Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"If it is any consolation, you should be aware that very few armies have been equally competent in the conduct of regular and irregular warfare. The principal reason is glaringly obvious. Armies generally are organized, equipped, and trained to fight other armies with characteristics similar to theirs. In regular warfare one seeks victory though the decisive defeat of the enemies’ forces on the battlefield. Although the enterprise is thoroughly political in motivation and meaning, the proximate behavior is, and has to be, military. An army commander may contribute to a dialog on strategy with his political masters, but corporals, sergeants, captains, colonels, and even one- and two-star generals will not.20 They will be fully occupied fighting the war. The problem is that in irregular warfare there is an armed enemy in the theater, but his military defeat or humiliation is not the prime objective of the COIN effort. This is not to say that such defeat is unimportant, a vital matter to which I shall return."

- Colin Gray

"He who has health, has hope; and he who has hope, has everything."

- Arabian proverb

"A people that values its privileges above its principles soon loses both."

- Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Biden, Xi agree to restart military communications

2. US paid $24 million for improvements to shared military runway in Philippines

3. ‘Ukrainian resistance is an example for the entire free world’. An American executive’s view on transparency and the rule of law in Ukraine

4. Army boot camp will soon include counter-drone training

5. Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity

6. Biden, Xi's 'blunt' talks yield deals on military, fentanyl

7. TAKEAWAYS - Biden and Xi meeting: Taiwan, Iran, fentanyl and AI

8. US spy tool will lapse unless Congress and White House can cut deal

9. Air Force turns focus to future information operations

10. Top general locked away evidence of SAS executions

11. Austin Applauds Strengthening U.S.-Philippine Alliance

12. Israel Storms Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital, Questioning Patients, Staff as More Aid and Fuel Expected to Arrive Today

13. TikTokers Discover Osama bin Laden's Letter Justifying 9/11, Decide They Agree With bin Laden

14. Americans flock to TikTok for news

15. DOD Makes Incremental Progress Toward Clean Audit

16. Pentagon fails sixth audit, with number of passing grades stagnant

17. How Will Southeast Asian Terror Groups Capitalize on the Israel-Hamas War?

18. Myanmar fighting intensifies near India border, curfew imposed in Sittwe

19. Karenni Resistance Evacuates University Staff Abandoned by Junta Troops (Burma/Myanmar)

20. Nine Towns Occupied by Myanmar Military for Decades Lost to Resistance in Days

21. Partisans Unfurl Ukrainian Flag in Russian-Occupied Crimea – 'We Await the AFU'

22. No good options for Myanmar’s mortally wounded regime

23. Independence Through Information War: Chechnya's Story and Ukraine Connection

24. Iran Update, November 15, 2023

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2023

26. The Virtues of Restraint: Why the Use of Force Is Rarely a Sufficient Response to Terrorism

27. Pathogens labeled ‘HIV’ and ‘Ebola’ found inside secret, illegal Chinese-owned biolab in California

1. Biden, Xi agree to restart military communications

All talk and no.... wait... that is what we are asking for is talk. (apologies for the little attempt at humor).

The important part of the meeting: the environment. I wonder if there is any symbolism of the location.

Biden and Xi held their talks at Filoli Estate, a bucolic country house and museum about 25 miles (40 kilometers) south of San Francisco. The event was carefully staged, Biden first to arrive at the grand estate, then Xi. After their handshake and smiles they sat down with aides for talks that lasted more than two hours.

Next came a working lunch with inner-circle members from both administrations. They ate ravioli, chicken and broccolini, with almond meringue cake and praline buttercream for dessert.

Before they parted, the two strolled the property along a red brick path through impressive topiary and knotted gothic trees. Asked by reporters how the meeting went, the president said “well” and flashed a thumbs up.

Biden, Xi agree to restart military communications

militarytimes.com · by Aamer Madhani, The Associated Press · November 16, 2023

WOODSIDE, Calif. — U.S. President Joe Biden and China’s Xi Jinping emerged Wednesday from their first face-to-face meeting in a year vowing to stabilize their fraught relationship and showcasing modest agreements to combat illegal fentanyl and re-establish military communications. But there were still deep differences on economic competition and global security threats.

The two leaders spent four hours together — in meetings, a working lunch and a garden stroll — intent on showing the world that while they are global economic competitors they’re not locked in a winner-take-all faceoff.

“Planet Earth is big enough for the two countries to succeed,” Xi told Biden.

The U.S. president told Xi: “I think it’s paramount that you and I understand each other clearly, leader-to-leader, with no misconceptions or miscommunications. We have to ensure competition does not veer into conflict.”

Their meeting, on the sidelines of the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference, has far-reaching implications for a world grappling with economic cross currents, conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, tensions in Taiwan and more.

They reached expected agreements to curb illicit fentanyl production and to reopen military ties, a senior U.S. official said after the meeting ended. Many of the chemicals used to make synthetic fentanyl come from China to cartels that traffic the powerful narcotic into the U.S., which is facing an overdose crisis.

Top military leaders will resume talks, increasingly important particularly as unsafe or unprofessional incidents between the two nations’ ships and aircraft have spiked, said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the agreements ahead of Biden’s remarks.

Chinese jets ramp up incidents with US aircraft, new videos show

Photos and videos show more than a dozen "risky" interactions by Chinese jets since early 2022.

The U.S. official described a significant back and forth between the two leaders over Taiwan, with Biden chiding China over its massive military build-up around Taiwan and Xi telling Biden he had no plans to invade the island.

Biden, the official said, said the U.S. was committed to continuing to help Taiwan defend itself and maintain deterrence against a potential Chinese attack, and also called on China to avoid meddling in the island’s elections next year. The official described the Taiwan portion of the talks as “clear-headed” and “not heated.”

Biden also called on Xi to use his influence with Iran to make clear that Tehran, and its proxies, should not take steps that would lead to an expansion of the Israel-Hamas war.

During the exchange on Iran, Biden did most of the talking and Xi mostly listened, according to the U.S official. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has assured the U.S. that the Chinese have communicated concerns to Iran on the matter. But the official said the U.S. has not been able to ascertain how seriously the Iranians are taking concerns raised by Beijing.

According to a statement released by China Central Television, the state broadcaster, Xi was most focused on Taiwan and the U.S. sanctions and restrictions against Chinese products and businesses.

Xi urged the U.S. to support China’s peaceful unification with the self-governed island, calling Taiwan “the most important and most sensitive issue” in the bilateral relations. He also raised Beijing’s concerns over export controls, investment screenings, and sanctions imposed by the U.S., which he said “have severely harmed China’s legitimate interests.”

“We hope the U.S. side can seriously treat China’s concerns and take actions to remove unilateral sanctions and provide a fair, just, non-discriminatory environment for Chinese businesses.”

Xi said he and Biden also agreed to establish dialogues on artificial intelligence and stressed the urgency for the two countries to cope with the climate crisis, the state broadcaster reported.

Both leaders acknowledged the importance of their relationship and the need for better coordination. But their differences shone through: Xi indicated he wants better cooperation — but on China’s terms. And he sought to project strength to his domestic audience in the face of U.S. policies restricting imports from China and limiting technology transfers to Beijing.

Biden, meanwhile, will also spend time this week in California working to highlight new alliances in the Indo Pacific and efforts to boost trade with other regional leaders.

Xi, speaking through an interpreter, declared it “an objective fact that China and the United States are different in history, culture, social system and development.”

The presidents and their respective aides on trade, the economy, national security and regional diplomacy gathered across from one another at a single long table, the culmination of negotiations between the two leaders’ top aides over the past several months. It was Biden and Xi’s first conversation of any kind since they met last November in Bali.

They’re seeking to build back to a stable baseline after already tense relations took a nosedive following the U.S. downing of a Chinese spy balloon that had traversed the continental U.S., and amid differences over the self-ruled island of Taiwan, China’s hacking of a Biden official’s emails and other matters.

For Biden, Wednesday’s meeting was a chance for the president to do what he believes he does best: in-person diplomacy.

“As always, there’s no substitute for face-to-face discussions,” he told Xi. With his characteristic optimism, Biden sketched a vision of leaders who manage competition “responsibly,” adding, “that’s what the United States wants and what we intend to do.”

Xi, for his part, was gloomy about the state of the post-pandemic global economy. China’s economy remains in the doldrums, with prices falling due to slack demand from consumers and businesses.

“The global economy is recovering, but its momentum remains sluggish,” Xi said. “Industrial and supply chains are still under the threat of interruption and protectionism is rising. All these are grave problems.”

President Joe Biden greets China's President President Xi Jinping at the Filoli Estate in Woodside, Calif., Wednesday, Nov, 15, 2023, on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperative conference. (Doug Mills/The New York Times via AP, Pool)

The relationship between China and the U.S. has never been smooth, he said. Still, it has kept moving forward. “For two large countries like China and the United States, turning their back on each other is not an option,” he said.

More pointedly, Xi also suggested it was not up to the U.S. to dictate how the Chinese manage their affairs, saying, “It is unrealistic for one side to remodel the other, and conflict and confrontation has unbearable consequences for both sides.”

Robert Moritz, global chairman for the consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers, said business leaders are hoping for signs of more cooperation and a firmer commitment to free trade between the world’s two largest economies following the Biden-Xi talks.

“What we are looking for is a de-escalation and a bringing of the temperature down,” Mortiz said during a CEO summit being held in conjunction with the annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum that has brought together leaders from 21 member economies.

“Discussion isn’t good enough, it’s the execution on getting things done” that will matter, he said.

The Biden-Xi meeting and broader summit events attracted protests around San Francisco, but the demonstrations were kept at distance. A large crowd loudly condemning Xi marched from the Chinese Consulate toward the summit venue at the Moscone Center nearly two miles away. Speakers implored the Biden administration to stand up to Xi and China’s human rights violations.

Late Wednesday, Xi was to address American business executives at a $2,000-per-plate dinner that will be a rare opportunity for U.S. business leaders to hear directly from the Chinese leader as they seek clarification on Beijing’s expanding security rules that may choke foreign investment.

Foreign companies operating in China say that country’s tensions with Washington over technology, trade and other issues and uncertainty over Chinese policies are damaging the business environment and causing some to reassess their plans for investing in the giant market.

Even before Biden and Xi met, there were some signs of a thaw: The State Department on Tuesday announced that the U.S. and China — two of the world’s biggest polluters — had agreed to pursue efforts to triple renewable energy capacity globally by 2030, through wind, solar and other renewables.

There were also light moments between the two leaders who have logged much time together over the last decade. Biden asked Xi to extend his early birthday wishes to Xi’s wife, who will be celebrating next week. Xi thanked the president for reminding him. The Chinese leader said that he’s been so busy working he had forgotten the big day was nearing.

Biden and Xi held their talks at Filoli Estate, a bucolic country house and museum about 25 miles (40 kilometers) south of San Francisco. The event was carefully staged, Biden first to arrive at the grand estate, then Xi. After their handshake and smiles they sat down with aides for talks that lasted more than two hours.

Next came a working lunch with inner-circle members from both administrations. They ate ravioli, chicken and broccolini, with almond meringue cake and praline buttercream for dessert.

Before they parted, the two strolled the property along a red brick path through impressive topiary and knotted gothic trees. Asked by reporters how the meeting went, the president said “well” and flashed a thumbs up.

Long and Tang reported from San Francisco. Associated Press journalists Zeke Miller, Sagar Meghani and Josh Boak in Washington and Michael Liedtke and Janie Har in San Francisco contributed to this report.

2. US paid $24 million for improvements to shared military runway in Philippines

A strategic location. Note the 7th Air Force Commander's comments. It is not clear when he was in the Philippines and whether when he was there he was in his capacity as the 7th Air Force Commander. He commands the assets that are most likely to leave Korea for any contingency. Almost all other US military organizations are optimized to support the ROK/US CFC and therefore, have little utility to other contingencies outside of Korea. But air power certainly does.

Excerpts:

The base, Newsham said, “is a piece of the larger puzzle that allows high end combat operations for USAF (and other services) in the Philippines and well beyond - to include Taiwan and South China Sea.”

Airmen understand that the improved Basa runway is part of power projection, U.S. 7th Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Scott Pleus said at the opening of the Basa project, according to the Inquirer article.

“I look forward to having our forces sharing this runway, facilities and time here at the 5th Fighter Wing, to exercise together and increase our capability,” he said.

Basa is a good place to preposition weapons and equipment that might be useful in a South China Sea and/or Taiwan contingency, according to Ralph Cossa, president emeritus of the Pacific Forum think tank in Hawaii.

“The improvements make it more suitable for heavy transport aircraft to come and go,” he said in an email Wednesday.

US paid $24 million for improvements to shared military runway in Philippines

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · November 15, 2023

U.S. military aircraft will operate from a newly refurbished runway on Basa Air Base, Philippines, seen here Aug. 1, 2016, from a Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey. (Carl King/U.S. Marine Corps)

American military aircraft will operate from a newly refurbished, nearly 10,000-foot runway that reopened last week at an air base north of Manila, according to the Philippine government.

The longtime allies held a ceremony Nov. 6 that included a flyover by four Philippine FA-50PH Golden Eagle fighters to mark the opening of the $24 million runway upgrade at Basa Air Base, the government-run Philippine News Agency announced that day.

The U.S.-funded renovation is one of several projects at bases in the islands that American forces have access to under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, according to the agency.

U.S. forces can operate from nine sites in the country, including four announced in February, under the 2014 security pact.

“This is the largest [EDCA] project between Manila and Washington,” the news agency said of the runway upgrade.

The U.S. has paid for $66 million in projects at Basa, including a warehouse and fuel storage tanks, the Philippine Inquirer reported Nov. 8. The U.S. Defense Department has earmarked $35 million in fiscal year 2024 to build a transient aircraft parking apron at the base.

Basa, just south of the larger Clark Air Base on the Philippine’s main island of Luzon and the home of the Philippine Air Force’s 5th Fighter Wing, was built by U.S. forces at the start of World War II.

Basa’s improved runway ensures safer conditions for training and operations, especially during response to emergencies and calamities, the Philippine statement said.

“After less than a year of rehabilitation, with reinforced pavement and improved structural integrity, the runway is now ready to accommodate larger and heavier aircraft, such as the (Philippine Air Force) cargo planes,” the statement said.

Shared-use bases such as Basa will improve the Philippines’ security, the country’s defense secretary, Gilberto Teodoro, said in the statement.

A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon taxis at Basa Air Base in the Philippines during the annual Balikatan exercise, April 1, 2022. (Steve Cushman/U.S. Marine Corps)

The new runway is long enough to accommodate any aircraft operated by the U.S. military, said Grant Newsham, a retired Marine colonel and senior researcher with the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies in Tokyo.

“It’s not clear how much they’ll have in terms of support facilities or the capacity for handling and staging aircraft,” he wrote in an email Tuesday.

The base, Newsham said, “is a piece of the larger puzzle that allows high end combat operations for USAF (and other services) in the Philippines and well beyond - to include Taiwan and South China Sea.”

Airmen understand that the improved Basa runway is part of power projection, U.S. 7th Air Force commander Lt. Gen. Scott Pleus said at the opening of the Basa project, according to the Inquirer article.

“I look forward to having our forces sharing this runway, facilities and time here at the 5th Fighter Wing, to exercise together and increase our capability,” he said.

Basa is a good place to preposition weapons and equipment that might be useful in a South China Sea and/or Taiwan contingency, according to Ralph Cossa, president emeritus of the Pacific Forum think tank in Hawaii.

“The improvements make it more suitable for heavy transport aircraft to come and go,” he said in an email Wednesday.

Stars and Stripes · by Seth Robson · November 15, 2023

3. ‘Ukrainian resistance is an example for the entire free world’. An American executive’s view on transparency and the rule of law in Ukraine

The title caught my attention. But my friend Andrew Borene covers a lot of ground in this interview from cyber to corruption.

‘Ukrainian resistance is an example for the entire free world’. An American executive’s view on transparency and the rule of law in Ukraine

tvoemisto.tv

In the latest episode of Lviv International Talks, presented by Lviv Now, our distinguished guest is Andrew Borene. Based in London, Borene serves as the Executive Director of Flashpoint, a risk intelligence firm. With a diverse background spanning government, counterintelligence, national security law, business, technology, and cybersecurity, Borene is also a member of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations and the UK’s Chatham House, the Royal Institute for International Affairs. During the interview, he emphasized the vital importance of implementing stringent anti-corruption measures within the Ukrainian IT sector and advocating for the rule of law in Ukraine. These actions are indispensable to ensure Ukraine’s full interoperability with Western economies and to establish robust and trustworthy business relationships in the future.

Photo by Ivan Stanislavskyi/Tvoe Misto

You’ve done so many different things in your life. Why do you think the cybersecurity you spoke about at the Lviv IT Arena is so important?

Thank you. I’ve just been overwhelmed with how friendly the Ukrainian people are. It’s just been a great honor to be here. I’ve been studying and watching your struggle against Russian aggression for some time now. It’s a real honor and humbling to be on the frontline in cybersecurity. That was part of my remarks. It’s an unfortunate reality that Ukraine’s IT sector, universities, and researchers are under a new form of hybrid attack of Russian aggression using proxies, cyber means, traditional human intelligence or espionage, and obviously kinetic warfare with some hard battle lines thrown in a hot war. I am actually humbled to be here and I’m very excited because I think what we see coming from Ukraine in the future is that your information technology professionals will be able to say that they’ve been developing battle-tested systems for a multi-front hybrid conflict. Again, it’s unfortunate, but I think that the experience of being in this struggle successfully is going to become a really helpful export to NATO, to the United States, to the United Kingdom, and to other EU economies.

In your panel at the IT Arena, you spoke about Ukrainian IT and cyber supply chain battlefield decisions that could be a precondition for long-term business success in the U.S., EU, and other Western markets. So it’s not only about the military, but can you explain more and recap a little bit of your presentation?

One of the things that I talked about, I showed some slides. In 2003, I was a Marine officer participating in the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Arguably, that was a very successful military operation. That invasion was the longest amphibious movement of troops in world history, bypassing more than 10 U.S. divisions, and it integrated intelligence in ways that hadn’t been done before. I was also showing some photographs of public-private partnerships when I was at a private sector company in Symantec, a meeting I had with the NATO Secretary General, a government, and a private sector entity, a meeting I had with the Department of Homeland Security’s Director for Critical Infrastructure Security, a meeting I had with Albanians recently, which was bringing together government, academic and industry leadership to develop a cyber defense strategy for the whole of society. Oftentimes in war or in conflict, it is appropriate to take actions that are not appropriate in a peacetime setting.

I don’t want to be the bearer of bad news. I don’t want to come from America and kind of be looking down the nose, but my thesis was that it’s really important for the information technology economy in particular to build trusted partnerships, to find trusted capital partners, to find pathways for compliant entry into the US market, the EU market, UK market, because those economies have strict anti-corruption practices.

Another thing I mentioned is that it is absolutely true that there are corruption criminal cases in the United States, in the United Kingdom, and obviously in the EU. But when we talk about defense procurement corruption, it’s taken very seriously. There are arrests made and people are prosecuted. And it’s like looking under the hood of a business, which I’ve done as a lawyer, which I’ve done working in financial services or even in business intelligence. My message was there is hope and there are many excited partners in the United States, UK, other Western economies, and across NATO, but for Ukraine to become fully interoperable, not just as a wartime partner, but as a peacetime partner, to really realize the gains of peace and prosperity, it’s going to require probably some cultural change. That’s not meant as a criticism, it’s meant as a message of hope that we can really secure great relationships to do business together in the future.

Could you explain here what you mean by this cultural change?

I think there’s a perception that historically Ukrainian has had some challenges with government procurement corruption. In the United States, there’s a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. It bars U.S. companies from either paying bribes or working with companies that pay bribes. Our adversaries don’t have that challenge, right? Particularly the big, the really big bad adversaries. They can move into an economy and they can participate in a cultural norm. It might not be called bribery or corruption. It might be called other things that sound nicer. But that transparency and trust in the system has to be built person to person, relationship to relationship, one brick at a time.

And so again, I’m very hopeful, but I also recognize that we have to address that perception and create business relationships rooted in transparency, trust, and in alignment with things like the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and on the privacy side, in compliance with the General Data Protection Regime for the EU. So, knowing both things, that it is difficult in the IT economy, and it is a wartime setting in what I would call in extremis as a lawyer, things that are absolutely justified and must be done from cyber defense, from countering things through cyber offense, those tools are going to pay off because Ukrainians are trusted allies in this struggle.

I also think it’s really important that we build partnerships that already comply with Western regimes and definitely with things like NATO interoperability because I think Ukraine has so much to offer the NATO allies who also face the same threats from Putin’s regime.

One of Ukrainian’s big intellectuals, Yevhen Hlibovytsky, who is an expert in strategies, said that there were wrong decisions previously, after 2014, taken by the U.S. when it could offer either security for Ukraine or support for anti-corruption institutions, and it chose the latter. It didn’t work that well because there was no security, but it is something that is needed as a basis. What do you think about it as a person with experience as a lawyer, attorney, and intelligence officer?

As a lawyer, I’m going to say it depends. There is an expression in finance – don’t do anything you wouldn’t want to see in the Wall Street Journal. There is the same expression we say in the intelligence community when we train new officers – don’t do anything that you wouldn’t stand by in the Washington Post. America has some history of challenges, of things that were done in the dark that when exposed were embarrassing. I think what you want to do is to ensure that those align with the values. I think that I and the Ukrainian people, all, believe in individual human rights. We believe nobody should get murdered by their government. We believe people should have the right to believe what they want to believe. We may not have an exactly aligned thing about privacy. That varies from country to country. Some countries have extremely tight privacy laws. Other countries support law enforcement in ways where there are more robust searches available. But I think on the whole, that what distinguishes us is the values of individual human rights, the right to life for human beings, and then sovereign states to be secure in their borders. Then I’m going to add that we all believe in the rule of law and a fair playing field.

One of the long-term concerns is that if corruption or bribery is not combated, it’ll never go away. If there’s no active combating of that, that will ultimately hurt the national security of a country because an army buys inferior goods if a general is bribed. An intelligence service could get software that didn’t work because somebody took a bribe. That is completely antithetical to me as a human being who wants to see Ukraine win this fight and wants to see the prosperity that can come from peace. I think we want to do things that move us absolutely in that direction of transparency and level playing field so that we win the fight with the best technologies, the best equipment, the best training, all of these things that must be brought into the military supply chain.

One of the interesting questions I got – what can we do? I think that’s the answer – to speak up, to embrace free world values, your individual human right to speak, to leverage free press. And then the other one was, well, about the fact that last week or the last month there were these cases and it makes Ukraine look bad in the international media. Well, here’s my answer, and I really do stand by this – there is no country where it doesn’t exist, and it makes sense that if there’s a transition toward more transparency, more fair play for business and economy, there may be some cases. If you’re fighting transnational crime, hypothetically, when the Italians were fighting transnational crime in Italy, there were suddenly more prosecutions of gangsters. The gangsters were there before the prosecutions, but the prosecutions were actually an indicator of moving toward a clean bill of health. I think that’s actually how I would look at it. Why do we get a fever when we’re sick? Well, our body is fighting the infection. So I think cases that come to the public light that demonstrate that this is being combated speak about the transition toward a much more Western-looking economy.

Great. Thank you. And the last question is about Ukraine and your perception. It’s your first time in Ukraine. You came to Lviv. What is your impression of these first few days?

I am really happy to see people living their lives. I didn’t really know what to expect, but I saw a bustling city. I experienced an air raid yesterday and I moved to a shelter and people were calm. Parents were helping their children move to the shelter briefly. One of my big surprises was kind of how when it was determined it was a MiG launch, everybody decided, oh, well, it’s just a MiG. They usually go elsewhere. I didn’t think in my lifetime that I would see a war in Europe as I was growing up and even in my time in the Marine Corps. But here it is. And the Ukrainian people day to day and the people of Lviv really are showing me that they live their lives as best they can and continue to resist. And that, I mean, that’s an example for the entire free world.

The interview was conducted by Taras Yatsenko

Photos by Ivan Stanislavskyi/ Tvoe Misto

Follow us on Facebook and Instagram. Lviv Now is an English-language website for Lviv, Ukraine’s «tech-friendly cultural hub». It is produced by Tvoe Misto («Your City») media hub, which also hosts regular problem-solving public forums to benefit the city and its people.

tvoemisto.tv

4. Army boot camp will soon include counter-drone training

I remember SAFAD (small arms for air defense) training in basic training some 40 years go. We have come a long way since then,

Army boot camp will soon include counter-drone training

armytimes.com · by Todd South · November 15, 2023

Soon brand new Army recruits will learn how to identify and counter small drone threats in basic training.

The Army wants soldiers at every level to understand the danger of small drone attacks and plans to equip units down to the squad level with devices to take down those drones.

“It’s going to become a basic soldier requirement to identify, report and in some cases react to the threat,” said Sgt. Maj. Demetrius Johnson, senior enlisted advisor for the joint counter-small unmanned aerial systems office. “It’s MOS agnostic, it’s not specific to an air defender to be able to employ these handheld systems.”

Johnson spoke alongside his boss, Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey, the office director, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on Tuesday as the center also released its extensive report, titled “Countering Small Uncrewed Systems.”

The pair said that the Army’s Center for Initial Military Training is currently rewriting doctrine to include counter-drone training in boot camp as the force fields equipment and recently opened the Joint Counter Small Unmanned Aerial Systems University at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. The university recently concluded its first course and is expected to be fully staffed within a year.

The shift is a result of the growing air threat from hypersonic and cruise missiles down to hobby quadcopters, which has placed a premium on air defense platforms and soldiers.

As the Army shifts its focus to large-scale combat, air defense battalions will integrate into the division, Gainey said. Each division will have a counter-drone battery manned by air defense soldiers. The Army plans to also issue handheld gear for smaller drones down to the squad level.

At the same time, Gainey said his office is working to revise strategy with U.S. Special Operations Command, which has been tasked with attacking air threats before they launch rather than relying on detection to stop an incoming attack.

But specialization matters.

Gainey said his team compared the performance of a Marine Corps air defense unit guarding an installation with another non-air defense MOS unit using the same equipment for another installation and found a 30% difference in their success rate for handling air threats.

Lt. Col. Robert Lodewick, an Army spokesman, confirmed that the air defense force has the lowest deploy-to-dwell ratio in the Army.

Whether its soldiers manning radars in Poland for the Russia-Ukraine War or beefing up aerial defenses across the Middle East following the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas War, which saw 55 attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria since Oct. 17, air defense is now part of nearly every deployment.

“In a crisis, the President usually reaches for the carriers first, but they usually reach for air defenses second,” Tom Karako, director of CSIS’s Missile Defense Project told Army Times. “The op tempo for Patriot personnel has been among the highest personnel tempo in the joint force, and with good reason.”

While the threat has grown, the number of soldiers the Army has in its air defender ranks has climbed only slightly.

A decade ago, in 2013, the service counted a total of 8,201 soldiers in the field in the active, Guard and Reserve. As of late September, 8,654 soldiers worked in the field, according to Army data. The current number is a slight dip from a higher total five years ago.

In 2018 there were 9,191 air defenders in uniform. For comparison, in fiscal year 2021 the Army had more than 11,000 human resource specialists.

“We don’t have enough air defense capacity relative to demand, and we never will. Look at the way in which Ukraine has been expending air and missile defense interceptors and translate that over to what we would need in a China conflict. We are going to need to increase capacity a lot more.”

To cover the nearly endless sky, counter-drone planners have split some of the tasks between “area” and “point” defense, according to the CSIS report.

Traditional air defenders are manning the larger, more complex systems such as long-range interceptors and high-energy lasers for area defense while maneuver forces use guns, nets and other handheld platforms for smaller threats.

That’s both a safety and cost issue. In one example, the report notes, Israel fired two $3 Million PAC-2 interceptors and scrambled a fighter jet to counter a drone that entered the country’s airspace in 2016.

Early in the Ukraine War, tens of thousands of drones were flooding the sky over Russian forces to thwart their air defense systems.

Currently, the Department of Defense offers a two-week counter drone course at Yuma, Arizona, which is planned to lengthen to three weeks in fiscal year 2025.

The Army conducts a master trainer course on countering small drones at the Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Moore, Georgia. Starting next year, the Joint Counter-UAS University at Fort Sill will offer separate, two-week operator and maintainer courses.

Soldiers who pass these courses will receive Additional Skill Identifiers that will help units track the personnel capabilities in their formations, Johnson said.

The Army is also dispatching mobile training teams to combat training centers, for units facing deployment and to Air Force units when requested to educate troops on air defense protection measures and gear.

About Todd South

Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.

5. Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity

The 37 page report can be downloaded here: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ISAB-Report-on-Deterrence-in-a-World-of-Nuclear-Multipolarity_Final-Accessible.pdf

Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity - United States Department of State

state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson

Home Office of the Spokesperson Press Releases…Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity

hide

Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity

Media Note

November 15, 2023

Today, the Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) released its study, “Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity.” The report fulfills the request from Ambassador Bonnie D. Jenkins, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, to undertake a study on how to use the mutually reinforcing tools of deterrence and arms control to address the challenges of two future nuclear-armed strategic peers – Russia and the PRC. The recommendations, developed by a study group consisting of a subset of board members, was approved during the Board’s October 31, 2023, plenary meeting.

The ISAB provides the Department with a continuing source of independent insight, advice, and innovation on all aspects of arms control, disarmament, nonproliferation, outer space, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity, the national security aspects of emerging technologies, international security, and related aspects of public diplomacy. The Board is sponsored and overseen by the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security and provides its recommendations to the Secretary through the Under Secretary. The ISAB is established in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), 5 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., and the study was conducted in accordance with FACA.

For further information, including a full copy of the report, please visit International Security Advisory Board – United States Department of State.

state.gov · by Office of the Spokesperson

6. Biden, Xi's 'blunt' talks yield deals on military, fentanyl

It will be interesting to read the assessments of the meeting from across the political spectrum in the coming days. And more importantly will any of these agreement make a real difference and wil there be follow-through (such as Fentanyl on which we supposedly had a previous agreement)

And most importantly we will have substantive military to military communications and will such communication reduce tensions?

Biden, Xi's 'blunt' talks yield deals on military, fentanyl

Reuters · by Trevor Hunnicutt

WOODSIDE, California, Nov 15 (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping agreed on Wednesday to open a presidential hotline, resume military-to-military communications and work to curb fentanyl production, showing tangible progress in their first face-to-face talks in a year.

Biden and Xi met for about four hours on the outskirts of San Francisco to discuss issues that have strained U.S.-Chinese relations. Simmering differences remain, particularly over Taiwan.

In a significant breakthrough, the two governments plan to resume military contacts that China severed after then-House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022.

“We’re back to direct, open clear direct communication on a direct basis,” Biden said.

In addition, Biden said he and Xi agreed to high-level communications. "He and I agreed that each one of us can pick up the phone call directly and we'll be heard immediately."

But in a comment likely to irk the Chinese, Biden told reporters later that he had not changed his view that Xi is a dictator.

"Well, look, he is. I mean, he’s a dictator in the sense that he is a guy who runs a country that is a communist country," Biden said.

Xi told Biden that the negative views of the Communist Party in the United States were unfair, a U.S. official told reporters after the meeting.

Biden and Xi came into the talks looking to smooth over a rocky period in relations that took a turn for the worse after a suspected Chinese surveillance balloon transited the United States and was shot down by a U.S. fighter jet in February.

The White House said Biden raised areas where Washington has concerns, including detained U.S. citizens, human rights in Xinjiang, Tibet and Hong Kong and Beijing’s aggressive activities in the South China Sea.

"Just talking, just being blunt with one another so there’s no misunderstanding," Biden said.

MILITARY, TAIWAN

U.S. and China's militaries have had a number of near-misses and acrimonious exchanges over the past year. After the pledge to renew communications, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will meet his Chinese counterpart when that person is named, a senior U.S. official said.

Biden and Xi agreed China would stem the export of items related to the production of the opioid fentanyl, a leading cause of drug overdoses in the United States. "It’s going to save lives,” Biden said, adding he appreciated Xi’s “commitment” on the issue.

Under the agreement, China will go directly after specific chemical companies that make fentanyl precursors, a senior U.S. official told reporters. He vowed to "trust but verify" Chinese actions on the drug.

The two leaders also agreed to get experts together to discuss the risks of artificial intelligence.

A U.S. official described an exchange over Taiwan, the democratic island that China claims as its territory. China's preference is for peaceful reunification with the Chinese-claimed island of Taiwan, Xi told Biden, the U.S. official said, but Xi went on to talk about conditions in which force could be used.

[1/8]U.S. President Joe Biden waves as he walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Filoli estate on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, in Woodside, California, U.S., November 15, 2023. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque Acquire Licensing Rights

Biden said he stressed the need for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. official said Biden argued to maintain the status quo and for China to respect Taiwan's electoral process.

"President Xi responded 'Look, peace is all well and good, but at some point we need to move towards resolution more generally'," the official quoted Xi as saying.

Xi also urged the United States to stop sending weapons to Taiwan and support China's peaceful "reunification" with Taiwan, Chinese state media said.

Bonnie Glaser, a Taiwan expert at the Germen Marshall Fund of the United States, said Xi seemed to have conveyed both threats and assurances on Taiwan.

"The suggestion that a resolution needs to be found in the near term is a worrisome sign, even if he emphasized that there are no plans for military action against Taiwan in the coming years," she said.

Biden said he asked Xi to use his influence with Iran to urge Tehran not to launch proxy attacks on U.S. targets in the Middle East as the Israel-Hamas conflict continues in Gaza.

RESPECT AND WARMTH

Biden welcomed the Chinese leader at the Filoli estate, a country house and well-manicured gardens about 30 miles (48 km) south of San Francisco, where they will move later for a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

APEC meets amid relative Chinese economic weakness, Beijing's territorial feuds with neighbors and a Middle East conflict that is dividing the United States from allies.

Xi came into the meeting looking for respect from the United States as China's economy struggles to recover from sluggish growth.

Biden, who had long sought the meeting, struck a warm, welcoming tone. Video of the two clasping hands in farewell after the meeting was posted on X by the Global Times, China's state-backed tabloid.

"Planet Earth is big enough for the two countries to succeed," Xi told Biden as they and their delegations sat across from each other at a long table in an ornate conference room.

Biden said the U.S. and China had to ensure that competition between them "does not veer into conflict" and manage their relationship "responsibly."

After lunch, the leaders took a short walk together in the manicured garden of the mansion following an interaction that lasted around four hours. Biden waved to reporters and gave a two thumbs up sign when asked how the talks were going. "Well," he said.

Xi told Biden as they began their talks a lot had happened since their last meeting a year ago in Bali, citing the impacts of the COVID pandemic, and calling the U.S.-China relationship "the most important bilateral relationship in the world."

"For two large countries like China and the United States, turning their back on each other is not an option," he said. "It is unrealistic for one side to remodel the other."

After the two met, Biden welcomed global leaders to the APEC meeting in San Francisco, where he said Xi regarded the visit as a homecoming given the city’s large Chinese population.

Reporting by Trevor Hunnicutt; Additional reporting by Steve Holland, Michael Martina, Martin Pollard, Jeff Mason, David Lawder, David Brunnstrom and Andrea Shalal; Editing by Josie Kao and Stephen Coates

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Jeff Mason

Thomson Reuters

Jeff Mason is a White House Correspondent for Reuters. He has covered the presidencies of Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden and the presidential campaigns of Biden, Trump, Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain. He served as president of the White House Correspondents’ Association in 2016-2017, leading the press corps in advocating for press freedom in the early days of the Trump administration. His and the WHCA's work was recognized with Deutsche Welle's "Freedom of Speech Award." Jeff has asked pointed questions of domestic and foreign leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un. He is a winner of the WHCA's “Excellence in Presidential News Coverage Under Deadline Pressure" award and co-winner of the Association for Business Journalists' "Breaking News" award. Jeff began his career in Frankfurt, Germany as a business reporter before being posted to Brussels, Belgium, where he covered the European Union. Jeff appears regularly on television and radio and teaches political journalism at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism and a former Fulbright scholar.

Reuters · by Trevor Hunnicutt

7. TAKEAWAYS - Biden and Xi meeting: Taiwan, Iran, fentanyl and AI

A useful roll up.

TAKEAWAYS - Biden and Xi meeting: Taiwan, Iran, fentanyl and AI

Reuters

TAKEAWAYS - Biden and Xi meeting: Taiwan, Iran, fentanyl and AI | Reuters

U.S. President Joe Biden waves as he walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping at Filoli estate on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, in Woodside, California, U.S., November 15, 2023. REUTERS/Kevin Lamarque Acquire Licensing Rights

WASHINGTON, Nov 15 (Reuters) - U.S. President Joe Biden and China’s Xi Jinping met for about four hours on Wednesday to discuss issues ranging from military conflicts to drug-trafficking.

Biden welcomed the Chinese leader at the Filoli estate, a country house and gardens about 30 miles (48 km) south of San Francisco, ahead of a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.

Here’s the key issues discussed.

TAIWAN

The two leaders had a “substantial” discussion on Taiwan, with Xi telling Biden that Taiwan was the biggest, most dangerous issue facing the two superpowers, a senior U.S. official told reporters.

The Chinese leader said that China had no plans for military action against Taiwan in coming years, but also discussed conditions under which force could be used, the official said.

Biden said he “stressed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.” He also asked Xi to respect Taiwan’s electoral process, the U.S. official said.

Xi responded: “Look, peace is … all well and good but at some point we need to move towards resolution more generally,” the U.S. official said.

MILITARY TALKS

Beijing said the two leaders agreed to resume military contacts that China severed after then-House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in August 2022.

Biden made a “very clear request” that both countries institutionalize the military-to-military dialogues, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will meet his Chinese counterpart when that person is named, a senior U.S. official said.

LEADER TO LEADER TALKS

Biden said he and Xi agreed to high-level communications.

“He and I agreed that each one of us can pick up the phone call directly and we’ll be heard immediately,” Biden told reporters after the meeting.

COOPERATION AND CONCILIATION

Beijing’s report of the meeting, via the Communist Party-controlled Chinese state media, emphasized the need for more cooperation, dialogue and respect. China and the United States should set an example for other countries, Xi told Biden, according to Chinese media, and promote cooperation on trade, agriculture, climate change and artificial intelligence.

An official briefed on the talks said Beijing was also seeking a show of respect from the trip.

FENTANYL

Biden and Xi agreed to cooperate on addressing the source of the opioid fentanyl, a leading cause of drug overdoses in the United States, the U.S. official said.

Under the agreement, China will go directly after specific chemical companies that make fentanyl precursors.

IRAN

The two leaders also discussed the unfolding crisis in the Middle East, with Biden asking China to weigh in with Iran and urge it to avoid steps that could be seen as provocative, the senior U.S. official told reporters.

Chinese officials told the U.S. side that they had engaged in discussions with Iran on regional risks.

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

The two leaders also discussed artificial intelligence (AI)and agreed that AI was used in military or nuclear operations, it created real risks.

The senior U.S. official said both sides were “very much focused” on practices regarding AI that could be dangerous or destabilizing, but not ready for any mutual declaration.

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Jeff Mason

Thomson Reuters

Jeff Mason is a White House Correspondent for Reuters. He has covered the presidencies of Barack Obama, Donald Trump and Joe Biden and the presidential campaigns of Biden, Trump, Obama, Hillary Clinton and John McCain. He served as president of the White House Correspondents’ Association in 2016-2017, leading the press corps in advocating for press freedom in the early days of the Trump administration. His and the WHCA’s work was recognized with Deutsche Welle’s “Freedom of Speech Award.” Jeff has asked pointed questions of domestic and foreign leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un. He is a winner of the WHCA’s “Excellence in Presidential News Coverage Under Deadline Pressure” award and co-winner of the Association for Business Journalists’ “Breaking News” award. Jeff began his career in Frankfurt, Germany as a business reporter before being posted to Brussels, Belgium, where he covered the European Union. Jeff appears regularly on television and radio and teaches political journalism at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism and a former Fulbright scholar.

Information you can trust

Reuters, the news and media division of Thomson Reuters, is the world’s largest multimedia news provider, reaching billions of people worldwide every day. Reuters provides business, financial, national and international news to professionals via desktop terminals, the world’s media organizations, industry events and directly to consumers.

Thomson Reuters Products

Westlaw, opens new tab
Build the strongest argument relying on authoritative content, attorney-editor expertise, and industry defining technology.
Onesource, opens new tab
The most comprehensive solution to manage all your complex and ever-expanding tax and compliance needs.
Checkpoint, opens new tab
The industry leader for online information for tax, accounting and finance professionals.

LSEG Products

Workspace, opens new tab
Access unmatched financial data, news and content in a highly-customised workflow experience on desktop, web and mobile.
Data Catalogue, opens new tab
Browse an unrivalled portfolio of real-time and historical market data and insights from worldwide sources and experts.
World-Check, opens new tab
Screen for heightened risk individual and entities globally to help uncover hidden risks in business relationships and human networks.

Reuters

8. US spy tool will lapse unless Congress and White House can cut deal

Do we need this? Or is it too much of an infringement on our civil liberties? Or is Congress not afraid to publicly debate this and take a stand on either slide of the issue and will just not act and let this law lapse?

US spy tool will lapse unless Congress and White House can cut deal

c4isrnet.com · by Eric Tucker, The Associated Press · November 15, 2023

With just seven weeks until the end of the year, the Biden administration is running out of time to win the reauthorization of a spy program it says is vital to preventing terrorism, catching spies and disrupting cyberattacks.

The tool, Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, will expire at the end of December unless the White House and Congress can cut a deal and resolve an unusually vexing debate that has yielded unlikely alliances at the intersection of privacy and national security.

Spy agency to prototype ground moving-target tracking from space

The director of the National Reconnaissance Office said the agency is manufacturing the prototypes and plans to start launching in eight to 12 months.

Without the program, administration officials warn, the government won’t be able to collect crucial intelligence overseas. But civil liberties advocates from across the political spectrum say the law as it stands now infringes on the privacy of ordinary Americans and insist that changes are needed before the program is reauthorized.

“Renewing this law before it expires is among the most consequential national security decisions we face as a country,” Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen, the Justice Department’s top national security official, said at an event last month.

FILE - Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen of the Justice Department's National Security Division speaks during a news conference at the Department of Justice in Washington, May 16, 2023. With just seven weeks until the end of the year, the Biden administration is running out of time to win the reauthorization of a spy program it says is vital to preventing terrorism, catching spies and disrupting cyberattacks. The tool is called Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana, File)

The law, enacted in 2008, permits the U.S. intelligence community to collect without a warrant the communications of foreigners overseas suspected of posing a national security threat. Importantly, the government also captures the communications of Americans citizens and others in the U.S. when they’re in contact with those targeted foreigners.

In making the case for the law’s renewal, the Biden administration over the last year has cited numerous instances in which intelligence derived from Section 702 has helped thwart an attack, including an assassination plot on U.S. soil, or contributed to a successful operation, such as the strike last year that killed al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahri.

National security officials have said that 59% of articles in the president’s daily brief contain Section 702 information. They also point to the need for the program at a time when Israel’s war with Hamas has led to elevated concerns about attacks inside the U.S.

But while both sides of the debate are in broad agreement that the program is valuable, they differ in key ways on how it should be structured, creating a stalemate as the deadline approaches and as Congress is consumed by a busy year-end agenda, including a government shutdown deadline and disputes over border security and war spending. The White House has already dismissed as unworkable the one known legislative proposal that’s been advanced.

Another complicating factor for the administration to navigate: the coalition of lawmakers skeptical of government surveillance includes both privacy-minded liberal Democrats and Republicans deeply supportive of former President Donald Trump who still regard the intelligence community with suspicion over the investigation of ties between Russia and the 2016 Trump campaign.

Despite the clear challenges in reaching a compromise, the last-minute scramble between the White House and Congress has come to be expected each time the government’s surveillance powers are set to be renewed. This particular program was last renewed in January 2018 following a splintered vote in Congress and signed into law by Trump, who in a statement praised the tool’s value for having “saved lives” but also cheered a new requirement that was meant to protect privacy.

“A lot of these in the past have gone up to the brink. There is a history here of this brinksmanship when you have these statutory sunsets,” said Jamil Jaffer, founder and executive director of the National Security Institute at George Mason University’s law school and a senior Justice Department official at the time the law was created.

This year, a key point of contention is the insistence by some in Congress, over the strong objection of the White House, that federal agencies be required to get a warrant before they can access intelligence collected on people in the U.S.

That’s been a priority in light of a succession of revelations over the past year about improper searches of the intelligence database by FBI analysts for information related to the Jan. 6, 2021 riot at the Capitol and the racial justice protests of 2020, as well as about state and federal political figures.

The Biden administration has said compliance errors by the FBI are exceedingly rare given the massive number of overall database queries and that the bureau has made important reforms to minimize the prospect for civil liberties intrusions.

Warrant requirement

A warrant requirement is supported by Republican Rep. Jim Jordan, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and one of the most pro-Trump members of Congress, and Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden, a reliable champion of civil liberties and liberal standard bearer for decades.

Wyden last week released a bill with a bipartisan group of lawmakers — including Republican Rep. Andy Biggs, a vocal Trump supporter — that would mandate a warrant to access the communications of people inside the U.S., except for limited exemptions such as when officials need to stop an imminent threat to public safety or if the subject of the query has consented to the search.

A senior administration official told reporters before the bill was even announced that a warrant requirement crosses a “red line” for the White House given that it would limit officials’ ability to detect, and act on, potentially vital intelligence in real time. The official, who briefed reporters on condition of anonymity under ground rules set by the White House, said such a mandate would not only be operationally unworkable but also legally unnecessary because it would force officials to get a warrant to examine intelligence that was already lawfully collected.

In an interview, Wyden said that though he felt strongly about the need for warrants — they’re “important because the Founding Fathers thought they were important” — he also believed that his team had adopted a measured approach by including significant exceptions to the warrant requirement.

“We’re not negotiating with ourselves,” Wyden said. “We’ve got an open-door policy. If there are concerns from the administration, they ought to come up, make the case and talk them through.”

9. Air Force turns focus to future information operations

When discussing influence operations why are not military organizations discussing the only organizations that are organized,equipped, trasined, edcuatatedm and optimiazed for infrlance operations, namely psychological operations forces (or the term I hate -Military Information Support Operations - japanese soup or MISO). Unless we are employing PSYOP forces correctly for influence operations we are simply amateurs paying lip service to influence.

Air Force turns focus to future information operations

defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker

Airmen at Joint Base San Antonio – Lackland’s Medina annex, Sept. 5, 2023. U.S. Air Force / Jason W. Edwards

Cyberwarfare and influence operations are converging as key focus areas for the 16th Air Force.

November 15, 2023 05:05 PM ET

By Patrick Tucker

Science & Technology Editor, Defense One

November 15, 2023 05:05 PM ET

Air Forces Cyber will devote more time to training airmen in information warfare—everything from uncovering disinformation campaigns and targeting the networks adversaries use to spread disinformation to attempting to influence the audience themselves—said Lt. Gen. Kevin Kennedy, the commander of 16th Air Force.

“We've been charged as the operational level of information warfare for the United States Air Force. So with that, in the construct that we're building out, our information warfare operations Center is going to lead,” Kennedy said during a Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies event Wednesday.

Influence operations are an area where the United States military has spent relatively little effort, compared to areas like developing high-performance platforms or cross-domain teams, and especially compared to China and Russia. “Adversaries are already looking to manipulate us through the [information] domain,” Kennedy said. “They're doing it to gain insights. They're doing that to shape our perceptions, and eventually they're doing that to try and shape our behavior.”.

“That's what our activity is going to help with, and we have more experience in that than a lot of places in the United States Air Force, just based on our alignment with U.S. Cyber Command, so we have a lot more planners that have done information operations planning and bringing together more of the information warfare capabilities, and that's one of the aspects that we're looking at bringing to the other” air combat commands.

About a year ago, Kennedy met with the other commanders at 16th Air Force to discuss how to mature information warfare, and they converged on the training goal. But, he said, information operations must still be fully integrated into broader non-kinetic effects,such as electronic and cyber warfare.

“We're working through the information warfare operations center concept … to understand how our operations activities and investments in competition are creating a baseline understanding of the information environment and influencing the information environment, and what our adversaries’ perceptions are.”

Away from the battlefield, the Air Force will do more work with other partners in the government to better reveal adversary information operations before they go viral and combat them, he said. That may mean reaching out to social media companies to discuss possibly adversarial campaigns, a practice that was somewhat controversial when the Cyber Infrastructure Security Agency attempted it.

Kennedy didn’t touch on the fight currently playing out in Congress over the question of foreign information campaigns and whether the government has a responsibility to reveal and thwart them. Instead, he used his time to remind the audience that foreign disinformation campaigns are very real and could have effects on the battlefield.

“We're looking at our adversaries trying to create the negative perception that there is no reason to fight, that there is no reason to contest the [People’s Republic of China]. Where there's disinformation and misinformation, we're looking to expose that. We're looking to see [how different actions] align with the authorities of our various hats. We're looking to remove the information, the infrastructure that they're using to propagate that message. So we partner closely through, generally, U.S. Cyber Command. But sometimes [we partner with] the interagency if we see terms of service violations on social media. Social media is the battleground for this activity.”

10. Top general locked away evidence of SAS executions

Oh no. Not another scandal.

Top general locked away evidence of SAS executions

BBC · by Menu

Published
12 hours ago

About sharing

Austin Applauds Strengthening U.S.-Philippine Alliance

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III welcomed the strengthening ties between the U.S. and Philippines as he met with Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. in Jakarta, Indonesia, today.

Austin Greeting

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III greets Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Jakarta, Indonesia, Nov. 15, 2023.

Download: Full Size (5 MB)

Photo By: Chad McNeeley, DOD

VIRIN: 231115-D-TT977-1710

During their discussion, the secretaries applauded the "historic momentum" in the alliance, "which has upheld peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region for over seventy years," according to a joint summary of the meeting.

"The secretaries highlighted the recent progress the two countries have made to modernize the alliance, enhance interoperability and address new and emerging challenges," the summary reads.

The two countries have made recent advances in implementing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. A key pillar of the alliance outlines steps to enhance combined U.S.-Philippine military capabilities.

That progress includes the recent completion of a $24 million upgrade to the runway at Basa Air Base in the Philippines.

"They committed to explore further opportunities to strengthen bilateral operations and planning, including through the upcoming Balikatan 2024 exercise, and noted their desire to expand multilateral activities with like-minded partners," according to the summary.

The secretaries also discussed recent provocations by China during the meeting.

Those include China's dangerous maneuvers against U.S. aircraft and ships operating in the South China Sea and the importance of "preserving the rights of all nations to fly, sail and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows," according to the summary.

Ministers' Meeting

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto arrive at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Jakarta, Indonesia, Nov. 15, 2023.

Download: Full Size (4.04 MB)

Photo By: Chad McNeeley, DOD

VIRIN: 231115-D-TT977-1028

Both leaders also condemned the recent harassment of Philippine Coast Guard and resupply vessels conducting lawful resupply operations near the Second Thomas Shoal, an area in the South China Sea within the Philippines' U.N.-sanctioned exclusive economic zone.

"Secretary Austin reiterated President Biden's message that the U.S. defense commitment to the Philippines is ironclad and emphasized that the United States stands shoulder-to-shoulder with the Philippines in defending its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone," according to the meeting summary.

The two leaders met as part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus. The summit includes representation from China, Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand in addition to the 10 ASEAN member states and the U.S.

Austin's attendance at the 3-day session caps his ninth official visit to the Indo-Pacific, which also included stops in India and South Korea.

A senior defense official previewing Austin's schedule in Jakarta said the secretary's engagement with the Southeast Asian bloc is further proof of the United States' commitment to the region.

The U.S., the official said, is "demonstrating that commitment through action and engagement—not just through rhetoric."

The official added that recognition of that commitment is being met by a growing demand from countries in the region to deepen their ties with the U.S.

Group Photo

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III gathers with his defense counterparts at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus in Jakarta, Indonesia, Nov. 15, 2023.

Download: Full Size (4.63 MB)

Photo By: Chad McNeeley, DOD

VIRIN: 231115-D-TT977-1205

Those deepening ties are critical in Southeast Asia, which defense officials note ranks among the fastest growing, youngest and most diverse regions within the Indo-Pacific.

"When you look at the trajectory of where the Indo-Pacific is headed over the next two decades, Southeast Asia—and ASEAN as a collective—is becoming an increasingly important player and will continue to in the future," a second official said.

This is a part of the world where half of the population of Southeast Asia is under the age of 30," the official added. "If you look at the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia [they are] some of the fastest growing economies right now. And when you see what the United States is doing in terms of supply chain diversification, a lot of that is coming to this part of the world."

The officials added that in addition to the strong economic growth, there is significant focus throughout the region on military modernization efforts.

"These are partnerships that we're going to be continuing to invest in further, and have already invested in a lot," the official said.

Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Focus-on-Indo-Pacific/

defense.gov · by Joseph Clark

12. Israel Storms Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital, Questioning Patients, Staff as More Aid and Fuel Expected to Arrive Today

Israel Storms Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital, Questioning Patients, Staff as More Aid and Fuel Expected to Arrive Today

The first fuel truck has reportedly entered Gaza from Egypt as the IDF says it found Hamas weapons in the hospital

Published 11/15/23 05:38 AM ET|Updated 22 hr ago

Luke Funk

themessenger.com · November 15, 2023

Israeli Defense Forces carrying out a “targeted operation” against Hamas remained in the Al-Shifa Hospital complex in Gaza City Wednesday after a raid overnight, reportedly in "complete control" of the facility.

Israel forces were going from room to room interrogating staff and patients, according to the BBC. Some sheltering at the hospital have been forced into the courtyard for security checks. A reporter on the scene said that IDF is in "complete control."

The military said its troops encountered explosives and terrorist squads outside the hospital, but defeated them. The Israeli army has claimed Hamas uses hospitals as a cover for its fighters and has a command center under Shifa. Troops say they have found Hamas weapons inside the hospital, according to the Times of Israel, but no sign of any hostages.

Thousands of hospital employees patients and evacuees are still inside the complex.

The IDF said it also brought incubators for newborns, baby food and medical supplies to the hospital.

Israeli officials said they agreed to allow fuel shipments into the Gaza Strip for humanitarian operations. AlQahera News reported that the first fuel truck had been allowed to enter the Gaza Strip from the Rafah border crossing.

It is the first time that Israel has allowed fuel into the besieged territory since the Hamas militant group’s bloody cross-border invasion on Oct. 7.

View post on Twitter

“The IDF forces include medical teams and Arabic speakers, who have undergone specified training to prepare for this complex and sensitive environment,” the military said in a statement.

Israel declared war and barred fuel shipments after the Oct. 7 attack, saying Hamas would divert supplies for military use. But fuel is key to operations at Gaza hospitals, which run on generators. The Israeli government said it's allowing 6,340 gallons of fuel into Gaza.

The U.N. agency for Palestinian refugees warned late Tuesday that its fuel storage facility in Gaza had run dry and that UNRWA would soon be forced to halt operations.

Shifa Hospital has become a symbol of the widespread suffering of Palestinian civilians during the war.

Forty patients died at the hospital on Tuesday, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Hospital officials said they're preparing to dig a mass grave with capacity for up to 180 bodies of those who cannot be evacuated due to the constant fighting between IDF and Hamas forces.

themessenger.com · November 15, 2023

13. TikTokers Discover Osama bin Laden's Letter Justifying 9/11, Decide They Agree With bin Laden

Sigh... sad...troubling.....

TikTokers Discover Osama bin Laden's Letter Justifying 9/11, Decide They Agree With bin Laden

The dead al-Qaeda leader's 'Letter to America' is going viral 21 years later, and a number of young people think he's got a point

Published 11/15/23 10:26 PM ET|Updated 43 min ago

Eli Walsh

themessenger.com · November 16, 2023

TikTok users inexplicably posted their reactions this week to reading Osama bin Laden’s infamous “Letter to America” for the first time, arguing it made them reevaluate their view of the Sept. 11 attacks Bin Laden orchestrated.

A slew of TikTok users expressed shock in their videos that they did not completely disagree with bin Laden’s reasoning that the attacks on the World Trade Center were retribution for the United States’ Cold War-era meddling in the Middle East and that Israel occupied Palestinian land and oppressed the Palestinian people for decades, he claimed.

View post on Twitter

Several other videos on the platform plainly explain the contents of the letter, comment on the discussion about the letter or explain the context of Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks to an audience that may not have been alive when they happened.

While a handful of videos found when searching “Letter to America” on TikTok have tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of views and spurred a minor moral panic on X, formerly known as Twitter, the majority do not approach virality on a platform where the most viewed videos receive millions of views and likes.

View post on TikTok

Videos using the hashtag #LetterToAmerica have a combined view count of 3.9 million views, a relatively small amount by TikTok's standards. In comparison, videos about Israel's raid early Wednesday on a Gaza hospital with the hashtag #alshifa have more than 26 million views.

The letter’s recent overall virality prompted The Guardian, which had published the letter when Bin Laden originally did so in November 2002, to remove it from its website on Wednesday, according to 404 Media.

Frederick Joseph, the author of two New York Times-bestselling books about social justice and racism, said in his own post on the platform that the Guardian's decision was a "good example or narrative control."

“It started going viral, not because people were necessarily agreeing with Osama Bin Laden’s actions or his moral clarity, but rather because the letter offered perspective into the hypocrisy of America, the hypocrisy of settler colonial nations, so on and so forth, and discussing the atrocities people in the Middle East have faced," Joseph said.

themessenger.com · November 16, 2023

14. Americans flock to TikTok for news

Again, troubling.

Graphics at the link: https://www.axios.com/2023/11/15/tiktok-social-media-news-source-us-data?stream=top&utm

My daughter, a 10th grade English teacher, can anecdotally confirm this based on discussions with her classes (about 160 students total).

Updated 16 hours ago -Technology

Americans flock to TikTok for news

Eleanor Hawkins
, author of

Axios Communicators

Share on facebook (opens in new window)

Share on twitter (opens in new window)

Share on linkedin (opens in new window)

Share on email (opens in new window)

Data: Pew Research; Chart: Tory Lysik/Axios Visuals

The share of TikTok users who consume news through the platform has nearly doubled since 2020, according to new Pew Research Center data.

Why it matters: News organizations, business leaders and brands are being forced to evolve and meet audiences where they are in order to break through.

What's happening: The Pew study shows that news consumers have accelerated their shift toward digital channels in the past year.

Americans are roughly twice as likely to say they prefer getting news on digital devices (58%) than television (27%).
Meanwhile, audience preference for radio and print media remains roughly stagnant at 6% and 5% respectively.

State of play: Roughly half of Americans say they get some news from social media platforms.

News audiences are increasing the most on TikTok and Instagram. Platforms like LinkedIn, Twitch and Nextdoor are also gaining traction as news sources.

Data: Pew Research Center; Chart: Axios Visuals

Roughly one-third of adults under age 30 regularly scroll TikTok for news, a 255% increase since 2020.

The TikTok increase is taking place across all age demographics, not just younger Americans.

Zoom in: Women make up a greater portion of regular news consumers on Nextdoor, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, while men are more likely to opt for platforms like Reddit, X and YouTube.

Yes, but: As big social media platforms move away from supporting news links, headlines and content, users seeking news content may be leaning more heavily on search engines, traditional news sites or aggregation apps.

What to watch: The kind of news content favored by platforms like TikTok, which is all short-form video and typically user-generated, may get penalized by Google and other search engines.

Google has long relied on a complex algorithm to prioritize content that the company views as authoritative, credible and trustworthy.
The more Google offers search results via conversational AI, the more likely it is to get even pickier about choosing sources.

15. DOD Makes Incremental Progress Toward Clean Audit

The DOD perspective.

DOD Makes Incremental Progress Toward Clean Audit

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

The Defense Department is making progress toward the goal of a clean audit, said Michael J. McCord, the undersecretary of defense comptroller and DOD's chief financial officer.

McCord briefed the press yesterday on the results of the massive audit of the department — the sixth since 2018.

Getting a clean audit is crucial so leaders can manage and lead the department. DOD is one of the largest organizations in the world with $3.8 trillion in assets and $4 trillion in liabilities, McCord said.

"The audit comprises 29 standalone audits of the military services and other components, such as the Defense Logistics Agency and several other accounts as well as the department's consolidated audit," he said in the briefing. In addition, there is an overall department-wide audit on its own.

Photo Shoot

An aerial view of the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., May 15, 2023.

Download: Full Size (3.62 MB)

Photo By: Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Alexander Kubitza, DOD

VIRIN: 230515-D-PM193-1762C

The audit is a massive effort conducted by a mix of independent public accounting firms and the DOD Office of the Inspector General.

The bottom line is of the 29 components undergoing stand-alone financial statement audits, seven received an unmodified audit opinion, and one received a qualified opinion. This means the audits found these organizations under compliance. The audits of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Defense Information Systems Agency Working Capital Fund and the DOD Office of Inspector General are still pending. All other DOD components undergoing a stand-alone audit received disclaimers of opinion, which means there were faults, and more work must happen before they come under compliance.

"I want to highlight that while we still have much work to do, our work on the audit over the last few years has yielded significant benefits to the department," McCord said. "Our efforts to track coordinate and quickly deliver security systems to our allies and partners in Ukraine and now Israel is closely related to the work across the DOD enterprise on readiness."

The overall results of the sixth annual department-wide audit will again be a disclaimer of opinion, McCord said. "This is not unexpected," he said.

McCord spoke about the Marine Corps audit, which has been extended. "We are very focused on it as a test case for the department and the larger services," he said. "The Marines have [an] extension to March 1 because this is a first-time audit. Whatever results of that may be when we get the auditor's final opinion, I want to commend the USMC and in particular, (Marine Commandant Gen.) Eric Smith for their leadership and effort."

Putting the audit results in perspective, McCord said favorable opinions cover 50% of DOD's assets. "This does not mean that the other 50% is unaccounted for," he said. "The department has tight control of its assets — but too many of our financial management systems, such as some of our property systems of record, still cannot meet auditing standards. We are working hard to accelerate the retirement of these older systems and bring more of our asset records up to accounting standards."

This is key to the future. The components have eliminated many older systems and put in more modern procedures and technologies. McCord hopes these changes will help to accelerate the process.

McCord also discussed the notices of finding recommendations, known in shorthand as NFRs. "As of Nov. 13, the auditors had validated that we had closed 490 of last year's 3,008 findings, and we expect that total will continue to increase as the numbers get finalized," he said.

To date, auditors issued 2,509 new NFRs, of which about 365 were completely new and the other 2,144 were reissued or recurring.

Another deficiency is known as a material weakness. Auditors did find material weaknesses that indicate "a pattern or a whole subject area that needs work," he said.

The department and its components closed one material weakness and downgraded six material weaknesses, an increase from three in fiscal 2022.

"The department took a major step toward resolving its Fund Balance with Treasury material weakness, one of Secretary of Defense (Lloyd J.) Austin III's three audit priority areas," he said.

The Air Force General Fund closed its Fund Balance with Treasury material weakness. It is the first service to fix this foundational issue on one of its financial statements, McCord said.

The Army Working Capital Fund and Navy General Fund both downgraded their Fund Balance with Treasury material weakness.

"The substantial progress made by the services shows that by naming DOD-wide priority areas, concentrating efforts and setting and monitoring metrics, we are collectively having a meaningful effect," he said.

McCord stressed that the audits are not just nameless, bureaucratic exercises that signify nothing.

"We measure progress across five areas: Workforce Modernization, Business Operations, Quality Decision-Making, Reliable Networks and Enhanced Public Confidence," he said.

Workforce modernization, for example, is robotics automating manual processes and freeing up labor hours "and allowing our workforce to focus on analytics and more value-added tasks," he said. All the services and many defense agencies are putting bots to good use.

Business operations are improving, and he pointed to the Marine Corps reducing unsupported, undistributed transactions from $2.2 billion in October 2022 to less than $500,000 in March 2023. This supports more effective leadership decisions, he said.

Data quality efforts give leaders more information. "The Navy reviewed $17 billion [in] unliquidated obligations; validating 97% of the balances met audit requirements, while also uncovering $330 million available for de-obligation," McCord said. "This provided Navy with greater insight into funds management and optimized use of budgetary resources for mission critical objectives."

Retiring legacy systems results in more reliable networks, he said. This past year DOD retired 10 audit-relevant systems, three of which were accounting systems used by multiple components over several years.

The process is moving forward, but McCord would like to see it speed up considerably. He called on Congress and defense industry partners to do more to help in the effort.

"Our congressional defense committees can help by doing their part in stabilizing the budget process and avoiding continuing resolutions and repeated threats of government shutdowns, such as the one we are living through yet again this week; by ensuring timely continuity and confirmation of our military and civilian leadership; by providing adequate and consistent resources for replacing DOD legacy systems; and through continued support of the department's financial transformation efforts," he said.

Industry partners can help by bringing property in the possession of contractors into audit compliance, providing transparency into the location and condition of DOD assets, and supporting audit progress by complying timely with all audit requirements and requests.

"I commit to accelerating our audit efforts to ensure every decision we make at the department is fiscally informed and empowers global force decision-making," he said. "Fiscal readiness accelerates mission readiness, and we are working hard to achieve greater financial integrity and increase transparency, in support of decision-making."

Spotlight: FY 2024 Defense Budget Spotlight: FY 2024 Defense Budget: https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/FY2024-Defense-Budget/

defense.gov · by Jim Garamone

16. Pentagon fails sixth audit, with number of passing grades stagnant

Another view of the latest audit.

Pentagon fails sixth audit, with number of passing grades stagnant

Defense News · by Noah Robertson · November 16, 2023

WASHINGTON — For the sixth year in a row, the Pentagon failed its annual audit.

The result is not a surprise. The Department of Defense’s assets are vast and decentralized, amounting to $3.8 trillion alongside $4 trillion in liabilities. These are located in all 50 states and more than 4,500 sites around the world.

Since the Pentagon began auditing itself in 2018 — the last department to do so after Congress required the practice across the government in 1990 — it’s solved some of its easiest accounting problems. Now change each year is more incremental.

If there’s change at all, that is — last year, auditors only rated seven of the nearly 30 sub-audits as clean. This year too there were seven.

One other was rated as “qualified,” the next step down in accounting jargon. Three more audits are still ongoing. The remaining 18 were given failing grades.

Pentagon officials have tried to reassure the public there is progress, despite the same topline rating. Speaking to reporters this week, Comptroller Mike McCord pointed to three areas.

The first is movement toward a resolved fund balance with the Treasury Department, meaning the two departments are getting closer to matching their ledgers. This consistency helps prevent fraud.

The second is the increasing use of automated programs, or bots, for rote tasks, freeing up accountants’ time for more important work. McCord said that in the Navy and Air Force alone, the use of bots saved around 600,000 hours.

The last is more relevant to the battlefield. Since Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022, the U.S. Defense Department has put a magnifying glass to its stockpiles while offering support. That effort proved useful when war began between Israel and Hamas this October. When Israel asked the U.S. for aid, McCord said, the U.S. knew what it had, where the capabilities were and what condition they were in.

“The Ukraine experience informed the Israeli one because there was already a lot of good practice built up,” he said.

Smaller successes aside, audits are still pass-fail tests and the Pentagon continues to fail, McCord acknowledged.

A full half of the Defense Department’s assets still don’t meet auditing standards. The Pentagon resolved around 500 Notifications of Findings and Recommendations, or specific problems found in last year’s audit, McCord said. At the same time, he said, there were 2,500 more NFRs identified this year, a total that includes new and recurring issues.

“It’s not enough,” McCord said. “The secretary [of defense] feels that we need to be doing better at this and moving faster.”

There is just under $5 billion worth of U.S. stockpiles that can still be sent to assist Kyiv, McCord said. At a Pentagon briefing last week, spokeswoman Sabrina Singh said there was $1 billion remaining to replenish those stocks.

The drawdown money leftover is itself the product of an accounting error. Earlier this year, Pentagon officials realized they had often been valuing the aid sent to Ukraine at its sticker cost rather than factoring in age — the equivalent of an insurance company reimbursing a totaled car at its original purchase price rather than its value at the time of a crash.

The funding vehicles being used to aid Israel in its war against Hamas are far different, in part because Israel has a large defense-industrial base and decades-long relationships with American arms manufacturers. But the road to keep funding them without more money approved by Congress is narrow, McCord said

“The running room we have to actually help Israel is much more constrained [than it is for Ukraine] because we don’t have any action by Congress yet,” he said.

Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, the Pentagon’s inability to get a passing grade continues to draw lawmakers’ ire. This summer, House Republicans held a hearing focused on the auditing failures.

This week, the House passed a continuing resolution to keep the government funded through early next year. The Pentagon has said such temporary spending bills make its accounting process more difficult.

About Noah Robertson

Noah Robertson is the Pentagon reporter at Defense News. He previously covered national security for the Christian Science Monitor. He holds a bachelor’s degree in English and government from the College of William & Mary in his hometown of Williamsburg, Virginia.

17. How Will Southeast Asian Terror Groups Capitalize on the Israel-Hamas War?

We cannot take our eye off the terrorist/violent extremist organization (VEO) ball.

How Will Southeast Asian Terror Groups Capitalize on the Israel-Hamas War?

thediplomat.com

From recruitment to possible ideological shifts to opportunistic cyberattacks, a prolonged conflict in the Middle East may have serious consequences for the region.

By Zam Yusa

November 16, 2023

Smoke rises from an explosion following an Israeli airstrike in the Gaza Strip, as seen from southern Israel, Monday, Oct. 23, 2023.

Credit: AP Photo/Ariel Schalit

A protracted Israel-Hamas war may have negative consequences in some Southeast Asian nations, in terms of terror recruitment, radicalization, and cyberattacks, according to experts.

The armed conflict in the Middle East has entered its second month after a surprise incursion by Hamas into southern Israel on October 7 resulted in the killing of over 1,200 people, according to estimates by Israeli authorities.

Israel retaliated initially via airstrikes followed by ground offensives that altogether have taken over 11,000 lives in Palestine, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry.

International terror groups have since taken advantage of the conflict.

Veryan Khan, president and CEO of the U.S.-based terrorism monitor, Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC), told The Diplomat that every single major jihadist group almost immediately attempted to leverage the Israel-Hamas war, issuing statements and propaganda posters and videos.

“Islamic State was the last to comment,” she said. “As you know, the Islamic State does not support Hamas in any way and are completely different ideologically speaking. While the al-Qaida franchises support Hamas, even praise what they considered an honorable event of 7 October 2023, Islamic State only supports the people of Palestine and has asked for lone-wolf supporters to target Western interests.

“Indeed, there has been at least one arrest from an IS supporter planning a vehicle attack at a pro-Israeli rally in Germany since the first IS calls to support Palestinians.”

A prolonged Israel-Hamas conflict would be capitalized by terror groups, according to Khan.

“The longer the war rages, the more jihadists will attempt to leverage the carnage,” said Khan. “Like in Syria and Iraq, the images of civilian deaths, especially children, outrage jihadist circles. TRAC foresees more propaganda campaigns featuring the carnage of war to anger and call supporters to rise.”

An analyst based in the Philippines is similarly concerned.

“Key here is the protracted nature of the crisis,” said Georgi Engelbrecht, a senior analyst for the Philippines at the International Crisis Group.

“The longer the conflict lasts, the deeper the emotions will reach – but also, the more used to the situation the public will become. This is a challenge as young people could always be enticed to feel aggrieved by the situation and discuss options forward.”

In Indonesia, the impact of the war on the security situation can be complex and multifaceted, said Indonesian terrorism expert Dr. Noor Huda Ismail.

“Heightened tensions and conflicts can be exploited by extremist groups to radicalize and recruit individuals in Indonesia, potentially leading to domestic security threats,” said Noor Huda, a visiting fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

“Heightened geopolitical tensions can lead to an increase in cyber threats, including hacking and attacks on critical infrastructure,” he added. “The conflict may attract individuals from Indonesia to join the fighting in the affected region, potentially gaining combat experience and radicalization.”

Noor Huda said Indonesian authorities should strengthen counter-radicalization efforts, community engagement, and intelligence-sharing in order to identify and address radicalization at an early stage as well as implement strict border controls, enhance intelligence cooperation with international partners, and monitor and address any attempts at recruitment or travel for the purpose of joining conflicts abroad.

In Malaysia, terrorist attack threats brought on by the Middle East conflict are unlikely, Malaysian terrorism expert Munira Mustafa told The Diplomat.

“There is no logical reason (for terror elements) to target Malaysia due to this conflict,” said Munira, founder and executive director of the Chasseur Group.

“I would also be cautious of any claims that there are Hamas (cells) or pro-Hamas targeting Western assets or interests in the country. That’s not part of their known modus operandi as they have been constraining themselves to local and adjacent arenas, that is Palestine and Israel only. Beyond that, such an approach would be counterintuitive for them,” Munira said..

“However, the recent FinTIP assessment have ignited speculations that cybersecurity intrusions are likely to occur, possibly from pro-Israel hacktivists online or any other opportunistic threat actors. Financial institutions are already advised to take precautionary measures to anticipate intrusion attempts,” Munira said, using the acronym for “financial sector cyber threat intelligence platforms.”

Change of Ideology?

International terror groups that still have some influence on followers in Southeast Asian nations, such as al-Qaida and the Islamic State, have their own ideologies, which differ in significant ways from that of Hamas.

Several terror groups still active in the southern Philippines are aligned with the Islamic State while in Indonesia, there are different groups loyal to either al-Qaida or the Islamic State.

A question that has been discussed by global experts is whether members and supporters of these local terror groups could have a change of ideology that shifts them closer to that of Hamas and therefore reduces support for the original groups.

Noor Huda said it is challenging to predict with certainty how the dynamics among extremist groups will unfold.

“The relationships between different jihadist movements are complex, and they can be influenced by a range of factors, including ideological differences, regional considerations, and changes in leadership,” he said.

“While it’s conceivable that individuals or factions may shift their allegiances based on changing circumstances, such transitions are contingent on various unpredictable elements. The ideological differences between [the Islamic State] and Hamas, along with their distinct regional focuses, may present obstacles to a wholesale transition of support from one group to another.”

Engelbrecht believes the various supporters of Moro militant groups in the southern Philippines are less focused on the nuances and more on symbols, slogans, and key messages.

“Most are considering Hamas an ethno-nationalist movement,” he said. “There are some who consider the group in a more ambiguous but neutral manner. Most of the information, however, comes from the outside and as such only a few are well versed with detailed politics of the Middle East.

“While sympathies are undoubtedly there, it remains to be seen if there is anything else beyond that. After all, the main issue in Bangsamoro right now – the transition and the peace process – are more relevant and urgent both for the leaders and the people of the region,” Engelbrecht said, referring to the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).

Munira said the change-of-allegiance issue was too speculative for her liking.

“This is not pre-2017 anymore, which means the conditions are no longer the same,” she said. “Many former supporters already expressed their disillusionment with [the Islamic State], and the remnants of IS in Iraq and Syria are primarily motivated by local grievances rather than grand ambitions of rebuilding a caliphate, which is not sustainable to begin with.

“Another point to consider is that it is improbable for foreign supporters to join Hamas in the same manner they did with IS,” she said. “Hamas’ ideology is a blend of nationalism and the political Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This will have limited appeal and unlikely to resonate with a broader audience. Additionally, there is no concrete evidence of operational connections between Hamas activists and global jihadist groups, as Hamas has been distancing themselves from them.”

TRAC’s Khan said that “Hamas has been around for decades and never has had any substantial support outside of Palestine or nation state actors funding their efforts. I do not see that anyone will switch their allegiance.”

Get to the bottom of the story

Understand the Asia-Pacific's biggest issues with a The Diplomat subscription.

Subscribe Now View Subscription Options

Already have an account? Log in.

A protracted Israel-Hamas war may have negative consequences in some Southeast Asian nations, in terms of terror recruitment, radicalization, and cyberattacks, according to experts.

Israel retaliated initially via airstrikes followed by ground offensives that altogether have taken over 11,000 lives in Palestine, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry.

International terror groups have since taken advantage of the conflict.

“Indeed, there has been at least one arrest from an IS supporter planning a vehicle attack at a pro-Israeli rally in Germany since the first IS calls to support Palestinians.”

A prolonged Israel-Hamas conflict would be capitalized by terror groups, according to Khan.

An analyst based in the Philippines is similarly concerned.

“Key here is the protracted nature of the crisis,” said Georgi Engelbrecht, a senior analyst for the Philippines at the International Crisis Group.

In Indonesia, the impact of the war on the security situation can be complex and multifaceted, said Indonesian terrorism expert Dr. Noor Huda Ismail.

In Malaysia, terrorist attack threats brought on by the Middle East conflict are unlikely, Malaysian terrorism expert Munira Mustafa told The Diplomat.

“There is no logical reason (for terror elements) to target Malaysia due to this conflict,” said Munira, founder and executive director of the Chasseur Group.

Change of Ideology?

Several terror groups still active in the southern Philippines are aligned with the Islamic State while in Indonesia, there are different groups loyal to either al-Qaida or the Islamic State.

Noor Huda said it is challenging to predict with certainty how the dynamics among extremist groups will unfold.

Engelbrecht believes the various supporters of Moro militant groups in the southern Philippines are less focused on the nuances and more on symbols, slogans, and key messages.

Munira said the change-of-allegiance issue was too speculative for her liking.

Myanmar fighting intensifies near India border, curfew imposed in Sittwe

Offensive launched by anti-coup forces two weeks ago puts military under pressure and is now spreading across the country.

Al Jazeera English

Ethnic armed groups fighting to restore civilian rule in Myanmar have claimed new territory in the country’s northwest near the border with India, amid an escalating offensive against the military regime.

Fighters in Chin state reportedly took control of two military outposts on the border of India’s Mizoram state after hours-long battles on Monday, according to local media outlets.

The advance follows successes in neighbouring Rakhine state and northern Shan state in a coordinated offensive launched two weeks ago by anti-coup forces.

Keep reading

list of 4 itemsend of list

Myanmar was plunged into crisis when Senior General Min Aung Hlaing seized power in a coup in 2021, leading to mass protests that evolved into armed resistance when the military used force to crack down on its civilian opponents.

About 80 fighters mounted attacks on Rihkhawdar and Khawmawi military camps in Chin state in the early hours of Monday, eventually taking control of both outposts after several hours of fighting, Chin National Front (CNF) Vice Chairman Sui Khar told the Reuters news agency.

The CNF will now look to consolidate its control along the India-Myanmar border, where the Myanmar military has two more camps, he said.

“We’ll move forward,” Sui Khar said. “Our tactic is from the village to the town to the capital.”

Martial law

The generals, who have acknowledged the scale of the challenge posed to their regime, have expanded martial law to more parts of the country amid the intensified conflict.

Social media posts said a nighttime curfew had been imposed in Sittwe, Rakhine’s capital, with some reports of tanks on the streets.

“We saw tanks going around the town. Many shops are closed today,” a resident told Reuters, declining to be named for security reasons.

Fighting was taking place across Rakhine, according to two residents and a spokesperson for the Arakan Army (AA), a group fighting for greater autonomy that has seized military posts in Rathedaung and Minbya towns.

A Rathedaung resident told Reuters on Tuesday the area came under artillery fire overnight and that the military had entered the town.

“Artillery fell on a street in Rathedaung town last night. No immediate report of injured or casualties yet,” said the resident, who asked not to be identified.

“People have started fleeing the town. Soldiers are in the town now.”

Despite its brutal history of communal violence and the 2017 military crackdown on the mostly Muslim Rohingya, Rakhine emerged as one of the more peaceful parts of the country after the coup, thanks to an informal ceasefire between the AA and the military agreed just a few months before.

The arrangement began to break down by November 2021, as the AA entrenched its political control over the state.

The AA was established in 2009 to push for self-determination within Myanmar and mostly represents ethnic Rakhine Buddhists, who make up the majority of the state’s population.

Many of the country’s other ethnic armed groups have been fighting the military for decades.

Al Jazeera English

19. Karenni Resistance Evacuates University Staff Abandoned by Junta Troops (Burma/Myanmar)

Karenni Resistance Evacuates University Staff Abandoned by Junta Troops

irrawaddy.com · by Hein Htoo Zan · November 15, 2023

A combined force of resistance groups in Kayah State has rescued 134 junta regime employees and 64 of their family members who were trapped inside Loikaw University amid clashes between the groups and the junta’s military, according to Karenni resistance groups and the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (KSIEC).

According to a KSIEC statement released on Tuesday, the regime employees, who worked for the university, were abandoned by the junta’s military council and left to fend for themselves following the launch of Operation 11.11 in Kayah State. Karenni revolutionary troops evacuated them from the university compound and transported them to a safe place, the KSIEC said.

“The regime employees from Loikaw University, who didn’t join in the Civil Disobedience Movement [CDM], are now being well cared for, in accordance with human rights principles, and provided humanitarian assistance,” the statement reads.

The humanitarian evacuation of the regime employees, most of whom are lecturers, and their families from the university compound followed a junta public disinformation campaign in which the regime portrayed the resistance groups as attempting to abduct the university staff.

At a press conference on Monday, junta spokesman Zaw Min Tun alleged that the “KNPP and PDF” were firing on Loikaw University while trying to abduct regime employees present there. He said regime forces had saved some of the lecturers and were attempting to rescue the remaining ones. The KNPP, or Karenni National Progressive Party, is the political wing of the Karenni Army (KA), while PDF, or People’s Defense Force, groups operate under the civilian National Unity Government.

However, the Karenni revolutionary forces denied the claim, explaining that in fact the junta troops made no effort to evacuate the employees from the university compound, despite being based there.

When the resistance groups launched their attack on regime troops in the area on Saturday as part of Operation 1111, hundreds of regime forces took up a position at the university compound, so resistance forces were forced to open fire on the compound, said Khu Ree Du, a spokesperson for the Karenni Nationalities Democratic Front (KNDF).

“But we realized that there were many non-CDM employees inside the university and they were in danger of being injured or killed at any time. Therefore, we decided to take them out,” he said.

The junta’s propaganda channels also falsely reported that the rector of Loikaw University had been killed. The KNDF denied the report and said the rector and all the other lecturers had been safely evacuated and were being well cared for.

Though the lecturers and other regime employees at Loikaw University didn’t join in the CDM movement, CDM participants are now helping them, providing them with food and drinking water.

After the combined resistance groups entered the university compound on Tuesday afternoon, they started evacuating the employees and their families. Resistance groups said intense clashes continue at Loikaw University and in other parts of the city.

Loikaw is the center of the junta’s administration in Kayah State and has around 50,000 residents, including those displaced by fighting since the 2021 military coup. Volunteer groups said at least 35,000 people now need to evacuate the town.

Allied resistance forces comprising the KA, KNDF, Karenni National People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF) and PDF groups launched the Operation 11.11 offensive in Kayah on Saturday in harmony with Operation 1027 in northern Shan State.

The offensive has so far seized seven junta outposts in Kayah’s Loikaw and Demoso and neighboring southern Shan State’s Pekon Township.

Your Thoughts …

irrawaddy.com · by Hein Htoo Zan · November 15, 2023

20. Nine Towns Occupied by Myanmar Military for Decades Lost to Resistance in Days

Again, the resistance is showing signs of success. What will come next? Is ASEAN, the UN, the international community, Thailand ,China, and the US ready for what happens next? Will Burma become another pawn in strategic competition?

Nine Towns Occupied by Myanmar Military for Decades Lost to Resistance in Days

irrawaddy.com · by The Irrawaddy · November 15, 2023

Less than three weeks since the ethnic Brotherhood Alliance launched its massive “Operation 1027” offensive, the Myanmar military has lost nine towns where its battalions had been based for decades.

The junta has lost control of five towns in northern Shan State – Chin Shwe Haw, Phaungsai, Monekoe, Namkham, Hseni and Kunlong – two in the resistance stronghold of Sagaing Region – Kawling and Kamphat – and Rih Kaw Dar in Chin State.

The Brotherhood Alliance, made up of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and Arakan Army (AA), seized the border trade town of Chin Shwe Haw on Oct. 27, the first day of the offensive. Over the next few days, it took control of Phaungsai, Monekoe and Namkham.

Kunlong, where the Lashio district junta administration is based, fell on November 12. Myanmar military units have been stationed in Kunlong, the gateway to the Kokang Self-Administered Zone, since independence in 1948. In 1971, the military successfully repulsed 40 days of human-wave attacks on the town by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB).

Namkham town in northern Shan State after being occupied by the TNLA. / The Irrawaddy

Kunlong was under the de facto control of the Myanmar military for 75 years until it was seized by the Brotherhood Alliance after just 12 days of fighting.

Namkham, located close to the key Myanmar-China border trade town of Muse, has housed Myanmar military units continuously except for one week during the civil war in 1949. It took only 11 days for the ethnic alliance to seize the town.

The MNDAA raises its flag at Chin Shwe Haw, a trade town on the border with China. / The Kokang

Phaungsai and Monekoe fell to the CPB in 1968 during the Burma Socialist Program Party regime headed by the country’s first military dictator, Ne Win. The previous military regime finally took them back 30 years ago in 1992. The current regime lost them to the ethnic alliance within a few days.

The Brotherhood Alliance has also gained almost total control of Kyugok (Pansai) and the strategic town of Hseni in northern Shan State. Two key Myanmar-China trade routes – Lashio-Muse and Lashio-Chin Shwe Haw – converge at Hseni.

MNDAA troops pose in front of the seized junta-run administrative office in Hseni town. / The Kokang

The MNDAA announced on Tuesday that its next target is northern Shan’s Laukkaing, the seat of the junta-appointed administrative body of Kokang Self-Administered Zone on the Chinese border.

The ethnic alliance has so far seized at least 144 junta positions.

On Nov. 3, a resistance alliance including the People’s Defense Force under the civilian National Unity Government occupied Kawlin, a district-level town in Sagaing Region.

Kamphat in Sagaing’s Tamu District fell on Nov. 7.

Resistance forces are currently besieging Tigyaing town in Sagaing.

An MNDAA flag flies at the township police station in Kunlong town, northern Shan State. /The Kokang

On Nov. 12, the Chin National Front (CNF) and allied resistance forces seized Rih Kaw Dar town on the Myanmar-India border in Chin State.

South of Chin State, a fragile year-long truce in Rakhine was shattered on Monday when fighting broke out between junta troops and the Arakan Army. The ethnic Rakhine armed group has seized border outposts and captured junta troops up to the ranks of captain and major, on the latest front opened in Operation 1027.

On Monday alone, junta border guards at nearly 40 Rakhine outposts fled to major military bases due to fear of resistance attacks.

A People’s Defense Force flag raised at the district administrative office in Kawlin town. / NUG Defense Ministry

In Kayah (Karenni) State, Karenni resistance forces are fighting for control of Loikaw, where they have seized around nine junta positions.

Meanwhile, the counteroffensive vowed by junta boss Min Aung Hlaing early this month has failed to materialize as his regime continues to lose one town after another to resistance forces.

Your Thoughts …

irrawaddy.com · by The Irrawaddy · November 15, 2023

21. Partisans Unfurl Ukrainian Flag in Russian-Occupied Crimea – 'We Await the AFU'

"We live for resistance"

In honor of these partisan freedom fighters we should all watch and get motivated by this video. "Kyiv Calling." https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xWQUkRKqp2E.

I just did.

Photos at the link.

Partisans Unfurl Ukrainian Flag in Russian-Occupied Crimea – 'We Await the AFU'

Members of the civil resistance movement "Yellow Ribbon" staged an action, installing the Ukrainian flag atop Boyka Mount in Crimea.

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/24153

by Julia Struck | November 15, 2023, 2:32 pm

The Ukrainian flag has been raised on Mount Boyka in Russian-occupied Crimea by members of the "Yellow Ribbon" civil resistance movement.

"With this action, we aim to reiterate that Crimea is Ukrainian land!” the partisans posted on Telegram on Wednesday, November 15.

They added: “We eagerly await the arrival of the Armed Forces of Ukraine! Our indefinite protest will persist until the objective is achieved.”

Photographs showcase a prominent Ukrainian flag set against the backdrop of the mountains.

The partisans said the Ukrainian flag now waves over Crimea's peak and soon they anticipate its presence on all administrative buildings across the peninsula "because Crimea is Ukraine."

Furthermore, yellow ribbons adorned the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea and the Fiolent stadium in Simferopol.

Partisans distributed leaflets and created graffiti in residential areas of Sevastopol and Yalta.

"All of this symbolizes the resistance of steadfast Ukrainians, the activists of the Yellow Ribbon movement, who persist in their struggle despite numerous challenges," the message reads.

On August 23, the partisans planted the Ukrainian flag on Mount Shaan-Kaya in Crimea to mark Ukraine’s National Flag Day.

To suggest a correction or clarification, write to us here

You can also highlight the text and press Ctrl + Enter

Julia Struck

Julia Struck is a news writer and Kyiv Post correspondent who has previously worked as a parliamentary editor, journalist, and news editor. She has specialized in covering the work of Ukrainian parliament, government, and law enforcement agencies.

22. No good options for Myanmar’s mortally wounded regime

This assessment makes it seem like the resistance could be successful. But what comes next? Will the resistance be able to unify the disparate organizations and create a unity government? Who is advising and assisting them? Who is prepared to provide them support if and when they oust the junta? Can they consolidate their gains and transition to a political structure?

To the IC and USSOCOM: please consider this recommendation I received from one of my mentors:

If I was an intell officer concerned with Myanmar, I’d start by reading George Orwell’s Burmese Days, and continue with Stephen Becker’s The Blue Eyed Shan, and Emma Larkin’s Finding George Orwell in Burma. Old stuff, but imo still relevant.

No good options for Myanmar’s mortally wounded regime

Military likely lacks the manpower, morale or leadership to launch an effective counteroffensive to Brotherhood Alliance’s crippling blow

asiatimes.com · by Anthony Davis · November 15, 2023

If the echoes of World War II have any resonance in 21st century Myanmar then events have not yet reached the point in April 1945 when the delusional commander-in-chief of a defeated German army directed non-existent divisions from an underground bunker amid the ruins of the national capital.

They are, though, plausibly at a similar point to August 1944 when two months after the D-Day landings German forces had just suffered a crippling defeat in Normandy’s “Falaise Pocket” and the Nazi high command confronted the prospect of an overwhelming Allied advance on the German homeland.

The Myanmar military’s commander-in-chief Senior General Min Aung and his generals in Naypyidaw’s war room are now facing their own “Falaise Pocket” moment in the shape of an insurgent offensive that has swept across the north of Shan state over the last two weeks.

Dubbed “Operation 1027” for its October 27 launch date, the coordinated onslaught brought together forces of the so-called Brotherhood Alliance composed of three insurgent factions which have operated together since at least 2014.

The trio includes the mainly ethnic Chinese Myanmar Nationalities Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which is spearheading operations in and around Kokang in the far northeast of the state; the ethnic Palaung Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), which dominates the northwestern hills and operates along the Mandalay-Muse highway; and the ethnic Rakhine Arakan Army (AA), which is based in Rakhine state on Myanmar’s western seaboard but which fields a contingent of around 1,500 troops alongside its allies in the north of Myanmar.

MNDAA, TNLA and AA ethnic armed organizations have combined in a potent insurgent front. Image: Facebook

Within the first two weeks of hostilities, Brotherhood forces had seized several towns along the Chinese border, including importantly Chin Shwe Haw and Namkhan, and overrun scores of military bases and posts capturing huge stocks of munitions.

How Myanmar’s military leadership will respond to this debacle in the coming days and weeks remains strikingly unclear and is certainly not made easier by significant dysfunction following the recent sacking of army chief-of-staff Lieutenant General Moe Myint Tun on charges of massive corruption.

But in strategic terms, the armed forces command faces three broad options, none of them attractive or likely to deflect the ultimate trajectory of a war it is now clearly losing.

One option would involve the launching of a major counteroffensive aimed at retaking the economically vital trade artery that runs from Mandalay in central Myanmar to the trade hub of Muse on the northeastern border with China which remains under regime control.

Another would be to attempt to retain strongholds in northern Shan state anchored on the regional capital and headquarters of the Northeastern Regional Military Command (RMC) in Lashio city and fight for time.

A third would entail a bold decision to undertake a strategic withdrawal from the north Shan region and possibly also eastern Shan state, pulling out troops and where possible hardware while there is time to bolster defensive lines around the heartland centers of Mandalay and the fortress capital of Naypyidaw.

All three options have pros and cons. Anchored on the garrison city of Pyin Oo Lwin in the hills overlooking Mandalay, a big push counteroffensive backed by air power and armored forces that to date have been little deployed in the conflict would serve to restore the flow of trade with China.

Thank you for registering!

An account was already registered with this email. Please check your inbox for an authentication link.

That would also impress on Beijing that Naypyidaw is still capable of controlling points on the border and that banking on the Brotherhood Alliance is necessarily a bad bet. It would also act to salve military honor and restore severely shaken morale.

These arguments, doubtless reinforced by the Myanmar Army’s congenitally aggressive instincts, are offset by other factors, however.

First, any such counterpunch would necessarily be channeled along only one dangerously narrow primary line of advance: the highway leading from Pyin Oo Lwin through the towns of Naungcho, Kyaukme and Hsipaw to Lashio; and then from Lashio through Hsenwi and Kutkai north to Muse on the border.

Spearheaded by elements from Naypyidaw’s Light Infantry Division (LID) assault units – Myanmar’s equivalent of the Nazis’ Waffen SS – and backed by a concentrated commitment of armor and air power, an initial advance should break through mainly TNLA forces scattered across the hill country along the highway relatively easily.

Map: ISP Myanmar / ISP Insight Email No. 27. Link to full report here.

But holding open the highway that stretches over nearly 400 kilometers in the face of aggressive insurgent harassment would prove a constant, debilitating drain on vehicles and manpower that would ultimately throw into question the value of the entire enterprise.

The counteroffensive would also require assembling a divisional-size task force of at least 2,000-3,000 troops in an army that is already severely overstretched, inevitably weakening the defenses around other key positions.

And importantly, the success of such a campaign would hinge critically on leadership in the person of a “fighting general” capable of commanding from the front and inspiring already demoralized troops.

In a military bureaucracy riddled with corruption where officers beyond colonel level rarely lead combat forces in the field, theater-level commanders of this caliber have been conspicuous by their absence for decades.

Today such a general would need to emerge from somewhere in the ranks between Myanmar Army commander and regime strongman Vice Senior General Soe Winn – who has a reputation as a “soldiers’ soldier” but now shoulders daunting countrywide responsibilities – and the commanders of any of the army’s ten LIDs whose duties are specific to their own divisional commands.

With a background in military education, current Northeastern RMC commander Brigadier General Naing Naing Oo is probably not that man and if there is any other candidate for the role he has yet to step forward.

Finally, the offensive would involve advancing through towns like Hsenwi (where a key bridge on the highway was blown in the opening hours of Operation 1027) with the prospect that the ultimate objective of Muse might already have fallen to the Brotherhood before it could be secured – implying the need for a far larger and inevitably costly urban battle immediately on China’s border to retake it.

All these factors militate powerfully against risking a strategic counteroffensive into northern Shan state.

The second option – defending key strongpoints in the region – has the advantage of reinforcing a response that has been in play since Operation 1027 began.

This involves flying reinforcements into the Lashio bridgehead from secure zones, such as Yangon, Meiktila and Mandalay, and then using helicopters to stage airmobile insertions into smaller bases and towns, buying time and possibly setting the stage for smaller offensive operations when the 1027 wave has exhausted its potential.

Myanmar’s military is overstretched fighting a multi-front war. Image: Twitter

But by deploying crucially needed resources into a fight that has arguably already been strategically lost, the dangers here are also stark. There is already virtually zero prospect of retaking Kokang in the far northeast corner of Shan state and the fall of the regional capital of Laukkai is now almost certainly just a matter of time.

If insurgent forces succeed in tightening their grip along the highway north and south of Lashio, that city too could be surrounded and slowly squeezed, trapping forces flown in to relieve it. And were its airport to be shut down by artillery fire, the ghosts of Dien Bien Phu would hover over Shan state.

Finally, there is the radically alternative strategy of withdrawing from rather than reinforcing northern Shan state. This option makes real sense in terms of husbanding exposed manpower and materiel, especially if that withdrawal were to be broadened to include the two RMCs in the east of the state, the Triangle Command in Kengtung and the East-Central Command in Koilam on the Kengtung-Taunggyi highway.

A withdrawal to the strongpoints of Pyin Oo Lwin defending Mandalay and the Shan state capital of Taunggyi screening the Naypyidaw Capital Region would free up several thousand troops whose utility in the defense of those key cities would be crucial.

The downsides are also striking though. At one level, strategic withdrawal would imply a psychologically near-impossible abandonment of the army’s deeply ingrained sense of institutional mission as an “all-of-Myanmar” force sworn to the “perpetuation of national sovereignty” and “non-disintegration of the union.”

Practically speaking, it would also effectively mean surrendering Shan state east of the Salween River to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which would emerge from behind the wall of its ceasefire with Naypyidaw and in a matter of days join up Wa territory along the Chinese border with the separate swath of territory it already controls along Shan state’s southern border with Thailand.

The upshot of these unpalatable considerations is likely to be a compromise strategy which in reality is less a strategy than the reaction of the proverbial deer frozen in the headlights.

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

Northern Shan state will be reinforced where possible to attempt a protracted defense of Lashio and Muse while assets under the two RMCs in Keng Tung and Koilam will be left in place to be overtaken by events in Myanmar’s national heartland – and then very probably face the ignominious prospect of having anyway to surrender to the UWSA.

Compounding the dilemmas confronting Myanmar’s generals is the fact that the battle for Shan state in the coming weeks will not be happening in isolation.

The November 13 return to hostilities of the powerful insurgent Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine will undoubtedly tie down the several thousand troops including important LID elements already committed to the defense of the western seaboard state.

Back in action: Arakan Army soldiers on the march at an undisclosed location in Myanmar’s Rakhine state. Image: Facebook

Equally, the current push by resistance forces in Kayah state led by the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) to seize the state capital of Loikaw is also demanding attention and resources.

At the same time, the battle for the Sagaing region town of Tigyaing on the Ayeyarwady River near the border with Kachin state could have a potentially decisive impact on the future of the war in northern Myanmar and by extension the national situation.

Were Tigyaing and its strategic bridge across the river to fall to a local alliance of Kachin Independence Army (KIA), AA and local anti-military peoples defense forces (PDFs) already reportedly fighting inside the town, the logistics lifeline linking the military in central Myanmar to Kachin state would effectively be cut.

Resupply of the northern RMC based in the Kachin state capital of Myitkyina would then depend on air transport, which over even the medium term is not sustainable.

The now real possibility that the debacle in Shan state will in the coming dry season months – or possibly even sooner – be paralleled by the loss of Rakhine, Kayah and Kachin states essentially presents military planners in Naypyidaw with a potential checkmate situation and the end of the war as a rational military undertaking.

At that point, it is reasonable to expect that either on the watch of Senior General Min Aung Hlaing or, more likely, after his departure, a proposal for a cessation of hostilities and negotiations will emerge from Naypyidaw.

How Myanmar’s still fragmented opposition responds to such an initiative that will almost certainly not involve a white flag of unconditional surrender will be critical to the country’s post-conflict future.

asiatimes.com · by Anthony Davis · November 15, 2023

23. Independence Through Information War: Chechnya's Story and Ukraine Connection

Excerpts:

When comparing the responses of the international community to these conflicts in Chechnya and Ukraine, it is apparent that the two wars have received distinct levels of attention. Although the Russians in both cases have faced international condemnation, the war in Ukraine has received greater solidarity from Western nations compared to the conflict in Chechnya. This difference can be partially attributed to the geopolitical consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which pose a threat to European security. Additionally, the war in Ukraine, which began in 2014, has created a robust civil society movement, which has been proven effective in the information realm, exposing alleged war crimes, atrocities, and environmental disasters, advocating for international support, building strong connections with global media, and using crowdfunding campaigns. Since the start of the 2022 invasion, these civil society organizations have collaborated in tandem with governmental initiatives.

Similarly, the Chechens – as described in this article – have also used different platforms to raise awareness for their cause. This includes the use of social media channels, documentaries, and other publications. They have successfully reached out to the Russian public, which led to a vocal anti-war movement in Russia during the First Russo-Chechen War, something Ukraine has not been able to duplicate. Furthermore, Chechens have engaged in diplomatic relations with foreign governments and international organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, and the United States.

Despite these efforts, Chechnya has struggled in vain to gain widespread recognition, especially during the Second Russo-Chechen War. One reason for this is Russia’s substantial influence over other nations in the Caucasus region. Another reason is the association of the independence movement with terrorism and extremism, which has hampered the success and impact of Chechen information campaigns. As a result, Chechnya has not been able to achieve the same level of global influence as Ukraine. The volunteers of the Chechen volunteer battalions fighting on the side of Ukraine hope that their current efforts will contribute to Russia losing not only its war on Ukraine, but also improve the chances for renewed Chechen independence in the long term.

Independence Through Information War: Chechnya's Story and Ukraine Connection - Irregular Warfare Initiative

irregularwarfare.org · by Ilya Varzhanskyi, Peter Schrijver · November 16, 2023

Since the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, dubious videos have surfaced across social media platforms depicting intense combat operations of Chechen forces loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov. Kadyrov uses online platforms to showcase Chechen soldiers fighting against Ukrainian forces, a move seen as a PR tactic serving both his image and Kremlin propaganda.

By contrast, Chechen volunteers fighting for Ukraine represent their current struggle as a historic opportunity to challenge the Russian Federation and regain independence. Since the early 1990s, the Chechen independence movement has consistently recognized the importance of conveying their struggle to break free from the Russian Federation to global audiences. This communication took the form of facilitating access for foreign journalists in the 1990s, and subsequently expanded to include the use of digital platforms like the Internet and mobile phones, which is congruent with current Ukrainian operations in the information environment.

The wars in Chechnya and Ukraine are examples of conflicts where the Russian Federation has aimed to regain influence and control over countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union. One aspect of these conflicts, from an informational point of view, is the use of euphemisms by Russian authorities to justify military intervention. Official Russian sources branded the Second Russo-Chechen war (1999-2009) as a ‘counter-terrorist operation’ and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 as a ‘special military operation.’ This retrospective analysis delves into the role the information environment has played in the ongoing Chechen struggle for independence as both a backdrop to the current efforts of Chechen volunteers fighting for Ukraine and a link to the overall Chechen and Ukrainian approaches to their respective information activities.

Punching above their weight

Ichkeria, widely recognized by the global community as Chechnya (although this name is derived from the Russian exoethnonym), has a turbulent history intertwined with the Russian Empire since the 16th century. Throughout conflicts involving Chechnya such as the Caucasus War (1817 – 1864), Russia has portrayed its offensive operations as defensive measures, and launched information campaigns to discredit the Chechen people and their culture. Common terms that the Russian Empire used to denigrate the Chechens were ‘the worst of the bandits,’ implying that they were violent and lawless, and referring to Chechnya as their ‘nest.’ Post the 1917 October Revolution, brief Chechen independence was soon overshadowed by Soviet incorporation, followed by the mass deportation of Chechens during World War II, accusing them of collaboration. Chechens returned home in 1957. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they declared independence of a new Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet aviation general, became the president of Chechnya in 1991, pushing for a definitive break from its Soviet past and establishing Ichkeria as a democratic and secular state. Amid a post-Soviet crisis, Russia could do little else than accept Chechnya’s independence. After the end of the 1993 political crisis in Russia, Moscow sought to regain control over Chechnya, resulting in failed political settlements and covert military actions against the Chechen government. When Chechens in November 1994 captured Russian tankmen inside Chechnya, it led to public embarrassment for the Kremlin due to international media coverage. This culminated in Russia launching a full-scale military operation against Chechnya on Dec. 11, 1994. The invasion of Chechnya was marked by notable refusals to participate among the Russian military, negatively impacting the operation’s public image. Despite the unexpected resilience of the Chechen army, Russia employed aggressive tactics, including heavy bombing in Grozny, resulting in massive civilian casualties and global disapproval.

No less importantly, the Chechen operation also created shockwaves inside Russia thanks to the established cooperation between the Chechen government and the Russian press, including the Media-Most holding of Russian oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky and its outlets such as NTV, TNT, and Ekho Moskvy radio station. The Chechens dominated the Russian information space by exploiting the main vulnerability of the post-Soviet approach to information support for conflict: banal silence. Throughout the First Russo-Chechen War, journalists, including international ones, often had more opportunity to communicate with representatives of the ‘separatist’ Chechens than with Russian military officials or the authorities in Moscow. For example, Chechen officials would pay taxi fares of journalists travelling from Dagestan to Chechnya to record interviews. There were also several Chechen newspapers and two Chechen radio stations, Radio Free Caucasus in Latvia, and a Chechen information centre in Poland. There are clear parallels between Chechen activities in the 1990s and current Ukrainian efforts aimed at gaining international attention by highlighting Russian brutality through a deft use of social media and overt public messaging, which has yielded greater Western arms donations and backing for sanctions against Russia.

Besides pursuing international attention for their cause, Chechen leaders also searched, given the significant population and military asymmetries, for an ideology to motivate the total mobilization of society. Islam became such an ideology, and the country began to dismantle the remnants of the Soviet judicial system and establish Sharia law. Many researchers believe that the proliferation of Wahhabism and Salafism in Chechnya was not a cause, but a consequence of the Russian invasion in 1994. The radicalization of Muslims became a distinct phenomenon within this trend, inevitably altering the forms and methods of resistance.

The historic Khasavyurt Accords in August 1996 marked the end of the First Russo-Chechen War, securing a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in the presence of observers from the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). This marked a substantial victory for the Chechen people, despite the unfortunate loss of their leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, at the hands of Russian security services in the lead-up to these negotiations.

The Empire strikes back

In 1997, under OSCE observation, Chechnya elected moderate leader Aslan Maskhadov as president. Maskhadov then met with Boris Yeltsin to sign a peace treaty, emphasizing the refusal to use force and commitment to international law principles. However, the document served as a pretext for Wahhabis and other radical Islamists to claim that Maskhadov had betrayed the national and religious interests of the North Caucasian people. After major clashes between supporters and opponents of Wahhabism, which resulted in dozens of casualties, the Chechen government officially banned Wahhabi organisations. Paradoxically, in 1998, the Russian Presidential Commission on Countering Political Extremism concluded that Wahhabism was not an extremist movement. Some political analysts believe that this indicated Russia’s interest in supporting the opposition to the Chechen government, even in the face of extremists. Some prominent Russian figures, including Anna Politkovskaya and Boris Berezovsky, asserted that it was the Russian government that orchestrated a provocation in the form of an invasion by a group of Chechen-based Islamic militants led by Shamil Basayev into the neighbouring Russian republic of Dagestan in August 1999. These border conflicts escalated tensions between Russia and Wahhabi groups, leading to the start of the Second Russo-Chechen War in October of that year. It is worth mentioning that the Russian authorities had been planning an invasion of Chechnya as early as March 1999, long before these events, as former Russian Prime Minister Stepashin later admitted.

Russian forces reclaimed Chechen territory, effectively ending Chechen independence by May 2000. The Russian authorities conducted an informational campaign by making considerable efforts to control coverage of events. The government also attempted to restrict journalists’ access to certain areas, especially those where active fighting was taking place. Nevertheless, many Russian and foreign journalists continued to work in the region without accreditation, risking their own safety. In addition, Chechens started using the Internet and mobile phones to communicate with the outside world. Websites were used to raise money, propagate the Chechen point of view on the conflict and unite the diaspora, show videos of successful combat operations against the Russian army, and expose war crimes committed against the Chechen population. These sites also sold themed merchandise to promote the Chechen agenda and fundraising activities. This is very much akin to current Ukrainian efforts, including crowdfunding goods for the army and the needs of citizens who are not able to help themselves, thereby broadening the scope of engagement.

Despite the efforts of Russian authorities to control the information space, Chechen information and psychological operations continued even after the military defeat of the main forces of Chechnya. Their main channels were websites, e-mails, the Russian press, lobby groups, the Russian intellectual and cultural elite, political organizations and movements in Russia, the Chechen diaspora, and public organisations in Russia and elsewhere. The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia, for example, exerted high-profile pressure on the Russian government in 1995 to disclose the actual number of casualties in the First Russo-Chechen War – now considered one of the significant reasons for its end. This is one of the remarkable advantages that the Chechen independence movement was able to accomplish in comparison with the Ukrainian effort. The Chechen message, especially during the First Russo-Chechen war, resonated more within Russian society than Ukrainian efforts to do the same. In that respect, the current Russian media landscape has grown more state-controlled during the last two decades, which leaves little room for dissenting opinions.

That said, Chechnya was unable to achieve the same informational results in the Second Russo-Chechen War that it did in the first, largely due to the Russian government’s efforts at censorship and improvements to its information warfare approach. This time, most of the Russian population supported the invasion. Also, international objections were tempered by arguments comparing Russia’s invasion of Chechnya to NATO’s operations in Kosovo and linking Chechen armed forces to global terrorist organizations. In the Russian political discourse, the Chechen government was made responsible for terrorist attacks, including those for which neither radical Islamists nor other groups had claimed responsibility, such as the 1999 bombings of residential buildings in Moscow and other Russian cities. In 2002, Russian command was widely criticized for a disastrous rescue operation at the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, where about 117 hostages died from a soporific gas used by Russian special forces. Despite this, Russia succeeded in linking this and other acts of terrorism to Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, which critically damaged his reputation. Any chance for an internationally mediated peace settlement was lost.

Waking the sleeping wolf

The basic strategy implemented by Russia at the final stage of the Second Russo-Chechen War was the so-called ‘Chechenisation’ of the conflict, wherein Russia framed the conflict as an internal Chechen affair; the supporters of independence were rebels against the legitimate authority of the Chechen government allied with Russia. Akhmat Kadyrov, the former highest Islamic cleric of Chechnya, who had changed sides and aided federal forces a year earlier, was appointed the head of the pro-Russian administration of the Chechen Republic in June 2000. He was later elected president of the Chechen Republic under Russian law in 2003 but was killed in an assassination attempt a year later. Chechnya’s pro-Russian administration is now headed by his son, Ramzan Kadyrov.

The persecution and subsequent killing of Chechen leaders by Russian security services fuelled a divide between radical Islamists and the democratic factions within Chechen leadership, including in the information space. Internet websites such as ‘Kavkaz-Centre’ and social media networks now play a significant role in this information war. Along with the traditional resources of Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, the messenger service Telegram is becoming increasingly popular due to less content regulation. Typical methods of propaganda on Chechen internet resources include the popularization of ideologically colored geographical names. For example, the province name ‘vilayat Nokhchiychoy’ signifies Chechnya’s integration into the Caucusus Emirate while, the Islamic theology-associated term ‘murtads’ in relation to representatives of the pro-Russian administration of Chechnya, highlights use of Islamic terms with a political meaning. These sites also reference the history of the North Caucasus, in particular the centuries-long confrontation with the Russian Empire.

A new stage of the Chechen struggle started after the beginning of Russia’s hybrid aggression against Ukraine. The Ukrainian government created conditions for volunteer Chechen battalions, such as the Sheikh Mansur and the Dzhokhar Dudayev battalions, to operate on its territory. Many are former members of the army of the Chechen Republic who took refuge in European or Middle Eastern countries after their defeat in the Second Russo-Chechen War and now wish to return to service. These volunteers see the war in Ukraine as a historic chance to defeat the Russian Federation and restore Chechen independence. After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this narrative has significantly intensified and expanded to include spreading the idea of an independent Ichkeria, positioning the war in Ukraine as a ‘gazavat’ (Caucasian variant of jihad) for Chechens, recruiting new fighters from Europe and the Middle East, where several hundred thousand Chechens reside, and psychological and military preparation for full-scale combat operations. On 18 October 2022, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine adopted a resolution recognizing the territory of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria as ‘temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation’ and condemning the commission of genocide of the Chechen people.

A world of difference

When comparing the responses of the international community to these conflicts in Chechnya and Ukraine, it is apparent that the two wars have received distinct levels of attention. Although the Russians in both cases have faced international condemnation, the war in Ukraine has received greater solidarity from Western nations compared to the conflict in Chechnya. This difference can be partially attributed to the geopolitical consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which pose a threat to European security. Additionally, the war in Ukraine, which began in 2014, has created a robust civil society movement, which has been proven effective in the information realm, exposing alleged war crimes, atrocities, and environmental disasters, advocating for international support, building strong connections with global media, and using crowdfunding campaigns. Since the start of the 2022 invasion, these civil society organizations have collaborated in tandem with governmental initiatives.

Similarly, the Chechens – as described in this article – have also used different platforms to raise awareness for their cause. This includes the use of social media channels, documentaries, and other publications. They have successfully reached out to the Russian public, which led to a vocal anti-war movement in Russia during the First Russo-Chechen War, something Ukraine has not been able to duplicate. Furthermore, Chechens have engaged in diplomatic relations with foreign governments and international organizations, such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the European Union, and the United States.

Despite these efforts, Chechnya has struggled in vain to gain widespread recognition, especially during the Second Russo-Chechen War. One reason for this is Russia’s substantial influence over other nations in the Caucasus region. Another reason is the association of the independence movement with terrorism and extremism, which has hampered the success and impact of Chechen information campaigns. As a result, Chechnya has not been able to achieve the same level of global influence as Ukraine. The volunteers of the Chechen volunteer battalions fighting on the side of Ukraine hope that their current efforts will contribute to Russia losing not only its war on Ukraine, but also improve the chances for renewed Chechen independence in the long term.

Ilya Varzhanskyi is a Ph.D. student at Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute as well as at the University of Edinburgh, and a Serviceman in the Armed Forces of Ukraine. His research focuses on reflexive control theory, information and psychological operations, and open-source intelligence.

Peter Schrijver is a Ph.D. researcher affiliated with the Netherlands Defence Academy. His academic interests focus on Ukraine’s operations in the information environment.

Main image: Fighters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the Chechen volunteer battalion named after Sheikh Mansur. Donetsk region, 2023. Photo by Ilya Varzhanskyi.

24. Iran Update, November 15, 2023

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-15-2023

Key Takeaways:

Israeli forces conducted a reconnaissance operation into the al Shifa Hospital complex on November 14-15 to obtain information about the Hamas tunnel network Israel says is under the complex.
Qatari mediators continued efforts to facilitate an agreement between Hamas and Israel to release 50 civilian hostages in return for a three-day ceasefire.
Palestinian militia fighters conducted 14 attacks on Israeli security forces in the West Bank on November 15.
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 9 cross-border attacks into northern Israel on November 15.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi proxies—claimed one attack on a US base in Iraq.
Western media reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei complained that Hamas did not warn Iran about its October 7 attack during his meeting with Hamas Political Bureau Head Esmail Haniyeh in Tehran on November 5, citing Iranian and Hamas officials.

IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 15, 2023

Nov 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Iran Update, November 15, 2023

Brian Carter, Amin Soltani, Peter Mills, Kathryn Tyson, Andie Parry and Johanna Moore

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm EST

The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.

Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Key Takeaways:

Israeli forces conducted a reconnaissance operation into the al Shifa Hospital complex on November 14-15 to obtain information about the Hamas tunnel network Israel says is under the complex.
Qatari mediators continued efforts to facilitate an agreement between Hamas and Israel to release 50 civilian hostages in return for a three-day ceasefire.
Palestinian militia fighters conducted 14 attacks on Israeli security forces in the West Bank on November 15.
Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 9 cross-border attacks into northern Israel on November 15.
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi proxies—claimed one attack on a US base in Iraq.
Western media reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei complained that Hamas did not warn Iran about its October 7 attack during his meeting with Hamas Political Bureau Head Esmail Haniyeh in Tehran on November 5, citing Iranian and Hamas officials.

Gaza Strip

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip

Israeli forces conducted a reconnaissance operation into the al Shifa Hospital complex on November 14-15 to obtain information about the Hamas tunnel network Israel says is under the complex. US military doctrine defines a reconnaissance operation as “a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary or to secure data concerning the...geographic characteristics of a particular area.”[1] Israeli officials said that IDF units entered the hospital grounds to “locate a Hamas tunnel hub that connects the hospital” with other areas.”[2] Israeli forces approaching from the east killed four Hamas fighters who engaged them with small arms fire, presumably on the eastern side of the hospital.[3] Israeli forces searched buildings throughout the complex and questioned Palestinians in the facility.[4] Israeli efforts to search facilities, question individuals, and locate tunnel hubs are consistent with a reconnaissance operation. Israeli forces also released images, video, and statements saying that they discovered an ”operational headquarters.”[5] The images and video show a limited amount of equipment labeled with Hamas insignia and iconography.[6] This refutes the Hamas claims that it was not using the hospital for any military purposes.[7]

Israeli forces also provided humanitarian aid to the al Shifa Hospital. A senior Israeli official told the Wall Street Journal that Israeli forces left portable incubators, baby food, and medical supplies at the hospital’s front gate and the staff was informed they could take the supplies.[8] The same official added that the incubators could be used in ambulances to transport babies to safer areas in southern Gaza or to Egypt or Israel. The official presumably meant via the evacuation corridor Israel established east of the hospital that most likely connects to Salah al Din Road. Salah al Din Road is the primary north-south humanitarian corridor that Israel established early in the war.[9] The senior Israeli official said that the final decision on where to take the babies would be up to doctors in the hospital.[10]

Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) have attacked Israeli forces east of the hospital—where Israel is attempting to establish an evacuation corridor—on several occasions since November 10.[11] Israeli officials reported on November 14 that Hamas fired on the humanitarian corridor.[12] This is consistent with reporting from official media arms of Palestinian militias, local reporters, independent news aggregators, and Western media highlighting Hamas and PIJ attacks targeting Israeli forces east of the hospital. A Gaza-focused account on X (Twitter) said that Hamas fighters attacked Israeli forces northeast of the hospital on November 10, and PIJ reported on November 11 and November 13 that it was engaged in ”fierce clashes” near the al Shifa Hospital.[13] A Palestinian journalist reported that Hamas fighters attacked an Israeli unit east of al Shifa on November 11.[14] Satellite imagery from November 14 also showed large smoke plumes caused by fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian fighters east of the hospital and along the area that presumably connects al Shifa to Salah al Din Road.[15] Palestinian fighters also fired at Israeli forces approaching the hospital compound from the east on November 14.[16]

Palestinian militia fighters continued to harass Israeli forces in southern Gaza City governorate on November 15 using indirect fire and improvised explosive devices (IED). The al Quds Brigades mortared Israeli forces entering Juhor ad Dik, presumably from Israel.[17] The group also fired unspecified rockets targeting IDF units near al Azhar University and al Nour Resort, west of Juhor ad Dik.[18] The al Qassem brigades fired short-range 114mm rockets targeting Israeli forces in the same general vicinity, south of Gaza City.[19] Al Qassem Brigades infantry separately ambushed IDF infantry and a bulldozer using anti-armor and anti-personnel IEDs east of Juhor ad Dik.[20] It is notable that no Palestinian militant organization has released footage demonstrating their ability to destroy Israeli armor since the ground operation began.

Israeli forces continued their clearing operations in northwestern Gaza City on November 14-15. Palestinian fighters continued attacks targeting Israeli forces in northwestern Gaza City, which is consistent with the doctrinal definition of clearing operations.[21] Palestinian fighters engaged IDF forces with small arms near al Mukhabarat Street, western Gaza City, on November 14.[22] The Al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade fired 60mm mortars at IDF armor and infantry near the al Maqousi area, west of Sheikh Radwan on November 15.[23]

Qatari mediators continued efforts to facilitate an agreement between Hamas and Israel to release 50 civilian hostages in return for a three-day ceasefire.[24] Israel would also release some Palestinian women and children and increase the amount of aid to Gaza.[25] Officials familiar with the negotiations said that Hamas agreed to the deal’s “general outlines” but Israel is continuing to negotiate on some details.[26] Israeli War Cabinet member Benny Gantz said that even if Israel needs to “pause” fighting, it will not stop the war until Israel “achieves its goals.”[27]

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad said on November 14 that it will hold its hostages until it obtains a “better” deal from Israel to exchange Palestinian prisoners for hostages.[28]

Palestinian militias conducted four attacks from the Gaza Strip into Israel on November 15. The al Quds Brigades claimed three indirect fire attacks.[29] Unspecified Palestinian fighters launched one anti-tank guided missile targeting Israeli forces near Kissufim.[30]

Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.

West Bank

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there

Palestinian militia fighters conducted 14 attacks on Israeli security forces in the West Bank on November 15.[31] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Quds Brigades engaged Israeli forces in four small arms clashes and detonated four IEDs targeting Israeli forces in several areas in Tulkarm on November 14.[32] The Tulkarm Battalion of the al Quds Brigades announced that seven of its members died during the clashes.[33] The Tulkarm Rapid Response Battalion of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade separately engaged Israeli security forces with small arms fire in Tulkarm on November 15.[34] The Hornets' Nest of the al Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, which operates in the Jenin camp, announced on November 14 that Israeli forces had arrested two of its members.[35] CTP-ISW recorded one anti-Israel demonstration in Ramallah.[36]

Hamas said on November 15 that Israeli forces detained dozens of students at Hebron University.[37] The IDF said on November 15 it had arrested 28 “wanted persons” in the West Bank, including Hamas fighters, in an ongoing arrest campaign.[38] The IDF said that it had arrested Hamas operatives in a “student dormitory,” likely referring to Hebron University.[39] Hamas also called for an escalation in attacks against Israeli forces in the West Bank by “all available means.” Hamas has repeatedly called for attacks and demonstrations in the West Bank since the Israel-Hamas war began, but the calls have so far failed to generate widespread attacks or protests.[40]

This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.

Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel

Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah (LH), conducted 9 cross-border attacks into northern Israel on November 15. LH claimed five rocket and ATGM attacks on IDF soldiers and military bases and one ATGM attack on an unspecified Israeli vehicle near the border.[41] Unidentified fighters launched rockets and anti-tank missiles towards Kiryat Shmona and Baranit, respectively.[42] IDF Army Radio stated the rocket attacks on Kiryat Shmona caused no casualties or damage and that the IDF responded with artillery fire toward the location from which the rockets were launched.[43]

Iran and Axis of Resistance

Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:

Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi proxies—claimed one attack on a US base in Iraq. The group claimed to have fired rockets at Ain al Assad Base in Anbar Province on November 15.[44] Iranian-backed militias have targeted US forces at Ain al Assad Base 18 times since mid-October, making it the most frequently targeted US base in the region.

A US Navy warship shot down a Houthi drone headed toward it over the Red Sea on November 15.[45] The USS Thomas Hudner, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, is a different US warship than the one that intercepted the several Houthi drones and cruise missiles fired toward Israel on October 19.[46] Unidentified US officials speaking to Reuters did not specify if the drone was an attack or surveillance model. The drone interception came hours after Houthi military spokesperson Brig. Gen Yahya Sarea claimed responsibility for the November 14 ballistic missile attack on Eilat in southern Israel.[47] Sarea stated that the Houthi army plans to continue attacks on Israel and that will target Israeli ships in the Red Sea. Sarea’s statement parallels Houthi movement Leader Abdul Malik al Houthi’s threat to target Israeli ships in the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandeb Strait on November 14.[48] The Houthis have the capability to conduct such attacks because the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force has provided the Houthis the means to do so.[49]

Likely Iranian-backed militants launched two rockets into the Golan Heights from Syria on November 14.[50] Local Syrian media reported militants fired rockets from Tell Jumou in Daraa Province at unspecified targets in the Golan Heights and Israeli forces returned mortar fire.[51] This brief exchange of fire in Syria does not mark an escalation of the conflict. Iranian-backed militants or Syrian Arab Army forces have fired projectiles into the Golan Heights from Syria at least 11 times since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[52]

Russian forces are trying to distance themselves from Iranian escalation against US forces and Israel in Syria. Local media Deir ez Zor 24 reported that the Russian general for Deir ez Zor Province ordered local mayors and sheikhs to report all Iranian-backed militia members attempting to attack US forces at Conoco Gas Field.[53] The general extended the surveillance demand to seven towns on the east bank of the Euphrates near US positions. Iranian-backed militants fired at least 15 rockets at Conoco on November 14, likely from sites near the seven towns.[54] The United States has conducted three retaliatory attacks on Iranian-backed militant positions in Deir ez Zor since the start of the Israel-Hamas war.[55] Russia instructed the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) to not co-locate with Iranian-backed militants in southern Syria and not participate in the Israel-Hamas war to avoid Israeli airstrikes, according to UK based anti-regime Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.[56] An Israeli airstrike that targeted an SAA ammunition position in late October was located less than a kilometer away from a Russian military camp in Daraa Province.[57] Israel also conducted airstrikes on the SAA 112th Mechanized Brigade in Daraa Province on November 12 after militants fired projectiles into the Golan Heights the day before.[58]

Western media reported that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei complained that Hamas did not warn Iran about its October 7 attack during his meeting with Hamas Political Bureau Head Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on November 5, citing Iranian and Hamas officials.[59] Reuters also reported that Khamenei warned Haniyeh that Iran would not “enter the war on your behalf” and pressured the Hamas leader to silence his group members calling for Iran and LH to fully join the war against Israel.

Western media previously reported that American intelligence officials have obtained information suggesting that Iranian officials were surprised by Hamas’ October 7 attack.[60] Western media reported that while Iranian officials were aware that Hamas was planning the attack, they were not aware of the timing or scale.[61] Some Western media has also reported that Iranian officials were directly involved in planning and preparation for the attack, including training Hamas militants inside Iran in the weeks before October 7.[62]
It is noteworthy that Iranian officials and media have been conducting two separate information operations, denying any Iranian involvement in or foreknowledge of the attack on the one hand and emphasizing Iranian support for Hamas and the Palestinian resistance on the other, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[63]

The United States extended its original July sanctions waiver permitting Iraqi payments for Iranian electricity on November 14.[64] The sanctions waiver permits the transfer of Iraqi payments for Iranian electricity to restricted bank accounts in third countries for the purchase of non-sanctioned goods. The United States previously issued a similar sanctions waiver in July 2023, permitting Iranian access to roughly 2.7 billion dollars of Iraqi payments, as CTP-ISW reported.[65] Western media reports did not specify whether Iran would now have access to the same or a greater portion of the roughly 10 billion dollars in Iraqi payments being held in escrow accounts inside Iraq.

IRGC-affiliated media separately recirculated US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller’s statement that Iran would be capable of purchasing only non-sanctioned goods on November 15.[66] The Ebrahim Raisi administration-affiliated outlet IRNA and Iranian Supreme National Security Council-affiliated outlet Nour News Agency recirculated reports about the sanctions waiver on November 14. These outlets additionally argued that the Biden administration should not prevent Iran from accessing its frozen assets in Iraq since Iran played no role in Hamas’ October 7 attack into Israel, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[67]

The Iraqi Federal Supreme Court issued a ruling to remove Iraqi Parliamentary Speaker Mohammed al Halbousi and Representative Laith al Dulaimi from parliament on November 14.[68] The Federal Supreme Court has not published an opinion at the time of publication. Halbousi, an important Sunni politician and the leader of the Taqqadum Movement, claimed that the Federal Supreme Court’s ruling was unconstitutional and was a move by unspecified parties to create political divisions within society.[69] He also announced that the Deputy Prime Minister of Planning Muhammad Ali Tamim, Minister of Industry and Minerals Khaled Battan al Najm, and Minister of Culture, Tourism, and Antiquities Ahmed Fakak al Badrani, all members of the Taqqadum party, would resign in protest and boycott Parliament sessions and State Administration Coalition meetings. All 43 members of the Taqqadum party boycotted the extraordinary parliamentary session held on November 15.[70] Halbousi adjourned parliament “until further notice” after being informed of his removal.[71] Dulaimi’s lawyer claimed that the Federal Supreme Court ruled to remove Halbousi as speaker after reviewing forgery accusations brought against Halbousi by his client Laith al Dulaimi and Representative Basem Khashan.[72] The Coordination Framework expressed its full support for the Iraqi Supreme Court's decision to remove Halbousi during a meeting held on November 15.[73]

25. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2023

https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-15-2023

Key Takeaways:

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia.
Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union’s (EU) insurance regulations.
The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference.
Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations.
Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
A Russian insider source claimed that Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which presented a limited number of former Wagner fighters with the certificates of their combat veteran status, is coercing former Wagner fighters into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 15, 2023

Nov 15, 2023 - ISW Press

Download the PDF

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2023

Angelica Evans, Grace Mappes, Nicole Wolkov, Kateryna Stepanenko, George Barros, and Frederick W. Kagan

November 15, 2023, 7:45pm ET

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia. The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) given precision machine tools’ importance in industrial manufacturing. Bloomberg reported on November 15 that the EU’s 12th sanctions package proposes a ban on the export of precision machine tools and machinery parts that Russia uses to make weapons and ammunition, such as welding machines, lithium batteries, thermostats, motors, and drone motors.[1] Bloomberg reported that Russia has been importing precision machines and precision machine tools from Europe to sustain its ammunition production and other DIB production efforts. Bne Intellinews reported in June 2021 that Russia’s near total reliance on European- and US-produced precision machine tools makes Russia particularly vulnerable to such sanctions and noted that at the time Russia imported almost all of the precision machines it required.[2]

Russia has been increasingly attempting to develop import substitution solutions for sourcing Western-made precision machine tools in 2023, likely in preparation for Western sanctions targeting this vulnerability. The Russian government approved in May 2023 the “Concept of Technological Development until 2030,” which encourages domestic production of high-tech products such as precision machine tools and mandates that domestic enterprises produce at least 75 percent of Russia’s high-tech products by 2030.[3] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reported in August 2023 that Russia’s STAN group, the country’s largest domestic precision machine manufacturer, which Rostec purchased in 2019, is a major element of Russia’s import substitution program.[4] Rostec subsidiary RT-Capital’s head, Semyon Yakubov, told Kommersant on October 26 that Rostec hopes to use the STAN Group to meet Russia’s “great need” for modern precision machines in the absence of Western imports.[5] Yakubov stated that Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine have sharply increased Russia’s military and civilian demand for domestically produced machine tools. Yabukov noted that STAN was unable to meet even a third of the total volume of Russia’s orders for precision machines in 2023, worth around six billion rubles (approximately $67.1 million). Yabukov stated that Russia’s demand for precision machines is “much greater” than its current production abilities.

Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union’s (EU) insurance regulations. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the EU proposed measures that would allow Denmark to inspect and block Russian oil tankers traveling through the Danish straits. These measures are part of an EU effort to enforce a G7 cap demanding that Western insurers only provide coverage to Russian shipments where oil is sold for less than $60 per barrel.[6] An unnamed senior European government official told FT that “almost none“ of the Russian maritime oil shipments in October 2023 were below the $60 barrel price cap.[7] FT also reported that the EU is concerned that Russian tankers are violating EU regulations by frequently traveling with falsified financial statements or non-Western insurance.[8]

The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the Ukrainian government reached a deal with insurance broker giant Marsh McLennan to provide up to $50 million in hull and liability insurance from Lloyd’s of London firms for each vessel carrying agricultural goods.[9] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that this agreement would allow Ukraine to “provide vital food supplies to the world at the same time as supporting the Ukrainian economy and keeping the Black Sea open for international trade.”[10] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined areas in the Black Sea to deny freedom of navigation in the corridor.[11]

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference. Putin stated that the Russian government will “continue to do everything necessary to prevent any illegal intrusion into electoral processes.”[12] Putin notably did not specifically reference the March 2024 presidential elections, nor did he announce his announce his presidential campaign.

Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations. The Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organization – reported on October 31 that 55 percent of respondents to a recent poll believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations while 38 percent favor continuing to conduct the war.[13] The Levada Center observed that while these numbers slightly increased between September and October by four percent, they have largely remained consistent since July 2023.[14] The Levada Center added that support for Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine remained high with 76 percent of respondents stating that they support Russian military operations in Ukraine. The Levada Center reported that 62 percent of surveyed Russians believe that the full-scale invasion is progressing well, while 21 percent of respondents believe that the war is going reasonably or very poorly for Russia.[15] The Levada Center reported on November 14 that two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is headed in the right direction and of those who believe the opposite, 45 percent cited the war in Ukraine.[16] Opposition-leaning Russian research organization Russian Field reported similar numbers supporting negotiations on November 15, noting that 48 percent of respondents said that Russia should engage in peace negotiations and that 74 percent would support Russian President Vladimir Putin if he signed a peace agreement “tomorrow.”[17] Russian Field stated that 36 percent of respondents believe that the war is going well for Russia whereas 25 percent believe that the war is going poorly for Russia and that respondents who trust Telegram channels are twice as likely to believe that the war is going poorly for Russia as those who rely on Russian television.[18]

Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space. Reuters and Bloomberg reported on November 14, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Yandex NV likely aims to sell all its Russian assets, not just a controlling stake, by the end of 2023.[19] One of Reuters’ sources claimed that Yandex NV seeks a complete break from Russia while another source stated that a complete exit is likely but undecided. Reuters and Bloomberg reported that Yandex NV will host a board meeting on the deal in late November and hopes to finalize a deal by December 2023.[20] The Kremlin has been attempting to crypto-nationalize Yandex through coercive measures since at least the summer of 2023 and reportedly approved a prior deal to sell Russian Yandex holdings to an affiliate of Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko.[21] The Yandex crypto-nationalization effort likely supports the Kremlin’s preparations for the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

Key Takeaways:

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia.
Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union’s (EU) insurance regulations.
The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor.
Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference.
Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations.
Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space.
Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
A Russian insider source claimed that Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which presented a limited number of former Wagner fighters with the certificates of their combat veteran status, is coercing former Wagner fighters into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine.

We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
Russian Technological Adaptations
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 15 and made confirmed advances. Geolocated footage published on November 14 indicates that Russian forces marginally advanced east of Ivanivka (20km southeast of Kupyansk) and west of Volodymyrivka (19km northwest of Svatove).[22] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced to the outskirts of Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk) and around Tymkivka (19km east of Kupyansk) to encircle the settlement.[23] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are advancing near Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk), Kyslivka (22km southwest of Kupyansk), and Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna).[24] ISW has not observed visual evidence that would confirm these claimed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Kupyansk direction near Synkivka, Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), and Ivanivka and in the Lyman direction near Nadiya (16km west of Svatove) and the Serebryanske forest area.[25]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line on November 15 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Synkivka, the former village of Zahoruykivka (a village 16km east of Kupyansk that was disincorporated in 1980) in Kharkiv Oblast, Hyrhorivka (10km south of Kreminna), and Serebyanka (11km southwest of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked in the forest area west of Kreminna and are attempting to push Russian forces from Torske (15km west of Kreminna).[27]

Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)

Russian forces continued to attack along Bakhmut’s northern and southern flank on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows Russian forces operating on Bakhmut’s southwestern outskirts, and Russian forces have likely been operating on the approaches to the Bakhmut prior to November 14.[28] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced on Bakhmut’s northern flank near Berkhivka (4km north of Bakhmut) and Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut) and consolidated new positions near the Berkhivka reservoir.[29] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) elements are attempting to regain lost positions and advanced 500 meters in an unspecified area south of the Berkhivka reservoir, and another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces lost nearly all territory that they captured in spring-summer 2023 in the vicinity of Berkhivka and Yahidne.[30] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces advanced in forest areas near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and gained a foothold on the settlement's northern outskirts.[31] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian and Ukrainian forces are actively fighting for control of key heights near Klishchiivka and claimed that Ukrainian forces still hold the key heights west of the settlement.[32] A Russian milblogger claimed that Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) remains contested while Russian forces maintain control of Kurdyumivka (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[33] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian “Sibir” Spetsnaz detachment are operating near Klishchiivka.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled all Russian assaults near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Ivanivske (5km west of Bakhmut), Klishchiivka, and Andriivka.[35] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces are likely preparing to launch new assaults by intensifying artillery fire around Bakhmut.[36]

Ukrainian forces launched localized attacks south of Bakhmut on November 15 and made confirmed territorial gains. Geolocated footage published on November 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced southeast of Toretsk (23km southwest of Bakhmut).[37] A Russian milblogger amplified footage published on November 14 purportedly showing Russian Spetsnaz elements repelling a group of Ukrainian forces attempting to advance near Andriivka.[38] Another Russian source claimed that Ukrainian forces are unsuccessfully counterattacking near Klishchiivka.[39] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to launch assaults on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[40]

Russian sources made unconfirmed claims that Russian forces continued advancing around Avdiivka on November 15. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from their positions near the waste heap north of Avdiivka and that Russian forces seized at least 60 percent of the industrial area south of Avdiivka.[41] One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced south of the waste heap and seized several unspecified Ukrainian positions.[42] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces pushed Ukrainian forces from Stepove (3km northwest of Avdiivka) and that the settlement is currently contested.[43] The milblogger added that Russian forces advanced north of Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka), drove Ukrainian forces from unspecified treatment facilities southeast of the waste heap, and consolidated control over Stepove’s eastern outskirts by advancing along the railway track.[44] The milblogger noted that Russian forces have not advanced towards Sieverne (6km west of Avdiivka) or Tonenke (5km west of Avdiivka) and are not directly attacking Avdiivka or the Avdiivka Coke Plant.[45] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces are not rushing to advance north of Avdiivka so as to avoid taking unnecessary losses.[46] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted simultaneous offensive operations near Stepove, Sieverne, and Pervomaiske; west of Kamianka (5km northwest of Avdiivka); near the water treatment plant; and on the industrial site.[47] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks east of Novokalynove (11km northwest of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske and near Avdiivka, Sieverne, Tonenke, and Vodyane (7km southwest of Avdiivka).[48]

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the Avdiivka direction on November 15 but did not advance. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attempted to attack Russian positions near the waste heap and in the industrial area south of Avdiivka.[49] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack with an infantry fighting vehicle near Stepove.[50] Geolocated footage posted on November 14 indicates that Ukrainian forces maintain control over the Avdiivka Coke Plant northwest of Avdiivka.[51]

Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 15 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported unsuccessful Russian attacks near Marinka (on the western outskirts of Donetsk City) and near Novomykhailivka (10km southwest of Donetsk City).[52] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces continued assault operations near Marinka and that the frontline had not significantly changed.[53]

Russian forces are continuing to establish new military bases in and near occupied Mariupol. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayor Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces continue to establish military bases outside of the industrial zones in occupied Mariupol.[54] Andryushchenko stated that these military bases include ammunition stores and barracks housing 100 to 150 personnel. The Crimea-based Ukrainian partisan group “Atesh” reported that Russian forces established a military base in Manhush (14km southwest of Mariupol) containing a fuel depot, at least 10 armored fighting vehicles, four air defense systems, a command post, and a headquarters.[55]

Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 15.

Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and did not advance on November 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), Novodarivka (13km southwest of Velyka Novosilka), and Prechystivka (17km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[56] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also attacked near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Veylka Novosilka).[57] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that elements of the Russian 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA) have been unsuccessfully attempting to advance near Staromayorske since November 11 and that elements of the 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th CAA, Eastern Military District) also recently tried to attack between Urozhaine and Novodonetske.[58]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 15 and reportedly advanced. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made some advances in an unspecified area of western Zaporizhia Oblast but that Russian forces are already counterattacking to recapture the positions.[59] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks between Robotyne and Kopani (5km northwest of Robotyne) and near Verbove (10km east of Robotyne) and Novofedorivka (15km northeast of Robotyne).[60] Another milblogger claimed that the nature of the fighting west of Robotyne is largely direct infantry contact.[61] Russian milbloggers noted that inclement weather is impeding offensive operations in the Orikhiv area.[62]

Russian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 15 and reportedly recently advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 700 meters into a forest area near Robotyne and to the outskirts of Pyatykhatky (27km northwest of Robotyne) on November 13-15.[63] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 14 that Russian forces failed to suppress Ukrainian firing positions on the heights surrounding Pyatykhatky after Russian forces entered Pyatykhatky from the south.[64]

Ukrainian forces continued larger-than-usual operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 15. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful attacks from central Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City, 2km from the Dnipro River, and about 3.6 km north of the E-58 highway) and that Ukrainian forces are also attacking near Poyma (11km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Pishchanivka (15km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River).[65] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces prevented Ukrainian forces from conducting casualty evacuation and deploying additional Ukrainian personnel to the east bank near the Antonivsky road bridge.[66] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces are pushing Russian forces three to eight kilometers from the Dnipro River's east bank in Kherson Oblast.[67] The geographic extent of this described effort is significantly larger than what any available open-source evidence currently shows.

Russian forces made a recent confirmed advance in a Ukrainian-held area in the east bank of Kherson Oblast amid continued operations against Ukrainian east bank positions on November 15. Geolocated footage published on November 14 shows that Russian forces made some advances into Krynky.[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces counterattacked and forced Ukrainian forces to withdraw from some areas south of Krynky, near Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River), and near the Antonivsky bridge, but ISW is unable to confirm these claims.[69] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that Russian forces have likely developed a plan to eliminate Ukrainian positions on the east bank by forming three tactical groups.[70] Mashovets stated that Russian forces plan to use two groups to flank the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka road and the Krynky area from the Korsunka (45km northeast of Kherson City and 1km from the Dnipro River) and Kozacha Laheri areas, while the third group will attack south of Krynky and advance north.[71] The Wall Street Journal, citing Ukrainian soldiers who fought on the east bank, reported that Russian forces are employing heavy mines, infiltration tactics, snipers, and heavy artillery, multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), and airstrikes to defend against Ukrainian advances on the east bank.[72]

Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

A Russian insider source claimed that Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which presented a limited number of former Wagner fighters with combat veteran status certificates, is coercing former Wagner fighters into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The insider source claimed on November 15 that Wagner Group representatives advertised to Wagner fighters applying for government assistance through the Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation that they should sign contracts with the MoD and told them that the Moscow Oblast military registration and recruitment head would explain to them the benefits of service under the Russian MoD.[73] ISW cannot verify the insider source’s claims, although ISW continues to observe reports that the Russian MoD continues attempting to recruit Wagner fighters.[74]

Russian authorities continue to target migrant communities as part of crypto-mobilization efforts across Russia. Russian sources reported on November 15 that Russian authorities physically issued about 50 summonses to attendees of a birthday celebration at a restaurant in Voronezh Oblast, demanding that these attendees appear at military enlistment centers.[75] Russian sources reported that the majority of people accosted with summonses were recently naturalized Russian citizens originally from Azerbaijan.[76]

Russian federal subjects continue to recruit volunteers to support the war effort in Ukraine. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty affiliate Idel Realii reported that Mari El Republic Head Yuri Zaitsev signed a decree that increased the one-time payment to individuals who sign contracts with the Russian military from 100,000 rubles (about $1,120) to 250,000 rubles (about $2,800) and that Udmurt Republic Head Alexander Brechalov announced that those who sign a Russian military contract will receive a one-time payment of 50,000 rubles (about $660).[77] The Moscow Oblast government announced on November 15 the creation of an elite unit of over 2,000 volunteers from Moscow Oblast and advertised one-time payments of one million rubles (about $11,200).[78] Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin claimed that 47,000 people from Moscow have signed contracts with the Russian military since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, including 22,000 people in 2023.[79]

Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)

The Institute for Science and International Security published satellite images on November 13 showing that Russian authorities are expanding the facilities that produce Shahed drones at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Republic of Tatarstan. The Institute for Science and International Security found that Russian authorities have constructed an additional facility, likely consisting of motor test cells, since April 2023 and a new security perimeter and corridors connecting the facility’s buildings since July 2023.[80]

Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that the Russian military is pulling Soviet-era T-62 tanks from long-term storage to use in combat in Ukraine. Fityo stated on November 15 that only about one in three T-62 tanks work but that they still pose a threat to Ukrainian forces because the additional armor forces Ukrainian forces to expend ammunition and loitering munitions to destroy them.[81]

Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine. The Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation reported on November 14 that occupation authorities are enrolling Ukrainian first graders into the “Orlyata Rossii” (“Eagles of Russia”) movement, which is the children’s branch of the Kremlin-funded pseudo-volunteer “Dvizheniye Pervykh” (“Movement of the First”) youth organization.[82] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 15 that employees of an unspecified Russian investigative department are raiding schools in occupied Kherson Oblast in search of teenagers who are helping the Ukrainian military and are encouraging other students to denounce “disloyal” classmates.[83] Former Ukrainian Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights and founder of the Save Ukraine organization Mykola Kuleba announced that Save Ukraine helped four Ukrainian children and their families escape occupied Ukraine after Russian authorities coerced the children’s parents into sending them to a Russian school, where Russian officials and armed Russian servicemen attempted to indoctrinate the children.[84]

Russian authorities continue efforts to artificially change the demographics of occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko stated on November 15 that occupation authorities are allowing Russian minority group members and Central Asia migrants to move into and loot apartments in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[85] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that crime rates are rising in occupied southern Donetsk Oblast due to the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) encouraging newly settled Russian and Central Asian migrants to form criminal groups in occupied Ukraine.[86]

Russian authorities continue preparations for the 2024 Russian presidential elections in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported on November 15 that Russian authorities are transporting ethnic Russian prosecutors, law enforcement officers, teachers, and other officials from Russia to occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, to form election commissions.[87]

Russian Information Operations and Narratives

Nothing significant to report.

Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated on November 14 that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan should “not rush” or “make hasty decisions” following Pashinyan’s refusal to attend the upcoming Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) summit in Minsk on November 23.[88]

Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.

26. The Virtues of Restraint: Why the Use of Force Is Rarely a Sufficient Response to Terrorism

Not sufficient but still necessary, no? Especially with terrorist organizations like Hama who are killing such a high number of innocent people.

But yes, political problems require a solution. That is why we have political protests, political defiance, and political violence.

Again, I do not think Bruce Hoffman's definition of terrorism gets enough attention:

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider `target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism

Excerpts:

Only by dealing with terrorism politically—isolating terrorists from the population they purport to represent and offering a better alternative—can a way forward be found that actually eliminates Hamas in its current rejectionist and nihilist form. Israel’s own experience proves that repression alone does not destroy a terrorist threat. The controlled application of force is useful, even necessary, to give politics room to work. If peace is the end goal, restraint opens the space for communication and negotiation. A purely military response to terror weakens those for whom peace is the real goal.

The calculus is, of course, further complicated when the terrorist is sponsored by a state or states. In such cases, the already limited utility of massive force against nonstate actors is compounded by the impunity that state protection gives them. A government must craft an effective response, both military and political, to the state sponsors of terror. India has considerable experience in dealing with state-sponsored terrorism. And it has, by and large, contained the problem through a combination of military, political, social, and other means internal and external to India.

None of this, of course, guarantees any country complete freedom from terrorist attacks. Experience suggests that there is no perfect formulaic response to terrorism, only less painful and more productive responses. Many Israelis and Palestinians are equally convinced that their victimhood justifies extreme and inhumane measures, and the rest of the world feels compelled to choose sides. The voices of those seeking peaceful outcomes by political means seem to be drowned out by those calling for revenge, punishment, and the use of indiscriminate force. But if there is a lesson to be drawn, it is that governments need to understand the limitations of repression and force. Choosing it alone can only lead to further tragedy.

The Virtues of Restraint

Why the Use of Force Is Rarely a Sufficient Response to Terrorism

By Shivshankar Menon

November 16, 2023

Foreign Affairs · by Shivshankar Menon · November 16, 2023

After Hamas’s horrific terrorist attack on Israel on October 7, it seemed inevitable that Israel would retaliate in devastating fashion. The first, natural reaction to such an attack is revulsion, accompanied by a desire for revenge and exemplary punishment. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acted on that desire, vowing to “destroy” Hamas, bombarding the Gaza Strip, and launching a ground invasion of the territory—even though it remains unclear how, if at all, Israel can eliminate Hamas militarily or ideologically.

But choosing to meet violence with violence is a choice. In fact, not all victims of terrorism choose retaliation. On November 26, 2008, ten Pakistani terrorists stealthily landed by sea in Mumbai. The carnage they unleashed over the next two days in attacks on hotels, cafes, a major train station, and a community center killed at least 174 people and injured over 300. Indian authorities swiftly realized that the terrorists came from Pakistan and enjoyed the backing of the country’s security establishment. I served as foreign secretary in the Indian government at the time, and my first reaction was to press for strong retaliatory action against our neighbor for such a brazen attack.

But after deliberations in which it weighed the likely outcomes and broader effects of various courses of action, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government ultimately opted not to undertake an overt military strike on terrorist camps in Pakistan. Instead, New Delhi responded to the terrorist atrocity in Mumbai through diplomatic and covert channels. In public, the country chose restraint, not revenge. That decision brought India international support, prevented a potentially catastrophic war, minimized civilian casualties, and arguably prevented more terrorism. At least so far, India has not experienced another Pakistani-backed attack with mass casualties on Indian soil.

India and Israel are, of course, two very different countries. And Pakistan and Gaza are not equivalent. Different contexts shape a state’s response to a terrorist attack. In different circumstances in 2016 and 2019, when faced with cross-border terrorist incidents, India chose to retaliate militarily against clearly defined targets in Pakistan. But the Indian experience is a powerful reminder of the limitations of dealing with terrorism as a purely military problem requiring a military response. As Israel levels parts of Gaza, sowing the seeds for future hatred, it is instructive to consider the benefits of not replying to terrorist violence with greater violence.

THE ENRAGED SAMURAI

The mythographer Joseph Campbell retold a Japanese folktale that follows the quest of a samurai intent on avenging his slain master. After hunting down his master’s killer, the samurai was preparing to decapitate him when the assassin spat in his face. The samurai immediately sheathed his sword and walked away. His master had taught him never to act out of blind anger; retribution should be exacted from an objective, righteous distance. Campbell’s tale illuminates one possible response to terror: restraint.

After the terrorist attack on Mumbai in 2008, India reasoned that a military strike was unlikely to solve the problem of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan; it would divert international sympathy from the Indian terror victims, suggesting that the affair was a quarrel between India and Pakistan in which both states were made equivalent. And it would give the terrorists and their sponsors precisely what they had hoped the attack would yield: an angry, divided India and possibly even a war.

Restraint appeared to be the least bad of India’s available choices. There were costs: many of the attack’s high-level sponsors in the Pakistan army and in the leadership of the anti-Indian militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was responsible for the violence, escaped retribution. To be sure, India is not a pacifist power, and in other cases it has responded to terrorist violence with force. When terrorists sponsored by Pakistan attacked an Indian army camp at Uri in 2016 and a security convoy in 2019 at Lethpora, India chose to retaliate across the line militarily, hitting the terrorists’ launching pads and bases. Neither retaliatory action had a huge effect on suppressing cross-border terrorism or eliminating its instigators and leaders.

After the terrorist atrocity in Mumbai, India chose restraint—not revenge.

The goal of terrorist violence is often to throw a more powerful state off kilter and incite bloodshed. History offers cautionary examples of terrorists’ successfully baiting powerful countries into strategic blunders. The Austro-Hungarian reaction to the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand led to World War I and the end of the Habsburg empire. After the 9/11 attacks, the United States chose to wage an unwinnable global war on terror, invading and getting bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq; one could argue that both countries and the wider region ended up in worse shape than they were to begin with. The war on terror birthed even more lethal terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State, and the high civilian death toll and the abuses committed by the U.S. military damaged the United States’ reputation.

How a government decides to respond to terrorism is often complicated by domestic political factors and the public’s desire for revenge. Leaders who pride themselves on their strength or their nationalist credentials tend to pick up the hammer. But two wrongs do not make a right, and history does not favor those who succumb to emotion and rely on military means to counter the threat of terror. Israel’s actions against civilians in Gaza and the ongoing violence in the West Bank have already cost it sympathy around the world. A “hard,” purely military response is less likely to achieve Israel’s goal of eliminating Hamas than a combination of military, covert, and political measures designed to fit this specific case. Empirically speaking, most massive military responses to terrorist attacks have led to long wars, unintended consequences, and a net increase in the threat of terror. The Sri Lankan government’s elimination of the secessionist Tamil Tigers as a military force in 2009 is often cited as an example of the successful use of force against a terrorist group. But this apparent victory displaced hundreds of thousands of people, failed to resolve ethnic tensions, and distorted the country’s democratic processes—problems that persist to this day.

A military overreaction generates the oxygen of publicity that terrorists seek. It helps to promote a terrorist group’s claim to represent a disadvantaged population. Indeed, one of Hamas’s motives in carrying out the October 7 attacks may well have been to create a situation in which Palestinians, most of whom did not previously support Hamas, are driven into its arms by Israel’s punitive actions.

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FORCE

Terrorism is political in motive and goal, and it must be dealt with as such. A strictly violent response falls in line with Israel’s response to terror over decades: a strategy it calls “mowing the grass,” a euphemism for periodic punitive campaigns that suppress, but do not eradicate, terrorist activity. The Israeli scholar and military strategist Eitan Shamir, one of the authors of that phrase, has now declared this tactic insufficient. Israeli deterrence has failed, he argues, and the country can only survive if it uproots Hamas from Gaza. How this can be achieved without horrendous casualties and suffering for the civilians of Gaza is not clear. Ignoring the rights of the Palestinians and their desire for statehood is precisely what produced the region’s present sorry state. Israeli bombings, missile attacks, and tank fire are most likely to push Gazans toward Hamas and other militant groups.

Hamas’s attack did not pose a political challenge to Israel alone. The West, now, can legitimately be accused of double standards and hypocrisy in its attitude toward foreign occupation and attacks on civilians in Ukraine and Palestine. For many in the global South and some in the North, the refusal of Western powers to press for a cease-fire or to address Israel’s attacks on civilians makes a mockery of the West’s avowed commitment to the laws of war and humanitarian considerations.

Israel’s own experience proves that repression alone does not destroy a terrorist threat.

Only by dealing with terrorism politically—isolating terrorists from the population they purport to represent and offering a better alternative—can a way forward be found that actually eliminates Hamas in its current rejectionist and nihilist form. Israel’s own experience proves that repression alone does not destroy a terrorist threat. The controlled application of force is useful, even necessary, to give politics room to work. If peace is the end goal, restraint opens the space for communication and negotiation. A purely military response to terror weakens those for whom peace is the real goal.

The calculus is, of course, further complicated when the terrorist is sponsored by a state or states. In such cases, the already limited utility of massive force against nonstate actors is compounded by the impunity that state protection gives them. A government must craft an effective response, both military and political, to the state sponsors of terror. India has considerable experience in dealing with state-sponsored terrorism. And it has, by and large, contained the problem through a combination of military, political, social, and other means internal and external to India.

None of this, of course, guarantees any country complete freedom from terrorist attacks. Experience suggests that there is no perfect formulaic response to terrorism, only less painful and more productive responses. Many Israelis and Palestinians are equally convinced that their victimhood justifies extreme and inhumane measures, and the rest of the world feels compelled to choose sides. The voices of those seeking peaceful outcomes by political means seem to be drowned out by those calling for revenge, punishment, and the use of indiscriminate force. But if there is a lesson to be drawn, it is that governments need to understand the limitations of repression and force. Choosing it alone can only lead to further tragedy.

SHIVSHANKAR MENON is Visiting Professor of International Relations at Ashoka University. From 2010 to 2014, he served as National Security Adviser to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He is the author of Choices: Inside the Making of Indian Foreign Policy and India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present.
MORE BY SHIVSHANKAR MENON

Foreign Affairs · by Shivshankar Menon · November 16, 2023

27. Pathogens labeled ‘HIV’ and ‘Ebola’ found inside secret, illegal Chinese-owned biolab in California

Hmmm... enquiring minds want to know.

Pathogens labeled ‘HIV’ and ‘Ebola’ found inside secret, illegal Chinese-owned biolab in California

New York Post · by Social Links for Victor Nava View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · November 16, 2023

Thousands of vials of biological substances — including some labeled “HIV” — and a freezer marked “Ebola” were found inside a secret Chinese-owned biolab in California which the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and FBI initially refused to investigate, according to a House committee report released Wednesday.

The illegal lab was operated in the city of Reedley, Calif., and the potential public safety risk it posed only came to light in December 2022 when Jesalyn Harper, an observant code enforcement officer, noticed a green garden hose sticking out of a hole in the side of a warehouse that was thought to be vacant for more than a decade.

Once inside, Harper discovered laboratory equipment, manufacturing devices, medical-grade freezers, lab mice and vials labeled in Mandarin, English and in a code that remains undeciphered.

She also encountered several individuals in lab coats who identified themselves as Chinese nationals.

The hose sticking out of the hole thought to be a vacant warehouse tipped off a Greeley code enforcement officer.

Hundreds of tons of research equipment and freezers were found in the facility.

KSEE/KGPE

Harper’s discovery kicked off a 9-month investigation by the city, which eventually roped in Rep. Jim Costa (D-Calif.), after being stonewalled by the CDC and FBI, to figure out what activities were taking place inside the illegal lab.

In a 42-page report, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, which launched its own investigation into the matter in September, detailed some of its shocking findings and the troubling questions raised by the presence of an apparent Chinese-owned research lab on US soil.

“Local officials spent months repeatedly trying to obtain assistance from the CDC,” the report states, noting that “the CDC refused to speak with them and, on a number of occasions, it was reported by local officials that the CDC hung up on them mid-conversation.”

“Local officials were similarly unable to get any help from other federal agencies,” congressional investigators found, including the FBI, which informed local officials that “it had closed its investigation because the Bureau believed that there were no weapons of mass destruction on the property.”

Lab mice were also found inside the biolab.

The CDC discovered at least 20-labeled vials presumed to contain potentially deadly pathogens.

With Costa’s help, CDC officials finally showed up at the Greeley biolab and identified at least 20 potentially infectious agents, including several “serious or lethal human diseases.”

Some of the potentially infectious agents found by the agency include SARS-CoV-2, Chlamydia, HIV, E. coli, Streptococcus pneumoniae, Hepatitis B and C, Dengue virus, the Rubella virus and Malaria.

The CDC, however, refused to test the samples or examine the unlabeled vials, even after city officials offered to pay for the testing.

The CDC refused to test the vials to verify the contents inside.

The report slams the CDC’s initial reluctance to get involved and its refusal to test the vials as “unacceptable.”

In July, under a court order, local officials contracted a hazardous waste firm to carry out the destruction of 140 tons of lab equipment and 440 gallons of medical and biological waste found at the site.

During this process, a previously undetected freezer labeled “Ebola” was found. The disease has a death rate between 25% to 90% once it is contracted.

“Local officials and contractors reported that they found a freezer labeled ‘Ebola’ with silver sealed bags found inside consistent with how the Reedley Biolab operators stored sensitive biological and other materials,” the report states, noting that the containers within the fridge were not expressly labeled “Ebola.”

Local officials notified the CDC about their find, and the agency responded by saying that it did not recall seeing the Ebola label.

The fridge and the contents within it were destroyed, without being tested, according to the report.

Photographs of the Ebola-labeled fridge do not exist, according to the report.

The panel’s investigation also uncovered a complex connection between the Reedley biolab owner and founder, Jiabei “Jesse” Zhu, and the Chinese Communist Party.

Zhu served as a corporate officer on Chinese military-civil fusion organizations and private organizations affiliated with the Chinese government.

Zhu has been charged with fraud and making false statements.

Zhu entered the US illegally, through Canada, after being slapped with a $330 million Canadian court judgment in 2016 for running companies engaged in “massive theft of American cattle-related intellectual property,” according to the report.

“The court found that Zhu and his PRC co-conspirators made many disturbing statements as part of their plan. These include instances where Zhu, in response to a co-conspirator’s reference to ‘American imperialism,’ replied that ‘the law is strong, but the outlaws are ten times stronger.’

In another instance, Zhu claimed that his fraudulent activity would help ‘defeat the American aggressor and wild ambitious wolf!’” the report states, citing private messages Zhu sent through the Chinese app WeChat.

Once in the US, Zhu operated under the alias “David He” and began work on setting up a network of biotech companies, including the Greeley biolab.

“To incorporate and administer many of these companies, Zhu turned to an accountant tied to entities associated with the CCP,” House investigators found.

The House panel found that “with the exception of Ebola,” the labeled vials of presumed pathogens found at the Greeley biolab are “inconsistent with the operation of a bioweapons program.”

Superior Court of the State of California

The select committee found evidence indicating that Zhu and his associates at the Reedley biolab were purchasing counterfeit COVID-19, pregnancy, ovulation, and nutritional deficiency test kits from China and relabeling and reselling the fakes in the US as “Made in the USA.”

The fraudulent scheme, however, did not require or explain the presence of the pathogens, equipment or freezers found in Zhu’s lab, according to congressional investigators.

“There is little to no market for test kits that would test the majority of the pathogens that the Reedley Biolab appeared to contain, let alone test kits created in an unlicensed laboratory,” the report notes.

Zhu with subsequently charged with federal offenses relating to fraud and false statements in an FDA-led investigation, according to the report.

The House panel found that “with the exception of Ebola,” the labeled vials of presumed pathogens found at the Greeley biolab are “inconsistent with the operation of a bioweapons program.”

The report cautions, however, that “the public health risks posed by the lab are unknown and, at this point, unknowable.”

“At a minimum, the Reedley Biolab shows the profound threat that unlicensed and unknown biolabs pose to our country. At worst, this investigation revealed significant gaps in our nation’s defenses and pathogen-related regulations that present a grave national security risk that could be exploited in the future,” the report states. “It is therefore incumbent upon Congress and the Executive Branch to address these vulnerabilities now before it is too late.”

New York Post · by Social Links for Victor Nava View Author Archive Get author RSS feed · November 16, 2023

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

Company Name | Website

Biden, Xi agree to restart military communications

US paid $24 million for improvements to shared military runway in Philippines

‘Ukrainian resistance is an example for the entire free world’. An American executive’s view on transparency and the rule of law in Ukraine

Army boot camp will soon include counter-drone training

Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity - United States Department of State

Secretary’s International Security Advisory Board Releases Report on Deterrence in a World of Nuclear Multipolarity

Biden, Xi's 'blunt' talks yield deals on military, fentanyl

MILITARY, TAIWAN

RESPECT AND WARMTH

TAKEAWAYS - Biden and Xi meeting: Taiwan, Iran, fentanyl and AI

TAIWAN

MILITARY TALKS

LEADER TO LEADER TALKS

COOPERATION AND CONCILIATION

FENTANYL

IRAN

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Information you can trust

Follow Us

Thomson Reuters Products

LSEG Products

US spy tool will lapse unless Congress and White House can cut deal

Warrant requirement

Air Force turns focus to future information operations

Cyberwarfare and influence operations are converging as key focus areas for the 16th Air Force.

Top general locked away evidence of SAS executions

More on this story

Austin Applauds Strengthening U.S.-Philippine Alliance

Israel Storms Gaza's Al-Shifa Hospital, Questioning Patients, Staff as More Aid and Fuel Expected to Arrive Today

The first fuel truck has reportedly entered Gaza from Egypt as the IDF says it found Hamas weapons in the hospital

TikTokers Discover Osama bin Laden's Letter Justifying 9/11, Decide They Agree With bin Laden

The dead al-Qaeda leader's 'Letter to America' is going viral 21 years later, and a number of young people think he's got a point

Americans flock to TikTok for news

DOD Makes Incremental Progress Toward Clean Audit

Pentagon fails sixth audit, with number of passing grades stagnant

How Will Southeast Asian Terror Groups Capitalize on the Israel-Hamas War?

Get to the bottom of the story

Myanmar fighting intensifies near India border, curfew imposed in Sittwe​

Keep reading

Martial law

Karenni Resistance Evacuates University Staff Abandoned by Junta Troops

Nine Towns Occupied by Myanmar Military for Decades Lost to Resistance in Days

Partisans Unfurl Ukrainian Flag in Russian-Occupied Crimea – 'We Await the AFU'

No good options for Myanmar’s mortally wounded regime

Sign up for one of our free newsletters

Independence Through Information War: Chechnya's Story and Ukraine Connection - Irregular Warfare Initiative

Punching above their weight

The Empire strikes back

Waking the sleeping wolf

A world of difference

IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 15, 2023

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 15, 2023

The Virtues of Restraint

Why the Use of Force Is Rarely a Sufficient Response to Terrorism

By Shivshankar Menon

THE ENRAGED SAMURAI

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF FORCE

Pathogens labeled ‘HIV’ and ‘Ebola’ found inside secret, illegal Chinese-owned biolab in California

Myanmar fighting intensifies near India border, curfew imposed in Sittwe