched the new missile without having to test its engine lent weight to the possibility of Russian technical assistance. Media also reported the possibility that Russia had provided North Korea with the engine.

North Korea reported a ground-based engine test for a medium-range ballistic missile on Nov. 15 last year, and on March 20 this year disclosed a multi-stage engine ground-based test for a new medium- to long-range hypersonic missile.

The South Korean military said that North Korea had not been confirmed as conducting any additional solid-fuel engine tests since March.

“There is a possibility that the North is receiving technologies from Russia under the name of ‘cooperation in the field of space technology’ that could be used for ballistic missile development,” the agency said.

What to do to build a ‘bromance’ with Trump

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2024-11-11/opinion/columns/What-to-do-to-build-a-bromance-with-Trump/2175394

Published: 11 Nov. 2024, 19:45

Chang Se-jeong

The author is an editorial writer of the JoongAng Ilbo.

President Yoon Suk Yeol will never forget Nov. 7, as he lowered his head for the first time in the nationally-televised speech and press conference marking the midpoint of his five-year term. However, a diplomatic event which took place early in the morning of the conference can be more important to the future of Korea. On that day, President Yoon had his first phone call with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.

According to foreign media reports, Trump received congratulatory calls from more than 70 leaders from around the world over five days, starting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But Trump’s phone conversations with the leaders of Korea and Japan stood out.

Japanese media reported that Yoon had a 12-minute conversation with Trump on Thursday, while Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba had a five-minute conversation with him that day.

Shortly after the 2016 U.S. election, Trump and then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had a 20-minute phone talk, as Abe boasted about his “bromance” with Trump. But this time, Ishiba was outranked by Yoon.

Media reported that Ishiba, known to be a heavy drinker, has no common point with Trump as he doesn’t play golf, unlike Abe. There is a sense of nervousness in Tokyo that Yoon could replace the late Abe. As Trump doesn’t drink alcohol, it may limit Yoon’s chance of capitalizing on his people skills. But Yoon has reportedly started practicing golf again after eight years. It will be interesting to see if Trump and Yoon will play golf together just like he did with Abe.

One can say that the order and duration of the phone call is not important, but it’s not something to be taken lightly, given Trump’s tendency to cherish personal intimacy. From this perspective, Yoon’s success in swiftly making a call was a good first step in his relationship with Trump.

The question is what comes next. As Trump will take office on Jan. 20, the transition team has already been launched. It is crucial to cement the Yoon-Trump relationship during the transition team’s operation, when the basic direction of Trump 2.0’s core policies on trade, security and foreign affairs are determined.

At the Nov. 7 press conference, President Yoon snickered when a foreign correspondent said, “Trump doesn’t know Yoon well and doesn’t like prosecutors, either.” At that time, Yoon expressed confidence, saying that U.S. officials close to Trump have predicted that he would have good chemistry with Trump.

However, actions to form a “bromance” between Yoon and Trump and establish a hotline between them to discuss how to deal with a nuclear-armed North Korea and how to learn from the Moon Jae-in administration’s failed North Korea policy are more important than words.

Chang Ho-jin, Yoon’s special adviser for foreign affairs and security, is expected to meet with Trump as Yoon’s special envoy. It would be nice if President Yoon pays a visit to Trump’s private residence at Mar-a-Lago, Florida, on his way to or from the Nov. 15-16 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru or arranges a separate trip before the end of this year.

In November 2016, Abe flew to New York just nine days after the U.S. election and presented Trump with golf clubs as a congratulatory gift and played golf with him a month after his inauguration. As a result, Abe could bring Trump to his side throughout Trump’s first term with his Quad and Indo-Pacific strategy.

It may also be worth considering assembling a “dream team” of envoys with influential people with close ties with Trump. Political and economic figures may be the first names on the list, but if the presidential office uses a new perspective, it could be better.

Just think of Kim Mina, the chairwoman of Build Up Korea, who had helped Trump’s eldest son, Donald Trump Jr., to testify his faith at a large church during his visit in August. Another candidate for the dream team members can be Lee Dong-sup, the president of the World Taekwondo Headquarters, who was unexpectedly invited to Mar-a-Lago in November 2021 and presented Trump with a Taekwondo uniform and an honorary black belt certificate.

Possible envoys can also include Ji Seong-ho, a North Korean defector who was invited to Trump’s State of Union address in January 2018 and met with the U.S. president at the White House. Another candidate is Lee Hyeon-seo, a North Korean defector who wrote “The Girl With 7 Names,” a memoir Trump had promised to read.

No matter how chaotic domestic politics may be, someone must squeeze out as much wisdom as possible to minimize the diplomatic, security and economic risks Trump’s second term will bring.

Translation by the Korea JoongAng Daily staff.

13. North Korean military police launch crackdown on AWOL soldiers

Is this an indication of the breakdown of the three chains of control within the nKPA? Is this an indicator of the possibility of the loss of coherency of the military (which is one of the two key conditions that can lead to regime collapse)?

North Korean military police launch crackdown on AWOL soldiers - Daily NK English

As a result, there's been a marked change in soldier-MP interactions – while MPs have increased their presence and visibility, soldiers now flee from them rather than complying as they did in the past

By Seon Hwa - November 11, 2024

dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · November 11, 2024

North Korean military police have launched a crackdown on soldiers who leave their bases without authorization. The operation, which began in mid-October, is targeting provincial cities including Pyongsong, Anju, Kaechon and Tokchon in South Pyongan province.

A source in the province told Daily NK recently that, “Soldiers wearing the characteristic armbands of the military police are being assigned in greater numbers than usual at marketplace entrances, vehicle parking lots, corners with heavy foot traffic and train station yards, as well as checkpoints on major roads. Apprehended soldiers are also frequently seen being led away by the military police.”

Pyongsong, Anju, Kaechon and Tokchon are transportation hubs with roads and railways leading to areas around the country. They are also the location of military units both large and small, such as the Pyongyang Defense Command, Wolli Airfield, the Light Infantry Guidance Bureau, the Roads Bureau, and the Engineering Bureau. In short, numerous soldiers are always moving about in these cities.

In principle, the North Korean military only allows soldiers to leave their post when they have specific orders such as executing a mission, transporting goods, moving formations or transporting the wounded. In such cases, they are issued a pass and placed under the guidance of a squad commander or officer.

But in reality, the source said, many soldiers move between bases and civilian areas without a pass, only verbal authorization from their unit commander.

“When supplies run low, soldiers in the lower ranks often have no choice but to visit private housing or local villages near where they are stationed,” the source explained. “Soldiers who leave their post to purchase supplies or perform similar tasks often travel long distances, staying out later than allowed and visiting areas other than those mentioned to their unit commander.

“Sometimes they’re visiting friends, relatives or supporters. Sometimes they’re frequenting marketplaces in distant areas,” the source added.

The North Korean military has emphasized on several previous occasions the need to eradicate unauthorized absences, along with other behaviors that undermine barracks discipline and military regulations. But those efforts have gained new urgency amid the recent tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The military police’s crackdown on soldiers leaving their post without a pass appears to be related to those tensions, too.

Meanwhile, unit commanders are actively helping soldiers evade military police detection when leaving base, directing them to areas with minimal MP presence. This behavior stems from commanders’ fear of the severe consequences of their soldiers being caught: investigations cascade through multiple command levels, requiring numerous meetings and self-criticisms, potentially damaging their careers.

The source noted a marked change in soldier-MP interactions – while MPs have increased their presence and visibility, today’s soldiers now flee from them rather than complying as they did in the past.

Daily NK works with a network of sources in North Korea, China, and elsewhere. For security reasons, their identities remain anonymous.

Please send any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · by Seon Hwa · November 11, 2024

14. President Yoon practices golf in case of possible round with Trump

I think he also must learn the President-elect's favorite songs because he can do what no other world leaders can do: to sing in public. Perhaps "Y-M-C-A" would be well received. (note attempt at humor here).

Excerpts:

Yoon’s decision to practice golf again is a way to get ready for his upcoming interactions with Trump, a well-known and avid golfer, sources familiar with the issue told The Korea Times.

Yoon stated that he plans "to arrange a meeting with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump as soon as possible to build rapport and hold discussions," during an economic and security meeting held at the presidential office, Sunday. The remarks came as he shared some details of his recent phone conversation with the U.S. president-elect that took place last Thursday.

The Korean president is known to have been practicing golf at a location other than the official presidential residence, following advice to improve his golf skills in order to strengthen his rapport with Trump.

President Yoon practices golf in case of possible round with Trump

The Korea Times · November 11, 2024

President Yoon Suk Yeol swings a bat during a baseball class for children in Seoul, March 16. Courtesy of presidential office

By Anna J. Park

President Yoon Suk Yeol has recently picked up his golf clubs again in preparation for a possible future round with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, according to officials at the presidential office, Monday.

Yoon’s decision to practice golf again is a way to get ready for his upcoming interactions with Trump, a well-known and avid golfer, sources familiar with the issue told The Korea Times.

Yoon stated that he plans "to arrange a meeting with U.S. President-elect Donald Trump as soon as possible to build rapport and hold discussions," during an economic and security meeting held at the presidential office, Sunday. The remarks came as he shared some details of his recent phone conversation with the U.S. president-elect that took place last Thursday.

The Korean president is known to have been practicing golf at a location other than the official presidential residence, following advice to improve his golf skills in order to strengthen his rapport with Trump.

It is believed that this is the first time Yoon has picked up a golf club in several years. Back in 2019, Yoon told lawmakers during his confirmation hearing for the post of the country's prosecutor general that he used to play golf occasionally in his early career as a prosecutor. But he added that he had hardly played since 2010 when he became the head of the second investigative division at the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office.

President-elect Donald Trump greets supporters during the final round of the Bedminster Invitational LIV Golf tournament in Bedminster, N.J., Sunday, Aug. 13, 2023. AP-Yonhap

Yoon's decision to resume practicing his golf swing seems to have been inspired by the late former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who developed a close personal relationship and mutual trust with Trump through several rounds of golf during the U.S. president's first term.

Abe played his first official round of golf with Trump at his Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Florida, in February 2017, shortly after Trump's inauguration as the U.S. president in late January. They were also seen enjoying golf together later in their state visits to each other's country, showing Trump's trait of mixing official business with golf playing.

Trump's love for golf went on, after his first presidential term ended in January 2021.

At the televised presidential debate against U.S. President Joe Biden in June this year, Trump boasted that his health is in very good condition, citing his recent wins of two championships at one of his golf courses.

“To do that, you have to be quite smart and you have to be able to hit the ball a long way,” Trump said.

The Korea Times · November 11, 2024

15. Trump 2.0 & North Korean refugees

Of course the freedom of Americans to travel to north Korea also comes with the potential for the regime to again take Americans hostage.

Excerpt:

Trump 1.0 was defined by high-level diplomacy that ended without lasting agreements, symbolic gestures toward North Korean refugees while accepting fewer as immigrants, and restricting the freedom of Americans to travel. Trump 2.0 can open the door for North Korean refugees to resettle in the U.S., restore the freedom of Americans to travel to North Korea and amplify the stories of refugees to highlight human rights abuses in North Korea.

Trump 2.0 & North Korean refugees

The Korea Times · November 11, 2024

By Casey Lartigue Jr.

North Korean refugees went through seven stages during Donald Trump's first presidential administration. Stage 1, Trump shocked North Korean refugees with his "fire-and-fury" rhetoric, publicly threatening and mocking North Korea's dictator. Some North Korean refugees feared war, but others were heartened to see someone speaking with language Kim Jong-un could understand. As one refugee gleefully told me: "I bet Kim Jong-un can't sleep peacefully with Trump threatening him so directly."

Stage 2, Trump highlighted a North Korean refugee during his 2018 State of the Union address and met with several North Korean refugees in person. This visibility offered hope that Trump might truly care about the plight of North Koreans.

Then, Stage 3 raised expectations, as Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach led some refugees to speculate that Kim Jong-un’s regime might soon collapse.

But in Stage 4, disappointment set in with underwhelming summits, praise from Trump to the North Korean dictator, and news of letter exchanges between the two leaders. In Stage 5, reconciliation, some North Korean refugees publicly criticized Trump’s approach, but some whispered he may have a strategic alternative. Stage 6, acceptance, recognizing that little had changed despite Trump’s bold gestures, tough talk and direct engagement with Kim Jong-un. Then, Stage 7, nothing, and Trump was unelected in 2020.

There were some significant temporary achievements, as Kim Jong-un fired off fewer missiles and froze nuclear tests, but despite the meetings with Kim and North Korean refugees, were there any long-term concrete gains in terms of diplomacy, policy and human rights in North Korea during the Trump administration?

Trump is back after his defeat of Vice President Kamala Harris. Trump 2.0 has the opportunity to move beyond symbolic gestures and create lasting change. While international focus often highlights China’s role in the forced repatriation of North Korean escapees, Western countries and leaders, including Trump 1.0, should also be criticized. Before COVID-19, they limited North Koreans’ ability to resettle freely. During Trump 1.0, the U.S. admitted fewer than 20 North Korean refugees. From 2017 to 2019, only 12 North Korean refugees were admitted, and in 2020, that number dropped to just one.

Trump 1.0 met with North Korean refugees, which is significant, as I don’t recall any public meetings by previous presidents Barack Obama, Joe Biden, or Bill Clinton with North Korean refugees. But can Trump 2.0 go further — so more than 20 North Korean refugees can immigrate to the United States during Trump 2.0?

The current asylum process gives applicants only one shot to choose a safe country, with limited information about their options. Refugees escape from North Korea’s darkness into the unknown. With a six-month grace period before applying for special visas to the U.S., they can have time to learn about the world and their options. An executive order in Trump’s first month could turn these symbolic gestures into real action, welcoming their legal immigration to the United States.

Second, in the other direction, Trump 2.0 could lift the ban prohibiting Americans from traveling to North Korea. The ban was established after the tragic case of Otto Warmbier and is renewed annually. Having personally met Otto Warmbier’s family, I understand the devastating impact his story has had and the pain his loved ones continue to endure. However, that tragedy should not restrict the freedom of others who wish to make their own travel decisions. By lifting the travel ban, Trump could restore Americans’ freedom to make their own choices, respecting individual liberty even when those choices carry risks.

Banning Americans from visiting North Korea echoes the restrictive nature of North Korea’s policies and also creates an ironic situation: if a North Korean citizen escapes to the U.S. and becomes an American citizen, they would be prohibited by America from returning to North Korea.

Third, Trump 2.0 could pursue a direct and personal approach by meeting with North Korean refugees again. In particular, Trump 2.0 could host North Korean refugee authors who have documented their stories in print. This visibility could highlight human rights abuses while adding credibility to U.S. policy.

As an update, Ji Seong-ho, the North Korean refugee featured during Trump’s 2018 State of the Union address, is now studying English in my organization and preparing to become a public speaker in English.

Trump 1.0 was defined by high-level diplomacy that ended without lasting agreements, symbolic gestures toward North Korean refugees while accepting fewer as immigrants, and restricting the freedom of Americans to travel. Trump 2.0 can open the door for North Korean refugees to resettle in the U.S., restore the freedom of Americans to travel to North Korea and amplify the stories of refugees to highlight human rights abuses in North Korea.

Casey Lartigue Jr. (CJL@alumni.harvard.edu) is the co-founder of Freedom Speakers International with Lee Eun-koo; and co-author with Han Song-mi of her memoir "Greenlight to Freedom: A North Korean Daughter’s Search for Her Mother and Herself.”

The Korea Times · November 11, 2024

16. Push for Seoul getting own nuclear arms gains steam after Trump win

Those discussing this issue should caveat their discussion with the understanding that Kim Jong Un wants the South to pursue nuclear weapons so that it will damage the ROK/US alliance and undermine extended deterrence. This is in support of Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy.

Then advocates of South Korea's nuclear weapons need to clearly articulate how they believe the South's possession of nuclear weapons will deter Kim Jong Un. Tey must describe what they believe actually dates Kim Jong Un. Then they need to describe their command and control process for nuclear weapons. And most importantly they need to develop and describe their concepts for employment of nuclear weapons across the spectrum of conflict. Lastly they must describe how they will develop and maintain a second strike capability. Until they can discuss all these issues and more then any attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the South is very premature.

Push for Seoul getting own nuclear arms gains steam after Trump win

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · November 11, 2024

By Kim Arin

Published : Nov. 11, 2024 - 16:31

People Power Party Rep. Yu Yong-weon speaks during an interview with The Korea Herald. (The Korea Herald)

Former US President Donald Trump’s return to the White House has South Korean conservatives pushing to secure nuclear capabilities to deter the threat posed by North Korea.

Rep. Yu Yong-weon, who sits on the National Assembly defense committee, on Monday hosted a seminar attended by some dozen ruling party lawmakers to discuss Korean Peninsula nuclear policy against the backdrop of a second Trump presidency.

Speaking at the seminar, Han Dong-hoon, the People Power Party chair, said Trump winning the US presidency could be a silver lining for South Korea.

“As Representative Yu has long advocated for, acquiring nuclear potential -- that is, having the right to enrich and reprocess uranium -- is not nuclear arms possession per se. But we would be capable of moving on to that stage at any moment if North Korea escalates nuclear threats,” he said.

The ruling party leader noted that for Seoul to widen its nuclear fuel usage, its agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation with Washington would first need to be revised.

“But I think we should be prepared for such a scenario amid the shifting power dynamics and world order,” he said.

Yu said that to address the “striking imbalance of nuclear arms imbalance” in the Korean Peninsula, securing reprocessing rights may be a “realistic option” for Seoul.

“There are a lot of concerns about former President Trump having been re-elected,” the first-time lawmaker said. “Gaining nuclear potential is going to be a long game for South Korea. But I think we can and should try to get there faster.”

Retired three-star Army general Rep. Han Ki-ho, reputed as a leading military expert in the ruling party, went a step further and said South Korea getting nuclear arms may no longer be a choice given North Korea’s advancing nuclear weapons program.

“For South Korea’s survival, nuclear armament may be the only path left to us,” he said.

Within the People Power Party, a National Assembly resolution urging the government to pursue nuclear arms as a means of North Korean nuclear deterrent is underway.

The resolution, prepared and pushed by former ruling party chair Rep. Kim Gi-hyeon, would be titled “a resolution calling for the right to self-defense and self-defensive nuclear armament to maintain permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and ensure the safety of the Korean people,” he said.

Kim said he plans to introduce an Assembly resolution this week calling on the government to declare nuclear armament in the event North Korea carries out a nuclear provocation, such as a nuclear test or launches an intercontinental ballistic missile.

The five-time lawmaker said that by nuclear armament, he meant for the peaceful purpose of protecting the lives of South Koreans from an actual nuclear threat by North Korea. It was not intended to trigger a nuclear arms race, he said.

He went on to explain that South Korea’s armament would be peace-oriented and conditional. Once the North Korean nuclear threat is eliminated, South Korea would disarm itself immediately, he said.

“During a plenary meeting of the Assembly intelligence committee, our intelligence agencies reported that a nuclear weapons test by North Korea may be imminent,” he said. “Faced with such threats, the Assembly resolution underscores the need for our own nuclear arsenal to ensure the right to self-defense.”

koreaherald.com · by Kim Arin · November 11, 2024

17. Commentary: Trump’s biggest impact in East Asia will be in Korea

"Danger, Will Robinson." (IYKYK)

The key question is whether the President-elect's views on north and South Korea have evolved. Or do we even know what his views really are?

Excerpts:

Where NATO allies can collectively grapple with Trump’s demands, South Korea’s position is much tougher. It is isolated in northeast Asia. It faces three nuclear autocracies on its doorstep, and its relations with Japan are poor (because of historical grievances dating to Japanese imperialism during World War II). It stands alone against Trump should he act as he did in his last presidency.

This could easily provoke an alliance crisis. Pro-alliance South Korean conservatives might be willing to accede to Trump’s huge financial demand to prevent an alliance fallout. But the public blowback would be intense, and the South Korean left, which is currently in opposition, would use it to pummel the government as weak and craven. The approval rating of South Korea’s current, conservative president, Yoon Suk Yeol, is at an all-time low of just 19 per cent, meaning he likely lacks the public support to appease Trump.

...

There is no evidence that Trump’s views on North and South Korea have changed since his first term. But there is also a chance that Trump will simply ignore Korea to focus on other matters, such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Trump’s unpredictable style brings uncertainty to all US foreign policy ventures. The next four years will be a challenge for all US partners.

For now at least, Seoul appears to be staying optimistic. After Trump’s victory last week, Yoon spoke to the president-elect for 12 minutes, during which the pair agreed to arrange an in-person meeting soon. Trump expressed the need to continue “good cooperative relations”.

Yoon said in a televised press conference after the phone call that he expects to have "good chemistry" with Trump and doesn’t foresee “any major issues” in working together.

Trump has long personalised foreign policy. He understands it as friendships among leaders rather than the play of strategic interests. Hence Yoon’s effort to cultivate Trump directly. If Yoon can flatter Trump enough, perhaps he can derail the fights Trump picked with Yoon’s predecessor before they arise.

Commentary: Trump’s biggest impact in East Asia will be in Korea

If South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol can flatter Donald Trump enough, perhaps he can derail the fights the president-elect picked with Yoon’s predecessor before they arise, says Pusan National University’s Robert Kelly.

Robert E Kelly

@Robert_E_Kelly

11 Nov 2024 06:00AM

(Updated: 11 Nov 2024 10:26AM)

channelnewsasia.com

BUSAN: Former American president Donald Trump has won the presidency again. He will return to the White House in 2025 with a popular vote majority and sympathetic Congress behind him. With this backing, Trump will have even greater freedom in shaping US foreign policy.

While this will be felt most immediately in Europe, where Trump clearly plans to cut off US aid to Ukraine, the most unexpected impact could be in Korea.

In his first presidential term, Trump evinced a visceral dislike for South Korea. Of all of America’s many allies, Trump seemed to have a special ire for South Korea.

He loathed its president at the time, Moon Jae-In (according to books written by former Trump national security officials) and was vocal about his dislike of South Korea. For example, he threatened to “blow up” the US-South Korea alliance if he won re-election in 2020. He complained that US-South Korean military exercises were too costly, and he said South Koreans were “terrible people”.

Conversely, Trump has a known affinity for autocrats and forged a curious “bromance” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump spoke approvingly of Kim’s aides jumping to their feet when Kim entered a room. He famously said he and Kim “fell in love”.

During his time in office, Trump held two high-profile summits with Kim, although both failed to yield any sort of meaningful progress toward denuclearisation.

Donald Trump forged a curious “bromance” with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un during his first term. (Photo: AFP/File/Brendan Smialowski)

Trump will likely try to resume his relationship with Kim in his second term.

This sets up a situation where the United States favours a dictatorship over a treaty ally in its foreign policy. That would be a shift more remarkable than the coming abandonment of Ukraine, which is not a formal US ally.

Trump also has a long history of demanding US allies pay for American security guarantees. He has been particularly extreme regarding South Korea. Just last month, he described South Korea as a “money machine”, saying he wants to multiply by nine times the cost of stationing US troops in South Korea.

Where NATO allies can collectively grapple with Trump’s demands, South Korea’s position is much tougher. It is isolated in northeast Asia. It faces three nuclear autocracies on its doorstep, and its relations with Japan are poor (because of historical grievances dating to Japanese imperialism during World War II). It stands alone against Trump should he act as he did in his last presidency.

This could easily provoke an alliance crisis. Pro-alliance South Korean conservatives might be willing to accede to Trump’s huge financial demand to prevent an alliance fallout. But the public blowback would be intense, and the South Korean left, which is currently in opposition, would use it to pummel the government as weak and craven. The approval rating of South Korea’s current, conservative president, Yoon Suk Yeol, is at an all-time low of just 19 per cent, meaning he likely lacks the public support to appease Trump.

THE SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR OPTION

One alternative is for South Korea to draw distance from the United States and “self-insure” via its own nuclear weapons. There is already a substantial debate in South Korea over this step. Public opinion has robustly supported nuclearisation for 15 years. The real block has been elite anxiety. There is fear over the Chinese and American response.

But with Trump in charge, American resistance is less important, because the US nuclear guarantee to South Korea is far less credible. South Korea has desisted from nuclearising, because the US has intensively signalled during the administration of current President Joseph Biden that it would fight for South Korea despite North Korea’s nuclear weapons. This commitment is far less believable now.

Trump will almost certainly not carry military costs for them. And he definitely will not carry nuclear risk to the US homeland for them. In 1961, French president Charles de Gaulle famously asked US president John Kennedy if he would “sacrifice New York for Paris”. In other words, would Kennedy risk Soviet nuclear retaliation on US cities to fight for Europe? Today, South Korean newspapers regularly ask if the US will risk San Francisco for Seoul. Under Biden, the answer might have been “maybe”; under Trump, the answer is almost definitely “no”.

In short, if Trump will not fight for South Korea, and if he demands a huge protection fee too, then the argument for South Korea to go its own way grows dramatically. Indigenous nuclear weapons is the obvious replacement for a decaying US nuclear security commitment.

CAN YOON FORGE “GOOD CHEMISTRY” WITH TRUMP?

There is no evidence that Trump’s views on North and South Korea have changed since his first term. But there is also a chance that Trump will simply ignore Korea to focus on other matters, such as the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. Trump’s unpredictable style brings uncertainty to all US foreign policy ventures. The next four years will be a challenge for all US partners.

For now at least, Seoul appears to be staying optimistic. After Trump’s victory last week, Yoon spoke to the president-elect for 12 minutes, during which the pair agreed to arrange an in-person meeting soon. Trump expressed the need to continue “good cooperative relations”.

Yoon said in a televised press conference after the phone call that he expects to have "good chemistry" with Trump and doesn’t foresee “any major issues” in working together.

Trump has long personalised foreign policy. He understands it as friendships among leaders rather than the play of strategic interests. Hence Yoon’s effort to cultivate Trump directly. If Yoon can flatter Trump enough, perhaps he can derail the fights Trump picked with Yoon’s predecessor before they arise.

Robert Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly) is a professor of political science at Pusan National University.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

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Commentary: Trump’s biggest impact in East Asia will be in Korea

THE SOUTH KOREAN NUCLEAR OPTION

CAN YOON FORGE “GOOD CHEMISTRY” WITH TRUMP?

Russia has amassed 50,000 soldiers in Kursk, including North Korean troops, for assault.