Courtesy Strategy Central: Access HERE

Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If you find it in your heart to care for somebody else, you will have succeeded."

– Maya Angelou

"One of the strongest characteristics of genius is the power of lighting its own fire."

–John W. Foster

"Science is organized knowledge. Wisdom is organized life."

– Immanuel Kant

1. Why Trump Wants Hegseth at Defense

2. Pentagon Has Two Years to Prevent World War III

3. Integrated strategic competition: A new approach to US national security

4. Trump is inheriting a more dangerous world

5. Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk

6. How China Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America

7. China opens huge port in Peru to extend its reach in Latin America

8. Exclusive-Trump's team drawing up list of Pentagon officers to fire, sources say

9. Trump Prepares a Pentagon Plucking Committee (And attacks on PME)

10. Russia's Battering Ram Strategy and It's Mission in the Donbas: Is Russia Reviving It's Operational Art?

11. 'It Could Be Very Hard to Do Our Job': Top Military Officers Brace for Trump's Potential Loyalty Review Boards

12. Security experts predict US military footprint in Australia will grow under Trump

13. What to Know About Tulsi Gabbard, Trump's Pick to Be Director of National Intelligence

14. Ukraine Prioritizes Security, Not Territory, as Trump Pushes Truce Talks

15. Transforming the U.S. Military for Gray Zone Operations: A New Approach to Force Structure

16. US, Asian allies gather in East China Sea for more large-scale training

17. Trump’s National Security Team Should Have Adversaries Worried

18. Why tattooed Fox News star Pete Hegseth is a genius pick for Trump's Defense Secretary, writes JOSH HAMMER

19. On the Precipice of a New Era of Warfare? Reflections on Military Revolutions, Past and Future

20. Rubio, Gabbard, and Gaetz. . . Oh My!

21. Opinion The right and left are talking about the military in dangerous ways

22. Opinion: 'This battle is different.' First Black female Army Ranger fights new adversary.

1. Why Trump Wants Hegseth at Defense

The Wall Street Journal - Objective analysis? I concur with the editorial board that okeness is a small concern in the big scheme of things. Is a culture war really our top warfighting priority?

Excerpts:

Yet he’s never run a big institution, much less one of the largest and most hidebound on the planet. He has no experience in government outside the military, and no small risk is that the bureaucracy will eat him alive.

Another concern is why Mr. Trump seems to have chosen Mr. Hegseth. The nominee’s focus in recent years has been attacking the Pentagon for its woke policies on transgender and racial equity. He has made a cause of opposing women in combat, though women have shown they can perform well in many roles. Mr. Trump seems to want Mr. Hegseth to wage a culture war against the military brass.

The Biden-era woke excesses need to be cleaned up, not least for recruiting from military families who have long prized the service for its devotion to excellence. Peacetime militaries tend to lapse into promotion based on administrative skill rather than war-fighting capability. But in the context of America’s security challenges, wokeness is a small concern.

The military isn’t Mr. Trump’s enemy, and a purge mentality will court political trouble and demoralize the ranks. The draft executive order, leaked to the press, about forming a group of former officers to rule on the fitness of current generals would be a mistake that smacks of politicizing the officer corps.

Firing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs CQ Brown would also be counterproductive. Mr. Trump is still furious about former Chairman Mark Milley’s criticisms, and not without cause, but Mr. Trump promoted Gen. Milley. The better path is to look for officers who understand the current global dangers and have good ideas for what to do about it. Adm. Sam Paparo of the U.S. Indo-Pacific command is one.

Why Trump Wants Hegseth at Defense

He seems to want a culture warrior to take on the military brass. There are bigger security issues.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/pete-hegseth-secretary-of-defense-donald-trump-pentagon-military-fox-news-6ea89c1a?mod=hp_opin_pos_0

By The Editorial Board

Nov. 13, 2024 5:50 pm ET

Pete Hegseth in 2016. Photo: Evan Vucci/Associated Press

Donald Trump has quickly filled the top ranks of his national security team, and for the most part they’re politicians with solid experience and understanding of today’s security threats. The main wild card is Pete Hegseth, the Fox News personality and decorated Army veteran, who will get close Senate scrutiny as the nominee to be Secretary of Defense.

The choice of Mr. Hegseth has shocked many in Washington, and that by itself might be a recommendation. He could hardly do worse than the so-called adults in the room of recent years. The armed services can’t make their recruiting quotas, America’s military industrial base has been exposed as inadequate with little protest from Pentagon leaders, and no one in the civilian or military ranks was held accountable for the Afghanistan debacle.

The 44-year-old Mr. Hegseth has combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq and has maintained his military ties as an officer in the National Guard. He has been an advocate for veterans, both on TV and as a member of veterans groups. He’s smart and telegenic.

***

Yet he’s never run a big institution, much less one of the largest and most hidebound on the planet. He has no experience in government outside the military, and no small risk is that the bureaucracy will eat him alive.

Another concern is why Mr. Trump seems to have chosen Mr. Hegseth. The nominee’s focus in recent years has been attacking the Pentagon for its woke policies on transgender and racial equity. He has made a cause of opposing women in combat, though women have shown they can perform well in many roles. Mr. Trump seems to want Mr. Hegseth to wage a culture war against the military brass.

The Biden-era woke excesses need to be cleaned up, not least for recruiting from military families who have long prized the service for its devotion to excellence. Peacetime militaries tend to lapse into promotion based on administrative skill rather than war-fighting capability. But in the context of America’s security challenges, wokeness is a small concern.

The military isn’t Mr. Trump’s enemy, and a purge mentality will court political trouble and demoralize the ranks. The draft executive order, leaked to the press, about forming a group of former officers to rule on the fitness of current generals would be a mistake that smacks of politicizing the officer corps.

Firing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs CQ Brown would also be counterproductive. Mr. Trump is still furious about former Chairman Mark Milley’s criticisms, and not without cause, but Mr. Trump promoted Gen. Milley. The better path is to look for officers who understand the current global dangers and have good ideas for what to do about it. Adm. Sam Paparo of the U.S. Indo-Pacific command is one.

The Senate will also want to know what Mr. Hegseth really thinks about today’s main security issues. He was a longtime hawk and supported the use of force abroad. But in recent years he has blown with the MAGA wind against U.S. commitments, notably in Ukraine. The risk is that he will tell Mr. Trump what he wants to hear rather than advising him to the contrary to avoid mistakes.

Successful Defense secretaries have driven a few high priorities, and Mr. Hegseth’s are unknown. Will he press to build three nuclear attack submarines a year to fulfill the Aukus commitment and deter China? What about fast-tracking the production of long-range antiship and other missiles? There are many such urgent priorities, as Michael Gallagher explains nearby. Getting those done would tax even the most seasoned Defense chief.

All of this could make Mr. Hegseth’s confirmation a close call, since Democrats are likely to line up against him. Senate Republicans like Dan Sullivan, Joni Ernst and Roger Wicker are serious about restoring U.S. military capabilities and deterrence. They have an obligation to scrutinize Mr. Hegseth to see if he is the right man to lead the military reform and buildup that America needs.

On Wednesday Mr. Trump named former Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard as director of national intelligence, the White House post that coordinates findings from the 18 U.S. intelligence agencies. Ms. Gabbard is in the Tucker Carlson isolationist wing of the MAGA coalition, which will heighten concern on Capitol Hill that the right person serve at Defense.

***

Mr. Trump’s other selections are likely to get more welcome Senate treatment. Marco Rubio, the Florida Senator picked as Secretary of State, has long experience on foreign affairs and believes in U.S. global leadership. He has focused on the China threat and would likely push to restore U.S. sanctions on Venezuela and do more to combat Cuba’s malign influence in the Western hemisphere.

Managing Administration security debates will be Rep. Mike Waltz, the new national-security adviser. He’s another veteran with hawkish views and led a group of 70 Republicans and 70 Democrats in crafting a framework to counter Iranian aggression. Like Mr. Rubio, he has tempered support for Ukraine of late. But he wrote this month that “If [Vladimir Putin] refuses to talk, Washington can, as Mr. Trump argued, provide more weapons to Ukraine with fewer restrictions on their use.”

Their voices will be needed to counter some of the isolationists surrounding Donald Trump Jr. who carry sway in the White House. Mr. Trump’s first term was a security success because he followed a policy of peace through strength. But the world is more dangerous now, and the mix of his nominees suggests his second term is likely to be a wilder ride.

Pentagon Has Two Years to Prevent World War III

To prepare, Defense Secretary-designate Pete Hegseth will need to overhaul the bureaucracy and cut waste.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/two-years-to-prevent-world-war-iii-trump-sec-def-needs-to-overhaul-bureaucracy-cut-waste-c9a162d8?st=7WtsBg&utm

By Mike Gallagher

Updated Nov. 13, 2024 4:45 pm ET

The flight deck of the USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier in the South China Sea, July 4. Photo: Seaman Ryan Holloway/Associated Press

Xi Jinping has ordered the People’s Liberation Army to be ready to seize Taiwan by 2027. Whether he launches an invasion may depend on President Trump’s defense secretary. If confirmed by the Senate, Army National Guard veteran and Fox News host Pete Hegseth, Mr. Trump’s nominee, will have to confront the collapse of deterrence in Europe and the Middle East, resource constraints on Capitol Hill, recruitment challenges, and a deteriorating balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. The only way to promote peace is to go to war on day one—not with China, Russia or Iran but with the Pentagon bureaucracy.

The first task is to fix the U.S. Navy. America needs a maritime industrial base that can counter China’s. Pentagon requirements for building maritime assets involve too many uncoordinated stakeholders. The Pentagon establishes war-fighting requirements—such as the number of missiles on a ship—without regard to interdependent technical specifications such as that ship’s center of gravity. When those technical specifications aren’t tightly linked to war-fighting requirements, the mismatch can cause underperformance or unplanned costs and time. The Defense Department should return to the board model that served the Navy well until the 1960s. The Navy would have a forum of senior stakeholders with a chairman empowered to decide both requirements and specifications, ensuring that these work in harmony.

The Navy should also create an office focused on expediting the development and deployment of certain war-fighting technologies, similar to the Rapid Capabilities Office at the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Space Force. The next secretary should insist on more flexible processes to deliver unmanned surface, aerial and underwater vehicles with speed and at scale. He must also work with Congress to help shipyards attract and retain talent.

Rebuilding the maritime industrial base can also help save Aukus—the security partnership between Australia, the U.K. and the U.S.—which is in danger of stalling. Under the Aukus agreement, the U.S. Navy intends to sell Australia at least three Virginia-class attack submarines by the early 2030s. To realize this goal, the Navy needs to build more than today’s 1.2 hulls a year and shrink maintenance backlogs that have sidelined nearly 40% of the fleet. Addressing these challenges will demand consistent funding, which will come only if the defense secretary articulates the importance of sea power and presents a coherent shipbuilding plan. The secretary can get Aukus off life support by accelerating U.S. submarine deployments to western Australia, bringing more Australian sailors onto U.S. boats, and establishing a naval reactors organization in Canberra.

The secretary must also confront the West’s depleted arsenal of critical munitions, especially air-defense missiles. In a conflict with China, the U.S. could run out of some munitions within a week. The next secretary must rebuild America’s arsenal by moving to maximum production rates of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (Extended Range), Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile, Harpoon, Standard Missile 6 and other munitions. Wherever possible, these systems should be equipped with advanced energetic materials to extend their range and destructive power.

Ships, submarines and missiles are all expensive. To save money, the next secretary must enforce fixed-price contracting and force private-sector contractors to acquire products and services that are researched and developed on their dime, not the U.S. taxpayer’s. The Defense Department’s cost-plus contracting model has destroyed competition and innovation while exploding costs. Sen. John McCain mandated fixed-price commercial contracts in 2016, but Congress repealed that mandate five years later, after his death. Lawmakers should rectify this mistake by re-establishing fixed-price contracting and requiring the defense secretary to sign off on any cost-plus contract.

To free up more money, the secretary can reduce the civilian workforce, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the general and flag officer corps, and the diversity, equity and inclusion bureaucracy. He can sell non-war-fighting assets such as golf courses and resurrect a 2015 Pentagon study that outlined a path to save $125 billion over five years.

Congress can help by ensuring the Defense Department complies with the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. This statute, which the Pentagon violates frequently, aims to prevent the government from wasting money on developing capabilities that can be purchased from the commercial sector. NASA predicted it would have cost $4 billion to build the Falcon 9 rocket, much more than the $400 million it cost Elon Musk’s SpaceX to build it. It stands to reason, then, that by adhering to the law’s commercial-preference provision, the Defense Department can save tens of billions annually. Additionally, Congress can give the Pentagon authority to use appropriated but unspent funds of between $10 billion and $15 billion per year.

Assuming China sticks to its Taiwan timeline, the next secretary has two years to prevent World War III. To do so, he must put the Pentagon on a war footing, firing any bureaucrat unable or unwilling to work at a wartime pace. The lack of accountability at the Defense Department—after the shameful Afghanistan withdrawal, the failure to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, and the current secretary’s disappearance without informing the White House—has undermined confidence in military leadership. Armed with a bold agenda, the next secretary can regain the trust of the American people and the fear of America’s enemies.

Mr. Gallagher, a Journal contributor, is head of defense for Palantir Technologies and a distinguished fellow at the Hudson Institute. He represented Wisconsin’s Eighth Congressional District (2017-24) and was chairman of the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.0:27

Replicator’s goals of drone deployment and business development process change are both worthy objectives. But given the Pentagon's antiquated culture, is two years enough time to procure more hard power faster? Photo: Dept. of Defense

Appeared in the November 14, 2024, print edition as 'Two Years to Prevent World War III'.

3. Integrated strategic competition: A new approach to US national security

Conclusion:

The United States faces a complex and evolving security environment in which adversaries increasingly employ all aspects of integrated strategic competition with coordinated precision to undermine its interests. A return to the principles of NSC-68 adapted for the twenty-first century offers a path forward. By embracing a multi-agency, integrating all instruments of national power, and developing a deep understanding of the evolving nature of power, the United States can effectively counter these challenges and secure its national interests in the coming decades.

November 13, 2024 • 10:57 am ET

Integrated strategic competition: A new approach to US national security

By Daniel Elkins

atlanticcouncil.org · by Holly Dagres · November 13, 2024

China Conflict East Asia Europe & Eurasia Indo-Pacific Middle East Russia Security & Defense

MENASource November 13, 2024 • 10:57 am ET

By Daniel Elkins

The twenty-first-century security environment is defined by the Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the resurgence of Great Power Competition (GPC). While the United States (US) has spent the last two decades embroiled in counter-terrorism (CT) operations, rivals like Russia, China, and Iran have been refining their strategies for integrated strategic competition. These adversaries aim to undermine US influence on the global stage through nonmilitary and asymmetric means, achieving their foreign policy objectives below the threshold of kinetic engagement. In this evolving security environment, the United States must draw from lessons of the past to inform the strategies of the future. By revisiting the principles of National Security Council Paper 68 (NSC-68), the historic Cold War blueprint that unified diplomatic, military, and economic power, the United States can create a modern framework for integrated strategic competition to counter terrorism and achieve national security goals effectively. To this end, a holistic approach is essential for addressing today’s multifaceted threats from state and non-state actors.

Unfortunately, the United States’ counter-terrorism strategy ultimately failed to produce a strategic victory throughout the GWOT. The crux of this failure lies in the absence of a cohesive, integrated whole-of-government approach. Despite significant military successes, the overall strategy fell significantly short in addressing the root causes of terrorism and preventing its spread. The lack of synchronizing diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence efforts in Afghanistan led to a disconnect between military operations and nation-building efforts, a pretext for the disastrous exit of US military forces marked by the fall of Kabul and the resurgence of the Taliban. In Iraq, the lack of coordination between military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of power ultimately prolonged instability and gave rise to new terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS).

Throughout the GWOT, the absence of clear, consistent objectives across rotating administrations and the sometimes-conflicting agendas of various government agencies hampered the effectiveness of US national strategies and obstructed the attainment of identified national security objectives. Consider the strategic incoherence in the case of competing US proxies in Syria. At one point, the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency backed different Syrian factions with divergent goals, leading to a counterproductive scenario where US-supported groups ended up fighting each other. Despite employing asymmetric tactics, these operations worked to defeat US national security objectives in Syria, as they lacked a unified strategy across the whole-of-government towards a singular goal.

In this evolving landscape, there is a pressing need for a renewed and coherent multi-agency approach that truly integrates the instruments of national power. A new strategic approach is long overdue—one that aligns all US national security objectives across the entire spectrum of strategic competition. Such an approach must synchronize diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) efforts into a cohesive and comprehensive strategy. Thus far, the failure to do so in the context of GPC has led to disastrous consequences, with regional competitors increasingly undermining US objectives through the use of proxies and the persistence of terrorist organizations that aim to destabilize US bilateral relations. As evidenced by China’s encroachment in the South China Sea and Iran’s regional escalation across the Middle East, it is time to rethink a counter-terrorism framework fit for the twenty-first century.

Moving forward, America’s National Security Strategy (NSS) should ensure for its allies and interests. Thankfully, the National Security Council’s historic paper NSC-68 outlined this multi-agency approach for the Cold War, providing a framework for effective and its application against the rising influence of the Soviet Union. Revisiting these proven principles to address the complexities of today’s security environment is critical and relevant for any counter-terrorism strategy.

NSC-68: A blueprint for action

The 1950 National Security Council Paper known as NSC-68, drafted in response to the perceived existential threat posed by the Soviet Union, serves as a historical cornerstone for understanding the efficacy of a cohesive and strategically nested multi-agency approach in countering national security threats. Anticipating the Soviet Union’s consolidation of international power through the spread of communism, the NSC recognized the need to move beyond direct military intervention. Instead of relying solely on conventional warfare and kinetic action, they advocated for a comprehensive plan that coordinated the United States’ political, military, and economic power to shape the national security landscape via integrated strategic competition in the gray zone.

While NSC-68 provided a comprehensive framework for combating the Soviet threat through a whole-of-government approach, in the post-Cold War era, the US has failed to apply its principles to modern counter-terrorism. The failure to fully integrate economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of power in the fight against terrorism has led to missed opportunities to counteract extremist narratives, build resilient societies, and undermine the financial networks that sustain terrorist organizations.

The Ronald Reagan administration’s support for the Polish Solidarity movement exemplifies the use of NSC-68’s integrated competition strategies under a whole-of-government approach. Through a combined effort of intelligence, public diplomacy, economic pressure, military deterrence, and non-state organizations, the United States supported and ensured the success of a political movement that would become instrumental in the collapse of communism in Poland, crippling the Soviet Bloc. These strategies restructured the United States’ thinking on the economics of force through the development of military Keynesianism, which leveraged the US industry to outpace the Soviet Union’s military buildup, placing further military and economic pressure on Soviet leaders and undermining the Communist model. In the end, the USSR collapsed without a single US tank crossing Russia’s border.

While NSC-68 successfully guided US foreign policy through the Cold War, today’s near-pear adversaries like Russia and China and regional powers such as Iran are operating in the grey zone of international relations, employing strategies that often fall below the threshold of conventional warfare. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 exemplifies this approach. By utilizing “little green men“—masked soldiers without identifiable insignia—Russia achieved its objective through a calculated blend of deniable military force, economic leverage, and influence operations, effectively circumventing a swift international response. Similarly, China has mastered using economic coercion and maritime militia forces to assert its dominance in the South China Sea, carefully avoiding open conflict with its neighbors, which include US allies. Further, increased attacks by Iran-backed militias throughout the Middle East, as well as posturing by organizations like ISIS, have proven that the Middle East remains a tumultuous region despite the absence of conventional war.

These adversarial actions highlight the limitations of conventional military-centric approaches to national security in the face of integrated strategic competition. Furthermore, the ongoing and accelerated advances of these near-peer competitors demonstrate the unified integration of their instruments of national power while, in stark contrast, highlighting the United States’ need to embrace a whole-of-government approach that revisits NSC-68-style strategies to mobilize all instruments of national power in a coordinated and comprehensive manner.

A modern approach to integrated strategic competition

Drawing lessons from both the successes of NSC-68 and the shortcomings of Global War on Terror strategies, a modern whole-of-government approach to integrated strategic competition requires a multi-pronged strategy:

Centralized strategy formulation: An updated national security doctrine, similar in scope and vision to NSC-68, is essential to guide US foreign policy in the twenty-first century. This strategy should clearly define national interests, identify key challenges and opportunities, and provide a framework for interagency coordination across all DIME-FIL instruments of national power.
Recognizing the evolving nature of power: A modern approach and implementation in the spirit of NSC-68 must recognize the shifting balance of power in the international system. The economic might of China, the cyber capabilities of Russia, and the intricate proxy networks of Iran require a nuanced understanding of how actors leverage unconventional means to achieve their objectives and further identify counter-strategies that coordinate and integrate the capabilities of the United States’ various institutions of national power, to include its allies.
Adapting instruments of national power: Existing national security institutions, primarily designed for Cold War realities, must adjust to the contemporary complexities of integrated strategic competition. A whole-of-government approach must strengthen diplomatic tools to counter economic coercion, enhance cybersecurity infrastructure, and develop more sophisticated information operations capabilities to counter disinformation campaigns and propaganda.
Building resilience at home: A successful strategy must extend beyond foreign policy alone, requiring a resilient society that can withstand external pressures and attempts at interference. A modern approach must also focus efforts domestically towards strengthening critical infrastructure against cyberattacks, mitigating the spread of disinformation through media literacy initiatives, and fostering social cohesion to prevent the exploitation of societal divisions.

The United States faces a complex and evolving security environment in which adversaries increasingly employ all aspects of integrated strategic competition with coordinated precision to undermine its interests. A return to the principles of NSC-68 adapted for the twenty-first century offers a path forward. By embracing a multi-agency, integrating all instruments of national power, and developing a deep understanding of the evolving nature of power, the United States can effectively counter these challenges and secure its national interests in the coming decades.

Daniel Elkins is the founder and president of the Special Operations Association of America. A former Green Beret and Special Operations combat veteran, he is also an Atlantic Council Counter-Terrorism Project member.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent the positions of the United States government or the Department of Defense.

4. Trump is inheriting a more dangerous world

Will the President-elect's advisors be able to overcome his dislike of friends, partners, and allies, and convince him that allies are a key contributor to the US winning on the battlefield and in strategic competition in the gray zone.

Inflection Points

November 13, 2024 • 7:00 am ET

Trump is inheriting a more dangerous world

By Frederick Kempe

atlanticcouncil.org · by jcookson · November 13, 2024

China Iran Korea Politics & Diplomacy Russia Security & Defense United States and Canada

Inflection Points November 13, 2024 • 7:00 am ET

After his January inauguration, US President Donald Trump will confront a far more dangerous world than he did during his first term, characterized by intractable wars in Europe and the Middle East, as well as increasing tensions with China over Taiwan.

What’s new as well is a burgeoning defense industrial and political alignment among four autocratic partners—China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Even as Trump recruits his national security team, fifty thousand Russian and North Korean soldiers are poised for battle on Russian soil against Ukraine.

None of these challenges would have been any different if Vice President Kamala Harris had been elected president.

The dramatic difference will be in how Trump confronts these generational challenges, deploying his proudly unpredictable and disruptive leadership style alongside his more transactional approach to allies and adversaries alike.

Trump has never been one to think about the world in Kissingerian terms, and he’s unlikely now to speak to the American public in the lofty terms of “grand strategy.” That’s what academics call the approach to how a country can stitch together military and nonmilitary means to achieve national interests designed for longer-term outcomes.

Yet that is precisely what’s required as the United States navigates the opening years of a new era that began before Trump’s reelection and likely will continue after it. To prevail, it will take grand strategy’s combination of military doctrine, force structure, alliances, economic relations, diplomatic behavior, technological leadership, societal strengths, and the mobilization of sufficient methods and resources to prevail.

Though it’s always tempting to think about what can be achieved in a single presidential term, such eras are more often defined through several presidencies and the opposing powers and events that punctuate them.

The last time the United States confronted such an opposing group of autocrats was in the opening years of the Cold War, when the country and its allies faced off against Nikita Khrushchev’s Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies, and Mao Zedong’s Communist China.

That era’s central conflict was resolved by the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, when the Soviet Union stepped back from the brink of a potential nuclear conflict. It then took nearly three decades more of relatively steady US commitment and allied common cause to win the Cold War, following the Berlin Wall’s fall and the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Before that in the late 1930s, three autocratic powers—Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, and Imperial Japan—combined their efforts in far less coordinated terms than today’s “axis of aggressors.” That period ended only after the United States’ entry into World War II in December 1941, which was followed by Italy’s surrender in September 1943, Germany’s surrender in May 1945, and then Japan’s surrender in September 1945, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

The lesson of both those experiences is that such conflicts don’t resolve themselves. In both cases, the decisions of US presidents were crucial to the outcomes, as will be the case again. (See my October 19 Inflection Points column explaining why it is that Americans were electing a “wartime president.”)

If previous experience is any guide, Trump is likely to take on this emerging era more tactically than strategically, dealing with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as individual challenges. Even some former Trump administration officials don’t believe that will be sufficient for the much-altered geopolitical landscape.

A former Trump White House official, quoted in the Wall Street Journal on November 9, said, “With North Korean soldiers serving with the Russians to kill Ukrainians using Iranian missiles, who are selling their oil to the Chinese, just the interconnectedness of all these different policy areas is something we didn’t have. We could have a discrete North Korea policy. We could have a discrete Iran policy. Now it’s got to be done more holistically.”

That said, Trump also brings instincts and approaches that could help disrupt this axis of aggressors, even if executed on a tactical basis.

Trump is likely to take a far tougher approach than President Joe Biden toward Iran, against which Trump pursued a “maximum pressure” campaign of sanctions and other measures in his first term. He is also likely to be more supportive of Israeli actions against Iran. That may be even more the case after the Justice Department disclosed on Friday that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had foiled an Iranian plot to assassinate Trump before the election.

Regarding Russia, Trump will bring an element of personal diplomacy with Russian President Vladimir Putin that Biden has lacked since their last direct conversation in February 2022.

The question for Ukraine is whether that is a bad or good thing. The advisers with Trump’s ear range from those who believe he should drastically reduce support for Ukraine to those who believe he needs to do far more.

On Thursday, Trump spoke by phone with Putin, and a person familiar with the call has told reporters that the president-elect advised the Russian leader not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s large military presence in Europe. (The Kremlin denied the conversation took place.) Trump reportedly expressed interest in follow-up conversations to seek an early resolution of the war.

The war in Ukraine stands out as the most significant of the immediate challenges Trump faces, as failure there will only encourage China in its ambitions to forcefully absorb Taiwan—and also encourage Putin to press his advantage elsewhere.

“The greatest national security threat to the United States, its fellow NATO members, and other US allies is the increasingly aggressive partnership of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea,” the Atlantic Council’s John Herbst, former US ambassador to Ukraine, wrote last week. “It is not clear that Trump fully acknowledges this challenge,” Herbst added. “But whether he understands it or not, his administration will have to deal with it and its most dangerous point of confrontation: Ukraine.”

One group of Trump advisers is advocating for sharply reduced aid to Ukraine, “clueless about the danger of a Kremlin victory,” wrote Herbst. Another, Reaganesque camp recognizes the broader global impact that would result from abandoning Ukraine. The appointments Trump makes to top national security positions will be telling on where the administration will ultimately fall. So far, Trump has selected Representative Mike Waltz as his national security advisor, while reports indicate that Senator Marco Rubio could be his nominee for secretary of state.

Trump has been “far tougher on Russia” than he is often given credit for in Washington, Waltz said during an Atlantic Council event on October 28. On Ukraine, Trump has a “different strategic focus on ending the war, versus this vague notion of what does winning look like, which despite three years of war now . . . I still cannot get a clear definition from the Biden administration.”

Regarding China, Trump is planning to ramp up economic threats and incentives—and increase deterrence.

Asked by Wall Street Journal editors whether he would use military force to defend Taiwan against a Beijing blockade, Trump said it would never come to that because Chinese leader Xi Jinping wouldn’t risk it. “I wouldn’t have to [use military force] because he respects me and he knows I’m f— crazy,” he said, underscoring his personal unpredictability as a deterrent.

The China that Trump faces will be far weaker economically than it was in his first term, but it is also less dependent on the US market, where China’s share of US imports has dropped to 13 percent from 20 percent over the past six years. That said, China’s domestic economic difficulties have made it more dependent on exports, and that will make Beijing more vulnerable to any threat to its exports.

At a time when the United States will need allied support more than ever for a more cohesive strategy toward the axis of aggressors, Trump is nevertheless more likely to continue the transactional approach of his first term to NATO and other allies.

Speaking to European leaders in Budapest on November 7, French President Emmanuel Macron warned against “a naïve form of transatlanticism” and said Trump “will defend American interests, which is a legitimate and good thing. The question is whether we are ready to defend the interests of Europeans.”

The even greater question is whether there is a form of “Trump-Atlanticism” through which the United States, Canada, and Europe can rally around any common cause to shape the dangerous new era they are confronting together. The alternative is every country for itself—a recipe that is unlikely to shape the coming era in the United States’ interest.

Frederick Kempe is president and chief executive officer of the Atlantic Council. You can follow him on X: @FredKempe.

This edition is part of Frederick Kempe’s Inflection Points newsletter, a column of dispatches from a world in transition. To receive this newsletter throughout the week, sign up here.

5. Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk

The author does not even mention the risk with north Korea. Lieutenant Colonel Gabbard has consulted with known north Korean sympathizers from "Women Cross the DMZ.". See the photo and the tweet thread at this link: https://x.com/eyepatch_man/status/1856776648496222321

She is photographed with Christine Ahn who is from Women Across DMZ. She is known to be handled by Park Chull when he was in the UN mission in New York.

Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · November 14, 2024

President-elect Donald Trump has nominated former Representative Tulsi Gabbard as the director of national intelligence. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence was created after 9/11 to remedy what American policy makers believed was a lack of coordination among the various national-intelligence agencies, and the DNI sits atop all of America’s intelligence services, including the CIA.

Gabbard is stunningly unqualified for almost any Cabinet post (as are some of Trump’s other picks), but especially for ODNI. She has no qualifications as an intelligence professional—literally none. (She is a reserve lieutenant colonel who previously served in the Hawaii Army National Guard, with assignments in medical, police, and civil-affairs-support positions. She has won some local elections and also represented Hawaii in Congress.) She has no significant experience directing or managing much of anything.

But leave aside for the moment that she is manifestly unprepared to run any kind of agency. Americans usually accept that presidents reward loyalists with jobs, and Trump has the right to stash Gabbard at some make-work office in the bureaucracy if he feels he owes her. It’s not a pretty tradition, but it’s not unprecedented, either.

To make Tulsi Gabbard the DNI, however, is not merely handing a bouquet to a political gadfly. Her appointment would be a threat to the security of the United States.

Gabbard ran for president as a Democrat in 2020, attempting to position herself as something like a peace candidate. But she’s no peacemaker: She’s been an apologist for both the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Her politics, which are otherwise incoherent, tend to be sympathetic to these two strongmen, painting America as the problem and the dictators as misunderstood. Hawaii voters have long been perplexed by the way she’s positioned herself politically. But Gabbard is a classic case of “horseshoe” politics: Her views can seem both extremely left and extremely right, which is probably why people such as Tucker Carlson—a conservative who has turned into … whatever pro-Russia right-wingers are called now—have taken a liking to the former Democrat (who was previously a Republican and is now again a member of the GOP).

In early 2017, while still a member of Congress, Gabbard met with Assad, saying that peace in Syria was only possible if the international community would have a conversation with him. “Let the Syrian people themselves determine their future, not the United States, not some foreign country,” Gabbard said, after chatting with a man who had stopped the Syrian people from determining their own future by using chemical weapons on them. Two years later, she added that Assad was “not the enemy of the United States, because Syria does not pose a direct threat to the United States,” and that her critics were merely “warmongers.”

Gabbard’s shilling for Assad is a mystery, but she’s even more dedicated to carrying Putin’s water. Tom Rogan, a conservative writer and hardly a liberal handwringer, summed up her record succinctly in the Washington Examiner today:

She has blamed NATO and the U.S. for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (again, to the celebration of both Russian and Chinese state media), has repeated Russian propaganda claims that the U.S. has set up secret bioweapons labs in that country, and has argued that the U.S. not Russia is wholly responsible for Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship.

When she appeared on Sean Hannity’s show in 2022, even Hannity blanched at Gabbard floating off in a haze of Kremlin talking points and cheerleading for Russia. When Hannity is trying to shepherd you back toward the air lock before your oxygen runs out, you’ve gone pretty far out there.

A person with Gabbard’s views should not be allowed anywhere near the crown jewels of American intelligence. I have no idea why Trump nominated Gabbard; she’s been a supporter, but she hasn’t been central to his campaign, and he owes her very little. For someone as grubbily transactional as Trump, it’s not an appointment that makes much sense. It’s possible that Trump hates the intelligence community—which he blames for many of his first-term troubles—so much that Gabbard is his revenge. Or maybe he just likes the way she handles herself on television.

But Trump could also be engaging in a ploy to bring in someone else. He may suspect that Gabbard is unconfirmable by the Senate. Once she’s turfed, he could then slide in an even more appalling nominee and claim that he has no choice but to use a recess appointment as a backstop. (Hard to imagine who might be worse as DNI than Gabbard, but remember that Trump has promised at various times to bring retired General Mike Flynn back into government. Flynn is a decorated veteran who was fired from Trump’s White House in a scandal about lying to the FBI; he is now a conspiracist who is fully on board with Trump’s desire for revenge on his enemies.

Gabbard has every right to her personal views, however inscrutable they may be. As a private citizen, she can apologize for Assad and Putin to her heart’s content. But as a security risk, Gabbard is a walking Christmas tree of warning lights. If she is nominated to be America’s top intelligence officer, that’s everyone’s business.

Last spring, I described how U.S.-government employees with clearances are trained every year to spot “insider threats,” people who might for various reasons compromise classified information. Trump’s open and continuing affection for Putin and other dictators, I said, would be a matter of concern for any security organization. Gabbard’s behavior and her admiration for dictators is no less of a worry—especially because she would be at the apex of the entire American intelligence community.

Presidents should be given deference in staffing their Cabinet. But this nomination should be one of the handful of Trump appointments where soon-to-be Majority Leader John Thune and his Republican colleagues draw a hard line and say no—at least if they still care at all about exercising the Senate’s constitutional duty of advice and consent.

The Atlantic · by Tom Nichols · November 14, 2024

6. How China Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America

Graphs and charts and proper formatting are at the link below.

Excerpts:

Resounding silence

When John Feeley arrived in Panama to serve as U.S. ambassador in early 2016, plans were afoot for a fourth bridge across the Panama Canal, and he wanted an American company in the mix. “The canal is what bound us,” he explained.

Yet, Feeley said his cables to Washington failed to generate much attention to the bridge project. He said he even cold-called the Reston, Va., engineering giant Bechtel to drum up interest. “What I was trying to do was make some noise about this, and I got a resounding silence,” Feeley said. Bechtel didn’t respond to questions.

Panama in 2018 awarded the $1.42 billion project to a consortium of companies owned and operated by China’s government. Beijing’s interest followed Panama’s decision the previous year to sever relations with Taiwan, and Chinese state media trumpeted the bridge deal as the country’s largest such win in the Americas.

The U.S., Feeley said, “looks at Latin America as a problem not an opportunity.”

How China Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America

Xi Jinping’s visit for summits and the inauguration of a port illustrates what some have called China’s economic marginalization of the U.S.

https://www.wsj.com/world/china-xi-jinping-latin-america-acf6dbc1?st=yCZTEe&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By James T. AreddyFollow

, Ryan DubéFollow

and Roque RuizFollow

Updated Nov. 14, 2024 12:33 am ET

South of the border, China is ascendant.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping arrives this week in a region where China has replaced the U.S. as the dominant trading partner for most big economies, with the exceptions of Mexico and Colombia. Beijing has signed up most of Latin America and the Caribbean to an infrastructure program that excludes the U.S. In Peru, Xi will inaugurate a megaport to speed trade with Asia.

China is a voracious buyer of Argentina’s lithium, crude oil from Venezuela, and Brazilian iron ore and soybeans. The $286.1 billion in Chinese projects in the region tallied by the AidData research lab at William & Mary in Williamsburg, Va.—including metro lines in Bogotá and Mexico City and hydroelectric dams in Ecuador—is approaching the value of China’s work in Africa, but with a revamped lending model and less backlash.

Xi is visiting South America to take part in leadership summits, including an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum this week in Lima, Peru, and a Group of 20 summit next week in Rio de Janeiro. Both are likely to illustrate what some have called China’s economic marginalization of the U.S. in the region. While President Biden is also expected, his stature will be much diminished in the wake of Donald Trump’s election victory—and Xi as China’s leader has visited the region more than both of them.

Largest extraregional trading partners, by total value of goods traded

2000

2023

China

U.S.

Other

No data

Note: No 2023 data for Venezuela

Source: United Nations Comtrade database

Few see Latin America as the U.S.’s backyard anymore.

The region’s nations are generally sincere in their desire for warm relations with the U.S., but they are often seen as a secondary priority in Washington. Beijing’s diplomats and executives, meanwhile, actively engage with local and national governments almost regardless of their political leanings.

“It’s super frustrating because this region has everything you’d think American companies would want,” said Ryan Berg, director of the Americas program at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies.

On top of deepening economic linkages, Xi promotes a governance model that breaks with the U.S.-led postwar order that he suggests is an outdated relic of colonialism. Xi’s sustained attention to the region “is symbolic, and countries of the Global South need that recognition,” said Alvaro Mendez, director of a unit at the London School of Economics and Political Science that studies China’s influence.

Trump, who in his first term mostly focused on the region as a source of unwanted immigration, could now force some of its countries into difficult choices if he pushes them to limit their China links. “Many Latin Americans are apprehensive about what’s in store for them over the next four years on this critical issue,” said Michael Shifter, a scholar of Latin America at the Inter-American Dialogue policy group in Washington. At the same time, higher Trump tariffs could potentially drive some nations closer to Beijing.

Number of visits of...

China leader to Latin America and the Caribbean

U.S. president to Latin America and the Caribbean

Latin America and the Caribbean leaders to China

Sources: Boston University Global Development

Policy Center (LAC visits); staff reports

2013

'14

'15

'16

'17

'18

'19

'22

'23

Chinese trade and investment has boomed across the approximately 40 nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, home to more than 660 million people stretching from Mexico to Chile and Argentina, plus island nations such as Jamaica and Cuba.

$30

trillion

$27.36 trillion

U.S.

Gross domestic product, current dollars

Source: World Bank

$17.79

China

$7.09

Latin America

and the

Caribbean

'90

2000

'10

'20

China’s construction of infrastructure including ports to move commodities mirrors how, all over Asia and Africa, China under Xi has cemented its presence by building bridges, power plants and stadiums. China also has less of a debt-collector reputation in Latin America than it has in other developing parts of the world, in part because Beijing has slowed new project commitments and adjusted how it has financed some work.

Latin America and the Caribbean trade balance

$150

billion

$125.10 billion

U.S.

100

-50

-100

-$124.06

China

-150

2013

'15

'20

Note: Trade balance is the difference between exports and imports. Mexico’s large trade deficit with China offsets surpluses enjoyed by countries such as Brazil.

Source: World Bank

Latin America and the Caribbean exports to China

Mineral products

Oil seeds, fruits and grains

Meat and edible meat offal

2021

Ores, slag and ash

Other

2022

2023

$0 billion

100

125

150

175

200

Source: Trade Map

Beijing’s largess isn’t always beneficial, and its exports of capital and consumer goods plus chemicals and machinery, in particular to Mexico, give China a trade surplus with the region overall.

China is crowding in with manufactured exports such as Huawei Technologies’ telecommunication hardware and electric vehicles from BYD, which has taken over an abandoned Ford plant in Brazil. An influx of Chinese steel recently forced the closure of a large Chilean mill. Already some countries are raising tariffs on Chinese goods, and others see threats from big Chinese entrants to traditional sectors, such as fishing. China’s image has also been tarnished by shoddy construction, such as on a hydroelectric project in Ecuador, and by limited regard for the environment and indigenous people, such as around copper mines in Peru.

New model

China is attracted by the same attributes that should make U.S. multinationals eager to compete in the largely democratic region: abundant natural resources including critical minerals; human capital to deploy for manufacturing products such as pharmaceuticals; growing consumer bases; and rule of law.

$0 billion

Venezuela

Brazil

Ecuador

Argentina

Bolivia

Chinese loans to select countries

Public debt to China as percentage of GDP

Jamaica

Note: No debt data available for Costa Rica

and Venezuela

Sources: Inter-American Dialogue (loans);

Boston University Global Development

Policy Center (debt)

Mexico

Suriname

Costa Rica

Guyana

Trade has given a lift to broader Beijing influence in a region that has traditionally allied itself with the U.S. Brazil recently joined China in putting forward a proposal for ending the Ukraine war and has stressed a vision of a Global South to challenge the traditional U.S.-led order. Argentina allows China to run a satellite tracking station there for its space program, one of an expanding number of quasimilitary linkages. And Washington’s nemeses in the region—Cuba and Venezuela—consider Beijing a friend and protector.

Washington worries that China’s growing economic clout will provide Beijing with deep influence over Latin American governments. The head of the U.S. Southern Command, Gen. Laura Richardson, has repeatedly warned about Beijing’s encroachment in the region. In response to China’s advances, the White House has sought to build lasting institutions in developing nations to attract investment.

The Biden administration “has focused very much on how we try to bring private-sector investment overseas” and make an impact through high standards that contribute to “host countries’ longer stability or long-term fiscal stability,” a senior administration official said, adding that China has slowed its commitments in the midst of headwinds at home and problems with some overseas projects.

A leading motivation for Xi’s attention to Latin America and the Caribbean is isolating the democratically governed island of Taiwan. Seven of the 11 nations worldwide that maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei are in the region, including Guatemala, Paraguay and Haiti. Five that switched recognition to Beijing under Xi’s watch, including Honduras and Panama, were showered with Chinese deals.

HONDURAS

HAITI

BELIZE

DOM. REp.

CUBA

GUATEMALA

JAMAICA

EL SALVADOR

NICARAGUA

COSTA RICA

VENEZUELA

PANAMA

Signatory nations to

China's Belt and Road program

ECUADOR

SURINAME

GUYANA

YEAR JOINED

2019-20

2017-18

2021-23

PERU

Antigua and BARBUDA

BOLIVIA

DOMINICA

BARBADOS

PARAGUAY

GRENADA

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

URUGUAY

CHILE

Ineligible because of their

Taiwan diplomatic relations

ARGENTINA

St. Kitts and Nevis

ST. LUCIA

ST. VINCENT and GRENADINES

Source: Green Finance & Development Center

Likely with Taiwan in mind, Beijing has locked in mineral and foodstuff purchase agreements, plus deals to operate ports in such places as Peru and trade in yuan, to fortify supply lines against risks that Chinese militarism one day sparks calls among Western powers to impose an embargo. In such a scenario, Beijing could be expected to offer inducements toward such G-20 nations as Brazil to defuse the kind of decoupling pressure Russia faced after it invaded Ukraine, according to a new report from the Rhodium Group and the Atlantic Council.

China greenfield foreign direct investment

in Latin America and the Caribbean

China mergers and acquisitions

in Latin America and the Caribbean

$20

billion

$15

billion

2003

'05

'10

'15

'20

2003

'05

'10

'15

'20

Note: Greenfield refers to new projects.

Source: Inter-American Dialogue

Not everything cuts Beijing’s way. Shortly before Xi’s trip, Brazil appeared to reject its overtures to formally join the Belt and Road Initiative, a blow to a program that by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ count includes 22 of the 26 Latin America and Caribbean nations eligible for it and a sign of displeasure from the region’s biggest economy about limited reciprocal access to China’s market.

Bumpy road

It has been 110 years since the U.S. completed the Panama Canal and over a half-century since Washington sought to check the spread of communism during the Cold War by meddling in Latin America’s democracies. Today, U.S. policymaking toward the region is heavily slanted toward illegal immigration and narcotics, instead of how its more recent general political stability and growing middle class could work to America’s advantage.

$15

thousand

$12,614

China

Gross domestic product per capita, current dollars

Source: World Bank

$10,682

Latin America

and the

Caribbean

$1,637

Sub-Saharan

Africa

1990

'95

2000

'05

'10

'15

'20

Washington’s smaller-scale and less deal-oriented engagement has provided space for China to win regional recognition for boldness. When two of the region’s pro-trade nations, Uruguay and Ecuador, got nowhere seeking free-trade agreements with the U.S. near the start of the Biden administration, they turned to Beijing. Last year, Uruguay and China said they were in talks for an agreement, while Ecuador completed a deal, Beijing’s fifth in the region compared with the U.S.’s 11.

Ecuador’s priority remains setting a trade agreement with the U.S. but in recognition of Washington’s current political climate, “Ecuador is prioritizing alternative strategies to boost exports to the U.S.,” according to the country’s ambassador in Washington, Cristian Espinosa Cañizares.

China’s financing for projects in Latin America—such as construction of a tunnel for a hydroelectric project in Ecuador—is getting close in value to its activity in Africa. Photo: XINHUA/Zuma Press

China hasn’t displaced the U.S. so much as it has taken advantage of uncontested opportunities, said Jorge Guajardo, a former Mexican ambassador to China now with the Washington advisory firm DGA Group. As he puts it, “The U.S. sees Latin America as ‘ours to ignore.’”

The indifference runs counter to a Pew Research Center survey published in July that showed the U.S. has a higher favorability rating than China in the economies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru.

Guajardo said U.S. economic buoyancy makes it the more attractive export market for Latin American and Caribbean nations in the face of slowing Chinese import demand and caution from Beijing on project financing compared with the last time Xi toured, in 2019.

One of Washington’s tools to counter Chinese inroads is funding from the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. The agency has touted as a success $30 million in funding for a cobalt and nickel mining project in Brazil to support lithium-ion battery production. But in the Americas under the agency’s current mandate, all but Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti are too wealthy to qualify for most of its project support; the Brazil mine funding was approved only after a special multiagency U.S. government review.

More characteristic is the situation in Guyana, which was seeking financing to expand a port to unload oil produced by Exxon Mobil and Hess but didn’t qualify for U.S. support because its oil reserves made the country too wealthy. That opened the door to Chinese contractors. “The U.S. is doing all the oil pumping, but China is doing a lot of the instructure,” said Berg of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

An International Development Finance Corp. official didn’t address questions about specific nations but said a priority for the agency is winning funding reauthorization in Congress.

Lithium extraction in a salt flat in Argentina. China has poured funds into resource production in Latin America. Photo: luis robayo/AFP/Getty Images

Resounding silence

When John Feeley arrived in Panama to serve as U.S. ambassador in early 2016, plans were afoot for a fourth bridge across the Panama Canal, and he wanted an American company in the mix. “The canal is what bound us,” he explained.

Yet, Feeley said his cables to Washington failed to generate much attention to the bridge project. He said he even cold-called the Reston, Va., engineering giant Bechtel to drum up interest. “What I was trying to do was make some noise about this, and I got a resounding silence,” Feeley said. Bechtel didn’t respond to questions.

Panama in 2018 awarded the $1.42 billion project to a consortium of companies owned and operated by China’s government. Beijing’s interest followed Panama’s decision the previous year to sever relations with Taiwan, and Chinese state media trumpeted the bridge deal as the country’s largest such win in the Americas.

The U.S., Feeley said, “looks at Latin America as a problem not an opportunity.”

China opens huge port in Peru to extend its reach in Latin America

The port opening in Chancay underscores China’s growing clout in a region that once looked primarily to the United States for economic opportunity.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/11/14/china-peru-port-latin-america/

The new port run by Chinese shipping giant Cosco in Chancay, Peru, last month. (Angela Ponce/Reuters)

By Christian Shepherd and Lyric Li

November 14, 2024 at 4:28 a.m. EST

Chinese leader Xi Jinping will inaugurate a huge port in Peru on Thursday, expected to attract more than $3 billion in investment, to create a direct route across the Pacific Ocean and extend Beijing’s influence in Latin America.

Get concise answers to your questions. Try Ask The Post AI.

The port opening, which comes ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum and Xi’s final meeting with President Joe Biden, underscores China’s growing clout in a region that once looked primarily to the United States for economic opportunity.

Chinese companies are involved in almost every aspect of the deepwater port in Chancay, which sits 50 miles north of the capital, Lima.

The high-tech logistics hub will be exclusively operated by Chinese shipping giant Cosco, which invested $1.3 billion in 2019 to take a 60 percent stake in the project. Chinese state media has estimated the total costs of the finished project to be over $3 billion.

The first phase, building a port that will handle only smaller ships, is expected to begin operations this month.

Following World news

Following

Its automated cargo cranes are supplied by Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries, a company that congressional investigators have said poses a security risk to U.S. ports. Electric driverless trucks made by Chinese companies will be used to handle containers and cargo.

The level of Chinese interest and involvement in Chancay has drawn warnings from the United States about Peru potentially being used by Chinese military ships as a foothold in the Americas.

Gen. Laura J. Richardson, the recently retired former head of U.S. Southern Command, said Chancay “absolutely” could host Chinese navy warships following a “playbook that we’ve seen play out in other places,” in a recent interview with the Financial Times. Beijing has denied the project is motivated by anything other than commercial interest.

Chinese and Peruvian officials have celebrated the project as a transformative opportunity for Peru to become a central hub for South American goods from its biggest trading partner.

President Dina Boluarte, who is set to unveil the project alongside Xi, has called it a potential “nerve center” joining the continent to Asia, one that could create 8,000 jobs and $4.5 billion in economic activity annually.

A crane at the port last month. (Angela Ponce/Reuters)

Even without potential military use, the port highlights the continent’s increasingly strong ties with China.

Chinese interests in Latin America are fast evolving beyond mining and other extractive industries to include agreements to provide surveillance technology and ground stations for Chinese satellites.

But American concerns about the port being used by the Chinese military haven’t resonated in Peru, which has welcomed the prospect of a high-tech hub attracting investment to the region, said Leolino Dourado, a researcher affiliated with the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies at Universidad del Pacífico in Lima.

“Latin America, and the Global South in general, wants to sell their products to whoever they can, so this sort of fearmongering is unlikely to work,” Dourado said.

When completed, the port’s 15 docks will be the first place in South America able to host carrier ships too big to fit through the Panama Canal.

Chinese researchers have said the route will cut costs and shorten sailing times by about 20 days, attracting business from other hubs in the region.

It could also make Peru an attractive destination for Chinese companies searching for new export markets or even locations to set up factories in the Americas. On a visit to China in June, Boluarte cited Chancay as a reason for Chinese electric car giant BYD to consider establishing an assembly plant in the country.

The Chinese takeover of Chancay has not been without controversy in Peru, however.

The Peruvian port authority tried this year to alter the terms of Cosco’s investment deal, citing an “administrative error” when agreeing to grant the Chinese firm exclusive operating rights over the seaport for 30 years. The lawsuit was dropped in June days before Boluarte traveled to China to meet Xi.

Chancay will join an expanding global network of more than 40 ports under the Belt and Road Initiative, a $1 trillion plan to build transportation and technology infrastructure launched by Xi in 2013.

Despite claims of Chancay being a purely commercial venture, Chinese foreign policy experts have written about the project as a geopolitical win for Beijing that will need to be defended from American interference.

The port’s geopolitical importance makes it “inevitable” that the United States will try to weaken Chinese control after the project is complete, researchers at Fudan University in Shanghai warned in a recent article.

Xi and Boluarte are also expected to sign an expanded free-trade agreement. China has been Peru’s largest trading partner for a decade. The countries traded $36 billion in goods last year, compared with Peru’s $21 billion trade with the United States.

For Beijing, the port promises to bring together a string of existing investments in Peru and neighboring countries.

China has ambitions to build a railway line connecting Chancay to Brazil, its largest trading partner in Latin America.

Chinese investments in the Peruvian mining sector total $11.4 billion. The majority of that is focused on securing access to copper, which is essential to the manufacturing of electronics and clean-energy technologies. Chinese firms are in the process of taking over electricity distribution for Lima.

Comments

By Christian Shepherd

Christian Shepherd is China correspondent for The Washington Post. He previously covered the country for the Financial Times and Reuters from Beijing.follow on X @cdcshepherd

8. Exclusive-Trump's team drawing up list of Pentagon officers to fire, sources say

This is just terrible for civil military relations. What will be the blowback and the long term implications?

But I suppose this is going to be the era of disruption. Buckle up.

Excerpts:

Hegseth has also taken aim at Milley's successor, Air Force General C.Q. Brown, asking whether he would have gotten the job if he were not Black.

"Was it because of his skin color? Or his skill? We'll never know, but always doubt - which on its face seems unfair to CQ. But since he has made the race card one of his biggest calling cards, it doesn't really much matter," he wrote.

The first source familiar with the transition planning said Brown would be among the many officers to leave.

I hope those advising the president-elect are not cherry picking from history.

Excerpts:

Such cuts could be endured in an organization the scale of the U.S. military, the source said.

"These people are not irreplaceable. They are very replaceable. And then the other thing too is there is no shortage of people that will step up," the source said.

"In World War Two, we were very rapidly appointing people in their 30s or people competent to be generals. And you know what? We won the war."

Exclusive-Trump's team drawing up list of Pentagon officers to fire, sources say

https://www.yahoo.com/news/exclusive-trumps-team-drawing-list-210302192.html

Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali

Wed, November 13, 2024 at 4:03 PM EST4 min read

Trump meets with House Republicans on Capitol Hill in Washington

Yahoo is using AI to generate takeaways from this article. This means the info may not always match what's in the article. Reporting mistakes helps us improve the experience.

Generate Key Takeaways

By Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Members of President-elect Donald Trump's transition team are drawing up a list of military officers to be fired, potentially to include the Joint Chiefs of Staff, two sources said, in what would be an unprecedented shakeup at the Pentagon.

The planning for the firings is at an early stage after Trump's Nov. 5 election victory and could change as Trump's administration takes shape, said the sources, who are familiar with the Trump transition and requested anonymity to speak candidly about the plans.

One of the sources questioned the feasibility of a mass firing at the Pentagon.

It was also unclear if Trump himself would endorse the plan, although in the past he has railed extensively against defense leaders who have criticized him. Trump has also spoken during the campaign of firing "woke" generals and those responsible for the troubled 2021 pullout from Afghanistan.

The Trump campaign did not immediately respond to request for comment.

The second source said the incoming administration would likely focus on U.S. military officers seen as connected to Mark Milley, Trump's former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Milley was quoted in the book "War" by Bob Woodward, which was published last month, calling Trump "fascist to the core" and Trump's allies have targeted him for perceived disloyalty to the former president.

"Every single person that was elevated and appointed by Milley will be gone," the second source said.

"There's a very detailed list of everybody that was affiliated with Milley. And they will all be gone."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff include the highest ranking officers in the U.S. military and comprise the heads of the Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, National Guard and Space Force.

The disclosure of plans to fire senior leaders of the U.S. armed forces comes a day after Trump picked as his defense secretary Pete Hegseth, a Fox News commentator and veteran who has signaled a willingness to clean house at the Pentagon.

"The next president of the United States needs to radically overhaul Pentagon senior leadership to make us ready to defend our nation and defeat our enemies. Lots of people need to be fired," Hegseth said in his 2024 book "The War on Warriors: Behind the Betrayal of the Men Who Keep Us Free."

It is unclear if Hegseth's lack of management experience could complicate his Senate confirmation and if a more traditional alternative for the position would carry out such sweeping dismissals.

GENERAL BROWN TO BE AMONG THE FIRST FIRED

Hegseth has also taken aim at Milley's successor, Air Force General C.Q. Brown, asking whether he would have gotten the job if he were not Black.

"Was it because of his skin color? Or his skill? We'll never know, but always doubt - which on its face seems unfair to CQ. But since he has made the race card one of his biggest calling cards, it doesn't really much matter," he wrote.

The first source familiar with the transition planning said Brown would be among the many officers to leave.

"The chiefs of the Joint Chiefs and all the vice chiefs will be fired immediately," the source said, before noting that this was still only early planning.

Some current and former U.S. officials have played down the possibility of such a major shakeup, saying it would be unnecessary and disruptive at a time of global turmoil with wars raging in Ukraine and the Middle East.

The first source said that it would be difficult bureaucratically to fire and replace a large swath of senior U.S. military officials, suggesting the planning could be bluster and posturing by Trump allies.

But the second source suggested the Trump camp believed the Joint Chiefs of Staff needed to shrink due to perceived bureaucratic over-reach.

Such cuts could be endured in an organization the scale of the U.S. military, the source said.

"These people are not irreplaceable. They are very replaceable. And then the other thing too is there is no shortage of people that will step up," the source said.

"In World War Two, we were very rapidly appointing people in their 30s or people competent to be generals. And you know what? We won the war."

(Reporting by Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali; Editing by Don Durfee and Suzanne Goldenberg)

9. Trump Prepares a Pentagon Plucking Committee (And attacks on PME)

Note the attack on the War Colleges and PME.

Perhaps someone in the new administration would consider my proposal on PME.

Thoughts on Professional Military Education: After 9-11, Iraq, and Afghanistan in the Era of Fiscal Austerity

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2012/01/01/thoughts-professional-military-education-after-9-11-iraq-and-afghanistan-era-fiscal/

And also PME or irregular warfare

Preparing for strategic competition: The need for irregular warfare professional military education

https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/3837521-preparing-for-strategic-competition-the-need-for-irregular-warfare-professional-military-education/

Excerpts:

The incoming Trump administration also has a very real problem on its hands with America’s war colleges. Military professional education has brought on a host of civilian Ph.D.s, who in turn have brought with them the toxicities of the modern college campus. There are few barriers to entry and almost zero attrition, suggesting an undemanding curriculum, a syllabus awash in nonmilitary courseware, a dog’s breakfast of student profiles with military dentists receiving the same instruction as the bomber pilots next to them, and a decreasing number of active-duty professor billets that are seen as little more than pastures for old retiring colonels to graze.

There has also been a good deal of rumbling in the rank and file that the military has been too exposed to the trappings of academic rent seekers, D.C. think-tankery, and social-media influencers who think war is icky and have sought to turn a generation of battlefield leaders into diplomats, academics, and aspiring social scientists. Fixing professional military education would be a small, but important, step in reversing that trend.

New Pentagon leadership has the ability to kill two birds with one stone here. Reshape broken war colleges into “Perisher” courses for aspiring commanders. Only by changing the military promotion system into a real, practical competition can you sort the meat-eaters from the leaf-eaters and create a permanent, rather than politically temporary, merit-based promotion system.

As for the committee planned by the incoming Trump team, the effort may benefit by restraining the impulse to staff the body out with retired flag officers, who may have contributed to the problem, and instead handpick a team of political appointees hyper-empowered by a secretary of defense to enact a lasting, merit-based promotion system at the Defense Department. Old officers may stick a Pentagon with the same old thinking, and the same old thinking will ensure that the military returns straight back to the old broken way of promoting bureaucrats.

In 1941, General Marshall held the Louisiana Maneuvers to test his officers on their leadership abilities. This series of exercises involved close to half a million soldiers, one of whom was a young colonel named Dwight Eisenhower. Ike was a standout performer, and his career skyrocketed as a result. In three short years, he went from colonel to supreme allied commander. The rest is history.

You can do only so much with performance reports and promotion boards. Go big. Create a competitive process full of practical challenges that test everything from an officer’s mind to his judgment to his temperament to his response to stress and the unforeseen. War colleges often test nothing more than an ability to regurgitate 200-level international-relations textbooks. This is how you separate the bureaucrat from the battlefield commander. The Pentagon has built elite schools before; it should do it again.

Bottom of Form

Trump Prepares a Pentagon Plucking Committee

https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/trump-prepares-a-pentagon-plucking-committee/

By John Noonan

November 12, 2024 9:20 PM

The Wall Street Journal reported today that the Trump transition team is drafting an executive order to “create a board to purge general officers.” Such a board, the article’s subhead warned, “could upend military review process and raise concerns about politicization of military.”

To the first suggestion, on upending the military review process, you will find no shortage of active-duty service members who say, “Hell to the yes.”

On the second, the Biden administration’s stewardship of the Pentagon — from throwing it into the abortion debate, to mandating force-wide diversity, equity, inclusion seminars, to promoting climate activism at the expense of real-world mission requirements, to quixotic campaigns to weed out domestic extremists, the list goes on — represents the most extreme politicization of U.S. military forces in modern history. Therein is the inherent challenge that Republicans face in the courtrooms of newsrooms — radical progressive policies are considered routine, but the act of removing those policies is considered inherently political and divisive.

I fear we may be returning to the toxic practice of “history began yesterday” reporting, in which every proposed action by a Trump administration is written as a tectonic, norms-defying event without precedent or historic rationale. But the act of removing bad or distracted leaders is a tool as old as war itself. President Lincoln went through several field commanders before settling on Ulysses S. Grant. Patton took over for Lloyd Fredenhall, whose failure at the Kasserine Pass in North Africa resulted in a catastrophic American defeat. President Eisenhower replaced General Matthew Ridgway with Maxwell Taylor after a policy disagreement over military end-strength. Barack Obama purportedly found Marine general James Mattis too aggressive for leadership of the U.S. Central Command and fired him, an act all but celebrated by Manhattan editors and D.C. think tanks.

Perhaps the most relevant example here is that of General George C. Marshall and his “plucking” committee. This was the informal name given to a panel, not dissimilar to the one described in today’s Wall Street Journal, that Marshall established in 1940 to reform and modernize the U.S. Army leadership in preparation for entry into World War II. The committee aimed to replace ineffective or outdated senior officers with younger, more dynamic leaders better suited to the quickly evolving demands of modern warfare.

The committee, established by Marshall, identified and “plucked” over 600 senior officers they deemed unfit or too old for command in wartime. Rather than basing their decisions on seniority, the committee focused on competence, leadership ability, and physical fitness. This process allowed Marshall to infuse the Army’s upper ranks with officers who could handle the pace and rigor of large-scale-maneuver warfare. While Marshall was blasted on the floor of Congress and in the press for allegedly gutting U.S. national security, the men who ascended key Army billets are now legend: Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, and Lightning Joe Collins, to name but a few. It was successful, but not permanent.

When I worked in the upper chamber of Congress, one of the duties inherent to working for a Senate Armed Services Committee senator was evaluating officers who aspired to the highest levels of command. My colleagues and I, many of them veterans of the War on Terrorism, shared a sense of discomfort with many of the admirals and generals seeking Senate confirmation.

In the stratospheric officer ranks, those with a couple of stars on their shoulders, there seemed to be more emphasis on administrative fripperies than the enemy and his capabilities. Some could not articulate a vision for the command that they sought. Some obsessed over structural reorganization inside the Pentagon, “shuffling deck chairs on the Titanic,” as we called it. Some loved to talk up the latest changes to their service uniforms, others offered mousey platitudes to the faddish political trends of the day. Few seemed like genuine war winners, though there were a few real standouts who gave us hope.

I wish every officer in the United States armed forces and political appointees to the Pentagon would read On the Psychology of Military Incompetence, which was written by a British World War II veteran in the 1970s. The lieutenant turned psychologist Norman F. Dixon detailed, in a meticulous analysis of a century of British military disasters, how lack of focus, promoting the wrong qualities in an officer, and bureaucratic obsessiveness can lead to brutal and sometimes irreversible losses on the battlefield. To read it, and compare it to our officer corps today, is a disconcerting endeavor.

If there is to be a small criticism of the Trump effort, long historical precedent and all, it is that a single committee working for but a short snapshot in time may have a hard time establishing permanent roots in the Pentagon. We cannot stop bad officers from rising to the top of our ranks until we begin promoting the right qualities. And the only true way to promote the proper qualities is through realistic, hard-nosed competition.

A committee is fine and a positive start, but a more proven method is creating high-excellence institutions that act as a filter for aspiring commanders. The template is military schoolhouses, like Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL school or the Air Force and Navy fighter weapons schools. These schools produce elite graduates using a simple and common formula: high barrier to entry, high attrition, and a high level of prestige for those selected to be school instructors. Still today, if you walk this earth with a SEAL badge on your chest or Top Gun patch on your flight suit, you are rightly acknowledged as elite.

Should battlefield commanders, charged with the lives of thousands of American sons and daughters, not meet the same level of scrutiny and rigor? Should they also not be products of institutions that are ruthless in their mission to manufacture elite graduates? Consider a shift from the bureaucratic and administrative promotion system used by the Pentagon, in which officers are often rewarded for their management skills rather than their aggressiveness and battlefield prowess, to a paradigm in which hundreds of officers apply for a school that selects only a few dozen to compete in realistic war games, problem-solving exercises, physical competitions, and technical challenges, and only ten or so are rewarded with a prized command billet.

Strong battlefield leaders love a challenge and love a fight. It is sensible that the military offer both as a condition for advancement. It is also how you separate your bureaucrats from your war winners. It is noteworthy that SEAL training and the two fighter weapons schools were among the few corners of the Pentagon that went unaffected by the Biden administration’s unusual and at times obsessive campaign to promote war fighters based on gender, sexual orientation, and race.

The incoming Trump administration also has a very real problem on its hands with America’s war colleges. Military professional education has brought on a host of civilian Ph.D.s, who in turn have brought with them the toxicities of the modern college campus. There are few barriers to entry and almost zero attrition, suggesting an undemanding curriculum, a syllabus awash in nonmilitary courseware, a dog’s breakfast of student profiles with military dentists receiving the same instruction as the bomber pilots next to them, and a decreasing number of active-duty professor billets that are seen as little more than pastures for old retiring colonels to graze.

Bottom of Form

There has also been a good deal of rumbling in the rank and file that the military has been too exposed to the trappings of academic rent seekers, D.C. think-tankery, and social-media influencers who think war is icky and have sought to turn a generation of battlefield leaders into diplomats, academics, and aspiring social scientists. Fixing professional military education would be a small, but important, step in reversing that trend.

New Pentagon leadership has the ability to kill two birds with one stone here. Reshape broken war colleges into “Perisher” courses for aspiring commanders. Only by changing the military promotion system into a real, practical competition can you sort the meat-eaters from the leaf-eaters and create a permanent, rather than politically temporary, merit-based promotion system.

As for the committee planned by the incoming Trump team, the effort may benefit by restraining the impulse to staff the body out with retired flag officers, who may have contributed to the problem, and instead handpick a team of political appointees hyper-empowered by a secretary of defense to enact a lasting, merit-based promotion system at the Defense Department. Old officers may stick a Pentagon with the same old thinking, and the same old thinking will ensure that the military returns straight back to the old broken way of promoting bureaucrats.

In 1941, General Marshall held the Louisiana Maneuvers to test his officers on their leadership abilities. This series of exercises involved close to half a million soldiers, one of whom was a young colonel named Dwight Eisenhower. Ike was a standout performer, and his career skyrocketed as a result. In three short years, he went from colonel to supreme allied commander. The rest is history.

You can do only so much with performance reports and promotion boards. Go big. Create a competitive process full of practical challenges that test everything from an officer’s mind to his judgment to his temperament to his response to stress and the unforeseen. War colleges often test nothing more than an ability to regurgitate 200-level international-relations textbooks. This is how you separate the bureaucrat from the battlefield commander. The Pentagon has built elite schools before; it should do it again.

John Noonan is a former staffer on defense and armed-service committees in the House and Senate, a veteran of the United States Air Force, and a senior adviser to POLARIS National Security. @noonanjo

10. Russia's Battering Ram Strategy and It's Mission in the Donbas: Is Russia Reviving It's Operational Art?

Excerpts:

A greater potential geostrategic problem arises from Russia’s battering ram strategy. If successful in the Donbas, these battering rams—currently functioning at the tactical-operational level in areas like Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka—could merge into larger, unified front-type groups under a single commander. This consolidation could pose a significant threat to NATO, as it would indicate that Russia has restored its operational art to the level of the Soviet era, with the capability to conduct operations on a much larger scale than those in the Donbas or Kursk.

Additionally, there is a strong possibility that we are witnessing the formation of a third major battering ram in Kursk, which could, in the near future, pose a serious threat to all of Northern Ukraine. Therefore, it is time to consider the creation of comprehensive and deep defense systems along the Dnieper River, as well as providing more substantial military assistance to Ukraine than was seen in 2023 and 2024. It should be noted that the success in creation by aggressor of these rams and their westward moves on the territory of Ukraine would have not only detrimental military-strategy effects, but geopolitical for entire Eurasia.

The key question is how long the occupants can sustain this battering ram strategy, and would the AFU find the forces to stabilize the situation in Kursk region and return the positional shape in the Donbas?

Russia's Battering Ram Strategy and It's Mission in the Donbas: Is Russia Reviving It's Operational Art? | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

Small Wars Journal · by Ridvan Bari Urcosta · November 13, 2024

Introduction

The war for the Donbas continues despite Ukraine’s ongoing operations in the Kursk region. Russia’s military battering ram continues its westward advance. In response, Ukraine’s political and military leadership launched a successful operation in the Kursk region of Russia, but the situation there is becoming critical and can turn the entire war into a completely different direction. It seems that Moscow has trapped Ukraine in a counter-propulsion, creating several simultaneous operational challenges. This operational dilemma could easily evolve into a strategic one in the coming months because Moscow has placed the Ukrainian military command in a situation that requires addressing several dialectical tasks. If Ukraine doesn’t find the solutions for these challenges, it seems that the war will enter into the dangerous stage of constant retreat of Ukraine. Otherwise, these challenges may eventually necessitate a more significant intervention from Ukraine’s allies to shift the dynamics of the war in the near future.

The first operational dilemma for the Ukrainian Stavka is the need to maintain two distant, large theaters: Kursk and the Donbas. The second challenge is the emergence of a front-type formation in the southern area of the Donbas, which combines old Soviet military traditions with modern Western concepts such as A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) and network-centric warfare. Third, is the deployment of the Northern Korean forces to the Kursk region.

If Ukraine fails to find effective solutions to these two dilemmas, they could easily evolve into strategic-level problems. Additionally, there remains the possibility of Russia opening new hotspots along the over 1,000-kilometer front line, such as a renewed offensive in the Kherson region or concentrating their efforts in Zaporozhe region. Even without newfronts, Ukraine is already facing operational-level threats, and it must be emphasized that this dilemma has the potential to escalate to a strategic level. An additional problem for the Ukrainian command is the continued redeployment of some of its best units, in terms of age, experience, and concentration of armored vehicles, to the Kursk region instead of consolidating reserves in the Donbas.

At the strategic level, this situation may require immediate intervention from Ukraine’s allies to stabilize the situation. The discussion about the deployment of NATO troops in Ukraine is no longer a far-fetched idea but rather a geostrategic consideration over Europe’s strategic depth. A recent example is the debate in Estonia about sending troops to Western Ukraine. The question remains unclear in the West regarding its strategic depth in Eastern Europe, and in particular, what will happen if Russia cannot be stopped in the Donbas, northern Ukraine, or Zaporizhzhia. French President Emmanuel Macron stated that under no circumstances can Odesa and Kyiv fall to the Russians. Thus, there is a substantial debate over Europe’s and NATO’s strategic depth in Eastern Europe. In October 2024, for instance, the Estonian government discussed the possibility of sending troops to Ukraine and the UK also considered sending trainers and military advisers to Ukraine. However, the future of this process will be determined by two key factors: (1) the success of Russia’s battering ram strategy in the Donbas and (2) Ukraine’s ability to hold its positions in the Russia’s Kursk region and in the left-bank Ukraine (that is, the portion of Ukraine that lies on the eastern side of the Dnieper River). This article examines the strategic and operational perspectives of Ukraine’s Kursk operation in correlation with events in the Donbas. Moreover, it proposes two theoretical frameworks that help to explain Russia’s Donbas-centric strategy, namely (1) the kill zone and (2) the battering ram strategy.

The Kursk Operation: From Euphoria to Cold Minded Assessment

According to Kyiv’s calculations, the operation in Kursk aimed to achieve two major strategic goals. The first is political. Kyiv intends to force the Russian government into negotiations on terms favorable to Ukraine. The second is that Ukrainian military operations are intended to disrupt Russian military plans in the Donbas by forcing the Russian military to divert significant reserves away from the Donbas and toward the Kursk region. It seems the ultimate military goal is to secure control over key chokepoints and establish a serious and long-lasting bridgehead inside Russian territory.

Despite these efforts, Moscow has not shifted from its publicly stated primary military objectives, which is the annexation and full incorporation of the Donbas and southern Ukraine into the Russian geopolitical and cultural matrix. It appears that Russian government is willing to sacrifice its own territory to achieve the goal of occupying southern Ukraine. This goal has become a sort of idée fixe for the Kremlin. In response, the Russian military has launched a counteroffensive in the Kursk region to force Ukraine to split its forces between two distant theaters of war. So far, Ukrainian attempts to strike at the rear of Russian forces, aiming to cut logistics and disrupt the Russian offensive, have not been successful.

Unfortunately for Kyiv, the offensive operation in Kursk can produce catastrophic results. Especially if we speak about the upcoming engagement of the Northern Korean Armed Forces in Kursk region. With this operation Ukraine has overextended the front line, depleted reserves of the best-trained and younger forces, drained the supply of armored and motorized vehicles, and expanded the warzone by several hundred additional square kilometers. Although Ukraine continues its operation despite the Russian counteroffensive, the associated risks are now dangerously high. A potential defeat of Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) —whether through encirclement or a chaotic withdrawal—would be far more damaging to Ukrainian leadership than the initial surge of emotional support that followed the beginning of the operation.

However, the Kremlin shows no signs of deviating from the declared war goals outlined at the start of the conflict. Russian military tradition calls for a rigid formulation of war goals, and it seems that Moscow will pursue these goals at any cost to achieve its objectives in Ukraine. This does not mean that Ukraine cannot alter these plans, but the end of diplomatic negotiations suggests that we are likely to witness more surprising and dramatic events on the battlefield in the coming months. The major question now concerns the geographic limits of this war. It was previously suggested that Russia is quite satisfied with the war in the Donbas and that they will attempt to primarily confine the war to this region.

Moreover, political declarations from European leaders have made it clear that as long as the war remains confined to the eastern portion of Ukraine, no European soldiers will officially join the fight on Ukraine’s behalf. Despite the high stakes in the Donbas and Kursk, it is unlikely that even a Russian breakthrough in these regions will completely break Ukraine’s resistance. However, it may provide Russia with the operational space they are desperately seeking in the Donbas or in a perfect scenario on the entire left-bank Ukraine.

What remains particularly concerning for Ukraine is that its best forces are tied down in an area more than 300 kilometers away from the battles unfolding in southern Ukraine that truly determine the future of Ukrainian sovereignty. This back-and-forth with reserves is impacting the speed of Russian troops in the Donbas. In addition to the Donbas-Kursk dilemma, the Kursk operation has revealed another significant issue: the vast expansion of the warzone by several thousand square kilometers. This extension requires additional resources, such as air defense systems, electronic warfare, and space intelligence which Ukraine lacks.

In general, it can be concluded that both armies are nearing culmination and perhaps the final stage of the war. The outcome of the Kursk offensive and the situation in the Donbas led us to believe that we were witnessing a decisive, general battle. This battle spanned several, sometimes geographically independent theaters, all of which will play a critical role in determining the course of the war.

It should be noted that when we refer to the war, it pertains to the fixation of the conflict on left bank Ukraine. The penetration of Russian, Belarusian, Northern Korean forces into central or western Ukraine would be considered a new stage of the war. Such a scenario would dramatically change the nature of this conflict, now focusing on the matter of strategic depth of the NATO countries. In these circumstances we should speak about different wars that we are experiencing currently.

The participation of the North Korean forces in the Kursk region has enormous geostrategic importance. First it escalates the war rhythm to the next less controllable stage. Second, the military aspect suggests that the North Korean soldiers likely are going to be deployed to the weakest front in the Kursk region, namely the Sudzha direction to reinforce the Russian positions there. But there is a high level probability that North Korea will send the forces invading sovereign Ukraine territories, not only the Kursk region. Particularly if we take into account the very fact that North Korea recognized the annexation of those territories that were occupied by Russia since 2022. Third, it unifies the knots of belligerence in Eurasia into one intertwined system of global confrontation and can serve as a pillar for the greater level of confrontation in Eurasia than we can imagine.

The New Look on Soviet Military Doctrine “Deep Operation”

After World War I and the Russian Civil War, Joseph Stalin and his generals debated the future of warfare and how to account for positional warfare. This led to the development of the Deep Operations concept. As a result, Russian generals began paying attention to the theories they had studied during their time in Soviet military academies.

The concept aimed to overcome the stalemates of WWI by using mobile armored forces to breach enemy lines and disrupt their rear positions. Technological advancements and the mass production of tanks, planes, and artillery systems led to vast battlefields filled with immense firepower. The basic principle was that despite the concentration of defensive lines, a concentrated force of heavy weaponry—such as tanks, artillery, and aviation—could break through at critical points and penetrate into the operational or strategic rears of the enemy. Russian military tradition defined positional warfare as “the simultaneous suppression of the enemy’s tactical defense throughout its entire depth, followed by a high-speed breakthrough by infantry and tanks, with support from artillery and aviation; a form of combat operations for a formation or unit.”

These theories were implemented throughout WWII and the Cold War, reaching their peak in the 1960s and 70s with the Ogarkov Doctrine, which adapted Deep Operations to meet Cold War demands. It was adaptation of the American military concept of the ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems and the long-range strike capabilities, precision-guided munitions and other systems into the Soviet military traditions. After the Soviet collapse, Russia sought a smaller, more agile military for “operations,” rather than full-blown wars. However, the prolonged war in Ukraine exposed Russia’s lack of preparation for large-scale, industrial-style warfare. Russian intellectual military thought is once again facing a serious challenge: how to break the positional stalemate that emerged at the end of 2023. In 2024, there was already a debate about using tactical nuclear weapons to resolve the impasse.

The decision of Ukrainian commanders to send troops to neighboring regions of Russia (before the Kursk operation) in cooperation with the AFU and RDK should be seen again as a way to escape the Donbas-centric war and the Kursk operation is culmination of AFUs search of the exit from positional stalemate and the Donbas kill zone.

The Ukrainian military however faces similar challenges as the Russian one. Former Chief of the General Staff Valerii Zaluzhnyi, facing these pessimistic circumstances, found himself compelled to directly engage with the Western military and political establishment through public channels. In his essay, he offers solutions to the strategic impasse that poses a threat to Ukraine. Firstly, Zaluzhnyi acknowledges that, following the failure to achieve a breakthrough on the front, the war has gradually devolved for both sides into positional warfare, which he regards as a trap. Secondly, he asserts that positional warfare favors the Russians over the Ukrainians. Thirdly, he concedes that the Russians are adept at swiftly adapting to every military strategy and tactic implemented by Ukraine and the West thus far. Zaluzhnyi suggests that Ukraine must promptly revert to a more maneuverable style of warfare. To achieve this, the AFU must enhance their current capabilities.

Thus, the old-Soviet thinking and current Russian and Ukrainian thinking concentrated on the suppression by all means of the enemy’s defense lines. If we speak about modern or future warfare (particularly future large-scale conventional wars between industrial powers), we can expect a similar idea of concentrating “suppression technologies.” However, this time the forces from all domains would be integrated into one or several synergetic formations capable of operating on a much greater scale, as we are witnessing in Ukraine now. Yes, Russia and Ukraine are capable of command and control over more than a thousand kilometers of the frontline, but they are limited in conducting massive, large-scale operations in the context of a continuous front. But it might be the end of the positional stalemate in this war.

Ukraine’s Efforts to Escape the Donbas-Centric War: From Crimea, Belgorod to Kursk

The Russian military-industrial complex has still not reached its full production capacity, and as a result, Moscow faces many issues in producing new types of weapons, especially counter-battery systems. There is no sign that Russia will conduct a massive World War II-type operation, but it is only a matter of time and depends on two factors. The first is the creation of front-type formations (the Soviet military formation which includes several armies) for combat operations in the Donbas and other areas. Under the Soviet Army, front armies consisted of several field armies. In US Army terms, front armies roughly equated to army groups. These front army formations can be considered battering ram formations. The second factor is the success or failure of Russia’s military-industrial complex. Reports from the front and within Russia indicate that the Russian state is only halfway along the path to exhaustion. Successes in the southern portion of the Donbas, coupled with reports of the military-industrial complex increasing production by hundreds of percent (for example, a 215% increase in tank production), are significant.

NATO artillery, signal, electronic warfare, and intel systems, which Ukraine possesses, are still causing enormous problems for the Russian military. However, it appears that Russia has found a solution by creating zones with highly concentrated electronic warfare systems, artillery, counter-battery systems, space, and drone reconnaissance. By this they are creating a type of A2/AD area. Russia has set its own rules of war in the Donbas by inviting the Ukrainians into kill zones within relatively small areas. The first signs of this strategy can be traced back to Bakhmut, where Yevgeni Prigozhin launched an information campaign to convince the AFU and the political leadership to fight for Bakhmut to exhaust AFU’s offensive potential and win the time to build the Surovikin Line. Prigozhin never hid this fact.

In hindsight, it seems the Russians have managed to create one large kill zone throughout the Donbas. As a result, Russia is vehemently resisting moving beyond the region. Any Russian advance could be interpreted as a move toward the concentration of enemy forces, using their artillery and air superiority to their advantage. Russia’s goal is to maximize its dominance in these areas by creating kill zones as mentioned previously. The conceptual issue for the defending side is that to counter such force amassing, they must formulate a sort of cybernetic and synergetic system. Unfortunately for the Ukrainians, they do not possess enough material to create such a structure, recently it was suggested that the AFU had to create from the Kursk region the Russian analog of the kill zone, but it was regretted that it is too late.

It seems that Ukraine is desperately trying to escape the Donbas-centric war, which has become a deathtrap. In the Donbas, Ukraine has limited chances to alter the course of the war, as the Donbas remains one of the most urbanized areas of Ukraine. Liberating these areas with the current number of soldiers and weaponry is simply impossible. The decision to move toward Crimea was correct, as it was an attempt to escape the Donbas pocket, but the counteroffensive failed as well and resulted in positional warfare.

The decision of Ukrainian commanders to send troops to neighboring regions of Russia (before the Kursk operation) in cooperation with the AFU and RDK should be seen again as a way to escape the Donbas-centric war and the Kursk operation is culmination of AFUs search of the exit from positional stalemate and the Donbas kill zone. Theoretically, these moves aimed to force Russia into unpredictable actions, but it seems that Ukraine should be seriously concerned about the North Koreans in the Kursk region and creation of the third battering ram (see below) which aim would be creation of the strategic depth or buffer zone in the Northern Ukrainian regions. Unfortunately, we are already witnessing this process, as Ukraine’s decision to attack the Kursk region has led to the creation of new army formations in Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod, along with the introduction of a new regional territorial defense network.

Russia’s fixation on the Donbas pays off for the Kremlin while Ukrainian commands search for a way to find new solutions to the Russian battering ram strategy. The operation in Kursk had a short-lived psychological effect, but not a military impact. The recent decision of Ukraine to present the Peace Plan to the Western allies demonstrates that Ukraine is searching for an existential path that would allow it to survive and win over the Russian aggressors. Recently Mykhailo Podolyak, adviser to the head of the Office of the President, brought some important details of this plan. According to Podolyak, Ukraine is searching for a way to wage total war against Russia on its territory to force the Russians to pay the highest price for occupation of Ukrainian territories by the attacking their deep rears, logistics, stockpiles and creation of chaos in its command and control system. It again demonstrates that Ukraine understands that in Donbas they don’t have a chance to reverse the correlation of forces in their favor and they logically search for ways to run aways from the Donbas trap.

The Battering Ram Strategy: A Preliminary Analysis

The current success of the Russians in the Pokrovsk direction can be seen as the first practical example of a deep operation since the Second World War. While the speed of this operation is not comparable to that of the Great Patriotic War, it appears that the Russians are returning to their lost tradition of acting from defensive positions supported by strong economic reserves. The Russian General Staff has created several fists or battering rams in the Donbas, which, through a combination of frontal and flanking attacks, aim to create large encirclements of AFU in the region. To achieve this, they have developed two army groups or battering rams that, using the same combination of frontal and flanking maneuvers, are breaching the decades-old Ukrainian fortifications in Donbas.

The first and primary battering ram was created less than a year ago near Avdiivka, with the goal of splitting the Donbas theater into two independent parts by reaching Pokrovsk or, at the very least, cutting several key communication arteries of the AFU in the Donbas. The Russians are now less than 10 kilometers from Pokrovsk, with a particular focus on the T0504 highway, which unifies the Donbas into a single theater of operations. It seems that, for the Russians, broadening the depth of their control in southern Ukraine is more important than anything else. The storming of Pokrovsk will likely occur after the end of the battle for Kurakhove, which is already on the way. The ram has smashed the Ukrainian defense structures in Wuhledar, Selidove within weeks. The Russian experts report that between 20th to 30th October occupied an unprecedented quantity of the Ukrainian lands – 200 square km. Such dangerous situation allowed to some Ukrainian generals to speak about the fact of the collapse of the Ukrainian front in Donbas due to: the lack of the munition and weapons; the catastrophic lack of the manpower and absence of the new flows; the disorganization of the system of the command and control.

From a grand strategy perspective, Russia is seeking ways to fragment the Ukrainian Donbas front by breaking it from a unified front into smaller, chaotic pieces with minimal coordination. This primary task has been assigned to the so-called “Avdiivka ram,” which, since March 2024, has developed into a wedge approximately 30 kilometers wide and over 30 kilometers deep into Ukrainian territory. So far, it is not too dangerous, but if it manages to absorb all neighboring supplementary areas into one front-type formation, it could pose an operational threat to the entire left-bank Ukraine. Especially after taking Vuhledar, Selidove, Kurakhove and finally Pokrovsk this scenario becomes much more likely.

In such a situation we would be witnessing unification of all Russian forces that stretched from Velyka Novosilka to the Banivka village on the north into one front that would be able withstand any possible counteroffensive operation. In order to stop this industrial and military role the resisting side must create a similar Newtonian-type counterforce, which is equal in its industrial power to attacking ram. If Russia would reach this stage of synergy in these rams then it might be an unmountable challenge to Ukraine in upcoming months to stop its westward move.

In addition to the major battering ram near Avdiivka, Russia has activated several supplementary forces that, while less important at the strategic level, are crucial at the operational level. These concentrations of Russian forces near Toretsk, New York, Kurakhove, Staromlynivka, and other locations aim to create the threat of encirclement for the AFU and force them to retreat. In a perfect scenario, the Kremlin would like to achieve full encirclement, but so far, the Ukrainian command has been wise enough to prevent such a disastrous outcome.

However, the weakness of Russia’s strategy in the Donbas lies in its inability to form two parallel, equally strong armies capable of executing a pincer movement in a specific theater. So far, the Avdiivka battering ram remains the only cohesive and powerful force that Moscow has managed to create. There is, however, a strong possibility that if Russian advances continue, these supplementary groups of forces could merge into the “Avdiivka ram.” This would resemble a Soviet-era army more than the Russian forces that fought in Georgia or Syria.

The second area where the Russians have concentrated significant forces is near Bakhmut, with the main objective of breaking the Ukrainian defense lines along the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and advancing into Chasiv Yar and Kostyantynivka. Success in this direction would mark a critical phase in the Donbas war, as controlling Kostyantynivka would bring the Russians to the final system of fortified cities, including Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. While the forces in this area are not as strong as those concentrated in the Avdiivka battering ram, Russian forces around Bakhmut are supported by several supplementary groups. Ideally, these units would advance toward the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka line as a unified army.

There is potential for creating two additional battering rams similar to the forces around Avdiivka and Bakhmut. The Russian forces in the Zaporizhzhia (Robotyne) and Kharkiv (Svatove-Kreminna) regions are particularly suited for such a strategy. That said, these forces have yet to demonstrate the effectiveness seen in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas, where the Russians have adopted a more flexible approach, avoiding direct frontal assaults and minimizing involvement in urban warfare.

Graphic: Legend: Red – two battering rams; Green – the supplementary groups of forces assisting the Russians in their offensive operation; Blue – the possible zone where all rams are expected to merge into one large front-type army under a single commander

The most dangerous scenario would be the creation of a single cohesive battering rams or unified fronts (comprising two or three armies). This brings us back to the old tradition of the Second World War, when the Soviet Union organized a sophisticated system of so-called “fronts.” In the Soviet tradition, the term had a secondary meaning: it referred to the highest operational-strategic military formation intended to solve operational-strategic tasks in one strategic or several operational directions within a continental theater of military operations. Usually, a front consisted of several armies and numbered from several hundred thousand to one million soldiers. A front possessed a certain level of autonomy, integrating all branches of the armed forces, including ground, air, engineering, signal, and logistical units. A front could occupy a zone that varies in width and depth depending on the situation and objectives at hand. The width could range from several hundred kilometers, while the depth could extend from several dozen to up to 200 kilometers.

There is great danger that Russian operational art could evolve to a new strategic level, enabling the formation of a front-type structure capable of operating on a greater scale than before. This would involve the full deployment of reserves, efficient military and supply logistics etc. Such a formation would include comprehensive artillery and counter-battery warfare, air power superiority, electronic warfare, and jamming and spoofing capabilities, UAVs (in the near future the drone swarms), the space capabilities (geospatial and signal intelligence), the air defense systems and so on. Essentially, all these elements would function as a single, cohesive mechanism or as an integral cybernetic system. Especially if we assume that in the near future AI and neural networks are going to play a greater role in the modern warfare.

This would be a conceptual blend of the Soviet military concept of a front army, the Western concept of an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system, and the integration of all modern warfare tools (electronic, space, UAVs, etc.). In essence, Russia is creating a new form of warfare—this military behemoth could become a dangerous and effective tool in this and future wars, both as a theoretical and practical concept. While A2/AD is typically a static model, this front-type A2/AD would be mobile, incorporating all the aforementioned capabilities. The purpose of this battering ram, functioning as a sort of “roller,” would be to compress and break through defense systems meant to slow or stop the enemy. This could be Russia’s contribution to 21st century military theory by practically developing a conceptual innovation in military doctrine.

As mentioned earlier, Russia has built a large kill zone in the Donbas, but this battering ram is an evolved form of the kill zone, capable of shifting positions along the front line. It is the Russian answer to the positional stalemate which they faced till the mid of the spring 2024.

In other words, we could witness the evolution of the Russian military machine in this war—from initial disorganization and degradation to the development of a new military doctrine. This new approach would combine old Soviet traditions of deep operations and deep battle with modern elements such as large-scale operations led by experienced commanders, along with the incorporation of UAVs, AI, robotic systems, and space-based assets. However, these observations remain preliminary and uncertain, as the evidence of this evolution is still faint on the horizon.

Finally, it should be noted that in Ukraine, there are increasing instances of the Russians enjoying a degree of mobility within a positional front line. They have significantly reduced the number of troops involved in storm operations, instead employing the so-called “tactic of small groups.” They send one or two soldiers which is called “shturmoviks” with artillery, electronic, and drone support. Once identified, these positions are destroyed with artillery and heavy bombs. These operations are often suicidal, but this is exactly how Russia is achieving success in the Donbas. This approach could be called the “tactic of cracks,” as the Russians are probing for weaknesses (“cracks”) in the dense Ukrainian defense lines while revealing Ukrainian positions. This theme requires deeper research, because it has particular importance for future wars. The shtumoviks are sort of new phenomenon in the 21st century because from one side it requires primitive heroism (sole or small group mission), but from other hand it acts under new technologic circumstances which became integral part of their job both for the Ukrainians and the Russians.

Conclusion

Thus, we can say that Russian military strategy and tactics are gradually evolving after the setbacks of the first two years, progressing from the operational-tactical level to the operational level, and potentially toward a more cohesive operational-strategic level. This development presents a dangerous scenario for the future, as it suggests that the Russians are learning how to more effectively command and conduct warfare.

The AFU attempted to shift the course of the war by launching a risky offensive in Kursk. Unfortunately, this operation has not significantly altered the overall situation on the battlefield. Ukraine now finds itself on the defensive in both the Donbas and Kursk. However, a noticeable change for Russia in recent months is their increasing use of flanking maneuvers, pincer strategy at both the tactical and operational levels, allowing them to avoid costly frontal assaults. These changes are particularly evident in the Donbas, where Russia enjoys the superiority, but Ukraine hasn’t given up its attempts to find nonlinear solutions to force the Russians to abandon their plans to occupy its territories. Zelensky’s “Victory Plan” seems to pursue this goal.

A greater potential geostrategic problem arises from Russia’s battering ram strategy. If successful in the Donbas, these battering rams—currently functioning at the tactical-operational level in areas like Chasiv Yar and Avdiivka—could merge into larger, unified front-type groups under a single commander. This consolidation could pose a significant threat to NATO, as it would indicate that Russia has restored its operational art to the level of the Soviet era, with the capability to conduct operations on a much larger scale than those in the Donbas or Kursk.

Additionally, there is a strong possibility that we are witnessing the formation of a third major battering ram in Kursk, which could, in the near future, pose a serious threat to all of Northern Ukraine. Therefore, it is time to consider the creation of comprehensive and deep defense systems along the Dnieper River, as well as providing more substantial military assistance to Ukraine than was seen in 2023 and 2024. It should be noted that the success in creation by aggressor of these rams and their westward moves on the territory of Ukraine would have not only detrimental military-strategy effects, but geopolitical for entire Eurasia.

The key question is how long the occupants can sustain this battering ram strategy, and would the AFU find the forces to stabilize the situation in Kursk region and return the positional shape in the Donbas?

Ridvan Bari Urcosta

Mr. Urcosta is an analyst with Geopolitical Futures. He has a wide range of experience in the Black Sea region, Russia and the Middle East, Ukraine and Crimea as a geopolitical region and Eastern Europe. He is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Strategic Studies, University of Warsaw and he also teaches an independent ERASMUS course: “Russia and the Middle East: Geopolitics and Diplomacy.” He was born in Abkhazia, Georgia where he lived until the onset of the Civil War. In the early 1990’s he moved to Crimea where he lived until its annexation by Russia. At the moment of annexation he worked in the Sevastopol State Administration. Following Crimea's annexation by Russia, Urcosta worked as a Human Rights Officer in Odessa, Ukraine in the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission. He speaks Polish, Russian, English, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and Turkish.

Small Wars Journal · by Ridvan Bari Urcosta · November 13, 2024

11. 'It Could Be Very Hard to Do Our Job': Top Military Officers Brace for Trump's Potential Loyalty Review Boards

There is only one loyalty test: Do you support and defend the constitution of the United States?

In my 30 years in uniform I never knew what political parties (if any, perhaps because I did not and still do not belong to any political party) my bosses, peers, or subordinates belonged to and I never had any superior officer espouse any political ideology in public or private. Sure there were grumblings in private about decisions by political leaders but there was never any partisanship attached to them, only what was best for the mission and the nation.

As a reminder:

Officer's oath:

"I, _____ (SSAN), having been appointed an officer in the Army of the United States, as indicated above in the grade of _____ do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office upon which I am about to enter; So help me God." (DA Form 71, 1 August 1959, for officers.)

Enlisted oath:

"I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God." (Title 10, US Code; Act of 5 May 1960 replacing the wording first adopted in 1789, with amendment effective 5 October 1962).

'It Could Be Very Hard to Do Our Job': Top Military Officers Brace for Trump's Potential Loyalty Review Boards

military.com · by Steve Beynon · November 13, 2024

'It Could Be Very Hard to Do Our Job': Top Military Officers Brace for Trump's Potential Loyalty Review Boards

military.com · by Steve Beynon · November 13, 2024

Senior officers in the U.S. military are preparing after reports of a potential new review process for top generals, a review they fear will vet personal loyalty to President-elect Donald Trump.

On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal reported on a draft executive order that is under consideration by the Trump transition team that would establish a so-called "warrior board," to review top generals over whether they should continue service or not, and whether they lack certain leadership qualities.

The proposal mirrors calls from conservative think tanks, lawmakers and Trump to weed out what they call "woke" generals -- broadly defined as officials who have promoted diversity in the ranks or supported taking vaccinations.

While the exact details of the proposed review board were unclear -- including who would serve as the arbiters of a general's leadership, though they would be appointed directly by the White House and would be veterans -- the senior uniformed military community immediately responded with concern that their commitment to avoiding politics would not be able to hold.

"The military is run by civilians, but the politics are supposed to stay outside," one currently serving Army lieutenant general told Military.com. "It could be very hard to do our job if we have to constantly be making sure we're appeasing someone on a political or partisan level."

Senior officers and Pentagon officials interviewed expressed concerns about the ease with which generals who fall out of favor with Trump could find themselves under scrutiny.

Most senior leaders have, at some point in their careers, publicly praised diversity as a virtue in meetings or at events -- particularly as women and those from minority groups have gained more prominent roles within the ranks in recent years and as the country that provides the military's recruiting pool has become more racially diverse. Many have likely signed memorandums or sent out emails to their formations emphasizing the importance of vaccines.

The creation of a separate review process reporting directly to Trump that is outside of the existing job performance system could impose a chilling loyalty test -- not to the Constitution or military code, but to a president known for prioritizing personal loyalty, currently serving generals and defense officials interviewed say.

One two-star Army general noted that the administration's stance could instill fear around hiring minority or LGBTQ staff, with promotions of soldiers from certain backgrounds potentially facing heightened scrutiny. This atmosphere of suspicion, the official warned, risks stifling diversity within the ranks and creating a hierarchy where personal backgrounds become a factor in career advancement -- a stark departure from the military's commitment to merit-based progression.

"I think moving forward, if someone is moved into a position and they don't have a certain ... let's say ... look, there could be hesitation," the major general said on the condition of anonymity to avoid retaliation. "Or people are going to ask, 'Hey, are we sure,' because it could bring unwanted attention from the White House."

The Trump transition team's draft on restructuring the military cited Gen. George C. Marshall's "plucking board" as a key precedent. Established in 1940, Marshall's board was composed of retired officers who reviewed the performance of active-duty officers. The thought was that too many senior officers were sticking around, blocking younger and more promising officers from promotion.

The hyper-fixated look at perceived diversity efforts in the force had created concern even ahead of the news about the review boards, with some defense officials and senior officers concerned over whether Joint Chiefs Chair Gen. C.Q. Brown will be fired. Brown has spoken publicly about the challenges of climbing the ranks as a Black man. One defense official said whether he's fired will be a "canary in the coal mine" and would immediately set "a really bad tone" for the Trump administration's relationship with the Pentagon.

During the Biden administration, Republicans in Congress have used military policies and actions of officers they label as "woke" as leverage to block or delay promotions. Col. Ben Jonsson, an Air Force officer nominated to one-star general, saw his promotion blocked by Sen. Eric Schmitt, R-Mo., using procedural tactics due to Jonsson writing an op-ed about racial blind spots in the military.

The Pentagon has historically insisted that service members remain staunchly apolitical, with specific regulations surrounding wearing the uniform as part of political activity, even as politically appointed civilian leadership often looks at national security through a political lens.

"I never worried about what political party someone was in; it never occurred to me," Paul Eaton, a retired infantry major general and head of the liberal veterans group VoteVets, told Military.com. "It could be very divisive to the [military]; it'll create mistrust."

military.com · by Steve Beynon · November 13, 2024

12. Security experts predict US military footprint in Australia will grow under Trump

Australia is a great country. I would not mind going back and spending time there.

Security experts predict US military footprint in Australia will grow under Trump

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · November 13, 2024

Marine Corps Staff Sgt. Alex Aman looks down the sight of an M110 Semi-Automatic Sniper System at Robertson Barracks in Darwin, Australia, April 5, 2024. (Juan Torres/U.S. Marine Corps)

Australia, already in partnership with the Pentagon on several fronts, would welcome an even larger U.S. presence under President-elect Donald Trump, Australian defense experts said Wednesday.

The United States has sent growing numbers of troops Down Under since 250 Marines kicked off annual rotations to the country’s northern port of Darwin in 2012.

The force, which operates in Australia from April to October, has grown to over 2,000 members.

Australian security researchers predict the U.S. under Trump will accelerate its growing military presence in their country as it seeks to deter China and disperse its forces to make them less susceptible to enemy missiles.

Australia is already spending $450 million in U.S. funds to build air bases in the Northern Territory to accommodate rotations of U.S. B-52 Stratofortress bombers, Pacific Air Forces commander Gen. Kevin Schneider said in July.

And the U.S. and United Kingdom are building five nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, part of the AUKUS pact, for deployment in 2027, the first delivery in a program expected to cost $250 billion over three decades.

The Trump administration will seek to ramp up the size of the Marine rotational force several fold, Australian defense researcher Allan Orr told Stars and Stripes by email Tuesday.

“Likely at least 10,000 Marines and likely permanent if they get their way,” he said.

Australia would prefer a permanently stationed force of 10,000-20,000 troops, Orr said, adding that the Marines should move forces from Japan to Australia as soon as possible.

“Moving these positions from a country where their presence is much more politically protested to Australia and out of most Chinese missile ranges would be ideal for both sides,” he said.

The U.S. and Australian governments have wanted to increase the American military presence for more than a decade, Orr said.

“If anything, the U.S footprint is evolving too slowly,” he said.

Australia needs to add missile defense, more runways for strategic bombers and enough troops to make sure the deployment deters China, Orr added.

Mike Green, chief of the United States Studies Centre in Sydney, told The Australian in a Nov. 7 report that ramped-up American deployments to Australia would be part of a bipartisan plan for a more distributed military posture in the region.

“They’re going to come in on day one and want to accelerate co-operation with Australia on defence,” he told the newspaper. “If there is an issue, frankly, it’s that the (Australian) government is going to come under pressure to spend more on defence.”

Australian military spending roughly matches the NATO target of 2% of gross domestic product.

“He (Trump) might also request a further boost in our defence budget — perhaps to 3% of GDP — within a few years,” former Australian assistant defense secretary Ross Babbage told Stars and Stripes by email Wednesday.

It’s possible that the Trump administration may want Australian units to operate more frequently with U.S. forces in the Far East and for Australia to accelerate efforts to build missiles to supply Australian and U.S. units, he said.

“Further US operations in and from Australia are anticipated over time and are almost always universally welcomed here,” he said. “They are rarely controversial.”

However, Paul Buchanan, an American security expert based in New Zealand, said Trump could scale back the U.S. commitment to the Indo-Pacific.

“The MAGA (Make America Great Again) people are neo-isolationist,” he said by phone Wednesday. “They want to withdraw American military commitments all around the world.”

The U.S. Congress has pushed back on the AUKUS commitment, contending it distracts from efforts to grow the U.S. submarine force, Buchanan said.

“I’m not convinced [Trump] considers the Western Pacific the region of priority,” he said.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · November 13, 2024

13. What to Know About Tulsi Gabbard, Trump's Pick to Be Director of National Intelligence

The military and the intelligence community are about to be disrupted and changed like they never have before. We are going to see a "revolution" in military and intelligence affairs unlike any past "revolution" we have experienced.

What to Know About Tulsi Gabbard, Trump's Pick to Be Director of National Intelligence

military.com · November 13, 2024

WASHINGTON — President-elect Donald Trump has tapped former Democratic Rep. Tulsi Gabbard to be the next director of national intelligence, a powerful position that sits atop the nation's spy agencies and acts as the president's top intelligence adviser.

Gabbard is a veteran who served for more than two decades but doesn't have the typical intelligence experience of past officeholders. She left the Democratic Party in 2022 and endorsed Trump earlier this year, becoming popular among his supporters.

Here are a few things to know about Gabbard:

She was the first Hindu elected to Congress

Gabbard, 43, was born in the U.S. territory of American Samoa, raised in Hawaii and spent a year of her childhood in the Philippines. She was first elected as a 21-year-old to Hawaii's House of Representatives but had to leave after one term when her National Guard unit deployed to Iraq.

She was later elected to Congress representing Hawaii. As the first Hindu member of the House, Gabbard was sworn into office with her hand on the Bhagavad Gita, the Hindu devotional work. She was also the first American Samoan elected to Congress.

During her four House terms she became known for speaking out against her party's leadership. Her early support for Sen. Bernie Sanders ’ 2016 Democratic presidential primary run made her a popular figure in progressive politics nationally.

Gabbard is married to cinematographer Abraham Williams. Her father, Mike Gabbard, is a state senator who was first elected as a Republican but who switched parties to become a Democrat.

She ran for president — then left her party

Gabbard sought the Democratic nomination for president in 2020 on a progressive platform and her opposition to U.S. involvement in foreign military conflicts.

Citing her military experience, she argued that U.S. wars in the Middle East had destabilized the region, made the U.S. less safe and cost thousands of American lives. She blamed her own party for not opposing the wars. During one primary debate, she criticized then-Sen. Kamala Harris’ record as a prosecutor.

Gabbard later dropped out of the race and endorsed the ultimate winner, President Joe Biden.

Two years later she left the Democratic Party to become an independent, saying her old party was dominated by an “elitist cabal of warmongers” and “woke” ideologues. She subsequently campaigned for several high-profile Republicans, became a contributor to Fox News and started a podcast.

“Today’s Democratic Party is unrecognizable from the party I joined 20 years ago," she said when explaining her decision.

She's a star in Trump world

Gabbard endorsed Trump earlier this year, and her support quickly made her popular among Trump's supporters.

Often appearing alongside Robert F. Kennedy Jr. — who challenged Biden for the Democratic nomination before transitioning to an independent bid, then ultimately endorsing Trump — Gabbard represented what Trump argued was his appeal across the political spectrum.

Gabbard helped Trump prep for his own debate against Harris this year. In October, while stumping with Trump at a rally in North Carolina, she announced that she was officially becoming a Republican, calling the current Democratic Party “completely unrecognizable” compared to the one of which she had been a member.

Trump has given both Gabbard and Kennedy roles in his presidential transition, potentially giving them the influence to help staff his administration and shape the policies the federal bureaucracy would pursue if he returns to the White House.

She's a veteran, but not an intelligence insider

Gabbard has served in the Army National Guard for more than two decades and deployed to Iraq and Kuwait.

She received a Combat Medical Badge in 2005 for “participation in combat operations under enemy hostile fire in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom III,” the Hawaii National Guard said.

Unlike past directors, she hasn't held any senior government roles. She served for two years on the House Homeland Security Committee.

The current director, Avril Haines, was confirmed by the Senate in 2021 following several years in a number of top national security and intelligence positions. Haines was the first woman to serve in the position.

She'll oversee Trump's possible intelligence overhaul

Trump has said he wants to overhaul the nation's intelligence services — a sector of the federal government he has long viewed with suspicion and distrust. The president-elect has blamed U.S. intelligence agencies of seeking to undermine his first administration as well as his campaigns.

He's also characterized the intelligence community as part of the “deep state,” his term for thousands of civil servants who work at a long list of government agencies and who Trump has never viewed as sufficiently loyal.

“We will clean out all of the corrupt actors in our national security and intelligence apparatus, and there are plenty of them,” Trump said in 2023 while laying out his priorities for a second term. “The departments and agencies that have been weaponized will be completely overhauled.”

The office of the director was created in 2004 as part of a series of changes to U.S. intelligence following the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Lawmakers hoped that the new office would prevent intelligence failures by streamlining interagency cooperation.

The office played a key role in the government’s efforts to identify and expose efforts by Russia, China and Iran to spread false and misleading claims about voting and democracy ahead of last week’s U.S. election. Other divisions focus on cyberthreats, counterterrorism and counterespionage.

military.com · November 13, 2024

14. Ukraine Prioritizes Security, Not Territory, as Trump Pushes Truce Talks

Excerpts:

Security guarantees, and not land, figure to be the thorniest issue in any peace deal. When Ukraine and Russia held peace talks in 2022, Russia eventually balked at the proposed deal’s critical component: an arrangement binding other countries to come to Ukraine’s defense if it were ever attacked again.

Russia has long said that it considers Ukrainian entry into NATO unacceptable. It has signaled that such a move would be a deal breaker for any cease-fire agreement, while also indicating it will want to keep control of the territory it has captured in Ukraine.

Discussions over a potential settlement have heated up since the election last week of Mr. Trump, who has vowed to press for immediate talks. That’s a shift from the Biden administration’s longtime position that the timing and terms of any settlement should be left to Ukraine. Mr. Trump has been openly skeptical about continuing American aid to Ukraine, and has said he can bring about an end to the war in one day — without saying how.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has repeatedly tried to portray Ukraine as the intransigent party when it comes to peace talks, while hinting at settlement terms that are only favorable to him. Ukrainian and Western officials view his stance as a demand for capitulation.

An immediate issue for any cease-fire along the front is Ukraine’s occupation of parts of Kursk, in southwest Russia, which the Ukrainian military invaded in August. Kyiv sees the territory as a potential bargaining chip during talks, but in Moscow, Ukraine’s departure is widely seen as a prerequisite for beginning negotiations. American officials say that some 50,000 Russian and North Korean troops have massed in Kursk in preparation for a counteroffensive to drive Ukraine from Russian land.

Ukraine Prioritizes Security, Not Territory, as Trump Pushes Truce Talks

President-elect Donald J. Trump may accelerate the timetable for a truce. Kyiv views guarantees against renewed aggression as crucial to any settlement.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/13/world/europe/trump-ukraine-russia-peace.html

A Ukrainian soldier repelling a Russian attack at a frontline position near Toretsk last month. Ukrainian forces have been losing ground in the east.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

By Andrew E. Kramer

Reported from Kyiv, Ukraine

Nov. 13, 2024

Leer en español

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Ukrainian officials have said for months that they would not cede territory occupied by Russia in any peace settlement. Now, as Ukraine contemplates an accelerated timetable for negotiations pushed by President-elect Donald J. Trump, it is putting at least as much importance on obtaining security guarantees as on where an eventual cease-fire line might fall.

With Ukrainian forces steadily losing ground in the east, two senior officials said that defending Ukraine’s interests in potential talks would hinge not on territorial boundaries, which are likely to be determined by the fighting, but on what assurances are in place to make a cease-fire hold.

“Talks should be based on guarantees,” said Roman Kostenko, the chairman of the Ukrainian Parliament’s Defense and Intelligence Committee. “For Ukraine, nothing is more important.”

A senior Ukrainian official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations, was more direct. “The territorial question is extremely important, but it’s still the second question,” the official said, “The first question is security guarantees.”

Ukraine sets its borders based on its 1991 declaration of independence. Russia has since gained control of about 20 percent of Ukrainian land, but Kyiv would not formally renounce its claim over any territory under Russian occupation, Mr. Kostenko said.

That appears to be the approach Ukraine is taking to justify any possible deal in which Russia would retain control of Ukrainian land. In October, President Volodymyr Zelensky, discussing a cease-fire, said “Everyone understands that no matter what path we take, legally no one will recognize the occupied territories as belonging to other countries.”

Skepticism about Russian commitment to a settlement runs deep in Ukraine, which had a bitter experience with cease-fires in 2014 and 2015 after sparring with Russian-backed forces along the eastern border. The cease-fires did not prevent more fighting, which simmered for eight years until Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.

Officials in Kyiv have been seeking membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a guarantee against renewed attacks from Russia. Western officials have signaled they want Ukraine to join NATO, but not on any kind of accelerated timetable.

Officials in Kyiv have also said that a robust arsenal of conventional weapons — to be provided by the West — would enable Ukraine to quickly strike back, serving as a deterrent to a resumption of hostilities.

Security guarantees, and not land, figure to be the thorniest issue in any peace deal. When Ukraine and Russia held peace talks in 2022, Russia eventually balked at the proposed deal’s critical component: an arrangement binding other countries to come to Ukraine’s defense if it were ever attacked again.

Russia has long said that it considers Ukrainian entry into NATO unacceptable. It has signaled that such a move would be a deal breaker for any cease-fire agreement, while also indicating it will want to keep control of the territory it has captured in Ukraine.

Discussions over a potential settlement have heated up since the election last week of Mr. Trump, who has vowed to press for immediate talks. That’s a shift from the Biden administration’s longtime position that the timing and terms of any settlement should be left to Ukraine. Mr. Trump has been openly skeptical about continuing American aid to Ukraine, and has said he can bring about an end to the war in one day — without saying how.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has repeatedly tried to portray Ukraine as the intransigent party when it comes to peace talks, while hinting at settlement terms that are only favorable to him. Ukrainian and Western officials view his stance as a demand for capitulation.

An immediate issue for any cease-fire along the front is Ukraine’s occupation of parts of Kursk, in southwest Russia, which the Ukrainian military invaded in August. Kyiv sees the territory as a potential bargaining chip during talks, but in Moscow, Ukraine’s departure is widely seen as a prerequisite for beginning negotiations. American officials say that some 50,000 Russian and North Korean troops have massed in Kursk in preparation for a counteroffensive to drive Ukraine from Russian land.

If Ukrainians are driven from Kursk, Russia could accept a cease-fire along the front line by next spring, Konstantin Zatulin, a lawmaker in Mr. Putin’s political party, said in an interview on Monday. “Everything will be based on facts,” he said. “Everything we have is ours; everything Ukraine has is Ukraine’s.”

To some of Moscow’s hard-liners, the points of dispute, including territorial claims, make a settlement by next spring unlikely.

“It will be difficult for us to come to an agreement precisely because even our softest position involves additional territorial concessions from Ukraine,” said Konstantin Malofeev, a conservative businessman allied with the Kremlin.

Image

Ukrainian forces pushed across the border into Kursk, in southwest Russia, in August.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times

The senior Ukrainian official said Kyiv would want to ensure any cease-fire line would not hurt the country’s economic recovery after the war by, for example, leaving industrial areas too insecure for investment. The width of a demilitarized zone — a buffer area between the two armies — would also be a key consideration, the officials said.

There are competing factions in Mr. Trump’s orbit who have expressed a range of views on Ukraine. A position voiced by JD Vance, the American vice president-elect, largely aligns with Kremlin talking points. His former secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, has advocated more robust military support than the Biden administration has been willing to offer.

Perhaps the most detailed clue of Mr. Trump’s views came in a July interview with Fox News.

“I would tell Zelensky, no more — you got to make a deal,” Mr. Trump said of President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. “I would tell Putin, If you don’t make a deal, we’re going to give him a lot.”

Mr. Trump and Mr. Zelensky spoke last week, but neither side made public what was discussed.

Mr. Zelensky has been appealing for support in the United States and European nations for what he calls a “peace through strength” strategy that would shore up Ukraine’s army and potentially improve its position on the battlefield before talks commence.

Image

Donald J. Trump with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at Trump Tower in New York in September.Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

But Ukraine’s plan is only one of several approaches, including a proposal by China and Brazil and another by Turkey that would address security for Black Sea shipping but could be expanded to include other issues.

For now, Ukraine is losing ground as quickly as at almost any time since the first days of the invasion. Russia has honed an effective if costly tactic of grinding forward through small infantry assaults, trading personnel for land. With too few soldiers, Ukraine has resorted to shuffling troops between hot spots on the front to prevent a collapse of the lines.

In its own plan, called the Peace Formula — widely seen as its starting point for negotiations — Ukraine has laid out 10 demands, including a full withdrawal, prosecution of war crimes and payment of reparations. At a summit in June, at which Russia was not present, those demands were not addressed.

But about 80 countries endorsed three other points in Ukraine’s plan: an exchange of prisoners of war and Russia’s release of civilian hostages; safeguarding nuclear sites such as the occupied Zaporizhzhia power plant; and guaranteeing free commercial shipping on the Black Sea.

Since then, Mr. Zelensky has softened Ukraine’s position, sending the foreign minister to China to welcome a Chinese role in talks and saying Russia could be invited to a future negotiating session on the Peace Formula.

Support for ceding territory in exchange for peace is rising among Ukrainians. A poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in October showed 32 percent of Ukrainians would support such an agreement, up from 19 percent last year.

But securing a favorable settlement for Ukraine while Russia is advancing would be extremely difficult, said Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a Ukrainian former minister of defense. Russian negotiators would be unlikely to settle only for territory their army had already taken.

“Whoever is in a winning position sets the terms,” he said. “It is true for governments or businesses.”

Image

Destroyed buildings in Kurakhove, Ukraine, in September. Russia has partly surrounded Ukrainian troops around the town, threatening new loss of territory.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Reporting was contributed by Anton Troianovski from Baku, Azerbaijan; Valerie Hopkins from Moscow; and Maria Varenikova and Marc Santora from Kyiv, Ukraine.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 14, 2024, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Ukraine Is Focusing on Security As Trump Presses for Cease-Fire. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

15. Transforming the U.S. Military for Gray Zone Operations: A New Approach to Force Structure

There is a supporting role for certain and applicable conventional forces for specific missions and tasks. However, they should be employed under an IW proficient and dedicated IW campaign headquarters. Our nuclear and conventional forces must be single-focused on being the premier warfighting forces in the world in order to be the most successful deterrent force. Which of course is the paradox. The greater our nuclear and conventional force capabilities are, the more likely the only domain in which our adversaries can compete is in the irregular warfare/gray zone space which then demands we have the exquisite political warfare/irregular warfare capabilities to compete in a superior manner there as well. We cannot sacrifice our nuclear and conventional force capabilities but we must have equally capable, proficient, and dedicated forces and headquarters that can orchestrate irregular warfare campaign in support of national level political warfare strategies.

Excerpts:

Conclusion: Rebuilding the U.S. Military for Gray Zone Dominance

To be prepared for the challenges of the future operating environment, the U.S. military must pivot away from a predominant focus on conventional warfare to address the persistent reality of Gray Zone conflict. This paradigm shift calls for a force structure oriented around flexibility, influence, intelligence, and deterrence, where traditional kinetic engagements are secondary to a broader strategy of maintaining leverage.

By prioritizing unconventional capabilities across each branch, the military can more effectively counter adversaries who operate below the threshold of war. This restructuring allows the U.S. to maintain regional influence, bolster partnerships, and counter adversarial influence operations without relying solely on the threat of large-scale combat. Each service’s divestment from outdated, combat-centric platforms frees resources for investments in agile, hybrid, and cyber-enabled assets that are essential for Gray Zone operations.

In adapting to this new operating environment, the U.S. military acknowledges that the Gray Zone is not an exception but a norm—an arena where influence, deterrence, and resilience determine success. Rebuilding for the Gray Zone positions the military to better protect national interests, uphold international stability, and deter adversaries who seek to achieve their aims without triggering conventional conflict. Doing so also presents an opportunity to divest expensive, legacy platforms that are tailor-made for situations that generally should be avoided if the military can dominate in the Gray Zone. This strategic evolution is essential for ensuring the U.S. military remains effective and capable in the face of modern, hybrid threats.

Transforming the U.S. Military for Gray Zone Operations: A New Approach to Force Structure

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/transforming-the-u-s-military-for-gray-zone-operations-a-new-approach-to-force-structure?postId=db3e89e4-6a77-463d-bccb-e10914fa29cc&utm

By Jeremiah Monk

Introduction

As global competition evolves, U.S. military strategy must adapt to a reality where conventional warfare is no longer the primary arena of conflict. In his 2015 article, Philip Kapusta defined the Gray Zone as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.” Kapusta noted that the U.S. has engaged in only five conventional wars over the past century, compared to 57 non-traditional actions. This data highlights that the Gray Zone is the norm rather than the exception.

Additionally, as I emphasized in the August 2024 Strategy Central article “What Are We Deterring,” effective deterrence today is less about preparing for open warfare and more about leveraging influence, intelligence, and hybrid capabilities to deter adversaries before conflict begins. Reorienting the U.S. military to treat the Gray Zone as the primary operating environment means shifting from a combat-centric force to a structure focused on flexibility, influence, and deterrence across unconventional domains. This article explores how each branch of the U.S. military—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force—can adapt to prioritize Gray Zone operations while maintaining a secondary capability for conventional warfare.

Redefining Deterrence: A Strategic Shift

The Deterrence article underscores the need for a deterrence model that extends beyond combat capabilities, noting that the Department of Defense (DoD) has traditionally equated deterrence with combat readiness. This approach fails to address adversaries who operate below the threshold of armed conflict, using economic, cyber, and influence tactics to achieve strategic goals without triggering military retaliation. Meanwhile, DoD’s focus remains on prevailing in combat rather than preventing and dissuading adversarial actions that could alleviate the need to engage in combat in the first place. This juxtaposition demands a redefined approach that integrates all elements of national power to achieve effective deterrence.

The DoD could restructure its forces to prioritize the Gray Zone as the default state of international conflict. This shift would entail developing capabilities optimized for unconventional, cyber, intelligence, and influence operations while retaining readiness for conventional warfare as a secondary focus. Here is a breakdown of a proposed force structure and organizational approach by service:

Army: Prioritizing Mobility, Special Operations, and Cyber Capabilities

In the Gray Zone, the Army’s primary focus would shift to small, mobile units and special operations forces (SOF) that can conduct intelligence gathering, cyber operations, and irregular warfare. The aim is to create an agile force capable of competing in complex, hybrid environments rather than preparing for large-scale, conventional battles.

Special Operations Expansion: Increase the size and operational support for Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, and Psychological Operations units. These units specialize in counterinsurgency, influence campaigns, and partnering with foreign militaries, making them ideal for missions that require a nuanced, on-the-ground presence in the Gray Zone.
Cyber and Electronic Warfare (EW) Units: Establish dedicated cyber and EW units at the brigade level to engage in cyber-psychological operations, disrupt adversary networks, and safeguard U.S. operations in contested environments. Cyber capabilities are essential for modern warfare, allowing the Army to counter adversaries in non-kinetic domains.
Forward-Deployed Hybrid Forces: Position small, resilient Army units in regions where hybrid threats are prevalent, such as Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific. These forces would act as rapid responders to Gray Zone activities, with multi-domain capabilities for intelligence, reconnaissance, and influence operations.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Emphasize FID missions, where Army units work alongside allied militaries to counter irregular threats. By building local defense capacities and enhancing partner resilience, the Army strengthens leverage in regions vulnerable to adversary influence.

Divestment Strategy: To support these shifts, the Army could divest from some heavy mechanized units, such as certain armored brigades and main battle tanks like the M1 Abrams. Heavy armor is optimized for large-scale combat but offers limited utility in irregular warfare. The Army could also reduce its reliance on large artillery units, focusing instead on portable precision-strike capabilities that support flexible, asymmetric operations.

Navy: Agile, Distributed Fleets and Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness

In a Gray Zone context, the Navy’s primary mission would be maritime domain awareness, influence operations, and controlling contested waters. While the Navy retains a secondary readiness for conventional naval combat, it would prioritize capabilities that provide intelligence, agility, and non-escalatory responses.

Distributed Maritime Operations: Restructure the fleet to include smaller, multi-role vessels (e.g., Littoral Combat Ships, Unmanned Surface Vessels) capable of rapid response and agile presence operations in contested waters. Distributed fleets allow the Navy to operate effectively in constrained and littoral zones, making it harder for adversaries to predict and counter U.S. naval presence.
Maritime Special Operations: Expand Naval Special Warfare units, such as SEALs, to focus on covert, Gray Zone missions. These missions could include countering hybrid threats, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and deploying in key maritime areas where conventional forces would be too visible or provocative.
Intelligence and Surveillance: Equip Navy vessels with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems for continuous maritime domain awareness. Gray Zone operations often rely on intelligence-driven strategies, and the Navy would require persistent ISR to monitor adversary actions, from covert supply routes to proxy activities.
Cyber and EW Integration: Place cyber warfare teams on key naval assets to disrupt adversary navigation, communications, and supply chains through electronic and cyber operations. By integrating EW with maritime forces, the Navy can operate non-kinetically to influence and deter without escalating to open conflict.

Divestment Strategy: The Navy could divest from large, high-maintenance platforms such as Ticonderoga-class cruisers and certain aging aircraft carriers. These vessels are resource-intensive and vulnerable in contested waters. By reallocating resources to smaller, more versatile platforms, the Navy can optimize its force structure for Gray Zone missions.

Air Force: Emphasis on ISR, Rapid Mobility, and Influence Operations

For the Air Force, the Gray Zone requires a focus on ISR, rapid deployment capabilities, and influence operations rather than traditional air dominance. The emphasis would shift toward unmanned systems, cyber capabilities, and intelligence assets that enhance flexibility and responsiveness.

Unmanned Systems and Drones: Expand the fleet of drones and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for persistent surveillance, reconnaissance, and influence operations. Drones can provide real-time intelligence in contested regions, support psychological operations from above, and maintain a low-profile presence in Gray Zone conflicts.
Cyber and EW Squadrons: Create dedicated squadrons for cyber and electronic warfare to disrupt enemy infrastructure, degrade communications, and perform cyber-enabled psychological operations. These capabilities enhance the Air Force’s ability to operate in Gray Zone environments with minimal kinetic engagement.
Influence and Information Operations: Develop capabilities to conduct influence operations, including air-dropped propaganda, broadcasted messaging, and non-lethal psychological operations. These tools enable the Air Force to influence adversary populations and sway public opinion without direct conflict.
Rapid Air Mobility: Invest in rapid airlift platforms to enable quick deployment of small, specialized teams in contested or unstable areas. Rapid mobility enhances the Air Force’s ability to respond to hybrid threats, providing deterrence through an on-the-ground presence.

Divestment Strategy: The Air Force could divest from some legacy fighter programs and manned bomber platforms, like the B-1 Lancer, which are costly and focused on conventional air superiority. Shifting resources toward drones, ISR platforms, and rapid airlift assets better aligns with Gray Zone priorities, allowing the Air Force to adapt to complex, hybrid missions.

Marine Corps: Stand-In Forces for Coastal and Influence Operations

The Marine Corps would shift from traditional amphibious assaults to operating as “stand-in” forces with a focus on coastal and influence operations. Marines would prioritize small, multi-role units capable of conducting reconnaissance, intelligence, and influence missions in close proximity to adversaries.

Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO): Develop small, agile bases in key regions for low-profile operations that monitor adversary actions and establish regional leverage. EABO allows Marines to engage in Gray Zone missions without escalating tensions, providing deterrence through presence.
Influence and Counter-Influence Units: Form influence-focused units that specialize in intelligence gathering, psychological operations, and counter-influence. These units enable the Marines to conduct missions that support U.S. influence in vulnerable areas, countering adversary propaganda and sway.
Hybrid Warfare Teams: Equip Marine units with hybrid warfare capabilities, such as cyber tools, EW, and drones, for multi-domain operations. These teams can counter irregular threats and enhance tactical flexibility in contested coastal regions.
Local Partnering and Training: Emphasize foreign internal defense (FID) missions, where Marines train and assist allied forces to bolster local defenses. By building capacity in partner nations, the Marines create regional leverage, supporting long-term stability and deterrence.

Divestment Strategy: The Marine Corps could reduce reliance on traditional amphibious platforms like the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs), which are costly and focused on conventional amphibious assaults. Scaling back heavy artillery and armored units also aligns with the Marines’ pivot to lighter, more agile forces for hybrid missions.

Space Force: Enhancing Resilience in Space and Cyber Domains

In the Gray Zone, the Space Force’s mission would emphasize protecting U.S. space infrastructure, gathering intelligence, and leveraging space-based assets for influence and cyber operations. Instead of focusing solely on conventional space warfare, the Space Force would prioritize building resilience against adversarial actions in the space and cyber domains.

Space ISR and Cyber Defense: Develop enhanced ISR capabilities specifically for monitoring adversary activities in space, such as satellite movements and potential cyber threats. This includes bolstering satellite defenses to prevent cyber infiltration or jamming, ensuring that U.S. space infrastructure remains secure and reliable in the face of adversarial interference.
Satellite-Based Influence Operations: Use satellite systems to conduct influence and information operations. This could include broadcasting messages or digital content in denied or restricted regions, allowing the U.S. to maintain influence and visibility even in adversary-controlled environments.
Anti-Satellite and Electronic Warfare Readiness: Although the focus remains on non-escalatory deterrence, the Space Force would maintain defensive anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite jamming and electronic countermeasures, as a deterrent against adversary space attacks. These measures enable the Space Force to protect critical space assets without relying solely on kinetic solutions.
Cyber-Resilient Space Infrastructure: Invest in distributed, resilient satellite constellations that reduce dependence on large, stationary assets vulnerable to attack. Small, rapidly deployable satellite networks can ensure continuous coverage and redundancy, enhancing the resilience of U.S. space capabilities in contested environments.
Allied Space Partnerships: Collaborate with allies on shared space monitoring and deterrence frameworks. By coordinating ISR and counter-space efforts with partner nations, the Space Force strengthens collective deterrence and ensures a unified response to adversary actions in space.

Divestment Strategy: The Space Force could phase out large, high-cost satellites and associated infrastructure that are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial threats. By reallocating resources toward smaller, distributed systems and cyber-resilient space infrastructure, the Space Force would build a force structure better suited for Gray Zone competition, while reducing reliance on assets designed primarily for conventional space dominance.

Conclusion: Rebuilding the U.S. Military for Gray Zone Dominance

To be prepared for the challenges of the future operating environment, the U.S. military must pivot away from a predominant focus on conventional warfare to address the persistent reality of Gray Zone conflict. This paradigm shift calls for a force structure oriented around flexibility, influence, intelligence, and deterrence, where traditional kinetic engagements are secondary to a broader strategy of maintaining leverage.

By prioritizing unconventional capabilities across each branch, the military can more effectively counter adversaries who operate below the threshold of war. This restructuring allows the U.S. to maintain regional influence, bolster partnerships, and counter adversarial influence operations without relying solely on the threat of large-scale combat. Each service’s divestment from outdated, combat-centric platforms frees resources for investments in agile, hybrid, and cyber-enabled assets that are essential for Gray Zone operations.

In adapting to this new operating environment, the U.S. military acknowledges that the Gray Zone is not an exception but a norm—an arena where influence, deterrence, and resilience determine success. Rebuilding for the Gray Zone positions the military to better protect national interests, uphold international stability, and deter adversaries who seek to achieve their aims without triggering conventional conflict. Doing so also presents an opportunity to divest expensive, legacy platforms that are tailor-made for situations that generally should be avoided if the military can dominate in the Gray Zone. This strategic evolution is essential for ensuring the U.S. military remains effective and capable in the face of modern, hybrid threats.

References

Kapusta, Philip. "The Gray Zone." Special Warfare, October-December 2015, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, p 19-25. https://www.swcs.mil/Portals/111/October%202015%20Special%20Warfare.pdf

Monk, Jeremiah. “What Are We Deterring?” Strategy Central, August 2024. https://www.strategycentral.io/post/what-are-we-deterring

16. US, Asian allies gather in East China Sea for more large-scale training

West Philippine Sea.

US, Asian allies gather in East China Sea for more large-scale training

Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · November 14, 2024

The aircraft carrier USS George Washington leads U.S., Japanese and South Korean destroyers in formation during Freedom Edge 24-2 in the East China Sea, Nov. 13, 2024. (Geoffrey Ottinger/U.S. Navy)

Warships and aircraft from the United States, Japan and South Korea gathered in the East China Sea on Wednesday to kick off their second large-scale exercise of the year.

Freedom Edge 24-2 ends on Friday and includes at least seven warships, including the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, which is due to arrive in Yokosuka later this fall, according to a news release Wednesday from South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The training is taking place south of South Korea’s Jeju Island, according to the news release.

The second iteration of Freedom Edge comes on the heels of recent North Korean missile launches, including an intercontinental ballistic missile on Oct. 31 and several short-range missiles on Nov. 5.

It also follows less than five months after the first Freedom Edge began on June 27, a day after the North fired an intermediate-range ballistic missile from near Pyongyang toward the Sea of Japan, also known as the East Sea.

The USS George Washington, seen here in the Pacific Ocean on Oct. 18, 2024, is among the warships involved in this week's Freedom Edge exercise in the East China Sea. (Geoffrey Ottinger/U.S. Navy)

The three countries agreed to the exercises at an August 2023 summit at Camp David, Md., between President Joe Biden, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.

The Freedom Edge participants this year jointly condemned North Korea’s recent actions, including the ICBM launch, during high-level talks, according to the South Korean news release.

“This training reflected their will to deter and respond to such threats,” it said.

The three-day exercise includes the U.S. guided-missile destroyers USS McCampbell, USS Higgins and USS Dewey; the Japanese destroyer JS Haguro; the Korean destroyers ROKS Seoae-Ryu-Seong-ryong and ROKS Chungmugong-Yi-Sun-sin; and scores of fighter jets, surveillance planes and other aircraft, according to a news release Wednesday from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

This iteration focuses on “state-of-the-art air defense capabilities,” including fifth-generation fighters, as well as ballistic-missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare and cyber defense, according to the release.

“The three countries will continue to closely cooperate to further expand their cooperation in a complex security environment,” INDOPACOM said.

An INDOPACOM spokesman did not immediately respond to an email requesting additional information Thursday, Japan time.

Alex Wilson

Alex Wilson covers the U.S. Navy and other services from Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. Originally from Knoxville, Tenn., he holds a journalism degree from the University of North Florida. He previously covered crime and the military in Key West, Fla., and business in Jacksonville, Fla.

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Stars and Stripes · by Alex Wilson · November 14, 2024

17. Trump’s National Security Team Should Have Adversaries Worried

This is one interpretation of the new administration and its national security team.

We must be careful not to over prioritize China at the expense of our interns throughout the world. Rather than prioritize China let's talk about protecting our interests, especially our vital national interests around the world. This new national security should first articulate in a clear and coherent manner what are our vital national interests and then inform the American people how they are protecting, sustaining, and advancing them around the world.

Excerpts:

With the benefit of seeing the president-elect’s burgeoning national security team, I think it is fair to say the isolationist canard can be readily dismissed as a gross misapprehension of the new administration’s foreign policy. A better understanding is to see the administration as poised to prioritize China while restoring effective deterrence in Europe and the Middle East.

Put more bluntly: The incoming administration will look to quickly clean up the messiness of the global security environment over the past four years, reinvigorate US military strength, and redirect US resources across the Pacific to ensure America wins the growing confrontation with its most significant adversary since the Soviet Union.

Trump’s National Security Team Should Have Adversaries Worried - Providence

providencemag.com · by Jeffrey Cimmino on November 13, 2024 · November 13, 2024

Since winning reelection to the White House last week, President-elect Donald Trump has rapidly started to form his cabinet and fill senior White House positions. Notably, the administration has filled or selected nominees for several key national security roles, including National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, and United Nations Ambassador. The post of Secretary of State will go to Senator Marco Rubio, who during Trump’s first term was known as “a virtual secretary of state for Latin America” owing to his vigorous efforts to intensify American resolve against Venezuela.

President Trump’s initial selections demonstrate a clear commitment to advancing US interests within a framework of peace through strength. America’s adversaries have every reason to be worried—and that’s for the best.

Over the course of his presidency, President Biden’s foreign policy has been hamstrung by a technocratic approach that has resulted in excessive caution while also trying to cater to progressive constituencies at home.

For example, in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Biden Administration has pushed for enough aid to keep Ukraine in the fight but has repeatedly dithered over providing certain weapons or reducing barriers to using US-supplied weapons on Russian territory. Rhetorically, the Biden Administration has stated it is in the fight for “as long as it takes,” which is hardly a strategy. Biden thus both failed to deter the full-scale invasion and then, operating with a lack of decisiveness, has sent billions of dollars worth of US resources to a conflict for which it has no clear endgame.

The incoming administration’s approach seems designed to take back control of the global landscape in the sense that rather than reacting to and managing cascading conflagrations, it will seek resolute action to enable the United States to focus on the severe challenge posed by China.

This approach is evident in a recent piece for The Economist by incoming National Security Advisor and current Florida Representative Mike Waltz and the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig. Noting how the current administration’s foreign policy blunders and indecisiveness have redounded to China’s benefit and invited more aggression from adversaries, the two authors argue for leveraging US strengths to wind down conflicts on favorable terms. In Europe, this means unleashing US natural gas and cracking down on Russian oil sales to choke Russia’s economy. If more is needed to bring Vladimir Putin to the table, the United States could also provide a jolt to Ukraine with more weapons and fewer restrictions to increase costs on already war-weary Russian troops. Meanwhile, in the Middle East, Washington should restore pressure on Iran and support Israel’s effort to finish the fight against Hamas.

For her part, incoming UN Ambassador and current New York Representative Elise Stefanik has been a staunch supporter of Israel and proponent of increasing pressure on Iran. President Trump’s Defense Secretary nominee, Pete Hegseth, has also expressed firm support for Israel while acknowledging the scale of the challenge posed by China. He has also been a staunch critic of progressive ideology emanating into the US military from the Pentagon and undermining American military strength.

In a piece I wrote for Providence over the summer, I noted that it was a misnomer to characterize the now-Vice President-elect’s foreign policy toward Europe as isolationist. Senator Vance had called for improved burden-sharing with European allies and suggested it was a fool’s errand to think Ukraine would regain its full territory, but he had not called for abandoning US security commitments or letting Ukraine fall under Moscow’s shadow.

With the benefit of seeing the president-elect’s burgeoning national security team, I think it is fair to say the isolationist canard can be readily dismissed as a gross misapprehension of the new administration’s foreign policy. A better understanding is to see the administration as poised to prioritize China while restoring effective deterrence in Europe and the Middle East.

Put more bluntly: The incoming administration will look to quickly clean up the messiness of the global security environment over the past four years, reinvigorate US military strength, and redirect US resources across the Pacific to ensure America wins the growing confrontation with its most significant adversary since the Soviet Union.

Jeffrey Cimmino is a Contributing Editor with Providence Magazine. His writing has appeared in The National Interest, National Review, Spectator USA, The Washington Examiner, and other venues.

Providence is the only publication devoted to Christian Realism in American foreign policy and is entirely funded by donor contributions. There are no advertisements, sponsorships, or paid posts to support the work of Providence, just readers who generously partner with Providence to keep our magazine running. If you would care to make a donation it would be highly appreciated to help Providence in advancing the Christian realist perspective in 2024. Thank you!

providencemag.com · by Jeffrey Cimmino on November 13, 2024 · November 13, 2024

18. Why tattooed Fox News star Pete Hegseth is a genius pick for Trump's Defense Secretary, writes JOSH HAMMER

I think it is clear (and always has been) that the sole guiding philosophy (political, economic, and national security) of the new administration can be summed up in one word: Disruption. The Disruptor in Chief is placing the ultimate disruptors in the key departments and agencies. Whether for better or for worse it is going to be interesting to see what can be done and how things will play out. As the Chinese curse says: "May you live in interesting times." The next two to four years will be some interesting times.

Why tattooed Fox News star Pete Hegseth is a genius pick for Trump's Defense Secretary, writes JOSH HAMMER

By JOSH HAMMER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

Published: 17:31 EST, 13 November 2024 | Updated: 18:22 EST, 13 November 2024

Daily Mail · by JOSH HAMMER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM · November 13, 2024

Cue the Democrat-media complex freakouts!

Leftist tears have been flowing mightily ever since Trump shocked the world by winning every single swing state in last Tuesday's electoral rout.

But those tears turned into waterfalls after Trump tapped Army veteran and Fox News host Pete Hegseth to clean out the Augean stables at the bloated, woke-addled Pentagon.

'When I saw [news of Hegseth's nomination], I thought the AP must have been hacked,' wailed former failed CNN host Don Lemon. 'But Pete Hegseth? The morning, weekend host on Fox News? Come on.'

Democratic Rep. Dan Goldman said: 'Being a serviceman does not make you qualified to lead the Department of Defense and to have access to our nuclear weapons.'

So says the man whose greatest credential is that he's an heir to the Levi Strauss & Co. fortune... and a TV pundit.

Well, since you raised it, Congressman, let's talk about those qualifications—shall we?

Liberal tears turned into waterfalls after Trump tapped Army veteran and Fox News host Pete Hegseth to clean out the Augean stables at the bloated, woke-addled Pentagon .

Fox News host Pete Hegseth's tattoos decoded after being named new Secretary of Defense

Hegseth received his Bachelor of Arts in politics at Princeton and earned a Master of Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.

In 2003, after being commissioned into the Minnesota National Guard and then serving as a platoon leader in Guantanamo Bay, he volunteered for the U.S. Army infantry at the height of the Iraq War.

Hegseth completed tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, winning two Bronze Stars in the process.

After returning home, he served as executive director of Concerned Veterans for America, a formidable conservative organization that (correctly) opposes reckless military boondoggles and advocates for a restrained — one might say 'America First' — approach to foreign policy.

He has also advocated for long-overdue reform of the sclerotic Department of Veteran Affairs—an agency he would later be considered to lead during the Trump administration.

At 44 years old, he's close to the age of many men and women who are now either serving overseas or recovering from the wounds of wars at home. And it is only someone of a younger generation, like Hegseth, who might be able to turn around our military's anemic enlistments.

Last year was the worst on record for recruitment – with the Army, Navy and Air Force missing their goals by double-digit percentages.

Want more young men to sign up to the military?

Ditch the assigned Ibram X. Kendi and Robin DiAngelo readings and make sure our young warriors once again read men like General George Patton and Douglas MacArthur, he suggests. And he's right.

Hegseth's attack on destructive progressive ideologies and the threat they pose to military readiness is full-on.

'My trust in this army is irrevocably broken,' he wrote in his bestselling book, 'The War on Warriors: Behind the Betrayal of the Men Who Keep Us Free,' published earlier this year.

'The so-called elites directing the military today aren't just lowering standards and focusing on the wrong enemy — they believe power is bad, merit is unfair [and] white people are yesterday,' he said.

In 2003, after being commissioned into the Minnesota National Guard and serving as a platoon leader in Guantanamo Bay, he volunteered for the U.S. Army infantry at the height of the Iraq War and completed tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, winning two Bronze Stars in the process.

Hegseth's attack on destructive progressive ideologies and the threat they pose to military readiness is full-on. (Above) Hegseth and wife Jennifer Cunningham Rauchet

Many of his critics were clutching their pearls on Tuesday over Hegseth's public take on women serving in combat roles.

While he supports women joining the military, he doesn't think they should be assigned to 'physical, labor-intensive-type jobs'. That, he argues, undermines military readiness.

To many Americans, it's also just common sense.

'Any general, any admiral... that was involved in diversity, equity and inclusion programmes or woke s*** has got to go,' he told a podcaster last week. And, he stressed, that includes members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Most importantly, Hegseth has demonstrated an understanding of Trump's pragmatic approach to foreign policy – that America has overextended itself in too many proxy wars.

He has identified that Communist China is, bar none, America's foremost 21st-century civilizational threat – and that, in the Middle East, Iran is a menacing actor and Israel is our closest friend.

Most importantly, Hegseth has demonstrated an understanding of Trump's pragmatic approach to foreign policy – that America has overextended itself in too many proxy wars.

Perhaps the best thing going for him? His nomination has all the right people triggered.

A Politico article quoted an anonymous defense industry lobbyist—someone whose entire job is to bilk the taxpayers of billions of dollars — as emoting, 'Who the f*** is this guy?'

Indeed, Hegseth's number is not in any of their rolodexes. And if that means less corporate slush fund money for overinflated defense contractors like Northrop Grumman, it sounds like an endorsement to me.

At a time when America's failed class of military generals valorize wokeism and far too often deploy our young warriors to unwinnable conflicts overseas, naming an 'outsider' to the Pentagon bureaucracy merits America's enthusiastic support.

Yes, the greatest knock of Hegseth is that he lacks significant experience maneuvering around the swollen federal bureaucracy.

But such skills have failed to keep America – and its brave warfighters – from being ensnared in decades of unnecessary and futile conflicts or from being humiliated in Afghanistan.

Perhaps, it's time to try something else?

Josh Hammer is the syndicated host of 'The Josh Hammer Show' and senior editor-at-large at Newsweek.

Daily Mail · by JOSH HAMMER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM · November 13, 2024

19. On the Precipice of a New Era of Warfare? Reflections on Military Revolutions, Past and Future

Changing nature? (not!), Changing character? (perhaps). The fluid future of warfare? (I like this one I heard from a general last week). Of course "war is more than a true chameleon. " (dead Carl)

And as Cohen and Gooch wrote, all military failures are a result of a failure to learn, a failure to adapt, and a failure to anticipate.

Excerpt:

Military organizations have been slow to adapt to these sociopolitical transformations. On the one hand, the unipolar world and the RMA of the 1990s convinced some leaders that large militaries were relics of the past; on the other, occupation duties in Afghanistan and Iraq and attritional warfare in Ukraine have shown the continued need for massive numbers of ground troops. Doctrine writers, too, are unsure how to proceed: NATO mostly still adheres to the joint and combined-arms warfare it perfected during the Cold War; Russia has been more adept at using “hybrid” techniques, such as information warfare, but has found in Ukraine that these cannot replace boots on the ground. At the tactical and technological level, the twentieth-century armored formations on land and carrier strike groups at sea seem antiquated, as combat shifts to urban areas, as standoff missiles become more precise and effective, and as cyber and electronic warfare become more sophisticated. Small cells of combatants with handheld devices detonating improvised explosive devices or flying drones have prevented the concentration of forces and blunted offensive maneuver, and artificial intelligence promises soon to make some weapon systems fully automated, requiring only programmers in the rear. Taken as a whole, are these changes simply another generational RMA, are they indicative of a military revolution, or do they represent a whole new, twenty-first-century paradigm of warfare? The next few years may very well tell. What is certain, however, is that our political and military leaders must equip themselves to respond to—and ideally to anticipate—the unforeseen, to think outside of the box, to learn from the past without being shackled by it. The continued preponderance of Western influence on the geopolitical stage depends on it.

On the Precipice of a New Era of Warfare? Reflections on Military Revolutions, Past and Future - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · by John F. Morris · November 14, 2024

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The literature on military revolutions and revolutions in military affairs has proliferated since historian Michael Roberts coined the former term in 1956. Among the most clear and compelling examples is MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray’s 2001 sketch of the historiography of both concepts. First, they define military revolutions as fundamental changes to the framework of war, recasting societies and states in addition to military organizations. Revolutions in military affairs, or RMAs, on the other hand, are less dramatic; they are “clusters” of technological, tactical, doctrinal, or organizational changes that are confined to the military sphere. Knox and Murray then summarize the consensus among historians that—preceded by “anticipatory RMAs of the Middle Ages and early modern era”—five military revolutions occurred in the West from about 1618 to the present. The first was “the seventeenth-century creation of the modern state and of modern military institutions”; the second, the French Revolution; the third, the Industrial Revolution; the fourth, the combination of the first three revolutions during World War I; and the fifth, “nuclear weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems” development from the end of World War II. Each of these military revolutions was associated with and resulted in certain RMAs. I should like to modify Knox and Murray’s narrative by grouping the first three and the last two of their military revolutions into what may be termed two fairly distinct paradigms of warfare. By doing so, and then examining today’s sociopolitical, strategic, and technological landscapes, it becomes clear that we may be on the precipice of a third.

From the early 1600s until the early 1900s, what I shall call the Westphalian paradigm transformed warfare in the West and allowed a handful of Western states to conquer most of the world. This paradigm included three military revolutions, the first of which began during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648) and came to fruition in the decades that followed. The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia inaugurated a system of states and of balance of power in Europe that would last until the first sounds of the guns of August in 1914. Most of the successful states in this system concentrated power in the hands of absolute monarchs, who created modern military institutions, such as standing regiments and technical academies, composed of forces loyal to them rather than to individual nobles and mercenary chiefs. They grouped themselves into temporary alliances to further their realist foreign-policy goals and conducted mercantilist exploitation of their overseas possessions to finance wars. Under the command of professional officer corps, armies incorporated Maurice of Orange’s and Gustavus Adolphus’s tactical reforms, improved the use of combined arms, and inculcated in their soldiers via drill what John A. Lynn has called the “battle culture of forbearance”—the ability to withstand indiscriminate musket and artillery fire without breaking and sometimes without even responding. Military engineers like the Marquis of Vauban in France both utilized trace italienne design techniques to build the star-shaped fortresses that still mark the European landscape today and developed siege warfare tactics to reduce them. Victory in continental war, which during the eighteenth century usually meant no more than a slight readjustment of state borders, relied on perfection of these methods. King Frederick II exemplified this mastery, managing to expand his Prussian realm despite being surrounded by foes.

The French Revolution of 1789 unleashed the second military revolution, with Napoleon Bonaparte threatening (though ultimately falling short of destroying) the entire Westphalian state system by combining French army reforms of the late-monarchical era, particularly the use of mobile field artillery, with the sociopolitical changes of the 1790s, foremost among them the levée en masse of 1793. Napoleon fought with an army that at first was several times the size of those of his opponents and drawn from all estates. Although we should not overstate it, his was a force imbued with the spirit of nationalism, which made soldiers less likely to desert. This, as well as the dramatic growth in the European population in the eighteenth century, meant that Napoleon and his generals could allow their men to forage for food when the army was on the march, no longer restricted to poor road networks and reliant on wagon resupply from caches. And this in turn facilitated dispersion, usually in corps-sized units, the avoidance of enemy strong points, and incredible speed of maneuver. Eventually France’s enemies not only adopted to an extent her tactical, doctrinal, organizational, and even sociopolitical innovations but also coalesced in a grand alliance against her, restoring the Westphalian state system and the balance of power between states in the Concert of Europe.

The third military revolution of this period could be termed the industrial, that which took place in the half century before World War I. It included: military exploitation of such marvels of the Industrial Revolution as the steamship, the railroad, and the telegraph; the introduction of smokeless powder, breech-loading bolt-action rifles and machine guns; and the development of antimalarial drugs. These innovations allowed Europeans to explore and conquer vast lands in Africa and Asia, well beyond the coastal enclaves to which they were hitherto confined. In Europe itself, the Prusso-German army of the late nineteenth century gained the most from the military revolution, achieving rapid victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1867), and France (1870) and uniting Deutschland for the first time in a thousand years. In North America, the United States remained united by defeating the rebellious Southern states between 1861 and 1865; it did so only by harnessing the industrial production capacity of the North in a way never before seen and raising troops in a way reminiscent of the French Revolutionary armies. Yet in the ensuing decades, the playing field, as always, leveled off, as all of the great powers underwent the industrial military revolution. In 1914, the well-oiled German war machine rolled through Belgium and northern France and reached the outskirts of Paris in a month’s time. Once it was halted, however, the Western Front devolved into four years of attritional warfare that witnessed no major grand-tactical (not to mention operational) breakthrough until the German Spring Offensives of 1918 and no strategic breakthrough until the Central Powers reached exhaustion in November of that year.

The difference between 1914 and, say, 1792 or 1864 was that it marked not just the apotheosis of a military revolution but also that of the entire Westphalian paradigm of warfare of the preceding three centuries. On the eve of World War I, the great powers faced off against each other in two allied blocs operating under the principles of Realpolitik. These were well-established Westphalian states bringing to bear centralized power, usually situated in monarchical institutions. All had colonies beyond their borders, many overseas, which they exploited for resources and manpower. Their professionalized officer corps were trained to command relatively concentrated infantry formations, horse cavalry, and horse-drawn, line-of-sight artillery, their regulars well drilled to withstand enemy fire. Generals were imbued with offensive élan and studied in the Napoleonic corps system, which emphasized rapid movement, dispersion, and foraging in order to bypass the Vaubanian fortresses—supposedly only penetrable by long, textbook sieges—that guarded nearly all of the key terrain in Europe. Given the heightened sense of nationalism across the continent, they could expect to augment their armies’ ranks with millions of conscripts and volunteers at the sound of the war tocsin, to get them to the front within hours using the railroads that now crisscrossed Western Europe, and to issue them commands from vast distances away via telegraph and telephone. These troops would be armed with rapid-firing rifles and machine guns, churned out of industrial factories converted to wartime purposes.

But just as the Thirty Years’ War of 1618 to 1648 ended the Renaissance paradigm of warfare and ushered in the Westphalian, the thirty years bookended by the outbreak of World War I in 1914 and the end of World War II in 1945 drew the curtain on the latter and launched a new phase in military history, what may be termed the Wilsonian paradigm. At the political, economic, and social level, this system, reflecting its namesake’s Weltanschauung, was fraught with paradoxes. On the one hand, the global league of nation-states advocated by Woodrow Wilson in 1919 eventually came into being as the United Nations after 1945. International law forbade any adjustment of state borders without its consent. On the other hand, this was hardly the cooperative body the US president and his allies envisioned, divided as it was (until 1991) into pro-American and pro-Soviet blocs of states and as it has been (since 1991) into pro-Western and anti-Western groupings. And the self-determination elucidated in Wilson’s Fourteen Points opened a Pandora’s Box of national aspirations that made border revisions all but inevitable. The states that emerged after 1918, and especially after 1945, were quite different than their Westphalian predecessors: centralized still, but far more reliant on bureaucratic and technocratic experts; democratic or dictatorial rather than monarchical; and with market or command rather than mercantile economies, the former integrated like never before by institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Atomic and then nuclear weapons technology made large-scale conflicts, such as the Korean War, limited, yet massive armies composed of long-serving regulars and short-term conscripts persisted on both sides of the Iron Curtain until it was lifted, at which time most Western states reverted to small professional militaries buttressed by increasingly destructive conventional weapons. The major organizational changes of the period, tied to the political, were first, the establishment of permanent alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) in Europe, and second, the rise of unconventional guerrilla forces in the developing world where they were much more effective than during the Westphalian era in hastening decolonization; they also fought successfully against the world’s superpower, the United States, and its nation-building exercises in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

The doctrinal, tactical, and technological innovations of the interwar years, first displayed by Germany with its Blitzkrieg operations of 1940, were soon adopted by all major powers. These included the use of armored cavalry, motorized and mechanized infantry, and long-range artillery. Air superiority, an unknown concept before 1914, became a key enabler of tactical and operational success on the battlefield. At sea too, airpower became the decisive element of victory, as the battleships of the Westphalian period were replaced by aircraft carriers with submarine escort. In the 1970s and ’80s, the United States perfected these methods of warfare, fielding the high-cost Big Five acquisitions (the AH-64 Apache attack helicopter, the M-1 Abrams main battle tank, the UH-60 Black Hawk utility and transport helicopter, the M-2 and M-3 Bradley fighting vehicles, and the Patriot air defense missile system), implementing the Airland Battle concept, employing an all-volunteer rather than a heavily conscripted force, and mastering what it called JLOTS—Joint Logistics over the Shore. In the Gulf War of 1991, the US armed forces showcased their battlefield dominance, defeating Iraqi forces in just a hundred hours. Meanwhile, satellite and digital technologies were facilitating what many commentators called another RMA, one that allowed advanced militaries to track with incredible accuracy their own (blue) forces as well as enemy (red) forces. These innovations, however, did not end up changing the framework of war: uncertainty on the battlefield remained, as counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq—where US forces found themselves mired for the first two decades of the 2000s—made clear.

On the other hand, the US experience in the inaptly named War on Terror, along with the increasingly aggressive geopolitical behavior of Russia and China after 2008, suggested that we might be on the precipice of whole new paradigm of warfare. At the sociopolitical level, the latter powers formed BRICS with Brazil, India, and South Africa in 2009 (Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Emirates joined in 2024), a direct challenge to the Bretton Woods economic system. In 2013, China launched its Belt and Road Initiative, a means for it to expand its influence in about 150 (mainly developing) countries. Russia also enhanced its activities in the developing world and began to counter NATO expansion into the former Soviet sphere of influence in 2008 with the invasion of Georgia, followed by the 2014 invasion of Ukraine. It has in recent years formed a loose military alliance with communist China and rogue states in Iran and North Korea. Meanwhile, nonstate actors have proliferated and grown as powerful as states themselves. These include, among others, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, private military companies like Blackwater and Wagner, and, in an era when the sources of power and influence are diversifying, multibillionaires such as Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos. While these entities weaken the Westphalian state, mass immigration into North America and Europe from the Global South and the rise of far-right parties in response threaten to destabilize the Wilsonian nation. Universal availability of the internet and smartphone technology has created networked populations simultaneously harder for traditional institutions to control and easier for nonstate actors to manipulate. In a sense, the world is returning both to pre-Wilsonian great power competition, with revisionist leaders constantly attempting to expand their states’ borders through direct invasions and indirect imperialism, and to pre-Westphalian power dynamics, with state power constantly challenged by feudal barons and mercenary captains.

Military organizations have been slow to adapt to these sociopolitical transformations. On the one hand, the unipolar world and the RMA of the 1990s convinced some leaders that large militaries were relics of the past; on the other, occupation duties in Afghanistan and Iraq and attritional warfare in Ukraine have shown the continued need for massive numbers of ground troops. Doctrine writers, too, are unsure how to proceed: NATO mostly still adheres to the joint and combined-arms warfare it perfected during the Cold War; Russia has been more adept at using “hybrid” techniques, such as information warfare, but has found in Ukraine that these cannot replace boots on the ground. At the tactical and technological level, the twentieth-century armored formations on land and carrier strike groups at sea seem antiquated, as combat shifts to urban areas, as standoff missiles become more precise and effective, and as cyber and electronic warfare become more sophisticated. Small cells of combatants with handheld devices detonating improvised explosive devices or flying drones have prevented the concentration of forces and blunted offensive maneuver, and artificial intelligence promises soon to make some weapon systems fully automated, requiring only programmers in the rear. Taken as a whole, are these changes simply another generational RMA, are they indicative of a military revolution, or do they represent a whole new, twenty-first-century paradigm of warfare? The next few years may very well tell. What is certain, however, is that our political and military leaders must equip themselves to respond to—and ideally to anticipate—the unforeseen, to think outside of the box, to learn from the past without being shackled by it. The continued preponderance of Western influence on the geopolitical stage depends on it.

Lieutenant Colonel John F. Morris, PhD, was an armor and cavalry officer for eight years, including two years of combat in Iraq. After becoming a foreign area officer, he has served as an instructor of military history at West Point, a strategic and international affairs advisor at two NATO headquarters, chief of the US Office of Defense Cooperation in Israel, and chief of a New START inspection division in the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency. He earned his BS from West Point and his MA, MPhil, and PhD from Columbia University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Image credit: Dpsu.gov.ua

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mwi.westpoint.edu · by John F. Morris · November 14, 2024

20. Rubio, Gabbard, and Gaetz. . . Oh My!

Ha ha. I could not resist this headline

Rubio, Gabbard, and Gaetz. . . Oh My!

https://www.thefp.com/p/rubio-gabbard-and-gaetz-oh-my?utm

Plus: What would Trump’s deportations actually look like? Border czar Thomas Homan talks to The Free Press. And much more.

By Oliver Wiseman

November 14, 2024

It’s Thursday, November 14. This is The Front Page, your daily window into the world of The Free Press—and our take on the world at large. Coming up: interviews with author Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Teamsters boss Sean O’Brien, and Trump’s new border czar Thomas Homan. Plus: Joe Nocera remembers Ted Olson. And more.

But first, three presidential picks—and what they say about the second Trump term.

On Wednesday, Donald Trump announced three more headline-grabbing cabinet nominees. Each represents a strand of the unlikely MAGA alliance that triumphed last week and is set to run Washington in the coming years.

The first pick was the most orthodox and least surprising. Earlier this week, The New York Times reported that Trump was expected to select Florida senator Marco Rubio as his secretary of state. And—after a few days of nervous waiting for Rubio and his supporters—he finally did just that.

Rubio’s elevation to the role of America’s top diplomat is a blow to those in Trump’s orbit pushing for a clean break from the Republican foreign policy establishment. More traditional Republicans welcomed Rubio as an adult in the room who has serious views on how to confront China, Russia, and Iran. But they also wondered how long he might last given how many MAGA loyalists have defined him as a war hawk. “That should make Rubio very wary,” a veteran foreign policy hand from Trump’s first term told The Free Press. “He will not last two years.”

When it comes to the dynamics of the MAGA coalition, Rubio represents a Republican establishment at peace with its leader: a rival turned supplicant whose loyalty since 2016 has been repaid.

The second pick was a little more surprising. Tulsi Gabbard—a military veteran and former Democrat until she came out as a Republican this year, and a longtime critic of the foreign policy establishment—is Trump’s selection for director of national intelligence. This is like putting an antiestablishment fox in charge of the deep-state henhouse. No one disputes the dynamic—they just disagree on whether that’s a good thing.

Gabbard’s foreign policy views are at odds with many of Trump’s other picks, including Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz. On the day Russia invaded Ukraine, Gabbard blamed the West for the war, stating that Vladimir Putin had legitimate fears over Ukraine joining NATO that Biden should have acknowledged. She is a dove on China (unlike most everyone else in Trump’s cabinet) and is also “skeptical” that Bashar al-Assad used chemical weapons on his own people—and even went to Damascus to meet the Syrian dictator in 2017.

One senior congressional staffer told The Free Press that he questioned whether the former congresswoman could even get a security clearance given her flirtations with the Assad regime, one of Iran’s closest allies. But many MAGA supporters claimed she’d facilitate a needed break from failed Republican policies. Moreover, they think there’s poetic justice in the idea that a woman who had reportedly been placed on a “secret terror watchlist” by the TSA could now be running the country’s national intelligence apparatus.

Even Gabbard’s admirers admit she’s a little kooky. In 2022, the former Hawaii lawmaker urged Putin, Volodymyr Zelensky, and Joe Biden to “put geopolitics aside and embrace the spirit of aloha, respect and love.” Okay?

While Rubio represents a GOP brought to heel, Gabbard represents the ragtag Rebel Alliance—many of them former Democrats—that formed behind Trump during this election.

But the third announcement yesterday was the real jaw-dropper: Florida congressman Matt Gaetz, Trump announced, would be his pick for attorney general. The news was met with shock across Washington.

The Gaetz pick felt like the cabinet-appointment equivalent of shitposting. The man Trump wants to be the federal government’s top attorney practiced law for a grand total of two years before becoming a legislator. He was the subject of a long-running House ethics investigation relating to allegations of sexual misconduct and drug use—until he resigned from Congress shortly after Trump’s announcement. And if confirmed—a pretty big if—he would be running the department that recently investigated him for sex trafficking and obstruction of justice.

We spoke to several senior conservative legal scholars and former White House officials about his appointment, and let’s just say they weren’t thrilled.

“I’m already hearing from a wide number of solid and capable conservatives great consternation,” said one top conservative legal figure.

“My phone is blowing up,” said a leading Republican lawyer. “I can’t believe the Senate would confirm him.”

“Gaetz will have to plead the Fifth at his confirmation, which would be a first,” said a veteran Republican strategist.

So what’s the takeaway on Gaetz?

The left-wing critique is that he’s crazy and this will be a disaster. The conservative critique, expressed by several we spoke to, is that this is needless drama, especially given the other qualified names that had been floated.

Some wonder if Trump is playing 4D chess—that he knows Gaetz won’t get confirmed and ultimately has someone else in mind. If Republican senators die on this hill, then he can get the rest of his picks through. Maybe. But that all sounds a little too premeditated.

What does Gaetz represent? Full-bore MAGA. The 42-year-old congressional troublemaker would be unimaginable in a previous iteration of the GOP: fully on board both stylistically and ideologically, and unquestioningly loyal. Which won’t reassure those who worry Trump wants an attorney general to do his bidding.

And there you have it: three legs of the MAGA stool exemplified by three cabinet picks on a weird day in Washington.

Will Donald Trump Really Deport Eleven Million People?

On the campaign trail, Donald Trump promised to deport millions of illegal immigrants. Exactly whether he’ll do that, and how, are questions that will dominate the early days of his second term.

The man who must answer the many thorny legal and political questions that arise is Thomas Homan, who Trump named his “border czar” last week.

Homan gave an exclusive interview to Free Press reporter Madeleine Rowley, and said his priority come January will be targeting immigrants who pose “public safety threats and national security threats.”

Read the interview in full: “Trump’s New Border Czar Has 11 Million Problems to Solve.”

What Made Ted Olson Great

The legal giant Ted Olson died of a stroke Wednesday morning at the age of 84. “He was a great man,” writes Joe Nocera in his tribute to “the finest Supreme Court practitioner of his generation.” Olson argued Bush v. Gore, winning the case for George W. Bush. He won the Citizens United case. And he became the conservative half of the winning team in the fight to legalize gay marriage in California.

“But when I think back on Ted Olson’s life—when I think about what made him great,” writes Joe, “it’s not the Supreme Court victories or the other career achievements I find myself focusing on. Rather, it was his integrity.

“That integrity informed his commitment to the American project, and above all else, his deep devotion to the Constitution.”

Read Joe Nocera’s full tribute to Ted Olson: “What Made Ted Olson Great.”

21. Opinion The right and left are talking about the military in dangerous ways

Opinion The right and left are talking about the military in dangerous ways

The U.S. military is busy enough. Stop dragging it into partisan politics.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/11/13/military-civilian-generals-trump-politics/?utm

President Joe Biden meets with the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders at the White House on May 15. (Demetrius Freeman/The Washington Post)

By Martin E. Dempsey and Peter Feaver

November 13, 2024 at 7:00 a.m. EST

Martin E. Dempsey was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2011 to 2015 and now teaches at Duke University. Peter Feaver is professor of political science and public policy at Duke and author of “Thanks For Your Service: The Causes and Consequences of Public Confidence in the US Military.”

Donald Trump will inherit a U.S. military that is professional, capable — and busy. Its officer and enlisted corps are focused on becoming more sustainably lethal to address the increasingly dangerous threats we face.

Our military is not perfect. It is under-resourced and recognizes that it must reform in many ways to better meet the challenges of a fast-changing world.

But one thing the military is not poised to do is “resist” a new president, much less foment a civilian-military crisis.

On the contrary, a civil-military crisis is likely only if civilians — either those eager to implement the policies of the new administration or those eager to thwart those policies — create one. Unfortunately, civilians from both political parties are talking about the military in ways that are ill-informed and dangerous.

Supporters of the returning president have argued that the senior military ranks are part of a “deep state” that is “woke” and eager to defy the policy changes that are coming. Better to get out in front of this, they believe, by firing some top officers — and perhaps a lot of them — and replacing them with those who are enthusiastic advocates of the president. A recent report of work being done by the Trump transition team suggests that the administration is considering doing precisely this. Officials would create a separate board of retired military members empowered to bypass both the services’ promotion system and Congress to identify and presumably remove senior leaders who are deemed to “lack strategic vision” or are “insufficiently committed to military readiness.” Most officers reviewed by this ad hoc board would see it as an insulting partisan litmus test, and it might well be designed just for that purpose. Either way, it would be hard to design a system more likely to sow distrust among the rank and file and tempt the best military leaders into giving up on military service.

Why Trump Wants Hegseth at Defense

He seems to want a culture warrior to take on the military brass. There are bigger security issues.​

Pentagon Has Two Years to Prevent World War III

To prepare, Defense Secretary-designate Pete Hegseth will need to overhaul the bureaucracy and cut waste.

November 13, 2024 • 10:57 am ET

Integrated strategic competition: A new approach to US national security

By Daniel Elkins

Inflection Points

November 13, 2024 • 7:00 am ET

Trump is inheriting a more dangerous world

By Frederick Kempe

Tulsi Gabbard’s Nomination Is a National-Security Risk

Resounding silence

How China Capitalized on U.S. Indifference in Latin America

Xi Jinping’s visit for summits and the inauguration of a port illustrates what some have called China’s economic marginalization of the U.S.

New model

Bumpy road

Resounding silence

China opens huge port in Peru to extend its reach in Latin America

Exclusive-Trump's team drawing up list of Pentagon officers to fire, sources say

Russia's Battering Ram Strategy and It's Mission in the Donbas: Is Russia Reviving It's Operational Art? | Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University

Introduction

The Kursk Operation: From Euphoria to Cold Minded Assessment

The New Look on Soviet Military Doctrine “Deep Operation”

Ukraine’s Efforts to Escape the Donbas-Centric War: From Crimea, Belgorod to Kursk

The Battering Ram Strategy: A Preliminary Analysis

Conclusion

'It Could Be Very Hard to Do Our Job': Top Military Officers Brace for Trump's Potential Loyalty Review Boards

'It Could Be Very Hard to Do Our Job': Top Military Officers Brace for Trump's Potential Loyalty Review Boards

Security experts predict US military footprint in Australia will grow under Trump

What to Know About Tulsi Gabbard, Trump's Pick to Be Director of National Intelligence

She was the first Hindu elected to Congress

She ran for president — then left her party

She's a star in Trump world

She's a veteran, but not an intelligence insider

She'll oversee Trump's possible intelligence overhaul

Ukraine Prioritizes Security, Not Territory, as Trump Pushes Truce Talks

US, Asian allies gather in East China Sea for more large-scale training

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Trump’s National Security Team Should Have Adversaries Worried - Providence

Why tattooed Fox News star Pete Hegseth is a genius pick for Trump's Defense Secretary, writes JOSH HAMMER

By JOSH HAMMER FOR DAILYMAIL.COM

Published: 17:31 EST, 13 November 2024 | Updated: 18:22 EST, 13 November 2024

On the Precipice of a New Era of Warfare? Reflections on Military Revolutions, Past and Future - Modern War Institute

Rubio, Gabbard, and Gaetz. . . Oh My!

Opinion The right and left are talking about the military in dangerous ways

He seems to want a culture warrior to take on the military brass. There are bigger security issues.