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Quotes of the Day:
"A book must be the axe for the frozen sea within us."
– Franz Kafka
"Truth emerges from the clash of adverse ideas."
– John Stuart Mill
"It's a universal law – intolerance is the first sign of an inadequate education."
– Aleksandr I. Solzhenistsyn
1. Elimination of reunification bureau preceded Kim Jong Un’s ‘two hostile states’ doctrine
2. South Korea to back U.N. resolution condemning North Korea rights abuses
3. US Withdraws from its UN Human Rights Review
4. Working with Japan and Korea to Compete with China on AI
5. Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries
6. How South Korea Can Help the U.S. Navy Stay Afloat in the Pacific
7. Lee wishes good luck to applicants of college entrance exam
8. Memorial foundation launched to honor U.N. forces who fought in Korean War
9. Canadian arctic patrol ship monitors North Korea smuggling for 2nd time in month
10. ASML completes construction of chip equipment plant in S. Korea
11. South Korea's Nuclear Submarine Ambitions Face Four Key Hurdles
12. U.S. Think Tank Report: KFTC Targets U.S. Firms, Overlooks Chinese
13. Russian, North Korean media ink deal on ‘objective coverage’ of bilateral ties
14. Hundreds of Korean workers detained in Georgia to file lawsuit against ICE
1. Elimination of reunification bureau preceded Kim Jong Un’s ‘two hostile states’ doctrine
Summary:
North Korea’s dissolution of the Fatherland Reunification Bureau in 2022 signaled Kim Jong Un’s long-planned shift to a “two hostile states” doctrine. The move abandons reunification rhetoric, framing North and South Korea as separate sovereign nations. It seeks regime stability, international recognition, and legitimacy as a “normal nuclear state.”
Comment: We need to be careful with analyses like these. We must not misinterpret what Kim Jong Un is doing. He does not seek peaceful co-existence. He still seeks peninsula domination as the long term objective that is necessary for sustained regime survival. We must understand this because the Kim family regime remains an existential threat to the South.
Elimination of reunification bureau preceded Kim Jong Un’s ‘two hostile states’ doctrine
Move suggests years of preparation for policy shift that aims to secure regime stability and international recognition
By Lee Sang-yong - November 10, 2025
https://www.dailynk.com/english/elimination-of-reunification-bureau-preceded-kim-jong-uns-two-hostile-states-doctrine/
dailynk.com
North Korea eliminated the foreign ministry’s Fatherland Reunification Bureau in early 2022, well before leader Kim Jong Un proclaimed his “two hostile states” doctrine, according to multiple sources inside the country.
A former North Korean diplomat who defected to South Korea said during a recent debate that the North had already scrapped the bureau in 2022. Daily NK sources’ testimony lends credence to his claim.
According to the sources, the Fatherland Reunification Bureau had played a significant role in propaganda efforts toward South Korea since the 1990s. However, its role began weakening after the 2018 inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits, and the bureau was officially scrapped in early 2022.
Even by 2018, the Foreign Ministry’s Fatherland Reunification Bureau handled only formal diplomatic protocol, one source said. Ultimately, it was divided and absorbed into the Central Committee’s United Front Department and another body run directly by Kim Yo Jong.
The United Front Department is a key party department that handles inter-Korean exchanges and operations against South Korea. It has been reorganized as Bureau 10 of the Central Committee and is also called the Enemy State Guidance Bureau.
Long-term strategy
The scrapping of the Fatherland Reunification Bureau suggests the Kim Jong Un regime had been preparing its new “two hostile states” strategy toward South Korea for quite some time, meaning the move cannot be seen as a mere administrative shakeup.
The leadership no longer views reunification as realistic, the source said. It believes North Korea and South Korea must be recognized as two independent nations, premised on the mutual existence of the regimes.
In South Korea, they interpret this as scrapping the reunification policy, but in North Korea, it’s seen as a process of stabilizing the national system and making diplomatic strategy realistic, the source said. This is simply a superficial change and does not mean a withdrawal from or retreat from policy toward South Korea.
North Korea’s “two states” doctrine is linked to the regime’s strategy to present itself as a “normal country,” which aims to achieve three goals: bolstering national identity, ensuring regime security and laying the groundwork for diplomatic diversification.
The two states doctrine goes beyond consolidating independent sovereignty as a nuclear state in the constitution and system and the logic of reunification, the source said. It is a strategic concept to win recognition as a normal country during later negotiations with the United States by blocking the introduction of reactionary thought and shifting the relationship between North and South Korea to a bilateral relationship under international law. It is a strategy for regime stability as part of Kim Jong Un’s long-term thinking.
Preserving the regime
Another source said North Korea now thinks of reunification as a channel for foreign intervention. The “two states” doctrine is a strategic adjustment to preserve the regime, the source added.
The concept that North Korea is an independent, sovereign nation is now taking root, and the country has already begun moving from the age of reunification to the age of two states, the source said.
North Korea is reportedly paying attention to South Korea’s reaction. If South Korea flatly rejects the “two states” doctrine, North Korea will revert to a competition of legitimacy, the source said. This means that if the South responds in a hardline fashion, the North will use it to bolster the Korean Peninsula’s confrontation over regime legitimacy, which will be used to promote internal unity.
Meanwhile, Daily NK recently reported — quoting a source in North Hamgyong province — that the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Agitation Department has focused on public ideological indoctrination efforts to promote the idea of North Korea as a completely independent nation, distributing study materials titled “Our Republic is One, Complete National System.”
dailynk.com
2. South Korea to back U.N. resolution condemning North Korea rights abuses
Summary:
South Korea will co-sponsor a U.N. resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights abuses, reaffirming its commitment despite efforts to engage Pyongyang. The move maintains Seoul’s principled stance, balancing dialogue and accountability. Human rights groups had urged support, warning peace requires truth. The U.N. vote is scheduled for December.
Comment: This is a positive sign for a possible human rights up front approach from South Korea. Given POTROK's discussion of "practical diplomacy" I feared (and still fear) they might be willing to make some concessions in return for engagement. If he does pursue engagement it is important to continue to focus on human rights without compromise. Hopefully this is a sign South Korea will do that. This is also especially important since the US has dropped out of the UN periodic review of north Korean human rights. And unfortunately the US is also not sponsoring this resolution.
World News Nov. 12, 2025 / 4:11 AM
South Korea to back U.N. resolution condemning North Korea rights abuses
By Thomas Maresca
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2025/11/12/Seoul-backs-United-Nations-resolution-condemning-North-Korea-human-rights-abuses/9881762936867/
South Korea will again co-sponsor a United Nations resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights violations, a document showed Wednesday. Questions had emerged whether President Lee Jae Myung, seen here addressing the U.N. General Assembly, would support the resolution amid efforts to improve relations with Pyongyang. Photo by Peter Foley/UPI | License Photo
SEOUL, Nov. 12 (UPI) -- South Korea will again co-sponsor a United Nations resolution condemning North Korea's human rights violations, a document showed Wednesday, amid speculation that Seoul might withhold support in an effort to improve relations with Pyongyang.
The draft resolution, introduced last week to the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, "condemns in the strongest terms the long-standing and ongoing systematic, widespread and gross violations of human rights in and by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including those that may amount to crimes against humanity."
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the official name of North Korea.
The resolution calls on Pyongyang to "respect, protect and fulfill all human rights and fundamental freedoms" and to "immediately close the political prison camps and release all political prisoners unconditionally."
Related
South Korea was among the 41 U.N. member states that co-sponsored the resolution, maintaining the position of former President Yoon Suk Yeol's conservative government.
The move comes as Seoul weighs how to balance engagement with Pyongyang against pressure to address its human rights record. President Lee Jae Myung has made efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas since taking office in June, with conciliatory gestures such as dismantling propaganda loudspeakers and restricting activist groups from floating balloons carrying information across the border.
He has expressed support for renewed diplomacy between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, saying last month he hoped Trump would have a chance to play the role of "peacemaker" on the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea co-sponsored the resolution from 2008 through 2018, but withdrew during a period of inter-Korean detente between 2019 and 2022 under then-President Moon Jae-in.
In late October, Human Rights Watch and 20 other groups sent an open letter urging Lee's government to back the resolution, warning that recent domestic policy shifts "signal a troubling move away from support for the victims of North Korea's repression."
"We stress that sustainable peace on the Korean Peninsula cannot be achieved by excluding human rights," the letter said. "Dialogue and engagement need to go hand in hand with accountability and truth, because genuine reconciliation cannot be built on silence or denial of North Korea's horrific rights violations."
South Korea's Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that Seoul's approach to North Korean human rights would remain a matter of principle.
"Our government believes it is important to make tangible improvements to the human rights of North Korean people, and we have co-sponsored the resolution based on this stance," a ministry official said, according to Yonhap News.
The United States was not among the sponsoring countries. In February, President Trump signed an executive order withdrawing the United States from the U.N. Human Rights Council, reinstating the position he adopted during his previous term.
North Korea has long rejected such resolutions as hostile acts, accusing the United Nations and Western powers of using human rights as a pretext to undermine its government.
Following the adoption of last year's measure, Pyongyang's Foreign Ministry denounced it as a "politically motivated provocation."
A September report by the U.N. Human Rights Office found that North Korea's human rights situation "has not improved over the past decade and, in many instances, has degraded," citing worsening food shortages, widespread forced labor and tight restrictions on movement and expression.
The U.N. General Assembly is expected to vote on the resolution in December.
3. US Withdraws from its UN Human Rights Review
Summary:
The United States’ withdrawal from the UN Universal Periodic Review marks a historic break from decades of engagement, undermining global norms of accountability. Critics warn it weakens democratic legitimacy, encourages authoritarian evasion, and erodes U.S. credibility on human rights, revealing tensions between national sovereignty and international oversight in sustaining democracy.
Comment: This is a troubling development. However it does illustrate why we need organizations like the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) if our government is going to abdicate its role and responsibility in the human rights space.
I wonder how this will affect the north Korean Human Rights legislation that Rep Young Kim just re-submitted.
Note also that whatever organization the US withdraws from China fills the void to exert its influence.
Why Committee for Human Rights in North Korea must be funded -- now more than ever
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/27/perspective-committee-for-human-rights-North-Korea/6181761599619/
Regime fears the truth: how HRNK gives world Its most powerful weapon against North Korea
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/10/perspective-human-rights-north-korea/5071762787247/
U.S. lawmaker reintroduces N. Korean human rights reauthorization act
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251111000200315
Opinion
US Withdraws from its UN Human Rights Review
Decision ignites global dismay from rights organizations
Nov 11, 2025
∙ Paid
By: Khanh Vu Duc
https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/usa-withdraw-united-nations-human-rights-review?utm
Earlier this month, the United States made the unprecedented decision to skip its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the United Nations Human Rights Council. This withdrawal from the mechanism, which regularly assesses the human rights situations of all United Nations member states, marks a sharp departure from decades of engagement and raises critical questions about the durability of democratic accountability in the 21st century.
Beyond the procedural implications, the decision challenges the norms that sustain freedom, transparency, and legitimacy in both domestic and international governance. The refusal to participate was quietly announced in September, the eve of the US Labor Day weekend. As justification, an official said the refusal was in response to the UN Human Rights Council’s “persistent failure to condemn the most egregious human rights violators.”
Even some of the most egregious human rights violators, including China, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Belarus, and Russia, however, have repeatedly participated in the process and subjected themselves to dialogue on their human rights records
Globally, the Trump administration’s approach to human rights has been marked by a pronounced shift away from traditional US leadership, drastically cutting or suspending foreign aid, including funding for programs addressing global health, democracy-building, and humanitarian assistance for refugees, such as the UN Relief and Works Agency.
In addition to withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council, it also quit the World Health Organization (WHO) and has imposed sanctions on officials from the International Criminal Court (ICC).
The November 7 decision by the US was much to the dismay of its allies and human rights advocates. For decades, Washington has engaged fully with the UPR, submitting national reports and participating in peer review on civil rights, racial equality, immigration, and indigenous issues. This year, however, it declined both to submit a report and to attend the session, citing concerns over alleged bias in the Council.
The UPR is founded on universality. Every UN Member State, regardless of power or prestige, is expected to submit itself to scrutiny. Its value is not only in recommendations for reform but in demonstrating that no nation is above accountability. By stepping aside, the United States disrupts the norms of international oversight and signals a tension inherent in modern governance. Even established democracies may prioritize perceived national interest over global standards. The withdrawal breaks a long-standing precedent, drawing attention not merely to U.S. policy but to the fragility of institutionalized accountability.
Consequences for Credibility and Oversight
The implications of this decision are profound. Practically, civil society groups, peer states, and human-rights monitors lose a formal forum to question and evaluate US policies. Symbolically, the move undermines the Review’s universality, suggesting that compliance with international norms is negotiable.
Other states with weaker human-rights records such as China, Cuba, Russia, Venezuela and/or Vietnam may now see an opening to evade scrutiny, weakening the peer-pressure mechanism central to the review process.
Internationally, the US’s absence chips away at its credibility. A nation advocating human rights globally, yet evading evaluation at home, invites accusations of hypocrisy. The withdrawal underscores a core tension in democratic governance: the balance between sovereignty and accountability. Democracies rely not only on domestic legitimacy but also on consistent engagement with international norms. Temporarily avoiding review may seem expedient, but it highlights how political calculus can outweigh long-term commitments to transparency and oversight.
For students of governance, the US case is instructive. Freedom, democracy, and prosperity are interdependent: freedom requires that leaders be answerable, democracy thrives under transparent institutions, and prosperity benefits from legitimacy and predictability. External oversight mechanisms like the UPR reinforce these principles by embedding norms that constrain arbitrary power.
The rescheduling of the US review for 2026 demonstrates that the mechanism remains resilient. The challenge is ensuring that participation is substantive, consistent, and meaningful. The US’s partial retreat illustrates a broader lesson for the global community: institutions must be designed to enforce accountability even when political incentives push states to resist. Without such structures, democratic ideals risk erosion.
Ultimately, the episode is a reminder that democratic values are fragile if left untested. The UPR is not ceremonial; it is a crucial instrument for sustaining legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. In a world where power, sovereignty, and global norms collide, the ability of states to submit themselves to scrutiny is a measure of their commitment to freedom, democracy, and prosperity. Avoiding review may offer short-term convenience, but true governance—and enduring legitimacy—requires courage, consistency, and accountability.
4. Working with Japan and Korea to Compete with China on AI
Summary:
The U.S., Japan, and South Korea are deepening AI cooperation to outcompete China by aligning supply chains, setting democratic tech standards, and banning untrustworthy PRC AI. RAND highlights Japan’s standards focus and Korea’s rapid adoption and defense applications, making trilateral AI collaboration central to safeguarding a free, open Indo-Pacific.
Comment The referenced reports can be downloaded here:
Japan Is a Critical Partner for U.S. in AI Competition with China
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA4137-1.html
The Republic of Korea Is a Key Partner for the United States in Artificial Intelligence Competition with China
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3691-15.html
Working with Japan and Korea to Compete with China on AI
Allies are an asymmetric advantage for the U.S. in the tech race.
Nov 10, 2025
by Scott W. Harold
https://geopoliticsagi.substack.com/p/working-with-japan-and-korea-to-compete
Photo by imaginima/Getty Images
As President Trump traveled to the Indo-Pacific in late October for his first summit with new Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae and the APEC Summit hosted by President Lee Jae-myung in South Korea, the U.S. signed agreements with both Japan and South Korea outlining plans for broadening cooperation aimed at outcompeting China on AI. What are the most promising areas for collaboration on AI with these countries, and what specific steps can Washington take with them? RAND examined these questions in a pair of recent reports, looking at what makes Japan and South Korea critical partners for the United States in seeking to shape a world safe for democracy by leveraging the power of AI.
The third pillar of the Trump administration’s AI Action Plan prioritizes exporting American AI to allies and partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, which the Pentagon has consistently identified as its “priority theater.” RAND found in examining the prospects for expanded AI cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, that the three sides share a common understanding of the threat to the region posed by authoritarian revisionists such as China, North Korea, and Russia. The U.S. and Japanese national security strategies, for example, prioritize supporting a free and open Indo-Pacific, while the Republic of Korea’s 2023 National Security Strategy referred to a ‘free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific’ and the Lee Jae-myung administration’s initial policy moves have continued to prioritize the U.S. alliance, cooperation with Japan, and collaboration on (and investment in) artificial intelligence.
Separately, Tokyo and Seoul are seeking to advance their nations’ AI capabilities, computing power, electrical generation capacity, semiconductor industries, robotics sectors, and university research prowess—all key components of advanced AI where cooperation with the United States holds great promise. In addition, collaboration on AI supply chains; controlling market access in ways that block untrustworthy PRC AI products from Japanese and Korean markets; and cooperation on global standards around ensuring that AI reinforces democratic values rather than authoritarian interests are areas for cooperation with Japan and Korea. Each country can bring to bear its own economic and technological hard power as well as its diplomatic and cultural soft power to promote norms that support trustworthy technology and discriminate against untrustworthy PRC AI products and services. While bilateral cooperation is possible with both Japan and Korea, the three nations’ leading diplomats have also agreed trilaterally to deepen AI cooperation at their meeting in New York in September 2025.
Two partners, two distinct strategies
Apart from their many similarities, Japan and South Korea do exhibit some key differences when it comes to their approaches to AI. While adoption has been growing in recent years, Japan’s use of generative AI is still lagging behind leading nations across both business and consumer sectors. By contrast, the ROK government and private sector have raced ahead, with Seoul having rolled out an ambitious national AI Framework Act that aims to position the country as one of the world’s top three AI powerhouses by 2030, while the Korean private sector topped all OECD countries in AI adoption, according to one recent survey.
With respect to the global AI competition, Japan’s approach has been built around setting international standards, such as through its organizing of the Hiroshima AI Process, and seeking to compete with China on AI in Southeast Asia by building and selling ‘sovereign AI’ models tailored to third countries’ languages and legal infrastructures and that built atop the U.S. tech stack, an approach very well-tailored to the U.S. AI strategy. By contrast, while South Korea also supports international efforts to define responsible standards, including by hosting the AI Seoul Summit in 2024 that led to the Seoul Declaration for Safe, Innovative, and Inclusive AI, it has been relatively more focused on seeking contracts for AI products and services (often through its own ‘sovereign AI’ products tailored to Southeast Asian customers such as Thailand) largely for commercial motives rather than as part of a national strategy to compete with China for regional influence.
In addition to their approaches to AI varying by logics of strategic competition versus commercial ambitions, Japan and Korea also differ in terms of their focus on the military applications of AI. Japan, which hews to an exclusively-defensive defense policy and faces challenges in working with its university sector on military technologies owing to its culture of post-war domestic anti-militarism, has been slow to explore the incorporation of AI into defense hardware. By contrast, President Lee Jae-myung has recently announced his ambitions for Korea to break into the ranks of the top-four global defense exporters within the next few years, including by incorporating AI into its military hardware. Commercially, Korea is also ahead of Japan in terms of constructing data centers and developing the energy infrastructure to support advanced AI. This potentially positions Korea as a more attractive partner for U.S. defense industrial co-development, with Japan playing more of a role down the line as its efforts to advance its own military AI sector mature further.
From shared vision to policy action
Unilaterally or in coordination, one step all three nations should consider taking quickly would be to move beyond simple bans of China’s DeepSeek on government devices to ban DeepSeek’s products nationwide across any and all devices. Such bans make sense in light of the national security risks posed by Chinese firms’ clandestine data collection and manipulation efforts, as well as the PRC’s broader efforts to weaponize data and information. They would also be reciprocal, since China already bans foreign AI products from being sold in its own market. Further steps the parties could take in tandem include coordinating on the alignment of efforts to close AI supply chain gaps; expanding efforts to work with other key actors in the AI supply chain; and continuing to pursue a campaign to stigmatize untrustworthy PRC AI products and services.
As the three nations’ leaders declared when they issued their Spirit of Camp David joint statement on advancing trilateral cooperation in August 2023, the three partners are “aligned in our vision; undaunted in the face of our era’s greatest challenges; and, most of all, united in our belief that Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States can meet those challenges together, now and in the future.” President Trump’s recent meetings with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts reflects this. And RAND’s research on the geopolitics of artificial intelligence and the role of cooperation with two of America’s most consequential allies in Asia show why this remains true two years on and how the three parties can collectively take further steps to develop AI that supports a free and open Indo-Pacific.
5. Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries
Summary:
Congress is advancing the bipartisan DISRUPT Act to counter growing coordination among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The bill directs State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, CIA, and DNI to form task forces and craft a whole-of-government strategy to “disrupt, frustrate, and constrain” adversary cooperation. It mandates reports on technology transfers, military risks, and war-planning modernization to address simultaneous multi-theater threats. Attached to the 2026 NDAA, the legislation highlights escalating collaboration among U.S. adversaries in arms transfers, disinformation, and dual-use technology sharing. Lawmakers aim to strengthen U.S. preparedness, digital capabilities, and interagency coordination to preempt unified challenges from authoritarian regimes.
Comment: Excellent initiative. We must deal with the Dark Quad or CRInK. Tell me Congress wants a political warfare strategy without saying political warfare.
Here is the link to the complete text of the draft bill: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/5912/text
Here are a few proposals that support this effort.
An American Way of Political Warfare: A Proposal
Charles T. Cleveland, Ryan C. Crocker, Daniel Egel, Andrew Liepman, David Maxwell
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE304.html
A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32
David Maxwell
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/26/a-modern-national-security-decision-directive/
Seizing the Initiative in the Gray Zone: The Case for a US Office of Strategic Disruption
David Maxwell
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/seizing-the-initiative-in-the-gray-zone-the-case-for-a-us-office-of-strategic-disruption/
America Needs a New National Strategy for Irregular Warfare
David Maxwell
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/america-needs-a-new-national-strategy-for-irregular-warfare/
Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea
David Maxwell
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/developing-an-irregular-warfare-campaign-for-north-korea/
Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries
Experts have warned that authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are working more closely on activities to defy America.
By
Brandi Vincent
November 7, 2025
https://defensescoop.com/2025/11/07/congress-disrupt-act-china-russia-iran-north-korea/
The U.S. Capitol Building is seen at sunset on June 18, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Kevin Carter/Getty Images)
Lawmakers in both congressional chambers are calling for the creation of a new whole-of-government plan to confront emerging national security threats associated with expanding cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — and to ultimately help ensure the U.S. is prepared to counter concurrent challenges from multiple adversaries in the years to come.
Introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, D-Ill., this week, the Defending International Security by Restricting Unlawful Partnerships and Tactics (DISRUPT) Act lays out a plan for multiple federal agencies to collectively disturb and derail some of the most concerning aspects of that adversarial collaboration.
The House version of the DISRUPT Act was co-sponsored by Guam Del. James Moylan, a Republican. Similar legislation was also previously proposed in the Senate by Sens. Chris Coons, D-Del., and David McCormick, R-Pa., and is attached to the draft version of the fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act.
“The bill was introduced to demonstrate bipartisan, bicameral support in the House as it continues to move through the NDAA process,” a spokesperson for the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party told DefenseScoop.
Experts have warned in recent years that authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are working together more closely on activities to defy the U.S., including via weapons and munitions transfers, sharing other military and dual-use technologies, launching disinformation campaigns, and coordinating operations that could undermine the interests of America and its allies.
The nearly 20-page DISRUPT Act spotlights a range of recent partnerships and actions the four nations have pursued with one or more of the others, which lawmakers believe could present risks to U.S. interests.
For instance, their mutual efforts increase “the chances of United States conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United States will have to contend with simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or more theaters,” the bill states.
If passed, the legislation would require the secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce and the Treasury, as well as the directors of National Intelligence and the CIA, to set up task forces to investigate and address this “adversary alignment.”
The bill would also direct the director of National Intelligence to issue a report on the trajectory of the nations’ alignment across the diplomatic, information, military and economic spheres.
That report would include an assessment of “the risk of technology transfers dramatically increasing the military capabilities of adversaries of the [U.S.] and the impact on the relative balance of [U.S] and allied capabilities as compared to that of the adversary.”
Further, leaders in the specific agencies called out would also be mandated to produce a comprehensive and coordinated government strategy to “disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare for adversary cooperation during the two-year period beginning on the date of the” bill’s enactment.
Notably, Congress also wants a “plan for digitizing and updating war-planning tools of the Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date on which the report is submitted to ensure that United States war planners are better equipped to update and modify war plans in the face of rapidly evolving information on adversary cooperation.”
Following its introduction, Krishnamoorthi’s bill was referred to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select).
Written by Brandi Vincent
Brandi Vincent is a Senior Reporter at DefenseScoop, where she reports on disruptive technologies and associated policies impacting Pentagon and military personnel. Prior to joining SNG, she produced a documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. Brandi grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland. She was named Best New Journalist at the 2024 Defence Media Awards.
6. How South Korea Can Help the U.S. Navy Stay Afloat in the Pacific
Summary:
Facing shipyard delays and maintenance backlogs, the U.S. Navy risks reduced readiness in the Indo-Pacific. To address this, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth plans to expand repair and overhaul work in South Korean shipyards. South Korea’s advanced maritime industry offers the infrastructure, workforce, and proximity the U.S. lacks, improving fleet availability and deterrence. Despite challenges like protecting sensitive technologies and logistics, cooperation provides mutual strategic benefits and strengthens the alliance and offers a near-term fix while the U.S. modernizes its shipbuilding base for long-term naval sustainability and Pacific operational readiness.
Comment: MASGA - Make American Shipbuilding Great Again and Make American Navy Ship Repair and Maintenance Great Again.
How South Korea Can Help the U.S. Navy Stay Afloat in the Pacific
Jeff Kucik
November 12, 2025
warontherocks.com · November 12, 2025
https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/how-south-korea-can-help-the-u-s-navy-stay-afloat-in-the-pacific/
Can America deter China if its warships are stuck in port? Probably not. And the problem is made worse by chronic shipbuilding delays. This means the U.S. Navy is forced to rely more heavily on its legacy fleet, which requires more maintenance. And neither the Navy’s domestic shipyards nor its overseas facilities can meet current demand. Without immediate action, the Navy risks missing force design and operational readiness goals in critical regions like the Indo-Pacific.
Aware of the risk, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently announced plans to expand maintenance, repair, and overhaul activities in South Korean shipyards. From a purely economic point of view, South Korea has exactly what the United States lacks: the infrastructure, industrial capacity, and skilled labor to help sustain its navy’s ships. But more than that, partnering with South Korea makes good strategic sense, strengthening a key alliance that offers forward support for operations in the Western Pacific.
Taking full advantage of this partnership will mean overcoming several political and logistical barriers, but the operational benefits will be worth the effort.
BECOME A MEMBER
Need for Foreign Partners Starts at Home
Although the Navy already utilizes several overseas facilities, including the regional maintenance centers in Japan, it still struggles to meet maintenance and repair schedules. Delays affect almost every major vessel class, leaving ships sitting longer in port — sometimes for years — or having to defer repairs due to expanding backlogs. While ships spend fewer hours at sea, costs continue to rise. Deferred repair costs hovered around $2 billion in recent years, almost enough to buy a new guided missile destroyer.
The high price of getting ships back on schedule has started affecting decommissioning schedules. A dozen Arleigh Burke-class destroyers saw their service lives extended in 2024. Those ships still in good condition are increasingly valuable as many of their peer vessels are deteriorating. While destroyers are seeing service life extensions, other ship classes, including amphibious warships, face early decommissioning due to resource-intensive repairs they need.
Delays and cost overruns stem from aging shipyards as well as shortages of critical parts and skilled labor. Many facilities need capital improvements, and efforts to modernize out-of-date infrastructure have progressed slowly. Parts shortages add to the bottleneck as supply chains, which the United States has tried to keep in house, remain too dependent on single-source suppliers. And difficulties recruiting and retaining workers persist amid perceptions of low wages and unattractive working conditions.
The numbers are not all bad. The Navy is now aiming for a 71 percent on-time completion rate, a significant improvement from past years. Perhaps just as importantly, there is plenty of political will to address the problem. The Trump administration has made shipbuilding a core priority, injecting U.S. money into the industry and securing investment from abroad. The recent deals with Japan and South Korea both promise hundreds of billions in commitments to revitalize U.S. shipbuilding, including Hanwha putting $5 billion into the Philly Shipyard. Those are commercial investments but likely have dual-use benefits.
But improving the maritime industrial base — and seeing results — will take time. Modernizing infrastructure, training workers, and structuring supply chains are all multi-year processes. Even the Shipyard Infrastructure Optimization Program, the Navy’s long-term plan for domestic modernization, is structured as a 20-year effort. Given the current geopolitical environment, the Navy must implement decisive interim measures to address the immediate readiness gap, making the integration of high-capacity allied shipyards a logistical necessity.
The Economic Case for South Korea
Allies and partners have untapped capacity that can help with U.S. Navy readiness, particularly in the Indo-Pacific where trade-dependent economies boast the maritime infrastructure and capacity to support ship repair. The U.S. government’s data on foreign ports show that over 100 sites across the Indo-Pacific have berths large enough fit an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer. And many of those sites have the physical infrastructure the Department of Defense requires to support various types of ship sustainment, including pier-side cranes, electrical repair services, and warehousing.
By some measures, the United States has underutilized the capacity allies and partners have to offer, with most activity confined to the Navy’s regional maintenance operations in Sasebo and Yokosuka. Those sites help support the 7th Fleet’s readiness through intermediate and depot level maintenance. Involvement with other countries has been more limited, but South Korean firms recently completed maintenance and repair operations on Military Sealift Command ships.
Taking fuller advantage of South Korea’s maritime infrastructure and know-how to repair surface combatants is the next logical step. South Korea has one of the world’s most efficient, advanced shipbuilding industries. Korean shipyards — including those operated by major conglomerates like Hanwha Ocean, Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Samsung Heavy Industries — possess large-scale, modern dry docks and expansive support facilities built for high-volume commercial production. These infrastructural assets and their associated management expertise can support Navy repair tasks. Labor shortages have been an issue in Korean industry, just like in the United States, but started rebounding in 2024. This industrial scale promises to absorb the backlog of U.S. surface combatants, especially destroyers and amphibious ships, freeing up strained domestic private yards to focus on more complex, U.S.-specific work.
Having the physical capacity to repair ships is just the first step. Securing Navy contracts also requires that foreign firms get the relevant certifications, such as master ship repair agreements and/or agreements for boat repair. These are formal application processes during which firms demonstrate the training and experience to perform a robust set of maintenance and repair tasks like sheet metal work, electrical repair, and more. Hanwha Ocean and Hyundai Heavy Industries already have these certifications, signaling their interest — and capacity — to do more work for the Navy.
Strategic Incentives
Apart from a globally competitive shipbuilding industry, South Korea has something else the US doesn’t — its location. The Navy’s primary strategic challenge in the coming decades is the tyranny of distance. Even if the U.S. industrial base could support all the Navy’s needs, it doesn’t get U.S. ships any closer to their areas of operation. And every day a ship spends transiting back to Pearl Harbor, Puget Sound, or San Diego is a day it is unavailable for deterrence or conflict.
Consider a destroyer based in Japan. If that ship enters a maintenance availability in San Diego or Hawaii, it is out of the fight for the repair time plus weeks of transit time across thousands of miles. If that same destroyer can receive its intermediate- or depot-level maintenance in a fully functional South Korean facility, the time saved in transit is instantly converted into operational time in the critical theaters of the Western Pacific and the South China Sea. This geographical advantage is not merely about convenience. It is about deterrence. Our ability to project power in the Indo-Pacific is directly proportional to the number of high-end combatants we can maintain on station.
Working with allies and partners is also a way to promote logistical resilience. In the same way the Trump administration wants strong critical supply chains, diversifying maintenance and repair operations means the Navy is less dependent on any given facility. Should domestic (or foreign) shipyards be attacked or otherwise disrupted — which is a real possibility in a major conflict — the Navy will have built-in redundancies across allied nations. This is especially important given that, while China has significantly expanded its ownership of foreign ports, the United States lags in comparison.
All of that is just about what the United States gets out of the deal. Working closer with South Korea generates mutual benefits by locking in security cooperation and fueling a crucial ally’s industry. Increased revenue helps South Korea maintain a robust, competitive industry that will assist both countries moving forward. And a stronger Korean industry is in both countries’ shared interests.
Challenges Remain
Utilizing foreign repair facilities is not cost-free. Relying on foreign partners introduces some security risks and logistical challenges. It also runs up against policy barriers that need to be addressed to take full advantage of a partnership with South Korea.
The first and perhaps largest challenge remains the protection of classified systems and sensitive technology present on Navy vessels. One reason the Navy doesn’t already do more overseas is the government’s strong preference for keeping parts and labor within the United States, which supports domestic industry while avoiding the complications of sharing sensitive technologies. We’ve already seen classification issues and other security barriers arise under the Australia – United Kingdom – United States agreement. Even seemingly menial tasks on highly advanced ships like destroyers could require access to sensitive systems or areas of the vessel. As a result, the Navy must determine how much to restrict access to U.S. vessels.
One possible solution is limiting Korean workers to non-sensitive tasks focused on hull, mechanical, and electrical work. But this approach would leave some of South Korea’s capacity on the table. Instead, as it has done under AUKUS, the United States may wish to loosen the restraints on sharing technology as well as utilizing foreign labor. The groundwork is already laid: South Korea builds and operates vessels with highly restricted technologies like the Aegis Combat System, the guided missile system that supports missions like ballistic missile defense and strike capabilities. The United States has shared this technology with relatively few countries, but Korea and Japan both utilize Aegis in their current fleet. From that point of view, taking further steps to enable maintenance and repair are not out of step with existing security cooperation efforts.
Second, the U.S. maritime industrial base already suffers from parts and supplies shortages. It is not optimized for material delivery to a forward maintenance hub in Korea. America’s preference for using its own materials and components exacerbates the logistical issues of getting a part from an assembly line in the continental United States to a shipyard in South Korea.
Overcoming this problem means increasing America’s willingness to source parts in South Korea, which makes the most logistical sense and takes fullest advantage of the world’s second largest shipbuilding industry. That may mean co-producing parts with U.S. firms who license designs, or it may mean the Navy starts stockpiling parts near the chosen Korean facilities for future needs. If the point of working with South Korea is to have repair capacity in a Western Pacific contingency, then stockpiling should happen now, especially for long lead-time U.S.-manufactured components. The alternative is streamlining the procurement path and ensuring parts are available locally, rather than relying on delayed shipment from the United States.
Third, and not least, there may be some concern in the United States that the deal with South Korea sounds a bit too much like outsourcing, especially at a time when the last two White Houses have been so focused on onshoring critical manufacturing. But working with allies and partners is not zero-sum, and current backlogs indicate there is plenty of work to go around.
To bring U.S. industry on board, the Navy must clearly articulate that this arrangement is an effort to triage the current backlog — and invest in future security — rather than a fundamental shift away from American vendors. Those investments in the U.S. industrial base, some of which are being made by South Korea, are still critical to modernizing infrastructure and building productivity capacity in the United States. If strictly necessary, repair contracts for Korean firms can include sunset clauses tied to appreciable increases in U.S. capacity.
Moving Forward
The decision to utilize South Korean shipyards for U.S. Navy surface combatant maintenance is a pragmatic response to a growing operational challenge. It means coming to terms with some market realities. The United States doesn’t have the industrial base it needs to support the Navy’s readiness goals. Foreign partnerships provide the necessary time and stability for the U.S. government and industry to execute the long-term, multi-decade modernization of its own industrial infrastructure. But even if the United States did have enough capacity to keep things in house, it would still be a bad idea. Cooperation with allies, including countries with advanced capabilities in critical industries, is still a strategic imperative. By leveraging allied expertise, the Navy immediately gains increased fleet availability — and enhanced forward deterrence in the critical Indo-Pacific theater.
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Jeff Kucik is a research scientist at CNA and a fellow at New York University’s Wahba Initiative for Strategic Competition.
**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.
Image: Grady Fontana via DVIDS
warontherocks.com · November 12, 2025
7. Lee wishes good luck to applicants of college entrance exam
Comment: Few countries put as much emphasis on national testing of their students as South Korea.
Lee wishes good luck to applicants of college entrance exam | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 12, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251112009700315
SEOUL, Nov. 12 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Wednesday wished good luck to applicants taking the college entrance exam, a high-stakes test taken annually by high school students and graduates.
Lee posted the Facebook message on the eve of the annual College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT), which is regarded as one of the nation's most important academic events.
"I wish luck for all of you who possess infinite potential," Lee wrote. "I am proud of each of you who have believed in yourselves and walked this path with perseverance and courage. I wholeheartedly support each of your dreams."
While acknowledging the importance of the exam, Lee stressed that it is by no means everything in life, urging students to continue pursuing their goals with perseverance and confidence.
A total of 554,174 people applied for this year's CSAT, the highest total number of applicants in seven years, according to the education ministry.
President Lee Jae Myung addresses a meeting at the former presidential compound of Cheong Wa Dae in Seoul on Nov. 12, 2025, to give mayors, county chiefs and ward chiefs nationwide a presentation on government policies. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 12, 2025
8. Memorial foundation launched to honor U.N. forces who fought in Korean War
Comment: And few countries are as grateful to foreign veterans who helped defend their freedom than South Korea. And Korea goes to great lengths to continue to honor them.
Memorial foundation launched to honor U.N. forces who fought in Korean War | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · November 12, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251112005700315
SEOUL, Nov. 12 (Yonhap) -- A foundation has been launched to honor tens of thousands of United Nations forces who fought for South Korea in the 1950-53 Korean War, officials said Wednesday.
As its first commemorative project following its launch Tuesday, the foundation plans to erect a memorial wall bearing the names of about 40,000 U.N. forces who served in the civil war, through fundraising from government, corporate and individual donors
It will also seek to install sculptures depicting combat troops from 16 participating countries, as well as those from six U.S. military units, under the title "U.N. forces on Korean battlefields."
Envisioned projects also include the creation of a commemorative park in central Seoul to enhance public access.
The Korean War ended in a truce, not a peace treaty, leaving the two Koreas technically still at war. Nearly 180,000 South Korean and U.N. Command troops were killed during the war, including 36,940 Americans.
Sixteen countries provided combat troops to fight on the South's side, including Canada, France, New Zealand, Turkey, Thailand and Ethiopia.
The Korean War U.N. Veterans Memorial foundation holds its inauguration ceremony on Nov. 11, 2025, in this photo provided by the foundation. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
sookim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Hyun-soo · November 12, 2025
9. Canadian arctic patrol ship monitors North Korea smuggling for 2nd time in month
Comment: Despite PRC and Russia pushback on UN sanctions it is good to see this international cooperation to try to enforce them and maintain pressure on the regime.
Canadian arctic patrol ship monitors North Korea smuggling for 2nd time in month
Operation based out of Japan aimed to document DPRK ship-to-ship transfers in violation of UN sanctions
Shreyas Reddy November 12, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/11/canadian-arctic-patrol-ship-monitors-north-korea-smuggling-for-2nd-time-in-month/
The Canadian arctic offshore patrol vessel HMCS Max Bernays | Image: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Nov. 11, 2025)
A Canadian arctic patrol vessel recently completed its second mission in a month to monitor North Korean maritime smuggling in violation of U.N. sanctions, Japan’s foreign ministry announced Tuesday.
The Royal Canadian Navy’s HMCS Max Bernays conducted surveillance activities in the waters around Japan in early November, targeting the DPRK’s illegal ship-to-ship transfers, the ministry said in a press release.
Japan welcomed the ship’s visit as part of international efforts to implement U.N. Security Council resolutions on Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program, adding that it has been conducting its own monitoring activities and sharing information with other countries.
The offshore patrol vessel’s operation marks the 14th time since 2018 that the Royal Canadian Navy has participated in activities to monitor North Korea’s maritime sanctions violations, and the ship’s second visit in a little over a month.
The Max Bernays last carried out surveillance of North Korean ship-to-ship transfers in mid to late September, coinciding with the Royal Canadian Air Force’s deployment of a CP-140 long-range patrol aircraft. The ship subsequently participated in multiple Indo-Pacific maritime exercises in October.
It is unclear why the arctic patrol vessel returned to Japan just a month after the last visit, with neither Canada nor Japan having released details of the ship’s findings last month.
Under Operation NEON, Ottawa’s contribution to multilateral DPRK sanctions monitoring efforts, Canada has joined other countries since 2018 in deploying aircraft and ships to monitor North Korea’s maritime transfers, which are prohibited under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2375 adopted in Sept. 2017.
The findings from monitoring missions formerly featured in U.N. Panel of Experts reports on North Korean sanctions violations, and are reported to the U.N.’s Enforcement Coordination Cell overseeing DPRK sanctions.
However, they have not been openly promoted since Russia vetoed the Panel’s mandate last year, and maritime surveillance findings have also not appeared in the first two reports by the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team set up to replace the Panel.
The U.N. measures seek to block transfers of prohibited goods, such as coal and oil, beyond U.N.-designated limits, which Pyongyang relies on heavily to acquire funds as well as materials supporting its nuclear development.
North Korea consistently rejects U.N. restrictions as a U.S.-led initiative infringing on its sovereignty and frequently condemns sanctions monitoring visits.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. ASML completes construction of chip equipment plant in S. Korea
Comment: The 21st Century "Acheson line" is now a "Chip line" and runs from the Netherlands through the US to Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
(LEAD) ASML completes construction of chip equipment plant in S. Korea | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · November 12, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251112002551320
(ATTN: ADDS more info in last 3 paras, new photo)
SEOUL, Nov. 12 (Yonhap) -- ASML, a Netherlands-based semiconductor equipment manufacturer, completed construction of a manufacturing plant in South Korea, which is expected to serve as a cooperation hub for the Dutch company and Korean chipmakers, the industry ministry said Wednesday.
The completion ceremony of the 16,000-square-meter cluster, named the New Campus, was held in Hwaseong, a major semiconductor hub located about 50 kilometers south of Seoul, according to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources.
The ministry said ASML's Hwaseong campus will serve as one of the company's key manufacturing hubs in Asia, while helping Korea strengthen its supply chains for the semiconductor industry.
The company also plans to expand its technology exchanges and cooperation with Korean chipmakers, such as Samsung Electronics Co. and SK hynix Inc., it added.
ASML is the world's largest manufacturer of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography system, a highly advanced machine used in semiconductor manufacturing to print small circuit patterns onto silicon wafers.
The company's plant here will house the so-called repair center, which remanufactures key equipment, such as EUV and deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography systems, as well as a training center dedicated to transferring advanced technologies.
"The advancement of Korea's semiconductor industry depends on close cooperation with municipal and central governments, and international partners," said Kang Gam-chan, deputy minister for trade and investment at the ministry.
"Today's completion ceremony is a great example of such collaboration and I hope to see even stronger technological cooperation and investment between Korea and the Netherlands in the semiconductor field going forward," he added, vowing efforts to attract more foreign investment to Korea.
This photo provided by the government of Gyeonggi Province shows the groundbreaking ceremony of ASML's chip equipment manufacturing plant in Hwaseong, about 50 kilometers south of Seoul, held on Nov. 16, 2022. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
The company said about 1,500 employees of ASML Korea, currently working at different offices around Hwaseong, will relocate to the new campus by the end of this year.
As part of its plan to strengthen cooperation with Korean chipmakers, ASML also aims to build a cooperative ecosystem with Korean materials, components and equipment companies.
ASML Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Christophe Fouquet met with SK hynix CEO Kwak Noh-jung the previous day and also reportedly met Jun Young-hyun, head of Samsung Electronics' chip division, on Wednesday to discuss ways to expand collaboration.
Officials from the South Korean government and ASML pose for a photo during a groundbreaking ceremony of ASML's chip equipment manufacturing plant in Hwaseong, about 50 kilometers south of Seoul, on Nov. 12, 2025, in this photo provided by ASML. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
nyway@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Boram · November 12, 2025
11. South Korea's Nuclear Submarine Ambitions Face Four Key Hurdles
Comment: A concise list and description of the main issues.
South Korea's Nuclear Submarine Ambitions Face Four Key Hurdles
[Chosun Column] U.S. nonproliferation, tech secrecy, operational limits, alliance uncertainty challenge nuclear-powered submarine project
By Lee Yong-joon, Chairman of the Sejong Institute and former North Korea Nuclear Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Published 2025.11.11. 23:56
Updated 2025.11.12. 11:31https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2025/11/11/46JUEHMTHFBMRKZNZ4ZPIW73N4/
The US Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarine 'Illinois' under construction at a shipyard in Groton, Connecticut, US in 2015. President Trump says, 'The South Korean nuclear-powered submarine is to be built at the Philadelphia, Philly shipyard,' and 'the US shipbuilding industry is set to experience a major revival.' /AP-Yonhap
Today, approximately 130 nuclear-powered submarines are in operation worldwide, distributed among the United States (66), Russia (31), China (12), the United Kingdom (10), France (9), and India (2). These are categorized into nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs). SSBNs are designed to hide strategic nuclear weapons at great depths to preserve retaliatory strike capabilities in the event of a preemptive nuclear attack by an adversary. These large submarines, functioning as underwater nuclear weapon storage facilities, are referred to as SSBNs.
In contrast, SSNs do not carry nuclear weapons and are instead deployed to monitor, pursue, and destroy enemy submarines or warships. While SSNs are significantly more expensive than diesel submarines and generate louder reactor noise, they are twice as fast when submerged and capable of continuous underwater operations for months, making them highly suitable for long-range maritime missions. The nuclear-powered submarines the U.S. agreed to supply to Australia, an AUKUS member, in 2021 are of this type, and South Korea is also seeking the same class.
Following the recent South Korea-U.S. summit, the issue of South Korea acquiring nuclear-powered submarines has surged to the forefront of public interest. In response to South Korea’s request for nuclear fuel for submarine use, President Trump proposed a plan to construct the submarines domestically in the U.S. While the U.S. has given its principled approval, allowing the project to gain momentum, it is premature to celebrate, as significant hurdles remain. Considering that the U.S. presidency will likely change at least two to three times before the project’s final realization, this becomes even more apparent. Below are four major obstacles that could arise during the process.
The first obstacle stems from U.S. nonproliferation policies. All nuclear power plants and reactors worldwide undergo IAEA inspections at least once to twelve times annually and are monitored in real time by IAEA cameras 24/7. However, submarine reactors, being military nuclear facilities, fall outside the IAEA’s jurisdiction and are physically impossible to monitor. Consequently, current or future U.S. administrations or Congress could oppose South Korea’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines due to concerns over potential nuclear armament. Preparations for such scenarios are necessary.
The second obstacle relates to U.S. military technology protection. Submarine reactors differ fundamentally from civilian reactors or small modular reactors (SMRs) due to their military weapon characteristics. While civilian reactors operate with low-enriched uranium (under 5%), U.S. nuclear submarines use weapon-grade uranium enriched over 90%, and Russian submarines use uranium enriched between 20–50%. Additionally, unlike civilian reactors, which require frequent fuel replacement, submarine nuclear fuel lasts over 20 years, matching the vessel’s lifespan. The U.S. has never shared its nuclear submarine propulsion technology with any country except the U.K. in the 1950s, and reports indicate reluctance even toward providing it to Australia. For South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine project, the risk of technology leakage to China or North Korea will be a critical consideration.
The third obstacle involves operational constraints. If South Korea acquires nuclear-powered submarines, a clear strategic blueprint is needed to justify the high cost of these assets. Deploying them to the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, or near Chinese waters for anti-China operations or surveillance of the Chinese fleet could provoke significant conflict with Beijing. However, restricting them to the Korean Peninsula to monitor North Korea’s 70-odd submarines would be highly inefficient and uneconomical. In such a case, mass-producing advanced AIP diesel submarines capable of one-month submerged operations and deploying unmanned underwater vehicles and sensors across the peninsula would be far more effective.
The fourth obstacle is uncertainty regarding the future of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. The U.S. decided to provide nuclear-powered submarine technology to Australia because it recognizes the country as a critical ally for maritime operations against China. The U.S. is likely to apply similar criteria when evaluating South Korea’s project. Therefore, a robust and trustworthy alliance between the two nations will be a prerequisite not only for finalizing agreements on submarine construction but also for ensuring continued U.S. support from future administrations over the next decade and securing post-completion maintenance and repair assistance.
12. U.S. Think Tank Report: KFTC Targets U.S. Firms, Overlooks Chinese
Summary:
A National Bureau of Asian Research report accuses South Korea’s Fair Trade Commission of targeting U.S. tech firms while overlooking Chinese competitors. It cites politically driven investigations, aggressive raids, and biased regulations as protectionist non-tariff barriers. The findings, shared with USTR and DOJ, could escalate U.S.–ROK trade tensions under President Lee’s tougher competition policies.
Comment: The obvious question: Why does it appear that China gets favorable treatment? Recall 2017 Chinese economic warfare against the South.
U.S. Think Tank Report: KFTC Targets U.S. Firms, Overlooks Chinese
National Bureau of Asian Research urges reassessment of KFTC's protectionist policies amid U.S.-South Korea trade tensions
By Kim Eun-joong
Published 2025.11.12. 19:31
Updated 2025.11.12. 19:38https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/11/12/MVUJSEEG5NBDLJQATPRGSJ5NMA/
Fair Trade Commission Chairman Ju Biung-ghi attends the National Assembly's Legislative Judiciary Committee and speaks in October. /News1
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR), a Washington, D.C.-based think tank, stated on the 12th, “The Korea Fair Trade Commission’s (KFTC) enforcement of competition policy is widely perceived as having a broadly protectionist character and does not align with global best practices.” It added, “While the competition authority’s legal enforcement may appear normal domestically, it is unpredictable, politicized, and raises concerns about a regulatory environment skewed in favor of domestic companies.” U.S. companies operating in the South Korean market cited issues such as overly aggressive investigative practices, lack of procedural legitimacy, and business damages caused by prolonged investigations. The NBR noted, “Considering bipartisan concerns in Congress and the Trump administration’s focus on non-tariff barriers, the findings were also explained to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).”
The NBR published a report titled *‘The Impact of the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC)’s Policy Enforcement on U.S. Companies: Qualitative Evidence and Analysis’* authored by Nigel Cory, a non-resident fellow. Following the Trump administration’s inauguration, digital barriers—such as regulations targeting U.S. big tech firms—have emerged as key issues in U.S.-South Korea trade negotiations. The report stated, “Compared to regulatory agencies in the European Union (EU) and other major economies, the KFTC’s enforcement actions against U.S. companies stand out in scale and nature.” It warned, “Targeted or politically motivated measures by the authorities undermine the rule of law, distort markets, and hinder innovation and economic growth.”
U.S. companies, which requested anonymity due to concerns about disadvantages, highlighted the KFTC’s investigative practices in multiple interviews with the NBR. They criticized “low thresholds for initiating investigations, unnecessarily aggressive tactics and raids, and excessively broad requests for information and data seizures.” They particularly objected to practices such as ‘voluntary submissions’—which effectively function without warrants—‘dawn raids,’ and ‘hostile interrogations.’ Regarding the proposed ‘Platform Fair Competition Promotion Act,’ which regulates unfair trade practices by large online platforms, the report noted, “Even though South Korean authorities have repeatedly explained the bill’s intent to lawmakers, its enactment could further increase the frequency and intensity of oversight on U.S. companies.” It added, “This underscores the critical need to reassess the KFTC’s approach.”
USTR Representative Jamieson Greer interviews with our newspaper at an office in Washington DC in May last year. /Courtesy of Kim Eun-jung
The NBR also noted, “Concerns are growing that the KFTC targets U.S. companies more than Chinese or South Korean firms in similar situations,” adding, “Chinese competitors operating in South Korea are overlooked regardless of their relative market share.” Jamieson Greer, USTR representative, expressed negative views in a previous interview with this newspaper regarding South Korea’s platform law, stating, “The law targets U.S. companies like Apple and Google while leaving Chinese firms untouched.” He warned, “The U.S. will continue to get along with South Korea, but if the price for tolerating massive trade deficits is harsh discrimination against our platform companies, it paints a terrible picture.” The NBR emphasized, “President Lee Jae-myung has expressed intent to enforce aggressive competition policies, and newly appointed Chairman Ju Biung-ghi has vowed to align the KFTC’s enforcement with political signals,” concluding, “Investigations against U.S. companies are almost certain to intensify.”
Notably, the NBR shared its findings with the USTR and DOJ. Amid extensive lobbying by big tech firms operating in South Korea, the reported ‘unfair and skewed competition policy enforcement’ could become another issue escalating trade pressure. The report suggested, “The KFTC’s measures function as clear non-tariff barriers to protect South Korean companies.” It urged, “As the Trump administration and U.S. Congress remain focused on non-tariff trade barriers, the concerns raised by the interviewed companies must remain a policy priority.”
13. Russian, North Korean media ink deal on ‘objective coverage’ of bilateral ties
Comment: I am sure it will include sharing of best practices in propaganda and how to undermine the ROK and the US with malign influence.
Russian, North Korean media ink deal on ‘objective coverage’ of bilateral ties
Agreements on mass media cooperation point to efforts to align messaging amid deepening cooperation over Ukraine war
Anton Sokolin November 12, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/11/russian-north-korean-media-ink-deal-on-objective-coverage-of-bilateral-ties/
A North Korean man reads a newspaper in the Pyongyang subway. | Image: NK News (Jan. 2018)
A sanctioned Russian state-run media group inked a cooperation deal with North Korea’s state news agency in Pyongyang on Tuesday, as the two allies push to align their messaging amid deepening military ties.
Information sharing and joint initiatives are at the core of the newly reached agreement between Rossiya Segodnya and the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the Russian media group stated in a press release.
The two sides plan to pursue projects “aimed at promoting objective, professional media coverage of developments in the cultural, humanitarian, economic and political spheres,” the readout added.
Rossiya Segodnya Deputy Editor-in-Chief Sergei Kochetkov and KCNA Deputy Chief Pak Kang Ho sealed the deal during talks in Pyongyang. KCNA previously reported that the Russian delegation arrived on Monday.
While Rossiya Segodnya describes itself as a news organization providing “prompt, balanced coverage of world events,” it has been widely criticized for heavily skewed reporting that aligns with the Kremlin’s agenda.
As the parent company of outlets such as RIA Novosti, Sputnik and RT, the media group has faced wide-ranging international sanctions since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine for allegedly spreading disinformation in America, Europe and Africa.
The U.S. sanctioned Rossiya Segodnya, its head Dmitry Kiselev, and Margarita Simonyan, a high-profile Kremlin ally who serves as the media group’s editor-in-chief and head of RT, in Sept. 2024.
The deal between the two outlets came as Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development overseeing mass media affairs also signed another cooperation agreement with the DPRK’s Information Committee in Moscow, according to the Russian Embassy in Pyongyang.
“The agreement opens new prospects for expanding Russia-DPRK partnership and lays the groundwork for deeper, mutually beneficial cooperation,” the diplomatic mission stated.
The new deal covers information sharing between “state and private news services,” organizing mutual broadcasts and exchanging publications in order to boost “information ties between the two countries,” according to the embassy.
The Russian ministry signed a similar agreement with Pyongyang on cooperation in communications, IT and digital development in Oct. 2024.
Chris Monday, a Russia researcher at Dongseo University, said the new agreements show the “North Korean-Russian military partnership is increasing.”
“For Russia, it’s not enough to conquer enemy territory; the key is to explain to the world why this matters,” the expert told NK News.
Monday pointed to shortcomings in Russian propaganda about North Korea’s troop deployments to Kursk, which the allies did not acknowledge even as Ukraine publicized details to rally international support.
He also noted that DPRK’s reporting on the Ukraine war has often highlighted the valor of North Korean forces while downplaying Moscow’s military actions, suggesting this betrayed tensions.
“DPRK propaganda is mainly aimed at an internal audience, while Russian propaganda is tuned to influence international opinion,” Monday said. “As Kim Jong Un enters the world stage, he will need Russia’s help in managing the narrative.”
Allowing Russian media to set up bureaus in Pyongyang could be one way to achieve that goal while improving oversight of reporting on topics “sensitive” to the regime, the expert added.
A delegation from Russia’s state-run TASS News Agency previously visited Pyongyang at the invitation of KCNA in August as part of efforts to boost cooperation.
TASS maintained a bureau in Pyongyang until mid-2020, when it pulled out its correspondent during a mass exodus of foreigners due to pandemic controls. So far, only Chinese reporters from the People’s Daily and China Media Group have returned to Pyongyang.
Edited by Bryan Betts
14. Hundreds of Korean workers detained in Georgia to file lawsuit against ICE
Comment: The Great ICE Raid Debacle in Georgia is the gift that keeps on giving.
Hundreds of Korean workers detained in Georgia to file lawsuit against ICE - The Korea Times
The Korea Times · ListenListenText SizePrint
By Anna J. Park
- Published Nov 12, 2025 3:28 pm KST
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20251112/hundreds-of-korean-workers-detained-in-georgia-to-file-lawsuit-against-ice
Hundreds of Korean engineers who were arrested and detained during an immigration raid at a Hyundai-LG Energy Solution battery plant in Georgia in September are preparing to sue U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), alleging unlawful detention and mistreatment.
According to industry sources and a report by ABC News earlier this week, roughly 200 of those detained in the weeklong ordeal are preparing to file a lawsuit against ICE, alleging racial discrimination, human rights violations and excessive use of force during their arrests and detention. They are seeking compensation for damages.
The group was among roughly 317 Korean workers out of 475 people arrested by ICE agents in a surprise raid on Sept. 4 (local time), an operation that officials said was targeting undocumented workers.
However, many of those detained — most of whom are skilled engineers — held valid work visas and were legally employed at the nearly 3,000-acre electric-vehicle battery plant in Georgia.
“To this day, we still don’t know why we were detained like that. There has been no apology or explanation from the authorities,” said Kim, one of the detained workers who spoke to ABC News on condition of anonymity. He added that this was one of the main reasons he decided to join the lawsuit.
Korean engineers who had been detained in Georgia by U.S. immigration authorities are seen leaving the arrival hall of Terminal 2 at Incheon International Airport in Incheon, Sept. 12. Korea Times photo by Choi Joo-yeon
Kim described how the detainees were transported to the ICE detention facility in Folkston, Georgia, where they were confined for seven days. He recounted that the experience was both terrifying and humiliating.
"The agents confiscated our phones and shackled us around the wrists, ankles and chest. Being confined in a space controlled by armed personnel, unable to see what was happening ahead or behind, with no explanations; it was terrifying. I felt utterly powerless," he said. "We were treated like dangerous fugitives, not engineers."
Kim added that during the weeklong stay at the detention center, they were "completely cut off from the outside world and had no understanding of what was going on."
Inside the facility, conditions were described as harsh and degrading. Detainees were packed into rooms with 60 to 80 people each, sleeping on moldy mattresses and drinking foul-smelling water.
“The toilets had no privacy,” Kim recalled. “The place was cold and unsanitary — we felt like criminals even though we had done nothing wrong.”
Many also reported being subjected to racial taunts and ridicule from some guards. “They made comments about North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and even pulled their eyes sideways to mock Asians,” Kim told ABC News.
The Korean detainees were eventually released on Sept. 11 without any charges against them, but many say the psychological scars remain.
“We were detained for seven days with no clear reason. ... All we want now is for the record to be corrected and the truth to be known," Kim emphasized.
Companies employing the detained workers, including LG Energy Solution and Hyundai Engineering, said that they are not involved in the matter, as "the lawsuit is being pursued on an individual basis."
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