Quotes of the Day:

"I wish our nation to become the most beautiful nation in the world. I do not necessarily wish for the nation to become the world's richest or strongest. Since I have suffered all too well the pain of foreign invasion, I do not wish my nation to invade another. Our national strength will be sufficient as long as our wealth makes our lives abundant and our military strength repels others' invasions. But the one thing I seek in infinite quantity is the power of a highly developed culture. This is because the power of culture brings happiness and meaning to our lives and, by extension, to the lives of others."

– Kim Koo, My Wish (for Korea) 1876-1949

“I’m here to contribute. We all depend on each other. I depend on people in generations prior to me. People in generations after me will depend on me.” 

– Bryan Nwafor

"Those who know how to win are much more numerous than those who know how to make proper use of their victories." 

– Polybius

1. 57th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

2. Colby praises S. Korea as 1st non-NATO treaty ally to commit to 3.5 pct of GDP defense spending

3. Trump blocked from gutting Voice of America collective bargaining rights

4. Ahn, Hegseth agree to craft road map designed to 'expedite' implementation of OPCON transition conditions

5. Senior U.S. diplomat hails joint fact sheet release as opening 'new chapter' in S. Korea-U.S. alliance

6. Fact sheet signals S. Korea-U.S. alliance 'moving forward,' but questions remain over details: experts

7. North Korea halves shell shipments to Russia as its own stockpiles run low, Ukraine's intelligence says

8. Elderly N. Koreans long for Kim Jong Il era as markets wither and smuggling ends

9. North Korea plans to send 12,000 workers to Russian drone factories: Ukraine

10. Ukraine Says it hit Russia’s Iconic Trans-Siberian Railway, Targeting N. Korean Ammo Supply

11. Seoul’s Nuclear Script: South Korea’s Quiet Redefinition of Deterrence

12. Korean shipbuilders upbeat on opportunity to build US vessels

13. 5 plead guilty in North Korean IT worker schemes in the United States

14. Lee vows to expand support for residents near border with N. Korea

15. Farm labor shortages force North Korea to trap discharged soldiers in rural hometowns

16. Kim Jong-un sends troops to Russia to clear deadly minefields for Putin’s war

17. President Lee Jae-myung’s Latest Headache

1. 57th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

Summary:

The 57th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting reaffirmed alliance strength, extended deterrence, and deeper modernization efforts amid rising DPRK threats and Russia–DPRK cooperation. Both sides emphasized ROK’s expanded defense role, OPCON-transition progress, robust combined exercises, and strengthening UNC functions. They committed to enhanced nuclear consultation (NCG), cyber, space, and missile-defense cooperation; expanded trilateral coordination with Japan; Indo-Pacific regional engagement; and major advances in defense-industrial cooperation, including ship maintenance in Korea. Both pledged continued dialogue on base returns, stable USFK stationing, and advancing defense science and technology. The allies will meet again in Washington in 2026.​

Excerpt:

...As such, the Minister emphasized efforts for the complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and the Secretary noted that the United States remains committed to the four pillars of the 2018 Singapore Statement, which includes the transformation of U.S.-DPRK relations, a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization, and recovery of POW/MIA remains. In this regard, Minister Ahn explained measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions and restore trust that can militarily support government efforts to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and requested cooperation, and Secretary Hegseth expressed understanding and support. 

​Comment: I am not sure what is up with the War Department PAO team but all that was posted on the War Department web site was a link to a PDF of the Communique. I am not sure why they did not give it the professional formatting and treatment like all the other documents. 

As expected, based on the omission in POTUS-POTROK Joint Statement there was no mention of unification. 

The full text is pasted below.

A lot of good statements as summarized above, but.....

Although there are some strong statements there are two issues with this communique. Along with the POTUS-POTROK statement there is an omission of the most important deterrence message which is the use of nuclear weapons will mean the end of the Kim family regime.  

Second, the reference to the 2018 Singapore summit (reinforcing the POTROK-POTUS statement) is a victory for Kim Jong Un's political warfare strategy and blackmail diplomacy. KJU is in the catbird seat: omission of the deterrence threat, unprecedented support from Russia and China, and now diplomatic path forward (in his mind that gets him recognition as a nuclear power, normalization of relations with the US, denuclearization of the South (from the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula statement) which means an end of extended deterrence, removal of US troops) and then and only then after all that will he think about starting denuclearization (which of course in his mind he will not have to do since he will have eliminated the threat from the US and willbeable to coerce concessions from the South or use force to achieve his ultimate goal of domination of the entire Korean peninsula. We fail to understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime at our peril.

Just to reiterate from the Singapore Summit. (https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit/). Here is the key text from the statement that ROK and US policy will be implmenting from here on.

Convinced that the establishment of new U.S.–DPRK relations will contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and of the world, and recognizing that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un state the following:

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new U.S.–DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.

This also means we have to go back to the "Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula (2018.4.27)"

https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr&amp%3BsrchTo&amp%3BsrchWord&amp%3BsrchTp&amp%3Bmulti_itm_seq=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_1=0&amp%3Bitm_seq_2=0&amp%3Bcompany_cd&amp%3Bcompany_nm&page=1&titleNm

​The return to the Singapore Summit and Panmunjom Deception (respectively and by virtue of the statement in the Singapore Summit statement to "reaffirm" the Panmunjom declaration). This potentially forms the basis for ROK/US alliance policy and strategy toward north Korea going forward. It is problematic due to the different interpretations of Singapore by KJU and POTUS and in actuality it actually supports KJU's political warfare strategy better than it supports a US or ROK denuclearization strategy.

north Korea Negotiating Strategy

(post Panmunjom, Singapore, Pyongyang Summits)

Key “agreement:” denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

1. Change relationship - Declaration of the end of the war  (end of hostile US policy - i.e., Peace regime)
2. Sanctions relief (permanent removal)
3. Denuclearization of the South (end of alliance, removal of troops, end of nuclear umbrella over ROK and Japan)
4. Then negotiate dismantlement of the north’s and ICBM programs

• In Short:
• nK: change relationship, build trust , denuclearize
• US: denuclearize, build trust, change relationship

Kim Family Regime Strategy

• Vital Interest: Survival of the Kim Family Regime
• Strategic Aim: Unification of the Peninsula
• Political warfare: Subversion, coercion, extortion and ultimately the use of force
• Key Condition: Split the ROK/US Alliance
• US forces off the Peninsula
• “Divide and Conquer” – Divide the Alliance and conquer the ROK
• Desire: Recognition as "global"and nuclear power – negotiate SALT/START
• Nuclear weapons key to deterrence – Hwang Jong Yop
• nK believes US will not attack a nation with nuclear weapons

57th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

A document regarding the 57th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique.

https://media.defense.gov/2025/Nov/14/2003820640/-1/-1/1/57-SECURITY-CONSULTATIVE-MEETING-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE.PDF

57th Security Consultative Meeting Joint Communique

November 14, 2025

1. The 57th Republic of Korea (ROK) - United States (U.S.) Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) was held in Seoul, on November 4, 2025. ROK Minister of National Defense Ahn Gyu-Back and U.S. Secretary of War Pete B. Hegseth led their respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. On November 3, 2025, ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jin Yong Sung, and the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Dan Caine, presided over the 50th ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM).

2. The Secretary and the Minister reaffirmed the determination of President Lee Jae-myung and President Donald J. Trump to advance Alliance cooperation in line with both countries’ national interests. Minister Ahn outlined ROK’s plan to increase its defense spending to 3.5% of ROK Gross Domestic Product as soon as possible in accordance with ROK legal requirements, and Secretary Hegseth applauded such commitment.

The Secretary and the Minister shared the understanding that the SCM is a key venue to respond to the changing security environment as well as to modernize the alliance in a future-oriented and mutually beneficial manner. They further reaffirmed the strength of the alliance and the two nations' mutual commitment to uphold the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty through a strong defense posture. Minister Ahn emphasized that the ROK will assume the leading role in the defense of the Korean Peninsula, and noted that the ROK will pursue the acquisition of critical national defense capabilities to achieve this goal. Secretary Hegseth welcomed such a commitment from the ROK Minister of National Defense and pledged continuing U.S. support. The United States and the ROK will enhance U.S. conventional deterrence posture against all regional threats to the Alliance, including the DPRK.

3. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the current security environment and assessed regional threats, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). They noted the DPRK’s advancing nuclear and missile capabilities and modernizing conventional forces, particularly through Russian-DPRK military cooperation. Both sides assessed that these developments present profound challenges to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as the region. The Secretary and the Minister pledged to closely coordinate to deter potential DPRK aggression as well as support engagement and diplomatic activities. As such, the Minister emphasized efforts for the complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, and the Secretary noted that the United States remains committed to the four pillars of the 2018 Singapore Statement, which includes the transformation of U.S.-DPRK relations, a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization, and recovery of POW/MIA remains. In this regard, Minister Ahn explained measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions and restore trust that can militarily support government efforts to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula and requested cooperation, and Secretary Hegseth expressed understanding and support.

4. Secretary Hegseth reiterated the firm U.S. commitment to provide extended deterrence to the ROK, utilizing the full range of U.S. defense capabilities, including nuclear capabilities. The two leaders appreciated the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance and enhance extended deterrence. Both welcomed the successful execution of the ROK-U.S. Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI) table-top exercises to enhance decision-making for potential nuclear contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. They also pledged to continue the work of the NCG, and looked forward to receiving regular NCG updates at future SCMs.

5. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed ROK progress to fulfill the Conditions-based Operational Control (OPCON) Transition Plan (COTP). Both leaders reaffirmed that the conditions stated in the bilaterally approved COTP must be met before wartime OPCON is transitioned in a systematic, stable, and proactive manner. They shared views that there was a meaningful progress during this year’s bilateral evaluation on readiness posture and capabilities. The two leaders pledged to develop a roadmap to acquire the capabilities necessary to expedite the fulfillment of conditions required for wartime OPCON transition and to pursue the certification of Full Operational Capability of Future-Combined Forces Command Headquarters in 2026. Both sides affirmed that the transition of wartime OPCON would strengthen ROK and Alliance capabilities and the combined defense posture.

6. Secretary Hegseth and Minister Ahn reaffirmed the role of the United Nations Command (UNC) in implementing, managing, and enforcing the 1953 Armistice Agreement, deterring DPRK aggression, and coordinating a multinational united response in case of contingencies on the Korean Peninsula. They underscored the need for closer communication and coordination between the ROK and the United States for the UNC to maintain and enforce the Armistice Agreement. The two leaders concurred that the Armistice Agreement remains in effect and is intended to guarantee the stable security order on the Korean Peninsula, and that all parties to the Agreement should abide by it while it remains in force. Both sides noted that the Northern Limit Line (NLL) has been an effective means of separating military forces and preventing military tension over the past 70 years, and urged the DPRK to respect the NLL.

7. The Secretary and the Minister noted the critical role that U.S. forces in the ROK have played for more than 70 years. They reaffirmed that U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) will maintain force and posture levels to support Alliance efforts to prevent armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula and promote peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

8. The Secretary and Minister reviewed the work of the bilateral consultation mechanisms, and noted that various bilateral mechanisms such as the Korea-U.S. Integrated Defense Dialogue effectively support the advancement of Alliance objectives. They assessed the work of the Counter-Missile Working Group and welcomed the implementation and maintenance of the Shared Early Warning System to deliver missile warning information to the ROK within this year. They also further acknowledged the need for cooperation to stabilize the supply chain of missile defense systems. Both leaders reviewed the work of the Space Cooperation Working Group and recognized ROK contributions to improving space situational awareness information sharing and interoperability. They shared views on the need to expand ROK’s role in

strengthening Alliance space capabilities and enhancing resilience against increasing space threats and committed to explore opportunities for expansion of ROK military participation in appropriate U.S.-led space exercises and training. They also noted that cyber cooperation between the two nations has been strengthened through the Cyber Cooperation Working Group, and that Alliance cyber operation capabilities have been improved through the Cyber Alliance and Cyber Flag training events. They pledged to cooperate closely to strengthen interoperability and enhance the cyber capabilities and infrastructure of both countries in preparation for increasing threats in the security environment. The Secretary and the Minister also reviewed the work of the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Committee, and applauded efforts to improve information sharing to enhance coordination during nuclear elimination operations consistent with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and applicable U.S. and ROK law and pledged to work closely to expand cooperation in consequence management.

9. The Secretary and the Minister received and endorsed the MCM Report to the SCM presented by the ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jin Yong Sung. They welcomed efforts to strengthen the combined defense posture to effectively respond to various security challenges including deepening DPRK threats, and assessed that meaningful progress has been made in the stable transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) based on a mutually complementary relationship.

10. The Secretary and Minister noted that the Freedom Shield (FS 25) and Ulchi Freedom Shield 25 (UFS 25) exercises enhanced the Alliance’s crisis management and strengthened deterrent and defensive capabilities. In addition, the two sides assessed that combined field training exercises (FTX), which were conducted in combination with FS 25 and UFS 25, enhanced interoperability and contributed to maintaining the combined defense posture. Based on such outcomes, both leaders decided to bolster the effectiveness of combined exercises and training in line with the changing security environment.

11. The Secretary and the Minister also emphasized that ensuring consistent training opportunities for ROK and U.S. troops is critical to maintaining a strong combined defense posture. Secretary Hegseth stressed the importance of improving training conditions for ROK and U.S. troops and conducting realistic live-fire exercises. The Minister and Secretary shared views on the importance of maintaining close cooperation and communication between USFK and MND for the joint use of ROK facilities and airspace for training.

12. The Minister and the Secretary concurred on the importance of ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation to maintain peace, stability, and prosperity in the region and to respond effectively to nuclear and missile threats, including from the DPRK. The two leaders noted that the response capabilities and posture of the three countries have been strengthened through the FREEDOM EDGE exercises and other military exchanges. They assessed the continuing work of all three countries through senior-level policy consultations, trilateral exercises, information-sharing, and defense exchange cooperation, and pledged to continue to strengthen ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation.

13. Reviewing the work of the Regional Cooperation Working Group (RCWG), the Secretary and the Minister acknowledged the importance of ROK and U.S. regional security cooperation initiatives to the Indo-Pacific region, and recognized the progress in substantial cooperation with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members this year. Both leaders applauded the work of the two countries in producing joint tasks for cooperation such as expanding participation in multilateral exercises, and increasing defense industrial cooperation and maritime security cooperation. They also emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and shared views on the need for the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.

14. The Secretary and Minister also reviewed cooperative measures for defense industrial cooperation to strengthen the defense capabilities and posture of the two nations and enhance the supply chain. They commended the Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) projects being conducted by Korean companies on U.S. non-combatant ships. The Secretary also announced that a U.S. warship would undergo MRO in the ROK for the first time, marking historic progress to enhance U.S. readiness and deterrence. In addition, both leaders exchanged views on the need for shipbuilding cooperation as discussed in the ROK-U.S. Presidential Summit, and noted the imperative to expedite cooperation in shipbuilding to strengthen the readiness posture of the U.S. Navy. They shared the understanding that legal and institutional constraints pose challenges to deepening defense industrial cooperation including shipbuilding and to strengthening supply chain resiliency, and concurred on the need to work together to make improvements. The Secretary and the Minister welcomed the selection of the CH-47 engine as an MRO pilot project under the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) initiative with ROK defense industry participation. Both leaders pledged to continue regional sustainment cooperation for maritime and aviation assets and to expand this cooperation toward ground assets.

15. The Secretary and Minister noted the importance of defense science and technology (S&T) cooperation for developing defense capabilities, and pledged to pursue cooperation in advanced defense technology areas including artificial intelligence and crewed-uncrewed teaming. They concurred on the importance of the Defense Science and Technology Executive Committee co-chaired at the Vice Minister-Under Secretary level, to make substantial progress on Alliance defense S&T cooperation, and concurred on the need to hold the first meeting as soon as possible.

16. The two sides also took the opportunity to discuss the relocation and return of U.S. military bases in the ROK and decided to work closely to ensure the return of the bases in accordance with the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and related agreements. The two leaders concurred to expedite the process to return the remaining Yongsan Garrison and unreturned bases in the north of Gyeonggi Province based on mutual agreement, and pledged to discuss these through regular consultations using SOFA channels to reach mutually acceptable outcomes in the future.

17. Secretary Hegseth expressed his gratitude that the ROK is contributing toward ensuring a stable stationing environment for U.S. Forces Korea. The Secretary and Minister also assessed

that the contributions made under the Special Measures Agreement (SMA) have greatly contributed to the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. combined defense posture.

18. Secretary Hegseth and Minister Ahn concluded that the discussions during the 57th SCM and the 50th MCM contributed to strengthening and modernizing the ROK-U.S. Alliance to respond to a changing security environment. The two leaders commended the ROK and U.S. personnel that worked to develop the Alliance, and expressed appreciation for their shared commitment and sacrifice. Both sides expect to hold the 58th SCM and 51st MCM in Washington D.C. at a mutually convenient time in 2026.

2. Colby praises S. Korea as 1st non-NATO treaty ally to commit to 3.5 pct of GDP defense spending

​Summary:

U.S. defense official Elbridge Colby praised South Korea for becoming the first non-NATO treaty ally to commit to 3.5% of GDP defense spending, calling the ROK a “model ally.” He emphasized partnerships, not dependencies, as Washington rebuilds military strength. Seoul’s increased defense investment supports shared (Asia)-Indo-Pacific security and deeper, more balanced alliance cooperation.

Comment: Was the USD?W (P) under duress? I was really hoping to hear him say "America First, Allies Always, " but alas.... I hope he lives up to his current words because they are 180 degrees out from his past words on the ROK-US alliance. Of course we could be waiting for the other shoe to drop depending on aht the NDS says and the Global Force Posture Review. We know he wants a reduction in USFK and that the remainder will focus on Taiwan while leaving defense of the ROK to the Koreans. Perhap that is one of the issues holding up the release of those documents.

Colby praises S. Korea as 1st non-NATO treaty ally to commit to 3.5 pct of GDP defense spending | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 15, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251115001200315?section=national/diplomacy

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- A senior Pentagon official on Friday praised South Korea as the first non-NATO treaty ally that has committed to increasing defense spending to 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), highlighting the Trump administration's desire to work with "partnerships" rather than "dependencies."

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby made the remarks during an event celebrating the Korean National Day and Armed Forces Day in Washington, casting the Seoul-Washington alliance as a "forward-looking" one, which he said is "very important" as America seeks to reinforce its own military.

"I would fully underscore what Ambassador Kang said ... that South Korea is indeed a model ally, and today, it's especially fitting to say so as President Lee and the Republic of Korea have put their effort, their money, their seriousness and their commitment where their mouth is," Colby said.

"South Korea is now the first treaty ally of the U.S. outside of NATO to commit to the 3.5 percent standard that President Trump has set at the Hague summit," he added.

U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby speaks during an event celebrating the Korean National Day and Armed Forces Day in Washington on Nov. 14, 2025. (Yonhap)

His remarks followed a speech by new South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Kang Kyung-wha who described the bilateral relationship as a "model" alliance.

Seoul has committed to the defense spending target following the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in June, where its members committed to spending at least 3.5 percent of GDP annually on core defense expenditures by 2035, and up to 1.5 percent of GDP on other defense-linked areas.

Colby underlined the importance of allies playing their role as partners rather than relying on the U.S. for their defense.

"Under President Trump and Secretary (Pete) Hegseth, we are rebuilding the American military. We are projecting strength and confidence, but we are doing so in a way that is clear-eyed, realistic and putting America's interests first albeit in a way that works with others," he said.

"And critical to that is working with ... allies that are not dependencies, but are partnerships."

The Pentagon has been calling for allies in the Indo-Pacific to bolster its own defense and contribute more to "collective defense" in the region, as Washington seeks to counter the "pacing threat" from an increasingly assertive China.

In response, South Korea has expressed its will to bolster defense spending and undertake greater security responsibilities through various efforts, including its push to secure conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines and retake wartime operational control from Washington.

Colby ended his speech by expressing his hope for a studier alliance.

"Our salute of the Department of War, on behalf of Secretary Hegseth, to you, to your country and to the future of our storied alliance that is on an even stronger and firmer footing than it was before," he said.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 15, 2025

3. Trump blocked from gutting Voice of America collective bargaining rights

​Summary:

A federal judge blocked President Trump’s attempt to cancel collective bargaining rights for Voice of America and U.S. Agency for Global Media employees, calling it unlawful retaliation. The court rejected claims that the agencies have “primary national security” roles and warned the unions faced an “existential threat.” Prior efforts to dismantle VOA were also halted.

Comment. I really wanted to be able to say I told you so. No one can counter my argument that VOA has "a primary national security function" because the Trump administration has stated that that is exactly the case. However, I guess Judge Friedman ruled it does not since he rejected the Administration's argument. 

But regardless please bring back my beloved Korean service.

Trump blocked from gutting Voice of America collective bargaining rights

A federal judge rejected the president’s assertion the U.S. Agency for Global Media had a “primary national security function” necessary to exempt employees from union representation.

courthousenews.com · Ryan Knappenberger · November 14, 2025

https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-blocked-from-gutting-voice-of-america-collective-bargaining-rights/

WASHINGTON (CN) — A federal judge on Friday blocked the Trump administration’s effort to cancel collective bargaining agreements for U.S. Agency for Global Media and Voice of America employees, slamming the move as clear retaliation for the workers’ efforts to halt Trump’s dismantling of the news outlet.

Senior U.S. District Judge Paul Friedman found President Donald Trump’s Aug. 28 executive order, “Further Exclusions from the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program,” wrongfully tried to classify the independent media agencies as having a “primary national security function” to strip their employees of union representation.

Other agencies targeted by the order included NASA, the National Weather Service, the International Trade Commission, the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service and the Office of the Commissioner for Patents.

The Bill Clinton appointee issued his ruling from the bench, noting he has ruled similarly in several near-identical cases challenging Trump’s March 27 executive order that aimed to exclude approximately two-thirds of the federal workforce from their collective bargaining agreements.

Friedman added the chief executive is not entitled to the “presumption of regularity” — a legal doctrine that affords the executive branch a certain amount of deference based on the assumption officials follow the law — due to his pattern of retaliating against his perceived enemies.

“This presumption is based on the assumption that the president will obey their official duties, but this has not been what’s happened since Jan. 20. It’s just not,” Friedman said.

The suit was brought by the American Federal Government Employees Union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the Voice of America Employees Union and the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s employee union on Sept. 19.

Friday’s ruling is the latest in an eight-month campaign by the Trump administration to dismantle the Voice of America, which Trump has slammed as the “Voice of Radical America,” starting with a March 14 executive order requiring its “nonstatutory components and functions” be eliminated to the “maximum extent.”

A coalition of VOA journalists and editors, led by White House Bureau Chief Patsy Widakuswara, challenged the March order, leading Senior U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth to issue an injunction blocking the outlet’s shuttering, which he noted “silenced VOA for the first time ever.”

John Pellettieri of Bredhoff Kaiser and representing the unions, argued Friday that the administration’s conduct following the March 14 executive order — including efforts to circumvent Lamberth’s order that led to a show cause order and the deposition of acting Voice of America CEO Kari Lake — along with Trump’s pattern of retaliation necessitated a preliminary injunction.

Without one, Pellettieri said, the employees would lose their union representation and could potentially face looming reduction-in-force orders on their own.

He noted that on Aug. 29, the day after Trump’s executive order, Lake emailed U.S. Agency for Global Media employees stating that their collective bargaining agreements were canceled, and included a file explicitly referencing further reduction-in-force orders.

Lamberth, a Ronald Reagan appointee, has also stayed the reduction-in-force orders, blasting Lake’s “concerning disrespect” for court orders and suggesting that contempt proceedings may be on the table.

Pellettieri pointed to the recent government shutdown and the fact that only seven of the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s 500 employees remained on the job, while the remainder were furloughed, as proof the government’s national security claims were inconsistent.

Only certain members of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting remained on the job due to certain national security interests.

The government’s claims that the global media agency has a primary national security function “just cannot be squared with the idea the agency should be closed,” Pellettieri said, adding the seven non-furloughed employees are further proof any such function is minimal.

Tyler Becker from the Office of the Assistant Attorney General argued that the only question Friedman must answer is whether Trump in fact targeted the global media agency in retaliation for the unions’ resistance, or if he would have issued the executive order anyway.

Becker further suggested the unions cannot claim the August executive order would irreparably harm them, as the reduction-in-force orders remained suspended by Lamberth’s order and thus any harm is speculative.

Friedman rejected that theory, saying the local unions face an “existential threat” and would no longer exist if the global media agency is fully dismantled and its employees all terminated.

The D.C. Circuit is set to hear arguments in three consolidated cases challenging Trump’s March executive order on Dec. 15.

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courthousenews.com · Ryan Knappenberger · November 14, 2025

4. Ahn, Hegseth agree to craft road map designed to 'expedite' implementation of OPCON transition conditions

​Summary:

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn and U.S. Defense Secretary Hegseth agreed to craft a roadmap to accelerate meeting conditions for wartime OPCON transfer and seek full operational capability certification in 2026. The communique noted significant progress, Seoul’s plan to raise defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, expanded deterrence cooperation, and historic U.S. ship MRO in Korea. It omitted the usual pledge to maintain current USFK troop levels, fueling drawdown speculation. Both reaffirmed extended deterrence, continued Nuclear Consultative Group work, and cooperation on Taiwan Strait stability. Ahn confirmed plans to pursue nuclear-powered submarine cooperation despite its absence from the communique.

Comment. If we really want to modernize the alliance and deal with the full spectrum of threats then we need to establish a Northeast Asia Command (NEACOM) and a Combined NEACOM (HERE). My talking points from a panel at the Atlantic Council/Korea Society event yesterday.

Challenges:

•INDOPACOM too large for one command with 2+ fights

•Geography does not easily support two commands

•Third Party Influence and intervention (Korea)

•Conventional Nuclear Integration (Korea)

•Counter Nuclear Operations (Korea)

•Nuclear Consultative Group – “not operationalized” (Korea)

•Dual Apportioned forces – multiple contingencies

•Combatant Command Authorities in Hawaii- not Korea

•ROK/US Alliance Modernization

1. The problem: Korea’s next war will not stay on the peninsula – and may not even start on the peninsula

2. INDOPACOM’s wide area responsibilities create a structural gap.

3. The solution: Establish a Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM) in Seoul.

4. With a Tokyo Fusion Node: integrating, deconflicting, synchronizing NEACOM and INDOPACOM activities – managing dual apportioned forces

5. NEACOM would operationalize the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG).

6. Beyond conventional boundaries: operating in overlapping areas of influence.

Doctrinal Heresy:“Shared Battlespace” – Rather than strict conventional boundaries – focus on shared area of influence 

Area of Operations, Area of Responsibility, Areas of Influence

Time to Think out of the Box

“ROK-US Alliance Modernization: Time for a Northeast Asia Combatant Command (NEACOM)”

The next war in Korea will not stay in Korea. and likely will not start on the Korean peninsula.

Ahn, Hegseth agree to craft road map designed to 'expedite' implementation of OPCON transition conditions | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 14, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251114011900315?section=national/defense

By Song Sang-ho, Lee Minji and Kim Hyun-soo

SEOUL, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- The defense chiefs of South Korea and the United States have agreed to develop a road map designed to "expedite" the implementation of conditions for the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON), a joint communique showed Friday, as President Lee Jae Myung's administration pushes to regain it from the U.S. within its term ending in 2030.

Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reached the agreement during the allies' annual defense talks, called the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), in Seoul on Nov. 4, according to the document, as Seoul seeks to beef up its independent military capabilities, with the U.S. calling for it to do more for its own defense.

The two sides also agreed to seek the certification of "full operational capability (FOC)" next year -- the second part of a three-stage program aimed at vetting Seoul's capabilities to lead the allies' combined forces. The program is part of various conditions required for the OPCON handover.

On the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the communique omitted what had largely been a boilerplate phrase underlining Washington's commitment to maintaining the "current level" of USFK troops, adding to speculation the U.S. may be open to the possibility of a troop drawdown in South Korea.

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (R) and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth shake hands before the two countries' annual Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul on Nov. 4, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

"The two leaders pledged to develop a roadmap to acquire the capabilities necessary to expedite the implementation of conditions required for wartime OPCON transition, and to pursue the certification of Full Operational Capability of Future-Combined Forces Command Headquarters in 2026," the communique reads.

Ahn and Hegseth also reaffirmed that the conditions stated in a related bilateral agreement for the OPCON handover must be met before OPCON is transitioned in a "systematic, stable, and proactive" manner. The two sides also assessed that "significant" progress has been made in the OPCON transition efforts.

The conditions include South Korea's capabilities to lead combined Korea-U.S. forces, its strike and air defense capabilities, and a regional security environment conducive to such a handover.

South Korea handed over operational control of its troops to the U.S.-led U.N. Command during the 1950-53 Korean War. It was then transferred to the two allies' Combined Forces Command when the command was launched in 1978. Wartime OPCON still remains in U.S. hands, while Korea retook peacetime OPCON in 1994.

The public has been divided over the high-stakes issue. Opponents have raised concerns that the OPCON transfer could lead to a weakening of America's security commitment, while supporters argue the transfer would bolster efforts to enhance South Korea's independent military capabilities and greater autonomy in the alliance.

The communique specified South Korea's plan to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product "as soon as possible" in accordance with South Korea's legal requirements -- as also indicated in a joint fact sheet detailing discussions of summits talks between Lee and U.S. President Donald Trump on Oct. 29.

"We emphasized our determination to continuously strengthen defense capabilities so that South Korea can play a leading role in defending the security of the Korean Peninsula based on a powerful combined defense posture," Ahn said in a press briefing Friday, as he explained the defense spending hike plan.

South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back (4th from R) and U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth (2nd from L) hold the two countries' annual Security Consultative Meeting at the defense ministry in Seoul on Nov. 4, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

During the SCM, Hegseth announced that a U.S. warship would undergo maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) in South Korea for the first time in what the document called "historic progress" to enhance U.S. readiness and deterrence. The MRO plan comes as Seoul and Washington seek to strengthen cooperation in rebuilding America's shipbuilding industry.

Hegseth also noted that the U.S. remains committed to the four pillars of the Singapore summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in 2018.

The pillars include the transformation of bilateral ties, a "lasting and stable" peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, denuclearization, and recovery of the remains of prisoners of war and those who went missing during the 1950-53 Korean War.

In addition, the two sides pledged to continue the work of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), the allies' key nuclear deterrence body.

The NCG was launched in July 2023 to strengthen the credibility of America's extended deterrence commitment to using the full range of its military capabilities to defend its ally and reaffirm South Korea's commitment to non-proliferation. Its last and fourth session took place in Washington in January.

The joint communique did not include a stern warning against a potential North Korean nuclear attack, whereas last year's statement entailed a warning that any nuclear attack by the North against the U.S. and its allies would result in the end of the Kim regime.

Both sides emphasized the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and shared views on the need for a "peaceful" resolution of cross-strait issues, according to the statement.

President Lee Jae Myung (C) attends a press conference at the presidential office in Seoul on Nov. 14, 2025, to make an announcement on a joint fact sheet outlining the results of the second summit between Lee and U.S. President Donald Trump in South Korea in October, flanked by National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac (R) and Kim Yong-beom, the presidential chief of staff for policy. (Yonhap)

This year's SCM came as the allies seek to "modernize" their alliance amid a changing security environment and threats, marked by an increasingly assertive China, North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile threats as well as an intensifying global arms race.

Details of the SCM communique were also outlined in the joint fact sheet released earlier in the day, including a reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to the defense of South Korea through the "enduring presence" of the USFK and extended deterrence.

In the fact sheet, South Korea pledged to spend US$25 billion on U.S. military equipment purchases by 2030 and provide "comprehensive" support for the USFK estimated at $33 billion in accordance with South Korea's legal requirements.

The leaders of the two countries also vowed commitment to cooperation for the transition of OPCON from Washington to Seoul and said the allies will enhance U.S. conventional deterrence posture against "all" regional threats, including North Korea, in what was seen as underscoring a U.S call for Seoul to contribute to deterring Chinese threats.

South Korea's push for a nuclear-powered submarine and formal U.S. approval for the plan, indicated in the joint fact sheet, was not included in the joint communique.

But Ahn said in the briefing the defense chiefs agreed to actively push to cooperate on building the nuclear-powered submarine as discussed in summit talks between their leaders.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 14, 2025

5. Senior U.S. diplomat hails joint fact sheet release as opening 'new chapter' in S. Korea-U.S. alliance

​Summary:

The DEPSECTATE hailed the joint fact sheet from the Lee–Trump summits as launching a “new chapter” in the alliance. He highlighted shared priorities in defense, trade, and critical industries, praised Korea’s major U.S. investments, and vowed visa reforms after the Georgia incident to support Korean experts training American workers.

​Comment: But still a linchpin and an ironclad alliance. He took on the Georgia Ice Raid debacle head on and said we need to implement visa reforms so Koreans could come to the US to teach Americans advanced skills for advanced manufacturing processes..

(LEAD) Senior U.S. diplomat hails joint fact sheet release as opening 'new chapter' in S. Korea-U.S. alliance | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 15, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251115000351315?section=national/diplomacy

(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 9-14)

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau said on Wednesday that South Korea and the United States have opened a "new chapter" in their alliance with the release of a joint fact sheet on bilateral security and trade agreements.

On Thursday (Washington time), the two countries released the document outlining the outcomes of the two summits that President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump held at the White House in August and in Korea's southeastern city of Gyeongju last month ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

"Just recently, yesterday, our two countries released a historic joint fact sheet on President Trump's historic state visit to Korea at the end of October, inaugurating a new chapter in the U.S.-Korea alliance," Landau said during a forum co-hosted by the Atlantic Council and the Korea Society.

"I encourage all of you to read that fact sheet closely, because it lays out our joint priorities for the relationship in the years to come," he added.

This file photo, released by the Associated Press, shows U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau speaking during a Global Refugee Asylum System meeting in New York on Sept. 25, 2025. (Yonhap)

The senior diplomat said that the priorities include rebuilding and expanding critical industries, maintaining foreign exchange market stability, enhancing commercial ties, promoting reciprocal trade, modernizing the bilateral alliance and furthering the two countries' maritime and nuclear partnerships.

Noting that the two in-person summit meetings have taken place, Landau said that Trump has a "great" relationship with Lee.

He also stressed that during Trump's state visit to Korea last month, he secured "billions of dollars for the American economy in "landmark" deals.

"These efforts recognize Korea as one of the leading investors in the United States, and will support American jobs, fuel America's energy exports, promote trusted technology and strengthen our maritime partnership," he said.

Noting the Trump administration's drive to revitalize American manufacturing, Landau said that South Korea is "absolutely vital to this effort."

"We need Korea's investment in key sectors, including shipbuilding, energy, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, critical minerals and AI Quantum," he said.

"We also need Korea's help in getting those investments up and running, sending experts on temporary visas who can teach our great American workers how to run these precision manufacturing facilities," he added.

Landau described the immigration crackdown on Korean workers at a Korean battery factory construction site in Georgia in September as a "regrettable incident," while touching on his trip to Seoul in the same month, during which he said he pledged to fix the U.S. visa system to prevent the incident from happening again.

"President Trump has been very, very clear. He welcomes Koreans to come to our country to train American workers in these high-precision jobs," he said. "Obviously, you cannot ask for countries to make significant investments in our economy and not expect them to send people over to implement those investments and make them a reality."

He underscored that there have been "very quick strides" toward preventing a repeat of the September incident by establishing a special desk at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul and working on creating a visa category to allow people to come and train American workers in line with U.S. immigration laws.

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 15, 2025

6. Fact sheet signals S. Korea-U.S. alliance 'moving forward,' but questions remain over details: experts

​Summary:

Experts say the new U.S.–ROK fact sheet shows the alliance “moving forward” with breakthroughs on nuclear-powered submarines, enrichment rights, defense spending, and deterrence. But major uncertainties remain over implementation, costs, congressional approval, regional reactions, and possible USFK posture changes. Analysts warn tariff risks, nuclear policy hurdles, and long negotiation timelines still loom.

Comment: No one else seems to be worried about our backsliding to the 2018 Singapore summit and the victory for KJU's political warfare strategy. I do not know if I am chicken little announcing that the sky is falling or that I am the boy who cried wolf one too many times.

(News Focus) Fact sheet signals S. Korea-U.S. alliance 'moving forward,' but questions remain over details: experts | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 15, 2025

By Song Sang-ho

WASHINGTON, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- A joint fact sheet encompassing trade and security agreements between South Korea and the United States shows the bilateral alliance "moving forward," but questions remain over implementation details, and potential financial, geopolitical and other difficulties ahead, experts said Friday.

This week, the two countries released the document outlining the results of the two summits that President Lee Jae Myung and U.S. President Donald Trump held at the White House in Washington in August and in Korea's southeastern city of Gyeongju last month ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit.

It contains a wide range of agreements and understandings, including U.S. approval for Seoul's push to build nuclear-powered submarines and its support for the Asian ally's drive to secure uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing capabilities.

Experts exhibited a mixture of relief, hope and caution, as the finalization of the document has eased uncertainties about the allies' trade and security partnerships, and put an end to a flurry of worrisome speculation surrounding the delay in its release.

"The absence of any joint statement or fact sheet after the Trump-Lee summit in Washington in August, and also the week after the two leaders met in Seoul was both unprecedented and concerning. So it is somewhat of a relief that the Lee and Trump governments were able to hash out a statement to share with the public," Andrew Yeo, SK-Korea Foundation chair at the Brookings Institution's Center for East Asia Policy Studies, told Yonhap News Agency.

"The statement suggests that the alliance is moving forward," he added.

This file photo, taken Aug. 25, 2025, shows South Korean President Lee Jae Myung (L) holding talks with U.S. President Donald Trump in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington. (Yonhap)

Ellen Kim, director of academic affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI), portrayed the agreements on nuclear energy cooperation and strategic submarine construction as "new breaking ground."

"Part of the reason that the Trump administration supported these agreements seems to be connected with the U.S. recognition of South Korea's need of spent fuel management and assured fuel supply, as well as the evolving strategic landscape, where South Korea's enhanced naval power capability is in mutual interests of the alliance," she said.

"That said, all of these issues will come under close scrutiny and be subject to working-group discussion, which could take many years. The Trump administration will remain committed to the agreements. But whether the U.S. Congress and future administrations will continue to support these agreements is not warranted."

Rob Rapson, former acting U.S. ambassador to South Korea, said that the fact sheet provides additional clarification of the understandings and agreements reached between the two sides. But he noted that much work is still left for those agreements to be put into practice.

"It remains vague in some areas, and there is much still needed with respect to implementation details in key sectors," he said.

With the wide-ranging document likely to create a fresh momentum for the two countries to chart a future direction of the alliance, analysts anticipated that it would serve as an important guide, particularly on trade.

"With the arrangements of the 'Trump Round' deal now superseding the erstwhile KORUS agreement, this is likely to be the guiding document for the U.S.-Korea trade and security relationship for the foreseeable future," Tom Ramage, an economic policy analyst at the KEI, said, referring to the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement.

Ramage called particular attention to the addition of an agreement on digital services in the document, saying it added new dimensions to an area where U.S. companies had been lobbying for different treatment.

Noting the security component of the document, he also expected it to work as a "reference point" for cooperation in the alliance going forward.

The component includes Seoul's plan to increase defense spending to 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product and a bilateral agreement to enhance the U.S. conventional deterrence posture against "all regional threats" to the alliance -- language that alludes to a U.S. demand for Seoul to contribute to countering Chinese threats.

Major security elements also include U.S. approval for Seoul to build nuclear-powered attack submarines, as well as Washington's support for Seoul's push to secure uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities, which have been banned under a bilateral civil nuclear energy cooperation pact.

"The door to nuclear sub building and uranium reprocessing has indeed been opened by Trump, for reasons not completely clear to me," Rapson said. "It will be up to the ROK to carefully evaluate how quickly to pursue this opening, taking into account high costs, likely strong regional reactions, and NPT considerations."

ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea, while NPT is short for Non-Proliferation Treaty.

From the nuclear submarine deal, the Trump administration likely sees commercial and security benefits, Yeo pointed out.

"The idea of South Korea building its own nuclear powered submarines fits within Trump's narrative that South Korea is seeking to do more to boost its own defense capabilities, and that Trump is proving more opportunities for economic cooperation and investment with allies," he said.

"Trump's approach is to say yes now to something that sounds attractive, and then work out the details later."

U.S. President Donald Trump speaks with Republican senators in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington on Oct. 21, 2025, in this photo released by UPI. (Yonhap)

Seoul has sought to secure enrichment and spent fuel recycling rights as part of efforts to address concerns about energy security and growing stockpiles of nuclear waste -- a move that would require a revision to the bilateral nuclear energy pact.

Ross Matzkin-Bridger, senior director at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, cautioned against believing that enrichment and reprocessing advances the goal of securing a "reliable, stable and affordable" energy supply, as he pointed to various practical issues, including "significant" time and money required to pursue those capabilities.

"The billions of dollars that it would take to build enrichment and reprocessing capabilities could instead be spent on technologies and infrastructure that can actually boost South Korean energy security rapidly and efficiently."

He proposed expanding and strengthening the global uranium supply chain, and building disposal pathways for spent fuel.

Regarding the 28,500-strong U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the fact sheet did not commit the U.S. to retaining the "current" troop level though it mentioned the "enduring" USFK presence -- a move that added to speculation that Washington may be open to a potential force adjustment in Korea.

"This language indicates that although there will be no withdrawal of the USFK from the Korean Peninsula, some changes could be possible, such as the level or repositioning of the USFK," Kim said. "This reflects the U.S. recalibration of 'strategic flexibility' to better address regional challenges in the Indo-Pacific."

Strategic flexibility is a U.S. effort to expand the operational scope of USFK beyond the Korean Peninsula to cover China-related contingencies, including a Taiwan conflict.

Regarding USFK posture, Yeo said, "The Trump administration may want to move away from offering any concrete figures, especially if the role and function of USFK is what's more important than the exact troop numbers."

On the trade front, the fact sheet codified the U.S. agreement to lower its reciprocal tariffs on Korean products to 15 percent from 25 percent in return for Seoul's commitment to investing US$350 billion in the U.S. and other pledges.

Rapson warned that the threat of "tariff snapbacks" is "real" if the Trump administration unilaterally feels Korea is not following through on its commitments. He also said that the situation is still "fluid" as U.S. policy under Trump towards Korea and other allies may continue to shift.

"And should the Supreme Court invalidate Trump's tariff authority under the IEEPA in the coming weeks, that will have huge ripple effects, reactions to which by allies and partners will be interesting to see," he added.

He was referring to the Supreme Court's deliberations on the legality of Trump's use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose across-the-board, country-specific tariffs on America's trading partners, including South Korea.

This photo, taken Oct. 29, 2025, shows the national flags of South Korea and the United States at a national museum in Korea's southeastern city of Gyeongju. (Yonhap)

sshluck@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 15, 2025

7. North Korea halves shell shipments to Russia as its own stockpiles run low, Ukraine's intelligence says

​Summary:

Ukraine says North Korea has halved artillery shipments to Russia in 2025 as its stockpiles run low. Many shells are poor quality, requiring refurbishment. Pyongyang sent millions in earlier years, plus thousands of troops, but deliveries dipped in September. North Korea is now expanding drone production and remains a key Russian ally.

Comment: Perhaps this can support attrition warfare: the nKPA can expend all its ammunition i support of Putin and then is unable to fight a war with the South (not sarcasm)

North Korea halves shell shipments to Russia as its own stockpiles run low, Ukraine's intelligence says

kyivindependent.com · Kateryna Hodunova · November 15, 2025

https://kyivindependent.com/north-korea-halves-arms-shipments-to-russia-as-its-own-stockpiles-run-low-ukraines-intelligence-says/

War

November 15, 2025 12:53 pm

• 2 min read

North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un smiles during a departure ceremony at the airport after Russian-North Korean talks, June 19, 2024, in Pyongyang, North Korea (Contributor/Getty Images)

Pyongyang has cut its artillery shell shipments to Russia by more than half in 2025 due to dwindling stockpiles, Vadym Skibitskyi, deputy head of Ukraine's military intelligence agency (HUR), told Reuters on Nov. 14.

North Korean artillery ammunition enabled Russia to maintain its firing rate in 2024, but this year, that support has declined markedly, with both the quantity and quality of munitions delivered to the Kremlin significantly reduced.

In 2023, North Korea supplied Russia with about 6.5 million artillery shells from its stockpiles, taking the opportunity to strengthen ties with Moscow following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Skibitskyi told Reuters.

Yet no shipments were recorded in September, though some were tracked in October, according to Ukraine's military intelligence.

Skibitskyi added that roughly half of the shells arriving from Pyongyang were so poorly maintained that they had to be sent to Russian factories for refirbishing.

North Korea has also begun mass-producing small, short-range combat drones equipped with FPV (first-person-view) cameras, as well as larger, medium-range drones, Skibitskyi said, without providing details on production volumes.

"They are learning, they are studying their experience (in this war) to expand production on their own territory," he added.

North Korea has become a key ally to Russia during the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, deploying thousands of troops in combat and providing artillery and ballistic missiles

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement, which includes mutual support in the event of an attack, ahead of North Korea's troop deployment to Russia in June 2024.

Since then, Pyongyang has sent roughly 11,000–12,000 troops to Russia in late 2024 to help repel Ukraine's advance in Russia's Kursk Oblast.

A senior Western diplomat told the Kyiv Independent that North Korea may have sent even more, with Ukrainian officials estimating its contribution at 20,000–30,000 soldiers.

Moscow has repeatedly highlighted the role of North Korean troops in the war against Ukraine, while Kim has openly acknowledged his military's participation on Russia's side.

Kateryna Hodunova

News Editor

Kateryna Hodunova is a News Editor at the Kyiv Independent. She previously worked as a sports journalist in several Ukrainian outlets and was the deputy chief editor at Suspilne Sport. Kateryna covered the 2022 Olympics in Beijing and was included in the Special Mentions list at the AIPS Sport Media Awards. She holds a bachelor's degree in political journalism from Taras Shevchenko University and a master's degree in political science from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.

8. Elderly N. Koreans long for Kim Jong Il era as markets wither and smuggling ends

​Summary:

Elderly North Koreans increasingly long for the Kim Jong Il era as today’s economy worsens under Kim Jong Un. Residents say markets were livelier, goods cheaper, and smuggling across China’s border allowed ordinary people to survive and even save. Since the pandemic, border closures, surveillance, and harsh crackdowns have crushed smuggling, remittances, and jangmadang activity. Older vendors lament that now they often sell nothing, prices are exorbitant, and even a kilogram of rice requires days of earnings. The nostalgia reflects deep dissatisfaction with Kim Jong Un’s tightening controls and a sense that life is harder than at any time since the Arduous March.

​Comment: So much to unpack here. But we need to be concerned with the internal situation north Korea. There are indicators of potential internal instability which could lead to regime collapse if the KFR loses central government effectiveness combined with the loss of coherency and support of the military.

Yet we are longing for a return to the Singapore Summit era and negotiations with the despot who is actively conducting political warfare and blackmail diplomacy while cracking down on the Korean people in the north with draconian population and resources control measures. The danger is that his actions are taking away the "relief valve" from the Korean people in the north (I.e., market activity) that has provided the resilience necessary for survival for more than two decades. Imagine that life was better under Kim Jong Il than it is under Kim Jong Un now?

Elderly N. Koreans long for Kim Jong Il era as markets wither and smuggling ends

Former smugglers who once bribed their way out of labor camps now face spy accusations and harsh punishment for using Chinese phones to facilitate remittances

By Lee Chae Eun - November 14, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/elderly-n-koreans-long-for-kim-jong-il-era-as-markets-wither-and-smuggling-ends/

dailynk.com · November 14, 2025

Portraits of KIm Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. (Michael Day, Flickr, Creative Commons)

Amid persistent economic hardship, it is becoming more common for elderly North Koreans to long for the days of Kim Jong Il, as an increasing number of people look back fondly on when it was possible to make a living as a smuggler or market vendor with fewer restrictions from the government.

“Nowadays, older people in the city of Hoeryong often talk about how things were better under the Kim Jong Il. Talk of that sort crops up when so many people are struggling just to keep their families fed,” a source in North Hamgyong province told Daily NK recently.

“Under Kim Jong Il, market conditions were much better than they are today. Ordinary individuals could smuggle goods across the border back then, earning a decent livelihood and even setting a little aside. When people look back on those days, they describe them as a time when it was easier to make a living,” the source added.

There was a fair amount of market activity and private smuggling during the early days of Kim Jong Un. But since the pandemic, private smuggling has basically been stamped out, and the informal marketplaces known as jangmadang in North Korea are gradually withering. In short, North Koreans are in a worse financial situation than ever, the source said.

From smugglers to spies: How survival became a crime

In the past, a fair number of people made a living by selling various goods they smuggled over the border from China. But that livelihood was eliminated when the North Korean authorities closed the border after the outbreak of the coronavirus. Most of those smugglers pivoted to work as remittance brokers, but even that occupation is growing untenable as the authorities crack down on the usage of Chinese-made mobile phones.

“In the past, people caught using a Chinese phone could get off with a few months at a labor camp with the right bribe, but bribes don’t cut it anymore. Chinese phone users are branded as spies and punished harshly. That’s why smugglers of a certain age will tut-tut while remarking that nobody knew how good they had it back then,” the source said.

Veteran vendors at the market are also known to sigh regretfully as they look back on the old days.

“Under Kim Jong Il, everything was much cheaper than it is now, and the markets were so boisterous that earning 5,000 won was no big deal. Nowadays, it’s common to go all day without selling a thing, never mind making 5,000 won. Prices are so high it takes several days to earn enough to buy a kilogram of rice,” the source quoted a vendor as saying.

“The vendors who talk like this tend to be a little older. They often say that the days of the General, who was in charge during the Arduous March, weren’t as tough as they are now. The markets were growing, and people there had found a way to make a living. That’s why they remember those days as a true heaven on earth,” the source said.

In the end, people’s longing for the days of Kim Jong Il appears to go beyond mere sentimentality and imply dissatisfaction with the current rule of Kim Jong Un, including the poor economic conditions. Since social restrictions are growing ever tighter, North Koreans’ mental anxiety is breeding animus against the regime.

“The impression I’ve gotten during all these years since the time of Kim Il Sung is that life keeps getting harder and harder. I’m not even sure how to make a living for myself, so I can only sigh when I think of my children,” said a Hoeryong resident in their sixties.

“During the time of Kim Jong Il, we longed for the days of Kim Il Sung because of the Arduous March. But now, we long for the days of the Kim Jong Il. At least we could count on the markets back then, but now even market vendors are struggling to make a living.”

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · November 14, 2025

9. North Korea plans to send 12,000 workers to Russian drone factories: Ukraine

​Summary:

Ukraine says North Korea will send 12,000 laborers to Russian drone factories in Tatarstan, deepening wartime cooperation. Workers will staff Geran drone production under Jihyang Technology Trade Company, a sanctioned DPRK arms dealer. Paid around $2.50 per hour for 12-hour shifts, the deployment highlights expanding Russia–North Korea military collaboration.

Comment: Training for future nKPA drone factories? I wonder how much of that $2.50 actually goes to the workers? Or is that what is left over after KJU's cut has been removed?

North Korea plans to send 12,000 workers to Russian drone factories: Ukraine

Sanctioned DPRK arms firm reportedly behind deployment to Tatarstan region, deepening military ties over the war

Anton Sokolin November 14, 2025

A Geran-2/Shahed-136 downed in Ukraine's Sumy region, Oct. 17, 2024 | Image: National Police of Ukraine

North Korea will send 12,000 workers to Russian drone factories in Tatarstan by the end of the year, Ukraine announced on Friday, reporting that a sanctioned arms peddler is behind the deployment.

The North Koreans will work in Tatarstan’s Alabuga special economic zone, home to factories producing the Geran drones that Russia has used in swarm attacks on Ukrainian cities, the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) said in a Telegram post.

The spy agency singled out the DPRK’s Jihyang Technology Trade Company as the firm tasked with procuring the laborers. It alleged that the company’s representatives held a meeting with local officials at the Russian foreign ministry to discuss the details of the deal in late October.

“The Russians are promising this imported labor force about $2.50 per hour, with shifts lasting at least 12 hours,” the DIU said, stating that the move highlights “deepening strategic cooperation between the two dictatorships aimed at continuing the aggressive war against Ukraine.”

Jihyang, also known as Green Pine Associated Corporation, has been under international sanctions for years as a successor to the Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, North Korea’s main arms dealer.

The U.N. designated the company as an actor responsible for “approximately half of the arms and related materiel exported by the DPRK” in 2012, following previous designations of the firm by the U.S. in 2010 and EU in 2011.

The news comes months after Japan’s NHK broadcaster reported in June that Russia was planning to bring in as many as 25,000 DPRK workers to give a boost to its Geran production lines in Tatarstan. The unmanned aerial vehicle is Russia’s version of the Iranian Shahed drone.

Kyiv previously claimed that Russia is helping North Korea set up local production of Geran loitering munitions, stating that Russian instructors train DPRK drone operators in the country.

North Korea’s ties with Tatarstan recently attracted attention after a Bombardier Challenger 605 aircraft (RA-67147) registered in the region and operated by a local charter airline flew from Moscow to Pyongyang in late October.

The DPRK has long dispatched workers to construction sites and factories across Russia to raise money for the regime, while more recently deploying thousands of troops to support the invasion of Ukraine.

Edited by Bryan Betts

10. Ukraine Says it hit Russia’s Iconic Trans-Siberian Railway, Targeting N. Korean Ammo Supply

​Summary: 

Ukraine says an intelligence operation struck Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway in Khabarovsk, halting military cargo flows, including North Korean ammunition. The blast disrupted a key 9,000-km logistics route supplying Russia’s war in Ukraine. Kyiv says the attack shows Moscow cannot secure critical infrastructure amid escalating strikes on each other’s energy and supply networks.

​Comment: I know the first response I will receive to this article from a friend will be: "About effing time. Why has no one targeting the nKPA logistic support Putin before now?"

Ukraine Says it hit Russia’s Iconic Trans-Siberian Railway, Targeting N. Korean Ammo Supply

kyivpost.com · TVP World · November 15, 2025

HUR said the attack blocked the movement of military cargo on a rail line that Moscow uses “to supply weapons and ammunition, including those obtained from the territory of the DPRK.”

by TVP World | Nov. 15, 2025, 8:56 am

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/64266

Screenshot from video by HUR

Ukraine said it had attacked freight traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railway, halting Russian military supply chains, including weapon deliveries from North Korea.

Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) said it was behind a major explosion in Russia’s eastern Khabarovsk region on Thursday, which damaged the railway along one of the country’s key logistics routes.

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HUR said on Telegram that the attack blocked the movement of military cargo on a rail line that Moscow uses “to supply weapons and ammunition, including those obtained from the territory of the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea].”

North Korea is one of the Kremlin’s closest allies, supporting Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine with both troops and weapons, including advanced rocket systems and ballistic missiles.

In May, Reuters reported that Pyongyang had supplied more than 20,000 containers of munitions, many of which have been used by the Kremlin to target civilian sites in Ukraine.

The world-famous Trans-Siberian Railway, spanning over 9,000 km from Moscow to Vladivostok, is a crucial logistics route for Russia, allowing military supplies from the east to reach the Ukrainian frontlines.

According to HUR, the operation – carried out over 6,000 km deep into Russian territory - showed that Moscow cannot secure its own military logistics network.

“The Kremlin’s special services once again demonstrate their inability to ensure effective control over even the most critical infrastructure facilities for the occupiers,” it said.

Ukraine’s officials also said that the attack was part of ongoing efforts to “dismantle the enemy’s logistics capabilities.”

This development comes as both countries intensify attacks on each other’s critical infrastructure—Russia targeting Ukraine’s power facilities ahead of winter, and Kyiv hitting oil depots to weaken Moscow’s ability to finance the war.

Overnight, Ukraine also struck a major oil terminal in the Russian seaport of Novorossiysk, as deadly Russian drones once again hit Kyiv.

11. Seoul’s Nuclear Script: South Korea’s Quiet Redefinition of Deterrence

​Summary:

Two Korean-language volumes from Seoul’s Korean Nuclear Security Project reveal a quiet but consequential shift: South Korea is rethinking deterrence and treating the U.S. nuclear umbrella not as sacred doctrine but as a negotiable contract. Written by retired generals, engineers, and scholars, the reports argue alliance credibility is no longer assured and urge deeper national deliberation about survival, strategy, and autonomy. As North Korea expands both tactical and intercontinental nuclear capabilities, Seoul’s nuclear debate has become institutional and sustained rather than reactive. Upcoming volumes will address command-and-control and nuclear-submarine architecture now reinforced by Washington’s recent approval of ROK nuclear-powered submarines thus signaling Seoul’s gradual move toward strategic adulthood under, but no longer entirely dependent on, the U.S. umbrella.

Excerpts:

The symbolism was unmistakable. The ROK Forum’s first volume devotes two chapters to arguing for a nuclear-powered submarine, and the forthcoming fourth volume, Nuclear Potential and Nuclear Submarines (핵잠재력과 핵잠수함), seems to forecast precisely this scenario—a step beyond dependency, toward a form of self-sustaining deterrence under the alliance umbrella. The US decision effectively turns the Project’s logic into policy almost without debate.

South Korean officials framed the move as a way to enhance underwater endurance and tracking capabilities, not to “arm submarines with nuclear weapons.” Yet for Pyongyang—already developing its own nuclear-powered vessel with Russian technical assistance—the optics are unmistakable. The duel now extends beneath the sea: a contest of persistence, patience, and political will.

The hurdles ahead remain steep. Technology transfer restrictions, high costs, and long lead times could delay deployment by a decade or more. Still, the gesture alone shifts the conversation. What began as an academic blueprint for autonomy is now the scaffolding of real policy.

Somewhere between analysis and anxiety, Seoul is teaching itself to think like a guarantor. The warning is already in print, in Hangul. Whether Washington bothers to read it, or waits for the translation, may decide who writes the next chapter of East Asia’s nuclear story.

I keep circling back to one quiet thought: deterrence, for all its theories and charts, is still about trust—and trust, once doubted, never really comes back.

Comment: I "keep circling back" to one question: What actually deters Kim Jong Un. I do not see members of the policy maker community, the press or pundits describe their assumptions about what deters KJU. We really need to make sound assumptions about what deters KJU and then devise ways to exploit that. Yes we need trust to assure our allies (strategic reassurance) but we also need to demonstrate strategic resolve to employ the correct ways and means that will cause KJU to be deterred.

Seoul’s Nuclear Script: South Korea’s Quiet Redefinition of Deterrence

• By: Perry Choi
• November 14, 2025

https://www.38north.org/2025/11/seouls-nuclear-script-south-koreas-quiet-redefinition-of-deterrence/?utm

Two Korean-language-only volumes reveal how Seoul is redefining deterrence and testing the limits of America’s nuclear assurances.

A few months ago, a small group of retired generals, nuclear engineers, and civil-defense scholars met inside a modest policy institute in Seoul. The banner above them read, without flourish, The Korean Nuclear Security Project (한국의 핵안보 프로젝트). On paper, it sounded routine—an audit of deterrence doctrines—yet something about it felt heavier than that.

What began as a government study soon became something else: a manifesto for a country trying to think through what survival might actually mean on its own. It was not ideological, and it was not showy. It grew out of a quieter faith—the idea that if you think hard enough, maybe you can keep disaster at bay. Working without honoraria and running on member dues, the authors spent the summer in what they later called “marathon season”: endless seminars, late-night calls, rewrites over coffee, each round meant to sharpen an argument that no one wanted to say aloud.

The first two volumes, Justification and Implementation Strategy (당위성과 추진 전략) and International Persuasion and Bipartisan Cooperation (국제사회 설득과 초당적 협력), came out in July and August of 2025 mark a subtle but real shift. Seoul no longer treats the American nuclear umbrella as sacred scripture. It is starting to see it as a contract—something to tend, to adjust, and, if needed, to renegotiate. For Washington, long-used to assuming its promises speak for themselves, that might seem like semantics—and maybe it is—but semantics have consequences. Small reinterpretations have a way of growing teeth.

From Dependence to Deliberation

Volume 1 opens with a question that feels half technical, half existential: would North Korea really be unable to use its nuclear weapons? (Vol. 1, ch. 1). The reasoning is brisk but grim—Pyongyang keeps building, while Seoul’s three-axes defense concept rests on preemption theories that could fall apart the first night things go wrong. I have argued before that those assumptions lean more on optimism than on evidence. The authors seem to know that too; they note, almost casually, that alliance credibility—once treated as a constant—now flickers like a variable.

Contributor Song Seung-jong writes that extended deterrence now belongs to the past—a strategic “myth” more invoked than trusted (Vol. 1, ch. 4). The phrase is pointed but not reckless; it captures the unease behind Korea’s new intellectual movement: an alliance that still works mechanically but no longer consoles psychologically.

The ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy, which coordinates the Project, brought together more than fifty contributors—retired generals, academics, former bureaucrats. Korean media hailed it a “paradigm shift” in strategic thinking. The Forum’s own updates later noted that both volumes reached national bestseller lists in mid-2025—a strange sentence to write about serious defense literature, but it could signal public resonance. When Vol. 2 came out a few weeks later, it felt less like a follow-up than an announcement: this discussion was here to stay.

The shift did not happen in a vacuum. North Korea is pursuing a dual-path strategy—building the tools to nullify the US nuclear umbrella while preparing for a tactical nuclear war. At its latest parade, Pyongyang unveiled the Hwasong-20 intercontinental ballistic missile, a platform capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. Seoul and Washington have remained strategically silent, perhaps to deny Kim Jong Un the satisfaction of recognition, but the silence itself increasingly signals something: not just avoidance, but tacit acceptance of a new normal. Meanwhile, the North keeps refining delivery systems for short-range and tactical nuclear weapons, building both deterrent and warfighting capacity.

That context gives the Project’s restraint its edge. The authors never call for a bomb, but their logic operates in a world where the threat keeps mutating. The difference this time isn’t in the conclusion but in the tone. Previous bursts of nuclear debate in Seoul tended to spike after North Korean provocations or U.S. election cycles, then fade. This one moves slowly, bureaucratically—the way real change often does.

And the scope keeps widening. Volumes 3 and 4, expected in 2026, will cover Nuclear Strategy and Command-and-Control Architecture (핵전략과 핵지휘통제체계) and Nuclear Potential and Nuclear Submarines (핵잠재력과 핵잠수함). It is a deliberate progression—the “why,” then the “how,” then the mechanics of deterrence itself. Maybe tidy enough to be deliberate.

And inside those pages, you can almost hear the hum of the bureaucracy translating fear into spreadsheets.

How Bureaucrats Imagine Deterrence

Reading The Project feels, at times, like watching engineers reverse-design Armageddon. Kwon Yong-su, a retired weapons specialist at the Korea National Defense University, traces missile trajectories and counter-force options in clean, detached prose. It is oddly calming—until you remember what those diagrams are for.

To outsiders, the restraint might look bloodless. But in a country where catastrophe is a daily thought experiment, calm is a coping mechanism. Here, deterrence is no swagger; it is paperwork.

Still, the undertone is hard to miss. South Korea is uneasy beneath the American umbrella and wants a say in how that protection works. That’s not freedom exactly, but it is not dependency either. It is something more awkward, more grown-up.

The Geocentric Mindset and The Parallel

Korean strategists sometimes joke about “Korean Peninsula Geocentrism” (한반도 천동설) — the belief that the world somehow revolves around them. There’s truth in the joke. Seoul wants independence from Washington’s orbit but can’t stop measuring distance from it. The Project tries to challenge that impulse—and ends up mirroring it instead. It tries to move beyond Washington’s orbit but can’t quite stop glancing back to see where the center is.

You can spot this tension at the top. In October 2025, South Korea’s defense minister remarked that U.S. troops on the peninsula should focus on deterring North Korea, not China, since alliance resources must remain “dedicated to the immediate threat.” It sounded reasonable in Seoul, a bit provincial in Washington. But the comment captured a truth: for most Koreans, the global balance of power is still drawn through Pyongyang.

The same gravity shows up in civilian writing—a parallel conversation runs outside the bureaucracy. In We Don’t Know America (우리는 미국을 모른다), journalist Kim Dong-hyun, once a Pentagon-accredited correspondent, argues that Korean elites often misread Washington—treating its pauses as purpose and its politics as grand design. His tone echoes The Project: one speaks through policy charts, the other through social critique. Both describe a nation trying to outgrow dependence, if a little unevenly.

Every alliance tells a story about who protects whom. In Seoul’s version, the fear isn’t abandonment so much as misunderstanding.

Alliance in Search of Reassurance

For American officials, these volumes should feel less like a warning and more like a mirror. They show what the alliance looks like from below the umbrella. Washington still interprets Korean nuclear debate through the old non-proliferation lens, as though every discussion is secretly about control. It is not. The domino metaphor doesn’t land when you’re the piece that’s been shaking for years.

South Koreans now talk about reassurance gaps, delayed signals, and the strange psychology of being defended by someone who isn’t really there. When I sat in those inter-agency rooms, we called that “alliance management.” Looking back, that phrase feels a little off, as if we were maintaining a machine that, in truth, was a relationship needing care.

South Korea is wavering under American protection and wants a say in how protection works. That’s not freedom exactly, but it is not dependency either. It is something more awkward, more grown-up.

Washington, for its part, seems consumed by the China problem and doesn’t have much bandwidth for anything else. But turning a blind eye to an ally’s security anxieties won’t make them fade. Seoul’s new nuclear discourse is not a tantrum; it is a reckoning. It may even be a test of whether reassurance can survive abstraction.

The Strategic Moment

The Korean Nuclear Security Project is not radical. It is incremental, patient, the kind of work that accumulates under fluorescent light. But it adds up to something: a declaration that strategic adulthood can’t be delegated forever. Published in Korean only, aimed at a domestic audience, the books weren’t written for Western applause—and that’s exactly why they matter.

That foresight has just become tangible. In late October 2025, Washington formally gave Seoul the green light to pursue nuclear-powered submarines, a policy long debated within the Project’s pages. During a summit in Gyeongju, President Donald Trump approved South Korea’s request to begin developing a nuclear-propelled fleet—a move Seoul argues is about endurance, not escalation. The decision marks the first time Washington has publicly endorsed such a capability for an ally outside the United Kingdom.

The symbolism was unmistakable. The ROK Forum’s first volume devotes two chapters to arguing for a nuclear-powered submarine, and the forthcoming fourth volume, Nuclear Potential and Nuclear Submarines (핵잠재력과 핵잠수함), seems to forecast precisely this scenario—a step beyond dependency, toward a form of self-sustaining deterrence under the alliance umbrella. The US decision effectively turns the Project’s logic into policy almost without debate.

South Korean officials framed the move as a way to enhance underwater endurance and tracking capabilities, not to “arm submarines with nuclear weapons.” Yet for Pyongyang—already developing its own nuclear-powered vessel with Russian technical assistance—the optics are unmistakable. The duel now extends beneath the sea: a contest of persistence, patience, and political will.

The hurdles ahead remain steep. Technology transfer restrictions, high costs, and long lead times could delay deployment by a decade or more. Still, the gesture alone shifts the conversation. What began as an academic blueprint for autonomy is now the scaffolding of real policy.

Somewhere between analysis and anxiety, Seoul is teaching itself to think like a guarantor. The warning is already in print, in Hangul. Whether Washington bothers to read it, or waits for the translation, may decide who writes the next chapter of East Asia’s nuclear story.

I keep circling back to one quiet thought: deterrence, for all its theories and charts, is still about trust—and trust, once doubted, never really comes back.

12. Korean shipbuilders upbeat on opportunity to build US vessels

​Summary:

Korean shipbuilders welcomed a new U.S.–ROK fact sheet signaling potential construction of U.S. commercial and military vessels in Korea. The MASGA initiative includes $150 billion in Korean investment, deeper cooperation on MRO, workforce development, and shipyard modernization. HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean hailed the deal as resolving uncertainties and opening major new markets.

Comment: The future of the alliance in one acronym: MASGA.

Korean shipbuilders upbeat on opportunity to build US vessels

koreaherald.com · Kan Hyeong-woo · November 14, 2025

Joint fact sheet issued by Seoul, Washington indicates potential construction of US ships at Korean shipyards

President Lee Jae Myung (right) and President Donald Trump look at Trump-related books and merchandise ahead of their summit at the Gyeongju National Museum on Oct. 29. (Presidential Office)

Korean shipbuilders on Friday welcomed the joint fact sheet announcement issued by Korea and the United States, which hinted at a possibility of building US vessels at Korean shipyards, opening a new market.

Earlier in the day, President Lee Jae Myung announced in a live broadcast from Seoul’s presidential office that the two countries had agreed to pursue systematic changes so that not only US commercial ships but also US military vessels can be built in Korea, saying they have laid stepping stones for their shipbuilding industry to be great together.

The White House, on its official website, also posted the fact sheet on President Donald Trump’s meeting with the Korean leader, disclosing the agreement document for the first time since the deal was struck in July.

Noting that the agreement includes $150 billion of Korean investment in the shipbuilding sector, an initiative known as Make American Shipbuilding Great Again, or MASGA, the White House said the two countries committed to further collaboration through a working group tasked with discussing vessel maintenance, repair and overhaul, or MRO, as well as workforce development, shipyard modernization and supply chain resilience.

Korea’s two leading shipbuilders -- HD Hyundai and Hanwha Ocean -- expressed appreciation for the government’s efforts to finalize the agreement.

“We expect that the confirmation of the fact sheet resolves uncertainties in the domestic economy,” said an HD Hyundai official.

“As the No. 1 global shipbuilder, HD Hyundai will actively push for the success of the Korea-US shipbuilding cooperation project MASGA.”

HD Hyundai has been building strong ties with Huntington Ingalls Industries, the largest military shipbuilder in the US, as the two partners agreed to construct auxiliary ships for the US Navy’s next-generation fleet as well as jointly invest in the acquisition or establishment of new shipbuilding facilities in the US last month.

Hanwha Ocean said in a statement that it will continue to move forward with the national agenda, adding that it will invest in its Geoje shipyard and expand the site as well as grow alongside regional partners.

“We will serve as the best Korea-US security partner by introducing the technologies and capabilities of the Geoje shipyard to US facilities such as the Hanwha Philly Shipyard,” said Hanwha Ocean.

Hanwha, which acquired the Philly Shipyard for $100 million last year, pledged a $5 billion investment in the yard in August this year when President Lee visited the facility after his first summit with Trump. Hanwha said the investment will be used to build two more docks and three quays to increase production capacity.

hwkan@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Kan Hyeong-woo · November 14, 2025

13. 5 plead guilty in North Korean IT worker schemes in the United States

​Summary:

Five people, four Americans and one Ukrainian, pleaded guilty to helping North Korean IT workers secure remote U.S. tech jobs using stolen identities, generating millions for Pyongyang’s weapons programs. They hosted laptops, faked locations, and even completed drug tests for DPRK workers. DOJ says the schemes hit 136 companies and aided sanctioned North Korean cyber groups.

Excerpts:

The criminal activities arise from the North Korean government's efforts to evade U.S. sanctions and generate millions of dollars to help fund its weapons programs, including nuclear arms development, said Roman Rozhavsky, assistant director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division.

"These guilty pleas send a clear message: No matter who or where you are, if you support North Korea's efforts to victimize U.S. businesses and citizens, the FBI will find you and bring you to justice," Rozhavsky said.

"We will ask all our private sector partners to improve their security process for vetting remote workers and to remain vigilant regarding this emerging threat," he added.

Comment: They were willing to support KJU's all purpose sword. I wonder how they were recruited and what they were promised? Other than $89,000.

U.S. News Nov. 14, 2025 / 5:24 PM

5 plead guilty in North Korean IT worker schemes in the United States

By Mike Heuer

https://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2025/11/14/north-korea-it-workers-scheme/2791763158178/

Four U.S. citizens and a Ukrainian have pleaded guilty to participating in criminal schemes aimed at generating funds for North Korean arms development, the Department of Justice announced on Friday. Photo by KCNA/EPA-EFE

Nov. 14 (UPI) -- Four U.S. citizens and a Ukrainian pleaded guilty to participating in North Korean internet technology worker and virtual currency theft schemes.

The Department of Justice announced the guilty pleas on Friday for the illegal schemes that generated funding for North Korea's armaments program and other uses at various times, from 2019 to 2024.

"Facilitators in the United States and Ukraine assisted North Korean actors with obtaining remote IT employment with U.S. companies," the DOJ said.

"The facilitators provided their own, false or stolen identities and hosted U.S. victim company-provided laptops at residences across the United States to create the false appearance that the IT workers were working domestically."

Related

• G7 diplomats reaffirm commitment to North Korea's complete denuclearization
• Regime fears the truth: how HRNK gives world Its most powerful weapon against North Korea
• North Korea fires short-range ballistic missile, Seoul says

The DOJ said the employment schemes affected at least 136 U.S. companies and used the identities of more than 18 U.S. citizens or legal residents to generate more than $2.2 million for the North Korean government.

The three U.S. defendants who pleaded guilty are Audricus Phagnasay, 24; Jason Salazar, 30; and Alexander Paul Travis, 34, all of whom entered their guilty pleas in the U.S. District Court for Southern Georgia.

The three pleaded guilty to providing U.S. identities to those who are located outside of the United States to enable them to obtain remote work with U.S. firms in exchange for between $3,450 and $51,397 in compensation.

Salazar and Travis at times completed drug testing on behalf of the overseas individuals.

The three defendants also kept laptops at their homes to make it look like the foreign individuals were located in the United States.

The IT worker scheme generated about $1.28 million in pay for the overseas workers.

Erick Ntekereze Prince, 30, also pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to commit wire fraud charge in the U.S. District Court for Southern Florida on Nov. 6.

Federal prosecutors said Prince used his company Taggcar Inc. to contract and supply overseas IT workers to U.S. firms by misrepresenting them as U.S.-based workers.

He also hosted laptops at several Florida residences and installed remote-access software to make it look like the overseas workers were working from locations in Florida.

Prince was paid more than $89,000 for his participation in the scheme, according to the DOJ.

Ukrainian Oleksander Didenky also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and aggravated identity theft in the U.S.District Court for the District of Columbia.

He agreed to forfeit $1.4 million for helping North Korean and other IT workers to get jobs at 40 U.S. companies.

A North Korean military hacking group identified as Advanced Persistent Threat 38 also carried out virtual currency heists totaling millions of dollars in value in 2023 while targeting four overseas platforms, according to the DOJ.

"While APT38 actors continued to launder their ill-gotten gains for these heists, the U.S. government froze and seized more than $15million worth of virtual currency that it now seeks to forfeit for eventual return to their rightful owners," the DOJ said.

The criminal activities arise from the North Korean government's efforts to evade U.S. sanctions and generate millions of dollars to help fund its weapons programs, including nuclear arms development, said Roman Rozhavsky, assistant director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division.

"These guilty pleas send a clear message: No matter who or where you are, if you support North Korea's efforts to victimize U.S. businesses and citizens, the FBI will find you and bring you to justice," Rozhavsky said.

"We will ask all our private sector partners to improve their security process for vetting remote workers and to remain vigilant regarding this emerging threat," he added.

14. Lee vows to expand support for residents near border with N. Korea

Comment: I recall our training in front line areas. Every so oftern we would find some UXO on the side of the road where we were training. A farmer would often come across such ordnance while cultivating their land. They would remove it and place it where we would find it becasuse they knew that we would have it rendered safe. 

Lee vows to expand support for residents near border with N. Korea | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 14, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251114011700315

SEOUL, Nov. 14 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung said Friday the government will step up support for regions bordering North Korea to compensate for their long-standing sacrifices and promote balanced regional growth.

Lee made the remarks during a town hall meeting in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, located just south of the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas. He served as governor of Gyeonggi Province from 2018 to 2021.

"I feel regret that the northern Gyeonggi region has been disproportionately excluded despite having made special sacrifices," Lee said.

He noted that border communities face extensive inconveniences due to strict military regulations near front-line areas, adding that the government will explore ways to promote development in the border regions.

President Lee Jae Myung speaks during a town hall meeting in Paju, Gyeonggi Province, on Nov. 14, 2025. (Pool photo) (Yonhap)

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 14, 2025

​15. Farm labor shortages force North Korea to trap discharged soldiers in rural hometowns

​Summary:

North Korea’s farm labor shortages are trapping discharged soldiers in rural hometowns by blocking residence changes. One groom-to-be can’t obtain documents to move to his fiancée’s city, threatening their wedding and illustrating how rigid domicile rules—and rising bribe costs—make marriage and mobility increasingly impossible for ordinary young couples.

Comment: We need to be observing for indicators of internal instability. What happens when the military no longer supports the regime? What might be a tipping point?

Farm labor shortages force North Korea to trap discharged soldiers in rural hometowns

A discharged border guard who promised to move to his fiancée's city cannot obtain residence documents as the state blocks young men from leaving farming areas

By Lee Chae Eun - November 14, 2025

dailynk.com · November 14, 2025

https://www.dailynk.com/english/farm-labor-shortages-force-north-korea-to-trap-discharged-soldiers-in-rural-hometowns/

The Rodong Sinmun newspaper reported that a wedding ceremony was held on March 3, 2024, for a couple who are members of the Paekdu Mountain Hero Youth Shock Brigade at the Jeonwi Street construction site. (Rodong Sinmun, News1)

A North Korean couple from different parts of the country—the man from the interior and the woman from the border—may have to call off their engagement as they struggle to process the paperwork needed for the would-be groom to update his official domicile. North Korea’s rigid restrictions on changing one’s domicile are even throwing a wrench in young people’s wedding plans.

“A man from South Hwanghae province who was discharged from the border guard in April and a woman in Sinuiju are preparing to hold their wedding in December, but the ceremony is currently in danger of being cancelled because the man cannot get the documents needed for a change of residence,” a source in North Pyongan province told Daily NK recently.

According to the source, the future groom (“A”), who is from a rural area in South Hwanghae province, met the bride-to-be (“B”) while he was doing his military service with the border guard in Sinuiju in North Pyongan province. After three years of dating, the two held an official engagement ceremony this spring, pledging to tie the knot after “A” completed his military service.

Because of the severe disparity between rural and urban areas in North Korea, many parents are reluctant to marry off daughters to men from the countryside. Sure enough, “B’s” parents were reportedly opposed to the match because of her boyfriend’s country pedigree. “A” managed to win them over by promising to change his domicile to Sinuiju.

But there are numerous obstacles to changing one’s official residence in North Korea, and the wedding now hangs in the balance.

Traditional customs reversed by urban-rural divide

“For a long time, it was the custom for women to move to their husband’s hometown upon marriage. But since women are averse to living in the countryside, men from rural areas are expected to make the move when they marry a city woman. But you can’t just change your residence on a whim here, so many such couples end up unable to follow through on their wedding plans,” the source said.

To change one’s domicile in North Korea, an individual must receive a “residence removal certificate” from their current area and then register their domicile in the new area. Arranging those papers, however, is apparently a very convoluted process.

In addition, urban youth are being basically compelled to take on rural assignments every year given the chronic shortage of farm workers. That makes it virtually impossible for “A” to change his domicile from the countryside to a city—and not just any city, but a border city where people are better positioned to attempt to cross the border into China.

“Since there aren’t enough young workers in farming areas, the state is not issuing residence removal certificates to young men fresh from the military who want to move to cities or other areas. And since [this young man] wants to change his domicile to a city on the border, there’s even less chance of him receiving the residence removal certificate or registering his new residence there,” the source said.

“Even if the couple puts off the paperwork and goes ahead with the wedding, they’ll ultimately have to live apart from each other. As a discharged soldier and a party member, ‘A’ risks being stricken from the party rolls if he doesn’t perform his organizational duties. That means ‘A’ cannot leave his hometown until he’s issued a residence removal certificate,” the source explained.

Under these circumstances, “B’s” parents have turned against the marriage. “You ought to just call it off. When so many people get divorced after having children, breaking an engagement is nothing to be ashamed of,” “B” was reportedly told.

“If the couple had enough money for a bribe, they might have been able to take care of the residence removal certificate and the new residence registration. As more and more restrictions are imposed, bribes are costing even more. Right now, poor people are finding it hard to even get married,” the source remarked.

“The couple’s friends sadly say that while ‘love knows no borders,’ in North Korea, love is doomed even inside the country’s borders. It’s really unfortunate that this young couple will have to break up because of these restrictions,” the source added.

Read in Korean

dailynk.com · November 14, 2025

16. Kim Jong-un sends troops to Russia to clear deadly minefields for Putin’s war

​Summary:

Images show North Korean troops clearing mines in Russia’s Kursk region, reflecting deepening Moscow–Pyongyang military cooperation. Reports say thousands of DPRK soldiers and engineers were deployed, with heavy casualties. Russia claims Kim Jong Un personally ordered the demining units, which receive Russian training and use advanced equipment amid ongoing Ukrainian attacks.

Comment: Like the old commercial: "Give it to Mikey. He will eat anything." Today: "Give it to Kim Jong Un. He will make his soldiers do anything for money paid to him." 

Kim Jong-un sends troops to Russia to clear deadly minefields for Putin’s war

foxnews.com · Efrat Lachter Fox News

https://www.foxnews.com/world/kim-jong-un-sends-troops-russia-clear-deadly-minefields-putins-war

Vladimir Putin set to meet with Kim Jong Un in North Korea

Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton argues the cooperation between Russia and North Korea are a result of President Biden's 'weakness.'

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New images released by Russia’s defense ministry show North Korean troops clearing mines in the war-ravaged Kursk region in western Russia, the latest sign of deepening military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang.

North Korean soldiers are seen handling detection equipment, receiving instructions from Russian engineers and singing patriotic songs before beginning their work. A Russian commander with the call sign "Veles" said, "They’re great lads, they learn quickly, listen attentively and take notes." Another commander, "Lesnik," said the North Koreans were operating "on an equal level with my sappers, carrying out the same tasks as my guys."

According to Reuters, Russia says the North Korean deployment follows last year’s fighting that helped repel a major Ukrainian incursion into the western Kursk region. South Korean, Ukrainian and Western sources told Reuters that North Korea sent about 14,000 troops under a mutual defense pact and that more than 6,000 were killed. The battlefield casualty numbers could not be independently verified.

NORTH KOREA HAS SENT TROOPS TO RUSSIA, PENTAGON CONFIRMS

Russia openly boasts about using North Korean soldiers for demining in its war-hit Kursk region. (East to West News Agency)

The Russian defense ministry channel Zvezda claims that the new demining unit was "created and sent to the Kursk region by order of Commander-in-Chief Kim Jong Un." The channel said North Korean engineers "arrived in the Kursk region already experienced in carrying out missions in their homeland" and then "received extensive additional training by the Engineering Troops of the Russian Armed Forces."

In the images released by the Russian defense ministry, Kim Jong Un's sappers begin each operation by venerating the North Korean flag, describing it as a sign of their readiness "to carry out any order from the Supreme Leader." The Russian defense ministry claims Russian instructors taught them to handle "the latest NATO and Ukrainian mines" and to counter drones.

GIVING PUTIN THE DONBAS WOULD HAND MOSCOW POWERFUL LEVERAGE OVER KYIV’S FINANCIAL SURVIVAL

Footage released by Moscow shows North Korean sappers using Russian demining equipment in the war-scarred Kursk region (East to West News Agency)

North Korean engineers now reportedly use Russian robotic demining platforms such as the Stalker and Uran-6.

The East to West News Agency reported that the first of thousands of North Korean military engineers have begun clearing explosives in the region, describing the mission as aimed at reducing the risk to Russian personnel. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, has also said North Korea is deploying 6,000 engineers to Russia.

In this pool photograph distributed by the Russian state agency Sputnik, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un toast during a reception at the Mongnangwan Reception House in Pyongyang on June 19, 2024. Putin enjoyed a red carpet welcome, a military ceremony and an embrace from North Korea's Kim Jong Un during a state visit to Pyongyang where they both pledged to forge closer ties. (Getty Images)

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that out of up to 12,000 North Koreans sent to support Russia’s war effort, "their losses are more than 4,000. I think two-thirds have died." Fox News Digital could not independently confirm casualty figures.

KIM JONG UN ACKNOWLEDGES DEATHS OF 100 NORTH KOREAN SOLDIERS HE SENT TO FIGHT FOR VLADIMIR PUTIN

North Korean troops sweeping minefields left behind in the Kursk region after months of fighting. (East to West News Agency)

Russian military outlet Krasnaya Zvezda reported that Russian and North Korean teams are confronting a "previously unseen density" of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines allegedly left by Ukrainian forces, adding that many of the devices were manufactured by NATO members. Reuters could not independently verify battlefield conditions.

According to the outlet, 37 of the 64 settlements in the Bolshesoldatsky district remain closed to civilians because of mines. The report also said the sappers continue to come under Ukrainian artillery and drone fire, which Reuters was also unable to confirm.

Ukrainian forces stormed into the Kursk region in August 2024, holding parts of the area for months. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in April that Russian troops, supported by North Korean units, had pushed them out.

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Russia openly boasts about using North Korean soldiers for demining in its war-hit Kursk region.

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said last month that the countries’ military cooperation would "advance non-stop," Reuters reported.

Reuters contributed to this report.

Efrat Lachter is an investigative reporter and war correspondent. Her work has taken her to 40 countries, including Ukraine, Russia, Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Afghanistan. She is a recipient of the 2024 Knight-Wallace Fellowship for Journalism. Lachter can be followed on X @efratlachter.

foxnews.com · Efrat Lachter Fox News

17. President Lee Jae-myung’s Latest Headache

​Summary:

South Korea’s opposition PPP has intensified attacks on President Lee Jae-myung after a court issued lighter-than-expected sentences in the Daejang-dong corruption case. Prosecutors chose not to appeal, enraging the PPP, which accuses the Lee administration of interference despite no evidence he benefited. Legal experts say the ruling followed precedent and an appeal was unlikely to succeed. PPP leaders now invoke inflammatory rhetoric, even calling for impeachment, but public support for Lee remains above 60 percent. Critics warn the PPP’s strategy is self-destructive as the government advances major achievements, from APEC diplomacy to tariff deals and U.S. approval for nuclear-powered submarines.

Comment: Domestic partisan politics are as messy in South Korea as they are in America today.

President Lee Jae-myung’s Latest Headache

Prosecutors and the opposition party are elevating their attacks on Lee over a recent court ruling.

By Eunwoo Lee

November 14, 2025

https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/president-lee-jae-myungs-latest-headache/

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung addresses the delegates at the Opening Ceremony of the 2025 IPSA World Congress of Political Science, held in Seoul, South Korea, July 13, 2025.

Credit: Facebook/ Lee Jae-myung

“The specter of Hitler glimmers,” said Jang Dong-hyeok, the leader of South Korea’s opposition People Power Party (PPP), at a party conference on November 13. He was referring to Lee Jae-myung, South Korea’s president. The day before, in front of the National Assembly swarmed by PPP members waving placards, Jang delivered a barbed speech against Lee. 

“Lee’s existence itself is our country’s disaster,” he said. “We need to end Lee Jae-myung! We need to end this administration!” His voice then started to break and crack in passion. “This is war!” he added toward the end.

No holds have been barred in the PPP’s diatribes against Lee. On countless occasions, they compared Lee to Hitler and other historically infamous dictators. They refuse to call him President Lee. Song Eon-eok, the PPP floor leader, keeps calling him a “criminal,” as most PPP legislators do. But the PPP has never been as cutthroat and frantic in their rhetoric and wanting to bring down the Lee administration as they have been in the past few days.

They are latching on to a sordid land development scheme perpetrated by private contractors and investors and high-ranking officials at the city of Seongnam, where Lee was a mayor from 2010 to 2018. The scheme concerned an area called Daejang-dong, nestled between Seongnam and Seoul’s posh southeastern neighborhoods. In return for cash bribes, top decision-makers at the Seongnam Development Corporation (SDC) colluded with an estate development company and a clique of investors. When awarding mammoth apartment complex projects, the SDC handpicked the estate company through private contracts, rather than through bidding procedures. The SDC also concocted a skewed profit-sharing structure, which funneled surplus profits to private parties at the expense of the public sector.

On October 31, the Seoul Central District Court rendered a ruling against those implicated in the machinations. The court found the accused guilty of breaches of trust, sentencing them to prison terms ranging from four to eight years, and forfeiting some of their profits.

Originally, the prosecution charged them with aggravated economic crimes, under which the defendant’s custodial time compounds proportionally to the size of their illicit gains. The defendants were facing life sentences. The court, instead, found them guilty of ordinary breach of trust offenses. 

In order for a breach of trust to amount to an aggravated economic crime, the defendant’s economic gains have had to be specifically calculated and known. However, at the time the SDC and the defendants entered their contracts, they couldn’t have known how much money they would be raking in, as their deals concerned the value of real estate in the future. Even the prosecution, when charging and throughout the trial, was hard-pressed to provide an accurate figure of the illicit gains, instead applying a haphazard percentage to calculate how much the defendants must have gained. 

In the absence of a clear estimate of economic gains at the time of the offense, the court cannot find for an aggravated economic crime. Given the gravity of applying an aggravated economic crime to an offense and its tremendous impact on sentencing and the defendant’s life, the court should refrain from such conviction when there’s uncertainty as to the defendant’s awareness of the precise figure of their economic gains. This is not only the Supreme Court’s precedent but also the legal academia’s consensus, all of which the court properly heeded. 

The prosecution went up in arms; they wanted the defendants to serve way longer jail terms and cough up hundreds of millions of dollars, not just tens of millions as ordered by the court. They also found fault with how the court rendered a not-guilty verdict on a separate prosecution charge of violating the prevention of conflict of interest act. The statute of limitations on that specific crime had been reached, but the prosecution became nit-picking as to when the defendants finalized their crimes, wanting to extend it. 

The prosecution wanted to appeal, but the prosecutor’s office decided not to. The PPP went livid, not least because their opportunity to lock away Lee for good seemed to have evaporated. Lee had also been undergoing a separate trial involving the same Daejang-dong scandal. (Lee’s trial proceedings were suspended after he became president as per the constitution, whereby “the president shall not be charged with a criminal offense during his tenure of office except for insurrection or treason.”)

The prosecution alleges that Lee knew about and condoned the backdoor dealings. But now that the principal offenders behind the Daejang-dong shenanigans received relatively lenient sentences, it’s likely Lee would as well, should his trial recommence after his presidency – and that’s if a conviction came through.

It is widely believed that the prosecutor’s office, then under former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s control, cobbled up a case against Lee in their grand scheme of eliminating political foes. According to the Seoul Central District Court’s October 31 ruling, “Lee doesn’t seem to have been aware” of his underlings’ malfeasance, and “there’s no evidence that Lee, unlike the defendants, received personal gifts.”

As is obvious from its inflammatory reaction of late, the PPP is bristling at the court ruling and the prosecutor’s office’s rare decision not to appeal against a verdict it didn’t like. The PPP and the prosecutors argue that the justice minister, Jung Sung-ho, browbeat the acting chief prosecutor into quashing the appeal application in what they consider to be abuse of authority. In response, Jung said that he merely voiced his opinion that “there might be a need for caution” when it comes to appealing. 

This trial dragged on for four years; there have been 190 hearings and a paper trail amounting to a quarter million pages. The defendants will spend a few years in prison – just not the life imprisonment that the prosecution wanted them to serve in an effort to subject Lee to a similar fate. As the court acknowledged, the prosecution’s reckoning of the defendants’ illicit financial gains was overblown.

Even if the prosecution had appealed, it would have been highly unlikely for an appellate court to reverse the ruling. The Daejang-dong swindle is no doubt deplorable and unscrupulous, but the level of the offense didn’t warrant further waste of time and resources on both sides.

The Justice Ministry hardly abused its authority in expressing this view. In South Korean law, the justice minister is the chief supervisor of prosecutorial affairs and they can indeed direct prosecutors. Still, unless the justice minister officially activates a legal provision that shifts jurisdiction over a case from the prosecutor’s office to the Justice Ministry, the prosecutors have complete discretion over what to do with the cases at hand. There have been numerous instances where the prosecutors ignored the ministry’s recommendations and went on to dispose of legal proceedings the way they saw fit. The justice minister expressing their view on a case – which Jung did in the Daejang-dong case – is the least they can legally do.

Yet, high-ranking prosecutors are remonstrating en masse, pelting the Lee administration for allegedly meddling in the case. (Strangely, they never complained about executive intervention when Yoon, a former prosecutor, was president.) But this is their final gasp for air and their last attempt to discredit the Lee administration. 

The ruling Democratic Party legislated for the abolition of the Prosecution Service. It will be broken into an indictment agency and a separate investigation agency under the Interior Ministry. No more will the Prosecution Service wield distended power to influence politics through deciding whom to investigate and indict and whom to shield from such trouble. 

In the meantime, the PPP is doing nothing but slandering Lee and vilifying any progress South Korea has made since Yoon’s governing debacles. For instance, APEC South Korea 2025 is hailed as the Lee administration’s major success. The world’s confidence in South Korea’s international role and domestic investment markets has never been so secure. KOSPI has reached a record high. The government managed to ingratiate U.S. President Donald Trump and hammer out a tariff deal more favorable to Seoul. Washington even agreed to allow South Korea to build nuclear-powered submarines, a decades-old dream. 

Still, the PPP maintains South Korea is heading towards ruin. “The only way to save our country,” according to Jang, the PPP leader, “is to drag down Lee from the presidency.”

“We need to impeach Lee,” he said.

To much relief, the PPP’s hyperbole is falling on deaf ears. In the latest national poll, Lee’s approval rating bounded back above the 60 percent mark. Even within the PPP, a long overdue fatigue is settling in from senselessly ramping up their rhetoric against Lee. On November 12, Kim Yong-tae, a PPP legislator who briefly led the party in the lead up to the June presidential snap election, worried that “mentioning impeachment recklessly shouldn’t be good for the national interests.”

Prominent conservative figures are ruing where the party’s headed. Cho Gab-je, a former editor-in-chief for the monthly magazine issued by Chosun Ilbo, South Korea’s largest conservative newspaper, admitted that the PPP leadership “is lacking any logic.” Cho added that “going down this path, the PPP will be routed at the next year’s local elections.” Meanwhile, Kim Jong-in, a former PPP leader, deplored the party’s useless declaration of war against the government. 

For the PPP, mulling over some constructive policy deliberation, not blindly maligning the government, might be in order. 

Authors

Contributing Author

Eunwoo Lee

Eunwoo Lee writes on politics, society, and history of Europe and East Asia.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com