Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:


"There are two rough but ready ways to distinguish regular from irregular warfare. The first is by the character of the combatants. Writing a century ago, Colonel Callwell of the British army employed the contemporary term of art, “small war.” He defined it thus: “Practically it may be said to include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops.” In other words, a small war is waged between state and nonstate adversaries. The legal and political status of the belligerents defines the irregularity. The second approach, in contrast, focuses upon modes of operation. Irregular warfare is waged by such irregular methods as guerrilla warfare preponderantly, probably with precursor and then adjunct terrorism. Scholars of strategic arcana like to debate their conceptual choices. Sometimes these matter. Is our subject insurgency, or is it irregular warfare? The latter risks diverting us unduly into a military box canyon at the expense of shortchanging the implications of the eternal truth that there is more to war than warfare. Indeed, in some parts of this world even referring to war and warfare can mislead by suggesting the possibility of their opposites, peace and stabilization. A territory may be locked in a condition of permanent war and peace. That is conceptually—as well as politically, legally, and socially—confusing to tidy-minded academics and drafters of doctrine manuals."
- Colin Gray

Given Colin Gray's description above regarding IW and all the controversy surrounding the definition, I suggest this: 
“You have your way. I have my way. As for the right way, the correct way, and the only way, it does not exist.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche

“If you kept the small rules, you could break the big ones.” 
- George Orwell, 1984



1. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint air drills with B-52H bombers over Yellow Sea

2. N. Korea tests newly developed solid-fuel engines for new-type IRBM: KCNA

3. Russian delegation arrives in Pyongyang for trade, science talks: KCNA

4. JCS chairman nominee says 2018 military agreement limits surveillance on N. Korea

5. Yoon departs for San Francisco to attend APEC summit

6. North Korea says it tested new solid-fuel engines for intermediate-range ballistic missiles

7. Top diplomats of South Korea, U.S. and Japan blast North-Russia arms deals, Hamas's attack on Israel

8. U.S. State Dept. approves sale of advanced interceptor missile to Korea

9. To CMA, or not to CMA, that is not the question (Korea - Comprehensive MIlitary Agreement)

10. JCS chief nominee under siege for stock trading amid multiple NK missile launches

11. The collapse of our military discipline (ROK Military)

12. North Korean Escapee Who Begged on the Streets Chases K-Pop Stardom

13. U.S. Needs to Be Ready for War

14. <Inside N. Korea> Speaking to a Border Guard (2) Defections and smuggling are no longer possible…government finds ways to put a wedge between locals and soldiers over concerns of corruption (5 recent photos)

15. What Russia’s Embrace of North Korea Means for America




1. S. Korea, U.S. stage joint air drills with B-52H bombers over Yellow Sea



​Perhaps this puts an exclamation point on the SCM and UNC talks this week. Peace through strength. We should keep in mind that Kim Jong Un is not stupid and he is unlikely to attack into strength. 


(LEAD) S. Korea, U.S. stage joint air drills with B-52H bombers over Yellow Sea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · November 15, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES throughout with ministry's release; CHANGES photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States staged joint air drills Wednesday, involving two U.S. B-52H strategic bombers, over the Yellow Sea, Seoul's defense ministry said, in the latest show of force against North Korea.

South Korean F-35A, F-15K, and U.S. F-35B and F-16 fighter jets escorted the nuclear-capable bombers during the drills, the ministry said, as the allies seek to bolster security cooperation against growing North Korean military threats.

The exercise marked the key U.S. military asset's return to the peninsula in less than a month after it made its first-ever landing at a South Korean air base on Oct. 17.


This file photo, provided by the South Korean Air Force on Oct. 17, 2023, shows a U.S. B-52H strategic bomber and South Korean F-35A fighter jets taking part in a combined air exercise over South Korea. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

With the latest exercise, South Korea and the U.S. have staged seven combined air drills, involving the B-52H bomber, over the peninsula this year. They have staged 12 such exercises this year with U.S. strategic bombers in total, including the B-1B bomber, which is no longer nuclear-capable.

The frequent deployments of high-profile military assets this year come amid U.S. efforts to bolster its security commitment to South Korea against evolving nuclear and missile threats from North Korea.

During annual bilateral security talks Monday, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reaffirmed America's extended deterrence commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to defend its ally.

"In line with this commitment, this exercise expands the frequency and intensity of the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to demonstrate an effect equivalent to constant deployment," the ministry said, describing the drills as "extended deterrence in action."

On Monday, Austin also hailed the B-52's first landing in South Korea as "a milestone" for the U.S. deterrence efforts and unveiled there will be "another carrier battle group that comes soon."

According to sources, the USS Carl Vinson nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is expected to dock at the Busan naval base early next week.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Chae Yun-hwan · November 15, 2023


2. N. Korea tests newly developed solid-fuel engines for new-type IRBM: KCNA


Is this the regime's response to the SCM and the UNC meeting?


The regime keeps developing advanced capabilities. Why? because they support blackmail diplomacy, political warfare, and provide the regime advanced capabilities to use force to dominate the Korean peninsula under the rule of the Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag state. We must never forget the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime.


(2nd LD) N. Korea tests newly developed solid-fuel engines for new-type IRBM: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 15, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 7-12)

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has successfully conducted ground tests of newly developed solid-fuel engines for a new type of intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Pyongyang's state media said Wednesday.

The first- and second-stage engines were tested Saturday and Tuesday to evaluate the technical specifications of the newly developed high-thrust solid-fuel IRBM engines, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said.

"The first ground jet tests of the first- and second-stage engines were very successful and the reliability and stability of the already-established Korean-style high-thrust solid-fuel engine designing and manufacturing technologies were clearly verified once again," the KCNA said.

"The test provided a sure guarantee for reliably accelerating the development of the new-type IRBM system," it said.

The KCNA said the North's General Missile Bureau attached "great significance" to the development at a time the country faces a "grave and unstable security environment" and "vicious" military collusion among its enemies.


North Korea conducts ground jet tests of a new type of high-thrust solid-fuel engines for intermediate-range ballistic missiles, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 15, 2023. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Despite international condemnation, the North has been seeking to bolster its nuclear and missile capabilities that are banned under U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Analysts said the latest tests may be part of such attempts to advance its weapons system in the face of growing trilateral security cooperation among Seoul, Washington and Tokyo.

An IRBM, which can fly some 4,000 kilometers, goes beyond the Korean Peninsula and puts the U.S. territory of Guam within range.

"It appears to be attempting to develop its weak intermediate-range missiles to increase deterrence against the U.S," Hong Min, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, said, noting how the North's intermediate-range missiles had been liquid-fuel types.

Solid-fuel missiles are known to be quicker to launch and harder to detect ahead of launch compared with liquid-fuel types.

With the North having announced the successful test of the first- and second-stage engines, the recalcitrant regime may attempt to test-launch a solid-fuel IRBM soon as it marks "missile industry day."


North Korea conducts ground jet tests of a new type of high-thrust solid-fuel engines for intermediate-range ballistic missiles, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency on Nov. 15, 2023. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

Earlier this month, the North designated a "missile industry day" to mark the anniversary of its test-firing of the Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile on Nov. 18 last year.

The North is also believed to be preparing to launch a military spy satellite, apparently with technological assistance from Russia following a rare summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September.

After two earlier launches failed in May and August, the North said it would try again in October. But no such launch has happened, and the North has given no word as to why the launch has been postponed and when it will take place.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 15, 2023


3. Russian delegation arrives in Pyongyang for trade, science talks: KCNA


Science talks = satellite technology?


Trade talks = oil?


Does Kim really want food aid for the people? Poroably onlyif it gies to the people of the military.


(2nd LD) Russian delegation arrives in Pyongyang for trade, science talks: KCNA | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 15, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS details in paras 8-10)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- A Russian government delegation has arrived in Pyongyang for talks on trade and science cooperation, the North's state media said Wednesday, as the two countries seek to strengthen ties following the rare summit between their leaders in September.

The delegation, led by its Natural Resources Minister Alexander Kozlov, arrived Tuesday to take part in the 10th meeting of the Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology between the two countries, according to the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA).

Working-level officials of the two sides were seriously discussing the "practical issues of realizing cooperation in various fields to be reflected in the protocol of the meeting," the KCNA said in an English-language article.


North Korean officials and a Russian delegation, led by its Natural Resources Minister Alexander Kozlov, toast in a reception held at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang on Nov. 14, 2023, in this photo carried by the Korean Central News Agency the following day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The delegation's visit came amid concerns over a suspected arms agreement between the two countries, with Pyongyang believed to be receiving technological support from Russia to put its spy military satellite into orbit after two botched attempts.

In a reception at the Koryo Hotel in Pyongyang the previous day, senior officials pledged to further promote their bilateral ties in a follow-up to the Sept. 13 summit, according to the KCNA.

Yun Jong-ho, the North's minister of external economic relations, said it is the North's stance to "further revitalize the bilateral relations in all fields and develop them onto a new high stage."

In response, Kozlov said the two countries are "fighting shoulder to shoulder in the forefront against the dominationist forces" and Russia is "desirous" of developing "substantial cooperation" in accordance with the agreements reached during the summit.


A Russian government delegation, led by Russian Natural Resources Minister Alexander Kozlov (C), arrives in Pyongyang on Nov. 14, 2023, to hold talks with North Korean officials to discuss trade and science cooperation, in this photo released the next day by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

The two countries have held nine rounds of bilateral committee meetings through 2019 after kicking off the key consultative body on economic cooperation in 1996.

The committee meeting is known to consist of five subcommittees, including those focused on forestry, science and technology, as well as trade.

Speaking to reporters last month, an official at Seoul's unification ministry said the committee is likely to address issues such as food aid, economic cooperation in North Korea's northeastern city of Rajin with the eastern Russian border town of Khasan as well as dispatching North Korean workers to Russia.

In a separate article, the KCNA said a delegation led by North Korean culture minister left for Saint Petersburg on Tuesday to attend a cultural forum.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 15, 2023


4. JCS chairman nominee says 2018 military agreement limits surveillance on N. Korea


Intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) is key to preventing surprise.




(LEAD) JCS chairman nominee says 2018 military agreement limits surveillance on N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 15, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with latest remarks in paras 9-12; ADDS photo)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- The nominee for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said Wednesday the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement poses limits to the South Korean military's surveillance on North Korea and live-fire drills near the maritime border.

Adm. Kim Myung-soo made the remark during a confirmation hearing on his nomination as South Korea is reviewing whether to partially suspend the agreement aimed at preventing military clashes near the border amid rising North Korean threats.

"The inter-Korean military agreement clearly limits the (South Korean) military's capability," Kim said during his confirmation hearing at the National Assembly.


Adm. Kim Myung-soo, the nominee for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), speaks during a confirmation hearing at the National Assembly on Nov. 15, 2023. (Yonhap)

The Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) calls for setting up buffer zones and no-fly zones near the inter-Korean border to ban artillery firing, naval drills and surveillance activities to prevent accidental clashes between the two Koreas.

The agreement prohibits flights of unmanned aerial vehicles within 10 kilometers of the western region and 15 km of the eastern region from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), the land border separating the countries.

Kim said the agreement has restricted the South Korean military's surveillance on North Korea in terms of "space and time," real-time monitoring of the North's rear side and live-fire drills on the western islands.

Given South Korea's overwhelming superiority in information, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions over North Korea, Kim said the no-fly zones stipulated in the pact needed to be reviewed to prepare for the possibilities of Pyongyang's surprise attacks.

"We are currently deploying various ISR assets, and small satellites should be in operation in the future," he said. "Drones should be operated without restrictions to monitor enemy activities and prepare for surprise attacks. So, the no-fly zones should be carefully reviewed."


North Korea unveils its newly built "tactical nuclear attack submarine" during a ceremony in this file photo provided by North Korea's official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 6, 2023. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

In light of growing concerns over North Korea's deepening defense ties with Russia, Kim vowed to mull ways to better counter threats posed by the North's advancing submarine programs.

In September, North Korea launched its first submarine capable of carrying out a tactical nuclear attack, raising calls for South Korea to acquire a nuclear-powered submarine.

"I think North Korea's defense technology will undergo significant changes in cooperation with Russia," he said. "In regard to the nuclear-powered submarine, I think it is necessary to make judgments based on national policy."

South Korea has advanced technology to build diesel-electric submarines, but it doesn't have nuclear-powered submarines as the bilateral atomic agreement with the United States bans the country from enriching uranium or reprocessing used fuel.

The top general is the only post in the armed services subject to a parliamentary confirmation hearing. It is widely seen as a formality because Kim's formal appointment does not require the endorsement of the National Assembly.

It is the first time in 10 years that a Navy officer has been appointed to the top military post since Adm. Choi Yoon-hee served as the JCS chairman from 2013 to 2015.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 15, 2023


5. Yoon departs for San Francisco to attend APEC summit




(LEAD) Yoon departs for San Francisco to attend APEC summit | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · November 15, 2023

(ATTN: UPDATES with departure; CHANGES headline)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Nov. 15 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk Yeol departed for San Francisco on Wednesday to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, where he is expected to call for stronger solidarity, promote trade liberalization, and discuss a response to military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.

Yoon and first lady Kim Keon Hee embarked on the three-day visit to San Francisco to attend the gathering of leaders from the 21 APEC member economies under this year's theme of "Creating a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All."


President Yoon Suk Yeol (R) and first lady Kim Keon Hee bid farewell at Seoul Air Base in Seongnam, just south of the capital, before departing on a trip to San Francisco on Nov. 15, 2023. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

During what will be his first attendance at an APEC summit, Yoon plans to address a leaders' session on Thursday and stress South Korea's commitment to contributing to the transition to clean energy and overcoming the climate crisis, according to Principal Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Tae-hyo.

The following day he plans to attend the second session, or the leaders' retreat, and talk about the need for APEC members to work together to restore the multilateral trading system, strengthen regional supply chains and establish a digital moral code.

"I will urge the member economies to work together in the spirit of stronger solidarity and cooperation to advance trade and investment liberalization, innovation and digitalization as well as inclusive and sustainable growth," Yoon said in a written interview with the Associated Press (AP) published Tuesday.

Yoon will also attend a summit of the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) on the sidelines of the APEC gathering on Thursday.

IPEF is widely regarded as a U.S. initiative to counter China's growing influence in the region and the meeting's outcome will draw attention in the wake of a planned summit between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in San Francisco the previous day.

Whether Yoon and Xi hold their own bilateral summit will also be watched closely, as the South Korean president has stressed his administration's commitment to increasing economic and people-to-people ties between the two countries through "mutually beneficial" cooperation.

If a Yoon-Xi summit materializes, it will be their second meeting after meeting for the first time on the sidelines of a Group of 20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, last November.

Also planned is a discussion led by Yoon and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida at Stanford University on Friday, during which the leaders are expected to share ways South Korea and Japan, and the two countries together with the United States, can cooperate in the cutting-edge technology sector.

Other bilateral summit arrangements are currently in the works.

Yoon said in the AP interview that he plans to raise the issue of North Korea-Russia military cooperation in his meetings with other leaders.

"I will emphasize that the illegal cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a serious threat to security not only on the Korean Peninsula and in the region, but also in the world, and discuss ways to cooperate," he said in the interview.

In San Francisco, Yoon will also host a meeting with Korean residents, attend an APEC CEOs summit and meet with young Korean leaders working in the cutting-edge technology field.

"President Yoon's attendance at the APEC meeting will be an occasion to enhance the status of the Republic of Korea, which fulfills its responsibilities and contributions in terms of regional and global issues, and to deepen cooperation with members of APEC, which is the world's largest regional cooperation body," Kim, the deputy national security adviser, told reporters last week, referring to South Korea by its formal name.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Haye-ah · November 15, 2023


6. North Korea says it tested new solid-fuel engines for intermediate-range ballistic missiles


Excerpts:

Analysts say the North has to clear further technological hurdles to have a viable nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States.
All of North Korea’s ICBM tests so far were done at high angles to avoid the territory of neighbors, so it’s not yet clear whether the country has mastered the technology to ensure its warheads would survive atmospheric reentry well enough to precisely hit their targets.
The North also has a variety of shorter-range solid-fuel missiles that are designed to be fired from land vehicles, silos or submarines. Some of these missiles are designed to be maneuverable and fly at low altitudes, theoretically giving them a better chance of defeating missile defense systems in South Korea.
U.S. and South Korean officials have repeatedly raised concerns that North Korea could receive Russian technological support to enhance the threat of its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for providing munitions and military equipment to boost Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine.


North Korea says it tested new solid-fuel engines for intermediate-range ballistic missiles

AP · November 15, 2023

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korea said Wednesday it successfully tested new solid-fuel engines designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles as it works on enhancing its nuclear-capable arsenal with more powerful, harder-to-detect weapons that can potentially target U.S. military bases in Guam and Japan.

North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency said the country’s military scientists tested the first-stage and second-stage missile engines on Saturday and Tuesday. The report did not say when the new missile system was expected to be completed.

The tests extend a torrid run in North Korea’s weapons development efforts, which some analysts say could be boosted by an alleged arms cooperation with Russia as they align in the face of separate, intensifying confrontations with the United States.

Tuesday’s test came as Russia’s natural resources minister, Alexander Kozlov, arrived in North Korea for talks over unspecified trade and technology exchanges, as the countries continued to build on a rare summit in September between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Russian Vladimir Putin.

Kim’s trip to the Russian Far East, where he also visited major rocket and military sites, sparked concerns about a potential arms alignment between the countries, in which North Korea provides munitions for Russia’s war in Ukraine in exchange for Russian technology transfers that would upgrade Kim’s military nuclear program.


The North’s existing intermediate-range missiles, including the Hwasong-12 that may be able to reach the U.S. Pacific territory of Guam, are powered by liquid-fuel engines, which need to be fueled before launch and cannot stay fueled for long periods of time.

Missiles with built-in solid propellants can be made ready to launch faster and are easier to move and conceal, which theoretically makes it harder for adversaries to detect and preempt the launch in advance.

The recent tests were an “essential process for further enhancing the strategic offensive capabilities of (North Korea’s) armed forces in the light of the grave and unstable security environment facing the country and the future military situation in the region, in which the enemies will get more vicious in their military collusion and nexus,” KCNA said.

North Korea’s claims that the engine tests were successful suggest the country will flight-test the new missile in the coming weeks, said Cheong Seong-Chang, an analyst at the private Sejong Institute in South Korea. The missile could pose a potential threat to Guam, a major U.S. military hub, and to American military bases in Japan, which may add to Japan’s urgency to upgrade its military and further expand three-way security cooperation with Seoul and Washington, Cheong said.

When asked about North Korea’s missile engine tests, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno said the North is clearly trying to improve its “sneak attack capability.” “We think North Korea possibly takes further provocative actions, including missile firings and nuclear tests, and the Japanese government will do its utmost for information gathering, analysis and reconnaissance,” he said.

Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are at their highest point in years after Kim ramped up his weapons demonstrations, including events he described as simulated nuclear attacks on the South. He also authorized his military to launch preemptive nuclear strikes against enemies if it perceived Pyongyang’s top leadership to be under threat.

South Korea has responded by expanding its combined military exercises with the United States, which Kim has condemned as invasion rehearsals, and enhancing trilateral security cooperation with Japan. Seoul is also seeking stronger public assurances from Washington that it would swiftly and decisively use U.S. nuclear weapons to protect the South in case of a North Korean nuclear attack.

In the allies’ latest show of force, the United States deployed at least one nuclear-capable B-52 bomber and F-35 and F-16 fighter jets to train with South Korean warplanes on Wednesday above the South’s western seas, Seoul’s Defense Ministry said. The ministry said in a statement that the joint exercise was aimed at demonstrating the allies’ capabilities to “instantly, overwhelmingly and decisively respond” to any North Korean provocations.

During their annual security talks this week, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and South Korean Defense Minister Shin Won-sik signed an updated bilateral security agreement with the aim of more effectively countering North Korea’s evolving nuclear and missile threats.

Shin said the new document spells out that the United States would mobilize its full range of military capabilities, including nuclear, to defend the South in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack. He also said the document would be a template for the allies to strategize how South Korea could assist U.S. nuclear operations in such events with its conventional capabilities but didn’t elaborate further.

North Korea earlier this year revealed its first solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile, the Hwasong-18, which has the potential ability to reach deep into the U.S. mainland.

Analysts say the North has to clear further technological hurdles to have a viable nuclear arsenal that could threaten the United States.

All of North Korea’s ICBM tests so far were done at high angles to avoid the territory of neighbors, so it’s not yet clear whether the country has mastered the technology to ensure its warheads would survive atmospheric reentry well enough to precisely hit their targets.

The North also has a variety of shorter-range solid-fuel missiles that are designed to be fired from land vehicles, silos or submarines. Some of these missiles are designed to be maneuverable and fly at low altitudes, theoretically giving them a better chance of defeating missile defense systems in South Korea.

U.S. and South Korean officials have repeatedly raised concerns that North Korea could receive Russian technological support to enhance the threat of its nuclear and missile programs in exchange for providing munitions and military equipment to boost Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine.

South Korean intelligence and military officials have said North Korea may have shipped more than a million artillery shells to Russia beginning in August, weeks before Kim’s meeting with Putin. Both Moscow and Pyongyang have denied U.S. and South Korean claims about the alleged arms transfers.

Separately, KCNA reported the visit by a Russian delegation led by Kozlov. The report said the two sides were engaged in talks over trade, science and technology exchanges, but it did not elaborate further.

The Associated Press had reported he arrived in Pyongyang on Tuesday. __ Associated Press writer Mari Yamaguchi in Tokyo contributed to the report.

___

Follow AP’s Asia-Pacific coverage at https://apnews.com/hub/asia-pacific

AP · November 15, 2023



7.Top diplomats of South Korea, U.S. and Japan blast North-Russia arms deals, Hamas's attack on Israel


Wednesday

November 15, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 15 Nov. 2023, 16:13

Updated: 15 Nov. 2023, 19:19

Top diplomats of South Korea, U.S. and Japan blast North-Russia arms deals, Hamas's attack on Israel

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-11-15/national/diplomacy/Foreign-ministers-of-South-Korea-US-and-Japan-blast-NorthRussia-arms-deals-Hamass-attack-on-Israel/1913736


From left, Foreign Minister Park Jin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa meet in San Francisco on Tuesday on the sidelines of the APEC meeting. [MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS]

The top diplomats of South Korea, the United States and Japan condemned alleged arms deals between Russia and North Korea and the Hamas militant group’s attack on Israel during their meeting in San Francisco on Tuesday.

 

“Military cooperation between Russia and North Korea is a serious threat to international peace and stability beyond the Korean Peninsula,” said South Korea's Foreign Ministry in a statement Wednesday.

 

Related Article

Yoon to speak against alleged North Korean, Russian arms deals at APEC

South could suspend 2018 agreement if North launches satellite, warns official

North Korean hacking group Lazarus behind cyber attack last year: Police

U.S. says Hamas received North's weapons through intermediaries

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken also condemned alleged two-way arms deals between Russia and North Korea in his visit to Seoul last week. U.S. officials have accused the North of supplying military equipment to Russia for its aggression against Ukraine and Russia for providing technology and support to the North for its military programs.

 



North Korean weapons have also surfaced in the Hamas attack on Israel last month.

 

“The rules-based international order is facing multiple challenges in this poly-crises era,” said Foreign Minister Park Jin in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa on the sidelines of the APEC meeting. “Strengthening cooperation among like-minded countries is more important than ever, which is why the three of us are here.”

 

In the trio’s meeting held as a follow-up to the agreements made by the leaders at Camp David in August, Blinken stressed America’s “ironclad commitment” to the defense of South Korea and Japan, according to the U.S. State Department.

 

“The three discussed the importance of greater economic cooperation and reaffirmed their commitment to build on the historic Camp David Summit to enhance U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral efforts in strengthening regional security, promoting economic prosperity, and advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the U.S. State Department said Tuesday.

 

The trio also called for the swift release of hostages taken during the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7.

 

“We have made very clear our position that there can be no more business as usual with Hamas since Oct. 7,” Matthew Miller, spokesman of the State Department, told the press in Washington on Tuesday. “At the same time, we have recognized that Hamas continues to hold American citizens and citizens of Israel and citizens of Thailand and citizens of other countries as hostages. And it’s useful for countries that have relationships with Hamas now to use those relationships to try to get hostages released.

 

“But long term, our position is very clear that there can be no going back to the days before Oct. 7,” he said.

 

The three also vowed to cooperate further to sanction the North’s illicit cyber activities funding its weapons programs, as well as call attention to the regime’s egregious human rights violations.

 

“The three ministers reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening cooperation to promote human rights in North Korea and agreed to accelerate related cooperation, including cooperation at the Security Council next year,” the South Korean Foreign Ministry said in its statement.

 

Starting next year, both Japan and Korea will be nonpermanent members of the Security Council, which has failed to pass resolutions to sanction the North since Russia and China vetoed a U.S. draft resolution in May last year.

 

The North has since conducted unprecedented numbers of military provocations, including the launch of two Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles in April and July and two failed attempts to launch a spy satellite into orbit.

 

On Wednesday, the regime claimed to have successfully tested solid-fuel engines to power a new intermediate-range ballistic missile.

 

 


BY ESTHER CHUNG [chung.juhee@joongang.co.kr]



8. U.S. State Dept. approves sale of advanced interceptor missile to Korea


This is a very important capability for the ROK Navy.


Excerpts:


Manufactured by Raytheon, the SM-6 system is designed for extended-range anti-air operations at sea.
 
Guided by an active radar homing technology from AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, the SM-6 system can intercept fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles in flight, and ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.
 
The SM-6 system can also intercept very high-altitude or sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. It can also be used as a high-speed anti-ship missile.
 
If Seoul’s sale request goes through, it is expected to install SM-6 interceptors on the South Korean Navy’s upcoming 8,200-ton Aegis system-equipped KDX-III Batch-II missile destroyers.



Wednesday

November 15, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 15 Nov. 2023, 18:48

U.S. State Dept. approves sale of advanced interceptor missile to Korea

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-11-15/national/defense/US-State-Dept-approves-sale-of-advanced-interceptor-missile-to-Korea/1913913


A Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) is launched from the Arleigh-Burke class guided-missile destroyer USS John Paul Jones in June 2014. [U.S. NAVY]

 

The U.S. Department of State has approved the potential sale of the RIM-174 Standard Extended Range Active Missile interceptor system, also known as Standard Missile 6 (SM-6), and other related equipment to South Korea, according to the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) on Tuesday.

 

The purchase request by South Korea, which falls under the DSCA’s Foreign Military Sale category of government-to-government weapons exports, is estimated to cost $650 million.

 

According to the agency, Seoul has requested 38 SM-6 Block I systems, vertical launch canisters, training aids and other related equipment.



 

Seoul’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration announced the purchase request in March and a separate, 3.75-trillion-won ($2.8-billion) plan to buy 20 more F-35As by 2028.

 

“This proposed sale will support the foreign policy goals and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a major ally that is a force for political stability and economic progress in the Indo-Pacific region,” DSCA said in its news release.

 

“The proposed sale will improve the Republic of Korea's capability to meet current and future threats while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other allies,” it added.

 

Through the Foreign Military Sale program, the DSCA serves as an intermediary between foreign governments and contractors, ensuring equipment quality, confidentiality, delivery, training and support.

 

The agency said it submitted the certification of the sale to the U.S. Congress earlier Tuesday. Foreign government weapons purchase requests are subject to congressional approval.

 

Manufactured by Raytheon, the SM-6 system is designed for extended-range anti-air operations at sea.

 

Guided by an active radar homing technology from AIM-120 advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, the SM-6 system can intercept fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship cruise missiles in flight, and ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.

 

The SM-6 system can also intercept very high-altitude or sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. It can also be used as a high-speed anti-ship missile.

 

If Seoul’s sale request goes through, it is expected to install SM-6 interceptors on the South Korean Navy’s upcoming 8,200-ton Aegis system-equipped KDX-III Batch-II missile destroyers.

 

The South Korean Navy already operates SM-2 ship-to-air missiles on existing missile destroyers, but it is seeking an upgraded system for the new destroyers as North Korean military threats advance.

 

The SM-6 weapons systems are expected to strengthen the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation and Korea Air and Missile Defense components of the South Korean military's so-called “tri-axis” defense strategy, which is aimed at deterring and defending against armed provocations by North Korea.

 

While the SM-2’s official range is 90 nautical miles (166 kilometers), estimates of the SM-6’s range is estimated to be between 200 nautical miles and 250 nautical miles.

 

If Congress approves, South Korea’s SM-6 acquisition project is expected to be completed by 2031. 

 

The Pentagon approved the release of SM-6 to foreign customers in December 2017.

 

Current operators of the system include the U.S. Navy and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, while future operators besides Korea include the Royal Australian Navy.

 


BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]



9. To CMA, or not to CMA, that is not the question (Korea - Comprehensive MIlitary Agreement)


LTG CHun argues the need to focus on training and readiness. He is making a candid and blunt critique of the ROK military.


Excerpts:

A peacetime army struggles to remind itself why it must train. Nobody can dispute safety but the fact is the military handles weapons that are designed to explode and are big. Civilians complain about noise and accidents but it is a matter of either inconvenience or national survival. As of now, we will pay a dear price if we do not fix this problem immediately and no one should think that nullifying the CMA is going to solve these problems.
The issue of renouncing the CMA can be dealt with later. The real issue is training and equipping the Army and gaining public support.


To CMA, or not to CMA, that is not the question

m-koreatimes-co-kr.cdn.ampproject.org

By Chun In-bum


On Sept. 19 2018, North Korean Defense Minister No Kwang Chol and South Korean Defense Minister Song Young-moo signed an Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation, known as the "Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain," or more commonly known as the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA). The purpose of the CMA was to decrease military tension between both North and South Korea along the line of contact and a possible future arms control. The agreement called for the removal of landmines, guard posts, weapons, and disarming the personnel in the Joint Security Area (JSA) from both sides of the North-South Korean border. The agreement also called for the creation of joint military buffer zones.

The DPRK agreed to dismantle its nuclear complex in the presence of the international community if the U.S. takes correlative action. The DPRK also agreed to complete its dismantling of the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, which started in July 2018, and that the dismantling of Sohae's missile engine test site and launch pad would be observed by the international community as well. Kim Jong-un also pledged to visit Seoul "in the near future."

Critics of the CMA did not trust the North Koreans and were especially concerned that the CMA would significantly cripple the South Korean military's ability to provide warnings of North Korean provocations and thus weaken readiness. Supporters accepted the fact that it would limit both North and South surveillance capabilities, but because South Korea has more advanced capabilities, whatever was lost would be easily compensated.

Whether one trusts North Korea or not, a stable DMZ and Northern Limit Line (NLL) was an imperative for a "peace process" to proceed. It is very unfortunate that the hoped-for peace regime was not achieved but supporters still point to the fact that there were no significant armed clashes along the DMZ and the NLL in this time period. This is probably because North Korea felt it was in their best interests to keep this area stable and not because of the CMA itself.

With the failure of the peace process, North Korean missile advances, drone incursions and a few minor infractions along the DMZ and NLL, and especially the war in Ukraine and the recent surprise attack on Israel by Hamas, the Yoon government has called for a cessation of the CMA. Although this is a matter of policy and political view, there are a few concerns to this action.

First, the justification and support is not shared by the Korean public as well as the international community. North Korean actions have been disappointing, to say the least, but the threshold of totally renouncing the CMA should be a violent action by North Korea.

Secondly, tensions are already high on the Korean Peninsula. Throwing out the CMA might actually make South Korea look like the perpetrator of a future military provocation. International support is critical and controlling the narrative is hard as it is. South Korea should be very careful not to lose the moral high ground.

Finally, the CMA is not the root cause of the military problem that South Korea must solve: it is readiness. The "peace" mood created by the CMA caused most mediocre commanders to neglect training. COVID-19 gave a great excuse to not train as well. Instead of trying to find every possible way to train, in spite of COVID-19, most units focused on preventing infection. In other words, units quarantined rather than trained.

The final straw was a sudden focus on "human rights" in the military. The Korean military had a long tradition of strict discipline that was based on a society that also had its roots in authority of the family and school. Under a progressive government, these traditional social values changed for the better but this caused social classes that impacted the military. The military was not prepared to confront soldiers who started asking questions and second-guessing their superiors. Korean commanders are not accustomed to explaining to a person, who doesn't want to be in uniform in the first place, why he has to stand guard duty in the cold.

A peacetime army struggles to remind itself why it must train. Nobody can dispute safety but the fact is the military handles weapons that are designed to explode and are big. Civilians complain about noise and accidents but it is a matter of either inconvenience or national survival. As of now, we will pay a dear price if we do not fix this problem immediately and no one should think that nullifying the CMA is going to solve these problems.

The issue of renouncing the CMA can be dealt with later. The real issue is training and equipping the Army and gaining public support.

Chun In-bum (truechun@naver.com) served as a lieutenant general of the ROK Army and commander of Special Forces Korea.

m-koreatimes-co-kr.cdn.ampproject.org



10. JCS chief nominee under siege for stock trading amid multiple NK missile launches


I do not recall other military nominees with these types of allegations.



JCS chief nominee under siege for stock trading amid multiple NK missile launches

The Korea Times · November 15, 2023

Adm. Kim Myung-soo, nominee for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), speaks during a confirmation hearing at the National Assembly, Wednesday. Yonhap

Opposition party lashes out at failure of gov't vetting system

By Lee Hyo-jin

Adm. Kim Myung-soo, nominee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) chairman, was grilled at his confirmation hearing in the National Assembly, Wednesday, over stock transactions he made while on duty including days when North Korea launched ballistic missiles.

According to Rep. Jung Sung-ho of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), Kim conducted 46 stock transactions from January 2022 until September this year, all during working hours. None were made during lunch breaks, the lawmaker pointed out, citing data submitted by the Korea Exchange (KRX).

Some of the transactions were made on Jan. 5 and 17, 2022, days when North Korea fired ballistic missiles toward the East Sea. Back then, Kim was a senior officer at the Ministry of National Defense.

Data revealed that Kim also conducted stock transactions on Sept. 8 this year, when North Korea unveiled its first tactical nuclear attack submarine. He was serving as the naval operations commander at the time.

During the confirmation hearing, Rep. Yoon Hu-duk of the DPK pointed out that a government official's stock trading during work hours is subject to disciplinary measures.

In response, Kim apologized for his inappropriate actions as a high-ranking government official, but explained that the stock trades were made mostly when he was not working as an operational officer.

Kim also came under scrutiny for playing golf at a club inside a military base in northeastern Seoul's Taereung on March 5, 2022, when North Korea launched a Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) toward the East Sea.

DPK lawmakers strongly denounced Kim for his golf outing when the nation was facing a severe security threat from the North.

Criticism also came from the ruling People Power Party's (PPP) members.

"As a former military officer myself, I think the golf outing was inappropriate," said Rep. Han Ki-ho of the PPP, urging Kim to be more cautious in his actions if he assumes the JCS post.

The nominee was also questioned about his daughter's school bullying allegations.

According to data submitted by the Busan Metropolitan City Office of Education to Rep. Ki Dong-min of the DPK, Kim's daughter was one of six middle school students accused of assaulting a fellow student at a school restroom in 2012.

Regarding this, Kim explained that he was not aware of the incident during the vetting process, saying that he thought the incident was handled properly after the victim accepted his daughter's sincere apology and the two reconciled.

Kim's nomination drew criticisms from opposition party lawmakers who viewed this as yet another failure of the Yoon Suk Yeol administration's vetting system for appointing high-ranking government officials.

This is not the first time that a nominee for a key government post has been mired in controversy surrounding their child's school bullying.

In October, presidential protocol secretary Kim Seung-hui resigned after his daughter — a third-grader at elementary school — was accused of physically assaulting a second-grade student at school, resulting in injuries requiring nine weeks to heal.

In June, then-special presidential adviser Lee Dong-kwan, who was tapped as the new head of the Korea Communications Commissions, faced allegations that his son bullied fellow students in high school in 2011. He was appointed to the post despite objections from opposition lawmakers.

Earlier in February, Chung Sun-shin, head of the National Office of Investigation, resigned just a day before assuming his post, due to a school bullying controversy involving his son.


The Korea Times · November 15, 2023



11. The collapse of our military discipline (ROK Military)


Thisiis not the military discipline that LTG Chun discusses in his OpED.


Wednesday

November 15, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 15 Nov. 2023, 20:02

The collapse of our military discipline

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-11-15/opinion/editorials/The-collapse-of-our-military-discipline/1914067


The confirmation hearing on Wednesday for Adm. Kim Myung-soo, the nominee for the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), exposed the lax military discipline among the top brass. After being promoted to a four-star general last month, Kim, the three-star vice admiral and Naval Operations Commander, was directly named as head of the Armed Forces. Many military insiders regarded it as a drastic promotion. As he served in the JCS together with Defense Minister Shin Won-sik when Shin was commander of operations, Kim was deemed fit for the job as chairman of the JCS, particularly given the increasing role of naval operations today.


But it turned out that Kim had traded stocks, including through the Exchange Traded Funds (ETF), over the past two years while working at the JCS. Lawmakers of the National Defense Committee discovered that he had been engaged in stock trading on Jan. 5 and 17 last year, when military tensions were heightened by North Korea’s firing of ballistic missiles into the East Sea. He did the same on Sept. 12, when North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was visiting Russia for a military deal.


The nominee was already criticized for playing golf last year when North Korea launched an ICBM and an SLBM. Despite the record of school bullying by his children 11 years ago, the government’s scrutinizing system solely relying on testimony by nominees didn’t work this time, either.




In the face of lawmakers’ attacks on his off-track behaviors, Kim apologized and promised to not repeat it. He said, “I just tried to understand the trading procedure, not make a profit.” In a volatile situation, military commanders should be alert 24/7 to brace for any possible provocations from North Korea. The fact that the admiral traded stocks on his smart phone only deepens public concerns about security.


It may not be only Kim who trades stocks during work. Even Rep. Yun Jae-ok, floor leader of the governing People Power Party, denounced him for engaging in totally inappropriate activities even though he was not in a position to deal with the North’s missile launches at the time.


It would be too much to expect our servicemen to do their utmost for all 365 days a year. They certainly need to rest and recharge. But Kim went too far by trading stocks on his phone even when North Korea fired multiple missiles. The public wants to see soldiers who are willing to sacrifice their lives to protect the country, not a general who tries to understand the mechanism of online stock trading. Our entire military must learn lessons from the mistakes of the top officer before it’s too late.











12. North Korean Escapee Who Begged on the Streets Chases K-Pop Stardom



Not quite the feel good story I expected. Escapees face real challenges.


North Korean Escapee Who Begged on the Streets Chases K-Pop Stardom

Music from the SB Boyz draws inspiration from hardships felt not in the Kim Jong Un regime but South Korea


https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/north-korean-escapee-who-begged-on-the-streets-chases-k-pop-stardom-bc344958?mod=hp_featst_pos5


By Jiyoung SohnFollow

 and Dasl YoonFollow

Updated Nov. 15, 2023 12:10 am ET

SEOUL—At first glance, Yu Hyuk looks like a typical K-pop rapper. He sports baggy pants, a black beanie and Air Jordans. A silver chain dangles from his neck.

But Yu represents a new wrinkle in South Korea’s music industry: The aspiring K-pop star is from North Korea. 

Even by the standards of hardscrabble hip-hop artists, Yu’s back story brims with tribulation and torment. The 23-year-old stole and begged as a child on the North Korean streets—his family was so poor that local soldiers gave him the occasional handout. He fled the country before becoming a teenager, crisscrossing three countries to freedom. 

In his new home, he has found opportunities, though he has also faced desolation, debt and despair. 

The South in many ways, Yu says, has proven more difficult than his birth country. “North Korea was physically arduous,” he said, “but life in South Korea was emotionally hard.”


Yu Hyuk says he wants to connect with people who have faced hardships like himself. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

Yu’s plight mirrors the uphill climb experienced over the decades by the more than 34,000 North Koreans who have relocated to South Korea, where they have often been treated as second-class citizens. Without much training or assistance, many struggle to make ends meet and work low-wage jobs. One-in-five North Korean escapees say they regret the decision to trade life in the North for the South, surveys have shown. 

But, increasingly in recent years, North Korean escapees are breaking through. Two have become elected National Assembly members. Another became the first to win a full-time professorship in the country earlier this year. The number of former North Koreans who became managers, high-ranking officials and politicians in the South doubled from 2019 to 2022, according to the Database Center for North Korean Human Rights, a Seoul-based nonprofit organization.

Younger North Korean escapees such as Yu, who came to South Korea about a decade ago, also tend to be more individualistic and ambitious than those who arrived in the past, said Sokeel Park, the South Korea country director of Liberty in North Korea, a nongovernmental organization that aids escapees. Many have taken to YouTube or other social media to dispel the notion that they are helpless, he added.

“K-Pop is the next frontier for that,” Park said. 

North Korea is one of the world’s most information-repressed nations, where the art parrots propaganda and deifies leader Kim Jong Un. Children sing songs such as “We Are The Happiest in The World.” All foreign content is technically banned in North Korea. In recent years, the regime has executed people for distributing or even just watching K-pop videos—the very type of music Yu now seeks to make.

Ji Seong-ho, one of the escapees who became a South Korean legislator three years ago, said his achievement has given hope to many other North Koreans who have secretly watched YouTube videos of him while working as laborers in Russia or China. Like Yu, Ji didn’t grow up privileged and survived by begging. Ji lost a leg and a hand stealing coal from a train as a teenager.

“I tell fellow North Korean defectors that you can even become the president of South Korea if you want to,” Ji said.


Yu Hyuk and Kim Seok performing as the SB Boyz in Seoul. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

‘We were essentially beggars’ 

Yu grew up in Kyongsong, a county on the eastern coast of North Korea known for its hot springs. His parents separated when he was three years old, he said. His father spent the family’s savings on alcohol and bribing officials to avoid work—a legal requirement for all able-bodied North Koreans. His mother lived separately, before fleeing to South Korea. 

At the age of seven, Yu recalls feeling obligated to support the family’s finances after watching his grandmother picking up grains of rice from the train-station floor. He stole cement to resell for cash. Sometimes he simply begged for money. A few North Korean soldiers, who recognized him on the streets, would occasionally hand him food or supplies. 

“We were essentially beggars who happened to have nothing else but a house,” Yu said. 

Then word came from his mother, whom he hadn’t felt close with, pleading with him to join her in South Korea. He refused due to their estrangement. His mother next asked Yu’s father if he would help intervene, promising to send monthly payments if their son agreed to leave. As he drank two bottles of soju, the Korean rice liquor, Yu’s father made the pitch to his then 12-year-old son: Go live with your mother and pursue a better life in the South. 

“I’ll be able to try harder to improve my circumstances here, and be a better son to your grandmother,” said his father, whom Yu remembers as tall and good looking, with a slow stride.


A military guard post in Paju, South Korea, near the border with North Korea. PHOTO: AHN YOUNG-JOON/ASSOCIATED PRESS

South Korean struggles

Yu’s journey to the South involved three countries and took half a year. By the time he reached Seoul, he was 13. 

He went through a mandatory three-month program for North Korean escapees designed to help them adjust to life in the South. Yu was enrolled in a free boarding school with other children like him, but he still felt like an outsider. He spent most of his time alone.

He chose not to live with his mother, whom he still felt distant from and didn’t want to depend on for financial assistance. He later took part-time work at a Korean barbecue restaurant to earn some extra cash. 

Two years into his South Korean life, Yu suffered another unexpected jolt: His father had died. 

As he digested the news in his dorm room, Yu grew angry. He loved and missed his father more than anyone. He was the one person who had always been on his side, he said. He learned that his father had died from complications of liver disease—an ailment that Yu felt could have been treated in the South if they had been together.

“I was the loneliest of all loners,” Yu said. 

Yu didn’t care much for school, though he enjoyed studying the Korean language and poetry. Given those interests, a high-school teacher suggested he try writing rap lyrics, a musical genre Yu knew little about at the time. 

He found he could identify with rappers and their music that he discovered through YouTube. He started watching a popular South Korean rap-battle show called “Show Me the Money” and encountered rappers battling angst and hardship in South Korea. 


Yu Hyuk had his makeup done ahead of a performance in Seoul last month. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL


Kim Seok is one of three current members of SB Boyz. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

He particularly connected with a 2018 song, “Life Is Beautiful,” by American hip-hop artist Lil Peep. The song grappled with depression and fears of dying alone. “It just felt like my story,” said Yu, who still speaks with a faint North Korean accent. 

Even as Yu found an outlet for his dark thoughts with rap lyrics, his life faced further tumult. He dropped out of an arts college. Yu said he accrued large amounts of debt, after falling for a scam. This led him to working on the factory floor of a 

Samsung semiconductor factory—a job that doesn’t require a college degree. And then his life changed once more. 

From factory work to K-pop

South Korean pop music over the years has come in many forms. There are girl groups such as Blackpink and boy bands like BTS. A decade ago, the breakout hit “Gangnam Style” was sung by Psy, a middle-aged man. Now, there are K-pop groups stocked with all non-Koreans, openly LGBTQ people and even virtual avatars. 

North Koreans have yet to break into the industry in a major way. 

Through a mutual acquaintance, Yu was introduced to Michelle Cho, a former artists and repertoire, or A&R, representative at SM Entertainment, one of South Korea’s powerhouse music agencies. Cho, who is Harvard educated, had left SM a few years earlier to start Singing Beetle, an independent label.   


Michelle Cho, founder of the Singing Beetle label, checked social media with SB Boyz members Yu Hyuk, in a gray hoodie, and Kim Seok in Seoul last month PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

At their first meeting, Yu presented Cho with a song he had written. She offered him free rap lessons on the weekends. About a year later, in the late summer of 2021, Yu quit his Samsung factory job to pursue music full time. 

Yu had attended the arts college with an interest in acting. He thought being an actor might mean his friends and family back in North Korea could one day encounter his work, see his face and know he is doing well. He has broader audience ambitions with the SB Boyz group.

“At the end of the day, there isn’t a single person who hasn’t had hardships,” Yu said. “I hope to move the world with our music.”


Attendees of the World Scout Jamboree watching a K-Pop concert in Seoul. PHOTO: KOREA POOL/ASSOCIATED PRESS

‘Yesterday that will never come’

Yu was the first recruit for the SB Boyz group, named after the Singing Beetle label. The group, for now, features one other North Korean escapee, Kim Seok, and Eric Hao, a Chinese American who goes by the stage name of Kenny. Singing Beetle plans to add two more members ahead of SB Boyz’s U.S. debut next year.

The SB Boyz face long odds of breaking through despite their novel back story. Hundreds of South Korean companies scour the world for promising pop-star talent, with auditions drawing tens of thousands of applicants a year. Just a fraction get signed to contracts: Only 1,375 people are registered as singer trainees in South Korea, according to the state-run Korea Creative Content Agency’s most-recent figures. 

Of that rarefied group, just several dozen K-pop acts debut a year.

The marketing costs to push any K-pop group to global stardom is rising, and could pose a burden especially for an upstart firm such as Singing Beetle, said Cha Woo-jin, a music critic based in Seoul. But SB Boyz, even with relatively mainstream music, could be perceived as an icon of peace and reconciliation, which could help them stand out and capture fans, Cha added.

The world is more than ready for a new group like the SB Boyz, as people today are looking for different stories and perspectives, said James Roh, a member of Far East Movement, which became the first Asian-American group to top the U.S. Billboard Hot 100 charts in 2010. “I don’t think anyone has really heard pop music from North Koreans before,” Roh said. 

In one potential song for the SB Boyz, Yu wrote lyrics wondering if one can ever be free. “If tomorrow’s an echo,” the lyrics read, in a mix of Korean and English. “Yesterday that will never come, let go; when you suddenly feel scared, believe.” 

Yu said he wants to connect with people who have faced hardships like himself. “Seeing that even North Koreans can have big dreams, I hope that other marginalized people can also have big dreams as they live their lives.”


Michelle Cho hopes that the SB Boyz’s songs will have broad appeal. PHOTO: JEAN CHUNG FOR WALL STREET JOURNAL

‘We’re the SB Boyz!’

The SB Boyz’s schedule is packed with dance classes, rap and vocal lessons, daily English tests and a “global citizenship” course aimed at developing cultural sensitivities. On the glass wall of Singing Beetle’s office in Seoul, some practice questions for English conversation are written in black marker, such as, “What did you do yesterday?” 

Kim, SB Boyz’s other North Korean escapee member, grew up in relative affluence and had even consumed some smuggled K-pop songs and music videos. He was wowed by how the lyrics explored love and relationships unlike North Korean music that sought to indoctrinate.

“I’d like to make music that can move people’s hearts from the first verse,” said Kim, 23, who came to the South around four years ago.

On a recent Saturday evening, Yu and Kim took the stage for a busking performance at a “multicultural festival” in Seoul. Just a smattering of spectators appeared before them.

“Hello, we’re the SB Boyz!” said the two singers.

They performed a cover of a South Korean hip-hop song, with Yu modifying the lyrics for one section. They finished by dancing energetically to the BTS song, “Idol.” The crowd had swelled to nearly 50 people by the end of their set.

After walking offstage, still panting after the performance, Yu thought he should think of the stage more as his own and lead the audience more. He rated himself a six out of 10.

No matter the odds, Yu has embarked on a career path that would have been forbidden in the North. 

“Comparing who I was in the past with who I am now, I’m so much happier and normal,” Yu said.

Write to Jiyoung Sohn at jiyoung.sohn@wsj.com and Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

The K-pop aspirant from North Korea is Yu Hyuk. An earlier version of this story spelled his name as Yoo Hyuk. (Corrected on Nov. 15)




13. U.S. Needs to Be Ready for War



Conclusion;


Had the domestically possible included a bit more stomach for risk taking by our leaders and electorate, World War II likely would have been avoided. If the Truman administration had been clearer in its own mind about its willingness to defend South Korea and communicated as much to Stalin, the Korean War likely wouldn’t have happened. Accepting the inhumane logic of conflict and of power realities is an uphill fight against the lure of risk avoidance and the illusion that our desire for peace is shared by others. The American record has often been one of recognizing this slower than it might have.



U.S. Needs to Be Ready for War

If Joe Biden wants peace, he should take a page from the script of ‘A Few Good Men.’

https://www.wsj.com/articles/america-needs-to-be-ready-for-war-taiwan-ukraine-gaza-b57f6a84?mod=Searchresults_pos4&page=1

By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.

Follow

Nov. 14, 2023 5:35 pm ET



Jack Nicholson in ‘A Few Good Men.’ PHOTO: ALAMY

Since Oct. 7 I keep thinking of Jack Nicholson, as a Marine colonel in “A Few Good Men,” bellowing “You can’t handle the truth.” I think of this line in respect to friends of Israel who are shocked by the bestiality of that day’s attack, as if history didn’t furnish examples and the assault wasn’t designed to achieve a desired effect.

I think of the Nicholson line in respect to students who cheer on Hamas from their campus safety, having no real conception of violence and expecting to be shielded from even having their feelings hurt. (If the draft makes a comeback, they will have some growing up to do.)

Another truth may soon have to be handled. The U.S. can be expected to serve its own interests, as filtered through the electoral interests of its president. The U.S. has moved a sizable force to the eastern Mediterranean. If sustained, it will allow Israel to complete the neutralization of Hamas and assure its timid Arab partners where the power still lies. That is, if U.S. politics can endure the gruesome necessities, blunders and inevitable allegations about war crimes that come in the wake of Israeli (or any) military action. The alternative, we will have to keep reminding ourselves, is unlikely to be prettier.

The Ukraine policy of Joe Biden has included whiffs of impatience with Ukraine for continuing to fight. An implicit shot clock was all but placed on its current offensive, as if to say, “Hurry up and reclaim whatever land you can so we can get to a cease-fire.” Weapons have been held back, it sometimes seemed, because of White House fear of what might happen from too much Ukrainian success.

Last week came a confession from Ukraine’s Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, using the word that Ukraine’s supporters in the West recently strived to make taboo: stalemate. Technology—surveillance drones—makes it difficult to concentrate forces for a decisive breakthrough, though this applies to both sides. Understandably, in Gen. Zaluzhnyi’s mind “defeat” is Ukraine not recovering all its territory. He doesn’t exactly blame the U.S. but . . . And yet the pessimism can be overdone.

If the U.S. isn’t committed to Ukraine regaining all its territory, it’s now fully committed to Ukraine’s independence and deterrence of Russia. President Volodymyr Zelensky should ask not just for F-16s but, by a date certain, F-35s. Mr. Biden should supply them. The Russians, for practical purposes, are at maximum effort. Unlike Stalin (with vast material help from the Roosevelt administration) Vladimir Putin isn’t building a massive army for the offensive. Further mobilization of his male population is low on his list of desirables—as the Biden administration undoubtedly calculates. Instability is growing on his southern periphery, along with the promise of Chinese mischief. Ukraine is a major new military power on his western border. With their formidable military capabilities, Sweden and Finland are becoming part of NATO. It likely means something that Mr. Putin’s subaltern Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus is also burbling about a “stalemate.”

Sixty years later, recommended reading in the Pentagon is again T.R. Fehrenbach’s 1963 history of the Korean War. The author explains the Truman tiptoe, the president’s willingness to settle for a tie rather than victory.

Like Mr. Biden, President Truman waited months to give a speech on the conflict. Then the U.S. wasn’t fighting a war, it was preventing one—World War III. Fresh in the mind of Truman and his advisers was America’s experience of total war in World War II. Also fresh was the recognition that the U.S. was losing its immunity to having its own cities burned to the ground.

A group of nuclear-capable states today assesses the U.S. to be a declining power. Russia and Iran have placed their bets. These bets would be stronger if China did the same. That’s why all eyes are on Taiwan. There are two sides to our truth-handling shortfall. Recall Truman’s distaste for Oppenheimer’s mooning over Hiroshima when Truman had many more deaths on his conscience. Recall Lincoln’s delight in Grant’s uncompromising approach to war. Americans have been blessed to find humane men who nevertheless recognize what must be done and are willing to do it. Too often, though, we find them in time to fight wars that might have been deterred.

Had the domestically possible included a bit more stomach for risk taking by our leaders and electorate, World War II likely would have been avoided. If the Truman administration had been clearer in its own mind about its willingness to defend South Korea and communicated as much to Stalin, the Korean War likely wouldn’t have happened. Accepting the inhumane logic of conflict and of power realities is an uphill fight against the lure of risk avoidance and the illusion that our desire for peace is shared by others. The American record has often been one of recognizing this slower than it might have.


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Journal Editorial Report: Pressure mounts on the Jewish state to 'pause.' Images: AP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly

Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 15, 2023, print edition as 'U.S. Needs to Be Ready for War'.




14. <Inside N. Korea> Speaking to a Border Guard (2) Defections and smuggling are no longer possible…government finds ways to put a wedge between locals and soldiers over concerns of corruption (5 recent photos)



​Photos at the link: https://www.asiapress.org/rimjin-gang/2023/11/military/border-guard-2/


​I will have to ask my escapee friends if party membership is a sufficient motivator for these guards:

◆ Soldiers given rewards of party membership, promotions if they catch defectors or stop smuggling


​But this is part of Kim Jong Un's strategic strangulation campaign of the dongju class (moneyed class) which is an existential threat to the regime.


<Inside N. Korea> Speaking to a Border Guard (2) Defections and smuggling are no longer possible…government finds ways to put a wedge between locals and soldiers over concerns of corruption (5 recent photos)

asiapress.org

An armed North Korean border guard doing rounds near the banks of the Yalu River. Taken on the Chinese side of the border across from Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in mid-October 2023.

<Inside N. Korea>Speaking to a Border Guard (1) Landmine Burial at the Korea-China Border? “Even soldiers are afraid because they don’t know where they’re buried”

Defecting and smuggling are no longer impossible…this is what people along the Yalu and Tumen rivers are saying about the controls placed on the border. What are the realities of the strict controls placed on the border with China by the Kim Jong-un regime? A border guard explained how border guards are monitoring the border to an ASIAPRESS reporting partner. (KANG Ji-won / ISHIMARU Jiro)

In August, the reporting partner, who lives in Yanggang Province, met with “A,” a noncommissioned officer who works as a border guard in the upstream area of the Yalu River. Starting in July, North Korean authorities loosened COVID-era restrictions on soldiers being able to leave their bases. “A” is a veteran border guard in his late 20s. Another reporting partner in North Hamgyung Province surveyed people on the border to hear their thoughts.

A poorly built sentry post monitoring people approaching the Yalu River. Taken on the Chinese side of the border across from Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in mid-October 2023.

◆ Government employs various methods to stop corruption between locals and soldiers

After the 1990s, people living in the China-North Korea border region have benefited from being able to cross the border and smuggling activities. Border guards have also benefited by receiving bribes or meals in exchange for turning a blind eye and, sometimes, being involved in smuggling themselves. Now, however, this relationship between local people and border guards, and the corruption they engaged in, almost no longer exists. A reporting partner in Hoeryong provided the following explanation:

“Soldiers who were stationed in the border patrol for several years earned money to buy a house or to get married, but now that’s no more than a dream. Even local people are treating the soldiers more coldly, so there’s no one giving soldiers meals on credit anymore.”

The authorities adopted a plan to reduce contact between the border patrol and local people to prevent corruption at any cost. The reporting partner told ASIAPRESS what “A” told him:

“Bases are changing the areas of deployment (of border patrol soldiers) without any warning. Soldiers are informed about which sentry post they’ll work on the day they are transferred, so it’s now impossible for them to arrange times and places to meet with smugglers as they did in the past.

The authorities started to shut down roads on the border along with those roads heading into mountainous areas (in the upper stream area of the Yalu River) from 7 PM each night. They intend to prevent smuggling and defections from occurring in places with little human traffic.”

Barbed-wire fencing surrounding the garden of even a small apartment building. There’s a structure in the middle used to keep watch. Taken on the Chinese side of the border across from Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in mid-October 2023.

◆ Soldiers given rewards of party membership, promotions if they catch defectors or stop smuggling

In North Korea, there are paramilitary organizations made up of laborers, farmers, and students that are organized apart from the regular military. These paramilitary forces are ordered to build and man sentry posts and checkpoints along the border. These forces closely monitor people trying to approach the riversides and contact between border patrol soldiers and local people. In fact, they all monitor each other.

The border patrol, meanwhile, teams up with local police and government officials to monitor people approaching rivers on the border. “A” gave the following explanation:

“The border patrol maintains close contact through cell phones with the paramilitary forces, local police, and state security officials. For example, there’s a system in place that works as follows: If a police officer inspects a civilian house and finds that there’s someone missing or a person who has left the house and not come back, they immediately contact the border patrol, which then alerts sentry posts along the border. Meanwhile, neighborhood watch units immediately alert the police if someone from another area comes to stay in their area.

※ Neighborhood watch units are North Korea's lowest administrative units and are typically made up of 20-30 households.

The authorities give out rewards to border patrol soldiers who actively crack down on smuggling and border crossings.

“If they catch even one border crosser or smuggler, they are provided with party membership, vacations, or promotions. There are whistleblower boxes set up on bases to allow soldiers to anonymously report on their superiors’ illegal activity, and the authorities tell soldiers to actively report misconduct.”

A low fence made of wood can be seen in front of a barbed wire fence near the garden of a residential house (circle in red). The fence, which is called a “tracking line,” falls apart if stepped on, alerting the authorities to an attempt to cross the border. Taken on the Chinese side of the border across from Sinuiju, North Pyongan Province, in mid-October 2023.

◆ Government warns that anyone seen approaching border after 7 PM will be shot at

The reporting partner in Hoeryong told ASIAPRESS that the border security situation on the Tumen River is similar, explaining:

“The border patrol soldiers’ deployment area and workplaces are changed frequently. They can’t even think of smuggling activities based on prearranged (times or places) like before, and if they do try to smuggle, they would be putting their lives at risk, regardless of their status as border guards.

In the past, people came out to the Tumen River to fish and do their laundry, but they can’t do those things anymore, though, depending on the area, people can get permission to come out to the riverside at prearranged times. There are sentry points all along the river border and the border patrol and Farmer and Worker Red Guard units confirm the identities of those passing by. The authorities are warning everyone that anyone caught approaching the border after 7 PM will be shot at.

Roads heading to unpopulated areas (near the border) are blocked off by units of two to three border guards, despite those areas not being buffer zones. They stop both vehicles and people to inspect them, so, at night, anyone living nearby is unable to leave their place of residence.”

A person on a bike behind a barbed wire fence. Again, a low fence made of wood can be seen. Taken in late September 2023 on the Chinese side of the border across from Sakju County, North Pyongan Province.

◆ Loyalty and ideological education for soldiers intensifies

“A,” the border guard, told the reporting partner that ideological and political study sessions have increased recently at bases, saying:

“The authorities are emphasizing ideology and belief in political study sessions held every day regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. They are repeating Kim Jong-un’s remarks that ‘war is a confrontation of ideology and belief before it becomes one of strength.’

They are saying that we will at some point have to reign victorious over the Americans with strength. That, they are emphasizing, is the mission and duty of soldiers who are loyal to Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and the Workers’ Party. The study sessions have also grown longer. In the past, they were just lectures, but recently they’ve changed considerably, with question-and-answer sections and presentations.”

The Kim Jong-un regime’s policies aimed at preventing defections and border crossings are not just leading to stricter controls on the border. The regime is also building checkpoints on roads heading toward the border, deeply investigating the sentiments of ordinary people, and ensuring that border guards and local people do not become too friendly with each other. It has now become almost impossible for people to cross the border into China due to the clever and cunning policies put into place to guard the border after the outbreak of COVID-19 in January 2020. (End of series)

※ ASIAPRESS communicates with reporting partners through Chinese cell phones smuggled into North Korea.

Map of North Korea ( ASIAPRESS)

asiapress.org



15. What Russia’s Embrace of North Korea Means for America


Only if the assumptions I make about the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family are wrong. And I sincerely hope I am wrong and that diplomacy will work and reduce tensions and bring about peace, stability, denuclearization, an end to the crimes against humanity, an end ot the proliferation of weapons, training, and advice to malign actors in conflicts zone, an end to global illicit activities to include overseas slave labor, cyber warfare against the ROK/US alliance and the free world, and climate a solution to the Koeran question.


But I will never write off diplomacy. I only demand that we sustain the strongest possible military capability at the highest state of military readiness to deter war and if deterrence fails to defeat the nKPA and undo all the wrongs outlined in the above paragraph. 


What Russia’s Embrace of North Korea Means for America

Diplomacy With Pyongyang Might Still Work Better Than Coercion

By Jamie Kwong and Ankit Panda

November 15, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Jamie Kwong and Ankit Panda · November 15, 2023

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ventured abroad in September to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin, ending a period of self-imposed diplomatic isolation that began with the COVID-19 pandemic. This summit meeting was largely motivated by the opportunities that Pyongyang sees in the geopolitical discord unleashed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, not least Moscow’s apparent willingness to provide Pyongyang with critical raw materials and technologies and to use its veto at the United Nations Security Council to shield Pyongyang from international censure.

North Korea’s exploitation of growing rifts between Russia and the West, paired with its seemingly insatiable ambitions for advanced nuclear capabilities, should prompt a substantial reevaluation in Washington of the problems posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal and, by extension, how the United States approaches the Korean Peninsula. The theory that pressure could change Pyongyang’s strategic calculus and force Kim to disarm has proved futile. The changing geostrategic environment in Northeast Asia today only further limits the viability of any American strategy that prioritizes denuclearization above all other ends on the Korean Peninsula. Washington must adopt a more pragmatic approach centered on proactive risk reduction and conventional deterrence. Rather than rely on coercive economic pressure to change North Korea’s calculus regarding the fundamental value of its nuclear weapons—a dubious proposition even before Moscow’s embrace of Pyongyang—a U.S. policy based on reducing nuclear risks and escalation pressures while giving North Korea incentives to reengage diplomatically would offer a more practical way to lower the likelihood of nuclear conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

NUCLEAR RECKONING

The Biden administration’s May 2021 review of North Korea policy concluded that in addition to seeking the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the United States would work toward a “calibrated, practical approach,” designed to “make practical progress that increases the security of the United States, our allies, and deployed forces.” In practice, this stated policy has failed despite U.S. attempts to restart open-ended diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang. North Korea has been unwilling to reciprocate U.S. diplomatic overtures and has instead cultivated closer ties with Moscow and Beijing, making good on a strategic recalibration that Kim first hinted at in the weeks and months after the failed U.S.–North Korean summit meeting in Hanoi in February 2019. In the absence of negotiation, Washington has focused exclusively on reassuring its regional allies, South Korea and Japan, and promoting stronger trilateral ties among Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo. The Japanese and South Korean governments, for their part, have continued to advance their conventional capabilities with an eye on the advance of Pyongyang’s nuclear capabilities.

As the Biden administration conducted its policy review, East Asia’s security environment was evolving, offering North Korea increasing opportunities to pursue its military modernization goals while being shielded from further international opprobrium. Moscow had not yet openly embraced Pyongyang, but, along with Beijing, had started to tilt in its direction. By 2021, both countries started to express the view that sanctions on North Korea needed to be adjusted—in part, to reward Pyongyang’s self-imposed moratorium in 2018 on long-range missile and nuclear testing. Alignment between Moscow and Pyongyang became more pronounced after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with both countries sharing increasingly aligned interests against common perceived threats from the United States and its allies. Now Russia and China block any censure or strengthening of multilateral sanctions against Pyongyang at the United Nations Security Council, with China openly calling for the United States and its regional allies to address North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns.”

North Korea’s rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities have also affected the regional security environment. Since the announcement of a major five-year military modernization plan in 2021, Pyongyang has made significant strides to “further strengthen [its] nuclear war deterrent.” In particular, the country has demonstrated a clear quantitative and qualitative advancement of its missile capabilities by launching more advanced missiles capable of stressing missile defense systems and better surviving attempts at preemption by the United States and its allies. It is no longer apt to describe most North Korean launches as “tests”; they are more frequently demonstrations of military utility and rehearsals for nuclear and high-intensity conventional war, rather than attempts at evaluating new technologies.

Pyongyang has also, for the first time, openly moved toward the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons (shorter-range nuclear delivery systems with lower explosive yields), which would reduce the threshold for nuclear use. Where Kim once relied on generally imprecise, higher-yield nuclear weapons that would be impractical for striking military targets, North Korea now sees tactical nuclear weapons as granting it a capability to “repel” an attack on its territory by U.S. and South Korean armed forces should deterrence fail. Kim would seek to use these lower-yield weapons while retaining higher-yield, longer-range missiles in reserve to compel Washington and Seoul into ceasing further escalation. On top of that, North Korea’s rubber-stamp parliament updated a law that cements nuclear weapons as the centerpiece of Pyongyang’s national defense strategy and indicates a clear intention to rely on that arsenal early in a conflict, a strategy that aims to offset North Korea’s conventional military inferiority relative to the U.S.–South Korean alliance. With Kim making an accompanying statement that Pyongyang will “never give up” its nuclear weapons, denuclearization is an unrealistic short-term goal, and—at best—an uncertain long-term aim.

PIVOT TO ... RUSSIA?

Kim’s meeting with Putin, set against the backdrop of North Korea’s ongoing nuclear modernization, indicates a stark shift in Pyongyang’s progress toward bolstering its strategic interests. Both leaders openly discussed unprecedented levels of potential technical cooperation, meeting at Vostochny Cosmodrome—a space launch facility in Russia’s far east—due to Pyongyang’s ongoing interest in space launch technologies and satellites. Although Kim and Putin did not issue a joint statement outlining any quid pro quos, they stand to gain much from each other. North Korea possesses large numbers of artillery shells and rockets that are reverse-compatible with Russian legacy military systems, while Moscow can offer Pyongyang a range of benefits from technical knowledge—such as space capabilities—to commodities such as food or raw materials.

Predictably, the United States condemned Russia’s embrace of North Korea, but Pyongyang’s new strategic convergence with Moscow has not prompted the Biden administration to reassess U.S. policy despite representing arguably one of the most positive geostrategic developments for North Korea since the end of the Cold War. Regardless of the policy review’s lofty ambitions, the United States has failed to reduce the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, or otherwise influence Kim’s choices, beyond relying on deterrence to avert a major war. Moreover, Washington’s muted reactions to Pyongyang’s unprecedented flurry of missile activity in 2022 and 2023 indicates a general normalization of the North Korean nuclear program. This situation is untenable, as unconstrained Russian–North Korean rapprochement—especially with unprecedented levels of technical cooperation—could supercharge the threat that North Korea poses to the United States and its allies.

NEW SOLUTIONS FOR NEW REALITIES

To effectively reduce this threat, Washington can no longer proceed with its status quo approach to North Korea. The United States should start by prioritizing risk reduction over denuclearization as a more practical means to averting nuclear war—the United States and its allies’ single most important security objective on the peninsula. It is important to remember that North Korea also has a fundamental interest in avoiding unwanted nuclear war. A U.S. policy focused on risk reduction would center this mutual interest, providing a starting point for dialogue and progress toward averting nuclear war unlike, from Pyongyang’s perspective, the nonstarter of denuclearization. Risk reduction efforts aimed specifically at addressing misperceptions and avoiding inadvertent or accidental escalation would go a long way in advancing that mutual interest.

As Pyongyang seeks advantage amid great-power rifts, policymakers in Washington should not complacently assume that North Korea’s past behavior—seeking capability through weapons development before turning to diplomacy—will repeat itself. With North Korea’s more favorable ties to Russia (and perhaps China), Kim may see no urgency in reengaging the United States. Amid these circumstances, Washington will need to proactively make proposals that lower nuclear risks without compromising general deterrence. Sanctions relief alone may no longer be sufficient for Washington to lure Pyongyang to the negotiating table in practical terms, as a lack of sanctions implementation by Russia and China lessens the perceived benefit of such concessions for North Korea. Nevertheless, Washington should consider limited forms of sanctions relief if it could help induce North Korean compliance with risk reduction initiatives.

Proactive risk reduction proposals could involve transparency measures such as missile launch notifications; exchanges on nuclear doctrines between U.S. and North Korean officials; and open-ended discussions on strategic stability between North Korea and the United States and its regional allies. For such risk reduction proposals to work, Washington would have to enter talks with North Korea premised on interim outcomes far short of denuclearization. U.S. policymakers would also likely need to reduce perceived threats to Pyongyang, for instance, by scaling back the types or scale of regional military exercises; adjusting its own characterizations of the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear arsenal; or being more attuned to how the alliance’s narratives about its military readiness and exercises can unintentionally escalate tensions. It will be critical to strike a balance between adopting measures that maintain deterrence while avoiding measures that could unnecessarily stoke instability in relations with Pyongyang.

A policy prioritizing risk reduction would not condone Pyongyang’s nuclear program nor preclude denuclearization as a long-term aspiration. Indeed, measures to reduce more immediate nuclear risks could enable long-term progress toward denuclearization. But prioritizing denuclearization in the short term inhibits efforts to reduce the most acute risks to the United States and its allies in the years ahead. Above all, it is time for U.S. and allied policy to acknowledge that it is not North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons that poses the greatest threat to their interests but the possibility that those weapons might be used in a conflict.

REFOCUSING DETERRENCE

To complement proactive risk reduction efforts, the United States should also put greater emphasis on the conventional—rather than nuclear—aspects of its extended deterrence relationship with Seoul. Over the past year, Washington’s attention has largely focused on nuclear deterrence in response to growing South Korean debate about acquiring an independent nuclear arsenal, as exemplified by the Washington Declaration, a statement issued during South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s visit to the White House in April 2023 that stresses the salience of nuclear weapons in deterring North Korea. While emphasis on the alliance’s nuclear dimensions is intended to assuage South Korean concerns about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, such a focus risks hindering future negotiations with Pyongyang. It also risks undermining the deterrent value of the alliance’s conventional capabilities and heightening escalation risks by implying that only nuclear weapons can effectively deter nuclear weapons.

Focusing on conventional deterrence instead of nuclear deterrence could help to reduce escalation risks and preserve the full scope of the alliance’s deterrence capacity. Conventional military capabilities, such as the precision-strike assets Seoul has and continues to invest in significantly, can go a much longer way in deterring North Korea, as they can credibly hold North Korean assets at risk without increasing the nuclear temperature on the peninsula. Conventional military forces are also much more flexible in managing limited crisis contingencies such as limited North Korean attempts at territorial revisionism, with the U.S. nuclear arsenal remaining the ultimate backstop and a potential option to respond to North Korean nuclear use against allied cities or U.S. territory. Greater coordination and integration of the alliance’s command structure will be key to ensuring the combat capability required for a credible conventional deterrent. The Washington Declaration’s call to connect South Korea’s new Strategic Command with the U.S.–South Korean Combined Forces Command, while vague, is an important starting point—as is the recently finalized alliance tailored deterrence strategy for North Korea.

Historical analogies have limited utility to Northeast Asia’s current security environment—and could even lead policymakers to dangerous conclusions. Unlike the early Cold War dynamic, in which NATO was conventionally inferior to the Soviet Union, North Korea is conventionally inferior to the U.S.–South Korean alliance and is seeking to offset that inferiority with nuclear weapons. Accordingly, adding more nuclear capabilities, whether in the form of U.S. nuclear deployments to the Korean Peninsula or South Korean nuclear weapons, would do little to augment deterrence but could drastically increase Pyongyang’s incentives to use nuclear weapons first and early in a conflict.

Kim’s rapprochement with Russia may make it tempting to entirely write off U.S. engagement with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Washington should recall, however, that Pyongyang has traditionally been willing to seek benefit where it can. Indeed, the United States has long been the grand prize of North Korean foreign policy. A bold rethinking of the U.S. approach could give Pyongyang reason to test diplomacy once again. This would not be a capitulation but a recognition of the reality that the United States and its allies will coexist with a nuclear-armed North Korea for years—likely decades—to come. Given that reality, the foremost objective must be keeping nuclear risk as low as possible.

Foreign Affairs · by Jamie Kwong and Ankit Panda · November 15, 2023





De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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