|
Quotes of the Day:
"Strive not to be a success, but rather to be of value."
– Albert Einstein
"You should not honor men more than the truth."
– Plato
"It takes a great deal of courage to see the world in all its tainted glory, and still to love it."
– Oscar Wilde
1. Waltz as US national security adviser would fit Trump’s tough line on China: analysts
2. Trump is likely to name a loyalist as Pentagon chief after tumultuous first term
3. Trump Expected to Nominate Rubio for Secretary of State, and Picks Waltz as National Security Adviser
4. Loyalty Is Common Thread as Trump Fills Foreign Policy, Immigration Jobs
5. What Trump Can Do for the Military By Gary Anderson
6. The Five Things President Trump Should Do on Day One
7. Harvest of Power: Food as the New Frontier in Hybrid Warfare
8. Exxon Says Trump Should Keep U.S. in Paris Climate Pact
9. Harriet Tubman promoted posthumously to general in Maryland National Guard
10. Trump Faces a Different World in Term Two
11. Russians Train Foreign Mercenaries in Crimea to Use Children as Human Shields, Say Partisans
12. An Army general's final 'walk' at the Tomb of the Unknowns
13. A new commander in chief, North Korean troops’ online ‘extracurriculars’ and more military news
14. Megacities: Key Strategic Terrain of the Future
15. After War in Gaza, Rivals Hamas and Fatah Don’t Plan to Be in Charge
16. Trump's global agenda is set to bring peace - opinion
17. How the Gray Zone Challenges Western Norms of Conventional Warfare:
18. Tell Your Story – Veterans
19. Balancing Risk: Ensuring the Safety of U.S. Peacekeepers in U.N. Missions
20. The End of American Exceptionalism
21. China Should Be Worried About North Korea
22. Israeli Rescuers Are an Example for the West
23. Just How Authoritarian Are Americans?
24. Social Media and Misinformation: The Fight for Integrity!
25. Special forces soldier reveals Saddam Hussein's desperate words after being captured
26. Kendall: USAF Should Take Over Air Base Defense from Army
27. Advice for Trump 2.0: Cipher Brief Experts Weigh In
28. China Can't Win Trump's New Trade War | Opinion by Gordon G. Chang
29. An Alliance of America’s Greatest Foes Is Getting Tighter
30. Data suggest vast majority of Trump voters believe American values and prosperity are 'under threat'
31. Forbes: Taiwan quietly armed Ukraine with critical air defense systems
1. Waltz as US national security adviser would fit Trump’s tough line on China: analysts
The view from the South China Morning Post. I think he will be the first Green Beret as the National Security Advisor (Except for LTG Keith Kellogg who briefly served as the acting NSA between Flynn and H.R. McMaster)
Excerpts:
According to the Financial Times, he has said China is an “existential threat” to US interests, and that Washington needs to “make significant investments in our own readiness”.
Sun Chenghao, a fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, said Waltz was “definitely tough” on China, judging from the congressman’s past statements and record.
“Especially when it comes to dealing with the so-called China challenge,” Sun said. “I think he will pursue the idea of ‘winning’ the strategic competition with China.”
But Sun suggested that Waltz’s approach towards China as national security adviser should not be based solely on his past record in Congress, where there has been a strong “anti-China atmosphere”.
“After all, the granularity and level of China issues that the House of Representatives and the National Security Adviser have to deal with are different,” he said.
Waltz as US national security adviser would fit Trump’s tough line on China: analysts
Hardline congressman has called China an ‘existential threat’ to US interests and called for a boycott of Beijing Winter Olympics
Reading Time:
3 minutes
Why you can trust SCMP
Dewey Sim
Published: 4:20pm, 12 Nov 2024Updated: 5:39pm, 12 Nov 2024
United States President-elect Donald Trump’s reported choice of a China hawk as his new national security adviser hints at a tougher China policy in the Republican’s new administration, say observers.
According to multiple reports on Tuesday, Trump has asked Mike Waltz, a Florida congressman and retired Army Special Forces officer, to fill the key position as he mulls who to put on his team for his second presidency.
Waltz has been an ardent supporter of Trump and a vocal critic of President Joe Biden and is known for being sceptical of US aid for Ukraine.
Global reaction to Trump's win in the US presidential election
On China, he is viewed as among the most hawkish members of Congress. He is a member of the House Republicans’ China Task Force which looks at how Washington should compete with Beijing.
In 2021, he called for the US to boycott the Winter Olympics hosted by Beijing, introducing the resolution by saying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had “carried out a number of heinous acts in the last year alone that should disqualify them from hosting the 2022 Winter Olympics”.
“The world cannot legitimise the CCP’s acts of genocide in Xinjiang, destruction of the democratic rights of Hong Kong and dangerous suppression of the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan that cost lives, by sending delegations to [the Games in] Beijing,” he said.
According to the Financial Times, he has said China is an “existential threat” to US interests, and that Washington needs to “make significant investments in our own readiness”.
Sun Chenghao, a fellow at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, said Waltz was “definitely tough” on China, judging from the congressman’s past statements and record.
“Especially when it comes to dealing with the so-called China challenge,” Sun said. “I think he will pursue the idea of ‘winning’ the strategic competition with China.”
But Sun suggested that Waltz’s approach towards China as national security adviser should not be based solely on his past record in Congress, where there has been a strong “anti-China atmosphere”.
“After all, the granularity and level of China issues that the House of Representatives and the National Security Adviser have to deal with are different,” he said.
Sun added that he hoped that Waltz, if he becomes national security adviser, would look at China issues from “a more strategic perspective”, and over time understand the complexity of US-China relations “rather than relying solely on suppressing China on individual issues to pursue US interests”.
Waltz would fill a position that is among the most influential in the White House, and he will play a key role in shaping Washington’s foreign policy, including its relationship with China.
The national security adviser post is appointed by the president and, unlike other top positions, does not require Senate confirmation, meaning Waltz would be able to start as soon as Trump is sworn in on January 20.
Current national security adviser Jake Sullivan has been a key architect of Washington’s so-called “small yard, high fence” strategy that, among other things, has restricted China’s access to certain US technologies.
Since winning decisively in last week’s presidential election, speculation has been rife over who Trump will pick to fill the top jobs in the White House, and how they will shape Washington’s ties with Beijing amid a deepening rivalry between the world’s two largest economies.
Diplomatic observers earlier suggested that the US and China could risk fiercer confrontation and a deterioration of ties if Trump recruited a team that pushed for a hardline China policy.
Also on Tuesday, US media reported that Marco Rubio – also seen as a China hawk – had been selected by Trump to be the country’s secretary of state. Rubio has urged a harsher China policy, including calling in 2019 for the national security review of Chinese-owned short video app TikTok.
Dylan Loh, assistant professor of foreign policy at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said it was too early to tell how concretely the two potential appointments would affect Washington’s China approach but picking two China hawks “sends a very strong signal that the US will pay a lot more emphasis on China and in competing with China”.
But he said the developments would not surprise China, noting that there were candidates who were even more hardline than Rubio and Waltz, and Beijing would have expected personnel as hawkish on China, or even more so.
Sun similarly said Trump’s picks would be within China’s expectations. “The people close to Trump are basically hardliners on China, and Trump and the Republican Party also have strong ideas on diplomacy and security,” he said.
“The secretary of state and the national security adviser are basically the chief officials in the field of foreign affairs and security in the US government.”
US President Joe Biden promises ‘peaceful and orderly’ transfer of power to Donald Trump
If Rubio and Waltz are confirmed, “the Trump administration’s policy towards China will definitely become tougher”, Sun said.
Zha Daojiong, a professor at Peking University’s School of International Studies, said the narrative – which Waltz espoused – that China poses an existential threat to the US was “very much a rhetorical construct of foreign policy elites” in Washington in contrast to American voters’ sentiments in the recently-concluded election.
He said China “was at best a sporadic topic” which could and should be read as “average American voters’ expectations of their elected officials [which is] to focus on self-strengthening of the American society”.
“For a government to be singularly focused on one country, whichever it may be, is not … doing itself the kind of service its silent majority wants and [deserves].”
Dewey Sim
FOLLOW
Dewey Sim is a reporter for the China desk covering Beijing's foreign policy. He was previously writing about Singapore and Southeast Asia for the Post's Asia desk. A Singapore native, Dewey joined the Post in 2019 and is a graduate of the Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and
2. Trump is likely to name a loyalist as Pentagon chief after tumultuous first term
Excerpts:
While he has yet to announce a decision, the names of potential Pentagon chiefs stretch from the well known — such as Rep. Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee — to an array of former administration loyalists, including retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, who held national security posts during Trump’s first term.
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had been floated, but Trump said on social media Saturday that Pompeo would not be joining the new administration. Rep. Michael Waltz of Florida had also been mentioned, but he’s now been tapped to be Trump’s national security adviser.
Some decisions may linger for days as candidates jostle for attention and officials wait for the final results from House races, weighing whether Republican lawmakers can be tapped or if others are a safer pick to avoid a new election for an empty congressional seat.
Trump is likely to name a loyalist as Pentagon chief after tumultuous first term
By LOLITA C. BALDOR
Updated 8:11 PM EST, November 11, 2024
AP · November 11, 2024
WASHINGTON (AP) — President-elect Donald Trump’s choice for defense secretary is still up in the air, but it is a sure bet he will look to reshape the Pentagon and pick a loyalist. During his tumultuous first term, five men held the job as Pentagon chief only to resign, be fired or serve briefly as a stopgap.
While he has yet to announce a decision, the names of potential Pentagon chiefs stretch from the well known — such as Rep. Mike Rogers, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee — to an array of former administration loyalists, including retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, who held national security posts during Trump’s first term.
Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had been floated, but Trump said on social media Saturday that Pompeo would not be joining the new administration. Rep. Michael Waltz of Florida had also been mentioned, but he’s now been tapped to be Trump’s national security adviser.
Some decisions may linger for days as candidates jostle for attention and officials wait for the final results from House races, weighing whether Republican lawmakers can be tapped or if others are a safer pick to avoid a new election for an empty congressional seat.
“The choice is going to tell us a lot about how he will deal with the Pentagon,” said Mark Cancian, senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a retired Marine colonel.
He said someone with a deep military background may not be as dramatic of a change as others who may be viewed as stronger Trump loyalists.
With a number of top jobs at the State Department, National Security Council and Defense Department up for grabs, Trump is expected to lean toward those who back his desire to end U.S. involvement in any wars, use the military to control the U.S.-Mexico border and take a hard line on Iran.
The key test, however, will be loyalty and a willingness to do whatever Trump wants, as he seeks to avoid the pushback he got from the Pentagon the first time around.
Trump’s relationship with his civilian and military leaders during those years was fraught with tension, confusion and frustration, as they struggled to temper or even simply interpret presidential tweets and pronouncements that blindsided them with abrupt policy decisions they weren’t prepared to explain or defend.
Time after time, senior Pentagon officials — both in and out of uniform — worked to dissuade, delay or derail Trump, on issues ranging from his early demand to prohibit transgender troops from serving in the military and his announcements that he was pulling troops out of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan to his push to use troops to police the border and stem civil unrest on the streets of Washington.
In his first administration, Trump hewed toward what he considered strong military men and defense industry executives. Initially enamored with generals, Trump over time found them to be not loyal enough.
“He soured on them,” Cancian said. “They were not as pliable as he had thought. ... I’ve heard people speculate that maybe the chairman would be fired. So that’s something to watch.”
Air Force Gen. CQ Brown, took over as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in October 2023 for a four-year term, but military leaders serve at the pleasure of the president. Brown, a combat pilot and just the second Black officer to serve as chairman, spoke out after the police killing of George Floyd, describing the bias he faced in his life and career.
Trump also is expected to choose someone as defense secretary with disdain for equity and diversity programs and less likely to counter his plans based on limits laid out in the Constitution and rule of law. But he also may well push for increased defense spending, at least initially, including on U.S. missile defense.
A key overriding concern is that Trump will select someone who won’t push back against potentially unlawful or dangerous orders or protect the military’s longstanding apolitical status.
On Thursday, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin raised that red flag. In a message to the force, he said the U.S. military stands ready to “obey all lawful orders from its civilian chain of command,” adding that troops swear an oath to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
He echoed retired Army Gen. Mark Milley’s pronouncement during a speech as he closed out four years as chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
“We don’t take an oath to a king or a queen or to a tyrant or a dictator. And we don’t take an oath to a wannabe dictator,” Milley said. “We don’t take an oath to an individual. We take an oath to the Constitution, and we take an oath to the idea that is America, and we’re willing to die to protect it.”
Trump’s first defense chief, retired Marine Gen. Jim Mattis, learned quickly to stay off his boss’ radar by largely eliminating press conferences that Trump could see.
Mattis and Milley, along with Trump’s chief of staff John Kelly, a retired Marine general, and retired Marine Gen. Joseph Dunford, who also served as Joint Chiefs chairman, all worked quietly behind the scenes to temper some of Trump’s decisions.
They stalled his demands that troops be quickly and completely withdrawn from Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan and managed to prevent the use of active-duty troops to quell civil unrest in Washington.
Two years in, Mattis abruptly resigned in December 2018 in frustration over Trump’s national security policies, including a perceived disdain for allies and his demands to pull all troops out of Syria. Patrick Shanahan, the deputy defense secretary, took over as acting Pentagon chief but withdrew as the nominee six months later due to personal family problems that were made public.
Then-Army Secretary Mark Esper took over in an acting role, but he had to step aside briefly when nominated, so Navy Secretary Richard Spencer served as the acting chief until Esper was confirmed.
Esper was fired days after Trump lost the 2020 election, largely because the president did not believe him to be loyal enough. Trump was especially angry over Esper’s public opposition to invoking the two-centuries-old Insurrection Act to deploy active-duty troops in the District of Columbia during unrest following the police killing of George Floyd.
Trump named Christopher Miller, a retired Army officer who has been director of the National Counterterrorism Center, to serve as acting secretary and surrounded him with staunch loyalists.
That is the Pentagon that officials quietly say they expect to see in Trump’s new administration.
AP · November 11, 2024
3. Trump Expected to Nominate Rubio for Secretary of State, and Picks Waltz as National Security Adviser
Not noted, but Senator Rubio is also a strong supporter of human rights in north Korea.
But every time I see comments about ending the conflict in Ukraine as soon as possible, George Orwell comes to mind.
"The quickest way of ending a war is to lose it."
– George Orwell
Excerpts:
The picks, made less than a full week since Election Day, illustrate how quickly the president-elect is moving to fill out key foreign policy positions. Also on Monday, he chose Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.) as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.
Rubio, a former Trump critic and rival for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination, has grown close with Trump in the years since and campaigned with him in the closing weeks of the race against Democratic Vice President Kamala Harris.
Rubio’s expected rise to the nation’s top diplomatic post, earlier reported by the New York Times, would put a more establishment figure into the highest echelons of the Trump administration. A hawk on China, Iran and Cuba, Rubio joined most of Washington in supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. But in recent months he started changing his message, advocating for the conflict to end as soon as possible, last week stating the U.S. was “funding a stalemate war” and that it would take “100 years” to rebuild Ukraine.
Trump’s pick comes just hours after he decided to name Waltz, a fellow tough-on-China lawmaker, as national security adviser. Earlier, Trump also chose another Floridian, co-campaign manager Susie Wiles, as his chief of staff.
Trump Expected to Nominate Rubio for Secretary of State, and Picks Waltz as National Security Adviser
Waltz has echoed Trump’s no-tolerance on illegal immigration, skepticism of America’s support for Ukraine
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/trump-selects-florida-rep-mike-waltz-as-national-security-adviser-104414fe?mod=hp_lead_pos3
By Vivian Salama
Follow, Alex Leary
Follow, and Alexander Ward
Follow
Updated Nov. 12, 2024 12:20 am ET
Donald Trump once considered Sen. Marco Rubio for the vice president slot. Photo: Evan Vucci/AP
WASHINGTON—President-elect Donald Trump is expected to nominate Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida as secretary of state and has asked Rep. Mike Waltz, a Green Beret veteran, to be his White House national security adviser, according to people familiar with his thinking.
Trump could change his mind on the Rubio move, as he remains fond of others lobbying for the secretary of state role. But people familiar with the Rubio decision said that Trump feels good about going with him; Trump had considered him for the vice president slot before settling on Ohio Sen. JD Vance.
Spokespeople for the Trump transition and Rubio didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.
The picks, made less than a full week since Election Day, illustrate how quickly the president-elect is moving to fill out key foreign policy positions. Also on Monday, he chose Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.) as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations.
Rubio, a former Trump critic and rival for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination, has grown close with Trump in the years since and campaigned with him in the closing weeks of the race against Democratic Vice President Kamala Harris.
Rubio’s expected rise to the nation’s top diplomatic post, earlier reported by the New York Times, would put a more establishment figure into the highest echelons of the Trump administration. A hawk on China, Iran and Cuba, Rubio joined most of Washington in supporting Ukraine against Russia’s invasion. But in recent months he started changing his message, advocating for the conflict to end as soon as possible, last week stating the U.S. was “funding a stalemate war” and that it would take “100 years” to rebuild Ukraine.
Trump’s pick comes just hours after he decided to name Waltz, a fellow tough-on-China lawmaker, as national security adviser. Earlier, Trump also chose another Floridian, co-campaign manager Susie Wiles, as his chief of staff.
Waltz will step into his cabinet-level role amid prolonged conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and Trump is expected to try to prevent further escalation abroad by building deterrence against foreign rivals while favoring transactional policies with U.S. allies.
Trump, in his first term in office, went through four national security advisers, the first of whom served only 22 days. The others, including Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster and John Bolton, were eventually pushed out by Trump over their disagreements over certain policy issues. Robert O’Brien, Trump’s last national security adviser, served through the Covid-19 pandemic and the Jan. 6, 2021, riot at the Capitol and was among the names Trump has considered for a cabinet job in his coming term.
Waltz, (R., Fla.), has been an outspoken Trump supporter in recent years, echoing the former president’s no-tolerance on illegal immigration and skepticism of America’s support for Ukraine.
Rep. Mike Waltz will step into his role amid prolonged conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images
Last year, Waltz penned an opinion piece for FoxNews.com in which he argued that “the era of Ukraine’s blank check from Congress is over.” He has echoed Trump in calling on Europe to do more to ensure the collective defense of members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
“Stopping Russia before it draws NATO and therefore the U.S. into war is the right thing to do,” Waltz wrote. “But the burden cannot continue to be solely on the shoulders of the American people, especially while Western Europe gets a pass.”
This month, he told NPR that Trump’s vow to negotiate between Ukraine and Russia is “perfectly reasonable” and said that if Russian President Vladimir Putin doesn’t cooperate, the U.S. has “leverage, like taking the handcuffs off of the long-range weapons we provided Ukraine as well.”
Waltz is among the most hawkish members of Congress on China, serving on the House China Task Force that coordinates policy on how the U.S. should compete with China. He also has echoed Trump’s calls for accountability after the Biden administration’s chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Waltz, 50 years old, is the latest West Wing official to hail from Florida, the state Trump now calls home. He was born in Boynton Beach, Fla., and grew up in Jacksonville.
Waltz served 27 years in the U.S. Army and National Guard, retiring during his second term in Congress. After being commissioned as an Army lieutenant, Waltz graduated from Ranger School and was selected for the elite Green Berets, serving worldwide as a Special Forces officer with several combat tours in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Africa. He was awarded four Bronze Stars, including two for Valor.
In government, he has served in various capacities at the White House and the Pentagon, including as a defense policy director for Secretaries of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Robert Gates.
In 2018, he was elected to serve as congressman for Florida’s sixth congressional district, replacing Ron DeSantis, who that year was elected the state’s governor. Waltz’s wife Julia Nesheiwat, a fellow combat veteran who served in several presidential administrations, was a homeland security adviser to Trump during his first administration.
The Rubio decision, if Trump goes through with it as expected, would open up a Senate seat in Florida, giving DeSantis a chance to appoint a successor. The seat would be up for election in 2026.
Once a swing state, Florida is now reliably red given Trump’s 13 percentage point margin of victory there last week. In the next Congress, Republicans are set to hold 53 seats compared with 47 for the Democrats.
The Waltz and Stefanik appointments would trigger special elections next year to fill their seats in the House, where the GOP appears on track to keep its narrow majority. Control of the House of Representatives remained uncalled. Republicans have a 214-205 advantage but need 218 for a majority.
Rubio’s relationship with Trump has come a long way since the “Little Marco” taunts of the 2016 campaign. The two bonded during Trump’s presidential term, when Rubio served as an informal adviser on Latin American policy and worked with Ivanka Trump, the president’s daughter, on expanding the Child Tax Credit.
Years ago Rubio criticized Trump’s calls for mass deportation; now he echoes the former president’s rhetoric. “This is an invasion of the country, and it needs to be dealt with dramatically,” he said on NBC’s “Meet the Press” in May.
Stephen Miller, the hard-charging architect of Trump’s border policies and a onetime Rubio detractor, has called the senator “one of the most deep, insightful and gifted thinkers on our political issues.” Trump picked Miller as deputy chief of staff in his second term.
Write to Vivian Salama at vivian.salama@wsj.com, Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com
4. Loyalty Is Common Thread as Trump Fills Foreign Policy, Immigration Jobs
If you take the oath to support and defend the Constitution, then by definition you are loyal to the Commander in Chief to faithfully execute all the duties of the office to which you are appointed which of course includes all lawful orders.
Loyalty Is Common Thread as Trump Fills Foreign Policy, Immigration Jobs
Trump settles on Republican lawmakers for key national security posts, hoping to avoid infighting that frustrated him in his first term
https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/donald-trump-cabinet-picks-14ad0489?mod=hp_lead_pos2
By Alexander Ward
Follow
Updated Nov. 12, 2024 1:09 am ET
Immigration hard-liner Stephen Miller was named Donald Trump’s deputy chief of staff for policy. Photo: brian snyder/Reuters
WASHINGTON—President-elect Donald Trump is stocking his cabinet and White House staff with loyalists with deep congressional experience who back his agenda on immigration and foreign policy—mostly shunning establishment Republicans whom he blames for thwarting his first-term goals.
In the clearest example yet, Trump has asked Rep. Mike Waltz (R., Fla.), a former Army Green Beret who shares the former president’s views on illegal immigration and skepticism of America’s support for Ukraine, to be his national security adviser, according to people familiar with the discussion. The job, which Trump has elevated to cabinet rank, doesn’t require Senate confirmation.
The president-elect is also expected to nominate Sen. Marco Rubio, (R., Fla.) to be secretary of state, according to people familiar with his thinking. Rubio has differed with Trump over the importance of alliances and favors confronting China and Iran but, like Trump, has called for ending the war in Ukraine.
Trump hasn’t signaled who he will pick as secretaries of defense and the treasury. Among the candidates for Treasury are hedge-fund manager Scott Bessent and billionaire investor John Paulson, both of whom publicly backed Trump during the campaign.
Some of Trump’s closest advisers are seeking to block candidates deemed insufficiently loyal for other top administration posts, fearing they could derail or slow roll his priorities.
It won’t be easy to achieve the unanimity that Trump and some advisers want. To ensure Senate confirmation he might be forced to turn to some candidates who are at odds with him in important respects. Disagreements between agencies and members of his team were rife in his first term and are likely to reappear, current and former officials said.
Trump has also announced he will nominate Rep. Elise Stefanik (R., N.Y.), the first lawmaker to endorse his re-election bid, as the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations and has named immigration hard-liner Stephen Miller as deputy chief of staff for policy. Tom Homan, a champion of family separation, will be the new “border czar.” Former Republican lawmaker Lee Zeldin was nominated to lead the Environmental Protection Agency, Trump announced Monday.
His choice as White House chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is known for delivering candid advice but isn’t confrontational and doesn’t seek the spotlight—traits that have gotten other Trump insiders in trouble. The discipline she brought to the campaign earned her credit with Trump, say people close to the incoming president, who wanted to send a message about the disciplined operation he plans to lead this time.
“What Trump will look for in senior nominees in a second term is fealty. He wants ‘yes men’ and ‘yes women,’” said John Bolton, who was national security adviser during Trump’s first term but is now one his most outspoken critics.
Former Republican lawmaker Lee Zeldin was nominated to lead the Environmental Protection Agency. Photo: Reuters
Trump has rejected Mike Pompeo, who served as the Central Intelligence Agency chief and secretary of state in the first term but has been a strong supporter of U.S. assistance to Ukraine, and Nikki Haley, Trump’s top presidential rival and former envoy to the U.N. who broke with him over support for NATO.
“I very much enjoyed and appreciated working with them previously, and would like to thank them for their service to our Country,” Trump said Saturday in a social-media post, referring to Pompeo and Haley. Responding the following day, Donald Trump Jr. said in a social-media post he was working on keeping other job seekers who didn’t share his father’s agenda out of the administration.
Former top aides such as Robert O’Brien, Trump’s fourth and last national security adviser, are open to serving again but aren’t sure they will be asked to join the administration.
“The president has a great group of people to select his cabinet from. I’m enthusiastic about the prospects for the country,” O’Brien said. “If I remain in the private sector, which is likely, I will be cheering on the president and his team for huge successes.”
With more like-minded advisers, the hope is Trump can pursue his “America First” agenda with fewer restraints, people who served on the Trump campaign said. But a team that shuns dissenting views also brings risks, according to former officials and analysts.
Trump’s choice for White House chief of staff, Susie Wiles, is known for delivering candid advice but doesn’t seek the spotlight. Photo: carlos barria/Reuters
“Trump looks set on bringing in a team that prizes loyalty, which could instill some message discipline but also risks group think,” said Richard Fontaine of the Center for a New American Security, a centrist Washington think tank.
Trump doesn’t make decisions in an orderly process, often announcing them without consulting advisers or via social media. Staffers during the first term often tried to walk back some of those decisions. Loyalists are more likely to carry out them without providing alternative ideas or debating the pitfalls, analysts said.
The president-elect has long said he would end American involvement in overseas wars, erect new trade barriers and force allies in Europe and Asia to share more in defense costs. During his first term, his advisers often pushed back against his more ambitious policies, occasionally convincing him to back off and other times slow-rolling his orders.
Several generals he placed in top jobs at the Pentagon and White House because he saw them as able to get results often proved to be obstacles to some of his most far-reaching national security plans.
Trump wanted U.S. forces out of Afghanistan, but it wasn’t until February 2020 that the administration struck a deal with the Taliban to withdraw several thousand remaining troops——but only after President Biden took office.
Mike Pompeo, who served as secretary of state in Trump’s first term, has been a strong supporter of U.S. assistance to Ukraine. Photo: Andrew Harnik/Getty Images
After Trump lost the 2020 election but before leaving office, he signed a directive pushed by loyalists and not seen by senior Pentagon leaders to remove all troops from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Germany, and across Africa. Trump eventually canceled the order but only after a conversation with O’Brien, then his national security adviser, who said it hadn’t gone through proper channels.
Journalist Bob Woodward reported in his book “Fear” that Gary Cohn, the chief economic adviser in the White House, stole a 2017 letter off the Resolute Desk that, if signed by Trump, could have ended a key free-trade deal with South Korea, a staunch ally. Trump denied that any aides took letters or other documents off his desk, even though Woodward reproduced the letter in his book.
As he constructs his second-term cabinet, Trump has turned to rivals who once derided his anti-establishment message but whose views have moved closer to his own. When Rubio ran for president in 2016, he taunted Trump at campaign stops and during debates, questioning his wealth, his temperament and even the size of his hands. Trump countered the attacks by referring to Rubio as “Little Marco” and calling him “a lightweight.”
But in a video statement posted on social media earlier this month, Rubio echoed Trump’s criticism of the Ukraine war, saying the Biden administration’s military aid to Kyiv was “funding a stalemate” that “needs to be brought to a conclusion.”
Unlike Trump, who has called Russian President Vladimir Putin a “genius” and “savvy” for the Ukraine invasion, Rubio said that seeking to end the war “doesn’t mean we celebrate what Vladimir Putin did or are excited about it. But there needs to be some common sense.”
Alex Leary and Brian Schwartz contributed to this article.
Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com
5. What Trump Can Do for the Military By Gary Anderson
Excerpts:
To remedy the Marine Corps’ unforced errors, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps should be replaced with officers who understand the true nature of what the Corps has traditionally added to national defense. It will take at least a decade to get the Marine Corps back to where it was when Mr. Trump left office, and that Vice President elect Vance remembers as a Marine even if they start on day one.
Albeit these recommendations are just a few in the effort to reform for the incoming Trump administration, but nonetheless vital to gain ground in preparation to deter any future conflict, large or small. I hope that we never have to fight a major war, but if we do, we should win it.
What Trump Can Do for the Military
By Gary Anderson
November 11, 2024
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/11/what_trump_can_do_for_the_military_1071280.html
Donald Trump correctly realized that this election was about domestic 'kitchen table" issues and not foreign policy or military readiness. He alluded to the fact that there was much wrong with the Pentagon and vowed to fix it. The voters were interested in other issues, and he did not have to go into details. Now that he is President-elect, he has an opportunity to fix what is wrong with the Pentagon while fulfilling his promise to reduce the size of government. Here are some ideas of how he can do it.
First, diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) has grown from a cottage industry in the Pentagon to a mega-juggernaut that produces nothing but resentment and a devastating impact on recruiting, particularly children of veterans. It will likely be high on the list of cuts on Elon Musk's efficiency task force agenda. The whole concept should be scrapped, and revert back to a merit-based promotion system for both service personnel and civilian employees.
The Biden administration, like many before it, attempted to turn the military into a social experimentation laboratory. Most of the red-blooded American men which the military needs do not want to participate in group self-deprecating seminars. They want to join an organization dedicated, if necessary, to locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat when the nation needs it. The Biden administration ignored this, and that is largely why we have a military recruiting problem.
A second and no less critical area to fix within the five walls of the Pentagon is to fix the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) military reform legislation. GNA was created for decades ago to improve the performance of joint staffs in the wake of the failed Iranian hostage rescue mission and the muddled command relationships that characterized our incursion into Grenada in the early 1980s. While well intentioned, GNA had unintended consequences that plague us today.
One such unintended consequence was the requirement for Flag or General Officers (FOGO) to serve three-year tours on a joint staff, leading to bloated staff that cannot get out of their own way, much less win wars. This also contributes to FOGO bloat. For example, Rommel's Panzer Army, the equivalent of U.S. AFRICOM today, overran most of North Africa with a staff the size of a U.S. Army brigade staff in 2024.
In contrast, most modern American theater commands are the size of two infantry battalions with staff sections run by FOGOs, Rommel's staff sections were run by colonels and below. The mighty fleets run by Bull Halsey and Raymond Spruance that beat Japan had staffs that could fit in the wardroom of an aircraft carrier, and that was before the advent of modern computers that are supposed to reduce the need for personnel.
It is instructive that the last war that we won decisively, Desert Storm, was run by officers educated before the reforms of G-N and the related Skelton military education mandates were fully in place. The current crop of FOGOs spent twenty years in Afghanistan without realizing that they were trying to build an Afghan army in our own image that would not be able to sustain itself after we left. The "Forever War" should have been handed over to an Afghan army built along Taliban lines in 2006 to fend for itself.
Cost effectiveness, the third fix for the Pentagon would be the making the Marine Corps great again. During the Biden administration, two misguided commandants reimagined the Marine Corps from a global force in readiness to a China-oriented defensive force at the expense of the combat power that made the Marine Corps capable of winning amphibious campaigns such as Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima, and Inchon.
The Marine Corps can no longer contribute to large-scale combat operations such as Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom without the tanks, heavy assault engineers, and adequate tubed artillery that the Marines divested to buy anti-ship missiles for the counter-China mission. Unfortunately, as noted in a recent study, the military cannot build a strategy or a force on a single adversary or conflict.
The good news is that, through incompetent leadership, the anti-ship missiles have yet to be acquired and are wastefully redundant. These capabilities are already in the Army, Navy, and Air Force’s inventory, but were never considered.
To remedy the Marine Corps’ unforced errors, the senior leadership of the Marine Corps should be replaced with officers who understand the true nature of what the Corps has traditionally added to national defense. It will take at least a decade to get the Marine Corps back to where it was when Mr. Trump left office, and that Vice President elect Vance remembers as a Marine even if they start on day one.
Albeit these recommendations are just a few in the effort to reform for the incoming Trump administration, but nonetheless vital to gain ground in preparation to deter any future conflict, large or small. I hope that we never have to fight a major war, but if we do, we should win it.
Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to The Deputy Secretary of Defense and as a civilian advisor In Iraq and Afghanistan.
6. The Five Things President Trump Should Do on Day One
An interesting phrase: "Circuit-break the interagency process." I do like the description if the IA process: "cover your asses and diffuse responsibility"
But we all know where the buck stops according to Harry Truman. And that is the person who has to make the decision in the interagency process.
Excerpts:
Circuit-break the Interagency Process
The federal government loves to make decisions by unanimous committee, in what’s called the “interagency process.” If the State Department wants to reverse a coup in Mauritania, as it tried to in 2008, it pulls together a committee with representatives from Defense, the National Security Council, Treasury, and other agencies that have stakes in the outcome.
The interagency process is an excellent way to cover asses and diffuse responsibility and, often, a terrible way to make decisions. My first interviewee, Dr. Mark Dybul, who helped develop America’s anti-HIV/AIDS program, described how the process devolves into “blood on the floor, hatchet work.” He added that “Big, bold things cannot be done through an interagency process. They tend to get to the lowest common denominator.”
How do you snap out of interagency gridlock? Use a stick. In 2003, President Bush brought squabbling agency heads tasked with combating HIV in Africa into the Oval Office and made a pointed threat. He said that if they didn’t sort things out, “I will be coming after you.” After that, according to Dr. Dybul, “The fighting dropped off remarkably.” Since then, America’s HIV/AIDS program in Africa has saved 20 million lives. Our next president should pick the right moments to remind executive branch functionaries who the boss is.
Agencies often need to work together to achieve complex goals. But the best collaborative work happens when each player knows that the buck stops with someone.
The Five Things President Trump Should Do on Day One
https://www.thefp.com/p/the-five-things-president-trump-should-do
Hire the right bureaucrats, set clear, ambitious goals, and experiment, experiment, experiment.
By Santi Ruiz
November 11, 2024
In a few short weeks, Donald Trump will be sworn in as the 47th president. His transition team will be in charge of a federal government that, in many rudimentary ways, doesn’t work.
Let’s leave aside partisan gridlock in Congress and turmoil in the judicial branch, and just focus on the executive branch: National Public Data, which aggregates personal information for background checks, was hacked this year, meaning your Social Security number is now floating around on the internet. The IRS is built on mainframes from 1965 and relies on code from JFK’s administration that no one’s learning anymore. The pandemic highlighted our broken systems: In January 2020, the Food and Drug Administration effectively banned private companies from rolling out their own Covid tests because the CDC was developing their own. But the CDC tests turned out to be defective, leaving the U.S. flying blind until private companies could rush in and pick up the slack.
For the past year, I’ve run an interview series called Statecraft where I talk with civil servants to understand how the federal sausage actually gets made. These men and women serve in a variety of roles, such as running a CIA base in Afghanistan, investigating Soviet anthrax leaks, and redesigning Department of Labor job centers. The best of them have managed to deliver good outcomes for the American people by working around the worst ingrained practices of the federal bureaucracy, and they have lessons for reformers eager to make the federal government go.
But changing the culture of a machine this size takes time. Despite the fact he will have a Republican House and Senate, and the allyship of Elon Musk, who seems eager to head his own Department of Government Efficiency, Trump faces the same broken federal machinery—and will face many of the same problems, and the shot clock to solve them—that Biden did.
To help make the government more efficient and effective instantly, the Trump team should prioritize the following:
Hire Bureaucrats, Just Make Them the Right Ones
Progressives fear Trump’s vision for civil service reform, Schedule F, which would reclassify many civil servants to make them easier to fire. They worry Schedule F would gut executive branch agencies—which includes the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departments of Education, State, Justice, et al.—of their talent, and consolidate power in the White House.
But even liberals like Jen Pahlka, former deputy chief technology officer of America under President Obama, have pointed out that “managing out” a poor performer can be a full-time job for political appointees. Firing an executive branch civil servant requires extensive documentation. Additionally, many employees are unionized, and all can appeal their firings internally. Partially as a result, the government cans bad employees about four times less often than the private sector does. It takes a lot more than saying “you’re fired” to get people out the door.
It’s also impossible to hire new, better civil servants. Our systems for sourcing are shattered. Take Jack Cable, 17, who won the Department of Defense’s “Hack the Air Force” contest against 600 other contestants by identifying weaknesses in Pentagon software. But when Cable applied for a DoD role, his résumé was graded “not minimally qualified” because the hiring manager didn’t know anything about the coding languages he listed himself proficient in. Or take the Federal Aviation Administration, which has been screening prospective air traffic controllers for how many sports they played in high school in an effort to meet its racial quotas.
A strategic administration will encourage agencies to find creative ways to bring in top talent. It could try using new tools to assess technically talented applicants in bulk, or it could increase the number of academic rotations through the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, which allows academics to contribute part-time to special federal agency projects. The Office of Personnel Management can and should encourage more aggressive use of Direct Hire Authority, allowing agencies to avoid certain procedural steps of the federal hiring process.
Find Out What Authorities You Actually Have
Agency bureaucrats tend to be wedded to incredibly specific processes, from conducting environmental reviews to military equipment procurement. They will tell political appointees that these processes are required by statute. But oftentimes, these processes are just a result of habit, not any law. Like a mollusk that builds its shell through accretion, agencies have a tendency to generate their own internal process requirements over time. Give it five years, and many civil servants will believe their own strictures are actually mandated by Congress. A few more years, and Congress will come to believe that its predecessors must have mandated whatever an agency is doing.
In fact, many of the statutory authorizations for agencies leave room for them to use special contracts that avoid the traditional procurement process. Many more agencies should receive the ability to challenge prizes, which offer rewards for specific technical innovations, or advance market commitments, in which the government commits to buying a product in development at a given quantity and price in the future.
Consider the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, or SPR: massive salt caverns on the Gulf Coast that house millions of barrels of oil. Traditionally, the SPR has been a rainy day tool: The government dumps oil onto the market in times of crisis and high prices, then refills the reserve when prices are low. But reformers had an idea: If the SPR made commitments to purchase oil at guaranteed prices in the future, those promises would help stabilize oil prices when geopolitical events roiled the market. It worked—for the past year, oil prices have mostly hovered in a sweet spot between $70–90 a barrel—but think-tank wonks had to spend a year convincing the SPR it already had authority to make those future commitments.
Trump’s former head of the Office of Management and Budget once described his philosophy to me: “Political appointees have to be really aggressive in going back to underlying statutes to see what is possible.” His advice should be heeded during Trump’s second term.
Set Ambitious, Concrete Goals
In 1961, JFK famously called for the U.S. to put a man on the moon and return him safely to Earth “before this decade is out.” NASA did it with six months to spare. The target was difficult but achievable, and it was falsifiable: If the agency failed, everyone would know. Both features helped focus the minds at NASA.
By contrast, many of the federal government’s most persistent failures can be tied back to a lack of goal-setting. As one economist pointed out to me, no one in D.C. is explicitly tasked with increasing productivity growth. Small wonder productivity has stagnated since the ’70s.
The next administration should take the same approach that JFK’s administration did. Pick a deadline: maybe America’s 250th birthday in 2026, for which President Trump is already planning a yearlong party, or the end of the decade. Have each agency head pick a verifiable goal for their agency, like building the biggest geothermal plant in the world, or sending a human to Mars, or developing a prototype vaccine for each of the known human viral families. Then commit to those goals in public, and use those commitments to get civil servant rears in gear.
Experiment, Experiment, Experiment
The National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health together are the largest funders of basic science in the world. But despite spending around $60 billion a year through them, we know little about the best ways to support science. How could their grants be more effective? Would administering grant proposals in a different way—via lotteries, or by giving reviewers “golden tickets” to champion specific proposals—encourage more innovative, high-reward proposals? Some agencies are beginning to build out the internal resources to test these hypotheses.
In the early days of the pandemic, the NSF disbursed grants related to Covid much faster than did the NIH, because it used internal review processes instead of sending grants out for external peer review. We use peer review by default in the scientific enterprise, but it may be advantageous to relax these peer review requirements in future crises.
Experiments take time. They also require bureaucrats to get comfortable with iterating—not traditionally a governmental skill. To get time and the freedom to experiment, innovators at agencies will need encouragement and blessing from the top. The sooner they get it, the sooner agencies can figure out what works; if they’re lucky, they’ll sort it out before the midterms roll around. Political appointees should explicitly encourage civil servants to try new things, and stand by them if it goes wrong the first time.
Circuit-break the Interagency Process
The federal government loves to make decisions by unanimous committee, in what’s called the “interagency process.” If the State Department wants to reverse a coup in Mauritania, as it tried to in 2008, it pulls together a committee with representatives from Defense, the National Security Council, Treasury, and other agencies that have stakes in the outcome.
The interagency process is an excellent way to cover asses and diffuse responsibility and, often, a terrible way to make decisions. My first interviewee, Dr. Mark Dybul, who helped develop America’s anti-HIV/AIDS program, described how the process devolves into “blood on the floor, hatchet work.” He added that “Big, bold things cannot be done through an interagency process. They tend to get to the lowest common denominator.”
How do you snap out of interagency gridlock? Use a stick. In 2003, President Bush brought squabbling agency heads tasked with combating HIV in Africa into the Oval Office and made a pointed threat. He said that if they didn’t sort things out, “I will be coming after you.” After that, according to Dr. Dybul, “The fighting dropped off remarkably.” Since then, America’s HIV/AIDS program in Africa has saved 20 million lives. Our next president should pick the right moments to remind executive branch functionaries who the boss is.
Agencies often need to work together to achieve complex goals. But the best collaborative work happens when each player knows that the buck stops with someone.
Presidents come into office with a list of policy priorities and campaign promises, and they don’t tend to be excited about reforming the nuts and bolts part. But they should be.
The feds have gotten real wins in the recent past: Look at Operation Warp Speed, or the IRS Direct File experiment, or the Federal Reserve’s indirect derisking of investment in fracking. Each of these wins came in part because civil servants were willing to challenge procedural norms in some places and to design better procedures in others.
If this administration wants to supercharge American growth, it should not be afraid of stealing those playbooks, and when necessary, throwing them out.
Santi Ruiz is the senior editor at the Institute for Progress. He writes Statecraft, an interview series with policymakers about how to actually get things done.
For more coverage of the 2024 election, click here.
To support independent journalism, subscribe to The Free Press today:
7. Harvest of Power: Food as the New Frontier in Hybrid Warfare
Excerpts:
Conclusion: Strategic Responses to the Weaponization of Food in Hybrid Warfare
The United States has a significant food systems problem with grave implications for national security, geopolitics, and ultimately, global food security. Decades of over-consolidation at critical points in the production chain, the obsessive quest for efficiency, and a global race to the bottom for critical inputs without regard for geopolitical risks has left behind a mess of strategic vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that adversaries can easily capitalize on. The fallout from Russia’s conquest of Ukraine went deeper than the headlines on wheat; Russia’s role in upstream products for food production means the world must now contend with multilayered risks to food security. Nordstream’s destruction may have flown under the radar of the average consumer, but farmers all over the world understood the impact and its potential to be much worse. The future of hybrid warfare is this type of event: questionable attribution, compounding geopolitical effects, below the threshold of conventional war, but with real consequences for human security.
Food systems can be weaponized in a way that erodes American geopolitical power and undermines domestic stability. Rather than recognizing the power of this kind of warfare, the United States continues to underwrite the transfer of its strategic advantages to its adversaries as Russia’s increasing market share of the global wheat supply is facilitated by the very U.S. producers Putin has displaced. Perhaps the West can continue to look the other way while Russia finances its occupation by stealing grain in occupied Ukraine and exporting it out of Crimean & Russian ports. Doing something about it would seriously disrupt the global trade in wheat and put the most food-insecure areas at immediate risk. On the other hand, perhaps U.S. firms shipping grain for Russia isn’t in the world’s long-term security interests any more than it is the United States’ long-term strategic interests.
Last time the U.S. faced destabilizing conflict in Europe that threatened the peace and security of the world, Roosevelt’s calls to the titans of industry to stop financing the disrupters and supply the arsenal of democracy went largely ignored until Pearl Harbor. Let us hope it doesn’t take such a catastrophic event to call them home this time, because now the world has bigger weapons and more vulnerable systems. Before the next destabilizing event leaves the world with famine-inducing fallout, leaders should think strategically about how to build flexible, resilient systems that can withstand, and adapt to, the unexpected. This is nowhere more important than in the food supply – the basis of prosperity, stability, and modernity. We might also consider the possibility that in the era of grey zone conflict, the balance of power might be determined not solely by the biggest bombs or the adoption of emerging technologies, but at least equally by the production and distribution of the world’s food.
Harvest of Power: Food as the New Frontier in Hybrid Warfare
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/12/harvest-of-power-food-as-the-new-frontier-in-hybrid-warfare/
by Alicia Ellis
|
11.12.2024 at 12:01am
In an era where strategic competition has resurged as a driving force of international politics, no dimension of statecraft is more important than economics. This idea is rooted in American history with its origins in Hamiltonian thought about the central role of industry in building strong empires. The United States rose to power on the ability of the American Midwest to feed emerging cities on both sides of the Atlantic with inexpensive wheat, enabling the industrial revolution and transforming the global balance of power as American farmers and traders out-competed Russia on production, transportation, and the financial networks that supported both. Today, American policymakers are grappling with a difficult truth: though empires are built on trade and industry, this is also where they’re most vulnerable.
The conditions that underpinned America’s rise to power have changed, largely as a result of its own policy mistakes. The interconnected global economy and diversification of supply chains intended to facilitate the growth of partner states has resulted in two unintended consequences: those “partners” have grown into serious geostrategic rivals, and the divestment of U.S. domestic capacity has left its critical systems – including its food systems – susceptible to weaponization. Too long wedded to the religion of free-trade-above-all, Washington has finally come to realize it spent decades underwriting the rise of its greatest challengers, whose goals (and means) may not be as benign as once hoped. Still reeling from the revelation that letting the foxes into the henhouse didn’t turn them into hens, the United States is now struggling to get all its players and partners on one team.
The economic domain of contemporary conflict has both a defensive (identifying vulnerabilities and risks in critical industries) and an offensive (competing in global markets and translating wealth into power) component. In this context, hybrid warfare, which integrates conventional, irregular, and cyber tactics below the threshold of traditional warfare, is reshaping global conflicts. As nations grapple with evolving threats, food has emerged as a critical and underappreciated weapon in this landscape. The manipulation of food supplies for geopolitical leverage is a hallmark of hybrid warfare, enabling state and non-state actors to destabilize adversaries and advance strategic goals without direct military confrontation.
The United States has too long overlooked this component of grey zone conflict, leaving its critical domestic systems increasingly vulnerable while some of its biggest firms facilitate the transfer of strategic advantages to its geopolitical rivals. The time has come for U.S. industry to synergize its resource capacity and mitigate a serious emerging threat: the weaponization of food by state competitors.
Balancing Efficiency and Resiliency in Domestic Food Systems
The network of vertically integrated, highly consolidated conglomerates that makes up U.S. food systems, though efficient, leaves entire industries overly reliant on single-points-of-failure for critical goods and increasingly open to deliberate attack. The Department of Defense has been sounding this alarm bell over the defense industry for some time. With uncertainty over the future of Taiwan, the U.S. finally turned its attention to examining its defense industrial base for supply chain risks. But the hyperfocus on defense-industry risks, though rightly prioritized, has left broader risks that pose direct threats to security unaddressed. This is nowhere more prevalent than in food supply. In the same way microchips and semiconductors underly an industry that provides security for the United States, the agriculture industry provides human security at the most fundamental level. Agriculture is not the benign good it tends to be regarded as: it is in fact, both strategic and existential. The modern world was built on the ability of a small percentage of the population to feed the rest, and the systems that underpin that world will crumble without it.
U.S. policymakers have long understood that food falls into the category of strategic commodities along with oil, critical minerals, and now semiconductors. Yet abundance, not scarcity, is one of the sacred pillars of the American way of life: the ability to access food from around the world on demand is largely taken for granted. The truth is that the food we eat and the complex, interconnected system that grows, processes, and transports this most essential resource, is vulnerable. Today, U.S. food supply chains in key industries are increasingly brittle and opaque due to the industry-wide tendency toward hyper-consolidation. Though the collective memory is short, it was only a few years ago that a human virus shut down just a handful of domestic beef, pork, and poultry processing plants. Within days, stores began experiencing shortages, leading to rationing. The easy out was to blame consumer panic stocking, but this (perhaps deliberately) obfuscates the harsh reality: contemporary U.S. food systems lack sufficient resiliency to ensure stability. Overstocking was a symptom (albeit a self-exacerbating one), but the root cause was the amalgamation of U.S. food production into too few players and too few facilities. 85% of U.S. beef, 45% of poultry, and 67% of pork is processed by just four companies (colloquially called the ‘Big Four’). This means farmers and ranchers must often sell to, or directly produce for, these conglomerates, but it has the added effect of driving out smaller processing plants and creating chokepoints in the supply chain. When Covid-19 spread rapidly through the massive processing plants full of shoulder-to-shoulder workers, there was nowhere to funnel the instant excess capacity of live animals for processing and distribution. Within weeks, farmers were forced to kill and bury livestock they couldn’t get in to bottlenecked processing facilities.
U.S. producers would be wise to resist putting all its eggs in one basket (or cows in one pen, so to speak) because the food system isn’t just vulnerable to accidental shocks such as Covid-19. Adversaries undoubtedly noticed how quickly the U.S. supply chain for key food items broke down and how few targets are actually needed to trigger serious breakdowns in domestic food systems. The Covid-related supply issues were a result of shutting down just a few production plants. How might a cyber-attack replicate – and amplify – this effect when it can spread through linked company-wide computer systems faster than a human virus?
This near miss should have been a glaring warning sign that the U.S. has a serious risk to domestic stability embedded in its food systems, but instead, recent developments are exacerbating the problem. In the beef industry, sustained droughts have led to a smaller domestic herd, making the Big Four increasingly reliant on foreign suppliers. The immediate response by many U.S. ranchers has been to fill the gap by increasing the number of heifers sent to feed lots destined for beef production. This will mean fewer heifers reproducing on ranches for future years, which will lead to longer term issues in the ability of the domestic beef industry to meet demand. The pork industry is in a state of oversupply, leading Smithfield (which alone accounts for 26% of all U.S. pork production) to end contracts with its pig farmers, while keeping the company owned farms, further consolidating every link in the supply chain and risking the closing of small to mid-sized farms across the United States. This is problematic not just from a resiliency standpoint but from a geostrategic one: Smithfield is the largest U.S. pork producer; it’s vertically integrated; it was purchased by a Chinese investor in 2013, and it actually increased its pork exports to China during the pandemic meat shortages.
Risks Lurking Beneath the Surface
But these aren’t the only agricultural industries susceptible to disruptions, and these are its problems before you even start examining related supply chains of key inputs for agricultural production. Unpacking that supply chain from top to bottom reveals this is only the tip of the iceberg. If there is one single point of failure that could unravel the global food system, it is nitrogen-based fertilizer production. This is problematic because the world’s leading exporters of nitrogen-based fertilizer, the invention that allows the planet to sustain a human population of eight billion, are Russia (13%), China (12%), and Belarus (5%), with the U.S. a leading destination for its fertilizer exports. Fertilizer is to food production what microchips are to consumer and military electronic systems. But unlike manufactured goods, food production cannot withstand delays while supply chains readjust. When farmers miss narrow planting windows, a delay of days may mean decreased yields; weeks can lead to significant shortages; a month risks total crop failure should farmers still decide to plant at all. In the same way overreliance for microelectronics leaves the entire U.S. defense industry open to risk, weaponizable interdependence in the inputs that form the basis of modern food production leaves its population vulnerable to geopolitics-driven food insecurity.
Russia’s position as the world’s largest exporter of natural gas amplifies this problem. Aside from making up approximately 70-80% of the energy used to produce it, natural gas is also a physical component of nitrogen-based fertilizers destined for farm use. Natural gas is to fertilizer what critical minerals are to microelectronics. This has ripple effects throughout food systems: it doesn’t just undergird the production of commodities for direct human consumption, but also further upstream: hay grown for dairies and beef cattle, wheat, maize, and soy for animal feed, cotton for clothing and cooking oils. The U.S. may be the world’s largest producer of natural gas, but turning that into food is a story about supply chains and policy decisions, not natural resources. Despite its significant natural gas reserves and production capacity, the U.S. is the world’s 3rd largest importer of fertilizers, importing 1.95 billion dollars of fertilizer from Russia in 2022 (the last year data was available at the time of this article).
In 2022, Europe also imported roughly 45 percent of its natural gas from Russia. The disruption to gas supply after the destruction of the Nordstream pipeline that same year caused a 70 percent drop in European production of ammonia for fertilizers and led rapidly to global fertilizer shortages. U.S. farmers, unable to predict prices from one day to the next, and worried about obtaining enough fertilizer for that year’s planting, ordered fertilizer by truckloads when they could get it at all. In Arizona, delays in obtaining fertilizer during spring 2022’s planting season resulted in upwards of 30 percent declines in yields for some farmers. Were shortages sustained just a little longer, this would have had more serious impacts on food prices and availability, but for the fact that fertilizers were exempted from U.S. sanctions on Russia: a necessary but short-term solution that tells Moscow exactly where its strongest geopolitical levers are located.
The Geoeconomics of Strategic Commodities
While the vulnerabilities in domestic food systems continue to build, geopolitical rivals are reaping the benefits of U.S. decline in production of the world’s most important foods. The U.S. share of the global wheat market has plummeted from 25% in 2010 to 9% projected for 2024. Several dynamics undergird this decline. Wheat lags behind corn and soybeans in technological developments and recent price volatility driven primarily by geopolitics have made wheat a risky bet for U.S. farmers. The drastic decline is at least partly a result of strategic calculation by Russia. Boosted by structural improvements in the agriculture sector and investment in processing and storage facilities, Russia rapidly increased its production capacity in the early 2000s. In response to western sanctions after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Putin instituted widespread bans on western food imports and devalued the ruble, making Russian exports cheaper. By 2017, Russia had surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest wheat exporter.
This is no small problem: Declining U.S. wheat exports leaves partners, allies, and everyone in between increasingly exposed to geopolitical pressure tied to reliance on Russian wheat. There is no substitute for the role wheat plays in the human diet at every level of the socioeconomic ladder. Wheat, otherwise called the “famine food,” makes up a disproportionate part of the diet in poorer countries. It also has a compelling history of making and breaking empires. Russia provided the bulk of European grain imports until the United States replaced Russia as the breadbasket of Europe in the mid-1800s as methods of long-term grain storage enabled long-distance transit. Viewed through the lens of Putin’s desire to restore the former Russian Empire, the invasion of Ukraine and the outsized role agriculture has played in that conflict makes sense. The wealth and power of the Russian Empire was built on Catherine the Great’s conquest of present-day Ukraine, and the grain exports flowing from the new port of Odessa. For this reason, Scott Reynolds Nelson speculated in February 2022 that Russia would never again be a great power without control of Ukraine. Putin launched the full-scale invasion two days later. This is not to suggest the relationship between the two events was causal, only that they share an understanding of the significance of this most important of commodities. It’s no accident that Russia’s most recent attempts to acquire Ukraine occurred shortly after Ukraine had re-established itself as a globally important source of grain exports.
In the era of hybrid warfare, Russia is a formidable player with a long history of weaponizing food. The Holodomore, which literally means to ‘inflict death by starvation’ is widely understood to have been a famine orchestrated in Moscow, which caused the deaths of nearly four million Ukrainians in the early 1930s. A study of the Holodomore by Northwestern University concluded that the central government in Moscow did in fact take more grain per person from Ukrainians than Russians, accounting for up to 92 percent of the famine deaths in Ukraine.
The immediate targeting of Ukrainian wheat commencing with the 2022 invasion suggests wheat once again has everything to do with Russia’s end game. The blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports during the invasion prevented it from exporting to destinations in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. This led almost immediately to global grain shortages, driving up the price and benefitting Russia financially as the world scrambled to replace its wheat imports. As Russia came under pressure for the humanitarian impact on the most vulnerable parts of the world, Putin made a half-hearted attempt to alter the narrative, claiming a record harvest in Russia that could fill the gap and signing onto the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which temporarily allowed Ukrainian grain to flow until Russia pulled out of the deal in 2023. Meanwhile, the Russian army was stealing harvests, occupying storage facilities, and moving Ukrainian grain into Russian-occupied Crimea, where it could export it out of Russian-controlled ports. Global supply issues have since improved, in no small part because much of the grain leaving the Black Sea was plundered and exported as Russian grain, which prompts the question of where Russia’s claimed “record harvests” in 2022 and 2023, really came from.
The prospect of a Russian victory in Ukraine is intensely problematic from a global food security perspective. By 2021, Ukraine and Russia together accounted for over one third of the world’s entire wheat supply. If Russia succeeds at controlling this from harvest to port, Moscow gains greater leverage to use this critical food source as a geopolitical weapon it won’t hesitate to use. Putin’s propensity to weaponize critical goods, including food, has not been limited to Ukraine. Before the Nordstream pipeline was damaged, Russia had already cut off European gas supplies in an attempt to coerce leadership into paying in Rubles in order to bypass U.S. sanctions. At the same time, Russia threatened to limit access to its agricultural products, specifically naming Europe and North America as its targets.
Even barring a Russian victory, the war has left Ukraine with damaged infrastructure at storage and export facilities, burnt wheat fields, and the possibility of a negotiated settlement that leaves Russia with territorial control of prime farmland. As refugees are forced to flee and remaining farmers put out of business by Russia’s heavy-handed tactics, Ukraine is unlikely to come out of the 2020s with the market share it had pre-invasion. The question is whether Russia will be permitted the spoils as U.S. production continues its decline. This is a critical question for U.S. partners around the globe, since Russia has habitually withheld or released wheat exports for domestic political or geopolitical reasons.
At first glance, this seems like a solvable problem for the United States. U.S. firms have significant assets in the grain trade: the ABCD commodity traders, all U.S.-owned, control approximately three quarters of the global trade in grain. But the byproduct of a hyper-globalized economic system is a tangled web of wickedly problematic relationships. As actual food production has shifted eastward to Russia, Ukraine, and parts of Eastern Europe, U.S. firms increasingly invest in downstream activities (mainly, storage and shipping). Cargill’s purchase of a 25% stake in the grain terminals of the Russian port of Novorossiysk in 2013 left it in an uncomfortable position in the wake of Russia’s plundering of Ukrainian harvests. Though it eventually sold its stake in the grain terminal in 2023, Cargill is still shipping Russian grain out of the port, less than 200 kilometers from the border of Crimea. Although western sanctions have placed limitations on activity out of several Crimean ports known for shipping stolen grain, these sanctioned port cities deliver to Russian ports through the Sea of Azov, and the internal grain storage sites are connected by road and rail directly into Russia, where it can be mixed and shipped out of non-sanctioned Russian ports.
Such entanglements, combined with critical resource dependencies, create crises of national power. Europe should have learned this in 2014 when Moscow threatened to cut Germany’s natural gas supplies in the middle of winter should Berlin oppose Russian aggression in Crimea. The U.S. should have learned this when disruptions to Russian natural gas exports in 2022 immediately impacted the cost and availability of fertilizer for U.S. farmers. Instead, both sides of the Atlantic band-aid the problem by shifting Russian gas from delivery by pipeline to delivery by sea and exempting Russian fertilizer from sanctions.
Mitigating Risk in a Complex System
The inherent complexities of contemporary food systems present a staggering list of potential points of risk and vulnerability. Though only a handful are examined in-depth here, food systems are also open to risk emanating from a number of related areas. All of these are necessary, but not sufficient to support the food supply, and all are susceptible to disruption from both adversaries and natural sources. Transportation systems, water supply, soil health, climate change, biological and chemical threats to plants and animals (both natural and manufactured), and geopolitical threats to the food, water, energy nexus generate compounding security risks with potentially systemic effects.
Diversifying toward alternate energy sources can help build resiliency into energy markets, but until there is another scientific breakthrough, it can’t replace nitrogen-based fertilizers. There is promise in innovative and (more importantly) scalable regenerative farming methods based on a newly patented composting process pioneered in the Phoenix east valley and designed for farming in arid climates. Such methods offset synthetic nitrogen requirements, sequester carbon, and improve soil structure and water retention, making food systems more resilient against climate-related disruptions as well as less reliant on petrochemically derived fertilizers. The biggest battle it faces is surviving Maricopa county’s relentless efforts to stymie such breakthroughs through new composting regulations that target the wrong problem, the wrong process, and the wrong industry. The U.S.’s worst enemy here, it seems, is once again itself: it self-generates new problems by failing to understand the impact on the system as a whole.
This can be fixed. The resilience of food systems needs to be reconceptualized as a national security problem in the context of grey zone conflict. Public and private sector investment in domestic capacity for critical food-related goods should be a priority, including research and development in drought and disease-resistant seeds. The lack of a coherent trade policy for agriculture needs addressing, with a focus on opening export markets for American goods and reducing foreign tariffs on American wheat. Attention to emerging markets with growing populations should be at the center of the conversation. Most of the growth in food demand in the future is likely to come from Africa, where Russian meddling and Chinese investment are crowding out opportunities for a U.S. foothold. This neglect has already created the space for U.S. rivals to lock down control of resources in energy and rare earth minerals, for which the U.S. and its European allies have paid dearly.
The resilience of food systems needs to be reconceptualized as a national security problem in the context of grey zone conflict. Public and private sector investment in domestic capacity for critical food-related goods should be a priority, including research and development in drought and disease-resistant seeds.
In wheat, there may be a critical window of opportunity as the world increasingly prizes reliability in its trade partners. Support for Foreign Market Development and Market Access Programs can help educate potential partners on the benefits of buying U.S. wheat while emphasizing its relative reliability. The U.S. cannot by law institute export bans except in the case of a declared national emergency. Against Putin’s record of wheat export bans and the supply uncertainties it creates, this is an appealing prospect. Likewise, the U.S. should support increased capacity of allies and partners for critical goods. Coordination with reliable partners will strengthen safety nets and improve the collective capacity to marginalize an adversary’s ability to manipulate markets and use life-sustaining goods as geopolitical levers.
As a linchpin of both food and energy systems, the U.S. must also turn its attention to natural gas. Although Russia is the world’s largest exporter of grain, natural gas, and fertilizer, the world’s largest producer of the last two is still the United States. That’s a failure of geoeconomic strategy. Europe needs to replace its natural gas source. Though imports of Russian gas to the EU by pipeline have declined sharply since 2022 (which is in itself a tremendous accomplishment), imports of Russian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which are exempt from EU sanctions, spiked in 2023, up nearly 40 percent in the first six months of the year. If the EU has any hope of eliminating its energy dependence on Russia, the U.S. must step up its investment in LNG conversion and export facilities. In the short term, investment in natural gas production is necessary to keep the alliance supporting Ukraine together. In the longer term, it simultaneously addresses energy security, food security, geopolitical, and climate change goals.
There is a critical window of opportunity over the next several years as LNG markets are developing into global networks. China is betting on it, investing in gas pipelines connecting it to Siberia, which offers a more secure supply route than sea corridors in case of a military confrontation. China is also attempting to develop a regional LNG trade hub, including investing in regasification facilities in Europe. This is aimed at more than Chinese energy security; it is also a strategic geopolitical move. Unlike petroleum, natural gas markets are not closely tied to the U.S. dollar, making it an energy source much less vulnerable to western sanctions. Russia also bet big on it, investing in LNG production and export infrastructure in the Russian Arctic, backed by European partners who provided the capital and technological expertise. The loss of European support is a major setback to Russia’s ambitions in future energy markets, creating an opening for the U.S. and allies. As LNG markets become increasingly global (and increasingly critical for energy security), major trading hubs will control key nodes in tomorrow’s energy markets. With the world increasingly wary of dependence on unreliable partners for critical goods and the EU re-classifying natural gas a clean energy in 2022, there has never been a more opportune moment for the U.S., with its vast reserves of natural gas, to secure its economic and geopolitical future.
Conclusion: Strategic Responses to the Weaponization of Food in Hybrid Warfare
The United States has a significant food systems problem with grave implications for national security, geopolitics, and ultimately, global food security. Decades of over-consolidation at critical points in the production chain, the obsessive quest for efficiency, and a global race to the bottom for critical inputs without regard for geopolitical risks has left behind a mess of strategic vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that adversaries can easily capitalize on. The fallout from Russia’s conquest of Ukraine went deeper than the headlines on wheat; Russia’s role in upstream products for food production means the world must now contend with multilayered risks to food security. Nordstream’s destruction may have flown under the radar of the average consumer, but farmers all over the world understood the impact and its potential to be much worse. The future of hybrid warfare is this type of event: questionable attribution, compounding geopolitical effects, below the threshold of conventional war, but with real consequences for human security.
Food systems can be weaponized in a way that erodes American geopolitical power and undermines domestic stability. Rather than recognizing the power of this kind of warfare, the United States continues to underwrite the transfer of its strategic advantages to its adversaries as Russia’s increasing market share of the global wheat supply is facilitated by the very U.S. producers Putin has displaced. Perhaps the West can continue to look the other way while Russia finances its occupation by stealing grain in occupied Ukraine and exporting it out of Crimean & Russian ports. Doing something about it would seriously disrupt the global trade in wheat and put the most food-insecure areas at immediate risk. On the other hand, perhaps U.S. firms shipping grain for Russia isn’t in the world’s long-term security interests any more than it is the United States’ long-term strategic interests.
Last time the U.S. faced destabilizing conflict in Europe that threatened the peace and security of the world, Roosevelt’s calls to the titans of industry to stop financing the disrupters and supply the arsenal of democracy went largely ignored until Pearl Harbor. Let us hope it doesn’t take such a catastrophic event to call them home this time, because now the world has bigger weapons and more vulnerable systems. Before the next destabilizing event leaves the world with famine-inducing fallout, leaders should think strategically about how to build flexible, resilient systems that can withstand, and adapt to, the unexpected. This is nowhere more important than in the food supply – the basis of prosperity, stability, and modernity. We might also consider the possibility that in the era of grey zone conflict, the balance of power might be determined not solely by the biggest bombs or the adoption of emerging technologies, but at least equally by the production and distribution of the world’s food.
Tags: Hybrid War, Hybrid Warfare
About The Author
- Alicia Ellis
- Alicia Ellis is an Assistant Teaching Professor and Director of the MA in Global Security program. She has developed and taught graduate & undergraduate coursework on national security, economic statecraft, geopolitics, war & conflict, and international relations. Alicia was appointed as a Presidential Management Fellow in 2012, during which she served as an analyst at the Department of Treasury’s Office of Financial Research and later as a policy analyst for the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. While assigned to the State Department, she studied Russian language at the Institute of World Politics, including six weeks immersion training in Odessa, Ukraine. A former Air Force officer, she served two deployments as an Air Battle Manager in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, including three months as the Joint Air Operations Center Liaison Officer. She received her B.S. in Political Science from Northern Illinois University, her M.A. in International Relations from St. Mary’s University, and her PhD in Political Science from Arizona State University. Alicia published her dissertation on how the structure of state-industry relations in the agriculture sector impacts democratic accountability. She is a committee member with the Phoenix Committee on Foreign Relations, and currently working on several articles on the impact of political risk on industry and strategic vulnerabilities in the food supply chain.
8. Exxon Says Trump Should Keep U.S. in Paris Climate Pact
For PR effect or does he really believe this?
But from a strategic competition perspective with China should we be ceding the battlefield to China here? As an aside, will the next administration even use "strategic competition" and "integrated deterrence" as part of its national security lexicon?
Exxon Says Trump Should Keep U.S. in Paris Climate Pact
Exxon Mobil CEO Darren Woods says the president-elect’s plan to pull U.S. out of the agreement is a bad idea
https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/exxon-says-trump-should-keep-u-s-in-paris-climate-pact-3d8de471?mod=latest_headlines
By Collin Eaton
Follow and Benoît Morenne
Follow
Updated Nov. 12, 2024 1:10 am ET
Exxon Mobil CEO Darren Woods says stops and starts create a lot of uncertainty for businesses. Photo: Karim Jaafar/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The chief executive of Exxon Mobil says President-elect Donald Trump shouldn’t pull the U.S. from an international pledge to mitigate climate change, putting the oil giant at odds with the incoming administration on a key policy issue.
In an interview, Exxon XOM -0.53%decrease; red down pointing triangle CEO Darren Woods said a second U.S. exit from the 2015 Paris climate agreement—as Trump has proposed—would create uncertainty and could confuse global efforts to stop the worst effects of climate change. Exxon has publicly supported the goals of the accord since 2015.
Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Paris agreement in his first term and is almost certain to do so again. The U.S. rejoined the accord under President Biden in 2021, a move Exxon applauded. Woods said it is unhelpful for businesses “to have the pendulum swing back and forth as administrations change.”
“I don’t think the stops and starts are the right thing for businesses,” Woods said. “It is extremely inefficient. It creates a lot of uncertainty.”
Woods is currently in Baku, Azerbaijan, where he is set to rub elbows with world leaders at the annual United Nations climate conference, known as COP29, the second time he has attended the event.
The U.S. oil major has recently expanded its outreach to government officials touting its carbon-cutting investments and is advising them to pursue global carbon accounting measures. It also has engaged more frequently with some officials critical of the oil industry’s contributions to the world’s greenhouse-gas emissions, including in the Biden administration.
The United Nations climate conference, known as COP29, is being held in Baku, Azerbaijan. Photo: Bianca Otero/Zuma Press
Exxon has long faced criticism for its climate change policies. In 2021, it lost a bruising proxy fight to a small investment firm, which argued the driller didn’t have a plan to navigate the energy transition. The company also faces dozens of lawsuits around the country that seek to hold it responsible for its contributions to climate change.
But its engagement comes as climate skeptics are ascendant in Trump’s political ranks, and Exxon could draw the president-elect’s ire. Trump has previously singled out companies whose positions he dislikes, including farm-equipment maker Deere & Co., whom he has threatened with tariffs if it sold made-in-Mexico equipment previously made in the U.S.
“It’s ironic that the major oil companies are not supportive of the ‘drill, baby, drill,’ strategy, nor are their shareholders,” said Paul Sankey, an independent analyst. “They’ve been working very hard to lower their emissions, and the last thing they want is for all the rules and regulations to change again.”
In his first term, Trump sometimes questioned Exxon’s allegiances, and some Exxon executives didn’t always support his administration’s policymaking, according to people familiar with the matter. Exxon says it has always had a productive relationship with Trump.
As the pandemic laid oil prices low in 2020, Trump met with oil executives including Woods to discuss ways to bolster oil prices. In that meeting, Trump joked Exxon was a smaller company than it once was as the oil bust tanked drillers’ stock prices, adding that Exxon would be “better than ever.” Trump had a public falling-out with former Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, who served as Trump’s first secretary of state after he retired from Exxon.
Some of the president-elect’s allies see a growing rift in the industry, between those on board with Trump’s “energy dominance” agenda and those who are seeking government support for carbon-cutting technologies.
Myron Ebell, a conservative strategist involved in the first Trump administration’s transition, said he thinks larger companies advocate for cutting carbon emissions in part because constraining oil supplies will help them keep prices high enough to make a profit.
“They’re not as proud of producing oil as they should be,” Ebell said. “[Trump] is going to listen to the independent [oil companies] more than he’s going to listen to Darren Woods.”
Trump drew hefty campaign donations from smaller, scrappy U.S. frackers, led by oil billionaires, many of whom harbor doubts about climate change science. Now, some of them are influencing Trump’s energy and climate policy.
Climate skeptics are ascendant in President-elect Donald Trump’s ranks. Photo: Eric Risberg/Associated Press
Billionaire wildcatter Harold Hamm is helping to oversee energy policy and personnel decisions by Trump’s transition team, according to people familiar with the matter. Hamm founded Oklahoma driller Continental Resources and has railed against many climate change policies under President Biden.
Continental Resources didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Chris Wright, the CEO of oil-field services firm Liberty Energy, has been advising Trump on energy issues and is seen as a contender for the role of Energy Secretary, according to people familiar with the matter. Wright wrote a 180-page report that criticized what he described as “a myopic focus on climate change and climate politics.”
Wright didn’t respond to a request for comment.
North Dakota Gov. Doug Burgum, whose state has become an oasis for frackers, is among the contenders to serve as Trump’s energy czar, people familiar with the matter said.
A Trump spokeswoman didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
Woods said policymakers have become more receptive to the idea that limiting fossil fuel supplies and forcing expensive green energy alternatives into the market isn’t working. Exxon, he said, is well positioned to develop low-carbon technologies such as carbon capture, hydrogen and domestic lithium. The company has vowed to invest $20 billion through 2027 on those and similar technologies.
Woods said Exxon will stick to its plan during a second Trump administration, though it may have to make short-term adjustments to investments if government policies supporting those technologies change significantly. Exxon and some of its peers have lobbied Trump’s advisers and the GOP to preserve tax credits in Biden’s signature climate law that reward technologies the companies are investing in, including carbon capture.
“We don’t let political agendas drive our business and investment decisions we make,” Woods said.
Write to Collin Eaton at collin.eaton@wsj.com and Benoît Morenne at benoit.morenne@wsj.com
9. Harriet Tubman promoted posthumously to general in Maryland National Guard
An excellent initiative and well deserved.
She should also be honored by USSOCOM and the USAJFKSWCS should make her an honorary Green Beret. Afterall no one epitomizes the Special Forces motto of "De Oppresso Liber" more than Brigadier General Tubman. And who has established and operated a more successful and effective underground than her?
Harriet Tubman promoted posthumously to general in Maryland National Guard
https://wtop.com/maryland/2024/11/harriet-tubman-promoted-posthumously-to-general-in-maryland-national-guard/
Mike Murillo | mmurillo@wtop.com
November 11, 2024, 5:21 PM
A number of Harriet Tubman’s descendants took part in the commissioning ceremony, attended by military, community, and local leaders. Closing the day, Governor Moore joined...Read more
On this Veterans Day, the Maryland National Guard honored famed abolitionist Harriet Tubman as a one-star general.
The posthumous honor for the Underground Railroad “conductor” came during a ceremony Monday at the Harriet Tubman Underground Railroad National Historical Park on Maryland’s Eastern Shore.
“Harriet Tubman should be revered always for risking her life and her own freedom and the cause of justice for the enslaved,” said Maryland National Guard Maj. Gen. Janeen Birckhead.
Tubman was born into slavery in Maryland in 1822. In 1844, she would escape but returned to the state 13 more times to help other enslaved friends and family get to freedom. She would also help many others by providing them with instructions on how to escape their slaveowners.
“She learned the geography contacts along the Underground Railroad, best ways to travel in the forbidden territory where even a free slave would be taken,” Birckhead said.
Her work wouldn’t end there, as she played a pivotal role in helping the Union Army during the Civil War. She would help wounded soldiers, serve as a spy for the Army and even help lead raids on several plantations.
The raid would not only free hundreds of slaves, but also bolster the Union Army as many of those freed enlisted to fight.
“I could not think of a more appropriate day — a day to lift up one of the greatest Marylanders we have ever seen, one of the greatest patriots this country has ever seen — than to have a day where we are going to honor and lift up and commission Harriet Tubman to be a general,” said Maryland Gov. Wes Moore.
Moore said Tubman was the first to live up to the phrase “leave no one behind,” a phrase often heard in lessons about bravery and compassion.
“There is nobody who defined ‘leave no one behind’ in the way that Gen. Tubman left no one behind,” Moore said.Moore, a combat veteran, said giving Tubman the title of general is a fitting tribute to an amazing woman.
“Tubman lived the virtues that the U.S. military taught each and every one of us who took that oath. She lived them, they’re embodied in who she was and what she represents, that you lead with honor and integrity, duty and courage,” he said.
Birckhead said Tubman had the skills and talents which would have put her in the top 1% of those enlisting in the Maryland National Guard.
“A scout, very good at land navigation, clearly physically fit, resilient, able to lead people — all those things that we look for,” Birckhead said.
There to receive the medal on Tubman’s behalf was her great-great-great-grandniece, Tina Wyatt.
“Aunt Harriet was one of those veterans, informally, she gave up any right that she had attained for herself to be able to fight for others,” Wyatt said.
Get breaking news and daily headlines delivered to your email inbox by signing up here.
© 2024 WTOP. All Rights Reserved. This website is not intended for users located within the European Economic Area.
Mike Murillo
Mike Murillo is a reporter and anchor at WTOP. Before joining WTOP in 2013, he worked in radio in Orlando, New York City and Philadelphia.
mmurillo@wtop.com
10. Trump Faces a Different World in Term Two
Sounds like Walter Russell Mead is calling for the Trump administration to execute a superior Political Warfare strategy against the "Dark Quad."
Excerpts:
Despite these opportunities, the world remains a dangerous place. Mr. Putin celebrated Mr. Trump’s return to power by putting old scantily clad modeling photos of the incoming first lady on Russian state TV. He is unlikely to offer Mr. Trump a cheap peace in Ukraine. China continues its massive military buildup. Key allies in East Asia question America’s reliability while loathing Mr. Trump’s trade policies. Middle East allies, including Israel, are flirting with Russia.
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea do not want America to be great. They want it to fail. Mr. Trump can succeed only by outwitting and outmaneuvering foreign adversaries that are smarter, better resourced and more ruthless than the hapless Democrats he defeated last week.
Trump Faces a Different World in Term Two
Some adversaries have passed from the scene, while others have grown tougher.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/trump-faces-a-different-world-in-term-two-national-security-iran-china-russia-conflict-trade-16b50af2?mod=Searchresults_pos5&page=1
By Walter Russell Mead
Follow
Nov. 11, 2024 5:16 pm ET
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin shake hands at the Brics Summit in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 23. Photo: Alexander Shcherbak/Zuma Press
No sooner had Donald Trump secured re-election than speculation at home and abroad turned to what kind of foreign policy he will pursue in term two. It’s not easy to predict. Mr. Trump’s foreign-policy instincts are mixed. He genuinely doesn’t want to preside over a new round of “endless” wars, small, hard-to-win conflicts in faraway places over issues that he believes are marginal to core American interests. But he also likes being a powerful world figure whose interventions on global issues are decisive. The president-elect is no neoconservative interventionist, but he is hard to restrain.
Events more than doctrines will ultimately drive and define Mr. Trump’s foreign policy. That’s how it goes. George W. Bush came to power wanting to reduce foreign policy’s place in American life—until he and the nation were mugged by 9/11. Barack Obama did not expect to be overthrowing Moammar Gadhafi and dispatching troops into Syria and Iraq when he took the oath of office. Joe Biden had no idea that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would overshadow his presidency.
Similarly, what Mr. Trump wants may matter less than what foreign powers decide to do. A Chinese blockade of Taiwan, a Russian attack on a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member, a major terror attack on the U.S., or an Iranian detonation of a nuclear weapon would force huge changes in American policy.
That said, some changes in world politics since 2017 offer Mr. Trump greater scope than when he took the oath of office for the first time.
Take Europe. When Mr. Trump entered the White House, the experienced German Chancellor Angela Merkel, soon to be joined by France’s then-popular President Emmanuel Macron, led a formidable coalition of countries. This time it’s different. A frail German coalition government collapsed even as the ballots were being counted in the U.S., and Mr. Macron is a less imposing if more experienced presence than he was at the start of his mandate.
On climate, divisions inside Europe and voters’ concerns about energy costs have weakened Mr. Trump’s opponents. On migration, European attitudes have moved toward Mr. Trump. The European Union is less self-confident, more aware of its security deficit, more worried about China, less united and less strongly led than at the beginning of Mr. Trump’s first term.
On Ukraine and Russia, the Olaf Scholz-Joe Biden policy of keeping Ukraine on a short leash antagonized Russia without opening a path to victory for Kyiv. One can make a strong case for increased support to Ukraine as part of a plan to force Vladimir Putin to retreat. One also can argue that it would be more honest as well as cheaper and more realistic to accept that Ukraine must reach an agreement with Russia on terms acceptable to Moscow. But the muddy middle course Messrs. Biden and Scholz unfortunately chose offers little hope, and leaves Mr. Trump free to change course.
In the Middle East, there is a vacuum in America’s Iran policy. In 2017 the Iran nuclear deal enjoyed the strong support of key U.S. allies. Despite sustained efforts, Team Biden failed to revive the old nuclear deal or to find another path for U.S.-Iran relations. With last week’s criminal charges over an alleged Iranian plot to assassinate Mr. Trump, the president-elect has much stronger legal and political standing for tough anti-Iran policies than he did in 2017. Closer to home, both Mexico and Canada have changed politically since 2017. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau has made Canada the standard bearer of global wokeism while stifling economic growth. Mexico’s judicial overhaul and general drift back toward left-leaning, quasi-authoritarian nationalism are worrying foreign investors.
China’s still-growing economic problems give Mr. Trump some leverage over Beijing as well. Xi Jinping is trying to bail out the construction industry and local governments and to stimulate spending among Chinese consumers hit hard by the housing downturn. Massive overinvestment has led to excess capacity in export-dependent industries ranging from automobiles to steel. That makes Mr. Xi vulnerable to American trade pressure and, perhaps, eager to strike deals with Mr. Trump.
Despite these opportunities, the world remains a dangerous place. Mr. Putin celebrated Mr. Trump’s return to power by putting old scantily clad modeling photos of the incoming first lady on Russian state TV. He is unlikely to offer Mr. Trump a cheap peace in Ukraine. China continues its massive military buildup. Key allies in East Asia question America’s reliability while loathing Mr. Trump’s trade policies. Middle East allies, including Israel, are flirting with Russia.
China, Russia, Iran and North Korea do not want America to be great. They want it to fail. Mr. Trump can succeed only by outwitting and outmaneuvering foreign adversaries that are smarter, better resourced and more ruthless than the hapless Democrats he defeated last week.
You may also like
1:45
0:02
/
5:38
Tap For Sound
Free Expression: By exaggerating our woes for partisan reasons, politicians on both sides of the aisle threaten to squander America's enduring global superiority. Photo: Shen Hong/Xinhua via ZUMA Press/AFP via Getty Images
Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the November 12, 2024, print edition as 'Trump Faces a Different World in Term Two'.
11. Russians Train Foreign Mercenaries in Crimea to Use Children as Human Shields, Say Partisans
This is a sometimes overlooked task that partisans can perform: collecting information to hold the occupiers accountable at the war crimes trials after Ukrainian victory.
Excerpts:
"Rashists are using children as human shields, trying to protect their soldiers and mercenaries from strikes by the Ukrainian Defense Forces," say the Atesh partisans, adding, "Our agents continue to closely monitor such incidents and are ready to provide all necessary information to hold the occupiers accountable."
Earlier, Kyiv Post reported that Russian troops from the 810th Marine Brigade, stationed in Russian-occupied Crimea, are allegedly paying bribes to avoid deployment to the Kursk region. Partisans claim that low morale among Russian personnel has led some to offer bribes to their superiors to remain in Crimea.
“Due to this situation, certain commanders are allegedly demanding bribes to grant temporary reprieves from deployment,” the Atesh report said.
Russians Train Foreign Mercenaries in Crimea to Use Children as Human Shields, Say Partisans
kyivpost.com · by Kateryna Zakharchenko · November 12, 2024
At the Kozachyi training ground in Sevastopol, Russian forces train African and Cuban mercenaries and use children from the Yunarmiya group as human shields.
by Kateryna Zakharchenko | November 12, 2024, 8:16 am
Photo: Atesh
At the Kozachyi training ground in the occupied city of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula, Russian military personnel are training mercenaries from Africa and Cuba, Atesh partisan movement agents reported on Sunday, Nov 10.
The training ground is operated by Russia’s 810th Marine Infantry Brigade, where military trucks periodically arrive with people who don’t resemble the local population, say the partisans.
In addition, shooting exercises for teenagers from the Yunarmiya (a Russian youth military-nationalistic organization that includes schoolchildren aged 8 and above) are occasionally held on the same training grounds.
"Rashists are using children as human shields, trying to protect their soldiers and mercenaries from strikes by the Ukrainian Defense Forces," say the Atesh partisans, adding, "Our agents continue to closely monitor such incidents and are ready to provide all necessary information to hold the occupiers accountable."
Earlier, Kyiv Post reported that Russian troops from the 810th Marine Brigade, stationed in Russian-occupied Crimea, are allegedly paying bribes to avoid deployment to the Kursk region. Partisans claim that low morale among Russian personnel has led some to offer bribes to their superiors to remain in Crimea.
“Due to this situation, certain commanders are allegedly demanding bribes to grant temporary reprieves from deployment,” the Atesh report said.
The EU is at a turning point. Faced with Robert Fico’s obvious challenge to its values, the EU must take action against leaders within the Union who deliberately undermine it.
The guerrillas added that those who managed to stay at the base by paying these bribes are now attempting to appear active.
“They are busy setting up camouflage barriers and moving equipment from one place to another, deeply fearful of an imminent surprise from the Ukrainian Defense Forces,” the report read.
In mid-October, Atesh partisans conducted surveillance near the Sevastopol guardhouse by the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s vehicle depot. Here, “refusals” – servicemen, primarily from the 810th Brigade, who disobeyed orders to fight in the Kursk region – are reportedly being held in restrictive conditions for the purpose of “re-education”.
To suggest a correction or clarification, write to us here
You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter
Please leave your suggestions or corrections here
Kateryna Zakharchenko
Born and lives in Kyiv. A journalist for Kyiv Post. Writes exclusive articles and interviews.
12. An Army general's final 'walk' at the Tomb of the Unknowns
Another inspiring story about a soldier.
An Army general's final 'walk' at the Tomb of the Unknowns
Maj. Gen. William Zana, the only guard at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier to reach the rank of general, took a final guard shift on the night he retired.
Matt White
Posted on Nov 11, 2024 7:00 AM EST
taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White
At exactly 10 p.m. on the warm, last night of May, Maj. Gen. William Zana received his orders and began his final guard shift on the smooth marble stone plaza at the center of Arlington National Cemetery. In two hours it would be midnight, a new day and new month. A new guard would relieve him at his post, he would march off the plaza and suddenly, instantly, be a civilian.
But for the final two hours of his 37-year career, Zana wanted one last chance to stand a shift he had held as a young sergeant: keeping watch over the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier.
“I was Pvt. Zana when I showed up to the Old Guard,” Zana told Task & Purpose.“You know, all of us who raise our right hand and serve, there’s things that define you. First combat tour, first loss of personnel. For me, volunteering for and serving at the Tomb was absolutely both defining and shaping.”
Maj. Gen. William Zana examines a ceremonial M14 rifle as he prepares to stand one final watch over the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery, May 31, 2024.
Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy
In the early 1990s, Zana served for two years as a Sentinel, as fully qualified Tomb Guards are known, leaving in March 1991 for the Virginia National Guard. He earned a commission and over the next three decades led units in combat as an infantry officer and, later, led joint task forces as a general, including as the commander of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in Djibouti. He retired as the National Guard Bureau’s director of strategic plans and policy and international affairs at the Pentagon.
In the 76-year history of the all-enlisted Tomb Guard corps, Zana is the only former guard to advance to the rank of a general officer.
But over his thee-plus decades of service, he returned to Arlington more than he thought he might, and more than he wanted. Over the years he buried his first wife, friends and fallen comrades in the cemetery.
“I’ve been on both ends,” Zana said. “I’ve been on the end with a casket in the back of a Humvee in a forward operating base in some remote location in Afghanistan, and I’ve been there with, you know, the caissons pulling up with the flag-draped coffin.”
Throughout his career, his time as a Tomb Guard was at the core of service.
“As I started approaching retirement, there was this idea of getting in one last shift at the Tomb,” Zana said. “It was important because I wanted to be able to pay my respects and say thanks to the Unknowns for their sacrifice and for their inspiration.”
‘Rows and rows’
Zana grew up in a military family, his father serving in the Air Force and with relatives in each of the other armed forces. He lived in Belgium for seven years, absorbing the history of two world wars and even older conflicts fought on its soil.
“I played on the battlefields of Waterloo,” the site of the English Army’s final victory over Napolean, he said. “That really spoke to me as a kid.”
Returning to the U.S., he went to college but left after three years to join the Army.
“I realized, if I didn’t go do this, you know, I didn’t know if was it gonna happen.”
He signed up for the infantry and arrived at boot camp at Fort Benning, Georgia, with a contract for Airborne training and the 75th Ranger Regiment. But when recruiters from Arlington’s 3rd Infantry Regiment — The Old Guard — visited his basic training class, he was hooked.
”I didn’t know anything about the Old Guard,” Zana said. “But there was just a different set of opportunities. […] It was something that was connected to honoring veterans, dignitary ceremonies, funerals within the cemetery, there was something about that that just seemed like a meaningful opportunity.”
U.S. Army Maj. Gen. William Zana watches a changing of the guard at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington National Cemetery prior to assuming his own final guard shift to end his career.
Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy
Zana changed his dream sheet and was soon at Fort Myer, adjacent to Arlington National Cemetery. Known as the Old Guard for its status as the oldest continually active infantry unit in the Army, the 3rd Infantry Regiment’s soldiers perform all ceremonial duties in Arlington, along with maintaining currencies and training as front-line infantry soldiers. Old Guard soldiers perform as firing parties and casket attendants at 25 to 30 burials every day, escort VIPs and participate in wreath-laying ceremonies. As a newcomer, Zana shuffled through those duties, learning the history of the cemetery, its rituals and its place in the American military as the foremost resting ground for war dead.
“Arlington Cemetery is a place that just moves you,” Zana said. “It can be overwhelming to be surrounded by rows and rows of headstones. I think for many people, it’s easy to depersonalize that.”
But the Tomb of the Unknown, Zana found, boils the scope and size of Arlington down to a single grave. “When you go to the Tomb of the Unknowns, it’s kind of the epicenter, it’s the representation of so much that’s within the cemetery.”
‘Known but to God‘
The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is a white marble crypt that holds the remains of an unidentified American killed in World War I. Engraved on the crypt are the words: “Here rests in honored glory an American Soldier known but to God.”
The unidentified remains of two other American service members are buried in front of the tomb, one from World War II, one from the Korean conflict. A third grave where an Unknown from Vietnam was laid to rest is now empty, after the remains were identified in 1998 by DNA testing as Air Force 1st Lt. Michael Blassie. An A-37 Dragonfly pilot with the 8th Special Operations Squadron, Blassie was shot down near An Lộc, Vietnam in May 1972. His body was exhumed and reburied near St. Louis.
Tomb Guards stand guard at the Tomb 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Maj. Gen. William L Zana holds a media roundtable at the Pentagon, wearing his Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Identification badge on his right breast pocket.
DOD photo by MC1 Alexander Kubitza
The role is the most public and most selective position in the Old Guard. In the 76 years of the tomb, just 731 soldiers have earned full status as guards, earning the title of Sentinel and the right to wear a Guard, Tomb of the Unknown Soldier Identification badge for the rest of their careers. The two newest Sentinels were awarded their badges on Monday during Veterans Day.
During Zana’s first two years with the Old Guard, the more Zana learned about Tomb Guard duty, the more he wanted to be a part of it.
“My first platoon sergeant went down to be the sergeant of the guard,” Zana said. “He reached out and asked me ‘Was I still interested in trying out?’ I said, ‘Yeah, absolutely.’”
Qualifying for duty as a Tomb Guard remains largely unchanged from the process Zana went through in 1989. The first cut-off is genetic — men must be between 5-foot-10 and 6–foot-4, while women must be 5-foot-8 and 6-foot-2. Volunteers must be in “superb physical condition” with an “unblemished military record.”
After an interview, Zana was given a two-week trial period, by the end of which he had to repeat back seven pages of Cemetery history verbatim.
That earned him a “walk.”
21 Steps
The “walk” is at the heart of Tomb Guard duty. During each Sentinel shift — known as a relief — six guards rotate through the duties of a walk. On the plaza in front of the Tomb, the on-duty guard walks a 21-step path at 90 steps per minute, then faces East for 21 seconds — both counts symbolic of a 21-gun salute. They reverse and perform a shoulder-arms movement to place their weapon, an immaculate M-14, on the shoulder facing the Tomb’s amphitheater, where the public gathers to watch, signifying that the guard stands between the Tomb and any threat.
During the countless hours Sentinels walk at the Tomb, they watch thousands of visitors.
“You realize that the Tomb of the Unknowns means something different to everyone who visits,” Zana said. “Some people look at it as this is representative of somebody they lost or [a] family member. It could be that it’s a relative they never knew.”
Maj. Gen. William L. Zana points to a photo from his time as a Tomb Sentinel.
Army photo by Sgt. Ethan Scofield
During his time as a Sentinel, Zana knew Arlington for the generations of America’s military dead buried there. As a Sentinel, he even had to memorize the details of 300 notable graves mixed among the thousands of others. But none held anyone he had known in life.
When he retired as a two-star general, that was no longer true. It was now a cemetery full of friends, family and comrades.
“It was very, very different when I was was first down there. I hadn’t lost any service members in combat.”
‘Your name on a headstone’
Zana’s first funeral duty for a fellow soldier came while still at the Old Guard, when the unit laid to rest the stillborn child of a team leader.
“At that time, I was a private or specialist,” Zana said. “Burying the child of someone who you’re working for, having a child-size casket, the firing party and the casket bearers, you know, you just cry.”
In the years since, Zana has been back many times.
“The most recent I went to was for a naval officer who served with me in Djibouti,” Zana said. “And over the years. I probably had two or three dozen people who I’ve known well who were buried in the cemetery and far more that I knew tangentially.”
In June 2006, Zana deployed to Afghanistan to lead a National Guard liaison unit under the 10th Mountain Division at Bagram, Afghanistan, a job with constant travel around the war zone.
A week after arriving, on his first patrol, his team’s vehicle was struck by a vehicle-borne IED, armed with four artillery shells. Only one exploded.
“We all walked away,” Zana said. “One of the EOD guys came up to us and wanted to shake our hands. He said ‘you’re the luckiest guys in all Afghanistan.’ I didn’t think so, it was my first week, but it was a realization that I am truly responsible for the lives and well-being of others, while still accomplishing the mission.”
William Zana’s name plaque among the 731 soldiers to ever serve as Sentinel Tomb Guards.
US Army video still.
Soon after, the unit would run out of that luck.
During Zana’s command, a Maryland Guardsman, Command Sgt. Major Roger Haller, joined his team. Zana rotated out of the job in January 2007, replaced by Lt. Col. David Canegata, an officer in the Virgin Islands Army Guard who was, like Zana, assigned to the National Guard Bureau headquarters in Virginia. The team’s counterpart in Iraq was another of Zana’s close friends, National Guard Col. Paul Kelly.
On Jan. 20, 2007, the same month Zana turned over command, Canegata, Haller and Kelly were on a Blackhawk that was shot down in Iraq, killing all 12 soldiers on board. Of the dead, 10 were National Guard members. It was the deadliest single loss for the Guard of the post-9/11 wars.
Canegata’s remains were eventually returned to the Virgin Islands and Haller’s to Maryland. Kelly is interred at Arlington, as is a monument dedicated to those killed in the crash. The monument includes comingled remains removed but not identified from the crash.
“It connects back when you realize you’re doing a fallen comrade ceremony for people who, you know, are going to go back and be interred at Arlington Cemetery,” Zana said. “It’s connecting the dots between what those things are. There’s 400,000 people buried in Arlington and you realize they’re all individuals with these full and profound stories and family members and connections and communities. And the Unknowns are the ones who not only lost their lives but they also gave their identity. That’s the important thread that connects it all together.”
Just a year before his Afghanistan deployment, Zana’s first wife, Rebecca Zana, died of brain cancer. Her internment at Arlington put Zana at the center of a ceremony he knew well. With the Old Guard, Zana performed hundreds of burials as a casket bearer or firing party, his presence and professionalism, he believed, a comfort to families of the dead.
“I was there with the spouses, the widows and the widowers, the family,” Zana said. “The headstone says ‘Rebecca Zana, wife of Major William Zana, and having your own name on a headstone on a grave in the cemetery and having been the spouse for the ceremony that I once did, I don’t think [there are] adequate words that I could give.”
The last walk
It was just after Veterans Day, a cold, blustery, wet Washington fall day in 1990. It was the kind of weather that empties the cemetery of nearly all visitors, particularly the tourists around the windswept Tomb.
Zana was walking a shift in the cold: 21 steps. Face south. 21-second pause. Turn. Shoulder arms. 21 steps.
The walk is always the same, even if the weather chases away anyone watching.
“It was raining and I was walking by myself,” Zana remembers. “And there [was] no one there because it was just like, not a hospitable environment. And there was an older gentleman who was wearing what appeared to be, like, an American Legion or VFW hat. One of those Garrison caps.”
As Zana walked, the man matched his paces back and forth.
“In your peripheral vision [you’re] kind of seeing what’s going on. So as I’m facing in the southerly direction. I see him just standing there, solemnly watching.”
Guards walk for an hour on each shift. The man stayed the whole time.
“Right before the guard changed he paused. And he raised his right hand to salute,” said Zana. “And I realized he was saluting the Unknowns as we do as Sentinels. But then he said — and and I could hear him — he said, ‘thank you, son,’ and, and I knew that was directed towards me.”
Zana then did the one thing a guard at the Tomb rarely does: He stopped.
“I pause my routine and came down [onto] the mat and saluted him back,” said Zana. “We just kind of held that for a moment and then I continued my routine. That was one of those things for me that meant something really special to him and I could [be] a part of this thing that was bigger than myself. I look at something like that is being one of those defining moments in your life.”
On the last day of May this summer, Zana arrived at the Tomb early with his wife, Agata, a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia Guard (her status, he joked, meant he would soon have a dependent I.D. card). He joined the current Tomb Guards in their quarters just off the plaza. He reviewed the shift to come with the relief commander, a female sergeant (the first woman to qualify as a Sentinel, Sgt. Heather Lynn Johnsen, arrived at the Tomb five years after Zana’s Old Guard tour).
Mostly, he swapped stories with the young guards on the shift.
“Whatever side you’ve been in the military, you’ve got these stories,” Zana said. “So being able to connect with young soldiers, and for me, hopefully, you know, giving them this idea that they can do whatever they want with their military career.”
One soldier was thinking about following Zana’s path to become an officer. Another was about to get a major promotion.
Zana also pulled out the guard logs from 1991, finding his own final entry: “Sgt. Zana, last walk,” it read.
To correct the record, Zana added a sticky note: “Not quite, see logbook for 5/31/24, MG Zana takes one more shift”
U.S. Army Maj. Gen. William Zana looks through a logbook of the guards of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in the Sentinel quarters at Arlington National Cemetery.
Army photo by Sgt. 1st Class Jon Soucy
Night shifts at the Tomb vary from day shifts. A guard always stands watch, but their precise dress uniforms are stowed overnight, replaced by duty uniforms. Tomb Guards use the night hours to train on the plaza or prepare the site for ceremonies.
Still, a guard is always posted.
For his first hour on duty, several of the guards joined him at the post. For the second hour, Zana stood alone.
“And that was some of the most profound time of my military career,” Zana said. “I look back, 37 years and you can do the math on the number of hours and minutes. But when you get down to [it], there’s just two hours. Then just this one hour. Tonight, you know the clock strikes, we change the guard. And I depart the cemetery as a retired soldier.”
A line he’d memorized in his original shift at the Tomb echoed in his mind.
Surrounded by well meaning crowds by day,
alone in the thoughtful peace of night,
this soldier will in honored glory rest
under my eternal vigilance.
“‘Alone in the thoughtful peace of night’,” Zana said. “It’s part of the Sentinel’s creed.”
The latest on Task & Purpose
Senior Editor
Matt White is a senior editor at Task & Purpose. He was a pararescueman in the Air Force and the Alaska Air National Guard for eight years and has more than a decade of experience in daily and magazine journalism. He teaches news writing at the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill’s Hussman School of Journalism and Media where he is frequently referred to as a “very tough grader” on Rate My Professor. You can reach Matt at matthew.white@taskandpurpose.com
taskandpurpose.com · by Matt White
13. A new commander in chief, North Korean troops’ online ‘extracurriculars’ and more military news
A new commander in chief, North Korean troops’ online ‘extracurriculars’ and more military news
The Pentagon Rundown is back. Here is the military news from the past week that you need to know about.
Jeff Schogol
Posted on Nov 8, 2024 12:00 PM EST
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
Good afternoon! This is Jeff Schogol, your friend and humble Pentagon correspondent, and it’s an honor to once again bring you the Pentagon Rundown after a nearly three-year hiatus.
Right now, the Pentagon is in wait-and-see mode pending President Donald Trump’s return to office in January. During his last tenure as commander in chief, Trump was heavily involved in military matters. He canceled large-scale military exercises between U.S. and South Korean troops; he twice tried to withdraw all American forces from Syria; and he accused senior Pentagon leaders of wanting to fight wars so that the defense industry could make money.
Trump also took a personal interest in the military justice system. In November 2019, he pardoned former Green Beret Army Maj. Matthew Golsteyn, who was accused of killing an Afghan man; he pardoned former Army 1st Lt. Clint Lorance, who had been convicted of murder after ordering his troops to fire on three unarmed Afghans, two of which were killed; and he restored the former rank of Navy SEAL Chief Eddie Gallagher — who was found not guilty of killing a wounded ISIS fighter but convicted of posing for a picture with the man’s corpse — and ended the Navy’s efforts to revoke Gallagher’s SEAL trident pin.
Subscribe to The Pentagon Rundown to get caught up on defense and national security news every Friday morning.
Although the news cycle has been dominated by election coverage, a lot has happened in the past week. Here’s your weekly rundown:
-
When a post went viral on social media claiming that North Korean troops in Russia were “gorging on pornography” online, we knew someone had to ask the Pentagon, so we did. Alas, the Defense Department didn’t have much to say about North Korean soldiers’ “internet habits or virtual ‘extracurriculars’ in Russia.”
-
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced on Tuesday that he had fired the country’s Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, who has spoken frequently with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin since the start of the Gaza war. Air Force Maj. Gen. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman, described Gallant as “a trusted partner,” adding that the Defense Department will work closely with Israel’s next defense minister.
-
More proof that the Global War on Terrorism never ended: U.S. Central Command announced on Monday that U.S. troops along with their partners in Iraq and Syria have killed 163 suspected terrorists and captured more than 30 mid-level ISIS leaders since Aug. 29.
-
A military judge has ruled that Secretary Austin waited too long and went beyond the scope of his authority to nullify plea deals with the accused masterminds of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The Pentagon is reviewing the decision.
-
Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall has said he would be comfortable if the Air Force took over the U.S. military’s air defense mission. The Army is currently in charge of that mission, and air defense units are the Army’s “most deployed formation,” Gen. Randy George, the Army chief of staff, told reporters recently. Nothing quite like telling another service that it sure would be great if they could do their job, and yours, too.
-
For reasons that are not clear, the X account for the Selective Service — you know, that thing most men have to register for in case the draft is reinstated — reposted this message on Wednesday from another user: “For all you stupid f—s out there that still believe military service will be voluntary. Remember Germany 1936.” On Thursday, the Selective Service announced the inappropriate post had been taken down and, “We are investigating this incident to determine how this happened and are proactively taking steps to prevent this from happening in the future.” It could be worse, at least it wasn’t a repeat of the great Fort Bragg (now Liberty) horny Twitter (now X) debacle of 2020.
In other news, Thursday marked the 20-year anniversary of the Second Battle of Fallujah. Stars and Stripes looked back at the bloodiest battle of the Iraq War, during which 95 U.S. troops were killed and another 560 were wounded between Nov. 7 and Dec. 23, 2004. To commemorate both battles that took place in the Iraqi city, the Navy announced that an America-class amphibious assault ship expected to be completed in 2029 will be named USS Fallujah.
On a closing note: Parking at the Pentagon can be an adventure. For years, I have been lucky enough to have a coveted parking pass, but I’ve been working at home since the COVID-19 pandemic, so the time came on Wednesday for me to surrender my beloved pass to another reporter who comes to the building every day and deserves it. As I handed over my parking pass, I said with a sigh: “Take good care of it.”
And for all you new readers who aren’t familiar with our Pentagon coverage, here’s a highlight reel of some of the questions I’ve asked Pentagon officials over the years for Task & Purpose. Yes, my editor made me include this.
Updating the Jeff Schogol @JSchogol73030 @TaskandPurpose sizzle reel of Pentagon press briefing questions to include today's Taylor Swift query …. pic.twitter.com/xxttvi0fcA
— Howard Mortman (@HowardMortman) August 9, 2024
If you enjoyed reading this week’s Pentagon Rundown, and don’t want to wait until Friday afternoon to hear from yours truly, you can sign up here to get The Pentagon Rundown in your inbox every Friday morning.
taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol
14. Megacities: Key Strategic Terrain of the Future
Excerpts:
Conclusion
The future of global stability will increasingly hinge on the dynamics within megacities, which are becoming key strategic terrain for geopolitical interests. As urban areas continue to grow, understanding their strategic significance will be essential for policymakers and military planners alike. Ignoring the challenges posed by these urban centers could lead to strategic vulnerabilities that threaten national interests. In summary, the rise of megacities presents a dual challenge: they are vital to economic growth and global connectivity, yet they also harbor risks that could necessitate military intervention.
As we look toward the future, it is imperative to develop strategies that address both the opportunities and challenges presented by these urban epicenters. To effectively navigate the complexities of megacities, stakeholders must invest in research, infrastructure, and community resilience. By fostering collaboration between governments, NGOs, and local communities, we can work towards creating sustainable urban environments that mitigate risks and enhance stability. Understanding megacities as key strategic terrain will be crucial for ensuring a secure and prosperous future in an increasingly urbanized world.
Megacities: Key Strategic Terrain of the Future
https://www.strategycentral.io/post/megacities-key-strategic-terrain-of-the-future
"In the future, the face of battle will be that of urban warfare, where our forces will face enemies in the midst of city streets, and this complex environment will test every aspect of our training and adaptability."
— General Charles Krulak
As we progress further into the 21st century, the world is undergoing an unprecedented urban transformation. By 2030, it is projected that cities will accommodate 60% of the global population and contribute to 70% of the world’s GDP. This rapid urbanization, particularly in developing nations, presents both opportunities and challenges. The strategic significance of megacities—urban areas with populations exceeding 10 million—cannot be overstated. These cities are becoming epicenters of human activity, economic growth, and, unfortunately, potential conflict. As such, megacities are emerging as key strategic terrain for future geopolitical dynamics.
Urban areas are expected to grow by 1.4 billion people over the next two decades, with the majority of this growth occurring in developing countries. Cities like Dhaka, Bangladesh, and Lagos, Nigeria, exemplify this trend, where rapid population increases are juxtaposed with inadequate infrastructure and resources. As urbanization accelerates, the risks associated with natural disasters, climate change, and social inequality will exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, creating fertile ground for illicit networks and potential conflict.
The Strategic Implications
The increasing significance of megacities poses unique challenges for military planners and policymakers. Historically, military doctrine has favored avoiding urban areas due to the complexities and risks involved. However, as megacities become more central to global dynamics, the question shifts from "Why would the U.S. Army go to one of these places?" to "What conditions would necessitate military intervention in a megacity?" Megacities are not only centers of economic activity but also potential hotbeds for instability. They can serve as safe havens for terrorist groups and criminal networks, allowing them to operate under the radar of law enforcement. The large, diverse populations in these cities can obscure the activities of hostile actors, complicating efforts to maintain security.
The fragility of megacities, coupled with their growing importance, creates a complex security environment. For instance, cities like Cairo, Egypt, and Karachi, Pakistan, are strategically located near global trade routes and resources, making their stability crucial for international order. However, their vulnerabilities—stemming from poverty, political instability, and inadequate infrastructure—pose significant risks.
Megacities as Key Strategic Terrain
The strategic implications of megacities extend beyond their immediate geographic and economic significance. As urban centers continue to grow, they will increasingly influence global stability and security dynamics. Megacities often serve as focal points for geopolitical tensions, with their strategic locations making them battlegrounds for influence among global powers. This can lead to potential conflicts that have far-reaching consequences, affecting not only the cities themselves but also the broader international community.
Moreover, the competition for resources such as water, energy, and food will intensify as megacities expand. This competition can lead to conflicts both within and between nations, necessitating a reevaluation of resource management strategies. The interconnectedness of megacities can also facilitate the spread of transnational threats, including terrorism, organized crime, and pandemics. Military and security strategies must adapt to address these complex, multifaceted challenges, recognizing that threats in one megacity can have ripple effects across the globe.
Additionally, the rapid growth of megacities can lead to humanitarian crises, including displacement, food insecurity, and public health emergencies. These crises may require international intervention and support, further complicating the strategic landscape. As military engagements increasingly occur in urban environments, understanding the unique challenges of megacities will be essential for effective military planning. This includes adapting tactics and strategies to navigate the complexities of urban warfare, which often differ significantly from traditional combat scenarios.
Conclusion
The future of global stability will increasingly hinge on the dynamics within megacities, which are becoming key strategic terrain for geopolitical interests. As urban areas continue to grow, understanding their strategic significance will be essential for policymakers and military planners alike. Ignoring the challenges posed by these urban centers could lead to strategic vulnerabilities that threaten national interests. In summary, the rise of megacities presents a dual challenge: they are vital to economic growth and global connectivity, yet they also harbor risks that could necessitate military intervention.
As we look toward the future, it is imperative to develop strategies that address both the opportunities and challenges presented by these urban epicenters. To effectively navigate the complexities of megacities, stakeholders must invest in research, infrastructure, and community resilience. By fostering collaboration between governments, NGOs, and local communities, we can work towards creating sustainable urban environments that mitigate risks and enhance stability. Understanding megacities as key strategic terrain will be crucial for ensuring a secure and prosperous future in an increasingly urbanized world.
#Megacities #Urbanization #GlobalStability #Geopolitics #SustainableCities #FuturePlanning
15. After War in Gaza, Rivals Hamas and Fatah Don’t Plan to Be in Charge
After War in Gaza, Rivals Hamas and Fatah Don’t Plan to Be in Charge
Palestinian factions aim to create an apolitical committee acceptable to Israel to oversee aid distribution and rebuilding
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/palestinian-factions-edge-toward-plan-for-postwar-gaza-recovery-89ce91ac?mod=latest_headlines
By Summer SaidFollow
in Dubai and Benoit FauconFollow
in Doha, Qatar
Updated Nov. 12, 2024 1:10 am ET
The two main Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, are coalescing around a plan for Gaza’s reconstruction when major fighting stops. Its main selling point: Neither will be in charge.
Palestinian officials from both factions, long bitter rivals, have reached a consensus to create an apolitical committee of Palestinian technocrats not affiliated with either of them to manage the sensitive and massive jobs of aid distribution and rebuilding, Palestinian and other Arab officials said. Their acquiescence clears one potential obstacle to a postwar plan discussed by the U.S. and Israel, which would put a temporary technocratic government in place in Gaza until it is stable enough for elections.
“They have a lot more room and urgency for common ground now and to avoid being sidelined,” said Tariq Kenney-Shawa, a policy fellow at the Palestinian Policy Network, a think tank.
Hamas is open to a committee not aligned with Palestinian factions to oversee aid and reconstruction, Husam Badran, a member of Hamas’s Doha-based political bureau, said in an interview. Fatah is also warming to the idea of an apolitical Gaza committee, said officials in the Palestine Liberation Organization political body and the Palestinian Authority, both controlled by Fatah. “An agreement [on such a formula] is likely,” said a senior official from the Palestinian Authority.
People salvage some belongings amid the rubble of destroyed buildings, following Israeli strikes on the Nuseirat refugee camp. Photo: Eyad Baba/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The initiative is fraught with uncertainty and dependent on a cease-fire deal that Hamas and Israel haven’t been able to agree on for more than a year. Even if the two Palestinian sides work out differences that have separated them for decades, it is unclear whether Israel would accept such a committee. The Israeli government is determined to stamp out what remains of Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, and opposed to the Palestinian Authority’s involvement in running Gaza after the war.
Egypt, acting as a mediator between Israel and Hamas in cease-fire talks, originally proposed a technocratic committee for postwar Gaza in December, with backing from another significant player in humanitarian aid, the United Arab Emirates. Israel and the U.S. have floated the possibility of a technocratic government after the war.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said Israel doesn’t want to occupy Gaza after the war. Beyond that, Israel released a blueprint in February that said the strip’s administration would be “based as much as possible on local officials” and “will not be identified with countries or entities that support terrorism.”
Israel’s military is also considering plans to slice up the enclave into “safe islands” or fortified corridors to allow raids when it deems necessary. Netanyahu’s office declined to comment.
An Israeli soldier closes a border fence leading to the Gaza Strip. Photo: Amir Levy/Getty Images
The current U.S. administration wants Gaza to be unified with the West Bank under the Palestinian Authority and without a role for Hamas in its governance, a State Department spokesman said. “Palestinian people’s voices, self-determination and aspirations must be at the center of postcrisis governance in Gaza,” he said.
President-elect Donald Trump hasn’t specified a vision for Palestinian governance. A plan he backed during his first term foresaw a sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza in which Israel would be allowed to annex existing settlements.
The Palestinian factions also might struggle to convince Arab states that have tried unsuccessfully for months to nudge Israel and Hamas toward a cease-fire. Last week, Qatar asked Hamas’s political leaders to leave the Gulf country after their presence failed to bring out a cessation of fighting.
The proposal for an apolitical aid and reconstruction committee was discussed in Cairo earlier this month in a meeting between Hamas officials Badran and Khalil al-Hayya—the group’s chief negotiator—and West Bank-based Fatah leaders Azzam al-Ahmad and Mahmoud al-Aloul, according to Palestinian officials.
The committee would operate alongside a proposed government of technocrats that would run the postwar Palestinian territories until elections are held, Badran and Fatah-aligned officials said. Talks have so far failed to reach an agreement on how that government would be set up. And both sides worry about being jilted.
A poster bears a portrait of late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in Ramallah in the West Bank. Photo: Jaafar Ashtiyeh/AFP/Getty Images
“There is fear that international powers will deal with the committee directly,” bypassing the Palestinian Authority entirely, said an official in the PLO.
Hamas, an Islamist group, has long opposed a significant role in postwar Gaza affairs for the secular Palestinian Authority, which governs the West Bank. Hamas also opposes any outside party governing Palestinians in Gaza, Badran said. The group forcibly ousted Fatah from Gaza in 2007 after winning elections the year before. But the current war has forced both sides to change tack.
No end is in sight for the war in Gaza. Cease-fire talks are moribund, and Trump’s election victory raises uncertainty about the Biden administration’s ability to push them forward. Egypt is struggling to expand humanitarian access to the enclave. The committee plan faces hurdles even within Palestinian ranks.
Rebuilding Gaza will be a gargantuan task. The enclave has descended into chaos with crime and violence, from robbery and killings to smuggling and protection rackets. Two-thirds of the buildings have been damaged or destroyed, according to the United Nations. Rebuilding war-racked Gaza could cost up to $40 billion, a U.N. agency said in May.
Hamas and Fatah leaders agreed that the committee overseeing aid and reconstruction would be made up of up to 15 independent Palestinian figures not aligned to any movement. Its mandate wouldn’t be political. Instead, it would focus purely on distributing humanitarian assistance, in Gaza and healthcare and rebuilding the enclave, according to Badran and other Palestinian and Arab officials.
Displaced Palestinians near their tents, set up along the beach at a refugee camp in Gaza. Photo: Mohammed Saber/EPA/Shutterstock
Mahmoud Habbash, a senior adviser to Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, said the unaligned nature of the proposed committee meant “Hamas must admit that it has failed in managing the Gaza Strip.”
Still, Habbash said a detailed agreement on the committee’s workings had yet to be reached. Hamas and Fatah disagree on how involved the Palestinian Authority would be in running it, say Palestinian officials.
The Palestinian Authority oversaw both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip before the 2007 split with Hamas, leaving a divide in governance of Palestinian territories. Efforts to negotiate a reconciliation have long failed to bear fruit.
Earlier this year, Hamas detained several Palestinian Authority officials who had entered Gaza and tried to prevent an aid convoy overseen by Palestinian Authority staff from traveling in the enclave.
Anat Peled contributed to this article.
Write to Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com and Benoit Faucon at benoit.faucon@wsj.com
Appeared in the November 12, 2024, print edition as 'Palestinian Factions Edge Toward Plan For Postwar Gaza'.
16. Trump's global agenda is set to bring peace - opinion
From a former UK minister for the Middle East.
Excerpts:
Making peace a reality
Peace will be a reality, not a pipe dream, with violent extremism limited to a tiny minority on the fringe.
Finally, the new president’s economic policies will directly impact our economy and others around the world.
Any leader has a primary duty to their own citizens and the interests of their nation. However, the president of the world’s biggest economy should also have regard for maintaining global stability, which significantly depends on people’s standard of living.
It is to be hoped that President-elect Trump balances measures such as imposing tariffs on goods from China and elsewhere with a plan to avoid unintended consequences which can have a detrimental impact on ordinary people’s standard of living and undermine his policy objectives to create jobs and wealth.
May God bless America in the leadership it provides and respect from all parties for the democratic will of the people.
God bless America so that President-elect Trump will show the moral courage and integrity the world desperately needs in these challenging times.
Trump's global agenda is set to bring peace - opinion
Peace will be a reality, not a pipe dream, with violent extremism limited to a tiny minority on the fringe.
By IVAN LEWIS
NOVEMBER 11, 2024 05:28
Jerusalem Post
In a remarkable political comeback by any standards, Donald Trump has been elected the forty-seventh president of the United States of America.
While it is too early to fully explain his victory, there are certain factors that seem clear.
Whatever the Biden administration’s economic achievements, too many Americans felt their living standards had continued to deteriorate and they were no better off.
Trump was able to increase his support among groups of voters who have historically been Democrat.
Kamala Harris as a liberal Democrat was seen as more of a risk by center-ground voters than the moderate Joe Biden four years ago.
Republican presidential nominee and former US President Donald Trump gestures as he holds hands with his wife Melania during his rally, at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, Florida, US, November 6, 2024. (credit: REUTERS/BRIAN SNYDER)
Despite being vice president, she had less name recognition than Donald Trump. And once again, the question was whether significant numbers of Americans are ready for a woman president.
His victory is also yet another wake up call to the Left, Center-Left and even Center-Right that maverick or populist right-wing candidates worldwide are attracting a broad spectrum of voters who feel squeezed financially, threatened by poorly managed, out-of-control immigration and perturbed that too many people in today’s world are no longer willing to define what a woman is.
At this pivotal moment in history, it most definitely matters who holds the office of US president and the nature of the leadership he (or she) provides. Talk of declining US influence with the rise of new global powers such as China and India is off the mark.
The US remains the most powerful country in the world, economically, militarily and culturally.
It may be true that US presidents can be constrained by Congress but when it comes to foreign affairs and global influence, it is the president who determines America’s impact on the rest of the world.
Stay updated with the latest news!
Subscribe to The Jerusalem Post Newsletter
Subscribe Now
He or she is not only the leader of a powerful nation but also the de facto leader of the West in a world where Russia, China, Iran and North Korea have set themselves up as an unholy anti-Western alliance.
So, what should we want from Donald Trump in his second term of office?
Firstly, a strong America is the best guarantor of Western security.
We need a president willing to pursue a hard-headed approach to dealing with tyrants and despots in the world.
They need to know that if they aspire to pose a threat, they will pay a heavy personal and economic price, which will ultimately damage their authority and credibility with their own people.
While recent history teaches us that putting Western troops on the ground in hostile terrain should be a last resort only to be considered in extenuating circumstances, the option of other forms of action against rogue regimes must always remain in play.
US presidents have every right to demand NATO members fairly share the financial burden but there also should be unwavering support for this alliance and its central importance to our shared security.
It is to be hoped that President Trump offers this support and drives a hard bargain with Russian President Vladimir Putin prior to his often stated commitment to immediately end the war against Ukraine.
This matters for the Ukrainian victims of Putin’s aggression but also for the Russian leader’s future behavior and the message it will send to other regimes tempted to engage in acts of aggression and intimidation.
Based on his first term in office, there should be optimism that Israel and the cause of peace in the Middle East will benefit from a Trump presidency.
It is impossible to predict what may happen in the period between now and the Presidential inauguration in January.
Trump supports Israel
However, we know President-elect Trump will have a total commitment to the release of the Israeli hostages and the defeat of Hamas and Hezbollah – which means they will no longer have the capacity to terrorize Israel on any border.
As he sought to do previously, he should also champion a new plan for the Palestinians that provides them with hope and dignity alongside a vision for self-determination.
This has to recognize that there is no longer a democratic mandate in Israel for a solution based on 1967 borders and majority Palestinian opinion believing in a one-state solution where Israel would become Palestine with no Jewish identity.
So, once again, Trump and his team will need to engage in fresh thinking and reject the majority of Western opinion that calls for a solution which is a cruel deception as it can’t be delivered and in reality is opposed by the majority on both sides.
The biggest global challenge for the new president will be the threat posed by the Iranian regime.
This will require a strategy that provides it with a final ultimatum on its nuclear program and sponsorship of global terrorism. In his first term, Donald Trump rightly withdrew the US from the flawed nuclear deal.
It should be made clear to the regime that if it fails to change course, the US will lead an alliance that will use a combination of economic sanctions and targeted military action to attack the regime and its forces of internal oppression.
This will create the conditions that will empower the Iranian people to bring down a regime that 80% of them despise. Such an alliance is preferable to Israel having to continue to take sole responsibility for dealing with a regime that threatens the security of the Middle East and the world.
The new president will be under no illusions that Israel will have to act alone if necessary as a nuclear Iran is an existential threat to her survival.
Also based on his first term, there should be optimism that reelected president Trump will step up to the plate with NATO allies and the tacit support of Gulf states to provide the leadership that is long overdue.
This in itself will send the strongest possible message to the Iranian people that they will not be sacrificed or abandoned. We will support them as they reclaim and rebuild their proud country.
HAVING DEVELOPED the groundbreaking Abraham Accords, Trump is fully aware that there is a great prize to be won from this comprehensive strategy.
It will almost certainly lead to Saudi Arabia normalizing relations with Israel and, in turn, the vast majority of Muslim majority countries will do the same.
The perennial running sore which has poisoned Muslim-Jewish relations and the Islamist fundamentalist threat to the West will be consigned to history.
Making peace a reality
Peace will be a reality, not a pipe dream, with violent extremism limited to a tiny minority on the fringe.
Finally, the new president’s economic policies will directly impact our economy and others around the world.
Any leader has a primary duty to their own citizens and the interests of their nation. However, the president of the world’s biggest economy should also have regard for maintaining global stability, which significantly depends on people’s standard of living.
It is to be hoped that President-elect Trump balances measures such as imposing tariffs on goods from China and elsewhere with a plan to avoid unintended consequences which can have a detrimental impact on ordinary people’s standard of living and undermine his policy objectives to create jobs and wealth.
May God bless America in the leadership it provides and respect from all parties for the democratic will of the people.
God bless America so that President-elect Trump will show the moral courage and integrity the world desperately needs in these challenging times.
The writer is a former UK minister for the Middle East.
Jerusalem Post
17. How the Gray Zone Challenges Western Norms of Conventional Warfare:
An 11 minute podcast that is a deep dive on the gray zone that is useful for the general public.
https://www.strategycentral.io/podcast-1/episode/8cf84acb/how-the-gray-zone-challenges-western-norms-of-conventional-warfare-a-paradigm-shift-in-military-strategy
The Strategy Central PodcastHow the Gray Zone Challenges Western Norms of Conventional Warfare:
aabazin|11/8/2024
Join Rachel and Hal in Episode #3 as they discuss the concept of the “Gray Zone,” and how it has reshaped discussions about contemporary conflict within Western military frameworks.
18. Tell Your Story – Veterans
Jim Perkins was a (positive) influencer in the US Army before being an influencer became a thing. A good man. A good American. A good soldier.
Tell Your Story - Modern War Institute
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jim Perkins · November 11, 2024
Share on LinkedIn
Send email
Brian was a pudgy, twenty-two-year-old Navy intelligence officer at his first assignment out of the Naval Academy. In front of him stood Jocko Willink, an officer with fifteen years of service in the SEALs and now the commander of a SEAL task unit. Jocko is the walking image of a warrior—a barrel-chested freedom fighter with 6 percent body fat, no hair, and the demeanor of a sledgehammer. To say Brian was intimidated about his new assignment would be an understatement. How would he fit into this elite team?
I stood rapt in interest as I listened to Brian’s story during the first “War Stories” event that I ever attended back in 2014. I was in the first year of the MBA program at Georgetown and the other student veterans were taking turns sharing stories at a happy hour in the student lounge of the Hariri Building. As a nerd for civil-military relations getting my first experience away from the military, I was hooked.
That evening’s event was the continuation of a tradition started in 2009 by GoRuck CEO and former Green Beret Jason McCarthy when he was a student in the same program. Dubbed “War Stories (and Free Beer),” the intent is to lower the social barriers and create opportunities for connection and understanding between veterans and society. Like a TEDx event with booze, everyone loved it.
The following year, it was my turn to host the event and I got my first taste of prepping speakers. I learned a lot from it. The stories were good, but we could have made them much better. I held the line with one individual who wanted to puff out his chest and spew a bunch of acronyms. I didn’t let him speak, but I wish I could have broken through with him. Every veteran has a story worth telling if you can find it.
Fifty years into the all-volunteer force, stories of military service are more important than ever. The share of Americans with connections to the military is at the lowest point in the last century. We need military, veterans, and dependents who can tell stories that humanize the military experience and connect with civilian society so that we do not drift further apart (or at least not as fast).
In the decade since Georgetown, I have helped organize similar events via veteran and military affinity groups with various employers. Along the way, I have learned what makes for a good war story (and when to not give someone the mic) and have become even more sure that America needs war stories.
With minor exceptions, America today only knows the military through Hollywood’s lens and the front page of the newspaper—neither of which are accurate. I often start these events by asking the audience whether they think The Hurt Locker or G.I. Joe is a more accurate depiction of the military. The veterans always know it’s a trick question. I usually add that the movie Stripes could not be made today because America is so disconnected from the military that we can’t (or don’t feel comfortable) making fun of it.
The overwhelming majority of men and women who serve in the military are not Chris Kyle or Pat Tillman. Instead, they are wonderful people who served honorably—yet unremarkably. For most veterans, military service was not as starkly different from civilian life as many civilians imagine. The chasm of understanding is not as unbridgeable as we treat it, but precious few Americans understand the military experience.
Veterans Day was originally enacted to “to perpetuate peace” by commemorating the extraordinary service demanded from the Great War. It deserves so much more than a well-intended yet hollow “Thank you for your service.” To truly commemorate service, Veterans Day needs stories.
Everyone who joins the military will eventually leave it and be a veteran for much longer. So, it is important that we—the veterans and military-connected community—all learn how to tell these stories. I want to share the lessons I’ve learned about good stories.
My ground rules for speakers are simple. First, you must tell a story, not just rattle off your service record. Second, the story must be about you, but you cannot be the hero, victim, or villain. Lastly, if you share your story at an organized event and you must include slides, they must adhere to the TED format: huge font or picture only. For some speakers, these ground rules are all they need. They understand human connection and storytelling and can craft a compelling story without more guidance.
Most speakers need more help though. Most of us don’t organize our thoughts in a way that weaves a message as a through line in a story. To help with this, I ask speakers two questions: What is the one thing that you want people to know about your military service? And why does this message matter to you? The former is much easier than the latter, but the why matters much more in the end.
For the audience to truly connect with the story and the speaker, it cannot simply be a series of events. Listeners must understand the speaker’s perspective—the emotional and psychological underpinnings of the story. So, it’s important to tease this out.
It is impossible to tell someone honestly why you served in the military. There is rarely one reason and we want to ascribe more value to the noblest motivation (a sense of duty over money for college, for example). But, defining the story’s core message helps bring forth something important: Why is military service important to who you are today? This is the stuff that lasting connections across the civil-military divide are made of—and those connections truly matter.
Admittedly, I’m very proud of my military service. But my role at these events is the emcee, not a speaker. I create the opportunities for the connections because I strongly believe that America needs to stay in touch with the military that serves in its name.
In 2006, an unnamed Army officer in Iraq was famously quoted saying, “We’re at war, America’s at the mall.” War stories matter. A society disconnected from foreign policy is not good. We risk waging expensive wars and impacting countless lives in minute and monumental ways for little benefit to society. While I firmly believe that the all-volunteer force is a good thing for America, it must be balanced by society understanding military service.
Today, the military is in a recruiting crisis. Even the veterans who served over the last twenty years in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are less supportive of their children serving. America needs a strong military, but if Americans no longer believe that the government will be good custodians of their service or lives, they will not volunteer to serve.
So, tell war stories on Veterans Day. Talk to your colleagues and neighbors about your service. Give the military a face and a name. Help Americans understand what military service is all about and why our foreign policy matters.
Jim Perkins is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve. He is professionally passionate about military talent management reform and civil-military relations to better support “who serves, how they serve, and why they serve.”
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
Image credit: Airman Juliana Londono, US Air Force
Share on LinkedIn
Send email
mwi.westpoint.edu · by Jim Perkins · November 11, 2024
19. Balancing Risk: Ensuring the Safety of U.S. Peacekeepers in U.N. Missions
US contributions to UN peacekeeping operations rarely make the news.
Excerpts:
Conclusion
As the situation in Lebanon demonstrates, the enduring dangers and complexities of these multilateral peacekeeping missions continue to test the international community. The experiences of the U.S. Military Observer Group offer important lessons that should inform how the United States navigates its future participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Ultimately, navigating this delicate balance between force protection and mission accomplishment will continue to define the future of U.S. engagement in U.N. peacekeeping. Thoughtful risk management, robust contingency planning, and clear-eyed strategic assessments will be essential to sustaining a prudent and impactful U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping operations going forward. While the host nations and United Nations share responsibility for peacekeeper safety, the United States must remain actively involved to ensure the safety and effectiveness of its personnel, while also upholding its broader commitments to international security and the liberal world order. This may require occasional tough decisions to temporarily suspend or reduce troop contributions when the risks become untenable, and the United States should be ready to bear the political consequences of such decisions.
The U.S. aversion to risk and the profound political and strategic implications of American peacekeeper casualties place unique constraints on our decision-making. This stands in stark contrast to the generally higher tolerance for risk exhibited by many other troop-contributing countries, some of which are more willing to accept the human cost of these dangerous assignments. As evidenced by the cases in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Israel, the United States is often compelled to make difficult choices that prioritize the safety of its personnel, even if that means scaling back or temporarily withdrawing from a mission.
In contrast, the United Nations must grapple with balancing the stabilizing benefits of maintaining a peacekeeping presence against the heightened risks, as the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon situation continues to demonstrate. The U.N. responsibility to safeguard all its peacekeepers, regardless of nationality, creates inherent tensions with the U.S. imperative to protect its troops at all costs.
Balancing Risk: Ensuring the Safety of U.S. Peacekeepers in U.N. Missions - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Christian Werner · November 12, 2024
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s calls for the withdrawal of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon, and headlines of rocket attacks resulting in numerous casualties, have brought to the forefront questions about the safety of U.N. peacekeepers and the utility of today’s peacekeeping enterprise. These developments highlight perennial challenges faced by peacekeepers worldwide: operating in volatile environments where escalating tensions can place them in harm’s way. Moreover, they illustrate the vastly different levels of risk tolerance between the United States and the United Nations.
Throughout my recent three-year assignment as the commander of U.S. military members assigned to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide, I was responsible for overseeing and supporting teams stationed in some of the world’s most challenging operational environments, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Libya, Western Sahara, and Israel. The hazardous nature of the missions and the environments in which our peacekeepers are deployed meant that a key focus of my command was managing the risks our peacekeepers faced while balancing the strategic desire to maintain our contributions to these missions.
This article looks at Washington’s approach to risk management for U.S. peacekeepers, examining three cases with parallels to the developing situation facing U.N. peacekeeping in Lebanon: the withdrawal of the U.N. mission from Mali, the high potential for state-on-state conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, and the immediate aftermath of the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks in Israel. The decisions in each of these cases highlight both the lengths to which the U.S. military goes to maintain the safety of its peacekeeping forces and the risks that U.N. missions face. Ultimately, both of these approaches are appropriate to the political requirements of the respective institutions; at their best, both can operate in tandem to help bolster global peace and security.
Become a Member
America Has Peacekeepers?
Across the Department of Defense, few are aware of the extent to which the department supports U.N. peacekeeping operations. In fact, the department has supported U.N. peacekeeping operations since the 1948 inception of the very first peacekeeping mission, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Israel. Of the more than 61,000 uniformed personnel deployed in support of U.N. peacekeeping operations today, the United States provides just 24 peacekeepers who serve as military staff officers in six of the 11 ongoing U.N. peacekeeping operations. This marks a downturn from a high of 115 officers in 1993, though the level of personnel support has ebbed and flowed with each administration. These officers serve in critical staff positions, helping to plan, coordinate, and execute U.N. operations that include monitoring ceasefires, protecting civilians, and supporting political processes.
The overall U.S. contribution to U.N. peacekeeping operations is far more impressive, with direct U.S. budgetary support to the U.N. Department of Peace Operations assessed at 22 percent of the U.N.’s peacekeeping operations budget (nearly $1.2 billion for 2024–25), and programs like the Department of State’s Global Peace Operations Initiative focused on building international peacekeeping capacity (funded at $1.4 billion from fiscal years 2005 to 2022). Nevertheless, the token personnel support is a visible sign of America’s commitment to the United Nations and its role in building a liberal international order.
During each of my visits to the U.N. missions we supported, the U.N. leadership universally recognized American staff officers as some of the most proficient and reliable members of the missions — and pleaded for more of them. Not only does their participation provide valuable deployment experiences to U.S. officers, it also strengthens our relationships with international partners and qualifies them to compete for future roles in U.N. military staff positions. Positions of influence within the U.N.’s Office of the Military Advisor and on its small military staff can offer opportunities to compete against our adversaries in what has emerged as another venue for competition. Although small in number, American uniformed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations are a strategic investment in the success of these multilateral missions.
The U.S. Military Observer Group approach
Throughout my recent three-year assignment as the commander of U.S. military members assigned to U.N. peacekeeping operations worldwide, I was responsible for overseeing and supporting teams stationed in some of the world’s most challenging operational environments. The hazardous nature of the missions and their environments meant that a key focus of my command was managing the risks our peacekeepers faced while balancing the strategic imperative to maintain our contributions to these missions.
Washington’s approach to risk was informed by the tragic experience of Lt. Col. William R. Higgins, a U.S. Marine Corps officer captured in 1988 while serving as part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon. Abducted by Hizballah, he was held hostage and ultimately killed in 1989. His death profoundly impacted U.S. policy toward peacekeeping, underscoring the unique security risks for American personnel in U.N. missions and shaping future U.S. approaches to risk tolerance and personnel safety. His legacy remains a reference point for the risks associated with American participation in peacekeeping operations.
Overall, the U.S. approach was rooted in the Army’s composite risk management process, which involves identifying and assessing hazards, evaluating the likelihood and severity of incidents, implementing controls, and making risk decisions. The types of risk we evaluated expanded well beyond anything described in Army Techniques Publication 5-19, Risk Management. Concerns over political and reputational risks often played as significant a role as operational and tactical ones. Regular communication with U.S. Africa Command and Southern European Task Force–Africa, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Army Central, our local U.S. Embassies, and the United Nations was critical to maintaining our situational awareness and informing our risk decisions.
Recognizing their high-risk category, U.S. peacekeepers undergo extensive training across medical, marksmanship, and driving skills, with additional training provided by the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. This preparation helped mitigate some of the risk, especially given the limited availability of U.S. military assets for evacuation or recovery.
Given that lack of available support, our contingency plans were rudimentary: when the security situations deteriorated, there were usually few options other than seeking refuge in their residences or their offices on U.N. compounds or withdrawing to safer locations, such as the closest U.S. embassy compound. There was always concern that a U.S. withdrawal might trigger a chain reaction, prompting other nations to reconsider their commitment, undermining confidence in the mission and further worsening the security situation. Some of our peacekeepers also feared resentment from colleagues left behind, which we termed “reputational risk.”
An unstated but clear aversion to casualties, stemming from the experience of Lieutenant Colonel Higgins, shaped the decision-making process and our contingency planning efforts. While some might argue that military service entails heightened risk, even a single U.S. peacekeeper casualty could have profound political and strategic ramifications and affect the U.S. willingness to continue participating in these operations. Ultimately, our decisions had implications far beyond the immediate safety of U.S. forces and risk to reputation. Thus, while we sought to avoid any appearance of “abandoning” missions, decisions were made with clear-eyed assessments that prioritized the safety and security of our individual peacekeepers. In three cases, this stood in stark contrast to some of the other troop-contributing countries and the United Nations, who were more willing to bear the consequences of the high cost of human lives.
Mali: Anticipating Risk as the Mission Winds Down
The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali faced a significant turning point when the Malian government withdrew its consent for the deployment of U.N. forces in June 2023, setting an end date for their deployment by December 2023. Our team anticipated that as the mission drew down, the risk of violence would increase, given the mission’s stabilizing role in the country. Our confidence in the U.N.’s force protection plans, which relied first and foremost on security provided by the host nation, was low, as repeated attacks against U.N. troops had demonstrated the Malian government’s inability (or perhaps unwillingness) to protect the mission against threats from the Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin terrorist group.
The drawdown of the 14,000-strong peacekeeping force required us to assess the security environment constantly, leveraging intelligence and strategic communications with the United Nations and partner nations, U.S. Africa Command, and the Department of State. As we monitored developments and considered the right time to direct the redeployment of our peacekeepers, the U.N. force headquarters chief of staff approved a drawdown plan for the staff that would see the U.S. peacekeepers departing in mid-September 2023 — before we expected the security situation to worsen. His decision came as a great relief to me as the commander responsible for our team’s well-being.
Democratic Republic of the Congo: Rising Fears of State-on-State Conflict
Much like the current situation in southern Lebanon, our experiences in the Congo saw an escalating conflict that posed significant risks to our peacekeepers.
Violence in July 2022 had already exposed the limitations of the U.N.’s ability to secure its facilities, as protestors overran and ransacked the force headquarters. The advance of the M23 opposition group, believed to be supported by Rwanda, raised concerns that Congo could descend into a broader state-on-state conflict with Rwanda. Our peacekeepers, stationed at the U.N. headquarters in Goma near the Rwandan border, faced limited options for evacuation should violence indeed escalate.
When tensions surged again in late 2023, we decided to temporarily relocate U.S. peacekeepers to Kigali, Rwanda. By departing the area among escalating tensions, our peacekeepers’ safety was assured. The U.N. leadership did not react well to the decision, made while the U.N. force commander was on leave, but it was necessary to ensure their safety. Although their departure did not cause other nations to follow, upon their return several months later, they indeed faced criticism from colleagues and superiors.
Israel: Turnover Amid an Escalating Conflict
The outbreak of the Israeli-Hamas war on Oct. 7, 2023, coincided with the arrival of a new cohort of U.S. peacekeepers assigned to the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem. The sudden hostilities, which led to the suspension of commercial flights, required us to quickly adapt our turnover plans. We had to coordinate a creative exfiltration for departing peacekeepers, ultimately relying on a U.S. Air Force C-17 returning from delivering security assistance to Israel.
The complex logistics of getting peacekeepers on the flight from Israel’s Nevatim Air Base required close coordination with the U.S. defense attaché and security cooperation offices at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. This was further complicated by the deteriorating security situation in the region, and it underscored the unpredictable and high-risk environment in which these operations take place.
The U.N. Approach
The U.N. uses a similar risk management methodology that weighs risk likelihood and severity and considers operational impacts. However, in each of the three above cases, the United Nations and fellow troop-contributing countries were more willing to accept the increased risk by opting for less disruptive mitigation measures than the removal of peacekeepers from mission. Occasionally, they might reposition a force protection element to reinforce security at a given site, but more frequently they would opt for more passive risk mitigation measures, such as directing staff to remain home and simply telework during times of increased tension. It was clear that the U.N. leadership, both in mission and in New York, was more willing to accept risk than the United States.
In the current situation in Lebanon, U.N. Undersecretary General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix testified to the U.N. Security Council about efforts to increase force protection for peacekeepers. These included relocating personnel away from danger areas, confining U.N. personnel to their bases and in shelters, limiting or even ceasing operational activities, and lodging protests with the Israeli authorities. Despite the increasing risk to peacekeepers, the United Nations seems determined to remain in place, with Lacroix underscoring commitment to implementing the U.N. Security Council mandate for the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon.
Luckily, the United States has no peacekeepers deployed as part of this force, or once again we would likely be forced to prioritize peacekeeper safety and consider whether to evacuate them.
Conclusion
As the situation in Lebanon demonstrates, the enduring dangers and complexities of these multilateral peacekeeping missions continue to test the international community. The experiences of the U.S. Military Observer Group offer important lessons that should inform how the United States navigates its future participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations.
Ultimately, navigating this delicate balance between force protection and mission accomplishment will continue to define the future of U.S. engagement in U.N. peacekeeping. Thoughtful risk management, robust contingency planning, and clear-eyed strategic assessments will be essential to sustaining a prudent and impactful U.S. role in U.N. peacekeeping operations going forward. While the host nations and United Nations share responsibility for peacekeeper safety, the United States must remain actively involved to ensure the safety and effectiveness of its personnel, while also upholding its broader commitments to international security and the liberal world order. This may require occasional tough decisions to temporarily suspend or reduce troop contributions when the risks become untenable, and the United States should be ready to bear the political consequences of such decisions.
The U.S. aversion to risk and the profound political and strategic implications of American peacekeeper casualties place unique constraints on our decision-making. This stands in stark contrast to the generally higher tolerance for risk exhibited by many other troop-contributing countries, some of which are more willing to accept the human cost of these dangerous assignments. As evidenced by the cases in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Israel, the United States is often compelled to make difficult choices that prioritize the safety of its personnel, even if that means scaling back or temporarily withdrawing from a mission.
In contrast, the United Nations must grapple with balancing the stabilizing benefits of maintaining a peacekeeping presence against the heightened risks, as the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon situation continues to demonstrate. The U.N. responsibility to safeguard all its peacekeepers, regardless of nationality, creates inherent tensions with the U.S. imperative to protect its troops at all costs.
Become a Member
COL Christian Werner is a U.S. Army foreign area officer with past assignments in Somalia, Stuttgart, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. He holds a master’s in public policy from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, a master of science from the Belgian Royal Military Academy, and a master’s in strategic studies from the Army War College. Currently serving as a faculty instructor at the Army War College, he commanded the U.S. Military Observer Group from 2021 to 2024. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army or the U.S. government.
Image: Lance Cpl. John Hall
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Christian Werner · November 12, 2024
20. The End of American Exceptionalism
Excerpts:
NO LONGER AN EXCEPTION
Does all of this mean Trump 2.0 will just be more of the same? Not exactly. Trump’s reelection augurs two trends in U.S. foreign policy that will be difficult to reverse. The first is the inevitable corruption that will compromise U.S. policies. Former policy principals in prior administrations, from Henry Kissinger to Hillary Clinton, have profited from their public service through book deals, keynote speeches, and geopolitical consulting. Former Trump officials have taken this to a whole new level, however. Advisers such as Trump’s son-in-law and White House aide Jared Kushner and Richard Grenell, a former ambassador and acting director of national intelligence, leveraged the ties they made as policymakers to secure billions in foreign investment (including from foreign government investment funds) and real estate deals almost immediately after they left office. It will not be surprising if foreign benefactors approach Trump’s coterie of advisers with implicit and explicit promises of lucrative deals after their time in office—so long as they play ball while in power. Combine this with the expected role that billionaires such as Elon Musk will play in Trump 2.0, and one can foresee a dramatic increase in the corruption of U.S. foreign policy.
The other trend that Trump 2.0 will accelerate is the end of American exceptionalism. From Harry Truman to Joe Biden, U.S. presidents have embraced the notion that American values and ideals play an important role in U.S. foreign policy. This claim has been contested at various times, but promoting democracy and advancing human rights has been identified as in the national interest for quite some time. The political scientist Joseph Nye has argued that these American ideals are a core component of U.S. soft power.
U.S. policy blunders, as well as Russian “whataboutism”—deflecting criticism of one’s own bad behavior by pointing to another’s bad behavior—have eroded the power of American exceptionalism. Trump 2.0 will bury it. Indeed, Trump himself embraces a version of whataboutism when it comes to American values. Early in his first term he noted, “We’ve got a lot of killers. What do you think—our country’s so innocent?”
Back then, foreign audiences could rationalize that most Americans did not believe this, given that Trump did not win the popular vote. The 2024 election shatters that belief. During the campaign, Trump promised to bomb Mexico and to deport legal immigrants; called opposition politicians the “enemies from within”; and claimed that migrants were “poisoning the blood” of the country. Despite all this—or perhaps because of it—Trump won a popular majority. When the rest of the world looks at Trump, they will no longer see an aberrant exception to American exceptionalism; they will see what America stands for in the twenty-first century.
The End of American Exceptionalism
Trump’s Reelection Will Redefine U.S. Power
November 12, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Daniel W. Drezner · November 12, 2024
The only thing uncontroversial about Donald Trump is how he won his second term. Despite polls showing a statistical dead heat and fears of a long drawn-out wait for election results, Trump was declared the winner early Wednesday morning. Unlike in 2016, he won the popular vote as well as the Electoral College, improving his margins in almost every demographic. Republicans won a strong Senate majority of 53 seats, and they look likely to maintain control of the House of Representatives. To the rest of the world, the picture should be clear: Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) movement will define U.S. foreign policy for the next four years.
Any close observer of Trump’s first term should be familiar with his foreign policy preferences as well as his foreign policy process. However, there are likely to be three significant differences between Trump’s first- and second-term foreign policies. First, Trump will come into office with a more homogeneous national security team than he had in 2025. Second, the state of the world in 2025 is rather different than it was in 2017. And third, foreign actors will have a much better read of Donald Trump.
Trump will navigate world politics with greater confidence this time around. Whether he will have any better luck bending the world to his “America first” brand is another question entirely. What is certain, however, is that the era of American exceptionalism has ended. Under Trump, U.S. foreign policy will cease promoting long-standing American ideals. That, combined with an expected surge of corrupt foreign policy practices, will leave the United States looking like a garden-variety great power.
THE RULES OF THE GAME
Trump’s foreign policy worldview has been clear ever since he entered political life. He believes that the U.S.-created liberal international order has, over time, stacked the deck against the United States. To change that imbalance, Trump wants to restrict inward economic flows such as imports and immigrants (although he likes inward foreign direct investment). He wants allies to shoulder more of the burden for their own defense. And he believes that he can cut deals with autocrats, such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin or North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, that will reduce tensions in global trouble spots and allow the United States to focus inward.
Equally clear are Trump’s preferred means of getting what he wants in world politics. The former and future president is a strong believer in using coercion, such as economic sanctions, to pressure other actors. He also subscribes to the “madman theory,” in which he will threaten massive tariff increases or “fire and fury” against other countries in the firm belief that such threats will compel them into offering greater concessions than they otherwise would. At the same time, however, Trump also practices a transactional view of foreign policy, demonstrating a willingness during his first term to link disparate issues to secure economic concessions. On China, for example, Trump displayed a recurring willingness to give ground on other issues—the crackdown in Hong Kong, the repression in Xinjiang, the arrest of a senior executive of the Chinese tech company Huawei—in return for a better bilateral trade deal.
Trump’s foreign policy track record during his first term was decidedly mixed. If one looks at the renegotiated deals for the South Korea Free Trade Agreement or the North American Free Trade Agreement (rebranded as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA), his attempts at coercion produced meager results. The same is true with his summitry with Kim Jong Un. But one can argue that this might have been because of the rather chaotic nature of the Trump White House. There were plenty of times when Trump seemed at war with his own administration, often leading to the characterization of his more mainstream foreign policy advisers (such as Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster) as the “adults in the room.” The result was a lot of personnel churn and inconstancy in foreign policy positioning, which degraded Trump’s ability to achieve his aims.
Trump 2.0 will bury the power of American exceptionalism.
That should not be an issue for Trump’s second term. Over the past eight years, he has collected enough acolytes to staff his foreign policy and national security team with like-minded officials. He is far less likely to meet resistance from his own political appointees. Other checks on Trump’s policy will also be far weaker. The legislative and judicial branches of government are now more MAGA-friendly than they were in 2017. Trump has indicated numerous times that he intends to purge the military and bureaucracy of professionals who oppose his policies, and he will likely use Schedule F—a measure to reclassify civil-service positions as political slots—to force them out. For the next few years, the United States will speak with one voice on foreign policy, and that voice will be Trump’s.
Although Trump’s ability to command the foreign policy machinery will be enhanced, his ability to improve the United States’ place in the world is another matter. The most prominent U.S. entanglements are in Ukraine and Gaza. During the 2024 campaign, Trump criticized Biden for the chaotic 2021 U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, asserting that “the humiliation in Afghanistan set off the collapse of American credibility and respect all around the world.” A similar outcome in Ukraine would create similar political problems for Trump. In Gaza, Trump has urged Benjamin Netanyahu to “finish the job” and destroy Hamas. Netanyahu’s lack of strategic vision to accomplish this task, however, suggests that Israel will be prosecuting an ongoing war that has alienated many potential U.S. partners in the world. The reality is that Trump will find it more difficult to withdraw the United States from these conflicts than he claimed on the campaign trail.
Furthermore, the global rules of the game have changed since 2017, when existing U.S. initiatives, coalitions, and institutions still had a lot of juice. In the interim, other great powers have become more active in creating and bolstering their own structures independent of the United States. These range from the BRICS+ to OPEC+ to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. More informally, one can see a “coalition of the sanctioned,” in which China, North Korea, and Iran are happy to help Russia disrupt global order. Trump may very well want to join some of these groupings rather than create compelling substitutes to them. His stated efforts to divide these groupings will likely fail. Autocrats might distrust each other, but they will distrust Donald Trump more.
The most important difference between Trump 2.0 and Trump 1.0, however, is also the simplest: Donald Trump is now a known commodity on the global stage. As the Columbia professor Elizabeth Saunders recently observed, “In the 2016 election, Trump’s foreign policy was somewhat mysterious. . . . In 2024, however, Trump’s actions are far easier to predict. The candidate who wanted to be the ‘madman’ and loved the idea of keeping other countries guessing has become a politician with a pretty predictable agenda.” Leaders like Xi, Putin, Kim, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and even French President Emmanuel Macron have seen Trump’s schtick before. Both great powers and smaller states know by now that the best way to deal with Trump is to shower him with pomp and circumstance, abstain from fact-checking him in public, make flashy but token concessions, and remain secure that by and large their core interests will be preserved. Trump’s negotiating style yielded minimal concrete gains in his first term; it will yield less than that in his second term.
NO LONGER AN EXCEPTION
Does all of this mean Trump 2.0 will just be more of the same? Not exactly. Trump’s reelection augurs two trends in U.S. foreign policy that will be difficult to reverse. The first is the inevitable corruption that will compromise U.S. policies. Former policy principals in prior administrations, from Henry Kissinger to Hillary Clinton, have profited from their public service through book deals, keynote speeches, and geopolitical consulting. Former Trump officials have taken this to a whole new level, however. Advisers such as Trump’s son-in-law and White House aide Jared Kushner and Richard Grenell, a former ambassador and acting director of national intelligence, leveraged the ties they made as policymakers to secure billions in foreign investment (including from foreign government investment funds) and real estate deals almost immediately after they left office. It will not be surprising if foreign benefactors approach Trump’s coterie of advisers with implicit and explicit promises of lucrative deals after their time in office—so long as they play ball while in power. Combine this with the expected role that billionaires such as Elon Musk will play in Trump 2.0, and one can foresee a dramatic increase in the corruption of U.S. foreign policy.
The other trend that Trump 2.0 will accelerate is the end of American exceptionalism. From Harry Truman to Joe Biden, U.S. presidents have embraced the notion that American values and ideals play an important role in U.S. foreign policy. This claim has been contested at various times, but promoting democracy and advancing human rights has been identified as in the national interest for quite some time. The political scientist Joseph Nye has argued that these American ideals are a core component of U.S. soft power.
U.S. policy blunders, as well as Russian “whataboutism”—deflecting criticism of one’s own bad behavior by pointing to another’s bad behavior—have eroded the power of American exceptionalism. Trump 2.0 will bury it. Indeed, Trump himself embraces a version of whataboutism when it comes to American values. Early in his first term he noted, “We’ve got a lot of killers. What do you think—our country’s so innocent?”
Back then, foreign audiences could rationalize that most Americans did not believe this, given that Trump did not win the popular vote. The 2024 election shatters that belief. During the campaign, Trump promised to bomb Mexico and to deport legal immigrants; called opposition politicians the “enemies from within”; and claimed that migrants were “poisoning the blood” of the country. Despite all this—or perhaps because of it—Trump won a popular majority. When the rest of the world looks at Trump, they will no longer see an aberrant exception to American exceptionalism; they will see what America stands for in the twenty-first century.
- DANIEL W. DREZNER is Distinguished Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and the author of the newsletter Drezner’s World.
Foreign Affairs · by Daniel W. Drezner · November 12, 2024
21. China Should Be Worried About North Korea
More than ever we must try to understand what are the national interests of our friends, competitors, and enemies and what they are willing to do to protect these interests. And we must understand our interests and what we are willing to do to sustain, protect, and advance them and communicate that to the American people.
Excerpts:
GO SMALLER
Chinese strategists are understandably wary of attempts by Western countries to exploit tensions between China and North Korea. In July 2024, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the South Korean press of spreading “groundless rumors” about rifts in the Chinese–North Korean relationship and reaffirmed the bond between the two countries. In reaction to North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, the United States and its allies in East Asia might strengthen their military cooperation—something China perceives as a threat to its own security. In this scenario, any effort by the United States to exploit tensions between China and North Korea backfire. The more Beijing believes that the United States is trying to weaken Chinese influence by driving a wedge between China and North Korea, the more valuable North Korea becomes to China—which may be exactly Pyongyang’s calculus.
To avoid such an outcome, the United States and its allies should focus on identifying interests they share with China: namely, preventing the outbreak of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Expecting Beijing to take extreme measures, such as suspending oil supplies or humanitarian aid to North Korea, is unrealistic. Instead of driving China and North Korea apart, Washington should try to capitalize on Beijing’s power over Pyongyang by urging China to clearly communicate two redlines to its partner. First, North Korea must refrain from directly assaulting South Korean lives and property, as it did in the 2010 Cheonan torpedo attack and Yeonpyeong Island shelling. Since these incidents, South Korea’s military doctrine has become far more offensive. Any North Korean attack, even on a limited scale, would trigger South Korean retaliation, and could spiral into all-out war. Second, North Korea must avoid conducting its seventh nuclear test. A seventh test would likely be geared toward developing a nuclear weapon with a small yield that would be easier to deploy. Such a test would be a sign of China’s weakening influence over Pyongyang and could spur Seoul to try to acquire nuclear weapons of its own—a position that both South Korea and the United States officially oppose but is gaining traction in Western policy circles.
U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between China and North Korea could backfire, potentially strengthening their autocratic alliance. To secure meaningful cooperation from China, it would be more effective for Washington to keep its requests specific, realistic, and geared toward achieving shared interests. A more focused approach is likely to yield better results.
China Should Be Worried About North Korea
How to Make Beijing a Partner in Restraining Pyongyang
November 12, 2024
Foreign Affairs · by Lee Hee-ok and Sungmin Cho · November 12, 2024
Last month, the White House confirmed that North Korea—a country with few allies and little money—had sent thousands of soldiers to join Russia in its war against Ukraine. Pyongyang was already supplying Moscow with weapons: according to The Times of London, half of Russia’s shells used in the war have come from North Korea. But sending personnel marks a new level of coordination. There are other signs of warming ties, too. In June, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his first trip to North Korea in over two decades.
That proximity has irked China, North Korea’s main backer. Chinese officials fear that Russia’s influence over the insular dictatorship is growing at China’s expense. They also worry that the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia will strengthen military cooperation in response to Russia and North Korea’s newfound closeness. Over the past year, Beijing has chosen to react to Pyongyang’s collaboration with Moscow by publicly courting North Korea’s adversaries. For instance, in May, China held a trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan after a five-year hiatus. On the same day in June that Putin visited Pyongyang, Chinese and South Korean officials held a security dialogue in Seoul—the first such meeting in nine years.
This seeming friction between China and North Korea has tantalized many Western security analysts, who have argued that the United States and its allies should try to drive a wedge between China and North Korea. Such an effort, however, would be futile. Despite signs of tension between the two countries, North Korea is overwhelmingly reliant on China. Nearly all of its trade, for instance, is with China. The countries have not always seen eye to eye over the past 75 years, but their relationship has never come close to splintering. Instead of focusing on what could divide North Korea from China, the United States should collaborate with the Chinese government to rein in North Korea’s volatile behavior. Both the United States and China are ultimately invested in maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. Working together to restrain the North Korean regime is the best way to achieve it.
LONGTIME FRENEMIES
Although North Korea is often imagined these days as a mere satrap of China, it is not, in fact, a Chinese vassal, and it has long sought to achieve a great degree of autonomy in its foreign policy. The two countries have endured many moments of friction in their relationship. In August 1956, Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s ruler and the grandfather of the current leader, fumed at Chinese and Soviet involvement in an attempted coup against him and bristled at subsequent Chinese and Soviet efforts to dissuade him from purging those officials who he believed were involved in the plot. During China’s Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, Chinese Red Guards labeled Kim a “counterrevolutionary dictator.” The fact that China tolerated open criticism of North Korea’s leadership put further strain on the relationship between the two governments. Back then, Pyongyang also played Beijing and Moscow against each other. During the rapprochement between China and the United States in the 1970s (which followed the split between China and the Soviet Union), North Korea hosted Soviet naval ships in its ports and allowed Soviet fighter jets to enter North Korean airspace. Throughout the 1980s, in response to North Korea’s tilt toward Russia, China increased its diplomatic contacts with South Korea.
Relations between China and North Korea hit another low point in 1992, when China formally established diplomatic relations with South Korea against Kim’s wishes. China further irked North Korea by joining international sanctions against Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear weapons programs in 2006. Pyongyang, for its part, often acted without consulting Beijing on matters that could seriously affect China’s security. In 2006, following North Korea’s first nuclear test, Beijing accused Pyongyang of “brazen” action, a term rarely used in official Chinese statements. North Korea’s nuclear tests violated a treaty between the two countries that requires them to “consult with each other on all important international questions of common interest.” In 2017, in a moment of great tension between North Korea and the first Trump administration, Beijing openly criticized Pyongyang. An editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese state-run newspaper, argued that “North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons . . . seriously harms China’s national security” and therefore violates their treaty.
Over the past year, there have been signs that China and North Korea have entered another rough patch. Beyond lending troops to Russia, North Korea has signaled its frustration with China over what it perceives to be a lack of diplomatic and economic support. In 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, for example, gave notably more attention to Russia’s defense minister than to China’s envoy at the 70th anniversary of the Korean War armistice. In July 2024, North Korea stopped disseminating its state television broadcasts from a Chinese satellite and started using a Russian one. And last month, when Kim and Chinese leader Xi Jinping exchanged messages marking the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between their two countries, Kim omitted traditional niceties, including “dear” and “respectful leader,” and terms that show bonds between the two countries, such as “blood-forged socialism,” in his letters to Beijing. These subtle symbolic and rhetorical shifts suggest that North Korea is dissatisfied with China.
In 2023, China accounted for 98 percent of North Korea’s official trade volume.
Meanwhile, China has used economic policies to express its frustration with North Korea for its current alignment with Russia and its refusal to consult with China over military provocations, such as weapon tests. Over the past year, Beijing has cracked down on North Korean smuggling, restricted the sale of North Korean seafood in China, and made it harder for Chinese boats to illegally fish in North Korean waters. (Chinese fishermen used to pay Pyongyang for the privilege, with Beijing turning a blind eye.) According to The Korea Times, in July 2024 Beijing demanded that Pyongyang recall North Korean workers in China—numbered in the tens of thousands—so that China could comply with UN Security Council Resolution 2937, which called for the repatriation of North Korean laborers. The move would further cut off North Korea from foreign currency that it desperately needs.
These punishments are especially painful since North Korea’s economy has been severely strained by international sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic, and economic mismanagement. Between 2016 and 2022, the country’s exports fell by 94 percent and its imports decreased by 61 percent. North Korea needs all the help it can get, but China has been doing the opposite: intensifying sanctions. Unsure of China’s intentions, North Korea has turned to Russia for economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation.
Through these punitive measures, China is not just trying to chastise Pyongyang for cozying up to Russia; it’s also seeking to curry favor with the United States and Europe. Since the summit between Xi and U.S. President Joe Biden in November 2023, Beijing has appeared determined to stabilize U.S.-Chinese relations so that it can still attract foreign investment from Western countries and maintain strong trading ties with them. In this context, North Korea’s belligerence toward South Korea and Japan and its military support of Russia has become a liability for China’s engagement with the West, because the United States and Europe see China as North Korea’s patron, and therefore as partly responsible for Pyongyang’s behavior.
A NEEDY NEIGHBOR
Some Western scholars have argued that tensions between China and North Korea present the United States and its allies with a chance to push the two countries apart. Such thinking, however, is wishful. Despite moments of discord, ties between North Korea and China are resilient. North Korea has been economically dependent on China for its survival since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and it grew even more reliant on Beijing after the UN ramped up sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program in 2017. China has effectively become a lifeline for North Korea, supplying essential goods such as food, clothing, fertilizer, machinery, and construction materials—nearly everything that sustains the daily lives of North Koreans and the country’s industries. Between 1994 and 2023, North Korea accumulated a trade deficit with China of more than $20 billion. North Korea’s 2024 treaty with Russia expands trade between the two countries, but it doesn’t reduce Beijing’s leverage over Pyongyang in a meaningful way. In 2023, China accounted for 98 percent of North Korea’s official trade volume.
When tensions ratchet up, the two countries quickly mend fences. Xi, for example, didn’t meet with Kim once between 2012 and 2017 but met with him five times from 2018 to 2019, after a summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump was announced (without Beijing’s approval). Even though China maintains enormous leverage over its neighbor, it refrains from playing hardball so as not to push North Korea into the arms of Russia or even the United States. When China joined UN sanctions on North Korea in 2006—in response to North Korea’s first nuclear test—Pyongyang reacted by holding bilateral talks with Washington without Beijing’s approval. China has since made an effort to avoid being bypassed by maintaining close channels of communication with Pyongyang. China also fears that applying pressure to North Korea, which is already strained by an economic crisis, could push the Kim regime to the brink of regime collapse. It is highly uncertain—even to China’s leadership—how Pyongyang would act if backed into a corner. In the worst-case scenario, Pyongyang may resort to attacking South Korea to deliberately create an external crisis, forcing China to intervene on North Korea’s behalf. Therefore, Beijing has to carefully assess the risks when considering how much it can push North Korea.
In the current era of U.S.-Chinese strategic competition, North Korea’s value to China extends beyond its role as a buffer zone between Chinese and U.S. forces. From Beijing’s perspective, during a conflict with the United States over Taiwan, maintaining close ties with North Korea is advantageous because Pyongyang can help tie down U.S. troops in the region by keeping open the possibility of another war. However, it remains uncertain whether Beijing would pre-coordinate with North Korea before taking military action against Taiwan, or if they would even want to coordinate such involvement if it could lead to conflict spreading from the Taiwan Strait to the Korean Peninsula.
GO SMALLER
Chinese strategists are understandably wary of attempts by Western countries to exploit tensions between China and North Korea. In July 2024, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused the South Korean press of spreading “groundless rumors” about rifts in the Chinese–North Korean relationship and reaffirmed the bond between the two countries. In reaction to North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, the United States and its allies in East Asia might strengthen their military cooperation—something China perceives as a threat to its own security. In this scenario, any effort by the United States to exploit tensions between China and North Korea backfire. The more Beijing believes that the United States is trying to weaken Chinese influence by driving a wedge between China and North Korea, the more valuable North Korea becomes to China—which may be exactly Pyongyang’s calculus.
To avoid such an outcome, the United States and its allies should focus on identifying interests they share with China: namely, preventing the outbreak of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Expecting Beijing to take extreme measures, such as suspending oil supplies or humanitarian aid to North Korea, is unrealistic. Instead of driving China and North Korea apart, Washington should try to capitalize on Beijing’s power over Pyongyang by urging China to clearly communicate two redlines to its partner. First, North Korea must refrain from directly assaulting South Korean lives and property, as it did in the 2010 Cheonan torpedo attack and Yeonpyeong Island shelling. Since these incidents, South Korea’s military doctrine has become far more offensive. Any North Korean attack, even on a limited scale, would trigger South Korean retaliation, and could spiral into all-out war. Second, North Korea must avoid conducting its seventh nuclear test. A seventh test would likely be geared toward developing a nuclear weapon with a small yield that would be easier to deploy. Such a test would be a sign of China’s weakening influence over Pyongyang and could spur Seoul to try to acquire nuclear weapons of its own—a position that both South Korea and the United States officially oppose but is gaining traction in Western policy circles.
U.S. efforts to drive a wedge between China and North Korea could backfire, potentially strengthening their autocratic alliance. To secure meaningful cooperation from China, it would be more effective for Washington to keep its requests specific, realistic, and geared toward achieving shared interests. A more focused approach is likely to yield better results.
- LEE HEE-OK is the Director of the Sungkyun Institute of China Studies and a Professor of Political Science at Sungkyunkwan University.
- SUNGMIN CHO is the Vice Director of the Sungkyun Institute of China Studies and a Nonresident Fellow of Center for China Analysis at the Asia Society.
Foreign Affairs · by Lee Hee-ok and Sungmin Cho · November 12, 2024
22. Israeli Rescuers Are an Example for the West
Israeli Rescuers Are an Example for the West
The Amsterdam attacks were an old story. The Jewish state’s response is something new.
https://www.wsj.com/opinion/israeli-rescuers-serve-as-an-example-for-the-west-netherlands-attack-antisemitism-81b17a3b?mod=Searchresults_pos1&page=1
By Rebecca Sugar
Nov. 10, 2024 3:17 pm ET
An El Al plane on a rescue mission lands in Amsterdam, Nov. 8. Photo: michel van bergen/Shutterstock
Images of Israeli soccer fans being beaten in the streets of Amsterdam fill the social-media feeds of those who want the world to see what unchecked antisemitism in the West looks like in 2024. They are often juxtaposed with photos from the 1930s, when Jews were also assaulted with impunity in European capitals. It is a powerful emotional association to make but not the right message to amplify.
We should pay more attention to another image from Thursday’s attack: that of two Israeli planes taking off from Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport to rescue the Jews whose safety couldn’t be guaranteed in the Netherlands. What’s more important isn’t the attack against the Jews but the Jewish response to it.
Jews have always been targeted, but 76 years ago, when the state of Israel was established, they stopped being defenseless. Today, when they are in trouble, someone comes to their aid. That didn’t happen in the 1930s.
No longer history’s reliably powerless punching bags, the Jewish people have liberated themselves from centuries of impotence. They should proudly embrace that reality and project it to the world by posting more pictures of the Israeli rescue planes than of Israelis in need of rescue.
Dutchmen need to see pictures of the planes as well. They live in a country that has already abandoned them, allowing hundreds of thousands of Muslims from North Africa and the Middle East to create parallel, radicalized societies, and commit aggression against the state and its citizens. Jews aren’t the only infidels. Can the people trust such a government to come to their defense when the next mob attacks bystanders at a Christmas parade? Seeing what it looks like when a country protects its population might inspire the Dutch to demand that their leaders take care of them too.
The entire Western world needs to see Israel’s show of strength. French, Germans, Americans, Australians—they don’t need to see more pictures of Jews lying in the streets. They need to see them soaring through the air. Maybe the sight will inspire them to a little self-preservation of their own.
Ms. Sugar is a columnist for the New York Sun.
You may also like
0:40
0:00
/
23:03
Tap For Sound
WSJ Opinion Docs: This 20 minute film sheds light on the worst antisemitic riot in American history, which occurred in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, in 1991. The current wave of antisemitism makes these events newly relevant and worthy of reconsideration. Photo: John Roca/NY Daily News Archive via Getty Images
Copyright ©2024 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the November 11, 2024, print edition as 'Israeli Rescuers Are an Example for the West'.
23. Just How Authoritarian Are Americans?
I guess this illustrates why we need renewed and better civics education. These types of views are in contradiction with the founding American principles and the US constitution which, among other things, was designed to prevent authoritarian rule of the US.
Just How Authoritarian Are Americans?
Surveys show that Trump’s supporters don’t just tolerate his autocratic tendencies. They positively like them.
Will Saletan
Nov 11, 2024
thebulwark.com · by Will Saletan
A Trump supporter displays a bejeweled “Make America Great Again” necklace at a campaign event in Macon, Georgia, on November 3, 2024. (Photo by Elijah Nouvelage / AFP via Getty Images)
DONALD TRUMP SENT A MOB to overturn the 2020 election. He called for the termination of all constitutional provisions that prevented his immediate reinstatement. He made it clear that if he regained the presidency, he would extend his abuse of the office.
Kamala Harris warned voters repeatedly that Trump would try to rule (as he half-jokingly affirmed) like a dictator. But they re-elected him anyway.
This raises serious questions about our country. Did Trump’s voters back him because of his authoritarian inclinations or in spite of them? To what extent has the United States become hospitable to one-man rule? How many Americans condone or outright prefer an autocratic style of leadership? And how much of Trump’s majority coalition will support him as he expands and abuses his power?
To answer these questions, I’ve looked at the VoteCast survey conducted by the Associated Press and the traditional exit polls, as well as surveys conducted in the months after Harris replaced Joe Biden atop the Democratic ticket. In some polls, respondents were asked about democracy vs. autocracy in general terms. In others, they were asked about specific scenarios.
The numbers paint a sobering portrait of the world’s oldest democracy. Most Americans don’t want explicit autocracy. But many Trump supporters are open to it, and most of his voters will support or tolerate authoritarian policies and acts.
Dictatorship.
In a September poll of likely voters by the McCourtney Institute for Democracy, 64 percent of Harris voters strongly agreed that “Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government.” Only 48 percent of Trump voters strongly agreed. Fifteen percent of Trump voters, compared to fewer than three percent of Harris voters, disagreed.
The poll also asked respondents to choose among three options: (a) “Democracy is the best political system in all circumstances,” (b) “In certain circumstances a dictatorship could be a good thing,” or (c) “Whether we live in a democracy or under a dictatorship makes no difference to people like me.” Nine percent of Trump voters chose “dictatorship could be a good thing.” Another 6 percent chose “no difference.”
When analysts combined the two questions, they found that 32 percent of Trump’s voters either (1) didn’t agree that democracy was the best system, (2) said dictatorship could be good, or (3) said it made no difference which system they lived under. The proportion of Trump voters who expressed weak or no support for democracy was double the proportion of Harris voters who did so (16 percent).
We exist for people who believe in democracy. Join our community today.
Strongman government.
In October, a CBS/YouGov survey asked which of three approaches would be “best for solving America’s problems”: (a) “Have both parties try to cooperate and negotiate on things,” (b) “Have your favored party run the government for a while,” or (c) “Have one strong leader who does what they think best, regardless of the parties.” Thirty-six percent of Republicans and 34 percent of Trump voters (but only 16 percent of Harris voters) chose the “one strong leader” option. Only 40 percent of Republicans and 43 percent of Trump voters (versus 64 percent of Harris voters) chose cooperation.
These findings, like those from the McCourtney survey, suggest that perhaps a third of Trump’s coalition has authoritarian inclinations.
Breaking rules.
In October, a New York Times/Siena College poll asked likely voters whether presidents should (a) “do what they think is best, even if that might go outside of existing rules” or (b) “follow existing rules, even if that prevents them from doing what they think is best.” Thirty-one percent of Trump voters, compared to 12 percent of Harris voters, said presidents should “go outside of existing rules.” Again, that’s about one in three.
Suspending the Constitution.
In October, a Monmouth University poll asked: “If Donald Trump did suspend some laws and constitutional provisions if he is elected president, would that bother you a lot, bother you a little, or not bother you at all?” Nearly 60 percent of registered voters said it would bother them a lot. But 40 percent of Republicans and 32 percent of Trump voters said it wouldn’t bother them at all. Only 25 percent of Republicans and 28 percent of Trump voters said it would bother them a lot.
This finding illuminates a second tier of voters who might go along with authoritarianism. In addition to the third of Trump’s supporters who affirmatively want a rule-breaking strongman, another third or more indicate that they won’t complain much if he openly violates laws and the Constitution.
Presidential immunity.
One of Trump’s first authoritarian acts in a second term will be to terminate all prosecutions of himself. On this, his coalition stands squarely behind him.
In October, a USA Today/Suffolk University poll asked: “If Donald Trump wins the presidency, there is widespread expectation in the legal and political communities that he will get the Justice Department to dismiss the pending criminal cases brought against him charging him with trying to overturn the 2020 election and with mishandling sensitive documents. Do you think this is the right thing or the wrong thing for him to do?”
Fifty-eight percent of likely voters said it would be wrong, but only 19 percent of Trump voters agreed. More than 60 percent of Trump voters said he would be right to terminate the cases.
In October, an AtlasIntel survey asked about “immunity from criminal prosecution for Donald Trump.” That’s a broader description of Trump’s immunity than what the Supreme Court has authorized, but only 52 percent of likely voters opposed it. Forty percent favored such immunity for Trump, which probably means that his voters overwhelmingly support it (though that breakdown wasn’t published).
Share
Crimes.
One reason why Trump can probably get away with terminating his prosecutions—and escaping punishment for the crimes of which he has been convicted—is that half of the electorate doesn’t care about his crimes.
In October, a CNN poll asked whether Trump’s “criminal conviction and the criminal charges against him” were a reason to vote for or against him, or whether they made no difference. Only 51 percent of voters said they were a reason to vote against him. Nearly 70 percent of Trump voters said they made no difference, and a quarter of Trump voters said they were a reason to vote for him.
This indifference goes beyond Trump’s fraud convictions. It extends to sexual assault. In October, an Economist/YouGov survey asked Americans how their votes would be affected “if the allegations that Donald Trump sexually assaulted women are true.” Only 43 percent of likely voters said this record of assault, if true, “disqualifies him from the presidency.” Nearly 30 percent, including most Trump voters, said it wasn’t even “relevant to this election.”
Political prosecutions.
Trump has signaled that he will do what Biden didn’t do: He will push the Justice Department to investigate and prosecute his enemies. And his coalition seems prepared to back him.
In August, a survey by the Pew Research Center asked voters whether it was acceptable for Trump to “order federal law enforcement officials to investigate Democratic political opponents.” Two-thirds said it wasn’t, but 54 percent of Trump voters said it was.
The October CNN poll asked whether Trump’s “pledge to go after his enemies if elected president” was a reason to vote for or against him, or whether it made no difference. Nearly half of Trump’s voters, 48 percent, said it was a reason to vote for him. Forty-one percent said it made no difference; only 10 percent said it was a reason to vote against him.
Share The Bulwark
Bypassing Congress.
Again, Trump’s coalition stands behind him. In the Pew survey, 58 percent of Trump voters said it was acceptable for him to “use executive orders to make policies when he can’t get his priorities through Congress.” (On this question, Harris voters weren’t much better: 55 percent of them said the same about her.)
Purging non-loyalists.
Trump wants to oust civil servants and replace them with people who will do as he says. Politically, this is more challenging. In the Pew survey, 58 percent of Trump voters said it was unacceptable for him to “fire any federal government workers at any level who are not personally loyal to him.” But fewer than half of the 58 percent said it was “definitely” unacceptable, and 41 percent of his voters said it was acceptable. That might be enough to sustain a purge, especially once Trump makes the case for it.
Pardons.
Trump issued corrupt pardons in his first term, and many of his supporters seem ready for more. In the Pew survey, 57 percent of Trump voters said it would be unacceptable for him to “pardon friends, family or political supporters who have been convicted of a crime,” but fewer than half of these objectors said it was definitely unacceptable. Forty-two percent of Trump’s voters said it was acceptable.
On each of these questions, Pew found that Trump’s voters were far more open to abuses of power than Harris’s voters were. Only 8 percent of Harris’s voters, for instance, said it would be acceptable for her to pardon friends, family, or supporters who had been convicted of crimes. Only 12 percent said it would be acceptable to fire government workers who weren’t personally loyal to her. The lopsided responses between the parties might reflect the extent to which Trump has ‘softened up’ Republicans to expect these actions from him.
Political violence.
Several surveys, including one taken in October by the University of Massachusetts Amherst, indicate that when Trump voters are asked explicitly about “violence,” most of them don’t endorse it. But there’s a catch: When Trump provokes or exploits violence, his supporters often find ways to justify it.
In September, an AtlasIntel poll asked likely voters, “Was the January 6th, 2021 invasion of the U.S. Capitol justified or unjustified?” Most respondents (64 percent) said it was unjustified, but the partisan difference was extreme: While 98 percent of Harris voters said it was unjustified, more Trump voters said it was justified (32 percent) than unjustified (25 percent).
When respondents were asked whether Trump should “be disqualified from running for office due to the January 6th invasion of the Capitol,” a slight majority (51 percent) of likely voters said no.
Trump’s voters also support the perpetrators of the January 6th attack. In an August PRRI poll, 46 percent of Republicans, including a narrow majority of Republicans who viewed Trump favorably, agreed that “The people convicted for their role in the violent Jan. 6 attacks on the U.S. Capitol are really patriots who are being held hostage by the government.”
Obedience.
Many of Trump’s voters revere him as the sole authority on questions of fact. This reverence gives him the power to turn his followers against any institution he chooses to target.
In an October Navigator poll, 44 percent of Republican voters said they trusted Trump completely to “tell the truth about election results and the legitimacy of elections.” Only 17 percent to 20 percent said they similarly trusted local or state election officials. Only 7 percent said they had such trust in “national news networks like NBC, ABC, and CBS,” while 60 percent said they trusted the networks not much or not at all.
Saving democracy.
Most Trump voters say they care about preserving democracy. But because they trust Trump more than they trust election officials and the media, they stand with him as he attacks—in the name of democracy—America’s system of free elections.
In the Times/Siena poll, only 8 percent of Trump’s voters said his conduct after the 2020 election “went so far that he threatened American democracy.” The overwhelming majority, 89 percent, insisted that “he was just exercising his right to contest the election.”
In an October Yahoo/YouGov survey, 57 percent of Trump voters agreed that “the only way Donald Trump is going to lose in November is if the election is rigged.” And in an October Fox News poll, 52 percent of Trump voters said that if he lost, they would not accept that Harris “won fair and square and will be the legitimate leader of the country.”
This is the most plausible path to autocracy in America: A demagogue stays in power not by spurning democracy, but by convincing his followers that he represents it.
Share The Bulwark
Nativism.
Among the major items on Trump’s agenda, the one that’s most familiar in authoritarian history is mass deportation. Here, the polls are ominous. Trump’s voters believe that immigration makes America worse. And for most of them, the anxiety isn’t just about crossing the border illegally. It’s about culture and race.
The August PRRI survey asked Americans to respond to two statements about immigration as an ethnic threat. One statement said, “Immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” The other said, “The immigrants entering the country illegally today are poisoning the blood of our country.” More than a third of respondents, including more than 60 percent of Republicans, agreed with each statement.
In September, an NPR/PBS/Marist poll asked voters to choose between two statements. One said, “America’s openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation.” The other said, “If America is too open to people from all over the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation.” Most voters chose the first statement, 57 to 41 percent. But Trump supporters slanted hard in the other direction, preferring the second statement by 71 to 28 percent.
TOGETHER, THESE SURVEYS suggest that most Americans still believe in the ideas of democracy, constitutional government, and nonviolence. But too many are willing to tolerate or only meekly oppose specific authoritarian acts that Trump has threatened or pledged to commit. And much of his majority coalition will rally behind him.
Trump will be our president again because the voters of this country failed to draw a firm line in defense of republican government and the rule of law. And as he consolidates power, backed by a servile party and a docile Supreme Court, there’s little sign that the public will stand in his way.
Take a moment to share this article with a friend, family member, or colleague.
Share
thebulwark.com · by Will Saletan
24. Social Media and Misinformation: The Fight for Integrity!
Social Media and Misinformation: The Fight for Integrity!
Reading Time:
4
minutes
Posted: November 11, 2024
CEO Today
In this Article
A Tightening Grip: Social Media Platforms Enforce Political Ad Bans
The Ghost of Misinformation Past: Is It Too Late?
X Marks the Spot for Misinformation
A New Age of Political Ads: The Role of AI and False Narratives
The Fight for Election Integrity Continues
The Road Ahead: Can Tech Companies Recover?
ceotodaymagazine.com
The Battle for Truth: Social Media's Role in Elections and the Struggle Against Misinformation
As the U.S. election season unfolds, social media platforms have become ground zero in the fight against misinformation, with tech giants like Google, Meta, and others taking drastic measures to curb the spread of false narratives. But with the damage already done, many analysts argue that these efforts may be too little, too late.
A Tightening Grip: Social Media Platforms Enforce Political Ad Bans
In response to mounting concerns about misinformation affecting the election, Meta, the parent company of Facebook and Instagram, recently enacted a temporary ban on new political advertisements. This move aims to stem the flood of misleading political content that could sway voters or incite unrest. Initially slated to end shortly after Election Day, the ban was extended through the week, signaling Meta’s recognition of the urgency to safeguard public trust in the democratic process.
Meanwhile, Google joined the ranks of platforms imposing restrictions, suspending ads related to U.S. elections following the closure of the last polls on Election Day. However, the company has yet to disclose how long this ad hiatus will last. TikTok, long a holdout against political advertising, has kept its ban intact since 2019.
Despite these initiatives, the tech world’s response is far from uniform. X, the platform formerly known as Twitter, lifted its political advertising ban after Elon Musk’s acquisition in 2022 and has not shown any signs of pausing ads for the election. This divergent approach raises questions about the effectiveness of these policies when large platforms, particularly X, still provide a platform for controversial political ads.
The Ghost of Misinformation Past: Is It Too Late?
While the pause on political ads is a step in the right direction, many experts believe it’s too late to undo the damage caused by years of unchecked misinformation. Analysts point to the fact that social media companies have significantly reduced their internal trust and safety teams, dismantling the safeguards that were put in place after the 2016 election interference and the January 6, 2021, Capitol attack.
Sacha Haworth, executive director of the Tech Oversight Project, emphasized the troubling regression: “Since the last presidential election, we’ve seen a dramatic backslide in social media companies’ preparedness, enforcement, and willingness to protect information online related to the election and politicians. Platforms are hotbeds for false narratives.”
The decline in resources dedicated to policing false claims has coincided with the proliferation of artificial intelligence, which has made it easier than ever to fabricate convincing fake content. Deepfake videos, doctored images, and AI-generated audio are rapidly becoming tools of political warfare, further muddying the waters of online discourse.
X Marks the Spot for Misinformation
Perhaps the most glaring example of how far social media has fallen from its original mission is X. After Musk’s acquisition, the platform reversed many of its election-related policies, allowing the spread of false claims that have fueled distrust in the electoral system. According to an analysis by the Center for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH), Musk’s rhetoric about voter fraud and immigration policies contributed to the spread of misleading claims, generating over 2 billion views this year alone.
X’s role as a major disseminator of misinformation about elections has led many to question whether it can be trusted to play a neutral role during crucial political moments. Once seen as a leader in managing online political discourse, Twitter’s evolution into X under Musk’s ownership has raised doubts about its ability to control the narrative in a fair and responsible manner.
A New Age of Political Ads: The Role of AI and False Narratives
In the context of AI’s rapid evolution, the ability to create convincing fake content has increased exponentially. Analysts worry that these tools will be used to further manipulate public opinion, especially in the volatile post-election period when rumors and misinformation can easily spiral out of control. AI-generated fake images, videos, and audios could lend an air of legitimacy to baseless claims, making it more difficult for voters to discern fact from fiction.
Political ads have long been a tool for swaying voters, but with the rise of digital manipulation and deepfakes, these ads could become more dangerous than ever. Experts warn that platforms like X, which continue to allow such ads without restrictions, could exacerbate the spread of falsehoods in the coming months.
The Fight for Election Integrity Continues
Election officials, meanwhile, are also scrambling to combat misinformation in real time. With widespread false claims of voter fraud and election manipulation already circulating, federal authorities have raised alarms about the potential for violence. Domestic extremists, some of whom are influenced by the lies spread online, could resort to violent actions in response to contested election results.
“The online ecosystem is broken,” said Imran Ahmed, CEO of CCDH. “It is now too late to rectify the damage caused by years of misinformation. The public has been bombarded with falsehoods, and the damage is already done.”
Despite these concerns, tech companies are making a concerted effort to step up their responses during this election cycle. Meta’s extended ad pause is just one example of the measures being taken to protect the integrity of the electoral process. However, experts remain skeptical about whether these efforts will be enough to restore public confidence in an increasingly fractured digital landscape.
The Road Ahead: Can Tech Companies Recover?
As we move beyond Election Day, the question remains whether social media platforms can recover from their role in fostering political misinformation. With AI-driven misinformation on the rise and platforms like X continuing to allow political ads without pause, there are serious concerns about the future of online democracy.
It’s clear that the battle for election integrity doesn’t end with the ad pauses. Social media platforms must take more significant steps to address misinformation, restore trust in their services, and prioritize the protection of democratic processes. Whether they can manage this challenge remains to be seen — but one thing is certain: the stakes have never been higher.
ceotodaymagazine.com
25. Special forces soldier reveals Saddam Hussein's desperate words after being captured
Special forces soldier reveals Saddam Hussein's desperate words after being captured
A retired US Army soldier unveils gripping insights into the capture of Iraq's former president, Saddam Hussein.
08:17 ET, Mon, Nov 11, 2024 | UPDATED: 08:42 ET, Mon, Nov 11, 2024
the-express.com · by Hannah Broughton · November 11, 2024
VanSant and Billingham are both retired soldiers (Image: LadBible/Instagram)
A retired US Army soldier has revealed fascinating details of the historic former president of Iraq’s capture.
Chris VanSant, now a Defense Industry Consultant, spoke to ex-SAS Sergeant Major Mark Billingham about his experience capturing one of the world's most brutal dictators, Saddam Hussein.
In an interview for LadBible, VanSant told Billingham that a former bodyguard of Saddam Hussein’s, Mohammed Ibrahim Omar al-Musslit, was the key to finding the former Iraqi president. However, according to VanSant, he did try to put them off the scent.
He said: “Muslit, in a last-ditch effort to protect Saddam, had pointed out the wrong farm. They shifted over to the next farm and ended up finding him there.”
VanSant then revealed exactly what Saddam said to them upon meeting the soldiers, saying, “He actually said, ‘I’m Sadam Hussein the leader of Iraq and I want to negotiate.’”
News of Saddam's capture spread throughout the world (Image: Getty)
Many Iraqi's celebrated the capture of the man who rule Iraq for over two decades (Image: Getty)
In the interview, both the former soldiers laugh out loud at this point at the absurdity that the American soldiers would have sought to negotiate with Hussein at that point.
VanSant also noted that he saw a snapshot of Saddam’s narcissism, even in the brief time the soldiers were with him.
He continued, “When we walked him out to the aircraft when he started to walk out into the room, he knew he was in front of a lot of people. As dishevelled as he was, he tidied himself before he walked out. It was like a little snapshot into his narcissism.”
View this post on Instagram
A post shared by LADbible (@ladbible)
Trending
The former Iraqi leader had a $25 million bounty on his head after being ousted during the 2003 US-led invasion and was number one in Washington’s list of 55 most wanted Iraqis.
The American military found Saddam in a hole in the ground near some farm buildings. He had been in hiding for eight months, and footage of the capture showed a dishevelled man with a long black beard.
Saddam Hussein’s crimes during his dictatorship include the systematic persecution of the Kurdish people.
In what many countries see as genocide, 182,000 Kurds were estimated to have been deported or killed in depopulation campaigns in Kurdish areas carried out by the Ba'ath party, for which Saddam was General Secretary.
the-express.com · by Hannah Broughton · November 11, 2024
26. Kendall: USAF Should Take Over Air Base Defense from Army
Does the Army have any force structure that is committed to air base defense? Obviously the Army's air and missile defense systems protect airbases. But what about air base ground defense? Is the Army of proper size with the necessary forces to execute these missions?
Kendall: USAF Should Take Over Air Base Defense from Army
airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · November 4, 2024
Nov. 4, 2024 | By John A. Tirpak
Share Article
The Pentagon should give the Air Force the air base defense mission and the resources to carry it out, Secretary Frank Kendall said Nov. 1 at the Airlift/Tanker Association Symposium in Grapevine, Texas.
“There is one thing we must move faster on: our progress against the full range of threats to our bases. This is a joint responsibility that we have been working on with our Army colleagues, and that we hope to accelerate,” Kendall said during a keynote address. “Frankly, I would be comfortable with the Department of the Air Force taking on the … defense of air bases as an organic mission, if the needed resources—human and financial, etc.—were made available.”
Under the 1948 Key West agreements that set the core roles and missions of the services, the Army is supposed to defend air bases. It’s a mission that’s gotten tougher in recent years as China has built a formidable number and variety of long-range precision-guided missiles likely intended to rain destruction on U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific, Kendall said.
This threat has prompted the Air Force to pursue the concept of Agile Combat Employment, in which the service plans to deploy small teams of Airmen capable of moving quickly to remote or austere bases, to multiply the number of targets China must shoot at and reduce the chances of a knockout blow at any one base.
But the Army has not committed the resources necessary to match the ACE model. Its Patriot and Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) systems are effective, but batteries are relatively few in number and there aren’t enough missiles to go around for the number of bases ACE will require. The Air Force has complained with increasing urgency that the Army is not taking the mission seriously enough, even as the Army encroaches on the Air Force’s core mission of long-range strike by developing costly hypersonic missiles with limited potential effects. The Air Force believes its forward forces are ill-protected.
The challenge of countering a large-scale missile strike has been drawn into sharp relief by Iran’s recent missile volleys toward Israel, which were thwarted by an international defensive effort from land, sea, and air. Such a level of effort would likely not be sustainable in a large Indo-Pacific theater war.
The Air Force and Army both have experimented with lasers and directed energy weapons for air base defense, the idea being that many, low-cost defensive shots can impose the greatest cost of such combat on the attacker instead of the defender.
Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. David Allvin, in a virtual event with the American Enterprise Institute on Oct. 31, said the Air Force used to have permissive access to forward locations, but “that is no longer the case.”
“The challenge is doubled or tripled by not only having to go the tyranny of distance, but being able to survive and protect the equipment along the way, into in the beginning of the fight and during the fight,” he said.
“We are looking at things … [that] increase the survivability of the bases from which we operate. And then in the midst of a conflict, how we get the right equipment to the right place at the right time is not only a matter of protecting it with hardened shelters and maybe camouflage, concealment and deception, but it’s also connectivity, to have that situational awareness,” and be able to react quickly when China points “its next salvo of long-range missiles to attack.”
Air
Operational Imperative 5: Resilient Basing
Operational Imperative 7: Readiness to Deploy And Fight
airandspaceforces.com · by John Tirpak · November 4, 2024
27. Advice for Trump 2.0: Cipher Brief Experts Weigh In
Advice for Trump 2.0: Cipher Brief Experts Weigh In
A dozen members of The Cipher Brief network offer advice to the 47th president on dealing with a "dangerous world."
https://www.thecipherbrief.com/advice-for-trump-2-0-cipher-brief-experts-weigh-in
EXPERT PERSPECTIVES
Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump walks out on stage with his wife Melania after being declared the winner during an election night watch party at the Palm Beach County Convention Center in West Palm Beach, FL, on November 6, 2024. (Photo by Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post via Getty Images)
Posted: November 7th, 2024
By The Cipher Brief
EXPERT PERSPECTIVES — In the hours after Donald Trump was declared the winner of the 2024 presidential election, we turned to our network of experts for reflections on the news, and what it may portend for national and global security issues.
Not surprisingly, given the diversity of views and backgrounds across the Cipher Brief network, we heard a range of perspectives: reflections on policy towards China, Russia, Ukraine, Iran and the broader Middle East; pleas for greater attention to defense industrial policy, cyber security, and longstanding U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia; and beyond national security policies, several experts stressed the importance of selecting a strong national security team – a particular challenge given how many former national security officials had been openly critical of Trump during the campaign.
THE EXPERTS
Saxby Chambliss
Saxby Chambliss is a partner at DLA Piper in Atlanta. He served as a member of the U.S. Senate for two terms, and was the Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He also served on the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Rules Committee. Chambliss was a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for four terms and served as Chairman of the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security.
Trump is inheriting a dangerous world. With real wars going on in Ukraine and in the Middle East, and real threats from China, North Korea and Iran, he is going to need an experienced national security team. He cannot walk away from Ukraine, in spite of some of his comments he’s made. He will need to come to the reality that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin is a thug and deal with him harshly. That is all Putin knows.
A strong message supporting Israel early will send a signal to Tehran. This will be an interesting four years on the foreign policy side and with the right tough team in place, Trump can have a place in history.
Jennifer Ewbank
Jennifer Ewbank, served as Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency for Digital Innovation from October 2019 until January 2024, where she led transformation of one the world’s most sophisticated and secure digital technology ecosystems.
The President-elect should prioritize several interconnected challenges that define today’s complex security landscape. First among these is strengthening allied cohesion, particularly in NATO and across the Indo-Pacific, while simultaneously reimagining our approach to strategic competition with China in a way that better leverages America’s many strengths.
Equally pressing is the need to further strengthen America’s digital and cyber resilience through improved public-private partnerships and more robust international deterrence frameworks. A connected effort would be the creation of a comprehensive U.S. national digital strategy, to counter China’s efforts to build a future global digital ecosystem in their own authoritarian image. Nothing less than global freedom is on the line.
Ambassador Kurt Volker
Ambassador Kurt Volker is a leading expert in U.S. foreign and national security policy with over 35 years of experience in a variety of government, academic, and private sector capacities. He served as U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations from 2017 to 2019, and as U.S. Ambassador to NATO from 2008-2009.
a) He needs to make clear that we are going to rev up American oil and gas production and exports. This will boost the American economy and work to undermine Iran and Russia.
b) He needs to tell Iran that they need to stand down; no more attacks by their proxies – the Houthis, Hamas, or Hezbollah – on Israel or American interests, or else they will face direct consequences from the United States.
c) He needs to tell Putin to end his war on Ukraine by January 20, or we will let Ukraine borrow as much money as they need to buy American defense products with no limits on type or use.
d) These steps are all essential to drive home the message to Beijing that it is a different game now, and there are no cost-free moves against American interests.
e) He definitely needs to pick a national security team that is both experienced and comfortable with the exercise of American power. For the last three years we have been afraid of escalation. We need our adversaries to fear escalation instead.
Linda Weissgold
Weissgold spent 37-years at CIA. Before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, she was an analyst and leader of analytic programs focused on the Middle East. She served as head of the CIA’s Office of Terrorism Analysis and helped to identify Usama Bin Laden’s location and the rise of ISIS. For more than two years, she served as President George W. Bush’s intelligence briefer.
Almost every president comes into office with the intention of prioritizing a domestic agenda, only to find national security and foreign affairs have a way of dominating their schedule. The world will be looking for proactive, rather than reactive, signals of the leadership role we will take in a new administration. The selection of a national security team is one of the first concrete signals the rest of the world will be able to see. To my mind, their Washington pedigree is much less important than the creativity they will need to tackle the ever increasingly complex problems they will face.
James Jeffrey
Ambassador James F. Jeffrey joined the Wilson Center in December 2020 as Chair of the Middle East Program. Ambassador Jeffrey served as the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS until November 8, 2020. He is a senior American diplomat with experience in political, security, and energy issues in the Middle East, Turkey, Germany, and the Balkans.
On personnel, Trump can draw on the team at NSC and State that stuck with him till the end, plus Senators, perhaps (Lindsey) Graham or (Tom) Cotton. There may be some surprises or crazies, but I worked with this team and they are competent. I am more worried about Defense and Intelligence picks. Fairly or not, he sees the career people there as not only opposed to him (that’s “normal” across national security bureaucracy) but willing to undercut him. So picks for leadership might be based more on loyalty and disdain than competence and experience. Watch that.
Trump’s biggest problem will be to understand that since 2020, an unholy coalition to overthrow the U.S. led order has coalesced, and to some degree it’s Russia, not China, that is setting the terms of the competition — in a brutal way that others, especially China, likely are uncomfortable with. This means he will have to confront Russia beginning with Ukraine more than he might now understand.
In the Middle East, no big change, as Biden’s major muscle movements did not differ greatly from Trump. Expect more consistent implementation of Iran sanctions but no warmongering with Tehran, behind fulsome support publicly for Israel; pressure to wind up Gaza and Lebanon conflicts which represent now-declining military-economic-diplomatic return on heavy Israeli investment; and strong efforts to expand the Abraham Accords.
Kevin Hulbert
Kevin Hulbert is a former senior intelligence officer in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations who retired in June 2014. He is currently the President of XK Group. Kevin served multiple overseas tours as CIA Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station.
The president needs an experienced and thoughtful national security team he trusts, that will provide him with nonpartisan intelligence that will help him to understand and to sort out these issues. At the end of the day, the Intelligence Community (IC) are not policy makers. Rather, they provide the president with the best information they can find so that the president and his team can make good decisions. As such, who he picks for key roles is very important. Not only should they be professionals who know what they are doing, but they also need to be men and women who have the president’s trust. The established order in the IC brings a vast amount of experience and professionalism to the equation, and they must be an important part of the national security team moving forward.
Admiral James ‘Sandy’ Winnefeld (Ret.)
Admiral Winnefeld served for 37 years in the United States Navy. He retired in 2015 after serving four years as the ninth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a flag officer, he commanded the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group, NATO Joint Command Lisbon, Striking and Support Forces NATO, the United States Sixth Fleet, United States Northern Command, and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, also known as NORAD.
Our world may well be on the precipice of the end of the current long-wave geopolitical cycle. These cycles last longer than a single human life, and usually end catastrophically due to some combination of a rising power (allied with lesser powers); a weakening existing power suffering from deepening political divisions and that overextends itself economically and militarily; fading memories over successive generations of the extreme violence of cycle-ending events; and politicians with little grounding in history who blindly stumble into crisis.
Avoiding a disastrous conclusion of this cycle will require clear understanding of the many-layered complexities of our world, exceptionally nuanced statesmanship, a thoroughgoing sense for where true U.S. national interests lie, and the closest possible collaboration with allies and partners.
Glenn Corn
Glenn Corn is a former Senior Executive in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who worked for 34 years in the U.S. Intelligence, Defense, and Foreign Affairs communities. He spent over 17 years serving overseas and served as the U.S. President’s Senior Representative on Intelligence and Security issues. He is an Adjunct Professor at the Institute of World Politics.
We cannot pull our support for the Ukrainians. We need to send a message to Russian President Vladimir Putin that there’s some willingness for dialogue, but on our terms, not his, and that those terms need to be coordinated closely with the Ukrainians because we should not let the Russians come between us and Kyiv. In the Middle East, obviously in places like Lebanon and Gaza, we need a resolution to that conflict. We need to send a strong message to Iran that we are not going to tolerate their behavior. There’s going to be no appeasement. So, I hope that we go back to the maximum pressure campaign.
The president also needs to pay attention to our relationship with Ankara. Turkey is a strategically important country for the United States. It has the second-largest standing army in NATO, geographically is in an extremely important region and is a traditional ally which is sometimes difficult to deal with, but it’s in our best interest to keep them on our side. My understanding is that many Turks are happy with the results of this election. We should capitalize on that.
And we absolutely need to start countering the Chinese and the Russians in Africa, not just with words or with statements, but with action and with financing for projects. We need to offer concrete assistance to the African nations that are willing to work with us and that are probably looking for our help. I think many Africans are becoming frustrated with the Chinese and the Russians, so this is a great opportunity.
Mark Kelton
Kelton retired from CIA as a senior executive with 34 years of experience in intelligence operations. He is a partner at the FiveEyes Group; a member of the Board of Trustees of Valley Forge Military Academy and College; member of the National Security Advisory Board of the MITRE Corp.; member of the Day & Zimmermann Government Services Advisory Board; member of the Siemens Government Technologies Federal Advisory Board; and a member of the Board of BigMediaTV.
The principal objective of the incoming Administration must be to reverse the perception of American weakness and decline on the world stage. To do so, the U.S. must restore deterrence in the face of the increasingly aggressive moves by our adversaries. This will require a commitment to restoring our country’s military capabilities with a focus both on rebuilding the present force and ensuring it has the weapons, ships and munitions needed to fight today; as well as the cutting-edge weaponry and technology needed to prosecute the coming war against China.
The very fact of Trump’s return to power will – because of his unpredictable nature – help with this. In short, he will be able to instill uncertainty and a degree of fear in our adversaries that is not currently present.
The second objective of the new Administration must be to deal with the regional crises now confronting the U.S.
In Ukraine, where we are seeing a slow, steady Russian advance that cannot end well for Kyiv, Trump should push for an end to the war that ensures Ukraine’s security and sovereignty. This will, of course, require concessions to Russia to achieve. But there seems no other choice given the terrible arithmetic favoring Russian that is currently at play. Under no circumstances – absent the consent of Ukraine – should the U.S. legally recognize any Ukrainian territory seized by Moscow as being Russian territory.
In the Near East, the new Administration must work to build up a military presence and regional alliances that engender a considerable degree of uncertainty in Xi’s mind regarding the prospects for a Chinese seizure of Taiwan be it, as is most likely, with the imposition of quarantine around the island or, in extremis, an effort by Beijing to invade the island.
In the Middle East, the new Administration should renew and strengthen America’s ties to Israel; recommit itself to expanding the countries engaged under the Abraham Accords; re-impose strict sanctions on Iran; and consider a regime-change strategy vis-a-vis the government in Tehran.
Jill Sanborn
Sanborn spent 24 years in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Prior to servicing as Executive Assistant Director, Sanborn served as the assistant director of the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., The first female to hold this position. She began her FBI career as a special agent in 1998.
Foreign policy and immigration are two issues that the incoming President should focus on. With the ongoing conflicts, strengthening allied partnerships and having a strong national security team will be paramount. Additionally, with the evolving terror threat and the potential for a coordinated terror attack like what we saw at the Russia concert hall [in March], the team will need to focus on intelligence and border issues – who has or is planning to enter the U.S., and do they have connections to ISIS or other foreign terrorist organizations.
Gilman Louie
Gilman Louie is the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of LookingGlass Cyber Solutions and a founding partner at Alsop Louie Partners. He is also the Chairman of the Federation of American Scientists and a director at the Markle Foundation. He founded and formerly led In-Q-Tel, a strategic venture fund created to help enhance national security by connecting the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Intelligence community with venture-backed entrepreneurial companies.
In order for the United States to maintain its national security capabilities and military ability, we must rebuild our industrial capacity to manufacture at scale in the United States. Over the past several decades, we have underinvested in our ability to build what we need to defend ourselves and no longer have the ability to manufacture at scale. As Commander-in-Chief, it will be critical that President Trump direct the Department of Defense to prioritize the rebuilding of critical defense manufacturing capabilities and our vital supply chains necessary to defending our country. We need experienced senior executives in the DoD who know how to build and manufacture at the speed of innovation rather than the slow pace of bureaucracy.
Lt. Gen. Michael Groen (US Marine Corps, Ret.)
Lt. Gen. Groen served over 36 years in the U.S. military, culminating his career as the senior executive for AI in the Department. Groen also served in the National Security Agency overseeing Computer Network Operations, and as the Director of Joint Staff Intelligence, working closely with the Chairman and Senior Leaders across the Department.
Since 1945, America’s strength has come through supportive relationships with like-minded nations. We called the Americans that achieved that the “greatest generation.” Today, Russia and China are working to dethrone our historic national accomplishments by dragging down our reputation in the rest of the world. They seek advantage through coercive diplomacy, and they are fighting to lead a new global order at our expense. With American innovation power, we have the opportunity to lead the globe in a new technological transformation. A new greatest generation of American innovators, pioneers, and global leaders are ready for launch.
Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief.
28. China Can't Win Trump's New Trade War | Opinion by Gordon G. Chang
China Can't Win Trump's New Trade War | Opinion
Newsweek · by Gordon G. Chang · November 11, 2024
Everyone is worried about a "trade war," and last week's U.S. presidential election has only heightened those fears. Donald Trump, the resounding winner in that contest, has threatened high across-the-board tariffs on all goods coming into the United States, and many fear a global downturn as a result. "If you have some very serious decoupling and broad scale use of tariffs, you could end up with a loss to world GDP of close to 7 percent," Gita Gopinath, the IMF's first deputy managing director, told the BBC last month. "These are very large numbers; 7 percent is basically losing the French and German economies," she added.
The concerns are real, but observers and analysts are identifying the wrong culprit, confusing the victim and the perpetrator. Don't blame Trump or America. Blame Xi Jinping and China.
Yes, Trump loves tariffs and tariff increases can cause global downturns. The former and future president has talked about them throughout his career and during the campaign, calling himself "Mr. Tariff" and "Tariff Man." "To me, the most beautiful word in the dictionary is 'tariff,'" he said at the Economic Club of Chicago in the middle of last month. "It's my favorite word. It needs a public relations firm."
Yes, that word could use some help. Economists abhor these measures, and global leaders do not like them either. Take Christine Lagarde, president of the European Central Bank and former IMF managing director. She sees parallels between today and the "economic nationalism" that led to a collapse in global trade and ultimately the Great Depression.
In a lecture delivered in September in Washington, D.C., she pointed out that global trade as a percentage of the world's gross domestic product fell from 21 percent in 1913 to 14 percent in 1929 to 9 percent in 1938. Lagarde blamed, among other things, tariffs.
Last year, global merchandise trade in fact fell 1.2 percent. Although trade volume will return to growth this year, there are concerns that global commerce has peaked, especially because countries are again prioritizing resilience and self-sufficiency and therefor trying to onshore industry.
What's the culprit causing the stagnation of trade? The IMF has long complained about "protectionism."
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump U.S. President-elect Donald Trump Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Protectionism is not the problem, however; it is only a symptom. Countries are protecting their economies because they are reacting to predatory and criminal trade practices, especially those of China. Those Chinese practices have created large imbalances, like its outsized trade surpluses. Imbalances, as the Wall Street Journal reminds us, brought on the Great Depression. They also are responsible for the 2008 global downturn.
This time, China is depressing consumer demand at home—the Chinese economy is structured to do that—and subsidizing manufacturing as Xi seeks to build an even more fearsome export powerhouse. China already accounts for 30 percent of global manufacturing.
As U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said last month at the Brookings Institution, Beijing's system "is producing far more than domestic demand, dumping excess onto global markets at artificially low prices, driving manufacturers around the world out of business, and creating a chokehold on supply chains."
Sullivan is right. In October, China's Producer Price Index, which measures factory gate prices, fell for the 25th straight month, indicating that China's manufacturing capacity is out of whack with internal demand. Yet Beijing is pouring even more money into manufacturing, which has an incidental effect of depressing consumers' ability to buy goods.
Internal demand in China is, as a result, falling. Last month, imports dropped a larger-than-expected 2.3 percent—at the same time exports soared 12.7 percent, far faster than estimates predicted.
The Chinese export-driven system creates "collateral damage," as the Wall Street Journal labeled the effects felt by China's trading partners. "China Shock 2.0" is how the Biden administration terms it.
So far, the IMF does not want to deal with Chinese trade practices, which means countries are going to take matters into their own hands. In response to Beijing's export-promotion policies, the U.S., the European Union, and even countries in the so-called Global South are raising tariff walls. Trump is now in good company.
"Foreign countries, and especially China, have been waging highly successful trade wars against clueless pre-Trump presidents for years," trade expert Alan Tonelson told me. "High tariffs, non-tariff barriers based on Mickey Mouse regulations, subsidies, local-content regulations, currency manipulation, and intellectual property theft have been Standard Operating Procedure for years."
A reckoning is coming soon, because the world's largest market is losing patience and will take action. It is true that tariffs will create "a world of unintended consequences," as Andrew Collier, a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, told me this month.
Is one of those consequences a worldwide downturn as Lagarde hinted? Perhaps, but as Tonelson, who writes about the intersection of trade and geopolitics at RealityChek, notes, "foreign economies are so dependent for growth on the American market that any retaliation for new U.S. levies will be symbolic at best."
Yet even if there is more than symbolic retaliation, the Great Depression shows that trade-surplus countries suffer the most. America should understand that: A century ago, it was the world's trade-surplus king and was hit hardest by the falloff in trade. Now, China will be the one to take the blows.
Trade-surplus countries, therefore, are in no position to wage trade wars with trade-deficit ones like America.
The Chinese regime surely knows this. In 2018, Beijing huffed and puffed when Trump imposed tariffs pursuant to Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 but took actions that absorbed somewhere between 75 percent to 81 percent of the cost of these measures.
History is already repeating itself. In recent days, China has been forcing down the value of the renminbi, partly in anticipation of Trump imposing new tariffs. Even before he has taken the oath of office, China's regime is paying the cost of his new tariffs.
Gordon G. Chang is the author of Plan Red: China's Project to Destroy America and The Coming Collapse of China. Follow him on X @GordonGChang.
The views expressed in this article are the writer's own.
Newsweek · by Gordon G. Chang · November 11, 2024
29. An Alliance of America’s Greatest Foes Is Getting Tighter
The "fusion of foes and the fluid future of warfare." Words I heard from a Combatant Commander last week.
Excerpts:
Some perspective is necessary: Patterns of autocratic defense cooperation are still far less impressive than those that America and its closest allies enjoy. To this point, the best revenge for North Korea’s intervention in Ukraine would be if Washington can induce South Korea, which possesses huge quantities of 155mm artillery ammunition, to give more of it to Kyiv.
But military integration among the Eurasian autocracies is making the world’s most disruptive states better armed and better informed about the realities of modern war. Given that this integration has repeatedly surged ahead far faster than Western analysts predicted, expect these relationships to keep developing in surprising, destabilizing ways.
The emergence of this arsenal of autocracy is one of many reasons to cheer the devastating strikes Israel carried out against Iran last month. In destroying Iran’s advanced, Russian-made air defense systems, Israel revealed the limits of the kit Moscow can give its friends. In badly damaging Tehran’s missile production facilities, Israel probably helped Ukraine in addition to helping itself. Yet the same phenomenon reminds us how high the stakes in Ukraine really are —and how ominous the trajectory of that conflict is.
If Putin imposes a conqueror’s peace on Kyiv, it won’t simply be a tragedy for Ukraine. It will be a victory for the larger cohort of autocracies and a testament to what their cooperation can achieve in a test of strength against the West. The autocracies are pulling together, not least militarily, in what looks increasingly like a prewar era. The democracies will have to do so, as well.
An Alliance of America’s Greatest Foes Is Getting Tighter
By Hal Brands
Bloomberg Opinion
November 08, 2024
AEI · by Hal Brands
The deployment of North Korean troops to fight in Russia’s war against Ukraine was one October surprise among many. November, December and the months thereafter will reveal how much Kim Jong Un’s forces can do to abet Vladimir Putin’s aggression. Yet the larger significance of the North Korean move may be what it reveals about the arsenal of autocracy taking shape.
The phrase “arsenal of democracy” was coined by Franklin Roosevelt during World War II. The thrust was that the US, not yet in the war, would arm and empower the friendly countries that were. Since February 2022, President Joe Biden has revived the concept in explaining America’s support for Ukraine. Yet the most striking, potentially historical advances toward deeper defense cooperation are coming from the autocratic side.
That integration is part of a broader phenomenon preoccupying the US government — the linking of arms by countries assaulting the international order. A “no limits” strategic partnership unites China and Russia, the two Eurasian giants. Iran and Russia have built what American officials call a “full-scale defense partnership.” Moscow and Pyongyang signed their treaty of alliance, which complements North Korea’s longstanding — if ambivalent — defense pact with China. Russia is helping a longtime Iranian client, Yemen’s Houthis, attack international shipping in the Red Sea.
Call it whatever you want — “axis of autocracies,” “axis of upheaval” or even “axis of losers” — but the reality is that the US faces a thickening web of alliance-like ties among its greatest foes. At the center of those relationships is collaboration in making and wielding the tools of war.
North Korea has provided millions of rounds of artillery to Putin’s forces, more than the US and its allies have given Kyiv. Iranian-made missiles and drones facilitate barrages against Ukrainian cities. Chinese factories have, reportedly, produced drones for Putin’s armies. Russia, in turn, has apparently agreed to provide its partners with more sophisticated aircraft and air defenses – among other capabilities – as part of a flourishing, autocratic arms trade that is changing the military balance in multiple regions.
Yet the revisionists aren’t simply trading in finished weapons; there is a deeper industrial integration underway. Tehran has built built factories that produce Iranian drones on Russian soil. China has undertaken a gigantic effort to rebuild Putin’s defense industrial base by selling him microchips, machine tools and other components. North Korean workers may already be toiling on Russian production lines.
More troubling, technology transfer is reaching new levels. Russia is reportedly aiding North Korea’s missile, satellite, and advanced weapons programs. Moscow and Beijing are engaging in joint development and co-production initiatives that grow more numerous, and more secretive, all the time.
Western governments are struggling to understand what, exactly, is happening in these partnerships, which raises the odds they will be surprised by the capability leaps that result. Perhaps North Korea’s next intercontinental missile, or China’s next attack submarine, will be more threatening thanks to the technology and know-how Putin is now trading away.
Finally, the autocracies are learning from one another. Iran’s missile and drone attack on Israel in April mimicked strikes that Moscow had carried out in Ukraine. Some of the value Kim gets from sending his soldiers into the Ukraine war will be the experience his army gains. And given that drones, missiles and missile defenses could shape the outcome of a US-China war in the Western Pacific, you can bet Beijing is studying the lessons of the Ukraine war.
Some perspective is necessary: Patterns of autocratic defense cooperation are still far less impressive than those that America and its closest allies enjoy. To this point, the best revenge for North Korea’s intervention in Ukraine would be if Washington can induce South Korea, which possesses huge quantities of 155mm artillery ammunition, to give more of it to Kyiv.
But military integration among the Eurasian autocracies is making the world’s most disruptive states better armed and better informed about the realities of modern war. Given that this integration has repeatedly surged ahead far faster than Western analysts predicted, expect these relationships to keep developing in surprising, destabilizing ways.
The emergence of this arsenal of autocracy is one of many reasons to cheer the devastating strikes Israel carried out against Iran last month. In destroying Iran’s advanced, Russian-made air defense systems, Israel revealed the limits of the kit Moscow can give its friends. In badly damaging Tehran’s missile production facilities, Israel probably helped Ukraine in addition to helping itself. Yet the same phenomenon reminds us how high the stakes in Ukraine really are —and how ominous the trajectory of that conflict is.
If Putin imposes a conqueror’s peace on Kyiv, it won’t simply be a tragedy for Ukraine. It will be a victory for the larger cohort of autocracies and a testament to what their cooperation can achieve in a test of strength against the West. The autocracies are pulling together, not least militarily, in what looks increasingly like a prewar era. The democracies will have to do so, as well.
AEI · by Hal Brands
30. Data suggest vast majority of Trump voters believe American values and prosperity are 'under threat'
There seem to be different views on American values. The values that should matter to all of us regardless of political views are those found in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Federalist Papers that have outlined an enduring political philosophy that has stood the test of eim and should continue to do so.
But this provides some important perspectives and analysis.
November 11, 2024
Editors' notes
Data suggest vast majority of Trump voters believe American values and prosperity are 'under threat'
https://phys.org/news/2024-11-vast-majority-trump-voters-american.html?utm
by University of Cambridge
Credit: Pixabay/CC0 Public Domain
Almost nine out of 10 voters who supported Donald Trump for US President believe that America's values, traditions and future economic prosperity are under threat—double the number of Kamala Harris supporters.
This is according to new data from Cambridge University's Political Psychology lab, who worked with YouGov to conduct an opinion poll of US voters shortly before the election.
Some 89% of Trump voters agree that "American values and beliefs are being undermined and cherished traditions are under threat" compared to 45% of Harris voters.
Moreover, 87% of Trump voters agree that jobs in the US are "insecure right now and future prosperity is under threat" compared to just 39% of those who supported Harris.
Trump voters also scored higher, on average, than Harris voters in brief psychological tests for levels of authoritarianism, as well as for Social Dominance Orientation: a preference for hierarchy within social groups.
"A lot of media attention focuses on the specific things Trump says and whether they are truthful," said Dr. Lee de-Wit, head of Cambridge's Political Psychology lab.
"Our results highlight that part of Trump's appeal is in the values he communicates, and the way in which he manages to respond more directly to the sense of threat perceived by many US voters," de-Wit said.
"These findings may help explain why Democrat attacks on Trump supporters resonated so strongly, from Clinton's 'basket of deplorables' to Biden's 'garbage' comment, because far more of Trump's base see their country's values and jobs as under threat already."
De-Wit points to recent research suggesting that voters in the UK are more likely to support candidates whose values and attitudes align with their own—an effect that outstrips left-right identification.
Both Democrat and Republican leaders repeatedly stated that a victory by the other side is dangerous for America, including in the closing arguments of the campaign.
Polling suggests that this resonated with the electorate. Large majorities in both camps felt their "way of life would be under threat" if the opposing candidate won (74% of Trump voters; 68% of Harris voters), suggesting high levels of mutual distrust.
"Psychological research suggests that across any population you will find that people respond differently to threat, whether perceived or real, and that their reactions are related to underlying psychological characteristics," said de-Wit.
For this reason, the Cambridge team asked voters to respond to scales measuring authoritarianism, as well as Social Dominance Orientation.
People who score highly on authoritarianism are concerned about enforcing in-group norms and respecting legitimate authority.
Meanwhile, those high in Social Dominance Orientation care about the position of their in-group in relation to other groups. "They are sensitive to status, and often view the world as divided into winners and losers. They can be triggered by the idea that their group is slipping down the social and economic hierarchy."
Trump voters scored significantly higher than Harris voters for both characteristics.
De-Wit says these results are consistent with the work of Dr. Karen Stenner, another political psychologist. "Stenner describes perceived threat as a trigger for an 'authoritarian dynamic'. When a group's norms are under threat, they seek safety through greater conformity, punishment for norm breakers and the authority of a strong leader."
De-Wit and colleagues say this may partly explain why the famous "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) slogan plays so well with Trump voters, with 97% agreeing that "Americans should make our country great again," compared to only 42% of Harris voters.
"The words themselves invoke a perceived loss of status which would matter for those high in Social Dominance Orientation, while the sense of a shared mass movement that has grown up around MAGA would be appealing to those high in authoritarianism," said de-Wit.
While the MAGA slogan proved divisive across the voting public, Democrat slogans such as Harris' statement that Americans have "much more in common than what separates us" were viewed favorably by a majority of Trump (80%) and Harris (86%) voters alike.
"The broadly positive response across the board to the 'more in common' slogan suggests the Democrat appeal to unity was a popular one," said de-Wit. "Perhaps Democrats need to better understand how to speak to the real or perceived threats people face."
The statement that "Americans should put country over party," used by some Republicans, including former Republican Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, to explain why they were endorsing a Democrat, polled even better: 89% of both Harris and Trump supporters agreed with the slogan.
De-Wit points out that the two Democrat slogans that got over 80% in both camps are compatible with at least moderate levels of authoritarianism, as "more in common" reassures those who dislike division and "country over party" is an appeal to loyalty, albeit to a wider in-group.
De-Wit added, "From Brexit to Trump, it is clear that those seeking to understand the dynamics of modern politics need to look beyond traditional political labels of left and right, and conventional demographics.
"We need to understand why some voters are feeling so threatened, and clearly, politicians need to think deeply about how to respond to those threats."
More information: University of Cambridge Political Psychology Lab US fieldwork - 23rd to 25th October 2024
Provided by University of Cambridge
31. Forbes: Taiwan quietly armed Ukraine with critical air defense systems
Forbes: Taiwan quietly armed Ukraine with critical air defense systems
Retired Taiwanese air defense batteries could represent nearly a third of Ukraine’s shield against Russian aerial attacks.
https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/11/12/forbes-taiwan-quietly-armed-ukraine-with-critical-air-defense-systems/
byYevheniia Martyniuk
12/11/2024
2 minute read
MIM-23 Hawk. Photo: TAIWANESE DEFENSE MINISTRY
Forbes: Taiwan quietly armed Ukraine with critical air defense systems
Taiwan has quietly emerged as a significant contributor to Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, Forbes reports. The publication cites former Pentagon official Tony Hu, who disclosed Taiwan’s transfer of its surplus HAWK batteries to the Ukrainian Air Force.
Taiwan’s support for Ukraine has been selective but strategic. While not fully joining Western sanctions on Russia, and despite potential tensions with China, this significant transfer of HAWK missiles revealed by Forbes has provided crucial reinforcement to Ukraine’s air defenses.
The donation, which appears to confirm earlier reports of a US-brokered deal, could help Ukraine deploy up to 15 HAWK batteries, each equipped with multiple three-missile launchers and radar systems. According to Forbes’ analysis, this would represent nearly a third of Ukraine’s air defense force, which has been transitioning from Soviet-era equipment to Western systems since the conflict began in 2022.
Although the HAWK is over 60 years old, the system offers several advantages: It’s mobile, reliable, and effective against drones, cruise missiles, and aircraft. Importantly, its missiles are compatible with Ukraine’s modern NASAMS air defense systems, potentially allowing integration with more advanced radar capabilities to counter jamming vulnerabilities.
Forbes reports that the deal, negotiated in 2023, involves approximately a dozen batteries with around a hundred launchers that Taiwan has been phasing out since 2015. For Ukraine, this diversification is crucial, providing access to multiple missile supply chains to maintain its air defense against ongoing Russian attacks.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
