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Quotes of the Day:
"If you find it in your heart to care for somebody else, you will have succeeded."
– Maya Angelou
"One of the strongest characteristics of genius is the power of lighting its own fire."
–John W. Foster
"Science is organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life."
– Immanuel Kant
1. Force multipliers for Stability – Special Operations Partnerships Strengthen Indo-Pacific
2. US issues update on North Koreans in Russia-Ukraine war
3. Another Korean American wins seat in U.S. Congress
4. Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk
5. Unification minister says S. Korea-U.S. alliance won't waver under Trump
6. Parliament passes bill to compensate damage caused by N. Korean trash balloons
7. S. Korea to take 'effective, phased' measures as N. Korean troops enter combat in Russia's Kursk
8. Yoon says S. Korea could increase support for Ukraine depending on N.K.-Russia military cooperation
9. Kim Jong Un lays low after Trump win, sign of possible policy review
10. What North Korean escapees think about Donald Trump’s return to power
11. How Trump’s picks for top posts could shape North Korea policy in second term
12. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Begins U.S.-Japan-South Korea Exercise
13. Trump 2.0: Fearmongering over 'America First' won't benefit South Korea
14. [EXCLUSIVE] ‘Don’t die for Putin’: Rights groups to send message to NK soldiers
15. In Brief: North Korea’s Critical Allies
1. Force multipliers for Stability – Special Operations Partnerships Strengthen Indo-Pacific
It is good to see SOCKOR featured prominently. It has come a long way since 1988. I remember in 1989 the SOC-K (as it was called back then) Commander (MOH recipient) COL Robert Howard coming to our training with the 5th ROK Special Forces Brigade. We had to cut our briefing to him on the range short because our tracers lit the hillside on fire and we spent the rest of the day trying to put out the fire.
SOC-K was originally housed in the oldJapanese shower building next to the Eighth Army HQ. Then it moved to Camp Kim next to Yongsan and was housed in the old Japanese Mortuary. Now it is at Camp Humphreys in a state of the art facility that is among the best of all the Theater Special Operations Commands.
Force multipliers for Stability - Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM
Special Operations Partnerships Strengthen Indo-Pacific
November 12, 2024
ipdefenseforum.com
FORUM Staff
Since the 1950s, the Korean Peninsula has simmered as a potential flashpoint in Northeast Asia. Tensions now threaten to boil over amid North Korea’s banned nuclear and ballistic weapons development and Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine.
Conventional military forces form the bulk of the multinational integrated deterrence posture in South Korea, enabling stability, security and a strong economy. However, should deterrence fail, smaller and less overt teams of Special Operations Forces (SOF) maintain a high state of readiness to overcome and mitigate an adversary’s potential asymmetric advantages.
If necessary, the forces can conduct specialized offensive or reconnaissance missions; provide internal defense and security assistance for partner nations; counter terrorism, insurgency and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; engage in unconventional warfare and military information operations; and carry out hostage rescue and recovery as well as humanitarian aid.
For more than 70 years, multinational SOF personnel have helped prevent conflict escalation on the Korean Peninsula thanks to the mutual defense priorities among South Korea and the United States, and their many Allies and Partners’ shared interests in a free, open and stable Indo-Pacific.
Republic of Korea (ROK) and U.S. Special Operations Forces conduct reconnaissance training in South Korea in January 2024.
CPL. YEONUNG KIM/ROK ARMY
Power of Partnership
The Korean War, which began when communist North Korea invaded its southern neighbor in 1950, demonstrated revolutionary and evolving SOF concepts. In the early years of the war, United Kingdom and U.S. advisors trained alongside nascent Republic of Korea (ROK) special units in Japan and on the Korean Peninsula, preparing to collect intelligence, enable tactical operations and conduct raids behind North Korean lines. Throughout, these teams were enabled and emplaced by complementary specialized units from the combined forces. U.S. Army SOF first saw combat in 1953 with the deployment of Soldiers for operations with partisan forces behind enemy lines. Thus, the ROK-U.S. SOF partnership began its storied and enduring history.
After an armistice signed in July 1953 ended hostilities, the focus shifted to developing and preserving a credible deterrent force that included the ROK, the U.S. and other regional nations. This collaboration continued throughout the decades of the Cold War and is solidified today through multinational exercises and joint rotations. Special operations efforts enable senior leaders with options across all phases of competition or conflict, gain advantages for conventional forces to exploit, and buy time for decision makers to leverage the most advantageous political or diplomatic outcome possible. These efforts also are enabled by credible training and combined operations.
The creation of the U.S. Forces Korea Special Operations Command in 1988 further institutionalized this partnership. The subsequent cooperation between the two nations’ SOF has deepened, with its key focus on the ability to conduct combined operations through training, planning, and command and control drills.
SOF have been involved in strategic competition since 1942, U.S. Army Gen. Bryan Fenton, commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command, told the House Armed Services Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee in March 2024. “These eight decades make your special operations tailor-made for this era. … Integrated deterrence and strategic competition are in our DNA,” he said.
In 1951, a sign alerts travelers approaching the 38th parallel that separates South Korea from the North.
United Nations/United States Signal Corps
Integrated Deterrence
The last time the North Korean People’s Army believed it had an advantage in combat power, its troops flooded south and sparked a war that cost millions of lives. This instance is not unique. Even in today’s strategic environment, Russia uses brute force as a bargaining tool. However, the Ukrainian people’s ability to resist a military once thought to be among the world’s strongest offers a reason to invest in a credible deterrent force in South Korea.
The decadeslong ROK-U.S. Alliance serves as a cornerstone for broader Indo-Pacific stability. Exercises such as Joint Combined Exchange Training and Expeditionary Deployment Readiness Exercises strengthen the bilateral capacity for SOF to meet mutual defense priorities. Other regular multinational exercises, such as Ulchi Freedom Shield and Freedom Shield, are critical to maintaining readiness and upholding deterrence in Northeast Asia.
Conflict in the region is neither imminent nor inevitable, Ely Ratner, U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, told U.S. lawmakers in March 2024. “This is because, whether on the Korean Peninsula, across the Taiwan Strait or elsewhere in the region, the [U.S. Defense] Department is doing more than ever to strengthen combat-credible deterrence and to prevail in conflict if necessary,” he said. “We have also reiterated our openness to dialogue to reduce risks and avoid unintended escalation. Taken together, these efforts are making significant contributions to regional security.”
Beyond the ROK-U.S. Alliance, the United Nations Command (UNC) unites personnel from 22 Allies and Partners across the globe to uphold the armistice. This long-standing collaboration has created a foundation for expanding partnerships with regional Allies such as Japan, creating a robust network of cooperation. The current security environment presents a compelling case for even closer collaboration. “The persistent [North Korean] threat looms far beyond the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and into multiple domains including cyber and space,” U.S. Army Gen. Paul LaCamera, commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, the UNC and U.S. Forces Korea, said in written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 2024.
North Korea’s recent collaboration with Russia, including defying U.N. sanctions by supplying artillery and ballistic missiles for Moscow’s war against Ukraine, undermines regional security, LaCamera noted. “The U.S. and the ROK will continue to stand together to maintain peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and stability throughout Northeast Asia,” he said. “This commitment is vital to stability in the region and is an example to other like-minded nations.”
This shared threat landscape has become a catalyst for closer cooperation. South Korea is increasingly receptive to expanding regional partnerships, recognizing that collective security is the best approach. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol has emphasized strengthening the UNC and the ROK-U.S. Alliance to maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. Meanwhile, the U.S.-led Camp David summit in August 2023 facilitated trilateral cooperation and information-sharing agreements among Japan, South Korea and the U.S. in response to North Korean ballistic missile threats.
ROK and U.S. Special Operations Forces train near Incheon, South Korea, in December 2023. CPL. YEONUNG KIM/REPUBLIC OF KOREA ARMY
Specialized Capabilities
SOF contribute to Korean Peninsula security with a unique blend of specialized mission sets and capabilities. One crucial function is Security Force Assistance, with experienced SOF personnel training and advising partner nation forces in critical areas such as counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and intelligence gathering. This capacity building empowers partner nations to effectively address internal and external threats.
SOF also bring distinct advantages to wartime scenarios. Their low-density capabilities are highly specialized and not readily available in conventional forces. Examples include conducting high-risk, direct-action missions against high-value targets, reconnaissance deep behind enemy lines and unconventional warfare operations.
Key to unlocking the full potential of SOF is expanding combined training to include regional partners, allowing for a more coordinated response to threats. ROK and U.S. special forces personnel regularly train together. U.S. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) also conducts exchanges with SOF personnel from U.N. member states. “With over 70 years in the making, our ROK-U.S. Alliance is one of the strongest in the world,” Brig. Gen. Derek Lipson, SOCKOR commander, said on the sidelines of a 2023 multinational training event at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. “We at SOCKOR advance that special relationship every day through training and engagements with unique special operations capabilities in mind.”
Each participating nation’s SOF offer a unique skill set that fosters a more effective and versatile combined force. Imagine a scenario where the U.S.’s SOF expertise in close air support combines with the ROK’s proficiency in urban warfare and a regional partner’s skill in cyber operations. Such a collaborative approach leverages each nation’s strengths while building trust, fostering interoperability and creating a more robust deterrent against potential adversaries.
Expanding these partnerships with regional Allies strengthens the collective response to challenges such as North Korea’s illicit nuclear weapons program and creates a robust and versatile security architecture for the Indo-Pacific. Ultimately, strong SOF partnerships on the Korean Peninsula serve as a force multiplier for regional stability, paving the way for a secure future.
ipdefenseforum.com
2. US issues update on North Koreans in Russia-Ukraine war
Well, it seems that State thinks the nKPA forces are going to be integrated with Russian forces. Or maybe he did not mean literal integration.
Excerpts:
"Russian forces have trained the DPRK soldiers in artillery, in UAV and basic infantry operations, including trench clearing, which are critical skills for front-line operations," Patel said. "However, Russia's battlefield success using these DPRK troops will in large part be dictated by how well the Russians can integrate them into their military."
Unfamiliarity with Russian weapons systems and the existing chain of command, as well as a possible language barrier are among the likely challenges facing Russia-North Korea cooperation on the battlefield, the official said.
What are the concrete actions the ROK and US can take concerning this deployment? (as I have said it should be PSYOP) Low hanging fruit is an aggressive PSYOP campaign against the nKPA in Ukraine and in north Korea. We need to turn ROK and US military PSYOP forces loose on the nKPA (support to Ukraine) and on the Korean peninsula. Information is an existential threat to the regime. If you want to pressure KJU you must use information aggressively. If you want to create change in north Korea you must use information aggressively. If you want to prepare the Korean people in the north for unification you must use information aggressively.
Influencing Minds and Will: A Psychological Operations Strategy for the Korean Peninsula from Lessons Learned in Ukraine
https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/a-psychological-operations-strategy-for-the-korean-peninsula-from-lessons-learned-in-ukraine/
Excerpt:
The South Korean foreign ministry said Seoul would respond to the North's deployment, but it is yet to announce any concrete actions. A senior ministry official told South Korea's Yonhap news agency that President Yoon Suk Yeol's government would coordinate with the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.
US issues update on North Koreans in Russia-Ukraine war
Newsweek · by John Feng · November 13, 2024
The United States said for the first time on Tuesday that North Korean soldiers are now actively fighting alongside Russian forces against Ukraine.
"Today I can confirm that over 10,000 DPRK soldiers have been sent to eastern Russia, and most of them have moved to the far western Kursk Oblast, where they have begun engaging in combat operations with Russian forces," Vedant Patel, a U.S. State Department spokesperson, told a regular briefing. He was referring to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.
In this photo taken from a video released by Russian defense ministry on November 13, a multiple rocket launcher fires towards Ukrainian positions in the border area of the Kursk region in western Russia. The... In this photo taken from a video released by Russian defense ministry on November 13, a multiple rocket launcher fires towards Ukrainian positions in the border area of the Kursk region in western Russia. The U.S. State Department said the previous day that North Korean soldiers were engaged in active combat against Ukrainian forces in Kursk. Russian Defense Ministry via AP
Patel said Washington is "incredibly concerned" about the development, which came barely a month after a South Korean intelligence report said Russian navy ships had loaded tens of thousands of North Korean troops and delivered them to training camps in Russia's Far East.
"Russian forces have trained the DPRK soldiers in artillery, in UAV and basic infantry operations, including trench clearing, which are critical skills for front-line operations," Patel said. "However, Russia's battlefield success using these DPRK troops will in large part be dictated by how well the Russians can integrate them into their military."
Unfamiliarity with Russian weapons systems and the existing chain of command, as well as a possible language barrier are among the likely challenges facing Russia-North Korea cooperation on the battlefield, the official said.
North Korea's embassy in Beijing and Russia's foreign ministry could not be reached for comment.
President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has for weeks said that North Korea's entry would signal a serious escalation of the almost three-year conflict, which otherwise shows no signs of slowing down.
Kyiv's appeared to achieve a tactical surprise in August when it redeployed forces from eastern Ukraine, away from Russia's main offensive, to launch a cross-border raid on the Kursk region. Now, U.S. and Ukrainian officials say Moscow and Pyongyang have jointly amassed some 50,000 ground forces to retake the Russian territory.
Pyongyang and Moscow have not openly confirmed that North Korean troops are aiding Russia's war effort. However, the parliaments of both capitals have ratified a mutual defense pact signed in June by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and President Vladimir Putin of Russia.
The accord, which calls for immediate military aid in the event of an attack on either party, is seen from the outside as the main justification for the North Korean deployment.
Pyongyang's only other treaty ally is Beijing, but China has remained largely silent on Kim's decision to join the first major foreign conflict in North Korea's history.
On Wednesday, South Korea's National Intelligence Service issued its own confirmation, saying North Korean troops had spent the past two weeks moving to Russia's Kursk region.
The South Korean foreign ministry said Seoul would respond to the North's deployment, but it is yet to announce any concrete actions. A senior ministry official told South Korea's Yonhap news agency that President Yoon Suk Yeol's government would coordinate with the incoming administration of U.S. President-elect Donald Trump.
Newsweek · by John Feng · November 13, 2024
3. Another Korean American wins seat in U.S. Congress
Another Korean American wins seat in U.S. Congress | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 14, 2024
By Song Sang-ho
WASHINGTON, Nov. 13 (Yonhap) -- Another Korean American won a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives, a news report said Wednesday, an election that will add to a steadily growing list of Korean American lawmakers in Congress.
State Sen. Dave Min, a Democrat, has defeated his Republican rival, Scott Baugh, by a slim margin in the race in California's 47th Congressional District, according to NBC News. It marks his first election to the lower chamber of Congress.
"I know many of us are anxious about the future of our country, but we cannot give up on America," Min wrote on X, formerly Twitter. "In Congress, I will fight to protect our democracy, safeguard our freedoms, and expand economic opportunity."
With his election, he joined a small yet growing group of lawmakers of Korean descent, including Rep. Andy Kim who has become the first Korean American elected to the Senate.
Before being elected to the California State Senate in 2020, Min was an assistant law professor at the University of California, Irvine School of Law. He graduated from the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business and Harvard Law School.
This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows State Sen. Dave Min listening as lawmakers discuss a bill before the Senate at the Capitol in Sacramento, California, on July 10, 2023. (Yonhap)
sshluck@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Song Sang-ho · November 14, 2024
4. Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk
The author does not even mention the risk with north Korea. Lieutenant Colonel Gabbard has consulted with known north Korean sympathizers from "Women Cross the DMZ.". See the photo and the tweet thread at this link: https://x.com/eyepatch_man/status/1856776648496222321
She is photographed with Christine Ahn who is from Women Across DMZ. She is known to be handled by Park Chull when he was in the UN mission in New York.
Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk
The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · November 14, 2024
President-elect Donald Trump has nominated former Representative Tulsi Gabbard as the director of national intelligence. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence was created after 9/11 to remedy what American policy makers believed was a lack of coordination among the various national-intelligence agencies, and the DNI sits atop all of America’s intelligence services, including the CIA.
Gabbard is stunningly unqualified for almost any Cabinet post (as are some of Trump’s other picks), but especially for ODNI. She has no qualifications as an intelligence professional—literally none. (She is a reserve lieutenant colonel who previously served in the Hawaii Army National Guard, with assignments in medical, police, and civil-affairs-support positions. She has won some local elections and also represented Hawaii in Congress.) She has no significant experience directing or managing much of anything.
But leave aside for the moment that she is manifestly unprepared to run any kind of agency. Americans usually accept that presidents reward loyalists with jobs, and Trump has the right to stash Gabbard at some make-work office in the bureaucracy if he feels he owes her. It’s not a pretty tradition, but it’s not unprecedented, either.
To make Tulsi Gabbard the DNI, however, is not merely handing a bouquet to a political gadfly. Her appointment would be a threat to the security of the United States.
Gabbard ran for president as a Democrat in 2020, attempting to position herself as something like a peace candidate. But she’s no peacemaker: She’s been an apologist for both the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Her politics, which are otherwise incoherent, tend to be sympathetic to these two strongmen, painting America as the problem and the dictators as misunderstood. Hawaii voters have long been perplexed by the way she’s positioned herself politically. But Gabbard is a classic case of “horseshoe” politics: Her views can seem both extremely left and extremely right, which is probably why people such as Tucker Carlson—a conservative who has turned into … whatever pro-Russia right-wingers are called now—have taken a liking to the former Democrat (who was previously a Republican and is now again a member of the GOP).
In early 2017, while still a member of Congress, Gabbard met with Assad, saying that peace in Syria was only possible if the international community would have a conversation with him. “Let the Syrian people themselves determine their future, not the United States, not some foreign country,” Gabbard said, after chatting with a man who had stopped the Syrian people from determining their own future by using chemical weapons on them. Two years later, she added that Assad was “not the enemy of the United States, because Syria does not pose a direct threat to the United States,” and that her critics were merely “warmongers.”
Gabbard’s shilling for Assad is a mystery, but she’s even more dedicated to carrying Putin’s water. Tom Rogan, a conservative writer and hardly a liberal handwringer, summed up her record succinctly in the Washington Examiner today:
She has blamed NATO and the U.S. for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (again, to the celebration of both Russian and Chinese state media), has repeated Russian propaganda claims that the U.S. has set up secret bioweapons labs in that country, and has argued that the U.S. not Russia is wholly responsible for Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship.
When she appeared on Sean Hannity’s show in 2022, even Hannity blanched at Gabbard floating off in a haze of Kremlin talking points and cheerleading for Russia. When Hannity is trying to shepherd you back toward the air lock before your oxygen runs out, you’ve gone pretty far out there.
A person with Gabbard’s views should not be allowed anywhere near the crown jewels of American intelligence. I have no idea why Trump nominated Gabbard; she’s been a supporter, but she hasn’t been central to his campaign, and he owes her very little. For someone as grubbily transactional as Trump, it’s not an appointment that makes much sense. It’s possible that Trump hates the intelligence community—which he blames for many of his first-term troubles—so much that Gabbard is his revenge. Or maybe he just likes the way she handles herself on television.
But Trump could also be engaging in a ploy to bring in someone else. He may suspect that Gabbard is unconfirmable by the Senate. Once she’s turfed, he could then slide in an even more appalling nominee and claim that he has no choice but to use a recess appointment as a backstop. (Hard to imagine who might be worse as DNI than Gabbard, but remember that Trump has promised at various times to bring retired General Mike Flynn back into government. Flynn is a decorated veteran who was fired from Trump’s White House in a scandal about lying to the FBI; he is now a conspiracist who is fully on board with Trump’s desire for revenge on his enemies.
Gabbard has every right to her personal views, however inscrutable they may be. As a private citizen, she can apologize for Assad and Putin to her heart’s content. But as a security risk, Gabbard is a walking Christmas tree of warning lights. If she is nominated to be America’s top intelligence officer, that’s everyone’s business.
Last spring, I described how U.S.-government employees with clearances are trained every year to spot “insider threats,” people who might for various reasons compromise classified information. Trump’s open and continuing affection for Putin and other dictators, I said, would be a matter of concern for any security organization. Gabbard’s behavior and her admiration for dictators is no less of a worry—especially because she would be at the apex of the entire American intelligence community.
Presidents should be given deference in staffing their Cabinet. But this nomination should be one of the handful of Trump appointments where soon-to-be Majority Leader John Thune and his Republican colleagues draw a hard line and say no—at least if they still care at all about exercising the Senate’s constitutional duty of advice and consent.
Related:
The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · November 14, 2024
5. Unification minister says S. Korea-U.S. alliance won't waver under Trump
It is imperative for those who support the ROK/US alliance to demonstrate how the alliance is in the national security interests of the US, how the ROK-US alliance (andthe Japan-US alliance and trilateral cooperation) will help the US defeat China in strategic competition as well as deter war in Taiwan and Korea and the region. It is also important to show how support for a free and unified Korea is in the US national security and economic interests.
Unification minister says S. Korea-U.S. alliance won't waver under Trump | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 14, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- The unification minister stated Thursday that the alliance between South Korea and the United States will remain steadfast under the U.S. administration of President-elect Donald Trump, and the trilateral partnership involving Japan will also remain unwavering.
Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho made the remarks during his welcome speech given at an opinion leaders' discussion held at Yonsei University in Seoul, about a week after Trump was elected to his second presidential term on platforms including his "America First" vision for foreign affairs.
"Despite the change in political leadership, the strong South Korea-U.S. alliance, which has endured for 71 years, will not waver," Kim said in his speech, read by Vice Minister Kim Soo-kyung.
"As the two nations have shared core values such as freedom and human rights for a long time and are progressing toward common goals of peace and prosperity, their partnership will further solidify," the minister noted.
Kim also said the trilateral partnership involving Japan, established during the Camp David summit in August 2023 among the leaders of the three nations, will also remain steadfast under the second Trump term, calling it a "cornerstone" for Korean unification and regional peace.
The minister also pledged that the government will work more thoroughly toward Korean unification, seeking solidarity and support from the international community for a democracy-based, free unification.
This image shows Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho speaking during an event on Oct. 16, 2024. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 14, 2024
6. Parliament passes bill to compensate damage caused by N. Korean trash balloons
Parliament passes bill to compensate damage caused by N. Korean trash balloons | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · November 14, 2024
By Yi Wonju
SEOUL, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- The National Assembly on Thursday passed a revised bill that provides state compensation for people who suffer damage from North Korea's trash-filled balloons.
During a parliamentary plenary meeting, the ruling and opposition parties voted to amend the Framework Act on Civil Defense to provide compensation for citizens affected by threats that do not constitute a full-scale "civil defense emergency," which refers to wars, armed conflicts and national disasters.
The amendment allows the state or local government to provide full or partial compensation to people who suffer damage to their health, property or life as a direct result of the emergency as defined by presidential decree.
Since last May, the North has launched thousands of balloons carrying trash in retaliation for what it claims are anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets sent across the border by activists in the South.
The revised bill is expected to take effect six months from now.
The National Assembly passes a revised bill that allows compensation for people who suffer damage from North Korea's trash-filled balloons during a plenary session on Nov. 14, 2024. (Yonhap)
julesyi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Yi Wonju · November 14, 2024
7. S. Korea to take 'effective, phased' measures as N. Korean troops enter combat in Russia's Kursk
"Phase 1" should be an aggressive, comprehensive, and sophisticated PSYOP campaign targeting the north Korean People's Army in Russia, Ukraine, and on the Korean peninsula.
S. Korea to take 'effective, phased' measures as N. Korean troops enter combat in Russia's Kursk | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 14, 2024
SEOUL, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's government said Thursday "effective and phased" measures will be taken over North Korea's dispatch of troops to fight for Russia against Ukraine, after the nation's spy agency confirmed that the North's soldiers have entered combat in Russia's Kursk.
"(The government) will proceed to implement effective, phased measures grounded in principles of composure and discipline," a unification ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity regarding North Korea's troop dispatch.
The previous day, the National Intelligence Service confirmed that North Korean troops sent to Russia have already engaged in front-line combat operations in the Kursk region, consistent with intelligence from the United States.
The official accused the North of dispatching troops to fight in an "unjustifiable" war and sending them to their death, adding that the regime has avoided informing its public about the deployment.
"It's another example of the North Korean regime's deceptive nature," the official noted.
Despite confirmations from the U.S. and South Korea about North Korean troops fighting for Russia on the front line, the North has remained silent on the matter amid speculation that it might make an official announcement after exchanging ratification instruments with Russia for their mutual defense treaty.
Earlier this week, North Korea's state media reported that leader Kim Jong-un ratified the comprehensive strategic partnership he signed with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang in June.
The landmark pact, which commits the two nations to providing military aid to each other in the event of war, has elevated their military relations to a new level, regarded as similar to an alliance.
In this file photo, a news report on North Korea's dispatch of troops to Russia plays on a television in a waiting area at Seoul Station in the capital on Oct. 20, 2024. (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Park Boram · November 14, 2024
8. Yoon says S. Korea could increase support for Ukraine depending on N.K.-Russia military cooperation
Do the right thing because it its the right thing to do.
Be a full partner in the arsenal of democracy and contribute lethal aid directly to Ukraine to help it defend itself and defeat the Russian invasion.
The more north Korean soldiers are killed in Russia and Ukraine the less will have to be killed when Kim miscalculates and attacks the South. Better yet, bleeding the Kim family regime of its best soldiers may contribute to deterrence.
Have Ukrainians kill them over there so South Korea does not have to kill them at home. (yes, facetious comments to try to make a point).
Yoon says S. Korea could increase support for Ukraine depending on N.K.-Russia military cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 14, 2024
By Kim Eun-jung
SEOUL, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol said South Korea could consider more support for Ukraine depending on the level of North Korean involvement in Russia's war against Ukraine, according to an interview published Thursday.
Yoon made the remark in a written interview with Spanish news agency EFE ahead of a trip to South America for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru and the Group of 20 (G20) summit in Brazil.
Both Seoul and Washington have confirmed that North Korean soldiers, who have been deployed to Russia's western front-line Kursk region, have begun engaging in combat against Ukrainian forces.
"If they both do not stop their dangerous military adventure, we are prepared to implement appropriate effective measures, including strengthening support for Ukraine, in cooperation with our allies and like-minded countries," Yoon said in the interview.
President Yoon Suk Yeol presides over an economic and security meeting with senior aides and ministers at the presidential office in Seoul on Nov. 14, 2024. (Yonhap)
Yoon cautioned against Moscow transferring sensitive military technology to Pyongyang in exchange for North Korean troop deployment, expressing concerns over North Korean forces gaining modern warfare experience in Ukraine.
He called on Pyongyang and Moscow to end their "illegal" military cooperation and withdraw North Korean troops from Russian territory, while noting South Korea is maintaining diplomatic channels with Russia.
Yoon said Seoul is also committed to maintain a "strategic dialogue" with China, an ally of both North Korea and Russia, underscoring China's potential role in promoting regional stability.
At the upcoming APEC and G20 summits, Yoon said he will advocate free, open world trade, emphasizing Latin America's growing "strategic importance." It marks Yoon's first official trip to Latin America since taking office in May 2022.
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 14, 2024
9. Kim Jong Un lays low after Trump win, sign of possible policy review
Data/graph at the link.
Excerpts:
The DPRK leader has returned to a busy schedule of public activities in 2024, featuring in special state media reports about new public activities on 89 days so far.
This is more than his annual totals for every year since 2016, even before his reclusive pandemic years when he made record few public appearances and took longer and more frequent breaks.
He has also taken long breaks of two weeks to over one month between October and November every year since 2020, marking the early fall possibly as his new standard vacation period.
State TV documentaries and commemorative plaques on display have revealed that Kim traveled around the country to inspect luxury shopping malls, weapons factories and other locations during periods when he didn’t appear in state media, suggesting he chooses when to disclose his activities after considering both their domestic and international impact.
While his absences do not necessarily mean he is vacationing, he has also built himself many new mansions in the last five years to enjoy in his leisure time.
Kim Jong Un lays low after Trump win, sign of possible policy review
North Korean leader has not appeared in state media in nine days, one of just a few extended absences this year
https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/kim-jong-un-lays-low-after-trump-win-sign-of-possible-policy-review/
Colin Zwirko November 14, 2024
Kim Jong Un at a party plenum in June 2022 | Image: KCNA (June 11, 2022)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has not appeared in public since Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election over one week ago, a sign he is taking time to review policy options following the comeback of his counterpart for two high-profile summits.
DPRK state media also has yet to mention Trump or the election results, after declaring earlier this year that Kim would continue to expand his nuclear arsenal no matter who won.
Kim’s current break is much different from his flurry of military-related activities in the weeks following Trump’s first win in 2016, and mirrors the long breaks he took after the 2020 presidential election as well as before multiple important political events like summits with world leaders.
However, it also follows a pattern from recent years of taking extended vacations in October and November, meaning the purpose of the break may not become clear unless Kim holds a Politburo meeting or similar gathering in the coming days or weeks.
Trump and Kim during their Hanoi summit | Image: Rodong Sinmun (March 1, 2019)
POST-ELECTION PAUSE
Kim was last seen in DPRK state media on Nov. 5 inspecting a flood reconstruction project, and he has not appeared in the nine days since.
He also took a nine-day break at the end of October between visits to nuclear missile bases and overseeing a long-range missile test.
These two appearances — as well as a short-range missile salvo test on the eve of the election that state media didn’t report on — clearly signaled that Kim will not enter denuclearization negotiations again like he did with Trump in 2018.
But with Trump’s win, Kim has likely taken time to hold meetings with his inner circle to discuss how to win concessions on his nuclear program, considering Trump’s tendency to speak highly of Kim and their relationship even after a series of ultimately failed summits in 2018 and 2019.
After Trump’s first election win on Nov. 9, 2016 (Korean time), Kim Jong Un appeared in state media inspecting various military units just hours before results were called, as well as on Nov. 11 and 13 and five other occasions to round out the month.
He was in the middle of intense efforts to develop a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile at the time and appeared to have no plans to negotiate with the U.S. until achieving this goal, which he did in late 2017 before shifting to pursuing talks with Trump.
But in 2020, when Trump lost to Joe Biden, Kim disappeared from public view from Oct. 22 until showing up in a Politburo meeting report on Nov. 16 — 12 days after the election and about eight days after the result became clear.
The report did not mention the election and painted the meeting as focused on the pandemic and domestic economic issues, though it may have also discussed the election result.
Kim had already declared the failure of diplomacy with Trump at the end of 2019, indicating his intention to go in a new direction centered on producing more and better nuclear weapons, but the change in administration would have required Kim to regroup or at least reiterate his plans regarding Biden to his top officials.
The North Korean leader previously took only three breaks of over nine days from public view so far this year.
His longest break this year lasted 17 days and came in June ahead of his summit with Russian leader Vladimir Putin in Pyongyang, suggesting he was focusing on preparing for the meeting without the distractions of other issues.
INCREASING PUBLIC APPEARANCES IN 2024
The DPRK leader has returned to a busy schedule of public activities in 2024, featuring in special state media reports about new public activities on 89 days so far.
This is more than his annual totals for every year since 2016, even before his reclusive pandemic years when he made record few public appearances and took longer and more frequent breaks.
Kim Jong Un’s current absence from state media will inevitably extend to at least 10 days, even if he shows up on Nov. 15. Breaks of 10 or more days in 2024, as well as long breaks in October and November, appear highlighted in orange, while breaks after the 2020 and 2024 U.S. presidential election appear in bright red. New appearances in state media appear as dark red marks. | Image: NK News (Nov. 14, 2024)
He has also taken long breaks of two weeks to over one month between October and November every year since 2020, marking the early fall possibly as his new standard vacation period.
State TV documentaries and commemorative plaques on display have revealed that Kim traveled around the country to inspect luxury shopping malls, weapons factories and other locations during periods when he didn’t appear in state media, suggesting he chooses when to disclose his activities after considering both their domestic and international impact.
While his absences do not necessarily mean he is vacationing, he has also built himself many new mansions in the last five years to enjoy in his leisure time.
Edited by Bryan Betts
10. What North Korean escapees think about Donald Trump’s return to power
Let's change the narrative. We should consider discussing the north Korean diaspora rather than escapees/defectors.
What North Korean escapees think about Donald Trump’s return to power
Defectors express hope former president could disrupt status quo on peninsula, but fear he could sideline human rights
Ifang Bremer | Joon Ha Park November 14, 2024
https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/what-north-korean-escapees-think-about-donald-trumps-return-to-power/
Former President Donald Trump meeting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at Joint Security Area in the demilitarized zone | Image: The White House (June 30, 2019)
Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election has stirred a mix of hope and apprehension among North Korean escapees, as they watch to see how the often unpredictable leader will approach the country they left behind.
In interviews with NK News, some defectors voiced optimism that Trump’s unconventional leadership will shake up the status quo and lead to improvements on the peninsula.
But others expressed their fear that the president-elect could once again sideline DPRK human rights if he pursues talks with Kim Jong Un again, stressing the need for Washington’s leadership on the issue.
Some escapees also highlighted Trump’s potential impact on Russia-North Korea cooperation, suggesting that he could help the DPRK soldiers deployed to Russia if he can succeed in ending the war.
DIPLOMATIC DISRUPTION
Several defectors told NK News that they see opportunities for shifts in geopolitical dynamics in the region due to Trump’s return.
“I feel a sense of anticipation rather than concern,” said Kang Chun-hyuk, a defector who has built a career as an artist.
Kang cited Trump’s previous willingness to break diplomatic conventions in his outreach to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Park Cheol-hoon, an escapee with a political science degree from Seoul’s Sogang University, also expressed hope that Trump’s disruptive approach to foreign policy will lead to change.
“Personally, I support Trump,” Park said. “What is clear is that for Trump, the Korean Peninsula has a high utility value as a means of pressure against China.”
The defector raised the possibility that Trump could disrupt the status quo by accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapons state or endorsing the idea of South Korea acquiring its own nuclear weapons.
“I think it’s better for us to find opportunities hidden in adventure,” he said.
However, Jae-Pyoung Seo, the director of the Association of North Korean Defectors, voiced concern about Trump’s transactional approach to the U.S.-ROK alliance, particularly his push to increase Seoul’s payment for U.S. forces in the South.
“This dynamic, especially when it involves Trump’s unpredictable behavior, puts South Korea in a tough position,” he said.
Kim Seong-ryeol, who made history as the first North Korean escapee to become a professor in South Korea, refrained from sharing his personal views on Trump’s victory, but he said he expects the former U.S. president to seek to restart his personal diplomacy with Kim Jong Un.
The professor also predicted that Trump will seek to end the war in Ukraine to “drive a wedge between Putin and Kim Jong Un before engaging North Korea.”
Ji Seong-ho during Trump’s 2018 State of the Union address | Image: The White House (Jan. 30, 2018)
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS
When it comes to human rights, some escapees have deep reservations about the incoming president’s stance toward improving the lives of North Koreans.
Jihyun Park, a senior fellow at the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy, wrote on social media after Trump’s election that she found the former president’s summits with Kim Jong Un “deeply unsettling.”
“I feared that the people of my homeland were being drawn deeper into isolation,” she said.
Park was particularly critical of Trump’s withdrawal from the U.N. Human Rights Council, which she viewed as an “abandonment of America’s role as a champion of human rights.”
“North Korea is a stage for 21st-century genocide, yet under the Trump administration, these human rights abuses received little attention … By doing so, it ultimately prolonged the dictator’s rule rather than challenging it. If there is to be a second Trump administration, I fear these issues may resurface.”
Seo of the Association of North Korean Defectors similarly argued that Trump’s first term as president did little to advance DPRK human rights concerns.
“Those looking for consistency and principled stances on human rights issues from Trump were left unsatisfied,” he said.
An escapee surnamed Kang, who requested anonymity due to their work in the U.S., told NK News that Trump’s diplomatic engagement with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un prioritized denuclearization over human rights, ultimately failing to achieve progress on either front.
“[Trump’s] interactions with Kim during his first term seemed more like political theater than substantive action,” the defector said. She emphasized that meaningful change in North Korea will require internal transformation driven by international pressure over human rights abuses.
Kang also expressed skepticism that Trump and the Republican Party will “regard North Korean human rights with the seriousness it deserves,” arguing that any future U.S. engagement should address both nuclear threats and human rights violations to avoid past shortcomings.
“If Trump recognizes these shortcomings and approaches Kim Jong Un or North Korea policy with this awareness, we might see different results from what was achieved the first time around,” she added.
But Ji Seong-ho, a defector who until recently served as lawmaker with the ruling People Power Party, was more positive about Trump’s impact on North Korean human rights.
“I was invited by then-President Trump to his 2018 State of Union address where I lifted the crutches that I held onto while crossing the Tumen River to escape from North Korea, a testament for all victims of North Korea’s human rights violations,” Ji wrote on Facebook.
“I met and talked with President Trump at the White House the next day and had an impression that he was genuinely interested in North Korean human rights and reunification of the Korean Peninsula.”
In early 2018, Trump also met with a group of North Korean defectors at the White House. But he appeared to reduce his engagement with escapees as he pursued diplomacy with the DPRK. Pyongyang’s state media routinely refers to defectors as “human scum.”
ENDING THE UKRAINE WAR
In recent weeks, reports that North Korea has deployed at least 10,000 troops to fight against Ukraine have highlighted just how extensively the DPRK and Russia have bolstered military ties in recent years.
And following Trump’s election, defectors expressed hope that the former president will make good on his campaign promise to end the war on day one of his term, for the good of the North Korean people.
“If Trump would withdraw U.S. support from Ukraine, a ceasefire or other form of resolution might be achieved more quickly, potentially stabilizing the global situation to some extent,” Seo of the Association of North Korean Defectors said.
Yuna Jeong, an escapee and media personality in South Korea, said on her YouTube channel that she “desperately hopes” a Trump intervention could save DPRK soldiers’ lives.
The North Koreans deployed to the Ukraine war “have to spend their youth from their teens to their 20s in Russia and end their lives to fill Kim Jong Un’s stomach,” she said.
Edited by Bryan Betts
11. How Trump’s picks for top posts could shape North Korea policy in second term
We have recommendations for each of them.
How Trump’s picks for top posts could shape North Korea policy in second term
Prospective national security advisor, CIA director and others have pushed hard line on DPRK, but also backed diplomacy
https://www.nknews.org/2024/11/how-trumps-picks-for-top-posts-could-shape-north-korea-policy-in-second-term/
Ifang Bremer | Shreyas Reddy November 13, 2024
From left to right: John Ratcliffe, Mike Waltz, Marco Rubio and Pete Hegseth | Images: U.S. government and Pete Hegseth's Facebook Page, edited by NK News
Incoming U.S. President Donald Trump announced his picks for three key positions that will shape North Korea policy during his second term on Tuesday, in addition to reportedly settling on his choice for Washington’s top diplomat.
On social media, Trump revealed that he has selected Mike Waltz as his prospective national security advisor, John Ratcliffe as Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director and Pete Hegseth as secretary of defense. Media reports also indicate Marco Rubio is likely to be named secretary of state.
Many of these officials have previously backed greater pressure and even direct military action against North Korea, while arguing that adversaries like Iran pose more urgent threats to the U.S.
But they have also shown a willingness to back Trump’s push for direct engagement with Kim Jong Un and could do so again if he seeks to rekindle diplomacy to denuclearize North Korea.
Mike Waltz with Donald Trump at Mar-A-Lago | Image: Mike Waltz via Instagram (March 25, 2021), edited by NK News
MIKE WALTZ: NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR
Mike Waltz, a former Green Beret and current member of the House Armed Services Committee, will be Trump’s chief advisor on all things related to national security, and he appears likely to endorse a hard line on North Korea.
Benjamin Engel, a visiting professor at Dankook University, told NK News that in the Asia-Pacific, “Waltz’s primary concern is China containment.”
“Waltz seems to want to push South Korea to at a minimum declare USFK and bases in Korea can be used to defend Taiwan. This has broader implications for the Korean Peninsula because it increases the likelihood of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait widening to the Korean Peninsula.”
When it comes to North Korea, Waltz’s views appear to align with the “maximum pressure” approach emphasizing economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation that Trump employed before engaging Pyongyang in 2018, according to Lami Kim, a professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
“That said, if Trump were to reengage with North Korea, Waltz would likely support such a move, given his loyalty to Trump — unlike [his former National Security Advisor] John Bolton, who has been consistently critical of engagement with Pyongyang,” Kim told NK News.
Most recently, Waltz emphasized strong defensive measures against North Korea. In a press conference in August, Waltz said investing in better defense against DPRK nuclear missiles should be a priority when it comes to North Korea policy, “so that a regime like North Korea can never hold [the U.S.] hostage.”
He also said an “unholy alliance” between North Korea, China and Russia has taken shape during President Joe Biden’s term, stating that the U.S. needs to develop “Iron Dome technology and aggressively apply that to the United States” in response to the DPRK’s expanding nuclear arsenal.
At the same presser, Waltz said he expects Trump to continue the relationship with South Korea, Japan and the Quad in defiance of North Korea.
However, the former special forces soldier has also stated that Iran is America’s “most pressing” threat, not North Korea — an opinion shared by Trump’s pick for CIA director.
John Ratcliffe with Donald Trump in the Oval Office | Image: John Ratcliffe via Facebook (June 15, 2019)
JOHN RATCLIFFE: DIRECTOR OF THE CIA
John Ratcliffe, who previously served as director of national intelligence from May 2020 to Jan. 2021, will return to the Trump administration as director of the CIA, overseeing U.S. efforts to gather foreign intelligence.
Ratcliffe called North Korea’s nuclear weapons program “deeply concerning” before his confirmation as national intelligence chief in 2020, and said Pyongyang viewed such weapons as “essential to protect the regime from military action and to gain standing in the international community.”
He added that North Korea could be open to partial nuclear and missile concessions in exchange for sanctions relief and other political and security benefits.
However, in a discussion hosted by the Heritage Foundation in 2021, Ratcliffe suggested Iran is a more urgent threat to the U.S., leaving the door open for acknowledging the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state.
Between Iran and the DPRK, the U.S. “only has the capability to stop one of those two countries from getting a nuclear weapon, and that’s Iran,” he said. Ratcliffe also emphasized that Pyongyang mainly uses nukes as a “deterrent,” while “we don’t know how the Iranians would use a deliverable nuclear weapon.”
But Kim of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies said that it’s difficult to determine how Ratcliffe’s views could influence U.S. policy “as intelligence chiefs are generally expected to focus on gathering, analyzing and presenting intelligence rather than shaping or advocating for specific policies.”
Pete Hegseth addressing an event by conservative group Turning Point USA | Image: Gage Skidmore via Flickr (Aug. 11, 2019) (Creative Commons – CC BY-SA 2.0)
PETE HEGSETH: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Pete Hegseth, a U.S. Army veteran and Fox News host, is set to lead the Department of Defense under a second Trump administration.
Hegseth, who did tours in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and Afghanistan, emerged as an “unofficial Trump adviser” during the former president’s first term, and his views often mirrored the White House’s policies at the time.
When Trump and Kim Jong Un were trading insults and threats in 2017, the “Fox & Friends” anchor called for “decisive” military action against Pyongyang.
“There’s merit in a preemptive strike. But you got to do it right,” he said.
“History shows us that when you let dictators get the worst weapons in the world, they wield a ton of influence,” he added, warning that North Korea would never stop its nuclear activity.
However, Hegseth began singing an entirely different tune the following year as Trump and Kim embarked on a historic period of diplomacy.
Weeks before the first U.S.-DPRK summit took place in Singapore, he backed a “normalization” of relations and said Kim would agree to a face-to-face meeting as he “wants a picture with the American president.”
“There is probably a point at which the guy who wants to meet with Dennis Rodman and loves NBA basketball and loves Western pop culture, probably doesn’t love being the guy that has to murder his people all day long,” he said.
When hopes for denuclearization nosedived after a failed summit in Hanoi the following year, Hegseth struck a balance between supporting Trump’s leader-to-leader approach and the overall goal of being “rid of nuclear weapons in rogue regimes.”
“He wants to get a deal with Kim Jong Un. It doesn’t mean he wants to be buddy-buddy with an authoritarian,” he emphasized in a May 2019 interview.
Marco Rubio at the Joint Security Area separating the two Koreas in 2014 | Image: Senator Marco Rubio via X (Jan. 24, 2014), edited by NK News
MARCO RUBIO: SECRETARY OF STATE?
One of Trump’s biggest cabinet picks is the reported appointment of Marco Rubio as secretary of state. While the president-elect has not announced the pick yet, even some Trump opponents have welcomed Rubio as a more moderate choice than some other rumored candidates.
The senator from Florida is known for his hawkish approach to foreign adversaries, including North Korea and Cuba. His anti-communist stance has shaped his Senate career, influencing U.S. policy on both Latin America and Asia, where he has advocated for a strong U.S.-ROK alliance.
Rubio previously condemned Pyongyang’s leadership as a nuclear-armed “criminal syndicate” that inflicts abuses on its own people, and has sponsored DPRK human rights bills on multiple occasions.
“The Kim regime systematically and ruthlessly terrorizes its own citizens, denying them their most basic freedoms,” he said in 2018, emphasizing that Washington must hold North Korea accountable for its crimes.
Before Trump’s first term, Rubio criticized the idea of engaging Kim directly as talks with Pyongyang “haven’t gone anywhere,” and said the North Korean leader was “not a stable person.”
However, he was more open to the idea of summitry as the two sides ramped up engagement in early 2018, while emphasizing that Washington would maintain “preconditions” and not abandon sanctions.
“If [Kim is] not willing to give up nuclear weapons and the ability to strike the United States, then my sense is that this is basically an effort to undermine international sanctions by saying, ‘Look, I’m willing to meet,’” he told CBS in March 2018.
When the Singapore summit was temporarily in doubt in May 2018, Rubio warned that Pyongyang was “playing a game” and would try to get as much sanctions relief as possible without giving up nuclear weapons.
After the failed Hanoi summit, Rubio said he believed Trump’s efforts to denuclearize North Korea and engage the “young dictator” would fail, but emphasized that he wasn’t criticizing the president’s efforts.
“I would love for Kim Jong Un to give up his weapons and everything else,” Rubio stated. “I just never believed he would.”
Edited by Bryan Betts
12. George Washington Carrier Strike Group Begins U.S.-Japan-South Korea Exercise
Five acres (plus) of US sovereign US territory operating in the Korean theater of operations.
George Washington Carrier Strike Group Begins U.S.-Japan-South Korea Exercise - USNI News
news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · November 13, 2024
An F/A-18F Super Hornet, attached to the Diamondbacks of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 102, takes off from the flight deck of Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN 73) in the Pacific Ocean, Nov. 9, 2024. US Navy Photo
The George Washington Carrier Strike Group began its participation in the second iteration of the U.S. – Japan – South Korea trilateral multi-domain exercise Freedom Edge, which began on Wednesday and wraps up on Friday.
The trilateral exercise, agreed to by the three countries during the Camp David summit in August 2023, comes in the wake of North Korea’s Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch on Oct. 31 and Short Range Ballistic Missile launches on Nov. 5. The U.S. had responded to North Korea’s ICBM launch with a joint air drill on Nov. 3 with Japan and South Korea involving a U.S. Air Force (USAF) B-1 bomber and fighter aircraft from all three countries.
“The three countries strongly condemned North Korea’s provocation, including its ICBM test launch, that undermine peace and stability in the region, including the Korean Peninsula, during recent high-level consultations, and this training reflected their will to deter and respond to such threats,” reads a South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) release on the exercise.
The exercise builds upon the inaugural execution of Freedom Edge, according to releases from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and the Japanese Joint Staff Office. This iteration, taking place in the East China Sea waters south of South Korea’s Jeju Island, will demonstrate the integration of 5th generation fighters into a multi-domain defense infrastructure.
Aircraft carrier USS George Washington (CVN-73) with embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5 will participate with destroyers USS Higgins (DDG-76), USS McCampbell (DDG-85) and USS Dewey (DDG-105). All three destroyers are part of the forward-deployed Commander, Task Force (CTF) 71/Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15 based in Japan.
U.S aircraft in the exercise will include P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), F-35 Lighting II and F/A-18 Superhornet fighters and KC-135 Stratotanker tanker aircraft.
Japan will deploy Aegis destroyer JS Haguro (DDG-180) along with P-3C Orion MPA, F-15J and F-2 fighters and E-767 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACs) aircraft for the exercise while South Korea will participate with Aegis destroyer ROKS Seoae Ryu Seong-ryong (DDG-993), destroyer ROKS Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin (DDH-975), P-3C Orion MPA and F-35 Lightning II and F-15K fighter aircraft
The inaugural Freedom Edge exercise, carried out from June 27 -30, involved the Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group.
The U.S. and Japan also planned to conduct a bilateral ordnance exercise to begin on Friday. However, Japan cancelled the exercise following the loss of a Japanese crew member from minesweeper JS Ukushima (MSC-686), which sank following a ship fire. Japan ended its search for the crew member on Tuesday.
Korea Announces UAV Experiment
The Republic of Korea Navy launched an uncrewed aerival vehicle from the flight deck of amphibious assault ship ROKS Dokdo (LPH-6111) in the East Sea (South Korea’s name for the Sea of Japan) Tuesday, the service announced in a Wednesday release.
While the release did not state the name of the UAV, only describing its size and dimension, imagery showed it to be the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc. (GA-ASI) Mojave UAV.
This is the first time a fixed-wing UAV launched from one of the ROKN’s ships.
“This combat experiment was conducted as part of the Navy’s plan to build a maritime manned-unmanned composite combat system for the purpose of ‘constructing an advanced science and technology force centered on AI-based unmanned combat systems’, and to establish a solid military readiness posture in a severe security situation and to seek ways to secure and operate unmanned aerial vehicles early,” reads the release.
After taking off, the UAV performed a mock landing maneuver by passing close to Dokdo, simulating a landing on the ship, according to the release, which added that the UAV maintained communication with Dokdo and the Naval Aviation Command for about an hour and flew over the East Sea. Subsequently, control of the drone was transferred from Dokdo to the Naval Aviation Command, and the drone safely landed on the runway of the Pohang Naval Aviation Command.
Throughout the trial, the UAV was operated by its manufacturer, according to the release.
The ROKN is accelerating the establishment of a maritime manned/unmanned composite combat system in various areas such as sea, underwater and air to establish a military readiness posture in the severe security situation, according to a release. In particular, the ROKN plans to continue developing the concept of operating drones on ships to strengthen maritime operational capabilities.
The ROKN is the second navy to test the Mojave UAV’s capability to operate from the flight deck of a ship, with the Royal Navy’s carrier HMS Prince of Wales (R09) previously trialing the UAV off the U.S. East Coast in November last year.
Related
news.usni.org · by Dzirhan Mahadzir · November 13, 2024
13. Trump 2.0: Fearmongering over 'America First' won't benefit South Korea
The key point is that the President-elect must view it as a vital national interest to ensure security and prosperity in Northeast Asia. They are directly linked to the security and prosperity of America. If he views the region as important to US national security and economic interests it will be mutually beneficial and the Koreans and Japanese should be reassured. A country may abandon allies but it will not abandon its vital national interests.
Trump 2.0: Fearmongering over 'America First' won't benefit South Korea
The Korea Times · November 14, 2024
President-elect Donald Trump arrives to speak at a meeting of the House GOP conference in Washington, Wednesday. AP-Yonhap
Expert suggests linking defense-cost sharing to reprocessing of spent fuel as Seoul faces nuclear storage crisis
By Kang Hyun-kyung
Like in other countries, in Korea, a flurry of debate is underway following Donald Trump's reelection. Policymakers, business executives and think tank experts are keen to find out the winners and losers of the Trump era as the clock is ticking for his return to the White House on Jan. 20, 2025.
His aggressive campaign pledges sparked lots of soul-searching as a drastic policy shift in the U.S. looms large.
With his signature "Make America Great Again" slogan, he is poised to push around allies to carry more burdens and spend more to defend themselves rather than expecting that the U.S. would protect them.
Trump's reelection has also kept the private sector entities busy. They are wary of the consequences of the trade policy shift. Trump vowed to impose 10 percent universal baseline tariffs on all imported goods, while imports from China will suffer from 60 percent or higher blanket tariffs.
It remains uncertain whether Trump will implement those aggressive measures as he promised during the campaign trail. Some observers say those campaign pledges may be his bargaining chips designed to gain concessions from foreign exporters, rather than a viable policy vision. But if he were to act on his words, Trump's second term will become the epicenter of global economic chaos.
Is South Korea prepared to brace for the shocks soon to be triggered by Trump 2.0? How should it respond to the shift? The Korea Times on Tuesday invited three experts to preview Trump's second term and address how South Korea should prepare for it. The three experts invited to the roundtable interview are Cho Byung-jae, the former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and author of the book, "Trump's Return"; Lee Hyo-young, a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; and retired Army Gen. Chun In-bum who served as commander of the Special Forces Korea.
Cho said media coverage of defense-cost sharing is exaggerated and it is not a huge bilateral issue as it was reported, adding South Koreans' overreaction to the issue is the result of media hype. He said the more important issue the nation should watch carefully is Trump's redefinition of the role of the U.S. in his second term. He said Trump's message is clear. He is telling the world that the U.S. is not going to do the world's police role any more, and therefore, nations should find a way to protect themselves, instead of relying on the U.S.
Chun said South Korea would have no choice but to accept if the Trump administration proposes renegotiating the defense-cost sharing agreement. Given the crucial role of the alliance, he said South Korea must be ready to contribute more to the cost-sharing effort. However, it could address related issues, such as the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods, and propose offering in-kind contributions, like South Korean military equipment, to the U.S. military.
Chun said the proposed "give and take" strategy may work out well as Trump is a talented businessman great at negotiating and making deals if conditions are met.
Meanwhile, Lee called for a calm reaction to the prospect of a U.S. trade policy shift. She said that she felt fears of Trump's return to the White House have been exaggerated. She said that Trump's trade pledges are too radical to be implemented, and, therefore, experts are divided with regard to the potential effectiveness of Trump's "America First" measures for the U.S. economy.
Instead of panicking, she advised that South Korea should wait and see if these measures are actually adopted, and if so, to what extent, much like the Trump administration's trade policies.
Following are the views of the three experts shared at The Korea Times Roundtable, titled "What Will Trump 2.0 Mean for South Korea?," which was held on Tuesday at the meeting room of The Korea Times in Seoul. Korea Times chief editorial writer Shim Jae-yun moderated the event.
This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
Cho Byung-jae, a retired career diplomat having served as former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy and author of the book, "Trump's Return," speaks during the Korea Times roundtable, "What Will Trump 2.0 Mean for South Korea?, held on Tuesday at the meeting room of the newspaper in Seoul. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Q: Will Trump meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un again for a summit in his second term? If he does, how will the Trump-Kim meeting turn out and how will it impact South Korea?
Cho Byung-jae: I think Trump will certainly meet Kim again in his second term. It will be a matter of time and the only thing we don’t know yet is when it will happen. My view about the Trump-Kim summit is based on my years of observation of related news articles. First and foremost, Trump hinted that he is open-minded toward dialogue with North Korea. Second, the U.S. president-elect commented positively about Kim. In 2017, for example, Trump praised Kim, saying, “At a very young age, he was able to assume power … So, obviously, he’s a smart cookie.” Third, I found out that Trump’s view of North Korea’s nuclear program is quite different from what South Korea and the U.S. have maintained during the past decades. During his campaign rally in July, he said, “It’s nice to get along when somebody has a lot of nuclear weapons or otherwise.” Trump rarely used expressions like “dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear program.” I took this as a signal that Trump has a flexible view about the nuclear issue.
How will the possible Trump-Kim meeting, if it happens, impact South Korea? I think it’s not a fancy situation for South Korea and the summit will damage South Korea’s image. This is because if Trump and Kim were to meet, they would discuss issues like nuclear weapons and the security of the Korean Peninsula. If South Korea is sidelined without being invited to such a critical talk, the South will find it difficult to digest.
Chun In-bum: I think it’s important to understand why Trump was elected president. It wasn’t about cost-sharing. It wasn’t about North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles. He was elected because of economic and border issues the U.S. faces.
I don’t believe having a summit with Kim Jong-un will be the top priority of the Trump administration.
Besides that, I also believe that Kim Jong-un is not too keen on having a summit with Trump in the first place, either. Kim wants to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state and he wants sanctions to be lifted. Unless Kim has these preconditions, he has no reason to meet with Mr. Trump, except maybe for a photo. I don’t see any summit coming soon.
Retired Gen. Chun In-bum who served as commander of the Special Forces Korea, speaks at the roundtable. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Q: Speculations are abounding about the U.S. election outcome and its impact on the war in Ukraine. Will Russia and Ukraine be able to sign a ceasefire deal anytime soon? And what are the implications of the war on Russia-North Korea relations?
Chun: Now, the war between Ukraine and Russia, it could last for another decade. People are all tired. I think everybody wants to stop the fighting. It’s just a matter of how they are going to do that. After the U.S. election, there are many speculations about what that deal will be like. But whatever the deal is, it’s not going to happen soon. It’s going to happen in several months. Probably next summer because that is the point where Russian President Vladimir Putin has to mobilize a considerable number of troops. But he doesn’t want to do that. It will be a good opportunity for Putin to take this election outcome as an excuse to make a deal. Same for the Ukrainian leader. I think if this occurs, we might see a ceasefire and some sort of perpetual armistice like the one we have in Korea.
A message to the Korean people is to never rely on others for your defense. Because Ukraine relied on NATO and the U.S. for their defense, and they are now in a sad situation. This is the biggest lesson we can learn from the war in Ukraine.
Cho: During the presidential election, Trump said if elected, he would end the war in Ukraine immediately. Given his remarks, it seems to be obvious that the war in Ukraine will be one of the top priorities for the U.S. if he takes office in January 2025.
Does this indicate that the war will end anytime soon? I am skeptical about that. Trump will speak with Putin about a ceasefire deal and negotiations may drag on if the two sides fail to narrow their differences. The ceasefire deal, if clinched, will certainly impact Russia-North Korea relations. But it won’t affect greatly Russia-North Korea relations because they signed a new treaty and the structure of their cooperation is in place. So I think their relations will stand even after the war in Ukraine.
Lee Hyo-young, a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, answers questions about the Trump administration's trade policy and its impact on Korean exporters at the roundtable. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
Q: Trump vowed to impose 10 percent universal baseline tariffs on all imported foreign goods and 60 percent or higher blanket tariffs on imports from China. How should South Korean companies prepare for Trump 2.0?
Lee Hyo-young: Trump said he would introduce 60 percent or higher tariffs on imported Chinese goods, and he even vowed to revoke China's most-favored nation (MFN) status. (Editor's note: MFN requires a country providing a trade concession to its trading partner to extend the same treatment to all.) Trump also mentioned the possibility of revoking Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) from China, a radical measure that, if implemented, would essentially mean the U.S. severing normal trade ties with China. I wonder if such extreme measures would be feasible or if they would even benefit the U.S. economy.
We should closely monitor whether the U.S. president-elect will follow through on the commitments made during the campaign and introduce those measures once he is sworn in as president in January. From my perspective, revoking China's MFN status could serve as Trump's bargaining chip to pressure Beijing into negotiating and complying with U.S. demands to address the trade deficit issue.
We will see if Trump is serious about the measure when and if he unveils a lineup of key post holders in charge of trade and economic affairs, like a secretary of commerce or the United States Trade Representative.
I don't know what Trump has in his mind about the end state of China. Does he ultimately want China to transition into a free economy? Or does he simply want to fix the U.S. trade deficits with China by introducing a set of hardline measures designed for decoupling from China?
Regarding Trump's proposal of 10 percent of universal baseline tariffs, this is not a discriminatory measure specifically targeting South Korean companies, because such tariffs will be imposed on all imported goods from foreign countries. However, if introduced, those tariffs will raise the prices of imported goods, and this, in turn, will negatively affect the global economy.
How should South Korean companies prepare for the export barriers? I think South Korea should keep asking the Trump administration to give Korean companies a favorable status, such as exemptions or suspensions. Considering the South's investments in the U.S., South Korean companies have made significant investments in building manufacturing facilities during the Biden administration. This could potentially be leveraged to put pressure on the Trump administration to allow exceptions.
Q: Please tell us how Trump will handle the Taiwan issue. Will the U.S. Forces in Korea be redeployed in the event of China’s invasion of Taiwan?
Cho: We must understand who Trump is. I think he is not an ideologically-oriented person. He is a pragmatist. He is a businessman-turned-politician, and he is willing to make a deal once conditions are met. Since 2016, he has told his supporters that he would end wars that were underway overseas. What he said during the recent campaign trail or in his first term made me think that he will be the last person to wage a war against other countries. If he does, it would be a trade war, not a ground war. He would prioritize economy, science and technology over military confrontations with other countries. He puts pressure on China probably because he wants to secure jobs for Americans and help the U.S. build manufacturing infrastructure rather than going to war with China.
I think the same holds true for Taiwan. Trump has maintained strategic ambiguity about the Taiwan issue.
What can South Korea do about Taiwan in the event of a contingency there? I think we don't need to overreact to the Taiwan issue, and instead, we should carefully watch how it develops without making hasty predictions about the prospects of a war between China and Taiwan.
Chun: I think it’s time to address a very important issue. Why are the U.S. troops based in South Korea? Are they here to defend South Korea? Or are they here to achieve the American policy priority, which is termed strategic flexibility? We’ve never come to an agreement about this.
My personal view is that the U.S. Forces Korea and their primary mission is the defense and stability of South Korea. But at the same time, their secondary priority is the pursuit of American national interests in the Asia Pacific. So, if the U.S. decides that they must redeploy some forces on the Korean Peninsula to address issues between China and Taiwan, or even some other issues in Africa or Europe, it is the U.S.' sovereign right to do so.
So, we are now at a crossroads where we must recognize and agree which one it is. It’s not an easy question to address but we must do it. If we acknowledge that the U.S. Forces Korea have these two missions, then the U.S. is not going to pull out everyone here. They are going to, at least, maintain forces to conduct the initial mission of maintaining the stability of the Korean Peninsula and other missions like the China-Taiwan standoff. When we think of that, then the role of Korean troops can be expected. What are we to do in order to maintain some capabilities of American forces here? Should we send our capabilities to the Pacific? Maybe yes. Maybe no. But I think that’s where we should start on this question.
Q: Defense-cost sharing has emerged as an issue after Trump won the election. Please tell us how South Korea should react if the Trump administration were to demand renegotiation of the defense-cost sharing. Inside South Korea, calls are growing that the nation should have nuclear weapons to defend itself.
Chun: We should acknowledge that the U.S. Forces Korea are priceless. So, we should embrace the fact that we need to increase cost-sharing when asked to do so. Then the issue is how we are going to finance it. We don’t have to give money. How about we build warships for the U.S. Another option can be exporting K-9 self-propelled artillery pieces. We have been trying to export K-9s to the U.S. Army but have been unable to do that. We also have other weapons systems perfect for the alliance. We can give $5 billion worth of Korean weapons. I think there is lots of room for negotiations.
I also think that with an increase in defense-cost sharing, we should negotiate our atomic agreement so that we would be allowed to reprocess spent fuel.
Cho: Defense-cost sharing has surfaced all of a sudden as if it is the biggest bilateral issue with the U.S. This is not true. We should understand what message Trump is trying to deliver with his remarks about defense-cost sharing and burden-sharing. His message is clear. He is saying that the U.S. under Trump will not pursue the world police-like role as it has done in the past. He is demanding that NATO should carry the burden of regional security on its own without relying on the U.S. The president-elect also puts pressure on European countries to increase their defense budget up to 3 percent of their GDP. His message to Asia is the same.
Q: Please share your concluding remarks.
Lee: Trump’s envisioned trade policy is very aggressive. Despite this, we should wait and see how his second term will turn out, instead of making premature predictions about his forthcoming presidency. Fearmongering doesn’t help our nation. And we don’t have to be worried too much about his second term because we don’t know yet whether his campaign pledges will be implemented or not.
Cho: I agree. We don’t need to be overwhelmed by his rhetoric. We should carefully watch his actions.
Chun: President-elect Trump is a businessman-turned-politician, and a strong America is in South Korea's best interests. South Korea needs to align its interests with the U.S., particularly in collaboration with Japan.
From left, Retired General Chun In-bum, Cho Byung-jae, the former chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, Lee Hyo-young, a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, and Korea Times chief editorial writer Shim Jae-yun pose before they attend the Korea Times roundtable about the U.S. presidential election outcome and its impact on Korea held on Tuesday at the newspaper's meeting room in Seoul. Korea Times photo by Shim Hyun-chul
The Korea Times · November 14, 2024
14. [EXCLUSIVE] ‘Don’t die for Putin’: Rights groups to send message to NK soldiers
Good. Just imagine how effective these messages could be and the effects that could be achieved if ROK and US military PSYOP resources were committed to a comprehensive PSYOP campaign to influence the nKPA both in Russia and Ukraine and on the Korean peninsula.
[EXCLUSIVE] ‘Don’t die for Putin’: Rights groups to send message to NK soldiers
The Korea Times · November 14, 2024
This image from a video posted Oct. 18 on X by Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communication and Information Security shows what the center claims are North Korean soldiers deployed to Russia. Human rights groups in South Korea are set to issue a joint open letter urging North Korean troops deployed in Russia not to sacrifice their lives for Moscow's war efforts against Ukraine, according to an activist familiar with the matter. Yonhap
Connected to outside world for 1st time, many could be affected: activist
By Jung Min-ho
Human rights groups in South Korea will issue a joint open letter urging North Korean troops deployed in Russia not to sacrifice their lives for Moscow’s war efforts against Ukraine, said an activist familiar with the matter.
Shin Hee-seok, a representative of the Transitional Justice Working Group, a Seoul-based NGO, told The Korea Times, Wednesday, that around 10 organizations are collectively drafting a statement aimed at "saving and awakening" more than 10,000 North Korean troops fighting on the frontline in Russia's Kursk region.
“The gist of our message will be this: The war initiated by Russia’s military was an invasion, and there is no justification for you (North Korean troops) to support it. Why should you die for Russia? You have to make the right choice,” said Shin, one of the key people behind the open letter plan, adding that it is expected to be released in the coming days.
This moves comes as North Korean soldiers are engaging in combat operations alongside Russian troops attempting to retake land lost to Ukraine’s military in the Kursk region. According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), North Korean troops have already begun participating in the battlefield.
Most of the North Korean troops who arrived in Russia last month are believed to be in their late teens and early 20s, according to the NIS. Many of these young soldiers, now connected to the outside world for the first time through the internet, could potentially be influenced by the sincere message from the human rights groups, Shin said.
The rights activists think that their message would be able to reach the North Koreans in the battlefield, based on some media reports that the soldiers have experienced “unrestricted access to the internet” and that many have been “gorging on pornography.”
“We hope more international organizations will join our continuing efforts to persuade the North Koreans,” Shin said.
The Russian army's Solntsepyok multiple rocket launcher fires at Ukrainian positions in the border region of Kursk, Russia, in this photo captured from a video released by Russian Defense Ministry press service, Wednesday. AP-Yonhap
On Tuesday (U.S. time), Vedant Patel, principal deputy spokesman for the U.S. State Department, also confirmed that more than 10,000 North Korean military forces in Russia began engaging in combat operations after being briefly trained in artillery, drone and infantry missions, including trench clearing operations, which he said are critical skills for frontline operations.
However, Pyongyang has so far kept the information about the deployment of its troops in Russia secret from the public.
According to the Ministry of Unification, this is likely due to the grave political risks associated with what could unfold on the battlefield.
Speaking to reporters, Thursday, a ministry official said the North Korean regime might have concluded that keeping the information hidden would be in its best political interest.
“Perhaps they didn’t feel comfortable with the idea of officially acknowledging that they had sent troops to an unjustifiable, illegal war,” the official said. “They are sending thousands of young soldiers to fight that war, and they can’t even tell the truth to their own people. This is another example of the deceptive nature of the regime,” the official said.
However, experts believe that Pyongyang’s strategy of keeping the deployment secret is not sustainable. If too many troops are killed on the battlefield or if a significant number escape to other countries, North Korea could be forced to disclose the situation to the public.
The Korea Times · November 14, 2024
15. In Brief: North Korea’s Critical Allies
In Brief: North Korea’s Critical Allies
Jenny Town, Thomas Shugart, and Maria Snegovaya
November 13, 2024
https://warontherocks.com/2024/11/in-brief-north-koreas-critical-allies/
A lot happens every day. Alliances shift, leaders change, and conflicts erupt. With In Brief, we’ll help you make sense of it all. Each week, experts will dig deep on a single issue happening in the world to help you better understand it.
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This weekend, Russia signed into law a strategic partnership agreement with North Korea that includes a mutual defense provision and strengthens security ties between the two countries. Meanwhile, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, North Korea has sent at least 11,000 troops to Russia to fight against Ukrainian soldiers in Russia’s Kursk region, potentially in exchange for a nuclear technology transfer. China, too, has maintained close ties with Pyongyang, even as the country’s actions have become increasingly belligerent. We asked three experts to tell us more about how North Korea’s strongest allies — Russia and China — are enabling it to become a serious global threat.
Read more below.
Jenny Town
Senior Fellow, Stimson Center
Director, Korea Program and 38 North
Naturally, there are growing concerns about how expanding Russian-North Korean military cooperation may improve Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction programs, its conventional capabilities, and now, potentially even its understanding of modern warfighting. These are all valid concerns with serious implications for U.S. and South Korean defenses especially.
However, the value of increased political and economic cooperation for North Korea should not be underestimated. In recent years, both China and Russia have effectively blocked the international community from imposing new punitive measures on Pyongyang for its persistent violations of international law while increasing economic cooperation to varying degrees. This has greatly diminished the long-standing proposition that Pyongyang must choose between “guns and butter” to increase its legitimacy.
The signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and North Korea has elevated Pyongyang’s global standing, while giving both countries a seemingly legal basis for cooperating on sanctioned activities and the facade of abiding by the rule of law.
Moreover, Russia’s own resistance to international sanctions has built a common cause between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un that is likely to be sustained in the long run. Putin’s pledge to Kim to “develop an alternative payment system that is not controlled by the West” was not unique, but in line with Russia’s vision of a multipolar world order. As that vision gains resonance among BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and United Arab Emirates) countries and the Global South, there may very well be a place for North Korea within those networks, strengthening its standing on the global stage, nuclear weapons and all.
Thomas Shugart
Adjunct Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security
Founder & Owner, Archer Strategic Consulting LLC
Recent months have seen a number of additional indicators that point to the possible formation of a loose Russia-China-North Korea (and perhaps Iran) anti-Western “axis” — one that could significantly complicate the U.S. and allied strategic calculus in the Western Pacific. While China’s mighty industrial base provides support for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine, Russia is aiding China in key areas such as submarine and missile technology — nuclear submarine quieting being a remaining weak area for the Chinese navy. For its part, North Korea is providing to Russia items that it apparently feels it can spare: stocks of munitions and the bodies of its soldiers. All of this points to a potential combination that could stretch the limits of U.S. and allied capacity in the event of a conflict with China, which could come within a matter of years. While Russian technology is unlikely to change much in that timeframe, were Russia to support Chinese aggression by surging its naval forces into the Pacific simultaneously with a Chinese military operation, and if North Korea were to also mobilize its forces to South Korea’s border — perhaps distracting U.S. forces and impelling South Korea to insist its facilities not be used against China — the combined effect could be to overwhelm America’s ability to respond effectively. And this is to say nothing of what Russia could do simultaneously in Europe to truly draw American attention away. While some observers may say that the level of coordination between these countries is still lacking, it is worth considering that the primary members of the last Axis that the United States had to contend with, Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, coordinated minimally (Adolf Hitler was just as surprised by Pearl Harbor as the United States was), and yet brought America and its allies year of hardship and war.
Maria Snegovaya
Senior Fellow
Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
In the last year, military-technical cooperation between Russia and North Korea has strengthened dramatically. North Korea has sent to Russia millions of rounds of 152-millimeter shells and 122-millimeter artillery shells, as well as its short-range ballistic missiles. In June 2024, both countries also concluded the Russian-North Korean “strategic partnership,” ratified last week by Russian lawmakers. In the latest round of escalation, North Korea has sent thousands of troops to enter the fighting in Russia’s western Kursk region. The United States suggested the total number of North Korean soldiers in Russia is at 10,000, and the number might increase going forward. Additionally, there were 500 North Korean officers as well as three army generals among the forces. The North Korean soldiers are being trained by Russian instructors on artillery, drones, and trench-clearing for combat.
For Russia, in view of the sanctions and isolation imposed by the West after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, forging alternative alliances with countries like Iran and North Korea is key. So far, Russia has strongly benefited from this collaboration. North Korean munitions and troop supplies help compensate for Russia’s shortages.
North Korea sees its arms transfers to Moscow as an opportunity to test its equipment in battle. It also gains from Russian diplomatic support and technical assistance. North Korea might also be expecting Russia to provide advanced weapons systems and technological know-how to significantly strengthen its defense, nuclear, and space programs. For example, in November 2023, two months after the meeting between Russian and North Korean leaders, North Korea successfully launched its own military reconnaissance satellite, which might be attributed to Russian expertise and assistance. Lastly, North Korea has also received from Russia money and between 50,000 and 100,000 tons of rice.
The U.S. government reached out to Chinese diplomats, hoping China will convince Pyongyang to limit or halt the deployment. But the Chinese foreign ministry has previously stated that Russia and North Korea have the right to decide how to develop bilateral relations as they please.
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That’s all for this week’s In Brief. For more information on what’s happening, head to our site or download the War on the Rocks app.
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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