Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

Excerpts From President Reagan’s second NSS:

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE NUMBER 238

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

September 2, 1986

(Copy 1 of 11, Declassified from TS on 10/27/2005)

https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf

Grand Strategy

The grand strategy of the United States is to avoid nuclear war while preventing a single hostile power or coalition of powers from dominating the Eurasian land-mass or other strategic regions from which threats to U.S. interests might arise. The success of this strategy is dependent on the maintenance of a strong nuclear deterrent, dynamic alliances, and a Western-oriented world economy. It is also dependent on the U.S. ability to wage successfully a competition for influence among less developed countries, the ability to influence events beyond our direct control, and ultimately, the ability to project military power abroad in defense of U.S. interests. The strength of this grand strategy is founded upon the convergence of interests between the U.S. and the community of nations as a whole. The national independence and individual freedoms we seek to uphold are in harmony with the general desires and ideals common to all mankind. The U.S. must therefore remain the natural enemy of any country threatening the independence of others, and the proponent of free trade, commerce, and economic stability.

This grand strategy requires the development and integration of a set of strategies to achieve our national objectives, including political, diplomatic, military, informational, economic, intelligence, and arms control components. These strategies are necessarily shaped by our values and our vision of the future; the national and international policy objectives we have set for ourselves; by dynamic trends in the global economy and the military balance; and by the demands of our geographical position. Such strategies must also take into account the capabilities and intentions of those hostile countries or coalitions which threaten to undermine the achievement of U.S. policy objectives.

Threats to U.S. National Security

…

One of the most challenging issues confronting the United States and its allies is the dedicated effort of the Soviet Union and others to subvert democratic processes and interests by whatever means. Western interests on all continents are threatened by direct and indirect actions on the part of the Soviet Union and its allies to undermine and take over other governments. They undertake this through destabilization and subversion, support of insurgencies, coups, infiltration and domination of local security and military services, use of propaganda and agents of influence, and other methods.

…

The underlying competition between the United States and the Soviet Union is in the realm of ideas and values, and in our contrasting visions of the future and the conditions for peace. Our way of life, founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual, depends on a stable and pluralistic world order within which freedom and democratic institutions can thrive. Yet, the greatest threat to the Soviet system, in which the State controls the destiny of the individual, is the concept of freedom itself. The survival of the Soviet system depends to a significant extent upon the persistent and exaggerated representation of foreign threats, through which it seeks to justify both the subjugation of its own people and the expansion of Soviet military capabilities well beyond those required for self-defense.

(Change Soviet Union/USSR to China/PRC (add Russia, Iran, and north Korea) and cut and paste for the 21^st century.)

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 11 (Putin's War)

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (11.11.22) CDS comments on key events

3. The Fight for the Future of Republican Foreign Policy

4. Biden pledges US will work with Southeast Asian nations

5. FACT SHEET: President Biden and ASEAN Leaders Launch the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

6. ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Statement on the Establishment of the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

7. Musk’s Twitter takeover comes as the CCP steps up its targeting of smart Asian women

8. With Biden and Xi to meet, China warns U.S. on Taiwan briefing

9. What China’s new military leadership line-up says about Xi’s plans for Taiwan

10. Ukraine works to stabilize Kherson after Russian pullout

11. Russia spreads fake news about infected donor blood for Ukrainian army from NATO

12. Biden Says Wants To End 'Political Warfare' With Republicans

13. Future Wars: The Way Forward

14. Biden’s Chance with China

15. The Supreme Court Targets Military Readiness

1. RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 11 (Putin's War)

Maps/graphics: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-11

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces are completing the liberation of the western (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian troops have made major territorial gains throughout Kherson Oblast on November 11 and will continue consolidating control of the western bank in the coming days.
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD’s statements about the Russian withdrawal to the left bank but generally took a more muted attitude to Ukrainian gains.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations towards Kreminna and Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, and Ukrainian forces targeted Russian logistics in rear Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued ground assaults around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.
Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian force concentrations in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Wagner Group financer Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to form parallel military structures in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts, even though there is no threat of a Ukrainian ground invasion into Russian territory.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) subpar conduct of partial mobilization continues to generate social tension.
Ukrainian partisans continued to target Russian occupation authorities.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 11

Nov 11, 2022 - Press ISW

understandingwar.org

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11

Karolina Hird, Grace Mappes, Riley Bailey, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 11, 6pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Ukrainian forces are completing the liberation of the western (right) bank of Kherson Oblast after the Russians retreated from it. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces completed the withdrawal to the eastern (left) bank of the Dnipro River at 5am local time on November 11.[1] While contingents of Russian soldiers likely remain on the west bank, they are likely scattered throughout the Oblast and attempting to retreat as Ukrainian forces push towards the Dnipro River, although some may have remained behind to attempt to conduct partisan activities in small groups. It is unclear how many Russian soldiers remain on the west bank at this time. Russian sources noted that the withdrawal lasted three days and claimed that 20,000 Russian personnel and 3,500 units of military equipment moved across the Dnipro River.[2]

Satellite imagery corroborates statements made by both Ukrainian and Russian sources that Russian troops destroyed the Antonivsky Bridge and Railway Bridge (near Kherson City) and the Nova Kakhovka dam bridge (east of Kherson City near Nova Kakhovka) over the Dnipro River and the Darivka Bridge (northeast of Kherson City) over the Inhulets River in a final attempt to block Ukrainian advances towards central Kherson Oblast (see images in-line with text).[3] Geolocated satellite imagery also indicates that Russian troops have prepared first and second lines of defense south of the Dnipro River and will likely continue efforts to consolidate positions on the left bank in the coming days.[4]

Ukrainian troops made major territorial gains throughout Kherson Oblast on November 11 and will continue consolidating control of the western bank in the coming days. Geolocated footage and imagery shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced into Kherson City likely along the T1501 highway from the west and M14 from the north and have taken control of Kherson City and several surrounding settlements along these roads.[5] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) notably confirmed that Ukrainian troops advanced into Kherson City, and geolocated social media footage shows civilians greeting Ukrainian troops in the center of Kherson City.[6] Ukrainian troops also notably took control of Kyselivka and Chornobaivka, two critical settlements along the M14 northwest of Kherson City.[7] Geolocated social media additionally shows that Ukrainian troops have advanced south along T1505 highway from positions in Snihurivka (northeast of the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border) and liberated several settlements on this line, including Lymanets and Inhulets.[8] Ukrainian forces entered Beryslav (60km east of Kherson City), and social media footage provides evidence of Ukrainian troops in settlements along the P47 highway that runs westward from the Beryslav area towards Kherson City.[9] Footage posted to Telegram notably shows Ukrainian troops in Tiahynka, a settlement between Kherson City and Beryslav, directly on the western shore of the Dnipro River.[10] Ukrainian forces will continue to drive down major roads towards the Dnipro River and liberate additional settlements in the coming days.

ISW has recoded all western Kherson Oblast as liberated based on our high confidence assessment that the Russians have deprived themselves of the ability to hold terrain on the right bank of the Dnipro. Ukrainian forces will complete the liberation of any areas not yet under their control rapidly.

Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD’s statements about the Russian withdrawal to the left bank but generally took a more muted attitude to Ukrainian gains on November 11. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces did not leave a single piece of equipment behind during the withdrawal period, which certain milbloggers directly refuted as blatantly untrue.[11] Many milbloggers, however, presented a relatively matter-of-fact overview of the situation in Kherson Oblast, largely confirmed Ukrainian gains, and emphasized that the retreat itself was a militarily-sound and necessary choice.[12] As ISW previously reported, Russian military leadership, namely Commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin, have been developing informational cover to set conditions for the loss of the right bank.[13] The generally muted milblogger response to such a massive Russian defeat is consistent with ISW’s previous observations of informational mitigations carried out by Surovikin and suggests that milbloggers will continue to focus their discontent on the Russian MoD establishment while backing Surovikin — at least for now.

Key Takeaways

Ukrainian forces are completing the liberation of the western (right) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
Ukrainian troops have made major territorial gains throughout Kherson Oblast on November 11 and will continue consolidating control of the western bank in the coming days.
Russian milbloggers criticized the Russian MoD’s statements about the Russian withdrawal to the left bank but generally took a more muted attitude to Ukrainian gains.
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations towards Kreminna and Svatove, Luhansk Oblast, and Ukrainian forces targeted Russian logistics in rear Luhansk Oblast.
Russian forces continued ground assaults around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.
Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian force concentrations in Zaporizhia Oblast.
Wagner Group financer Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to form parallel military structures in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts, even though there is no threat of a Ukrainian ground invasion into Russian territory.
The Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) subpar conduct of partial mobilization continues to generate social tension.
Ukrainian partisans continued to target Russian occupation authorities.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because those activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn these Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict, Geneva Conventions, and humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Ukrainian Counteroffensives—Southern and Eastern Ukraine
Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and two supporting efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort—Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Activities in Russian-occupied Areas

Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)

Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the direction of Kreminna and Svatove on November 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults within 28km northwest of Svatove near Yahidne, Kyslivka, and Volodymyrivka in Kharkiv Oblast.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults on Russian strongholds in Kuzemivka (13km northeast of Svatove) and rotated personnel on the Pishchane-Stelmakhivka line.[15] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces within 17km northwest of Kreminna near Chervonopopivka and Ploshchanka.[16] A video posted on November 11 shows a Russian servicemember claiming that Ukrainian forces are amassing in Chervonopopivka, however.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 11 that Russian forces fired on Ukrainian forces rotating personnel into the Nevske-Terny area west of Kreminna.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 15km northwest of Svatove near Novoselivske and Miasozharivka, 22km northwest of Kreminna near Makiivka, and 12km south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[19] The Luhansk Oblast Administration reported that heavy fighting is occurring in areas near Lysychansk.[20] Russian forces conducted counterattacks in eastern Kharkiv and western Luhansk oblasts likely intending to constrain the actions of Ukrainian forces instead of regaining limited territory.

Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian logistics in Luhansk Oblast on November 11. The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) People’s Militia claimed on November 11 that Ukrainian forces struck Kadiivka, Artemivsk, Krinichne, Svatove, and Lysychansk with 18 HIMARS rockets.[21] A BARS-13 (Russian combat reserve) representative amplified a claim from an LNR People’s Militia officer stating that Ukrainian forces intensified shelling on industrial enterprises in Luhansk Oblast, including a coal mine in Krinichne, a construction company in Kadiivka, and a concrete plant in Svatove.[22]

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)

See topline text.

Russian Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and Avdiivka on November 11. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults near Soledar, Bakhmut, and south of Bakhmut near Andriivka.[23] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast of Bakhmut, near Bakhmutske and Yakolivka, and south of Bakhmut near Kurdiumivka.[24] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian counterattack south of Bakhmut towards Zaitseve and Odradivka.[25] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks north of Avdiivka near Krasnohorivka, west of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske, south of Avdiivka near Opytne and Marinka, and southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske.[26] A Russian source claimed that Donetsk People‘s Republic (DNR) forces captured Opytne.[27] A Russian source posted footage of DNR forces attacking Ukrainian defensive positions near Avdiivka.[28]

Russian sources claimed that Russian forces seized Pavlivka in western Donetsk Oblast on November 11 amid reports of continued fighting. Geolocated footage shows Russian forces raising a flag in the southeast corner of the village.[29] However, poor weather conditions and heavy losses likely have and will continue to hinder Russian territorial advances near Vuhledar, as ISW has previously assessed.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Pavlivka and continued routine shelling in the surrounding area.[31] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions northeast of Vuhledar near Novomykhailivka.[32]

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks west of Hulyaipole and continued routine artillery fire along the front line and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on November 11.[33] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck the cities of Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv with S-300 missiles.[34] Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russian forces continued routine artillery fire against Nikopol and Marhanets on the north bank of the Dnipro River.[35] Russian sources expressed continued concern about a Ukrainian counteroffensive along the Zaporizhia Oblast front line in the coming weeks.[36]

Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian force concentrations in rear areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 11 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian control post in the Enerhodar area, killing over 50 and wounding over 40 Russian military personnel.[37] The General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Russian Ka-52 helicopter in the area.[38]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Wagner Group financer Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to form parallel military structures in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts, even though there is no threat of a Ukrainian ground invasion into Russian territory. Prigozhin-affiliated Russian outlet RIAFAN published a video on November 11 showing Wagner-affiliated instructors training residents in Belgorod Oblast how to use weapons and tactical medicine supplies.[39] Russian sources claimed that Wagner-affiliated instructors are also conducting similar classes in Kursk Oblast.[40] Prigozhin confirmed on November 6 that the Wagner Group planned to open centers for people’s militias in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts that will function outside of the Russian Armed Forces.[41] Prigozhin responded to claims that it is too early to build border fortifications and establish people’s militias on November 11 by stating that Russia “must be fully prepared to protect [its] land.”[42] Prigozhin also stated that “no one has the right to decide who can defend their homeland,” a likely rebuke to regional authorities in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts that have opposed Prigozhin’s activities.[43] ISW has previously assessed that Prigozhin’s pursuit of parallel military structures in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts is part of an effort to raise Prigozhin’s stature and power and not a part of the overall Russian campaign in Ukraine.[44] Prigozhin will likely continue to absurdly claim that efforts to establish parallel military structures in Belgorod and Kursk oblasts are necessary to protect against the non-existent threat of a Ukrainian invasion of Russian territory. Prigozhin will also likely continue to pursue the formation of parallel military structures more broadly to expand his own influence and standing in Russian political circles and to develop his own private army.

Russian political officials are likely serving in Russian formations in Ukraine for self-promotion. A Russian milblogger claimed on November 11 that United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak met with State Duma deputies who are currently fighting in the new BARS (Russian combat reserve) division “Kaskad” in eastern Ukraine.[45] The milblogger claimed that the State Duma deputies volunteered to serve in the division during partial mobilization.[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed that former Roscosmos head Dmitry Rogozin announced that he created a military inspection group that will provide technical military support to Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR, LNR) units.[47] These and other Russian political officials likely view participation in the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine as a means for increasing their political standing within Russia.

Russian officials continued to pursue the formation of volunteer battalions as of November 11. The Republic of Chechnya head, Ramzan Kadyrov, claimed on November 11 that another group of Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz forces deployed to eastern Ukraine.[48] Ultranationalist milblogger Igor Girkin amplified a call for volunteers for his volunteer detachment serving in Ukraine on November 11.[49] Girkin stated that volunteers will have six-month contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense but then contradicted himself and stated that service would last until the end of the war in Ukraine.[50] Russian officials will continue to pursue an extremely ad-hoc approach to the formation of volunteer battalions, one that may divert resources away from the Russian MoD’s autumn conscription cycle and other ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts.

The Russian military’s subpar conduct of partial mobilization continues to generate social tension as of November 11. Russian outlet Sirena reported that wives of mobilized personnel from Kursk oblast appealed to authorities to return their husbands after outrage over poor conditions.[51] Sirena reported that Russian military officials sent some of the personnel home and that the wives of the remaining mobilized personnel plan to travel to Moscow and demand an audience with the Russian MoD.[52] Russian outlet Astra reported on November 11 that relatives of mobilized men detained in Zaitseve, Luhansk Oblast for refusing to fight arrived at the settlement in Ukraine and appealed to Russian servicemembers to see their detained relatives.[53] A Russian source reported on November 11 that the relatives of mobilized personnel from Belgorod Oblast voiced complaints on social media that payments were substantially less than what Russian officials had promised.[54] Social tensions will likely persist and grow as Russian officials fail to meet the financial promises they made during partial mobilization and as mobilized personnel continue to suffer significant losses at frontline positions in Ukraine.

Russian officials continued to acknowledge on November 11 that the Russian military faces significant supply issues. Amur Oblast Governor Vasily Orlov acknowledged that units of the Russian Armed Forces have lacked necessary provisions from the very start of the war in Ukraine, but that regional authorities concealed the issues so that “enemies” would not use the knowledge to present the Russian military as being in a “great tragedy.”[55] Russian officials will likely continue to publicly acknowledge the substantial supply issues faced by the Russia military as the Russian military encounters more setbacks in Ukraine.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied and annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian civilians into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Ukrainian partisans continued to target Russian occupation authorities on November 11. Russian and Ukrainian authorities stated that unspecified actors, likely referring to Ukrainian partisans, attempted to assassinate Zaporizhia Oblast occupation Deputy Minister for Culture, Sports, and Tourism Andriy Boyk with an improved explosive device at Boyk’s residence in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[56] Boyk only sustained minor injuries.[57] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast head, Serhiy Haidai, stated that Ukrainian partisans set fire to an occupation headquarters in Artyema, Luhansk Oblast.[58]

Russia and Ukraine conducted another one-for-one prisoner-of-war (POW) exchange on November 11. The Ukrainian Ministry for Reintegration reported that 45 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine after exchanging 45 Russian POWs on November 11.[59] Russian sources criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for failing to announce the POW exchange and allowing Russians to learn of the exchange from Ukrainian officials.[60] The Russian MoD has an established pattern of downplaying or failing to announce POW exchanges that may anger the Russian nationalist and milblogger information spaces, as ISW has previously reported.[61]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

[36] https://t.me/vrogov/6027; https://ria dot ru/20221111/svo-1830648174.html; https://t.me/epoddubny/13616; https://t.me/s/vladlentatarsky

[55] https://t dot me/sotaproject/49443

[56] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/42592; https://sprotyv dot mod.gov.ua/2022/11/11/v-melitopoli-progrymiv-vybuh-v-budynku-kolaboranta/; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/843; https://t.me/BalitskyEV/480; ...

[59] https://minre dot gov.ua/news/dodomu-z-vorozhogo-polonu-povernuly-45-oboronciv; https://t.me/ermaka2022/1604; https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/1591078078012432386?s=20&t=G4k9iNt...

understandingwar.org

2. Ukraine: CDS Daily brief (11.11.22) CDS comments on key events

CDS Daily brief (11.11.22) CDS comments on key events

Humanitarian aspect:

As of November 11, as a result of the full-scale armed aggression of the Russian Federation, 430 Ukrainian children were killed, and 829 were injured, reported the Prosecutor General's Office with reference to data from juvenile prosecutors.

Over the past day, November 10, due to Russian armed aggression against Ukraine, 14 civilians were killed, and 15 more were injured, according to data from Oblasts' military administrations, published by the deputy head of the Office of the President, Kyrylo Tymoshenko.

In Kharkiv and Kherson Oblasts, civilians were blown up on the Russian explosive devices; among the injured were four children, according to Tymoshenko.

As of 9 a.m. this morning, Oblast Military Administrations reported that the Russian army struck eight Oblasts of Ukraine over the past 24 hours.

Consequences of enemy shelling on the morning of November 11:

• At night, the enemy shelled a residential quarter in Mykolaiv. One of the rockets hit the 5-storey residential building. Preliminary, 7 killed and 2 wounded civilians were reported. The Russian occupiers also shelled the Mykolaiv and Bashtan districts of Mykolayiv Oblast.

• The enemy hit one of the critical infrastructure facilities in Vinnytsia Oblast. No victims.

• On November 10, the Zaporizhzhia, Vasylivka and Polohy districts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast were under fire. 13 reports were received about the destruction of residential houses (apartments) and infrastructure facilities.

• In Kharkiv Oblast over the past day, the enemy shelled towns and villages of the Kharkiv, Chuhuyiv and Kupyansk districts with mortars, jet and barrel artillery (1 wounded reported).

• On November 10, 2 civilians were killed by enemy shelling in Bakhmut and Avdiivka of Donetsk Oblast. 5 more were wounded.

• At night, the Russians shelled the Nikopol district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. No victims were reported. The college and housing were damaged.

Today, after another exchange, 45 Ukrainian defenders returned from Russian captivity. Since the beginning of the Russian Federation's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, 1,183 Ukrainians have returned home. Also, Ukraine returned the bodies of two fallen heroes, stated Andriy Yermak, head of the President's Office.

Power outages and critical infrastructure:

Because the Russian occupiers again hit energy facilities in Ukraine, particularly in Vinnytsia Oblast, emergency outages were applied in Kyiv on the morning of November 11, said Serhiy Kovalenko, CEO of the Yasno company. In the Chernihiv region, emergency power outages outside the scheduled ones are also possible, which means for more than 4 hours.

Occupied and liberated territories:

Kherson returned to the control of Ukraine, and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine entered the city. The only chance to avoid death for Russian servicemen is immediate surrender, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine announced on its official Facebook account.

In the center of Kherson, on Freedom Square, patriots raised the Ukrainian flag. The Ukrainian flag has also returned to the National Police Headquarters in Kherson. Multiple videos of people taking to the streets with Ukrainian flags and greeting Ukrainian defenders are spreading on social networks. Kherson residents gathered in the city center, on Freedom Square, where protests against the Russian invaders took place during the occupation. They unfurled a huge flag of Ukraine, which they brought to protest actions against the military of the Russian Federation at the beginning of the occupation.

However, Kherson's humanitarian situation remains challenging, particularly with fuel, bread, electricity and communication, said Kherson Regional Council deputy Serhii Khlan at a briefing at the Ukraine-Ukrinform Media Center. He also noted that "many Russians [military] could not cross the Dnipro; they changed [in civilian] clothes and are hiding in the city."

Natalia Humenyuk, head of the joint press center of Operational Command "South", warned that "the fortifications of the Russians on the left bank are quite close to the territories they left behind. There may be powerful mass shelling." Yaroslav Yanushevich, head of Kherson Oblast Military Administration, urged local residents not to rush to return.

The bodies of three civilians were found in the liberated village of Berislav district in Kherson Oblast. "During the initial examination, bodily injuries in the form of fractures of the bones of the skull were revealed," the Kherson Regional Prosecutor's Office reports.

The Russian invaders take away the property of music and art schools from the temporarily captured Melitopol, the [legally-elected Ukrainian] mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov, stated on the telethon. "Just a few years ago, we opened [the schools] after reconstruction. And now furniture, equipment, LED screens - all of it [Russians] have started to take away," Fedorov noted. He reported in Telegram that the invaders appropriated everything in the city and region - from state institutions and communal property to private cars and housing. Only in the last two weeks, they handed over the "Stone Tomb" museum complex to the administration of the Russian Federation and decided to "nationalize" 47 healthcare facilities.

Operational situation

(Please note that this section of the Brief is mainly on the previous day's (November 10) developments)

It is the 261st day of the strategic air-ground offensive operation of the Russian Armed Forces against Ukraine (in the official terminology of the Russian Federation – "operation to protect Donbas"). The enemy tries to maintain control over the temporarily captured territories,

concentrates efforts on restraining the actions of the Defense Forces, continues the equipment of defensive lines on the left bank of the Dnipro River, and conducts the offensive actions in the Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Novopavlivka directions.

The enemy shelled populated areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Near the state border, Gremyach in the Chernihiv Oblast was shelled from mortars, and Strilecha, Ternova, Starytsia, Ohirtseve, Vovchansk and Kolodyazne in the Kharkiv Oblast was shelled from mortars, rocket and barrel artillery.

The Republic of Belarus continues to support the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, providing it with infrastructure, territory and airspace. The formation of a Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops on the territory of the Republic of Belarus continues.

In order to replenish the current losses and strengthen the enemy grouping in the Kherson direction, the Russian military searched and detained personnel who retreated from the Kharkiv direction in the temporarily occupied territory of the Donetsk Oblast. Typically, these groups are deployed without warm clothes, equipment, means of protection, and weapons; they are promised to be provided directly in the area of hostilities.

The training of personnel mobilized in the Russian military educational institutions continues. This category of personnel is expected to be deployed from Smolensk in the second decade of November. This group was trained at the Air Defense Academy of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

During the past day, the aviation of the Defense Forces struck the enemy 8 times. As a result, 7 areas of concentration of enemy personnel, weapons and military equipment, as well as the position of the enemy's air defense equipment, were affected.

Additionally, Ukrainian missile forces and artillery units hit the enemy command post, 8 areas of concentration of manpower, weapons and military equipment, 2 ammunition depots, 5 air defense systems and other important military targets.

The morale and psychological state of the personnel of the invasion forces remain low. Kharkiv direction

• Topoli - Siversk section: approximate length of combat line - 154 km, number of BTGs of the RF

Armed Forces - 23-28, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 5.5 km;

• Deployed enemy BTGs: 26th, 153rd, and 197th tank regiments (TR), 245th motorized rifle regiment (MRR) of the 47th tank division (TD), 6th and 239th TRs, 228th MRR of the 90th TD, 25th and 138th separate motorized rifle brigades (SMRBr) of the 6th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 27th SMRBr of the 1st Tank Army, 252nd and 752nd MRRs of the 3rd MRD, 1st, 13th, and 12th TRs, 423rd MRR of the 4th TD, 201st military base, 15th, 21st, 30th SMRBrs of the 2nd CA Army, 35th, 55th and 74th SMRBrs of the 41st CA Army, 275th and 280th MRRs, 11th TR of the 18th MRD of the 11 Army Corps (AC), 7th MRR of the 11th AC, 80th SMRBr of the 14th AC, 2nd and 45th

separate SOF brigades of the Airborne Forces, 3rd and 14th separate SOF brigades, military units of the 1st AC of so-called DPR, 2nd and 4th SMRBrs of the 2nd AC, PMC

The enemy shelled the positions of the Defense Forces in the areas of Kislivka, Tabaivka, Berestove, Lisna Stinka, Stelmakhivka, Myasozharivka, Makiivka, Nevske, Yampolivka and Lyman.

Donetsk direction

● Siversk - Maryinka section: approximate length of the combat line - 144 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 13-15, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 9.6 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 68th and 163rd tank regiments (TR), 102nd and 103rd motorized rifle regiments of the 150 motorized rifle division, 80th TR of the 90th tank division, 35th, 55th, and 74th separate motorized rifle brigades of the 41st Combined Arms Army, 51st and 137th parachute airborne regiment of the 106 airborne division, 31st separate airborne assault brigade, 61st separate marines brigade of the Joint Strategic Command "Northern Fleet," 336th separate marines brigade of Baltic Fleet, 24th separate SOF brigade, 1st, 3rd, 5th, 15th, and 100th separate motorized rifle brigades, 9th and 11th separate motorized rifle regiment of the 1st Army Corps of the so-called DPR, 6th motorized rifle regiment of the 2nd Army Corps of the so-called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy shelled from tanks and artillery the areas of Rozdolivka, Yakovlivka, Soledar, Bakhmutske, Bakhmut, Opytne, Kurdyumivka, Toretsk, New York, Mayorsk, Avdiivka, Opytne, Vodyane, Pervomaiske, Nevelske, Maryinka, Paraskoviivka, and Novomykhailivka.

The forces of the 10th separate mountain assault brigade repelled the enemy in Yakovlivka.

The advanced enemy units entered the southern outskirts of Pavlivka, but as of yesterday, they did not manage to gain a foothold.

Zaporizhzhia direction

● Maryinka – Vasylivka section: approximate length of the line of combat - 200 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 17, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 11.7 km;

● Deployed BTGs: 36th separate motorized rifle brigade (SMRBr) of the 29th Combined Arms (CA) Army, 38th and 64th SMRBrs, 69th separate cover brigade of the 35th CA Army, 5th separate tank brigade, 37th of the 36th CA Army, 135th, 429th, 503rd and 693rd motorized rifle regiments (MRR) of the 19th motorized rifle division (MRD) of the 58th CA Army, 70th, 71st and 291st MRRs of the 42nd MRD of the 58th CA Army, 136th SMRB of the 58 CA Army, 46th and 49th machine gun artillery regiments of the 18th machine gun artillery division of the 68th Army Corps (AC), 39th SMRB of the 68th AC, 83th separate airborne assault brigade, 40th and 155th separate marines brigades, 22nd separate SOF brigade, 1st AC of the so-called DPR, and 2nd AC of the so- called LPR, PMCs.

The enemy shelled the Defence Forces' positions near Vuhledar, Pavlivka, Novosilka, Neskuchne, Novopil, Temyrivka, Olhivske, Uspenivka, Chervone, Hulyaipole, Zaliznychne, Hulyaipilske, Charivne, Orihiv and Stepove.

The Russian forces are increasing the fortification of positions in the temporarily occupied territory of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast to prevent the advance of the Defense Forces units. In order to speed up the pace of engineering work, the Russian occupiers are trying to involve the local civilian population.

Tavriysk direction

• Vasylivka – Sofiivka section: approximate length of the battle line – 296 km, the number of BTGs of the RF Armed Forces - 39, the average width of the combat area of one BTG - 7,5 km;

• Deployed BTGs of: the 8th and 49th Combined Arms (CA) Armies; 11th, 103rd, 109th, and 127th rifle regiments of the mobilization reserve of the 1st Army Corps (AC) of the Southern Military District; 35th and 36th CA Armies of the Eastern Military District; 3rd AC of the Western Military District; 90th tank division of the Central Military District; the 22nd AC of the Coastal Forces; the 810th separate marines brigade of the Black Sea Fleet; the 7th and 76th Air assault divisions, the 98th airborne division, and the 11th separate airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces.

Musiiivka, Illinka and Novokiivka of the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast were directly hit by artillery fire.

During the past day, in the Petropavlivka - Novoraysk direction, Ukrainian Defense Forces advanced 7 kilometers and took control of 6 villages. The situation is similar in the Pervomaiske

- Kherson direction, where Ukrainian troops also took control of 6 villages. The Armed Forces of Ukraine liberated Snigurivka, Bruskinske, Kyselivka, Blahodatne, Borozenske, Pavlivka, Vasylivka, Yevhenivka, Bobrovy Kut, Stanislav, Oleksandrivka, Pravdyne, Soldatske, Chkalovka, Myrolyubivka, Tamarine, Kucherske, Pyatykhatky, Kachkarivka, Sablukivka, Mylove, Novokayiry, Bezvodne, Sadok, Ishchenka, Starytsia, and a number of other villages were abandoned by the enemy and are in the gray zone.

Azov-Black Sea Maritime Operational Area:

The forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet continue to project force on the coast and the continental part of Ukraine and control the northwestern part of the Black Sea. The ultimate goal is to deprive Ukraine of access to the Black Sea and to maintain control over the captured territories.

17 enemy ships are at sea. They are located along the southwestern coast of Crimea. Two ships carry 16 Kalibr missiles.

In the Sea of Azov, the enemy continues to control sea communications, keeping 1 ship on combat duty.

Enemy aviation continues to fly from Crimean airfields Belbek and Gvardiyske over the northwestern part of the Black Sea. Over the past day, 17 combat aircraft from Belbek and Saky airfields were deployed. The enemy monitors the waters adjacent to the grain corridor, thus keeping itself ready for the renewal of blockade actions of Ukrainian ports.

After completing a 1.5-month training course, 668 mobilized personnel were sent from occupied Sevastopol to the combat zone in the south of Ukraine. Most of them are equipped with 1970s

weapons. The occupation authorities are trying to raise their motivation with one-time payments to families of 200,000 rubles.

The enemy's shelling of the coastal regions of Ukraine continues. At least seven people died from the Russian rocket attack on Mykolaiv last night. According to the local authorities, at approximately 3:05, a missile from the S-300 anti-aircraft missile complex hit a five-story residential building.

Grain initiative: as of the evening of November 10, 3 vessels with 21.6 thousand tons of oil left the ports of "Odesa", "Chornomorsk" and "Pivdenny" for the countries of Asia and Europe. 9 ships move along the "Grain Corridor" to Ukrainian ports for loading. Among them, the STARVOS bulker is loaded with 55,000 wheat for Yemen's citizens suffering from the food crisis. Since the first ship with Ukrainian food left, 10.1 million tons of agricultural products have been exported. A total of

435 ships with agricultural products left Ukrainian ports for Asian, European and African countries.

The European Union calls on Russia to extend the duration of the "grain agreement". This was stated in the EU's statement at the Permanent Council of the OSCE on Thursday in Vienna. The EU emphasizes that "food and hunger should never be used as weapons of war." "However, Russia deliberately exacerbated the global food security crisis by destroying or looting Ukrainian grain stocks, disrupting production, imposing quota restrictions on its own exports of food and fertilizers, and imposing a blockade on Ukrainian seaports," the EU said. In this context, the Black Sea Grain Initiative is key to providing food to the most vulnerable populations in the world, the document states.

Russian operational losses from 24.02 to 11.11

Personnel - almost 79,400 people (+710);

Tanks - 2,814 (+10)

Armored combat vehicles – 5,696 (+14);

Artillery systems – 1,817 (+12);

Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) - 393 (0); Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 205 (0); Vehicles and fuel tanks – 4,259 (+17); Aircraft - 278 (0);

Helicopters – 261 (+1);

UAV operational and tactical level – 1,505 (+6); Intercepted cruise missiles - 399 (0);

Boats / ships - 16 (0).

Ukraine, general news

Ukraine is building a wall on the border with Belarus. "A ditch, an embankment, a reinforced concrete fence with barbed wire are engineering barriers being built in Volyn [Oblast]. About 3 km of the border have already been arranged; the work is ongoing," said Deputy Head of the OP

of Ukraine, Kyrylo Tymoshenko. Fortification structures are also being built in Rivne, Zhytomyr Oblast and other regions bordering Russia.

As of September 15, 2022, indirect losses in the agriculture sector of Ukraine as a result of the aggression of the Russian Federation amounted to 34.25 billion US dollars, according to the results of the "Review of Indirect Losses from the War in the Agriculture of Ukraine", prepared by the KSE Agrocenter and the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, the Ministry's press service reports. The indirect losses take into account the lost income from the decrease in the amount of produced products and the decrease in domestic prices, as well as the additional costs that producers are forced to bear due to the war.

In the conditions of a full-scale war, Ukraine increased product exports to the European Union by 6% compared to the pre-war period in 2021, stated by the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olga Stefanishyna at the Re: Open Zakarpattia forum.

Rocket shellings and power outages have devastated Ukrainian restaurant and cafe businesses. On October 10, the first day of massive attacks on the infrastructure, sales of cafes and restaurants in Ukraine fell by 22% compared to the same day of the previous week. In Kyiv, this indicator reached -27%. The Ukrainian restaurant automation company Poster provides such research data. In the middle and at the end of October, the indicators did not recover. At the same time, the situation improved at the beginning of November. The turnover in Kyiv increased by 6%, compared to the beginning of October, Dnipro - by 5%, Lviv - by 15%, and Odesa - by 30%.

International diplomatic aspect

On November 11, Europe commemorates the end of the Great War, Poland celebrates its Independence Day, and Ukrainians rejoice liberation of the city of Kherson.

"Since 1918, we have marked Armistice Day and paid tribute to the brave men and women who have served to give us peace. Yet as we salute our troops this year, this peace has been shattered by a Russian aggressor. As we honour the war dead of the past, we also remember Ukraine's fight for freedom today. The UK stands steadfast with our friends and allies in defence of freedom and democracy in Ukraine, and I am proud to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with a historic ally in Paris today," Foreign Secretary James Cleverly said.

"This event occurred 123 years after the First Polish Republic had ceased to exist—the result of an arrangement between Russia, Prussia, and Austria… During that time, although Poland disappeared from the map of Europe, it never ceased to exist in the hearts of Poles… Putin's propaganda machine is trying to prove that Ukraine does not exist as an independent state and that there is no such thing as the Ukrainian nation. In February, when Russia invaded Ukraine, nobody believed that the latter could win. Its fate, like Poland's a century before, appeared to be sealed. And yet this, too, has proved not to be the case," wrote Poland's Prime Minister in a Newsweek magazine article. "The experiences of Poland and Ukraine demonstrate that history is not a trap from which there is no escape and that even the power of a mighty state must take seriously the power of a nation which desires freedom," concluded Mateusz Morawiecki.

At a joint news conference with the Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda, Polish President Andrzej Duda: "We are supporting Ukraine, and this is the path towards building our own security."

Despite Russia's invasion forces' retreat from Kherson, chief Putin's mouthpiece claimed that "it is a subject of the Russian Federation - it is legally fixed and defined. There are no changes, and there can be no changes." The conflict "can only be ended after its goals have been achieved - or by achieving those goals through peace negotiations," Dmitry Peskov said. "However, due to the position taken by the Ukrainian side, peace talks are impossible," he added.

Presidents of Turkey and Hungary expressed their belief that Ukraine and Russia should start negotiations for a "ceasefire, negotiations and peace needed as soon as possible." A month ago, Viktor Orban said that a truce should be concluded not by Russia and Ukraine but by Russia and the United States. "Whoever thinks that this war will be ended through Russian-Ukrainian negotiations does not live in this world," said the Hungarian politician who acts as the Kremlin's asset in NATO and the EU.

A UK national who worked as a security guard at the British Embassy in Berlin has admitted spying for Russia. Meanwhile, Swedish prosecutors have indicted two men for gross espionage on behalf of Russia. One of the men is also indicted for gross unauthorized handling of secret information.

The Russian Prosecutor General's Office has declared the Woodrow Wilson Center "undesirable." The Office believes that the activities of the Center pose "a threat to the foundations of the constitutional order and the security of the Russian Federation." Ironically, several fellows from the Centre, Dmitry Trenin alike, were very much respected and treated as independent experts despite allegedly having close ties with Russia's security services. Russia's all-out invasion was a watershed moment for Mr Trenin to turn from an independent scholar into a propagandist of imperial conquest. Such degradation was more natural for Sergey Karaganov and Fyodor Lukyanov, who, from the beginning, were serving as Kremlin's soft power tools, wrapping up Putin's wishes into scientific covers.

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3. The Fight for the Future of Republican Foreign Policy

I commend everyone to read NSDD 238 - the Basic National Security Security Strategy, September 2.1986. It is better than any NSS written since then (during the Goldwater Nichols era). See above excerpts in today's Quotes of the Day.

https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-238.pdf

Conclusion:

Today, American neo-isolationism offers a potent critique of occasional U.S. overreach, hubris, and foreign policy mistakes. For Republicans dispirited by their country’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, angered by economic losses to foreign predatory trade practices, frustrated by decades of allied free-riding, and fearful of a dangerous escalatory spiral with a nuclear-armed madman in Putin, the appeal of restraint is understandable. The cavalier use of military force can prove catastrophic; Vietnam and Iraq will ever loom as costly cautionary tales. Yet the mistaken deployments of American ground troops in unnecessary wars should not be distorted into calls for terminating aid to U.S. friends in their own fights, withdrawing any American forces stationed abroad, or ending U.S. alliances altogether. As a prescription for addressing the challenges the United States faces, isolationism’s record over the past century does not inspire confidence. From World War II, to the Cold War, to the abandonment of Afghanistan, opponents of U.S. international leadership and armed diplomacy have an unhappy record. Republicans looking for foreign policy guidance today would do better to ensure that the GOP remains the party of Reagan.

The Fight for the Future of Republican Foreign Policy

In the Run-Up to 2024, the GOP Should Look to Reagan

By William Inboden

November 9, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by William Inboden · November 9, 2022

As Republicans ponder the outcome of the midterm elections, in which a GOP rout failed to materialize, the party seems torn over national security. Such divisions are not new. Every couple of decades, the Republican Party has cycled through an internal debate over foreign policy and the United States’ role in the world. The Democratic Party has been beset with its own divisions, of course, most recently evidenced by the publication and subsequent retraction of the Congressional Progressive Caucus’s letter urging President Joe Biden to pursue direct talks with Russia to end the war in Ukraine. Some of the most consequential foreign policy debates take place within each party, rather than between the parties.

This has held true for almost a century. Before World War II, during and after the Cold War, and in the modern era, Republicans have fought over the extent to which the United States should lead in global affairs. Broadly speaking, for Republicans, these intraparty fights seem to be settled by world events, successful GOP presidencies, or a combination of both. As they build on their 2022 congressional victories and eye a return to the White House in 2024, Republicans would do well to look to President Ronald Reagan’s legacy as a lodestar.

Internal Affairs

There are certainly echoes from the past in the current GOP battle. In the 1930s, Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio led the “America First” movement that anathematized any U.S. involvement in countering Nazi aggression in Europe. Taft squared off against GOP internationalists such as Wendell Willkie, the 1940 Republican presidential nominee, who favored supporting the Allies. After the war, Taft led the opposition to initiatives such as the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, and higher defense spending. Leaders of the GOP internationalist wing ultimately prevailed, led by figures such as Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican senator from Michigan, and Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe who in 1952 successfully challenged Taft for the GOP presidential nomination. Indeed, Eisenhower staked his successful campaign almost wholly to his foreign policy credentials.

In the 1970s, Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford—along with Henry Kissinger, who served during their tenures as national security adviser and secretary of state—had to fend off a conservative insurgency led by then–California Governor Ronald Reagan. The former cohort advocated détente with the Soviet Union whereas Reagan and his enthusiasts called for a more confrontational posture toward the Kremlin, especially on human rights and arms control. The fight reached a crescendo at the 1976 GOP convention in Kansas City, when Reagan came within a few delegates of defeating the incumbent Ford for the presidential nomination. The 1990s witnessed a new rift between the internationalists, led by President George H. W. Bush and then Senator Bob Dole, and the isolationist Pat Buchanan, who mounted presidential runs in 1992 and 1996, in which Buchanan made opposition to free trade, alliances, foreign aid, and the 1991 Gulf War cornerstones of his candidacy.

These GOP rifts were not so much healed as resolved by world events and successful presidencies. In 1941, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany’s declaration of war on the United States squelched the anti-interventionists. In the 1950s, Eisenhower’s two-term presidency, coupled with the growth in Soviet power and aggression, solidified GOP internationalism. The Kremlin’s global advances through the 1970s, culminating in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, discredited détente, and Reagan’s eight years in office and the peaceful U.S. Cold War victory that followed vindicated values-based global leadership, military power, and robust alliances. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush marshaled a GOP majority supportive of democracy and human rights promotion, humanitarian assistance, and muscular internationalism.

But that majority soon fell apart. By the end of Bush’s second term, he lamented the upsurge in “protectionism, isolationism, and nativism” in response to the GOP base’s repudiation of his policies. The post-9/11 GOP consensus proved ephemeral, as did each of the other apparent resolutions of GOP squabbles in earlier decades. As soon as one camp seemed to win the debate and secure its hold on the party, some combination of world events or foreign policy mistakes would raise new doubts and give dissenting voices an opening to contend for a different path.

Sucking Up All the Oxygen

In this century, the troubled wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2008 financial crisis, the failure of the engagement strategy with China, and other policy missteps have produced the fissures that now bedevil the GOP. Republicans today inhabit a murky menagerie of shifting coalitions and competing impulses rather than clearly demarcated tribes. This is especially true since the GOP does not hold the White House and thus lacks a president setting the foreign policy agenda for the party base. The fault lines that do exist follow the century-long debate about the United States’ posture and purpose in the world. Republicans are still struggling between showing leadership abroad or focusing on domestic affairs.

This debate is complicated by the singular figure of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who still inspires fervent devotion among a large segment of the Republican base and fear among a large portion of Republican officeholders. His foreign policy is less a coherent worldview and more a collection of whims and impulses—sometimes internationalist, sometimes isolationist, always about him. He is neither a hawk nor a dove but rather a peacock, clamoring for attention. Though no longer in office, his plumage casts a shadow over the GOP, complicating the debate. This is why a majority of Republicans supported withdrawing from Afghanistan when Trump pushed for it and then opposed the withdrawal when executed (albeit badly) by Biden.

The most visible fault line in the GOP foreign policy divide is Ukraine.

Cultural concerns also shape the foreign policy views of a vocal minority in the GOP, who see international affairs through a domestic policy lens. The “national conservative” movement embodies this trend. One of its exemplars, the Fox News host Tucker Carlson, has repeatedly voiced skepticism about aiding Ukraine and has expressed sympathy for Russian President Vladimir Putin. Carlson has spoken warmly about how the Russian dictator pays rhetorical fealty to social conservatism and ridicules “wokeness.” For similar reasons, Carlson and many other national conservatives have embraced Hungarian President Viktor Orban, in whom they see a cultural pugilist; the popular conservative writer Rod Dreher has even decamped to Hungary in a form of self-imposed exile. National conservatives disinclined to relocate to Hungary still cheered Orban’s message when he gave one of the keynote addresses at this year’s Conservative Political Action Conference. It was perhaps unsurprising when the CPAC then parroted Russian propaganda in a since-deleted tweet opposing aid to Ukraine.

The most visible fault line in the GOP foreign policy divide is Ukraine. A majority of Senate and House Republicans have supported the $66 billion in military and economic assistance that Washington has appropriated to support Kyiv, but a vote this summer saw 11 GOP senators and 57 House members oppose aid to Ukraine. Recent public opinion polling shows a further decline in Republican support for aiding Ukraine. Channeling these sentiments, the Heritage Foundation has become the most influential conservative organization to join the chorus of Ukraine skepticism. Heritage’s stance is notable in part because of its history: in the 1980s, it was the most consequential organization in shaping and supporting the Reagan Doctrine of providing aid to foreign forces fighting against aggression by the Kremlin and its proxies. Now the think tank has reversed course and fiercely opposes aid to foreign forces resisting Kremlin aggression.

Nonetheless, a majority of GOP representatives still support aiding Ukraine in its fight against the Russian invaders. This is notable given the absence of any prominent Republican aside from Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, Republican from Kentucky, making the case for Ukraine aid to the party’s base voters. Look for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to make impassioned appeals to the GOP for support. The responsibilities of governing will also hold weight, as few Republican members would welcome the shame of Ukraine losing the war because a GOP Congress cut off aid.

It Will be All Right

Neo-isolationism still seems to face a hard ceiling in the GOP. Consider the July 2022 U.S. Senate vote expressing support for Sweden and Finland joining NATO. For all of Trump’s imprecations against allies in general and NATO in particular, only one Republican senator, Joshua Hawley of Missouri, voted “no.” That shows the broad and deep Republican commitment to the alliance. And almost all of the likely GOP candidates for president—aside from Trump—seem to sit comfortably in the conservative internationalist camp: current Senators Ted Cruz of Texas and Tim Scott of South Carolina; Governors Ron DeSantis of Florida and Glenn Youngkin of Virginia; former Vice President Mike Pence; former Kansas Representative and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and former Governors Nikki Haley of South Carolina and Chris Christie of New Jersey. Of course, if Trump is the GOP nominee, the party’s foreign policy will take a different and unpredictable path.

More than any political figure, the factor most likely to keep Republican internationalism alive is China. Today’s threat from the Chinese Communist Party recalls how events such as World War II, the rise of the Soviet menace, and the 9/11 attacks resolved earlier GOP foreign policy debates. A recent poll indicates that 89 percent of Republicans view China unfavorably, and significant majorities see China as an “enemy” of the United States. There is nary a GOP congressional candidate running on a platform of accommodating China; even Hawley advocates a hard line toward Beijing. And hawkishness on China is hardly exclusive to the GOP. It is one of the very few areas of bipartisan agreement in U.S. politics, as strong majorities of voters favor a forceful policy toward China and more robust support for Taiwan.

Putting such convictions into practice leads unavoidably to an assertive foreign policy. Abandoning Asian allies, sidelining human rights, and reducing defense budgets are not viable options in countering the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China also poses a policy dilemma for the national conservative movement, since its avatars, such as Orban, have embraced Beijing, as has Putin. It is hard to credibly oppose China while supporting Orban and Putin.

The China challenge in turn points to the other factor that offers hope for Republican internationalism: the Reagan legacy. Reagan was, after all, the last U.S. president of either party to wage and win a competition against a nuclear-armed communist superpower on the Eurasian landmass, all while avoiding nuclear catastrophe, supporting the global enlargement of liberty and prosperity, and winning landslide reelection, as well as the election of his successor.

Virtually all Republicans herald Reagan as successful.

Though most Republican voters have not studied Reagan’s policies, and the younger generation was born after he left office, virtually all Republicans herald him as successful. And what voters value most are policies that succeed, more than any particular ideological commitments to internationalism or isolationism. To be sure, there are manifest differences between the 1980s and today, and China is not the Soviet Union. But it is fair to say his foreign policy record still has something meaningful to say to the contemporary GOP (and to Democrats, too).

Reagan’s national security policies are often summed up in his catchphrase “peace through strength,” but he believed “strength” went beyond military power to include the United States’ values, ideas, alliances, diplomacy, and history. For Reagan, that history held the hard lessons of errant protectionism and isolationism in the 1930s. He confronted the isolationists of his own day in an iconic address at Pointe du Hoc, France, on the 40th anniversary of the Normandy invasion. “We in America have learned bitter lessons from two world wars,” he said. “It is better to be here ready to protect the peace than to take blind shelter across the sea, rushing to respond only after freedom is lost. We’ve learned that isolationism never was and never will be an acceptable response to tyrannical governments with an expansionist intent.”

Reagan ordered U.S. ground troops into combat only once in his eight years in office, to the small Caribbean island of Grenada. He was cautious about the use of force, and he wielded military power to deter aggression, to support foreign forces to do their own fighting (as per the Reagan Doctrine), and to fortify diplomacy. The integration of force and diplomacy was a hallmark of Reagan’s statecraft. He built a formidable Department of Defense in part to empower his outreach to the Kremlin and his landmark negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. One of the biggest proponents of the Reagan defense buildup was U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who understood that a strong military made for effective diplomacy.

Reagan also viewed liberty as an asymmetric advantage for U.S. foreign policy. He supported human rights, religious freedom, and democracy in both communist regimes and military dictatorships, and he worked to expand economic freedom through an open trading order among the United States’ friends while also pressuring allies such as Japan to open their closed markets. He showed political courage: he promoted free trade despite fierce protectionist sentiment in Congress and defied resistance from his own party in his agreement with Gorbachev to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missiles. He was an incomparable communicator of his policies, seeking to persuade the voters who disagreed with him and equip and inspire those who agreed.

Today, American neo-isolationism offers a potent critique of occasional U.S. overreach, hubris, and foreign policy mistakes. For Republicans dispirited by their country’s failures in Afghanistan and Iraq, angered by economic losses to foreign predatory trade practices, frustrated by decades of allied free-riding, and fearful of a dangerous escalatory spiral with a nuclear-armed madman in Putin, the appeal of restraint is understandable. The cavalier use of military force can prove catastrophic; Vietnam and Iraq will ever loom as costly cautionary tales. Yet the mistaken deployments of American ground troops in unnecessary wars should not be distorted into calls for terminating aid to U.S. friends in their own fights, withdrawing any American forces stationed abroad, or ending U.S. alliances altogether. As a prescription for addressing the challenges the United States faces, isolationism’s record over the past century does not inspire confidence. From World War II, to the Cold War, to the abandonment of Afghanistan, opponents of U.S. international leadership and armed diplomacy have an unhappy record. Republicans looking for foreign policy guidance today would do better to ensure that the GOP remains the party of Reagan.

WILLIAM INBODEN is Executive Director of the Clements Center for National Security and Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, both at the University of Texas at Austin. He previously served at the State Department and National Security Council staff under President George W. Bush. His newest book is The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, The Cold War, and the World on the Brink.

Foreign Affairs · by William Inboden · November 9, 2022

4. Biden pledges US will work with Southeast Asian nations

Excerpts:

Biden’s efforts at this year’s ASEAN summit are meant to lay the groundwork for his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping — the first face-to-face encounter of Biden’s presidency with a leader whose nation the U.S. now considers its most potent economic and military rival.

...

ASEAN this year is elevating the U.S. to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” status — a largely symbolic enhancement of their relationship but one that puts Washington on the same level as China, which was granted the distinction last year.

...

Biden will participate in East Asia summit sessions on Sunday, including a three-way meeting with the leaders of South Korea and Japan, before leaving for the G-20 summit in Bali.

Biden pledges US will work with Southeast Asian nations

AP · by SEUNG MIN KIM and ZEKE MILLER · November 12, 2022

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP) — President Joe Biden promised Saturday that the United States would work with a strategically vital coalition of southeast Asian nations, telling leaders that “we’re going to build a better future that we all want to see” in the region where U.S. rival China is also working to expand its influence.

Citing the three Association of Southeast Asian Nations summits he’s participated in as president, Biden said the 10-country bloc is “at the heart of my administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy” and promised to collaborate to build a region that is “free and open, stable and prosperous, resilient and secure.”

“I look forward to continuing our work together with ASEAN and with each one of you to deepen peace and prosperity throughout the region to resolve challenges from the South China Sea to Myanmar and to find innovative solutions to shared challenges,” Biden said, citing climate and health security among areas of collaboration.

Biden’s efforts at this year’s ASEAN summit are meant to lay the groundwork for his highly anticipated meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping — the first face-to-face encounter of Biden’s presidency with a leader whose nation the U.S. now considers its most potent economic and military rival.

Joe Biden

Biden and Xi will meet on Monday at the Group of 20 summit that brings together leaders from the world’s largest economies, which is held this year in Indonesia on the island of Bali.

Traveling to Phnom Penh earlier Saturday, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Biden will raise issues such as freedom of navigation and illegal and unregulated fishing by China with the ASEAN leaders — aimed at demonstrating U.S. assertiveness against Beijing.

Freedom of navigation refers to a dispute involving the South China Sea, where the United States says it can sail and fly wherever international law allows and China believes such missions are destabilizing. Sullivan said the U.S. has a key role to play as a stabilizing force in the region and in prevention of any one nation from engaging in “sustained intimidation and coercion that would be fundamentally adverse to the nations of ASEAN and other countries.”

“There’s a real demand signal for that,” Sullivan told reporters aboard Air Force One on Saturday. Referring to the People’s Republic of China, Sullivan continued: “I think the PRC may not love that fact, but they certainly acknowledge it and understand it.”

One new initiative related to those efforts that Biden will discuss Saturday focuses on maritime awareness, specifically using radio frequencies from commercial satellites to better track dark shipping and illegal fishing, Sullivan said.

Biden’s visit to Cambodia — the second ever by a U.S. president — continues his administration’s push to demonstrate its investments in the south Pacific, which was highlighted earlier this year when the White House hosted an ASEAN summit in Washington, the first of its kind. He also tapped one of his senior aides, Yohannes Abraham, as the official envoy to ASEAN, another way the White House has highlighted that commitment.

ASEAN this year is elevating the U.S. to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” status — a largely symbolic enhancement of their relationship but one that puts Washington on the same level as China, which was granted the distinction last year.

Biden opened Saturday in Phnom Penh by meeting with Hun Sen, the prime minister of Cambodia, the host for the regional summit. He also participated in the traditional family photo with southeast Asian leaders — one that required a re-do as the gregarious Biden was too busy shaking hands with other heads of state — and later, will attend a gala dinner hosted by a parallel summit in Cambodia focusing on east Asia.

Another topic Biden focused on is Myanmar, where the military junta overthrew the ruling government in February 2021 and arrested its democratically elected leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. As he met with Hun Sen, Biden stressed that the U.S. was committed to the return of democracy in Myanmar, which had steadily headed toward a democratic form of governance before the coup.

Biden also raised human rights concerns in Cambodia. In a statement after the meeting with Hun Sen, the White House said Biden urged the prime minister — an authoritarian ruler in a nominally democratic nation — to “reopen civic and political space” before its 2023 elections.

Biden, according to the White House, also pushed Hun Sen to release activists including Theary Seng, a Cambodian-American lawyer who was convicted of treason as the prime minister’s long-running rule aimed to crack down on his opposition. The White House said Biden also raised concerns about activities at Ream Naval Base, whose expansion Cambodian officials have described as a collaborative effort between it and China.

At the U.S.-ASEAN summit, there was an empty chair where a representative from Myanmar would have sat had its leaders not been barred from participating in official ASEAN meetings.

In his brief remarks Saturday, Biden mistakenly identified host nation Cambodia as “Colombia,” a flub he also made on Thursday night as he was leaving the U.S.

Biden will participate in East Asia summit sessions on Sunday, including a three-way meeting with the leaders of South Korea and Japan, before leaving for the G-20 summit in Bali.

AP · by SEUNG MIN KIM and ZEKE MILLER · November 12, 2022

5. FACT SHEET: President Biden and ASEAN Leaders Launch the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

FACT SHEET: President Biden and ASEAN Leaders Launch the U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 12, 2022

At the 10th annual U.S.-ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, President Biden and the ASEAN leaders will elevate U.S.-ASEAN relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). President Biden will also attend the annual East Asia Summit, further demonstrating the United States’ prioritization of the Indo-Pacific and the ASEAN-led regional architecture.

At both summits, President Biden will reaffirm the United States’ strong support for ASEAN centrality and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, building on the historic success of the first-ever U.S.-ASEAN Special Summit in Washington, DC earlier this year. President Biden will review implementation of the many new U.S.-ASEAN initiatives he has launched with ASEAN leaders over the past year, and he will also announce several new initiatives designed to supportthe four pillars of the ASEAN Outlook: maritime cooperation, connectivity, the UN sustainable development goals, and economic cooperation.

OUR COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Expanding our Diplomatic Architecture: President Biden has overseen an unprecedented expansion in U.S.-ASEAN relations, marked by the launch of five new high-level dialogue processes on health, transportation, women’s empowerment, environment and climate, and energy, as well as elevated engagement in existing dialogue tracks on foreign affairs, economics, and defense, led on the U.S. side by Secretary Becerra, Secretary Buttigieg, Administrator Power, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Granholm, Secretary Blinken, Ambassador Tai, and Secretary Austin, respectively. Under the framework of our newly established U.S.-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the United States and ASEAN will institutionalize and expand cooperation in each of these important areas, in order to support robust implementation of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and promote a free and open region that is connected, prosperous, secure, and resilient.

In May, Secretary of Health and Human Services Xavier Becerra traveled to Bali, Indonesia for a special U.S.-ASEAN Health Ministerial Meeting, during which the two sides agreed to develop a cooperation work plan and to convene senior officials’ meetings.
In June, the Department of Transportation led U.S. participation in the first-ever U.S.-ASEAN Senior Transport Officials Dialogue in Bali, Indonesia, where ASEAN endorsed an ASEAN-U.S. transport cooperation work plan.
In August, Secretary of State Antony Blinken attended the annual U.S.-ASEAN, East Asia Summit, and ASEAN Regional Forum foreign ministers’ meetings in Cambodia.
In September, the Department of Energy participated in the second U.S.-ASEAN Energy Ministers’ Meeting, institutionalizing a dialogue first convened by Secretary of Energy Granholm in 2021.
In September, U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Katherine Tai traveled to Siem Reap, Cambodia to meet with ASEAN Economic Ministers and attend the East Asia Summit Economic Ministers’ Meeting. ASEAN endorsed a new ASEAN-U.S. Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement Work Plan to further promote economic relations and trade.
In September, USAID Administrator Samantha Power co-chaired a special U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment.
In October, the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate joined a senior officials’ dialogue on the environment and climate with ASEAN, during which the two sides agreed to establish a cooperation work plan and to hold a special U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on the Environment and Climate in 2023.
Later this month, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will travel to Cambodia for the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting “Plus” (ADMM+) where he will coordinate with ASEAN partners on defense matters, continuing the United States’ unbroken record of attending every ADMM+ meeting at the highest level.

Supporting the PARTNER with ASEAN Act: The Biden-Harris Administration welcomes the recent introduction of bipartisan legislation that would authorize the President to extend privileges and immunities under the International Organizations Immunities Act to ASEAN. President Biden hopes to have the opportunity to sign the PARTNER with ASEAN Act into law.

U.S. Assistance in Southeast Asia: The United States is proud to provide over $860 million in assistance through the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development to our ASEAN partners in 2022. This assistance is supporting climate ambition and the clean energy transition, access to education, strengthened health systems, security modernization efforts, rule of law and human rights, and more.

PROMOTING CONNECTIVITY

U.S.-ASEAN Electric Vehicle Initiative: Today, President Biden launched the U.S.-ASEAN Electric Vehicle Initiative, through which the United States and ASEAN will work together to develop an integrated electric vehicle (EV) ecosystem in Southeast Asia, thereby enhancing the region’s connectivity while ensuring ASEAN nations can achieve ambitious emissions reductions targets. As the flagship initiative of the U.S.-ASEAN Transportation Dialogue Partnership, the U.S.-ASEAN Electric Vehicle Initiative will:

Support the planning, integration, and deployment of EV infrastructure;
Support the development of an ASEAN EV Implementation Roadmap;
Provide capacity-building and technical assistance to accelerate the adoption of EVs across Southeast Asia; and
Facilitate partnerships with U.S. companies and familiarize ASEAN governments and companies with U.S. solutions and technologies.

U.S.-ASEAN Platform for Infrastructure and Connectivity: President Biden announced the establishment of a U.S.-ASEAN Platform for Infrastructure and Connectivity, a demand-driven co-development mechanism through which the United States will support ASEAN initiatives that enhance connectivity across Southeast Asia and facilitate high-quality investment in regional infrastructure projects, under the auspices of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII). Based in Jakarta to facilitate partnershipwith the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives, this mechanism will supportimplementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025, the ASEAN Interconnection Masterplan Study III, and other high-priority ASEAN infrastructure initiatives.

Emerging Defense Leaders Program: The Department of Defense plans to invest approximately $10 million each year to launch and support a new network of Southeast Asian emerging defense leaders. This initiative will provide training opportunities that will accelerate defense sector professionalization, while building mutual understanding and lasting connections among the next generation of Southeast Asian defense leaders and their U.S. counterparts. Training opportunities will include English language classes, as well as courses focused on international law, defense strategy planning, and responsible defense budgeting and resource allocation. The program seeks to build people-to-people connectivity by supporting an alumni network, facilitating exchanges with high-level officials, and offering follow-on courses and trainings.

ACHIEVING THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Food Security and Access to Clean Water: The U.S. Department of Agriculture and U.S. International Development Finance Corporation will invest $57 million in new programs across Southeast Asia to promote food security and ensure access to clean water, including a new “Food for School Feeding” program that will provide meals to 109,000 Cambodian students over the next five years, as well as loans that will provide affordable drinking water to vulnerable populations in Southeast Asia, as well as India, and help the Philippines expand production of organic coconut products.

Resilient Health Supply Chains: The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation will partner with the Quadria Capital Fund III to invest $75 million in strengthening healthcare systems and building resilient health supply chains across Southeast Asia – as well as India and Sri Lanka. This partnership will increase access, affordability, awareness, and quality of healthcare services for low- and middle-income consumers throughout the region.

ASEAN Center for Pandemic Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases: The United States will support the ASEAN Center for Pandemic Health Emergencies and Emerging Diseases (ACPHEED), including through USAID assistance and through the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, which is assigning Regional Technical Advisors to support ACPHEED in the areas of workforce development, infection prevention and control, antimicrobial resistance, respiratory disease surveillance, and zoonotic diseases.

ASEAN Center for Climate Change: The United States will support the new ASEAN Centre for Climate Change, based in Brunei Darussalam, including through technical exchanges with the United States’ premier climate experts. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Argonne National Laboratory will provide trainings that expand the Centre’s capacity for decarbonization research, disaster management planning, and other areas of work.

Disability Rights: The United States is working with ASEAN and civil society partners to launch a U.S.-ASEAN Dialogue on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, focused on implementing the ASEAN Enabling Masterplan on Mainstreaming the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the obligations of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The United States will support complementary programs that support ASEAN countries and disabled people’s organizations to accelerate regional implementation of the ASEAN Masterplan.

ASEAN Regional Plan of Action on Women, Peace, and Security: In December, USAID, in collaboration with ASEAN and UN Women, will launch the Regional Plan of Action on Women, Peace, and Security. The plan will build on the achievements of the inaugural U.S.-ASEAN Ministerial Dialogue on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, and it will be implemented through a partnership with the ASEAN Committee for Women and ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children.

ADVANCING ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Supporting Women Entrepreneurs: The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation will invest $215 million in loans to Southeast Asian financial institutions, in order to support women entrepreneurs and women-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises. These investments will help low-income women access capital and contribute to economic growth, while addressing the credit gap for women-led businesses.

Investing in Sustainable Infrastructure: The U.S. Trade and Development Agency will launch $13 million in new infrastructure project preparation initiatives designed to catalyze financing for the development of high-quality sustainable infrastructure projects valued at over $7 billion across Southeast Asia. These projects will strengthen transportation links and supply chains, promote regional energy security and the clean energy transition, facilitate improved healthcare, and advance digital connectivity.

Digital Economy & Digital Trade Standards: To strengthen ASEAN’s digital trade ecosystem and enhance regional connectivity, the U.S. Department of Commerce will partner with the ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and Quality (ACCSQ) to co-develop programs on digital trust and cybersecurity standards. Commerce will convene U.S. industry leaders and the ASEAN Digital Trade Standards and Conformance Working Group to promote good regulatory practices, address cyber risks, and pursue best practices for regional harmonization and stronger interoperability.

ASEAN SME Academy 2.0: In April 2022, USAID launched the ASEAN SME Academy 2.0 in collaboration with the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council. Now, USAID will expand SME support in the ASEAN region to accelerate economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and address the rising cost of living. New resources to strengthen small business recovery will be available in four languages (English, Thai, Indonesian, and Vietnamese) in 2023. Through the modernized SME Academy platform, SMEs will be better equipped to manage cash flow, increase revenue, and leverage digital technologies for growth.

EXPANDING MARITIME COOPERATION

Countering Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing:USAID is strengthening the regional capacity to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing through the Sustainable Fish Asia (SuFiA) project. SuFiA is partnering with the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN members to undertake a demand-driven technical service model for the region, a gender equality and social inclusion analysis, with a focus on small-scale and indigenous fishers and youth, and a regional IUU fishing risk assessment.

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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 12, 2022

6. ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Statement on the Establishment of the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

I always think about all the work the action officers of these countries have to do to arrive at a comprehensive joint statement. So much behind the scenes negotiation and coordination has to take place and the more countries involved the more complex is the work.

ASEAN-U.S. Leaders’ Statement on the Establishment of the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership | The White House

whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 12, 2022

1 WE, the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United States of America (United States),gathered on the occasion of the 10thASEAN-United States (U.S.) Summit and the commemoration of the 45th anniversary of ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue Relations in Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia, on November 12, 2022;

2 APPRECIATING the United States’ support for ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture and its continued contribution to regional peace, stability, security, and prosperity and to ASEAN integration and the ASEAN Community building process;

3 REAFFIRMING the importance of adhering to key principles, shared values and norms enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, the ASEAN Charter, the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP);

4 NOTING that both the AOIP and the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States share relevant fundamental principles in promoting an open, inclusive, and rules-based regional architecture, in which ASEAN is central, alongside partners who share in these goals;

5 WELCOMING the significant growth of our political-security, economic, and socio-cultural cooperation since launching our dialogue partnership in Manila in 1977;

6 HIGHLIGHTING that as strategic partners, ASEAN and the United States have enhanced our dialogue through annual leaders’ meetings (since 2009); annual leaders’ summits (since 2013); the elevation of ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue Relations to a Strategic Partnership (2015); the Special ASEAN – U.S. Leaders’ Summit (Sunnylands Summit)– the first ASEAN-U.S. standalone summit in the United States (2016); the expansion of ASEAN-U.S. engagement and cooperation, including through the existing and the proposed ministerial-level meetings on climate and the environment, energy, health, transportation, and gender equality and women’s empowerment – building on our long-standing ministerial-level engagement on defense (2010), and economics (2002); and the ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit (2022) commemorating 45 years of Dialogue Partnership – where for the first time, U.S. President Joseph R. Biden Jr. welcomed ASEAN leaders to Washington D.C.;

7 REAFFIRMING the goals and principles enumerated in the Joint Vision Statement of the ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit, adopted by the Leaders of ASEAN and the United States in Washington, D.C. on May 12, 2022;

8 EMPHASIZING that the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership (2021-2025)outlines our shared commitments under ASEAN’s political-security, economic, and socio-cultural pillars, and its priorities for cooperation, including trade and investment; maritime cooperation; environmental protection and climate change; digital development and cybersecurity; energy transition; smart cities; public health; good governance and human rights; human capital development; people-to-people ties; trans-national crime, counter-terrorism; supporting micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs); combatting illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing; supporting the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and Narrowing the Development Gap; and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals;

9 ACKNOWLEDGING that at the 9th ASEAN-U.S. Summit, President Biden announced the U.S. intent to provide up to USD 102 million in new initiatives to expand the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership and that at the 2022 ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit in Washington, D.C., President Biden announced USD 150 million in programs for ASEAN that combined with over USD 800 million requested in fiscal year 2023 for bilateral programs in ASEAN Member States, over USD 12 billion in development, economic, health, and security assistance since 2002, and over USD 1.4 billion in humanitarian assistance, including life-saving disaster assistance, emergency food aid, and support to refugees throughout Southeast Asia over the same period of time, will support the implementation of the AOIP and reflect the Biden-Harris Administration’s deep commitment to ASEAN’s central role in the Indo-Pacific region.

WE HEREBY DECLARE TO:

ESTABLISH the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to reflect the ambitious outcomes of the 9thASEAN-U.S. Summit and the 2022 ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit and to open new areas of cooperation vital to the future prosperity and security of our combined one billion people, and task our officials to follow up on its implementation.
REAFFIRM steadfast support for an open, transparent, resilient, inclusive, and rules-based ASEAN-centered regional architecture at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region that promotes ASEAN’s strong, unified, and constructive role in addressing regional issues of common concern.
FURTHER REAFFIRM that the ASEAN-U.S. Comprehensive Strategic Partnership supports ASEAN’s goal to implement the AOIP through existing ASEAN-led mechanisms and supports the principles upon which it is based.
PROMOTE maritime cooperation through ASEAN-led mechanisms by upholding freedom of navigation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and promote cooperation and coordination among our relevant agencies, including maritime law enforcement agencies, to collaborate to improve maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, protection, restoration and sustainable management of the marine environment, maritime safety, security and education, as well as to promote sustainable and responsible fisheries, including through possible collaboration with the ASEAN Network for Combatting IUU Fishing (AN-IUU).
BUILD people-to-people connectivity within the region and beyond by enhancing economic and socio-cultural cooperation including through ASEAN-led mechanisms, focusing on good governance and the rule of law, investing in human capital development, empowering youth and vulnerable or marginalized groups, advancing the rights of persons with disabilities, investing in education, promoting and protecting cultural heritage, empowering women and girls and promoting gender equity and equality, and strengthening the connections between our combined one billion people.
ADVANCE efforts to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals by promoting complementarities between the ASEAN Community Vision 2025 and the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with particular emphasis on eradicating poverty, promoting the conservation of natural resources and the environment, and promoting peace and prosperity through equitable development and sustainable economic growth, including in the fields of energy resilience; clean and just energy transition and renewable energy deployment; decarbonization of the transportation sector; climate change mitigation and adaptation; health security; sustainable management of water and natural resources; food security; sustainable agriculture, fisheries, forestry, and land management.
ENHANCE partnerships in economic and technological cooperation, catalyze investments in high-standard, transparent, and climate-resilient infrastructure, including projects under the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, as part of the regional transformation to net zero emissions, facilitate trade and investment between the two sides to promote resilient global supply chains and seamless regional connectivity, and promote stronger, more equitable, and more inclusive economic growth as well as sustainable development to achieve sustainable and broad-based prosperity in ASEAN and the United States as well as better and stronger economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.
STRENGTHEN practical cooperation in areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, humanitarian mine action, and cyber security through the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) framework.
FURTHER PROMOTE the stability, peace, prosperity, and sustainable development of the Mekong subregion through shared initiatives under the Mekong-U.S. Partnership (MUSP), which complements the Friends of the Mekong and supports the implementation of MPAC 2025 and the IAI Work Plan IV (2021-2025), in support of ASEAN Centrality and unity in promoting ASEAN’s sub-regional development.

ADOPTED in Phnom Penh, Kingdom of Cambodia, on the Twelfth day of November in the Year Two Thousand and Twenty-Two in a single original copy in the English language.

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whitehouse.gov · by The White House · November 12, 2022

7. Musk’s Twitter takeover comes as the CCP steps up its targeting of smart Asian women

Excerpts:

Elon Musk has an opportunity to prioritise policy areas such as preventing state-backed information campaigns, disinformation and online harms. But we cannot rely on Musk—and the challenge is far greater than any single platform. Too many policymakers and regulators have been overinvested in admiring the problems and underinvested in developing policy to solve them. They must step up and produce those policies.

While we wait for action, smart Asian women across the globe are being threatened and viciously abused every day by the world’s newest superpower.

Musk’s Twitter takeover comes as the CCP steps up its targeting of smart Asian women | The Strategist

Danielle Cave and Albert Zhang Strategist special report

aspistrategist.org.au · by Danielle Cave · November 6, 2022

Graphic online depictions of sexual assault, homophobia and racist imagery (sometimes involving Australian lawmakers) and life-threatening intimidation (including calling for targets to kill themselves) are a growing part of the Chinese Communist Party’s toolkit of digital transnational repression. Such imagery, and associated threats, characterise ongoing coordinated information operations the CCP is running online against women of Asian descent living in democracies around the world, including in Australia, the UK and the US.

This strand of cyber-enabled foreign interference—targeting both overseas public debates and key women within those debates—continues without consequential intervention from policymakers or social media platforms.

In Australia, parts of this campaign are seeking to interfere in public debates by using the #auspol and #qanda hashtags. Concerningly, a more sophisticated subset of posts are seeking to engage in political interference by promoting a fringe Australian political party. This highlights the importance of prioritising cyber-enabled foreign interference, both as a major part of the next national cyber strategy and in Australia’s foreign policy.

If Elon Musk drills down to examine Twitter’s work on state-backed information operations, he will discover he’s taking over a platform considered industry leading in areas such as transparency, data sharing and policy responses designed to deter such activity. Policymakers and regulators around the world will watch closely to see if Musk’s known support for freedom of speech results in an open slather on the vulnerable, including reductions in transparency and data sharing.

Notwithstanding Twitter’s reputation for prioritising its work in this space, Chinese state-backed information operations are proliferating on Twitter because they are now on all major platforms. They are becoming more sophisticated and increasingly target countries, elections, policy topics, organisations and individuals.

Commentators and industry figures have argued that some of these operations are low impact, including because they attract little genuine online engagement. But such arguments rely solely on online metrics that don’t factor in the distressing impact it has on the targeted individuals (or companies) or those who worry that they too could become targets. They also don’t consider the wide range of activity now occurring across global platforms, including the more insidious forms of state-backed activity that have more recently emerged.

Since ASPI first revealed in June 2022 that the CCP had turned its disinformation and coercive capabilities towards women of Asian descent reporting critically on China—including journalists, researchers and human rights activists—new evidence suggests the party has stepped up its psychological-warfare techniques. The following tweets were all posted in the past fortnight:

‘People like you who betray the motherland, smear and slander at will, are really inferior to dogs.’

‘Traitors will not end well.’

‘I think you’d better see a doctor, you’re scared you’re going to self-harm.’

‘If you enter this restaurant with a dog, the waiter will take care of the dog first.’

‘You should live your whole life with the guilt of killing your own mother.’

‘You are just relying on your Chinese identity and belittling your country to survive, you are just a tool. If you are not Chinese, your value is zero.’

‘I advise you not to run around. Stray dogs are easy to kill.’

These tweets form just a tiny percentage of the abusive and threatening messages targeting a small group of high-profile Asian women who’ve become a focus of this persistent and harmful activity. (Note: ASPI deliberately selected tweets that did not include the women’s names. Tweets of that kind are often more personalised and abusive.)

In addition to constant abuse, many of these accounts also tweet bespoke imagery (see Figure 1). These images are tweeted at the women, are circulated through hashtags and are also tweeted at other high-profile figures, including Australian politicians and journalists and think tankers who work on China.

Figure 1: Examples of abusive imagery tweeted at high-profile Asian women

ASPI assesses that, like previous Chinese-state-affiliated harassment and trolling campaigns, the Spamouflage network—which Twitter attributed to the Chinese government in 2019—is likely behind the targeting of these women. Twitter publicly confirmed that this was the case in response to ASPI’s June 2022 analysis.

Examination of these newly created accounts that reveals they repeatedly share the same images, mostly post content during Beijing business hours (see details on activity below) and use double-byte fonts commonly used in Asian languages. Accounts also previously shared the #USCyberHegemony hashtag, which is part of a broader CCP-linked propaganda campaign, and flooded other online platforms with pro-Chinese police content to drown out the latest report of the human rights organisation Safeguard Defenders on China’s transnational policing. Some accounts have diverted to focus on spreading propaganda claiming former CCP general secretary Hu Jintao was expelled last month from the 20th party congress because he was in poor health.

The coordinated activity targeting these women uses a combination of Twitter replies, direct tweets and quote tweets. It builds up dedicated hashtags about its targets and also seeks to tap into existing popular hashtags—those used internationally as well as domestically in countries where these women live (including #auspol in Australia). It includes crude imagery that appears to have been designed specifically for, and which links to, YouTube videos. In October, tweets that formed a part of this campaign led and dominated Twitter search results for related hashtags and versions of the target’s name.

The online activity we analysed is often highly customised and is clearly the result of extensive surveillance of each targeted individual to tailor messages and react quickly to developments in their lives. This includes information they’ve shared publicly and, for some, information they haven’t shared publicly. It’s all blended with disinformation, threats and abuse.

The tactics are multifaceted and are designed to intimidate and silence through constant harassment with misogynistic, racist and homophobic content. They also spread disinformation and abuse that seeks to undermine the credibility of the women being targeted by attacking their work, physical appearance, values and morals, ethnic background, sexuality, friendships, partners and deceased family members.

In addition to the examples given above (such as repeatedly being called a ‘dog’) smears such as ‘liar’, ‘biased’, ‘untrustworthy’, ‘promiscuous’, ‘prostitute’, ‘ugly’, ‘scum’ and ‘psychopath’, and insults like ‘beasts dressed in human skin’ are common. Accusations that they have betrayed and smeared their ‘motherland’ and any (real or perceived) links to a Western democracy, particularly any association with the US, are a key focus of the campaign (noting many of those targeted are actually citizens of the countries in which they live). Threats calling for women to kill themselves, or insinuating that they should do so, and telling them that their lives are in danger, are commonplace.

Three ongoing campaigns, in English and in Mandarin, stand out for their threatening approach; deep misogyny; and coordinated, persistent harassment.

For months, a network of accounts has harassed Jane Wang, a UK-based activist campaigning for the release of Zhang Zhan, a journalist jailed in China for her early reporting of the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan. Under almost every tweet posted by Wang, accounts with anglicised names followed by eight numbers (a default format Twitter uses for newly created accounts) call her a ‘traitor’ and a ‘puppet of Western capitalism’. In one post referencing the Sitong Bridge protest, Wang received more than 588 replies exclusively from inauthentic accounts abusing her and seeking to undermine her credibility. Other accounts post highly sexualised cartoons depicting her being molested by another Chinese pro-democracy advocate, Qiu Jiajun, who has also been targeted separately by these accounts. Wang told ASPI that she has never met Qiu.

A second campaign targets ASPI senior fellow Vicky Xu, who has long been attacked by the CCP across multiple platforms—in China and globally—in an incredibly obsessive fashion. This campaign was reignited recently after Xu returned to social media after an extended break. A group of authors at the Chinese state-owned Global Times collectively named BuYiDao (补壹刀) published a hit piece about Xu in July 2022 and called her one of the ‘female vanguards against China’. The article currently has over 75,000 vitriolic comments, mostly calling for her execution.

More recently, coordinated covert Twitter campaigns have escalated their abuse against Xu. Between 14 and 24 October, at least 199 accounts posted around 582 tweets mentioning her Chinese name, calling her a traitor and making physical threats. Of these tweets, 92% were posted between 9 am and 5 pm Beijing time, with a significant break in activity between 12 and 2 pm when businesses usually have their lunch break (Figure 2). Some of these accounts have already been suspended, but many remain active online and are harassing Xu hourly and in response to every post she tweets. One series of clearly concocted tweets asks, ‘Why didn’t you get hit by a car?’

Figure 2: Number of abusive tweets mentioning Vicki Xu by hour of posting, 14–24 October 2022

In an effort to tap into Australian public discourse and draw political and media attention, accounts posting about Xu often include hashtags such as #Australia, #Metoo and #Auspol and #qanda in their tweets. Short for ‘Australian politics’, #Auspol is one of Australia’s most popular hashtags discussing domestic politics, and #qanda is used to discuss the ABC’s weekly TV show Q&A. For Twitter users searching a combination of these hashtags—for example, ‘#Australia #metoo’ or ‘#Auspol #metoo’—tweets in this campaign are displayed prominently in Twitter’s search results, both in the ‘top’ and ‘latest’ categories. ASPI searched multiple times between 24 and 31 October.

These accounts also tag journalists, researchers and human rights activists. Some of these high-profile commentators tweet in response calling for action by Twitter.

A linked but more sophisticated subnetwork of accounts that has recently started targeting Xu is also seeking to engage in more direct interference in Australian politics. Many of the accounts in this small network—which are new as of September and October 2022—are promoting the Australian Citizens Party, a fringe party affiliated with the LaRouche political movement. Commentary by the Australian Citizens Party is regularly promoted and cited by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chinese state media, and Chinese embassies and diplomats on social media.

Accounts in this network, some of which have also tweeted about or tagged ASPI (along with dozens of other organisations and individuals, including current and former politicians), are attracting more organic online engagement than other parts of the network. Their personas are slightly more authentic than other parts of the campaign and are sometimes based on real Australians. For example, one inauthentic account, ‘Erin Chew’, is based on a real woman named Erin Chew who works at the Asian Australian Alliance advocacy network (figure 3).

Figure 3: Example of tweet posted on inauthentic Twitter account ‘Erin Chew’

These accounts are seeking to drive online attention towards the Australian Citizens Party and its members, as well as public commentators in Australia and globally whose political beliefs sit on the alt-left of the political spectrum (through retweets and mass tagging of other accounts), including some individuals who promote conspiracy theories. They are seeking to engage in debates on topics including the state of Australian democracy, Australia–US relations, Australia–China relations and AUKUS. They are also making allegations of corruption in Australian politics.

While this small network is more sophisticated and far more proactive in its efforts to interfere in Australian political debates, it is still in its infancy and hasn’t yet had any serious impact.

The activity targeting Xu isn’t limited to US-based social media platforms. On Chinese social media, posts sharing photoshopped images of Xu in faked pornographic situations are prominently displayed at the top of search results under Xu’s Chinese name on Weibo, China’s equivalent of Twitter. That these posts remain visible on China’s domestic internet, where the government has criminalised highly sexualised content, means they are very likely to be state sanctioned and deliberately left uncensored to broaden their reach.

The activity doesn’t just target Wang and Xu. Many of the journalists targeted earlier this year when ASPI conducted its original analysis are still constantly abused. They include the New York Times’ Muyi Xiao, Washington DC–based video journalist Xinyan Yu and New Yorker writer Jiayang Fan.

Attacks on Jiayang are intense. On 27 October, for example, abusive and threatening tweets were sent to her every few minutes. One busy hashtag, #TraitorJiayangFan, is kept alive entirely by inauthentic accounts. Since January, more than 400 accounts have posted at least 4,300 tweets using that hashtag. Like the accounts targeting Vicky Xu, 90.9% of these tweets were posted between 9 am and 5 pm Beijing time.

Jiayang has previously written and spoken about being targeted by China’s propaganda apparatus and Chinese nationalist trolls, including while her mother was in hospital in 2021 during the Covid-19 pandemic. After Fan’s mother died in early 2022, the campaign cruelly pivoted to focus on her mother’s death, bombarding her with tweets accusing her of being responsible and warning, ‘Your mother’s experience will be repeated on you.’ Some tweets in the campaign link to crude YouTube videos, originating from Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok, about the death of Fan’s mother, titled ‘You love America, but does America love you?’

Spamouflage’s persistent multi-year presence on US social media platforms has allowed the CCP to refine its ability to incapacitate groups of people and organisations seen as critics, such as journalists, researchers, dissidents, activists and victims of human rights abuse. Parts of this campaign are agile in responding to new developments—some accounts regularly divert from key targets to harass and threaten others in the China-watching community as they share their reporting and analysis on Twitter. Another common tactic is to create hundreds of replicant accounts of individuals and organisations to harass those targets and confuse online users (see figure 4).

Figure 4: Tweet from Jane Wang with examples of replicant accounts using her name

These campaigns can cause enormous harm to those targeted, and some of these women have already spoken about this publicly.

For democratic governments, this is about much more than a group of individuals being relentlessly harassed. The CCP is taking advantage of open societies that tolerate bona fide criticism of high-profile individuals. These women are targeted because of their gender and perceived ethnicity and because their work—even if only partially focused on topics that irritate the Chinese party-state—has a global reach. For the CCP, this potent mix is enough for it to invest serious resources into harming these women and seeking to deny them a public voice. It’s only a matter of time before the CCP expands its targeting to include politicians, industry leaders and other public figures who work on China. That would be consistent with the CCP’s increasingly aggressive interference in the political processes of democracies.

That these campaigns remain so prevalent, despite global media coverage and efforts from high-profile commentators to bring them to Twitter’s attention, highlights the massive scale of this problem. Much more work is required for social media platforms and policymakers to tackle the CCP’s increasingly global efforts to censor and interfere in public debates, to threaten and harass individuals and to spread disinformation outside China’s borders.

We propose eight recommendations for governments and social media platforms, focusing on enforcement, building deterrence, public signalling and transparency.

1. Social media platforms must better enforce their rules and terms of service prohibiting harassment, hateful conduct and threats of violence—all rules we saw repeatedly broken by many of the inauthentic accounts taking part in this campaign. Platforms should also invest more resources in beefing up their capabilities, human and technical, to identify and remove inauthentic material.

2. Social media platforms need to urgently shift their thinking and move from taking down these campaigns through a defensive ‘whack-a-mole’ approach to a more proactive stance. As an example, limiting searches of these women’s names, as appears to have occurred in some cases, is a band-aid solution that also punishes the victim. This feature may limit public access to some of the inauthentic activity under a particular search term, but it can also censor everything the public can see about that person—including authentic media about that person or their work and their own tweets. Restricting the reach of all content about and tweeted by the women who are being targeted just limits their voice further. Instead, platforms could remove access to the tweet analytics, such as impressions or engagements, of accounts identified in coordinated information campaigns. Depriving the operator of the metrics required to assess the impact of their operations will disrupt plans for future iterations.

3. Political leaders and parliamentary bodies, including in Australia, must take greater responsibility for ensuring that foreign states can’t so easily manipulate Western social media platforms to target elections, public discourse and individuals. Given the rapid rate at which CCP information operations are proliferating, it’s time for parliamentary bodies to commission dedicated inquiries into Chinese cyber-enabled foreign interference. They should work with all major social media platforms to share technical data with third-party researchers and cybersecurity experts. The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reports on Russia’s Internet Research Agency and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence agency, could act as models.

4. Cyber-enabled foreign interference, in all its forms, needs to become a standard focus for governments in both cyber and national security strategies. Online interference often receives minimal attention in government strategies because of artificial and unnecessary distinctions between whether cyberspace is being used to commit malicious behaviour, is enabling malicious behaviour or is only a vector. This distracts from dealing with the problem. Cyber-enabled foreign interference is a growing policy challenge for democracies, yet most democracies only focus on it before an election. The result is that most other online interference that’s occurring falls through the cracks between policy and intelligence agencies. The reality is that we’re not even tasked or institutionally set to deal with a threat at which our adversaries excel. In Australia, the departments of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs and Trade need to coordinate and lead on implementing policies to build greater deterrence, and they must engage closely with social media platforms as they undertake a more proactive stance.

5. Democracies should establish an Indo-Pacific hybrid threats centre. This could be modelled on the NATO–EU Hybrid Centre of Excellence in Finland, while reflecting the differences between the European and Indo-Pacific security environments. It would contribute to regional stability and enhance cooperation on the emerging security challenges countries in the region are struggling with while having few places to turn to for support and information sharing. The centre would build broader situational awareness on hybrid threats across the region and build confidence through measures supporting research and analysis, greater regional engagement, information sharing and capacity building.

6. Democratic governments should step up their global signalling. A group of democracies led by the US, Australia and the UK, whose citizens are targeted in this campaign, should coordinate a joint statement denouncing harassment and disinformation campaigns. Diplomats should work with the UN special rapporteur for freedom of opinion and expression and the new UN high commissioner for human rights to investigate the perpetrators of such online attacks.

7. Governments should do much more to deter this activity, with costs placed on the Chinese government’s transnational repression by summoning China’s ambassadors and consuls-general to explain the CCP’s disinformation campaigns and ongoing threats targeting these women. For Australia, the government should raise the harmful practice in bilateral meetings with Beijing counterparts—as was done in 2016–17 on cyber-enabled intellectual property theft.

8. Finally, governments need to consider forcing platforms to disclose cyber-enabled foreign interference activity. While there are differences in the content and impact, data-breach notification requirements around the world could provide a template for how policymakers build a system requiring social media platforms to disclose state-backed inauthentic activity on their platforms. While some platforms, including Twitter and Facebook, disclose such activity, others don’t, or do so rarely. But few platforms disclose all activity and many don’t disclose foreign interference in a timely fashion. And, as we’ve highlighted, none invest enough resources in tracking and removing such activity.

Elon Musk has an opportunity to prioritise policy areas such as preventing state-backed information campaigns, disinformation and online harms. But we cannot rely on Musk—and the challenge is far greater than any single platform. Too many policymakers and regulators have been overinvested in admiring the problems and underinvested in developing policy to solve them. They must step up and produce those policies.

While we wait for action, smart Asian women across the globe are being threatened and viciously abused every day by the world’s newest superpower.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Danielle Cave · November 6, 2022

8. With Biden and Xi to meet, China warns U.S. on Taiwan briefing

I am sorry, China. This is what friends, partners, and allies do. And you do not have veto power over what we do.

Excerpts:

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan announced the plan to brief Taiwan about the talks on Thursday, telling reporters the United States aimed to make Taiwan feel "secure and comfortable" about U.S. support.

But Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said any such briefing by the United States for Taiwan would violate a U.S. promise to maintain only non-official contacts with the island.

"It is egregious in nature. China is firmly opposed to it," Zhao told a regular briefing, shortly after the ministry announced that Xi would meet Biden and also attend the G20 meeting and a later APEC summit next week.

With Biden and Xi to meet, China warns U.S. on Taiwan briefing

Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard

BEIJING, Nov 11 (Reuters) - China on Friday condemned a White House plan to brief Taiwan on the results of a much-anticipated meeting between President Joe Biden and his counterpart, Xi Jinping, next week on the sidelines of a G20 gathering in Indonesia.

The two leaders will meet on Monday, the White House said, for their first face-to-face meeting since Biden became president, amid low expectations for significant breakthroughs. China confirmed the planned meeting but did not give a date.

Ties between China and the United States are at their worst in decades, strained over issues including trade and technology, human rights and Taiwan, the self-governed democratic island that Beijing claims as its territory. Taiwan rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims.

White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan announced the plan to brief Taiwan about the talks on Thursday, telling reporters the United States aimed to make Taiwan feel "secure and comfortable" about U.S. support.

But Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said any such briefing by the United States for Taiwan would violate a U.S. promise to maintain only non-official contacts with the island.

"It is egregious in nature. China is firmly opposed to it," Zhao told a regular briefing, shortly after the ministry announced that Xi would meet Biden and also attend the G20 meeting and a later APEC summit next week.

Several analysts have said that both sides may use the talks to seek clarification on each other's "red lines", identify areas for cooperation and to stabilise relations, but significant progress is unlikely.

U.S. President Joe Biden speaks virtually with Chinese leader Xi Jinping from the White House in Washington, U.S. November 15, 2021. REUTERS/Jonathan Ernst

"I don't think we can expect any breakthrough," Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies told Reuters.

"They are able to finally get to meet face to face and convey each other's concerns to the other," he said.

Biden and Xi last met in person when Biden was vice president during the Obama administration.

"This face-to-face meeting will provide the Biden administration the best opportunity to test whether Xi recognises the importance of stable relations with the U.S. to China's own security and economy," said Susan Shirk, an author and professor at the University of California San Diego.

Xi's visit to Southeast Asia will be only his second foreign trip since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic.

When he travelled to Uzbekistan for a meeting of regional leaders in September, he skipped a dinner with 11 other heads of state because of his delegation's COVID-19 policy.

The G20 summit is on the Indonesian island of Bali, where Xi will also meet with his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, before travelling to Thailand for an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, the foreign ministry said.

Editing by Tony Munroe, Himani Sarkar and Raju Gopalakrishnan

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Martin Quin Pollard

9. What China’s new military leadership line-up says about Xi’s plans for Taiwan

What China’s new military leadership line-up says about Xi’s plans for Taiwan

By Lyle J. Morris South China Morning Post4 min

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Lyle J. Morris

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Published: 8:30am, 12 Nov, 2022

President Xi Jinping

While the world’s attention was focused on the appointment of Xi Jinping for an unprecedented third term at last month’s 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi quietly appointed a new line-up of military leaders. These six members – who will sit on the Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s top military body – will shape China’s military and security policy for the next five years, if not longer.

Their appointment also signals that Xi is more serious about Taiwan.

Personal relationships have long proved beneficial to upward mobility in Chinese politics, so it comes as no surprise that ties to Xi influenced the new CMC leadership. But two other interrelated traits seemed equally important, and potentially worrisome for the international community: operational experience in China’s Eastern Theatre Command (ETC), which oversees Taiwan military planning, and combat experience.

In other words, Taiwan – and the operational imperatives for a military contingency – appear to have been prominently on Xi’s mind in choosing his next slate of military leaders. While this might not necessarily translate to increased tension and confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, it does underscore a military-focused approach to the Taiwan problem.

The CMC is China’s highest military operational and decision-making body. Distinct from the Ministry of National Defence of the People’s Republic of China – whose primary purpose is to interface with foreign militaries and publish news about the Chinese military – the CMC has operational oversight of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s armed forces, and oversees its strategy, doctrine, personnel, equipment, and funding and assets, among other duties.

The body is led by Xi, its chairman, two vice-chairman and four other members who together form the nucleus of China’s military operations.

In past party congresses, the choice of civilians to serve as vice-chairman meant that an heir apparent for General Secretary had been chosen. Xi himself and former Chinese presidents Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin all served as vice-chairmen before taking over as General Secretary of the Communist Party and chairman of the CMC. This year, as expected, Xi did not choose any civilians for the role, suggesting his control and consolidation of power within the PLA and CMC is undiminished.

Personal ties have proved the determining factor for Xi’s new CMC roster. Its highest ranking vice-chairman, General Zhang Youxia, is one of Xi’s most trusted officers in the PLA: his father Zhang Zongxun, a founding member of the PLA, served alongside Xi’s father Xi Zhongxun during the founding of the People’s Republic.

Zhang, who served as the second vice-chair on the last CMC, was so desirable a choice that Xi brought him on to serve another term despite Zhang being 72, breaking the normal protocol for retirement at 68.

Below Zhang is General He Weidong, a fellow vice-chairman, and new CMC member Admiral Miao Hua, both of whom were working in Fujian province in the late 1990s and early 2000s when Xi was the province’s deputy party secretary and governor. Xi and He also reportedly overlapped when Xi was party secretary of Zhejiang province.

02:03

China’s 20th party congress concludes with bigger than expected leadership reshuffle

Beyond these close connections, the new line-up of leaders stands out for several reasons.

It was not that big of a surprise that Xi chose to retain Zhang Youxia, a close and experienced ally. The appointment of the other vice-chairman, He Weidong, was.

He recently served as commander of the ETC, with responsibility over Taiwan and the East China Sea. He also served briefly on the CMC’s joint operations command centre – the top joint command and control centre of the PLA. In this sense, He is arguably one of the most knowledgeable military planners on Taiwan in the PLA.

However, He had not previously served on the Central Committee of the Communist Party nor on the CMC – two preparatory posts for future vice-chairman spots. Xi essentially had He jump two grades to land the second CMC vice-chairmanship – a strong sign of endorsement, and an unmistakable signal that operational experience near Taiwan matters for military leadership.

When viewed in the context of the other CMC appointments, He’s rise raises alarm bells about the implications for military tension between the People’s Republic and Taiwan.

With his new roster, Xi has signalled that in addition to personal ties, combat and operational experience also matter. Zhang and new CMC committee member, Liu Zhenli, are two of only a handful of generals in China who have served during the Sino-Vietnam war of the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Meanwhile, new appointee Miao Hua has an extensive background in military districts in Xiamen opposite Taiwan.

Taken together, these appointments may offer the clearest signs yet that Xi aims to focus the PLA even more on a possible Taiwan contingency. While not a prediction of confrontation, it does demonstrate that a background in combat and in the planning of a Taiwan scenario may be variables that matter in Xi’s choice of military leaders.

Lyle J. Morris is a senior fellow for foreign policy and national security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis

10. Ukraine works to stabilize Kherson after Russian pullout

I am still waiting for the Russian hammer to drop. I wonder if we will see a major missile assault by Russia after Ukraine forces consolidate in the city. Perhaps right in the middle of ongoing celebrations of the liberation.

Ukraine works to stabilize Kherson after Russian pullout

AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA · November 12, 2022

MYKOLAIV, Ukraine (AP) — The Ukrainian military carried out “stabilization measures” near the southern city of Kherson on Saturday following the end of an eight-month occupation by Russian forces, a retreat that cast a further pall on President Vladimir Putin’s designs to take over large parts of Ukraine.

People across Ukraine awoke from a night of jubilant celebrating after the Kremlin announced its troops had withdrawn to the other side of the Dnieper River from Kherson, the only regional capital captured by Russia’s military during the ongoing invasion.

In a regular social media update Saturday, the General Staff of Ukraine’s armed forces said Russian forces were fortifying their battle lines on the river’s eastern bank after abandoning the capital. About 70% of the Kherson region remains under Russian control.

Ukrainian officials from President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on down cautioned that while special military units had reached Kherson city, a full deployment to reinforce the advance troops still was underway. On Friday, Ukraine’s intelligence agency said it thought some Russian soldiers stayed behind, ditching their uniforms for civilian clothes to avoid detection.

“Even when the city is not yet completely cleansed of the enemy’s presence, the people of Kherson themselves are already removing Russian symbols and any traces of the occupiers’ stay in Kherson from the streets and buildings,” Zelenskyy said in his nightly video address on Friday.

Russia-Ukraine war

Photos circulating Saturday on social media showed Ukrainian activists removing memorial plaques put up by the occupation authorities the Kremlin installed to run the Kherson region. A Telegram post on the channel of Yellow Ribbon, a self-described Ukrainian “public resistance” movement, showed two people in a park taking down plaques picturing what appeared to be Soviet-era military figures.

Moscow’s announcement that Russian forces planned to withdraw across the Dnieper River, which divides both the Kherson region and Ukraine, followed a stepped-up Ukrainian counteroffensive in the country’s south.

In the last two months, Ukraine’s military claimed to have reclaimed dozens of towns and villages north of Kherson city, and the Ukrainian General Staff said that’s where the stabilization activities were taking place.

The Russian retreat represented a significant setback for the Kremlin some six weeks after Putin annexed the Kherson region and three others provinces in southern and eastern Ukraine in breach of international law and in the face of widespread condemnation. The Russian leader unequivocally asserted the illegally claimed areas as Russian territory.

Russian state news agency TASS quoted an official in Kherson’s Kremlin-appointed administration on Saturday as saying that Henichesk, a city on the Azov Sea some 200 kilometers (125 miles) southeast of Kherson city, would serve as the region’s “temporary capital” after the withdrawal across the Dnieper.

Ukrainian media derided the announcement, with daily newspaper Ukrainskaya Pravda saying Russia “had made up a new capital” for the region.

Like Zelenskyy, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba sought to temper the excitement over the invaded nation’s latest morale boost. “We are winning battles on the ground, but the war continues,” he said from Cambodia, where he was attending a meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Kuleba also brought up the prospect of the Ukrainian army finding evidence of possible Russian war crimes in Kherson, just as it did after the Russian Defense Ministry pulled back its forces in the Kyiv and Kharkiv regions earlier in the way.

“Every time we liberate a piece of our territory, when we enter a city liberated from Russian army, we find torture rooms and mass graves with civilians tortured and murdered by Russian army in the course of the occupation of these territories,” Ukraine’s top diplomat said. “It’s not easy to speak with people like this. But I said that every war ends with diplomacy and Russia has to approach talks in good faith.”

U.S. assessments this week showed Russia’s war in Ukraine may already have killed or wounded tens of thousands of civilians and hundreds of thousands of soldiers.

Despite the advances in Kherson, other parts of Ukraine continued to face civilian casualties, energy shortages and other fallout from Russian military attacks and Putin’s illegal annexation of Ukraine’s Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk and Zaporizhzhia regions.

The state-owned electricity grid operator, Ukrenergo, announced emergency blackouts — which could go on indefinitely — in eight regions that included Kyiv, where a Russian military strike hit an energy facility critical to supplies to the capital.

Ukrenergo said scheduled one-hour blackouts, which are temporary and limited in time, also would continue daily in central and northern Ukraine.

Moscow has admitted targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure with drone and rocket strikes since early October. Ukrainian officials reported said last month that 40% of the country’s electric power system had been severely damaged.

While much of the focus was on southern Ukraine, Russia continued its grinding offensive in Ukraine’s industrial east, targeting in particular the Donetsk region city of Bakhmut, the Donetsk region, the Ukrainian General Staff said.

Donetsk Gov. Pavlo Kyrylenko reported Saturday that two civilians were killed and four wounded over the last day as battles heated up around Bakhmut and Avdiivka, a small city that has remained in Ukrainian hands throughout the war.

Russia’s continued push for Bakhmut demonstrates the Kremlin’s desire for visible gains following weeks of clear setbacks. Taking the city would open the way for a possible push onto other Ukrainian strongholds in the heavily contested Donetsk region. A reinvigorated eastern offensive could also potentially stall or derail Kyiv’s ongoing advances in the south.

Kyrylenko, in a Facebook post Saturday, also pointed to “intense shelling” by Russia overnight of two other Ukrainian-held cities: Lyman, near the border with the neighboring Luhansk region, and Vuhledar, southwest of Donetsk’s separatist-controlled capital of the same name.

Luhansk Gov. Serhii Haidai said Ukrainian forces had recaptured 11 unnamed settlements in his province but their advance was “not as rapid as in other regions.”

“We congratulate Kherson on its homecoming!” Haidai posted on Telegram. In Luhansk, the “occupiers continue to dig in and gather reinforcements, mine everything around them.”

In the Dnipropetrovsk region west of Donetsk, Russia kept up its shelling of communities near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the Ukrainian regional governor said. Russia and Ukraine have long traded blame for shelling in and around the plant, Europe’s largest.

Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser, reemphasized that the United States would defer to Ukrainian authorities on whether or when to negotiate with Russia about a possible end to the conflict.

“Russia invaded Ukraine,” Sullivan told reporters on Air Force One en route to Phnom Penh, Cambodia, as part of a trip by President Joe Biden to international summits in southeast Asia.

“If Russia chose to stop fighting in Ukraine and left, it would be the end of the war,” Sullivan said. “If Ukraine chose to stop fighting and give up, it would be the end of Ukraine.”

___

Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine: https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine

AP · by HANNA ARHIROVA · November 12, 2022

11. Russia spreads fake news about infected donor blood for Ukrainian army from NATO

Excerpt:

The Russian news site Mash is part of the News Media holding. According to information from open sources, it was closely linked to the state in different years of its existence.

Russia spreads fake news about infected donor blood for Ukrainian army from NATO

ukrinform.net

The Russian Telegram channel Mash spread false information that Ukraine had received canned blood for the Armed Forces of Ukraine from NATO member countries, with HIV and hepatitis allegedly found in the blood.

The Telegram channel claimed it had received an electronic version of a letter from Ukraine's Minister of Health Viktor Liashko to Prime Minister Denys Shmygal from Kombatant group hackers, which allegedly stated that the Ministry of Health had requested 62,000 liters of blood from member countries of NATO for the wounded in the Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia regions, but HIV and hepatitis were found in the blood.

The letter stated that Ukrainian experts from the Ministry of Health selectively analyzed the blood that was given to them in July-October 2022. In the samples of the first group, they detected 6.3% of samples with HIV, 7.4% with hepatitis B and 3.2% with hepatitis C. In the second group, they detected 5.9%, 6.8% and 3.1% respectively.

Such information turned out to be another fake news that Ukraine's Ministry of Health officially denied. The point is that during the war, Ukraine never received donor blood from foreign partners. According to the Ministry of Health, the state has built a national blood service that works according to European standards and enables patients to receive high-quality and safe components of donor blood.

Since the beginning of the war, citizens of Ukraine have reliably provided a "donor front," and planned donation supports blood reserves. The Ministry of Health noted that if there is an urgent need for supplies in blood centers, people actively respond to requests and close such needs within a few hours.

In addition, it was noted that Ukraine does not carry out random checks - blood and components are tested in labs, and patients receive only a safe product.

Finally, the Ministry of Health noted that the letter published by the Telegram channel Mash does not meet the requirements for issuing official documents in Ukraine.

The Ministry of Health also recalled that the initiative "Your Blood Can Fight. Become a Donor" is underway in Ukraine. It aims not only to encourage blood donation, but also to form a permanent register of potential donors who, if necessary, can replenish blood reserves, help Ukrainian patients and support the country's defense capabilities.

The Russian news site Mash is part of the News Media holding. According to information from open sources, it was closely linked to the state in different years of its existence.

Dmytro Badrak

ukrinform.net

12. Biden Says Wants To End 'Political Warfare' With Republicans

This is why we cannot use George Kennan's or Paul Smith's political warfare constructs. Political Warfare DOES NOT equal domestic partisan politics. With all due respect to President Biden, he is talking about politics not political warfare.

I will sound very hypocritical here but I think we use the term warfare to describe too much and that gets us into trouble and hampers our strategic thinking. So to follow my own logic I am wrong to use political warfare. However I would make two points. First for our adversaries politics is war by other means. Second Kennan and Smith have provided some of the best descriptions of the environment below the threshold of war - or as the new NDS states: "Competitors now commonly seek adverse changes in the status quo using gray zone methods – coercive approaches that may fall below perceived thresholds for U.S. military action and across areas of responsibility of different parts of the US government." (Page 6). I argue that political warfare is the best description for strategic competition in the "gray zone" (which is used 12 twelve times in the NDS). Show me I am wrong.

Biden Says Wants To End 'Political Warfare' With Republicans

Barron's · by AFP - Agence France Presse

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US President Joe Biden appealed for political unity Wednesday after midterm elections in which his party looked set to narrowly lose control of the House of Representatives, calling for an end to "endless political warfare."

"I'm prepared to work with my Republican colleagues," he said. "The future of America's too promising to be trapped in an endless political warfare."

aue-wd/bgs/ec

Barron's · by AFP - Agence France Presse

George F. Kennan defined political warfare as “the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace.” While stopping short of the direct kinetic confrontation between two countries’ armed forces, “political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command… to achieve its national objectives.” A country embracing Political Warfare conducts “both overt and covert” operations in the absence of declared war or overt force-on-force hostilities. Efforts “range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures…, and ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.” See George Kennan, "Policy Planning Memorandum." May 4, 1948.

http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm

Political warfare is the use of political means to compel an opponent to do one's will, based on hostile intent. The term political describes the calculated interaction between a government and a target audience to include another state's government, military, and/or general population. Governments use a variety of techniques to coerce certain actions, thereby gaining relative advantage over an opponent. The techniques include propaganda and psychological operations (PSYOP), which service national and military objectives respectively. Propaganda has many aspects and a hostile and coercive political purpose. Psychological operations are for strategic and tactical military objectives and may be intended for hostile military and civilian populations. Smith, Paul A., On Political War (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989)

https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a233501.pdf

13. Future Wars: The Way Forward

A view from India:

Excerpts:

This should certainly give China pause as its military organisation, adapted from the Russian (Soviet) system, with its inherent leadership, logistics and manpower weaknesses, is attempting to transform itself into a force reliant wholly on high end technology. Whatever be said, given the American experience, this may not be the best way forward.

It must be added that we on the other hand, have not been particularly adept at incorporating technology. Our advantage lies in an extremely motivated, trained and battle hardened force, which this Government has decided to reshape through its unviable Agnipath Scheme,for unfathomable reasons.

Still, this can hardly be the reason for anyone to suggest that “In his first article since retirement, General MM Naravane (the former Chief) has exposed Indian Army’s lack of understanding of present and future wars”, as one prominent editor of a Defence Journal has done. This unseemly remark only suggests that he has probably let his ego get the better of his common sense and that, as American author JR Landsdale writes “is the way to give your soul to the devil, an inch at a time.”

Future Wars: The Way Forward - Indian Defence Review

indiandefencereview.com · by November 11, 2022 at 1:33 pm

Home > News > Military & Aerospace > Future Wars: The Way Forward

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Future Wars: The Way Forward

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Issue Net Edition | Date : 10 Nov , 2022

Over the years, national security issues have gained in importance and face constant and detailed scrutiny from a wide variety of practitioners, researchers, analysts and journalists. This is indeed an excellent development as it keeps the government and its security establishment, including the military, on its toes.

It is no secret that they tend to use secrecy as a cover to hide their interminable turf battles and their ineptness and lack of clarity when things go wrong. The imbroglio in Eastern Ladakhis a good example of this phenomenon, where reasoned debate remains stymied for the most part by lack of verifiable information.

While examination of past events allows for a forensic audit and subsequent corrective measures, what is equally important is the necessity into look to the future. Especially, how wars will be fought and won. Not only are we in the midst of a “clash of civilisations” that is upending existing geo-political equations, but we also face the challenge that disruptive technologies impact on warfare.

As weapons, organisations, doctrines and tactics are closely intertwined and interdependent, the importance of visualizing the future technological environment cannot be overstated. However, what makes this truly difficult and complex are factors such as rapid rate of technological obsolescence and the inevitable time lag between R&D, trials and introduction of the weapon system into service. Of necessity, it must remain in service for a couple of decades to be economically viable and provide an acceptable return on investment, apart from issues connected with skills development and training infrastructures. Off the shelf procurements, while feasible to a limited extent come with their own set of problems.

The American experience in this regard is particularly illustrative and relevant in our context. The end of the Cold War left the United States as the only military power of consequence with relatively weak opponents and the possibility of large scale conventional wars drastically reduced. With strategic imperatives clearly defining the need for ensuring minimal casualties, and a rapid and successful termination of any crisis that impacted US interests or required US intervention, the military looked towards its economic and technological edge to achieve its objectives.

It embraced revolution in military affairs (RMA) and network centric warfare (NCW), based on superior information and communication technologies (ICT), as the cornerstone of its “Force Transformation” agenda. This led to smaller high quality forces supported by precision munitions and a potent and highly effective command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) capabilities. This transformation paid off in the First Gulf War of 1991, and to an extent in the initial phases of the subsequent offensives in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Its limitations were, however, clearly brought out in the continuing and protracted campaigns of attrition that followed as the challenge of asymmetric or irregular warfare accentuated the inadequate availability of “boots on the ground”, lack of social and cultural awareness of the enemy and poor understanding of and training in counter-insurgency operations. Much of the blame for its poor showing lies on its leaderships fascination with technology and its version of RMA, along with its utter contempt for capabilities of its potential third world adversaries.

The ongoing Ukraine Conflict has to an extent cleared the air on the impact of transformative technologies. Whilst satellites, drones, RPVs, smart munitions etc have proved their worth, given the quantities that have been provided by NATO to Ukraine. They have, however, not really transformed the battlefield and it is the better trained and motivated Ukrainian Defence Forces, mostly equipped with Soviet Era weapon systems, that is giving the Russians a run for their money.

As the American and Russian experiences show, we are in an era where any conflict is unlikely to be purely in the realm of the conventional. It will also incorporate irregular, information, cyber and other domains, in what is commonly referred to as Hybrid War. In such an environment technology has its place but is not the sole war winning factor as some analysts believe.

This should certainly give China pause as its military organisation, adapted from the Russian (Soviet) system, with its inherent leadership, logistics and manpower weaknesses, is attempting to transform itself into a force reliant wholly on high end technology. Whatever be said, given the American experience, this may not be the best way forward.

It must be added that we on the other hand, have not been particularly adept at incorporating technology. Our advantage lies in an extremely motivated, trained and battle hardened force, which this Government has decided to reshape through its unviable Agnipath Scheme,for unfathomable reasons.

Still, this can hardly be the reason for anyone to suggest that “In his first article since retirement, General MM Naravane (the former Chief) has exposed Indian Army’s lack of understanding of present and future wars”, as one prominent editor of a Defence Journal has done. This unseemly remark only suggests that he has probably let his ego get the better of his common sense and that, as American author JR Landsdale writes “is the way to give your soul to the devil, an inch at a time.”

The views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily represent the opinions or policies of the Indian Defence Review.

About the Author

Brig Deepak Sinha

is a Military Veteran. He is a Visiting Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation and a Senior Visiting Fellow with The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai.

14. Biden’s Chance with China

Conclusion:

Biden should also use the rare meeting with Xi to address any misunderstanding created by his comments about Taiwan to 60 Minutes in September, despite his reassurance that the United States is “not encouraging” Taiwan independence. (He had said that, “Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. . . . That’s their decision,” raising concerns that the United States was making an unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan, even if the island were to formally declare independence and provoke a Chinese attack.) Biden should clarify, as he did at the UN General Assembly, that the United States continues to oppose unilateral changes in the status quo by either side and would act to oppose unilateral steps toward formal independence, permanent separation, or U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The credibility of U.S. assurances to maintain the status quo is essential to the success of U.S. deterrence efforts. Biden should also make more explicit the conditions under which the U.S. would expand or relax restrictions and sanctions against China, so as to make clear that U.S. policies are a calibrated and proportionate effort designed to shape Chinese policies and behavior rather than unconditional efforts aimed at containment.

By setting the stage for officials on both sides to reopen and expand channels of communication, the meeting could begin to put the relationship on a better course—marking the first signs of an inflection point that begins to decelerate the spiral toward conflict. Otherwise, U.S.-Chinese competition risks becoming an end unto itself, pressing leaders in Beijing and Washington to embrace maximalist positions meant to thwart each other and crowding out attention and resources for tackling global challenges like climate change and pandemics. For the welfare, freedom, and prosperity of peoples in both countries, and the wider world, leaders in Beijing and Washington should invest more in strategies and metrics of success defined by the future they seek, not the future they fear. But without greater efforts to put a floor beneath the U.S.-Chinese relationship, including clearer expectations around what competitive efforts are above the belt and below the belt, the current dynamic will continue to strengthen the most hardline voices on both sides, marginalizing the voices and judgments of those who would pursue competition on less zero-sum terms.

Biden’s Chance with China

How Meeting With Xi Can Redefine a Dangerous Rivalry

By Jessica Chen Weiss

November 11, 2022

Foreign Affairs · by Jessica Chen Weiss · November 11, 2022

As Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden sit down for a rare face-to-face meeting in Bali, Indonesia, on November 14, both leaders are confronting acute challenges at home. Despite his newly confirmed third term as China’s top leader, Xi faces far-reaching economic challenges. He is grappling with how and when to loosen the draconian zero-COVID policies that have angered Chinese citizens and battered investor confidence. Adding to the pressure are the country’s flagging growth and ambitious modernization targets, which have been further challenged by a new U.S. ban on advanced semiconductor exports to China. For his part, Biden faces a difficult domestic political environment, despite better than expected results in the U.S. midterms: with high inflation, and potential loss of control of the House of Representatives, he now confronts the prospect of strengthened opposition to his administration and its policies.

Yet these domestic challenges should not distract from the strategic value of the Biden-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting, the first direct encounter between the two leaders since Biden’s election in 2020. In fact, even if they make it politically more difficult, the domestic headwinds that each leader faces may offer further incentives to both stabilize the spiral of actions and reactions and establish new rules of fair play and an affirmative vision to discipline the competition. In the meeting and beyond, both leaders have a crucial opportunity to put a floor beneath the relationship in ways that benefit both countries.

For one thing, amid acute political and economic challenges on both sides of the Pacific, it is no longer clear whether time is on Washington’s or Beijing’s side—whether the future will increasingly favor China or the United States. That means both sides have every reason to seek greater stability in the near term, even as they invest in their ability to compete for the years to come. So long as this goal does not require either side to make fundamental concessions or accept a subordinate status to the other, both the United States and China would benefit from a period of détente. Moreover, bending the trajectory of competition away from enmity and conflict will also free up the political space and resources on both sides to drive forward an inclusive, affirmative vision of the future that measures success in terms of positive achievements, rather than by the extent to which the other’s capabilities and initiatives can be downgraded or blocked.

Accordingly, in Bali and in the weeks to come, Biden should make clear that the United States is prepared to work with China through multilateral forums like the G-20 to address global challenges, including debt sustainability and food insecurity, while at the same time seeking a mutual understanding with Xi about what kinds of actions are in and out of bounds. Efforts by the two leaders to establish a modus vivendi will be made more challenging, but no less important, by recent U.S. actions to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors, combined with growing congressional activism and Biden’s own recent statements on Taiwan. Although each side is likely to treat any assurances and diplomatic overtures from the other with skepticism, both Biden and Xi should come prepared to test the proposition that the two governments could begin a range of discussions in areas of shared concern and explore potential terms of coexistence, including a positive-sum vision of global governance that both sides can plausibly live with. Such an approach would need to be backed up with meaningful actions to demonstrate good faith and would likely take time to achieve tangible results. But the alternative—an accelerating spiral toward crisis or even conflict without meaningful channels of communication—would be far worse for the two countries and for the world.

An Avoidable Collision

As I wrote in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs, the United States and China have been on a collision course. Worse, the action-reaction dynamic has increasingly pushed policymakers in both countries to define success in terms of their ability to thwart the other. If not checked, this escalatory spiral could lead to a crisis over Taiwan, exacerbate the erosion of the “rules-based international order,” and further constrict domestic space in both countries for pragmatic policy discussions that focus on results rather than on sounding tough. In the months since House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August, this cycle has continued, despite efforts by both governments to prevent demonstrations of resolve from precipitating a direct military conflict.

Indeed, despite fragile efforts to avoid a crisis, a growing chorus of commentators, and even some U.S. officials, have warned that Russia’s war in Ukraine is just a “warm-up” for a much more significant and protracted conflict with China. Some analysts have even suggested that war with China over Taiwan is unavoidable. Many of these comments refer to a supposed deadline or window for China to use force to retake Taiwan within the next two to five years. The theory is that Xi is looking for the earliest opportunity to attack Taiwan, whether because he is becoming more confident in China's military capabilities or because he perceives that military and political trends are tilting against China.

A war over Taiwan is no longer unthinkable, but it is by no means inevitable.

But there are many reasons think that such assumptions are misguided. For one thing, the argument for a near-term action against Taiwan presupposes a deadline that Xi has not actually set, conflating military modernization goals with a timeline for using force. Although Xi has previously linked the Party’s 2049 goal of “national rejuvenation” to “reunification,” his address to the 20th Party Congress in October did not include accelerated targets for military modernization or more aggressive language against Taiwan independence. If anything, Xi emphasized that “We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort.” And as John Culver, former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, has pointed out, there is no sign that Xi is currently mobilizing the military or country for a major assault or invasion of Taiwan. More concerning is the risk that politicians in the United States and Taiwan take formal steps to assert the island’s status as a permanently separate and sovereign country. Already, a number of former U.S. officials have called on Washington to reconsider its “one China” policy and recognize Taiwan as an independent state. Rather than dissuade Beijing, such dramatic steps could hasten even more coercive measures against Taiwan and ultimately provoke the very attack the United States seeks to deter.

A war over Taiwan is no longer unthinkable, but it is by no means inevitable, especially if the United States acts to bolster the credibility of the conditional threats and conditional assurances that have preserved the peace for decades. The growing fatalism of some commentators neglects the interest that the United States, China, Taiwan, and the world all share in avoiding a shooting war. Even if such a conflict were restricted to conventional weapons and avoided nuclear escalation, it would likely involve casualties on a scale not seen since the Vietnam or Korean wars and the devastation of the global economy, and the destruction of the lives and hard-won democratic freedoms of 24 million people in Taiwan. And although there may be bipartisan support in Washington for getting tough on China, polling makes clear that there is no such consensus over whether the United States should risk the lives of tens of thousands of U.S. troops to defend Taiwan. Despite this uncertainty, many well-intentioned calls for change in U.S. policy underestimate the possibility that change could make the situation far worse. Consider that in a September survey of U.S. experts and former government officials about China’s approach to Taiwan, 77 percent said China would immediately invade if Taiwan were to declare independence, whether or not Beijing felt confident it could win that fight.

More Engagement, More Deterrence

As the United States and Taiwan pursue efforts to make the island harder to invade, the best strategic bet is to play for time. This does not mean backing off or simply acquiescing to Beijing’s demands. No unilateral concessions—either given or demanded—would be wise, given fears on each side that such accommodations would be pocketed or exploited by the other. But coordinated measures taken in reciprocal fashion could enable Washington and Beijing to move back from the brink without sacrificing defense preparedness or deterrence. In fact, mutual, proportional steps taken to reduce the frequency and proximity of military operations near Taiwan, including finding ways to dial back the recent increase in Chinese maneuvers across the centerline of the Taiwan Strait, would be beneficial to the island’s defense.

Efforts to lower the temperature should also be paired with efforts to jump-start discussions on issues where the United States and China could work together, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Such steps would also go a long way toward reassuring allies and partners that the United States shares their desire for a productive relationship with China, and that Washington’s recent unilateral export controls do not herald a fundamental shift in U.S. policy that is aimed at containing and isolating China.

The United States and its partners can still shape a modus vivendi with Beijing.

The United States and its partners can still shape a modus vivendi with Beijing by making any rewards and punishments conditional on Chinese actions. This requires making clear that if China’s leaders change their behavior, they can expect to be rewarded rather than exploited. As former National Security Council official Mike Green recently noted, “The current U.S. approach has left allies and partners wondering what the American endgame is for relations with China. If they haven’t given up on shaping China, neither should the United States.”

Renewed efforts at diplomatic engagement are unlikely to bear fruit immediately, given the deep distrust on both sides and the challenge of establishing channels of communication that transcend exchanges of talking points. But high-level diplomatic engagement is valuable for empowering policy officials to begin a process of working out potential terms of coexistence and competition that would set expectations, reduce the risk of war, and make space for cooperation on shared interests.

Conditional Is Better

Biden should also use the rare meeting with Xi to address any misunderstanding created by his comments about Taiwan to 60 Minutes in September, despite his reassurance that the United States is “not encouraging” Taiwan independence. (He had said that, “Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. . . . That’s their decision,” raising concerns that the United States was making an unconditional commitment to defend Taiwan, even if the island were to formally declare independence and provoke a Chinese attack.) Biden should clarify, as he did at the UN General Assembly, that the United States continues to oppose unilateral changes in the status quo by either side and would act to oppose unilateral steps toward formal independence, permanent separation, or U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The credibility of U.S. assurances to maintain the status quo is essential to the success of U.S. deterrence efforts. Biden should also make more explicit the conditions under which the U.S. would expand or relax restrictions and sanctions against China, so as to make clear that U.S. policies are a calibrated and proportionate effort designed to shape Chinese policies and behavior rather than unconditional efforts aimed at containment.

By setting the stage for officials on both sides to reopen and expand channels of communication, the meeting could begin to put the relationship on a better course—marking the first signs of an inflection point that begins to decelerate the spiral toward conflict. Otherwise, U.S.-Chinese competition risks becoming an end unto itself, pressing leaders in Beijing and Washington to embrace maximalist positions meant to thwart each other and crowding out attention and resources for tackling global challenges like climate change and pandemics. For the welfare, freedom, and prosperity of peoples in both countries, and the wider world, leaders in Beijing and Washington should invest more in strategies and metrics of success defined by the future they seek, not the future they fear. But without greater efforts to put a floor beneath the U.S.-Chinese relationship, including clearer expectations around what competitive efforts are above the belt and below the belt, the current dynamic will continue to strengthen the most hardline voices on both sides, marginalizing the voices and judgments of those who would pursue competition on less zero-sum terms.

JESSICA CHEN WEISS is the Michael J. Zak Professor for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Cornell University and a former Council on Foreign Relations Fellow on the U.S. Department of State Policy Planning Staff.

Foreign Affairs · by Jessica Chen Weiss · November 11, 2022

15. The Supreme Court Targets Military Readiness

The Supreme Court Targets Military Readiness

Former senior leaders are cautioning the Court not to scuttle affirmative action, which remains important to the service academies—and national security.

defenseone.com · by James Kitfield

On this Veterans Day, the nation would do well to heed retired military leaders who are alarmed by the Supreme Court’s apparent willingness to jeopardize U.S. national security in its eagerness to trample decades of precedent. Just last week the Supreme Court’s conservative majority indicated openness to banning any consideration of race in college admissions as a means to achieving a diverse student body.

“I’ve heard the word diversity quite a few times, and I don’t have a clue what it means,” said Justice Clarence Thomas, a longtime critic of affirmative action, during oral arguments on a pair of challenges to race-conscious admissions policies at Harvard and the University of North Carolina.

Putting aside the apparent cluelessness of just the second Black Justice to sit on the Supreme Court, an extraordinary friend-of-the-court brief filed in the case by former senior military leaders aptly described the meaning of diversity by noting its former absence in the U.S. officer corps.

“History has shown that placing a diverse Armed Forces under the command of a homogenous leadership is a recipe for internal resentment, discord and violence,” wrote the group, which includes four former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, six former superintendents of the service academies, and 17 retired four-star flag officers. Because most uniformed officers come from ROTC and the service academies that use race as one consideration in admissions, they noted, “the diversity of these institutions and programs directly impacts the diversity of our military’s leadership.”

The history of internal discord and violence that the group references, which many of them can remember firsthand, is the Vietnam War and its dismal aftermath. That history includes a young Army lieutenant and recent graduate of a de facto segregated West Point (where Black enrollment was less than one percent) who took command of a platoon in Pleiku province, South Vietnam, in 1971. As the incident was described to me by the late Lt. Gen. William McCaffrey, the second-in-command of troops in Vietnam at the time who investigated the incident, the green officer ordered some of his recalcitrant troops to join a unit on patrol, or else spend time in the stockade. Instead, four Black enlisted soldiers shouldered their weapons and gunned the lieutenant down in front of the entire platoon.

Such “fraggings” were just one insidious side effect of the acute racial tensions, drug use, and insubordination that beset the U.S. military in the latter stages of the Vietnam War. As the U.S. military began its gradual withdrawal from a losing war in Vietnam in the years between 1968 and 1972, the incidence of enlisted men trying to murder their officers with “fragmentation” grenades or other means increased dramatically. In all there were an estimated 830 actual and suspected such “fraggings” in Vietnam, with the number peaking at 333 in 1971. Scores of officers were murdered.

The costs of having an overwhelmingly white officer corps commanding troops in which African Americans were disproportionately fighting and dying had come due. During the Vietnam-era draft, Blacks made up more than 25 percent of some high-risk elite Army units and frontline Marine companies. According to the amicus brief recently filed by the retired senior military leaders, in 1969 and 1970 the Army catalogued more than 300 race-related disturbances, resulting in the deaths of 71 American troops. Racial tensions reached such a fever pitch that some bases were all but separated into armed camps of “bloods” and “whites.” Many white officers at the time have told me that they were afraid to inspect their own barracks without carrying a sidearm.

One notable officer who lived through the Army’s racial crisis was the late general Colin Powell, who would advance to become the nation’s first Black Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the highest position in the U.S. military. The son of Jamaican immigrants and a child of Harlem and the South Bronx, Powell was no stranger to racism and institutional bias. In an interview, he once told me of being turned away at a hamburger joint in Columbus, Georgia, back in the early 1960s, when he was stationed at Fort Benning. Negroes, he was told, had to use the back door.

While Powell was in Vietnam on his first tour in 1963, his wife and baby daughter had stayed with his in-laws in Birmingham, Alabama, where white supremacist Bull Connor was turning cattle-prod-wielding cops and attack dogs loose on civil rights marchers. Powell was on his second tour in Vietnam in 1968 when Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated, unleashing a tide of frustration and racial rage in the enlisted ranks. In South Korea in the early 1970s, he commanded a battalion in a division nearly paralyzed by racial tensions. At the time Powell was approached by anxious white counterparts asking him what to do, as if the only Black officer in their midst somehow had an easy answer to the plague of institutional racism.

The U.S. military has always held up a mirror to the society it serves, reflecting America’s strengths but also revealing its blemishes. In response to the racial crisis of the Vietnam era, the armed services concluded that they must embrace diversity in their officer corps as a national-security imperative, and they committed to race-conscious affirmative action in the service academies and ROTC programs as a key tool in trying to achieve that objective.

Even with affirmative action, the U.S. military’s record is far from perfect. In 2021, for instance, only two of the U.S. military’s 41 four-star flag officers were Black. However, the fact that the current entering West Point class of cadets is 12 percent African American, and the officer corps is now 9 percent Black, represents unmistakable and hard-won progress.

As did Powell’s ascendance to the highest echelons of the U.S. government, including becoming the first-ever Black Secretary of State and garnering the kind of respect due to the George Catlett Marshall of his generation of officers. It thus carried weight in 2003 when then-Secretary of State Powell broke ranks with the White House and his boss, former President George W. Bush, by coming to the defense of affirmative action in the landmark Grutter v. Bollinger case in which the Supreme Court reinforced the precedent that race could be considered in college admissions.

“I’m a strong believer in affirmative action,” Powell said at the time, noting that he had benefited from it. “I wish it was possible for everything to be race-neutral in this country, but I’m afraid we’re not yet at that point where things are race neutral.”

Nor are we a “race-neutral” country today. Ironically, with the U.S. military once again coping with the repercussions of a chaotic withdrawal from another losing war, and racial tensions spiked by the murder of George Floyd and the Black Lives Matter movement, the Supreme Court has chosen this moment to seriously consider overturning the precedent confirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger.

Before the justices reach their fateful decision and risk repeating historic folly, they would do well to at least consider the words of one Lila Holley, a Black former Army chief warrant officer, who noted that virtually all of the portraits of leaders of the armed forces over the past century displayed on the walls of the Pentagon’s E-ring are of white men.

“I walk their halls, and nobody on their wall looks like me,” Holley told New York Times defense reporter Helene Cooper last year. Until she gets to the one portrait that stands out. “I exhale when I see Colin Powell.”

That’s a clue, Justice Thomas, to the power of diversity.

James Kitfield is a Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress, and a three-time recipient of the Gerald R. Ford Award for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense. He is author of “Prodigal Soldiers: How the Generation of Officers Born of Vietnam Revolutionized the American Style of War”(Simon & Schuster).

defenseone.com · by James Kitfield

De Oppresso Liber,

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