Quotes of the Day:

Many scholars are confused about the core of the subject of strategy. Although I believe that strategy, the function, is eternal and universal, apparently not everyone agrees. Some scholars, especially historians, prefer to believe that strategy is a relatively modern invention, indeed is one that has been migrating in meaning since it first emerged in French, English, and German in the 1770s. I must say that I find this belief in the modernity of strategy to be close to absurd. However, I have test-driven the view that strategy is a modern invention or discovery at gatherings of senior American historians, who, I must report, found the thesis to be ridiculous.[iv] The view that we could not have strategy ‘before the word’, was rejected almost out of hand. The point is that strategy as a function has always been understood and attempted, regardless of the availability or otherwise of a neat enough concept in the contemporary language of choice. Experience does not always require language that today we find to be conducive to appropriate thought. Over the course of the Twentieth Century, strategy substantially migrated from the Clausewitzian focus upon the use made of battle for the political purpose of a war, towards the paying of greater attention to the value of military power for the ends of policy, whatever they may be. The change was modest, but noticeable, in its post-Victorian deemphasising narrowly of battle as a principal engine of strategic history. We in the West became somewhat disenchanted with the strategic promise of and in battle by the grim protracted events of 1916 and 1917 in particular. We humans have always sought to behave strategically, in good part because there is not, and has never been, any practicable alternative. Functionally, the Greeks did strategy, as also did the Romans. The fundamental abstract architecture of strategic theory applied in all climes and circumstances. Just four words express the core of the matter — (Political) Ends, (Strategic) Ways, (Military) Means, and the Assumptions that inform and can well drive action.

- Colin Gray

"Progress is impossible without change; and those who cannot change their minds, cannot change anything."

- Bernard Shaw.

"Men cannot improve a society by setting fire to it: they must seek out its old virtues, and bring them back into the light." 

- Russell, Kirk

1. China is using the world’s largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds

2. US Treasury: 100 ships in 30 countries helping Russia violate sanctions

3. Special Operations News - Monday, Nov 13, 2023 | SOF News

4. Versatility at the Tip of the Spear: Food Security and the Utility of SOF

5. The US is sending more Patriot defense systems to the Middle East. They cost $1.1 billion each.

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2023

7. Iran Update, November 13, 2023

8. The Great Illusion: Why DOD’s Reinvigoration of the Term 'Perception Management' is Just Old Wine in a New Bottle with a Different Label

9. The Extremist Domino Effect of October 7

10. And You Are? How to Recognize and Remedy Unrecognized Frictions

11. China lures Western scientists to obtain advanced American technology

12. Army Pacific Launches Massive "Theater Wide" US vs China Wargame

13. China’s disregard for small state agency hampers its foreign policy

14. How China commands its ‘people’s army’

15. Fighting to Govern Myanmar, From a Teeny Office in Washington

16. Chinese Navy's Suspected New Overseas Base in Cambodia Now Even Larger

17. Think China's PLA is a paper tiger? Think again

18. Non-Combatant Women of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

19. Myanmar junta faces ‘biggest threat’ since coup as fighting engulfs border region

20. "The best way to spot an idiot. Look for the person who is cruel.​"

1. China is using the world’s largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds

This explains a lot. Let us recognize what is happening, understand the CCP strategy, EXPOSE it to help inoculate Americans against it, and then attack it with a superior political warfare and information strategy.

I also wonder what about the target audiences? Are our young people in high school and college being attacked? If so, we need more of these types of articles to help build cyber defense capabilities, cyber hygiene, and cyber resilience among our young people. They need to know what China is doing so they can prevent falling into their cyber disinformation traps.

Reference Zoom issue below. Is Zoom a threat or not? I had a friend recently explain how vulnerable we are using Zoom, yet I participate in Zoom calls with government officials often (as well as MS Teams and also WebEx and evern Google meet). What is the safest video platform to use these days?

China is using the world’s largest known online disinformation operation to harass Americans, a CNN review finds

cnn.com · by Donie O'Sullivan · November 13, 2023

CNN —

The Chinese government has built up the world’s largest known online disinformation operation and is using it to harass US residents, politicians, and businesses—at times threatening its targets with violence, a CNN review of court documents and public disclosures by social media companies has found.

The onslaught of attacks – often of a vile and deeply personal nature – is part of a well-organized, increasingly brazen Chinese government intimidation campaign targeting people in the United States, documents show.

The US State Department says the tactics are part of a broader multi-billion-dollar effort to shape the world’s information environment and silence critics of Beijing that has expanded under President Xi Jinping. On Wednesday, President Biden is due to meet Xi at a summit in San Francisco.

Victims face a barrage of tens of thousands of social media posts that call them traitors, dogs, and racist and homophobic slurs. They say it’s all part of an effort to drive them into a state of constant fear and paranoia.

Often, these victims don’t know where to turn. Some have spoken to law enforcement, including the FBI – but little has been done. While tech and social media companies have shut down thousands of accounts targeting these victims, they’re outpaced by a slew of new accounts emerging virtually every day.

Known as “Spamouflage” or “Dragonbridge,” the network’s hundreds of thousands of accounts spread across every major social media platform have not only harassed Americans who have criticized the Chinese Communist Party, but have also sought to discredit US politicians, disparage American companies at odds with China’s interests and hijack online conversations around the globe that could portray the CCP in a negative light.

Private researchers have tracked the network since its discovery more than four years ago, but only in recent months have federal prosecutors and Facebook’s parent company Meta publicly concluded that the operation has ties to Chinese police.

Meta announced in August it had taken down a cluster of nearly 8,000 accounts attributed to this group in the second quarter of 2023 alone. Google, which owns YouTube, told CNN it had shut down more than 100,000 associated accounts in recent years, while X, formerly known as Twitter, has blocked hundreds of thousands of China “state-backed” or “state-linked” accounts, according to company blogs.

Still, given the relatively low cost of such operations, experts who monitor disinformation warn the Chinese government will continue to use these tactics to try to bend online discussions closer to the CCP’s preferred narrative, which frequently entails trying to undermine the US and democratic values.

“We might think that this is confined to certain chatrooms, or this platform or that platform, but it’s expanding across the board,” Rep. Mike Gallagher, chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP, told CNN. “And it’s only a matter of time before it happens to that average American citizen who doesn’t think it’s their problem right now.”

Trolling for a living

When trolls disrupted an anti-communism Zoom event organized by New York-based activist Chen Pokong in January 2021, he had little doubt who was responsible. The trolls mocked participants and threatened that one victim would “die miserably.” Their conduct reminded Chen of repression by the government of China, where he spent nearly five years in prison for pro-democracy work.

But his suspicions about who was behind the interruption were solidified when the US Department of Justice charged more than 30 Chinese officials earlier this year with running a sprawling disinformation operation that had targeted dissidents in the US, including those in the Zoom meeting Chen says he hosted in 2021.

Chen Pokong in a recent interview with CNN.

It was just one of multiple indictments the Justice Department unsealed in April exposing alleged Chinese government plots to target its perceived critics and enemies, while impugning the sovereignty of the United States. Two alleged Chinese operatives were charged with running an “undeclared police station” in New York City. Last year, another indictment outlined how Chinese agents allegedly tried to derail the congressional campaign of a Chinese dissident.

“They want to deprive my freedom of speech, so I feel like it’s not only an attack on me,” said Chen, who was ejected from his own meeting during the disruption. “They also attack America.”

The DOJ complaint named 34 individual officers with China’s Ministry of Public Security and published photographs of them at computers, allegedly working on the disinformation campaign known as the “912 Special Project Working Group.” The operation, primarily based in Beijing, appears to involve “hundreds” of MPS officers across the country, according to an FBI agent’s affidavit.

The complaint does not refer to the cluster of fake accounts as “Spamouflage,” but private researchers and a spokesperson for Meta told CNN that the social media activity described by the DOJ is part of that network. As part of a mission “to manipulate public perceptions of [China], the Group uses its misattributed social media accounts to threaten, harass and intimidate specific victims,” the complaint states.

When asked about Spamouflage’s reported links to Chinese law enforcement, a spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington, Liu Pengyu, denied the allegations.

“China always respects the sovereignty of other countries. The US accusation has no factual evidence or legal basis. It is entirely politically motivated. China firmly opposes it,” Liu said in a statement to CNN. He claimed that the US “invented the weaponizing of the global information space.”

A report released by Meta in August illustrates how the posts from the network often align with the workday hours in China. The report described “bursts of activity in the mid-morning and early afternoon, Beijing time, with breaks for lunch and supper, and then a final burst of activity in the evening.”

And while Meta detected posts from various regions in China, the company and other researchers have found centralized coordination that relentlessly pushed identical messages across multiple social media platforms, sometimes repeatedly insulting the same individuals who have questioned the Chinese government.

One of those individuals is Jiayang Fan, a journalist for The New Yorker who told CNN she began facing harassment by the network when she covered pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong in 2019.

Jiayang Fan, a US-based journalist, says the online harrassment against her began when she covered the 2019 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.

Attacks directed at Fan – which ranged from cartoons of her painting her face white as though rejecting her identity to accusations that she killed her mother for profit – carry telltale signs of the Spamouflage network, said Darren Linvill of the Media Forensics Hub at Clemson University. Linvill’s group found more than 12,000 tweets attacking Fan using the same hashtag, #TraitorJiayangFan.

Although she hasn’t lived in China since she was a child, Fan believes such messages have been levelled against her to spark fear and silence others.

“This is part of a very old Chinese Communist Party playbook to intimidate offenders and aspiring offenders,” said Fan, who questioned what her distant relatives in China may think when they see such content. “It is uncomfortable for me to know that they are seeing these portrayals of me and have no idea what to believe.”

Evolving tactics

Experts who track online influence campaigns say there are signs of a shift in China’s strategy in recent years. In the past, the Spamouflage network mostly focused on issues domestically relevant to China. However, more recently, accounts tied to the group have been stoking controversy around global issues, including developments in the United States.

Spamouflage accounts – some of which posed as Texas residents – called for protests of plans to build a rare-earths processing facility in Texas and spread negative messages about a separate US manufacturing company, according to a report by cybersecurity firm Mandiant last year. The report also described how the campaign promoted negative content about the Biden administration’s efforts to hasten mineral production that would curb US reliance on China.

Other posts by the network have referenced how “racism is an indelible shame on American democracy” and how the US committed “cultural genocide against the Indians,” according to a Meta report in August. Another post claimed that former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi is “riddled with scandals.”

Spamouflage is “evolving in tactics. It’s evolving in themes.”

Ben Nimmo, global lead for threat intelligence at Meta

Chinese government-linked accounts have also posted messages that included a call to “kill” President Biden, a cartoon featuring the so-called QAnon Shaman who rioted at the US Capitol as a symbol of “western style democracy,” and a post that suggested US defense contractors profit off the deaths of innocent people, according to a Department of Homeland Security report in April obtained through a records request.

The DOJ complaint filed against Chinese officials alleged that last year they sought to take advantage of the second anniversary of George Floyd’s death and post on social media about his murder to “reveal the law enforcement brutality” in the US. They also received a task to “work on 2022 US midterm elections and criticize American democracy.”

Spamouflage is “evolving in tactics. It’s evolving in themes,” said Ben Nimmo, the global lead for threat intelligence at Meta. “Our job is to keep on raising our defenses and keep on telling people about it, especially as we get closer to the election year.”

Yet as social media companies race to stop disinformation and the US government files complaints against those allegedly responsible, accountability can be elusive.

“This is the rub with a lot of cybercrimes, that it becomes very, very difficult to actually put the perpetrators in jail,” said Lindsay Gorman, the head of technology and geopolitics at the German Marshall Fund’s Alliance for Securing Democracy.

But, Gorman added, that doesn’t mean there are no consequences for China.

“Even if individuals have a degree of impunity because they are never planning on coming to the United States anyway, that doesn’t mean that the party operation has impunity here – certainly not in terms of public opinion, certainly not in terms of US-China relations,” she said.

‘Flooding’ social media

Meta, Google, and other companies that have published reports outing Spamouflage stress that most of the social media accounts within the network receive little or no engagement, meaning they rarely go viral.

But Linvill of Clemson University argues that the network uses a unique strategy of “flooding” conversations with so many comments that posts from genuine users receive less attention. This includes posting on platforms typically not associated with disinformation, such as Pinterest.

“They are operating thousands of accounts at a time on a given platform, often to drown out conversations, just with sheer volume of messaging,” Linvill said. “When we think of disinformation, we often think of pushing ideas on users and making ideas more salient, whereas what China is doing is the opposite. They are trying to remove conversations from social media.”

When Beijing hosted the 2022 Winter Olympics, for example, human rights groups began promoting the hashtag #GenocideGames to bring attention to accusations that China has detained more than a million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in internment camps.

But then something surprising happened. Accounts that Linvill and his colleagues believed were part of Spamouflage started tweeting the hashtag too.

It might be counterintuitive for a pro-Chinese government group to start spreading a hashtag that brought attention to the Chinese government’s human rights’ abuses, Linvill explained. But by using the hashtag repeatedly in tweets that had nothing to do with the issue itself, Spamouflage was able to reduce views on the legitimate messages.

Jiajun Qiu, whose academic work focused on elections and who fled China in 2016, showed CNN what happens when he types his name into X, formerly known as Twitter. There are sometimes dozens of accounts pretending to be him by using his name and photo.

Jiajun Qiu, who fled China in 2016, has faced an onslaught of Spamouflage trolls.

They are designed by the operators of Spamouflage, Linvill explained, to confuse people and prevent them from finding Qiu’s real account by muddying the waters.

Now living in Virginia, Qiu runs a pro-democracy YouTube channel and has faced an onslaught of homophobic, racist and bizarre insults from social media accounts that Linvill’s team and others have tied to Spamouflage.

Some accounts have posted cartoons that convey Qiu as an insect working on behalf of the US government. Another image depicts him being stomped by a cartoon Jesus. Yet another paints him as a dog on the leash of an American rat.

“I tell people the truth, so they want to do anything possible to insult me,” Qiu said.

Linvill and his team have tracked hundreds of these cartoons across the internet, and said they are a “tell” of Spamouflage. Cartoons, Linvill explained, can be more effective than text because they are “eye-catching” and “you have to stop and look at it.” In addition, these original cartoons can easily be translated into hundreds of languages at a very low cost.

Beyond the online smears, Qiu says he has also faced threats via other online messages and escalatory calls from unidentified sources who he believes have ties to the Chinese government. One anonymous message told him he would be arrested and brought to justice for breaking Chinese law. An email referenced the church he attends in Manassas, Virginia and said, “for his own safety and that of the worshippers, he would do well to find another place to stay.”

Qiu told CNN that the FBI has interviewed him four times regarding these threats, and that he has been instructed to contact local police if he is ever followed.

“Every day I live in a sense of fear,” Qiu said.

cnn.com · by Donie O'Sullivan · November 13, 2023

2. US Treasury: 100 ships in 30 countries helping Russia violate sanctions

US Treasury: 100 ships in 30 countries helping Russia violate sanctions

kyivindependent.com · by Lance Luo · November 14, 2023

by November 14, 2023 6:40 AM 1 min read

A ship in the Port of Vladivostok in Vladivostok on September 13, 2023. (NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AFP via Getty Images)

This audio is created with AI assistance

The U.S. Treasury Department requested information on about one hundred ships suspected of violating Western sanctions on Russian oil, Reuters reported on Nov. 13 citing an unnamed source.

Official notices were sent by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control to shipping management companies in thirty different countries on Friday.

"While we do not confirm or comment on investigations or enforcement actions, Treasury is committed to enforcing the price cap and reducing Russia’s resources for its war against Ukraine," a Treasury spokesperson said.

The price cap of $60 per barrel implemented by G7 members and led by Washington has caused a shift in global markets as China and India buy more Russian oil, often at a rate lower than market prices.

But a rally in prices this year has led to Russian oil being exported at higher value. Traders often use creative strategies to ensure maximum revenue, such as marking up shipping costs.

U.S. officials say the sanctions are still working by forcing Moscow to rely on a fleet of ‘ghost tankers’ operating under the radar.

FT: Russia avoids G7 price cap on most oil exports

Russia is growing increasingly less reliant on Western services when shipping out its oil, allowing it to more successfully avoid the $60-per-barrel price cap set by the Group of Seven (G7), the Financial Times reported on Sept. 25.

The Kyiv IndependentMartin Fornusek

Lance Luo

Lance Luo (Li P. Luo) is a news editor at the Kyiv Independent. Previously, he worked at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Hromadske Television in Kyiv. He also spent three years in finance and strategy consulting. Mr. Luo graduated from the University of Southern California and serves as an arbitrator at FINRA.

kyivindependent.com · by Lance Luo · November 14, 2023

3. Special Operations News - Monday, Nov 13, 2023 | SOF News

Special Operations News - Monday, Nov 13, 2023 | SOF News

sof.news · by SOF News · November 13, 2023

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: Marine Raiders rehearse advanced military free fall jumps at Camp Lejeune, N.C., Sept. 1, 2021. Military free fall sustainment training is necessary for a Marine special operations team to stay proficient and ready at all times for future operations. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Ethan Green)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it five (almost) days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Five KIA in MH-60 Crash. Five crew members of an Army special operations helicopter died in a crash in the eastern Mediterranean Sea during an air refueling event on Friday night. The mishap took place off the coast of southeast Cyprus. “5 U.S. Special Operations Forces Killed in Helicopter Crash in Mediterranean”, The New York Times, November 12, 2023. (subscription may be required) See also “US Military Plane Crashes in Mediterranean Training ‘Mishap'”, Voice of America, November 11, 2023. “DOD Identifies Army Soldiers Killed in Helicopter Crash”, U.S. Department of Defense, November 13, 2023.

Pulling TACPs from Army Bases. Bad Idea? An Air Force plan to relocate squadrons of elite close-air support airmen on Army bases, consolidating from eight locations down to just two, is likely to harm military readiness. (Military.com, Nov 7, 2023)

AC-130J’s Big Gun Going Away? The future of the AC-130J’s big gun is once again uncertain as interest in giving the Ghostrider more stand-off strike capabilities grow. “AC-130J Ghostriders Could Lose Their Big 105mm Guns”, The WarZone, November 7, 2023.

Lasers for the AC-130? The future of a laser-armed AC-130J is increasingly uncertain and a broader review of the Ghostrider’s armament package is in progress. “AC-130 Laser Weapon Test Slip Raises Questions About Its Future”, Thew Warzone, November 10, 2023.

Navy’s Leap Frogs. The Leap Frogs, a U.S. Navy Parachute Team, showcase their precision, teamwork, and commitment to excellence in each jump, and are a vital tool in Navy recruiting by landing and immediately interacting with the crowd to offer their unique perspective on Naval Special Warfare. “A Leap of Faith and Excellence: Skydiving with the U.S. Navy’s Leap Frogs”, Men’s Journal, November 9, 2023.

History of the Green Berets. Christopher Klein provides a historical timeline of U.S. Army Special Forces – from their founding in 1952 to the end of the GWOT era. “How Green Berets Became the US Army’s Elite Special Forces”, History.com, November 7, 2023.

Matt Parrish and TFDSOF. A former Green Beret, Matt Parrish, has been appointed as the new Executive Director of the Task Force Dagger Special Operations Foundation. Matt served much of his career with the 7th Special Forces Group. He recently retired, his last assignment with U.S. Special Operations Command in Tampa, Florida. https://www.taskforcedagger.org/our-team/

British SRR. Guy McCardle provides some insight into the British Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR). Established in 2005, the unit provided an evolution of the UK’s special forces capabilities. “SOF Spotlight: British Special Reconnaissance Regiment”, SOFREP, November 2023. (subscription)

Fires Center Named After Ranger. After four years of planning, collaboration, design, and renovation, the U.S. Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment cut the ribbon on the Domeij Fires Center on Nov. 2, 2023, marking its grand opening. “The Crucible of Fires: State of the Art Fires Center Named After Legendary Ranger”, U.S. Army, November 9, 2023.

Romania SOF Orders Polaris DAGOR. Romania is ordering more than 50 DAGOR ultralight tactical vehicles. These vehicles will enhance the tactical mobility of Romanian SOF. (Joint-Forces.com, Nov 13, 2023).

GBs Visit JFK’s Gravesite. A wreath-laying ceremony was held at the grave of President John F. Kennedy on November 8, 2023, at Arlington National Ceremony. “Green Berets bring annual tribute to JFK’s Arlington Gravesite”, Stars and Stripes, November 10, 2023.

Myths about SEALs. One result of that increased public notoriety, which has reflected both positively and negatively on the SEALs, has been the growth of certain misconceptions held by the wider public about the Navy SEAL Teams. “Think You Know the Navy SEALs? Here’s 3 Things You Have Wrong”, National Interest, November 9, 2023.

Combat Diver Competition. In September, two-man teams from across the U.S. special operations community competed in a number of MAROPS events held for three-days at Naval Air Station Key West. “US Commandos showed off their little-known underwater skills in Army Special Operations Command’s best combat diver competition”, Business Insider, November 11, 2023.

SOF History

Operation Eagle Claw. On November 4, 1979, nearly 3,000 fundamentalist Iranian students stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran and took 63 American personnel hostage. The storming of the Embassy came after the fall of Iran’s U.S.-backed government and the rise of an Islamic republic. The United States feared for the safety of all the hostages and as a result, on April 16, 1980, after months of being held, U.S. President Jimmy Carter approved a military rescue operation to free the hostages and end the crisis, codenamed Eagle Claw. Read more in “Operation Eagle Claw”, Grey Dynamics, November 8, 2023.

Afghanistan 2001. On November 13, 2001, Taliban-held Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance. Green Berets would enter the city the next day. The Northern Alliance were also advised and assisted by other SOF elements such as the 49th Public Affairs Detachment (ABN) out of Bragg, Psychological Operations elements, and 1st Battalion 87th Infantry Regiment out of Ft. Drum, NY. The initial operation name was Operation Stronghold Freedom and these U.S. service members made up the Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N).

Book – Lincoln’s Special Forces. During the Civil War a shadow conflict took place between special irregular units of both sides. A new book entitled The Unvanquished covers the history of the Jessie Scouts, a unit that hunted Mosby’s Confederate Rangers from 1963 to the war’s end.

Conflict in Israel and Gaza

Evac of U.S. Citizens from ME? There are about 600,000 Americans (many dual citizens) that are living in Israel and Lebanon that may need to be evacuated. The U.S. government is getting ready to act if the war between the Palestinians militants of Gaza and Israel continues to escalate. “U.S. readies plans for mass evacuations if Gaza war escalates”, The Washington Post, October 23, 2023. (subscription)

Hostages. There are still 9 Americans missing and presumed to be hostages taken by Hamas and now held in captivity in Gaza Strip. U.S. SOF units are positioned in the area to respond to the situation and to offer Israel advice on hostage recovery.

Map. Check out a regularly updated visual tracker of northern border attacks by Hezbollah, the IDF, and Palestinian groups during the 2023 Hamas-Israel War. “Mapping Clashes Along the Israel-Lebanon Border”, Washington Institute, November 1, 2023.

References: Map Gaza Strip (2005), and more maps of Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel.

Ukraine Conflict

Creating an Army in the US Fashion. The United States is repeating mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan – attempting to create a Ukrainian military with US doctrine and strategy. Some believe we are going about it all wrong. “It’s Time to Ukrainify US Military Assistance”, Modern War Institute at West Point, November 10, 2023.

Beating Up on Russia’s Navy. The Ukrainians have broken the Russian naval blockade of Odesa. Although Ukraine doesn’t have a navy it has mastered the use of unmanned maritime drones, long-range anti-ship missiles, and special operations forces to diminish the effectiveness of Russia’s Black Sea fleet. “How Ukraine, With No Warships, Is Thwarting Russia’s Navy”, by Marc Santora, The New York Times, November 12, 2023. (subscription) See also “Russia’s Black Sea Fleet Loses One of Its ‘Most Advanced Ships’ – Ukraine”, Newsweek, November 5, 2023.

Video – Training for the Return of Trench Warfare. The Ukraine conflict has evolved into a long-term battle where success is measured in small territorial gains along a wide front. With the war in Ukraine proving trench-to-trench battles are not a relic, NATO troops prepare for the grueling form of war. Military Times, November 6, 2023, YouTube, 2 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ns0FeJG0kVU

Interactive Map. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine by the Insitute for the Study of War and Critical Threats.

On storymaps.arcgis.com

Help Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel with spine injuries receive the healthcare options, education, and care they need.

Commentary

IW Research Center. David Maxwell provides his perspective on the merits of establishing an academic setting for the research of irregular warfare. “Ensuring the Success of America’s First University-based Irregular Warfare Research Center”, Small Wars Journal, November 8, 2023.

Stay Behind Forces. Brian Petit, a retired Special Forces colonel, provides his perspective on the use of stay behind forces in the context of four different occupation environments. “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Stay-behind Force Decision-Making”, War on the Rocks, November 8, 2023.

Intel Ops and IW. Sal Artiaga traces the history of intelligence operations over the course of recent warfare – from Vietnam to Ukraine. Over time, the nature of intelligence has shifted – from human-centric insights to technology-driven reconnaissance. The role of intelligence in irregular warfare is continuing to change, however, the importance of understanding human terrain will never go away. “The Evolution of Intelligence Operations in Support of Irregular Warfare”, Irregular Warfare Center, November 1, 2023.

PTSD and Psychedelics. Clinical trials have shown that, under the right conditions, psychedelics can have a positive effect on mental health conditions like PTSD or depression for some people. Veterans have responded by calling for greater access to psychedelic-assisted therapy for some patients. “Therapeutic Use of Psychedelics in Treating PTSD and Depression Among Veterans”, RAND Corporation, November 8, 2023.

National Security

CT and Armed Drones. The United States has significantly increased its use of armed drones to attack global counterterrorism targets since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) continuing to

today to support U.S. and partnering country counterterrorism missions. Read more in Armed Drones: Evolution as a Counterterrorism Tool, Congressional Research Service, CRS IF12342, updated November 7, 2023, PDF, 3 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12342

U.S.-ROK Alliance. To more effectively advance three strategic priorities of the United States and Republic of Korea relationship, Secretary Austin (SecDef) and Minister Shin (ROK) are looking to restructure existing bilateral Alliance dialogue mechanisms to ensure that the Alliance is well-postured for the future. “Defense Vision of the U.S.-ROK Alliance”, U.S. Department of Defense, November 13, 2023.

Report on Nigeria. The Congressional Research Service has published an update to Nigeria: Overview and U.S. Policy, CRS R47052, updated November 9, 2023, PDF, 28 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47052

Great Power Competition

Preparing for War with China. Jennifer Hlad writes on how the U.S. Army is conducting exercises in the Indo-Pacific region to prepare for future conflicts. “How US Army Pacific is preparing for war with China”, Defense One, November 9, 2023.

IW in the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Lumpy Lumbaca details why a comprehensive Irregular Warfare (IW) campaign strategy is needed by the United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). He outlines the strategic focus areas that the IW campaign should be built upon and then describes the specific lines of effort that may be used as building blocks toward strategic success. “Irregular Warfare: Undermining the CCP’s Dangerous and Illegal Activities in the Indo-Pacific”, Small Wars Journal, November 12, 2023.

Afghanistan – China Wins? Almost two-and-a-half years after the U.S-backed Afghan government crumbled and the Taliban regime resumed power in Afghanistan, Chinese investors are maneuvering into the country – most notably to reap the benefits of Afghanistan’s abundant and in-demand national resources. Has China emerged as the ultimate winner of the long and devastating war? “Is China the Real Winner in Afghanistan?”, by Hollie McKay, The CIPHER Brief, November 13, 2023. (subscription)

Philippines Confronts China. For years China has slowly extended its maritime reach. It is now increasing tensions with the Philippines – a situation that may draw the United States into a maritime confrontation. “Let’s Call China’s Actions in the South China Sea What They Really Are”, by Charmaine Misalucha-Willougby, United States Institute of Peace, November 1, 2023.

China’s PLA. Payton Rawson describes “How China commands its ‘people’s army'”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 13, 2023.

Arrow Security & Training, LLC is a corporate sponsor of SOF News. AST offers a wide range of training and instruction courses and programs to include language and cultural services, training, role playing, and software and simulation. https://arrowsecuritytraining.com/

Afghanistan

Former CIA and SF Vets Helping Afghans. Members of “Team Alpha” – Special Forces and CIA paramilitary personnel who link up with the Northern Alliance in 2001 – are now assisting Afghans of the Northern Alliance who fought with them in the initial days of the invasion of Afghanistan by the United States. Their private organization, Badger Six, is working to bring these Afghan allies to the United States. “These US veterans aren’t giving up on Afghan fighters who save their lives”, New York Post, November 8, 2023.

Afghan Economy. Kate Clark provides an overview of the Afghan economy. It is a bleak look that contradicts the rosy proclamations of the Taliban regime. “Survival and Stagnation: The State of the Afghan Economy”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 7, 2023.

Deportation of Afghans from Pakistan. In October, Pakistan announced that undocumented migrants would be expelled from Pakistan. About 1.6 million Afghans currently live in Pakistan; some 600,000 fled there after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. Beginning on November 1st, Pakistan began rounding up Afghans and sending them back to Afghanistan. Read more in “Pakistan opens 3 new border crossings to deport Afghans in ongoing crackdown on migrants”, by Abdul Sattar, The San Diego Union-Tribune, November 13, 2023.

Afghanistan’s Earthquakes. Herat province has suffered a series of deadly earthquakes over the past few months. This article looks at the damage and the science behind the earthquakes, the disaster response efforts, and what remains to be done to help Afghans affected by the quakes to rebuild their lives. “Nature’s Fury: The Herat earthquakes of 2023”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, November 10, 2023.

Podcast – Shawn VanDiver with #AfghanEvac. Shawn VanDiver, is president and founder of the #AfghanEvac coalition, which unites volunteers and professionals from government, national security, and public policy backgrounds in a search to fulfill the promises the U.S. made to its allies left behind in Afghanistan. Shawn talked about the important wins that the coalition has been able to achieve through their efforts, as well as some of the difficulties they have faced over the past two years. The Afghanistan Project Podcast, November 13, 2023, YouTube, one hour. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePjYq2x5E90

Middle East

U.S. Military Strikes in Syria. U.S. military forces conducted precision strikes today on facilities in eastern Syria used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iran-affiliated groups in response to continued attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria. The strikes were conducted against a training facility and a safe house near the cities of Abu Kamal and Mayadin, respectively. See “U.S. airstrikes kill Iranian proxies in Syria, officials say”, The Washington Post, November 12, 2023. (subscription)

Houthi Rebels Shoot Down U.S. Reaper. A US drone was shot down by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on November 8, 2023. The MQ-9 was shot down in Yemeni airspace. “U.S. officials have confirmed an MQ-9 has been shot down off the coast of Yemen”, The Aviationist, November 8, 2023.

Qatar. The Congressional Research Service has updated its report entitled Qatar: Issues for the 118th Congress, CRS R47467, updated November 3, 2023, PDF, 27 pages. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47467

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Video – Rescuing Americans Where Others Won’t. Brian Stern of Project Dynamo is interviewed by Matt Parrish on the Prep for Impact show. Stern’s organization has been assisting in the evacuation of Americans from Afghanistan, Ukraine, Sudan, and now Israel and Gaza. The podcast is backed by the Green Beret Foundation. November 6, 2023, YouTube, 57 mins. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUwmnpguD80

Video – Scott Mann and SF Around the World. A retired Green Beret talks about the role of U.S. Special Forces around the globe. Fox News, November 11, 2023, 5 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ySJHjv5Tjg

Video – The Legacy of the 75th Ranger Regiment in Afghanistan. The 75th Ranger Regiment, YouTube, November 11, 2023, 8 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYrJZDzXytI

Video – Training ARVN | Foreign Internal Defense (FID). “Training ARVN” examines US Foreign Internal Defense (FID) doctrine through the early years of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. ARVN came to look like a mirror image of the US Army of the 1960s. Under American advisement, South Vietnam developed its abilities in its war against North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front. Yet ARVN’s deficiencies contributed to the United States’ decision to introduce American combat forces in 1965. Army University Press, YouTube, November 2, 2023, 29 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OAOUnPOUzoQ&t=2s

Video – Beyond the Battlefield: Inside the US Special Forces. History, YouTube, November 12, 2023, 8 minutes. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Q2pvUg95co

Upcoming Events

November 29-30, 2023

SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

Defense Strategies Institute

December 8, 2023

Winter Cruise

Combat Diver Association

December 8-10, 2023

2023 Civil Affairs Conference

Civil Affairs Association

sof.news · by SOF News · November 13, 2023

4. Versatility at the Tip of the Spear: Food Security and the Utility of SOF

Mon, 11/13/2023 - 2:46pm

Versatility at the Tip of the Spear:

Food Security and the Utility of SOF

By Lydia Kostopoulos, PhD, Peter Cloutier, Isaiah Wilson III, PhD

https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/versatility-tip-spear-food-security-and-utility-sof

The full use and utility of special operations forces has been underappreciated in the context of food security.

It is food (in)security that lies at the heart of every conflict today and yet invisible to most in its most fundamental context as a matter, and driver, of global security and defense. Special Operations Forces (SOF) offer unique capabilities that can respond best to USAID Administrator Samantha Powers’ concluding statement in the 2022-2026 U.S. Global Food Security Strategy that, “Conflict remains the single largest driver of food crises worldwide, so the Strategy also leverages investments in conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and social cohesion.” [1] The COVID pandemic has brought our global food systems to the public eye, and it is the Russo-Ukrainian War that has made the fragility of the food system all the more visible and hard-felt.

“Conflict remains the single largest driver of food crises worldwide, so the Strategy also leverages investments in conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and social cohesion.”

USAID Administrator Samantha Power, Feed the Future Global Coordinator

01. Introduction

02. Food Security, Food Systems - Unavoidable Threat Multiplier

03. The Utility of Special Operations Forces in relation to Food Security

04. The Use of Special Operations Inboxing the Spear Heads in the SOF Toolkit

05. Conclusion

INTRODUCTION:

Even before Russia invaded Ukraine, the global economy was suffering from the repercussions of several man-made conflicts, climate shocks, COVID-19 and rising costs— with devastating consequences for poor people in low-income and developing countries.

"The war in Ukraine—a major “breadbasket” for the world—is deepening these challenges on an unprecedented scale. In the immediate, swift and bold action is required by both wealthy and low-income nations to avert humanitarian and economic catastrophe. Looking forward, the international community should learn two key lessons from the Ukraine crisis." [2]

First, that we lie in an increasingly interconnected world and would be remiss if we ignored food insecurity and conflict challenges in any part of the globe as someone else’s problem. Secondly, it is critical for the international community to go beyond immediate stopgap measures; to not only address the root causes for these challenges but to also reexamine the agricultural and energy policies that underpin our global economy. The landscape of international conflict today is filled with examples of nation-state armed conflict such as that between Ukraine and Russia, and conflicts taking place amongst and between nation- states, terrorist organizations and mercenaries such as in the Sahel. [3] There are other layers of conflict which increasingly involve nation-state offensive cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, economic and societal targets. The most recent Microsoft Digital Defense report illustrates this trend with their graphics showing that nation-state cyber-attacks targeting critical infrastructures has doubled from 20% to 40. [4] The physical and digital terrain is widely understood as the battleground space in international conflict; however, this is only the tip of the iceberg of conflict.

What lies underneath is a large mass of interconnected and intertwined constants and currents of conflict. These include the geopolitics of economics, where goods are (and are not) adequately produced, how they are sourced, and how they are manufactured. They include sanctions that implicate all members of the sanctioned state and impair the development of populations. Increasingly more important are the impacts of climate change where adverse environmental events create ripple effects and waves around the world which are felt in different ways. For some it could be drought, for others it could be flooding. At the very primordial level of the Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, which all other needs rest on, is the foundation of physiological needs, which includes food.[5]

Today more politicians are asking about food insecurity and more governments are inquiring about food availability in their countries. Now is the time to start talking about how the military, specifically special operations forces, or SOF, can be leveraged to be a part of mitigating, managing, preventing and anticipating food insecurity challenges.

This paper seeks to unpack the global food security challenges through the lens of the compound security dilemma, to articulate special operations competencies and core activities use cases, and highlight the key partners and allies who are an integral part of integrated deterrence in combating the precarious state of global food insecurity.

Access the full article, “Versatility at the Tip of the Spear: Food Security and the Utility of SOF” 

About the Author(s)

Isaiah Wilson III

Dr. Wilson (Colonel, U.S. Army, retired) is a professor and former president of JSOU. He has earned a reputation as a versatile and innovative soldier-scholar. A decorated combat veteran with multiple combat tours in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan and extensive operational experience across the greater middle east, he is a nationally and internationally recognized advocate for change in how America understands and deals with matters of security affairs and uses of force in times of peace and war— particularly at a time when disruptive change continues to outpace the ability of organizations and organizational leadership to think and act fast and effectively.

Peter Cloutier

Peter Cloutier has 12 years of strategic technical direction for over $1 billion of foreign assistance in multiple regions with proven impact in transformational management. He has advised a Head of State, authored a transformative USG strategy, worked for a Pacific Island government, and was the first USG representative on the ground after the second- deadliest tropical cyclone recorded in the Southern Hemisphere struck Mozambique in 2019. His last full post overseas was as USAID's Health Office Director overseeing the partnership with Government of Mozambique in which he won two Superior Honor Awards for helping lead the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) to unprecedented performance with 63 staff and an annual budget of over $200 million. He had also led health, governance and environmental programming in Afghanistan, Angola and Timor-Leste. He speaks Portuguese.

Lydia Kostopoulos

Lydia Kostopoulos, PhD is a senior strategy and emerging technologies advisor. Her expertise has been sought by the United Nations, US Special Operations, US Secret service, Foreign Governments, NATO, IEEE International Standards Body, management consultancies, industry and academia. She has participated in UN disarmament conversations on lethal autonomous systems and has advised government entities on future related opportunities and risks in relation to emerging technologies, geopolitics and climate change. More on her work can be found at LKCYBER.COM.

​

.

5. The US is sending more Patriot defense systems to the Middle East. They cost $1.1 billion each.

Just to follow up the previous WSJ report and to emphasize the sensational headline. At this cost it is no wonder we do not have enough Patriot systems. And this must be making Raytheon shareholders rich.

The US is sending more Patriot defense systems to the Middle East. They cost $1.1 billion each.

Business Insider · by Lloyd Lee

Two Patriot systems deployed at the German Air and Missile Defense Task Force.

Soeren Stache/picture alliance via Getty Images

• The Patriot is a missile air defense system that can reach aerial targets up to 66,000 feet.
• It's a highly sought-after defense system that costs $1.1 billion each.
• The US has recently doubled the number of Patriot batteries in the Middle East, WSJ reported.

The US has sent more of its valuable surface-to-air missile defense systems, known as the Patriot battery, to the Middle East following attacks on American troops in Iraq and Syria in recent weeks, The Wall Street Journal reported.

Dozens of US troops in Iraq and Syria have been injured in the past month due to attacks that the Pentagon has attributed to Iran-backed militia groups.

Pentagon officials said that militant groups have carried out nearly 50 attacks since October 17 on bases housing US personnel, The Associated Press reported. These attacks have been conducted with rockets and drones, officials say.

In response to the "recent escalations by Iran and its proxy forces across the Middle East Region," Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin announced on October 21 several steps to increase "force posture," including the deployment of more Patriot battalions throughout the region.

The Department of Defense did not disclose the number of Patriot batteries it was sending. Still, people familiar with the matter told the Journal that the US had sent six, doubling the number of defense systems that were already deployed.

It's not known precisely where these systems will be deployed.

According to the Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance, a nonprofit that promotes ballistic missile defense development, Israel currently operates three Patriot batteries. These systems were critical to the country's air defense during the 2014 Gaza War, taking down armed unmanned aerial vehicles and other aircraft.

A DOD spokesperson declined to provide further comment.

The missile defense systems are produced by Raytheon, a contractee of the US government, and cost about $1.1 billion each.

Some of the significant components of the system include a launching system for the missiles, a radar that detects targets, a control station, and a generator, according to a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report.

Though official ranges are unknown, the CRS report stated that the "flight ceiling" for one of the interceptors is about 20 km or about 66,000 feet.

Eighteen countries currently operate Patriot, according to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, including Ukraine, which received the first one from the US in April.

US officials have said that the defense system has been used to shoot down a Russian hypersonic missile and to defend itself from attacks.

Business Insider · by Lloyd Lee

6. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2023

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-13-2023

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.
• There are three hypotheses of varying likelihood for the release of the now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast: They may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military; the Russian military command alternatively may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast; or an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets.
• Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter.
• A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets.
• US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor.
• Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas of the frontline.
• Ukrainian officials continued to discuss Russian forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continued to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under vacation schemes.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 13, 2023

Nov 13, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2023

Christina Harward, Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Nicole Wolkov, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 13, 2023, 6:55pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank. Kremlin press wire TASS and Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti published reports claiming that the command of the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces (currently active in east bank Kherson Oblast) decided to transfer troops to unspecified “more advantageous positions” east of the Dnipro River and that the Russian military command would transfer elements from the “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces to other directions for offensive operations following the regrouping.[1] TASS and RIA Novosti withdrew the reports within minutes and TASS later issued an apology wherein it claimed that it had “erroneously” released its report.[2] Russian state-affiliated outlet RBK reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) called the reports of a regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast “false” and a ”provocation.”[3] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question about the situation in Kherson Oblast by stating that only the Russian military can and should comment on the situation.[4]

The Russian MoD has not acknowledged persisting Ukrainian positions on the east bank or ongoing larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations in recent weeks. Russian milbloggers have increasingly reported on Ukrainian activity on the left bank, however, sharply contrasting with the continued lack of acknowledgement from Russian state media and Russian officials.[5] The Russian command has previously struggled to establish a coordinated informational approach to developments in Ukraine, particularly when the Russian command failed to set informational conditions for defeats during the Kharkiv 2022 counteroffensive.[6] Previous failures to set coordinated informational approaches have led to chaotic fractures and pronounced discontent in the Russian information space, and the Russian command risks repeating these incidents with the situation on the east bank, which has drawn notable concern from Russian ultranationalists.[7] The reports‘ references to Russian “offensives“ elsewhere on the front suggests that the uncoordinated informational approach may be more widespread than the east bank, since the Russian command has not explicitly recognized any current Russian operations in Ukraine as an offensive effort.[8]

The now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military. Russian media outlet RBK reported that the original TASS and RIA Novosti reports stated that the commander of the joint Russian group of forces in Ukraine (unnamed in the article, but in reference to Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov) heard and agreed with arguments from the "Dnepr" group command (also unnamed in the article, but known to be Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky) and ordered the "Dnepr" group to redeploy and free up forces for offensive operations in other unspecified directions.[9] The suggestion that two high-ranking military commanders would have a discussion on reallocating Russian forces away from a certain sector of the front to another is not outlandish or improbable. RBK’s report further suggests that the Russian military command has assessed that the situation in Kherson Oblast is not overtly threatening to Russian forces. Despite near-constant anxiety about the Kherson direction on the part of milbloggers, the Russian military command itself seems to be preoccupied with other sectors of the front, namely the Avdiivka direction, where Russian forces are pursuing renewed offensive operations.[10] Gerasimov and Teplinsky may have weighed the costs of maintaining frontline units in Kherson Oblast with the benefits of redeploying these units to other areas of the front and decided that the current Russian grouping in rear areas of Kherson is sufficient to defend against Ukrainian operations on the east bank. Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets remarked on November 12 that the Russian command in the Kherson direction has refused to commit to the front lines additional forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) and 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division beyond the elements of single regiments and battalions, opting instead to maintain the remainder of these formations in near rear areas and secondary echelons of defense.[11] Mashovets noted that the Russian presence in frontline areas of Kherson Oblast is "limited."[12] The suggestion that Russian forces have a stronger rear-area presence in Kherson Oblast largely tracks with purported discussions between Gerasimov and Teplinsky to free up these frontline elements and commit them to other areas of the front.

Alternatively, the Russian military command may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 13 that Ukrainian officials have not observed any Russian forces withdrawing from positions on the east bank and that the TASS and RIA Novosti reports are a part of a Russian information operation to distract Ukrainian forces.[13] Ukrainian forces are very unlikely to make any operational-level decisions based on limited media reports of a Russian regrouping, however, and if the reports are a part of an information operation, they will likely fail to deceive the Ukrainian command.

It is unlikely that an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets. Several Russian sources suggested that an unspecified actor posing as the Russian MoD from a fake account could have provided the information to Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti.[14] It is very unlikely that an outside actor posing as the Russian MoD could deceive Russian state media outlets as Russian state media is closely connected to Russian government bodies including the Russian MoD.

Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro. The published reports use relatively neutral language and notably do not announce a "retreat" or "withdrawal," instead discussing a "transfer" and "regrouping."[15] The Russian media frenzy that followed, including the immediate retraction of the statements, a direct response from the Kremlin, and emphatic milblogger refutations, reflects the fact that any mention of the Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast generates near-immediate information space neuralgia.[16] It also appears that the Russian information space has not yet determined how to discuss the operational situation on the east bank of the Dnipro, and that any inflection in the situation there can generate an informational shock. The Russian MoD falsely framed the Russian retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September of 2022 as a "regrouping," and that word and general concept apparently remains highly neuralgic for the Russian information space.

Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo noted on November 13 that rain and mud in Donbas impede the speed of ground maneuver advances.[17] Ukrainian 14th Mechanized Brigade Spokesperson Nadiya Zamryha stated on November 12 that fog and rain complicate both Russian and Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance efforts and lead to reduced numbers of attacks.[18] Zamryha added that the falling leaves complicate efforts to hide equipment and personnel. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian aviation has been less active in southern Ukraine due to weather conditions and that Russian forces are attempting to launch as many glide bombs as possible with each sortie.[19] A Ukrainian reserve officer assessed that mud will make many roads near Avdiivka impassable, complicating logistics for both sides.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that recent heavy rains led to reduced shelling and that strong winds and rain interfere with Russian drone operations and complicate offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Russian sources also circulated footage purporting to show mud and rain filled Ukrainian trenches.[22] ISW continues to assess that fall weather conditions will decrease the tempo of Russian and Ukrainian operations but not halt them entirely, and that fighting will continue on both sides throughout the winter months as it did in the winter of 2022-2023 and in the years between 2014-2022.[23]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk responded on November 13 to the forecasted large-scale Russian strike series against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the upcoming winter and stated that Ukraine is preparing air defense capabilities and needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles, such as ATACMS, to hit Russian rear areas.[24] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces’ current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that these disruptions, coupled with the onset of inclement weather, will “freeze” Russian offensive operations.[25] Fityo also stated on November 13 that Ukrainian disruptions of Russian GLOCs will create issues for the supply of food, water, ammunition, and winter materials to Russian forces.[26] Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily Black Sea Fleet assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military’s ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine, and Ukraine may intend to intensify and widen this interdiction campaign in the coming months.[27]

A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets. A Russian milblogger claimed that all types of Russian units work together to identify, record, direct, and confirm Russian strikes on Ukrainian targets.[28] The milblogger complained that the Russian information space barely covers these events, which creates a “false impression of [Russian forces’] inaction.” The milblogger claimed that the Russian information space instead devotes more coverage to Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory and that Russian milbloggers have to search for information about the alleged Russian strikes on their own. The milblogger urged other milbloggers and “ordinary pro-Russian residents of Ukraine” to offer “brighter” coverage of Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and military targets in order to “create the spirit of victory in the media space.” The milblogger offered an example of the alleged insufficient coverage, claiming that Russian forces struck five unspecified Ukrainian railway junctions on an unspecified date in response to the Ukrainian operation that derailed a Russian freight train in Ryazan Oblast on November 11. The milblogger did not report on these five alleged Russian strikes previously but did report on the Ukrainian operation in Ryazan Oblast.[29] The wider Russian information space has also not reported on these alleged five retaliatory strikes, and the Russian milblogger did not specify where they got this information.[30]

Russian forces have used many of their long-range weapons to target Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure and have recently increased glide bomb strikes against populated areas of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[31] One critical Russian milblogger, whom Russian authorities later arrested, complained in July 2023 that the Russian strike campaign was more “retaliatory” than “operationally sound” and blamed the Russian General Staff for wasting Russian efforts on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure rather than military infrastructure.[32] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 12 that Ukraine will focus on responding to the large-scale Russian series of strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure that are likely to occur in the winter, and Ukrainian officials have signaled their intent to strike military and energy targets within Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.[33]

US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor. Brink also stated that Ukraine has used the corridor to export 3.7 million tons of food and other goods, presumably since the first civilian vessel successfully departed from a Ukrainian port through the corridor on August 15.[34] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined water areas to disrupt and discourage civilian maritime traffic through the corridor.[35]

Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa. A Russian insider source claimed on November 13 that the Russian MoD, led by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), has been attempting to recruit former Wagner personnel at the former Wagner base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Russian MoD operations in Africa since September 2023.[36] The insider source claimed that the Russian MoD is offering former Wagner personnel 110,000-ruble (about $1,200) salaries, “promising” positions and ranks, and the formation of a separate unit capable of operating in Libya, Syria, Mali, and Burkina Faso.[37] The insider source also claimed that the reported leader of Redut private military company (PMC), Konstantin Mirzoyants, denied the MoD’s offers on November 8 and claimed that the Russian MoD would not form a separate unit and that all personnel would go to Burkina Faso, which caused over 120 former Wagner personnel to reject contracts with the Russian MoD and leave Molkino.[38] ISW cannot confirm any of the insider source’s claims.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.
• There are three hypotheses of varying likelihood for the release of the now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast: They may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military; the Russian military command alternatively may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast; or an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported “regrouping” of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets.
• Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter.
• A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets.
• US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor.
• Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas of the frontline.
• Ukrainian officials continued to discuss Russian forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continued to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under vacation schemes.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. 

• Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
• Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
• Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
• Activities in Russian-occupied areas
• Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on November 13 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 13 indicates that Russian forces advanced west of Volodymyrivka (19km northwest of Svatove).[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 15 Russian assaults near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (21km southwest of Kupyansk), Kyslivka (22km southwest of Kupyansk), and Novoyehorivka (15km southwest of Svatove).[40] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Ukrainian forces in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Bakhmut directions are defending against Russian detachments comprised of convict recruits and regular Russian units comprised mainly of mobilized personnel.[41] The spokesperson for a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kupyansk direction stated that Russian forces in the area often conduct assaults with groups of up to 10 personnel each and with four to five vehicles - squad-sized elements with limited combat power.[42]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 13. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled four Ukrainian assaults near Zahoruykivka (16km east of Kupyansk) and Tymkivka (19km east of Kupyansk) and that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled five assaults near Kreminna, Dibrova (6km southwest of Kreminna), and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[43] Fityo stated that Ukrainian forces conduct opportunistic offensive actions to improve their tactical positions in the Kupyansk, Lyman, and Bakhmut directions.[44]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut on November 13 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations in the Bakhmut direction.[45] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut), and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[46]

Russian forces continued localized offensive operations near Bakhmut on November 13 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on November 12 shows that Russian forces advanced west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut).[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Klishchiivka and near Dubovo-Vasylivka (8km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske, and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[48] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces crossed the railway track near Klishchiivka and are consolidating control over positions in the northern part of Klishchiivka, though ISW cannot confirm this claim at this time.[49] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of Klishchiivka several days ago, while another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces still control Klishchiivka.[50] ISW has not observed visual evidence of a Russian advance into Klishchiivka itself. Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced in the direction of Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut) and established new positions near the Berkhivka Reservoir (about 3km north of Bakhmut).[51] Footage published on November 13 purportedly shows elements of the Russian “Alexander Nevsky” Assault Brigade operating near Vasyukivka (15km north of Bakhmut) and elements of the Russian 331st Airborne (VDV) Regiment (98th VDV Division) operating in the Bakhmut direction.[52]

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on November 13 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage published on November 10 shows that Russian forces recently advanced to the eastern outskirts of Stepove (3km north of Avdiivka).[53] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks southeast and south of Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka), east of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) and Novobakhmutivka (13km northeast of Avdiivka), and near Avdiivka and Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka).[54] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that fighting is ongoing near the Avdiivka Coke Plant and the waste heap in northern Avdiivka.[55] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces control at least half of the Avdiivka Coke Plant and that alleged reports of Russian forces capturing the plant are false.[56] ISW has not observed Russian claims that Russian forces captured the Avdiivka Coke Plant, however. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces out of several unspecified positions in the industrial area on Avdiivka’s southern flank, although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim.[57]

Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces successfully counterattacked and advanced near Avdiivka on November 13. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced to the railway station near Stepove and near the “Tsarska Okhota” restaurant immediately south of Avdiivka.[58] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Krasnohorivka (5km north of Avdiivka).[59]

Russian forces continued limited ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 13 but did not make any confirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Marinka (immediately southwest of Donetsk City) and Novomykhailivka (11km southwest of Donetsk City).[60] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces gained a foothold near Novomykhailivka but are currently unable to assault Novomykhailivka itself.[61]

Ukrainian forces did not conduct any claimed or confirmed ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 13.

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces resumed ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any advances on November 13. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked north of Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Veylka Novosilka) and that positional fighting is ongoing in the area.[62]

Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked south of Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[63] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces remain active north of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and near Urozhaine (9km south of Veylka Novosilka), though ISW has not observed any significant Russian advances in the area in several months.[64]

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted larger-than-usual assaults with tank support north of Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and that mutual shelling is ongoing.[66] Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Rivne (8km west of Robotyne), Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne), and Verbove.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed that fighting along the Kopani-Robotyne line (up to 5km northwest of Robotyne) is positional.[68]

Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed advances on November 13. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces captured an unspecified fortified Ukrainian position near Robotyne.[69] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces counterattacked from Novofedorivka (21km southeast of Orikhiv) but did not specify an outcome.[70] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Robotyne.[71]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and advanced on November 13. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 12 and 13 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River) and marginally expanded their zone of control south of the settlement.[72] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 13 that Russian forces managed to push Ukrainian forces out of unspecified positions near Krynky.[73] A Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive maneuvers near Krynky.[74] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are persistently attempting to gain a foothold near Poyma (10km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Pishchanivka (13km southeast of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[75] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are using firepower to prevent Ukrainian transfers of personnel and materiel to the east bank.[76] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) are operating near Krynky.[77] Ukrainian counteroffensive operations reportedly previously rendered the 810th Naval Infantry Brigade combat ineffective as of September 22.[78]

Russian forces conducted air and artillery strikes against the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 13. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command stated on November 13 that Russian forces conducted four air strikes with 41 glide bombs against populated areas of Kherson Oblast in the past day.[79]  Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian glide bomb strikes target critical infrastructure.[80] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are constantly conducting strikes with TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems and glide bombs on the west bank.[81]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Ukrainian officials continue to discuss Russian forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas of Ukraine. Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Head Artem Lysohor and the Ukrainian General Staff noted on November 12 that Russian authorities are conducting forced mobilization in Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast, and removing mobilized Ukrainians to Krasnodar Krai for training.[82] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov also stated that Russian authorities are using mandatory passportization measures in occupied areas of Ukraine to distribute summonses to Ukrainian men.[83] Fedorov reported that forced mobilization has spread from small villages to bigger cities in occupied areas.[84]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

Russia continues efforts to enhance Iranian-produced Shahed-131/136 drones. A Russian milblogger posted footage on November 13 of a Shahed-136 drone equipped with an electro-optical seeker striking a target during testing in Iran.[85] The milblogger noted that this adaptation essentially converts Shaheds into Lancet-type drones that can travel greater distances and cause more damage.[86]

Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti reported on November 13 that Russian state-owned defense enterprise Rostec is preparing to produce the first units of the Sukhoi Su-75 "Checkmate" fifth-generation single-engine stealth aircraft.[87]

Russia continues to build out testing infrastructure for drone use. RFE/RL affiliate Idel Realii reported on November 13 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a draft resolution establishing an "experimental legal regime" for the operation and testing of light and heavy drones in Samara Oblast.[88] The testing regime reportedly accommodates 18,000 planned flights for test drones that are produced at the production center for the national "Unmanned Aircraft Systems" program in Samara.[89]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under vacation schemes. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik stated on November 12 that the Russian “humanitarian” organization “We Don’t Abandon Our Own” sent nine children from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Sochi, Krasnodar Krai for rehabilitation.[90] Pasechnik stated that the “We Don’t Abandon Our Own” organization has sent a total of 170 Ukrainian children to Sochi.[91]

Russian occupation officials continue to use social service provisions to coerce residents into receiving Russian passports and to collect personal information on residents. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on November 13 that updated regulations for the acquisition and use of housing certificates needed for purchasing a home or apartment will require that recipients have a Russian passport or birth certificate.[92] The new stipulations for housing certificates also likely aim to facilitate the ongoing resettlement of ethnic Russians in occupied territories in Ukraine.[93] The Kherson Oblast occupation Ministry of Internal Affairs stated on November 12 that residents will have to re-register license plates, driver’s licenses, and documentation numbers in the Russian system by 2026 and that residents will need a Russian passport to do so.[94] These re-registration measures likely aim to collect information on residents in occupied territories while also further augmenting ongoing passportization efforts.

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russia continues to militarize Russian children against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger reported on November 13 that members of their team attended the "Time of Heroes" social event in Moscow to teach young children of Russian servicemembers "visual propaganda" via coloring books and comics.[95] The Russian Federal Agency for Youth Affairs and the Main Military-Political Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces organize the "Time of Heroes" program, which intends to instill Russian "military-patriotic" values in Russian children and youth.[96]

Prominent Russian sources are propagating various information operations aimed at disparaging the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian military command. Various Russian sources are speculating on potential "purges" in the Ukrainian military command and amplified claims that protests against mobilization are growing in Ukraine.[97]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to present Chechnya as stable by making claims about the purported diversity and unity of Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz formations. Kadyrov posted footage on November 13 showing "Akhmat" Spetsnaz Commander Apti Alaudinov talking to "Akhmat" personnel and asking them to raise their hands to demonstrate if they are former Wagner personnel, Orthodox Christians, Muslims, or members of other faith groups.[98] Kadyrov claimed that there has never been dishonesty, disagreements, or divisions amongst "Akhmat" personnel.[99] Kadyrov is likely using this purported guise of diversity and unity amongst his notoriously brutal forces to portray "Akhmat" fighters as a powerful and effective fighting force as he continues to curry favor with the Russian high command.

Hyper-nationalist factions within the Russian space continue to seize on Russia's relationship with migrant communities to further hardline xenophobic rhetoric against minority communities. Moscow Duma Deputy Andrey Medvedev responded on November 13 to a statement made by the Russian Commission of the Public Chamber on Interethnic and Interreligious Relations and Migration Chairperson Vladimir Zorin, who voiced his concern over the "changed tone in the socio-political discourse on the issue of migration and interethnic relations."[100] Medvedev questioned Zorin's "Russianness" and emphasized that Russia is ignoring "migrant problems," concluding that Russia needs to protect Russians in Russia.[101] ISW previously assessed that the war in Ukraine is exposing tensions between Russian national identity and Russian nationalism, and the continued participation of Russian politicians in anti-migrant discourse exacerbates these apparent tensions.[102]

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian Defense Minister Lieutenant General Viktor Khrenin signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement with United Arab Emirates (UAE) Minister of State for Defense Affairs Mohammed Ahmed al Bowardi following negotiations in Dubai on November 13.[103]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

7. Iran Update, November 13, 2023

ISW uses this title in their email with this message in it: "Israel-Hamas War (Iran Update)"

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-13-2023

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel is pressuring Hamas to surrender its position inside the al Shifa Hospital. Hamas prevented al Shifa Hospital staff from accepting fuel from Israeli forces, according to the Israel Defense Forces.
2. Israeli forces advanced further into the al Nasr neighborhood in the northwestern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces also fought with Palestinian militia fighters at the al Quds Hospital in southwestern Gaza City. The IDF said it has weakened 10 out of 24 Hamas battalions in the Gaza Strip.
3. Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in seven small arms clashes and detonated five IEDs targeting Israeli forces across the West Bank on November 13.
4. Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel on November 13. Israeli officials stated on November 13 that LH attacks on November 12 killed and wounded 17 Israeli soldiers and civilians. LH acknowledged on November 13 that 73 of its fighters have died fighting Israel since October 7. 
5. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one attack targeting US forces in Syria on November 12 and claimed to fire one drone at US forces stationed at Green Village. CTP-ISW recorded four attacks targeting US forces in Syria on November 13.

IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 13, 2023

Nov 13, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, November 13, 2023

Ashka Jhaveri, Johanna Moore, Annika Ganzeveld, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, and Kathryn Tyson.

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

1. Israel is pressuring Hamas to surrender its position inside the al Shifa Hospital. Hamas prevented al Shifa Hospital staff from accepting fuel from Israeli forces, according to the Israel Defense Forces.
2. Israeli forces advanced further into the al Nasr neighborhood in the northwestern Gaza Strip. Israeli forces also fought with Palestinian militia fighters at the al Quds Hospital in southwestern Gaza City. The IDF said it has weakened 10 out of 24 Hamas battalions in the Gaza Strip.
3. Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in seven small arms clashes and detonated five IEDs targeting Israeli forces across the West Bank on November 13.
4. Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel on November 13. Israeli officials stated on November 13 that LH attacks on November 12 killed and wounded 17 Israeli soldiers and civilians. LH acknowledged on November 13 that 73 of its fighters have died fighting Israel since October 7. 
5. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one attack targeting US forces in Syria on November 12 and claimed to fire one drone at US forces stationed at Green Village. CTP-ISW recorded four attacks targeting US forces in Syria on November 13.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
• Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Israel is pressuring Hamas to surrender its position inside the al Shifa Hospital.[1] Reuters reported on November 13 that Israeli forces and tanks reached the gate of the al Shifa Hospital. Israeli Military International Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hecht said that the IDF has not entered the hospital yet.[2]  The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—clashed with Israeli forces in the vicinity of the hospital, marking the fourth day of armed clashes between Palestinian militias and Israeli forces near the hospital.[3] The spokesperson of the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry said that 650 patients are still inside the hospital.[4] The World Health Organization reported that the al Shifa Hospital is no longer functioning.[5]

Israeli forces arrested Palestinian militia fighters northeast of the al Shifa Hospital on November 12.[6] A local news organization said that Israeli forces surrounded al Wafa Hospital east of the al Shifa Hospital on November 13 and ordered patients and medical staff to evacuate.[7]

Hamas prevented al Shifa Hospital staff from accepting fuel from Israeli forces, according to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The IDF reported on November 12 that it left 300 liters of fuel at a location approximately 300 meters from the hospital.[8] The head of the hospital told Al Araby TV that the amount of fuel is insufficient and that he agreed to accept the fuel so long as it was delivered by the International Committee of the Red Cross.[9] The IDF reported that Hamas prevented the hospital staff from taking the fuel.[10] A US official with knowledge of US intelligence said on November 13 that Hamas has a command node underneath the al Shifa Hospital and uses the fuel intended for the hospital.[11] US and Israeli officials have stated that Hamas uses hospitals and civilian facilities for command and control, storing weapons, and housing fighters.[12]

Israeli forces advanced further into the al Nasr neighborhood in the northwestern Gaza Strip. The IDF and Shin Bet arrested more than 20 Hamas operatives in the al Shati refugee camp.[13] The al Quds Brigades clashed with Israeli forces in the al Nasr neighborhood on November 13.[14] The IDF published footage of ground forces operating in the Ranteesi Specialist Hospital in the al Nasr neighborhood on November 13.[15] An IDF combat team continued raids on the outskirts of al Shati Refugee Camp, focusing on destroying military infrastructure in the heart of the civilian population including schools, universities, mosques, and homes. The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades artillery unit launched mortars at the Israeli army operating in the vicinity of the camp.[16] A Palestinian woman told the BBC that the IDF ordered some 800 people taking shelter in a clinic in the camp to leave.[17]

Israeli forces fought with Palestinian militia fighters at the al Quds Hospital in southwestern Gaza City. The IDF said a brigade combat team of armored forces, engineers, and infantry with air support killed 21 militants during a period of intense fighting against Hamas.[18] The IDF published drone footage of a militant with an RPG taking cover within hospital grounds and an Israeli tank operating outside of the hospital grounds.[19] The IDF said the incident is another example of Hamas’ ongoing exploitation of sensitive sites, including hospitals.[20] The Palestinian Red Crescent Society said there was heavy shooting and the presence of Israeli military vehicles and forces in the vicinity of the hospital.[21]

Hamas and other Palestinian militia fighters conducted indirect fire attacks against the IDF behind the Israeli forward line of advance, which is consistent with the nature of clearing operations. The al Qassem Brigades fired mortars at Israeli forces east of Juhor ad Dik on November 13.[22] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—separately claimed to fire rockets and mortars at Israeli forces east of Juhor ad Dik on November 12 in response to Israeli aggression in the Gaza Strip.[23] The al Quds Brigades fired 60 mortars at Israeli vehicles on Highway 10, where Israeli forces have been crossing to advance into Gaza City.[24] Palestinian media reported that the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-claimed militant wing of Fatah— fired mortars at the Israeli army in an unspecified location in the southern Gaza city axis.[25]

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Beit Hanoun in the northeastern Gaza Strip on November 11. The IDF said that reservists raided the home of a senior PIJ member in a civilian area in Beit Hanoun where they found various weapons and intelligence materials and located a tunnel shaft.[26] CTP-ISW previously reported on October 21 that the IDF faces a loose coalition of Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza Strip—rather than just Hamas.[27] The al Qassem Brigades conducted two attacks on Israeli forces north of Beit Hanoun using a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and sniper rifle.[28] 

The IDF said it has weakened 10 out of 24 Hamas battalions in the Gaza Strip.[29] The IDF published a report explaining how it has been working to eliminate Hamas operatives and commanders at the field and senior levels since October 7.[30] The report says Hamas is comprised of 30,000 militia fighters in the Gaza Strip, which are divided into five regional brigades, 24 battalions, and 140 companies.[31] Each battalion is comprised of several strongholds and military outposts.[32] The IDF said that its ground forces are fighting in areas of several battalions.[33] The IDF has been assassinating several Hamas leaders to dismantle military structures. The IDF said on November 13 that it had assassinated five leaders with various roles in Hamas’ intelligence services, anti-armor units, and special forces.[34]

Palestinian militias conducted three indirect fire attacks into Israel on November 13. The al Qassem Brigades claimed one rocket attack at Tel Aviv.[35] The al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades claimed one mortar attack on an Israeli military site in southern Israel.[36] The al Quds Brigades claimed two rocket attacks on Israeli military sites in southern Israel.[37]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian fighters engaged Israeli forces in seven small arms clashes and detonated five IEDs targeting Israeli forces across the West Bank on November 13.[38] Palestinian militia groups have not claimed the attacks, which occurred primarily in major cities, including Nablus and Jenin. The attacks came as Israeli security forces continued conducting arrest raids in the West Bank on November 13.[39] The IDF said it detained 14 Hamas operatives during the overnight raids.

 This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
• Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted at least 12 attacks into northern Israel on November 13. LH claimed five attacks targeting the IDF along the Israel-Lebanon border.[40] Unidentified fighters conducted seven more indirect fire and anti-tank guided missile attacks on Israeli towns and IDF border posts along the Israel-Lebanese border.[41] Israeli officials stated on November 13 that LH attacks on November 12 killed and wounded 17 Israeli soldiers and civilians.[42] LH acknowledged on November 13 that 73 of its fighters have died fighting Israel since October 7.[43] Unidentified fighters also fired an anti-tank guided missile which caused several injuries near Netua, along the Israel-Lebanon border.[44]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

• Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
• Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that members of the Front for the Liberation of the Golan are currently operating in territory surrounding the Golan Heights.[45] SOHR claimed that approximately 700 fighters deployed to the Qunaitrah countryside, western Rif Dimashque, and western Daraa in October 2023.[46] The Assad regime formed the Resistance of the Front for the Liberation of the Golan in 2006 and is primarily made up of Syrians and Palestinian refugees.[47] The group also has ties to LH according to the Washington Institute.[48] CTP-ISW has previously reported on LH and other Iranian-backed militias deploying to the border of the Golan Heights since the beginning of the Israel-Hamas war.[49]

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed one attack targeting US forces in Syria on November 12.[50] The group claimed to fire one drone at US forces stationed at Green Village.[51] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has claimed two attacks targeting US forces stationed at Green Village since October 18.[52] CENTCOM has not commented on the attack at the time of publication. CTP-ISW cannot independently verify this claim.

CTP-ISW recorded four attacks targeting US forces in Syria on November 13. The LH-controlled news outlet al Mayadeen reported that unidentified militants conducted attacks targeting US forces in Syria in retaliation for the US airstrike on an IRGC training facility and safe house on November 12.[53] CTP-ISW has not recorded any group claiming responsibility for the four attacks and cannot independently verify this claim.

• The Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) fired 15 rockets at US forces stationed at al Omar Oil Field, according to unidentified sources cited by Iranian state news on November 13.[54] Unidentified militants also targeted US forces stationed at Conoco with Grad missiles, according to Iranian state news.[55] The local Syrian news outlet Deir ez Zor 24 reported that Iranian-backed militias were also behind the attack at Conoco.[56]
• Iranian-backed militants fired at least one drone targeting US forces stationed at Abu Hajar Airport on November 13 according to UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR).[57] Iranian state media reported that unidentified Iranian-backed militants launched three drones at US forces stationed at al Shadaddi, Hasakah Province.[58]

The Ebrahim Raisi administration is pressuring Egypt to reopen the Rafah crossing to enable humanitarian aid to enter the Gaza Strip. Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian urged the Egyptian government to reopen the Rafah crossing in separate meetings with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al Sisi and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry. The meetings occurred on the sidelines of the joint Arab League-Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in Riyadh on November 11.[59] Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanani separately emphasized the need for Egypt to reopen the Rafah crossing in a press conference on November 13.[60]

Iranian media claimed on November 13 that Israeli officials have called on the Egyptian government to turn away 60 tons of Iranian humanitarian aid destined for the Gaza Strip.[61] The media reports did not specify why Israel is blocking that aid. Iranian Red Crescent Society head Pir Hossein Kolivand announced on October 20 that this organization had sent its first humanitarian aid shipment to Egypt en route to the Gaza Strip.[62] CTP-ISW cannot independently verify that Iran has sent humanitarian aid shipments to Egypt or that Israel is blocking such shipments from entering the Gaza Strip.

LEC Commander Ahmad Reza Radan met with senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad on November 13. Radan discussed law enforcement and border security cooperation with Iraqi Prime Minister Shia al-Sudani, Interior Minister Lieutenant General Adel al Khaldi, and National Security Adviser Qassem al Araji.[63] Radan also discussed internal security cooperation with Popular Mobilization Forces Chairman Fali al Fayyadh.[64] Radan’s meetings follow Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's statement that Iran and Iraq should coordinate to “increase political pressure” on the United States and Israel during a meeting with Sudani in Tehran on November 6.[65] Sudani met with Khamenei after meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Baghdad on November 5, during which he and Blinken discussed Axis of Resistance attacks on US forces.[66]

• Radan is a hardline member of the IRGC and has extensive experience crushing political dissent and protests.[67] He joined the Basij and IRGC as a teenager to fight in the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and transferred to LEC after the war.[68] Radan served as law enforcement deputy commander from 2008 to 2014, during which time he played critical roles in cracking down on the 2009 Green Movement and suppressing protests in Syria.[69] Radan traveled to Damascus in 2011 to meet with Syrian security services and support their crackdown against the Syrian people.

8. The Great Illusion: Why DOD’s Reinvigoration of the Term 'Perception Management' is Just Old Wine in a New Bottle with a Different Label

Who is in charge of information within the US government? Who is synchronizing the development and distention of US government themes and messages?

The Global Engagement Center (GEC) by its mission and vision is only defensive -countering adversary propaganda.

Mission: To direct, lead, synchronize, integrate, and coordinate U.S. Federal Government efforts to recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts aimed at undermining or influencing the policies, security, or stability of the United States, its allies, and partner nations.

Vision: To be a data-driven body leading U.S. interagency efforts in proactively addressing foreign adversaries’ attempts to undermine U.S. interests using disinformation and propaganda.

So who is in charge of overall messaging and all things relating to information for the US government? Or are we making deliberate division not to have a single agency or person in charge?

The article below address the DOD aspect.

Key point from this article: 

If anything, it is another contemporary highlight showing a lack of understanding of influence activities overall within DoD. Specifically relating to this article, it shows how PSYOP has been increasingly neglected within SOF/DoD writ large, allowing its real capabilities and strategic efficacy to diminish since the PSYOP Master Plan of 1985; it is an issue that must gain greater and focused attention by senior leaders in DoD and Congress.

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The Great Illusion: Why DOD’s Reinvigoration of the Term 'Perception Management' is Just Old Wine in a New Bottle with a Different Label

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/great-illusion-why-dods-reinvigoration-term-perception-brad-carr-imkme%3FtrackingId=panmKkQvoQ3tJXVMH2vtuA%253D%253D/?trackingId=panmKkQvoQ3tJXVMH2vtuA%3D%3D

Brad Carr

USSOCOM Special Activities / Strategic Planner | Executive Management Consultant / Coach | Owner at Carr Media Productions, LLC | Futurist | Retired Army Colonel | Disabled Veteran

November 14, 2023

Open Immersive Reader

**The views expressed in this article are my own and may not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Special Operations Command, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.**

The term "perception management" has been associated with a range of activities aimed at shaping the perceptions of various audiences to align with desired strategic outcomes. It has been gaining traction again within the halls of the Pentagon and the Department of Defense (DoD) Components recently (https://nsiteam.com/smaspeakerseries_03october2023/). However, in the early 2000s, DoD deleted the term "perception management" as it is the de facto definition and function of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) under the Information Operations/Operations in the Information Environment (IO/OIE) construct. The deletion of the term from DoD lexicon reflected and affirmed that perception management is a core function of PSYOP, a critical component of a more comprehensive IO framework. The current push for the reintroduction of "perception management" as a separate term and concept within the DoD shows a misunderstanding of history, terminology, the operational environment, and established capabilities. These capabilities have already been resourced by DoD for multiple decades with policies, doctrine, funding, etc., and already reside within the DoD’s Joint Staff, Service Component, Combatant Command, task force J39/Service equivalent architecture, and Public Affairs Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS) process. If anything, it is another contemporary highlight showing a lack of understanding of influence activities overall within DoD. Specifically relating to this article, it shows how PSYOP has been increasingly neglected within SOF/DoD writ large, allowing its real capabilities and strategic efficacy to diminish since the PSYOP Master Plan of 1985; it is an issue that must gain greater and focused attention by senior leaders in DoD and Congress.

By definition, PSYOP is aimed at conveying selected information and indicators to audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce behavior favorable to objectives. To affect emotions, cognition, reasoning, and behavior, there is a direct link to perceptions. This is supported by the predominance of Psychology literature and studies. Thus, any successful PSYOP campaign inherently manages perceptions. It is a fundamental aspect of OIE as currently practiced and defined by DoD. One of the last definitions of Perception Management used within DoD before it was deleted was as follows:

“Actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviors and official actions favorable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.”

As you can easily see, it is essentially the definition of PSYOP. For experienced practitioners of PSYOP and military deception (MILDEC), through PSYOP’s understanding of human behavior and cognition, the creation of “conceal” and/or “reveal” activities (i.e. the buzz words current perception management pushes for the accepted and understood lexicon of OPSEC/Denial and Deception) naturally develop and one of the major reasons the term was deleted. The decision was supported at the time by numerous sources both internal and external to DoD. However, this argument was supported almost two decades earlier in 1982 by Ron D. McLarin in his chapter on “Objectives and Policy: The Nexus”, in his book Military Propaganda, and even 60 years earlier in 1941 by Hadley Cantril in his book The Psychology of Social Movements along with numerous other sources.

Lightheartedly but seriously, the perception management that should be done is the perception management of PSYOP (and OIE overall) internal and external to DOD. It must move far beyond the outdated and shortsighted “hearts and minds” concept that views PSYOP as simply winning over large populations through messaging. This perception is an inadequate understanding of what PSYOP is historically from over 100 years as a formal capability of the U.S, Military, and that must change to gain advantage over nation-state adversaries in the current and future information environment. History teaches that PSYOP is much more, and one of the most critical capabilities DoD has for great power competition. The information environment today is exponentially more complex, fast-moving, and multidimensional. Practitioners must granularly diagnose the unique cognitive landscape, network structures, motivations, and vulnerabilities based on the local context rather than taking a blanket messaging approach. This requires an advanced understanding of how beliefs form, values interact, and perceptions bias. PSYOP is the force that provides the very core of the perception management concept if it is meant to be effective. DoD should not forget lessons of the past but reinvigorate PSYOP to fix the current gap in executing activities it is designed to address.

The reintroduction of "perception management" as a separate construct from IO is not only unnecessary but potentially detrimental to the strategic coherence and operational effectiveness of DoD's efforts in the information environment at a crucial time where information warfare is at the forefront of strategic competition with Russia and China. The historical lineage and current application of PSYOP within IO demonstrate that perception management is already fundamentally an integral component of these operations, and just needs enforcement by senior leaders and policymakers. DoD does not need to obfuscate already challenging policy bureaucracy relating to influence activities, along with their congressional resourcing and oversight. To ensure DoD's strategic influence efforts remain focused and effective, it is crucial to continue to simplify, emphasize, reinvigorate, and evolve PSYOP's historic role within the existing and well-established IO framework rather than reverting to outdated, inadequate terminology that may lead to strategic misalignment and resource misappropriation. The need of the hour is to educate across DoD on the history, utility, and current state of PSYOP (and really OIE overall) to foster a better understanding and support for this crucial capability. Such focus will ultimately provide the critical element to the answer for the influence-related problem DoD is trying to solve rather than just resurrecting a term that had already been deleted for compelling reasons and without current and proper congressional understanding/oversight, policy, funding, an adequate operational concept, doctrine, etc.

#DoD #perceptionmanagement #PSYOP #informationoperations #militarydeception #OPSEC #strategiccompetition #Russia #China #nationalsecurity #greatpowercompetition #militarystrategy #militarypolicy

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Brad Carr

USSOCOM Special Activities / Strategic Planner | Executive Management Consultant / Coach | Owner at Carr Media Productions, LLC | Futurist | Retired Army Colonel | Disabled Veteran

Published • 39s

This week is another provocative topic meant to spur thought about how DoD is looking at the overall information environment and how we compete in it. DoD is reviving the use of the term "perception management" for activities aimed at shaping perceptions of foreign audiences to align with desired strategic outcomes (https://lnkd.in/gY5y_Ymy). However, this term had previously been officially approved for removal from DoD lexicon (Joint Publication 1-02) in the early 2000s, as it was recognized that perception management is already an inherent function of psychological operations (PSYOP) under the information operations framework. The article argues that bringing back the term "perception management" as a new or innovative concept is unnecessary and potentially detrimental. PSYOP, as part of the broader information operations capabilities, already encompasses perception management through its focus on influencing emotions, reasoning, and behaviors of target audiences which is directly linked to perceptions. Reintroducing perception management separately risks misaligning strategy, misappropriating resources, and confusing existing policy, doctrine, and congressional oversight. Instead, the article advocates for educating across DoD on the history and current state of PSYOP and information operations, and reinvigorating PSYOP's role within the established information operations framework. Rather than reinventing the wheel with an outdated term like perception management, the focus should be on reinvigorating and evolving PSYOP to close current gaps in influence capabilities against strategic competitors like Russia and China.  **The views expressed in this article are my own and may not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Special Operations Command, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.**  #DoD #perceptionmanagement #PSYOP #informationoperations #militarydeception #OPSEC #strategiccompetition #Russia #China #nationalsecurity #greatpowercompetition #militarystrategy #militarypolicy

9. The Extremist Domino Effect of October 7

Conclusion:

The significance of Oct. 7 in the context of global extremism cannot be understated. As alliances shift and Israel’s operations on the ground progress, the extremist landscape is set to evolve. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective counterterrorism policies. Recognizing the historical enmities and pragmatic alliances that define Hamas and al-Qaeda’s relationship is essential in anticipating the possible outcomes of their cooperation. Moving forward, as we witness the domino effect of Oct. 7 spread, it becomes imperative for the international community to adapt its strategies to meet the sophisticated and ever-changing tactics of global jihadist factions.

The Extremist Domino Effect of October 7 - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Mark Berlin, Sara Harmouch, Vladimir Rauta · November 14, 2023

Half a century after the Yom Kippur War, Hamas’s surprise attacks on Oct. 7 echo the infamous 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. This day has also been likened to Israel’s own Sept. 11 by diplomats and commentators, intensifying its contemporary resonance. Moreover, in the annals of the War on Terror, Oct. 7 holds powerful symbolic value for additional reasons: it marks the onset of the US war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in 2001.

As President Biden warns Israel not to repeat these mistakes twenty-two years after the United States initiated its War on Terror, al-Qaeda remains resilient and reactive. Its response to Oct. 7 is worth unpacking for its implications to the broader extremist landscape. Despite ongoing debates among analysts regarding the organization’s strength, al-Qaeda and its affiliates continue to operate, govern territory, and launch attacks across various regions. And the Oct. 7 attacks may have just catalyzed a shift in extremist alliances, unfolding a new chapter in the global jihadist narrative.

While the Islamic State (ISIS) labels Hamas as “apostates” for their Iranian links and perceived failure to enforce Islamic law, al-Qaeda’s transnational network welcomed the Oct. 7 attacks with endorsements of solidarity. Al-Qaeda’s “General Command” lauded the operations as a “turning point in history” and a “once in a lifetime opportunity for Muslims to “liberate Palestine.” By Oct. 13, various al-Qaeda factions from East Africa to the Sahel echoed this sentiment, hinting at a possible convergence of extremist narratives that could resonate within the global militancy landscape.

Al-Qaeda and Hamas Relations

The relationship between al-Qaeda and Hamas has gradually evolved, ebbing and flowing through cooperative and conflictual phases. At its core, this relationship is shaped by a delicate balance of strategic pragmatism and an uncompromising commitment to ideological principles, interconnected with the goals pursued and the methods employed to achieve them.

Indeed, al-Qaeda and Hamas diverge on affiliations, tactics, and goals, inciting tensions and confrontations between the two entities. Al-Qaeda, with its global jihadist agenda, criticized Hamas for its Muslim Brotherhood affiliation, ties to Iran and Hezbollah, and election participation, which al-Qaeda deemed un-Islamic. Osama bin Laden even went as far as to claim that Hamas had “lost its religion” when Hamas clashed with jihadist militants in Gaza in the late 2000s. Moreover, differences over nationalism and views towards the international system further separate these organizations’ tactics and territorial ambitions. It is worth remembering that at the height of the War on Terror, Hamas was even considered a potential counter-weight to al-Qaeda.

Despite these differences, both groups have consistently highlighted the Palestinian cause. Their convergence on this issue was evident as early as 1991, during the “Popular Arab and Islamic Conference” in Sudan, where Osama bin Laden met with representatives from several extremist militant organizations, including Hamas. Following this, adjacent training camps were established by bin Laden and Hamas in Sudan, marking an era of cooperation. Bin Laden even went as far as to reference Hamas’s founder Ahmad Yassin in his 1996 Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Sanctuaries. This recognition hinted at a shared objective despite differing operational tactics and affiliations. The operational overlap became more apparent in 2006, when members of Hamas’ military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, joined forces with al-Qaeda-inspired groups in Gaza. Around the same time, al-Qaeda figures like al-Zawahiri reached out to the rank-and-file members of the Qassam Brigades.

Al-Qaeda’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, at least rhetorically, has been unwavering. Bin Laden, in an oft-quoted statement, pledged that “America shall never dream of peace as long as Muslims in Palestine don’t live in peace.” Bin Laden reiterated this theme in various statements, most notably linking the 9/11 attacks to US backing of Israel. Al-Qaeda militants further echoed this sentiment by stating, “We wanted to take revenge for our brothers and sisters in Palestine by striking at the nation that is the reason behind the existence of Israel.”

Emphasizing the significance of Palestine, al-Qaeda factions, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), frequently incorporate the al-Aqsa Mosque into their propaganda. This site, deeply embedded in the Palestinian cause, serves as a rallying cry and is reflected in the designation of the Oct. 7 attacks as “al-Aqsa Flood.” AQAP’s slogan “O Aqsa, We Are Coming” and al-Shabaab’s integration of Palestinians into their martyrdom narratives, such as “Jerusalem Will Never Be Judaized,” underscore the centrality of the Palestinian issue in al-Qaeda’s ideological framework.

Contemporary Dynamics and Future Trajectories

The post-Oct. 7 statements from al-Qaeda’s transnational network illuminate several key insights into the group’s position and the wider trends in regional militancy. First, in recent statements, al-Qaeda’s transnational network has primarily directed its praise toward the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and general Palestinian resistance rather than Hamas’ political faction. This nuanced commendation is exemplified by al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which heralded the “marvelous series of combative encounters” by the Qassam Brigades against Israel. Similarly, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM), al-Qaeda’s affiliates in the Sahel, conveyed messages of encouragement to the Mujahideen in Palestine, explicitly mentioning the Qassam Brigades. Such statements showcase al-Qaeda’s ongoing strategy to support Palestinian militant actions without endorsing the political decisions of Hamas, maintaining a clear distinction in their approach to the organization’s different branches.

Second, the glorification of Palestinian militants in the Oct. 7 attacks serves to reassert al-Qaeda and its affiliates’ dedication to the Palestinian cause. This is typified by AQAP’s reference to the “Blessed al-Aqsa Flood Operation,” which intertwines religious motifs with militant rhetoric to venerate Palestinian fighters and vilify Israel. AQIS and al-Shabaab also joined in expressing joy and admiration for the Palestinian “heroes,” framing their actions as part of a larger battle against “Crusaders.”

Third, these statements from al-Qaeda’s network serve a dual purpose: rallying global support for their cause and unifying disparate extremist factions. AQAP’s call for solidarity among Palestinian Islamic groups, for example, seeks to advance a collective militant response against common adversaries, echoing al-Qaeda’s wider ambitions. Al-Shabaab’s denunciation of Israel as a “bastard entity” reflects an extremist worldview that aims to resonate with jihadists worldwide by depicting the Palestinian struggle as a universal Muslim issue.

The global response to the Oct. 7 attacks underscores the need for a nuanced grasp of the fluid dynamics within extremist alliances and rivalries. It stresses the importance of a comprehensive and multilateral counterterrorism strategy that addresses the global scope of jihadist narratives.

Implications of Endorsements: A Look at Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Beyond

The endorsement from al-Qaeda’s global network towards the actions of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades signals a nuanced shift that may point to a new tactical alignment, one that may have the potential to bridge the longstanding ideological rift between al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated-Hamas. This raises a crucial question: In confronting a shared foe, could these groups momentarily set aside their ideological differences?

The reactions to the Oct. 7 operations from al-Qaeda affiliates highlight the intricate relationship between regional conflicts and the overarching extremist discourse. The rise of Palestinian Sunni Islamist groups, such as the ‘Lion’s Den,’ with its explicit nod to bin Laden’s legacy, expands the influence of jihadism within Palestinian territories and signals possible future alliances among extremist factions, amplified by al-Qaeda’s endorsements.

Expressions of support, which might initially appear as mere rhetorical solidarity, could foreshadow deeper coordination among militant factions. This ideological convergence, though potentially transient, could spawn transactional alliances against mutual adversaries. Research has demonstrated that external pressures can alter the behavior of armed groups in significant ways. As the ground invasion of Gaza unfolds, it could change Hamas’s standing in the region, potentially catalyzing a united front among various factions against external military aggression and a common enemy – Israel.

These expressions of unity across jihadist factions could embolden extremist groups, promoting a narrative of a broader religious or ideological conflict. Should this ideological camaraderie translate into actionable alliances, the threat level may escalate, possibly leading to an uptick in terrorist activity both within the Middle East and beyond.

Historically, anti-Israel sentiment among extremist groups is not new. Following the 9/11 attacks, Bin Laden explicitly mentioned Tel Aviv would be the next target. This longstanding enmity towards Israel, along with the events in Gaza, hints at the opportunistic nature of extremist factions to capitalize on regional hostilities. These endorsements and shared affinities might serve as a rallying point, rekindling global jihadist interest in the Palestinian cause and potentially fostering new alliances against Israel.

While al-Qaeda’s endorsement suggests possible alliances, it also paves the way for rivalries, with the hostilities in Gaza serving as a platform for extremist groups to reassert their global relevance within a competitive jihadist landscape. For instance, the quest for influence might propel al-Qaeda and its affiliates to execute high-profile attacks. These dynamics could further ignite rivalries, especially with groups like ISIS, potentially triggering inter-group violence and further fragmentation as the differing ideologies and control over territories come to the forefront.

Conclusion

The significance of Oct. 7 in the context of global extremism cannot be understated. As alliances shift and Israel’s operations on the ground progress, the extremist landscape is set to evolve. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for developing effective counterterrorism policies. Recognizing the historical enmities and pragmatic alliances that define Hamas and al-Qaeda’s relationship is essential in anticipating the possible outcomes of their cooperation. Moving forward, as we witness the domino effect of Oct. 7 spread, it becomes imperative for the international community to adapt its strategies to meet the sophisticated and ever-changing tactics of global jihadist factions.

Mark Berlin is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at George Washington University and a fellow at the University of York’s Centre for the Comparative Study of Civil War. His research on armed group cooperation, patterns of violence, and Middle East politics has been published in outlets such as International Interactions, International Studies Review, Terrorism and Political Violence, and Texas National Security Review.

Sara Harmouch, a Lebanese national and Doctoral Candidate at American University, specializes in counterterrorism. She has firsthand experience with the impacts of conflict and terrorism through her upbringing and extensive fieldwork conducted across the MENA region. Harmouch consults for the US government and the private sector, and has recently briefed NATO on religious terrorist groups. Her research focuses on asymmetric warfare, political violence, and threats to democracies. She holds graduate degrees in International Relations and contributes to Lawfare, War on The Rocks, Voice of America, Dagbladet Information, the Globe Post, and Orion Policy Institute.

Vladimir Rauta is an Associate Professor in International Security at the University of Reading. He researches conflict delegation to proxies and has published in International Security, International Studies Review, International Relations, Contemporary Security Policy, and Civil Wars. He recently edited the Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars, together with Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss.

Main image: Hamas flags. Credit: Rainwiz via Flickr.

10. And You Are? How to Recognize and Remedy Unrecognized Frictions

As the young people or rappers say: "Truth."  

There is so much truth to this. This article may have to become required reading in PME leadership courses at all levels and at pre-command.

Excerpts:

Dealing with the subject of internal organizational friction is problematic on two fronts. First, it is difficult to quantify. It is nuanced and uneven across forces. There is no firm methodology by which to analyze a commander’s grasp on all the capabilities under their command, nor how good the relationships are between the battalion’s core and its attachments. Commanders do get put through their paces on validation exercises, but the marking criteria concern objectives like bridge crossings and assaults. Moreover, many exercises today are simulated, which further dilutes interactions between individuals.

Second, the topic does not make for good reading. Forces like to assume that soldiers are professional enough to put aside any personal or professional differences in order to complete an objective. This is often true, but not always. It is hard for a commander to admit that some of their soldiers are rude to other troops because they wear a different badge or have not completed a certain qualification. However ridiculous it seems, some readers will find this awfully familiar, and some will be guilty of it themselves.

This makes it all the more important to remember that, when assessing the readiness of a military, what you cannot see is of great importance. While some of this invisible friction is baked into military culture, time spent physically training together can dramatically reduce it. Combined arms training, which builds relationships, trust, and skills, will transfer directly into operational advantage.

And You Are? How to Recognize and Remedy Unrecognized Frictions - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Patrick Hinton · November 14, 2023

British military exercise, Salisbury Plain Training Area, England, 2016: Our convoy set off from its departure point in the dead of night. The six vehicles, carrying soldiers and air defense missile launchers, made their way slowly through wooded areas, across fields, and down rural tracks, looking to avoid detection by the enemy. Progress was slow. Vehicles got bogged down on more than one occasion, and we struggled to navigate using night vision equipment whilst trying to relate paper maps to the silhouettes of hills and trees. After several hours, we arrived at the battlegroup headquarters to which we were assigned. I headed into the building that had been requisitioned as the operations room. I approached the battle captain and introduced myself, but it quickly became apparent that we were not expected nor were we particularly welcome. There ensued an uphill battle for our capability to be understood, protected, and deployed appropriately in order to prevent the position being destroyed by enemy aircraft. Relationships had to be built, favors pulled, and compromises reached to make any progress.

Armed forces are divided entities by design. They are first split by domain — land, air, sea. The army, navy, and air force are then divided again by function. The enterprise is built on having separate capabilities such as armor, infantry, artillery, signallers, logisticians, and engineers all come together in times of conflict. Units are further dislocated by space, spread around a country and overseas. As a result, forces often do not “know themselves” as well as they should. Moreover, human frailties such as accidents and losses exacerbate the problem.

Become a Member

As our exercise showed, internal organizational friction reduces operational effectiveness and is often invisible in measures of force readiness. The British Army provides a particularly stark example where these functional divisions are exacerbated by historical norms and fissures. Other forces can learn from our experience, using rigorous and regular collective training to reduce the impact of friction.

Finding Friction

Analysis of military capability often focuses on headline metrics: numbers of tanks, howitzers, and soldiers. The strength of armies is often portrayed as a function of their size, with some minor modifications for the modernity of the systems at play. Forces the world over hold parades, flyovers, and demonstrations to show off this metric to allies and adversaries alike. This was certainly the case regarding Russia prior to February 2022. But the war in Ukraine demonstrated the importance of other considerations, such as the will to fight and the ability of commanders to combine capabilities and sequence them appropriately in time and space. However, there are also more ambiguous frictions that can prevent forces from reaching their potential. As shown in the anecdote above, which took place in a real training exercise, organizational realities must be considered when attempting to analyze the true abilities of a fighting force.

Many commentators were surprised by the Russian armed forces’ apparent inability to seize key objectives in Ukraine after the invasion in 2022. Subsequent examination has revealed that a layer of friction existed below the normal threshold of analysis — Russian soldiers had been using out-of-date maps as well as inadequate food and antiquated rifles. Moreover, command and control was confused, information was kept from soldiers, and orders failed to account for developments on the ground. Such revelations were seized upon by Western analysts and practitioners as evidence that the Russian war machine was a laughing stock. However, such hubris is unwise, and forces should take time to inflect to ensure they do not suffer from a similar sort of rot.

Do I Know You?

The British Army, like most military forces, moves its personnel around the country regularly. Each force does this differently, but it is common for soldiers and officers to change positions every two to three years. This may be upon promotion, or on a more general rotation. As a result, there is a constant churn of personnel through units and formation headquarters. Some people will have been there for two years, others two months, and some two days. Sometimes it is unavoidable for whole command teams to depart at once, although this is avoided where possible. Consequently, expertise in planning and executing missions waxes and wanes.

Indeed, while armies will have centralized, accepted planning processes, individual formations often put their own spin on things, producing their own templates and products. As a result, on arrival in a formation, new personnel will have to learn how to slot in. It is not uncommon for formations to hold an annual series of “crawl, walk, run” planning exercises to bring new staff up to speed with its processes. Ideally, these align with readiness timelines, but conflict may well fail to respect neat operational readiness mechanisms, especially when resources are scarce as they are in many NATO militaries.

In the United Kingdom, related units are often not located together. It may surprise nonpractitioners to learn that in many cases, units that are expected to deploy together, often at very short notice, are not based together and indeed are sometimes separated by hundreds of miles. As a result, there is an immediate barrier to building relationships and working together. Time spent together builds familiarity. It should not be underestimated how much easier it is to work with people you have a rapport with. This becomes even more critical in times of high pressure and fatigue.

When commanders may not know some of the people in their staff, this immediately leads to a reduction in performance. Moreover, familiarity with capabilities may be lacking. Battlegroup commanders may be given a fire group of air defense missile launchers having never laid eyes on them before and may not know the first thing about their use. It is then up to a young troop commander to bridge the gap in understanding. In some cases, this is easy. In others, the battalion commander may be reluctant to take advice from an unknown junior officer, or even fail to realize they are in the headquarters at all.

Military tribalism may also be deleterious to performance. Military forces are broken down into units with different capabilities that are often defined by their historic and lived experience. Different parts of the force often have their own colloquialisms. Some soldiers look down on those who do not have a particular qualification badge or who have not served with a particular unit and even have specific deprecatory terms for outsiders. In operational theaters, these problems become more acute as formations change shape as time moves on. Operational realities such as casualties or demands for capabilities with higher priority elsewhere will keep formations in flux, further exacerbating the issue.

Accidents Happen

Other frictions exist as well. Whilst some might seem minor, they form part of the complex picture that affects how forces perform on the battlefield. For example, despite lots of training and attempts at mitigation, soldiers crash their vehicles an awful lot, both in exercises and on operations. This, in fact, is one of the highest causes of casualties in military forces worldwide. Operating heavy machinery in convoys in the dark or conducting complex maneuvers in urban and wooded areas is hard — really hard. Vehicles get stuck, make a wrong turn, and in the worst cases overturn or collide with a friendly vehicle.

Soldiers also lose things as well as themselves. Weapons, night vision equipment, and even vehicles go missing. Operational imperatives will determine how much time is spent trying to recover them. These sorts of frictions are not accounted for in most planning cycles. This friction also captures last-minute demands on soldiers, including the simple act of battling the military bureaucracy to reach an outcome. Military forces are a mix of analogue and digital processes, in which archaic structures are wrestling with modernity. Obtaining a vehicle, rations, or place to train can be so complex and protracted as to be impracticable among a host of competing priorities.

When added together, the totality of these seemingly minor frictions means that the capability of a military to defeat an enemy is much more nuanced than might be reflected by numbers or the latest technology. A complex cocktail of personal relationships, ability, and willingness contributes to the effectiveness of a force in the field.

What to Do About It?

The solution? Train. Train lots, and train well. Aside from delivering on operations, the second most important task for armies and the other services is to prepare and train for those operations. British military training takes place at a number of levels. First, soldiers must be able to administer themselves in the field and be able to fire their personal weapon accurately and use basic communications equipment. Second, they must be able to operate their core equipment, which might be a vehicle, heavy weapon, missile system, or radar. Third, they need to operate that equipment in concert with other capabilities in pursuit of an aim or objective. This collective training is difficult and expensive to execute effectively, but is absolutely critical to achieving commonality. Units may also be stuck performing other duties such as vehicle maintenance and distracted by an assortment of other demands, from online training to hosting visitors to filling out paperwork.

William F. Owen, editor of Military Strategy magazine, argues that formations should train in the field for 90 days a year. Currently, however formations might be lucky to get 30 days of combined training in a year. And often, that combined training is also an assessment of some sort, which can detract from being able to take time to fully integrate and assimilate the various personnel and capabilities involved.

There are, as ever, frictions associated with such an aim. Some specialist units are passed between larger formations as there are not enough to go around. This means they could potentially end up spending a much longer time in the field, which would have ramifications on morale and retention. Prioritizing their time between supporting formations, their own force development, and time to recuperate requires a pragmatic approach by commanders. Inverting the normal practice of specialists travelling to the associated formation and instead being visited by them to share knowledge would reduce the burden on the minority. This also substantiates the point made previously about being unable to forge strong relationships. However, the intent is a good one. Time spent together builds familiarity with capabilities, which in turn means more favorability — those capabilities will be employed effectively and in concert with the rest of the formation offering competitive advantage.

Issues surrounding the locations of units, and how far they are from the formations they work with, are more difficult. Bases have finite capacities and may simply be unable to house the totality of those who would deploy with them. Sometimes there are infrastructure limitations as to what can be stored where — for example, not every base has the requisite facilities to store sensitive items like missiles. What’s more, armies often try to balance their presence around the country to help with recruitment and enable people to stay where their families are based. Likewise, the problem of career movement is difficult to solve. British career structures are built upon movement and promotion, moving from jobs requiring different skill sets with different profiles. Staying in one place can count against people when trying to achieve the next rank if a high-profile job exists elsewhere.

Remaining Challenges

Dealing with the subject of internal organizational friction is problematic on two fronts. First, it is difficult to quantify. It is nuanced and uneven across forces. There is no firm methodology by which to analyze a commander’s grasp on all the capabilities under their command, nor how good the relationships are between the battalion’s core and its attachments. Commanders do get put through their paces on validation exercises, but the marking criteria concern objectives like bridge crossings and assaults. Moreover, many exercises today are simulated, which further dilutes interactions between individuals.

Second, the topic does not make for good reading. Forces like to assume that soldiers are professional enough to put aside any personal or professional differences in order to complete an objective. This is often true, but not always. It is hard for a commander to admit that some of their soldiers are rude to other troops because they wear a different badge or have not completed a certain qualification. However ridiculous it seems, some readers will find this awfully familiar, and some will be guilty of it themselves.

This makes it all the more important to remember that, when assessing the readiness of a military, what you cannot see is of great importance. While some of this invisible friction is baked into military culture, time spent physically training together can dramatically reduce it. Combined arms training, which builds relationships, trust, and skills, will transfer directly into operational advantage.

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Patrick Hinton was until recently the British Army’s visiting fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a defense and security think tank based in London. He is a serving artillery officer with a background in ground-based air defense systems and uncrewed aerial vehicles. He has an MA in international relations and an MBA. He has published widely on personnel matters, defense technology, and training.

Image: U.K. Ministry of Defence

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warontherocks.com · by Patrick Hinton · November 14, 2023

11. China lures Western scientists to obtain advanced American technology

You would think we would no longer be duped by this. Haven't we publicized this enough? Haven't all the scientists been sufficiently informed about the threat? DOn't these scientists know they will eventually be caught?

China lures Western scientists to obtain advanced American technology

Former Los Alamos scientists lead a new version of controversial Thousand Talents recruiting drive

washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

A worker uses a computer terminal to monitor remote operations at a container port in Tianjin, China, on Jan. 16, 2023. As technicians in a distant control room watch on display screens, an automated crane at one of China’s busiest … A worker uses a computer terminal … more >

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By - The Washington Times - Monday, November 13, 2023

China is investing more than $1.4 billion in a new institute run by former scientists at the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory, part of an ambitious program to hire top U.S. scientists and obtain advanced American technology, according to an investigation by The Washington Times.

The Eastern Institute of Advanced Study (EIAS) is described on its Chinese website as the precursor to the planned Eastern Institute of Technology (EIT) in Ningbo, China. Organizers are paying American scientists million-dollar salaries and providing other lucrative benefits for their knowledge of cutting-edge technology that China has been unable to generate independently.

The program has hired some of the United States’ most experienced scientists, according to documents and open-source research specialists who have studied the project.

The EIAS and the proposed EIT are below the radar and backed financially and politically by the regional Chinese Communist Party in Ningbo, south of Shanghai. The project is the latest version of Beijing’s Thousand Talents recruitment program.

The Justice Department’s China initiative targeted the Thousand Talents program for its focus on American technological knowledge and skills. Since 2018, the Justice Department unit has prosecuted more than 20 U.S. figures with ties to American universities. Many of them were allegedly involved in sensitive U.S. government research while covertly working for Chinese government-linked projects.

The China initiative was launched during the Trump administration in a bid to halt an estimated $250 billion to $600 billion annual loss from Chinese technology theft. The Biden administration halted the legal initiative over concerns that the prosecutions appeared racially motivated.

SEE ALSO: Biden family’s big-money deals in China in background when president meets with Xi Jinping

The Times investigation into the technology theft and recruitment program is based on information and interviews provided by specialists with knowledge of the program, documents outlining the goals and objectives of the project, and information posted on the Chinese internet.

The EIAS plan for the Eastern Institute of Technology includes a multi-acre campus in Ningbo, but the purpose is to systematically steal U.S. intellectual property, mainly in the field of semiconductors, according to security researchers familiar with the programs.

The ‘Kunpeng Plan’

China is calling the talent recruitment effort the “Kunpeng Plan,” according to EIAS documents. The plan is a crucial element of China’s answer to multibillion-dollar U.S. investments in semiconductor manufacturing backed by U.S. export curbs on sales of advanced microchips to China.

Kunpeng is a term derived from a mythical Chinese leviathan-roc, a creature that transforms from a large fish into a predatory bird.

In addition to hiring Nobel Prize-level technology specialists, the EIAS plans to obtain advanced technology from the United States in the areas of semiconductors, artificial intelligence, batteries and advanced computing.

SEE ALSO: Xi Jinping’s goals for APEC summit, Biden meeting revealed by China state-controlled outlets

“The practices of EIT faculty and administration would be blatant violations of trade secrets and noncompete clauses in any U.S. company,” said one expert who has studied the project.

The EIAS plan is funded by an initial commitment of $4 billion from Yu Renrong, founder and chairman of Will Semiconductor Co. Ltd. in Shanghai. The Chinese government agreed to provide matching funding of 20% to 30% of the initial investment.

The planned Eastern Institute of Technology website describes “a new-style research university” funded by Mr. Yu, a Ningbo-based billionaire and CEO of OmniVision Technologies. The local Zhejiang government provided a large plot of land that eventually will become a high-tech university campus.

Will Semiconductor was relatively small until 2019, when it quietly purchased the U.S.-based OmniVision for $2.178 billion, assisted by a $50 billion grant from the China National Integrated Circuit Investment Fund. The fund’s publicly stated goal is to pursue China’s “fusion projects” benefiting the commercial and military sectors.

OmniVision is among the world’s leading providers of image sensors — critical elements for self-driving cars, medicine, cameras and phones — and weapons systems. Mr. Yu did not immediately respond to a request for comment submitted through an OmniVision spokesman.

‘Innovation superpower’

The Pentagon’s latest annual report on the Chinese military said Beijing is aggressively acquiring military-civilian technology to become an “innovation superpower” no longer reliant on foreign technology.

In 2015, the government of President Xi Jinping launched the “Made in China 2025” plan to accelerate advances in emerging technology sectors. The plan calls for setting up regional innovation centers, such as the one in Ningbo, that will “leapfrog foreign technological competitors and create a superior innovation ecosystem,” the report said.

Beijing is focused on dominating emerging dual-use civilian-military technologies, the report said, including next-generation artificial intelligence, quantum information systems, brain science and biotechnology tools, advanced semiconductors, and deep-space, deep-sea and polar-related technologies.

“Beijing has a clear understanding of its remaining [science and technology] deficiencies and wields industrial policies and the country’s massive tech transfer apparatus in an effort to close these gaps,” the report said.

China is a global leader in AI technology with an announced goal of overtaking the West in AI by next year, the report said. AI and autonomous weapons are central to China’s “concept of future warfare.”

China currently relies on advanced foreign capabilities for AI hardware, including semiconductor fabrication and electronic design automation software, but Beijing researchers are pressing ahead with design concepts for next-generation semiconductors.

Huang Deshuang, an EIAS researcher, is an expert on brain science who studied at China’s National Defense University of Science and Technology, according to the project’s website.

China also designed and fabricated a quantum computer capable of outperforming classical high-performance computers and is moving toward a quantum computing system, the Pentagon report said.

China “has mobilized vast resources in support of its defense modernization, including through its military-civilian development strategy, as well as espionage activities to acquire sensitive, dual-use, and military-grade equipment,” the report said.

High pay, strong incentives

Zhejiang officials say the EIAS is offering high salaries and lucrative incentives to hire 200 technology experts over the next five years. It recruited 48 U.S. specialists by mid-2022.

Those eligible under the recruitment program must hold a Nobel Prize, Fields Medal or other prestigious international award. Scientists for the program must be younger than 60 and have experience in world-renowned universities and scientific research centers in the past two years, the project document states.

Chiefs and technology officers of leading technology companies in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Japan, Canada and Australia are also being recruited.

The recruits must resign from their positions and commit to working in Zhejiang province, where Ningbo is located, for more than five years. Chinese experts also are being recruited.

The most prominent experts will be paid more than $1 million annually. Lesser-known researchers are offered salaries of $110,000 to $137,000.

The project will pay recruited experts 20% of the cost of buying a house, fund their children’s education and provide medical treatment at “key municipal medical care” facilities, a perk usually reserved for members of the ruling Chinese Communist Party.

Zhejiang provincial Communist Party Secretary Peng Jiaxue proposed a broad plan for an advanced digital economy for Ningbo that was approved in September 2022, according to one planning document.

Building a new university

The Ningbo government and the EIAS announced in December that a university, tentatively called the Ningbo Oriental University of Science and Technology, would be built with an initial investment of $110 million. Other information indicates that the university’s name will be the Eastern Institute of Technology.

A second document details the types of research and technology the institute is pursuing, including “intelligent hardware and perception” with a focus on “super-resolution detection, super-sensitive sensing, cross-modal fusion, and multi-modal integrated non-contact smart sensors.” Another research topic will be 3D modeling and simulation analysis and design simulation based on virtual reality and augmented reality.

The artificial intelligence research will seek to develop massive data storage, intelligent reasoning and decision-making.

Blockchain technology and information security also are major focus areas. The document says recruited scientists will pursue “major scientific issues and key technical difficulties in the international frontier fields of blockchain and information security.”

Another research area is industrial internet and feedback controls. The project will seek to solve technical problems for sensing technology, the Internet of Things and radio frequency identification and will produce cutting-edge computing capabilities.

EIAS and CHIPS

The EIAS program is part of Beijing’s response to the Biden administration’s 2022 CHIPS and Science Act, a $53 billion investment plan for the U.S. semiconductor industry, according to a report by the research group Frontier Assessments. Chinese officials accuse the U.S. of unfairly blocking access to critical high-tech product lines to curb China’s rise as a rival economic superpower.

“In response to China’s aggressive tech investments, the U.S. must urgently reevaluate its [computer chip] strategy, focusing on securing intellectual property, retaining top talent and bolstering R&D efforts,” according to a research report on EIAS by three open-source intelligence specialists. “This critical reassessment will safeguard U.S. technological leadership and address the pressing need to counterbalance China’s rapid advancements before it’s too late.”

China’s surge in scientific and technological investment and development poses a significant challenge to the United States’ long-standing global leadership in these areas. Extensive funding, the rapid creation of research centers and a strategic focus on producing future-oriented technologies are clear signs that China will reduce its reliance on foreign technology and establish itself as a global market leader.

China’s close integration of industry, academia and government strategies is an advantage in the competition for technological supremacy. The U.S. system is more compartmentalized, the report said.

“The speed and scale of these developments underscore the urgency with which China is seeking to ascend the global ranks of science and technology, marking a pivotal moment in the U.S.-China tech race,” the report said.

The Frontier Assessments report was written by L.J. Eads, a former Air Force intelligence analyst; Ryan Clarke, a strategic intelligence analyst; Hans Ulrich Kaeser, a corporate security specialist; and Robert McCreight, a former U.S. intelligence analyst and State Department official.

The experts are part of the CCP Biothreats Initiative, a program focused on issues related to the convergence of biotechnology, neurobiology, artificial intelligence and human-computer interface.

Los Alamos pipeline

The EIAS leadership includes three scientists who once worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory, the New Mexico facility that designed nuclear weapons.

EIAS President Chen Shiyi was a Los Alamos mechanical engineer from July 1997 to 2000. During that period, U.S. intelligence agencies say, China was engaged in a large-scale spying operation to obtain classified nuclear weapons data.

Mr. Chen, who served for a time as department chair of mechanical engineering at Johns Hopkins University, moved to China in 2005 and renounced his U.S. citizenship. From 2015 to 2020, he was president of the Southern University of Science and Technology, known as SUSTech.

While at SUSTech, Mr. Chen oversaw the recruitment of Massachusetts Institute of Technology mechanical engineer Chen Gang, who was indicted in 2021 on fraud charges for failing to disclose his connections to Chinese government-linked groups, including SUSTech, as required for research funding from the Pentagon and Energy Department. The charges against Chen Gang were dropped in 2022.

Mr. Chen did not immediately respond to an email request for comment.

The EIAS provost is Dongxiao Zhang, a U.S. citizen and expert on renewable energy who worked at Los Alamos as a senior research scientist from 1996 to 2004. Former Los Alamos scientist Yushen Zhao is one of the institute’s vice presidents. Neither responded to requests for comment.

EIAS Vice President Wenjun Zeng, currently a U.S. citizen, worked on developing artificial intelligence at Microsoft Research Asia. Mr. Zeng did not respond to a request for comment.

Several institute specialists also have worked with Mr. Chen at SUSTech.

“It is one thing to recruit talent who start research from scratch using knowledge gained throughout their career,” said a security researcher who has studied at the institute.

“EIT’s practice is to hire people who already or just made breakthrough research using U.S. funding and move them to China, give them lofty titles, big salaries and a safety net, and funding for commercialization that will help them become strategic competitors of the U.S. government and taxpayers who paid for the research in the first place,” said the researcher, speaking on the condition of anonymity.

Another EIAS expert is Lei He, a computer scientist at the University of California, Los Angeles. Mr. He is working on artificial intelligence and, according to insiders, has placed many of his graduate students in leading American laboratories.

Mr. He is listed on the UCLA website as a professor of electrical and computer engineering. Mr. He did not respond to an email request for comment.

The objective was to facilitate a “human cloud” computing service that allows Chinese access to computing platforms no longer accessible to China.

A major concern is that a cluster of technological advances derived from the experts’ knowledge and involvement in developing U.S. technology will give China a significant boost in dominating key global technology fields.

Key players

People familiar with the program’s internal workings identified several key players and their roles.

Mr. Zeng, the EIAS vice president, is working to produce advanced algorithms useful for AI. Mr. He is said to be working on electronic design automation and chiplet development. Chiplets are tiny integrated circuits that boost computing power, a fundamental shortcoming of current Chinese microchips.

Others at EIAS include former Georgia Institute of Technology professor David Keezer, a specialist in semiconductor testing, and Qinghuo Liu, a former Duke University specialist in microwave and electronic design automation. Neither responded to requests for comment. While at Duke, Mr. Liu worked on projects for the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Army Night Vision Lab, the Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, and Sandia National Laboratory.

At EIAS, Mr. Keezer and Mr. Liu are developing China’s microchip manufacturing and fabrication capabilities.

Another recruit for EIAS is Chen Zhangxing, a specialist in chemical engineering who left the University of Calgary.

Sun Xueliang, a specialist in next-generation batteries, is another former Canadian scientist at EIAS and is said to be helping Beijing advance the electric vehicle industry.

Tan Zhongchao joined EIAS from the University of Waterloo in Ontario and is working to develop China’s energy and nanotechnology.

The three scientists did not respond to requests for comment.

The Frontier Assessments report on EIAS said the recruitment and technology development program in Ningbo signals an intensification of global technological rivalry.

“It’s clear that the current era is characterized by strategic maneuvering, significant financial investments, and a fierce battle for intellectual property supremacy, particularly between the U.S. and China,” the report said. “The battleground spans several critical sectors, from semiconductors to AI, and involves not only corporate acquisitions but also the shaping of future minds through educational initiatives.”

China’s technology ambitions, embodied in initiatives such as EIT, EIAS and the Kunpeng Plan, “demonstrate a concerted effort to pivot the epicenter of technological innovation eastward,” the report said.

“These efforts are not just aspirational; they are backed by substantial financial muscle, with investments in technology procurement sometimes soaring as high as $2.178 billion.”

The strategic acquisition of technology companies further highlights the Ningbo program’s aggressive strategy.

Congress seeks answers

On Oct. 31, two House panels wrote to the director of the National Science Foundation questioning the security of the foundation’s nearly $7 billion in funding for research at 2,000 universities. The letter said foreign talent recruitment at U.S. universities is a continuing threat.

The Republican chairmen of the panels warned about “systematic attempts to exploit, degrade and misappropriate our open system of science.”

One case involved the federal indictment in 2021 of Mingqing Xiao, a professor at Southern Illinois University who was paid $151,099 by the National Science Foundation and concealed funding he was receiving from the Chinese government and a Chinese university.

“Defending American research is essential to maintaining U.S. scientific competitiveness and safeguarding economic and national security,” said the letter by Reps. James Comer of Kentucky and Frank D. Lucas of Oklahoma. Mr. Comer is chairman of the House Oversight and Accountability Committee. Mr. Lucas chairs the House Science, Space and Technology Committee.

The EIAS did not respond to a request for comment. All EIAS specialists mentioned in this report were asked for comments on their roles in the institute, but none of them responded.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2023 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

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washingtontimes.com · by Bill Gertz

12. Army Pacific Launches Massive "Theater Wide" US vs China Wargame

Very interesting read that puts the USARPAC CG's vision and intent into perspective.

Excerpts:

Senior members of Army Pacific tell Warrior that Commanding General Charles Flynn says the purpose of Army Pacific and its build-up is to “avoid war.” At the same time, part of the method of “avoiding war,” Flynn emphasizes, is to train, prepare, experiment and refine a “war plan.”

“While many different scenarios concern us, central is the PLA using yearly large scale exercises in the Straits to lull us into thinking the threat of invasion is low, then one year in the near future, that large training force abruptly changes course and heads straight for beaches on Taiwan. The result is a surprise invasion with very little warning,”

Army Pacific Launches Massive "Theater Wide" US vs China Wargame

https://warriormaven.com/china/army-pacific-launches-massive-theater-wide-us-vs-china-wargame?mc_cid=49400de3b3&mc_eid=70bf478f36

Commanding General Charles Flynn says the purpose of Army Pacific and its build-up is to “avoid war.”

• KRIS OSBORN, WARRIOR MAVEN - CENTER FOR MILITARY MODERNIZATION21 HOURS AGO

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

A massive “bolt-out-of-the-blue” salvo of attacking ballistic missiles designed to overwhelm Taiwan…..a large-scale amphibious assault to surround and take-over the island…a rapid blockade of the South China Sea …..or perhaps even a surprise 5th-generation air attack on US warships in the Philippine Sea ….all seem to be realistic possibilities should the People’s Republic of China suddenly move to annex Taiwan or claim exclusive ownership of disputed island territories in the South China Sea.

Would a large-scale ballistic missile attack designed to take-out Taiwanese air defenses and cripple its weapons, air fields and defenses be a most likely start to a surprise attack? Any attack is almost certain to be accompanied or even preceded by a commensurate PRC effort to “jam” US and allied GPS and communications signals in the region … to effectively blind US, Taiwanese and allied defenses in position to respond in the region.

Senior members of Army Pacific tell Warrior that Commanding General Charles Flynn says the purpose of Army Pacific and its build-up is to “avoid war.” At the same time, part of the method of “avoiding war,” Flynn emphasizes, is to train, prepare, experiment and refine a “war plan.”

“While many different scenarios concern us, central is the PLA using yearly large scale exercises in the Straits to lull us into thinking the threat of invasion is low, then one year in the near future, that large training force abruptly changes course and heads straight for beaches on Taiwan. The result is a surprise invasion with very little warning,”

Maybe the PLA might seek to exploit what it thinks is an overmatch or advantage in the realm of hypersonic weapons and simply seek to “deny” US warships from closing in on an area to defend Taiwan? Given the sheer size and growing technological sophistication of the PLA Navy, a massive amphibious attack on Taiwan would be another likely avenue of approach for the PLA should it seek to rapidly “take-over” Taiwan. The likely thinking on the part of the PRC, as explained in the Pentagon’s annual reports on the Chinese military, might be to take over Taiwan so quickly that their dominion becomes a kind of “fait accompli” wherein it simply becomes too costly in terms of lives and too large-scale an endeavor to try to extricate the PLA from Taiwan. Should the US, Japan and South Korea need to mass a liberation force and fully “extricate” an occupying PLA force from Taiwan … could it be done?

Paradox of Deterrence: Peace Through Strength

While the purpose of the war game is to establish and refine an informed warplan in the event one is needed…. Army Pacific Commander Gen Charles Flynn regularly emphasizes the paradox central to deterrence…. Be ready to prevail in war if needed…. For the sole purpose of avoiding war

Army Pacific senior officials say Flynn says the Wargame is intended to train, experiment and build multinational relationships to “prevent” war…..peace through strength. As part of this, senior members of Army Pacific tell Warrior that Gen. Flynn says the purpose of Army Pacific and its overall strategy is to “avoid war.” At the same time, part of the method of “avoiding war,” Flynn emphasizes, is to train, prepare, experiment and refine a “war plan.” Army Pacific’s main concern is indeed related to the risk of a sudden PLA “surprise attack.”

“While many different scenarios concern us, central is the PLA using yearly large scale exercises in the Straits to lull us into thinking the threat of invasion is low, then one year in the near future, that large training force abruptly changes course and heads straight for beaches on Taiwan. The result is a surprise invasion with very little warning,” the senior official with Army Pacific explained

A defining challenge when it comes to countering a sudden Chinese attack would likely relate to simple question of time and distance. Can US warships and their supporting 5th-generation air attack capability respond fast enough? Will enough torpedo armed submarines be in position to destroy Chinese warships crossing the Taiwan strait? Could US Navy amphibs armed with 20 F-35Bs each be close enough to quickly establish air superiority and leverage the US Navy’s massive 5th-generation air advantage? China has no sea-launched 5th-generation threat and would therefore be very challenged to succeed with an amphibious take-over of Taiwan if US F-35s could get their fast enough to destroy a PLA Navy amphibious attack from the air​.

These are all questions likely to be entertained by US Army Pacific commanders in a massive “theater-wide” wargame exploring a full-scale conflict with China in the Pacific. While tactical scenarios, weapons ranges and particular methods of attack are almost certain not to be available for security reasons, Army Pacific officials say this wargame is an enterprise which has not been pursued in living memory.

Army Pacific Wargame “Rehearsal of Concept”

Senior officials with Army Pacific Command tell Warrior there is now a large-scale “Rehearsal of Concept” underway as an initial step in the wargame, where participants and commanders are briefing their roles, solidifying command relationships and anticipating key tasks. Details regarding weapons, scenarios and capabilities are not available for security reasons, yet Army officials say the all-out-war exercise is today’s version of the “War Plan Orange wargaming done by the Navy and Army in the 1930s.”

The idea of the ROC, senior officials explain … is to prepare for the worst and “develop an executable war plan that prepares USARPAC (US Army Pacific) for the worst eventuality.”

Much attention has been focused on flashpoints in the South China Sea and the pressing Chinese threat to attack Taiwan, yet fewer minds have likely been sharpened in upon the reality of what a full-scale, Pacific-wide war with the PRC might look like. This is a complex and very nuanced question with seemingly far too many variables to consider, yet the current Army Pacific ROC seems up to the task.

Specifics related to threats, ranges, combat scenarios and joint, multi-domain dynamics for the wargame are likely informed by findings from recent wargames and comprehensive Army analyses of the PLA’s reach and capability across the region. In recent months, US Army Pacific has published several research documents and studies offering findings and insights of great relevance to the Chinese threat in the Pacific. One major finding from an Army Pacific 2023 wargame called “Unified Pacific Wargame Series”

Any outcome to an enterprise of this kind clearly results from a complex mixture of different variables, and of course the growing nature of multi-domain, information-driven warfare. Specifically, several Army studies are clear that there remains a “massive” need for more Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Pacific theater. This need, senior Army officials and the Command’s research papers emphasize, need to me matched a commensurate improvement in data processing, or PED .. Processing Exploitation and Dissemination” of critical wardata.

“We need vastly more dense and redundant ISR, yet it is not enough to just have the world's best airborne sensors…..after collecting massive data, there is a need for "massively capable" PED,” a Senior Army official familiar with the Wargame told Warrior. The idea, the Senior Army expert explained, would be for the force to “Get quickly enough to the point where planes, drones, land troops, and ships are seamlessly passing and sharing both targeting data and BDA.(Battle Damage Assessments).”

The text of US Army Pacific’s Unified Pacific Wargame Series findings aligns closely with the Senior Army officials’ comments, as it emphasizes a need for not only an increase in “collection capability” related to volumes of information but also a “parallel increase in PED capacity to conduct proper analysis and avoid “bottle necks” in the information chain.”

The Army essay makes the related critical point that redundancy in the realm of information collection, analysis and transmission will be essential to ensure “joint” awareness and also mitigate against or overcome any Chinese attempt to “jam,” “derail” or “destroy” US and allied communication systems. More transport layers and secure, redundant levels of information exchange can help ensure operational functionality in the event some systems are destroyed or jammed.

“Joint Collection requires diversified collection platforms, across all three layers – the aerial, space, and terrestrial layers….Additional sensing in the terrestrial layer provides more consistent, persistent pattern development and recognition,” the text of the UPWS Army paper states. “Federation of collection and PED responsibilities not only eases the burden on the forward-most formations, but provides for common understanding.”

The need for more layers of ISR and PED would indeed make sense and seem critical given the vast-expanse of the Pacific. This is particularly true in the case of a “theater-wide” wargame exploring conflict from the Korean Peninsula all the way down beyond the South China Sea. This is why military experts refer to the Pacific in terms of a “tryanny of distance,” because conflict in the vast pacific would seemingly rise or fall on a successful ability to integrate and connect otherwise disparate operations across the theater. However, it is not enough for volumes of information to simply “get there” or “transmit” … the data must be processed and exploited quickly and efficiently, a point highlighted in the Army Pacific’s UPWS paper.

“Without simultaneous improvements in the capacity and capability of PED systems,parallel improvements in collection will fail to achieve desired results,” the Army Pacific essay writes.

What might it mean in practical or operational terms to make this a reality. Clearly there would be a simple need for more nodes and assets in terms of drones, fixed-wing surveillance planes, ship and ground-based sensors and radar along with a robust air and space ISR capacity. However, of key relevance, not only would these nodes need to exist…but they would need to be engineered with the requisite “interfaces” “gateways” and technical standards to ensure information interoperability. Should time critical sensor data arrive through one transport layer format for example, such as RF or GPS, it will need to be “pooled” and analyzed in relation to data collected through otherwise disconnected sensor systems. This is where gateways come in, as they are systems described almost as translators able to receive data from one RF signal, for example, and combine it with incoming data from a GPS signal, ship-based radar or wireless datalink of some kind. Successful operation of ISR and PED, particularly when it comes to blending the two together with optimal efficiency, would require the interfaces to ensure seamless data flow and analysis across a diversified joint network.

“PRC investments include digital infrastructure abroad, 5G cell networks, undersea cables, and data centers,” the Army Pacific text explained.

Chinese Expansionist Ambition

All of the studies findings and related US Army Pacific research rest upon a growing sense of urgency given the known elements of Chinese ambition. Another Army Pacific research essay published in 2023 alongside the UPWS findings is called “America’s Theater Army for the Indo Pacific.” The text of this document is clear about PLA expansionist aims, explaining that military modernization in the form of “intelligentization” may be positioning the PRC to think it can move to take over Taiwan in the near future.

“PLA now sets its sights to 2027 with a goal to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, in-formatization, and intelligentization of the PRC's armed forces. If realized, this 2027 objective could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification,” the America’s Theater Army for the IndoPacific states.

US Army Pacific’s text, “America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific” details some of the specifics informing the PRC’s expansionist aims and strategies throughout the region. The paper provide summaries of China’s well known Belt-Road-Initiative. The BRI include a mix of transportation and economic alignments along the periphery of mainland China designed to expedite an ability to mass power, deploy and move resources throughout SouthEast Asia. BRI includes railways, port access and logistical support for global naval deployment, the Army Pacific text states.

“Recent agreements with countries such as Cambodia on Ream Port and Sri Lanka on the Port of Hambantota provide strategic positioning and expanded access to the region's waterways,” the Army Pacific text states.

The BRI has been followed by what the Army Pacific text refers to as “Digital Silk Road” in which avenues for technology-focused investments were emphasized and added to the PRC strategy in the region.

There is also China’s “nine-dash-line” claim, an assertion reportedly rooted in the Chinese Dynastic era hundreds of years ago .. claiming the entirety of the South China Sea as its own territory.

China Occupies Taiwan

What if an US-led allied coalition had to liberate Taiwan from an occupying PLA force? Could it be done? Such questions may seem impossible to answer, however a quick look at GlobalFirewpower.com in relation to improving maritime force deployment platforms seems to indicate the answer may be …”yes,” but at a huge cost.

South Korea and Japan operate 1.1 million and 309,000 forces respectively and the US and Japan could together deploy an unrivaled 5th-generation F-35 force likely capable of quickly achieving air superiority. China’s J-20 exists in sizable numbers but cannot launch from the ocean and may not compete with the F-35 or Guam-based F-22s.. Furthermore, the PLA’s J-31 5th-gen stealth carrier launched aircraft only exists as a few prototypes and the PLA has no sea-launched F-35B vertical take-off-and-landing 5th-generation platform. Alongside these factors, the largest and perhaps less recognized element of any Pacific confrontation would undoubtedly rely upon a massive Army Pacific ground presence supporting a joint, multi-domain campaign. Ultimately, any effort to liberate Taiwan would require forces on the ground, a reason why the US Army Pacific continues to massively expand its presence and “joint” emphasis in terms of connecting with the other services. This is fundamental to the Army Pacific’s need for ISR and PED.

“Land forces, particularly the U.S. Army, would figure centrally in de- fending national borders and preserving the territorial integrity of its Allies. This is because victory in an interstate war typically depends on control of key ground, with its corresponding abundance of resources, food supplies, wealth, and populations,” the text of America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific” states.

Gen Flynn explains that a growing, strong US Army presence in the Pacific theater is an indispensable and defining element contributing to a joint, multi-service effort to deter the PLA.

"The People’s Republic of China holds advantages of mass, munitions depth and interior lines—operating from a central position that enables an army to move faster than opposing forces can counter—that will take the entire joint force to deny its military objectives," Army Pacific Commander Gen. Charles Flynn writes in an April 2023 edition of AUSA Magazine.

These factors and considerations are likely why the “America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific” points to the growing significance of US-allied connectivity in the Pacific, as a joint US, Japanese, Korean force might well be able to liberate Taiwan from Chinese occupation. The aim would of course be to prevent that from being necessary, yet an established ability to do this figures prominently in the deterrence equation.

“The United States maintains defense treaties with five Allies in the Indo-Pacific: Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Treaties are binding agreements between nations and become part of international law, which, if enacted, would likely require all forms of U.S. military power,” America’s Theater Army for the Indo Pacific states.

Kris Osborn is President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. 

13. China’s disregard for small state agency hampers its foreign policy

Exploit this.

China’s disregard for small state agency hampers its foreign policy | East Asia Forum

eastasiaforum.org · by Gregory Poling · November 12, 2023

Authors: Gregory Poling and Jude Blanchette, CSIS

On 22 October 2023, two separate collisions took place near Second Thomas Shoal, an underwater feature that an international tribunal in 2016 ruled is part of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. A China Coast Guard ship rammed a much smaller civilian vessel contracted by the Philippine Navy to resupply troops stationed aboard the BRP Sierra Madre.

In videos released by both sides, the coastguard vessel can be seen blocking the path of the resupply ship, which attempted to evade the vessel by crossing its bow and was struck. Separate videos show the second collision. The Qiong Sansha Yu 00003, a professional maritime militia vessel operated by China’s state-owned Sansha Fisheries Development Company, pulled alongside and then collided with a stationary Philippine Coast Guard ship. The incident appeared to involve no serious damage, and a second Philippine resupply vessel managed to reach the Sierra Madre. But these were just the most dangerous interactions in pattern of unsafe conduct that recurs monthly around Second Thomas Shoal.

The situation around Second Thomas highlights a key feature of China’s foreign policy — its refusal to acknowledge that the Philippines or other small states have their own agency in disputes with Beijing. This worldview was aptly summed up in a piece by the nationalist Global Times, which concludes ‘By escalating the tensions, the Philippines likely wants to draw support from the US, or the entire farce was staged by the US in the first place’.

When the Chinese leadership confronts a middle or small power that challenges or offends Beijing, they often accuse the smaller power of working in tandem with the United States or being used by the United States to drive an ‘anti-China’ strategy. This is the same sentiment with which Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi infamously shouted down Singaporean counterpart George Yeo at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum. ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact’, he said.

This sentiment is also the reason that Beijing sought to undermine the arbitration brought by the Philippines from 2013 to 2016 by insisting that it was engineered by the United States and Japan. And it is why after every Philippine diplomatic objection over the violence at Second Thomas, Chinese officials ignore the substance of the complaints and lecture their Filipino counterparts about being pawns in a US plot.

When another China Coast Guard vessel nearly collided with a Philippine ship in September 2023, Beijing read from this familiar script. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. aired his frustrations at the annual ASEAN Summit that same week, saying that the Philippines rejected narratives of the South China Sea disputes that revolved around US–China competition. Marcos asserted that ‘this not only denies us our independence and our agency, but it also disregards our own legitimate interests’.

A month later, after the Philippines complained about another violent incident between itself and China, Global Times ran an editorial cartoon showing the Philippines as nothing more than a stick being used by the United States to stir up the South China Sea.

Beijing is not ready to acknowledge that Manila, or any other Southeast Asian claimant, has legitimate grievances that must be addressed to peacefully manage disputes. This increases the risks of escalation as Beijing seems to believe that other states are less committed to their sovereignty and rights, defy China only because of American interference and will eventually buckle in the face of sustained pressure. Running the same coercive play over and over at Second Thomas Shoal seems unlikely to change Philippine policy and so will only lead to further collisions and risk escalation.

There are two driving forces behind this forceful aspect of China’s regional foreign policy — Beijing’s vision of regional hierarchy and fear of US containment. In China’s long-embedded view of regional hierarchy, smaller states are historically and necessarily subservient to Beijing in the Asian pecking order. Long legacies of traditional tributary state relations with China, as well as the historical dominance of Chinese culture, language and economic power in the region, still linger in the minds of Chinese decisionmakers.

Chinese leaders also genuinely see the United States as an architect of a long-term containment strategy that seeks to undermine China’s regional influence or worse, to bring about the collapse of the Communist Party of China. This view, which dates to the years just after the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, now colours much of Beijing’s thinking about its external environment. As Chinese President Xi Jinping stated in March, ‘Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China, which has brought unprecedented severe challenges to our country’s development’.

Beijing’s unwillingness to treat the concerns and grievances of its regional neighbours as legitimate has now become one of the most prominent challenges to its management of external relations. As US officials admit privately, the Biden administration’s progress in strengthening relations with countries across the region, from Australia to India to the Philippines, is less a story of diplomatic acumen and more one of Chinese truculence. Should Beijing adjust course and begin treating regional actors as partners, not irritants, the United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy may face its greatest challenge yet.

Greg Poling is Senior Fellow and Director of the Southeast Asia Program and the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC.

Jude Blanchette holds the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington DC.

eastasiaforum.org · by Gregory Poling · November 12, 2023

14. How China commands its ‘people’s army’

From an Air Force Academy Cadet. I am optimistic about our future leaders.

Excerpts:

While understanding the PLA’s dual-command structure is a great start, viewing the PLA as one might view a Western military is the wrong approach. When considering the PLA’s structure, Western leaders must keep in mind what it is—the armed wing of the CCP. It is a civil-war-born military that exists to hold political power for the party. The dual-command structure is not just a quirk of command-and-control tactics; it’s integral to the PLA’s purpose.

In the CCP’s eyes, the PLA’s dual-command structure is just as efficient and powerful as a Western military’s command system, if not better. Above all, if strategists cannot prevent themselves from projecting their Western-style military perspectives onto the PLA, they risk severely misunderstanding the CCP’s lethal arm, and will pay the price for it.

How China commands its ‘people’s army’ | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · by Payton Rawson · November 12, 2023

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s visit to Beijing in June exposed the scarcity of military-to-military dialogue between China’s People’s Liberation Army and the US military. Stabilising US–China relations to manage competition and avoid conflict was the main goal of Blinken’s visit.

Despite echoing these aims in its propaganda, Beijing has closed military-to-military channels at the same time that the PLA is ramping up assertive manoeuvres against US assets in the Indo-Pacific, raising the risk of potentially fatal miscalculations and accidents. These channels could mean the difference between peace and war.

The PLA is the Chinese Communist Party’s military arm. Article 29 of the Chinese constitution states that the armed services ‘belong to the people’, yet CCP Secretary General and Chinese President Xi Jinping reiterated to the 20th Party National Congress the importance of ‘absolute leadership of the party over the people’s army’. As chair of the Central Military Commission, Xi is paramount commander of the PLA—itself a branch of the party, not the Chinese state.

That might sound similar to the principle of civilian control over the military familiar in the West, including the US president’s role as commander-in-chief, but these parallels are misleading. Xi commands without the checks and balances central to constitutional democracy. The CCP extends its control over the PLA at every level of command through the ‘military and political dual-command structure’ (军政双首长制).

Quoting Mao Zedong at the PLA’s 90th anniversary celebration in 2017, Xi reminded the armed forces that ‘our principle is that the party commands the gun, but the gun is never allowed to command the party’. The CCP uses political organisations to avoid corruption, revolution and dissension in the PLA, and officials have noted the importance of the dual-command structure in ‘fully implementing and embodying the fundamental principle of the absolute leadership of the party over the people’s army’.

While a dual-command structure will be unfamiliar to most associated with Western-style militaries, it is imperative to understanding China’s ‘people’s army’. So what is it? And why does the CCP think it is the PLA’s ‘greatest characteristic and advantage’ compared to the West’s single-command structure (一长制)?

Essentially, the PLA reports to the rest of the CCP at every level of command. The party uses a handful of political organisations in the PLA, additional to the military’s command structure, to keep it under control. The political commissar at one of China’s top defence universities has said that these organisations—namely, the party committee system (党委制), the political commissar system (政治委员制) and the political organ system (政治机关制)—represent the CCP‘s ‘painstaking exploration and development and gradual finalisation in the process of ideologically building the party and politically building the army’. These are the three foundational political structures at the heart of the dual-command structure.

The party committee system is the ‘fundamental system of the party’s leadership of the people’s army’. Party committees lead and guide the work of the party at every military level; they also function outside the PLA in all aspects of society. The CCP sees committees as crucial to a ‘unified system of division of responsibility among heads under the unified collective leadership of the party committee’ (党委统一的集体领导下的首长分工负责制). While a mouthful, the phrase strikes on the CCP idea of ‘collective leadership’ (集体领导) that’s at the core of the dual-command structure securing the rest of the party’s control of the PLA.

The second pillar of the dual-command structure is the political commissar system. A PLA political commissar (政治委员) acts as the ‘head of his unit along with the military commander at the same level and is jointly responsible for the work of the troops to which he belongs under the leadership of the party committee at the same level’. The commissars lead and organise the political work of units, including education. Since they act at the same level with similar authority as their corresponding military commanders, they are integral to the dual-command structure of the PLA.

Political commissars also play a role managing discipline, morale and welfare, a function usually filled by higher-ranking enlisted soldiers in Western militaries. Political commissars’ specific roles can vary—at lower levels they are designated as directors and instructors—but they have similar responsibilities.

The third pillar, the political organ system, comprises ‘administrative and functional’ departments that host political work at each level of the military. While little is known about exactly how they function, the role of the political organs is hold the PLA accountable to political objectives through inspection and punishments. (The word ‘organ’ is the Chinese ji’guan (机关), which can also be translated as ‘institution’ or ‘agency’.)

Using these systems, the dual-command structure provides political command that sits alongside the operational command of military personnel. Since the PLA’s official creation on 1 August 1927, there was only one short period in the late 1930s when it didn’t have a dual-command structure. After an almost immediate increase in disloyalty, Mao quickly reversed the decision and reinstated PLA political organisations.

From the Western perspective, a collective leadership system like this would seem to weaken the PLA’s ability to make good decisions quickly. Its advantage, however, is complete political alignment and, ideally, prevention of corruption. The dual-command structure can secure party loyalty with little room for error, but at some point the party is making a trade-off, be it for speed of communication, innovation or intent. The Western military mind is immediately drawn to the limitations of collective leadership, but without a real test we will never know for sure where those limitations might lie, or how restrictive they might be.

While understanding the PLA’s dual-command structure is a great start, viewing the PLA as one might view a Western military is the wrong approach. When considering the PLA’s structure, Western leaders must keep in mind what it is—the armed wing of the CCP. It is a civil-war-born military that exists to hold political power for the party. The dual-command structure is not just a quirk of command-and-control tactics; it’s integral to the PLA’s purpose.

In the CCP’s eyes, the PLA’s dual-command structure is just as efficient and powerful as a Western military’s command system, if not better. Above all, if strategists cannot prevent themselves from projecting their Western-style military perspectives onto the PLA, they risk severely misunderstanding the CCP’s lethal arm, and will pay the price for it.

Payton Rawson is a cadet as the US Air Force Academy and conducted the research for this article during a placement at ASPI. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the US Air Force Academy, the US Air Force, the US Department of Defense or the US government. Image: Etienne Oliveau/Getty Images.

aspistrategist.org.au · by Payton Rawson · November 12, 2023

15. Fighting to Govern Myanmar, From a Teeny Office in Washington

So what are we cou=ing to do about Burma/Myanmar? What can we do? What should we do?

I would be interested in reading the assessments and recommendations at various commands in intelligence agencies as well as State.

Fighting to Govern Myanmar, From a Teeny Office in Washington - The New York Times

By Hannah Beech

Reporting from Washington

Nov. 13, 2023

nytimes.com · by Hannah Beech · November 13, 2023

National Unity Government of Myanmar Dispatch

Fighting to Govern Myanmar, From a Teeny Office in Washington

The National Unity Government of Myanmar, formed as an alternative to the junta that orchestrated a 2021 coup, has to battle global apathy and ignorance as it struggles for recognition.

U Moe Zaw Oo, the deputy foreign minister in a shadow government seeking recognition as the legitimate leadership of Myanmar, at the group’s American headquarters in Washington.Credit…Kenny Holston/The New York Times

By Hannah Beech

Reporting from Washington

Nov. 13, 2023

Three blocks from the White House, at the end of a fluorescent-lit hallway on the sixth floor of a co-working space for “business nomads, freelancers and energetic entrepreneurs,” sits the American headquarters of the National Unity Government of Myanmar.

This pro-democracy government was formed after a military coup in Myanmar deposed civilian authorities in 2021. Although Western nations condemned the putsch — and the massacres and mass arrests that followed — no national government has formally recognized the N.U.G. as the legitimate leadership of Myanmar.

But Washington attracts political refugees from all over the world who hope proximity to power will draw attention to their national plights. Ma Aye Chan Mon and U Moe Zaw Oo of the N.U.G. remain optimistic they can get the world to care about Myanmar, despite the destructive forces of apathy and ignorance.

“They don’t even know how to pronounce Myanmar,” said Ms. Aye Chan Mon, about the reception she often receives in Washington. “They think it’s Yemen.”

“It’s not Yemen,” she added.

Fortified by her mother’s curries — enlivened with roselle leaves and shrimp paste — Ms. Aye Chan Mon, 26, spends her days trying to arrange meetings with anyone willing to listen to her recount her homeland’s desperate present situation and its history of military tyranny and civil war. In September, she testified before Congress.

“They don’t even know how to pronounce Myanmar,” said Ma Aye Chan Mon about the reception she often receives as she tries to tell her country’s story in Washington. “They think it’s Yemen.”Credit…Kenny Holston/The New York Times

Last December, President Biden signed the BURMA Act, which refers to Myanmar by a name discarded by military rulers. The legislation calls for sanctions on those who quashed Myanmar’s reforms and for nonlethal aid for pro-democracy forces. Its passage was a triumph for the N.U.G.’s Washington representatives. In late October, the United States announced targeted sanctions on Myanmar’s state-run oil and gas enterprise.

But any actual spending for Myanmar must be authorized though separate appropriation bills.

“After the BURMA Act was enacted, the people of our country and the resistance movement had very high expectations,” said Mr. Moe Zaw Oo, who is the N.U.G.’s deputy foreign minister. “But we have not seen any tangible results.”

Myanmar has never been a foreign policy priority for the United States.

During the Obama administration, the Southeast Asian nation of slightly over 50 million people seemed to offer a hopeful narrative: a military dictatorship peacefully giving way to an elected government. Mr. Obama visited twice. That gauzy tale, though, proved a mirage. The military never relinquished true power. Its soldiers continued to persecute ethnic minorities.

Mr. Moe Zaw Oo after attending a congressional meeting in Washington, in July. “After the BURMA Act was enacted, the people of our country and the resistance movement had very high expectations,” he said. “But we have not seen any tangible results.”Credit…Kenny Holston/The New York Times

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel laureate turned civilian leader, declined to forcefully condemn the army’s brutality against Rohingya Muslims. The United States soured on her and labeled anti-Rohingya violence, which reached a frenzy in 2017, ethnic cleansing.

Now, she and nearly her entire cabinet are imprisoned. Vast tracts of the country are at war, as civilians refuse to submit to the junta and armed ethnic groups expand their territory. At least 1.7 million people are internally displaced, the United Nations says, with another million or so having fled the country.

The N.U.G. Washington office opened a year ago, joining branches in six other countries, including the Czech Republic and Japan. Almost all its meetings are virtual.

“Sometimes we joke that meetings online are good because we are not facing each other, so we can argue without the threat of a physical fight,” Mr. Moe Zaw Oo said.

The entire office is barely larger than a cubicle. There’s little else besides a sign proclaiming the government’s name — strategically placed as a backdrop for online meetings — plus four portraits of N.U.G. leaders (two of whom are imprisoned in Myanmar) and three tables. Cappuccinos for visitors are sourced from a nearby cafe. An unplugged air freshener occupies one corner.

Mr. Moe Zaw Oo bought the air freshener, and Ms. Aye Chan Mon chose its floral scent, although she says no bottle compares to Myanmar’s tropical bouquet: the night jasmine or the golden padauk of the hot season.

“I can get everything here, like beautiful clothes and food and a car,” she said, of Washington. “But it’s not home.”

Those in exile from Myanmar have faced numerous hardships.

Mr. Moe Zaw Oo, left, and Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, center, at the Washington offices of the National Unity Government of Myanmar.Credit…Kenny Holston/The New York Times

U Kyaw Moe Tun was Myanmar’s envoy to the United Nations at the time of the coup. He refused to submit to the military and kept control over his post. In July, a Myanmar man was convicted in a New York court of conspiring to injure or kill the ambassador on behalf of Myanmar’s military leaders. Lead in the paint of the ambassador’s residence has poisoned his son, causing developmental delays, Mr. Kyaw Moe Tun said. But the family remains so as not to relinquish a valuable asset to the junta.

“Every one of us here in the United States for the Myanmar resistance, we are fighting our own wars,” Mr. Kyaw Moe Tun said.

The N.U.G.’s ranks include members of the ousted government, activists who campaigned against that government and ethnic minorities who have fought for autonomy for decades. Ms. Aye Chan Mon’s father, a once-imprisoned poet, serves as the N.U.G.’s defense minister. There is an N.U.G. deputy minister who is Rohingya. There is also a humanitarian affairs minister who, while serving in the previous government, refused to use the word “Rohingya” lest it legitimize the Muslim group.

That cabinet minister, Dr. Win Myat Aye, now says he was misinformed by his military counterparts about their persecution of the Rohingya.

“If I could know what was really happening at that time, I would not tolerate their inhumane crimes on the Rohingya community,” he said.

An image of Myanmar’s civilian leaders, who were deposed in the 2021 coup. State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, now imprisoned, is second from left.Credit…Kenny Holston/The New York Times

When he was a minister for social welfare in the ousted government, Dr. Win Myat Aye had a staff of 6,000 and a swanky office. Today, he is often on the move: sheltering in safe houses in Myanmar’s borderlands and eating uninspiring pan-Asian takeout in Washington.

“I am getting more and more energized with the moral standing of the right side,” he said.

Most days in Washington, Mr. Moe Zaw Oo, the deputy foreign minister, works from an oval table in the middle of the tiny work space. Ms. Aye Chan Mon sits at a little desk to the side, fixing his schedule and battling the printer, which, like printers everywhere, needs coaxing to do its job. She checks Facebook to see friends in the jungle fighting for democracy, as part of a loose coalition even more loosely affiliated with the N.U.G.

“We had dreams,” she said. “They were crushed.”

In some parts of Myanmar that are successfully resisting army rule — and such areas are growing with recent battlefield gains — the N.U.G. is providing health and education services, supplementing what ethnic armed groups have done for years. Funding comes from housekeepers in Bangkok, sushi sous-chefs in New York and tech entrepreneurs in Singapore, among others.

Dr. Zaw Wai Soe, the N.U.G.’s health and education minister, oversees schools and clinics, some camouflaged with foliage to avoid airstrikes. Once an orthopedic surgeon for Myanmar’s top generals, Dr. Zaw Wai Soe now dispenses telemedicine to N.U.G. fighters in the forest, squinting at the screen to examine war wounds.

“I was very rich,” he said. “Now, I know, we have to try something new. We need federal democracy. Otherwise, we cannot live together.”

A pair of owls in the small office of Mr. Moe Zaw Oo. Owls are believed to bring good luck in Myanmar. Credit…Kenny Holston/The New York Times

But the N.U.G., working with other groups, has yet to produce a federal constitution to protect Myanmar’s diverse ethnicities. Various drafters have walked away from the process.

The billions of dollars in American aid and weapons dispatched to Ukraine — and now promised to Israel — is almost inconceivable to the N.U.G.’s leaders.

“As a refugee, I stand with the people of Ukraine,” Ms. Aye Chan Mon said. “But sometimes I think, if we got even a little bit of the money Ukraine gets from the U.S., then our revolution in Myanmar would succeed.”

is the senior correspondent for Asia based in Bangkok. She was previously the Southeast Asia bureau chief.

A version of this article appears in print on  , Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: Fighting For Freedom While Miles From Home. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

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nytimes.com · by Hannah Beech · November 13, 2023

16. Chinese Navy's Suspected New Overseas Base in Cambodia Now Even Larger

Photos/imagery at the link: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/11/chinese-navys-suspected-new-overseas-base-cambodia-now-even-larger/

Chinese Navy's Suspected New Overseas Base in Cambodia Now Even Larger - Naval News

navalnews.com · by H I Sutton · November 13, 2023

China’s new naval base at Ream in Cambodia is well documented. It will provide the Chinese Navy (PLAN) with a base at the southern end of the highly contested South China Sea. The base is still east of the Malacca Straight which separates the South China Sea from the Indian Ocean, yet is still strategically important. And a key part of China’s construction of overseas bases.

However the base now appears even more expensive and capable than previous reports suggested. There is clear evidence of a new dry dock being constructed.

It is important to acknowledge that Cambodia has claimed that the rebuilding of the base at Ream, with Chinese Aid, is for their own navy. So it is possible that the dry dock is for the Royal Cambodian Navy, or even civilian use. However its size and construction make this a less likely explanation and few analysts are likely to accept it. Cambodia’s small navy barely has any naval vessels over 50 meters (164 feet) in length.

Rapid Construction of the Chinese base in Cambodia

The dry dock is being built on reclaimed land adjacent to the previously identified new Chinese naval base. Work has progressed quickly since the first hints on 2022 and is already far enough along to be confident that it is indeed a dry dock.

The Cambodian government in Phnom Penh, and some Chinese sources, have denied that the base is for the Chinese Navy. However this argument is increasingly implausible. And there is now little doubt that it is a PLAN overseas base. Adding to this, the construction work shows tell-tale signs of being Chinese.

China’s Most Capable Overseas Base To Date

The dry dock also shows that the base is larger than previously estimated. In August 2022 respected analyst Thomas Shugart was able to deduce about half of the facility. Since then the affected area has more than doubled, partly due to reclaimed land.

Might be going out on a limb a bit on this one, but something I saw in imagery of China's ongoing construction at Cambodia's Ream naval base caught my eye today.

Here is the entirety of the base, with the portion that is reportedly reserved for Chinese military use in red. pic.twitter.com/MU3yBASbhj

— Tom Shugart (@tshugart3) August 26, 2022

In 2022 around half the base was clearly visible. The dry dock is on reclaimed land to the south of the marked area there.

It appears that an additional quay may be constructed on the western side of the dry dock although this is less progressed. The increase in berthing will also be significant.

Increased Strategic Importance Of The Base

The war in Ukraine reminds us that the ability to perform maintenance and repairs on warships is critical to sustain combat operations. China will not want to face the same challenges that Russia does currently in the Mediterranean.

The base is one of several throughout the Indian Ocean, Middle East and Africa. The first, and best known, is in Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. That base is heavily fortified and situated next to a much smaller U.S. Navy base. In 2021 China was accused of clandestinely building a special military facility at a port in UAE. That work stopped but there have been unconfirmed reports that it may have resumed in 2023. In addition there have been reports of Chinese plans to build a naval base in Equatorial Guinea in West Africa. This will extend operations into the Atlantic. Most recently there have been reports from U.S. sources of a plan to build another base in Oman, although whether this would be a port facility is unclear.

The base in Ream is at least the same size as the one in Djibouti. And the main pier, which appears almost complete, is about the same size in both; large enough to accommodate an aircraft carrier. Given the footprint of the construction activities it is possible that the base will actually end up being larger.

navalnews.com · by H I Sutton · November 13, 2023

17. Think China's PLA is a paper tiger? Think again

Excerpts:

No one except Xi Jinping knows what he will do. But it’s best to prepare for the worst – and now.

And remember that a military just has to be good enough to do a certain thing at a certain time at a certain place.

Its government just has to be willing to absorb some economic punishment and political blowback.

If that’s the case, the PRC only has to pick its spots and its timing – and hope the United States keeps convincing itself that China wouldn’t dare attack.

Think China's PLA is a paper tiger? Think again​

PLA more capable than US cares to admit and only needs to be good enough at a certain time and place to send US packing from the Indo-Pacific

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · November 14, 2023

I keep hearing these days that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a “paper tiger,” and thus there’s no need to worry about an attack on Taiwan.

And anyway, I also keep hearing, the United States has plenty of time to get ready before the PLA is a real threat – rather than just a “near-peer competitor.”

The PLA’s problems? To name a few: no recent combat experience, corruption, too many “only children” in the ranks. The Chinese Navy can’t conduct combat operations in distant seas and is not able to master “amphibious operations” – supposedly the most complex and hardest of all military operations.

Even China’s leaders complain about “peace disease.” The PLA hasn’t fought a war for decades. And too many senior officers can’t manage the demands of modern high-tech warfare.

Maybe so. But in the last 30 years, the People’s Republic of China has pulled off the biggest, fastest military build-up seen anywhere since World War II. China’s defense budgets are much greater than the roughly US$220 billion it claims and possibly exceed US defense spending.

The PLA Navy is already larger than the US Navy and the gap will widen. China is launching five ships for every one the USN puts in the water. It has put more tonnage and missiles to sea as well.

Beijing lavishes similar attention upon its air force and ground forces and its cyber and electronic warfare. And its missile capabilities, including hypersonic weaponry, probably exceed US capabilities. Its nuclear weapons build-up has finally got even the China experts worried. They dismissed it for years.

‘Eyes wide open’

China knows its problems but it has clear objectives. Defeating US forces is objective number one. And it trains hard to achieve its goals. Its ships are not rust buckets. Nor do they collide with other ships or burn up pierside every so often.

Yes, the PLA would have a harder time attacking Des Moines, Iowa, but that’s not the point.

It’s true that Chinese conventional combat power – or “power projection” – drops off rapidly beyond, say, 1,000 miles from the Chinese border. But its land-based missiles easily range Guam and Hawaii. Plus, it is operating ships and aircraft more often and farther out into the Pacific and beyond.

China is setting up a network of ports and airfields to which it has access worldwide. And it is building more of the refueling ships and aircraft and long-range transports needed for global power projection – akin to what the Americans can do.

Play this out five or ten years and it is hard to be sanguine. And somehow, the “paper tiger” took de facto control of the South China Sea six or seven years ago.

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The US Navy can transit the area – as can the US Air Force – and even conduct exercises. But it’s like the New York Police Department going through Times Square back in the bad old days before Mayor Giuliani cleaned things up. The cops controlled only the space they actually occupied, and when they left the “bad guys” filled in and took control.

Even now the PLA is shadowing (“escorting”) US ships and aircraft through the South China Sea.

China televises the firing of ballistic missiles into ‘training’ areas around Taiwan and in Japan’s EEZ in Okinawa Prefecture, August 4, 2022. Photo: Weibo

It only has to be good once

Nothing to worry about? One of these days a US Navy destroyer skipper will have a dozen anti-ship missiles headed his way – at supersonic speed – and 12 seconds to respond. He might be forgiven for thinking the PLA is not a paper tiger and is more than just a “near-peer competitor.”

But here’s something to keep in mind when you consider the People’s Liberation Army: A military only has to be good enough to do a certain thing, at a certain place, at a certain time.

Recall the Falklands War in 1982. The British outclassed the Argentinians in nearly every respect. Argentine hardware was often obsolete and many of the troops were “draftees.”

Yet, the Argentines almost won. And they would have won if a few more 500-pound bombs and torpedoes detonated and sunk Royal Navy ships.

Britain also had the good fortune that Margaret Thatcher was prime minister. The Falklands are about 200 miles from the Argentine coast at the closest point. Taiwan is only 90 miles from the Chinese mainland.

A Chinese newspaper reports on military exercises conducted by the Chinese military around Taiwan on April 10, 2023. Photo: Kyodo

China’s not going after Des Moines

If it’s just Taiwan you’re after – as opposed to Des Moines – it looks possible.

And an attack on Taiwan won’t just be an amphibious assault. It will also include massive and accurate missile barrages, total air and sea control, aggressive electronic warfare and cyber warfare. And internet and comms links will be cut. Fifth columnists will be causing chaos. And it will include threatening the US with nuclear war.

China has practiced and prepared for all of this – and for years.

Sure, Xi Jinping would rather get Taiwan by not fighting, but force is on the menu and Xi has said so. It’s comforting – but dangerous – to assume that Xi and the Chinese just aren’t good enough, or are too frightened, or are just bluffing – which is the most commonly held belief in DC and even in Taipei.

One detects the same sort of condescension as in 1950 when the experts – not least in General Douglas MacArthur‘s headquarters – insisted: “They (the PLA) will never come across the Yalu.”

But they did. And nobody has ever heard a Korean War veteran say he wanted to fight the Chinese again.

You’d think US Marines, of all people, would know better. This writer recalls them rolling their eyes circa 2016 at the idea that Chinese equivalents of US Marine and US Navy amphibious units (the MEU/ARGs) would be making the rounds in the Indo-Pacific before too long. Just not our equals, you know.

The Chinese navy is turning out amphibious ships at a rapid clip and could deploy two or three similar amphibious task forces if they wanted to.

A Chinese naval vessel departs from Vladivostok in the Russian Far East for a joint patrol with the Russian Navy. Photo: TASS News Agency

As for the PLA’s lack of warfighting experience…

Proper training can also make up for that.

And don’t forget that the US military has fewer and fewer combat veterans. And none of them have experience in high-end warfare against a high-end opponent in a largely maritime domain. Fighting Iraqis and the Taliban is not the same the same thing as going against a modern opponent. Nor were those campaigns huge successes.

It also helps to recognize that China has been conducting non-kinetic warfare against the United States and the West for decades. Political warfare, economic warfare, propaganda, elite capture, cyberattacks, espionage, chemical (fentanyl) and biological warfare (Covid?) are part of China’s “unrestricted warfare.”

It is all intended to soften up the enemy and undermine his will and ability to resist. Kinetic warfare is only used if needed to finish things off.

But doesn’t the US have allies?

Yes, it does, and America’s allies are a huge benefit even if military capabilities are uneven and political interests are not always aligned.

But China also has allies: North Korea, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba. And much of the Global South is at least sympathetic to the People’s Republic of China.

These may not be the most lovable countries, not always the best of friends – but together they can cause trouble for the United States and its partners.

And, for now, their strategic interests align.

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The Japanese, who are regularly harassed and circumnavigated by Russian and Chinese planes and aircraft, can tell you that.

And recently the PRC, via Iran and its Hamas and Hezbollah proxies, got the United States and the US military wrapped around another Middle Eastern axle – at the expense of the Indo-Pacific.

The PLA has other things working in its favor:

The US won’t cut economic dependencies on the PRC, which include many required for defense production. And Wall Street and the American business class continue providing the Chinese Communist Party with a few hundred billions in convertible currency a year – effectively funding the country (and the military) that is looking to drive it out of the Indo-Pacific, for starters.

But back to the main point – don’t underestimate the Chinese or the People’s Liberation Army.

They wouldn’t dare? A simulated Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Image: Facebook

It’s not the first time America has underestimated an enemy:

“Saddam Hussein won’t attack Kuwait”

“Once we take Baghdad everything will be fine”

“Putin attack Ukraine? He won’t dare.”

“China doesn’t want a blue-water Navy.”

“The PRC just wants to do business and make money.”

Only Xi knows for sure

No one except Xi Jinping knows what he will do. But it’s best to prepare for the worst – and now.

And remember that a military just has to be good enough to do a certain thing at a certain time at a certain place.

Its government just has to be willing to absorb some economic punishment and political blowback.

If that’s the case, the PRC only has to pick its spots and its timing – and hope the United States keeps convincing itself that China wouldn’t dare attack.

Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America.

This article was first published by JAPAN Forward and is republished with permission.

asiatimes.com · by Grant Newsham · November 14, 2023

18. Non-Combatant Women of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

As always in every conflict, women are the unsung heroes. Women are the key to all resistance. 

Record Keepers, Tailors, Cooks, and Housekeepers

Filling the Education Gap

Paramedics and Nurses

Aid and Humanitarian Workers

Spies, Undercover Operatives, and Money Changers

Non-Combatant Women of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution

thediplomat.com · by Rajeev Bhattacharyya · November 13, 2023

Their role in the anti-junta resistance is crucial but not known widely.

By for The Diplomat

Women tailors at Camp Victoria, military headquarters of the Chin National Front, in Myanmar’s Chin State.

Credit: CNF

They do not carry guns to fight the junta in Myanmar. Unlike women combatants in battle fatigues flaunting automatic weapons, their role in the resistance has gone by barely noticed. But they are among the most vital cogs in a complex apparatus that sustains the war machine against Myanmar’s military regime.

Meet the non-combatant women functionaries of Myanmar’s Spring Revolution. They are more in number than their counterparts in active combat roles against the regime troops. They are performing varied roles inside and outside the camps of the resistance groups, inside the country and abroad, and engaged in perilous activities in a quiet and camouflaged manner to escape detection.

Citing independent analyst Dr. Miemie Winn Byrd, Minister of Women, Youth, and Children’s Affairs in the National Unity Government (NUG) Naw Susanna Hla Hla Soe told The Diplomat in an online interview that women comprise an estimated 60 percent of the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar, whether in combat roles or non-lethal resistance efforts. “Many women in the Spring Revolution are usually silent but involved in important roles such as cooks and record keepers in the camps, medics, teachers, etc. and different from the active woman combatants. Many young women are also active in logistics support and fundraisers roles as well,” the NUG minister said.

In the course of my travels in Myanmar’s Chin State and Sagaing Region between January and March this year, I met women combatants and non-combatants who are part of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), the newly-formed People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), and the Chinland Defense Force (CDF). While some among them agreed to be interviewed and photographed but without revealing their faces, others only shared their views about their roles and experiences on condition of anonymity.

Record Keepers, Tailors, Cooks, and Housekeepers

Women maintaining records at Camp Victoria, military headquarters of the Chin National Front, in in Myanmar’s Chin State. Photo by Rajeev Bhattacharyya.

In Camp Victoria, the military headquarters of the Chin National Front, in Chin State, is an elongated structure of tin and timber, similar to many other houses in the sprawling establishment. But unlike the other houses, this one has a team of women tailors who stitch uniforms for functionaries of the Chin National Army (CNA) and members of other groups being trained in the camp. Around a dozen women work here six days a week from 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. to produce a fixed number of uniforms. They were trained by professional tailors for almost a month before being assigned this role.

Other women are cooking, maintaining records and housekeeping in Camp Victoria. The cozy wooden double-storied house where I was accommodated is a guest house with an office of two rooms on the ground floor for keeping records of the entire camp. The three-member team that maintains records in the office is headed by a woman in her mid-20s.

I had a brief conversation with her with the help of a translator. She told me that she had been associated with the office for over a year and narrated how records are maintained systematically so that information can be retrieved when needed. All hard copies that are received have to be scanned, and all data, including those on monthly expenses, are recorded on desktop computers.

“We were trained for this role over many months. At the beginning, it was tough for all of us but now we are enjoying the role,” the head of the office management team said, adding that they have also completed the mandatory military training.

A woman cooking food at Camp Victoria, military headquarters of the Chin National Front, in Myanmar’s Chin State. Photo by Rajeev Bhattacharyya

The system in place in Camp Victoria is typical of most EAO camps across Myanmar, with some variations. A large number of women are active in non-combat roles in EAOs like the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force, the Kachin Independence Army, and the Karen National Liberation Army.

The PDFs and CDFs are not as well organized or resourced as the EAOs. No wonder, I spotted fewer women working in PDF camps. At the Kalay PDF camp located deep in the mountains between Kalay and Tedim, I saw two women working as housekeepers and office managers.

There were five young women in a group of 41 at an early morning training session of the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) at Kalay. They were most likely to be assigned non-military roles, CNDF commander Lal Than Mawia told me in an interview on January 25. He was not in favor of deploying women in combat roles alongside men on the frontlines.

Filling the Education Gap

A woman teaching fifth grade students at a school established by the Pa Ka Pha (Local Defense Force) in Kalay in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region. Photo by Rajeev Bhattacharyya.

Actively associated with the resistance movement outside the camps are smaller teams of women who are teachers, medics, and aid workers. While some are attached to resistance groups, others operate individually.

In north Kalay, the Pa Ka Pha (Local Defense Force) is running schools affiliated with the NUG. On January 24, The Diplomat visited three schools established in Letpanchaung, where about 200 students were enrolled. Three women teach the children at two centers. One among them, who is in her early 30s, had previously participated in the civil disobedience movement (CDM). When asked about her experience in the school, she said that it is “a challenging job to keep the classes going and to motivate the children to come to school every day.” Besides, “we have to remain prepared for all kinds of situations,” she said.

Besides teaching in schools set up by resistance groups in the conflict zones, women are also teaching children of refugees at some border towns in the Indian states of Mizoram and Manipur. In Mizoram, while the majority of children have enrolled in government or private schools, around 106 students are attending classes at a refugee camp in Zokhawthar, which is affiliated with the NUG.

A teacher, who identified herself as Vung Sian Huai, is a woman in her early 20s. Hailing from Tedim in Chin State, she was teaching English, Burmese, and the Bible in a school before she fled to Mizoram a year after the coup. “There are five teachers, including four women, in this school in Zokhawthar,” she said. Expressing concern over children in refugee camps not getting admitted into schools in Mizoram, she said that women like herself “have decided to devote ourselves to fill the gap.”

“I will continue my further studies only after democracy returns to Myanmar,” added Vung Sian Huai.

Around 90 percent of the teachers associated with the five Spring Schools in Manipur are women, who were previously part of the CDM in Myanmar’s border district of Tamu. These schools, which are also affiliated to the NUG, were established by the Burma Refugee Committee Kabaw Valley with the approval of village chiefs at some border areas in the districts of Chandel and Tengnoupal. The schools have remained shut since Manipur erupted in communal riots on May 3, which was followed by a crackdown by the government on Myanmar nationals in the state.

Paramedics and Nurses

A woman engaged with the Kalay PDF, who distributes medicines to residents of some villages in Kalay in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region. Photo by special arrangement.

Many women are engaged in healthcare services too. Their work is more challenging than that of teachers as they sometimes function in hostile situations as well. I heard gruesome tales about the military torturing and killing paramedics at Wetlet and Yinmabin in Sagaing Region. In Kalay in late 2021, nine women who were attached to a resistance group as paramedics were arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment.

In Chin State and Sagaing Region, paramedics and nurses are often associated with resistance groups. Chin Health Organization (CHO), for instance, has established 17 hospitals and 53 mobile teams involving a large number of women as paramedics and nurses.

In Thantlang township of Chin State, there is a team of members led by a doctor known by his nom de guerre, Dr. Amos, who had participated previously in the CDM. His team includes three nurses and five assistants. Speaking on phone from an undisclosed location, Dr. Amos drew attention to the “invaluable role” of nurses. “The hospital that we have set up,” he said, “cannot function without nurses.” Their roles are “extremely crucial,” he continued, pointing to the healthcare facilities that the medical teams are providing to residents in remote villages.

A woman I had met at a village near Letpanchaung in Kalay had a different role, albeit also in the healthcare field. A member of the Kalay PDF, her task was to administer medicines to the sick. Although women like her are in non-combat roles, they also have to ferry the injured from the battlefield to the camp and sometimes take serious patients to the doctors for treatment. Their numbers are reportedly more in south Kalay, where more PDFs are active than in the north.

On the Indian side, I met two groups of women paramedics and nurses who are helping refugees. Among them is a team of midwives at Zokhawthar in Mizoram. Two doctors and five nurses, who were previously associated with the CDM at Tamu across the border, have set up a “CDM Clinic” at Moreh in Manipur. In an informal conversation at Moreh on March 25, a doctor explained that teams are sometimes sent to provide medicines and treatment to refugee populations at other villages in Manipur. This clinic has remained shut since May 3 owing to mass violence and unrest in the state.

A woman at a refugee camp in the border town of Farkawn in India. She coordinates with local NGOs for the supply of essential commodities. Photo by Rajeev Bhattacharyya.

Aid and Humanitarian Workers

Since the coup in February 2021, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected populations has emerged as a major challenge for resistance groups as well as aid agencies. Such efforts have been constrained by restrictions imposed by the military on the movement of both people and goods. There have also been instances of frontline workers being detained and even killed.

Thang Sei, a parliamentarian from Tamu, pointed out that it is “huge challenge” for humanitarian aid workers not only to reach the displaced people, as they relocate frequently for security reasons, but also to maintain supply lines.

There is “a greater degree of security for humanitarian workers in Chin State than in Sagaing Region, which makes it easier to offer assistance to displaced groups here,” he said.

Several factors have facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Chin State. One is that much of the territory in Chin State is under the control of resistance groups. Besides, Chin State is contiguous to India’s Mizoram, where the state government and civil society groups have come out overwhelmingly in support of the refugees. There are safe routes through which workers can operate and commodities ferried to the displaced populace. The relatively safe environment here has facilitated the participation of women in the distribution of aid and relief.

I met a middle-aged woman who is delivering essential commodities to the IDP camp at Salen village in Chin State, where about 200 families have taken shelter. She was a member of the village committee that supervises the supply to the camp. The committee assigns responsibilities to residents in rotation without any fixed tenure. A few women are active in the refugee camps at Zokhwthar and Farkawn in Mizoram where they coordinate with the local NGOs.

Spies, Undercover Operatives, and Money Changers

The least known among the non-combatant women are those working as informers, money changers, and undercover operatives. They live in the shadows and resistance fighters are reluctant to share details about them. Some of them have suffered torture; others have been killed by the military or the Pyu Saw Htee (pro-junta militias). In July last year, a teenager was decapitated by members of a Pyu Saw Htee in Magwe on the allegation that she was trying to convince some policemen to join the resistance movement.

Based on information provided by refugees in Mizoram and Manipur, it appears that more men than women work as spies and undercover operatives across Myanmar. Their primary task is to monitor the movement of regime troops, ferry weapons, and carry out undercover operations. In Kalay in Chin State, resistance groups have set up a network of informers, including women, who pass on information instantly when regime troops move out of their barracks for raids and operations.

Some women also work as money changers. They operate along the borders in an environment that is more secure than that in which undercover functionaries operate. They convert foreign currencies into the Myanmar kyat, which is then distributed through multiple networks to different destinations. Their roles have assumed great importance as expatriate communities in the United States, Canada, and Europe are remitting large amounts of money to resistance groups and the displaced people.

The varied and enormous participation of women in the Spring Revolution has provoked an aggressive retaliation from the military regime, which can be gleaned from the fact that at least 56 women and girls were killed in Myanmar between July and September of this year. A total of 613 women and girls have been killed since the resistance to the coup began more than two years ago, according to an estimate by the Burmese Women’s Union.

A large percentage of these women are likely to be non-combatant functionaries, whose precise numbers are not known. Their vital roles were acknowledged by all the commanders and senior functionaries of the resistance outfits that I met during my travels in Myanmar earlier this year.

A major challenge for the groups and especially the PDFs would be to keep them engaged in the movement since there have been cases in Sagaing Region of some women withdrawing from active engagement as their grievances were not redressed.

Authors

Contributing Author

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

Rajeev Bhattacharyya is a senior journalist in Assam in India’s northeast.

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thediplomat.com · by Rajeev Bhattacharyya · November 13, 2023

19. Myanmar junta faces ‘biggest threat’ since coup as fighting engulfs border region

Myanmar junta faces ‘biggest threat’ since coup as fighting engulfs border region

The UN warned 50,000 have been forced to flee, with the junta conceding the country could be split if it cannot contain the clashes

By

Sarah Newey,

 GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY CORRESPONDENT, IN BANGKOK

10 November 2023 • 11:32pm

The Telegraph · by Sarah Newey,

Intense fighting in northern Myanmar has forced 50,000 people to flee, with military leaders conceding that the country is in danger of breaking apart unless it can contain the clashes.

A fortnight ago, an alliance of armed ethnic forces and newer anti-coup groups - formed when the junta seized power in February 2021 - launched a major, surprise offensive in Shan state. In a significant blow to the junta, the alliance has since seized dozens of military outposts and blocked critical, billion-dollar trade routes to China.

Analysts told the Telegraph the loss of territory is a turning point in the complicated conflict, and represents the “most significant challenge that the military regime has faced since the coup, at least in terms of armed conflict”.

In response to the clashes, former general Myint Swe - who was appointed as acting president by the military following the coup - has warned the country could end up “split into various parts” if the junta does not “manage” the fighting, according to state media.

While the military has regularly used the potential “disintegration” of Myanmar as a justification for their role in national politics, the context of this week’s warning is significant, said Tom Kean, a senior consultant on Myanmar at Crisis Group.

“His comments reflect the threat to the military regime. They understand that they could lose control over a significant amount of territory, including major towns, and not have the capacity to recapture it from these groups,” he told the Telegraph.

‘Reinvigorated the resistance’

The Shan state offensive - called Operation 1027, and launched by three groups collectively known as the Brotherhood Alliance - is also a “turning point in the way the war is being fought”, added Mr Kean.

Previously, anti-military forces mainly controlled rural areas; now they’ve captured several strategic towns - including Chinshwehaw, which borders China. More than a quarter of Myanmar’s $1.8 billion border trade with the superpower - which has not yet intervened in the clashes - passed through the town between April and September this year.

Operation 1027 also appears to be injecting renewed vigour into resistance movements elsewhere in Myanmar - in Sagaing, for instance, armed groups say they have already captured two towns, while central Myanmar has also seen attacks.

“One of the most striking elements is that the military has not yet been able to hit back [in Shan state]… because it’s fighting on so many fronts,” said Mr Kean. “[Operation 1027] has certainly reinvigorated the fight against the military.”

But the continued conflict is coming at a heavy cost for many. On Friday, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said the clashes have so far displaced almost 50,000 people, but disrupted internet and phone signals have hindered humanitarian aid.

“The fighting in Shan State may be considered a turning point but civilians are once again bearing the brunt and caught up in the fighting,” Manny Maung, a Myanmar researcher at Human Rights Watch, told the Telegraph.

“The junta should allow unhindered humanitarian assistance so that the more than 50,000 people who are now displaced in northern Shan do not suffer further.”

Protect yourself and your family by learning more about Global Health Security

The Telegraph · by Sarah Newey,

​20. "The best way to spot an idiot. Look for the person who is cruel.​"

And now for something completely different but worth reflecting upon.

I somehow missed this when it went viral this summer during graduation season. These are among the wisest words I have ever read or heard.

Read the transcript excerpt or watch the Governor's 2 minute excerpt on YouTube at the link below.

"The best way to spot an idiot. Look for the person who is cruel.​"

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qXnlWeY5Gw4

From J.B. Pritzker, Governor of Illinois

"The best way to spot an idiot. Look for the person who is cruel.

Let me explain. When we see someone who doesn't look like us, or sound like us, or act like us, or love like us, or live like us, the first thought that crosses almost everyone's brain is rooted in either fear or judgment or both.

That's evolution. We survived as a species by being suspicious of things that we aren't familiar with.

In order to be kind, we have to shut down that animal instinct and force our brain to travel a different pathway. Empathy and compassion are evolved states of being. They require the mental capacity to step past our most primal urges.

This may be a surprising assessment because, somewhere along the way in the last few years, our society has come to believe that weaponized cruelty is part of some well thought-out master plan.

Cruelty is seen by some as in an adroit cudgel to gain power.

Empathy and kindness are considered weak.

Many important people look at the vulnerable only as rungs on a ladder to the top.

I'm here to tell you that when someone's path through this world is marked with acts of cruelty, they have failed the first test of an advanced society. They never forced their animal brain to evolve past its first instinct. They never forged new mental pathways to overcome their own instinctual fears. And so, their thinking and problem solving will lack the imagination and creativity that the kindest people have in spades.

Over my many years in politics and business, I have found one thing to be universally true: The kindest person in the room is often the smartest."

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com