Quotes of the Day:

"A book must be the axe for the frozen sea within us."

– Franz Kafka

"Truth emerges from the clash of adverse ideas."

– John Stuart Mill

"It's a universal law – intolerance is the first sign of an inadequate education."

– Aleksandr I. Solzhenistsyn

1. Happy Veteran’s Day from Small Wars Journal

2. What the Looming Fall of a Ukrainian City Says About Putin’s War

3. SOF News: Drone News Weekly Update – Nov 12, 2025

4. Inside the CIA’s secret mission to sabotage Afghanistan’s opium

5. America’s Chip Restrictions Are Biting in China

6. The AI Boom Is Looking More and More Fragile

7. Arrival of U.S.’s Largest Warship Ratchets Up Pressure on Venezuela

8. Microinsurgency: Introducing and Defining a Distinct Category of Intrastate Conflict

9. Pentagon sends ground forces to train in Panama’s jungle for first time in decades

10. Communist China has never been a peace-loving country

11. Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On

12. Modelling of Taiwan war shows US could recruit Australia, Japan for sanctions

13. Exclusive: FBI chief visited China to talk fentanyl, law enforcement, sources say

14. Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries

15. US Withdraws from its UN Human Rights Review16. 

16. Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas

17. EXCLUSIVE: The Army is changing its acquisition structure. Here are the details.

18. AI-Driven Disinformation Campaigns on Twitter (X) in the Russia-Ukraine War

19. Ghosts of the Road: What the Failed War on IEDs Means for Drones

20. Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously: How His Second Term Is Reshaping America and the World

1. Happy Veteran’s Day from Small Wars Journal

​Comment: Graphic at the link honoring the late Dave Dilegge, founder of Small Wars Journal.

Happy Veteran’s Day from Small Wars Journal

by SWJ Staff

|

11.11.2025 at 11:11am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/11/happy-veterans-day-from-small-wars-journal/

One year ago today, on Veterans Day 2024, we relaunched Small Wars Journal under Arizona State University’s Future Security Initiative. The timing was deliberate. We choose this day to honor service, sacrifice, and the enduring commitment to understand the character of conflicts.

In the past year, our authors, readers, and partners have rebuilt SWJ into a thriving forum for professional discourse, with half a million monthly page views, tens of thousands of active readers, and a growing community that continues to challenge assumptions and advance ideas.

 To our veterans, thank you for your service, and for continuing the fight to think critically and write honestly.

 To our contributors and readers, thank you for keeping the small wars conversation alive and relevant.

Here’s to the next year with sharp minds, open hearts, strong voices, and the pursuit of a powerful discourse in complex times.

Sincerely, The Small Wars Journal Team

Learn more about Arizona State University’s Salute to Service here.

Tags: Arizona State University, Dave Dilegge, Future Security Initiative, SWJ Cares, Veteran Resources

About The Author

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• SWJ Staff
• SWJ Staff searches the internet daily for articles and posts that we think are of great interests to our readers.
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2. What the Looming Fall of a Ukrainian City Says About Putin’s War

​Summary:

Pokrovsk’s likely fall underscores Putin’s aims beyond territory: reassert dominance over Kyiv, restore great-power status, and reverse the Soviet collapse’s legacy. Russia will absorb heavy losses to exhaust Ukraine. Trump’s territory-focused peace push misses Moscow’s imperial ambitions; durable settlement requires security guarantees and addressing geopolitical grievances and NATO border issues.

​Excerpts:

Russia is willing to endure tremendous human losses in the hopes that it will sap Ukraine of the resources and will to keep fighting. Ultimately, the Kremlin leader wants to regain political sway over Kyiv, reclaim Russia’s status as a great power and secure his place in history, Russia watchers say.

“Trump is trying to solve a problem, but Putin, as we’ve been told, consults Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible and Catherine the Great for his vision,” said William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at Rand and a former U.S. ambassador. “He thinks in terms of empire.”

Comment: So to follow Ambassador Courtney's comment it seems like we are playing two different games.

What the Looming Fall of a Ukrainian City Says About Putin’s War

WSJ

By Thomas Grove

Follow

Nov. 11, 2025 11:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/russia-ukraine-war-pokrovsk-9d6831a8

• Russia’s war aims extend beyond territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, seeking to regain political influence over Kyiv and restore its status as a great power.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin views the collapse of the Soviet Union as a major geopolitical catastrophe and seeks to reverse its outcomes through the current conflict.
• Despite President Trump’s peace efforts, a narrow focus on territorial negotiations has failed to address Russia’s broader historical and geopolitical grievances.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Russia’s war aims extend beyond territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, seeking to regain political influence over Kyiv and restore its status as a great power.

When Russians finally began to outnumber Ukrainians in Pokrovsk in recent weeks, the city lay in ruins and bodies lined the streets.

The brutal fight for the Ukrainian city points to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ultimate aims in the war—and explains why President Trump’s peace efforts have, so far, failed.

Trump has appealed to both sides to stop the killing and sought to use negotiations over territory to settle the dispute. For Putin, however, the war is about much more than the region in eastern Ukraine where most of the fighting is taking place.

Russia is willing to endure tremendous human losses in the hopes that it will sap Ukraine of the resources and will to keep fighting. Ultimately, the Kremlin leader wants to regain political sway over Kyiv, reclaim Russia’s status as a great power and secure his place in history, Russia watchers say.

“Trump is trying to solve a problem, but Putin, as we’ve been told, consults Peter the Great, Ivan the Terrible and Catherine the Great for his vision,” said William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at Rand and a former U.S. ambassador. “He thinks in terms of empire.”

A satellite image shows armored vehicles maneuvering this month amid a Russian attack on Pokrovsk. Vantor/Reuters

In recent talks, the U.S. has zeroed in on the Donbas as one element of a possible peace deal, hoping that Putin might agree to stop the bloodshed if Kyiv were to cede the rest of the territory in eastern Ukraine.

But a narrow focus on territory underestimates the importance Russia’s dominance over Ukraine has for Putin. Months before launching the invasion, Putin wrote a lengthy essay, arguing Russians and Ukrainians were “one people.” He has called the statehood of Ukraine into question, saying the country was a creation of Soviet Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin.

“Ukraine is not just a neighboring country for us, it is an inalienable part of our own history,” he said in a televised address made days before his troops marched across the border.

The Russian leader, who watched the U.S.S.R. dissolve from East Germany where he worked as a KGB officer, has called the Soviet Union’s collapse “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”—an event that holds more significance for the Kremlin leader than two world wars and the Holocaust.

For Putin and his generation, the end of the Soviet Union turned a country that saw itself as America’s equal plunged into poverty and humiliation. U.S. businessmen came to the country to make a fortune on the selloff of state assets, while Western politicians lectured a nascent Russia about human rights and democracy. Moscow watched as its former satellites drifted westward, joining the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A Ukrainian drone pilot prepares to launch a drone at night. maria senovilla/epa/Shutterstock

The drone is on a nighttime strike mission against Russian forces near Pokrovsk. maria senovilla/epa/Shutterstock

“Putin is carrying out this war out of principle, to cancel the outcome of the Cold War and return Russia to its acknowledged position as a great power,” said Ruslan Pukhov, founder of Moscow-based defense and arms industry think tank the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies.

Unsurprisingly, under Putin, the cult of personality of Joseph Stalin has resurfaced, celebrating the Soviet dictator who met with Western leaders in Yalta and Potsdam as World War II was ending to carve up the territory occupied by Nazi Germany. There, Stalin managed to translate Moscow’s military successes in the war into greater territorial claims and Western recognition of a sphere of influence that extended far beyond the country’s own border with a host of Communist satellites in Eastern Europe.

When Trump and Putin met in Alaska earlier this year, Russian media cast the summit as another great power meeting. Putin managed to persuade Trump that a cease-fire must be secondary to a long-term political solution, exactly the kind that would address Russia’s grievances.

“Alaska in and of itself was a great foreign policy success for Putin, all the more with the attendant ghosts of Yalta,” Pukhov said.

For Russia, great powers have the resources and military might to dictate terms to smaller nations. That was the posture Moscow adopted in the early days of the war when Russian and Ukrainian negotiators met. The Kremlin was willing to accept nothing less than restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military and its arsenal. The talks soon fell apart.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned Trump that Putin’s ambitions aren’t focused solely on acquiring and developing more land. Putin’s unilateral 2014 annexation of Crimea, Ukraine’s Black Sea peninsula, wasn’t enough and Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region which Putin now demands likely won’t be either, he said, proving the need for the kind of security guarantees that he and other European leaders are calling for from the White House.

Damage in January in Pokrovsk, where fighting has continued for months. Serhii Korovayny for WSJ

“Why does Putin need the administrative borders of the Donbas? he said in a post on X. “He doesn’t care about the Donbas at all.”

“But here’s the thing: who says he won’t go further in a few years? Who can guarantee that? It will definitely happen—that’s the kind of system Russia has, one that constantly returns to war. That’s why security guarantees have always been our number one priority.”

Trump’s desire to make a deal with Russia hasn’t gone unnoticed in Moscow. While Putin might not be willing to make concessions on Ukraine, Russia has tried to seduce the U.S. administration into lifting sanctions. It is no coincidence that the Kremlin has handed the head of the country’s direct investment fund, Kirill Dmitriev, the task of getting the attention of Trump’s adviser, namely Steve Witkoff, another real estate mogul.

At one of the first meetings between U.S. and Russian officials in Riyadh, the former investment banker held a list up to the television cameras assembled to enumerate the projects American businesses had lost out on and how much money it was costing them.

Indeed, any serious diplomatic engagement needs to address some of the Kremlin’s concerns over the future of Ukraine and the border with NATO, said Samuel Charap, a veteran Russia watcher and senior political analyst at Rand.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

What do you think the future holds for the war in Ukraine? Join the conversation below.

“Issues are not fundamentally about taking territory,” he said. “You need to have some sort of principled agreement on these big picture issues.”

But in recent weeks, the pace of peace talks has increasingly frustrated Trump. In a meeting with Zelensky last month, he refused to look at maps the Ukrainian leader brought with him. Meanwhile, a growing rupture with Putin has triggered a public exchange of veiled threats over each country’s nuclear arsenal.

After Putin touted a 15-hour test of a Russian cruise missile that is both nuclear capable and nuclear powered, Trump issued his own demand.

“You ought to get the war ended, the war that should have taken one week is now in…its fourth year, that’s what you ought to do instead of testing missiles.”

Write to Thomas Grove at thomas.grove@wsj.com

WSJ

3. SOF News: Drone News Weekly Update – Nov 12, 2025

​Comment: A useful roll-up of Drone related information and news.

Drone News Weekly Update – Nov 12, 2025

November 12, 2025 SOF News Drones 0

https://sof.news/drones/20251112/

Below the reader will find recent news about unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are used in conflicts (Ukraine, Africa, etc.), new developments in drone use, and training by military forces for using drones during combat operations. Curated articles on the topics below are provided:

• U.S. Army and Drones: Defense or Offense?
• General Atomics New Attack Drone
• Neros Wins U.S. Army Contract
• Russian Oil Refineries Targeted by Drones
• Single Drone Operator Controlling Multiple Drones.
• Chinese Ship – “Drone Carrier”
• Humanitarian Aspects of Drone Warfare
• Taiwan Responds to China’s Drone Threat
• The Politics of Europe’s “Drone Wall”

U.S. and Drones

U.S. Army and Drones – Defense or Offense? Some commentators worry that the U.S. Army may rush into the rapid transformation of utilizing offensive drones at the expense of the Army’s advantage in land warfare. Perhaps the Army would be better served in coming up with more ways to counter drones than to transform its armed forces into a ‘drone-centric’ force. This would entail countering the drone revolution to restore maneuver to the battlefield. Matthew Revels and Eric Uribe provide their thoughts on the topic in “Drones Won’t Save the US: Learning the Wrong Lessons from Ukraine will cost the US Army its Edge in Maneuver Warfare”, Modern War Institute at West Point, November 5, 2025.

Neros Wins U.S. Army Contract. The founders of a drone manufacturing company were just a few years ago teenage drone racers. Now the company, formed in 2023, has won a coveted Army contract supplying its Archer drone to the army. Neros is one of three companies picked to supply low-cost, expendable drones. The company also has a contract with the U.S. Marines as well as with Ukraine. “The 20-Somethings Who Raised $121 Million to Build Military Drones”, by Farah Stockman, The New York Times, November 10, 2025. (subscription)

General Atomic’s New Attack Drone. The Gambit-6 features pluggable mission modules and flexible air-to-ground strike capabilities. “Gambit Evolves: General Atomics Introduces New Stealth Attack Drone”, NextGenDefense, November 2025.

Drones and the Ukraine – Russia Conflict

Russian Oil Refineries Targeted by Drones. Oil refineries in Russia have been targeted by Ukrainian drones causing chaos for the Russian energy market. The oil refineries and oil pipelines have been a regular target for Kyiv in the past year.

Single Drone Operator Controlling Multiple Drones. A new system is multiplying the power of drones by allowing one operator to control several at a time, hitting targets in quick succession. This technology, known as Pasika, includes modules for communications, navigation, and autonomy. It is used for low cost First Person View (FPV) drones. “New Setup Turns Ukrainian Drone Operators into Squadron Commanders”, by David Hambling, Forbes, November 6, 2025.

“Army of Drones Bonus” System. The Government of Ukraine has launched a platform entitled “Brave1” that connects innovative companies developing technologies for national defense. Ukrainian soldiers can now redeem combat points earned for destroying enemy targets for unmanned ground vehicles through the Brave1 Market platform. United24 Media, Oct 28, 2025.

Drones Around the World

Chinese Ship – “Drone Carrier”. China appears to be testing and potentially fielding a number of different ship designs that will carry drones of various sizes. “Chinese ‘Mini Drone Carrier’ Seen Being used as Test Ship”, The War Zone, November 5, 2025.

Humanitarian Aspects of Drone Warfare. Lauren Spink writes that urgent global action is needed to prevent harm to civilians by cheap but dangerous UAVs. “Drones are Changing How Wars Harm Civilians”, Just Security, November 4, 2025.

Taiwan Responds to China’s Drone Threat. Many national security observers are looking to 2027 as the year that China will be able to attempt – by several possible methods – to take control of Taiwan. A new dimension in this potential threat is the leading role that China is taking in drone development with the potential that drones will play a major role in any attempted takeover of Taiwan. The island nation is responding with plans to grow its own domestic drone production pipelines and to adopt drone technology in its military. Read more by Brandi Vincent in “Taiwan moves to counter China’s drone dominance”, Defensescoop, November 5, 2025.

The Politics of Europe’s “Drone Wall”. Russia’s threats has prompted a response by European powers for an integrated continental defense against drones; however, quarrels over capabilities and control might derail or weaken the project. “A wall rebuilt in Europe – this one for drones”, by Angela G. Palmer, The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, November 7, 2025.

**********

Image. A Swedish K3 Ranger operates a first-person view drone during Adamant Serpent 26 in Alvdalen, Sweden, Oct. 25, 2025. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Reece Heck, SOCEUR)

4. Inside the CIA’s secret mission to sabotage Afghanistan’s opium

​Summary: 

From 2004 to about 2015, the CIA secretly ran a covert program to sabotage Afghanistan’s opium trade by dropping billions of modified poppy seeds that produced little morphine. Conducted without Afghan government knowledge, the operation aimed to degrade heroin potency by crossbreeding altered plants with native crops. Authorized under President George W. Bush, it was expensive and largely unknown even to U.S. agencies. While initially promising, it failed to yield lasting results. The initiative reflected “out-of-the-box” thinking in the war on drugs but was ultimately another costly, short-lived U.S. counternarcotics effort overshadowed by Afghanistan’s enduring poppy economy.

Comment: When have we ever effectively eradicated a drug supply source?

Inside the CIA’s secret mission to sabotage Afghanistan’s opium

In a decade-long covert operation, the U.S. spy agency dropped modified poppy seeds in an attempt to degrade the potency of Afghanistan’s billion-dollar opium crop.

Washington Post · Warren P. Strobel

Today at 5:00 a.m. EST

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/11/12/cia-afghanistan-heroin-poppy-seeds/

In 20 years of grinding war in Afghanistan, the United States dropped a multitude of weapons from the skies: Millions of tons of ordnance. Hellfire missiles launched from Predator drones. Even the “Mother of All Bombs,” the most powerful nonnuclear bomb in existence. And, amid the more conventional projectiles, tiny poppy seeds. By the billions.

On and off for over a decade, the Central Intelligence Agency conducted an audacious highly classified program to covertly manipulate Afghanistan’s lucrative poppy crop, blanketing Afghan farmers’ fields with specially modified seeds that germinated plants containing almost none of the chemicals that are refined into heroin, The Washington Post has learned.

The covert program, which has not previously been disclosed, is an unreported chapter in the 2001-2021 U.S. war in Afghanistan, and in the long checkered history of American efforts to combat narcotics globally, from Latin America to Asia. Its existence was confirmed by 14 people familiar with aspects of the secret operation, all of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe a classified project.

On a billboard in Afghanistan in 2006, an antidrug poster shows a skeleton hanging from a poppy bulb. (John Moore/Getty Images)

An Afghan farmer collects raw opium in 2013. (Noorullah Shirzada/AFP/Getty Images)

The program’s disclosure comes as the war on narcotics is again dominating the security agenda. President Donald Trump has declared war on drug cartels in the Western Hemisphere, ordering more than a dozen lethal strikes on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, designating cartels as terrorist groups, and moving a vast naval and air force to the region. He has also authorized the CIA to take aggressive covert action against drug traffickers and their supporters.

This latest effort, like the fight against opium in Afghanistan two decades ago, faces uncertain success, according to former officials who participated in drug wars of the past.

In Afghanistan in the early 2000s, the burgeoning opium trade was thwarting U.S. goals, as American troops engaged in a deadly struggle to defeat the Taliban, eliminate terrorist groups and stabilize the weak Western-backed government. Afghan heroin fueled corruption in President Hamid Karzai’s government and in the provinces. It helped pay for the Taliban’s weapons and equipment. And it accounted for the majority of global heroin supplies, with most of the drugs bound for Europe or the former Soviet Union.

Western allies and U.S. government agencies argued bitterly over which strategies would dent the crop without undermining rural Afghan support for Karzai. Diplomats and drug enforcement officials debated everything from aerial herbicide spraying to purchasing the entire Afghan crop and sending it overseas to be processed into medicine.

Unbeknownst to almost all of them, the CIA was operating its own secret heroin-eradication program, run by the spy agency’s Crime and Narcotics Center, which was flush with funds during the Afghan war. The airdrops of modified poppy seeds began in the autumn of 2004, three people familiar with the program said. The operation was paused at least once and ended about 2015, those familiar with it said.

Clandestine operators, initially using British C-130 aircraft, made nighttime flights to avoid detection, dispersing billions of the specially developed seeds over swaths of Afghanistan’s extensive poppy fields, people knowledgeable about the program said. The airdrops took place over the Afghan provinces of Nangahar and Helmand, centers of poppy cultivation, they said.

As far as is known, the seeds were not genetically engineered with gene editing — a technology not widely available until more recently — but grown and selected over time to produce a plant that harbored less of the alkaloid chemicals used to produce heroin. Details of when and how the seeds were developed remain unclear. But one person said the cultivation took several years and involved crossbreeding them with natural poppy seeds.

Once the seeds were dropped, the goal was for the plants sprouting from them to cross-fertilize with native plants and become the dominant strain over time, degrading the overall crop’s potency.

Many aspects of the program remain classified, including its budget, how many flights took place and hard metrics on its efficacy. It was so closely held that some senior Pentagon and State Department officials involved in Afghan policy under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama said they were unaware of it or had only heard rumors.

The CIA required a classified written authorization, known as a “finding,” from Bush to conduct the flights and other aspects of the operation, which fell under the spy agency’s covert action powers, two former U.S. officials said. The finding made the program legal, at least as far as the U.S. government was concerned.

A CIA spokesperson declined to comment after the agency was given a list of specifics The Post planned to report. Former spokespeople for the Bush and Obama administrations also declined to comment.

The Afghan government led by Karzai was not informed when the CIA began the program, people familiar said. It remains unclear whether the Afghans found out later. Karzai did not respond to a request for comment made through an aide.

The British Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.

Antonio Maria Costa, who led the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime from 2002 to 2010, said he heard whispers about a program like the one the CIA conducted but never had any confirmation.

As the program in Afghanistan was coming to an end in about 2015, U.S. officials discussed using the same unorthodox method against opium poppy fields in Mexico, another major heroin producer, two people familiar with the program said.

That plan was ultimately dismissed because poppies in Mexico are grown in small plots in hilly terrain, making them a much tougher target for aerial seeding than the flatlands of southwest Afghanistan, where the bulk of that country’s poppy crop was grown, one of the people said.

‘Out-of-the-box thinking’

The overall counternarcotics campaign in Afghanistan was an abysmal failure, Western officials acknowledge. It was doomed by interagency bickering in Washington; U.S. frictions with allies including Britain, which led the international effort; intermittent support from Karzai and his government; and the entrenchment of poppy farming in rural Afghanistan’s culture and economy.

The Pentagon repeatedly resisted deeper involvement in the Afghan drug war, arguing it distracted from its mission of eliminating Islamist terrorists and fighting the Taliban.

Several former CIA and State Department officials, however, said the spy agency’s seeding program to degrade the potency of Afghanistan’s poppy crop was successful for a time. It was also tremendously expensive, chewing up the CIA Crime and Narcotics Center’s operational budget.

The budget of the CIA unit, which under Trump’s second administration has merged with the agency’s Western Hemisphere center, is classified.

“There was a sense that it worked. But maybe over time, it worked less well. That the juice wasn’t worth the squeeze,” said a former U.S. official who read reports on the program. “This is actually an example of creative, out-of-the-box thinking by the agency. … It was dealing with a problem in a non-kinetic, nonmilitary way.”

Others aware of the program were less impressed by the results, saying it made no lasting dent in Afghan opium production and helped Bush administration policymakers avoid tough decisions in the war on Afghanistan’s drugs.

A 2018 report by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction concluded: “No counter-drug program undertaken by the United States, its coalition partners, or the Afghan government resulted in lasting reductions in poppy cultivation or opium production.” SIGAR was not privy to the covert CIA operation.

Beginning in 2001, the United States spent about $9 billion to try to stem the tide of heroin flowing out of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s poppy crop declined notably from 2007 to 2011, before rising again and skyrocketing after 2016, the SIGAR report said, citing U.N. and CIA data. The Taliban profited off the heroin pipeline for years, although U.S. officials clashed over how central it was to their finances.

The war over spraying

The United States has spent decades fighting illegal narcotics globally, interdicting shipments, penetrating trafficking networks, extraditing drug lords. Trump has deemed the problem a national security threat on par with international terrorism, and he has authorized the use of military force to allow strikes on alleged traffickers at sea that many former officials and legal experts say violate international law. He has used economic power, too, suggesting he would lower tariffs on China if it curbs the export of precursor chemicals used to make the deadly synthetic drug fentanyl.

With plants grown for their narcotics, Washington has tried multiple approaches. In Colombia, U.S. funds paid for widespread aerial spraying of the herbicide glyphosate over plantations of coca, used to make cocaine. U.S. officials claimed the program was successful in reducing the crop. In Peru, American drug-control agencies tested a pellet containing herbicide, but it was never dropped, a former U.S. official said.

In Afghanistan, the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement bureau argued for aggressive aerial spraying of herbicide based on the Colombia model.

The Pentagon, the CIA and the British government opposed spraying, arguing it would hurt efforts to win over the Afghan population from the Taliban. So did top Afghan officials, who said the chemicals could poison the groundwater in their heavily agricultural society.

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan William Wood, previously ambassador to Colombia, was so adamant about the spraying that he offered to sit, clad in a Speedo bathing suit, in a vat of glyphosate in Kabul’s Massoud Circle to prove its safety, three former senior officials said. Wood became known as “Chemical Bill.”

“I’m a spraying guy,” Bush told Karzai in one video teleconference, a former senior Bush administration official recalled. “Not in Afghanistan you’re not,” the Afghan president shot back.

U.S. officials were so confident the Afghan government would eventually approve the herbicide plan that they moved glyphosate and equipment for ground-based spraying into Kabul, the SIGAR report said. But the Afghan cabinet rejected the idea in January 2007. No significant herbicide spraying of Afghan poppies ever took place, according to multiple former U.S. officials.

As the deadlock over spraying stretched on, the Bush administration explored more unconventional control strategies.

“They were constantly looking for some sort of silver bullet,” said former journalist Gretchen Peters, who wrote a 2009 book on ties between the Taliban and drug traffickers.

Some proposals were exotic. State Department officials debated using mycotoxins, poisons produced by fungi, two former officials said. Beginning in 1998, the United Nations and the United States had funded research at a former Soviet laboratory in Uzbekistan on a fungus that infects and kills opium poppy plants.

But there was a problem: The poisons might inadvertently kill not only poppies but Afghan food crops, leading to starvation.

“We could not use a pathogen that was not safe. That’s biological warfare,” said John Walters, Bush’s director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy. Walters, now president of the Hudson Institute, declined to comment on the CIA poppy seed program.

A grim harvest

The covert CIA program went forward even as the debate over herbicide spraying raged, with airdrops beginning in 2004. It involved careful timing and elaborate orchestration, and it was preceded by years of secret agricultural research. The seeds had been grown at a site in the United States, crossed with normal poppy plants to test the outcome, and then produced in mass quantities, one person said.

The seeds had to be dropped in late autumn, when Afghan farmers were planting their own seeds. You had to “take care to make sure it didn’t stand out too much,” so that an Afghan poppy farmer would notice nothing amiss, but also “to ensure over time it did become the dominant crop,” or strain of poppy plant, said a former senior U.S. official familiar with the program’s beginnings.

The American plants not only contained virtually no morphine, but they were bred to sprout early and produce especially vivacious red flowers, making them attractive to Afghan farmers who, the CIA hoped, would harvest and replant their seeds.

There was also a hope, several officials said, that the farmers would keep and sell some of the seeds, propagating them through the country’s brisk agricultural markets.

Areas subjected to airdrops were targeted again in subsequent years with the aim of making the modified plants the dominant strain of opium poppy, the former senior U.S. official said.

The program’s progress was assessed in multiple ways, two people familiar said. Aerial surveillance and satellite imagery showed farmers ridding their fields of unproductive plants. Electronic eavesdropping picked up conversations among opium growers. There were even occasional on-the-ground checks at farmers’ fields, with U.S. officials disguising the true purpose of their visit.

The CIA operation continued after Obama took office in 2009, and it was discussed at White House meetings of the Deputies Committee, a group of high-level national security officials from across government.

The program, which had always been expensive, ended because of money woes, numerous people said. The CIA counternarcotics center’s budget was being squeezed, and the spy agency tried to convince other agencies — the Pentagon, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the State Department — to fund the poppy seed drops.

In its final years, the State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement bureau picked up the cost of aircraft fuel, maintenance and repair, but it never conducted airdrops, those familiar with the program said.

For nearly two decades, there had been persistent rumors among Afghan farmers that foreigners had fouled their poppy crop, either by covertly spraying it, adulterating the fertilizer they used or deliberately spreading disease. Those rumors, it turned out, were not entirely unfounded.

When the U.S. military — and the CIA — finally withdrew from Afghanistan in chaotic fashion in 2021, the opium trade represented between 9 and 14 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product, or between $1.8 billion and $2.7 billion, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime.

After regaining control of the country, the Taliban banned opium production. By 2023, cultivation had plummeted by 95 percent. But the crop rebounded last year by 19 percent, the U.N. said, and shifted to the country’s northeast, away from the traditional poppy growing areas once targeted by the CIA.

Washington Post · Warren P. Strobel

5. America’s Chip Restrictions Are Biting in China

​Summary:

U.S. export controls have created severe AI-chip shortages in China, prompting Beijing to direct SMIC’s output by prioritizing Huawei and to push state data centers off Nvidia hardware. Firms resort to workarounds: smuggling or remote access to Nvidia chips, bundling thousands of lesser chips into power-hungry systems, and designing on older nodes; DeepSeek even delayed a model. Engineers struggle with non-Nvidia ecosystems, and yields on advanced domestic chips remain poor. Washington is split over easing limits; Nvidia lobbies to sell downgraded parts as analysts debate China’s true capacity. Some officials hint limited exports could resume in 1–2 years, while Huawei rapidly scales production.

Comment: How should we assess this on the strategic competition scoreboard? 

America’s Chip Restrictions Are Biting in China

WSJ

Shortages of advanced AI chips are so acute that Beijing is intervening and tech companies are resorting to workarounds

By Lingling Wei, Amrith Ramkumar and Robbie Whelan

Nov. 11, 2025 9:56 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/china-us-ai-chip-restrictions-effect-275a311e

Chinese companies are hamstrung by export control of chips even as the country works to win the AI race. Fang Dongxu/Utuku/Zuma Press

• China’s government is intervening in how the output of SMIC is distributed due to acute shortages caused by U.S. chip restrictions.
• Chinese companies are using workarounds like bundling thousands of chips and smuggling Nvidia chips to train AI models.
• U.S. government officials are divided on continuing chip export limits.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• China’s government is intervening in how the output of SMIC is distributed due to acute shortages caused by U.S. chip restrictions.

Beijing is taking an aggressive approach to help its technology giants squeezed by America’s chip restrictions.

Shortages of advanced semiconductors are so acute that the government has begun intervening in how the output of China’s largest contract chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International 981 0.83%increase; green up pointing triangle, is distributed, according to people familiar with the matter. Chinese authorities are trying to give priority to the needs of tech conglomerate and national champion Huawei Technologies, which uses SMIC technology to make artificial-intelligence chips, the people said.

Chinese tech companies are fighting to secure limited domestic capacity and, in some cases, labs are smuggling coveted supplies of high-performance Nvidia NVDA -2.96%decrease; red down pointing triangle chips.

Buzzy AI upstart DeepSeek had to delay the release of its latest model earlier this year because of a shortage of chips, people familiar with its operations said. And companies such as Huawei are cobbling together workarounds, including by bundling thousands of chips into huge, power-hungry systems that can help train AI models, people familiar with their moves said.

The lengths to which Chinese companies and Beijing are going in the face of recent U.S. export restrictions are a sign of the stakes in the race for AI supremacy.

Top U.S. officials are divided on whether to continue limiting China’s access to chips and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, or allow more sales. Their goal is to prevent chips made by Huawei from becoming more advanced and in demand around the world. The White House’s decision has ramifications at home—for companies such as Nvidia—and abroad.

Companies such as Huawei are trying to work around U.S. export restrictions of chips. Qilai Shen/Bloomberg News

President Trump elected not to discuss the potential export of a new Nvidia chip to China in a recent meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping after top officials warned him about the security risks, which include boosting China’s military by providing better technology.

Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, has argued that China is rapidly increasing production of semiconductors and is home to half of the world’s AI developers. He says the world’s most valuable company should be allowed to export a version of its Blackwell advanced-AI chip to China to compete with Huawei and counter the proliferation of its chips across the globe.

“China is nanoseconds behind America in AI,” he said recently.

Nvidia and allies such as White House AI Czar David Sacks say many experts underestimate how fast China is improving and that its state-led investments will eventually pay off.

“Our mature chip capacity accounts for about 28% of the global market, and the advanced chip sector has produced groundbreaking outcomes,” said Liu Pengyu, a spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Washington.

China AI upstart DeepSeek had to push back the release of its latest model this year because of a shortage of chips. hanschke/epa/shutterstock

Representatives for the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which oversees the technology sector in China, SMIC, Huawei and DeepSeek didn’t respond to requests for comment.

China’s self-reliance

It is difficult to quantify China’s semiconductor production, but even the most aggressive forecasts fall short of the country’s demand, illustrating its challenge in becoming fully self-sufficient, many experts said.

“You could multiply the numbers by five and it might still not be close to satisfying the domestic market,” said Saif Khan, a distinguished technology fellow at the think tank Institute for Progress, who worked on export restrictions in the Biden administration.

Chinese officials acknowledge their chipmaking capacity isn’t as advanced as that of the U.S., but say that it has developed quickly and is underpinned by a political system capable of accelerating industrial production.

“Maybe now, it’s not as good as in the U.S., but the gap will become smaller and smaller,” Ma Xiaoxiao, China’s deputy consul general in New York, said at a news conference last week.

President Trump decided not to discuss the potential export of a new Nvidia chip to China in a recent meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping after U.S. officials cited security concerns. Andrew Harnik/Getty Images

As China tries to become more self-sufficient, authorities have instructed state-owned data centers to stop using Nvidia’s chips, with some even removing existing Nvidia products from service, people with knowledge of the moves said. Authorities have also told companies not to use an older Nvidia product, a move some analysts view as posturing to negotiate access to a better chip with the U.S.

The shift has been painful. Engineers are accustomed to Nvidia’s proprietary software ecosystem, and some say they struggle with domestic alternatives, citing problems such as overheating, system crashes and a lack of software support.

Workarounds

Up against restrictions, some semiconductor companies such as Shanghai-based MetaX are designing chips on older, more available technology, bundling two or more smaller chips together to compensate for more limited computing power. Bundling strategies at Chinese companies have resulted in electricity-guzzling data centers, prompting multiple local governments to start subsidizing their power bills, people familiar with the matter said.

Companies in China also continue to smuggle Nvidia chips or access them remotely in other countries using cloud computing.

According to contracts reviewed by The Wall Street Journal, at least 16 refrigerator-sized Blackwell racks—shipped in smaller parts and reassembled in China—were set to be delivered by November. That amount of chips isn’t sufficient to train advanced, large-scale AI models, but it can still be useful for conducting research and developing powerful applications.

Nvidia has said smuggling doesn’t occur on a significant scale and disputes figures showing a capacity crunch or need for the company’s products in China. “China’s own industry has more than enough domestic AI chips and servers for any undesired or military use, with millions left to spare,” a spokesman said.

The chips that China is able to produce on its own have limitations. The U.S. has banned the sale of tools known as extreme ultraviolet lithography machines, which inscribe silicon wafers with microscopic patterns filled by billions of transistors.

Chinese fabrication plants have been forced to rely on older manufacturing techniques that are less efficient, opening the door to more errors and reducing the percentage of chips manufactured that are usable. In a September report, Morgan Stanley analysts estimated that making Huawei’s advanced 910C chip using SMIC’s technology could mean 95 out of every 100 pieces of silicon produced are unusable.

The fight in Washington

The Institute for Progress recently found U.S. production of chips comparable to Nvidia’s top-tier B300 will be nearly 25 times China’s output this year. That gap is forecast to widen to roughly 40 times by next year.

A text to image generative AI demonstration in 2024 at the CES tech event in Las Vegas. Bloomberg News

To Khan and many experts, China’s chip struggles and shortages show that U.S. export controls are working. They say that allowing China to access even downgraded chips would help close the AI gap.

Opponents of the export restrictions say recent advancements by Chinese model developers show that opaque estimates of chip production are part of a broader AI puzzle that the nation is solving on its own.

Huawei’s plans to export chips to other regions like the Middle East and release new products to compete with Nvidia such as an AI supercomputer unveiled this year show the company’s ambitions and rapidly evolving capacity, they say.

Michael Frank, CEO of a geopolitical risk platform and a longtime tech analyst, recently visited China and said policy experts seemed less concerned about chip-export restrictions than they were previously. AI researchers felt comfortable they could get roughly 80% of the performance they could otherwise, he said.

“It’s much much more complicated than any one aspect and there are tons of workarounds,” Frank said.

Nvidia has spent nearly $3.5 million on lobbying in the first three quarters of this year, up from $640,000 in all of 2024, according to data provider OpenSecrets. That includes spending on policies beyond exports.

In recent weeks, Jack Mallery, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst focused on China who now works for Nvidia, told administration officials, Congressional staffers and think tanks that estimates of Chinese production are too low, according to people familiar with the discussions. Mallery at times contradicted government figures, in some cases citing industry estimates that are publicly available.

The potential discrepancy in data is at the heart of the dispute over export controls. And performance differences make apples-to-apples comparisons of chips difficult.

In June, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick testified to Congress that Huawei was capable of making about 200,000 AI chips a year. However, many analysts and people close to Huawei say that its output is much higher.

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Who do you think will win the AI race, the U.S. or China? Join the conversation below.

Research shop SemiAnalysis estimates Huawei will have produced 805,000 Ascend processors this year, though not all of those are comparable to Nvidia’s top products. Huawei plans to more than double its total capacity by next year, according to people close to the company.

The U.S. also expects Huawei’s output to jump in 2026, an administration official said. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent recently signaled that the U.S. could allow some exports in one to two years—as long as the chips in question were generations behind Nvidia’s best.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com, Amrith Ramkumar at amrith.ramkumar@wsj.com and Robbie Whelan at robbie.whelan@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 12, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Chip Restrictions Bite China'.

WSJ

6. The AI Boom Is Looking More and More Fragile

​Summary:

AI stocks wobble as investors question sustainability amid soaring capex, scarce revenues and heavy leverage. OpenAI’s vast spending plans, debt-financed data centers, power shortages and construction delays amplify risks; CoreWeave slumps. Yet hyperscalers pledge $400B+ capex, suppliers remain bullish, and Nvidia projects strong growth while keeping the capital cycle alive, for now.

Comment: So is AI critical to our future or not? Are investors losing significant confidence in AI? What does this bode for our future?

The AI Boom Is Looking More and More Fragile

WSJ

AI stocks have swung downward as doubt rises about sustainability and payoff

By Asa Fitch and Dan Gallagher

Nov. 12, 2025 5:30 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/the-ai-boom-is-looking-more-and-more-fragile-bd546022

Michael Intrator, CoreWeave’s chief executive Michael Nagle/Bloomberg News

Perfect isn’t good enough, and any sign of weakness is a disaster: Justified or not, that’s the current mood in the markets about the AI boom.

Recent history suggests that the gloom won’t last. But the shake-up serves as a strong reminder that the early years of AI pose a challenge for investors accustomed to measuring returns on a 12-month time horizon.

Generative artificial-intelligence services require massive data centers and state-of-the-art chips and server racks that don’t come together quickly. The companies at the heart of AI now are talking about years—plural—of major investments still ahead.

The latest episode of fragility started last week, when shares of some of the sector’s leading lights lost ground. After a broad-based recovery Monday on news of a possible end to the government shutdown, AI-exposed stocks fell again on Tuesday. Nvidia NVDA -2.96%decrease; red down pointing triangle lost 7% last week and slipped another 3% on Tuesday—leaving it well shy of its $5 trillion market-cap milestone last month.

Even companies posting strong financial results haven’t avoided investors’ wrath lately. Meta Platforms META -0.74%decrease; red down pointing triangle has shed nearly 17% since its solid third-quarter report two weeks ago that included another plan for blowout capital spending. Palantir PLTR -1.37%decrease; red down pointing triangle, the AI software company that had soared to an absurd price-to-forward-earnings ratio above 250, is down nearly 8% since its respectable earnings last Monday.

There are, of course, real reasons to worry about the sustainability of the boom. Chief among them is that there is far more AI computing infrastructure spending than there is AI revenue, a gulf that is widening by the day.

OpenAI says it is planning to spend $1.4 trillion in the next eight years. But it is pulling in only around $20 billion of annual revenue today, and it lacks a clear business model to reach the hundreds of billions it needs within the next few years to keep spending growth going.

OpenAI is already projecting that losses will swell to $74 billion in 2028. So skittish has the mood become that Chief Executive Sam Altman felt the need last week to defend the company on X, saying the spending was “understandably” causing concern. He pointed to his plans to boost revenue with new consumer devices, robotics efforts and an AI cloud-computing service, none of which currently exist.

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What is your outlook on the AI boom? Join the conversation below.

Another source of concern lies in the huge amount of leverage needed to finance the outsize ambitions of AI’s biggest players. Oracle ORCL -1.94%decrease; red down pointing triangle reached a $300 billion deal with OpenAI in September to supply it with AI computing power, and it raised $18 billion through a bond sale the same month. That is a foretaste of what analysts say will be a growing pool of debt tied to data centers.

AI-related companies had issued $139 billion of corporate bonds this year as of last month, according to a Goldman Sachs report—about 9% of all investor-grade issuance and a 23% jump over last year. Meta Platforms organized a $27.3 billion financing for a Louisiana data-center complex last month alone in what was the largest-ever private-debt deal.

Then there are the inevitable hiccups from shortages of power and other supply-chain bottlenecks. CoreWeave CRWV -16.31%decrease; red down pointing triangle, an AI cloud player backed by Nvidia, reported strong earnings on Monday but noted a delay in data-center construction that would dent revenue in the current quarter. Its shares slid 16% on Tuesday and have lost a third of their value since the beginning of last week, as the highly leveraged company is considered one of the riskier stocks in the AI space.

So far, though, there is little sign that the underlying spending boom is stagnating. The big tech companies’ capital spending on AI is on the rise, with more than $400 billion planned this year. Nvidia, Advanced Micro Devices AMD -2.65%decrease; red down pointing triangle, Arm ARM -3.29%decrease; red down pointing triangle, Supermicro SMCI -3.41%decrease; red down pointing triangle and other suppliers to the boom haven’t moderated their tone at all—if anything, they appear increasingly bullish. Nvidia has already projected revenue growing 56% year over year for the fiscal third quarter that it plans to report next week.

On Tuesday, AMD Chief Executive Lisa Su said some customers last year thought their investments in AI would level off but now say they are accelerating. “If you have the chance, if you have the balance sheet, if you have the capability to put on more compute, you’re going to do it, because it’s going to give you incremental advantage versus your competition,” she said.

Overall, tech valuations don’t look outrageous, especially with companies like Nvidia minting profits. The average forward price-to-earnings ratio for the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite Index is about 29—a high number, to be sure, but nothing astronomical for a basket of growing companies. That figure reached above 32 in 2021, the year before the AI boom.

Investors are twitchy about any sign of weakness in the AI trade and have been for some time. The emergence of DeepSeek, a sophisticated Chinese model created with relatively few AI chips, caused a scare earlier this year. Other smaller moments of panic have also come up since; Nvidia’s stock alone has seen worse weekly drops four times this year compared with last week’s decline.

As was the case then and still is now, there are fundamental factors driving the AI story, most notably the very real spending intentions of the biggest companies in tech. But after three years of booming investment and no clear financial model for profitable AI, breakouts of fear and fatigue among investors are inevitable.

Write to Asa Fitch at asa.fitch@wsj.com and Dan Gallagher at dan.gallagher@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

7. Arrival of U.S.’s Largest Warship Ratchets Up Pressure on Venezuela

​Summary:

USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group arrived near Latin America, boosting U.S. pressure on Venezuela and capacity to hit air defenses. It follows 19 lethal strikes on suspected drug boats, sparking legal disputes and Colombian suspension of cooperation. Trump sends mixed signals on escalation. Deployment shifts carriers from Europe/Mideast.

Comment: Mixed signals? All warfare is based on deception (Sun Tzu). But what is our strategy and the desired end state and what is the campaign plan to achieve our strategic objectives? Rhetorical questions I know since we should not read about them in the media (but we probably will).

Arrival of U.S.’s Largest Warship Ratchets Up Pressure on Venezuela

WSJ

USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group is in waters off Latin America as buildup of forces continues in the Caribbean

By Michael R. Gordon

Updated Nov. 11, 2025 8:16 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/arrival-of-u-s-s-largest-warship-ratchets-up-pressure-on-venezuela-b520463e

The USS Gerald R. Ford on Nov. 5. Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Apprentice Alyssa Joy/U.S. Navy

• The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group arrived near Latin America, increasing U.S. military presence near Venezuela.
• The strike group, including destroyers with Tomahawk missiles, enhances U.S. capability to attack Venezuelan targets.
• The U.S. has recently conducted 19 strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, resulting in 76 deaths, according to the Trump administration.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group arrived near Latin America, increasing U.S. military presence near Venezuela.

The U.S. Navy’s largest aircraft carrier arrived in waters near Latin America on Tuesday, expanding the American military’s buildup as the Trump administration seeks to ratchet up the pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

President Trump has expressed reservations about taking military action against Venezuela, The Wall Street Journal reported last week.

But the arrival of the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group, with several destroyers equipped with Tomahawk missiles, will boost the U.S. military’s capability to attack targets in the country, including Venezuela’s air defenses.

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said the carrier strike group “will enhance and augment existing capabilities to disrupt narcotics trafficking and degrade and dismantle Transnational Criminal Organizations.”

The strike group’s firepower, however, goes beyond what is required to strike the small boats that the Trump administration says are being used to smuggle drugs.

To date, the U.S. has carried out 19 strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and in the eastern Pacific Ocean. Those attacks have killed 76 people, according to the administration’s account, and spurred a legal debate about whether the strikes are legal.

The Pentagon is moving some of its most advanced units and weapons closer to Venezuela as tensions run high between President Trump and Nicolás Maduro. WSJ’s Shelby Holliday maps the buildup in the Caribbean. Photo Illustration: Annie Zhao

In the latest strikes, on Sunday, six men were killed in two attacks on boats in the eastern Pacific, according to Pete Hegseth, the defense secretary. Hegseth said, without providing evidence, that both boats were known by U.S. intelligence to be associated with illicit drug smuggling and were carrying drugs at the time of the strikes.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro​ said ​that as long as the boat strikes in the Caribbean continue, his country will suspend communications and other dealings with U.S. security agencies. He made the announcement Tuesday night on X after CNN reported that the U.K. has stopped ​sharing intelligence with the U.S. about suspected drug trafficking vessels in the Caribbean.

While the Trump administration says it is carrying out legitimate attacks against drug gangs with which the U.S. is engaged in armed conflict, some lawmakers and former American officials say the strikes were “nonjudicial killings” of civilians who posed no immediate threat to the U.S.

Trump has talked publicly at times about broadening the military operation to include targets on land. Sending mixed signals, he has also said that he isn’t considering ordering attacks inside Venezuela.

The warplanes on the Ford include F/A-18 fighters that can strike targets on land and Growler electronic warfare planes that can attack and jam enemy radars and air defenses. In addition to its two guided-missile destroyers the USS Bainbridge and the USS Mahan, the Ford strike group includes the USS Winston S. Churchill, an air and missile defense command ship.

The Ford strike group had been operating in the Adriatic Sea when it was ordered on Oct. 24 to head for the Caribbean. That move left the Navy without a carrier in regions overseen by the U.S. European Command and the U.S. Central Command, which directs American forces in the Middle East.

The Ford strike group will add to the U.S. forces that have already been amassed in the Caribbean region, including an amphibious ready group and F-35Bs and MQ-9s in Puerto Rico. AC-130 gunships have also been deployed in Puerto Rico and El Salvador, according to public photos.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 12, 2025, print edition as 'Warship’s Arrival Ratchets Up Pressure on Venezuela'.

WSJ

8. Microinsurgency: Introducing and Defining a Distinct Category of Intrastate Conflict

​Summary:

"Microinsurgency" can be defined as a long-term, small-scale intrastate conflict between an aggrieved minority and a ruling state over natural resources, without foreign involvement. Distinct from civil wars, these decade-long struggles suchs as those seen in West Papua, Balochistan, and the Southern Philippines that seek autonomy or secession. Studying them aids early conflict prevention, policy, and counterinsurgency planning.

Excerpts:

To recap, a microinsurgency is a long-term intrastate conflict between an aggrieved minority and a recognized state or ruling authority. The conflict involves fighting over natural resources and has no appreciable or measurable international or external influences or support. The primary objective of the insurgents is an end state ranging in degree of autonomy from semiautonomous rule to complete secession.

No definition of microinsurgency has been identified in extant literature. An extensive review of the literature yielded little about small-scale intrastate conflict, while microinsurgencies are essentially ignored. This research fills gaps in the existing literature by defining and explaining the dynamics of microinsurgencies and associated resource wealth. Although this type of intrastate conflict is positioned on the low end of the conflict intensity scale, studying microinsurgencies is important for four reasons. First, findings about microinsurgencies can inform and clarify the understanding of small-scale, intrastate and ethnic conflict. Second, almost all larger-scale intrastate and many interstate conflicts began as smaller-scale conflicts, such as these. Third, more accurate understanding of microinsurgencies can permit accurate causal analysis and precise development of proper policies, strategies, and tactics for conflict termination. Through the identification of such root causes, counterinsurgency operations, policies, and solutions can be developed to sufficiently address grievances of ethnic groups forming the insurgency and to pressure national governments into reasonable conflict termination agreements, preferably before armed conflict begins or increases in duration, intensity, or scale. Civilian and military analysts, planners, and policymakers should be better equipped to identify and understand these long-term conflicts and their associated grievances and issues. Finally, once identified, microinsurgencies can serve as an indication and warning of potential larger-scale conflicts, because almost all traditional insurrections began as microinsurgencies.

Comment: I fully agree that these phenomena must be studied and understood. But is the name helpful? With no disrespect to the author but does this contribute to our definitions and terminology paralysis with the proliferation of names and terms? More importantly, does it help us "do strategy" better? Does it help us campaign better? Does it help us communicate understanding? I have been carrying this list below with me since I received it in 1994 at CGSC at Leavenworth. I will add microinsurgency to the list.

(And as an aside, when we were in the Southern Philippines the conspiracy theories about Yamashita's gold were still around).

“100 NAMES” OF LIC!!!

• Little Wars
• Small Wars
• Guerrillas
• Guerrilla warfare
• Partisan warfare
• Asymmetric warfare
• Low Intensity Conflict
• Low Intensity Opns
• Insurgency
• Counterinsurgency
• COIN
• Terrorism
• Counter-terrorism
• Anti-terrorism
• Imperial Policing
• Nation Building
• Intervention
• Irregular Warfare
• Wars amongst peoples
• Operations Other Than War
• Military Operations Other Than War
• OOTW
• MOOTW
• Gray Area Phenomena
• Revolutionary War
• Insurrection
• Counter-narcotics opns
• Counter Drug opns
• Punitive opns
• Peace opns
• Small scale contingencies
• Stability opns
• SASO
• Nation Assistance
• Occupation
• Uncomfortable Wars
• 4GW
• 5GW
• Civil wars
• ​AND MANY MORE

Definition and Terminology Paralysis​

My thoughts on terminology are here:

Threats and the Words We Use: A Thought Experiment

https://warontherocks.com/2013/11/threats-and-the-words-we-use-a-thought-experiment/

Microinsurgency: Introducing and Defining a Distinct Category of Intrastate Conflict

by LTC Michael F. Trevett

|

11.12.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/12/microinsurgency-introducing-and-defining-a-distinct-category-of-intrastate-conflict/

West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB) Fighters in West Papua New Guinea. Https://www.btl-research.com/p/west-papua-the-insurgency-that-indonesia.

Introduction

Microinsurgencies, small-scale armed conflicts over natural resources internal to one country, are not necessarily new. Although such conflicts involving natural resource wealth occurred in ancient times, little seems to have been studied and published about the interaction of these conditions and variables until the late 1900s. For example, the King Scorpion settled and united ancient Egypt in approximately 3150 BC, after centuries of fighting by “dozens of independent chieftains” over control of the Nile River. Whoever controls the Nile still controls the wealth of modern Egypt today. Other examples from the distant past are those of Portugal and Spain with their avarice for gold, silver, precious stones, silks, and spices, even slavery and human trafficking. According to Charles Chasteen, “the Iberian invaders…came to [the Americas] seeking success in the terms dictated by their society: riches, the privilege of being served by others, and a claim to religious righteousness.” Jasper Humphreys offers another example below.

The Portuguese adventurers often faced stiff local opposition to their gathering of the commodities they sought; to deal with this, the Portuguese frequently resorted to the tried-and-tested economics of capturing and ransoming local chiefs and notables. Sometimes these and other people were brought back to Portugal where they could make an economic contribution to the costs of the expedition [and resource exploitation] by being sold.

The article “Scarcity and Abundance Revisited: A Literature Review on Natural Resources and Conflict” explains, since the 1990s, the “body of literature devoted to analyzing the relationship between resources and conflict can be broadly divided into two groups: studies which focus on resource scarcity and conflict and studies that analyze the relationship between resource abundance and conflict.” The resource scarcity and conflict group has many more qualitative works using case studies. The resource abundance and conflict group instead overwhelmingly employs quantitative analysis and studies. Each of these groups has its own proponents and critics, but none identifies the unique category of microinsurgency.

Definitions

Intrastate Conflicts

The focus of research on microinsurgencies begs the initial task to define the categories and concepts of intrastate armed conflicts. A hierarchy of all categories of armed conflict is depicted in Figure 1 below. This hierarchy is defined in terms of the size, range, participants, and magnitude of the conflict in question. Microinsurgencies are at the left or lower end of this scale. At the higher and larger end of the conflict scale are civil wars and international conflict. Examples of most are provided in Figure 1 in parentheses.

Civil wars serve as the dividing line between intrastate and international armed conflicts, because they can be in either category more often than insurrections. The focus regarding microinsurgencies is within the realm of intrastate conflict. According to Nicholas Sambanis, “most civil war lists [including insurrections] rely heavily on the Correlates of War (COW) project.” Unfortunately, “since the first COW list was published, there has been little peer review of COW coding rules.” Furthermore, “most projects do not conduct original historical research and depend heavily on COW. For these reasons, and others outlined below, existing databases of conflicts are not reliable or sufficient for the analysis and research of smaller-scale armed conflicts because these are often excluded from those databases.”

Figure 1: Hierarchy of Armed Conflict from Lower Violence and Size to Higher[1]

[1] This hierarchy is not meant to be all-inclusive. Instead, it is used to illustrate where microinsurgencies fit within the scale of armed conflict in terms of size and violence. Additionally, this hierarchy does not dismiss the fact that smaller armed conflicts can have very violent actions and tactics, but in general, smaller armed conflicts do not meet the higher levels of violence observed and recorded in large-scale civil wars and international conflicts.

Karl DeRouen Jr. offers perhaps the best examinations of the concept of civil wars. In An Introduction to Civil Wars, DeRouen presents many viewpoints and definitions, most of which require 1,000 battle related deaths in at least one year of the conflict, but he does not identify or define smaller-scale conflicts, such as microinsurgencies. Finally, in “What Is Civil War?” Sambanis offers a definition of civil war that is extremely long, in which he also outlines nine distinct aspects or characteristics of civil wars, but which are not applicable to microinsurgencies.

Microinsurgency

Neither the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms nor Operational Terms and Graphics (FM1-02) provides a definition of microinsurgency, and no other sources identified or defined the concept or term microinsurgency. Consequently, the specific elements and an initial definition of microinsurgency are first offered here. In sum, a microinsurgency is a long-term intrastate conflict between an aggrieved minority and a recognized state or ruling authority. The conflict involves fighting over natural resources and has no appreciable or measurable international or external influences or support. The primary objective of the insurgents is an end state ranging in degree of autonomy from semiautonomous rule to complete secession.

All microinsurgencies are intrastate armed conflicts, in which no appreciable or measurable international or external influences contribute to the onset, duration, or outcome of the conflict. While many microinsurgencies might fit within various definitions of civil wars, most civil wars are not microinsurgencies. As explained below, the microinsurgency is also distinct from traditional insurrections.

The microinsurgency conflict is a dyad with one side being a government or ruling authority and the other an organized, armed opposition, typically an ethnic minority, to that authority or government. The duration of a microinsurgency is defined as at least 10 years. One reason for the selection of the 10-year mark is that many studies of insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) identify that the average duration of post-World War II counterinsurgencies is over nine years.

The definition employed for this research uses no threshold for annual deaths or total deaths from conflicts, as do most of the accepted databases. Attempting to calculate annual or total battle deaths is often misleading and always skews results or makes for awkward lists and definitions of civil wars and insurrections, which otherwise, might not even be categorized as armed conflicts. Others have often categorized these microinsurgencies as civil wars, regular to full-blown insurrections, or neither, because they do not meet their thresholds of battle related deaths. Consequently, these intrastate armed conflicts are frequently excluded from databases covering armed conflicts, even though microinsurgency durations are at least 10 years.

Seemingly, most intrastate conflicts have similar characteristics. However, the strategic objectives of microinsurgencies are distinct. The key objective of the insurgents is not to overtake or overthrow the national-level government, but to attain some degree of local control, or a certain measure of separation within their traditional lands from the established government. Microinsurgencies can be large in terms of geography or population relative to the size of the country in which the conflict is fought, such as the Moro conflict in the Philippines. In this sense, the size of the insurgent organization does not matter, neither do the numbers of those killed, civilian or militant.

Civil wars, insurgencies, and microinsurgencies are the three primary types of intrastate armed conflict, even though there are other types, such as coups. Of these three, only microinsurgencies always fall within the definition of an intrastate conflict. Civil wars and insurrections can be internationalized or can become interstate conflicts. For example, ISIS and the current conflict in Yemen are international in nature and scope. Historically, the Spanish Civil War and Vietnam War are two large-scale and classic examples. However, microinsurgencies, even when misclassified as civil wars or insurrections, are never internationalized. This is another one of the key distinguishing features setting microinsurgencies apart from most other insurgencies and civil wars.

Civil wars and full-scale insurrections are generally larger in scale and range than microinsurgencies, larger in the sense of the number of participants and in the geographic area under conflict. Civil wars and traditional insurrections are concerned with which group or organization will govern and control the entire country, whereas microinsurgencies never have this objective. See Figure 2 below for a Venn diagram displaying the logical and set relationships among intrastate armed conflicts, including civil wars, insurgencies, and microinsurgencies.

Figure 2: Microinsurgencies vs. Other Intrastate Conflicts.[2]

[2] This Venn Diagram displays the overlap among the three most significant intrastate conflicts: civil wars, insurgencies, and microinsurgencies. It also illustrates one of the key defining characteristics of microinsurgencies. They are always within the geographical boundaries of a single state, unlike many civil wars and larger insurrections, which often become international in scale and scope.

Although they are not about defeating national militaries, this does not prohibit the insurrectionists in a microinsurgency from attacking government facilities or forces in regions of the country other than contested areas. Attacks and fighting may often occur in capitals and other large urban areas in which the insurgents have no chance of controlling. Examples of this include the Southern Philippines, Northern Ireland, and Malaya. Importantly and more precisely, microinsurgencies are concerned with a range of issues and outcomes from various levels of local autonomy to complete secession from national-level governments.

Natural Resource Wealth

Microinsurgencies involve natural resources, actual or perceived, and conflict over them. The research has not identified any microinsurgency in which natural resources did not play a key role or motivating factor in the conflict. In microinsurgent conflicts, resource wealth may take the form of natural resources, such as petroleum, highly arable land, or precious gems and metals. These may be raw resources unique to a country or region used to produce something of high value, such as cocaine or opium. However, finished products, such as cocaine, heroin, furniture, etc., are not considered natural resource wealth. Additionally, resource wealth may also be derived from perceived, valuable resources, such as the potential presence of oil in the South China Sea or something as simple as traditional lands. Perceived resources must be believed or provable and feasibly exploitable in order to garner revenue and support. The relative distribution and exploitation of resources, regardless of what the resources are, contribute to the complexity and duration of microinsurgencies. Where these exploitable resources are relatively equally distributed between the two sides, microinsurgencies tend to be longer in duration.

Finally, it is important to note that, similar to characterizing and defining intrastate civil wars, microinsurgencies do not fit within existing political theories, and no international relations theory even begins to address this type of conflict. Being small-scale, intrastate conflicts, microinsurgencies cannot be described or explained by any of the various forms of realism. For similar reasons, the various forms of liberalism cannot adequately explain the phenomena of microinsurgencies either. In fact, microinsurgencies are not accounted for or explained by any theories of international relations or foreign policy. There does not appear to be a single theory, source, or concept that addresses the various aspects of these small-scale, intrastate conflicts.

Cases of Microinsurgency

West Papua

West Papua, Indonesia is an example of an ongoing microinsurgency. The Dutch granted independence to Indonesia in 1949. However, the Dutch first transferred Irian Jaya (West Papua, New Guinea) to the United Nations (UN) in 1962, and then the UN transferred it to Indonesia in 1963. Although the transfer was completed in 1963, it was thoroughly opposed by the indigenous population of West Papua.

The resource wealth exploited in West Papua is actual and entirely beneficial to Indonesia. The West Papuans receive practically nothing from the copper, gold, and other resources taken out of their land and surrounding sea. The resource wealth lost by the West Papuans ensured their demise and contributed significantly to the Indonesian economy. Additionally, Indonesia has committed numerous human rights violations against the indigenous Christian population of West Papua, including large numbers of murders.

Balochistan

The second example is that of Balochistan, an ongoing microinsurgency within the sovereign territory of Pakistan. The Province of Balochistan also borders Afghanistan and Iran. In 1876, the British established a treaty with Balochistan, known then as Kalat. As the British withdrew from the region immediately after World War II, Kalat sought independence, declaring so on 12 August 1947. However, Pakistan asserted its power and control over the region, which resulted in a backlash by the Baloch population. The conflict was short lived, with Pakistan gaining control over most of Balochistan in 1948. From 1948 to present, Pakistan has faced at least four other insurrections in Balochistan, including the current conflict that began in 2005.

One of the primary causes of this longest insurgency in Balochistan is exploitation of resource wealth from the province by the state of Pakistan. For example, Balochistan contains the largest natural gas fields in Pakistan, which according to Maliha Tariq “account for nearly 36 percent of Pakistan’s total gas production. Balochistan also produces more than 40 percent of Pakistan’s primary energy consisting of coal, oil, natural gas, and electricity.” The province also has an abundance of copper, gold, silver, platinum, and uranium. However, it remains the poorest of all Pakistan’s provinces. Clearly, this is a motivating factor for the insurgents.

Southern Philippines

A third example covers the temporarily terminated microinsurgency in the Southern Philippines. The modern conflict with the Muslim Moros in the Southern Philippines began in the late 1800s when forces from the United States ousted the Spanish government in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War. The United States forced the integration of Moros into the greater Philippine population, erasing centuries of voluntary segregation. After the United States granted independence to the Philippines on 4 July 1946, the Moros shifted their fight for autonomy against the Philippine government in part due to forced migration of non-Muslims from other regions in the country to the traditional Moro lands (Information was obtained from in-person interviews of and emails with former MILF fighter: 2019-2023).

In terms of intensity and grievances, this conflict has ebbed and flowed until today. The primary resources sought by the Moros are their traditional lands and any wealth produced from them. Of course, any marine resources would be included in these, as all their traditional lands are islands, or regions of large islands. The Philippine government does not receive much resource wealth from the traditional lands in which the Moros live. However, the perceived resource wealth by the Moros is tremendous, while that which is perceived by the national government is moderate (The author has conducted field research in and lives on Mindanao Island in the Southern Philippines). For example, the Philippine culture abounds in rumors, such as large caches of gold left behind and hidden by the Japanese after their occupation of the Philippines during World War II and offshore oil fields yet to be located and identified, but claimed by many, including China.

Conclusion

To recap, a microinsurgency is a long-term intrastate conflict between an aggrieved minority and a recognized state or ruling authority. The conflict involves fighting over natural resources and has no appreciable or measurable international or external influences or support. The primary objective of the insurgents is an end state ranging in degree of autonomy from semiautonomous rule to complete secession.

No definition of microinsurgency has been identified in extant literature. An extensive review of the literature yielded little about small-scale intrastate conflict, while microinsurgencies are essentially ignored. This research fills gaps in the existing literature by defining and explaining the dynamics of microinsurgencies and associated resource wealth. Although this type of intrastate conflict is positioned on the low end of the conflict intensity scale, studying microinsurgencies is important for four reasons. First, findings about microinsurgencies can inform and clarify the understanding of small-scale, intrastate and ethnic conflict. Second, almost all larger-scale intrastate and many interstate conflicts began as smaller-scale conflicts, such as these. Third, more accurate understanding of microinsurgencies can permit accurate causal analysis and precise development of proper policies, strategies, and tactics for conflict termination. Through the identification of such root causes, counterinsurgency operations, policies, and solutions can be developed to sufficiently address grievances of ethnic groups forming the insurgency and to pressure national governments into reasonable conflict termination agreements, preferably before armed conflict begins or increases in duration, intensity, or scale. Civilian and military analysts, planners, and policymakers should be better equipped to identify and understand these long-term conflicts and their associated grievances and issues. Finally, once identified, microinsurgencies can serve as an indication and warning of potential larger-scale conflicts, because almost all traditional insurrections began as microinsurgencies.

Tags: civil war, COIN, insurgency, Intrastate Conflict, Microinsurgency, Natural Resource Wealth, Resource Wealth

About The Author

• 
  
• LTC Michael F. Trevett
• LTC Michael Trevett served 30 years in three branches of the US military. He was an accredited diplomat in two countries and has worked with and trained intelligence, military, and police forces in dozens of countries. He earned a Ph.D. in International Development and Security Studies from the University of Southern Mississippi, an MS in Strategic Intelligence from the National Intelligence University, and an MA in Global History from American Military University and published the declassified book Isolating the Guerrilla.
• Https://www.linkedin.com/in/michael-trevett-ph-d-74001039/
• View all posts 

9. Pentagon sends ground forces to train in Panama’s jungle for first time in decades

​Summary:

For the first time in over 20 years, U.S. troops are training in Panama’s jungles at the revived Fort Sherman site. The three-week “Combined Jungle Operations Training Course” strengthens regional ties and counter-narcotics readiness amid Trump’s renewed Latin America focus. Officials deny Venezuela targeting, though the move signals strategic pressure on Maduro.

Comment: I know a lot of my 7th SF Group friends would be happy to re-establish the Red Empire in Panama. (of course I believe we should have Special Forces permanently assigned in all theaters at least one battalion – if not two).

Pentagon sends ground forces to train in Panama’s jungle for first time in decades

"Green Hell" revived as Trump shifts the military’s focus to Latin America.

ByAnne Flaherty

November 10, 2025, 5:13 AM

ABCNews.com · ABC News

https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/pentagon-sends-us-ground-forces-train-panamas-jungle/story?id=127314276

For the first time in more than two decades, the Pentagon has begun sending conventional ground forces to Panama to train in the jungle there, returning U.S. soldiers and Marines to a three-week course once called the "Green Hell" because of its similarities to Vietnam.

The training program at Base Aeronaval Cristóbal Colón, formerly known as Fort Sherman, is relatively small in scope but is expected to ramp up over the next year, according to one defense official.

The program began earlier this year and is not intended to prepare troops for a potential mission, including inside Venezuela, the official said.

Trump doesn't rule out US troops on the ground in Nigeria over claims of 'killing of Christians'

Still, the military's interest in jungle warfare in Latin America is noteworthy given Trump's heightened focus there. Since taking office, Trump has vowed to "take back" the Panama Canal and repeatedly threatened to attack Venezuela because of its alleged role in transiting illegal narcotics.

U.S. Marine Corps Lance Cpl. Robert Martinez, left, and Sgt. Jevin Wells, a squad leader, both assigned to 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, clear a building during the Combined Jungle Operations Training Course at Base Aeronaval Cristobal Colon, Panama, Oct. 27, 2025.

Spc. Trey Woodard/U.S. Southern Command

"If you can train and fight in one of the most difficult and challenging locations in the world, you build a really lethal, effective force," the defense official said of the rationale behind the new training program.

Alex Plitsas, a former Pentagon official and senior fellow at The Atlantic Council, said the new training course wouldn't likely play a role in potential operations inside Venezuela. The training effort appears to be more about building Panama's capacity to handle security threats in the region.

But the move signals a shift in priorities by the Trump administration, he said.

"It's an expansion of an existing military relationship, but it's not happening in a vacuum," Plitsas said. "It's happening as a broader change in policy. There's a renewed interest in South America, where the president sees the drug flow to the United States as a national security issue with the intention of potential military action."

Jungle training hasn't been a priority for the military since 9/11, when the nation's focus shifted to counterterrorism operations in the Middle East. The Defense Department in recent years has relied on a smaller Army jungle training center in Hawaii and at a Marine Corps site in Okinawa, Japan.

During the Vietnam War, however, Fort Sherman was considered a prime location where most troops could hone their jungle survival skills before shipping off to war.

Conditions at the Panamanian training site are considered among the harshest in the world, including venomous snakes and several layers of thick, towering vegetation that can make it difficult to operate communications and night-vision equipment or evacuate wounded personnel.

By 1999, the training site shuttered and the last of the U.S. military departed Panama as part of an agreement ceding U.S. control of the Panama Canal.

Shortly after taking office, though, Trump expressed renewed interest in the region, declaring the U.S. would be "reclaiming" the Panama Canal. That effort has since been couched by Pentagon officials as a renewed "partnership" with Panama to prevent Chinese influence over the canal, which the U.S. relies on heavily for shipping.

U.S. Marine Corps Cpl. Mason Weasel, a member 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines, crosses a rope bridge at Base Aeronaval Cristobal Colon, Panama, Oct. 27, 2025.

Spc. Trey Woodard/U.S. Southern Command

Trump also has overseen an unprecedented buildup of U.S. troops to the region, deploying 10,000 troops and, more recently, the USS Gerald R. Ford, the world's largest aircraft carrier. The public display of force appears to be a kind of pressure campaign aimed at forcing out Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

By August, the military had set up the "Combined Jungle Operations Training Course" with Marines and Panamanian forces training as part of a pilot program. A military spokesperson said there have since been 46 graduates of the three-week course: 18 Marines, one Army soldier and 27 personnel from Panama's National Aeronaval Service, National Border Service and National Police.

According to the Defense official, the Army plans to ramp up training over the next year, eventually sending in platoons of some 40 soldiers at a time to train.

Steve Ganyard, a retired Marine Corps colonel and ABC contributor, said the renewed interest in Panama is likely a practical one, but it also can be used to send a message.

"From a practical perspective, it's easier to get to Panama than Okinawa. And the jungles of Central and South America have their own unique challenges," he said. "That said, no doubt a message is being sent to Maduro by conducting combat training in his neighborhood."

ABCNews.com · ABC News

10. Communist China has never been a peace-loving country

​Summary: 

 The Chinese Communist Party has been the world’s chief source of instability since 1949. Rooted in Marxist-Leninist militancy, the CCP views peace as temporary and sustains itself through perpetual conflict. From Korea and Vietnam to Ukraine, Iran, and Venezuela, Beijing fuels wars, supports dictatorships, and undermines democracy worldwide.

​Comment: I think we should adopt the subtitle below - "Sustaining America's enemies since 1949." :-)  Unrestricted Warfare. Of course we (or they) can look to George Kennan's 1948 memo on the Inauguration of Political Warfare. They could criticize us for our actions during the Cold War based on Kennan's memo. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945-50Intel/d269

Communist China has never been a peace-loving country

Sustaining America's enemies since 1949

washingtontimes.com · Miles Yu

Monday, November 10, 2025

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/nov/10/communist-china-never-peace-loving-country/

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

OPINION:

Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party has projected an image of a “peace-loving” civilization wronged by imperialism and devoted to harmony. Yet from the Korean War to Ukraine, from the Himalayas to the South China Sea, the historical record exposes a very different truth.

The CCP, not the United States, has been the principal engine of global instability since the end of World War II, as today’s China is a revolutionary regime whose survival depends on perpetual struggle, conquest and deception.

Communism, by its very nature, is a militant ideology. It regards peace not as a moral good but as a temporary pause between battles. Mao Zedong built his regime on the doctrine of permanent revolution, declaring that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Like the Soviet Union before it, the CCP must continually demonstrate its vitality through conflict to preserve its myths of infallibility and invincibility. For the CCP, aggression is not an aberration but an existential requirement.

That imperative explains China’s unparalleled record of military adventurism.

Scarcely a year after its founding, the regime sent millions of Chinese “volunteers” into Korea and transformed a regional civil war into a global conflagration that claimed millions of lives.

In 1954 and again in 1958, it bombarded Taiwan’s offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, inaugurating decades of armed intimidation across the Taiwan Strait. In 1962, China invaded India and seized border territory under the false banner of “self-defense.”

Only a few years later, Chinese and Soviet troops clashed along the Ussuri River in bloody battles that nearly triggered nuclear war between the two communist powers. In 1979, Beijing invaded Vietnam, launching a monthlong campaign that killed tens of thousands on both sides.

No other major nation since World War II has initiated so many wars and border conflicts. Yet generations of Western apologists — from the so-called FOCs (Friends of China) such as Henry Kissinger to today’s loathsome clowns such as Jeffrey Sachs — have continued to parrot Beijing’s propaganda that China is uniquely “peaceful” and “non-expansionist.”

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That claim collapses under even the briefest historical scrutiny. Each of the CCP’s wars, large or small, was not defensive but ideological, an assertion of revolutionary dominance designed to remind the world that the party could never be challenged without consequence. Unable to confront the United States directly, the CCP also devised a long-term strategy of proxy confrontation.

In every major global conflict since the founding of the communist state in 1949, Beijing has been the hidden hand sustaining America’s enemies and prolonging instability.

The Korean War was the prototype. Had China not intervened, the conflict would have ended within months and the Kim dynasty would have disappeared into history. Instead, Mao’s intervention created the modern North Korean regime, a hereditary dictatorship that has menaced Asia with nuclear weapons for decades, propped up by China’s economic lifeline.

The pattern repeated in Vietnam, where China supplied Hanoi with weapons, equipment and advisers throughout the 1960s and 1970s, turning a limited conflict into a quagmire that exhausted American resolve. The purpose was never Vietnam’s freedom but the weakening of the United States.

Today, the same strategy persists under new guises. Beijing’s “no-limits partnership” with Moscow has made China the primary enabler of Russia’s war on Ukraine, supplying roughly 90% of the dual-use components, electronics and machine tools that sustain Vladimir Putin’s war machine.

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Without the CCP’s support, Russia’s assault would have collapsed already under sanctions and attrition.

In the Middle East, China’s 2021 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with Iran — a staggering $400 billion lifeline — has fueled Tehran’s capacity to bankroll Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist proxies. The Oct. 7, 2023, massacre of Israeli civilians was not just an act of Islamist barbarism; it was also the downstream consequence of Beijing’s decision to empower the world’s most prolific state sponsor of terrorism.

In Latin America, Chinese financing and political backing have transformed Venezuela’s regimes under Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro into a regional aggressor now openly threatening to annex two-thirds of neighboring Guyana.

Whether it’s Caracas, Tehran or Pyongyang, every major threat to international peace today carries Beijing’s fingerprints.

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These are not random episodes of opportunism. They form a coherent global strategy: to bleed the United States through endless peripheral wars, to fragment the Western alliance system and to reshape the world order in a way that normalizes dictatorship and punishes democracy.

The CCP’s method is to let others fight while it profits from the chaos, an updated version of Vladimir Lenin’s dictum that “the capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.”

The record is unambiguous. The CCP has fought or enabled more wars than any other power since 1949. Its ideology exalts struggle; its diplomacy cultivates instability; its economy fuels tyrants.

Although Washington’s foreign policy has often been imperfect, the United States has been a stabilizing force, defending free nations, rebuilding shattered economies, and anchoring the international order in law and restraint. Beijing, by contrast, equates peace with submission and “cooperation” with obedience. Wherever Chinese influence spreads, repression, conflict and fear soon follow.

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The great lie of our time, animating throngs of blame-America-first tenured professors, think tank misfits, greedy Wall Street financiers and nerdy Silicon Valley upstarts, is that the United States is the source of global instability. The truth, visible to anyone who examines the wreckage of modern history, is that the CCP has never ceased waging war, whether by armies, proxies, economic coercions or ideology.

It remains the most destabilizing, most warlike regime on earth, with the world’s largest military force under strict command of the world’s only remaining real Marxist-Leninist communist party, energized by a creed that can never coexist with genuine peace.

Until such an existential threat is confronted and defeated, the world will continue to live under the long shadow of Beijing’s aggression and strategic sophistry.

• Miles Yu is the director of the China Center at the Hudson Institute. His “Red Horizon” column appears every other Tuesday in The Washington Times. He can be reached at mmilesyu@gmail.com.

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Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · Miles Yu

11. Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On

​Summary:

Trump’s new Russia sanctions, though late, are devastatingly effective. Major buyers in China and India are halting purchases, crippling Rosneft and Lukoil. Russia’s oil exports, revenues, and refineries are collapsing amid Ukrainian drone strikes. The sanctions strike Moscow’s war-financing lifeline, aiming to force peace talks despite Russia’s continued battlefield ambitions.

Trump’s Russia Sanctions Are Really Putting the Hurt On

He was late to the show, but he brought a big stick.

By Keith Johnson, a staff writer at Foreign Policy covering geoeconomics and energy.

Foreign Policy · Keith Johnson

November 11, 2025, 12:45 PM

https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/11/11/trump-russia-sanctions-rosneft-lukoil-ukraine-war-putin/

Russia’s War in Ukraine

Understanding the conflict three years on.

More on this topic

U.S. President Donald Trump’s sanctions on Russia in late October may have been belated—they were the first of his second term—but they already seem shatteringly effective.

Big buyers of Russian oil, especially in Asia, are forsaking Urals crude, and major Russian oil companies such as Rosneft and especially Lukoil are under pressure worldwide as the specter of U.S. secondary sanctions chokes their business and prospects.

Russia’s economy is already shaky (interest rates are in the double digits, inflation is still a bugbear, and what economic growth there is is fueled by rampant and unsustainable defense spending), and its earnings from fossil fuel exports were already at their lowest point in September since the war began. Now things are going to get dire.

“You never know what the straw that breaks the camel’s back is,” said Edward Fishman, a former U.S. government official now at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy. “The benefit of stopping the oil trade is that you are hitting the Russian military-industrial complex at its source.”

China, the biggest buyer of Russian oil, is a good case in point. Beijing long shrugged off U.S. threats about China’s reliance on Russian energy and even increased its purchases late this summer of Russian natural gas, flouting U.S. sanctions. But in the wake of Trump’s October announcement, not only have Chinese state-owned refiners halted purchases of Russian oil, but some of the smaller, independent “teapot” refiners have, too. Even pipeline trade of oil from Russia to China is under threat: Big Chinese refiners in the northeast are not penciling in any Russian volumes for the next few months. That is a major shift.

But it’s not just China. India is Russia’s second-largest customer for oil. Trump’s threat this year of “secondary tariffs” on the country if it didn’t stop buying Russian oil did little to alter New Delhi’s calculus. But these new sanctions have. Two-thirds of the Russian oil that was headed to India now seems without a destination; only a Rosneft-run refinery really seems keen on buying the stuff.

“The sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil are by far the strongest steps taken yet against Russian oil. The reason we know that is [by seeing] how quickly the market reacted,” Fishman said. “Secondary tariffs led to an increase in India’s reliance on Russian oil. It goes to show that in economic statecraft, the weapons matter, and tariffs are much less effective than sanctions.”

Previous Western sanctions had put some of Russia’s smaller energy companies under threat. But the latest measures went after Moscow’s two prize pigs, and Lukoil has been reeling ever since.

At first, it tried to sell all of its international holdings to a Swiss-based firm in a bid to sidestep the impact of U.S. sanctions. The U.S. Treasury Department put the kibosh on that idea. Then Bulgaria, which is overwhelmingly reliant on a Lukoil refinery for fuel, said it would nationalize the complex to avoid headaches from the United States. The situation is still complicated, but it doesn’t look good for Lukoil.

Then in Iraq, where Lukoil operates a major oil field that produces nearly half a million barrels of oil a day (the West Qurna-2 field by itself is essentially a Libya or an Ecuador), the company declared force majeure on Monday, saying it could not continue operations. Baghdad is still seeking clarity, but here again, it doesn’t look good for Lukoil.

And that is all without accounting for measures beyond economic statecraft that are also impacting Russian oil. Ukraine has intensified its drone war against Russia’s oil complex, striking targets hundreds of miles from the border. Overnight, two Russian refineries were set alight, accounting for a nontrivial portion of Russia’s already diminished domestic refining capacity. That kinetic offensive reduces morale, margins, and more—forcing cheaper Russian crude onto shrinking global markets, where it finds fewer and fewer buyers willing to chance running afoul of U.S. sanctions.

That’s not to say the Trump administration has applied pressure on Russia uniformly. Trump gave Hungary a free pass last week to continue importing Russian oil and gas for at least a year, but Hungary has an election coming up, and Prime Minister Viktor Orban is an ideological ally of the U.S. president.

The ultimate goal of U.S. and Western sanctions is to crimp Russia’s ability to fund its war on Ukraine and thus to make peace talks possible. Arguably, that stranglehold could have been made more effective from the start of the war, rather than in year four, but late is better than never.

However, emboldened by some modest battlefield successes, Russia seems grimly determined. Despite having sustained heavy casualties in its effort to take a city in eastern Ukraine that once held 60,000 people, it appears close to finally achieving that goal. The Kremlin insists that it will only come to the peace table when its initial goals of the invasion of Ukraine are met: namely, “denazification” and “demilitarization” of a sovereign, independent, neighboring country.

Bankrupting Moscow is necessary, but is it sufficient?

This post is part of FP’s ongoing coverage of the Trump administration. Follow along here.

Foreign Policy · Keith Johnson

12. Modelling of Taiwan war shows US could recruit Australia, Japan for sanctions

​Summary:

A RAND Corporation study modeled potential U.S.-led pre-emptive sanctions to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan, identifying Australia and Japan as key partners, with the U.K. possibly joining. Sanctions could include financial restrictions, export controls, and curbs on resource shipments. RAND found sanctions alone unlikely to deter Beijing but vital to broader contingency planning. Canberra and Tokyo’s participation would depend on U.S. pressure and perceived existential threats, given economic ties with China. Japan views a Taiwan conflict as a “survival-threatening situation,” while Australia’s support hinges on national security interests, reflecting both nations’ balancing of alliance obligations and economic exposure.

Comment: Orange Wang references this RAND study (Economic Deterrence in a China Contingency) and it can be downloaded here: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA4000/RRA4022-1/RAND_RRA4022-1.pdf

Modelling of Taiwan war shows US could recruit Australia, Japan for sanctions

‘Sanctions alone are unlikely to deter’ Beijing but economic tools should be part of ‘broader contingency planning’, Rand says

South China Morning Post

Orange Wang

Published: 8:02pm, 10 Nov 2025Updated: 8:51pm, 10 Nov 2025

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3332235/modelling-taiwan-war-shows-us-could-recruit-australia-japan-sanctions-beijing

Australia and Japan could serve as “core” members of potential US-led pre-emptive sanctions to deter Beijing from launching a military attack on Taiwan if Washington considers the threat imminent, according to an influential American think tank.

Researchers from the Rand Corporation said that if the United States expected war to break out across the Taiwan Strait “within an ensuing three to six months”, it was possible Washington would put in place economic restraints “pre-emptively in a large-scale fashion” against mainland China.

“For maximum effectiveness [of those measures], allies and partners will need to be on board,” the analysts argued in a report titled “Economic Deterrence in a China Contingency”. It depicted Canberra and Tokyo as “the most important of those in the Pacific area”.

“We suggest that it is likely that the core group of countries that would counter China would be the United States; Australia and Japan, given their Pacific security interests and their close relationship with the United States,” said the study published on Thursday.

Trump downplays Taiwan dispute in China talks

Trump downplays Taiwan dispute in China talks

It identified the United Kingdom as another potential party to the expected coalition, citing London’s “historic relationship” with Washington and its long-standing role as a “global security leader”.

“We do not have strong prior expectations about how countries and regional groupings close to the core group, such as the European Union and individual EU member states, will act,” it added.

The restrictions targeting the world’s No 2 economy could include financial sanctions, limits on natural resource shipments, export controls on dual-use technology and individual punitive actions on mainland Chinese companies, vessels and people, the Rand report suggested.

The research came as Taiwan continued to stand out as one of the most sensitive and thorny issues pitting Beijing against Washington and its allies.

Although the issue was barely mentioned in the summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his American counterpart Donald Trump in South Korea two weeks ago, Beijing’s defence chief Dong Jun later urged Washington to “take a clear stance against ‘Taiwan independence’” during a meeting with Pentagon head Pete Hegseth in Malaysia on October 31.

The statement marked a call for the US to take an arguably nuanced shift from its conventional stance of “not supporting” Taiwan independence.

“Advancing the cause of national reunification” ranked as a priority in the framework of Beijing’s 15th five-year plan adopted by the fourth plenum of the Communist Party’s 20th Central Committee last month.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including the US, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-governed island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

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On Friday, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told a parliamentary committee that a military attack by mainland China on Taiwan could constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, a comment that prompted an official diplomatic protest and warning from Beijing.

Before that, her contact with a former senior Taiwanese politician on the sidelines of the Apec summit in South Korea led to a sharp backlash from Beijing in early November, days after Xi urged Tokyo to uphold bilateral political agreements on Taiwan during his meeting with Japan’s new leader.

Meanwhile, ties between Australia and China have remained strained in the security domain.

As two of Washington’s treaty allies, Canberra and Tokyo have been deepening their bilateral defence bonds recently. Notably, Australia in August selected Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to build the Royal Australian Navy’s new fleet of warships, before Japanese firms made their largest-ever appearance at an Australian defence exposition in Sydney last week.

Neither country has seen their respective trade friction with the White House hamper solidifying security relations with Washington. Still, four months ago, the Pentagon reportedly pressed Australia and Japan to clarify what their roles would be if war broke out between Washington and Beijing over Taiwan.

The Rand report highlighted the two countries’ potential reluctance to take pre-emptive sanctions against Beijing on Taiwan without strong US pressure, given their deep economic interdependence with mainland China.

Australia would embrace economic deterrence tools only if it believed the threat from China was existential or if it significantly and irreversibly threatened Australia’s immediate security interests, the report said.

“[The US] would need to exert significant pressure on Australia to have it join meaningful, pre-emptive actions.”

Xi’s National Day speech warns against Taiwan independence

Xi’s National Day speech warns against Taiwan independence

The study noted that Japan would consider the effectiveness of sanctions, Chinese retaliation and the safety of Japanese nationals and assets in China.

“Japan may be open to steps that pressure the Chinese economy … at the risk of retaliation if there were a strong consensus among like-minded countries and if there were pressure for Japan to cooperate, particularly from the [US].”

The Rand analysts estimated that when only Washington and Taiwan imposed “complete” sanctions against Beijing, applying to all sectors of trade, mainland China’s economic size would decline by about 1 per cent but the US would also see an annual GDP reduction of around 0.5 per cent – a decline that could narrow when other allies and partners joined in, according to Rand’s modelling.

The report added that “sanctions alone are unlikely to deter” Beijing from taking action against Taiwan but the use of economic tools should be part of “broader contingency planning”.

South China Morning Post

13. Exclusive: FBI chief visited China to talk fentanyl, law enforcement, sources say

​Summary:

FBI Director Kash Patel made an unannounced visit to Beijing to discuss fentanyl cooperation and law enforcement after the Xi-Trump summit. China agreed to tighten export controls on drug-making chemicals, requiring licenses for shipments to North America. The move signals rare bilateral coordination following Trump’s tariff cuts and new working-group deal.

Comment: Can we stop the flow of fentanyl (or precursor chemical)? Fentanyl = unrestricted warfare = subversion of US society.

Exclusive: FBI chief visited China to talk fentanyl, law enforcement, sources say

Reuters ·

By Laurie Chen and Antoni Slodkowski

November 10, 20255:37 AM ESTUpdated November 10, 2025

https://www.reuters.com/world/china/fbi-chief-visited-china-talk-fentanyl-law-enforcement-sources-say-2025-11-10/

• Summary
• Visit followed leaders' summit that hailed consensus
• China to adjust catalogue of drug-related precursor chemicals
• To require licences for exports of some chemicals to N. America

BEIJING, Nov 10 (Reuters) - FBI Director Kash Patel visited China last week to discuss fentanyl and law enforcement issues, two people familiar with his trip said, following a summit of the U.S. and Chinese leaders where both hailed "consensus" on the matter.

A person briefed on Patel's trip said the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation flew into Beijing on Friday and stayed for about a day. He held talks with Chinese officials on Saturday, the person added.

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Patel's visit to Beijing was not officially announced by either the United States or China and is being reported by Reuters for the first time.

Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian said on Monday he was not aware of the trip. China's Ministry of Public Security and the U.S. embassy in Beijing did not respond to requests for comment.

CHINA TO ADJUST LIST OF CHEMICALS

China's Commerce Ministry announced, opens new tab on Monday that the country will make adjustments to the catalogue of drug-related precursor chemicals and will require licenses for export of certain chemicals to the United States, Canada and Mexico.

The anti-drug authority also tightened oversight of production and export of drug-making chemicals not on its control list to keep them out of illegal channels, it said in a notice.

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It underscored criminal risks exporters could face when shipping chemicals to certain "high-risk" countries such as the United States.

U.S. President Donald Trump halved the tariffs on Chinese goods imposed as a punishment over the flow of fentanyl to 10% after reaching the agreement during last month's talks with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Xi will work "very hard to stop the flow" of fentanyl, a deadly synthetic opioid that is the leading cause of American overdose deaths, Trump told reporters after the talks.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the details of the fresh consensus would be hashed out through a new bilateral working group. It was unclear whether Patel discussed the new mechanism during his Beijing visit.

DEAL SIGNALS SHIFT FOR TRUMP OFFICIALS

The deal signalled a shift for Trump officials, who had insisted that punitive measures would remain in place until China proved it was cracking down on fentanyl supply chains.

Chinese officials vehemently defend their record on fentanyl, saying they have already taken extensive action to regulate precursor chemicals used to make the drug and accuse Washington of using the issue as "blackmail."

The Xi-Trump deal went beyond fentanyl and included the resumption of U.S. soybean purchases by China.

For its part, Beijing agreed to pause export curbs unveiled in October on rare earths, elements with vital roles in many modern technologies.

Reporting by Laurie Chen and Antono Slodowski in Beijing; Editing by Lincoln Feast and Neil Fullick

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab

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Laurie Chen

Thomson Reuters

Laurie Chen is a China Correspondent at Reuters' Beijing bureau, covering politics and general news. Before joining Reuters, she reported on China for six years at Agence France-Presse and the South China Morning Post in Hong Kong. She speaks fluent Mandarin.

Antoni Slodkowski

Thomson Reuters

Antoni Slodkowski is Reuters Chief Politics & General News Correspondent for China, based in Beijing, where he leads coverage of Chinese politics, society, and its relations with global counterparts. He has won two Pulitzer Prizes with Reuters colleagues: in Investigative Reporting in 2025 for uncovering fentanyl supply chains, and in International Reporting in 2019 for exposing the persecution of Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. Previously Japan Deputy Bureau Chief and Myanmar Bureau Chief at Reuters, Antoni also reported from Tokyo for the Financial Times and was a Knight-Wallace Fellow at the University of Michigan. He began his journalism career as a teenager, hosting a children's TV show for Poland's largest public broadcaster.

Reuters · Laurie Chen

14. Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries

​Summary:

Congress is advancing the bipartisan DISRUPT Act to counter growing coordination among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The bill directs State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, CIA, and DNI to form task forces and craft a whole-of-government strategy to “disrupt, frustrate, and constrain” adversary cooperation. It mandates reports on technology transfers, military risks, and war-planning modernization to address simultaneous multi-theater threats. Attached to the 2026 NDAA, the legislation highlights escalating collaboration among U.S. adversaries in arms transfers, disinformation, and dual-use technology sharing. Lawmakers aim to strengthen U.S. preparedness, digital capabilities, and interagency coordination to preempt unified challenges from authoritarian regimes.

​Comment: Excellent initiative. We must deal with the Dark Quad or CRInK. Tell me Congress wants a political warfare strategy without saying political warfare.

Here is the link to the complete text of the draft bill: https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/5912/text

Here are a few proposals that support this effort.

An American Way of Political Warfare​: A Proposal

Charles T. Cleveland, Ryan C. Crocker, Daniel Egel, Andrew Liepman, David Maxwell

https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE304.html

A Modern National Security Decision Directive for Irregular Warfare: Guidance from President Reagan’s NSDD 32

​David Maxwell

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2024/11/26/a-modern-national-security-decision-directive/

Seizing the Initiative in the Gray Zone: The Case for a US Office of Strategic Disruption

​David Maxwell

https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/01/seizing-the-initiative-in-the-gray-zone-the-case-for-a-us-office-of-strategic-disruption/

America Needs a New National Strategy for Irregular Warfare

​David Maxwell

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/america-needs-a-new-national-strategy-for-irregular-warfare/

Developing an Irregular Warfare Campaign for North Korea

​David Maxwell

​https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/developing-an-irregular-warfare-campaign-for-north-korea/

Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries

Experts have warned that authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are working more closely on activities to defy America.

By

Brandi Vincent

November 7, 2025

https://defensescoop.com/2025/11/07/congress-disrupt-act-china-russia-iran-north-korea/

The U.S. Capitol Building is seen at sunset on June 18, 2025 in Washington, DC. (Photo by Kevin Carter/Getty Images)

Lawmakers in both congressional chambers are calling for the creation of a new whole-of-government plan to confront emerging national security threats associated with expanding cooperation between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea — and to ultimately help ensure the U.S. is prepared to counter concurrent challenges from multiple adversaries in the years to come.

Introduced in the House of Representatives by Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi, D-Ill., this week, the Defending International Security by Restricting Unlawful Partnerships and Tactics (DISRUPT) Act lays out a plan for multiple federal agencies to collectively disturb and derail some of the most concerning aspects of that adversarial collaboration.

The House version of the DISRUPT Act was co-sponsored by Guam Del. James Moylan, a Republican. Similar legislation was also previously proposed in the Senate by Sens. Chris Coons, D-Del., and David McCormick, R-Pa., and is attached to the draft version of the fiscal 2026 National Defense Authorization Act.

“The bill was introduced to demonstrate bipartisan, bicameral support in the House as it continues to move through the NDAA process,” a spokesperson for the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party told DefenseScoop.

Experts have warned in recent years that authoritarian regimes in China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are working together more closely on activities to defy the U.S., including via weapons and munitions transfers, sharing other military and dual-use technologies, launching disinformation campaigns, and coordinating operations that could undermine the interests of America and its allies.

The nearly 20-page DISRUPT Act spotlights a range of recent partnerships and actions the four nations have pursued with one or more of the others, which lawmakers believe could present risks to U.S. interests. 

For instance, their mutual efforts increase “the chances of United States conflict or tensions with any one of such adversaries drawing in another, thereby posing a greater risk that the United States will have to contend with simultaneous threats from such adversaries in one or more theaters,” the bill states.

If passed, the legislation would require the secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce and the Treasury, as well as the directors of National Intelligence and the CIA, to set up task forces to investigate and address this “adversary alignment.”

The bill would also direct the director of National Intelligence to issue a report on the trajectory of the nations’ alignment across the diplomatic, information, military and economic spheres. 

That report would include an assessment of “the risk of technology transfers dramatically increasing the military capabilities of adversaries of the [U.S.] and the impact on the relative balance of [U.S] and allied capabilities as compared to that of the adversary.”

Further, leaders in the specific agencies called out would also be mandated to produce a comprehensive and coordinated government strategy to “disrupt, frustrate, constrain, and prepare for adversary cooperation during the two-year period beginning on the date of the” bill’s enactment.

Notably, Congress also wants a “plan for digitizing and updating war-planning tools of the Department of Defense not later than 1 year after the date on which the report is submitted to ensure that United States war planners are better equipped to update and modify war plans in the face of rapidly evolving information on adversary cooperation.”

Following its introduction, Krishnamoorthi’s bill was referred to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Intelligence (Permanent Select).

Written by Brandi Vincent

Brandi Vincent is a Senior Reporter at DefenseScoop, where she reports on disruptive technologies and associated policies impacting Pentagon and military personnel. Prior to joining SNG, she produced a documentary and worked as a journalist at Nextgov, Snapchat and NBC Network. Brandi grew up in Louisiana and received a master’s degree in journalism from the University of Maryland. She was named Best New Journalist at the 2024 Defence Media Awards.

​15. US Withdraws from its UN Human Rights Review

Summary:

The United States’ withdrawal from the UN Universal Periodic Review marks a historic break from decades of engagement, undermining global norms of accountability. Critics warn it weakens democratic legitimacy, encourages authoritarian evasion, and erodes U.S. credibility on human rights, revealing tensions between national sovereignty and international oversight in sustaining democracy.

Comment: This is a troubling development. However it does illustrate why we need organizations like the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK) if our government is going to abdicate its role and responsibility in the human rights space.

I wonder how this will affect the north Korean Human Rights legislation that Rep Young Kim just re-submitted. 

Note also that whatever organization the US withdraws from China fills the void to exert its influence.

Why Committee for Human Rights in North Korea must be funded -- now more than ever

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/10/27/perspective-committee-for-human-rights-North-Korea/6181761599619/

Regime fears the truth: how HRNK gives world Its most powerful weapon against North Korea

https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/10/perspective-human-rights-north-korea/5071762787247/

U.S. lawmaker reintroduces N. Korean human rights reauthorization act

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251111000200315

Opinion

US Withdraws from its UN Human Rights Review

Decision ignites global dismay from rights organizations

Nov 11, 2025

∙ Paid

By: Khanh Vu Duc

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/usa-withdraw-united-nations-human-rights-review?utm

Earlier this month, the United States made the unprecedented decision to skip its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the United Nations Human Rights Council. This withdrawal from the mechanism, which regularly assesses the human rights situations of all United Nations member states, marks a sharp departure from decades of engagement and raises critical questions about the durability of democratic accountability in the 21st century.

Beyond the procedural implications, the decision challenges the norms that sustain freedom, transparency, and legitimacy in both domestic and international governance. The refusal to participate was quietly announced in September, the eve of the US Labor Day weekend. As justification, an official said the refusal was in response to the UN Human Rights Council’s “persistent failure to condemn the most egregious human rights violators.”

Even some of the most egregious human rights violators, including China, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, Belarus, and Russia, however, have repeatedly participated in the process and subjected themselves to dialogue on their human rights records

Globally, the Trump administration’s approach to human rights has been marked by a pronounced shift away from traditional US leadership, drastically cutting or suspending foreign aid, including funding for programs addressing global health, democracy-building, and humanitarian assistance for refugees, such as the UN Relief and Works Agency.

In addition to withdrawing from the UN Human Rights Council, it also quit the World Health Organization (WHO) and has imposed sanctions on officials from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

The November 7 decision by the US was much to the dismay of its allies and human rights advocates. For decades, Washington has engaged fully with the UPR, submitting national reports and participating in peer review on civil rights, racial equality, immigration, and indigenous issues. This year, however, it declined both to submit a report and to attend the session, citing concerns over alleged bias in the Council.

The UPR is founded on universality. Every UN Member State, regardless of power or prestige, is expected to submit itself to scrutiny. Its value is not only in recommendations for reform but in demonstrating that no nation is above accountability. By stepping aside, the United States disrupts the norms of international oversight and signals a tension inherent in modern governance. Even established democracies may prioritize perceived national interest over global standards. The withdrawal breaks a long-standing precedent, drawing attention not merely to U.S. policy but to the fragility of institutionalized accountability.

Consequences for Credibility and Oversight

The implications of this decision are profound. Practically, civil society groups, peer states, and human-rights monitors lose a formal forum to question and evaluate US policies. Symbolically, the move undermines the Review’s universality, suggesting that compliance with international norms is negotiable.

Other states with weaker human-rights records such as China, Cuba, Russia, Venezuela and/or Vietnam may now see an opening to evade scrutiny, weakening the peer-pressure mechanism central to the review process.

Internationally, the US’s absence chips away at its credibility. A nation advocating human rights globally, yet evading evaluation at home, invites accusations of hypocrisy. The withdrawal underscores a core tension in democratic governance: the balance between sovereignty and accountability. Democracies rely not only on domestic legitimacy but also on consistent engagement with international norms. Temporarily avoiding review may seem expedient, but it highlights how political calculus can outweigh long-term commitments to transparency and oversight.

For students of governance, the US case is instructive. Freedom, democracy, and prosperity are interdependent: freedom requires that leaders be answerable, democracy thrives under transparent institutions, and prosperity benefits from legitimacy and predictability. External oversight mechanisms like the UPR reinforce these principles by embedding norms that constrain arbitrary power.

The rescheduling of the US review for 2026 demonstrates that the mechanism remains resilient. The challenge is ensuring that participation is substantive, consistent, and meaningful. The US’s partial retreat illustrates a broader lesson for the global community: institutions must be designed to enforce accountability even when political incentives push states to resist. Without such structures, democratic ideals risk erosion.

Ultimately, the episode is a reminder that democratic values are fragile if left untested. The UPR is not ceremonial; it is a crucial instrument for sustaining legitimacy, both domestically and internationally. In a world where power, sovereignty, and global norms collide, the ability of states to submit themselves to scrutiny is a measure of their commitment to freedom, democracy, and prosperity. Avoiding review may offer short-term convenience, but true governance—and enduring legitimacy—requires courage, consistency, and accountability.

16. Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas

​Summary:

Leland Lazarus and Guido Torres argue that China’s economic engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is a form of irregular warfare that uses trade, infrastructure, loans, and lawfare to gain political leverage and erode sovereignty. Through “CCP, Inc.”, Beijing cultivates dependence via ports, energy grids, and telecom projects, especially in the Caribbean and Central America. Nations that defy China, like recognizing Taiwan, face coercion through delayed investments or trade restrictions. The authors urge LAC governments to diversify markets, strengthen investment screening, and coordinate regional defenses, while calling on the U.S. and partners to provide transparent, reliable development alternatives and strategic financing.

Excerpts:

China’s expanding economic engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is reshaping the region’s strategic landscape. Beijing has positioned itself as an indispensable development partner—especially for those who perceive traditional Western actors as inconsistent, conditional, or disengaged.

Yet China could use the same levers of commercial cooperation to deploy irregular tactics to undermine LAC countries’ sovereignty, especially when those countries make decisions that go against China’s interests. Governments that cross Beijing—by recognizing Taiwan, criticizing its human rights record, or aligning more closely with Washington—risk subtle but tangible forms of retaliation: project cancellations, delayed trade, suspended medical shipments, or withdrawal of tourists and investors. This is irregular warfare by design—waged in boardrooms, tenders, and trade agreements. Subversion replaces confrontation; contracts replace conflict.

LAC governments must guard their sovereignty from China or risk seeing the Monroe Doctrine replaced by Sun Tzu Doctrine. The U.S. interagency—along with its allies and partners—must do more to provide alternatives to LAC countries to ensure the region experiences true unfettered freedom.

Comment: The IWI-SWJ partnership is a good thing. It allows us to read good articles more than once. Graphics at the link.

Development or Dependence? Rethinking China’s Economic Playbook in the Americas

by Leland Lazarus, by Guido Torres

|

11.12.2025 at 06:00am

 https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/12/china-economic-coercion-latin-america-irregular-warfare/

Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of the Irregular Warfare Initiative as part of a republishing arrangement between IWI and SWJ. The original article was published on July 16, 2025 and is available here. 

Introduction

“Economic security is national security.” This core principle, long echoed across the U.S. interagency—from the White House’s National Security Strategy to Treasury and Commerce policy directives—has gained renewed urgency as strategic competition intensifies in the Western Hemisphere. In no place is this more evident than in Latin America and the Caribbean, where economic statecraft has become the terrain of contestation.

For three years, this slogan permeated out of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), stressing that a nation’s economic and national security are intertwined and that economic over-reliance on China could infringe on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)’s sovereignty. While the slogan certainly resonated in Washington, we often discussed with colleagues in the region whether LAC citizens felt the same way.

Oftentimes, they didn’t. Part of the reason is the U.S.’s own fraught history of imperialism in the region, where it militarily intervened in LAC countries dozens of times under the infamous Monroe Doctrine. In the minds of some LAC leaders, U.S. warnings about Chinese threats to their economic and national security come off as hypocritical.

That being said, it is disappointing that the same kind of domestic political discourse in many LAC countries where politicians jealously guard their sovereignty from the clutches of a Monroe Doctrine 2.0 doesn’t also include the same fervent effort to protect their sovereignty from China.

Beijing often cloaks its regional projects in strictly commercial language, but the substance is strategic: using economic leverage to shape the policy behavior of smaller states. In LAC, this coercion is increasingly subtle, pervasive, and effective. China’s tactics constitute a form of irregular warfare as old as Sun Tzu’s Art of War. An ancient Chinese idiom captures this approach well: ‘subdue the enemy without fighting.’ Therefore, LAC countries must identify when and how China is deploying economic coercion, and develop strategies to successfully counteract them and proactively protect their sovereignty.

The following table illustrates all instruments wielded by Chinese embassies.

Irregular Warfare Framed through DIME-FIL

Instruments of PowerChina’s ActionsImplications for IWDiplomacyChinese embassies serve as the center of gravity for all CCP actions, overt and covert.Coordinates influence across domains, pressuring and bribing elites behind closed doors, and reinforcing dependency through covert inducements—blurring the line between statecraft and subversion.InformationState-linked media outlets and social influencers amplify CCP narratives—framing infrastructure as win-win.Shapes local perceptions, reducing resistance to dual-use assets.MilitaryDual-use ports (e.g., Chancay) serve as platforms for CCP access and placement.Enables maritime presence & access to strategic key terrain under cover of civilian logistics.Economic 

Companies like Huawei and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) like China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC) develop infrastructure projects.

Expands CCP control over telecom, cyber networks, and critical infrastructure.

FinanceHeavy lending via Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)-like instruments, resulting in debt and substandard construction projects, leading to pressures (e.g., Peru).

Builds financial dependency that doubles as political leverage.

IntelligenceSatellite-linked operations in Cuba, data centers, undersea cables, and space sites expand People’s Liberation Army (PLA) access and global capabilitiesEnhances SIGINT collection capabilities across the hemisphere and possess risks to U.S. on-orbit capabilities.Lawfare/Law enforcementLegal agreements and nebulas language embed Chinese arbitration terms, complicating renegotiation.Creates coercive strategic traps through binding agreements.

Economic Statecraft as Irregular Warfare

At the heart of China’s statecraft is a global network of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), policy banks, politically connected private firms, Chinese diaspora leaders, and local businesspeople. These actors extend China’s reach through infrastructure projects, trade ties, loans, and in some instances, bribery. These relationships are not purely commercial; they’re tools of foreign policy. This is Chinese state capitalism, or as China scholar Jude Blanchette calls it, “CCP, Inc.” By dominating strategic sectors—ports, power grids, telecommunications—Chinese firms make countries reliant on Beijing for economic growth and essential services, which in turn further ensure the Chinese Communist Party’s long term stability. That dependence becomes leverage. If a government supports Taiwan, criticizes Chinese policies, or edges closer to the U.S., China can retaliate by canceling projects, restricting imports, delaying vaccine shipments, or suspending tourism.

The Caribbean

Nowhere in the hemisphere is China’s per-capita investment footprint more concentrated than in the Caribbean. Through a mix of concessional loans, tourism-focused developments, and high-visibility infrastructure projects, Beijing has embedded itself in the political economies of small island states. For many of these nations, Chinese capital fills critical development gaps left by traditional Western actors. Yet beneath the surface, these engagements function as strategic footholds—testing how commercial dependency can evolve into geopolitical leverage.

Guyana is illustrative. Chinese companies are increasingly engaged in the oil rich country, especially in energy and construction. In early 2021, Guyana announced it would allow Taiwan to open a small trade office in Georgetown. But within 24 hours, Guyana abruptly reversed course after China purportedly threatened to delay COVID-19 vaccine shipments or curtail investments in energy and infrastructure. Local Guyanese have also expressed dismay at the proliferation of Chinese supermarkets and retailers undercutting local businesses.

In the Bahamas, the $3.5 billion Baha Mar resort—financed by the China Export-Import Bank and built by China Construction America (CCA)—became the largest single-phase resort in the Caribbean. When the project went bankrupt, Chinese entities forced out the original developers and seized control through legal and financial maneuvering. A New York state court ruled that CCA induced the project’s financial collapse through fraud and misrepresentation.

In Jamaica, China Harbour Engineering Company (CHEC)—which was blacklisted by the U.S. Commerce Department for building artificial military islands in the South China Sea- constructed the North–South Highway and was later awarded contracts for port expansion and logistics hubs. While Jamaica maintains strong ties with the U.S., it consistently avoids antagonizing Beijing.

In Trinidad and Tobago, Chinese companies have become involved in the oil industry, built a $500 million drydock and a $102 million industrial park in La Brea, made significant investments in the telecommunications sector, and donated hundreds of police motorcycles and buses. This has caused concerns about over-reliance.

In Antigua and Barbuda, a Chinese SOE secured the rights to a large swath of land to build a deep water port and special economic zone with everything from logistics to cryptocurrencies. This raised concerns in Washington that China could potentially use this area for commercial and military purposes. The project’s opacity, combined with its proximity to major maritime routes, mirrors similar dual-use infrastructure strategies employed by Beijing in Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Such developments underscore how seemingly benign investments can serve as prepositioning platforms for influence projection, economic leverage, or even future People’s Liberation Army (PLA) logistical access in the hemisphere.

There are also more subtle tactics. Prominent members of the local Chinese diaspora community with direct ties to top political leaders help facilitate Chinese business projects in their respective countries. Some Caribbean countries have also received an influx of Chinese nationals acquiring citizenship by investment who then help expand Chinese business interests and try to persuade some governments to ditch Taiwan.

China is not just investing—it is rehearsing influence. The Caribbean provides a low-risk, high-return environment for the CCP to refine coercive economic tools. These engagements, when left unchecked, enable Beijing to shape elite behavior, compromise digital and physical infrastructure, and embed long-term dependencies under the guise of partnership.

Central America

Central America is a key battleground for China’s campaign to diplomatically isolate Taiwan. Since 2017, Panama, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and most recently Honduras have switched recognition to Beijing—each after receiving promises of investment, aid, or infrastructure.

In Honduras, the decision came in 2023 after officials openly compared what Taiwan and China could offer. Honduras reportedly asked Taiwan for $2 billion in development assistance, including a hospital and a hydroelectric dam, though the Honduran government denied this. When Taipei declined, Honduras quickly sealed a deal with Beijing. China rewarded the move with state visits and new cooperation agreements. Whether the promises will materialize remains to be seen—but the diplomatic result was already banked.

El Salvador followed a similar path in 2018, announcing its break with Taiwan just months after President Nayib Bukele came to power. China quickly pledged a new stadium, library, and water treatment plants—while U.S. officials warned that the proposed La Unión port project could serve dual military purposes. El Salvador’s economy is now more entwined with Chinese capital—and its foreign policy more circumspect.

In Panama, China’s influence extends well beyond trade. After switching diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China in 2017, Panama signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and welcomed a surge of Chinese business delegations. The Trump administration decried the fact that the Hong Kong-based company CK Hutchison Holdings operated two key port terminals on both sides of the Panama Canal. A U.S. company, BlackRock, has since sought to acquire the ports, although the deal is currently in legal limbo. Panama’s president Jose Raul Mulino also said Panama has withdrawn from the BRI, and the U.S. is helping Panama replace Huawei telecommunications equipment in 13 sites around the country. Mulino and subsequent Panamanian officials will now have to walk a careful line—placating U.S. national security concerns around the canal while not appearing as a U.S. puppet and continuing to welcome Chinese capital.

South America

In South America, China’s strategy hinges on dominating trade. Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Argentina all count China as their largest export destination. With stakes in copper, lithium, soy, and rare earths, China has embedded itself deeply in these economies. But that trade relationship can become a political tool. In Brazil, when President Bolsonaro threatened to ban Huawei from 5G contracts, China delayed key vaccine ingredients. Shortly after Brazil softened its position, shipments resumed. Beijing never admitted a link—but Brazilian governors certainly noticed. Brazil’s current president Lula da Silva has been much more cooperative with the Chinese, and Brazil is courting Chinese electric vehicle and tech companies to invest in the country. However, there is an ongoing debate in Brazil about how a further increase in Chinese exports due to overcapacity of both high and low-end manufactured goods could exacerbate the de-industrialization of Brazil’s manufacturing sector; this is why Brazil has imposed anti-dumping tariffs on Chinese iron, steel, and fiber optic cables.

Elsewhere, Chinese firms have invested in ports, highways, and energy grids. In Peru, two Chinese companies have a virtual monopoly over Lima’s electrical grid. China is financing Peru’s Chancay megaport, which Chinese scholars of Latin America call one of China’s “strategic support points,” a term used by the PLA and military researchers denoting ports with both commercial and strategic purposes. In Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela, Chinese companies have built space research infrastructure that could also serve dual-use purposes; local governments can push back on these projects for only so long until they suffer economic retaliation. While many of these projects appear beneficial, they deepen structural dependence on Chinese capital—making future coercion easier and more effective.

Policy Recommendations

All these examples point to the need for local LAC leaders to take stock of the very real irregular tactics China uses to undermine their sovereignty. As such, LAC countries must reduce their economic over-reliance on China with the same fierceness they use to guard against U.S. or other big country interference. Fortunately, there are already playbooks Global South countries can use to further shore up their economic security. The following recommendations are intended for both LAC governments and their U.S. and international partners:

Recommendations for LAC countries:

1. Institutionalize awareness of CCP economic coercion. The Atlantic Council’s Chinese economic coercion report can act as a guide. It provides case studies and operational tactics to recognize early indicators of economic warfare. Regular public-sector training in ministries of trade, economy, and foreign affairs should include scenario-based simulations of coercive trade behavior, investment withdrawal threats, and digital authoritarian entrenchment.
2. Seek transparent, high-quality alternatives. Pursue the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and Inter-American Development Bank-financed infrastructure that emphasizes governance, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards, and local capacity building. Critically, demand conditionality transparency in all future foreign infrastructure contracts—especially those related to ports, fiber-optic cables, energy grids, telecommunications, space, artificial intelligence, and data centers.
3. Coordinate regional response mechanisms. Develop rapid-response economic teams to support countries facing Chinese retaliation—whether through trade substitution, diplomatic backing, or financial relief.
4. Strengthen investment screening. Review foreign investment deals for national security risks, similar to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. or Canada’s recent amendments to its foreign direct investment rules. This includes legal reforms to screen foreign direct investment in strategic sectors, empowering defense and intelligence ministries to contribute to risk assessments, and publicizing CCP-linked corporate acquisition trends for transparency.
5. Support export diversification. Reduce overreliance on Chinese demand by identifying new markets, building downstream industries (e.g., lithium battery tech, rare earth separation), investing in logistics modernization, and expanding trade facilitation efforts. Some partners like the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and India are also looking to expand economic partnerships with LAC. Market diversification through free trade agreements offers sustainable pathways to reduce coercion exposure.

Recommendations for U.S. and partner nations:

1. Expand and Reauthorize the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Congress should reauthorize the U.S International Development Finance Corporation and double its capital portfolio to $120 billion from $60 billion. The U.S. should not try to match China dollar-for-dollar, but it can match China in reliability. Under the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act, this should be coordinated with the Office of Strategic Capital and the proposed National Security Council Economic Statecraft Integration Cell, enabling the Development Finance Corporation to deliver targeted, secure infrastructure financing at scale.
2. Maintain persistent engagement. Diplomatic absence creates space for China and diplomatic consistency is as important as financial presence. Regular high-level visits, economic dialogues, and people-to-people exchanges can reaffirm U.S. commitment. Moreover, the U.S. should embed Economic Influence Monitoring Teams—comprising State, Treasury, DOD (SOUTHCOM), and Commerce officials—at embassies in vulnerable LAC countries. These teams would provide early warning of coercion attempts, vet infrastructure proposals for embedded risk, and coordinate direct reporting mechanisms.
3. Elevate Civil Society Capacity through Targeted Legal and Media Support. Fund regional investigative media hubs, legal watchdog networks, and civic tech platforms to expose hidden debt clauses, political financing flows from CCP-linked firms, and disinformation tied to foreign investment. The Global Magnitsky Act should be utilized to protect journalists and civil society actors at risk from transnational repression or corruption.

Strategic Action Framework: Countering CCP Economic Influence in LAC

Line of EffortLead ActorsStrategic MechanismsDesired OutcomesRecognize and Counter Economic CoercionLAC Ministries of Trade, Economy, Foreign AffairsPolicy training and coercion recognition exercisesLocal leaders can detect and resist coercive pressureBuild Strategic Economic AlternativesLAC Governments, IDB, PGII, G7 PartnersPGII/IDB infrastructure packages with conditionality transparencyLAC nations access transparent, sovereign-aligned development pathwaysEnhance Regional Defense and CoordinationLAC Regional BlocsEconomic resilience compacts and trade substitution protocolsCollective response capability to CCP retaliation or economic pressureModernize Investment OversightLAC National Security and Economic MinistriesForeign investment screening legislation and risk auditsScreen out predatory investments and preserve national autonomyPromote Export DiversificationLAC Trade and Industry MinistriesNew trade agreements, logistics hubs, downstream processing investmentReduce overdependence on Chinese commodity demandExpand U.S. Strategic Finance ToolsU.S. Congress, DFC, Treasury, OSC, NSCFY25 NDAA authorities, BUILD Act, OSC mobilizationScale reliable capital deployment for key infrastructure projectsDeploy Economic Influence Monitoring TeamsNSC, State Department, DOD, TreasuryEmbassy-embedded interagency teams with OSINT and risk flagsEnable real-time risk identification and policy coordinationStrengthen Civil Society Watchdog CapacityStateMedia hubs, legal watchdog grants, Magnitsky protectionsExpose malign influence and protect democratic resilience

Conclusion

China’s expanding economic engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean is reshaping the region’s strategic landscape. Beijing has positioned itself as an indispensable development partner—especially for those who perceive traditional Western actors as inconsistent, conditional, or disengaged.

Yet China could use the same levers of commercial cooperation to deploy irregular tactics to undermine LAC countries’ sovereignty, especially when those countries make decisions that go against China’s interests. Governments that cross Beijing—by recognizing Taiwan, criticizing its human rights record, or aligning more closely with Washington—risk subtle but tangible forms of retaliation: project cancellations, delayed trade, suspended medical shipments, or withdrawal of tourists and investors. This is irregular warfare by design—waged in boardrooms, tenders, and trade agreements. Subversion replaces confrontation; contracts replace conflict.

LAC governments must guard their sovereignty from China or risk seeing the Monroe Doctrine replaced by Sun Tzu Doctrine. The U.S. interagency—along with its allies and partners—must do more to provide alternatives to LAC countries to ensure the region experiences true unfettered freedom.

Tags: Central America, China, China strategic influence, Global South, Latin America, South America

About The Authors

• 
  
• Leland Lazarus
• Leland M. Lazarus is the founder and CEO of Lazarus Consulting, LLC, a strategic consulting firm focused on U.S.-China-Latin America relations. He is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub and is a former SOUTHCOM official and U.S. diplomat.
• View all posts
• 
  
• Guido Torres
• Guido L. Torres is the executive director of the Irregular Warfare Initiative and a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Forward Defense Program.

17. EXCLUSIVE: The Army is changing its acquisition structure. Here are the details.

​Summary:

The U.S. Army is overhauling its acquisition system in its largest reform in decades, consolidating 12 Program Executive Offices into six “Portfolio Acquisition Executives” to streamline weapons development and cut bureaucracy. The restructure reduces senior ranks, accelerates delivery timelines by up to 50%, and strengthens coordination between requirements, contracting, and testing. A new “Pathway for Innovation and Technology” office will integrate rapid prototyping and nontraditional programs, fostering faster fielding of emerging technologies and a more agile partnership with industry to maintain technological superiority.

​Comments: Perhaps the most important bureaucratic initiative since Goldwater Nichols? Video at the link.

EXCLUSIVE: The Army is changing its acquisition structure. Here are the details. - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · Ashley Roque · November 12, 2025

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll laid out the plan for Breaking Defense, including the formation of six new Portfolio Acquisition Executives.

By Ashley Roque and Carley Welch on November 12, 2025 8:00 am

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/army-acquisition-reform-driscoll-peo-major-changes/?utm

WASHINGTON — The Army is launching a complete rework of its weapons portfolio organization in the biggest acquisition shakeup the service has seen in years, officials exclusively told Breaking Defense.

The overhaul will see a host of consolidations, including a reduction in the number of general officers at the top rank, the contraction of the 12 Program Executive Offices (PEOs) in charge of acquisition, and an entirely new reporting structure up the chain.

“We had previously created a system that was wildly risk averse and … the cost of that risk aversion was being able to get tools into the hands of our soldiers fast enough for them to actually be able to use it,” Army Secretary Dan Driscoll told Breaking Defense.

The Army acquisition revamp has been in the works for the better part of the year, as first reported by Breaking Defense in April. But the Army is finally implementing the plan, which fits into broader reform efforts outlined last week by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

“This transformation is about preparing the Army for the future, whether it’s ensuring that we can quickly adopt the next generation of technologies or that we are ready to respond rapidly to a crisis,” Army Undersecretary Michael Obadal said in a Nov. 10 email to Breaking Defense. “A modernized acquisition system will position us ahead of our adversaries, strengthen our readiness, and maintain a technological edge in all domains.”

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One Army official who briefed Breaking Defense explained that the moves have been driven by asking how the Army can remove constraints and hone its processes to move much faster. Part of that answer, the official added, was to find a way to “reset and rebuild” the relationship between the requirements and the acquisition communities.

According to Lt. Col. Charlie Dietz, who is working in Obadal’s office, the goal is to streamline the bureaucracy between different Army offices that don’t always communicate well.

“Too often they are pointing at each other, ‘Like, well, we’re waiting on them.’ ‘[No,] we’re waiting on them right now,’” explained Dietz. “Hey, you guys are all together now, so you can’t blame each other. We’re going to make this quicker. We’re going to give you less paperwork. … And, this is supposed to save money.”

While the Army has already rolled out changes to the requirements process with the new Transformation and Training Command, Driscoll estimated that the complete overhaul could speed up acquisition by as much as 30 percent and, in some cases, even more.

“I’m optimistic that it could be even greater than 50 percent on a lot of projects because … we will have parallel execution of many of our processes,” he said.

New Structure of Portfolio Acquisition Executives

According to Army officials, under the reorganization the top of the structure will be the new Army Transformation and Training Command and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, or ASA(ALT) — not altogether different from the current setup. It’s a step down the chain where things begin to shift.

Under those two offices will live six overarching “Portfolio Acquisition Executives,” or PAEs: Fires in Redstone Arsenal, Ala.; Command and Control (C2) and Counter C2 in Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.; Maneuver Ground in Fort Benning, Ga.; Maneuver Air in Fort Rucker, Ala; Agile Sustainment and Ammunition in Picatinny, N.J.; and Layered Protection Plus Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear in Fort Leonard Wood, Mo.

Said Driscoll, “The requirements, teams, the system centers, programming, acquisition, the contracting and testing, will all now report to each of these PAEs, and they will report directly up to our ASA(ALT) who will report directly to me and chief, and we will be able to manage innovation as they push through different projects.”

Each PAE will eventually be managed by a two-star general, or the civilian equivalent, along with a deputy. One will serve in an operational role and one will serve in an acquisition role, the Army official said.

Then, under those six PAEs will be “enabler organizations,” which include the artists formally known as PEOs.

• PAE Fires: PEO Missiles and Space, also adds Self Propelled Howitzer Systems (SPHS) from PEO Ground Combat Systems, and a majority of the Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO)
• PAE C2 and Counter C2: PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare & Sensors (IEWS), PEO Command, Control, Communications, and Network (C3N), and adds the majority of PEO Simulation, Training and Instrumentation (STRI) under this umbrella
• PAE Maneuver Ground: PEO Soldier, PEO Ground Combat Systems, and moves the Infantry Squad Vehicle (ISV) from PEO Combat Support & Combat Service Support.
• PAE Maneuver Air: PEO Aviation, moves aircraft survivability from PEO IEW&S and moves autonomy under one umbrella.
• PAE Agile Sustainment and Ammo: Joint Program Executive Office Armaments & Ammunition, and moves majority of PEO Combat Support & Combat Service Support
• PAE Layered Protection Plus Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear: Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, and moves terrestrial sensors from PEO IEW&S

That plan leaves PEO Enterprise out of the PAE structure; however, the “pre-decisional” plan is to align PEO Enterprise with the Chief Information Officer to centralize efforts to “rapidly deliver automated tools for business process automation and direct alignment” with the Army financial and comptroller shop, the Army official explained.

The Army official stressed that these changes will alter the “reporting chain” but aren’t going to force soldiers or the civilian workforce to uproot their lives due to new bureaucracy.

“There’s no geographical relocation [for any PAE] at this time, everybody is going to stay in their spaces where they’re currently geographically set,” the Army official said. “So Detroit people stay in Detroit. Whether or not a piece [of a PEO] goes to PAE Fires in Huntsville, the people stay in Detroit.”

In addition to having those acquisition enablers nested inside each PAE, each portfolio will have people devoted to working requirements, contracting, testing and evaluation, sustainment and international efforts like foreign military sales.

There will also be a “system centers” enabler inside each PAE, like some tied back to the Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) to better ensure that internal science and technology efforts are aligned with what soldiers need, in order to ultimately produce fieldable tech and weapons.

New Pathways For Innovation

Outside of the PAE structure, the Army is also creating a new office, known as the Pathway for Innovation and Technology (PIT). This will be used to look at “how can we kind of get techie stuff quicker and then, if it works, how can we scale it across organizations,” the Army official said.

Falling into the PIT, which the Army official described as the “forward edge” of ASA(ALT), are parts of the service’s RCCTO office, which was established in 2018 for rapid prototyping and getting soldiers weapons at a quicker pace. The PIT will also include the Army Applications Laboratory and the Joint Innovation Outpost under its umbrella.

It’s basically the Army’s “innovation line,” the official said, adding that it will house non-traditional programs like the FUZE initiative and is designed to help companies who traditionally “struggle” to get into the defense industrial base.

While the Army began implementing the changes in October, the service official emphasized that it will take time, trial and error to get this right, especially for those PAEs combining multiple acquisition shops.

Ultimately, though, the service is hoping that this new construct removes some of the red tape and hurdles separating requirements, acquisition, contracting and testing communities.

Concluded Driscoll, “We are incredibly bullish that it will change our relationship with the American Defense Industrial Base and it will make us a much better, more powerful, predictable customer that will allow them to continue to invest around our needs and allow us as an Army to continue to transform quickly for the threats that exist.”

breakingdefense.com · Ashley Roque · November 12, 2025

18. AI-Driven Disinformation Campaigns on Twitter (X) in the Russia-Ukraine War

​Summary:

AI-driven disinformation on Twitter (X) played a major role in shaping global perceptions of the Russia-Ukraine war. Using bots, deepfakes, and data-mining algorithms, Russian operatives spread targeted propaganda that mimicked credible sources, manipulated hashtags, and exploited public sentiment. These AI tools amplified false narratives, polarized audiences, and undermined trust in Ukraine’s leadership and Western support and demonstrated how artificial intelligence has transformed information warfare into a potent, automated weapon for influence and deception in modern conflicts.

​Comment: Also from the IWI-SWJ partnership. If it was good once it is worth reading a second time.

AI-Driven Disinformation Campaigns on Twitter (X) in the Russia-Ukraine War

irregularwarfare.org · Tayyaba Rehan · November 12, 2025

https://irregularwarfare.org/uncategorized/ai-driven-disinformation-campaigns-on-twitter-x-in-the-russia-ukraine-war/

Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of Small Wars Journal as part of a republishing arrangement between IWI and SWJ. The original article was published on 10.02.2025 and is available here.

Abstract

In the Russia-Ukraine war, sectors like the digital and psychological ones were added to the conflict, and AI-driven fake news on Twitter (X) played a major part. Propaganda was disseminated to large numbers by operatives who used automated tools powered by artificial intelligence. They applied data mining and AI techniques to read through large data sets, find out what people felt about certain situations, and then send messages that mattered to specific groups. People were exposed to AI-created content, which included articles, images, and deepfakes, all aimed at copying the look of trustworthy sources, tricking users, and harming what people think about Ukraine’s leadership and help from the West.

Introduction

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which reached its peak in February 2022, has fought a massive struggle of information dissemination in addition to its existing military hostilities. Current media organizations work to provide reports about the situation, but people turn primarily to Twitter (X) platforms to share news and opinions with disinformation. Twitter (X)’s network features, including instant posting and tagging patterns, enable users to distribute content widely, thus creating an effective means of influencing public opinion. Artificial intelligence (AI) stands as an essential tool for people who wish to control and shape information during this particular time. Artificial intelligence enables the production and dissemination of false information on Twitter (X), which produces major changes in how audiences think about the conflict. The analysis of disinformation campaign mechanisms on Twitter (X) enables people to understand the effects these techniques have on their perceptions and perspectives. During the Russia-Ukraine war, Twitter (X) and AI have enabled multiple disinformation methods that altered global public perception and war narrative formation. AI bots, together with AI-backed accounts, generate artificial propaganda that opposes alternate perspectives and advocates opposing viewpoints.

The level of complexity with which AI handles disinformation campaigns on Twitter (X) continues to advance. It utilizes machine learning algorithms to evaluate big datasets from the platform, which helps them detect patterns and user attitudes alongside population statistics. AI analytics produce targeted disinformation programs that speak directly to various audiences through content that appeals to them. Comprehensively detailed messages take advantage of people’s existing viewpoints, therefore becoming more convincing in their delivery and difficult to detect AI-generated content.

The Role of Twitter (X) in Information Warfare

Twitter (X) functions as a major platform for delivering news from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to presents live information worldwide to its users. Through its message-sharing system, Twitter (X) allows people to transmit brief updates together with their opinions and situational analyses rapidly. Fast sharing of information creates opportunities to transmit fake information because of Twitter (X)’s real-time transmission capabilities. Twitter (X) has been structured to promote shareable content through its features that include hashtags along with retweet capabilities, enabling fast dissemination to many users. Information exchanged at fast speeds on Twitter (X) enables people to mistake unverified details as authentic, which results in misinterpretations of ground realities.

Twitter (X) turned into a leading source of news updates after the conflict began, as both official accounts and common users transmitted real-time developments through their posts. The hashtags #UkraineUnderAttack and #RussiaTerroristState gained wide usage to mobilize international support and political focus on Ukraine. The genuine expressions of solidarity, as well as accurate news reporting, were accompanied by fabricated hashtags. The pro-Russian accounts invented #FakeNewsUkraine to attack the Ukrainian narrative with massive hashtags per minute, and Twitter (X) users quickly reacted to instantaneous information, thus becoming more likely to accept information they saw as facts, even if they were untrue. The accumulation of deceptive narratives caused noticeable changes in public understanding of the conflict, which subsequently guided both international reactions and public discussions about the matter.

Automated Bots and AI-generated content on Twitter (X)

AI-based automated bots deployed through Twitter (X) disinformation campaigns represent the most widespread AI implementation for spreading misinformation. These bots use programmed AI systems that produce content rapidly while attempting to imitate human dialogue behavior. Artificial intelligence bots operate in an automated style to both post tweets and retweets from other profiles while they initiate social interactions with users to build fake natural dialogue, duplicating human tone. AI systems produce fake human-shaped texts quickly, which introduces false information into the public discussion. Twitter (X) proved the existence of Russian disinformation through its removal of thousands of fraudulent accounts that disseminated fabricated information using bots. Researchers at the University of Adelaide’s School of Mathematical Sciences analyzed 5,203,764 Twitter (X) posts, including tweets, retweets, quote tweets, and replies that carried hashtags #StandWithPutin, #StandWithRussia, #SupportRussia, #StandWithUkraine, #StandWithZelenskyy, and #SupportUkraine from 23 February through 8 March 2022. Research revealed that AI bot accounts comprised 60 to 80 percent of the total tweets bearing the studied hashtags during this specific timeframe.

A recent study discovered that about 1,000 fake American AI bots had generated accounts to spread pro-Russian propaganda, which targeted Ukrainian backlash and shaped geopolitical stories to benefit Ukrainian interests by polluting public opinion.

The extent of automation is worth mentioning, as highlighted by the Washington Post, where researchers examined 1.3 million accounts that regularly tweeted about Russian politics, underscoring that 45% or 585,000 of these accounts were bots, also known as “political bots”. Thousands of social media bots and fake AI-supported accounts spread false information about the Russia-Ukraine conflict, severely affecting public opinion during the conflict. The bot networks employ artificial intelligence to behave similarly to real people so they can connect with users as they distribute state-approved Russian self-defense messages. A recent study discovered that about 1,000 fake American AI bots had generated accounts to spread pro-Russian propaganda, which targeted Ukrainian backlash and shaped geopolitical stories to benefit Ukrainian interests by polluting public opinion.

Deepfakes serve as a main method in the Russia-Ukraine war to distribute misinformation through the Twitter (X) social media platform. Artificial intelligence systems create fake videos and audio files that alter real-world public figures, such that their images, as well as recorded statements present false information that quickly captures widespread attention. In March 2022, the release of a deepfake video depicted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy supposedly asking his troops to lay down their weapons and surrender. Even though the video proved to be fake, it received thousands of retweets on Twitter (X) before people discovered its fraud. According to research from the Digital Forensic Research Lab, deepfakes and other misinformation about the conflict spread to more than 70 million Twitter (X) users during the first few weeks of the Russian invasion. A manipulated video falsely showing Putin making a declared martial law statement successfully spread through Twitter (X),using hashtags including #PutinSurrender to deceive people about his actions. Deepfakes are distributed at an alarming rate because they create significant problems for readers trying to spot factual information, since manipulated media warps true events and can shape how people think about reality.

These artificial intelligence bots use algorithms to identify trends, along with generating messages that represent prevailing public sentiments. The bots leverage this ability to expand messages that represent Russian military ventures as suitable reactions to outside dangers. During 2024, the Pravda network released around three and a half million inaccurate AI-produced articles because they wanted to test AI chatbots and confuse their responses. Artificial intelligence bots produced fake tweets that presented false statements about the Ukrainian military committing violent actions toward civilians so Russia could legitimize its military actions under humanitarian pretenses. A study showed that elite Twitter (X)bots spread Russian falsified information successfully through their platforms with a success rate of approximately 33%.

Although Twitter (X) is officially blocked in Russia, the platform continues to host accounts and users that are backed by AI Twitter (X)bots, which are strategically employed to counter Ukrainian narratives and promote pro-Russian viewpoints. The artificial intelligence-based bots operate to spread Russian-supporting content as a method to generate trends that back up Kremlin positions. The bots enhance Russian control of Twitter (X) through their continuous production of pro-Russian content and counteraction of opposing viewpoints, thus determining how people perceive the Ukrainian conflict. These AI bots execute three elements: post pro-Russia tweets that link to active trends and hashtags, follow users to enhance certain messaging, and create the impression of backing for Russian activity. The coordinated campaign works to discredit Ukrainian perspectives between nations as it leverages AI technology to transform modern information warfare between countries.

The false tweets generated by AI bots and large language models (LLM) generated false public consensus about narratives, including the widespread defense justification for Russian actions and the narrative about sovereignty protection. Automated bots succeed in manipulation by producing substantial content quantity rapidly. Users who received the same message from different accounts three times were inclined to believe these narratives were true. The misinformation spread by these bots altered public opinion, thus creating wrong perceptions about the conflict while promoting Russian propaganda.

Viral Hashtag Manipulation

Through the use of #StopUkrainianAggression, pro-Russian accounts wanted to change the public’s perspective by making Russia appear defensive. Several untrue viral tweet contents spread quickly because they contained frequently used hashtags, making them accessible to a wider listener base. A generating campaign alleging Ukrainian military attacks against civilians would gain rapid spread across social media, employing strategic AI-created hashtag promotion. The hashtag mechanism formed a propagation pattern that allowed false information to spread rapidly throughout different groups of audience members. AI bots use automated content creation to support hashtag propagation and distribute disinformation across trending topics. Due to their data-oriented algorithms, AI bots execute their work, which enables them to spread false information regardless of the truth. These bots maintain pro-Russian content creation alongside user interaction to build artificial consensus about fake messages until it becomes hard for users to identify authentic information from fake content. The discussions about Ukraine’s conflict evolved through misinformed content that spread through popular hashtag trending topics. The artificial intelligence algorithms significantly contributed to this misinformation spread by causing bots to interact with the hashtag, thus producing a continuous stream of false content that deepened its acceptance in public discussion. Research showed how millions of people received messages through the #UkrainianNazis hashtag, and one specific post became viral within only a few hours after being posted. By controlling hashtags, these operators disrupted public discussions, so information accuracy became nearly impossible to find since the noise drowned out all else. The false narratives reached wide public visibility, which altered how people viewed the conflict and how they understood both parties.

Targeted Disinformation Campaigns to gain public support

Many of the AI tools operated by Russian operatives analyzed the listener groups that reacted best to specific informational messages during the conflict. The Russian strategists engineered propaganda through campaigns to depict Western Ukraine’s backing as a violation of Russia’s regional control area. Twitter (X) messages that were specifically tailored presented alleged cases of Ukrainian governmental corruption while spreading the claims that Western countries are backing a “failed” state. Russian operatives during the Russia-Ukraine war implemented artificial intelligence for creating targeted disinformation, which used enhanced propaganda through precise audience targeting capabilities. The campaigns used machine learning algorithms to analyze user data, which helped propagandists deliver messages specific to their target groups’ political and demographic characteristics. Artificial intelligence bots spread propaganda by increasing message efficacy, so false information seemed to have broad support from the public. Deepfake videos alongside media further added credibility to fabricated narratives.

Public opinion has seen a considerable transformation because of deliberately crafted misinformation. The campaigns achieved their objectives by targeting specific audiences, strengthening pre-existing beliefs, and making false information more convincing to counter. These refined strategies helped to increase societal polarization because people started creating self-contained information bubbles that eliminated dissenting opinions. These narratives grew more pervasive in worldwide dialogue, which made diplomatic solutions more challenging for the crisis.

Conclusion

Twitter (X) served extensively for spreading disinformation throughout the Russia-Ukraine conflict to show how information warfare is becoming more sophisticated. Modern AI systems have extensively boosted the production and diffusion of false content, specifically identified for target audiences, allowing them to define public opinions regarding the ongoing conflict. Twitter (X) provides a case study of how social media platforms can become tools for weaponization in modern times through mechanisms ranging from false narrative automation by AI bots to orchestrating disinformation operations that confirm existing biases.

Tayyaba Rehan is a student of the National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan. She is currently pursuing her degree in Defence and Strategic Studies. She has worked with multiple governmental and non-governmental organizations. Her numerous articles have been published on national and international platforms. Her area of interest includes national security, terrorism, and peacekeeping.

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irregularwarfare.org · Tayyaba Rehan · November 12, 2025

19. Ghosts of the Road: What the Failed War on IEDs Means for Drones

​Summary:

America’s failed war on IEDs offers lessons for countering drones. Despite innovation, IED defenses proved too costly and reactive thus possibly mirroring today’s counter-drone efforts. Drones, cheaper and more adaptive, invert the cost-risk balance and require proactive, layered defenses emphasizing training, reusable interceptors, and cost-efficient systems over complex procurement cycles. The authors urge prioritizing practical, scalable solutions such as mixing kinetic, directed-energy, and static defenses to avoid repeating past mistakes and to maintain technological and strategic advantage in future conflicts.

Excerpts:

Our analysis suggests that U.S. forces should prioritize reusable firing systems paired with inexpensive interceptors such as modified rockets, gun-fired ordnance, and directed-energy weapons. In the case of directed-energy weapons, it is vital to be cognizant of the tight correlation between effective range, power, and overall cost — making a directed-energy weapon “long-range” risks making a system unaffordable and immobile. A layered approach that integrates both static defenses and point-defense systems with light fighter aircraft offers an optimal balance of coverage and cost-efficiency. As autonomy software matures, shifting to fully autonomous drone interceptor solutions will become increasingly viable, but we still see a need for manned systems for the foreseeable future to ensure responsiveness, adapt to algorithmic countermeasures, and retain human judgment and decision-making.

Beyond the battlefield, soft targets, such as transformer substations and undersea cable landing sites, should at least implement simple protective measures, such as deceptive painting to confuse image-recognition algorithms, netting, and physical barriers. Critical infrastructure targets such as power plants, ports, logistics hubs, and command-and-control or communication nodes warrant the protection of point-defense systems.

Because autonomy is already embedded in many long-range drone systems, electronic jamming is rapidly losing its effectiveness and should be deprioritized relative to kinetic, reusable, and passive defense investments. One thing is for sure: Threats are proliferating, and the American homeland is increasingly exposed. In the competition for finite resources, the United States should be diligent and deliberate in its spending. That means focusing on winning strategies and not equating effective with exquisite or inexpensive with ineffective.

Ghosts of the Road: What the Failed War on IEDs Means for Drones

Andrew Tenbusch and Trevor Phillips-Levine

November 12, 2025

warontherocks.com · November 12, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/ghosts-of-the-road-what-the-failed-war-on-ieds-means-for-drones/

The United States lost the war against a weapon that almost everyone knows by its acronym: the IED or improvised explosive device. Despite technological innovation, training, and tactical brilliance, attacks persisted. Tactical adaptations failed to prevent strategic defeat. IED components remained cheap and ubiquitous. Manufacturing knowledge spread faster than defenses could adapt. Most critically, the countermeasures never managed to close the risk-cost imbalance. Each new or improved defensive kit pushed the United States deeper into a cost trap.

Listening to today’s military and industry discussions on counter-drone strategies, it feels like déjà vu. As the Army’s chief technology officer warned in a recent War on the Rocks podcast episode focused on the Army’s counter-drone initiatives, “IEDs fly now, and they fly at 100 miles an hour.” The current counter-drone strategy borrows heavily from the counter–IED three-pillar playbook: attack the network, defeat the device, and prepare the force. Yet, if the counter-IED campaign ended in strategic defeat, is it wise to replicate its framework for counter-drone operations? To answer this question, the U.S. armed forces should first identify how drones differ from improvised explosives and determine whether a proactive or reactive approach best fits the threat and how drones interact with current military missions.

BECOME A MEMBER

Déjà Vu

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the war against IEDs was a war within the war. At first, few grasped the profound impact that a crude bomb buried in the dirt or hidden in a pile of trash would have on two decades of combat and the character of war. The early roadside bombs were simple: an artillery shell, a pressure plate, and a few wires. Then came greater sophistication with the inclusion of shaped charges and remote triggers, such as cell phones. No route was safe — IEDs appeared beneath culverts, inside animal carcasses, even under roads coalition engineers had just paved. The enemy did not need to win decisive firefights. They only needed to make convoys feel hunted.

The United States responded with a torrent of money and ingenuity, pouring billions into solutions and standing up the Joint IED Defeat Organization. Armored Humvees gave way to expensive, hulking mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (commonly known as MRAPs), whose V-shaped hulls were designed to deflect blasts. Electronic jammers became standard features for vehicles, and electronic warfare platforms flew convoy overwatch. Units trained to spot disturbed earth, suspicious trash, or tripwires, all while moving through villages where any inhabitant could be a bomber or a spotter. The innovations and initiatives saved lives, but they never flipped the cost-risk equation. IED attacks persisted.

Each time the United States fielded a new sensor, jammer, or armor kit, insurgents shifted tactics seemingly overnight. Most American adaptations required contracts, production lines, and fielding cycles that stretched for months. The result was a grinding, asymmetric duel: one side learning through experimentation and improvisation, the other through procurement orders and PowerPoint briefings. By the time the U.S. military perfected its countermeasures, the battlefield was already changed. With a 1000:1 cost ratio, the enemy succeeded through cost imposition: It was far more expensive to defend than to attack.

In the end, the IED campaign revealed an uncomfortable truth. Technology can blunt the impact of a threat, but it cannot compensate for an adversary who adapts faster and spends less.

The slow recognition of the changing character of warfare and the rapid innovation cycle of the adversary is eerily similar to the rise of drones on the battlefield. The drone threat mirrors the IED’s asymmetric cost dynamic.

That dynamic is what makes today’s counter-drone conversation feel like déjà vu. The Defense Department’s counter-drone strategy rests on five pillars: deepen understanding and awareness of trends and threats, disrupt and degrade threat networks, defend against threats, deliver solutions at speed and scale, and develop and design a force for unmanned systems warfare. Succinctly, the framework expands upon the three-pillar counter-IED approach and formalizes the need for rapid acquisitions.

To determine whether adopting a well-worn strategy is warranted, it is instructive to examine the similarities and differences between IEDs and drones. Both are ubiquitous on modern battlefields due to a single overarching attribute: cost asymmetry. Each benefit from an abundance of dual-use civilian components that enable scalable manufacturing and proliferation while complicating interdiction and control efforts. Technical know-how diffuses easily across the battlespace and, as with IEDs, effective drone defense still depends on well-prepared forces, intelligence fusion, and disciplined training.

Colloquially known in some circles as “the poor man’s air force,” drones deliver aerial effects once reserved for traditional militaries. All air forces rely on aerial platforms for reconnaissance and interdiction, but drones offer these capabilities at a fraction of the cost. Compared with a traditional air force consisting of manned aircraft, drones trade individual flexibility and platform capability for sheer volume and distribution.

Drones deliver a key capability over IEDs: the ability to hunt for targets. Whereas IEDs acted as ambush predators, emplaced along predictable routes, drones can search for and approach targets from multiple directions, erasing the perceived safe rear area. Drones extend area denial and constrain maneuver more effectively than IEDs or mines.

Drone networks also differ from IED networks in the number of key individuals involved. IED bombmakers were required to manufacture the devices, even though components were easy to obtain. In contrast, many drone systems draw from a mature global supply chain and require only simple assembly or modification. This shifts the importance from the manufacturer to the operator, specifically, the drone pilot. While skill levels vary, the gap between novice and expert drone pilots is narrower than among bombmakers, considering there are more prospective pilots. Drone piloting suits gamers well, and advanced simulators can speed up training. As autonomy improves, the significance of individual pilot skill will matter even less.

Given these realities, the effectiveness of attacking the drone network offers limited strategic payoff. China alone accounts for roughly 90 percent of the global drone supply chain and manufactures tens of millions of drones annually. Beijing’s economic leverage and divergence from U.S. priorities make interdiction or cooperation unlikely amidst the trade war, strategic misalignment, and the resultant decoupling. Consequently, at least one of the three classic counter-IED pillars appear ill-suited for the drone challenge.

Ironically, the drone’s ability to range targets inverts the traditional defense cost equation. With IEDs, troops had to travel into enemy territory to be targeted, requiring complex and costly technology to mitigate the threat. Drones, by contrast, can hunt troops into their own rear areas — but counters can be surprisingly simple and inexpensive, such as netting or static barriers. In some contexts, the asymmetric cost advantage may approach parity. For this reason, defeating the device has merit for retention.

Perhaps the largest contributor to reducing IED effectiveness and casualties was through improved training. Training programs prepared troops to identify IED indicators and understand their construction, better coordinate clearance efforts, and enhance tactics that limited their exposure. Countering drones reinforces the importance of preparing the force as a pillar. Rapid changes in tactics, equipment, and countermeasures in Russia and Ukraine are representative of a force that understands their threat and drives a rapid innovation cycle. Without preparation, a force risks being caught flat-footed and taking higher casualties.

Focus on Winnable Strategies

The counter-drone strategy should prioritize preparing the force and defeating the drone (the “device”), as attacking the global supply network is likely unwinnable. The global supply chain is too abundant and mainly controlled by countries whose incentives diverge from U.S. interests, undermining the broad consensus and coalition required for effective arms controls or sanctions. If America pursues a strategy with two winnable lines of effort, explicit objectives should be set for cost, scalability, and operational effectiveness.

Counters need not equalize costs on a per-system basis, but rather on an aggregated interception basis. Reusable systems usually offer the best bang for the buck. For example, L3Harris’ VAMPIRE counter-unmanned weapons system costs approximately $2.85 million and shoots $30,000 rockets for drone defense, while the attacking Shahed-136 drone is estimated to cost around $50,000. The cost-benefit analysis of this defensive purchase depends on the coverage, reliability, and the expected number of interceptions the system can achieve over its service life.

Cheaper options (trading a rocket for a bullet) are attractive cost exchanges, provided this does not disproportionately degrade effectiveness. Gun-based systems offer exceptional cost-per-engagement and simple logistics, provided accurate aiming can be assured. Gun systems that use existing infantry weapons or smaller-caliber rounds are intriguing. Still, first-hit percentages would have to be high to compensate for the lower rate of fire and lack of burst capabilities, especially with maneuvering aerial targets. Therefore, gun systems that use proximity-fused or variable-time rounds are preferred, as they increase the likelihood of hitting the target by compensating for minor tracking errors that would otherwise constitute a near-miss.

Directed-energy weapons, such as lasers and high-powered microwaves, offer very low costs per shot but come with some significant caveats. Such weapons lose effective power by orders of magnitude with distance, rendering them short- to medium-range point-defense systems. Because of the relationship between power loss and distance, the system’s cost increases dramatically with incremental increases in effective range. Also, increases in power requirements come at the expense of mobility, and a thesis performed by the Naval Postgraduate School illustrates the challenges of powering these weapons. In general, high-powered microwaves have a shorter range than laser weapons.

For high-powered microwave systems, shielding can delay or negate damage to electrical components. Reflective or diffusive coatings can delay effects for laser weapons, but must be tailored to the laser weapon’s wavelength. Dwell time can also limit the suitability of laser weapons for a swarm attack. In general, smaller drones are harder to shield and protect against directed-energy weapons because they lack the space and power to accommodate shielding, which also increases their cost. For these reasons, microwave weapons are better suited for close-in protection against multiple, multi-axis lower-end threats, such as first-person-view or repurposed commercial drones. Lasers are effective regardless of coatings – eventually; however, lasers require sufficient power to burn through coatings with enough stored energy for multiple shots. Thus, laser weapons need to be paired with other methods as they risk being overwhelmed if not part of a layered defense.

In the illustrative example below, L3Harris’ VAMPIRE counter-drone system is employed against a Shahed-136 one-way-attack drone. For simplicity, the example omits operations and sustainment costs and assumes a 100 percent engagement success rate. Under those assumptions, the defender’s and attacker’s cost curves intersect at roughly 144 engagements. In the context of a protracted conflict, reusability and low-cost intercept munitions will improve the cost-exchange ratio in the defender’s favor.

Coverage density is also decisive. A VAMPIRE system has an engagement envelope of roughly four nautical miles and can be truck-mounted, whereas an Embraer A-29 Super Tucano light-attack aircraft without external fuel tanks has a combat radius of about 100 nautical miles. Without factoring in repositioning time, road accessibility, or aircraft response delays, the chart below illustrates an order of magnitude difference in coverage cost, showing that aircraft can provide far cheaper area coverage than point defense systems.

Simple, static defenses are often the most cost-effective protection for fixed infrastructure or expeditionary military encampments. Both Ukraine and Russia have used simple netting — sometimes improvised from recycled fishing gear — to protect roadways and vehicles against first-person-view drones, demonstrating how otherwise worthless trash can defeat a $500 drone. Other relatively cheap countermeasures include erecting barriers, such as the famous Hesco barriers used in the desert, to blunt low-angle approaches. When Shahed-type drones approached their infrastructure targets at low altitude, such barriers reduced damage and made interdiction by gunfire easier. Russia eventually adapted its tactics, operating at a higher altitude before executing a steep, high-speed dive to avoid these counters. The new tactics decreased Ukrainian intercept rates for now but provide opportunities for other interception tactics. For example, higher drone transit altitudes provide greater opportunities for aircraft interceptions.

The push to use attritable systems to attack attritable systems, first demonstrated in Ukraine, can be a slippery slope. Ukraine demonstrated success in ramming Russian drones with human-piloted interceptor drones. In the Ukrainian construct, the cost exchange was favorable; however, Western companies are pushing for greater autonomy features, seeking improved effectiveness. Several defense company efforts and concepts for interceptor drones hinge on the success of complex software. Software is notoriously expensive to develop, but once created, it can be downloaded onto numerous platforms, amortizing the upfront software cost across an expanded fleet. A wrinkle is that software can be deceived by simple countermeasures, requiring updates as tactics and operating environments evolve. For example, Russia changed the paint schemes on warships and mounted tires on TU-195 bombers to throw off image-based algorithms. How the overall cost-benefit ratio is affected by these required software updates to regain efficacy, and the timeline for implementation, is unknown.

Another challenge is that most U.S. interceptors are significantly more costly than the systems they are designed to defeat. Over the course of a prolonged conflict, this imbalance can lead to a slow bleed of capability and resources. In the chart below, a notional $100,000 interceptor is used to engage Shahed drones, underscoring the unfavorable cost-exchange ratio. Arguments circulate that a system’s cost relative to a nation’s economy is more important than the comparative cost between the system and the threat it is designed to defeat. Such arguments miss the point, and each dollar consumed represents one lost for another purpose.

By contrast, several developers are pursuing reusable concepts, turning their drones into analog fighter aircraft that shoot down other drones with nets or mounted guns. Such designs represent a circular evolution of aerial warfare and are more likely to sustain a favorable cost-exchange efficiency over time. As a circular evolution, counter-drone missions complement and layer into existing missions of integrated air and missile defense, strike warfare, and offensive or defensive counter-air.

Actions to Take

Preparing the force will yield the greatest dividends in defending against aerial threats. The Survivability Onion is an instructive concept to direct training efforts. First, ensure timely, widely shared intelligence to identify which adversary drone operating areas to avoid. Second, minimize and conceal detectable signatures through infrared-absorbing fabrics, netting, and deliberate movements to reduce detection and targeting susceptibility. Finally, if detected, employ active defenses such as aim-assist gun scopes and mobile point-defense systems. Aircraft would provide interdiction well beyond point defense systems to blunt incoming attacks by thinning numbers before reaching critical areas. In essence, counter-drone needs to be thought of in the context of being layered into traditional mission sets: integrated air and missile defense, strike, and offensive counter-air warfare concepts.

Our analysis suggests that U.S. forces should prioritize reusable firing systems paired with inexpensive interceptors such as modified rockets, gun-fired ordnance, and directed-energy weapons. In the case of directed-energy weapons, it is vital to be cognizant of the tight correlation between effective range, power, and overall cost — making a directed-energy weapon “long-range” risks making a system unaffordable and immobile. A layered approach that integrates both static defenses and point-defense systems with light fighter aircraft offers an optimal balance of coverage and cost-efficiency. As autonomy software matures, shifting to fully autonomous drone interceptor solutions will become increasingly viable, but we still see a need for manned systems for the foreseeable future to ensure responsiveness, adapt to algorithmic countermeasures, and retain human judgment and decision-making.

Beyond the battlefield, soft targets, such as transformer substations and undersea cable landing sites, should at least implement simple protective measures, such as deceptive painting to confuse image-recognition algorithms, netting, and physical barriers. Critical infrastructure targets such as power plants, ports, logistics hubs, and command-and-control or communication nodes warrant the protection of point-defense systems.

Because autonomy is already embedded in many long-range drone systems, electronic jamming is rapidly losing its effectiveness and should be deprioritized relative to kinetic, reusable, and passive defense investments. One thing is for sure: Threats are proliferating, and the American homeland is increasingly exposed. In the competition for finite resources, the United States should be diligent and deliberate in its spending. That means focusing on winning strategies and not equating effective with exquisite or inexpensive with ineffective.

BECOME A MEMBER

Andrew Tenbusch is a U.S. Navy officer and author.

Trevor Phillips-Levine is a U.S. Navy officer and author. Previously, he advised in cooperative research and development agreements regarding weaponized drones and participated in Defense Innovation Unit unmanned system initiatives.

The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the views or positions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: L3Harris via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · November 12, 2025

20. Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously: How His Second Term Is Reshaping America and the World

​Summary:

Trump’s second-term first year, though predictably disruptive, produced three shocks: unprecedented domestic military deployments, a pivot from China to the Western Hemisphere, and remarkable domination of Congress. Loyalist staffing and unilateral tariffs accelerated. Civil-military norms frayed as Guard and active-duty forces policed cities. Abroad, policy centered on Venezuela, Mexico, and canal rhetoric, while China was treated mainly as a trade issue, including aggressive counterdrug strikes. Congress largely ceded oversight, enabling executive overreach. Feaver warns this trajectory could erode U.S. global leadership and constitutional checks, unless elections or renewed congressional pushback restore constraints and strategic focus.

Excerpts:

Internationally, the United States has long relied on the global power and influence that it built in the post–Cold War era to preserve great-power peace. But Trump is drawing down on these reserves, and at some point, the institutions that the United States relies on to constitute its power and manage the global order will crack. What comes next is anyone’s guess. China, for instance, as the United States’ principal rival for global power, has made it clear that it has no interest in shoring up the American-built order. Beijing seeks a replacement system that would more parochially benefit China, and at the moment, it might relish Trump’s diversion to the Western Hemisphere so it can pursue its agenda in Asia, the region of greatest economic importance in the future.

Meanwhile, no foreseeable amalgamation of U.S. partners and allies appears capable of replacing American leadership on the global stage. While our European and Asian partners are keen to work with the United States to address geopolitical challenges, they are not capable of effecting lasting beneficial solutions without the United States shouldering its part of the burden. Without a change in trajectory, Trump’s siphoning of American global power could usher in a new geopolitical order—one in which great powers that are hostile, or at best indifferent, to U.S. interests would hold sway in vast spheres of influence. Those spheres would increasingly rub up against one another, and the prospects for geopolitical fracture and great-power war would intensify.

Ultimately, Trump and his supporters are right when they boast about the extraordinary impact the second administration has had since taking office. It is as consequential a first year as any president since Roosevelt. Much of Trump’s approach was predictable, including his general unpredictability. But the true surprises are those that are likely to reverberate for years to come. They are also the ones that make the long-term forecast harder to discern.

Comment: Unconventional diplomacy. Disruptive politics. But I am not sure if we are really pivoting from China to Homeland Defense. And as I recall from my 30 years in the Army, defense of the Homeland has leeway been the number one priority.

Trump’s Year of Living Dangerously

Foreign Affairs · More by Peter D. Feaver · November 12, 2025

How His Second Term Is Reshaping America and the World

Peter D. Feaver

November 12, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/americas/trumps-year-living-dangerously

U.S. President Donald Trump in Tokyo, October 2025 Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters

PETER D. FEAVER is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Duke University and the author of Thanks for Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the U.S. Military. From 2005 to 2007, he was Special Adviser for Strategic Planning and Institutional Reform on the staff of the National Security Council.

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Both supporters and critics of U.S. President Donald Trump agree that the first year of his second term has been an extraordinarily disruptive one. But for all its significance, this disruption wasn’t entirely unexpected. Even as the final votes were being tallied, enough was known about Trump’s intentions to make some relatively confident predictions about the shape of his second term, as I did one year ago for Foreign Affairs. Many of these predictions have already manifested. For example, Trump’s most senior advisers are, as he promised they would be, people chosen based on personal loyalty and their capacity to mobilize his base. With some notable exceptions, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent, who may have fit into the old Trump cabinet, the personnel now driving Trump’s second term policy apparatus are the “chaos agents” who were expected after the election.

Trump is also leaning even further into unilateralism, which was predictable given that he entered office this time around without many of the geopolitical constraints he had previously. In 2017, for instance, he inherited two coalitional wars with U.S. troop involvement (Afghanistan and the counter-ISIS campaign), and his hands were tied in regard to Iran by the coalitional diplomatic approach embodied in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Similarly, the constraints of the global trading system, which the first Trump administration had already sought to reduce, were reduced still further in the intervening years by efforts after the COVID-19 pandemic to create greater resiliency. Economically, Trump had a much freer hand to play in 2025, and as such he could pursue his maximalist approach to tariffs.

It was also possible to foresee much rockier civil-military relations this time around. Trump spent much of his first term surrounded by retired military brass, but during the last six months of that term, when their advice increasingly diverged from Trump’s preferences and his base criticized him for giving in to their concerns, Trump concluded that the military was part of a “deep state” that was committed to hobbling him. Trump and his surrogates made clear that they intended to clean house on their return. Although his decision to summarily remove at least 15 senior officers—many of them women or people of color—without reference to specific instances of dereliction was alarming, it was not altogether surprising.

Still, despite the predictability of this opening act, several developments have progressed much further and faster than most had expected. Indeed, Trump has managed to truly shock observers on three fronts: his deployment of the military within U.S. borders; his pivot to the Western Hemisphere as the primary foreign policy theater, effectively pushing China to the back burner; and his ability to cow Congress into abdicating its powers and responsibilities. The significance, and perhaps permanence, of these first-year surprises suggests they could have an outsize influence on Trump’s national security and foreign policy legacy. They also create the conditions for a wild swing of the pendulum, as future presidents attempt to overcorrect or, alternatively, pursue their own agendas to the new limits established by the Trump precedent.

THE DEPLOYMENT DILEMMA

Given how extensively Trump campaigned on the issue of immigration, it was no secret that on retaking office, he would turn inward with an exacting stance on undocumented immigrants. In his stump speeches, he floated the idea of involving the National Guard in deportation efforts—an outgrowth of how he used military units to patrol the southern border with Mexico during his first term. He also doubled down on his argument that local law enforcement was chronically overwhelmed, a conclusion he reached during the Black Lives Matter protests in 2020.

But little from his first stint in office or from his campaign foretold the kinds of domestic military deployments that he has ordered in his second term. Trump has sent thousands of troops from the National Guard to major U.S. cities, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Memphis, Portland, and Washington, D.C., in most cases over the objections of local authorities. In Los Angeles, Trump also authorized the use of active-duty marines, saying that local protests—which were sparked by aggressive raids by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement—had gotten out of hand. Trump and his advisers even talked repeatedly about invoking the Insurrection Act, which would empower the president to direct a large military response to function as an arm of law enforcement and address what he considered to be a domestic emergency.

Trump is by no means the first U.S. president to federalize the National Guard or deploy active-duty forces to handle problems within U.S. borders. But most domestic deployments are in response to natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005, or to help at major events, such as the Super Bowl or the inauguration. Likewise, using the military to patrol the border is not a shocking mission. Even critics of Trump’s use of the military for border patrol during his first term didn’t focus on the legitimacy of the deployment itself; instead, they questioned whether it was an efficient or appropriate use of military resources and training.

Trump has managed to truly shock observers on three fronts.

By contrast, Trump’s domestic use of military forces over the past year has more clearly crossed a line by putting the apolitical military in the middle of partisan conflicts. Service members were sometimes sent to respond to peaceful protests of Trump’s policies, other times to deal with a chronically high crime rate. In certain cases, they were sent for no evident reason beyond trolling or threatening predominantly Democratic cities. To be sure, prior presidents deployed the military domestically for contentious missions that they framed as defending the Constitution, most notably during the civil rights era, when local law enforcement could not be trusted to ensure the rights of the entire citizenry. Those deployments were politically controversial at the time, especially to those in the South who wanted to preserve the Jim Crow system of segregation. But history ultimately vindicated the decision, as Trump may believe it will do for him. The wide gap between the enormity of the military response and the triviality of the local threats in the present moment, however, raises the possibility that Trump’s deployments will be judged not as a victory for constitutional defense, but rather as an attempt to advance a partisan policy agenda.

It is not surprising that the military has obeyed every order from Trump so far. The military plays only an advisory role in the American system, giving input to the president’s deliberations but not otherwise independently adjudicating whether his or her decision is wise. Instead, the surprising part of the deployments is Trump’s intention. Why Trump thinks they are necessary or smart remains uncertain. In the absence of clear and convincing explanations from the Trump administration as to the purpose of the deployments, many critics are offering worst-case extrapolations. They are surmising, for instance, that this is a dress rehearsal for aggressive deployments timed to shape, if not interfere with, the 2026 and 2028 elections. If accurate even only in part, such a dramatic escalation would cast doubt on the reliability of the election results and put the military at the center of the blame for the outcome. This would make it difficult for the military to remain the nonpartisan institution on which every administration depends. It would also turn the military into an unreliable protector of the Constitution.

HOMEWARD BOUND

It may have been obvious that the “America first” president intended to focus more of his attention on the Western Hemisphere, but it remains surprising the extent to which the second Trump administration has elevated the Western Hemisphere above the Indo-Pacific in its foreign policy approach. Based on the model of the first Trump administration, which effectively mobilized the entire federal government to take a more aggressive posture toward China, the Indo-Pacific seemed likely to be a priority in Trump’s second term. The messaging from Trump’s second campaign similarly promised an end to the distractions in Gaza and Ukraine in order to, as Vice President JD Vance stated, “focus on the real issue of China.” Addressing competition with China is also the one area for which there is broad bipartisan support.

But while the administration has certainly not ignored the Indo-Pacific, it has surprised many, and perhaps Beijing most of all, just how unexceptional China is in Trump’s second-term view. Trump seems to be approaching China through the narrow lens of trade deals as opposed to a comprehensive, all-elements-of-national-power competitive strategy. China currently faces higher tariff rates than most other countries, but Trump has earnestly signaled his willingness to bring China’s rates in line with those of other countries in exchange for a suspension of Beijing’s restrictions on U.S. access to rare-earth minerals. After Trump met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in South Korea in October, he confirmed the potential to decrease, or even suspend, certain U.S. tariffs on China.

Adding to this surprise is Trump’s unexpected treatment of the Western Hemisphere, where expansive foreign policy aims and considerations of the use of force have suddenly arisen. Trump’s musings about expanding U.S. territory to include both Canada and Greenland and retaking control of the Panama Canal, for instance, which were originally dismissed as jokes, seem to be genuine foreign policy goals. Trump has returned to the threats more than once, including in direct statements on social media.

It is not surprising that the military has obeyed every order from Trump so far.

The president has also turned the “war on drugs” from a metaphor to a manifest. He has repeatedly threatened military force to strike drug gangs in Mexico without the cooperation of the Mexican government, which would amount to an act of war against the United States’ southern neighbor—the first major military operation there since U.S. President Woodrow Wilson authorized the Punitive Expedition to capture the Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa on the sidelines of World War I. At the same time, Trump is dramatically ramping up aggressive military actions and coercive diplomacy against Nicolás Maduro’s regime in Venezuela with repeated, lethal strikes on vessels he says are carrying drugs in the Caribbean and the Pacific.

Along the way, the Trump administration has given every indication that it is pursuing regime change in Venezuela, including Trump’s recent confirmation that he has authorized covert CIA action there. Trump famously criticized regime change as a strategy in 2016, which helped make him a viable presidential candidate in the first place. The transformation of Trump from regime-change critic to champion is among the most astonishing developments thus far. Trump’s pursuit of the violent collapse of a South American country is especially ironic considering it could directly increase the flow of migrants across the United States’ southern border—an issue Trump campaigned aggressively on solving.

In every respect, Trump’s pivot from China to the Western Hemisphere is a significantly unexpected dimension of his second term. If it’s sustained, it will have global reverberations, possibly shifting the balance of power decisively in China’s favor and further shrinking U.S. global influence.

BLANK CHECKS AND IMBALANCES

To a certain extent, it is normal for second-term presidents to start with lofty, even overreaching ambitions. They enter office believing they have a clear mandate from the electorate, and they don’t require the same learning curve as first-term presidents do. They are also eager to hit the ground running because, inevitably, they will confront the lame-duck stage of their presidency.

But while this political pattern could be predicted, Trump’s impressive control over his base and his party is new. Even as his agenda oscillates wildly between opposing policies and backtracks on campaign promises—arming Ukraine versus not arming Ukraine, getting tough on China versus cutting a deal with China, ending forever wars versus striking adversaries in multiple theaters—Trump boasts stunning levels of popularity, with over 90 percent approval among Republicans. For the roughly 43 percent of respondents who self-identify as or lean Republican, what matters most is loyalty to Trump’s agenda.

Even more surprising than Trump’s continued control of his base, however, is the truly shocking dominance he has managed to assert over the legislative branch. Every modern president has dreamed of bypassing Congress and poaching congressional prerogatives, such as control of the purse strings, but no president since Franklin Roosevelt has been able to do so as effectively as Trump. This is especially impressive given the razor-thin majorities Republicans have in the current Congress. Only a few Republicans would have to defect to the Democrats’ side to thwart some of Trump’s more radical policies, but they have been remarkably reluctant to do so. The few who have flirted with defying the president have quickly seen their reelection fortunes falter. More remarkably still, the members who have announced their retirement and thus should be immune to reelection worries nevertheless remain reluctant to vote with Democrats to check the Trump administration in any meaningful way. In the wake of the dramatic Democratic sweep in the November 2025 elections, Republicans who are concerned about Trump’s policies may be emboldened to flex their congressional oversight muscles. But thus far, the defining feature of Trump’s second term has been the extent of Congress’s deference to the executive, even as Trump usurps his colleagues’ independent authority.

Trump’s siphoning of American global power could usher in a new geopolitical order.

Trump, for instance, has ignored explicit congressional mandates in the area of foreign aid and undermined quasi-independent foreign policy institutions created by Congress. He has also sidelined the Government Accountability Office and the inspectors general. He has curtailed briefings to Congress by executive branch officials in the national security and foreign policy arenas. And he has bypassed congressional oversight on arms sales to the Middle East and security aid to Ukraine, even when those benefits were appropriated by Congress. But despite the litany of overt infringements on congressional authority, legislators have done little to retake their traditional role in policymaking.

If this trend continues, the American constitutional system could be decisively altered. The framers of the Constitution created a powerful president because they counted on powerful legislative and judicial branches to serve as counterbalances. If those branches willingly cede their responsibility to enforce guardrails on the executive, then the only check on presidential impulses will be whatever restraint the administration’s internal deliberative process provides.

TRUMP’S TOMORROW

One year after Trump’s reelection, the biggest unknown is how long any of this can last. Trump’s actions, those foreseen and those unforeseen, are creating immense opportunities for change. Both domestic and international actors are sure to respond. Domestically, for instance, Trump has unsettled delicate equilibriums critical to both civil-military relations and constitutional checks and balances. In doing so, he has raised troubling questions about the future of the constitutional system. Yet the trends at home are not irreversible. If Congress rediscovers a zeal for protecting legislative prerogatives and exercising rigorous oversight of the executive branch, the rest of Trump’s second term could diverge sharply from the first year. And if Democrats win one or both chambers of Congress in the 2026 midterm elections, the checks on the president would likely revert to historical norms—perhaps even returning to the congressional assertiveness of the immediate post-Watergate era.

If Republicans maintain control or even extend their majorities in Congress, the prospects are harder to predict. By that point, Trump would look increasingly like a lame duck, and ambitious Republicans might see some advantage in putting distance between themselves and the more controversial second-term Trump policies. On the other hand, such a history-defying electoral outcome could just as easily empower the administration to do whatever is necessary to cement Trump’s legacy as the most transformative president of the modern era.

Internationally, the United States has long relied on the global power and influence that it built in the post–Cold War era to preserve great-power peace. But Trump is drawing down on these reserves, and at some point, the institutions that the United States relies on to constitute its power and manage the global order will crack. What comes next is anyone’s guess. China, for instance, as the United States’ principal rival for global power, has made it clear that it has no interest in shoring up the American-built order. Beijing seeks a replacement system that would more parochially benefit China, and at the moment, it might relish Trump’s diversion to the Western Hemisphere so it can pursue its agenda in Asia, the region of greatest economic importance in the future.

Meanwhile, no foreseeable amalgamation of U.S. partners and allies appears capable of replacing American leadership on the global stage. While our European and Asian partners are keen to work with the United States to address geopolitical challenges, they are not capable of effecting lasting beneficial solutions without the United States shouldering its part of the burden. Without a change in trajectory, Trump’s siphoning of American global power could usher in a new geopolitical order—one in which great powers that are hostile, or at best indifferent, to U.S. interests would hold sway in vast spheres of influence. Those spheres would increasingly rub up against one another, and the prospects for geopolitical fracture and great-power war would intensify.

Ultimately, Trump and his supporters are right when they boast about the extraordinary impact the second administration has had since taking office. It is as consequential a first year as any president since Roosevelt. Much of Trump’s approach was predictable, including his general unpredictability. But the true surprises are those that are likely to reverberate for years to come. They are also the ones that make the long-term forecast harder to discern.

Foreign Affairs · More by Peter D. Feaver · November 12, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com