Quotes of the Day:

“Never before have men crossed the seas to a foreign land to fight for a cause which they did not pretend was peculiarly their own but knew was the cause of humanity and of mankind.”

– Woodrow Wilson

“Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn’t pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same.”

– Ronald Reagan

“The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him.”

– G.K. Chesterton

History of Veterans Day

World War I – known at the time as “The Great War” – officially ended when the Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919, in the Palace of Versailles outside the town of Versailles, France. However, fighting ceased seven months earlier when an armistice, or temporary cessation of hostilities, between the Allied nations and Germany went into effect on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. For that reason, November 11, 1918, is generally regarded as the end of “the war to end all wars.”

Veterans Day continues to be observed on November 11, regardless of what day of the week on which it falls. The restoration of the observance of Veterans Day to November 11 not only preserves the historical significance of the date, but helps focus attention on the important purpose of Veterans Day: A celebration to honor America’s veterans for their patriotism, love of country, and willingness to serve and sacrifice for the common good.

Complete Veterans Day history timeline at this link:

 https://department.va.gov/veterans-day/history-of-veterans-day/

1. Yesterday’s, Today’s, and Tomorrow’s Small Wars | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

2. Small Wars Journal: The Legacy of Dave Dilegge and the Future of Small Wars and U.S. National Security

3. State Department Division That Battles Foreign Disinformation Faces Closure

4. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

5. Russian artillery production to outmatch all of EU by 30% next year, Ukrainian intelligence says

6. Asia Greets a Rejuvenated Donald Trump

7. Can Trump Be the New Reagan?

8. Inside the Battle over Trump’s Foreign Policy

9. Trump’s Transition Effort Kicks Into High Gear

10. Trump talked to Putin, told Russian leader not to escalate in Ukraine

11. Pentagon to appeal ruling that affirms plea deals for 9/11 defendants

12. Targeted Killings Won’t Destroy Hezbollah

13. Security experts: NATO-type Southeast Asian defense alliance not feasible at present

14. How to Talk to a Veteran

15. Netanyahu approved pager attacks against Hezbollah, spokesman says

16. US carries out strikes against Houthis in Yemen, defense official says

17. Netanyahu says he spoke three times with Trump in recent days

18. Kremlin says reports of Trump-Putin call about Ukraine are ‘pure fiction’

19. Taiwan considers big US defence purchases as overture to Donald Trump

20. Chinese incursions soar 300%, US general says

21. China maps out baseline claims over a contested South China Sea shoal with the Philippines

22. Location tracking of phones is out of control. Here’s how to fight back.

1. Yesterday’s, Today’s, and Tomorrow’s Small Wars | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

Small Wars Journal 2.0 has launched. Congratulations to Dr. Ken Gleiman as the new Editor in Chief and thanks to Arizona State University for taking on this project to revitalize and renew Small Wars Journal and take it to the next level while honoring its founder, the late Dave Dilegge.

Yesterday’s, Today’s, and Tomorrow’s Small Wars | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/11/yesterdays-todays-and-tomorrows-small-wars-2/

Small Wars Journal · by Kerry Chavez · November 11, 2024

For two decades, Small Wars Journal (SWJ) has curated and enriched the exchange of ideas on warfare below the threshold of large-scale combat operations. Many of these were popular, hotly debated topics, but editors also regarded explorations of undervalued events and themes packed with import for scholars and practitioners. The journal has been and is distinctive for its willingness to wade into nuanced, complex, and dynamic discourses on unglamourous small wars that form the bedrock of modern conflict.

Small wars are far more common than large-scale combat operations. Indeed, they are the venue where great powers clash while carefully avoiding crossing the threshold into total war. They are also more diverse, and therefore harder to study systematically. We agree with SWJ’s animus that, for better or worse, regardless of how difficult or distasteful, small wars are an enduring feature of modern politics. The United States (US) and its allies must be prepared to fight and win them just as much as major theater war. This held true during the long wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it holds true now as leaders shift focus to great power competition. All along, SWJ has refused to look away from these constant currents that lie barely beneath the surface of what has been securitized and deemed salient.

War is Nuanced

Encompassing a hefty portion of the continuum of competition and conflict, studying small wars is no small task. We commend SWJ for spotlighting this less sensational segment of the spectrum of war. Even more, however, the journal’s most inspiring contribution has been to dimensionalize small wars and bring attention to their breadth and depth across the various analytical frameworks employed to ensure all elements of national power receive proportionate consideration (DIMEFIL – diplomacy, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, law enforcement; PMESII – political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure; ASCOPE – areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events; etc.).

The hard work for leaders, decision-makers, scholars, and practitioners is in parsing those details, scoping the scale, and mapping the connections and cross-pressures that span them.

The United States’ relationship with the Republic of the Philippines offers a successful example of a dynamic, mutually beneficial, whole-of-government approach to security. After the Second World War, the US built bases and permanently assigned naval and air forces in the island nation. The US was a major contributor of funds, training, and equipment to help defeat the communist Huk Rebellion. In 1951, the Philippines and the United States signed a mutual defense treaty that is still in force today. During the Cold War, the Philippines’ strategic position in the South China Sea made it a critical base for naval and air forces seeking to contain Soviet and Chinese communist influence.

While the political and economic relationship between the two nations was not always squeaky clean, the US has invested billions of dollars over seven decades to support Filipino agriculture, education, public health, economic development, and governance. Between 2002 and 2014, the US supported the government of the Philippines’ efforts to neutralize the al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. The relationship continues as the US helps the Philippines defend itself from Chinese bullying and incursions into Filipino territorial waters in the South China Sea. That China pays agitated attention to this alliance indicates it is working. All of this is strategic, long-term, and vital. None of it is spectacular, large-scale, or existential. It is the before, during, and after of omnipresent small wars.

Writing from the vantage point as leaders of Project Air and Space Power for the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI), we take a similar approach. Our team’s vectors for exploration focus on the same diverse scale of air and space power, trust and capacity building to foster resilience for small wars, and also gray zone activities that simultaneously release and stoke near-peer pressures. Each category has its own logic and attributes, yet also has connections to and impacts on other actions along the spectrum of competition and conflict. To succeed in small wars, leaders must grasp the devilish details as well as the extensive scale, understanding how local or tactical issues reverberate up while strategic strokes trickle down.

The hard work for leaders, decision-makers, scholars, and practitioners is in parsing those details, scoping the scale, and mapping the connections and cross-pressures that span them. Thus, the beauty of outlets like SWJ. Here, the debate continues, issues are explored, and when enlightened leaders choose to pay attention, divergent and innovative concepts are put forward without the corporate hobbles that restrict creativity and deter professional dissent.

War is Complex

SWJ’s mission statement explains that “small wars involve a wide spectrum of specialized tactical, technical, social, and cultural skills and expertise, requiring great ingenuity from…a broad community of practitioners.” Surveying and analyzing each category and their confluences is a Herculean task, but SWJ intentionally and boldly engages the complexity and rewards the kind of cleverness and cross-functional collaboration that success in small wars requires.

Since humans first sought to use mechanical means to overcome the strictures of gravity, airmen and air forces have neglected the complexity of airpower to focus on complication. Complicated challenges present a cause-and-effect relationship that can usually be solved through scientific or mechanical analyses. Complex systems are human-centric, though, typically do not have clearly defined end-states, and feature relationships and factors that express differently across contexts. Complex systems adapt and they are characterized by unpredictability and irrationality. Building an airplane or a rocket is complicated. Changing behaviors through air or space power is complex.

Elements of both complication and complexity are inherent in small wars. SWJ has not shied away from examinations of the latter. During the long wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, SWJ engaged in discussions about “warheads on foreheads,” or the relative effectiveness of the US’s persistent surveillance and precision strike systems in its global counterterrorism campaign. Rationalized as an effort to limit collateral damage against an enemy that embeds its fighters in and among civilian populations, leaders invested in the platforms, training, and sustainment of exquisite medium- and high-altitude, long endurance unmanned aerial systems (UAS).

The consequences of the US’s pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations were far less clear than its causes. Though tactically efficient in certain situations, drone campaigns must be judged in political terms. Critics have argued that they undermine legitimacy, signaling to local populations that their government is incompetent or subservient to the US, thereby demoralizing collaboration and capacity-building. There is some evidence that drone strikes unravel social capital, especially in Pakistan, sowing distrust of pervasive informants and fear of punishment by militants. Their tactical effectiveness of decapitating terrorist organizations might also reduce control of rank-and-file members with less experience, incentives to display zeal to organizationally ascend, and fewer constraints on indiscriminate violence. Insofar as drones lower the costs and risks of using force, they are more likely to become platforms of perpetual force, exercises in risk management that set off geographic and temporal limitations, that does not comport with the notion of war as a foil of peace. Finally, in the gray zone between peacetime and wartime legal frameworks, the US has set precedents of covert strikes in sovereign nations outside of hot wars that the quickly growing global drone club has already begun to follow.

Future wars will most likely be fought in settings where exquisite capabilities, manned or unmanned, are less appropriate and less useful. They will be fought in environments where low technology mass, both humans and systems, is employed to overcome the high-tech advantages of modern military forces.

SWJ was a strong voice in the debate on the efficacy of large drones, especially in population-centric operations, capturing concerns from mission success to population perceptions to strategic backlash. Contributors recognized the “seductive lure” of this new expression of airpower’s reach, power, and precision, yet questioned whether the US could “kill our way to victory.” This debate continues, one of many, both old and new, that earnest scholars and practitioners must ponder carefully. The journal continues to be a key place for these conversations, including beyond airpower into other domains, from other angles, and importantly, across domains.

War is Dynamic

Globalization amplifies and accelerates all the above. Grievances, tacit knowledge, and propaganda can rapidly disseminate to galvanize combatant groups, whether state or nonstate. Innovation cycles are speeding up as weaker actors adapt under pressure, often harnessing commercial technologies for war, while stronger states take note and adapt concepts to address the unknown challenges of future war. This is especially true in the current open era of innovation, when civilian and commercial innovation epicycles have the potential to run circles around the stolid pace of systems development that is the US’s military-industrial complex.

Another air-minded case in point, during the 2010s airpower again became the province of garage tinkerers. Much like the way two bicycle shop owners (the Wright brothers) achieved manned powered flight before heavily subsidized government-funded efforts, the commercial industry is now keeping pace with or outstripping the military-industrial processes in many emerging technologies including UAS. Furthermore, the internet is a hotbed of information on after-market modifications to improve drones’ technical specifications or to add features. This has enabled dabblers and enthusiasts, from the benign photographer to the ambitious terrorist, to take to the skies frequently and flexibly.

Thus, while the US took a single-track approach to drones, concentrating on expensive, large, and highly capable long-range platforms, militant tinkerers married hobbyist UAS, commercial cameras, and recreational navigation systems to bomblets and cargo packages. Furthermore, adversaries took note of what the tinkerers were able to accomplish and commercialized their successes, simultaneously developing high-end drones while also pursuing small, inexpensive analogs. China is soundly the primary manufacturer of commercial drones. Iran has promoted commercial UAS and provided military-grade models to its proxies for approximately the same duration as SWJ has been in the game. Russia, after having “overslept the UA[S] revolution,” is on a path to indigenously produce models across the full range of drone diversity and densely integrates them in its strategy in Ukraine.

The US has been exposed to this trend from the get-go but has only just begun to move. To be fair, emerging phenomena are difficult to forecast. Drone warfare’s emerging nature suggests that it will remain an enduring characteristic of future warfare but like the disruptive technologies that preceded drones (e.g., English longbow, airplane, and tank), it is unclear whether UAS will remain as dominant as it appears on today’s battlefields. As the technology-tactics epicycle continues to spiral forward, one can only speculate who will most benefit—militant tinkerers, the military-industrial complex, or cash-rich extremist organizations and cartels.

Nonetheless, more astute attention to small wars, where many of these instances seed and unfold, will enable practitioners and decision-makers to progress further and faster along the curve of such trends. SWJ has been in the thick of issues like this and as it continues, and our Air and Space Power project joins the fray, we look forward to helping shape conversations committed to deep, careful thinking about what matters most in modern warfare.

Current and Future Wars

Now that the United States has largely disengaged itself from the quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq and is keeping a healthy distance from the ongoing wars in Ukraine, Gaza, and Sudan, the Department of Defense has reoriented for the kind of wars its prefers: large-scale combat operations against peer competitors. They are cleaner, technophilic, and mostly complicated. Focusing on a single strategic competitor, the People’s Republic of China, simplifies the DoD’s primary military challenge—the Beltway budget battle. This in turn informs the military service subsets of doctrine development, systems acquisition, tactical training, and leader education. People and institutions are thus able to study the preferred adversary in depth, develop quantitative rubrics and systematic expectations about how the adversary will likely react to given stimuli, and create bodies of statistics-based knowledge to inform political, economic, and military decision-making.

Regardless of how clean, technocentric, and preferable, large-scale combat operations against a peer competitor are also unlikely, a fact that history confirms. The United States is heavily investing in deterring these clashes. Given their presumed ruinous and lethal outcomes, all parties have keen incentives to resolve escalating crises prior to the event horizon of war. Consequently, the wars the US and its allies will most likely fight will not be on the eastern flank of NATO (the acute threat) or in the South China Sea (the chronic/pacing threat). Instead, they will be fought in the global South—Africa, South America, South and Southeast Asia, or the Middle East.

Future wars will most likely be fought in settings where exquisite capabilities, manned or unmanned, are less appropriate and less useful. They will be fought in environments where low technology mass, both humans and systems, is employed to overcome the high-tech advantages of modern military forces. In short, they will be fought as small wars. While the US certainly should structure its forces to deter major war, it must also do the same to fight small ones of all stripes.

Written by authors with extensive credentials and fresh ideas, both academic and battle-borne, SWJ generates knowledge and indexes experience to stitch the seams across the spectrum of small wars. As we at Project Air and Space Power research and debate the complexities of airpower as an influencing tool in irregular warfare, we recognize that we are a stipple (arguably a vivid, pointed one) in the broader ecology of multi-domain small wars. At the same time, we estimate that only about five percent of SWJ’s scholarship has been air or space related, and that sliver has focused on over-the-horizon capabilities that yield global power, global reach, and global vigilance. Insofar as we delve into the Indiana Jones examples of proverbial sword versus gun in irregular warfare, we are in avid conversation with and support of SWJ. IWI’s Air and Space project offers analytical depth while the journal provides strategic context. The fact remains that small wars will remain small wars, and we look forward to serving, in discourse and in stride, alongside SWJ as it embarks on a rebooted season under new leadership.

About The Authors

Kerry Chavez

Kerry Chávez, PhD, is an assistant professor in the Military & Strategic Studies Department at the United States Air Force Academy. She is also a nonresident research fellow with the Institute for Global Affairs, a two-time nonresident research fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point, and an advisor for Project Air and Space Power at the Irregular Warfare Initiative. Her research focusing on the politics, strategies, and technologies of modern conflict and security has been published in several venues.

Rick Newton

Richard D. Newton, PhD, is currently serving as an irregular warfare and airpower planner for Special Operations Command Europe and as adjunct professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. He is a retired USAF special operations and combat rescue helicopter pilot and combat aviation advisor. “Newt” also serves as the Director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s Air and Space Power project, and as a senior nonresident fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute and the Global National Security Institute. His research interests include Russia as a strategic adversary, irregular / hybrid / gray-zone conflict, airpower, special operations, and Arctic security.

Small Wars Journal · by Kerry Chavez · November 11, 2024

2. Small Wars Journal: The Legacy of Dave Dilegge and the Future of Small Wars and U.S. National Security

​Today we should remember and honor the late Dave Dilegge and all his contributions over the last 3 decades until his passing in 2020.

Small Wars Journal: The Legacy of Dave Dilegge and the Future of Small Wars and U.S. National Security

https://smallwarsjournal.com/history/

Retired Marine Major Dave Dilegge passed away suddenly on May 2, 2020. For 15 years he and Bill Nagle, also a retired Marine, nearly single-handedly led the intellectual transformation of the U.S. and allied militaries and national security communities in recognizing the importance of “small wars.” Dave and Bill established Small Wars Journal in 2005 and paved the way for intellectual discussions about everything related to warfighting in the 21st Century. Just as important, their efforts sparked the creation of a new online ecosystem that has produced gigabytes of critical thought on complex political-military and national security challenges.

Even as the national security community continues to debate the efficacy of irregular, unconventional, political, revolutionary, and counterinsurgency warfare (and more), “small wars” remains the best overall descriptor of the phenomena that the national security community wrestles with short of large scale combat operations (LSCO) and major theater war (MTW). And paradoxically small wars activities take place in LSCO/MTW but not the reverse. The importance of small wars cannot be underestimated.

Dave’s philosophy was quite simple: Build a big tent to provide a platform for authentic voices to present and debate ideas about warfighting and everything related to national security. Dave worked tirelessly to rapidly publish long form essays, think pieces, editorials, and analysis from former secretaries of defense and combatant commanders to the most junior solder serving at the tip of the spear. He created vibrant discussion boards and moderated a very engaged commentary section for each piece he published. He also provided voice to civilian professionals and young scholars from undergrads to post-docs as well as accomplished professors. Most importantly, he provided a platform for networking and the exchange of critical ideas that were immediately put into practice by those serving on the small wars battlefield. And lastly, it served as a near real-time feedback loop to assess the implementation of ideas and concept. Everyone wanted to contribute to Dave’s Small Wars Journal and be heard and read on one of the most influential platforms in the online national security community.

In 2014 Ryan Evans, at War on the Rocks, interviewed Dave and elicited the important points of Dave’s ideas and thought process. It is worth reviewing those five questions and answers to gain a better understanding of Dave, how SWJ evolved, and its contributions through 2014. Dave’s concerns at the time, remaining relevant and adapting to the changing environment, the character of war, the emerging threats, and calls for “no more Afghanistans and Iraqs,” are as important today as they were in 2014.

Dave built and operated Small Wars Journal from his own resources. He had a modest operational budget that was generously supported by grants from the Smith Richardson Foundation. Small Wars Journal was and remains a non-profit organization. Dave was the epitome of the selfless servant of our nation punching well above his weight and making contributions to national security far greater than one person could be expected to make.

When Dave passed in 2020 the Small Wars Foundation Board wanted to sustain SWJ. However, no one person could do what Dave did. He was truly a one-man show making Small Wars Journal function effectively every day. The Board kept the lights on while it struggled to find a way to sustain it. It engaged with myriad organizations, government and non-government. While participating in the debate about the future of irregular warfare, Small Wars Foundation board members met scholars and practitioners from Arizona State University (ASU) who immediately recognized the opportunity to partner with and bring Small Wars Journal into the Future Security Initiative (FSI). For the past few months FSI and the Small Wars Foundation have been working on the transition plan which has resulted in what can only be described a SWJ 2.0.  All member of the Small Wars community can be assured that the new SWJ will continue to honor Dave Dilegge’s legacy and move the ball forward to continue to keep it relevant and make important contributions to the Small Wars discourse and national security. The vision for the future also comes from the words of David Kilcullen who described Dave and Bill’s contributions with the highest praise from the dedication in his book, Counterinsurgency:

“For Dave Dilegge and Bill Nagle, founders and editors of Small Wars Journal. They gave the counterguerrilla underground a home, at a time when misguided leaders banned even the word ‘insurgency,’ though busily losing to one. Scholars, warriors, and agitators, Dave and Bill laid the foundation for battlefield success: our generation owes them a debt of gratitude.”

— David Kilcullen

In honor of Dave Dilegge, SWJ 2.0, under the auspices of Arizona State University and the Future Security Initiative, will lead the way and inspire the next generation of scholars, warriors, and agitators working in the counter-guerrilla underground.

With thanks to and respect for Dave Dilegge from the Small Wars Journal Foundation

3. State Department Division That Battles Foreign Disinformation Faces Closure

What would replace this? I hope the new administration takes a hard look at how to deal with the modern information environment. and understand the political warfare being conducted by China, Russia, Irna, and north KOrea.

Excerpts:

But the center has been more controversial in Congress among members who say it has been associated with organizations that have challenged the legitimacy of some conservative media outlets at home. House Republicans have taken issue with the center due to a $100,000 grant it gave to the Global Disinformation Index, a London-based organization that labeled Newsmax and some other conservative U.S. outlets as risks for spreading disinformation.

The State Department said the grant was for countering disinformation in Asia, and that the money wasn’t related to American media. State Department officials have informed congressional staffers they wouldn’t provide funding to the British organization again. 

Republicans in Congress have torpedoed other similar efforts, including a Disinformation Governance Board that the Department of Homeland Security tried to establish two years ago. The board drew sharp criticism from conservatives—and some free-speech advocates like the American Civil Liberties Union—due to fears it might result in censorship.

While the Global Engagement Center focuses strictly on countering disinformation overseas, it has also often been pulled into the broader debate over the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s role in identifying and thwarting foreign information operations.

...

“If they see China’s influence efforts globally as a bigger threat, as frankly they should, then the chances are much higher that the department’s efforts here survive,” Rid said.

The immediate debate, however, is in Congress. While House Republicans have been sharply critical of the center’s grants, some in Congress see a need to counter Chinese influence, opening the possibility that a compromise might be reached. Texas Republican Sen. John Cornyn, who is a candidate to become the next Senate majority leader, and Sen. Chris Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat, have pushed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would enable the center to keep operating for another seven years while putting strict limits on its grants.

But if that congressional debate over the center isn’t resolved before the end of the year, the center will be forced to shut down. In that case, its mission could be dispersed among State Department bureaus.

“The danger is that the rug will be pulled out from under us just as we are getting our footing,” said Rubin. “One can only hope that the Congress will understand that taking away the best tool the U.S. government has to fight Chinese and Russian information warfare would be a big mistake.”

State Department Division That Battles Foreign Disinformation Faces Closure

The Global Engagement Center, which has been criticized by Elon Musk, may be shut down as Trump prepares to take power

https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/state-department-division-that-battles-foreign-disinformation-faces-closure-315e58b7?mod=latest_headlines

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow and Dustin Volz

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Nov. 10, 2024 10:00 am ET

Tesla CEO Elon Musk joined Donald Trump at an early October campaign rally in Butler, Pa. Photo: Jim Watson/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—A State Department office that uses high-level U.S. intelligence to combat Russian and Chinese information operations abroad faces a possible shutdown at the end of the year, just weeks before President-elect Donald Trump returns to the White House.

Its fate is seen as an early sign of the willingness of the second Trump administration and its congressional allies to push back against foreign disinformation plots, which intelligence officials say went into hyperdrive during the 2024 election season, powered in part by artificial intelligence.

The office, known as the Global Engagement Center, has vocal backers including retired Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, the former head of the National Security Agency and the U.S. Cyber Command, who says it has been an important tool for stymieing foreign disinformation directed at overseas audiences. But its most acerbic critics include Elon Musk, the billionaire owner of X who backed Trump during the election and is now expected to head a commission that would recommend ways to cut government bureaucracy and spending.

Musk alleged last year the center has sought to shape social-media content.

House Republicans also have trained their sights on the center, accusing it of funding organizations that have meddled in domestic politics. The center has more support in the Senate, where a bipartisan push is under way to extend it with strict controls on how it spends its funds.

Barring congressional action, the center will shut down after its current seven-year mandate lapses on Dec. 23.

Ret. Army Gen. Paul Nakasone, the former head of the NSA, has been a vocal backer of the Global Engagement Center. Photo: Michael Brochstein/Zuma Press

The Trump transition team didn’t respond to requests for comment on whether the president-elect sees a role for the center in his administration.

Proponents of the center say its budget of $61 million and some 130 employees is modest compared with the billions of dollars Russia and China are spending on campaigns to spread misinformation about the U.S. and its policies and shape international opinion. 

In recent years, the center has documented a Chinese multibillion-dollar disinformation campaign that used online bots and troll armies. It also exposed Russian efforts to spread disinformation that Western public health efforts to protect Africans against disease are a plot to use them as unwitting test subjects in Pentagon biological research programs. 

After it accused Russian-owned outlet RT of carrying out disinformation and other operations at the behest of Russian intelligence, several social-media companies, including Meta Platforms, which owns Facebook and Instagram, and TikTok blocked them from their platforms.

RT still posts its content on X, the social-media company Musk purchased in 2022. Musk, in a 2023 tweet accused the center of being the “worst offender in US government censorship & media manipulation.”

Musk didn’t respond to a request for comment about his current views on the center. A spokesman for X also didn’t respond. 

The center’s possible folding comes as X and other social-media platforms have retreated from policing disinformation. At the same time, the rapid growth of generative artificial intelligence has made it much easier for Russia, Iran, and others to disseminate disinformation to international audiences in a variety of languages, including Spanish. 

The center traces its origin to a State Department office established in 2011 to counter violent foreign online propaganda by al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups. The Global Engagement Center took over that mission when it was established five years later. Its role was later broadened by Congress so it could respond to information operations by foreign governments, a move taken with Republican support.

During Trump’s first administration, the center played a role in chronicling Russia’s extensive disinformation efforts.

But it has faced questions about the effectiveness of its operations. A September 2022 report on the center by the State Department’s Office of Inspector General identified an array of organizational problems with the center, including the absence of a presidentially appointed coordinator and special envoy for nearly half of the center’s existence.

James Rubin oversees the State Department’s Global Engagement Center. Photo: Marcin Obara/Shutterstock

Three months later, the Biden administration moved to address those concerns by naming James Rubin, the chief spokesman for former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, to the post. 

Soon after Rubin took up his position, Nakasone, the head of the NSA at the time, invited him to the spy agency’s headquarters at Fort Meade, Md., to meet with senior analysts and discuss where the U.S. could focus its disinformation efforts. 

The spy agency and the center expanded a partnership; NSA would identify and sanitize intelligence about foreign disinformation operations so the Global Engagement Center could expose them.

“If you’re going to do this type of work, you need to have the State Department with a prominent role in what is going on,” Nakasone, who retired in February, said in an interview.

But the center has been more controversial in Congress among members who say it has been associated with organizations that have challenged the legitimacy of some conservative media outlets at home. House Republicans have taken issue with the center due to a $100,000 grant it gave to the Global Disinformation Index, a London-based organization that labeled Newsmax and some other conservative U.S. outlets as risks for spreading disinformation.

The State Department said the grant was for countering disinformation in Asia, and that the money wasn’t related to American media. State Department officials have informed congressional staffers they wouldn’t provide funding to the British organization again. 

Republicans in Congress have torpedoed other similar efforts, including a Disinformation Governance Board that the Department of Homeland Security tried to establish two years ago. The board drew sharp criticism from conservatives—and some free-speech advocates like the American Civil Liberties Union—due to fears it might result in censorship.

While the Global Engagement Center focuses strictly on countering disinformation overseas, it has also often been pulled into the broader debate over the effectiveness of the U.S. government’s role in identifying and thwarting foreign information operations.

The center’s possible closure comes as X and other social-media platforms have retreated from policing disinformation. Photo: Daniel Heuer/CNP/Zuma Press

“While there were some bright spots with regards to countering foreign malign influence, there didn’t appear to be a meaningful or cohesive strategy,” Lisa Kaplan, founder of Alethea, a technology firm focused on disinformation, said of government efforts in this area. “There’s a lot that needs improving.”

Thomas Rid, a political scientist who studies information policy, said China’s ambitious efforts to spread disinformation around the globe may give the Trump administration reason to preserve many of the Global Engagement Center’s capabilities even if ties between Washington and Moscow improve. 

“If they see China’s influence efforts globally as a bigger threat, as frankly they should, then the chances are much higher that the department’s efforts here survive,” Rid said.

The immediate debate, however, is in Congress. While House Republicans have been sharply critical of the center’s grants, some in Congress see a need to counter Chinese influence, opening the possibility that a compromise might be reached. Texas Republican Sen. John Cornyn, who is a candidate to become the next Senate majority leader, and Sen. Chris Murphy, a Connecticut Democrat, have pushed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would enable the center to keep operating for another seven years while putting strict limits on its grants.

But if that congressional debate over the center isn’t resolved before the end of the year, the center will be forced to shut down. In that case, its mission could be dispersed among State Department bureaus.

“The danger is that the rug will be pulled out from under us just as we are getting our footing,” said Rubin. “One can only hope that the Congress will understand that taking away the best tool the U.S. government has to fight Chinese and Russian information warfare would be a big mistake.”

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 11, 2024, print edition as 'U.S. Office Battling Disinformation Faces Closure by Year-End'.

4. Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

The world is getting smaller. How should we think about working across Geographic Combatant Commands?

Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_230355.htm

• 08 Nov. 2024 -
• |
• Last updated: 08 Nov. 2024 15:24
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Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Ukraine associate themselves with this statement

NATO Allies strongly condemn the decisions by the leaders of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to dangerously expand Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine.

In addition to the DPRK’s already substantive support to Russia’s war effort, through the provision of millions of rounds of ammunitions and ballistic missiles, the thousands of combat troops deployed by the DPRK constitutes a dangerous expansion of its ongoing support for Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.

The deepening military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK deeply impacts Euro-Atlantic security, with implications also for the Indo-Pacific.

Increasing military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is a breach of multiple UN Security Council resolutions, including 2270 (2016), 1718 (2006), and 1874 (2009). This is particularly egregious given Russia’s status as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. We call on Russia to return to compliance with these resolutions and to uphold its international obligations.

Russia’s statement on 26 September asserting that the denuclearisation of the DPRK is “off the table” is unacceptable, as it undermines the global non-proliferation regime, directly contradicts relevant UN Security Council resolutions, and further exacerbates regional tensions. The Russian statement forms part of its wider effort to undermine the global non-proliferation regime and to dismantle UN sanctions.

We urge all countries not to provide any kind of assistance to Russia’s aggression, and condemn all those who are facilitating and thereby prolonging Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.

NATO will continue to work with its partners, in particular in the Indo-Pacific, to promote peace and stability, and prevent Russia and those facilitating its war effort from undermining regional and global stability.

Allies continue to enhance NATO’s deterrence and defence against all threats and challenges, in all domains, and in multiple strategic directions across the Euro-Atlantic area.

Allies remain as resolute as ever in supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to prevail. Allies and partners continue to step up vital political, military, financial, economic, and humanitarian assistance as Ukraine exercises its inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Allies are determined to support Ukraine in building a force capable of defeating Russian aggression, in line with the pledge of long-term security assistance for Ukraine.

5. Russian artillery production to outmatch all of EU by 30% next year, Ukrainian intelligence says

Russian artillery production to outmatch all of EU by 30% next year, Ukrainian intelligence says

https://kyivindependent.com/russian-artillery-production-to-outmatch-all-of-eu-by-30-next-year-ukrainian-intelligence-says/

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by The Kyiv Independent news desk

November 9, 2024 9:08 PM2 min read

Members of the unit Dnipro One of the Joint Assault Brigade of the National Police of Ukraine "Luty" operate a Soviet-era howitzer D-30 on November 09, 2024, near Toretsk, Ukraine (Diego Fedele/Getty Images)

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Russia will be able to produce 30% more artillery shells than all EU member states combined next year, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha said at a press conference in Kyiv on Nov. 9.

"According to Ukrainian intelligence, using the information we have, if there is no proper response or prevention, Russia will be able to produce 30% more artillery shells than all countries of the European Union combined," he said in comments reported by Ukrinform.

Sybiha called for international action to constrain Russia's industrial capacity.

"First of all, here I am referring to the shadow fleet, which helps Russia circumvent sanctions and continue to trade energy resources, oil. It is very important that the further strengthening of the EU's sanctions policy of our allies focus on this aspect," he said.

An ammunition shortage has long been a cause for concern in Ukraine but has escalated this year. The EU failed to deliver on its promise to produce 1 million artillery shells between March 2023 and 2024 while disputes in Washington led to a severe delay in a $61 billion aid package.

Several countries have backed a Czech-led initiative to procure 800,000 shells for Ukraine proposed in February this year. In March, the EU allocated 500 million euros ($544 million) to bolster the EU's ammunition production capacity to 2 million shells per year by the end of 2025.

Ukraine has long tried to ramp up its own domestic ammunition production to become more independent from Western partners.

In the summer of 2023, Ukroboronprom said that it had already mastered the production of 82 mm mortar mines, 122 mm, and 152 mm artillery rounds, as well as 125 mm tank shells.

Earlier media reports cited Ukrainian officials hoping to begin producing "desperately needed" NATO-standard 155 mm artillery rounds in the 'second half' of 2024 at the earliest.

Despite domestic efforts, the Ukrainian army still mainly depends on supplying 155 mm shells from partners, as European countries join forces to buy the rounds outside Europe.

The U.S. also opened a new factory last May to produce 155 mm munitions for Ukraine and significantly increased production in some existing factories.

6. Asia Greets a Rejuvenated Donald Trump

Sigh... No mention of Korea.

Asia Greets a Rejuvenated Donald Trump

An America with diminished room to maneuver

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/asia-greets-rejuvenated-donald-trump?utm

Philip Bowring

Nov 10, 2024

Regardless of what policies newly-returned President Donald Trump follows when he takes office again in January, his election has significantly eroded America’s soft power. There are several reasons for this. His criminal record, sexist and racist remarks, and general record of dubious business dealings, crudeness, and boorish behavior have been noted around the world. These things matter, particularly for a world accustomed to being lectured by the US on standards of governance. Despite his evident faults, or perhaps because of them, the fact that Trump was elected by a clear majority is unlikely to be seen as an advertisement for democracy, to be noted with satisfaction in Beijing.

Second, his reputation, already shown in his first term, of erratic and unpredictable policy-making is unsettling, especially for America’s allies. Third, he rejects the open trade and investment agenda which the US has preached and generally practiced since 1945, enhancing its standing in an internationalist world. As for specifics, there are radical moves on his economic and social agenda that are unlikely to be mutually compatible: tax cuts, deportation of undocumented migrants, a general tariff increase, China-specific tariffs, reduction in inflation, attempts to improve the US trade balance, etc.

The Trump fixation on tariffs is worrying because of the danger that it will spark not merely retaliation against the US but broader protectionism, a chain reaction leading to 1930s-type global depression. That said, there is clearly a need for the US to reduce its trade deficit and reliance on the continued global acceptance of enormous quantities of US dollar bonds to finance it.

One possibility may be that the tariff barriers are just a threat, partly to open up other markets and to persuade countries such as China to restrain exports of specific products, for instance, electric vehicles, whose pricing would play havoc with an inefficient car industry. Another possibility may be that Trump takes leaves out of the books of fellow Republican presidents Nixon and Reagan, both of whom faced the problem of excessive US current account deficits. Nixon’s shock solution was the ending of dollar convertibility into gold, which led to dollar devaluation and eventually to the floating of all major currencies. Reagan’s Treasury Secretary James Baker, faced with an over-strong dollar sucking in imports, engineered the Plaza Accord which saw the US dollar decline sharply, particularly against the Japanese and German currencies. Given how much the dollar has risen, notably against the yen, in the past two years, a sharp devaluation might do more for its trade balance than tariffs

But US room for maneuver is now much less given the role of a resurgent China and others less susceptible to US pressure. There are already efforts being made by several holders of dollar assets to diversify their reserves elsewhere out of concern the dollar’s international role is too often used as a political weapon, as has been the case with sanctions on Russia. The shortage of alternatives partly explains the strength of the gold price. US interest rates have already risen in response to Trump’s election, showing the incompatibility of a strong dollar with reducing the trade deficit.

For East Asia, Trump’s apparent lack of an overall strategy and reliance on deal-making on specific topics leaves friends and foes alike unsure of where they stand. The threats to China trade may prove less than they seem due to the influence of billionaires such as Elon Musk on policy. Where Taiwan stands is particularly uncertain given its massive trade surplus with the US, yet its importance to US strategy to prevent China from dominating the western Pacific at US expense. In theory, the Philippines should not need to worry due to its strategic importance and not being seen as a trade problem.

But other countries in the region such as Vietnam and Indonesia which had been drawing closer to the US out of fear of China may worry about the consistency of US policy as well as the impact of tariffs at a time when China remains a major source of capital for much-needed infrastructure. India however may find itself favored as a counterweight to China and the Islamic world.

Trump’s policy towards Israel will be closely watched, at least by Muslim-majority countries already unhappy with US failure to restrain the Israeli assault on Gaza and its continued colonization of the West Bank. The Netanyahu government is clearly opposed to a two-state solution which can only mean that seven million Palestinians of the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel itself will remain under the thumb of seven million Israelis. It seems likely that Trump will underwrite Netanyahu and possibly give him freer rein to attack Iran, which may have few friends internationally but is clearly of strategic importance to Russia and India. Saudi Arabia reasonably fears the consequences of humiliating Iran. However, just possibly Trump now has the ability to spring a surprise and put Netanyahu back in his box.

For Europe, fear of Trump’s trade agenda and his determination to do a deal with Putin at the expense of Ukraine and its European allies may persuade the EU to seek better relations with China. The rest of the world may not care much about Ukraine’s territorial integrity but how Trump treats NATO will be a signal to other nations with defense pacts or informal arrangements with the US. The election of an “America First” Trump has happened just at a time when countries in groupings such as BRICS are questioning western dominance of institutions and ideas. Possibly this more multi-polar world will be fairer. But it is also likely to be messier.

7. Can Trump Be the New Reagan?

I certainly hope he can.

​If I were advising the administration's new national security team I would have them go to this link and review all of President Raegan's National Security Decision Directives – study them, learn from them, and adapt the relevant ones for the 21st Century. I find so many of them useful in thinking about strategy for the future. President Reagen had many a great advisors. I hope the advisors in the Trump administration will possess the same level of intellect and vision.

https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/reagans/reagan-administration/nsdd-digitized-reference-copies

Can Trump Be the New Reagan?

Politico

A clear victory gives the president-elect a strength and credibility on the world stage that he lacked eight years ago.

President-elect Donald Trump walks offstage after his remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference on Feb. 24 in National Harbor, Maryland. Trump's political comeback gives him credibility and freedom on the world stage he didn’t have in 2017, writes the author. | Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

11/10/2024 07:00 AM EST

Matthew Kaminski is editor-at-large, writing regularly for POLITICO Magazine on American and global affairs. He’s the founding editor of POLITICO Europe, which launched in 2015, and former editor-in-chief of POLITICO. He previously worked for the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal, based in Kyiv, Brussels, Paris and New York.

Eight years ago, at a post-election breakfast party we threw in POLITICO’s Brussels offices, I watched Donald Trump claim victory in a presidential election for the first time with shell-shocked European legislators and policymakers.

The reaction in global capitals this Wednesday morning was very different. Anxiety in many, jubilation in some. But not shock. The world has experience with Trump in office. These same people from the Brussels party in 2016 have spent months preparing for a possible restoration.

There’s something else that’s different and more unexpected. One of America’s perceived weaknesses is our “polarized” and “dysfunctional” politics. I’ve not heard those words since the election was called early for Trump. The manner of his victory — a comfortable sweep of the swing states, the popular vote and what could be a majority in both houses of Congress — neuters the charge that for all of America’s huge advantages over any other rival, what dooms us to be a fading giant is our messy internal politics.

This election is clarifying. Trump will lead a unified party, unlike after 2016, and most likely a unified government as well. You can call that many things but that’s not a recipe for dysfunction or a sign of debilitating polarization for the time being. Trump has a mandate. He won’t be litigating his victory like he had to with the Russia probe. He has plenty of other baggage, including some legal troubles, and 78 years of habits. But Trump is a far stronger figure than the ’16 version when he was distrusted by Republican mandarins and despised by Democrats for taking the White House after losing by three million votes. Stronger at home, and as a result abroad.

This political comeback gives Trump credibility and freedom on the world stage he didn’t have in 2017. That’s not to say he will be more “presidential,” not by conventional standards. “Unpredictable,” Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the other Donald this week. I’m not suggesting it means the U.S. is bound to be stronger. Trump’s isolationism, his thing for Vladimir Putin and trade protectionism are red flags from a now long public life.

I’m saying Trump has the ability to shape the world like he didn’t before. This is horrifying or exciting, depending on whether Trump chooses to engage with the world or hunker down. “Gloom and despair,” is the mood in most of Europe, according to former Swedish Prime Minister and face of European establishment Carl Bildt. In the Free Press, the British economic historian and columnist Niall Ferguson discerns the potential for Trump to be a powerful presence on the global stage, seeing a “line of continuity” from Reagan to Trump who can lead the free to victory in “Cold War II.”

The world is more complicated and dangerous than the one Trump left behind as president in 2021. In this Cold War, the U.S. faces an empowered axis of authoritarians led by China, joined by a Russia at war in Europe, Iran at war in the Middle East and North Korea. This group gathered last month in Kazan, Russia with others like South Africa and NATO member Turkey in a kind of summit of the parallel non-U.S. world.

American allies in Asia and Europe are looking to Washington for leadership. Will Trump 47 surprise them? That depends on whether “Make America Great Again” is more about, to use a couple other slogans that Trumpists love, “America First” (in the sense of the 1930s isolationist Father Coughlin) or “Peace Through Strength” (still unmistakably Ronnie). His choice.

Three early tests will tell us. Who Trump puts in which seats. What he does on Ukraine. And how far he goes to restrict world trade.

Trump’s options for his team span the orbit. Experienced pros ex-NSC adviser Robert O’Brien and Florida Sen. Marco Rubio want America engaged in the world. Brian Hook, appointed to run the transition at the State Department, comes from that class. Ric Grenell, the former ambassador to Germany tipped for a top job, is a blusterer who takes his cues from Trump. Vice President-elect JD Vance is the isolationist wing. There are a fair number of grifters too. “If Trump brings in Johnny McEntee or Kash Patel,” one Trump-friendly ambassador told me referring to two from that class, “we’re all screwed.”

Ukraine will be the litmus test of American military and diplomatic power. Certainly for Europe. But to my slight surprise, Ukraine was top of mind in Asia when I spent a few weeks out there earlier this fall. When they look at what America does in Ukraine, they see it through the prism of what it might do to deter China in East and Southeast Asia. When the Europeans look, they worry about how committed the U.S. will be to NATO and stability on their eastern flank with Russia. Both want clarity. During the campaign, Trump blamed Volodymyr Zelenskyy for starting the war and refused to say he wanted Ukraine to win. He says wants to end it on day one. Let’s hope he does not. This should be an easy one for Trump and his advisers: Anything that gives Putin a win gives China a win, weakening Europe and the U.S. That isn’t a recipe for greatness or strength.

It was hard to miss the nods to Reagan from leaders who pray he chooses the path of the Gipper. Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy, advised wisely in this case, put “peace through strength” in his congratulatory tweet for Trump. Mike Johnson, the House speaker who signed off on the $60 billion aid package to Ukraine this spring, threw out the phrase from the Mar-a-Lago stage on Tuesday night. NATO’s new boss Mark Rutte praised Trump’s “strong” leadership the first time around. Not to be outdone in appealing to virility, Vladimir Putin on Thursday praised Trump for acting “bravely as a man” after an assassin’s bullet grazed his ear.

Finally trade, the test of America’s global economic leadership. Trump isn’t the model pupil. He escalated up his promises of “beautiful” tariffs (20! 50! 100 percent!). But he’s a real estate guy: He’ll try to sell you a $1 million apartment by offering it up for $10 million. Will he risk throwing the global economy into recession and stoking inflation by implementing those tariffs? An alternative comes from his first term. He blustered then but renegotiated the Canada, Mexico and U.S. free trade deal. There was no chance that either Trump or Harris would support sweeping new regional trade deals. There is a version of Trump that protects the American and global economy even as Washington turns the screws tighter on China economically through trade restrictions.

In the coming months, Trump gets to deal with the world from a position of strength. The scenario that’s hardest to imagine is for Trump and American to withdraw from the world. If there’s anything we know about him it is that he wants to be center stage.

Politico

8. Inside the Battle over Trump’s Foreign Policy

​Excerpts:

Many in the Republican establishment had seen Pompeo as the lead candidate to head the Pentagon, where he could continue to promote tough policies against China, Russia, and Iran. Haley, who initially ran against Trump in the Republican primaries, shares many of Pompeo’s views. 

Trump’s decision followed lobbying from advisers, both formal and informal, who saw Pompeo and Haley as both politically disloyal and overly willing to use military force, top Republican leaders and members of Trump’s transition team told The Free Press. Among those who lobbied against Pompeo and Haley were Trump Jr., Carlson, Grenell, and former Democratic congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, who publicly campaigned for Trump.

The younger Trump did little on Sunday to hide his lobbying against Pompeo. He wrote on X that he was “100!!! I’m on it” in response to a post by libertarian comedian Dave Smith, which read: “The ‘stop Pompeo’ movement is great but it’s not enough. Right now we need maximum pressure to keep all neocons and war hawks out of the Trump administration.”

Inside the Battle over Trump’s Foreign Policy

“There were at least 25 people who called the president and said: ‘It’s got to be Mike Pompeo.’ And none of it mattered.”

https://www.thefp.com/p/trump-foreign-policy-pompeo-haley-carlson

By Jay Solomon

November 10, 2024

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There are three hot wars gripping the planet as Donald Trump prepares for his second term: the war in Ukraine, the battle in the Middle East, and an escalating fight in Washington for influence over his national security strategy.

This last war isn’t taking place across a border or over Iranian airspace, but mostly on X, where potential appointments—and bans—are being litigated by comedians and campaigns are being run by surrogates of hopefuls against other hopefuls.

Key protagonists in this early struggle include, on one side, Trump’s eldest son, Don Jr.; talk show host Tucker Carlson; billionaire industrialist Elon Musk; and a politically incongruous mix of viral podcasters and politicians. On the other side are several people from Trump’s first term, leading Republican lawmakers, and military veterans.

This conflict over the transition claimed its first victims on Saturday when Trump announced on social media that two stalwarts from his first administration—former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and ex-ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley—won’t be serving in his second term. “There were at least 25 people who called the president and said: ‘It’s got to be Mike Pompeo,’ ” a senior Republican official told The Free Press. “And none of it mattered.” 

The defenestration of Pompeo and Haley, followed by some political muscle-flexing on X by Trump Jr. and Carlson, unnerved a number of Republican leaders and Trump administration veterans involved in the transition. Talking on background to The Free Press Sunday, they said they fear Trump’s inner circle is pushing for a national security team that will be reluctant to use U.S. military power to back American allies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. 

Donald Trump Jr. lobbied against Mike Pompeo and Nikki Haley receiving cabinet positions in his father’s incoming administration, sources told The Free Press. (Michael M. Santiago via Getty Images)

Such a strategic shift inward could almost immediately undermine Ukraine’s military operations against Russia and Israel’s war against Iran and its proxies, they warned. “I think there’s a new inner circle around Trump that is pushing him toward allowing Putin, Xi Jinping, and Iran to kind of do whatever they want to do, into a new isolationist approach, which we really haven’t seen before,” said a Republican national security strategist who held a senior post in the first Trump administration.

Trump campaigned against embroiling the U.S. in “forever wars” and has voiced skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to push Russian forces off their lands. Carlson and other public personalities who backed Trump, such as the venture capitalist and podcaster David Sacks, have argued that U.S. and NATO military deployments essentially forced Russian president Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine. Israeli media has reported that Trump wants Israel to wrap up its war in the Gaza Strip by the time of his inauguration.

There’s also a growing concern that Trump may rely mainly on political loyalists rather than seasoned national security staffers. It’s a temptation he largely resisted during his first term, though he moved in that direction toward its end. “Don Jr. and Grenell and Tucker have his ear in a way that’s very dangerous,” the first Republican leader told The Free Press on Sunday, referring to Ric Grenell, a close campaign adviser and former ambassador to Germany. 

Others involved in the transition, though, cautioned against overreacting to the moves against Pompeo and Haley, and said Trump would build a balanced and experienced team. “I’d give it time,” said a third senior veteran from Trump’s first foreign policy team. “The president is pragmatic, and he’s very clear about what he wants to do this time.”

Many in the Republican establishment had seen Pompeo as the lead candidate to head the Pentagon, where he could continue to promote tough policies against China, Russia, and Iran. Haley, who initially ran against Trump in the Republican primaries, shares many of Pompeo’s views. 

Trump’s decision followed lobbying from advisers, both formal and informal, who saw Pompeo and Haley as both politically disloyal and overly willing to use military force, top Republican leaders and members of Trump’s transition team told The Free Press. Among those who lobbied against Pompeo and Haley were Trump Jr., Carlson, Grenell, and former Democratic congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard, who publicly campaigned for Trump.

The younger Trump did little on Sunday to hide his lobbying against Pompeo. He wrote on X that he was “100!!! I’m on it” in response to a post by libertarian comedian Dave Smith, which read: “The ‘stop Pompeo’ movement is great but it’s not enough. Right now we need maximum pressure to keep all neocons and war hawks out of the Trump administration.”

Ric Grenell, a Trump campaign adviser and former ambassador to Germany. (Joe Raedle via Getty Images)

Carlson on Sunday publicly endorsed national security strategist Elbridge Colby for a top position on the national security team. Colby, a veteran of the first Trump Pentagon, has written extensively about Washington’s need to turn away from Europe and the Middle East and train its military might almost solely on deterring China. “Elbridge Colby is one of the very few experienced national security officials who actually agrees with Donald Trump,” Carlson wrote on X. “He’s likely to play a big role in the new administration.”

Israel’s war against Iran and its proxies in the Middle East is expected to be the first international issue that Trump addresses. Members of Trump’s campaign and transition team told me that the U.S. will return to the “maximum pressure” strategy against Iran that Trump employed during his first term. This included ratcheting up financial sanctions to damage Iran’s ability to export oil and earn hard currency. It also involved using U.S. forces to push back against Iranian proxies in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Among Trump’s most aggressive international actions during his first term was the 2020 assassination in Iraq of Major General Qasem Soleimani, Tehran’s most important military figure.

The value of Iran’s currency, the rial, fell to an all-time low Wednesday in a sign of Iranians’ fear about U.S. foreign policy under Trump. Aides to Trump say he views the conflict with Iran personally. The Department of Justice has indicted a string of Iranian officials and operatives for allegedly plotting to assassinate the president-elect and his former aides in retaliation for the Soleimani hit. In July, the FBI arrested a Pakistani man in New York for allegedly plotting to kill Trump at a campaign rally.

Trump and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky on September 27, 2024, in New York City. (Alex Kent via Getty Images)

But it’s still unclear how far the Trump administration will go in supporting Israel’s campaign against Tehran. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has indicated his military could strike Iranian nuclear and oil facilities in the coming months. This risks dragging the U.S. into the type of all-out Middle East war that Trump campaigned against. It also could drive up global energy prices that would severely hurt the U.S. economy. 

European officials, meanwhile, are watching to see if Trump makes good on his campaign promise to try and quickly end Russia’s war in Ukraine. They fear Russian president Vladimir Putin will try to use Trump’s brand of personal diplomacy to consolidate Russia’s territorial gains in eastern Ukraine and then apply military pressure on NATO members in central and northern Europe. Trump has repeatedly put U.S. support for NATO in doubt, citing the failure of European governments to contribute a fair share toward funding the alliance. 

Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky last week vowed to work with Trump after his election victory, citing his calls for “peace through strength” as a stabilizing dictum. “When this principle becomes the policy of the 47th President, both America and the entire world will undoubtedly benefit,” Zelensky wrote on X. 

Members of Trump’s campaign and transition team told The Free Press they wouldn’t rule out the president-elect brokering an agreement between Zelensky and Putin. They noted Trump’s efforts during his first term to negotiate a nuclear arms agreement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un as an example of his willingness to take personal diplomatic risks on the world stage. 

Tucker Carlson. (Anna Moneymaker via Getty Images)

Finally, managing the U.S.’s relationship with China will be among Trump’s most important international issues during his second term. The Republican leader pledged to intensify his economic campaign against Beijing during a second term, including by dramatically raising tariffs from 60 to 100 percent on Chinese steel, medical supplies, and semiconductors. 

It’s unclear if Trump’s plans to confront China will translate into military action. Beijing has grown increasingly aggressive over the past four years in asserting its territorial claims, particularly in the South China Sea. During his campaign, Trump was noncommittal on whether he’d employ force to protect U.S. allies in Asia, particularly Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan.

The secretary of defense position is particularly important to Trump, sources said, as he believes the Pentagon needs to be wholly restructured to face the threats posed by China, Russia, and Iran. In addition to Pompeo, Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas was initially seen as a leading candidate to run the Pentagon. But Cotton pulled himself out of consideration, citing family issues. With both men out of the race, Trump insiders say U.S. Rep. Mike Waltz of Florida is now a top contender. “You need a tough guy,” said a senior official from Trump’s first term authorized to talk about the transition. “You need somebody who can really tell the generals and the admirals what’s happening.”

Among the candidates for secretary of state are Grenell, and Tennessee senator Bill Hagerty, who served in Trump’s first term as ambassador to Japan. Others expected to be vetted for key national security roles include Florida senator Marco Rubio; John Ratcliffe, Trump’s director of national intelligence; Robert O’Brien, Trump’s last national security adviser; and Kash Patel, a senior Pentagon official during Trump’s first term.

Grenell was extremely active in the 2024 campaign and oversaw efforts to court Arab Americans and Muslim Americans. The 58-year-old’s career traces back to the George W. Bush administration, where he served as a top aide to then-UN ambassador John Bolton, among its most hawkish officials. Since Trump’s first term, Grenell’s entered into his inner circle both through his political work and close ties to members of Trump’s family. (On Sunday, meanwhile, it was reported that Rep. Elise Stefanik has been offered the role of UN ambassador.)

One potential wild card in Trump’s plans is his son-in-law, Jared Kushner. The 43-year-old played a central role in Trump’s first White House, brokering a string of agreements between Israel and Arab states known as the Abraham Accords—one of Trump’s most important foreign policy successes. 

Trump has signaled that he’d like to expand the Abraham Accords by forging a diplomatic pact between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Kushner would be a likely candidate to continue this work, but so far he’s told people that he plans to remain outside of Washington and focused on business. One person who talked to him told The Free Press it’s unclear whether Kushner could turn down a direct request from his father-in-law to return to public service. 

“There are plenty of ways to be an unpaid outside adviser and take on a portfolio,” that person said. “So, I could see Jared doing something like that.”

Jay Solomon is an investigative reporter for The Free Press and author of the book The Iran Wars. Follow him on X at @FPJaySolomon, and read his piece “Why Are Iran’s Thugs Free to Walk the Streets of New York?”

For more coverage of the 2024 election, click here.

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9. Trump’s Transition Effort Kicks Into High Gear

Trump’s Transition Effort Kicks Into High Gear

President-elect taps Tom Homan to oversee a planned mass deportation effort

https://www.wsj.com/politics/elections/trumps-transition-effort-kicks-into-high-gear-f4f1a752?mod=hp_lead_pos2

By Brian Schwartz

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 and Andrew Restuccia

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Updated Nov. 11, 2024 12:05 am ET

President-elect Donald Trump wants cabinet secretaries to look the part. Photo: Julia Demaree Nikhinson/AP

WASHINGTON—Donald Trump’s transition team has assembled digital presentations for the president-elect that feature headshots of potential contenders for key cabinet positions, according to people familiar with the process. Aides are reviewing candidates’ television interviews to gauge whether they are adept at selling Trump’s agenda, some of the people said.

The efforts reflect the priorities of the incoming commander in chief, who expects that his cabinet secretaries look the part and keeps track of what allies and adversaries say about him on cable news. And it signals that the transition team that has been working in obscurity for months is kicking into high gear as Trump and his advisers shift from campaigning to governing.

Late on Sunday, Trump said he was naming Tom Homan to oversee a planned mass deportation effort, describing it on social media as “in charge of all Deportation of Illegal Aliens back to their Country of Origin.”

Trump said the position would be akin to a “border czar,” overseeing the southern and northern border plus maritime and aviation security. Homan served as acting director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement during Trump’s first term.

More broadly, Trump transition officials have had informal discussions with the president-elect, and they are planning to present a range of options for hires in the federal government he will soon lead, according to the people familiar with the process. The digital presentations, on a screen instead of in briefing books, will feature details of candidates’ résumés and are intended to give the president-elect an easy way to pore over his options, the people said.

The Republican’s decisive victory in Tuesday’s election sets off a roughly 10-week scramble to vet and sign off on top staffing picks before Inauguration Day, after which the soon-to-be GOP-controlled Senate can consider nominations. Susie Wiles, the Florida political strategist who helped run his campaign, will be his White House chief of staff and the first woman to hold the role in U.S. history.

Susie Wiles, who led Donald Trump’s presidential bid, will become his White House chief of staff. Photo: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

Trump’s team met in Las Vegas this weekend with members of the Rockbridge Network, a conservative donor network co-founded by Vice President-elect JD Vance, according to people briefed on the meeting.

The meeting, during which the Trump team went over the campaign’s performance, comes as Trump’s advisers are raising money for his coming inauguration. The president over the weekend announced that New York real-estate developer Steve Witkoff and former Sen. Kelly Loeffler (R., Ga.) would co-chair his inaugural committee.

Next up, national security and economic positions are likely to be the focus, the people familiar with the process said.

Howard Lutnick, the billionaire chief executive of financial-services firm Cantor Fitzgerald, is in charge of personnel and plans to take point on presentations to the president-elect, according to those familiar with the matter. Trump, who is known to take looks into account when hiring, often praised members of his administration and people in his orbit as being straight out of “central casting.” He also prefers to have pictures in front of him to remember those he has previously met. 

Howard Lutnick, the CEO of Cantor Fitzgerald, is in charge of personnel for the incoming Trump administration. Photo: carlos barria/Reuters

Another person familiar with the matter said reviewing candidates performances’ during interviews on television is a precautionary measure to determine, if a candidate is hired, whether they can communicate clearly enough to go on television to represent the administration. This person said it is less about their looks.

The transition is working with several outside firms that are conducting more traditional vetting of candidates’ backgrounds. The firms are vetting hundreds of contenders for senior jobs, people with knowledge of the process said.

Representatives for the Trump transition didn’t respond to requests for comment.

Trump’s advisers said the president-elect has had informal discussions with friends and allies about the people he likes for key jobs. But Trump has yet to decide, for instance, who he wants to become the next Treasury secretary, a crucial nominee who will implement his economic vision. 

People familiar with his thinking say his top choices for the role are veteran investors Scott Bessent and John Paulson, as well as Sen. Bill Hagerty, (R., Tenn.). Several Trump allies said they think Bessent has the inside track, but caution that Trump is known for being unpredictable. Trump met with Bessent at Mar-a-Lago on Friday, according to people briefed on the meeting. Bessent declined to comment.

Several of the candidates for Treasury secretary and other cabinet positions have appeared on television before and after Election Day, including Bessent, Hagerty and former Securities and Exchange Commission chair Jay Clayton, who is angling for a job in the administration.

Lutnick, the transition co-chair, has also been discussed by some of Trump’s advisers as a candidate for Treasury secretary or another prominent economic job. Hagerty is a contender for several roles in the administration, including secretary of state.

Hagerty declined to say how he might serve in a Trump administration when asked Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “In whatever role I hold going forward, it’s going to be advancing the positions that President Trump has articulated, that the American people overwhelmingly supported, and I’ll do that in whatever role necessary,” he said. 

Sen. Bill Hagerty (R., Tenn.) is a candidate for several high-profile jobs in the Trump administration. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

Another potential choice to lead the Treasury Department is Trump’s former U.S. Trade Representative Bob Lighthizer. The Financial Times reported Friday that Trump asked Lighthizer, who oversaw the tariffs the then-president slapped on Chinese imports, to return to his role as the administration’s trade chief. A person familiar with the matter said Lighthizer has talked to Trump about an administration role, but hasn’t been formally offered anything.

Bessent has landed in pole position to become Treasury secretary in part because he is allied with economic advisers to the president-elect, including former Trump National Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow. “Scott [is] my first choice for Treasury. I’m a big fan,” Kudlow said in an email.

Leading contenders for other jobs are also coming into focus. Linda McMahon, the former head of the Small Business Administration and a co-chair of Trump’s transition, is seen by many close to the president-elect as the front-runner to lead the Commerce Department. Meanwhile, Trump declared on social media Saturday night that two officials from his first term, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, wouldn’t be landing jobs in his second administration.

Among Pompeo’s opponents was Donald Trump Jr., according to people familiar with the matter. The president’s son has said he would block people from joining the administration who aren’t aligned ideologically with his father.

Also on social media, the president-elect demanded that the next Republican leader of the Senate agree to allow him to push through at least some nominees without going through a vote. Such a move would give more power to the White House to get around congressional opposition.

Trump, his advisers said, relishes the process of picking his staff—and the attention it brings. 

Shortly after he won the 2016 election, Trump launched into lengthy transition deliberations at Trump Tower in New York. For weeks, potential candidates for jobs arrived in Midtown Manhattan and were escorted to the building’s elevators past waiting reporters, creating a reality-show-like spectacle.

At least so far, Trump’s deliberations are happening behind closed doors at Mar-a-Lago, his private Florida club.

Republicans are jockeying behind the scenes for influence, with competing ideological factions making the case for and against key candidates. The behind-the-scenes posturing has spilled out into the open. Corey Lewandowski, a longtime Trump adviser, asked his followers on X this weekend who they want to see Trump choose for secretary of state.

“Reply back with your pick and share WHY,” he wrote. 

Alex Leary, Vivian Salama and Gordon Lubold contributed to this article.

10. Trump talked to Putin, told Russian leader not to escalate in Ukraine

Exclusive

Trump talked to Putin, told Russian leader not to escalate in Ukraine

President-elect Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday and discussed the war in Ukraine, according to people familiar with the call.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/10/trump-putin-phone-call-ukraine/

President Donald Trump shakes hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Osaka, Japan, in 2019. (Susan Walsh/AP)

By Ellen Nakashima, John Hudson and Josh Dawsey

Updated November 10, 2024 at 6:15 p.m. EST|Published November 10, 2024 at 2:28 p.m. EST

President-elect Donald Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Thursday, the first phone conversation between the two men since Trump won the election, said several people familiar with the matter.

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During the call, which Trump took from his resort in Florida, he advised the Russian president not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe, said a person familiar with the call, who, like others interviewed for this story, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

The two men discussed the goal of peace on the European continent and Trump expressed an interest in follow-up conversations to discuss “the resolution of Ukraine’s war soon,” one of the people said.

In his presidential campaign, Trump said he would bring an immediate end to the war in Ukraine, though did not offer details about how he intended to do so. He has signaled privately that he would support a deal where Russia kept some captured territory, and during the call he briefly raised the issue of land, people familiar with the matter said.

Orban predicts Trump will walk away from Russia-Ukraine war

0:46

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said during an interview on Nov. 8 ”Americans will quit” the Ukraine war under President-elect Donald Trump. (Video: Reuters)

The call, which has not been previously reported, comes amid general uncertainty about how Trump will reset the world’s diplomatic chessboard of U.S. allies and adversaries after his decisive victory on Tuesday. Trump told NBC on Thursday that he had spoken to about 70 world leaders since the election, including Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — a call that Elon Musk also joined.

Ukrainian officials have been informed of the Putin call and did not object to the conversation taking place, said two people familiar with the matter. Ukrainian officials have long understood that Trump would engage with Putin on a diplomatic solution to the war, the people said.

Trump’s initial calls with world leaders are not being conducted with the support of the State Department and U.S. government interpreters. The Trump transition team has yet to sign an agreement with the General Services Administration, a standard procedure for presidential transitions. Trump and his aides are distrustful of career government officials following the leaked transcripts of presidential calls during his first term. “They are just calling [Trump] directly,” one of the people familiar with the calls said.

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“President Trump won a historic election decisively and leaders from around the world know America will return to prominence on the world stage. That is why leaders have begun the process of developing stronger relationships with the 45th and 47th President because he represents global peace and stability,” said Steven Cheung, Trump’s communications director, in an email.

Moscow initially responded coolly to Trump’s win, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov telling reporters that Putin had no plans to call the incoming president of “an unfriendly country that is directly and indirectly involved in a war against our state.”

But on Thursday, Putin publicly congratulated Trump on his victory, praising his “manly” response to the assassination attempt in Pennsylvania, and said he was “ready” to speak with Trump.

Peskov did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Earlier Sunday, a journalist with the Russian state TV channel Rossiya, Pavel Zarubin, published an interview with Peskov in which the Kremlin spokesman said the signs for an improvement in relations under a Trump presidency were “positive.”

“Trump talked during his campaign about how he sees everything through deals, that he can make a deal that will lead everyone to peace. At least he talks about peace, not about confrontation and the desire to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia,” Peskov said.

While President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris’s strategy in relation to Ukraine was predictable, Peskov added, “Trump is less predictable, and also [it] is less predictable to what extent Trump will stick to the statements he made during the election campaign. Let’s wait and see.”

Trump’s call with Zelensky on Wednesday was amicable but comes as officials in Kyiv are anxious about what a Trump presidency might mean for the war effort, said people familiar with the call.

Ukraine requires billions of dollars in economic and military support every month to continue to fend off its bigger and better-equipped foe, which has made significant military advances in recent months. Trump has complained about the war’s cost to U.S. taxpayers and privately noted that Ukraine may have to give up some of its territory, such as Crimea, for peace.

Tensions between Ukraine and the Trump campaign were heightened following Zelensky’s visit to an ammunition plant in Pennsylvania in September. The visit to the swing state was criticized as a political stunt by Trump allies, including House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-Louisiana), who called for Zelensky to fire his ambassador to the United States, Oksana Markarova.

Zelensky is now reviewing candidates to replace her, said an official in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

News of the call comes as Ukraine on Sunday launched a major drone attack on Moscow and five other Russian regions, injuring one person and forcing three airports to temporarily halt operations, officials in Moscow said.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said its air defense systems intercepted 84 Ukrainian drones over the Moscow, Bryansk, Oryol, Kaluga, Kursk and Tula regions. Thirty-four of those drones were shot down over the Moscow region, the ministry said — making it the largest Ukrainian drone attack on the capital since Russia invaded the country more than two years ago.

Meanwhile, Ukraine is bracing to hold land it gained in Russia’s Kursk region amid reports that Moscow is preparing a counteroffensive. U.S. intelligence agencies have reported that there are now at least 10,000 North Korean troops in the Kursk region, which could be used to buoy the Russian attempt to retake lost territory.

Ukrainian commanders have told The Washington Post that North Korean troops are also in Russia’s neighboring Belgorod region.

While Trump has not spelled out a plan to end the war, he has said it would have benefited Ukraine to make a deal earlier in the war as the country continues to lose soldiers, civilians and infrastructure.

“Any deal — the worst deal — would’ve been better than what we have now,” Trump said during a speech in North Carolina in September. “If they made a bad deal it would’ve been much better. They would’ve given up a little bit and everybody would be living and every building would be built and every tower would be aging for another 2,000 years.”

“What deal can we make? It’s demolished,” he said. “The people are dead. The country is in rubble.”

A former U.S. official who was apprised of the Putin call said that Trump probably does not want to enter office with a fresh crisis in Ukraine prompted by escalation by Russia, “giving him incentive to want to keep the war from worsening.”

Siobhán O’Grady in Kyiv, Isabelle Khurshudyan in Los Angeles, Catherine Belton in London and Aaron Schaffer in Washington contributed to this report.

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By Ellen Nakashima

Ellen Nakashima is a national security reporter with The Washington Post. She was a member of three Pulitzer Prize-winning teams, in 2022 for an investigation of the Jan. 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol, in 2018 for coverage of Russia's interference in the 2016 election, and in 2014 for reporting on the hidden scope of government surveillance. follow on X @nakashimae

By John Hudson

John Hudson is a reporter at The Washington Post covering the State Department and national security. He was part of the team that was a finalist for the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service for coverage of the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. He has reported from dozens of countries, including Ukraine, China, Afghanistan, India and Belarus.follow on X @John_Hudson

By Josh Dawsey

Josh Dawsey is a political enterprise and investigations reporter for The Washington Post. He joined the paper in 2017 and previously covered the White House. Before that, he covered the White House for Politico, and New York City Hall and New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie for the Wall Street Journal.follow on X @jdawsey1

11.. Pentagon to appeal ruling that affirms plea deals for 9/11 defendants

​How will this turn out? Will it drag on for a long time? What do the survivors want? Some kind of "closure" now or wait to hope to see harsher punishment? How do we define justice in this situation?

Pentagon to appeal ruling that affirms plea deals for 9/11 defendants

The move intensifies a confrontation between the military court and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, who opposes the Guantánamo court

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/08/guantanamo-plea-deal-austin-pentagon/ 

U.S. military personnel stand guard at the Guantánamo Bay detention center in Cuba. (Ramon Espinosa/AP)

By Missy Ryan

Updated November 9, 2024 at 10:36 a.m. EST|Published November 8, 2024 at 6:24 p.m. EST

The Pentagon will appeal a military judge’s ruling that Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin did not have the power to throw out plea deals reached earlier this year in the long-stalled cases against the accused planners of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, intensifying an unusual standoff over a seminal terrorism case.

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In a letter dated Friday to the families of 9/11 victims, Rear Adm. Aaron Rugh, chief military commissions prosecutor, said the government would challenge the ruling days earlier by Air Force Col. Matthew McCall, which found that agreements finalized this summer, enabling three of the alleged plotters to admit guilt in exchange for being spared the death penalty, remained valid because Austin lacked the power to void them after the fact.

The Pentagon chief abruptly canceled the plea agreements in August amid outcry from some 9/11 families, New York firefighters and Republican lawmakers, citing authority granted to him under the 2009 Military Commissions Act

.

The Pentagon’s planned appeal represents the latest twist for the ill-fated 9/11 cases, which have been stuck in pretrial proceedings for more than a decade, underscoring the larger failure of the military court system set up after the attacks to deliver meaningful justice.

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It also lengthens the legal showdown surrounding the fates of three central 9/11 defendants: alleged mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid bin Attash and Mustafa al-Hawsawi. They are among the most prominent among the 30 remaining inmates at the high-security facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

In his Aug. 2 memo voiding the plea deals, Austin also stripped retired Brig. Gen. Susan Escallier, whom he appointed in 2023 as the official overseeing the military trials, of her authority over those cases, saying the “significance” of the plea deals meant the decision should rest with him as defense secretary.

But McCall found that Austin’s move came too late.

“The timing of the SECDEF memo is fatal to its enforceability,” the judge ruled. “Assuming the secretary of defense had the authority to withhold Ms. Escallier’s authority to enter into [plea deals] as a matter of law, the secretary’s new power would only be effective prospectively, not retroactively.”

Speaking to reporters this week, Austin reiterated his belief that he, not Escallier, should have had purview over such plea deals. “I thought at that point in time that it was important enough that I should be the person to make the decision on this,” Austin told reporters of the decision on Thursday. “And I still feel that same way.”

In his letter, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post, Rugh said the government would seek to delay proceedings on the plea agreements, which McCall’s ruling set in motion. He said McCall’s findings would be appealed to the U.S. Court of Military Commission Review, which is made up of military judges.

Looming over the dispute is President-elect Donald Trump, who during his first term signed an order to keep Guantánamo open indefinitely and once threatened to fill it with new extremist inmates. While the facility remained in operation, it ultimately did not house new prisoners.

Given the outrage over the plea deals voiced by Republicans in Congress, including Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) and House Armed Services Committee chair Rep. Mike D. Rogers (R-Alabama), a Trump-run Pentagon may also seek to quash the plea deals, which critics said let terrorists off the book.

But legal experts point out that, without a pretrial agreement, the 9/11 cases may never conclude because of legal impediments rooted in defendants’ torture, which defense lawyers have described as the system’s “original sin.” Without a conclusion, the three defendants, like other remaining Guantánamo inmates — many of whom have never been charged with a crime — could face lifetime detention without conviction or even trial.

Ian Moss, a former State Department official and Guantánamo defense attorney who is now an attorney at Jenner & Block, called McCall’s ruling “a victory for the rule of law.”

“What it says is that despite the well-documented challenges of the military commission system, this decision, which again I think is right on its merits, really presents an opportunity to move us closer to closing this chapter,” Moss said.

The families of 9/11 victims and their advocates are divided over the plea deals. Some have advocated for an agreement that would conclude years of legal wrangling that prevented even the start of a trial; others remain firm that they want to see the death penalty remain as a possible sentencing option.

In the plea deals, the defendants agreed to plead guilty to the killing of 2,976 people and to respond to written questions from victims and their survivors.

Eugene Fidell, who teaches military law at Yale Law School, suggested that President Joe Biden could use his status as a lame-duck president, freed from potential political consequences, to let the plea deals stand and ensure that a case with global resonance does not drag on indefinitely.

“You could argue that this is the most liberated administration in the history of Guantánamo,” Fidell said, urging Biden to “bring it in for a landing.” Otherwise, he added, “what is his legacy if he passes this on to the next administration?”

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By Missy Ryan

Missy Ryan writes about national security and defense for The Washington Post. She joined The Post in 2014 and has written about the Pentagon and the State Department. She has reported from Iraq, Ukraine, Egypt, Libya, Lebanon, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, Peru, Argentina and Chile.

12. Targeted Killings Won’t Destroy Hezbollah

​"Sordid history?" "Flawed tactic?" You never know . There could be significant effects. It is too early to tell.

Excerpts:

All in all, the record on targeted killings suggests that Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah are unlikely to destroy it. Israel has been using the tactic against the group for decades. Rather than collapsing, Hezbollah has proved both resilient and adaptive. Attempts at leadership decapitation have produced more violence, organizational expansion, and increased Iranian influence.

No one knows this better than the Lebanese people themselves. Israel’s attacks “will entrench Hezbollah,” Rami Mortada, Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in October, responding to Netanyahu’s threat to turn Lebanon into Gaza. “It will increase frustration among the population. And it will play to the benefit of what Hezbollah has been saying for 40 years—that, ‘you see, Israel only understands the language of force.’”

Targeted Killings Won’t Destroy Hezbollah

The Sordid History of a Flawed Tactic

By Sarah E. Parkinson and Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl

November 11, 2024

Foreign Affairs · November 11, 2024

On September 27, Israel assassinated Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, by dropping between 60 to 80 bunker buster bombs on a densely populated neighborhood in Beirut’s southern suburbs. The strike killed several other Hezbollah leaders, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general, and at least 33 civilians. It injured 195 more.

This attack, others that followed, and Israel’s ground invasion of Lebanon represent the ramping-up of a yearlong escalation against Hezbollah’s leadership. In that timeframe, Israel’s military has killed hundreds of militants and thousands of civilians. Among the former are at least two dozen military commanders and high-ranking officials, including Nasrallah’s anticipated successor, Hashem Safieddine. On October 8, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that the campaign had been a success. “We took out thousands of terrorists, including Nasrallah himself, and Nasrallah’s replacement, and the replacement of his replacement,” he said.

According to his logic—and that of other Israeli government officials—these assassinations will help permanently destroy Hezbollah. But the reality is that they are unlikely to work. Hezbollah is a 40-year-old organization with a large social base, a political party represented in Lebanon’s parliament and cabinet, and Iranian state backing. It is adaptable and resilient. Israel might succeed at temporarily fragmenting the group, but Hezbollah will likely reconsolidate. Newly elevated commanders are likely to retaliate against Israel to prove their credentials and demonstrate the organization’s relevance.

Even if Israel’s assassination campaign does permanently weaken Hezbollah, it is probable that another group will rise to fill the void. Throughout history, when targeted killings have irreparably damaged armed organizations, others typically coalesce to take their place. That is in part because assassinations are a tactic, not a political solution. They do nothing to resolve the underlying issues that drive conflict. And whether by mistake or as collateral damage, targeted killings routinely kill and maim civilians while destroying infrastructure. They amplify popular grievances, drive militant recruitment, and disrupt negotiations. Targeted killings, in other words, prolong violence rather than end it.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

For more than 50 years, Israel has assassinated militant leaders in Lebanon using commando raids, car bombs, and airstrikes. These attacks have focused attention on what some scholars and military strategists call “leadership decapitation”: killing or capturing leaders of nonstate armed groups in hopes of degrading their capabilities and spurring organizational collapse.

Neither “targeted killing” nor “leadership decapitation” are formal terms in international law. Many experts argue that both are simply euphemisms for extrajudicial executions, which the laws of armed conflict proscribe. The tactics’ proponents, especially Israel and the United States, contend that they are a militarily effective and morally justifiable way to degrade and defeat organized armed groups. Such strikes, the reasoning goes, can take out individuals essential to an armed organization’s functioning while minimizing civilian harm. But even under U.S. and Israeli interpretations, targeted killings should respect the principle of proportionality, meaning that the operation’s military gain must justify resultant civilian casualties. “Take the usual case of a combatant or a terrorist sniper shooting at soldiers or civilians from his porch,” Israeli Supreme Court Justice Aharon Barak wrote in a 2006 opinion. “Shooting at him is proportionate even if, as a result, an innocent civilian neighbor or passerby is harmed. That is not the case if the building is bombed from the air and scores of its residents and passersby are harmed.”

Under most interpretations of the laws of armed conflict, including that of the International Committee of the Red Cross, many of the people Israel kills have protected status. By those readings, people employed or volunteering for Hezbollah’s social services and political wings are considered noncombatants, unless they are directly participating in hostilities. But Israel and the United States have a far more permissive interpretation of what constitutes direct participation in hostilities. In an October 16 strike on a municipal building in the Lebanese city of Nabatieh’s municipal building, for example, Israel killed the elected mayor—who ran on a joint Hezbollah-Amal candidate list—and officials in the city’s emergency services’ crisis committee.

Even if Israel’s strikes only killed combatants, targeted killings have another problem: they backfire. Although research on the tactic has yielded a mass of apparently contradictory findings, thanks in part to different measures of success, it generally suggests that such attacks fail to achieve their long-term aims. They did not succeed, for example, during U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. The first country provides a kind of case-in-point. According to the Johns Hopkins professor Dipali Mukhopadhyay—a leading expert on the U.S. war in Afghanistan—the United States fell into a trap that is emblematic of targeted killing campaigns: it focused on revenge and short-term political gains rather than on establishing durable solutions.

Assassinations can elevate more radical or more effective leaders.

Proponents of targeted killings argue that attacks against individuals actively involved in the planning and execution of violence reduce an organization’s capacity and collapse morale. The Israeli government claims its current operations in Lebanon achieve exactly these goals. Yet Hezbollah has proved resilient in the face of them. That is in large part because it is heavily institutionalized and bureaucratized. Such groups have set procedures and succession plans for when their leaders are promoted, die, or otherwise leave their positions. Cell-like units are trained to operate independently, such that killing the group’s top leadership may not permanently affect its capacity.

In the immediate aftermath of a major assassination, groups certainly can experience communications breakdowns, confusion, grief, and paranoia. Yet even if a mid-level commander, military bigwig, or senior leader is killed, deputies wait in the wings and fighters can continue attacks. Since Nasrallah’s death, for example, Hezbollah has launched hundreds of rockets, missiles, and drones at Israeli military bases, major cities such as Haifa, and Netanyahu’s own residence.

In fact, a group that has publicly lost key figures may be more determined to prove its capabilities and rebuild its strength. Hezbollah first shelled across the Lebanese-Israeli border following the funeral of Hezbollah Secretary-General Abbas al-Musawi, whom the Israel Defense Forces assassinated in 1992. Musawi’s death pushed Hezbollah’s leaders to retaliate and afforded maximalists in the organization to deploy increasingly sophisticated operations against the IDF in occupied south Lebanon and escalate to international attacks. Israel’s military intelligence chief from 1991 to 1995, Uri Sagi, directly linked Musawi’s assassination to Hezbollah’s escalation, including the group’s bombing of the Israeli embassy and a Jewish cultural center in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. Close to a decade after Musawi’s death, Hezbollah was only stronger and more capable. Years of bloody stalemate in south Lebanon led to Israel’s eventual withdrawal in 2000. The country continued to conduct targeted killings against Hezbollah in the years that followed, but the group’s influence only continued to grow. On July 12, 2006, it launched a cross-border raid and killed and kidnapped Israeli soldiers. The result was the 2006 July war.

Assassinations can also elevate more radical or more effective leaders. Musawi’s assassination led to the rise of the more charismatic Nasrallah. As secretary-general, Nasrallah—along with Hezbollah’s top military strategist Imad Mughniyeh—was widely credited with transforming the group from a local militia to a nonstate military more powerful than the Lebanese Armed Forces. Similarly, assassinations can invite in outside actors who provide financial assistance and technical support. When Israel killed Mughniyeh in 2008, Iranian Revolutionary Guard advisers became more involved in Hezbollah’s day-to-day operations. Similarly, in Gaza, the assassination of Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in 2004 cleared the way for deeper Iranian involvement with the organization—a relationship Yassin had opposed.

VIOLENCE BEGETS VIOLENCE

Even when targeted killings successfully temporarily degrade organizations’ leadership structures, they can result in more violence. In groups that employ compartmentalization and cell structures, factions with independent interests and agendas can emerge. Rising leaders then use violence to compete for attention, resources, and status—a practice political scientists call “outbidding.” The result is that the targeted group’s attacks often become less predictable and more sensational.

This process has already played out in Lebanon. In 1982, Israel invaded with the goal of rooting out the Palestine Liberation Organization and Palestinian armed factions, which had been firing rockets and launching military raids from south Lebanon into northern Israel. Israel killed or imprisoned Palestinian commanders, along with thousands of civilians, leaving Palestinian operational units leaderless and uncoordinated. As Israel occupied southern Lebanon up to the coastal city of Saida, local Palestinian militias untethered to traditional command-and-control structures emerged. Operating in loose cooperation with Lebanese insurgents, these militias wreaked havoc on Israeli forces and their collaborators.

Israel consequently withdrew in 1985 to the border zone, which it occupied until 2000. But Lebanon continues to live with the war’s legacy. One of the Palestinian leaders Israel targeted in an October strike on Ain al-Hilweh camp, in Saida, came to prominence in this 1980s power vacuum.

The aftermath of Israel’s 1982 invasion illustrates another stark fact: permanently weakening or even defeating an organization can give rise to new ones. The Palestinians’ defeat and Israel’s occupation provided Hezbollah with its raison d’être. In August 1982, 14,398 Palestinian guerrillas evacuated Beirut following a United States–brokered ceasefire. Palestinian political leaders’ exile to Damascus and Tunis left a void that Hezbollah came to fill.

COLLECTIVE PUNISHMENT

One core justification of targeted killings is the claim that they minimize civilian deaths. Yet operations targeting individuals have produced devastation and extensive civilian casualties. The airstrike that killed Nasrallah leveled an entire block of one of Lebanon’s most densely populated neighborhoods. Israel’s October 10 attack targeting Wafiq Safa, Hezbollah’s liaison to Lebanon’s security agencies, collapsed an eight-story apartment building in central Beirut, killing 22 people and wounding 117 more. The Israeli government says that it often uses phone calls, text messages, and air-dropped leaflets to prompt the evacuation of targeted areas before attacking them. But in October, Amnesty International reported that if evacuation notices arrive, they are often unclear or provide civilians insufficient time to leave the area.

Even operations that military analysts laud for their technical sophistication have lacked the precision to avoid widespread harm to civilians. Many observers were astonished, for example, when in September, Israel simultaneously detonated thousands of pagers and walkie-talkies used by Hezbollah. But these attacks killed and maimed scores of people who do not belong to the group. Former CIA director and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta called them “a form of terrorism.”

In many cases, civilians who want to flee simply cannot. People who are elderly, sick, or disabled may not be capable of flight. In a country in which nearly half the population lives in poverty, too many others do not have the financial means to evacuate.

Given the devastating consequences, civilians in Lebanon experience targeted attacks as collective punishment. For the Israeli government, that may be the point. It certainly hopes that hardship will turn civilians against Hezbollah. In October, Netanyahu threatened Lebanon with “destruction and suffering like we see in Gaza” unless people rise up against the organization. If people blame Hezbollah for their country’s destruction, the logic goes, they will help Israel target the group’s members and dismantle its influence.

Israel’s attacks will strengthen the convictions of Hezbollah’s supporters.

But this shift is extremely unlikely to happen. In fact, if anything, the opposite will occur. Israel is a foreign power that has already invaded Lebanon three times and launched smaller but still devastating military operations. During the 1982 to 2000 occupation, it brutally policed south Lebanon’s population, incarcerated thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians, and stoked sectarian tensions by outsourcing violence to the predominantly Christian South Lebanon Army. Occupation, along with the repression and hardship that accompanied it, rallied new recruits to Hezbollah and other Lebanese armed political parties’ ranks.

Civilians’ experience of Israel’s strikes as indiscriminate and ubiquitous further influences their decision-making. These attacks will strengthen the convictions of Hezbollah’s civilian supporters. Some who were not previously fighters may become willing to join, deciding that access to arms, a salary, and information is the best path they have, especially when they may be killed randomly even while attempting to avoid the escalating hostilities. As they did between 1982 and 2000, greater segments of the Lebanese population may well mobilize against Israel.

All in all, the record on targeted killings suggests that Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah are unlikely to destroy it. Israel has been using the tactic against the group for decades. Rather than collapsing, Hezbollah has proved both resilient and adaptive. Attempts at leadership decapitation have produced more violence, organizational expansion, and increased Iranian influence.

No one knows this better than the Lebanese people themselves. Israel’s attacks “will entrench Hezbollah,” Rami Mortada, Lebanon’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in October, responding to Netanyahu’s threat to turn Lebanon into Gaza. “It will increase frustration among the population. And it will play to the benefit of what Hezbollah has been saying for 40 years—that, ‘you see, Israel only understands the language of force.’”

• SARAH E. PARKINSON is Aronson Associate Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. She is the author of Beyond the Lines: Social Networks and Palestinian Militant Organizations in Wartime Lebanon.
• JONAH SCHULHOFER-WOHL is Universitair Docent of Political Science at Leiden University and Guest Professor at the “Transformations of Political Violence” Research Center at Goethe University Frankfurt and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. He is the author of Quagmire in Civil War.

Foreign Affairs · November 11, 2024

13. Security experts: NATO-type Southeast Asian defense alliance not feasible at present

​Everything cannot be a NATO. We also cannot implement a Marshall Plan everywhere. But it seems like NATO and the Marshall Plan are two concepts which pundits apply to almost every security situation.

Security experts: NATO-type Southeast Asian defense alliance not feasible at present

Minilateral agreements, rather than multilateral ones, may more likely be formed, they say.

https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/security-experts-nato-type-southeast-asian-defense-alliance-not-feasible-at-present-11082024145231.html

Jason Gutierrez

2024.11.08

Manila

(From left) U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin; U.S. State Secretary Antony Blinken; Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. pose for the cameras after holding a meeting in Manila, July 30, 2024.

 Jason Gutierrez/BenarNews

A Southeast Asian defense alliance modeled after NATO and aimed at countering China may not be set up any time soon because the region’s nations would want to maintain good relations with the superpower, regional security analysts said.

The creation of more minilateral agreements, though, rather than multilateral ones like the 32-member North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are not only likely but may be more effective, they added.

A minilateral agreement is an accord between a small group of nations that have come together to achieve mutual goals or tackle shared problems, according to international relations experts.

For instance, a good example is a minilateral agreement renewed last year by the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia for joint patrols on their seas, said geopolitics expert Don McLain Gill.

“The most we can expect [in the form of a defense alliance] for now is an area- specific and time-dependent security cooperation between particular states in the region in a way that would also reflect individual varying sensitivities,” he told BenarNews.

Another lecturer from the university concurred.

“I think that [creating] minilaterals is more plausible,” political science lecturer Sherwin Ona told BenarNews.

“I also think that armed enforcement has its limitations and has a tendency for escalation.”

Established in 1949, NATO commits its 32-member countries to each other's defense in the event any are attacked. Aside from the United States, other NATO members include the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, France, and Canada.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaders pose for a photo during an event commemorating the 75th Anniversary of the alliance at the Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium, in the United States capital Washington, July 9, 2024. [Susan Walsh/AP]

Conversation about a regional NATO, Asian or Southeast Asian, revived after now-Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba wrote a paper late September for think-tank Hudson Institute about his proposal for such a defense alliance.

“[T]he absence of a collective self-defense system like NATO in Asia means that wars are likely to break out because there is no obligation for mutual defense,” Ichiba wrote late September.

“Under these circumstances, the creation of an Asian version of NATO is essential to deter China by its Western allies,” added the then-candidate for prime minister added.

The proposal was rejected by the United States and India said it doesn’t share Ishiba’s vision.

Similar ideas have irritated Beijing, which sees itself as the main focus of these proposals, in the same way that Moscow has accused NATO of concentrating its defense efforts against Russia.

U.S. troops leave a hill on a beach in Laoag city, northern Philippines, during U.S.-Philippine exercises, May 6, 2024. [Jason Gutierrez/BenarNews]

In Southeast Asia specifically as well, the idea of a NATO-like grouping has been talked about in response to some countries claiming harassment by Beijing’s vessels in the South China Sea, where they have overlapping claims. 

Beijing claims most of the South China Sea, but its claims overlap those of Taiwan, which isn’t a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, all of which are.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. trod carefully when asked on Tuesday about a grouping similar to NATO consisting of the 10 members of ASEAN.

“I don't think it is possible at this time because of the dichotomies and divergence between country interests,” Teodoro answered at the venue of a private conference in Manila. 

Still, he acknowledged the need to boost multilateral security alliances.

Teodoro noted that Manila has a bilateral defense alliance with Washington since 1951, even before it became one of the Southeast Asian countries to set up the ASEAN in 1967.

Sherwin Ona, a political science lecturer at Manila’s De La Salle University, told BenarNews that ASEAN nations would stick to the bloc’s “non-interference policy.” 

Besides, some Southeast Asian countries are very pro-Beijing because their economies are heavily dependent on China, indicated Ona.

“I agree [with Teodoro] about the beneficial relationship between countries that are pro-Beijing.”

Another reason Southeast Asian countries may be cool to the idea of an “Asian NATO” is because they have different security interests, noted a researcher at the New Delhi-based think-tank Observer Research Foundation.

“This is because most countries are convinced that a multilateral security architecture will only elevate regional insecurities, and make them subservient to great power contestations,” Abhishek Sharma wrote on Deccan Herald.

'Loose, flexible' minilaterals

Minilaterals are “loose and flexible,” believes Gill.

“This is not NATO’s established collective security structure,” he said.

Minilaterals are “only as good as they last.”

Gill explained that if one country in a three-nation minilateral agreement felt it did not any longer share the same interest with the other two, “it can walk out anytime.” 

Geopolitical analyst Julio Amador III believes a network of “minilateral ties” might be able to offset this shortcoming and would be more effective. 

Additionally, he said there was a way ASEAN as a bloc could become “a formidable diplomatic counterweight.” 

If the group’s members, particularly those that drift towards China, agree that there are some issues “that go beyond national interests, that there are issues that do matter to the collective interests of the group,” ASEAN could be powerful, Amador said. 

However, De La Salle University’s Gill said that the character of Southeast Asian cooperation tended to be based mostly on mutual interest. 

“An ASEAN version of NATO is unlikely going to happen given the nature of ASEAN,” he said.

14. How to Talk to a Veteran

​The best advice I have received on a way for veterans to respond to the timeless statement of "Thank you for your service." The response: "Thank you for being an American worth fighting for."

How to Talk to a Veteran - War on the Rocks

David Barno and Nora Bensahel

November 11, 2024

warontherocks.com · by David Barno · November 11, 2024

Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in War on the Rocks to honor Veterans Day in 2017. Seven years later, its message of fostering meaningful communication between servicemembers and civilians is more important than ever.

This Veterans Day, the country will pause to honor those that have served in the U.S. military — including more than 2.7 million veterans of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, as many have noted, fewer than 1 percent of Americans serve in the military today, and they are growing increasingly distinct and isolated from the remaining 99 percent. Most Americans hold the men and women who have fought in these wars in high personal esteem, yet often struggle to connect with this new generation of veterans.

Starting a meaningful conversation with these veterans of our current wars remains extraordinarily difficult for the vast majority of Americans who have no association with the military. They are often afraid of saying the wrong thing, appearing intrusive, or of somehow offending a veteran and triggering an angry response. And, as Rosa Brooks has eloquently written, ignorance leads many Americans to stereotype military men and women into three different categories: the hero, who is always brave, courageous, and selfless; the villain, who enjoys brutally killing others; and the victim, whose guilt over what he or she has done in war leads to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or an increased risk of substance abuse, homelessness, unemployment, and suicide.

Overcoming these stereotypes isn’t just a matter of courtesy or kindness, or even of treating veterans fairly. In many ways, this growing gap between soldier and civilian underscores a quietly crumbling facet of American citizenship: the obligation of everyday citizens to understand and take responsibility for our military and its members, and to understand what we ask our men and women in uniform to do on our behalf. Connecting personally with the veterans around us can strengthen that bond and help restore some of that sense of responsibility between soldier and citizen.

To encourage our fellow citizens to reach out and connect with veterans — not only on Veterans Day but every day — we offer the following suggestions about questions to avoid, questions to ask, how to say “thank you,” some lighter questions, and finally some deeper questions to ask once a relationship has been established.

Become a Member

Questions to Avoid

“Did you ever kill anyone?” This is the gold standard for questions never to ask someone who has served in uniform. And yes, it still does get asked, far more often than you would think possible. No veteran who has lived through that searing experience is ever going to want to talk about it to a passerby, and often not even to close family or friends. Those who ask this make themselves look thoughtless, ignorant, and extremely disrespectful. In sum: Never, ever, ever.

“Did you see any dead bodies?” This is another example of insensitivity. Many veterans will have never have seen anyone dead, but for the vast majority of those who have, it’s a sickening snapshot that will never be forgotten. And whether those dead bodies were Americans, enemy soldiers, or innocent civilians, nobody needs that jarring image refreshed.

“What was the worst thing you ever saw?” This is guaranteed to bring back memories that a veteran may be trying hard to forget. Images of dead comrades, the wounded suffering in pain, and the inevitable human carnage of war are pictures and sounds the mind works hard to erase. Asking about them brings these sensations immediately back to the fore, and inflicts the pain all over again.

“I almost joined the military, but…” Most veterans have heard some version of this refrain, and discount everything after the “but.” Sadly, it never seems to be followed by what that person actually did do to serve their country or community in some way — joined AmeriCorps, volunteered at a local food bank, organized sponsors for a deployed unit, or anything else.

“Do you have PTSD?” This is the victim stereotype: “If you served, you must be damaged.” Most veterans do not have PTSD, and the vast majority view their military service in a positive way. This question insults veterans by assuming they are volatile powder kegs of emotions just waiting for a spark to explode. A friend of ours who is a recent combat veteran told us why this question infuriates him so much: “I can tell from the way the question is framed that they usually see me as some suffering, broken human being. It’s obvious they don’t care about me or my service.”

“[Insert your politics here.]” Do not push your views about whether we should have gone to war in Iraq or Afghanistan, or ask for a veteran’s opinion of current or past presidents. Political statements that impugn the rationale for our recent wars and implicitly project the divisiveness of American politics at home onto the battlefield are unwelcome by almost all veterans. They signed up to defend the country, regardless of their personal views, and bridle at the notion of having their military service used to justify one political position or another.

Questions to Ask

“What service were you in? Why did you choose that one?” Veterans often appreciate the opportunity to talk about their decision to serve, and every vet identifies with their specific service. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps each have their own culture, history and customs. Not understanding that each service is very different from one another is a common mistake.

“Are you still in the military? What are you doing now? What are your friends doing now?” These are terrific questions to find out more about the current lives of veterans and to show that you are interested in more than lurid tales of firefights and dead bodies.

“What inspired you to join?” This is a subtle but important salute to veterans. It is a question that recognizes that each one felt some spark, some impulse that brought them into the recruiting station to embark upon a very different path than most of their fellow citizens. Let them tell you why.

“What was your job? What was the most rewarding part of doing it?” Most veterans take pride in their military jobs and like talking about the parts that they found most fulfilling. But this is also important because many Americans erroneously believe that all members of the military, especially those in the Army and Marines, directly fight the enemy. The military includes literally hundreds of diverse specialties, from welders to dog handlers to musicians. Asking a vet about the job he or she had in uniform may open a surprising new conversation.

“What surprised you the most about being overseas?” For most veterans, an overseas deployment was the first time in their life that they visited a part of the world outside of the United States. This is a great opportunity to learn about what that felt like — and you might be surprised by these stories as well.

How to Say “Thank You”

“Thank you for your service” has become a common refrain during the recent wars, but veteran reactions to it are decidedly mixed. Some veterans appreciate that many people want to express their gratitude and support, while others — including one of your column authors — react negatively and find it an all-too-easy brush-off of any further need to be involved with our wars. (The recent film with this title, and the book upon which it is based, use the phrase ironically.) If you want to avoid seeming trite, try saying thanks in one of these ways instead.

“Thank you for putting the rest of your life on hold to serve your country.” This shows that you understand the totality of what a veteran has given up in choosing to spend several years in uniform.

“Thank you for the sacrifices you made being away from your family.” This thanks the veteran in much the same way as the previous question, but also adds something specific and meaningful to you.

“Thank you for stepping up and choosing to serve when so many others didn’t.” This demonstrates that you know that the veteran felt a powerful commitment to defend the nation and made truly life-changing choices that others did not.

On the Lighter Side

“What is the funniest thing that ever happened to you in the military?” This opens up all kind of potentially happy memories and comical stories, capturing everything from boot camp humor to unexpected laughs under fire. Every vet has some of these stories and most will enjoy sharing some of their favorites.

“Was the food as crappy as we hear?” This connects you to the human dynamics of everyday life in uniform. Everybody eats, and people in the military have a wide range of culinary experiences that can only be described as interesting — and, thankfully, are rarely replicated in civilian life.

“What did you do in your free time while you were deployed?” Yes, members of the military have down time when deployed, even in combat zones. Soldiers often describe combat as long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror. Many soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines overseas do things in their free time that might surprise you, like making parodies of Carly Rae Jepsen songs or filming other funny and creative YouTube videos.

The Advanced Course: After Your First Conversation

“What’s the most important thing you learned from your service?” or “What made you most proud of being in uniform?” These questions might prompt a long pause, but they are worth asking. Some veterans may have never reflected upon their service in this way. Pondering these questions might help them gain greater insight about their time in uniform — and probably help you learn something important too.

“How did the United States change while you were gone? Any veteran who spends significant time overseas returns to the United States with a different perspective of the country and its people. Find out what it feels like to come back. (For example, one of your column authors was both struck and disheartened by how much of American culture is dominated by an incessant obsession with sports and entertainment.)

“Would you do it again? Why or why not?” This can be a very tough question, but even some veterans who have been grievously wounded will still answer “yes.” Understanding how and why a veteran chooses to answer this question shines a powerful light on the meaning of service to them — and it helps us all understand each other better.

We hope that you use these suggestions on this Veterans Day and in the years ahead to better understand some of your fellow citizens who have chosen to serve in uniform. Many of them have done extraordinary things, but they still see themselves (and mostly want to be treated) as regular people just like everyone else. As one of our veteran friends explained: “I guess what I really want non-veterans to do is to see us as fellow Americans first and foremost.” Perhaps the biggest sign of respect you can show is to get to know them and their life experiences as you would get to know anyone else in your community. Military service is only one part of their life story — but finding out more about that part is the best way to express your gratitude for the many sacrifices they have chosen to make. Happy Veterans Day!

Become a Member

Lt. Gen. David W. Barno, U.S. Army (ret.), and Dr. Nora Bensahel are Professors of Practice at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and are also contributing editors at War on the Rocks, where their column appears periodically. Sign up for Barno and Bensahel’s Strategic Outpost newsletter to track their articles as well as their public events.

Image: Lance Cpl. Terry Haynes

Special Series, Strategic Outpost

warontherocks.com · by David Barno · November 11, 2024

15. Netanyahu approved pager attacks against Hezbollah, spokesman says

​I would expect that to be so.

Netanyahu approved pager attacks against Hezbollah, spokesman says

By Reuters

November 11, 20245:30 AM ESTUpdated 2 hours ago

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-approved-pager-attacks-against-hezbollah-spokesman-says-2024-11-11/

A man, who was wounded when pagers used by Hezbollah detonated on Tuesday across Lebanon, receives treatment at Sidon Governmental Hospital, in Sidon, Lebanon September 20, 2024. REUTERS/Ali Hankir/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

JERUSALEM, Nov 11 (Reuters) - Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved pager attacks that dealt a deadly blow to the Iran-backed Lebanese armed group Hezbollah in September, Omer Dostri, spokesperson for his office, said on Monday.

The Israeli military, which has been engaged in cross-border fighting with Hezbollah since the start of the Gaza war in October 2023, at first declined to respond to questions about the detonations.

On Sept. 17, thousands of pagers simultaneously exploded in the southern suburbs of Beirut and other Hezbollah strongholds, in most cases after the devices beeped, indicating an incoming message.

A Hezbollah official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the incident was the "biggest security breach" for the group in nearly a year of conflict with Israel.

Among the victims rushed to hospital, many had eye injuries, missing fingers or gaping holes in their abdomens, Reuters witnesses saw, indicating their proximity to the devices at the time of detonation.

In total, the pager attack, and a second on the following day that activated weaponised walkie-talkies, killed 39 people and wounded more than 3,400.

Israeli media reported that Netanyahu claimed responsibility for the attack during a cabinet meeting, telling ministers that senior defence officials and political figures were opposed to the detonation of the pagers but that he went ahead with the operation.

Hezbollah fighters have been using pagers as a low-tech means of communication in an attempt to evade Israeli location-tracking, two sources familiar with the group's operations told Reuters this year. A pager is a wireless telecommunications device that receives and displays messages.

Israel followed up the pager detonations with the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in an air strike and launching incursions in south Lebanon.

The Reuters Daily Briefing newsletter provides all the news you need to start your day. Sign up here.

Reporting by Jonathan Saul, Writing by Michael Georgy, Editing by William Maclean

16. US carries out strikes against Houthis in Yemen, defense official says

US carries out strikes against Houthis in Yemen, defense official says

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/11/09/politics/us-strikes-houthis-yemen/index.html

By Oren Liebermann, CNN

 2 minute read 

Published 11:12 PM EST, Sat November 9, 2024

The Pentagon in Washington, DC. Charles Dharapak/AP

CNN — 

The US carried out a series of strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen late Saturday evening, according to a US defense official, targeting numerous weapons storage facilities across at least three locations.

The facilities housed advanced conventional weapons used to target ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, said the official, who added that the US used fighter jets to carry out the attack.

The Iran-backed Houthis have for months targeted ships in the Red Sea, one of the world’s busiest waterways, calling the attacks a response to Israel’s war in Gaza against Hamas.

Related article

Qatar says it suspended mediator efforts for Gaza ceasefire due to lack of good-faith negotiations

The Houthis, Hamas and Hezbollah are all part of an Iran-led alliance spanning Yemen, Syria, Gaza and Iraq that has attacked Israel and its allies since the war began last year. They say they won’t stop striking Israel and its allies until a ceasefire is reached in the Palestinian enclave.

In mid-October, after more than a year of attacks by the Houthis on US and international vessels, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin announced that the US struck the militant group using stealth B-2 bombers for the first time. Austin said he authorized the strikes at the direction of President Joe Biden to “further degrade” the Houthis’ capabilities.

The B-2 bombers, which can carry a far larger payload than fighter jets, were a clear message to Iran, with Austin saying afterward that the US can hit targets “that our adversaries seek to keep out of reach, no matter how deeply buried underground, hardened, or fortified.”

“We will continue to make clear to the Houthis that there will be consequences for their illegal and reckless attacks,” he said at the time.

CNN reported last month that the US has strengthened its military posture in the region amid Israel’s war with Hamas in Gaza and conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon. US forces in the region include a carrier strike group, several additional guided missile destroyers, an amphibious ready group, a marine expeditionary unit and a broad range of aircraft, including fighter and attack aircraft.

CNN’s Haley Britzky contributed to this report.

17. Netanyahu says he spoke three times with Trump in recent days

Netanyahu says he spoke three times with Trump in recent days

Axios · by Barak Ravid · November 10, 2024

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said on Sunday that he has spoken three times with President-elect Trump in recent days. Netanyahu is also sending Minister of Strategic Affairs Ron Dermer to Mar-a-Lago this week, a senior Israeli official told Axios.

Why it matters: The challenge of Israel's multi-front war and the deteriorating security situation in the Middle East will soon fall to Trump. Netanyahu's comment and his adviser's trip suggest they're already coordinating closely.

• One Trump-Netanyahu call had been made public since the election. If Netanyahu did have another two calls with Trump, it would likely make him the foreign leader who has spoken the most with the president-elect.
• The calls would give Netanyahu a chance to influence Trump's thinking on the wars in Gaza and Lebanon. Trump has previously called on Netanyahu to end the war in Gaza, but the Israeli PM has continued to pursue maximalist aims rather than prioritizing a ceasefire.
• The Trump transition team did not respond to a request for comment.

What they're saying: "These were very good and important conversations. We see eye to eye on the Iranian threat in all its components, and the danger it poses. We also see the great opportunities that Israel faces, in the field of peace and its expansion, and in other areas," Netanyahu said.

The other side: Israeli President Isaac Herzog will meet with President Biden at the White House on Tuesday to discuss the war in Gaza and Lebanon, U.S. and Israeli officials said.

• Biden wants to try and use the two months he has left in office to reach an agreement to end the war in Lebanon and make progress towards a hostage and ceasefire deal in Gaza.

Driving the news: A U.S. deadline for Israel to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza looms on Wednesday.

• If it determines Israel has not taken sufficient steps to improve the humanitarian situation, the Biden administration could suspend arms supplies to Israel, in accordance with U.S. law.
• National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said Sunday on CBS News' "Face the Nation that the U.S. has told Israel it will "measure you against the progress you're making" as explained to them in a letter sent from Secretary of State Tony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin.
• "This week, we will make our judgments about what kind of progress they have made," he said.
• However, U.S. officials said that the deadline might be extended by a few days due to the appointment of a new Israeli minister of defense.

What's next: The Israeli security cabinet will meet on Sunday to discuss the U.S. ultimatum and the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

• Netanyahu, new Defense Minister Israel Katz and Dermer met on Sunday with the UN humanitarian coordinator for Gaza, Sigrid Kach.
• On Friday the independent Famine Review Committee (FRC) which includes global food security experts, warned of a "strong likelihood that famine is imminent" in areas of northern Gaza.

What to watch: Dermer is expected to travel to Washington on Sunday night for talks with Sullivan and Blinken to discuss the U.S. ultimatum as well as efforts to reach a ceasefire in Lebanon.

Editor's note: This story has been updated with comments from Jake Sullivan on CBS News' "Face the Nation."

Axios · by Barak Ravid · November 10, 2024

18. Kremlin says reports of Trump-Putin call about Ukraine are ‘pure fiction’

Kremlin says reports of Trump-Putin call about Ukraine are ‘pure fiction’

Putin has no specific plan to speak to president-elect, says spokesperson, after reports Trump urged him not to escalate Ukraine war

The Guardian · by Pjotr Sauer · November 11, 2024

The Kremlin has denied reports that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, spoke to the US president-elect, Donald Trump, calling the media reports “pure fiction”.

The Washington Post first reported that a call had taken place, citing unidentified sources, and said Trump had told Putin he should not escalate the Ukraine war. Reuters also reported on a call.

“It is completely untrue. It is pure fiction; it is simply false information,” the Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said when asked about the call. “There was no conversation.

“This is the most obvious example of the quality of the information that is being published now, sometimes even in fairly reputable publications.”

Peskov added that Putin had no specific plans to speak to Trump.

According to the Washington Post, Trump reminded Putin of “Washington’s sizeable military presence in Europe”. It added that Trump expressed interest in follow-up conversations on “the resolution of Ukraine’s war soon”.

The reported call took place after Putin on Thursday congratulated Trump on his election win and expressed admiration for the way Trump reacted to an assassination attempt during the campaign.

Peskov has a history of dismissing media reports that later prove to be true; most recently, he labelled reports of North Korean soldiers arriving in Russia as “fake news”, despite credible audio and visual evidence confirming their presence. Still, the Kremlin’s swift denial of the phone call with Trump is likely to raise eyebrows, especially given that both leaders have previously expressed openness to dialogue.

Trump’s team has not yet confirmed the call. When asked by Fox News for comment about the Washington Post report, Trump’s communication director, Steven Cheung, released a statement saying: “We do not comment on private calls between President Trump and other world leaders.”

Peskov on Monday also accused European leaders of continuing to seek a “strategic defeat” of Russia. He was responding to a question about the possibility that Britain would allow Ukraine to use Storm Shadow long-range missile systems to hit targets inside Russia.

The Kremlin repeatedly said Putin was ready to discuss Ukraine with the west but that it did not mean he was willing to alter Moscow’s demands.

On 14 June, Putin staked out a maximalist position for an end to the war: Ukraine would have to drop its Nato ambitions and withdraw all its troops from all the territory of four regions claimed by Russia.

During the election campaign, Trump said he would find a solution to end the war “within a day” but did not explain how he would do so. He also spoke to Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Wednesday, according to reports. The Ukrainian president later confirmed the conversation with Trump, describing it as an “excellent call”.

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Washington has provided tens of billions of dollars worth of military and economic aid to Ukraine since it was invaded by Russia in February 2022, funding that Trump has repeatedly criticised and railed against with other Republican lawmakers.

The US president, Joe Biden, will host Trump for a traditional post-election meeting in the Oval Office on Wednesday, where the current US leader is expected to try to convince the president-elect not to withdraw support from Ukraine when he takes office.

The meeting will take place against the backdrop of reports that Russia, with support from North Korean soldiers, is planning a significant assault to drive Ukrainian forces out of its western Kursk region.

On Sunday, the New York Times reported that Moscow had assembled a force of 50,000 troops, including North Koreans, in the region bordering Ukraine for an attack. According to US intelligence, 10,000 North Korean soldiers have arrived in Russia, a figure that Ukraine’s military intelligence chief says includes 500 officers and three generals.

In August, Ukraine launched a surprise incursion into the Kursk region, capturing settlements within Russian territory in what was widely seen as a major embarrassment for Putin. However, Russia has gradually recaptured some of this territory and also made steady advances across much of eastern Ukraine.

The Guardian · by Pjotr Sauer · November 11, 2024

19. Taiwan considers big US defence purchases as overture to Donald Trump

Taiwan considers big US defence purchases as overture to Donald Trump

Taipei wants to show new administration it is serious about protecting itself against China

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · November 10, 2024

Taiwan is considering buying a big package of US weapons, including the Aegis destroyer, to show the incoming administration of Donald Trump that it is serious about boosting its own defences against China.

Several people familiar with the situation said Taipei would probably request the Lockheed Martin vessels and Northrop Grumman’s E-2D Advanced Hawkeye, an airborne radar system. It also wants more Patriot missiles and may request F-35 fighter jets, which would be controversial in Washington.

“Taiwan is thinking about a package to show that they are serious,” said one former Trump administration official.

“Assuming they follow through, they will go to the US national security adviser when they are named and present a very aggressive package of American hardware.”

The deliberations come as countries consider how to avoid becoming a target of the new administration given the emphasis Trump has put on the need for allies to spend more on defence.

Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon official and candidate for a top job in the Pentagon or on the National Security Council, has been vocal in urging Taiwan to spend more. “Those who care about Taiwan should be super clear they need to dramatically step up. Their fate hangs in the balance,” he recently wrote on social media platform X.

A senior Taiwanese national security official said there had been “informal discussions” with the Trump team about what kind of arms package would demonstrate Taiwan’s determination to invest in its own defence.

“There are quite a few big platforms and other items that our armed forces have had their eyes on for a long time but have not been able to acquire, so there’s a lot to choose from,” the official said.

A second Taiwanese official said Aegis would be near the top of the list. But officials and defence experts said there were other more expensive items Taiwan needs that would leave a bigger impression.

“If you are talking about a wish list, this is the time to ask for F-35s,” said Su Tzu-yun, a senior official at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, the Taiwanese defence ministry’s think-tank. He added that Taiwan would probably request retired Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Perry-class frigates.

“Taiwan’s instinct to invest more in its own defence is right and in the first Trump administration, historic arms sales packages were approved,” said Heino Klinck, a former senior Pentagon official in the first Trump term.

Klinck said there should be “minimal [spending] thresholds for partners facing an existential threat”. But he stressed the importance of prioritising critical capabilities, such as munitions, command and control, air and missile defence, and to enact defence reforms.

“Requesting F-35s would not make much sense operationally or fiscally,” Klinck said.

People familiar with the discussions said Taiwan could request as many as 60 F-35 fighters, four Advanced Hawkeyes, 10 retired warships and 400 Patriot missiles — a package that Su estimated would be worth more than $15bn.

Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the US-Taiwan Business Council, said there was a recognition in Washington that Taiwan had come a long way in defence spending but still had much more to do.

He pointed out that Colby had been “laser-focused” on the issue of Taiwanese defence spending and said a large package “could look like a down payment that would attempt to get off on the right foot with the new administration”.

Taiwanese officials said concerns about the risk of a second Trump administration were overblown.

“There is strong bipartisan backing for Taiwan, as you can see from the steady flow of legislation and resolutions aimed at bolstering support for Taiwan,” said the second official.

“The first Trump administration oversaw more frequent and higher-level visits and it unblocked arms sales to our country.”

During Trump’s first term, the US approved 11 packages to Taiwan worth $21bn, including F-16 fighter jets and Abrams tanks.

The Biden administration approved deals worth $7bn. It tried to force Taipei to allocate its limited defence budget differently and prioritise stockpiling munitions and other cheaper, mobile weapons suitable for attacking a superior invader over buying traditional big-ticket systems.

The Taiwanese package is being managed by two veteran US hands in vice-president Hsiao Bi-khim and Joseph Wu, the national security adviser.

Karen Kuo, spokesperson for President Lai Ching-te, would not confirm or deny if top officials were having discussions with the Trump team about a potential arms procurement proposal.

“Facing the ever increasing military threat from China in the Taiwan Strait and elsewhere in the region, Taiwan and other countries nearby are all continuing to strengthen their defences,” Kuo said.

The Trump transition team did not respond to a request for comment.

Financial Times · by Demetri Sevastopulo · November 10, 2024

​20. Chinese incursions soar 300%, US general says

​Excerpt:

From May to November last year, Chinese aircraft intruded into Taiwan’s ADIZ 335 times, Ministry of National Defense data showed.

Sun, Nov 10, 2024 page1

https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2024/11/10/2003826656

Chinese incursions soar 300%, US general says

PRESSURE CAMPAIGN: China’s bullying and aggressive behavior are to show not just to Taiwan but the world that Beijing can accomplish its goals, the general said

• By Lee I-chia / Staff reporter
• 
  
•  
•  
• China has increased its provocative incursions around Taiwan by 300 percent since May, US Commander of Pacific Air Forces General Kevin Schneider said in an interview published yesterday, adding that adversaries in the region could try to test the new administration of US president-elect Donald Trump.
• “Whether it’s coming into the air defense identification zone [ADIZ] or crossing the center line within the Taiwan Strait, since the inauguration [of president William Lai (賴清德)], we have seen a 300 percent increase in those air activities,” Schneider told NBC News.
• From May to November last year, Chinese aircraft intruded into Taiwan’s ADIZ 335 times, Ministry of National Defense data showed.
• 
  

US Air Force General Kevin Schneider is pictured in an undated photograph.

• Photo: screen grab from the US Pacific Air Force Facebook page
• In the same time frame this year, China intruded into that same airspace at least 1,085 times, more than three times as many as the previous year, NBC News reported.
• The difference was more pronounced in the summer — 50 Chinese aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ in July last year, while 210 entered it in July this year, more than four times as many, it said.
• The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force has maintained the increased activity level since Lai was sworn in on May 20, Schneider said.
• Liu Pengyu (劉鵬宇), a spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington, was quoted by NBC News as saying that the flights are fully consistent with international law and common practices, adding that “the PLA’s relevant drills are a necessary and legitimate move to crack down on ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.”
• Schneider said the biggest challenge he faces comes from Beijing, which is building a massive rocket force, air force, submarine force and cyberforce, which it uses to intimidate other nations in the region.
• “It’s the behaviors that have gone along with that. It’s the bullying, the aggressiveness,” Schneider said.
• “My assessment is it’s a pressurization campaign designed to win without fighting, and I think just to continue to impose costs, physical or otherwise, to present a fait accompli to the world,” he said. “Not just to Taiwan, but to the world that Beijing can accomplish their objectives, and they continue to ramp up their activities, military activities, in conjunction with diplomatic activities, informational activities, economic activities, to win without fighting.”
• US intelligence officials have said that 2027 could be an inflection point for a cross-strait conflict, which would come during Trump’s second term in office, but the returning president has not committed to defending Taiwan during a Chinese invasion, NBC News reported.
• It quoted Schneider as saying that 2027 as the year for possible action by Beijing is still uncertain, but added that China’s behavior has grown more aggressive and it is operating farther away from China.
• Learning from how the US has operated in the Middle East, Beijing aims to push the US out of the region, while bolstering its military capabilities, the general said.
• “We had the ability to take our time, to bring our forces into the theater, to build up large bases, to build up our capability and then at the time of our choosing, when we had the advantages of mass in place, were able to determine when we would go to conduct our operations,” he said. “I assess that Beijing has recognized that, and now they are building this capability to prevent us from ever being able to do that and replicating it.”
• Adversaries in the region could try to test the new Trump administration in its early days, and opportunist “actors in the region may seek to challenge a new administration,” he said.
• “It’s something that we on the military side are ready for, and we continue to provide options back to our national leadership,” he said.
• Ultimately, the US is still focused on effective deterrence to prevent conflict in the region, Schneider said.
• “And if that peace, stability and security is unilaterally upended by anyone in the region, then we will react, and we will react with a network of allies and partners that is incredibly capable,” he added.

21. China maps out baseline claims over a contested South China Sea shoal with the Philippines

​The West Philippine Sea.

That will not be on Chinese maps and charts.

China maps out baseline claims over a contested South China Sea shoal with the Philippines | CNN

CNN · by Story by AP · November 11, 2024

A Chinese coast guard vessel stays beside suspected Chinese militia ships near Thitu island, locally called Pag-asa Island on November 6, 2024 ahead of a Philippine military multi-service joint exercise at the disputed South China Sea, Philippines.

Aaron Favila/AP

China has published baselines for a contested shoal in the South China Sea it had seized from the Philippines, a move that’s likely to increase tensions over overlapping territorial claims.

The Foreign Ministry on Sunday posted online geographic coordinates for the baselines around Scarborough Shoal. A nation’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone are typically defined as the distance from the baselines.

Both China and the Philippines claim Scarborough Shoal and other outcroppings in the South China Sea. China seized the shoal, which lies west of the main Philippine island of Luzon, in 2012 and has since restricted access to Filipino fishermen there. A 2016 ruling by an international arbitration court found that most Chinese claims in the South China Sea were invalid but Beijing refuses to abide by it.

Ships from China and the Philippines have collided several times as part of increased confrontations, and the Chinese coast guard has blasted Philippine vessels with water cannons.

China’s move came two days after Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed two laws demarcating the government’s claims in the disputed waters.

A Chinese Foreign Ministry statement said that the delimiting of the baselines was in accordance with a United Nations agreement and Chinese law.

“This is a natural step by the Chinese government to lawfully strengthen marine management and is consistent with international law and common practices,” it said.

The statement added that one of the laws signed by Marcos, the Philippine Maritime Zones Act, violates China’s sovereignty in the South China Sea.

This photo taken on February 15, 2024, shows an aerial view of over Scarborough Shoal in the disputed South China Sea.

Jam Sta Rosa/AFP/Getty Images

“China firmly opposes it and will continue to do everything necessary in accordance with law to firmly defend its territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” the Foreign Ministry said.

China stakes claim to almost the entirety of the South China Sea. It has a series of disputes with several Southeast Asian nations including the Philippines and Vietnam over territory in the waters, which are part of a key shipping route in Asia.

CNN · by Story by AP · November 11, 2024

22. Location tracking of phones is out of control. Here’s how to fight back.

Location tracking of phones is out of control. Here’s how to fight back.

Ars Technica · October 23, 2024

I KNOW WHAT YOU DID LAST SUMMER

Unique IDs assigned to Android and iOS devices threaten your privacy. Who knew?

Dan Goodin – Oct 23, 2024 7:03 pm | 203

Credit: Getty Images

Credit: Getty Images

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You likely have never heard of Babel Street or Location X, but chances are good that they know a lot about you and anyone else you know who keeps a phone nearby around the clock.

Reston, Virginia-located Babel Street is the little-known firm behind Location X, a service with the capability to track the locations of hundreds of millions of phone users over sustained periods of time. Ostensibly, Babel Street limits the use of the service to personnel and contractors of US government law enforcement agencies, including state entities. Despite the restriction, an individual working on behalf of a company that helps people remove their personal information from consumer data broker databases recently was able to obtain a two-week free trial by (truthfully) telling Babel Street he was considering performing contracting work for a government agency in the future.

Tracking locations at scale

KrebsOnSecurity, one of five news outlets that obtained access to the data produced during the trial, said that one capability of Location X is the ability to draw a line between two states or other locations—or a shape around a building, street block, or entire city—and see a historical record of Internet-connected devices that traversed those boundaries.

Reporter Brian Krebs said that the data included nearly 100,000 hits for the phone of a New Jersey police officer who recently became the victim of an intense doxxing campaign that subjected her and her family to dozens of death threats from people who knew her home address and the phone numbers of both her and her husband. The campaign included masked people in cars driving outside the family’s home.

The data seen by the person using the two-week trial provided a detailed and intimate picture of the officer over several months. There’s no indication that the people stalking and harassing the family used Location X, but there’s little doubt the service could have allowed them to determine the officer’s phone number and residence location.

404 Media, another outlet given access to the data, reported that the trove allowed a reporter to zoom in on the parking lot of an abortion clinic in Florida and observe more than 700 red dots, each representing a phone that had recently visited the clinic. Location X then allowed the reporter to trace the movements of one specific device.

That device—and by extension, the person carrying it—began the journey in mid-June from a residence in Alabama. The person passed by a Lowe’s Home Improvement store, drove on a highway, visited a church, crossed into Florida, and finally stopped at the clinic where the phone indicates the person stayed for two hours before leaving and returning to Alabama. The data tracked the phone as having visited the clinic only once.

The technology making this vast data collection possible is, of course, tracking mechanisms built into Android and iOS and the apps that run on those operating systems. By default, Android assigns a unique ad ID to each device and makes it available to any app that has location permissions. iOS, by contrast, keeps its “Identifier for Advertisers” tracker private, but gives each installed app the opportunity to request access to it.

Some apps are given permission to access a phone's location and then sell the device's location to consumer data brokers. The data can also be made available through the web ad ecosystem. While an ad-supported page loads, the advertising network holds an auction in real time to sell a personalized ad to the highest bidder. A key piece of information bidders use to set a price is—you guessed it—the location of the device running the browser. Advertisers generate additional revenue by selling that history to the likes of Location X provider Babel Street.

Fighting back

There are multiple settings that phone users must choose to close off the constant leaking of their locations. For users of either Android or iOS, the first step is to audit which apps currently have permission to access the device location. This can be done on Android by accessing Settings > Location > App location permissions and, on iOS, Settings > Privacy & Security > Location Services.

Both operating systems will display a list of apps and whether they are permitted access always, never, only while the app is in use, or to prompt for permission each time. Both also allow users to choose whether the app sees precise locations down to a few feet or only a coarse-grained location.

For most users, there’s usefulness in allowing an app for photos, transit, or maps to access a user’s precise location. For other classes of apps—say those for Internet jukeboxes at bars and restaurants—it can be helpful for them to have an approximate location, but giving them precise, fine-grained access is likely overkill. And for other apps, there’s no reason for them ever to know the device's location. With a few exceptions, there’s little reason for apps to always have location access.

Not surprisingly, Android users who want to block intrusive location gathering have more settings to change than iOS users. The first thing to do is access Settings > Security & Privacy > Ads and choose “Delete advertising ID.” Then, promptly ignore the long, scary warning Google provides and hit the button confirming the decision at the bottom. If you don’t see that setting, good for you. It means you already deleted it. Google provides documentation here.

iOS, by default, doesn’t give apps access to “Identifier for Advertisers,” Apple’s version of the unique tracking number assigned to iPhones, iPads, and AppleTVs. Apps, however, can display a window asking that the setting be turned on, so it’s useful to check. iPhone users can do this by accessing Settings > Privacy & Security > Tracking. Any apps with permission to access the unique ID will appear. While there, users should also turn off the “Allow Apps to Request to Track” button. While in iOS Privacy & Security, users should navigate to Apple Advertising and ensure Personalized Ads is turned off.

Additional coverage of Location X from Haaretz and NOTUS is here and here. The New York Times, the other publication given access to the data, hadn't posted an article at the time this Ars post went live.

Dan Goodin Senior Security Editor

Dan Goodin Senior Security Editor

Dan Goodin is Senior Security Editor at Ars Technica, where he oversees coverage of malware, computer espionage, botnets, hardware hacking, encryption, and passwords. In his spare time, he enjoys gardening, cooking, and following the independent music scene. Dan is based in San Francisco. Follow him at @dangoodin on Mastodon. Contact him on Signal at DanArs.82.

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Ars Technica · October 23, 2024

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com