​Quotes of the Day:

"As our own species is in the process of proving, one cannot have superior science and inferior morals. The combination is unstable and self-destroying."

– Arthur Clarke

"A free press can of course be good or bad, but, most certainly, without freedom it will never be anything but bad." 

– Albert Camus

"Trust men and they will be true to you; treat them greatly, and they will show themselves great." 

– Ralph Waldo Emerson

1. New Nuclear Arms Race Pits U.S. Against Both Russia and China

2. Opinion | Trump and a New ‘Arsenal of Freedom’

3. Trump Says U.S. May Hold Talks With Venezuela’s Maduro

4. Pentagon Creating Amazon-Like Shopping Portal For Counter-Drone Equipment

5. Could America Have Lost the Revolutionary War?

6. China Coast Guard ship formation sails through Japan-administered Senkaku Islands

7. Japanese divided on military response to China over Taiwan, Kyodo poll shows

8. Trump’s Trade-Centric Indo-Pacific Realignment

9. Transitioning Professional Military Education to All AI – All the Time

10. The Puntland Model: A Somali State’s Relentless War for Stability and Autonomy

11. Special Operations News – Nov 17, 2025

12. Former Bangladeshi Leader Sheikh Hasina Sentenced to Death Over Protest Crackdown

13. Hamas’s Popularity Rises in Gaza, Complicating Trump Plan to Disarm Militants

14. Advancing the SOF Profession: The future of IWI's SOF Focus Area

15. The Day After: What Successful Regime Change in Venezuela Would Really Take

16. Hundreds of US troops are helping in the Philippines after back-to-back typhoons

17. A Grand Bargain With Venezuela

18. How to Fix Free Trade

19. Our nation requires three ARG/MEUs

20. Are we in a new cold war?

21. How cartels are adopting drone tactics from Ukraine

1. New Nuclear Arms Race Pits U.S. Against Both Russia and China

​Summary:

A new nuclear arms race pits the U.S. against both Russia and China. Beijing is racing toward warhead parity, Moscow brandishes exotic systems and nuclear threats, and Washington’s modernization lags. Allies doubt U.S. guarantees as planners fear simultaneous crises in Ukraine, Taiwan, and Korea without robust deterrence and arms control.

Excerpts:

“The movement now is toward building up nuclear arsenals, not reducing them,” said Matthew Kroenig, director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center and a former Pentagon official. “We’re entering the third nuclear age that is going to look a lot more like Cold War than the 1990s and the 2000s.”

A bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S.’s strategic posture, on which Kroenig served, recommended in 2023 that the U.S. should consider expanding its nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades because of China’s buildup. Trump has said he seeks to cut back nuclear weapons but that he can’t do so if America’s rivals don’t disarm, too. Last month, he also called for the resumption of nuclear testing.

​Comment: Are we ready for a nuclear arms race? Are we ready for the threat of nuclear war to move closer to reality? Will it be worse than the Cold War? Will traditional nuclear deterrence theory still hold?

New Nuclear Arms Race Pits U.S. Against Both Russia and China

After a decades​ long hiatus, nuclear weapons surge back to the forefront of global politics

By Yaroslav Trofimov

Follow

Nov. 16, 2025 7:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/new-nuclear-arms-race-pits-u-s-against-both-russia-and-china-5a96fde8?mod=hp_lead_pos2

WSJ

• China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, projected to achieve near parity with the U.S. in deployed warheads by the mid-2030s.
• Russia is developing new-generation nuclear systems, testing a nuclear-powered missile and submarine drone.
• The U.S. currently possesses 5,117 nuclear warheads, Russia 5,459 and China approximately 600, according to the Federation of American Scientists.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal, projected to achieve near parity with the U.S. in deployed warheads by the mid-2030s.

The new nuclear race has begun. But unlike during the Cold War, the U.S. must prepare for two peer rivals rather than one—at a time when it has lost its clear industrial and economic edge.

China, which long possessed just a small nuclear force, is catching up fast, while Russia is developing a variety of new-generation systems aimed at American cities.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has already used nuclear saber-rattling to throttle American support for Ukraine. He has deployed nuclear weapons to Belarus and, in recent weeks, tested a nuclear-powered missile and a nuclear-powered submarine drone that he claims are impervious to American defenses.

While Russia and the U.S. are still abiding by some arms-controls limits, such as the New Start treaty that expires in February, China, unconstrained by any commitments, is quietly but rapidly leaping ahead. According to American estimates, Beijing will reach rough parity with the U.S. in deployed nuclear warheads by the mid-2030s.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping for the first time showcased China’s nuclear triad—its land, sea and air-launched ballistic nuclear missiles—at a Beijing parade honoring the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in September. Putin, sitting to his right atop the Gate of Heavenly Peace, took note. So did North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, sitting to his left.

Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un were guests of Xi Jinping at September's World War II commemorations. jade gao/AFP/Getty Images

The growing bond between Moscow and Beijing—onetime rivals that neared the brink of a nuclear exchange during a border conflict in 1969—has already created an unprecedented level of strategic uncertainty for the U.S. and its European and Asian allies. That wariness is compounded by doubts among Washington’s allies about President Trump’s commitment to honor mutual-defense obligations.

“The movement now is toward building up nuclear arsenals, not reducing them,” said Matthew Kroenig, director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center and a former Pentagon official. “We’re entering the third nuclear age that is going to look a lot more like Cold War than the 1990s and the 2000s.”

A bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S.’s strategic posture, on which Kroenig served, recommended in 2023 that the U.S. should consider expanding its nuclear arsenal for the first time in decades because of China’s buildup. Trump has said he seeks to cut back nuclear weapons but that he can’t do so if America’s rivals don’t disarm, too. Last month, he also called for the resumption of nuclear testing.

The U.S., which hasn’t conducted an explosive nuclear test since 1992, currently owns 5,117 nuclear warheads, including 3,700 retired in stockpiles, compared with Russia’s 5,459 and China’s 600, according to the Federation of American Scientists. North Korea, a new entrant to the nuclear club that last year sealed a formal military alliance with Russia, possesses an estimated 50 warheads and is heavily investing in intercontinental missile and submarine capabilities that can strike the American mainland.

A U.S. stealth bomber, flanked by jet fighters, performed a flyover at the White House on July 4. brendan smialowski/AFP/Getty Images

The U.S. has been slow to react to these new threats. “Our entire nuclear modernization program was sized around the belief that we’re going to continue to have further cuts with Russia, and that China and North Korea wouldn’t pose challenges for the U.S. posture. All those assumptions have turned out to be wrong,” said Vipin Narang, director of the Center for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who oversaw U.S. strategic capabilities at the Pentagon during the Biden administration.

“If there is a regional conflict in Europe and China decides to take Taiwan, or vice versa, we will be stretched really thin,” he added. “These are the kinds of scenarios we are really unprepared for.”

Xi has ordered the Chinese military to be ready for a military takeover of Taiwan, if necessary, by 2027, according to U.S. intelligence, though it doesn’t mean that he will pursue this soon. American and NATO military commanders say that the most probable scenario in case war over Taiwan erupts is the so-called simultaneity problem: Chinese operations would trigger Russian military action against one or more North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, and possibly a North Korean invasion of South Korea.

Currently, China isn’t interested in any arms-control negotiations because it wants to catch up with the U.S. and Russia, and says that the two biggest nuclear powers should cut down their own arsenals first. While Russia has used nuclear blackmail to compensate for the weakness of its conventional forces, as demonstrated through the nearly four years of war against a resilient Ukraine, Chinese strategists say that an inverse calculus is in play in Asia.

Monks look over the sea on Pingtan Island, the closest point in China to Taiwan's main island. adek berry/AFP/Getty Images

“For China, the point is that because the U.S. is afraid that they might lose in a conventional war, some people are suggesting using a nuclear weapon against China in the Taiwan Strait,” said retired Senior Col. Zhou Bo, a former director at the Center for Security Cooperation in China’s Ministry of Defense who is now a senior fellow at Beijing’s Tsinghua University. “China should increase its arsenal—not to reach parity, but to the extent that the U.S. will never even dare to think about using nuclear weapons against China. And then, in a conventional war, China can win.”

This year’s brief war between Pakistan, which used Chinese weapons, and India, which lost at least one French-made Rafale jet, reinforced this sense of confidence about Beijing’s rising military might. “The U.S. doesn’t really have the capacity to engage in a big-scale war in Asia,” said Tang Xiaoyang, the chair of international relations at Tsinghua University. “The U.S. realizes that if there is a war, China is currently quite confident of defeating the U.S. due to its strong industrial capacity.”

While the U.S., Russia and China have all invested in more-sophisticated missiles and other nuclear delivery systems in recent years, American and Russian nuclear warheads date back several decades. The U.S. has been modernizing its warheads with subcritical testing that produces zero nuclear yield.

Trump raised the prospect of renewed testing of warheads after intelligence reports that Russia, at its Novaya Zemlya archipelago, and China, at its Lop Nur site, have been conducting supercritical tests that create a self-sustained chain reaction in an underground containment vessel but stop well short of a full yield.

Trump first spoke on the matter—just before an October summit with Xi—after the much-publicized Russian testing of the Burevestnik missile, which because of a nuclear reactor aboard could stay airborne for months, and of the Poseidon nuclear-powered underwater drone that is designed to sneak up to the coast and wipe out entire cities. Since then, Trump also shelved the idea of providing Ukraine with Tomahawk missiles that could strike strategic sites deep inside Russia.

Ukrainian troops are fighting Russia, which has used nuclear threats to limit Western support for Kyiv. Manu Brabo for The Wall Street Journal

“Putin’s pronouncements have to be answered. When the war in Ukraine started in 2022, there was a huge disbalance of fear, with Putin using those nuclear threats, veiled and not so veiled, and the West was pretty much paralyzed,” said Serhii Plokhy, a professor at Harvard University and author of “The Nuclear Age.” “There has to be a response. If there is no response, Putin is winning.”

Putin this month instructed his own Defense Ministry to study the possibility of resuming nuclear testing, though he stopped short of publicly ordering concrete preparations. “It’s evident that the Russians always pull the nuclear card when things are not good for them. It’s strategic communication,” said a senior Western official.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

Do you view the potential for nuclear tests as a necessary deterrent or an unacceptable risk? Join the conversation below.

Russia hasn’t tested nuclear warheads with a full-yield explosion since the Soviet Union’s collapse, and it wasn’t clear to what kind of future testing Putin—or Trump—were referring. The Nevada National Security Site where most of the previous 1,054 explosive U.S. nuclear tests occurred would need between two and three years of technical preparations for the resumption of full-yield testing.

Despite all the hype, Russia’s Burevestnik and Poseidon wonder-weapons aren’t fully operational, and have more psychological rather than military utility, said Fabian Hoffmann, an expert on nuclear weapons and missile technology at the University of Oslo.

“For the Russians, a lot of the motivation is just the fear factor, getting us to talk about this scary missile,” Hoffmann said. “It is eating up their research-and-development budget. It’s a Russian waste of money, in essence. The Chinese have a much smarter approach: They’re just building warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles, and aren’t trying to build anything weird and exotic.”

Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com

WSJ

2. Opinion | Trump and a New ‘Arsenal of Freedom’

​Summary:

The Wall Street Journal editorial board argues that Defense Secretary Hegseth’s acquisition reforms could revive a sluggish U.S. defense industrial base by accelerating procurement, empowering portfolio executives, stabilizing demand, and embracing “85% solutions.” Yet without higher defense spending, risk tolerance, and redundancy, this “arsenal of freedom” vision may fall short despite strong ideas today.

Comment: Again, this is likely the consequential modernization effort of the US military. But the WSJ identifies some challenges and apparently existing shortfalls.

Opinion | Trump and a New ‘Arsenal of Freedom’

WSJ

Hegseth’s acquisition reforms are crucial to reviving U.S. defenses.

By The Editorial Board

Follow

Nov. 16, 2025 3:51 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/pete-hegseth-donald-trump-pentagon-defense-military-arsenal-b0bbec50?mod=hp_opin_pos_2

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth Darron Cummings/Associated Press

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently made a bracing remark that received almost no attention. “This is a 1939 moment,” he told defense executives in a speech, “or, hopefully, a 1981 moment—a moment of mounting urgency.” The Administration deserves credit if this urgency translates into fixing how the U.S. military fields equipment, amid new threats and ways of war.

The Defense Department has released memos on pushing the bureaucracy to move faster in buying everything from drones to missiles to ships. Most Americans have been hearing tales of Pentagon woe—late, expensive new aircraft carriers; an 8,000% price markup on a soap dispenser inside a C-17 bathroom.

Mr. Hegseth says the Administration is aiming to “rebuild the arsenal of freedom,” and the Trump crowd has identified the dysfunctions: Overregulation, diffused accountability, and insufficient competition. “Every process, every board, and every review must justify its existence,” the secretary said.

The Pentagon essentially wants to make faster and more flexible contracting authorities the default instead of the exception, and give more priority to the private economy to solve military problems. “We will be open to buying the 85% solution and iterate together over time to achieve the 100% solution,” Mr. Hegseth said, instead of demanding endless specs that only a few big contractors can meet.

This is crucial to capitalizing on the recent influx of venture capital to the industry. New defense tech companies are a marvel of American ingenuity, but their success depends on the Pentagon buying their wares at scale—and soon. The iterative nature of war in Ukraine also demands more ability to switch buying strategies as the tech evolves.

Welcome is concentrating more authority in a “portfolio acquisition executive,” who could oversee a suite of programs and make tradeoffs on cost and performance. The current system includes far too many layers of authority. “Program managers answer to dozens and dozens of folks” and “have to go get permission to move a dollar to a better priority,” a former U.S. Navy secretary for acquisition told Congress this year.

The Administration already made a good move in appointing a single officer to oversee President Trump’s Golden Dome missile shield, and don’t underrate presidential priority and accountability’s roles in producing results. Dogged management will also be essential to break bureaucratic inertia and turf wars among the services.

Mr. Hegseth conceded that the problem is partially driven by a fickle Pentagon that, for example, buys a handful of munitions one year and then suddenly wants hundreds. “We will stabilize demand signals. We will award companies bigger, longer contracts for proven systems,” to assure companies that expanding production lines will pay, he said.

The asterisk is that the Administration isn’t proposing a defense budget that shows investors the Pentagon is serious. Is it 1939 or not? Mr. Hegseth is right that the department needs to “increase acquisition risk in order to decrease operational risk”—to take more chances to make sure U.S. troops always have the best equipment before the fighting starts.

Yet such risk left the procurement system in part because U.S. defense spending has dipped to 3% of the economy from a peak of 6% in the 1980s. Risk means budget room for experimentation—and the occasional failure. The Pentagon also needs money to buy redundancy so it isn’t stuck with only one vendor who can produce a given weapon. More sources reduce prices over time.

Getting better bang for the defense buck is also crucial to persuading voters that the U.S. military is worth more investment. The Trump Administration can rely on intellectual spade work from Sen. Roger Wicker, and many of the ideas we’ve discussed here are in the next defense authorization bill.

There is much defeatism these days about the American industrial base, but the recent U.S. development of a cheap cruise missile for Ukraine is a reminder that America can still choose to be nimble to meet a threat. If President Trump could start a revolution in military contracting affairs, it would be one of the biggest achievements in his second term.

Journal Editorial Report: Calls for a leadership change as the government reopens.

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 17, 2025, print edition as 'Trump and a New ‘Arsenal of Freedom’'.

WSJ

3. Trump Says U.S. May Hold Talks With Venezuela’s Maduro

​Summary:

President Trump signaled possible talks with Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro even as the U.S. deploys the carrier USS Gerald R. Ford and escalates anti-drug strikes on “narco-boats” near Venezuela. Washington weighs but has not approved direct military action, while Trump faces bipartisan pressure to justify the lethal ongoing maritime campaign.

Comment: Has all the activity in recent months been conducted to set the conditions for talks? What are they going to negotiate? What if talks do not take place or if they do and then they fail? Are we prepared to go to war with Venezuela? And if so, for what end?

Trump Says U.S. May Hold Talks With Venezuela’s Maduro

WSJ

The president’s comments come as the USS Gerald R. Ford arrives in the Caribbean Sea

By Alex Leary

Follow

 and Alexander Ward

Follow

Nov. 16, 2025 8:52 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/trump-says-u-s-may-hold-talks-with-venezuelas-maduro-5bde12c3?mod=hp_lead_pos3

President Trump has faced bipartisan calls on Capitol Hill to provide more information about strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean Roberto Schmidt/Getty Images

• President Trump said the U.S. may hold talks with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
• The U.S. military buildup near Venezuela, including the USS Gerald R. Ford in the Caribbean, is framed as an antidrug operation.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• President Trump said the U.S. may hold talks with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.

WASHINGTON—President Trump said his administration may hold talks with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro as the U.S. military buildup near the South American country grows.

“We may be having some discussions with Maduro and we’ll see how that turns out,” Trump told reporters Sunday evening. “They would like to talk.”

The White House didn’t immediately respond to a request for more information about potential U.S. outreach to Venezuela.

The administration has been seeking to pressure Maduro to step down and said Sunday that it intended to designate Cartel de los Soles, a network of Venezuelan military officers that U.S. officials accuse Maduro of leading, as a foreign terrorist organization.

The Trump administration has carried out strikes against alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean, killing dozens of people. The Navy’s largest aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, has entered the Caribbean Sea, U.S. Southern Command announced on Sunday.

The Trump administration has said that the military buildup is directed at stopping the flow of drugs such as cocaine and fentanyl into the U.S., and isn’t geared toward a regime-change campaign against Maduro.

A senior administration official said Sunday that no military action in Venezuela was imminent.

Two other U.S. officials said Trump had yet to make up his mind about whether to attack Venezuela directly in an effort to oust Maduro. Options presented to Trump last week by aides such as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth included the use of special forces and airstrikes on government and military facilities, the officials said.

The Journal reported earlier this month that Trump has expressed reservations about taking military action against Venezuela. Trump said on Friday that he had “sort of made up his mind” about how to proceed with Venezuela, but offered no concrete plans.

Maduro has accused Washington of trying to topple him, calling the military buildup “regime change through military threat.” In a letter to Trump after the initial strikes in September, Maduro promised to produce data showing that his country doesn’t traffic drugs. Last month, Trump said Maduro was willing to give “everything” to ease tensions, adding “he doesn’t want to f—around with the United States.”

Trump has faced bipartisan calls on Capitol Hill to provide more information about the boat strikes, which the Justice Department in a secret memo has said are legally justified, calling fentanyl a potential chemical weapons threat.

Trump said he told Secretary of State Marco Rubio to inform Congress about the missions. “We don’t have to get their approval, but I think letting them know is good,” Trump said Sunday. “If they say, ‘We don’t want you to stop drugs from coming into the country,’ I don’t think that would be good.”

Write to Alex Leary at alex.leary@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

4. Pentagon Creating Amazon-Like Shopping Portal For Counter-Drone Equipment

​Summary: 

The Pentagon’s new Joint Interagency Task Force-401 is creating an online “UAS and counter-UAS marketplace” so bases, NORTHCOM, and civilian agencies can quickly buy vetted sensors, effectors, and components to counter small drones. The portal will include performance data and plug-and-play standards to integrate diverse systems into common mission command networks. Efforts focus on layered defenses for critical infrastructure, rapid-response flyaway kits, and standardized authorities under 130(i) so local commanders can act fast. Priority areas include protecting U.S. bases, responding to mystery overflights, and building an integrated detection and defeat architecture along the increasingly drone-contested southern border and other sites.

Comment: Necessary innovation. I hope this works.

Pentagon Creating Amazon-Like Shopping Portal For Counter-Drone Equipment

The new shopping portal is being created as the U.S. faces increasing numbers of highly concerning drone incursions over military bases.

Howard Altman

Updated Nov 14, 2025 7:37 PM EST

59

twz.com · Howard Altman

https://www.twz.com/land/pentagon-creating-amazon-like-shopping-portal-for-counter-drone-equipment

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

The new Pentagon task force established to counter threats posed by small drones on Friday announced the creation of a hub for agencies to purchase counter-drone equipment and ways to improve how these systems work together. The effort comes as the U.S. faces an increasing number of incursions over these facilities, and about a year after a spate of them began popping up across the continent.

“We’re going to use all the tools at our disposal to be able to acquire new technology as quickly as possible to get it into the hands of the warfighter,” Brig. Gen. Matt Ross, director of the newly created Joint Interagency Task Force-401 (JIATF-401). Ross spoke on Friday to a small group of reporters, including from The War Zone.

The Army-led task force is creating what Ross calls a “UAS and counter-UAS marketplace” that will allow the installation commanders and interagency partners like the FBI, Department of Homeland Security and local law enforcement to shop for equipment and components.

A task force spokesman described the effort as “an Amazon-like marketplace for the procurement of counter-drone technology and equipment where people can go online, look for capabilities and user feedback.” It will be similar to one being launched by the Army for the procurement of drones.

Tech. Sgt. Ian Kay, a member of the U.S. Northern Command Counter-small Unmanned Aerial System fly-away kit team, sets an Anvil drone interceptor on its platform during an exercise at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., Oct. 27, 2025. (Department of Defense photo by John Ingle) John Ingle

The marketplace “will provide authoritative data on how each of these systems performs under varying conditions and allow users or customers to select the tool that’s right for them,” Ross explained. “We’ve got a wide variety of counter-UAS tools, and I actually think that we need all of them, because depending on where you are or what threat you’re focused on, your requirements will be slightly different. So we want to ensure that we provide a range of options both to the Department of War and to our interagency partners.”

The task force is looking at systems and components already on the market as well as working with industry partners to develop new ones. There are “hundreds of components of counter-UAS systems that could go on to the marketplace today, and we need to start thinking about these counter-UAS systems as components that are interchangeable.”

He did not offer specific examples but said it includes a wide range of sensors to detect drones and low-collateral and non-kinetic effectors to defeat them. The task force is not looking at explosive interceptors because, as we pointed out in the past, there are concerns about collateral damage and what works in a combat zone is not applicable in the homeland. We have profiled a number of these systems in previous articles.

Providing individual components in addition to complete systems allows individual purchasers to better obtain what they need, Ross noted.

“When you look at a full-stack system, you may settle for a less-than-optimal configuration of your radar, your EO/IR camera, and your layered effectors,” Ross explained. “If I only need to sense 20 kilometers and not 40 kilometers and I could change out that radar, put a lower-cost radar on there, then I could put more systems out into the field. As we look at that marketplace, I really want it to be components, similar to what you would see on any other online marketplace, that are plug-and-play as part of a counter-UAS system.”

A system designed to detect drones via the radiofrequency signals they put out and hijack the control link between them and their operators on display at Falcon Peak 2025. (Howard Altman)

Beyond offering equipment, the task force is streamlining the command and control of the wide array of systems being used by the military and its agency partners.

“What’s critical in any counter-UAS system is the mission command that allows you to tie together disparate sensors and effectors,” he posited. “And so what we are going to do inside of JIATF-401 is ensure that we standardize the communications protocols on how we send and receive information so that every component of a counter-UAS system is plug and play.” “

“For too long, we’ve struggled with integration,” Ross suggested. “And as people use different mission command systems, they had to specifically integrate a new component. And just like when you buy something to put on your Wi-Fi network at home, you know it’s going to work because the communication protocols are already established. We want to do the exact same thing for counter-UAS systems, both internal to the Department of War and for our interagency partners.”

The task force has yet to settle on a specific system.

The Engagement Operation Center, which is the primary data process and communication component of the Army’s Integrated Battle Command System. (U.S. Army) NATHANIEL PIERCE

“We evaluated every service’s mission command system last month in Operation Clear Horizon,” the task force director explained. “We did that specifically to assess their quantitative performance and then qualitatively how the workflows affected the outcome of those mission command systems. And we’re evaluating that now.”

While the task force is creating a more unified mission command system, Ross said it is important for individual installations to be able to act quickly on their own.

“It’s important that we remain decentralized,” he said. “If you look at the speed at which these systems can present a threat, you have to have operators that are empowered, trained, and they understand their authorities to be able to counter those threats, because they just don’t have time to go up to a higher level for approval.”

The U.S., he added, has improved how installations respond to incursions after the ones last year over Picatinny Arsenal, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, and several others, as well as those over Langley Air Force Base in 2023 that we were also the first to report.

Wright Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio was one of several military installations to report drone overflights last year. (Wright Patterson Air Force Base) Wright Patterson Air Force Base

“I think there’s a number of things that have changed,” the director pointed out. “Number one, we are consistently fielding new counter-UAS capabilities at our installations, and as we do that, we prioritize them based off what we have to protect at each of those installations.”

In addition, the task force has “also worked with the services that are responsible for each of the installations in NORTHCOM to provide additional options. So what you described is a very complex problem, and as you look at it at scale, there’s a lot of work to do.”

“We are helping the services with their assessments of critical infrastructure, determining what they need to close gaps, and then we’re helping them get it quickly. In areas where the services require assistance inside of the homeland.”

One example Ross pointed to is NORTHCOM’s new flyaway kits – equipment procured from Anduril and trained personnel that can board C-130 transports and respond within 24 hours to drone incursions at homeland installations.

According to the Army, the kits themselves are “an amalgamation of sensors and effectors that creates a total detect, track, identify and mitigation system including:

• The Heimdal mobile sensor trailer that includes a continuous 360-degree pan and tilt unit, thermal optics and a radar, all working together autonomously for target acquisition.
• Anvil drone interceptors and launch box, which operate autonomously to detect, track, shadow and mitigate threats.
• An electromagnetic warfare effector called Pulsar that features radio frequency detect, track, classify and deny options.
• The Wisp, a wide-area infrared system that is AI-enabled and offers 360-degree, full-motion sensoring that provides an accurate sight picture for operators.”

An Anvil non-kinetic drone interceptor from Anduril launches from its platform in response to a drone threat during an exercise at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., Oct. 23, 2025. (Department of Defense photo by John Ingle) John Ingle

Last month, the kits attained operational certification, according to the Army. NORTHCOM told us they are the “final option in a series of escalating measures for the Department of War’s response to drone threats,” only called upon if an installation or the service that owns it can’t provide the needed tools and personnel.

Still, Ross insisted that military installations “are equipped to handle UAS incursions.”

“The specific equipment varies by location,” Ross proffered, “but what we’re trying to build at each location where we have critical infrastructure that needs to be protected is a layered defense that includes distributed sensing and layered effectors so that we have the ability to counter any and all threats.”

Another huge area of concern for the military are attacks like Ukraine’s Spider Web strike on Russian aviation and Israel’s Operation Rising Lion attack on air defense systems and other military targets and personnel. The incidents have highlighted the danger presented by near-field drone attacks launched deep within enemy territory, in close proximity to their targets. As we have pointed out for many years, military assets and other high-value targets are extremely vulnerable to these types of operations within the homeland.

One of the most visible counter-drone efforts is taking place on the southern border, where President Donald Trump has ordered thousands of troops and equipment to prevent the flow of undocumented aliens and drugs into the country.

“I was actually at the southern border last week, spending time both with the NORTHCOM team and with the Joint Task Force Southern Border to understand the challenges that they’re facing,” he said. “I do that because understanding their challenges very specifically will allow us to focus our effort on closing that next gap. If you look across the 1,954-mile border, I think that we do face a challenge of unmanned systems, and NORTHCOM is focused on addressing those challenges now, in conjunction with other lead federal agencies.”

The task force is working toward “an integrated, distributed sensing network that includes both passive and active sensors, and then layering in effectors, or counter UAS effectors that will allow us to defeat a threat as it crosses the border,” Ross explained. “We’re working closely with DHS, Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Interior and other agencies that are working along the southern border.”

The U.S. Army is contributing ground-based radars to help spot and track drones as part of the continued build-up of U.S. military support along with the U.S.-Mexican border. (DoD/US Army)

In addition, JIATF-401 is “also looking to integrate new technology like low-cost attritable interceptors that will provide additional options and more tools to our service members as they’re defending our southern border.”

These include “RF defeat, absolutely low-cost interceptors, a variety of different sensors that would include acoustic and active radar. And then we’re going to make sure that all of those sensors provide an integrated air awareness or air picture, so that we can choose the best effector to counter a UAS depending on its size, its activity in the location.”

Drones have already been taken down coming over the border, Ross stated, but he did not specifically say how. We reached out to NORTHCOM and the task force for further details.

U.S. Army soldiers stand outside of a Stryker armored infantry transport vehicle, which has been deployed along the U.S.-Mexico border as part of the military’s Joint Task Force Southern Border mission, in Sunland Park, New Mexico, on Friday, April 4, 2025. Paul Ratje

It is one thing to have the equipment and personnel, but the task force is also pushing for increased authorities to act. That includes making sure all bases fall under the provisions of “130(i),” federal law covering current authorities for the “protection of certain facilities and assets from unmanned aircraft.”

Under 130i, the U.S. military has the authority to take “action” to defend against drones including with measures to “disrupt control of the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft, without prior consent, including by disabling the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft by intercepting, interfering, or causing interference with wire, oral, electronic, or radio communications used to control the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft” and “use reasonable force to disable, damage, or destroy the unmanned aircraft system or unmanned aircraft.”

The new counter-drone task force is pushing for additional authorities to protect bases from drones. (Air Force photo by Peter Borys) (U.S. Air Force photo by Peter Borys)

However, only a portion of U.S. bases are covered and Ross wants to make it a blanket protection for all.

“We want to make sure that those authorities enable installation commanders with everything they need to be able to protect that critical infrastructure,” Ross explained. “That’s one part of it. The second part of it is making sure that what’s actually in the law is clearly communicated to those installation commanders so there’s no ambiguity, and they know exactly what they can do, both inside the fence line, outside the fence line, and in coordination with local law enforcement around those installations.”

On Nov. 25, JIATF-401 is going to hold what Ross calls “a counter-UAS summit” attended by subject matter experts from interagency partners. The summit will focus on intelligence gathering, policy, science and technology, and operations.

“We want to make sure that we’ve got an enduring partnership with each of those agencies because we know this problem is going to continue to evolve,” said Ross, “and we want to be able to move at the speed of relevance.”

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.

• Drones
• News & Features

twz.com · Howard Altman

5. Could America Have Lost the Revolutionary War?

​Summary:

Britain was unlikely to retain the Thirteen Colonies once war began. Geography, distance, and colonial demography made control prohibitively hard, even for a superior army and navy. Saratoga and French, then Spanish and Dutch intervention, turned a colonial revolt into a global war. Britain might have delayed defeat with better generals and conciliatory politics that empowered Loyalists, but structural constraints, Atlantic communications, and imperial overreach made long-term success doubtful. Like later Spanish losses, the empire faced an unsustainable task. Over time, American population growth and wealth meant the balance of power would inevitably shift against London.

Comment: I enjoyed episode 1 of Ken Burns' documentary Sunday evening.

Could America Have Lost the Revolutionary War?

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Robert Farley · November 17, 2025

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/could-america-have-lost-the-revolutionary-war/

Key Points and Summary: Could Britain Have Crushed the American Revolution? Historians Say ‘Maybe’

-Could Great Britain have crushed the American rebellion? An expert argues that, while better generalship and politics might have delayed defeat, the odds were stacked against London from the start.

-Holding a vast, underdeveloped continent with a small population, across an ocean, was a nightmare even for Europe’s strongest navy and army. Saratoga and French intervention made things worse, forcing Britain to fight a global war while trying to subdue the colonies.

-In the end, distance, imperial overreach, and political inflexibility meant the empire was likely to lose North America sooner or later.

Why Britain Was Probably Doomed to Lose the Thirteen Colonies Anyway

Could Great Britain have crushed the rebellion in the Thirteen Colonies and ended the campaign for American independence? Perhaps. The British lost battles that they could have won, and failed to take political steps that could have divided the Continentals.

That said, the best way for Britain to win the war would have been to avoid it in the first place by making political concessions that would have held revolutionary sentiments at bay. By the time the guns sounded on Lexington Green, Britain’s first empire was in dire trouble.

Difficulties

American accounts of the Revolution focus on how scrappy bands of rebels managed to defeat Europe’s most powerful crown, and tend to de-emphasize the extraordinary difficulties of holding onto a vast, lightly populated territory with poor infrastructure.

The inhabited territory of the Thirteen Colonies amounted to more than 400000 square miles, some five times the size of Great Britain. The colonies claimed some 2.5 million inhabitants to eight million Britons, although over half a million of the former were enslaved.

Moreover, although Great Britain was wealthier in aggregate than the Colonies, per capita living standards were almost certainly higher in America, mainly because of the abundance of land.

The British government also faced immense difficulties in maintaining armies in the field and in communication across the breadth of the Atlantic.

This is not to say that the Patriots faced an easy task; the British Army and the Royal Navy were larger, better armed, and more experienced than their Colonial counterparts. The British maintained better relations with the Native American tribes that lived on the frontier, a particularly sore point with the colonists. Nevertheless, conquering the recalcitrant colonies would have been an immensely difficult military task even for a Crown undistracted by other problems.

Saratoga and the Passing of the Illusion of Military Victory

The first two years of the war saw bitter fighting across New England, New York, and Pennsylvania, but no decisive engagements that could have destroyed either the Continental Army or any of the several British armies in the field.

Many historians of the war identify the Battle of Saratoga as the key military turning point of the Revolutionary War. The culmination of a British campaign to seize Albany, the battle (actually two battles separated by eighteen days) stymied British efforts to split New York from New England.

It resulted in the surrender of General John Burgoyne’s army.

American victory at Saratoga triggered increased French intervention, which itself eventually led to Spanish participation in the war. But just because Saratoga had a decisive impact for the Colonials does not mean that the reverse would have meant British victory in the long-term.

The seizure of Albany would have been inconvenient for Colonial forces, but the British misunderstood the depth of Patriot sentiment across the colonies. Still, holding off French intervention for a time would certainly have worked in Britain’s favor.

French Intervention

French, Spanish, and Dutch intervention made a difficult problem immensely more complicated for the British. Covert French support had helped keep the Continentals afloat in the first two years of the war. In March 1778, the war between France and Britain broke into the open, occupying much of Britain’s fleet and military capability.

As Spain and eventually the Dutch joined the fight, the difficulties only grew. Much of the British war effort after Saratoga was geared towards trying to hold onto certain parts of the empire rather than the whole, and on creating the best possible conditions for peace.

Continental victory at the Battle of Yorktown, with an assist from the French Navy, made the conclusion of the war inevitable.

What History Teaches Us About the American Revolution

In hindsight, the idea that Britain could have held onto its American colonies seems absurd. The vast size of the empire made it almost impossible for Britain to police an even vaguely restive population.

The rapid collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas emphasizes the difficulty of a colonial metropole maintaining vast overseas holdings in the context of Napoleonic era communications technology. Still, for Britain to have any chance of victory, it needed to combine crushing defeats of American armies in the field with a diplomatic approach that enabled Loyalists to recapture political power in key colonies.

The former was difficult because American armies could simply retreat into the hinterland when in distress, and the latter was difficult because of the intransigence of both King George III and Parliament.

In fairness to the British, Colonial political demands were substantial, and some (including the full opening of the frontier) would have been difficult for the Crown to countenance.

Nevertheless, it was a tall task but not an impossible one; the same Britain that lost the Revolutionary War would prevail against a far more lethal Napoleon Bonaparte only a generation later.

In the long run, however, there was probably no way to really arrest American expansion. Over time, the balance of power between Great Britain and the Americas would have had to change, not to England’s advantage.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley, University of Kentucky

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

More Military

The Mach 2.2 YF-23 Black Widow II Stealth Fighter Has a Message for the U.S. Air Force

Mach 10 Missile Showers: China’s Aircraft Carriers Have 1 Big Advantage over the U.S. Navy

China’s New H-20 Stealth Bomber Keeps U.S. Air Force Generals Up at Night

The A-6 Intruder Has a Message for the U.S. Navy

How NATO Got Its Hands on Russia’s ‘Black Hole’ Kilo-Class Submarine

nationalsecurityjournal.org · Robert Farley · November 17, 2025

6. China Coast Guard ship formation sails through Japan-administered Senkaku Islands

​Summary:

A China Coast Guard formation sailed through waters around the Japan-administered Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on a “rights enforcement” patrol, escalating tensions after PM Takaichi said a Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger Japanese military action. Beijing issued travel warnings, rhetoric, and military drills, while Taiwan reported increased Chinese and naval activity.

Comment: Are we moving closer to conflict?

China Coast Guard ship formation sails through Japan-administered Senkaku Islands

channelnewsasia.com

17 Nov 2025 09:19AM

(Updated: 17 Nov 2025 09:25AM)

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/china-japan-senkaku-islands-taiwan-sanae-takaichi-remarks-5470096

BEIJING: A China Coast Guard ship formation passed through the waters of the Senkaku Islands on Sunday (Nov 16) on a "rights enforcement patrol", the China Coast Guard said in a statement, as Beijing ramps up tensions with Japan over its prime minister's remarks on Taiwan.

A diplomatic spat between China and Japan has intensified since Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told parliament on Nov 7 that a hypothetical Chinese attack on Taiwan could trigger a military response from Tokyo.

The remarks sparked an angry response from Beijing, which has signalled that it expects Takaichi to retract them in some fashion.

China claims Taiwan as its own territory and has not ruled out the use of force to take control of the island, which sits just 110km from Japanese territory. Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims.

"China Coast Guard vessel 1307 formation conducted patrols within the territorial waters of the Diaoyu Islands. This was a lawful patrol operation conducted by the China Coast Guard to uphold its rights and interests," the statement said.

China and Japan have repeatedly faced off around the Japan-administered islands, which Beijing calls Diaoyu and Tokyo calls the Senkaku.

The Japanese Embassy in Beijing did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Japan has been facing mounting pressure from China since Takaichi made her remarks, with China’s Consul General in Osaka commenting: "The dirty head that sticks itself out must be cut off," prompting a formal protest from Tokyo.

Beijing then summoned the Japanese ambassador for the first time in more than two years, and China's defence ministry declared that any Japanese intervention would be doomed to fail.

On Friday, China cautioned its citizens against travelling to Japan, prompting Tokyo to urge Beijing to take "appropriate measures" though it did not elaborate.

Three Chinese airlines said on Saturday that tickets to Japan could be refunded or changed for free.

In Taiwan, the defence ministry said on Sunday morning it had detected 30 Chinese military aircraft operating around the island and seven navy ships over the past 24 hours.

Late on Saturday, the ministry said China had been carrying out another "joint combat patrol" to "harass the airspace and sea around us".

It added that Taiwan had sent its own aircraft and ships to monitor the situation. Taiwan reports such Chinese patrols a couple of times a month as part of what Taipei says is an ongoing military pressure campaign.

Taiwan's government says only the island's people can decide its future.

Japanese leaders have previously avoided publicly mentioning Taiwan when discussing such scenarios, maintaining a "strategic ambiguity" also favoured by Tokyo's main security ally, the United States.

Source: Reuters/rl

Newsletter

7. Japanese divided on military response to China over Taiwan, Kyodo poll shows

​Summary:

A Kyodo poll shows Japanese opinion split over using collective self-defense if China attacks Taiwan, with 48.8% in favor and 44.2% opposed. Yet 60.4% support Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s plan to raise defense spending to 2% of GDP, helping lift her cabinet’s approval rating to 69.9% in the latest survey.

Japanese divided on military response to China over Taiwan, Kyodo poll shows

The opinion poll comes at a time when diplomatic tensions between Tokyo and Beijing have intensified following Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's recent remarks over Taiwan.

16 Nov 2025 05:06PM

(Updated: 16 Nov 2025 05:07PM)

channelnewsasia.com

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/east-asia/japan-china-taiwan-military-invasion-citizens-survey-5470416

TOKYO: The Japanese public is divided on whether Japan should exercise its right to collective self-defense if China attacks Taiwan, a Kyodo news agency poll found on Sunday (Nov 16).

The survey found 48.8 per cent in favour and 44.2 per cent against, while 60.4 per cent backed Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's plan to beef up the country's defence spending.

The opinion poll comes at a time when a diplomatic spat between Tokyo and Beijing has intensified following Takaichi's remarks related to Taiwan.

The Japanese premier said on Nov 7 that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could amount to a "survival-threatening situation" and trigger a potential military response from Tokyo.

China has not ruled out using force to assert its claim to democratically-governed Taiwan, which is only 110km from Japanese territory.

Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's sovereignty claims.

Takaichi's remarks sparked angry responses from Beijing, which also cautioned its citizens against traveling to Japan.

Takaichi has pledged to reach a defence spending goal of 2 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the current fiscal year through March, ahead of the original target of fiscal 2027, in a policy speech last month.

The approval rating for Takaichi's cabinet was 69.9 per cent, up by 5.5 percentage points from the previous month's survey, Kyodo said.

Source: Reuters/ht

Newsletter

8. Trump’s Trade-Centric Indo-Pacific Realignment

​Summary:

Trump’s second-term, trade-centric Indo-Pacific strategy is reshaping alliances around “reciprocal” deals, unsettling partners. Vietnam, now a key manufacturing and strategic hub, seeks market-economy status, tech access, and a reciprocal trade pact while balancing the U.S. and China. A potential Trump-Lam summit would symbolize pragmatic, transactional realignment over rules-based partnership globally.

Business/Economy

Trump’s Trade-Centric Indo-Pacific Realignment

Vietnam seeks to fit in

Nov 16, 2025

∙ Paid

By: Khanh Vu Duc

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/trump-trade-centric-indo-pacific-realignment?utm

Photo from Shenzhen Dantful International Logistics Co.

When Donald Trump returned to the White House on January 20, the world braced for another upheaval and rightly so. His second term, 10 months old, has already begun to redefine America’s alliances and economic posture in Asia.

The Indo-Pacific, once framed by Washington as a theater for “strategic partnership and shared prosperity,” is again being reimagined through the prism of reciprocity and raw deal-making. What Trump calls “fair trade” is, to many allies, a doctrine of coercive equilibrium: a transactional re-ordering that turns the language of friendship into the arithmetic of balance sheets.

In this recalibrated landscape, Vietnam occupies a distinctive position. Once peripheral to US strategy, it has evolved into a hinge between security and commerce. Its economic dynamism, strategic geography, and cautious diplomacy – often labeled “bamboo diplomacy” for its flexibility and resilience – make it both a partner and a test case. The question for both capitals now is whether Trump will sustain the pragmatic engagement of his predecessors or imprint his own unmistakably Trumpian stamp on the relationship.

Framework to Friction

During Trump’s first administration, Hanoi and Washington deepened ties even as the White House fretted over America’s trade deficit. Vietnam’s ascent as a manufacturing hub for US and global supply chains made confrontation difficult. The 2023 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signed under President Biden, symbolized a hard-won trust stretching across three decades, from wartime enmity to pragmatic alignment in technology, supply-chain security, and green growth.

That legacy is now being rewritten. Since early 2025, “reciprocal trade” has become the Trump administration’s mantra. Policy statements and an October 26 joint communiqué outlined a harder line: parity in tariffs, market access, and regulatory transparency—the same terms now demanded of Japan, South Korea, and even the European Union.

The goal, in Trump’s words, is to restore America’s “economic sovereignty.” But in practice, it risks unsettling partners that have long counted on rules-based predictability.

Vietnam, whose exports to the US exceeded $136,5 billion last year, feels the tremor keenly. The new Framework for a Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade Agreement announced in October offers both opportunity and unease: opportunity in institutionalizing cooperation, unease in the implicit threat that non-compliance could trigger tariffs or sanctions.

The Hanoi–Washington Calculus

This momentum intensified when Vietnam’s Deputy Prime Minister Bùi Thanh Sơn, speaking at a US–Vietnam business summit on November 12 in Hanoi, declared that both nations expect to sign a reciprocal trade agreement “soon.” His message carried both diplomatic optimism and philosophical weight: “Only trust can lead to cooperation, and only cooperation can lead to prosperity.”

Bùi Thanh Sơn. Photo from Voice of Vietnam

Behind those words lies a subtle plea for recognition and maneuvering space. Hanoi seeks US recognition as a market economy, which would end punitive anti-dumping reviews, and access to American high-tech exports still restricted under Cold War-era controls. Negotiators led by Minister of Industry and Trade Nguyễn Hồng Diên arrived in Washington on November 10 for a three-day round of talks aimed at resolving tariff disparities. Reports suggest that while most Vietnamese exports would remain capped at 20 percent tariffs, certain goods may receive exemptions – a gesture of compromise and goodwill.

Vietnamese officials are also keen to mark the signing of any trade deal with a meeting between Trump and General Secretary Tô Lâm in the Oval Office, according to multiple sources. Deputy PM Sơn urged US businesses to support efforts to set up this high-level encounter, framing it as a symbol of mutual trust and recognition. Previous attempts to arrange such a meeting have faltered, but this time both sides sense the potential for a moment of historic resonance, an image of former adversaries sealing a new economic pact beneath the gaze of global markets.

The Return of Economic Realpolitik

Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy today resembles less a doctrine than a negotiation strategy. By demanding “balanced trade” and “reciprocal access,” Washington asserts leverage across sectors from steel and textiles to semiconductors and rare earths. The rhetoric plays well with Trump’s domestic base, which views globalization through the lens of lost jobs and unfair competition. Abroad, it appears as economic Realpolitik—a revival of nineteenth-century mercantilism dressed in 21^st Century populism.

Vietnam’s response remains measured. Its long-standing Four No’s defense policy – no alliances, no siding with one power against another, no foreign bases, and no use of force – still guides foreign relations. This self-imposed neutrality allows Hanoi to navigate between Washington and Beijing without overt provocation.

Yet as Trump’s trade logic hardens, that neutrality becomes harder to sustain. China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner and a crucial source of industrial inputs, yet also a rival in the South China Sea. Every tariff adjustment thus carries geopolitical weight.

Between Autonomy and Alignment

What makes Vietnam’s position remarkable is its persistence in preserving agency. Trump’s transactional worldview leaves little room for nuance, yet Hanoi continues to frame cooperation as pragmatic convergence rather than alignment. It welcomes US technology and investment while guarding political independence – a balance that mirrors the region’s cautious engagement with resurgent American assertiveness.

For Trump, the calculus is simpler: he wants a deal he can brand as proof of “America’s comeback.” Vietnam, dynamic yet disciplined, offers an ideal stage for that narrative.

If the Oval Office meeting between Trump and Tô Lâm does take place, it will be remembered less for its ceremony than for its contradictions: a populist American president and a Vietnamese leader shaped by the security state, each seeking legitimacy through the language of reciprocity.

The image will speak to more than trade. It will capture the uneasy pragmatism defining the new Indo-Pacific order, where gestures of trust mask layers of calculation. Whether that handshake signals a durable recalibration or merely another transaction in Trump’s ledger will depend on what both sides value more: stability or spectacle.

9. Transitioning Professional Military Education to All AI – All the Time

​Summary:

Dr. Lacey argues AI’s rapid advance makes “go-slow” approaches in professional military education obsolete. With most students already using AI, he contends resisting integration is professional malpractice. Instead, PME should go all-in on human-AI teaming, using LLMs and tools like NotebookLM as tutors, research assistants, and “cognitive multipliers” to compress learning time and deepen critical thinking. Faculty become coaches while AI handles core instruction, freeing hours for wargaming, planning, and research that feed directly into joint warfighting innovation. Drawing on school and Harvard studies, he concludes AI-driven PME can teach faster, cheaper, and at larger scale worldwide.

Excerpt:

Conclusion

By rapidly expanding the use of artificial intelligence throughout professional military education, Professional Military Education can achieve similar results to Alpha School. Unlike Jensen, who foresees schoolhouses becoming “smaller and more elite,” widespread AI integration will make it possible to sustain a much higher student throughput, while improving student outcomes (by a large margin), and also allowing considerable time for students and professors to conduct research and wargaming activities. All of this will hugely enhance professional military education’s contribution to the Joint Force’s warfighting capabilities. Moreover, the schoolhouses will be able to do so, with considerably less administrative staff, fewer teachers, and, thus, at significantly less cost per student.

Comment: Jim Lacey is one of the outspoken critical commentators on PME as he can observe the system from inside out. But the question is: will he himself be replaced by AI? (note attempt at humor). Seriously, he will likely not be replaced as he is an early adopter of AI and will likely be one of the leaders with the PME system for knowing how to exploit it.

Transitioning Professional Military Education to All AI – All the Time

by James Lacey

|

11.17.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/17/transitioning-professional-military-education-to-all-ai-all-the-time/

Similar to the arrival of the technologically advanced Borg in Star Trek, Artificial Intelligence has arrived within the hallowed halls of professional military education, leaving resistance as futile. Thus, this article is not intended to persuade those who remain skeptical about the AI invasion. For, at the risk of sounding overly harsh, they have opted for obsolescence, and their opinions are no longer relevant. As their final denouement approaches, they will, undoubtedly, still be shouting “AI is killing critical thinking” as they are pushed into history’s trash bin.

In an earlier article, “Peering into the Future of Artificial Intelligence in the Military Classroom,” I stated that AI would not replace Title 10 professors, but that many professors would be replaced by professors who are comfortable with AI tools. I no longer believe that statement to be true. AI advances in just the last six months have made it an existential risk to all but a few Title 10 professors. We are rapidly entering an educational environment where only those who master human-AI teaming are likely to survive.

We are already living in a world where 85% of college students admit to regularly using AI, where high schoolers are writing in The Atlantic about AI “demolishing” their education, and parents are finding AI cheat sheets in their grade schoolers’ laundry. If we can assume that PME students are at least as clever as a grade-schooler, we must also accept that every one of them is, or soon will be, using AI throughout the academic year. Moreover, given the speed at which AI is being integrated into the administrative and warfighting infrastructure of every Service, educators have a duty to ensure that their students are as familiar with AI tools as possible.

This cheat sheet was found in a grade-schooler’s laundry (author provided).

Although the full integration of AI into professional military education is inevitable, many schools, as well as their faculties, remain hesitant to incorporate AI into coursework or research.   Even those who pay lip service to increasing AI use within PME are all too eager to throw up roadblocks. For instance, in a recent War on the Rocks article (23 October 2025), “A Guide to Collaborating With AI in the Military Classroom, Matthew Woessner opened with, “If educators do not learn to embrace AI, they risk being left behind.” I fully agree with this sentiment but was then amazed to find that the remainder of the article was a litany of reasons for schools and educators to slow down AI integration in favor of a “middle way.”

Unfortunately, Woessner’s “middle way” advocates limiting or forbidding the use of AI until students have mastered basic skills. Remarkably, for an educator who argues for the “embrace” of AI, Woessner advocates that professional military education first “teach students to live without it [AI].” It is hard to think of a more horrible approach or one that students will so widely ignore. Humanity now has at its disposal the most powerful educational tool since the invention of the printing press. Yet professors are telling them to put it on a shelf until they have learned to live without it, forgetting that almost all of them have been living without AI their entire careers.

But what are the skills Woessner insists must be mastered before students can be trusted to use AI? Allow me to collect a few:

• Students must learn to reason for themselves” without AI.
• Students must be taught that AIs are fallible and not surrender their judgment to a machine.
• Students must be made aware that AIs are programmed, and therefore, they must be on the lookout for the “invisible hand of the programmer.”

Finally, Woessner insists that students must be taught not to use AIs to create academic shortcuts, arguing that if students are allowed to use AI at will, they will fail to develop essential skills such as reading, writing, and critical thinking.

It would be far better for all concerned if we kept a simple yet often overlooked fact at the forefront of our decision-making process: every war college student is rapidly approaching or already past the age of 40. While all of Woessner’s concerns may be appropriate for high school students, they are senseless for adult professionals. PME is not grade school. Every student entering our hallowed halls knows how to read and write, and our current programs do almost nothing to enhance those skills. Moreover, I doubt that there is a PME student alive who does not know that AIs are fallible and often make stuff up. Thus, no one is “surrendering” their judgment to AIs, now or for some time to come.

But what about critical thinking? Of course, AI must kill critical thinking, especially if students use it to shortcut the academic process. Right? In my experience, the opposite is most often true.

But first, as the words “improve critical thinking” appear in the “program learning objectives” of nearly every PME institution, we must come to grips with what it is and how we measure it. At its core, critical thinking is simply questioning assumptions. But mastering critical thinking presupposes one possesses a large body of foundational knowledge that can be drawn upon to test assumptions against. Developing this knowledge base requires intense reading, study, and the employment of active learning methodologies (e.g., wargames). Contrary to what Woessner and others in the “go-slow alliance” believe, AI will turbocharge all such learning activities, and the sea change is already beginning.

What Students Can Already Do

At the start of this academic year, I taught Marine Corps War College students two classes, totaling approximately four hours, on the use of the three leading AIs (OpenAI’s Chat, Google’s Gemini, and Anthropic’s Clause), as well as NotebookLM, a Google-created AI-based learning tool. In preparation for this article, I asked my students to send me a quick note on how they are using AI in their various courses. Here is a summary of their replies.

For class preparation and reading analysis, students are using AI to synthesize, summarize, and visualize dense readings. For instance, almost every student reported using ChatGPT or NotebookLM to generate concise summaries and “audio deep dives” of assigned readings, converting lengthy texts into briefing notes, outlines, or podcasts for review before class. Many students had gone a bit further and asked their selected AI tools to map frameworks like DIMEFIL+, PMESII-PT, Ends–Ways–Means, or SWOT to readings, creating ready-made discussion tools.

Students continue to use AI post-class, with students describing what one called the “Eureka” effect, after using AI to challenge, reinforce, or extend what was discussed. Students reported using AI after class to:

• Run post-class debriefs to test assumptions, clarify contradictions, and identify causal claims that were made in class. It is worth noting that students are also increasingly using AI to check my “causal claims” during class. Yes, it is annoying, but it also forces me to spend more time ensuring I am prepared.
• Asking AIs to red-team their understanding of class discussions and to generate counterarguments for consideration.
• Using AI to translate theory and class discussions into applications. For instance, connecting a discussion of Chinese demographics to help create alternative, forward-thinking ideas on how INDOPACOM might profit from China’s demographic collapse.

A large number of students are also using AI to create customized agents tailored to specific needs, effectively creating AI teaching assistants. For example:

• One student created an interconnected chain of AI-agents to keep track of developments in the news and then recommend changes to the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. He then had agents specifically designed to behave as President Trump, Secretary of War Hegseth, and Secretary of State Rubio analyze and comment on the perspective changes. Finally, the approved changes were sent to an “Admiral Pampero Agent” for comment and integration into INDOPACOM plans.
• A few students have created agents that were trained on the MCWAR Strategy Primer and the Joint Planning Process to help design military strategies and plans. These first-cut documents are then used to drive classroom discussion and wargaming.
• One student trained an AI agent on the methodologies that made some of the great captains in history effective and then used the agent to review and comment on his answers to various operational-level case studies.
• To help in a series of negotiation exercises, students employed an agent trained on the methods of Henry Kissinger. A second agent was employed to offer commentary from ten of history’s greatest statesmen (e.g., Bismarck, Churchill, Metternich, etc.), all of whom behaved in character.

Almost every student is using NotebookLM as a personal research assistant to organize their class materials, facilitate interactive discussions of the material, test their knowledge of the material, and present the material in various formats (summaries, podcast discussions, videos, mind maps, etc.). NotebookLM is also being used to discover new and relevant sources on specific topics and to conduct in-depth analyses of those items that students take a deeper interest in.

Students, as one would expect, are also using AI tools to help them research and craft writing assignments, and then using GammaAI to reduce the hours it used to take to create presentations to a few minutes. Moreover, almost all of them are using AI to build digital archives, aiming to develop automated pipelines that turn courseware into structured data for later study. Some are even using vibe coding to script Python pipelines that transform their written products into multimedia outputs (JSON file, voice discussion, video, and imagery), and others are beginning to move on to building significantly more sophisticated agent-based workflows using AgentKit, Agent Builder, n8n, and similar tools.

Not a bad start, given they received a mere four hours of instruction at the start of the academic year.

Still, the worry that all of this AI use is wreaking havoc with students’ ability to develop critical thinking skills persists. But is it true? Well, in their own words:

• I wholeheartedly think AI improves critical thinking. For specific subjects that I’m less familiar with, the AI-assisted work before class has helped me go one or more steps deeper in my analysis.
• I use AI as an intellectual Socratic sparring partner and a disciplined analyst to dig deep into my thoughts and assumptions.
• AI is what saves me the time required for me to actually think about the deeper meaning of what we are learning, and it is there 24/7 for me to discuss or dig deeper into my reflections.
• I am good at generating immediate, surface-level answers. Iterating with AI improves my precision and conceptual reach.
• I am using AI as a strategic amplifier and cognitive multiplier (author’s note: this is my favorite comment).
• You have to avoid using AI as the easy button, but if you can do that, AI can be a HUGE (emphasis in the original) multiplier/advantage.

Thus, I continue to believe that professors do face a binary choice: either fully integrate AI into everything they and their students do, or risk academic oblivion. If professors are not using LLMs and AI tools, such as NotebookLM, to support their own research and class preparation, they are doing themselves a tremendous disservice. If they are forbidding or limiting their students’ use of AI, the day is quickly approaching, in my humble opinion, when they will be committing professional malpractice.

Where Do We Go From Here

Dr. Benjamin Jensen, in his recent War on the Rocks Article, “Building a New Brain: Transforming Military Schoolhouses into AI Battle Labs,” did the Professional Military Education community a favor by pointing out one possible direction the schoolhouses might take as they adapt to the artificial intelligence onslaught. Many of Dr. Jensen’s ideas represent a significant extension of what I did last academic year, and I am continuing to pursue this year.

However, Dr. Jensen’s desire, “turning senior military colleges into hubs for AI research where students learn and apply core AI skills,” is different from my original aim, but one I now find myself in agreement with. Jensen’s vision, as outlined in his article, unfortunately, has a crippling flaw at its core.  Where, and at what point, are students educated in the core skills they are expected to be able to conduct meaningful research upon? No one would expect a student to conduct serious scientific research before she had been adequately educated in the field. Having, as Jensen advocates, PME students spend an entire academic year focused on narrow research topics leaves no time to educate them on the broad scope of foundational knowledge that is crucial to their future success.

Still, educating officers for war, while also producing high-quality research, are not mutually exclusive. Success in both endeavors rests upon finding the right balance. Thus, we require a roadmap that ensures war college students are mentally prepared for their future responsibilities, while also enabling them to better comprehend and contribute to finding solutions for pressing operational and strategic problems.

Artificial intelligence not only makes both possible but also allows most students to achieve their learning goals in significantly compressed time periods, thereby freeing up more time for research and other activities.

None of this is possible unless we adopt Dr. Jensen’s core tenet: “as the military pivots toward great state competition and possible conflict, professional military education, if it is to remain relevant, must change rapidly and radically.” As Jensen points out, the White House’s AI Action Plan lays out the path,

Grow our Senior Military Colleges into hubs of AI research, development, and talent building, teaching core AI skills and literacy to future generations. Foster AI-specific curriculum, including in AI use, development, and infrastructure management, in the Senior Military Colleges throughout majors.

As there is no reason to limit AI initiatives to War Colleges, I would add a line or two to this instruction to integrate AI throughout PME. Still, where the War Colleges go, the rest of PME is sure to follow.

To accomplish this, we must eschew Woessner’s “middle way,” which is a disguised excuse to maintain the status quo, and follow Jensen’s all-in approach, with several modifications. I am firmly behind Jensen’s call for a “deliberate effort to organize history, theory, and doctrine into usable forms that machines can learn from – the ‘Brain of the Army.’ But I believe Jensen hugely overestimates the difficulty of creating and continuously updating such a ‘brain.’ At its core, such a ‘brain’ consists of a custom database (structured and unstructured data) and an integrated LLM, specifically trained to support military operations and planning. This core can be built cheaply, and a working ‘brain’ could be ready within a few months, after which it can be continuously refined.

As discussed, the missing ingredient in Jensen’s vision is time to educate the students. Fortunately, the classroom time that professional military institutions dedicate to education can be significantly reduced through the widespread use of AI. To accomplish this, schools must replace outdated teaching methods with AI systems that take over core teaching duties. AI modules must be created for each class, enabling students to utilize them for study and preparation. Then, for two hours a day, several days a week, AI systems will teach students the basics of every course and regularly test their knowledge attainment. Students can advance at their own pace but cannot advance until they demonstrate basic proficiency in the current module. In this new paradigm, teachers mostly stop running seminars and move into the role of coaches.

As the AI instruction will end at 1000, students have the rest of the day to complete all the activities that Jensen advocates, including deep dives into military history (studying war), conducting Joint Operations case studies, running detailed planning exercises, engaging in extensive wargaming, and researching the conduct of future wars. Such projects will tie the student’s education to real-world planning and warfighting-based research that can be fed back into the Joint Force for further experimentation and evaluation. In this paradigm, professional military education can both educate students and provide the Joint Force with cutting-edge thinking on a host of operational and strategic issues.

For those seeking a working model of this educational paradigm, the Alpha School in Austin, Texas, is demonstrating what the future of education will look like. Although the Alpha School is a grade school, there is no reason that its methodology, with a few tweaks to cater to adult learners, cannot be adopted wholesale by professional military education institutions. Alpha’s students spend two hours each day receiving instruction from a proprietary AI platform, with humans teaching less than 20% of the classes. At the end of those two hours, students are free to pursue passion projects for the rest of the day or explore new areas of learning.

Despite being exposed to formal educational activities for only two hours daily, Alpha School’s test scores place it in the top 0.1% of institutions nationally. Most 3rd and 4th-grade students are taking 7th-grade math and routinely scoring in the top 97th-99th percentile on standardized tests. By any measure, and even after controlling for Alpha School’s selection process, which attracts students from wealthy homes, these results are astonishing.

Regarding the application of these techniques at higher levels of education, Harvard recently released a study that tested the use of AI tutors by physics students. The study’s crucial finding was that Harvard students using AI tutors absorbed the material in half the time it took the students who were taught by professors in classrooms. Moreover, in later testing, they retained twice as much of the material being taught. In short, AI tutors took half the time professors did and got double the results. Thus, the question is, why PME is mostly shunning one of the most effective teaching tools ever developed?

Conclusion

By rapidly expanding the use of artificial intelligence throughout professional military education, Professional Military Education can achieve similar results to Alpha School. Unlike Jensen, who foresees schoolhouses becoming “smaller and more elite,” widespread AI integration will make it possible to sustain a much higher student throughput, while improving student outcomes (by a large margin), and also allowing considerable time for students and professors to conduct research and wargaming activities. All of this will hugely enhance professional military education’s contribution to the Joint Force’s warfighting capabilities. Moreover, the schoolhouses will be able to do so, with considerably less administrative staff, fewer teachers, and, thus, at significantly less cost per student.

Tags: Artificial Intelligence (AI), PME, Professional Military Education

About The Author

• 
  
• James Lacey
• Dr. James Lacey holds the Horner Chair of War Studies at Marine Corps University.

10. The Puntland Model: A Somali State’s Relentless War for Stability and Autonomy

Summary:

Somalia’s Puntland state built a hybrid governance and security model blending Harti clan structures with externally funded professional forces like the PSF and UAE-backed PMPF. Success against piracy and ISS-linked jihadists via Operation Hilaac turned Puntland into a key counterterrorism partner, but also empowered it to defy Mogadishu, culminating in a 2024 constitutional break with the Federal Government. The author argues this is an iatrogenic result of “by, with, and through” security assistance that prioritizes kinetic gains over national cohesion, and urgently urges external partners to reorient support toward Somali-led political reconciliation and federal constitutional resolution.

​Excerpt:

Conclusion: Puntland at a Crossroads—A Consequence of Counterterrorism

Puntland has evolved from a clan-based project for survival into a highly securitized statelet, a direct product of two decades of externally-driven security policy. Its hybrid model has produced undeniable tactical successes against piracy and the Islamic State. However, this very success—and the de facto independence it has fostered—is a feature, and not a bug, of the prevailing counterterrorism paradigm. The current political breaking point, which threatens the foundational concept of a federal Somalia, is the predictable outcome of a framework that consistently prioritizes creating capable kinetic partners over the painstaking work of building cohesive national political structures, and inclines one to better understand the path dependency on international relations in tangent with the timescales of security gains.

The Puntland Model: A Somali State’s Relentless War for Stability and Autonomy

by Hashim Umar Ali

|

11.17.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/17/puntland-model-stability-autonomy/

Abstract

In today’s post-civil war Somalia, the Puntland State stands as a critical case study in sub-national state-building. This article analyzes how Puntland developed a hybrid model of governance and security, fusing indigenous clan kinships with externally sponsored professional capacity, to become a bulwark against jihadist expansion. Its recent military successes against an Islamic State affiliate have fueled a political schism with the Somali Federal Government, representing an iatrogenic outcome of a counterterrorism framework that prioritizes kinetic partnerships over national political cohesion.

Genesis of a Federal State—Forging Order from Chaos (1991-2012)

The formation of the Puntland State of Somalia was a direct consequence of the catastrophic failure to reconstitute a national government following the 1991 ouster of Siad Barre. For nearly a decade, Somalia was effectively stateless, a condition the leaders of the northeastern regions found untenable. This culminated in the 1998 Garowe Constitutional Conference, a seminal event in modern Somali history. Over three months, a broad-based assembly of the region’s political elite, traditional elders (Issims), business leaders, and intellectuals gathered to chart their own course in a home-grown, bottom-up process. The result was the establishment of the Puntland State on August 1, 1998, with Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as its founding president.

From its inception, Puntland made a foundational choice that distinguished it from its northwestern neighbor, Somaliland, which declared outright independence. Puntland’s founders envisioned an autonomous state within a future federal Somalia. This federalist stance was a core security doctrine, born from a deep-seated mistrust of the concentrated power that characterized Barre’s oppressive regime. Federalism was seen as the only viable model to prevent the re-emergence of an authoritarian central government and safeguard regional autonomy. This principle was enshrined in its evolving constitutional framework, from the 1998 provisional charter to the permanent constitution ratified in 2012.

This formal structure is built upon a powerful, unwritten foundation of clan legitimacy, creating a hybrid political order. Puntland was established primarily as a “homeland” for the Harti clan confederation, providing a degree of internal cohesion absent in southern Somalia. This model, where modern state institutions are grafted onto a substrate of traditional authority, reflects a pragmatic approach to state-building in a fragmented society. However, it also establishes the clan-based power-sharing arrangement as the state’s ultimate social contract. Any attempt to dismantle this delicate balance, as seen in the 2024 election crisis, is perceived not as a political reform but as an existential threat to the state’s foundational consensus.

Building the Spear of Puntland’s Security Apparatus

The security and economic landscape of early Puntland was dramatically shaped by the explosion of maritime piracy off its shores. The phenomenon was an outgrowth of state collapse, as illegal fishing by international trawlers and the dumping of toxic waste destroyed local livelihoods, prompting fishing communities to form armed “coast guards” that evolved into criminal enterprises. Between 2005 and 2012, Puntland became the global epicenter of piracy, with ransoms in 2008 alone estimated between $50 million and $150 million. This illicit economy became a form of resource curse, deeply embedding itself in coastal communities and creating a complex security challenge that local militias could not handle. UN reports even alleged complicity among some Puntland officials.

This crisis, however, had a transformative effect. The international scale of the piracy problem created an urgent demand for a professional maritime security force that could not be met by Puntland’s internal resources or the weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu. This security vacuum created a unique opportunity for external actors to engage directly with Puntland, bypassing dysfunctional national structures. The global piracy crisis inadvertently became the gateway for the internationalization of Puntland’s security sector.

This led to the development of a hybrid security architecture. The primary terrestrial body, the Puntland Security Force (PSF), is a conventional army of around 15,000 personnel formed in 1998. Its development reflects an effort to move from a purely clan-based force toward a professional military, but this transition remains incomplete, with clan loyalties persisting as a potential fracture point.

The most striking example of Puntland’s security development is the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF). Established in 2010 after Puntland passed Somalia’s first Anti-Piracy Law, its creation was a direct response to requests from the UN Security Council for local institutions to combat piracy at its source. The concept is credited to Erik Prince, founder of the private military company Blackwater, who saw the need for a land-based force to dismantle pirate networks.

The United Arab Emirates emerged as the PMPF’s indispensable patron, providing an estimated $50 million annually for training, equipment, and salaries. This relationship can be analyzed through a principal-agent framework, where the UAE (the principal) funds the PMPF (the agent) to achieve its security objectives. This reliable funding stream distinguishes the PMPF from other Somali units plagued by inconsistent pay and logistical failure. To stand up the force, Puntland and its Emirati backers turned to private military contractors, initially Saracen International (later Sterling Corporate Services). This period was controversial, with the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea accusing the firms of violating the UN arms embargo and raising allegations of human rights abuses. Despite this troubled genesis, the PMPF emerged as a highly capable force, less beholden to clan interests and corruption due to its merit-based recruitment and consistent UAE-funded salaries.

The War on Two Fronts—From Counter-Piracy to Counterinsurgency

The PMPF’s primary contribution to defeating piracy was its land-based strategy of denying pirates onshore sanctuaries in hubs like Eyl and Hafun. The force’s capability was demonstrated in the December 2012 rescue of the crew of the MV Iceberg 1, the first successful hostage rescue mission by an indigenous Somali force. By the mid-2010s, the combination of the PMPF’s onshore pressure and international naval patrols had effectively broken the piracy business model. However, as the PMPF was repurposed to confront terrorism, its maritime focus diminished, correlating with a resurgence in piracy since late 2023.

As the piracy threat waned, the PMPF pivoted to become Puntland’s premier counterterrorism force, confronting a persistent insurgency from Al-Shabaab in the Galgala mountains and repelling a major seaborne assault by the group in 2016. A more complex threat emerged in 2015 with the formation of Islamic State in Somalia (ISSOM), a faction led by Abdul Qadir Mu’min that pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Pushed out of southern Somalia by the rival Al-Shabaab, ISSOM established its sanctuary in the remote Cal Miskaad mountains in Puntland’s Bari region.

While small, ISSOM holds strategic importance far outweighing its size. The US government has identified it as a key node in the Islamic State’s global network, operating the “Al Karrar” office, a hub that facilitates funds and personnel for ISIS affiliates across Africa and as far as Afghanistan. One of its key financiers, Bilal al-Sudani, killed in a US raid in Puntland in January 2023, was responsible for developing funding networks across the continent. This elevates the fight in Puntland from a local counterinsurgency to a globally significant counterterrorism effort.

In late 2024, the Puntland government launched Operation Hilaac (“Lightning”), its largest military offensive since 2016, to dismantle ISSOM’s mountain strongholds. The operation, executed in several phases, involved repelling a sophisticated suicide assault by ISSOM fighters on a military base and advancing deep into ISSOM territory, capturing the Togjaceel Valley, and discovering a reinforced underground command center. By June 2025, President Said Abdullahi Deni announced that Puntland forces had recaptured 98% of the Cal Miskaad mountain range. The offensive reportedly killed over 700 militants, many of them foreign fighters, confirming the group’s role as a regional jihadist hub. This ground offensive was critically enabled by international airpower from the UAE and the United States, operating in direct support of Puntland’s forces and entirely outside the Federal Government of Somalia’s security architecture. Operation Hilaac is the quintessential demonstration of the “Puntland Model”: a state-led, locally-manned ground offensive, enabled by precision foreign airpower, executing a strategically vital counterterrorism mission.

The Iatrogenic Crisis: State Deconstruction as a Consequence of Success

While Puntland’s security forces achieved remarkable battlefield successes, its political landscape became increasingly fractured. The period leading up to the January 2024 presidential election was marked by intense polarization. Incumbent President Said Abdullahi Deni championed a move from the traditional indirect, clan-based electoral system to a direct, “One Person, One Vote” (OPOV) model. This was met with fierce resistance from opposition politicians and clan elders, who feared it was an attempt to dismantle the delicate clan-based power-sharing arrangements that have underpinned Puntland’s stability. The dispute was a proxy war over the state’s fundamental political settlement. The traditional system functions as an elite pact ensuring predictability and inclusion by rotating offices among major sub-clans. The standoff led to violent clashes in Garowe in June 2023, resulting in over 25 deaths. Under pressure, Deni reversed course, and the traditional indirect election proceeded, granting him a second term.

These internal tensions were soon overshadowed by a constitutional crisis with the FGS. On March 30, 2024, the federal parliament in Mogadishu, without Puntland’s participation, passed sweeping constitutional amendments, including a transition to a presidential system. Puntland’s reaction was swift. On March 31, 2024, it formally withdrew its recognition of the federal government, declaring it would operate as a functionally independent state until a new, comprehensive constitution could be negotiated. This move represents the logical culmination of Puntland’s history. The FGS’s unilateral amendments were the final trigger that transformed a de facto reality into a de jure policy, seen as a hostile act of centralization that the state was created to resist.

In a Tillyan sense, Puntland’s externally-funded security apparatus emerged as a ‘protection racket.’ A government that produces both the danger and the shield against it inevitably operates like a racketeer through this rhetoric. While Puntland did not create piracy, its ability to offer a credible shield against it, which was a service the federal government could not provide, was thereby instrumental in legitimizing its authority and building its state capacity. This is an extractive state-building philosophy where security provision becomes a means of power and resource accumulation with little room for ethics.

This crisis is a deeply iatrogenic outcome of the prevailing counterterrorism paradigm. The term, from medicine, refers to an adverse effect caused by treatment. Here, the “treatment”—direct security assistance to a sub-national actor via the “by, with, and through” model—has induced the “disease” of state fragmentation. By directly funding, training, and equipping Puntland’s forces to combat piracy and terrorism, international partners like the US and UAE have empowered it to the point where it can credibly defy the central state. The policy designed to fight instability has actively generated a new, more profound political instability, leading to potential optical resemblance to political balkanization.

Conclusion: Puntland at a Crossroads—A Consequence of Counterterrorism

Puntland has evolved from a clan-based project for survival into a highly securitized statelet, a direct product of two decades of externally-driven security policy. Its hybrid model has produced undeniable tactical successes against piracy and the Islamic State. However, this very success—and the de facto independence it has fostered—is a feature, and not a bug, of the prevailing counterterrorism paradigm. The current political breaking point, which threatens the foundational concept of a federal Somalia, is the predictable outcome of a framework that consistently prioritizes creating capable kinetic partners over the painstaking work of building cohesive national political structures, and inclines one to better understand the path dependency on international relations in tangent with the timescales of security gains.

President Said Abdullahi Deni’s second term is defined by immense challenges. The high operational tempo of Operation Hilaac creates a political trap where the state’s relevance to its international partners is contingent on the existence of a perpetual threat. The schism with Mogadishu is the logical endpoint of a security assistance model that fosters the very fragmentation it purports to oppose. For international partners, this crisis demands a fundamental re-evaluation of a counterterrorism strategy that is achieving tactical ‘victories’ at the cost of strategic political cohesion.

Policymakers must critically re-evaluate the “by, with, and through” model, recognizing how direct security partnerships with sub-state actors fuel state fragmentation. Future assistance must be subordinated to a unified, Somali-led political strategy. Kinetic action must be subordinated to political reconciliation. The primary objective should not be the military defeat of ISSOM but the resolution of the constitutional crisis threatening the entire Somali state. Key partners, particularly the United States and the UAE, must use their considerable leverage to prioritize dialogue between Garowe and Mogadishu.

Tags: Al-Shabaab, clan politics, counterterrorism, Horn of Africa, ISIS, maritime piracy, Puntland, Puntland Security Force (PSF), Somalia, state building, United Arab Emirates (UAE)

About The Author

• 
  
• Hashim Umar Ali
• Hashim Umar Ali is an independent pre-doctoral researcher specializing in the war on terror and conflict in the MENA region. His research focuses on sociopolitical Middle Eastern studies. He is featured in the Middle East Monitor & various INGOs. His upcoming publication is a chapter in Wiley-Blackwell’s first handbook on Islamic liberation theology.

11. Special Operations News – Nov 17, 2025

Special Operations News – Nov 17, 2025

November 17, 2025 John Friberg Update 0

https://sof.news/update/20251117/

Curated news, analysis, and commentary about special operations, national security, and conflicts around the world.

Photo / Image: A U.S. Air Force special missions aviator assigned to the 1st Special Operations Wing dons a helmet and night-vision goggles during a training exercise near Hurlburt Field, Florida, Oct. 7, 2025. NVGs amplify existing ambient light or detect infrared radiation to produce an image visible to the human eye in low-light or dark conditions, ensuring Air Commandos can effectively conduct covert night operations. (U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Tori Haudenschild)

Do you receive our daily newsletter? If not, you can sign up here and enjoy it 2 or 3 days a week with your morning coffee (or afternoon tea depending on where in the world you are).

SOF News

Boeing Contract to Support Little Birds. A $18 million contract has been awarded to Boeing to provide engineering and technical support to the A/MH-6 Little Bird program. The Little Birds operate alongside other special operations helicopters to include the MH-60 and MH-47 series. “Boeing to support special ops Little Bird fleet through 2030”, Defence-Blog, November 14, 2025.

MH-47G Chinook Specs. The Boeing MH-47G helicopter is in service with the US Army Special Operations Aviation Command. The current MH-47G modernization program is aimed at delivering a mix of remanufactured and new MH-47Gs to USASOC. Read more about the MH-47G in an article published by Airforce Technology, November 10, 2025.

Ronny Jackson Profile. The Chairman of the House Armed Services (HASC) Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee is Representative Ronny Jackson (R-TX). This subcommittee is focused on DoD policies and programs affecting military and national intelligence with an emphasis on special operations, intelligence, information operations, and more. Learn more about Rep. Jackson. Breaking Defense, November 7, 2025.

3rd SFG(A) Memorial Walk Rededication. Soldiers across the FBNC SOF community convened at the new headquarters of 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) on November 7th to pay tribute to the unit’s fallen Soldiers in a rededication ceremony of the Group’s Memorial Walk. In a ceremony Soldiers, civilians, and Gold Star families gathered in front of the 3rd SFG(A) headquarters, marking the beginning of a new era in remembrance of the fallen. The Memorial Walk traces its history back to 2010 when 28 stones were placed in honor of Soldiers from 3rd SFG(A) who paid the ultimate sacrifice to their nation during the War of Terror. Since it’s 2010 creation, Soldiers of 3rd SFG(A) have borne the responsibility of adding 33 more stones to site. “3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) Rededicates Memorial at New Headquarters”, by Maj. Justin Zwick, DVIDS, November 10, 2025.

10th Group Cpt Receives Prestigious Intel Award.  Capt. Keneally Phelan, Director of Intelligence with 4th Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), was named the 2025 recipient of the Lt. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein Award for Excellence in Military Intelligence at a ceremony held on Fort Carson, CO, Oct. 30, 2025. The award recognizes exceptional leadership and commitment within the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps. (DVIDS, 30 Oct 2025)

International SOF

“Little Spartans” and SF. Russia, China, and Iran have been increasingly flexing their muscles and taking part in aggressive activities that threaten smaller states. Meanwhile, the “policeman of the world” (United States) has become unpredictable as an ally who would stand up to these aggressive nations. As a result smaller states need to develop their own means of standing up to the bullies of the world. One way to make up for smaller size is to organize and train special operations units to compensate for a smaller military. This article looks at three case studies: the 1st New Zealand Special Air Service Regiment, the Irish Army Ranger Wing, and the UAE Presidential Guard Special Operations Command. “Little Spartans: How Small State Militiaries Use Special Forces to Punch Above Their Weight”, Military Strategy Magazine, November 11, 2025.

UK’s SOMTG. Recent training exercises by the United Kingdom saw the UK Special Operations Maritime Task Group (SOMTG) deploy in the eastern Baltic. UK Royal Marines and Army Rangers conducted a series of training exercises to include ship recapture and covert coastal raids. The training took part during Exercise Baltic Dawn which included 42 and 47 Commando as well as the British Army’s 3 Ranger. “UK Marines, Army Rangers Test Rapid-Response Forces in Baltic”, The Defense Post, November 12, 2025.

SEALs and Exercise TRIDENTE. Naval SOF of the U.S. and Argentina recent took part in an exercise in the waters of Argentina. The exercise promoted the transfer of knowledge, tactics, and procedures in SOF naval operations. Zona-Militar.com, November 12, 2025.

SOFEX ORION 25. The multinational Special Operations Forces Exercise (SOFEX) “ORION 25” concluded in mid-November in Greece. The exercise has been conducted on an annual basis since 2018 which SOF participating troops from many countries. “Multinational SOFEX ORION 25 Concludes”, Geetha.mil.gr, November 13, 2025.

French Special Forces Aviation. The aircrews of an elite French aviation unit under the operational control of the French Special Operations Command (COS) are some of the most heavily armed chopper crews in the world. “The Best-Armed Pilots: French Special Forces Aviation”, SOFREP, November 12, 2025.

SOF History

On November 24, 1963, Camp Hiep Hoa, Republic of South Vietnam, was overrun by the Viet Cong. It was the first CIDG camp to be overrun during the Vietnam War. In the battle, an estimated 500 Viet Cong fighters took the Hiep Hoa Special Forces Camp, resulting in four American personnel MIA. South Vietnamese commando units and the American Green Berets resisted but were overwhelmed. A Special Forces soldier, Isaac Camacho, one of four missing Americans, later became the first American to escape from a Vietcong POW Camp.

On November 19, 1969 the ‘Bronze Bruce’ statue was dedicated at Fort Bragg, NC. The statue memorialized Special Forces soldiers and was the first Vietnam War memorial in the United States. https://www.specialforceshistory.info/culture/bronze-bruce.html

On November 21, 1970, Operation Ivory Coast was conducted. This was a joint operation led by Air Force General LeRoy J. Manor and Army Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons. The operation was conducted by 56 U.S. Army Special Forces Soldiers who infiltrated by helicopter into the Sơn Tây prisoner-of-war camp, located 23 miles (37 km) west of Hanoi, North Vietnam. The objective was to rescue 61 American prisoners of war assessed to be at the camp. Unfortunately, the prisoners were moved to another camp shortly before the mission. https://sof.news/history/son-tay-raid/

Four Delta Force Men Enter a Bar . . . George Hand tells one of his stories of how a quiet night drinking beer in Norway ends up in a fracas with some Russian sailors. SANDBOXX, November 12, 2025.

National Security and Commentary

Syrian President Visits White House. Ahamed al-Sharaa, who was once designated as a terrorist by the United States with a $10 million bounty on his head, visited President Trump last week. Abu Mohammad al-Julani (as he was formerly known) was a member of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – an Islamist rebel group that played a pivotal role in the Syrian civil war. He joined Al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2003, fought against Americans, was captured, and imprisoned in U.S. facilities. After his release he returned to Syria and founded the Al-Nusra Front in 2012 as Al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate.

DISRUPT Act. The Defending International Security by Restricting Unlawful Partnerships and Tactics Act lays out a plan for multiple federal agencies to collectively disturb and derail some of the adversarial collaboration taking place between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. “Congress eyes whole-of-government plan to disrupt growing cooperation between US adversaries”, by Brandi Vincent, DefenseScoop, November 7, 2025.

CRS Report on Intel Funding. The Congressional Research Service has updated its report Defense Primer: Budgeting for National and Defense Intelligence, IF10524, 13 Nov 2025, PDF, 2 pages.

https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10524

A New Cold War? Ten senior academics and diplomats are asked the question: “Are We in a New Cold War?”, Britain’s World – Council on Geostrategy, November 14, 2025.

New Director of NGA. Lieutenant General Michele Bredenkamp has been selected as the Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). LTG Bredenkamp brings more than 30 years of military experience to her new role, where she will lead U.S. geospatial intelligence collection, analysis, and distribution in support of national security. In her most recent role as DNI Gabbard’s Advisor for Military Affairs (DAMA) at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Bredenkamp oversaw the seamless and timely integration of intelligence between the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense.

Venezuela in the Crosshairs

State Department Declaration. Adding more speculation to the tense situation between Venezuela and the United States is the U.S. Department of State’s (DoS) intent to designate the Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) effective November 24, 2025. According to DoS the Cartel de los Soles is headed by Nicolas Maduro, the president of Venezuela. This would seem to give the United States legal cover for conducting operations against Venezuela and appears to set up a timeline for Maduro to depart voluntarily or face possible military action by the United States. “Terrorist Designations of Cartel de los Soles”, U.S. Department of State, November 16, 2025.

“Gunboat Diplomacy?” The recent military and diplomatic actions by the U.S. could very well be a lot of “signaling” that demonstrate Trumps desire to shape the geopolitical environment of Latin America and demonstrate the willingness to use military force to degrade the trafficking of drugs into the United States. “Why Donald Trump is Not Set on Venezuelan Regime Change”, National Interest, November 12, 2025.

SOF and Venezuela? Recent flights of special operations aircraft (C-146A, MH-6, and MH-60s) near the Venezuela coast and a significant increase in SOF military forces in the Caribbean have raised speculation of U.S. special operations targeting Venezuela. “Are US Special Forces Getting Ready to Attack Venezuela?”, National Interest, November 13, 2025.

Reviving Old Bases in Latin America. Deactivated bases in Panama, Puerto Rico, and possibly Ecuador are coming back to life as the U.S. military builds up forces in the region. Naval Station Roosevelt Roads and former Fort Sherman in Panama are seeing signs of renewed life. There are also talks to bring back a naval presence in the port city of Manta in Ecuador. “The US military’s plan to revive old bases in Latin America”, by Nicholas Slayton, Task & Purpose, November 14, 2025.

Operation Southern Spear. The Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, announced this past Thursday night that the U.S. will be stepping up its military presence and activities in the Latin American region. The effort is to remove ‘narcoterrorists from our hemisphere’. “U.S. Launches Operation Southern Spear”, The Soufan Center, November 14, 2025. In related news, the USS Ford Carrier Strike Group is reported to be positioned between Guadeloupe and Dominica. The ships will be joining the Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group as part of Joint Task Force – Southern Spear (JTF-SS).

Ukraine Conflict

Russians Exploit Bad Weather. While drones may be the new dominant force on the battlefield they do have their limitations in poor weather conditions. Clouds and heavy fog contribute to masking the movements of Russian forces into forward positions and the Russians have taken advantage of the latest spell of inclement weather.

Battle for Pokrovsk. The Russians hope to take this small city of 60,000 (pre-war population) and proclaim that they are marching on to victory. Putin will be able to use it as a talking point on state TV as a symbol of progress in the war. The victory will have been extremely costly to the Russians. The Ukrainians could have vacated the depopulated and destroyed city months ago but in staying they are buying time. The loss of Pokrovsk will cause some difficulties in Ukraine’s defensive lines in the Donbas region; but they have likely already taken measures to compensate for the loss when it happens. It will have taken about a year for the Russian’s to capture Ukraine’s 76th largest town (based on pre-war population). Read more in “Pokrovsk: Where Putin Shattered His Teeth”, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), November 6, 2025.

A Hard Winter Coming. Jack Watling, a Senior Research Fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute in London, says that with the Donbas region in peril, Europe must pressure Russia now. The year-long Russian offensive to take the small city of Pokrovsk may soon come to an end resulting in a victory for Moscow. Over the past year the Russians have lost thousands of soldiers to take a devastated city that used to have 60,000 occupants but now has a population of less than 1,500 civilians. With the fall of Pokrovsk the Russians will move on to their next objective – which very likely could be the city of Kharkiv. Months of talks about ceasefires has only contributed to more time for the Russians to slowly grind away at Ukrainian defenses and take ground meter by meter. A decline in U.S. aid to Russia has yielded some advantage to the Russian military forces and also contributed to a Russian belief that western resolve has diminished. “Ukraine’s Hardest Winter”, Foreign Affairs, November 11, 2025.

SOF News welcomes the submission of articles for publication. If it is related to special operations, current conflicts, national security, or defense then we are interested.

Around the World

A Unified Korea. David Maxwell, a retired Special Forces officer, writes on how the unification of the Korean peninsula is a “central unresolved strategic, moral, and humanitarian problem of Northeast Asia. “U-ROK: Why Koreans and Americans must pursue a free, unified Korea”, UPI, November 11, 2025.

Degrading ISIS in Syria. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces advised, assisted, and enabled more than 22 operations against ISIS with partners in Syria over the past month, diminishing the terrorist group’s ability to conduct local operations and export violence around the world. Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) conducted the operations in coordination with Syrian partners from Oct. 1 to Nov. 6, resulting in five ISIS members killed and 19 captured. “CENTCOM Degrades ISIS in Syria”, CENTCOM, November 12, 2025.

Oil Tanker Seized by Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized a Marshall Islands-flagged vessel on Friday as it was passing through the narrow Strait of Hormuz. The M/V Talara, carrying high-sulfur gasoil, was boarded by helicopter. It was transiting from the UAE toward Singapore.

Russia – Losing Ground in Africa. Russian forces are facing a difficult situation in the West African nation of Mali as Al-Qaeda-loyal JNIM militants (SOF News) close in on the capital city of Bamako. Russia’s Africa Corps has not been successful in assisting Mali government troops in defeating or degrading JNIM and the Tuareg separatists. Three years ago the Mali military regime ousted French forces in favor of Russian mercenaries (Wagner Group) and their replacements (Africa Corps); but the switch has not yielded the results expected. There are about 2,000 Africa Corps personnel in Mali along with a complement of military equipment. “Advancing in Ukraine, Russia Troops are Losing Ground to Al-Qaeda in Africa”, by Tom O’Connor, Newsweek, November 14, 2025.

Sweden to Assist Somalia. The Swedish military has deployed small units to support the Somali National Army (SNA) in counterterrorism. It will provide advise and training on technical exploitation capabilities. “Sweden Deploys Military Units to Somalia to Support SNA in Counterterrorism”, Garowe Online, November 11, 2025.

RSF Thrusts East in Sudan. The paramilitary force battling the army in Sudan’s civil war (SOF News) is shifting its focus eastward after consolidating its grip over Darfur last month. The Rapid Support Forces and the Sudan army are now centering their efforts on Kordofan, a region comprised of three states that serves as a buffer between the RSF’s western Darfur strongholds and the army-held states in the east. “Paramilitary force pushes east in new escalation of Sudan’s war”, Reuters, November 13, 2025.

Books, Podcasts, Videos, and Movies

Publication – The Military’s Role in Humanitarian Efforts During Conflict and Post Conflict, Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL No. 25-1022, August 2025, PDF, 12 pages. The United States has engaged in 17 nation-building efforts since 1900, with only four resulting in established democracies—a 24% success rate if democracy establishment is the metric. How does the United States ensure future success in nation building efforts? This paper explores key topics including recovery and post-conflict strategies, military applications tailored to host nation needs, communication challenges, and resource coordination. https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2025/09/30/b3732d44/no-25-1022-the-military-s-role-in-humanitarian-efforts-during-conflict-and-post-conflict.pdf

Sentinel. The November 2025 issue of the Sentinel has been posted by Chapter 78 of the Special Forces Association. Some great articles can be found in this issue on the following topics:

• Gabriel Field Vietnam Memorial
• Lieutenant Governor of Florida – Green Beret
• 55th & Final Son Tay Raider Reunion
• Supporting the Special Forces Monument
• Book Review on the 20th SOS Green Hornets of Vietnam War
• PROJECT CHECKO
• Article on Lehr-Regiment Brandenburg z.b.V. 800
• Art from the 17 Special Forces Group

Video – Veterans Day 2025 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne). DVIDS, 1 1/2 minutes.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/986449/veterans-day-2025-1st-special-forces-command-airborne

Video – Green Beret, 1st SF Command, DVIDS, 1 minute.

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/985229/green-beret

SOF News Book Shop

View our selection of books about special operations forces at the SOF News Book Shop.

Upcoming Events

November 17-20, 2025

2025 Modern Warfare Week

Fort Bragg, Global SOF Foundation

December 2-4, 2025

2025 Irregular Warfare Forum

Andrews AFB, MD

December 10-11, 2025

SOF & Irregular Warfare Symposium

Tampa, Florida, DSI Group

February 10-12, 2026

Special Air Warfare Symposium

GSOF – Fort Walton Beach, FL

February 17-18, 2026

36th Annual NDIA Special Operations Symposium

NDIA – Washington, D.C.

12. Former Bangladeshi Leader Sheikh Hasina Sentenced to Death Over Protest Crackdown

​Summary:

Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentenced ex–Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death in absentia for crimes against humanity over the 2024 protest crackdown, including inciting violence that killed at least 1,400 demonstrators. She denounces a “kangaroo tribunal” as Bangladesh heads toward February elections under Yunus’s government with her Awami League barred.

Former Bangladeshi Leader Sheikh Hasina Sentenced to Death Over Protest Crackdown

WSJ

Conviction in absentia marks a historic milestone for South Asian country Hasina ruled for over 15 years

By​ Shan Li

Nov. 17, 2025 4:33 am ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/former-bangladeshi-leader-sheikh-hasina-sentenced-to-death-over-violent-protest-crackdown-072de13b

Sheikh Hasina, who lives in exile in India, said she had been convicted by a ‘kangaroo court.’ daniel leal-olivas/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

• Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentenced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death for her role in the killing of at least 1,400 protesters.
• Hasina was found guilty of crimes against humanity, including inciting violence against student protesters and conspiring in civilian killings.
• The conviction comes as Bangladesh prepares for February elections, with Hasina’s Awami League party now banned.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal sentenced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death for her role in the killing of at least 1,400 protesters.

The decision

A special court in Bangladesh sentenced the country’s former prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, to death on Monday for her role in the killing of at least 1,400 protesters who participated in nationwide demonstrations last year that ultimately led to her ouster.

The International Crimes Tribunal ruled that Hasina and several of her top officials were guilty of crimes against humanity, including inciting and abetting organized violence against peaceful student protesters in July and August 2024, and conspiring in the killing of civilians, among other charges.

The key point

The conviction of Hasina, who resigned and fled to India last year, marks a historic milestone for Bangladesh, the South Asian country that she once ruled for over 15 years, during which she imposed an increasingly authoritarian regime. Protesters had demanded she be brought to justice, even in absentia, as a key step in moving the country toward democracy.

In a statement before her conviction, Hasina said she categorically denied all the allegations and had not been given a proper chance to defend herself.

“It is a kangaroo tribunal, presided over by an unelected government, whose purpose is to deliver a preordained guilty verdict and to discredit a political opponent,” she said.

The tribunal was set up by Hasina in 2010 to pursue crimes against humanity linked to Bangladesh’s 1971 war of independence against Pakistan. It has issued the death penalty in a number of previous cases. The court cheered as the sentence was delivered.

The context

The charges stemmed from Hasina’s deadly crackdown on protesters last year. What started with students protesting against a quota system for government jobs eventually turned into broader demonstrations calling for an end to Hasina’s authoritarian rule. The protests reflected the deep frustration among young people, who have grappled with soaring inflation and a high unemployment rate for years.

Students protesting against Sheikh Hasina last year in Dhaka, Bangladesh. luis tato/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The 78-year-old tried to quell protests with a heavy hand and characterized the demonstrators as criminals, terrorists and traitors. That backfired and spurred more people to protest.

What’s next

The decision comes at a politically fraught time for Bangladesh, which is preparing for elections in February for the next prime minister.

Choosing a leader in a free and fair election would be a watershed moment for a country. Ahead of national elections in 2024, Hasina’s government jailed scores of political opponents, leading the main opposition party to boycott that election.

But Hasina’s Awami League party is now banned, which observers say will undermine the legitimacy of the new polls.

Attempts by the caretaker government led by Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus to enact democratic reforms have been met with limited success. He appointed 11 commissions to propose overhauls to the country’s institutions, including the police and judiciary, but few reforms have been pushed through and hopes for sweeping changes have dimmed.

Some opposition parties had pushed Yunus to hold elections earlier, arguing that constitutional changes should be the responsibility of the next elected leader.

Write to Shan Li at shan.li@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

13. Hamas’s Popularity Rises in Gaza, Complicating Trump Plan to Disarm Militants

​Summary:

Hamas’s popularity in Gaza has ticked up since the cease-fire, complicating Trump’s plan to disarm the group. Polls show 51% view Hamas’s wartime performance positively and 41% would back it in hypothetical elections, while 55% oppose disarming it and most resist an international force. Many Gazans still resent Hamas’s brutality and blame it for devastation, yet welcome its restoration of order, policing, and protection of aid convoys after months of looting and lawlessness. For now, fear of Israeli aims and of militia anarchy leads many to tolerate Hamas’s armed role until a credible, realistic, stable democratic political alternative finally emerges.

Can Gaza ever get past Hamas?  This situation certainly complicates the peacekeepers' work.

Hamas’s Popularity Rises in Gaza, Complicating Trump Plan to Disarm Militants

WSJ

• In a poll published last month by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 51% of Gazans surveyed expressed positive views of Hamas’s performance during the war, up from 43% in May.
• Support for Hamas in theoretical elections rose to 41% among Gazans, a 4 percentage point increase from five months prior.
• A slight majority of 55% of Gazans opposed disarming Hamas.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• In a poll published last month by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 51% of Gazans surveyed expressed positive views of Hamas’s performance during the war, up from 43% in May.

Hamas’s popularity has edged up among Palestinians in Gaza since the cease-fire, ending a slide during the war and posing a challenge to President Trump’s plan to bring peace to the enclave by disarming the militant group.

A major reason is security. Last month, as a cease-fire took root and Israeli forces pulled back, Hamas fighters re-emerged on the streets as police and internal-security forces, patrolling and targeting criminals along with rivals and critics. While many Gazans have a dim view of the U.S.-designated terrorist group and don’t like seeing the group reassert itself, Palestinians have welcomed a reduction in crime and looting.

“Even those who oppose Hamas, the idea of security is something people want,” said Hazem Srour, 22, a businessman in Gaza City. “It’s because we had a security breakdown with thefts, thuggery and lawlessness.”

“No one could stop it except Hamas, and that’s why people support them,” he said.

Before the truce, more than 80% of humanitarian aid from the U.N. and its partner agencies was intercepted by desperate Gazans or seized by armed gangs, according to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

In the past month, thefts are down to around 5% of deliveries, according to the agency. That is because more aid is flowing and Hamas’s “blue police” are preventing criminality, a UNOCHA spokesperson said.

Trucks carrying commercial goods in Gaza City this month. Jehad Alshrafi/AP

The reduction in crime and lingering support for armed resistance to Israel has allowed Hamas to rebuild its image and exert tighter control over the enclave, as many Palestinians now perceive the militant group in more pragmatic terms, according to pollsters, analysts and Palestinians across Gaza.

In a poll published last month by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, based in the West Bank, 51% of Gazans surveyed expressed positive views of Hamas’s performance during the war, up from 43% in May and 39% just over a year ago. The poll had a margin of error of 3.5 percentage points. On a separate question about support for political parties in theoretical elections, 41% of Gazans said they aligned with Hamas, up 4 percentage points from five months prior and the highest level of support since December 2023.

Polling is difficult in Gaza’s wrecked cities. Surveyors interviewed people face to face on the Hamas side of the cease-fire dividing line as the militant group was engaging in battles with armed clans and carrying out public executions.

Khalil Shikaki, the director of the center that produced the poll, said that his pollsters interviewed Gazans in their tents using tablets and phones, and that results were directly sent to his servers. Many Gazans who were surveyed criticized Hamas, he said.

Still, the pollsters were surprised by the results. The trend over the past 12 months in previous polls has been declines or weakness in Hamas’s popularity, particularly in Gaza.

“To some extent, this war has proven to Gazans and others that Israel has failed to defeat it,” Shikaki said of the militant group. “Hamas isn’t going to disappear tomorrow. We have to live with that.”

A street in Gaza City lined with buildings that have suffered heavy damage. mohammed saber/epa/shutterstock

Earlier this year, hundreds of Gazans tired of being homeless and hungry protested against Hamas, which launched the Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel that left around 1,200 dead and 251 taken hostage and sparked the war. Many Gazans criticized Hamas for waiting too long to end the subsequent two years of fighting. The enclave was left in ruins, and more than 69,000 people died, according to Palestinian health authorities, who don’t say how many were combatants.

Many people in Gaza remain frustrated with Hamas and appalled by its violent crackdown.

“Hamas are the ones creating this chaos,” said Mohammad Burno, 33, an anti-Hamas activist who supports the rival Fatah party underpinning the Palestinian Authority, which governs much of the West Bank. “From their perspective, they call it maintaining security, but true security cannot be achieved through brutality.”

Early this month, the U.S. Central Command, which is helping monitor the cease-fire, released what it said was drone footage of suspected Hamas operatives stealing a truckload of aid after attacking its driver. Hamas denied any involvement in the incident.

Hamas today controls roughly 47% of Gaza, the area west of the so-called yellow line that marks the withdrawal limit for Israeli troops under the first phase of Trump’s plan. The other side of the yellow line, roughly 53% of the enclave, is controlled by Israel’s military.

The rise in Palestinian support for Hamas could complicate efforts to move the Trump plan into the second phase, which calls for Hamas to disarm and give up any role in a future Gaza government in exchange for a withdrawal by Israeli troops and their replacement by an international security force.

Palestinians surveyed in Gaza were split on the Trump plan’s call for disarming Hamas, with a slight majority of 55% opposed and 44% in support, according to the poll.

A slim majority of 52% of Gazans opposed the entry of an international force tasked with disarming Hamas, according to the poll.

“This majority means that a lot of people want Hamas to continue to have arms despite the fact that they don’t support Hamas,” Shikaki said. “There is fear of the ultimate Israeli objective in this war and, in the short term, fear of anarchy.”

Gazans have regularly complained about looting and violence as armed groups operated across the enclave during the war. Almeqdad Meqdad, a 31-year-old researcher who works with local aid organizations and lives in Gaza City, said the risk without a controlling authority is that Gaza would be divided up by 10 or 20 different militias.

Hamas controls roughly 47% of Gaza. omar al-qattaa/AFP/Getty Images

Israeli soldiers near the border with Gaza last month. jack guez/AFP/Getty Images

As the cease-fire removes the fear of being killed in bombardments, Meqdad has returned to his home and said he feels safer now that order has been restored in the streets.

“When weapons spread unchecked and there was no system or authority to enforce control, these groups began operating freely,” Meqdad said. “People don’t necessarily want Hamas to remain in power forever. They simply want stability until a new government is formed.”

Ebrahim Mqead, 47, who lives in central Gaza’s Deir al Balah, said people no longer feel adrift with Hamas running things. He wants the militant group to keep its weapons so that it remains capable of standing up to Israel “until rights are restored to their owners and Palestine is recognised as a land.”

The Trump plan has successfully halted most of the fighting in Gaza, but it has also opened the door for Hamas to consolidate its control. On the militant group’s side of the yellow line, there is currently no viable alternative.

Israel’s government came under heavy criticism during the war, including from its own security services, for failing to empower an alternative to Hamas. Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies, in Tel Aviv, and the Misgav Institute, an Israeli think tank, said Palestinians will continue to support Hamas—or at least not oppose it – until an alternative emerges.

Many Gazans agreed, saying they don’t want Hamas to play a role in a future government—if there is a credible alternative to maintain order.

“If there were a government or system capable of keeping order in the country, like Hamas did before, people would support it,” said Srour, the Gaza City businessman. “What people want at this stage is simply order, safety and a normal life—nothing more than that.”

Write to Sudarsan Raghavan at sudarsan.raghavan@wsj.com

WSJ

14. Advancing the SOF Profession: The future of IWI's SOF Focus Area

​Summary:

IWI is evolving its “SOF in Competition Project” into a broader SOF Program as a virtual team house for SOF professionals and partners. It aims to be the intellectual home for SOF in irregular warfare, curating ideas, education, and debate, and issues three calls to action: build the community, publish and speak, and join the team.

Comment: It was an honor to be asked, so I happily joined this team.

Advancing the SOF Profession: The future of IWI's SOF Focus Area

irregularwarfare.org · Joseph Long · November 17, 2025

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/advancing-the-sof-profession-the-future-of-iwis-sof-focus-area/

Since launching in August 2024, the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI) “SOF in Competition Project” has aspired to serve as the intellectual home for Special Operations Forces (SOF). As a retired Army Special Forces officer and leadership scholar, I am proud to have taken over this initiative from its founding director, Adam Darnley Stuart, to continue our collective pursuit of understanding the complex role of SOF in irregular warfare. In assuming this new role, we have reframed the “SOF in Competition Project” as the IWI “SOF Program,” providing an opportunity for us to outline our updated vision and present calls to action for the community.

The Significance of SOF in Irregular Warfare

The need for an intellectual home for SOF has been reinforced by the significant amount of content generated across the SOF enterprise exploring SOF activities and contemplating its role in a complex strategic environment. This activity demonstrates that the SOF community is a learning organism—we seek to quickly capture lessons learned, rigorously analyze their implications, and then share our findings with the broader community so we can move forward together to improve our craft and its relevance for achieving national and strategic objectives.

A similar dialogue has emerged regarding irregular warfare, enabled by IWI’s core mission statement to bridge the gap between policymakers, practitioners, and academics. SOF play a significant role in the discussion and the implementation of irregular warfare. While SOF are not the only actors in irregular warfare, irregular warfare is the central activity of SOF.

However, irregular warfare is a team sport and SOF do not compete or campaign in a vacuum. Irregular warfare is often played out in Title 22 environments and in the gray zone where collaboration is crucial, and building dynamic networks across sectors is key to success.

Vision: A Virtual Team House for SOF Thinkers

The shift in this initiative is more than semantic; it is necessary to promote a long-term vision for the future of the SOF profession.

SOF professionals, seeking to sharpen their understanding of irregular warfare and their role in attacking complex national security challenges, need a home where they are afforded opportunities to build community and networks across the joint force, interagency, industry, and research base; to engage in professional discourse as both consumers and influencers; and to grow professionally.

The purpose of the IWI SOF Program is to curate a virtual “team house” where we explore the big ideas impacting SOF and engage in constructive discussions and substantive debate. While acknowledging the past to understand our present, our primary focus will be on conceptualizing the future of SOF in an ever-changing global landscape. The team house is not just for operators, but for all stakeholders in the SOF enterprise.

The SOF Program will continue to serve as a one-stop shop for SOF-related professional growth, cognitive exploration, and the development of SOF concepts that drive public dialogue, while also offering opportunities for community members to volunteer with IWI or participate in meaningful leadership opportunities.

Call to Action 1: Build the Community

IWI recognizes the power of human networks and bridges the gaps between our different professional and academic communities. But the strength of IWI’s human networks and the effectiveness of IWI in fulfilling its mission statement depend on active participation across our community. As part of the SOF Program, I invite you to consume website content regularly and engage with content creators and team members. Although the first objective of IWI is to build a community, merely creating a community is not the end goal. Lasting success and relevance will result from proactive engagement by individuals across the IWI community with relevant backgrounds and expertise. That is how the SOF Program will unearth game-changing insights to advance the profession.

Call to Action 2: Give Voice to Your Passion

The SOF Program website is a digital flagpole for our professional community. It is dedicated to our pursuit of knowledge sharing, spirited discussion, and opportunities for refining these ideas through professional discourse. We encourage you to view the program as an opportunity for members of the SOF community of interest to offer a published voice to our collective passion for the SOF profession. In this program, you can write an article, propose a podcast episode, or plan/co-plan an event with the IWI SOF community. We welcome all submissions as opportunities for motivated individuals to have a platform for sharing new ideas and innovative recommendations.

We are seeking thought leadership that offers meaningful insights into all aspects of SOF and IW as we embark on a new chapter in the program’s development. Areas of exploration include, but are not limited to:

• Exploring each of the SOF core activities in the modern national security context
• Showcasing the impact of the SOF profession on the future of irregular and conventional warfare
• Exploring SOF’s complex nexus between the human domain and emerging new technologies
• Shaping the SOF Identity
• Discussing and defining requirements for SOF Education
• Reflecting on SOF organizational structures
• Identifying and conceptualizing historical experiences into meaningful lessons learned
• Recruitment, training, and sustainment challenges

The possibilities are endless, and we encourage you to think creatively and contribute your unique perspectives.

Call to Action 3: Join the Team

The IWI SOF Program will feature all team members on the IWI website, enabling them to gain valuable thought leadership experience within the SOF community and contribute meaningfully to shaping the SOF profession. As a member of the team, we will not only showcase your expertise on social media platforms but also encourage your own initiative in promoting new topics and shaping existing discussions.

The SOF Program aims to have a significant impact across the entire SOF world, and we cannot achieve this without participation from talented and experienced scholars, practitioners, and industry professionals who make up the SOF community. We invite you to join us on this exciting journey to advance the future of SOF. Reach out and help us make a difference!

Dr. Joseph Long is the Director of the IWI SOF Program. He is also a retired Green Beret officer, leadership scholar, author, and public speaker. Dr. Long currently works as a the Program Manager and Senior Policy Analyst in support of the Office of Information Operations Policy (OIOP) for the Assistant Secretary of War for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD SO/LIC), and serves as a 2025 IWI Non-Resident Fellow, Special Operations Association of America (SOAA) Advisory Board Member, and former Professor of Leadership and Ethics at the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

Main Image courtesy of DVIDS.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

Related Posts

• The Cyber-SOF-Space Triad and the Future of Army Special Operations
• Episode 78 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores the evolution of Army special operations forces (ARSOF) and the ways that ARSOF can contribute to future irregular warfare campaigns around the world. Our…
• SOF in Competition Kickoff Event — Future of Irregular Warfare Conference
• Are you interested in understanding more about Indo-Pacific security dilemmas? Between 16-18 October UNSW Canberra in partnership with the Irregular Warfare Initiative to provide a unique and expertly facilitated opportunity…
• SOF and Influence Activities
• Episode 116 of the Irregular Warfare Podcast explores the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in influence activities, featuring insights from Professor Martijn Kitson and Major General Ron Smits. The…

irregularwarfare.org · Joseph Long · November 17, 2025

​15.The Day After: What Successful Regime Change in Venezuela Would Really Take

​Summary:

U.S. “counternarcotics” strikes and military buildup around Venezuela resemble the preparation for regime change, but warns this would be no quick win. Venezuela’s dense air defenses, coup-proofed security architecture, criminalized elites, and foreign backers mean pressure or decapitation alone will not trigger collapse. Any intervention would inherit a fractured, armed society and severe regional fallout. Real success hinges on the “day after”: a Machado-González–led transition that quickly secures streets, stabilizes basic services and wallets, sequences justice carefully, strikes bargains with security forces, and builds a broad, inclusive governing coalition rather than relying on offshore bombardment.

Excerpts:

Build a New Government that Reflects the People

Strike a Security Bargain that Shrinks the Battlefield

Maintain Peace by Protecting People’s Routines Immediately

Sequence Justice so it Heals Instead of Harms

Stabilize Wallets While Stabilizing Streets

Comment: I am glad that someone is thinking about "what comes next?"

The Day After: What Successful Regime Change in Venezuela Would Really Take

warontherocks.com · November 17, 2025

Orlando J. Pérez

November 17, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/the-day-after-what-successful-regime-change-in-venezuela-would-really-take/

What if the “counternarcotics” strikes against boats suspected of moving drugs aren’t really about cocaine at all, but about toppling Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro?

What’s happening now in the Caribbean — repeated airstrikes, detainee transfers to third countries, public hints of covert authorities, and a military build-up — looks like scaffolding for something larger. U.S. forces have been gathering in the Caribbean for weeks, suggesting an effort to overthrow Maduro may be on the horizon soon.

If the Trump administration drifts from interdiction to regime change, it will be forced to confront three hard truths. First, a quick win is unlikely, because any operation would face a larger, more entrenched security ecosystem than past U.S. interventions in Latin America have. Second, Maduro has spent a decade “coup-proofing” his regime by building overlapping structures that can survive leadership decapitation. Finally, the aftermath will be a political project for Venezuelans as much as a security mission for a foreign military force. The opposition and any transition government would carry the heaviest load — and face the highest risks — once the shooting stops.

BECOME A MEMBER

Not a Quick Win

Venezuela fields more than 100,000 military and paramilitary personnel and sits behind one of the densest integrated air defense networks in the hemisphere. Its S-300VM and Buk-M2 surface-to-air systems, paired with Su-30MK2 fighters, would make the early phases of any intervention — especially the fight for air superiority — slow, costly, and politically fraught. Even optimistic planners estimate that a minimally viable invasion and stabilization force would require upwards of 50,000 troops. Securing Caracas, sealing porous borders, and guarding key infrastructure would demand far more.

With no U.S. basing rights in Venezuela, every sortie, surveillance mission, medevac, and resupply run would have to launch from ships offshore or from reluctant third countries. And “reluctant” may be generous — no Latin American state is likely to support a ground invasion.

Toppling Maduro is the easy part. What follows is the hard strategic slog of policing a sprawling, heavily armed society where state services have collapsed and regime loyalists, criminal syndicates, and colectivos — pro-government armed groups that police neighborhoods and terrorize dissidents — all compete for turf. Colombia’s National Liberation Army and dissident Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia factions operate openly from Venezuelan safe havens, running mining and smuggling routes, recruiting, and staging cross-border attacks. They would not go quietly.

Regionally, Washington would face stiff diplomatic headwinds. Brazil and Colombia have already bristled at recent U.S. maritime enforcement actions, telegraphing the political costs of a wider campaign. Overflight rights, third-country basing, intelligence cooperation, and status-of-forces agreements would almost certainly be withheld. Any assistance that materializes would be narrow, conditional, and transactional — border deconfliction, refugee management, maybe limited police cooperation. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s offer to mediate between Washington and Caracas signals just how far Brazil is from anything resembling operational support.

A major conflict would trigger large-scale civilian flight, pushing fragile neighbors toward humanitarian crisis and political instability.

External actors would further complicate the picture. Russia and Cuba are deeply embedded in Venezuela’s security and intelligence apparatus. Moscow, Caracas’ primary military patron, is unlikely to deploy combat forces, but it doesn’t have to. Intelligence sharing, electronic warfare support, and discreet logistics could raise operational costs. Russian aircraft deliveries in late October — after an unusually circuitous flight path — underscore that quiet resupply continues. Russian weaponry anchors Venezuela’s air defenses, air force, and small-arms production, and Russian technicians remain integral to keeping much of it running. Wagner-linked contractors have reinforced Maduro’s security detail during past crises, and that footprint could expand if fighting intensifies.

Cuban advisers, long woven into Venezuela’s intelligence and counterintelligence services, wouldn’t bring battalions — but they don’t need to. Havana can shape surveillance, internal coordination, and regime cohesion in ways that matter when a government is under military and political stress.

Some advocates now insist the Maduro regime could “collapse” without a single U.S. boot on the ground: A wave of inland kinetic strikes on military installations, command-and-control nodes, leadership compounds, and cartel-linked targets is supposed to trigger elite splits and prompt the armed forces to move against Maduro. But a regime collapse engineered by bombardment is still regime change by force, and you don’t escape the Pottery Barn problem by keeping troops offshore — you simply outsource the chaos to Venezuelans and their neighbors while betting the local military will finish your work for you.

Maduro’s System is Hard to Break

The heart of the problem in Maduro’s Venezuela is “coup-proofing” — how rulers configure coercive institutions so no single betrayal or external shock brings them down. Autocrats tend to stack the deck with competing security bodies, cultivate overlapping intelligence services, and reward loyalists with patronage and illicit rents. Erica de Bruin shows that removing dictators rarely ends with toppling one man. Lasting transitions require overwhelming security forces, police-heavy stabilization, and durable institutions that don’t currently exist in the country

Venezuela is a textbook case of coup-proofing with local twists. Since the Hugo Chávez years of 1999 to 2013, Maduro has organized military and paramilitary forces into a layer cake of security and repression, involving the regular armed forces (Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana), the Bolivarian National Guard, competing intelligence agencies (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia Nacional and Dirección General de Contrainteligencia Militar), and colectivos.

These parallel forces not only deter external threats but also monitor each other and the armed forces, thereby making coordinated rebellion more difficult. On top of that, the regime has bound senior military officers to its survival through criminal rents — from illegal gold mining to smuggling and drug logistics — so that a post-Maduro future looks less like exile and more like prison. This is precisely the kind of elite-loyalty market that sustains authoritarian endurance.

This baked-in structural insulation helps explain why escalating pressure, whether through sanctions, kinetic strikes, or psychological operations, has repeatedly failed to produce decisive fractures among Venezuelan elites. Indeed, the April 30, 2019 military uprising fizzled and the 2020 “Operation Gideon” seaborne raid collapsed immediately. The military is entangled in a web of mutual surveillance, criminal rents, and institutional overlap, all designed to punish defection. Even targeted violence or the threat of regime decapitation does not shift the internal balance when those being pressured see no viable path to personal safety, power, or immunity. Without holding territory or the means to offer credible guarantees, external actors cannot broker elite realignments from offshore. In this environment, the idea that outside pressure alone will catalyze regime collapse is not a strategy — it’s wishful thinking.

Decades of abuses by security and intelligence forces have narrowed safe exit options for regime officials. Research on autocratization and civil-military relations shows that human rights abuses raise the cost of defection and entrench loyalty by fear. Security forces and colectivos have been implicated in killings of protesters and widespread repression. Courts lack independence and reinforce impunity. Harold Trinkunas’ study of the armed forces across the Punto Fijo era from 1958 to 1998 and the Bolivarian revolution of 1998–2004 explains how attempts to embed civilian control within the armed forces left pockets of politicized coercion that later became levers for an authoritarian turn.

Decapitation doesn’t end repression. Remove the leadership, and you are left with armed fragments: colectivos, loyalist police splinters, intelligence units with their own files and grudges, and cross-border insurgent dissidents who don’t take orders from Caracas. That environment punishes naivety and rewards careful political planning.

The Day After: González, Machado, and the Toil of Governing

On July 28, 2024, independent tallies showed Edmundo González Urrutia won the presidential election, with María Corina Machado as the architect and mobilizer calling the shots. Several countries have formally recognized González as Venezuela’s legitimate president-elect, including the United States, Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. The European Parliament also passed a resolution recognizing him. Machado’s 2025 Nobel Peace Prize expanded the duo’s reach internationally, bringing moral authority and media influence.

External recognition matters politically and financially. It opens doors to high-level engagement with leaders of powerful countries and can unlock control over certain state assets abroad and sanctions licensing. Yet, by itself it does not transfer control over territory, security forces, or ministries inside Venezuela.

Think of the transition as a tandem bike. If González and Machado ride in rhythm, they can turn a moral victory into a governing coalition. If they drift apart, the corrupted system they inherit will exploit every gap.

González’s diplomatic experience as the former Venezuelan ambassador to Argentina and technocratic profile reassures moderates, public servants, and nervous neighbors. He can be a president who communicates measurable objectives and the trade-offs and timelines to achieve them. That matters to public servants who must keep the state running and to neighboring countries who must police porous borders. The risk is to seem like a figurehead. He needs to demonstrate ownership of day-one deliverables — power stabilization targets, police vetting criteria, accessible humanitarian corridors — so Venezuelans see a government, not a personality cult.

Machado brings energy, clarity, and a national network that has already shown it can mobilize voters, monitor polling stations, and absorb regime pressure. Her Nobel Prize provides a platform and international contacts from Brussels to Brasília, crucial for garnering initial humanitarian aid and early investor interest — if security on the ground holds. Her clear communication can keep a broad coalition united during the difficult early months. The danger is polarization: Regime hardliners will label every move as a foreign imposition, and some undecided parties will interpret reform as retribution when the government announces changes. Her challenge is to defuse this narrative by sharing credit, highlighting credible moderates, and appearing in locales that didn’t vote for her.

A Machado-González-led government should focus on several key tasks to stabilize the country after foreign military intervention or regime collapse.

Build a New Government that Reflects the People

For starters, the cabinet should be ideologically diverse and capable. This means putting key Democratic Unitary Platform parties in government positions, placing respected independents in justice and finance, and keeping on pragmatic Chavista technocrats who accept the new rules of the game. Doing so will cool tensions among those who did not vote for the opposition and prevents spoilers from claiming that “the victors are here to purge.” Machado’s win opens doors, and González’s temperament helps keep them open.

Strike a Security Bargain that Shrinks the Battlefield

Coup-proofing left Venezuela with rival security organs, colectivos, and criminal‑political hybrid groups. The transition requires a visible, credible offer to mid-level officers and rank-and-file police: stay, help restore order, and keep your career, provided you have clean hands. At the same time, the new government should draw clear red lines for torture and repression, with early, fair prosecutions for the worst crimes. Appoint a defense minister and an interior minister who can communicate effectively with both the armed forces and victims’ families, thereby carrying legitimacy in both worlds. Promise amnesty for disarmament to low-level colectivo members. Ensure speedy trials for those who keep shooting. Make the incentives obvious.

Maintain Peace by Protecting People’s Routines Immediately

Revenge politics destroys countries. The transition should depoliticize, not eliminate, the social programs that millions depend on. Keep food distribution running under neutral management. Prioritize electricity, water, clinics, and transit. Quickly put vetted and supervised police back on the streets. Publish daily dashboards: fewer blackouts, more clinic stockpiles, fewer homicides, and reopened schools. The public will accept slow reforms, but they won’t tolerate chaos.

Sequence Justice so it Heals Instead of Harms

Venezuela needs justice for torture, disappearances, and corruption. It also needs to avoid the Iraq trap: Purge too broadly and you create an insurgency. Start with the worst offenders prosecuted by revitalized independent courts. Establish a “truth commission,” similar to other cases of post-conflict transitions, with victim participation to ensure families are heard and the record is set. Offer conditional amnesty to lesser offenders who disarm and tell the truth. Use hybrid or internationalized mechanisms to bolster due process until national courts are rebuilt.

Stabilize Wallets While Stabilizing Streets

With U.S. sanctions likely lifting as the new government comes to power, act quickly on an emergency stabilization kit: Initiate temporary cash transfers to the poorest households; prioritize fuel for hospitals, food distribution, and water systems; and unify the exchange rate under a simple, transparent rule with a rebuilt, independent central bank. Treat early oil and donor inflows as bridge financing, not patronage. Publish where every dollar goes and audit major purchases. Use Machado’s Nobel profile to convene a donors’ roundtable with the Interamerican Development Bank, World Bank, Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean, and International Monetary Fund to sequence emergency grants. Mobilize the diaspora for skills and short-term projects back home and expedite credentialing and match remittances to local initiatives so goodwill translates into payrolls and infrastructure.

Own the Day After

There will always be a temptation to act fast — strike, claim victory, and hand off governance. Maduro’s Venezuela punishes that kind of wishful thinking. The military problem can be solved. The political situation is the real challenge.

A solid plan starts with what comes after regime change: A transition cabinet representing the whole country; restoring public order in days, not months; delivering justice that punishes the worst human rights abuses without creating martyrs or mass outcasts; neutralizing external rogue actors; and providing immediate relief that shows up in households first — cash transfers, food stocks, and fuel for water, power, and clinics — before any new debt-service outlays or bondholder deals. The plan should involve local partners who can spot trouble before a foreign patrol does: re-vetted municipal police, harbor masters and customs officers, fisher cooperatives, utility and clinic managers, and neighborhood councils that spot anomalies early and route warnings fast to commanders. Honest communication at home about costs and timelines is crucial. Without candor, political support erodes quickly.

If Washington remains focused on counternarcotics, it should shift toward law enforcement that relies on evidence, transparency, and court prosecutions. Even with the current military build-up in the region, there is still time to pivot to restore legal legitimacy and invite regional cooperation. But a pivot seems less likely by the day given the continued gathering of U.S. forces near Venezuela.

If the build-up becomes a full-scale invasion, it would be foolish to assume it would be a weekend mission. Be clear about troop numbers, timelines, and trade-offs, then align resources with goals. If you choose to intervene, do so with appropriate scale because in Venezuela, democracy isn’t just about toppling a regime, but about building a functioning state in the following weeks, months, and years.

BECOME A MEMBER

Orlando J. Pérez, Ph.D., is a political science professor at the University of North Texas at Dallas. He authored Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Societies: Transforming the Role of the Military in Central America and Political Culture in Panama: Democracy after Invasion; co-authored Making Police Reform Matter in Latin America, and co-edited Democracy and Security in Latin America: State Capacity and Governance under Stress. As a consultant, he has worked on issues of democratization, civil-military relations, and anti-corruption for the United States Agency for International Development and the United Nations Development Program.

Image: Eneas De Troya via Wikimedia Commons

warontherocks.com · November 17, 2025

16. Hundreds of US troops are helping in the Philippines after back-to-back typhoons

​Summary:

Over 450 U.S. troops with aircraft are aiding Philippine forces after typhoons Kalmaegi and Fung-Wong, delivering relief supplies as part of Task Force Philippines.

Comment: Allies doing what allies do for each other.

Hundreds of US troops are helping in the Philippines after back-to-back typhoons

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson · November 17, 2025

https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2025-11-17/philippines-typhoon-relief-mission-19792383.html?utm

A Philippine airman, center, and U.S. Marines assigned to the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit and Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 262 unload hundreds of family food packs in Virac, Philippines, Nov. 15, 2025. (Luis Agostini/U.S. Marine Corps)

More than 450 U.S. service members are assisting the Philippines with disaster relief after two powerful storms killed hundreds and forced millions to move this month, according to a military task force operating in the country.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on Thursday announced the joint relief mission with Philippine forces in response to Typhoon Kalmaegi, which struck Nov. 4, and Typhoon Fung-Wong, which arrived five days later.

Kalmaegi devastated Cebu, parts of the Visayas and the southern island of Mindanao, causing massive flooding that killed 232 people. Fung-Wong battered much of Luzon and portions of the Visayas, with at least 26 dead, the Philippines’ National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council announced Monday.

Almost 1.5 million people had been evacuated with more than a million displaced on Nov. 12, the council reported.

The country experiences more tropical cyclones than any other nation, with about 20 typhoons entering the region each year and eight or nine making landfall, according to the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration.

Over 450 U.S. troops deployed to Clark Air Base north of Manila as part of the relief effort, Marine 1st Lt. Greyson Anthos, spokesman for Task Force — Philippines, said by email Friday.

Anthos said the U.S. troops at Clark are flying MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors, KC-130J Super Hercules airlifters and HH-60W Pave Hawk helicopters and have brought additional logistical equipment. Initial relief operations included delivering 10,000 family food packs to the island province of Catanduanes in eastern Philippines, he said.

“The U.S. military will continue to work shoulder to shoulder with the Armed Forces of the Philippines to provide aid and assistance to the people of the Philippines,” Anthos said.

The task force did not identify specific units, but the 374th Airlift Wing at Yokota Air Base in Tokyo posted photos Saturday showing its personnel departing for the Philippines. The mission is the first for the wing’s Logistics Quick Reaction Force, according to the post.

Task Force — Philippines was announced on Oct. 31 by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro on the sidelines of a meeting of Association of Southeast Asian Nations defense ministers in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The task force is also intended to help deter aggression in the South China Sea.

The U.S. government is providing $1.5 million in emergency assistance on top of $1 million already delivered for typhoon victims, the U.S. Embassy in Manila said Saturday. The aid includes support for logistics, emergency shelter, water, sanitation and evacuation center management.

U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson announced the additional funding during a visit to Clark with Teodoro on Saturday, the state-run Philippine News Agency reported. The pair observed staging, loading and rapid-response operations and praised personnel working on relief efforts.

“Your dedication, teamwork, and compassion embody the very best of what partnership represents,” Carlson said.

Seth Robson

Seth Robson

Seth Robson is a Tokyo-based reporter who has been with Stars and Stripes since 2003. He has been stationed in Japan, South Korea and Germany, with frequent assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Australia and the Philippines.

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson · November 17, 2025

17. A Grand Bargain With Venezuela

​Summary:

POTUS' naval buildup and covert moves toward Venezuela are unlikely to dislodge Maduro by force and instead should be leveraged for a negotiated “grand bargain.” Rather than immediate regime change or quick elections, Washington should push both Maduro and the opposition into a long-term power-sharing pact, with guaranteed opposition representation in courts, electoral bodies, and oversight institutions, constitutional reforms that limit executive power, and joint management of economic recovery. Sanctions relief and international backing would support reconstruction. Gradual, sequenced elections would follow only after institutions and the economy stabilize, offering the most realistic path to durable democratization.

Excerpts:

For American officials eager to get rid of Maduro, a pacted transition might sound far too slow and far too intricate. But in Venezuela, there are no shortcuts to a better future, and this proposal’s deliberate pace is why it holds more promise than any alternative promising immediate solutions. By limiting the government’s ability to rig elections while simultaneously constraining the opposition’s capacity to abuse executive authority, it generates the inc2entives for both sides needed to make a peaceful transfer of power viable. More important, it would cause immediate improvements in the living conditions of Venezuelans—freeing hundreds of political prisoners and leading to a rapid economic recovery that would stem outward migration. It would also contribute to addressing Washington’s political priorities by allowing the United States and Venezuela to work together to reduce transnational crime and migration pressures.

This agreement will be staunchly opposed by extremists on both ends of the Venezuela’s political spectrum. But that is not unusual: democratic transitions are, more than anything, a process of finding common ground between moderates on different sides of polarized polities. Other countries have managed to bridge these divides, and Venezuela can, too. The United States and its partners can help by supporting negotiations aimed at helping the country establish a broad political consensus on a path forward.

The potential upside to the current U.S. military buildup off the coast of Venezuela may lie precisely in the uncertainty it has generated. In classic Art of the Deal style, Trump has single-handedly raised the stakes of Venezuela’s political conflict. The risks are now high not just for the Maduro government, which faces the real prospect of a massive military attack, but also for the opposition, whose near-total dependence on U.S. support has been laid bare. Trump’s threat of fire and fury could presage violence. But it could just as easily create an opening for a negotiated transition—one that breaks a catastrophic stalemate and allows Venezuelans to reclaim their future.

Comment: Perhaps this is POTUS' plan all along since we have heard reports he is willing to talk to Maduro. Perhaps he will offer him a deal he cannot resist.

A Grand Bargain With Venezuela

Foreign Affairs · More by Francisco Rodríguez · November 17, 2025

American Force Won’t Dislodge Maduro, but American Diplomacy Might

Francisco Rodríguez

November 17, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/venezuela/grand-bargain-venezuela

A Venezuelan flag at a march in Caracas, November 2025 Leonardo Fernandez Viloria / Reuters

FRANCISCO RODRÍGUEZ is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and a faculty affiliate at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of Global and Public Affairs. He is the author of The Collapse of Venezuela: Scorched Earth Politics and Economic Decline, 2012–2020.

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

U.S. President Donald Trump, it seems, has it out for Venezuela. Over the summer, his administration began massing naval power in the Caribbean, largely near the country’s coast, and striking ships soon after they exit its territorial waters. In October, he authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to carry out operations within Venezuela’s borders. And Trump has repeatedly railed against President Nicolás Maduro, accusing him of emptying Venezuelan prisons into the United States and saying that his days in office are numbered. This week, Washington moved an aircraft carrier group to the Caribbean, and Trump was briefed on possible military options, including land strikes. Publicly, the White House maintains its operations are simply designed to stop narcotics—not to facilitate regime change. But the scale of the military deployment (it is the largest in the Caribbean since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) and the accompanying rhetoric suggest Washington’s real objective is toppling the government.

If Trump does attack Venezuela, it is unlikely to end well. Short of an invasion—a move for which there is little domestic appetite and for which the current mobilization is inadequate—a show of force will probably not be enough to bring down Maduro’s regime. As the political scientists Alexander Downes and Lindsey O’Rourke wrote in Foreign Affairs, airstrikes alone have never driven a leader from office. Even if U.S. efforts somehow succeeded here, Venezuela’s military would almost certainly replace Maduro with an insider. And even if, against all odds, Venezuela’s opposition seized sudden control of the country, there is no guarantee that its ascendance would lead to a durable, democratic transition.

Trump, of course, could decide to attack anyway. But the White House probably knows that a simple show of force won’t topple Maduro, and for all of Trump’s fiery rhetoric, he has historically opposed large-scale military interventions involving prolonged deployments and nation building.

Instead, throughout his two administrations, Trump has consistently approached thorny domestic and foreign policy issues via a strategy he laid out in his 1987 book, The Art of the Deal: escalate to negotiate. Shortly after North Korea tested nuclear missiles capable of hitting the United States in 2018, Trump threatened it with “fire and fury like the world has never seen.” He then held three summits on denuclearization with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump threatened to pull the United States out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization if other members did not raise their own levels of military spending. Most did, and so Washington has stayed put. And in April, Trump raised tariffs on almost every country in the world, only to pause many of the levies in order to negotiate with states for lower trade barriers.

If Trump’s plan is to force regime change in Venezuela, then he could be walking into an embarrassing and expensive failure. But if he sees the military buildup as a prelude to a diplomatic overture, he has a shot at notching perhaps the most significant foreign policy win of his administration. To succeed, however, Washington must understand that democratic transitions do not happen overnight. Instead, they tend to occur after extensive negotiations in which the dictatorship agrees to start sharing authority with its critics. Free and fair elections come at the end—not at the beginning—of these transitions, because institutional reforms and a period of coexistence with the outgoing regime are needed to make a peaceful transfer feasible.

The United States should thus use its leverage to get both sides of Venezuela’s internal political conflict to the negotiating table. It should then force each to abandon its maximalist goal—obliterating the other—and instead, accept sharing power. A deal that does this may not feel as satisfying to some as would a military strike. Unlike a CIA operation to remove Maduro, it does not promise immediate results. But it is far more likely to be effective at advancing U.S. interests, improving the lives of Venezuelans, and setting the stage for the country’s democratization.

CHANGE YOU CAN BELIEVE IN

When it comes to attempts at regime change, Venezuela is a graveyard of ideas. During Trump’s first administration, the United States imposed punitive economic sanctions on the country’s oil and mining sectors, believing that depriving the government of crucial resources would lead to its implosion. It didn’t: Maduro stayed in power, even as the sanctions helped provoke the largest peacetime economic contraction and migration exodus in modern history. The Biden administration took a different approach, offering partial sanctions relief in exchange for commitments to hold free elections. But this, too, floundered. During the country’s 2024 contest, more than half of Venezuelans turned out to vote, and according to the opposition’s methodical collection of official tally sheets, the former diplomat Edmundo González overwhelmingly prevailed. But electoral authorities declared Maduro the winner anyway, and his government forcefully put down the resulting protests.

But there is another approach to handling Maduro, one that has not been properly attempted: brokering a coexistence agreement between the president and his opponents. Rather than forcing Maduro to give up power immediately—a demand that has repeatedly proven unrealistic—the goal with such a deal would be to incentivize his government to gradually yet meaningfully democratize.

This idea shares some elements with the first Trump administration’s Democratic Transition Framework for Venezuela. That plan, outlined in 2020, would have created a Council of State featuring both government and opposition representatives to oversee a transition to free and fair elections. But the framework treated the power-sharing council as a short-term bridge to national elections, which would come within, at most, a year. To work, coexistence agreements almost always need to run for a longer time, as this one should.

An anti-Chavista president could become the mirror image of Maduro.

Done right, a coexistence deal would have good odds of democratizing Venezuela, at least relative to the alternatives. Decades of political science research show that these kinds of so-called pacted transitions offer one of the most stable avenues for ending authoritarian rule. Latin America alone has multiple states—Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay—in which reforms initiated by an authoritarian government created a level political playing field that has lasted across multiple governments. It is, by contrast, rare to find cases in which an external intervention has led to a durable process of democratization, absent a prolonged military occupation.

And Venezuela, in particular, needs a pacted transition. After years of dictatorship, the country is deeply divided. Although most of the country opposes Maduro, nearly one-third of the population still identifies with him. Many more people—over half the country—have a positive view of Hugo Chávez, the populist former president who mentored Maduro and, before dying in 2013, named Maduro as his successor. To successfully undertake major reforms, Venezuela’s next leader will thus need support from at least some Chavistas.

Without a power-sharing deal, however, Venezuela’s opposition is unlikely to construct a big tent. Instead, it might use the presidency to seek revenge. It has, after all, failed to condemn the forced deportations and killings of Venezuelans in the Caribbean. It has advocated for sanctions that have severely damaged the country’s economy. It has, in other words, subordinated human rights concerns to political objectives—the hallmark of an authoritarian movement. Coupled with Venezuela’s winner-take-all political institutions, it is not hard to imagine an anti-Chavista president becoming the mirror image of Maduro and using the institutions of the state to viciously persecute opponents.

If anti-Chavista leaders do prioritize vengeance, Venezuela will not only face continued autocracy and economic malaise but also risk civil war. The country’s military is packed with Chavistas, and should Venezuela’s next leader systematically purge them, they might start an armed insurgency—drawing on support from Colombian guerrillas and organized criminal networks that have a strong presence in Venezuela. The result could be a prolonged internal conflict, reminiscent of the one that has plagued Colombia for over 50 years.

AN OFFER YOU CAN’T REFUSE

To work, a Venezuelan grand bargain will need to ensure that both dueling factions are represented in the country’s many political and legal institutions. A stable democracy requires not just elections but also arrangements that limit executive power and make political competition safe and meaningful. Transitioning away from autocracy is difficult precisely because autocratic governments lack such bodies and rules; instead, they tend to concentrate authority, opening the temptation for opposition movements to similarly abuse power once they reach office. Venezuela’s constitution, for example, allows the president to convene elections for a constitutional convention that can dissolve the other branches of government at any time. This prerogative would almost certainly be used by the opposition upon taking charge to drive Chavistas from all state institutions.

But Trump might be able to prevent a vicious cycle—while still easing out Maduro—by compelling Venezuela’s two camps to forge a joint agreement. The country’s opposition is highly dependent on Washington and thus ill positioned to refuse its demands. Meanwhile, by confronting the Maduro regime with an existential threat unlike any it has faced, Trump has gained new leverage over Caracas. This puts him in a position to make both sides an offer they can’t refuse: a framework for political coexistence with institutional guarantees, backed by the United States and other major international actors (who would also promise to help facilitate economic recovery).

In practice, this would mean representatives from the regime would need to agree to carve out quotas for the opposition in key branches of government. Opposition figures should, for example, receive guaranteed representation in the supreme court, the electoral council, and the country’s key oversight institutions. A credible arrangement would appoint opposition representatives to eight of the 20 seats in the supreme court, with another four justices chosen from figures acceptable to both sides; similar ratios should be used for appointments to the electoral council. Opposition-nominated justices should hold a majority of votes in some key supreme court chambers, such as the Criminal Cassation Chamber, which reviews prosecutions for human rights abuses and can overturn politically motivated convictions. Similarly, negotiators must agree to the appointment of a new prosecutor general, comptroller general, and ombudsperson. At least one of these positions should be held by an opposition nominee, and another by a figure acceptable to both sides. An impartial or opposition-aligned comptroller general (who oversees the use of public funds and investigates corruption in public administration), for example, could reassess the bans on political participation that have played a key role in reducing the competitiveness of Venezuelan elections.

In Venezuela, there are no shortcuts to a better future.

Some of these reforms will require that Venezuela amend its constitution. Right now, it is the text of an electoral autocracy, not a democracy. A revised document must reduce the power of the executive branch and enshrine protections that ensure the losers of future elections will not be persecuted. It must also abolish the power of constitutional conventions to dissolve nonexecutive branches of government, create a bicameral legislature with binding supermajority requirements for key laws, and establish explicit provisions blocking whatever side wins the next election from manipulating the country’s transitional judiciary and oversight bodies. Most important, the new constitution should emerge from an inclusive national discussion and be approved by Venezuelan voters in a referendum. That referendum would double as an opportunity for the new electoral authority to establish its credibility before Venezuelans—and before the world.

Reforming Venezuela’s institutions will, naturally, be a protracted process. But there are steps the country could take immediately, including ending political persecution and other human rights abuses. The government should begin with the release of all political prisoners and the approval of a new law to limit arbitrary detention. It could create an impartial oversight body, assisted by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and empower it to supervise the conditions of any remaining or new detainees in real time and to order investigations for human rights abuses. This body would also have the authority to ensure that the country’s National Telecommunications Office stops using its regulatory authority to censor speech.

These institutional and legal reforms would go a long way in facilitating Venezuela’s democratic transition. But they are not enough to secure the country’s future. As part of any agreement, the government and the opposition must work together to revive Venezuela’s moribund economy. They can start by crafting an internationally backed economic reconstruction program aimed at reinserting the country into global oil and financial markets. To do so, the government and opposition could jointly appoint nonpartisan experts to head the country’s central bank and oil company. The United States would lift all economic sanctions on the country and, in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund and private creditors, coordinate to give Venezuela the financial and technical assistance it needs to embark on reforms aimed at restoring its economic competitiveness and rebuilding its social and physical infrastructure.

Eventually, the country would hold elections at different levels of government. But the timetable for doing so must be gradual. Venezuela will be unable to carry out a free and fair contest until its new institutional framework is consolidated and the economy is clearly rebounding—a process that is likely to take three to five years. Even then, elections must proceed under a predetermined schedule: first local, then regional, then parliamentary, and finally presidential. The transitory judiciary, electoral, and oversight bodies that embody the power-sharing arrangements will have to remain in place, with the same split membership, through at least the first posttransition presidential term.

LEARNING TO LIVE TOGETHER

For American officials eager to get rid of Maduro, a pacted transition might sound far too slow and far too intricate. But in Venezuela, there are no shortcuts to a better future, and this proposal’s deliberate pace is why it holds more promise than any alternative promising immediate solutions. By limiting the government’s ability to rig elections while simultaneously constraining the opposition’s capacity to abuse executive authority, it generates the incentives for both sides needed to make a peaceful transfer of power viable. More important, it would cause immediate improvements in the living conditions of Venezuelans—freeing hundreds of political prisoners and leading to a rapid economic recovery that would stem outward migration. It would also contribute to addressing Washington’s political priorities by allowing the United States and Venezuela to work together to reduce transnational crime and migration pressures.

This agreement will be staunchly opposed by extremists on both ends of the Venezuela’s political spectrum. But that is not unusual: democratic transitions are, more than anything, a process of finding common ground between moderates on different sides of polarized polities. Other countries have managed to bridge these divides, and Venezuela can, too. The United States and its partners can help by supporting negotiations aimed at helping the country establish a broad political consensus on a path forward.

The potential upside to the current U.S. military buildup off the coast of Venezuela may lie precisely in the uncertainty it has generated. In classic Art of the Deal style, Trump has single-handedly raised the stakes of Venezuela’s political conflict. The risks are now high not just for the Maduro government, which faces the real prospect of a massive military attack, but also for the opposition, whose near-total dependence on U.S. support has been laid bare. Trump’s threat of fire and fury could presage violence. But it could just as easily create an opening for a negotiated transition—one that breaks a catastrophic stalemate and allows Venezuelans to reclaim their future.

Foreign Affairs · More by Francisco Rodríguez · November 17, 2025

18. How to Fix Free Trade

​Summary:

Economists blur two different things: efficient, broadly balanced trade based on comparative advantage, and persistent, policy-driven trade surpluses that export domestic imbalances abroad. Countries such as Germany and China suppress wages, credit costs, or currencies to boost manufacturing, then force partners like eurozone states and the United States to absorb their surpluses through higher debt, unemployment, or deindustrialization. Because this reflects sovereignty choices, “free trade” can’t be separated from who bears these costs. Pettis proposes a new global customs union in which members keep external accounts within narrow bands and apply variable barriers to chronic surplus countries, forcing each state to resolve imbalances at home.

Excerpts:

The principle behind such a union is that the gains from trade are largest when trade flows are reciprocal and sustainable. That is because persistent, policy-engineered surpluses—designed, for example, to boost a country’s manufacturing share by suppressing wage growth—do not maximize global output. They instead reflect income distribution choices and credit policies that reduce global demand while pushing the cost of that reduced demand onto trade partners in the form of higher unemployment or higher debt.

Debates over “free trade” cannot be separated from questions of sovereignty. To sustain a stable and fair global system, policymakers must recognize that integration entails shared constraints. Countries cannot insist on the freedom to engineer domestic imbalances while also insisting that other countries absorb them. Unless major economies accept equivalent limits on their ability to manage credit, currencies, and external accounts, the world will see recurring beggar-thy-neighbor tensions, protectionist backlashes, and a fragmented trading order. The arithmetic of global accounts guarantees it.

Comment: Beyond my economic knowledge but it sounds intriguing. I will defer to expert economists. If this is a good idea why has it not been implemented? 

How to Fix Free Trade

Foreign Affairs · More by Michael Pettis · November 17, 2025

A Global Customs Union Could Solve the Problem of Imbalances

Michael Pettis

November 17, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-fix-free-trade

A cargo ship at the Yantian port in Shenzhen, China, October 2025 Tingshu Wang / Reuters

MICHAEL PETTIS is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

Debates over world trade often conflate two distinct issues. The first is how to expand the efficiencies that occur when international trade is broadly balanced and countries are able to benefit from trade by specializing in particular industries. As the British economist David Ricardo famously observed, when Portugal specialized in producing wine and the United Kingdom specialized in producing textiles, trade allowed them collectively to produce more than they otherwise would. The second issue is how to think about and allocate the costs of persistent trade surpluses—or when some countries export more than they import in order to resolve economic imbalances between domestic production and domestic demand.

Many economists are unable to distinguish between the two, mainly because mainstream models are largely based on assumptions that government intervention in trade is limited, and countries export primarily to maximize their imports. Their policy recommendations thus assume that countries export roughly as much, value-wise, as they import—even in cases where that clearly isn't true. Instead, some large economies use growing exports not to pay for growing imports but rather to compensate for weak domestic demand. To do so, they manipulate their trade and capital accounts to keep their manufacturing cheap—such as by suppressing their currencies. They then export their cheaper wares, forcing the wider world to absorb their subsidized manufacturing while insulating their economies from the consequences of weak domestic purchasing power.

Persistent trade imbalances are thus the result of a world in which—to use the framing of the Harvard economist Dani Rodrik—countries have made different tradeoffs between global integration and economic sovereignty. Those choosing more of the former have to absorb the imbalances of those choosing more of the latter. Consider, for example, a government that runs surpluses by pursuing policies that effectively subsidize manufacturing at the expense of households. It might do so by suppressing the rate at which banks lend to manufacturers, by depreciating its currency, or by subsidizing transportation infrastructure. Unless its trade partners resist with countervailing policies, they will have to absorb this surplus either through higher domestic investment, higher consumption, higher unemployment, or some combination of the three. That is true no matter how powerful those partners might otherwise be. The United States, for example, has the biggest economy in the world. But because its market has been so open, its economy has been partly restructured by China—which heavily subsidizes its domestic manufacturers.

This doesn’t mean governments should close themselves off to international commerce; people benefit from trade. But to make sure that trade serves their national interests, the United States and its allies must create a system that reduces the ability of countries to offload the cost of their domestic policies. The best way they can do so is by establishing a new global customs union whose members agree to keep their trade relatively balanced and free, while putting up barriers against countries that refuse to balance exports with imports. Within such a union, a government could still choose to subsidize certain types of investment and manufacturing, but only if it can itself absorb the resulting costs. For trade to work, every state must maintain its economic sovereignty. Otherwise, countries will have too strong an incentive to export their economic problems through beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

DUMPING GROUND

Any country's internal imbalances must always be consistent with its external imbalances, which in turn must always be consistent with the external imbalances of its trade partners. The result in today’s hyperglobalized world is a kind of transitive property: states that control their capital and trade accounts can export the costs of their domestic policies. Consider what happened, for example, when Germany chose to address domestic unemployment in the 1990s with the Hartz reforms of 2003–5. These reforms effectively restrained wage growth relative to productivity, reducing the share of German GDP held by German workers and sharply boosting business profits. The lower wage share limited domestic consumption while the higher business profits led to an expansion in manufacturing. The country’s trade surpluses surged.

These effects did not end at Germany’s borders. At the time, Berlin effectively managed the euro, thanks to its dominance at the European Central Bank, and used this power to limit monetary and interest-rate adjustments within the European Union. As a result, Germany's EU partners were forced to import nearly all of Germany's surpluses. As they ran the corresponding trade deficits, their economies had to adjust, sometimes with higher investment, including in real estate bubbles, and sometimes with higher unemployment or rising household or fiscal debt. But either way, the manufacturing share of GDP rose in Germany and fell elsewhere in the eurozone.

Germany’s behavior helps explain why so much of Europe struggled to recover after the 2008 financial crisis. Analysts like to blame the troubles of Greece, Portugal, and Spain on bad domestic decisions, especially excess fiscal spending, but in truth, the hardships they experienced were not only the product of decisions made in Athens, Lisbon, or Madrid. They were also the consequence of policies designed by Berlin to expand German manufacturing. Those policies were transmitted through Berlin’s trade and capital account to its European Union partners, causing them to lose manufacturing while being forced to make tradeoffs between higher unemployment and higher debt. Berlin, in other words, was able to use trade to accommodate its industrial policies in Germany, which in turn constrained and directed policy in much of the EU.

Policymakers must recognize that shared trade entails shared constraints.

A similar story unfolded between China and the United States around the same time. Between 2002 and 2010, as Beijing implemented negative real interest rates to clean up a banking system burdened with bad loans, the household and consumption shares of China’s GDP fell sharply—from an already low 48 percent of GDP at the beginning of the century to a surreal 34 percent by 2011. China's national savings and trade surplus soared, along with its manufacturing, which was energized by extraordinarily cheap capital.

But again, this was not the end of the story. The Chinese economy’s surplus savings were mostly directed into the United States by the People’s Bank of China. The bank was shocked by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when a sudden run on the Thai baht set off a vicious currency crisis, rocking the region's banking systems and pushing many of their economies into serious trouble. China avoided the worst of it, but the People’s Bank—eager to protect the Chinese economy from future such events—accumulated massive amounts of U.S. government bonds to shore up its reserves. By pouring money into these bonds and forcing up the value of the dollar relative to the yuan, China also forced the United States to run corresponding deficits. That led to changes in the latter country's internal economic imbalances. Manufacturing leaked abroad to China, and American factories closed down production lines and fired workers.

The United States was able to avoid a spike in unemployment, mainly by running larger fiscal deficits and having households borrow more. But as China's share of global manufacturing surged, the United States shifted domestic economic production away from manufacturing and into service sectors. The United States thus changed the structure of its economy, partially directing and reshaping U.S. employment and leverage, not because Americans chose those changes but because of policies made by decisionmakers in Beijing aimed at stabilizing China’s banks.

TRADE AS IT IS

In a truly open world—one with no directed credit, no currency intervention, no restrictions on trade and capital flows, and minimal government intervention in output—one country's imbalances would not be so easily transmitted. Instead, they would tend to self-correct as market-determined exchange rates, capital flows, and interest rates adjusted in ways that reversed the internal imbalances. In this world, trade would be broadly balanced, with countries pursuing comparative advantages and exporting to pay for imports that maximized domestic welfare.

But in the real world, some major economies actively intervene in their trade and capital accounts, producing persistent surpluses caused by distortions in domestic demand and production, whereas other economies don’t. Little wonder, then, that the present trading system is so unstable. If some countries are able to use an open global trading system to transfer economic headaches onto their trading partners, the latter will eventually turn against the existing regime.

To sustain a stable and fair global system, policymakers must recognize that shared trade entails shared constraints. All major economies must accept similar limits on their ability to manage credit, currencies, and external accounts. The world must, in other words, fashion a new trading regime that forces each member to resolve its external imbalances at home, as the economist John Maynard Keynes proposed at Bretton Woods in 1944.

Thus far, countries have shown little appetite for forging such a coalition. Instead, they are embracing the kind of “beggar-my-neighbor” policies that the economist Joan Robinson warned of in 1937, when she explained that the main purpose of trade surpluses was to externalize the unemployment that results from weak domestic demand. The United States, for example, is now working aggressively—although not very effectively, if the growing U.S. trade deficit is any indication—to reduce its trade deficit by imposing tariffs. Other states are responding with their own retaliatory measures.

Debates over “free trade” cannot be separated from questions of sovereignty.

There is a better way. When trade is used by countries to expand their relative share of production, it allows individual countries to benefit from policies that are collectively harmful. Still, balanced trade can be positive for global growth, provided that it rearranges global production to maximize production efficiency. Instead of trying to restrict trade through piecemeal measures, the United States should try to impose a system similar to what Keynes proposed at Bretton Woods. Washington and its allies should organize a new global customs union open to all countries that commit to balanced trade. States would be able to join the union by agreeing to keep their current accounts with the union within a narrow band. This band would allow normal cyclical variations while preventing the externalization of policy-driven imbalances.

The customs union would then balance trade with nonmembers by adopting variable trade barriers—either in the form of tariffs or taxes on capital flows—that prevent the imbalances of nonmembers from being imported into the customs union. This would not be a political sanction, but rather a rules-based measure among trade partners. To join the union, countries would have to agree to these restrictions.

The principle behind such a union is that the gains from trade are largest when trade flows are reciprocal and sustainable. That is because persistent, policy-engineered surpluses—designed, for example, to boost a country’s manufacturing share by suppressing wage growth—do not maximize global output. They instead reflect income distribution choices and credit policies that reduce global demand while pushing the cost of that reduced demand onto trade partners in the form of higher unemployment or higher debt.

Debates over “free trade” cannot be separated from questions of sovereignty. To sustain a stable and fair global system, policymakers must recognize that integration entails shared constraints. Countries cannot insist on the freedom to engineer domestic imbalances while also insisting that other countries absorb them. Unless major economies accept equivalent limits on their ability to manage credit, currencies, and external accounts, the world will see recurring beggar-thy-neighbor tensions, protectionist backlashes, and a fragmented trading order. The arithmetic of global accounts guarantees it.

Foreign Affairs · More by Michael Pettis · November 17, 2025

​19. Our nation requires three ARG/MEUs

​Summary:

The Commandant argues the United States must sustain three continuously deployed ARG/MEUs to project sea-based combat power without host-nation permission. He warns amphibious capacity and readiness have fallen below requirements, even as MEUs modernize with long-range fires, unmanned systems, and advanced C2. A 3.0 ARG/MEU posture is the minimum to deter and fight.

Our nation requires three ARG/MEUs

The Marine Corps commandant underscores the necessity of the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit for projecting American strength and sustaining deterrence.

defenseone.com · Gen. Eric Smith

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/11/our-nation-requires-three-args-and-meus/409542/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story&utm

The Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit—the ARG/MEU—is the Nation’s most flexible and effective formation for projecting power from the sea. Three ships, carrying a 2,200-Marine combined arms team, maneuver as sovereign U.S. territory anywhere on the globe. They respond in hours, not weeks. They can put Marines ashore without relying on ports, airfields, or permission from another country. They bring command and control, aviation, fires, logistics, and a reinforced infantry battalion—all from the sea, ready to fight on arrival.

Despite the MEU’s proven value in warfighting and deterrence—and its growing combat power under our Force Design initiative—our nation’s maritime expeditionary capability has steadily eroded. Today, we sit at 32 amphibious ships, barely meeting the congressionally mandated floor. With amphibious-ship readiness below 50 percent, we are well short of what’s needed to support three consistently forward-deployed ARG/MEUs. The Marine Corps has identified this gap for years, and leaders within the Department of the Navy are now moving with urgency to stabilize the fleet and drive investment in the industrial base for military shipbuilding.

As Commandant, I am addressing this amphibious capability shortfall through two initiatives outlined in my Planning Guidance. First, we must restore our amphibious capacity through a return to a 3.0 ARG/MEU presence: three forward-postured MEUs, each with three amphibious warships, persistently positioned around the globe. This has long been the standard, and it remains the Marine Corps’ North Star. Our combatant commanders, the Joint Force, and our civilian leaders rely on these formations to campaign, deter, and respond without delay and without any permission needed from a third party for access, basing or overflight.

Second, we are modernizing the MEU through Force Design, ensuring it evolves in stride with the changing character of war. Just as our Marine Littoral Regiments are receiving long-range fires, resilient command and control, unmanned systems, and advanced sensing networks, those same capabilities are being fielded across the MEUs, advancing their role as a flexible, multi-domain force from the sea.

A needed force for a maritime nation

For 250 years, Marines have been first to fight—closing with the enemy, defending our nation, always forward, always ready, and often from the sea. Our enduring warrior ethos reflects the fundamental truth that the nature of war does not change—but the character of war does—and so must the way we fight.

After the Second World War, as a new era of global tension took shape, the nation needed a force that could respond rapidly and operate forward without waiting on ports, bases, or permission. That requirement came into sharp focus in the early years of the Cold War, when the Navy and Marine Corps were asked to counter nuclear-armed adversaries, dispersed flashpoints, and threats with no notice. The logic behind the MEU’s design was operational from the start: built to be ready now, to maneuver from the sea, to project power inland, and to shape the fight before it began.

The advent of nuclear weapons reshaped our approach to amphibious operations. What worked at Okinawa or Inchon required rethinking in the face of a threat that punished mass and predictability. The Corps responded by developing new ways to come from the sea without confining the assault to a narrow beachhead. Vertical envelopment was added to the beach assault, expanding the maneuver space and giving commanders more options.

To support this new approach, the Marine Corps restructured its forward-deployed forces. Rotary-wing lift, aviation-delivered fire support, and integrated logistics gave rise to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force concept: an integrated formation that could launch from sea, land inland, and fight immediately. By the late 1980s, the MAGTF formations called MEUs were operating routinely from the Mediterranean to the Western Pacific. They weren’t held in reserve. They were deployed forward.

During the Cold War, the MEU’s value was recognized in operational war plans. One of the clearest examples was in the High North. If Soviet forces pushed into Norway, a MEU embarked aboard amphibious shipping would land in the fjords to reinforce Norwegian defenders and counter Soviet naval infantry along the flanks. That wasn’t a theory, it was backed up by prepositioned equipment, rehearsed in exercises like Teamwork and Northern Wedding, and respected by Soviet planners who were forced to hedge against it.

The operational rationale that validated the MEU in the past remains just as relevant today. It creates problems adversaries cannot ignore at a cost the Nation can sustain—turning shorelines into entry points, projecting power inland, and transforming maritime access into combat power for the Joint Force. Forward-deployed at sea, the ARG/MEU deters by denying the adversary decision space, shaping the environment in our favor, and introducing risk before conflict begins. Its maneuverable posture gives it both survivability and combat credibility. And it remains able to operate independently, integrate with the fleet, or reinforce allies—preventing escalation and–if required—moving rapidly to combat.

Toward a modern MEU

As the character of warfare continues to evolve—driven by a connected world and rapid advances in technology, tomorrow’s fight will be more connected and lethal. Success will depend on speed, precision, and adaptability in a battlespace that is sensor-rich and contested across all domains.

Force Design, launched in 2019, remains the Marine Corps’ framework for adapting to the changing character of war across our MEUs, Marine Expeditionary Brigades, Marine Expeditionary Forces, and Marine Littoral Regiments. It is guided by a campaign of learning that refines how we man, train, and equip the force to deter aggression and close gaps in a contested, multi-domain fight. That learning is what drives Force Design’s modernization initiatives. The technology fielding that began with the Marine Littoral Regiments is now advancing through the MEUs and across the Corps—shaped by experimentation, real-world operations, and the integration of long-range fires, resilient C2, and unmanned systems. These advances enable MEUs to operate as agile, sea-based maneuver elements—able to sense, shoot, and support the Joint Force from sea to shore.

The MEU remains a forward-deployed, combined arms team: light enough to deploy quickly, but potent enough to punch above its weight. Its combat power is built around three core advantages: precision fires, adaptable command and control, and enhanced survivability. When armed with HIMARS, NMESIS, loitering munitions, and supported by fifth-generation F-35B sensor fusion, the MEU will deliver effects into areas other formations cannot reach. Its command element is already optimized to serve as an agile hub for multi-domain operations by integrating kinetic and non-kinetic effects, sensors, and decision-makers across the battlespace. Future dispersed C2 nodes, unmanned platforms, and advanced manufacturing capabilities will strengthen its ability to maneuver, sustain, and adapt under pressure.

Getting to a 3.0 ARG/MEU

Modernization isn’t enough. Advanced capabilities only matter if we can get them forward, on time, and where the fight is. The MEU is evolving to meet tomorrow’s demands, but realizing its full potential depends on having a fleet that can support it. That’s one of the biggest challenges we face today.

The problem is capacity. In 1991, the fleet had more than 60 amphibious warships—enough to sustain global presence and reinforce war plans across multiple theaters. But as the nation focused on extended land campaigns in the Middle East, the amphibious fleet was deprioritized. By 1997, that number had dropped to 40, and by 2016 it stood at just 31. Today the amphibious fleet has 32 ships whose average readiness hovers around 45 percent. Shipyards are strained, timelines are slipping, and hulls are aging faster than we can replace them.

Sustaining a 3.0 ARG/MEU presence will require 31 amphibious ships at 80 percent readiness. The recent LHA/LPD block buy was a step in the right direction, but we must continue to build on this momentum. The Marine Corps is working closely within the broader defense establishment to maintain the fleet, improve readiness, and set conditions for a stronger future. The effort will take broad cooperation, sustained investment, and shared urgency across the U.S. government, industry, and the Department of War.

Conclusion

The Corps’ North Star must remain a steady 3.0 ARG/MEU presence: three continuous, three-amphibious warship formations forward deployed—one from the East Coast, one from the West, and one patrolling from Okinawa, Japan. (If you ask our combatant commanders what they need, the answer isn’t a total of three ARG/MEUs; it’s closer to five or six.) 3.0 is the minimum required to provide our nation and the Joint Force with a capability that can serve as both a warfighting formation and a cross-service integrator. It’s what keeps pressure on our adversaries, supports the maritime fight, and gives combatant commanders and national decision makers scalable options they can employ without delay to buy time, create decision-space, and if required to do so, be first to fight.

Right now, we’re falling short. Every day below that mark costs time, space, and initiative. The ARG/MEU is more than just a crisis-response formation, it is how a maritime nation extends influence, demonstrates resolve, and turns naval capability into action. It reflects who we are as a service: forward, agile, and ready to fight. The world and our adversaries are moving fast, and so must we. In a battlespace defined by access, timing, capability, and tempo, the ARG/MEU stands out: a formation that reaches the fight without relying on basing or buildup and bringing with it a MAGTF that delivers immediate combat power and multi-domain effects.

Its capabilities continue to evolve. Its demand by combatant commanders continues to grow. But one thing hasn’t changed: Marines. Their cohesion and resolve turn emerging technologies into battlefield advantage. When they come from the sea, they bring C2, fires, logistics, aviation, and a reinforced infantry battalion—ready to act forcibly before anyone else can.

The MEU remains the connective tissue between sea and land, deterrence and decision, day-to-day campaigning and high-end warfighting. What began as a Cold War solution has since matured into forward-deployed expression of American resolve.

For 250 years, Marines have fought forward—ready at a moment’s notice, often from the sea. That legacy endures in the ARG/MEU: first to the fight, lethal on arrival, and ready for anything. This unique capability remains a cornerstone of American strength that secures peace. It must be sustained.

Gen. Eric Smith is the 39th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

defenseone.com · Gen. Eric Smith

20. Are we in a new cold war?

​Summary:

Do today’s tensions amount to a new cold war? Intelligence chiefs cite rising hostile activity from China, Russia, Iran and North Korea and renewed nuclear brinkmanship. Many contributors argue we are already in a cold war-like era, or that the old one never truly ended: nuclear deterrence still prevents great-power war while rivalry plays out through proxy conflicts, espionage, economic coercion, cyber and “grey-zone” attacks. Others stress this contest is more multipolar and unstable than the U.S.–Soviet standoff and warn that Western complacency and Cold War nostalgia risk underestimating CRINK and non-aligned states’ growing weight.

Comment: Or is it really a continuation of the orginal one that has just evolved in complexity?

Big Asks

Are we in a new cold war?

The Big Ask | No. 46.2025

Alec Smith

Nov 14, 2025

https://www.britainsworld.org.uk/p/the-big-ask-46-2025

After the collapse of the high-profile Chinese espionage case in October, Sir Ken McCallum, Director General of MI5, expressed his frustration over the failure to prosecute the two men accused of spying for the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He also revealed the extent of MI5’s operations in combatting threats from external actors, citing a 35% increase in hostile activity originating from the PRC, Russia and Iran in the past year.

With the inevitable reactions in kind to Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), calling for a renewal of American nuclear testing, and growing alignment between the three aforementioned adversaries and North Korea – the four ‘CRINK’ nations – as well as their associates, the period of global stability enjoyed after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has come to an end. Considering the increasingly volatile state of the world, for this week’s Big Ask, we asked 11 experts: Are we in a new cold war?

In this article, we make a distinction between the historical Cold War of the 20th century and ‘cold war’ as a concept first described by George Orwell in his 1945 essay ‘You and the Atomic Bomb’.

Richard Ballett

Council on Geostrategy

Are we in a new cold war?

Yes. When Orwell, Walter Lippmann, Bernard Baruch and other commentators in the late 1940s talked about a ‘cold war’, they meant a period of heightened tension bubbling just below the threshold of all-out great power conflict.

We are in a similar condition today. As Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of Poland, recently said, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is closer to war with Russia ‘than at any time since the Second World War.’ French and German military and intelligence chiefs have also publicly warned that Russia could attack NATO before the end of the decade.

To make matters worse, William Burns, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), publicly disclosed that intelligence shows Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has instructed his military to be ‘ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion’ of Taiwan. More recently, Marco Rubio, US Secretary of State, warned Congress that the US ‘will have to deal with’ the PRC invading Taiwan before the end of this decade.

Orwell thought that nuclear weapons would stop great power confrontation turning into a ‘hot war,’ leading to a permanent ‘peace that is no peace’. His prediction came true, but only just. Despite the prudence that nuclear weapons inspire, the world came frighteningly close to a Third World War on multiple occasions.

Thankfully, the Cold War ended peacefully. However, that does not mean that the new cold war is destined to follow suit.

John Foreman CBE

British Defence Attaché to Ukraine (2008-2011) and Russia (2019-2022)

There is no new cold war: the old one never ended. Orwell was right when he predicted that fear of nuclear annihilation would usher in a ‘horribly stable’ epoch of ‘cold war’, putting an end to large-scale conflicts between major powers at the cost of prolonging – indefinitely – a ‘peace that is no peace’.

Non-peace has driven consistency in Soviet and then Russian behaviour, albeit with a brief respite in the 1990s. As George Kennan, American diplomat and historian, explained in his Long Telegram, like the Soviet Union, Russia strives to undermine the rules-based international order, hamstring its defences, disrupt national self-confidence and stimulate unrest. Rather than being the cause of any disunity, Putinism – like communism – is a ‘malignant parasite which feeds on diseased tissue’.

If there has been continuity in Russian philosophy and approach since 1945, there has been discontinuity in tempo, goals and tools used. The recent uptick in Russian indirect aggression coincides with its strategic catastrophe in Ukraine and attempts to stop European nations supporting Kyiv. New technology, such as drones, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and networked information, present Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, with additional means for political warfare to complement those from the past.

But Russia isn’t the Soviet Union. Putin’s negative, strange ideology is not as attractive as communism. Russia is a declining – if dangerous – power, whatever Putin’s bluster. The small scale of Russia’s current campaign of indirect warfare speaks to its weakness, not strength. Nuclear deterrence still holds.

Prof. Amelia Hadfield

Founding Director, Centre for Britain and Europe, and Head, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Surrey

Russia’s subsequent illegal invasions of Georgia, Crimea and Ukraine proper represent successive inflection points, which have tipped European nations and the United Kingdom (UK) into a new cold war era. Added to this is an American abdication from global rules-based structures, and presidential pugnacity newly interested in resuming US nuclear weapons testing ‘on an equal basis’ with Russia and the PRC. This presages a trinity of worrying developments.

First is the tit-for-tat reflexes that accompany any strategic weapons tests. Any American nuclear warhead test, regardless of where it takes place, would likely instigate a response in kind from Russia, the PRC or North Korea. Putin has already ordered Russian officials to draft proposals for possible nuclear weapons tests, arguing that retaliatory steps are an appropriate response to any US tests.

Second is the broader collapse of the arms control architecture by major nuclear powers, after a three-decade moratorium. Unfortunately, the expiration of the New START Treaty limiting deployed strategic warheads in February 2025 increases the chances of slipping back to pre-1960s scenarios – with its wholesale absence of treaties controlling nuclear weapons. The consequences of eroded nuclear governance are already on display. Military buildups in the PRC and Russia are easy targets, but, in truth, all nine nuclear-armed states – including Britain – are currently modernising and expanding their nuclear arsenals.

Third is the clear and consistent engagement by the CRINK nations in systematic and sustained espionage, and determined interference with democracy. These, and other jurisdictions, deploy advanced cyber terrorism against both governments and businesses, as well as old-fashioned sabotage, with increasing skill and frequency.

Taken together, these trends suggest the new cold war era is increasingly aligned with the disruptive principles and violent methods of the Cold War. However, unlike the Cold War’s basic bilateral competition, today’s landscape involves multiple nuclear powers and new vulnerabilities, producing systemic volatility that is now an essential reality rather than merely an existential threat. This is a truly regressive outcome for international relations.

Dr Sari Arho Havrén

International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Associate Fellow, Royal United Services Institute

Both Friedrich Merz, Chancellor of Germany, and Ulf Kristersson, Prime Minister of Sweden, have referenced ‘You and the Atomic Bomb’ in stating ‘we are not at war, but no longer at peace either.’ Merz used the phrase to describe free and open European nations’ relationship with Russia, while Kristersson applied it to sub-threshold attacks on Sweden.

Orwell’s essay envisioned a prolonged state of hostility between major powers, where the mutual threat of atomic annihilation deterred direct military confrontation. Today, as with the Cold War, major power rivalries manifest themselves through proxy battles, ideological propaganda, espionage and economic pressures, creating a permanent tension which reshapes societies towards securitisation and expanding surveillance.

With the US, Russia and the PRC increasing their nuclear arsenals and arms control collapsing, Orwell’s ‘peace that is no peace’ endures. The threat of mutual annihilation prevents great powers from engaging in direct conflict, but there is a permanent readiness for war. This ‘cold stability’ has metastasised into every realm – conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza where great powers choose sides, deniable cyber and sub-threshold attacks, and an escalating technological arms race which advances missiles with algorithms.

Orwell also warned that such a world would consolidate into an oligarchy. Today’s digital monopolies and surveillance states echo that fear. Control is no longer solely maintained through weaponry but through information: propaganda, data and AI have become tools of governance. The concentration of destructive and technological power in a few hands breeds a global paralysis disguised as peace.

In a new cold war – as great power competition escalates, blocs are formed and strong nations again dominate weaker ones – small and medium-sized economies have increasingly limited room to manoeuvre.

Joshua C. Huminski

International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Senior Vice President of National Security and Intelligence Programmes, Centre for the Study of the Presidency and Congress

Much as it will chill the hearts of the European adherents of Kantian ‘perpetual peace’, the world today is reverting to its historical geostrategic norm – away from the exception of the last seven decades. The period of the Cold War and the post-Cold War end of history, that time of surprising stability despite conflicts large and small, is ending.

The halcyon days of greater (although by no means constant) strategic predictability are giving way to a time of increasing strategic unpredictability, where states – particularly great powers – are increasingly acting not in the pursuit of abstract ideals, but openly of their core interests.

The US under the second Trump administration is expressly pursuing an ‘America First’ agenda. While Trump’s predecessors put American interests front and centre, they did so more often cloaked under the guise of supporting the rules-based international order built in the wake of the Second World War, husbanded and nurtured by American military and financial largesse. The president’s ambition is to see the US become ‘self-contained’ (and indeed self-sufficient) in its own hemisphere, if rumours of the forthcoming National Defence Strategy’s orientation are to be believed.

Orwell’s 1945 suggestion that a ‘cold war’ of a small number of super-states, possessing atomic weapons, but ‘unable to conquer one another’ is therefore apt. The world is indeed increasingly leaning towards a state of ‘peace that is no peace’.

Dr Robert Johnson

Honorary Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Director, Oxford Strategy, Statecraft and Technology (Changing Character of War) Centre

Periodically, there are accusations against free and open nations from the PRC and Russia of a ‘Cold War mentality.’ Despite denials from the US and European nations, the current geopolitical rivalry between democratic states and authoritarian regimes does seem to indicate that a new form of standoff is underway. There are emerging alignments, which could solidify in the coming years.

There is a persistent arms race, with the PRC rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and Russia using threatening nuclear rhetoric. A seminal hot war is also underway, namely Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which, like the Korean War, is likely to shape relations between the free and open nations and Russia (as well as its associates) over the coming decades.

There are claims that the more enmeshed nature of global economies means that this cannot be a cold war, but the speed of commercial and scientific decoupling and the hostility demonstrated in recent diplomacy shows that international relations have moved from competition to confrontation and, increasingly, to coercion.

In the Cold War of 1945-1991, the West enjoyed an overwhelming economic advantage, and could afford to contain its rivals. This time, the same ideological and economic certainties are not present. We should not be surprised to find that this is a new form of cold war.

Dr Alexander Lanoszka

International Fellow, Council on Geostrategy, and Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Waterloo (Canada)

Regardless of what leaders of NATO member states might want to believe, the Kremlin thinks of itself as being in major conflict with the alliance. Why else would it go about a sustained and deliberate campaign of sabotage and subversion; one which exploits the very openness and pluralism that characterises the Euro-Atlantic community?

The same goes for the PRC. The CCP has little interest in democracy and the rule of law, yet the belief that some sort of economic partnership is mutually beneficial and politically neutral still seems to persist in many NATO capitals.

Although some of the rhetoric in European circles has sharpened against these two authoritarian powers in recent times, NATO members’ actions fall short of what the term ‘cold war’ implies. European countries still purchase enough Russian hydrocarbons to fill Moscow’s coffers. Support for Ukraine as regards to military assistance remains halting and uneven, whereas talk of renewing strategic partnerships with the PRC abounds in some NATO capitals despite the country’s continued enabling of Russia’s ongoing invasion.

Even the second Trump administration has failed to embrace the competitive approach that it adopted in its first incarnation. If there is indeed a cold war, then the countries that make up NATO appear reluctant to wage it.

George Magnus

Member of the Advisory Board to the China Observatory, Council on Geostrategy

There is a significant risk that the Chinese-Western cold war will be different and more unstable from Orwell’s template. The PRC’s economic competition is designed to win it, and thus establish a new Sinocentric world order.

The PRC’s quest to dominate what Xi has called the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, and its drive to build self-reliance and ‘cleanse’ its supply chains began about 20 years ago. Industrial policy, now being carried out on an unprecedented scale, consumes far more of the PRC’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than any other nation spends on defence.

Instead of deeper economic integration and mutual dependency between the global east and west, there is now managed economic disengagement, or decoupling, in strategically important and national security-sensitive areas, punctured by periods of more overt disruption.

Free and open nations need to catch up, and do so promptly. Commercial tensions in the pursuit of resources, exports, markets, supply chains and standards in a fragmenting world are liable to intensify, and they may also do so with important emerging and middle-income countries, keen to protect their own industrialisation and local industry programmes.

Both the PRC and the free and open nations are pursuing, in the words of Edward Luttwak’s reflections on trade wars many decades ago, the ‘logic of conflict in the grammar of commerce’. However, they are doing this with the intention to prevail, not to balance one another out.

James Rogers

Co-founder (Research), Council on Geostrategy

Orwell provided us with the intellectual apparatus to understand that all future periods of sustained geopolitical competition would be cold wars. He recognised that nuclear weapons would prevent the leading states – nuclear powers – from using decisive military force against one another. To do so would result in mutual suicide.

But he also realised that this would not end rivalry; it would merely displace it. Unable to find release through vertical escalation, the great powers would channel competition into every other available domain. Orwell argued that this situation would result in a ‘peace that is no peace’, or a ‘cold war’.

Why have we rejected this elegant concept? For at least a decade, a plethora of terms have been invented to account for the new era of competition: ‘hybrid warfare’, ‘“grey-zone” conflict’, ‘sub-threshold confrontation’. All of these are dangerous illusions. Why? Because they seek to deceive us: in focusing on the instrumental character of conflict, they reject its malevolent reality.

It is time to accept that multiple actors – especially the CRINK – see the world in zero-sum terms. The PRC, Russia, Iran and North Korea see the UK and other democracies as enemies whose political systems are threats to their own existence. From the economic and the technological to the cultural and ideological planes, these states are not only attempting to degrade the prevailing international order, but weaken the democracies themselves.

The quicker Britain comes to terms with the new era of confrontation, the better. It is time to accept the truth: we are in a new cold war. The sooner the UK accepts this, the sooner it can enhance its resilience and sharpen its foreign policy to push back against its adversaries.

Dr Jan Ruzicka

Lecturer in Security Studies and Director of David Davies Institute of International Studies, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University

In late December 1992, just as his country was about to dissolve, Czechoslovakia’s last ambassador to Moscow returned to Prague. Amid the chaos and misery characteristic of Russia in the early 1990s, he had little positive news to report. Meeting Vaclav Havel, then President of Czechoslovakia, the ambassador had said he only had one bit of good news: ‘there are fewer and fewer of them every day’.

More than thirty years on, his words still ring true. They echo Orwell’s opinion that in the world of nuclear weapons, political stability would become so robust that ‘it is difficult to see how the balance can be upset except by slow and unpredictable demographic changes’.

Oppressive stability – not anarchy – concerned Orwell. Of course, he wrote about ‘a permanent state of “cold war”’ prior to the advent of thermonuclear weapons. Their utter destructiveness might have led him to appreciate stability more. Nevertheless, his remarks about cold war were prescient.

Today, we are not in a new cold war. To say otherwise would presuppose the previous cold war had ended. It has not: neither in the Orwellian sense, nor with regard to the historical Cold War. The divisions which that particular conflict forged are still with us. They fuel Chinese resentment and Russian revisionism, both aimed against the free and open nations.

There is an irony in the fact that the country which needed the most convincing to remain on the world stage and join the Cold War in the 1940s – the US – is most keen to leave the current iteration of the cold war. If it does, Britain and its European allies and partners will truly find themselves in a new cold war.

Andrew Yeh

Executive Director, China Strategic Risk Institute

The ‘new cold war’ framing is misleading on three fronts.

First, it risks giving false comfort to liberal democracies, who recall winning the last one. Then, the West faced a poorer, technologically weaker Soviet Union. Today, it faces a far more formidable rival: an economic superpower fast achieving parity – and in some sectors superiority – in technology and industrial capacity.

Second, the rules of engagement have changed. While direct conflict remains unlikely, the ‘grey zone’ of sub-threshold confrontation has vastly expanded in the digital era. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, sabotage of undersea internet cables and manipulation of online debate are threats which the Cold War never knew.

Finally, the non-aligned world is now far more important. Unlike in the 20th century, the economic weight of India, Brazil and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is growing rapidly, while European and other free and open countries are in stagnation and decline. ‘Western’ influence in these regions has waned, even before Trump’s tariffs and aid cuts, and while the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative has not been without its failures, it has bought many friends and allies.

The danger of Cold War nostalgia is that it obscures the novelty of this competition, and the scale and pace of response it demands.

​21. How cartels are adopting drone tactics from Ukraine

​Summary:

Mexican cartels increasingly use explosive FPV drones, copying Ukraine battlefield tactics and training obtained there. Attacks in Tijuana and Chihuahua show cartels evolving into hybrid criminal-paramilitary actors, while over 1,000 cross-border drone incursions monthly spur U.S. counter-drone teams, new training courses, and surveillance systems like Draganfly’s Outrider.

How cartels are adopting drone tactics from Ukraine

Defense News · Zita Fletcher · November 14, 2025

https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2025/11/14/how-cartels-are-adopting-drone-tactics-from-ukraine/?utm

Last month, three drones rigged with explosives detonated outside a prosecutor’s office in Tijuana, Mexico, besieging six cars parked outside with a blast of nails, BBs and metal fragments. The attack was orchestrated by a cartel, Mexican government officials confirmed, and targeted an anti-kidnapping unit of the Baja state attorney general’s office. It is the latest high-profile example of first-person view drones being used by cartels to replicate military tactics being used in Ukraine.

Defense News previously reported that members of Latin American drug cartels had joined Ukraine’s foreign fighter volunteer units to gain FPV drone training.

Earlier this year, a cartel ambush using an explosive drone in the border state of Chihuahua sent two Mexican military service members and one police officer to the hospital. Three drones were subsequently seized.

Attacks made by explosive-equipped drones surged to over 260 in 2023. In 2024, a drone ambush was reportedly followed by an infantry-style attack in a remote community in Mexico, according to AP.

“Nonstate actors can now acquire capabilities once reserved for nation-states,” writes Stephen Honan for the Atlantic Council on cartels’ increasing use of FPV drones. “Cartels are no longer merely criminal syndicates; they increasingly resemble hybrid entities blending organized crime, paramilitary force, and terrorist tactics.”

Hybrid Threat

The hybrid threat posed by cartels is not a new phenomenon — the line between criminal and paramilitary groups with state ties has become increasingly blurry over the last two decades, as Latin American criminal groups have turned to recruiting ex-military personnel and adopting military-style tactics to undermine the rule of law and control territory.

“While organized crime and terrorism are marked with these theoretical distinctions, in reality such differences may not be as clear, with both activities reinforcing one another,” according to a report published by CT Morse, a European Union counterterrorism think tank.

In 2011, cartels were reported to have made use of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices as well as 50 caliber anti-aircraft guns, plus machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades to engage in combat with police and government entities.

“Often, these actors are not operating autonomously, but rather symbiotically with State and non-State parties to an armed conflict,” according to a 2023 report published by the Red Cross. “In some neighborhoods of Acapulco, Rio de Janeiro, Karachi and Durban, drug trafficking cartels, militia and mafia engage in pitched battles with heavily armed military, paramilitary and police units.”

Counter-Drone Measures

As the threat of drones used by transnational criminal organizations persists, the U.S. military increasingly faces the demand to secure domestic air space at a rapid pace.

In 2024, Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot of NORAD told lawmakers that over 1,000 drone intrusions were taking place across the U.S. border with Mexico each month.

“I don’t know the actual number — I don’t think anybody does — but it’s in the thousands,“ Guillot told lawmakers according to a Defense Department release. ”We... probably have over 1,000 a month.”

The problem persists.

This month, Senate Intelligence Committee chairman Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas) told CBS News in an interview that drone intrusions along the border and over U.S. military installations remain a “severe and growing” problem.

To combat FPV drone threats to domestic installations, NORTHCOM this month formed a rapid response team equipped with a counter-drone fly-away kit, capable of deploying quickly to defend bases across the country.

Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Command released a solicitation for a contractor to provide a 10-day course for operators to learn all aspects of building and using FPV drones.

To enhance border surveillance and security, manufacturer Draganfly is unveiling its new Outrider drone this month at a border security summit in Arizona. The multi-mission drone is designed to enhance border patrols and increase surveillance capabilities of remote areas potentially used by cartels as access points.

About Zita Ballinger Fletcher

Zita Ballinger Fletcher previously served as editor of Military History Quarterly and Vietnam magazines and as the historian of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. She holds an M.A. with distinction in military history.

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com