Quotes of the Day:
“Absolute certainty will always elude us. We will always be mired in error. The most each generation can hope for is to reduce the error. . . .”
- Carl Sagan
“The foolish and the dead alone never change their opinions.”
- James Russell Lowell
“But courage in fighting is by no means the only form, nor perhaps even the most important. There is courage in facing poverty, courage in facing derision, courage in facing the hostility of one’s own herd. In these, the bravest soldiers are often lamentably deficient. And above all there is the courage to think calmly and rationally in the face of danger, and to control the impulse of panic fear or panic rage.”
- Bertrand Russell
1. Modern War in an Ancient Land: The U.S. Army in Afghanistan) Volumes I and II (Afghanistan War History from the U.S. Army Center for Military History)
2. Philippines tells China to ‘back off’ after South China Sea clash
3. Taiwan’s Defense Plans Are Going Off the Rails
4. Japan, U.S. conduct their 1st anti-sub drill in South China Sea
5. Do Less, Better: The Audacity Of Stewardship In Great Power Competition
6. Women's tour chief casts doubt on statement attributed to China's Peng
7. China's move on Taiwan is all but inevitable unless Biden stops it
8. Peng Shuai: Doubt cast on email from Chinese tennis star
9. The challenge of extremism in the military is not going away without a new perspective
10. ‘We must work harder,’ SECDEF says as Pentagon grapples with civilian casualties of airstrikes
11. PacNet #53 – What should Washington expect from US-China strategic stability talks? - Pacific Forum
12. Tougher U.S. stance on Taiwan urged by Congressional advisory body
13. Is Belarus migrant crisis a new type of war?
14. Pentagon Scrambles to Defend ‘Juicy Targets’ After Rivals’ Space Tests
15. Virginia elections show that Biden needs a bipartisan approach to Iran
16. FBI launches probe after 'smallpox' vials are found in Merck facility
17. FDD | A Sign That Iran Is Still Pursuing Nukes
18. FDD | Washington and Jerusalem Enhance Cooperation to Counter Ransomware
19. The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - November 2021
20. FDD | Don’t Believe Predictions of a Rift Between Iran and Syria
21. The US Must Turn the Tables on Russia’s Psyops
22. The Navy's plan to build flying submarines for Navy SEALs
23. With special-ops drills in hotspots on opposite sides of the world, the US military says 'they're back'
1. Modern War in an Ancient Land: The U.S. Army in Afghanistan) Volumes I and II (Afghanistan War History from the U.S. Army Center for Military History)
Modern War in an Ancient Land
Volumes I and II
MODERN WAR IN AN ANCIENT LAND: THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN, 2001-2014 (2 VOLUMES)
Edmund J. “E. J.” Degen and Mark J. Reardon
Global War on Terrorism Series
CMH Pub 59-1, Paper
2021; 965 pages (2 Volumes), illustrations, maps, index
These volumes, prepared by the Operation Enduring Freedom Study Group, present an operational-level narrative of how the U.S. Army formed, trained, deployed, and employed its forces in Afghanistan from October 2001 to December 2014. To write this history, the study group embarked on an extensive research program, conducting oral history interviews with dozens of key military and civilian leaders. These volumes contain a total of fifty maps, a wide range of campaign photography and artwork, and volume-specific indexes.
* View this publication online.
2. Philippines tells China to ‘back off’ after South China Sea clash
Philippines tells China to ‘back off’ after South China Sea clash
Philippines says Chinese coastguard blocked and fired water cannon on two of its supply ships inside its exclusive economic zone.
China has been increasingly aggressive South China Sea claims, and many Filipinos think Manila should be more assertive in pushing back against Beijing [File: Francis Malasio/EPA]
Published On 18 Nov 2021
|
Updated:
2 hours ago
Three ships from the Chinese coastguard blocked and fired water cannons on two Philippines supply boats within the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the disputed South China Sea, the Philippines has said.
Foreign Minister Teodoro Locsin said the incident took place near Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) on November 16 and the Philippine vessels, which were taking food supplies to military personnel stationed nearby, were forced to abandon the mission. No injuries were reported.
“The acts of the Chinese coast guard vessels are illegal,” Locsin said in a statement shared on social media by the Foreign Ministry. “China has no law enforcement rights in and around these areas. They must take heed and back off.”
China claims nearly the entire South China Sea based on its so-called ‘nine-dash line’ that the international court ruled without merit five years ago. Beijing has ignored the ruling, instead building artificial islands and deploying its navy, coastguard, and fleets of fishing vessels to the disputed sea, which is also claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei, and Taiwan.
Locsin accused China of failing to exercise self-restraint and said he had conveyed Manila’s “outrage, condemnation and protest” over the incident to the Chinese ambassador.
President Rodrigo Duterte, who has sought a closer relationship with China, has been criticised for not taking a tougher line on the country’s South China Sea activities. On Thursday he backed the foreign affairs ministry’s swift response.
“We will continue to assert our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over our territory,” acting presidential spokesman Karlo Nograles said in a statement.
Ayungin Shoal is part of the Spratly Islands, known as the Kalayaan Islands in the Philippines. It lies within the Philippines EEZ, which stretches 370km (200 nautical miles) from its coast.
Earlier this year, the Philippines complained about the weeks-long presence of dozens of vessels from China’s so-called ‘maritime militia’ at Whitsun Reef, which lies about 320 kilometres (175 nautical miles) west of Palawan Island within its EEZ.
In 2012, China forcibly took control of Scarborough Shoal, which lies 229km (124 nautical miles) west of the Philippine island of Luzon.
Source: Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera and news agencies
3. Taiwan’s Defense Plans Are Going Off the Rails
Conclusion:
Some will argue that friends require a soft touch. I would ordinarily agree. Unfortunately, these are not ordinary times. Storm clouds are gathering, and the stark reality is that one day soon Washington might find it necessary to send Americans into harm’s way to defend Taiwan. Washington, therefore, has a profound moral obligation to do everything in its power to make sure that Taiwan is doing everything in its power to provide for its own defense.
Taiwan’s Defense Plans Are Going Off the Rails - War on the Rocks
As the United States talks more and more of defending Taiwan from an attack from the mainland, Taiwan’s military seems to be taking its defense preparations less and less seriously. Policymakers and voters alike increasingly see Taiwan as a friend worth protecting. After all, despite their many differences, the Trump and Biden administrations both signaled support for Taipei while working to bolster its defenses. Just this week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Beijing that the United States would “take action” in response to an attack on Taiwan. Taiwan likewise enjoys deep bipartisan support in an otherwise divided Congress. Comedians are even starting to get in on the act. Most striking of all, public opinion polling now suggests that the average American is willing to fight for the island.
Yet before Washington contemplates sending American troops into harm’s way to help Taiwan, it should pause to consider whether Taiwan’s military is doing enough to help itself. While the Tsai administration has proposed a major increase in defense spending, it all comes down to how this money will be spent. Seen through that lens, Taiwan can and should do more — a lot more — especially when it comes to preparing to defend the island from attack. Responsibility for why it is not falls squarely on the shoulders of Taiwan’s military bureaucracy. Most notably, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has abandoned asymmetric defense reform in all but name and has not been reined in by President Tsai Ing-wen. Instead, the ministry is now planning to deter an invasion by threatening to retaliate with missile strikes against the Chinese homeland and by pitting Taiwanese units in direct combat against the vastly superior People’s Liberation Army. Moreover, the ministry has the audacity to tell American audiences that this dramatic shift is fully congruent with an asymmetric posture.
The ministry’s preferred approach to defending Taiwan is unrealistic and destabilizing. Its implementation will both weaken cross-strait deterrence and undermine the Tsai administration’s many other national defense achievements, including major increases in defense spending, reserve reform, and raising threat awareness among voters. Unfortunately, because the Tsai administration has thus far been willing or unable to challenge the Ministry of National Defense, Washington ought to step in to get Taiwanese defense reform back on track.
Old Habits Die Hard
How did Taiwan get to this point, especially when it looked like hope was on the horizon and the Ministry of National Defense was starting to take asymmetric defense reform seriously? The explanation revolves around habit and institutional inertia. For generations, Taiwan’s military planned to counter an invasion force by meeting and defeating it head-on. The idea was that the island’s small fleet of technologically superior, American-made jets, ships, and tanks could offset the People’s Liberation Army’s numerical advantages. Unfortunately, this approach stopped making sense once China’s military modernization efforts gave it the edge quantitively and qualitatively.
As the cross-strait military balance started to shift in China’s favor, American analysts and reform-minded Taiwanese officers began calling on the Ministry of National Defense to stop buying outdated jets, ships, submarines, and tanks so it could invest in an asymmetric posture instead. Asymmetry meant acquiring large numbers of small and cheap capabilities — weapons like coastal defense cruise missiles, short-range mobile air defenses, naval mines, and drones — and using them to wage a prolonged denial campaign in the air, at sea, and on the ground.
For a moment, it seemed like the message was getting through. In 2017, then chief of the General Staff, Adm. Lee Hsi-Min, introduced an innovative and decidedly asymmetric new warfighting framework, the Overall Defense Concept. In this concept, Taiwan’s armed forces finally had a logical blueprint to help them to survive a first strike and wage a prolonged, decentralized, and multilayered campaign of attrition.
Unfortunately, the Overall Defense Concept was more popular with American analysts and officials than it was with currently serving Taiwanese generals and admirals. Driven by personal animosity and the fact that true asymmetry undercuts the rationale for pursuing high-profile, high-prestige, and high-cost weapons, these military leaders and civilian enablers purged the Overall Defense Concept as soon as Lee retired. There are rumors that the ministry has even banned senior officers from using the term and that message has trickled down into the junior ranks. Notably, the term does not appear in either the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review or the recently released National Defense Review.
Having thrown the Overall Defense Concept in the dustbin, the Ministry of National Defense reverted to form. Except this time, defense officials no longer bothered to pretend that Taiwan could afford enough outdated jets, ships, submarines, and tanks to deter — let alone defeat — a determined attacker. Instead, vague references to “grey-zone competition” now justify their pursuit, dressing up the old way of doing things in fashionable jargon. Meanwhile, the ministry is trying to acquire a larger inventory of longer-range missiles in the hopes that it can use the threat of punishment by missile bombardment to convince the Chinese Communist Party not to invade.
Senior defense officials are fully aware that the United States still expects Taiwan to pursue asymmetric defense capabilities. But rather than acquiesce to these painful and costly demands, the ministry has instead coopted and repurposed asymmetry’s lexicon so as to rationalize their decidedly symmetric plans.
Time Is Taiwan’s Most Precious Resource
No matter how hard the Ministry of National Defense might try to convince American audiences otherwise, there is no hiding the fact that it is once again trying to replace its existing inventory of antiquated and hard-to-maintain legacy weapons with newer, shinier versions of the same. Take, for example, the 2019 announced sale of 66 F-16 aircraft for an estimated $8 billion. Or the ministry’s ongoing efforts to build eight indigenously developed submarines for an approximately $16 billion (an amount roughly equivalent to the Tsai administration’s entire 2022 defense budget). And, of course, this fall’s announcement that Taiwan wants to spend nearly $1 billion on 40 M109 Paladin self-propelled howitzers. Meanwhile, genuinely asymmetric capabilities, like the proposed fleet of 45-ton fast-attack missile boats, remain unfunded.
It should go without saying that manned fighter jets, main battle tanks, self-propelled howitzers, and diesel submarines are ill-suited to wage an asymmetric defense of the island. Yet even if one pretends that these legacy platforms have a realistic role to play in an invasion scenario, the question of time remains. Diesel submarines, F-16 jets, M1A2 tanks, and Paladins take a long time to build and field. Years will pass before Taiwan will get its hands on the weapons that are already in the pipeline for production or purchase.
Take, for example, Taiwan’s decision to spend $5 billion upgrading its fleet of 141 F-16A/B jets. Although it inked a deal in 2011, the upgrades did not start until 2016. Five years later, the first combat wing of upgraded F-16s will stand up this month. The air force even spent another $140 million this year to try to speed the process up so it can hopefully finish the last upgrades in another two years — more than a decade after starting the process. Similarly, in a best-case scenario, Taiwan’s navy will not receive its first submarine until 2024 — but there are indications that the program is about to be significantly delayed. The last of the M1A2 main battle tanks purchased in 2019 will not reach the island until 2027.
Nor will these shiny new weapons be ready to go into action the moment they arrive. Units will still need to learn how to use and fix them. The services will still have to develop the maintenance capacity to keep them operational. And the Ministry of National Defense will need to stockpile logistics to ensure that these capabilities will have enough ammunition, fuel, and parts to stay in the fight (at least those that survive a first strike). These critical but oft-ignored changes can take years to implement under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, with tens of billions of dollars’ worth of purchases and platforms already coming down the pipeline, the risk that the Ministry of National Defense might choke on the glut of new toys is real.
Enter the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Review
By passing fighter jets, amphibious ships, submarines, and armored vehicles off as “asymmetric,” the Ministry of National Defense is attempting to convince Washington (and its own nominal masters in Taipei) that it has a realistic plan for using these legacy platforms to blunt an all-out attack. To support their case, Taiwan’s senior leaders have published the 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Review.
On the surface, these documents might seem like they share the ejected defense concept’s focus on destroying the enemy in the littoral area and annihilating it on the beachhead. But any such parallels are misleading at best, because they tack on two additional goals that are incompatible with a genuine asymmetric posture: namely, resisting the enemy on the opposite shore, and attacking it at sea.
In essence, these documents reveal that the Ministry of National Defense hopes to extend the battlefield deep inside of China in a way that justifies the pursuit of expensive long-range strike, air superiority, and sea control capabilities. Take the Quadrennial Defense Review’s top priority, long-range precision strike. Ostensibly, the plan is to deter a Chinese attack by threatening to retaliate with long-range strikes on the Chinese homeland. There are myriad problems with this concept. History suggests that these sorts of conventional “punishment” campaigns usually backfire or fail. Instead of breaking a nation’s will to fight, striking targets deep inside its territory tends to stoke outrage and indignation, causing civilians to rally to their government and not against it. And make no mistake: No matter how hard Taiwanese military planners try to only hit legitimate military targets, Beijing will do everything it can to make it look like Taipei is intentionally striking Chinese civilians. Therefore, far from deterring Beijing, Taiwan’s long-range arsenal could inadvertently help the Chinese Communist Party galvanize domestic support.
In any case, Taiwan lacks the surveillance and targeting capabilities needed to accurately strike distant targets. Developing a full and robust “kill chain” will take much longer — and cost more money — than simply buying more missiles. Survivability concerns also loom large, since China will try to preempt Taiwan’s missiles and the sensors and data links that enable them. Even those who think that missiles might make sense under certain, narrowly circumscribed conditions nevertheless still argue that they should be the ministry’s last priority, not its first. Common sense says that Taipei should find a way to survive a body blow from the Chinese before it worries about poking Beijing in the eye. After all, a long-range strike arsenal cannot compensate for the absence of a credible way to prevent Chinese invasion forces from quickly gaining control over Taiwan’s air, sea, and ground space.
Yet instead of worrying about how to wage a prolonged defense of the island — especially in the all-too-likely event that invasion troops make it past the beaches — the 2021 review says that Taiwan’s military must find ways to achieve air superiority and sea control. Never mind the fact that even the U.S. Navy and Air Force are not sure they can attain these goals against a determined, capable, and proximate Chinese foe. The Ministry of National Defense is, with a straight face, committing itself to the pursuit of achieving air and sea control using fourth-generation aircraft, a few dozen major surface combatants, a handful of indigenously produced diesel submarines, and yes — main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers.
Some key architects of the 2021 review now seem to be moving over to the National Security Council, creating a powerful impediment to asymmetric reform across Taiwan’s national security apparatus. Such a development will not portend well for U.S. efforts to assist Taiwan’s defense modernization and reform. If the champions for large, conventional, expensive platforms (read tanks, artillery, and submarines) control the bureaucratic high ground, there is not much room left for the few reform-minded officers remaining within the ministry to maneuver.
Civilian Control of the Military
Why has the Tsai administration yet to intervene in this critical debate? Such reluctance is especially puzzling given the degree to which President Tsai emphasized national defense at the start of her second term.
There are compelling reasons to think that a cold, hard political calculus is at play. Asymmetry is also a politically tricky concept to sell, particularly in the absence of a clear-cut American security guarantee. After all, Taiwanese voters can see their tax dollars at work whenever a F-16 flies overhead, whereas asymmetric capabilities are low-profile and designed to remain unseen. Moreover, even asymmetry’s most ardent advocates accept that Taiwan’s military will struggle hold out indefinitely without outside help. Asking the Taiwanese people to prepare for a long and bloody war of attrition — one that might become a fool’s errand if the United States ultimately decides to stay on the sidelines — is a tall order.
It will also be politically costly to impose change on the historically Kuomintang-leaning military bureaucracy. Nor does the Democratic Progressive Party have a deep “bench” of civilian defense experts who can help to translate top-level political guidance into an actionable plan, especially in the face of entrenched resistance. Even if such a bench existed, the Ministry of National Defense has nothing like the U.S. Department of Defense’s Office of the Secretary of Defense, which translates, implements, and enforces political guidance within the U.S. military bureaucracy. Therefore, Tsai may well see no other option than to continually appoint retired generals and admirals to serve as senior civilian defense officials in the hope that they can be incrementally nudged toward reform.
The same calculus can help to explain why Taiwan’s elected leaders are unwilling to challenge their generals and admirals. Taking such a step in order to generate public support for dramatic defense reform could give opposition politicians the opportunity to spin things, perhaps by implying that the administration’s mismanagement of cross-strait relations created the need for such dramatic reforms in the first place.
Few observers inside or outside of Taipei think that the Tsai administration is willing to pay such a price at the ballot box. Indeed, the administration seems to act as if it is trapped: Voters will not support dramatic measures like conscription or a massive increase in defense spending unless they think the threat is real, but telling voters that the threat is real will cause them to panic and will cost votes.
Yet this “chicken and egg” line of reasoning has more than a whiff of self-interest. National defense leadership should always come from the top. Neither the Ministry of National Defense nor the Taiwanese people will embrace costly and painful reform until Taiwan’s elected officials convey the existential nature of the threat; offer a clear vision for how and why an asymmetric defense posture can meaningfully improve deterrence; and to expend political capital necessary — even if it costs them an election — to make it a reality.
It Is Time for Washington to Step In
This challenge is not Taiwan’s alone to navigate, because the costs of failure are not Taiwan’s alone to bear. As Washington edges ever closer to defining Taiwan’s security as a core national interest, Taiwan—and American allies around the region—will expect American military power to fill any lingering deterrence gaps that Taiwan cannot, or will not, handle itself.
Thankfully, Washington has options. Here are three recommendations.
First, it is time for Washington to confront Taipei. To this end, the Biden administration should organize a behind-the-scenes meeting with Tsai and her senior national security officials. The sole purpose of this
“come-to-Jesus” intervention should be to communicate the unambiguous expectation that the Tsai administration immediately implement the Overall Defense Concept. Senior Biden political officials should also make clear that Washington will only support the sale of weapons, platforms, and capabilities that are fully congruent with that concept. At the same time, because the United States has a bad habit of sending contradictory signals about defense reform and arms sales, the Biden administration should also coordinate and enforce clear and consistent messaging across all of the agencies that interact with Taiwan. Clear signaling is essential to prevent those who oppose or resent the Overall Defense Concept from coopting the rhetoric of asymmetry to justify their usual priorities.
Second, Congress should give this message teeth by passing the Arm Taiwan Act recently introduced in the Senate. This important bill clearly links future arms sales with Taipei’s ability to make real progress toward developing denial concepts, acquiring the right capabilities (as defined by Washington), and recruiting, training, and equipping so as to match these new denial capabilities with a credible warfighting doctrine. Heavy-handed though they may seem, conditional arms sales can help the Tsai administration undertake the bureaucratically painful and politically costly steps associated with reform. Moreover, Congress should fully fund the $3 billion provision within the Arm Taiwan Act to help Taiwan purchase denial capabilities outside of the normal Foreign Military Sales process. Doing so will both free up Taiwan’s defense budget to pay for other urgent doctrinal, training, logistical, and maintenance requirements needed to support asymmetric operations, and will blunt the critique proffered by some in the United States and Taiwan that U.S. arms sales are just a form of protection money.
Third, the Department of Defense should develop operational warfighting plans that complement a Taiwanese posture of denial. The fact is that Taiwan will struggle to defend itself from attack without external support. It is increasingly clear that the Taiwanese people are willing to fight. But it is unreasonable to ask them to sacrifice for a hopeless cause. By making it clear that American war plans are designed to serve as a counterpunch to the island’s denial-oriented posture, Washington can help the Tsai Administration convince Taiwanese voters—and Chinese military planners—that an asymmetric defense will work. Specifically, by holding out and absorbing as much Chinese military power as possible, Taiwan can buy time for U.S. forces to intervene while exposing vulnerabilities for U.S. forces to exploit.
Some will argue that friends require a soft touch. I would ordinarily agree. Unfortunately, these are not ordinary times. Storm clouds are gathering, and the stark reality is that one day soon Washington might find it necessary to send Americans into harm’s way to defend Taiwan. Washington, therefore, has a profound moral obligation to do everything in its power to make sure that Taiwan is doing everything in its power to provide for its own defense.
Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an assistant professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he is also associate director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.
4. Japan, U.S. conduct their 1st anti-sub drill in South China Sea
Japan, U.S. conduct their 1st anti-sub drill in South China Sea | The Asahi Shimbun: Breaking News, Japan News and Analysis
Japan, U.S. conduct their 1st anti-sub drill in South China Sea
THE ASAHI SHIMBUN
November 17, 2021 at 18:50 JST
A U.S. Navy destroyer, rear, and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force submarine participate in their first joint anti-submarine drill in the South China Sea. (Provided by the Maritime Self-Defense Force)
Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted its first joint anti-submarine drill with the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea, the MSDF announced on Nov. 16.
The joint exercise is aimed at highlighting their capabilities and keeping China, which is building military bases in the South China Sea, in check.
“The ability to conduct an advanced (joint) drill in any areas of the sea shows a high level of interoperability between Japan and the United States,” MSDF Chief of Staff Hiroshi Yamamura said at a news conference held the same day. “It also represents the deterrence and response capability of the MSDF and the U.S. Navy.”
An MSDF submarine, along with the destroyer Kaga, which is expected to be converted into an aircraft carrier, and P-1 patrol aircraft, participated in the joint drill, according to the announcement.
The U.S. Navy’s USS Milius, an advanced guided missile destroyer, and P-8A patrol aircraft also took part.
Patrol aircraft monitor the movements of submarines from above. It is rare for a Japanese patrol aircraft to fly over the South China Sea, according to the MSDF.
5. Do Less, Better: The Audacity Of Stewardship In Great Power Competition
Excerpts:
Bluntly, the interagency does not need “warrior diplomats” so much as it needs more resources to support the diplomatic and other elements of national power in Great Power Competition- entities with roughly 5% of DoD’s budget.
...
...As life-long China expert Michael Pillsbury describes in his authoritative account of China’s rise vis-a-vis the United States in The Hundred-Year Marathon, China’s Unrestricted Warfare strategy to competition deliberately minimized military efforts while giving primacy to whole-of-government initiatives from other elements of power that ultimately proved successful in building Chinese superpower capabilities. Well-intentioned DoD efforts to apply these adversary lessons militarize them without internalizing their greater significance for whole-of-government competition. As a recent and important example of this flawed approach, to expand capabilities in irregular warfare, the Department released the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy–essentially mandating that the entire Joint Force add irregular warfare expertise (a traditional domain for smaller Special Operations Forces) to its core competencies. To be sure, irregular warfare is a critical and increasing component of modern conflict that deserves greater attention from military practitioners and strategists. Even so, DoD’s folly in its new approach to irregular warfare appears twofold: first, it asks the whole force to develop competencies for tasks which it is not designed to conduct. This creates intra-department competition to learn new skills while still maintaining readiness for all of the old ones.
Do Less, Better: The Audacity Of Stewardship In Great Power Competition
DoD must: expand competition without exacerbating it, internalize the salient lessons from adversary approaches without militarizing them, and integrate capabilities without duplicating them.
Introduction
According to Hollywood lore, directors fired A-list movie star Edward Norton from his role in the Marvel superhero films because he lacked the “collaborative spirit” working as a member of an ensemble cast. In other words, he failed to internalize the “support” requirements of an actor in a “supporting” role. In Hollywood, the price of such miscalculations is merely a bruised ego. In Great Power Competition, the price could be fatal.
As the United States operationalizes its shift from counterterrorism to nation-state competition, much discussion has occurred regarding how the Department of Defense (DoD) should address the challenges posed by nation-state competitors. Almost universally, the discussion of how DoD contributes to Great Power Competition involves increasing or adding capabilities to support a whole-of-government approach. That is, “expanding the competitive space” means expanding DoD capabilities to support all instruments of national power. However, even while correctly perceiving the expanded scope of conflict in the emerging operational environment, DoD should tread carefully in its zeal to expand the competitive space. Specifically, DoD needs to recognize and preserve the balance between three critical relationships as it aims to position itself for Great Power Competition. DoD must: expand competition without exacerbating it, internalize the salient lessons from adversary approaches without militarizing them, and integrate capabilities without duplicating them. Such is the essence of audacious stewardship–which seeks to align and position DoD as a supporting (not supported) effort in competition. Audacious stewardship will enhance DoD’s credibility, counterintuitively preserve capability, and truly enable the critical expertise located across the instruments of national power for nation-state competition.
Expanding vs. Exacerbating Competition
Well-intentioned DoD efforts to expand the competitive space against external actors may unintentionally exacerbate the internal competitive space between the elements of U.S. national power that comprise a whole-of-government strategy. In her best-selling book How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, author Rosa Brooks documents how, during the enduring counterinsurgency wars of the previous decades, DoD consistently competed with elements of national power to develop soft-power approaches to conflict that encroached on (and indeed usurped) some of the latent expertise within the non-DoD interagency.
To be sure, this reality is likely the product of good-faith efforts from DoD to analyze and develop capabilities aligned with (and responding to) the emerging threat environment at the time. Even so, whether intended or unintended, DoD’s expansion and infiltration into all elements of national power reflects an imbalance in its approach where DoD perhaps over-analyzed whether it could contribute capabilities to the emerging threat while under-analyzing whether it should contribute certain capabilities better situated in other elements of national power.
Guided by the above impulses, for example, instead of empowering and enlarging the diplomatic and political expertise resident in a highly trained diplomatic and foreign service corps, DoD articulated the need to create “warrior diplomats” to solve the political problems encountered on the emerging and expanded battlefield. The same impulses drive current recommendations for DoD to incorporate social science skills into strategy training as well previous DoD efforts to conduct large-scale nation-building as a military function of combat. In short, in the frantic race to provide exquisite capability in the emerging competition environment, DoD now performs “nearly every job on the planet”-regardless of whether or not such so-called expertise is more appropriately leveraged from other agencies within the whole-of-government.
Bluntly, the interagency does not need “warrior diplomats” so much as it needs more resources to support the diplomatic and other elements of national power in Great Power Competition- entities with roughly 5% of DoD’s budget. In this way, DoD ends up exacerbating competition rather than expanding it. DoD needs to weigh every initiative to create or augment “soft power” approaches through the “Expand vs. Exacerbate” lens to ensure that resources requested to create new expertise and capabilities do not undermine existing expertise and capability within the interagency. Former Secretary of Defense James Mattis highlighted the imperative of balancing resources across the whole-of-government spectrum when he noted that the more resources committed to diplomacy (as an additional element of national power), the “less we have to put in a military budget.” True recognition of both the expansion of modern conflict and DoD’s role as a supporting (not supported) effort reflects Mattis’ maxim and demands pushback, in the name of stewardship, every time DoD aims to expand competition at the expense of mobilizing the ideally suited (and often better positioned) elements of national power to address competition short of war.
Internalizing vs. Militarizing Competitive Approaches
Presumably, much of the impetus to expand the competition against adversaries in this age of Great Power Competition comes from concern analyzing successful adversary approaches to competition in the contemporary environment. Much has been made, for instance, of the Russian New Generation Warfare achieving competitive gains in Ukraine and Europe. Likewise, celebrated Chinese colonels Quiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui published Unrestricted Warfare as the manual for how China used whole-of-government irregular warfare to rise to superpower status over the last thirty years. Given these successes, there appears to be many valuable lessons to draw from adversary actions in the competitive space.
Well-intentioned DoD efforts to apply these adversary lessons militarize them without internalizing their greater significance for whole-of-government competition.
But DoD must draw the correct lessons from such approaches and internalize them without exclusively militarizing them. The idea of the military not exclusively “militarizing” adversary lessons in competition seems non-sensical until one remembers that the whole idea behind the changing character of war in the 21st century is that conflict will expand into new and decidedly non-military domains. Thus, to the extent that DoD seeks to define new concepts in strictly military terms, it inadvertently (and inefficiently) narrows the scope and arena for active and effective competition. As life-long China expert Michael Pillsbury describes in his authoritative account of China’s rise vis-a-vis the United States in The Hundred-Year Marathon, China’s Unrestricted Warfare strategy to competition deliberately minimized military efforts while giving primacy to whole-of-government initiatives from other elements of power that ultimately proved successful in building Chinese superpower capabilities. Well-intentioned DoD efforts to apply these adversary lessons militarize them without internalizing their greater significance for whole-of-government competition. As a recent and important example of this flawed approach, to expand capabilities in irregular warfare, the Department released the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy–essentially mandating that the entire Joint Force add irregular warfare expertise (a traditional domain for smaller Special Operations Forces) to its core competencies. To be sure, irregular warfare is a critical and increasing component of modern conflict that deserves greater attention from military practitioners and strategists. Even so, DoD’s folly in its new approach to irregular warfare appears twofold: first, it asks the whole force to develop competencies for tasks which it is not designed to conduct. This creates intra-department competition to learn new skills while still maintaining readiness for all of the old ones. In metaphorical terms, one should not expect success asking a surgeon to take on the new (and unrelated to medicine) task of welding while still expecting the maintenance of the skills required for a heart transplant. Secondly the Irregular Warfare Annex appears to incorrectly locate irregular warfare solely within the military element of national power. In other words, it adopts the exact opposite approach that China successfully demonstrated with their Unrestricted Warfare strategy de-emphasizing the military element of competition while expanding competition to all other elements of power. The lesson for internalizing (not militarizing) seems clear: modern competition in conflict is not wholly- or perhaps even primarily- located in the military dimension of national power. Stewardship strategies for resource allocation should reflect this truth.
Integrating vs. Duplicating Competitive Capabilities
There is a subtle but critical difference between efficiently integrating military capabilities into existing elements of national power and inefficiently duplicating interagency efforts. This “Integration vs. Duplication” paradigm should serve as a litmus test for DoD efforts seeking to expand the competition with adversaries in an environment that increasingly sees competition as a non-military domain. Resisting impulses to duplicate capabilities that reside more appropriately in the interagency demonstrates a profound stewardship of resources that fully communicates DoD as a supporting (not supported) effort in competition short of war. Adapting a famous early American quote from Robert Harper , the mantra for this type of stewardship should read: “Billions for integration, but not a cent for duplication.” That is, DoD should spend as much as it needs for integrating its capabilities into whole-of-government approaches but not one cent on activities that duplicate them. Critically, this allows the interagency to grow and develop their existing expertise while leveraging the most successful lessons from adversary approaches to competition. Additionally, far from doing less, this stewardship approach preserves DoD capabilities by allowing it to focus along a more narrowly defined band of capabilities that is both commensurate with the military supporting role in competition and the requirements for readiness to deter and (if necessary) prosecute high intensity conflict. Like a professional researcher narrowing a research question to obtain focused and better-quality results, such an approach to stewardship will focus DoD capabilities in a way that wisely resists the urge to create DoD experts in all dimensions of competition.
Conclusion
As Great Power Competition continues to define the contours of the 21st century’s greatest security challenges for the United States, it is audacious to make recommendations that, on their surface, appear to ask DoD to contribute less to the challenge. Yet this is the very essence of good stewardship. If conflict in the 21st century has taken on a character that emphasizes indirect competitive approaches, then the most responsible DoD response is to advocate for the reallocation of resources to the elements of national power that feature most prominently in emerging national security challenges. In this way, DoD facilitates the expansion (not exacerbation) of competition that reflects a credibility-enhancing attitude embracing a supporting role to whole-of-government approaches. Likewise, it demonstrates a mature perspective to competition that internalizes (without militarizing) the best competitive approaches to optimize the interagency and a whole-of-government strategy. Finally, such an approach to stewardship requires constant assessment of where efforts to expand the competition duplicate (rather than integrate) capabilities. Taken together, these metrics serve as a powerful plumb line guiding and aligning DoD’s approach to competition. As a critical part of the national security ensemble cast of characters for competition, DoD must demonstrate the stewardship required for an effective “collaborative spirit” to emerge among the integrated elements of national power. America’s adversaries are counting on the United States getting its approach to competition wrong. Emerging from the Global War on Terror as a high-performing and trusted national security tool, the American people are expecting DoD to lead efforts to get it right.
Scott J. Harr is an Army Special Forces Officer and Ph.D. Candidate at the Helms School of Government, Liberty University. He holds an undergraduate degree in Arabic Language Studies from West Point and a master’s degree in Middle Eastern Affairs from Liberty University. A trained Arabic and Farsi speaker with over four years of cumulative deployment time in the Middle East, his work has been featured in The Diplomat, RealClearDefense, The Strategy Bridge, Modern War Institute, Military Review, The National Interest, and Joint Force Quarterly among other national security focused venues.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
6. Women's tour chief casts doubt on statement attributed to China's Peng
Strange situation. It sure seems the email was fabricated. Does someone in China really believe no one can see through their actions?
Women's tour chief casts doubt on statement attributed to China's Peng
Nov 17 (Reuters) - The head of the Women's Tennis Association on Wednesday voiced doubt over an email it received, also released by a Chinese state media outlet, in which tennis player Peng Shuai was said to deny her allegations of sexual assault.
Peng, one of China's biggest sport stars, said on social media this month that former Chinese vice premier Zhang Gaoli coerced her into sex and that they later had an on-off consensual relationship.
Her post was deleted about half an hour later and she had not since then been seen in public or made a statement, alarming the global tennis community. read more
On Twitter on Wednesday, Chinese state media outlet CGTN released what it said was an email Peng had sent to WTA Chairman Steve Simon, who is also its CEO, in which she said the allegation of assault was untrue. Twitter is blocked in China.
"The statement released today by Chinese state media concerning Peng Shuai only raises my concerns as to her safety and whereabouts," Simon said in a written statement.
"I have a hard time believing that Peng Shuai actually wrote the email we received or believes what is being attributed to her."
Beijing has yet to comment on Peng's initial allegation and discussion of the topic has been blocked on China's heavily censored internet.
The statement comes as China prepares to host the Winter Olympics in Beijing in February amid calls from global rights groups and others for a boycott over its human rights record.
"My answer is very simple. This is not a foreign affairs matter, and I am not aware of the situation you mentioned," foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on Thursday when asked about Peng's whereabouts and whether China is concerned her case would affect its image ahead of the Olympics.
1/4
A file photo of China’s Peng Shuai serving during a match at the Australian Open on January 15, 2019. REUTERS/Edgar Su
The Chinese Tennis Association did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The email which CGTN attributes to Peng says: "I'm not missing, nor am I unsafe. I've just been resting at home and everything is fine."
Besides CGTN, the English-language arm of state broadcaster CCTV, no other Chinese media outlet as of Thursday morning in Asia had reported the letter.
A representative for Peng did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
The Florida-based WTA and its men's counterpart, the London-based Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP), previously called on China to investigate Peng's allegations.
Current and former players, from multi-major winners Naomi Osaka and Novak Djokovic to Billie Jean King, have expressed support and concern for Peng, with many top women's players taking to social media with the hashtag #WhereIsPengShuai. read more
"The WTA and the rest of the world need independent and verifiable proof that she is safe," Simon wrote. "I have repeatedly tried to reach her via numerous forms of communications, to no avail."
Peng, 35, was the first Chinese player to top the world rankings when she was doubles number one in 2014. She won doubles titles at Wimbledon in 2013 and the French Open in 2014.
Zhang, now 75, was a vice premier between 2013 and 2018 and served on the Politburo Standing Committee between 2012 and 2017.
"I hope @WTA continues to show what we stand for as players," Jessica Pegula, a top-20 American player, said on Twitter. "We are extremely lucky to be able to do what we do but I hope more people, not just tennis players, shed some light on this deeply concerning situation."
Reporting by Amy Tennery in New York; Additional reporting by Sudipto Ganguly in Mumbai; Editing by Michael Perry, Robert Birsel and Nick Macfie
7. China's move on Taiwan is all but inevitable unless Biden stops it
An ominous warning from Joe Bosco.
Excerpts:
Every day, Taiwan’s population becomes more distinctively Taiwanese — and politically, more anti-Communist China. Taipei and Washington are taking long-overdue actions to beef up Taiwan’s defenses. Countries in the region and in Europe are expressing ever stronger moral and diplomatic support for Taiwan. America and its allies and friends are cooperating more extensively on security planning for Taiwan’s defense. U.S. public and congressional opinion turns perceptibly toward unequivocal support for Taiwan. Even before Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong, the window has closed on the possibility that Taiwan would ever “peacefully” accept submission to Chinese Communist Party rule. Now the window on a lethal and successful quick strike against Taiwan is also closing.
After recently threatening to "smash" Taiwan, while his colleagues warned of "sinking U.S. ships and killing thousands of American sailors," Xi greeted Biden last evening as "my good friend." Perhaps this Chinese Communist dictator — once called "a thug" by Biden and a perpetrator of genocide by his administration — is now following the advice of "The Godfather" to "keep your friends close and your enemies closer."
With his new stature as “emperor for life,” Xi may well believe his time to end the generations-long delay on incorporating Taiwan has arrived. Hopefully, Biden emphatically disabused him of that temptation by making clear that war with Taiwan means (a) war with the United States and its allies and (b) instant U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. An administration official said hours before the call, “This is not a meeting where we expect deliverables to be coming out.” Nevertheless, the president should follow up their conversation by demanding that Xi publicly renounce China’s use of force to take Taiwan, or Biden will publicly announce America’s intent to use force to defend Taiwan.
China's move on Taiwan is all but inevitable unless Biden stops it
The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · November 16, 2021
Deception and surprise are supposedly the stock-in-trade of China’s way of war, as famously articulated by the legendary ancient sage, Sun Tzu. In the modern era, communist and erstwhile communist powers — China, the Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, Serbia under Milosevic, and Vladimir Putin’s Russia — consistently have put that teaching into practice.
Of course, duplicity in the service of aggression is not the exclusive domain of communist powers, as the tyrannical raging of Nazi Germany and Imperialist Japan demonstrated. But those powers are long gone, whereas China under Xi Jinping and autocratic Russia under Putin are, regrettably, still very much with us, as are their partners in international crime, North Korea and Iran.
So, Washington and the West, and those countries that rely on them — especially Taiwan — should be particularly on alert now that Beijing and Moscow have assured the world that all is calm in their regions and that talk of resurgent cold wars, let alone hot ones, should be put aside as historically outmoded thinking and self-serving histrionics. No doubt, Xi repeated that assurance to President Biden when they spoke last night.
In a recent speech commemorating the 110th anniversary of China’s first republic, Xi said, “To achieve the reunification of the motherland by peaceful means is most in line with the overall interests of the Chinese nation, including our compatriots in Taiwan.” He did not repeat his earlier reference to “smashing” Taiwanese opponents of unification, leaving it to the imagination of his global audience: “The historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled.”
Putin quickly noted Xi’s softer tone, and either took it upon himself to chime in or did so in coordination with Beijing: “I don’t think China needs to use force,” he said. “China is a very powerful economy [and] is capable of achieving its national goals. I see no military threat.”
Then, in early November, the Global Times, a Chinese propaganda outlet, joined the calming chorus: “The Taiwan question is a war of words [and] is not limited to the Taiwan Straits region nor just showed by military action. The fundamental competition is about the driving forces of development, the growth of power, and the strengthening determination. … Therefore, mainland netizens don’t have to be impatient.”
The thrust of these messages from America’s adversaries is that there is no immediate threat of military conflict over Taiwan. The recent statements of concern from present and retired U.S. military officers also put the danger of war as years away. Asked at the Nov. 2-4 Aspen Security Forum if China is preparing to make a move on Taiwan, Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, answered: “Based on my analysis of China, I don’t think that it is likely in the near future — being defined as, you know, six, 12, maybe 24 months, that kind of window.”
One of Taiwan’s own top security officials also has adopted a more relaxed view of China’s threat. National Security Bureau Director-General Chen Ming-tong told a parliamentary meeting, “Attacking and capturing the Pratas Islands — this scenario where war is being used to force talks — our assessment is that this will not happen … in the next one, two, three years, within President Tsai’s tenure,” which ends in 2024. Chen’s view apparently was based on some undisclosed intelligence.
And military capabilities are the easier part of the threat posed by an actual or potential enemy. Assessing its intentions is the ultimate challenge. When it comes to Beijing’s intent on Taiwan, there is strategic clarity: China plans to take control of Taiwan, one way or another, unless physically prevented from doing so by Taiwan, with the indispensable assistance of the United States and other friendly nations. But China’s tactics and timing are opaque and ambiguous. Recent Xi and Putin statements, mouthpiece media opinion, and information possibly spoon-fed to U.S. and Taiwanese military officials all point in the direction of Chinese inaction in the near future. But Sun Tzu, Mao Zedong, and perhaps Xi himself, may suggest conversely that this is the time to strike — especially given the confluence of external factors and growing trends.
Every day, Taiwan’s population becomes more distinctively Taiwanese — and politically, more anti-Communist China. Taipei and Washington are taking long-overdue actions to beef up Taiwan’s defenses. Countries in the region and in Europe are expressing ever stronger moral and diplomatic support for Taiwan. America and its allies and friends are cooperating more extensively on security planning for Taiwan’s defense. U.S. public and congressional opinion turns perceptibly toward unequivocal support for Taiwan. Even before Beijing’s crackdown on Hong Kong, the window has closed on the possibility that Taiwan would ever “peacefully” accept submission to Chinese Communist Party rule. Now the window on a lethal and successful quick strike against Taiwan is also closing.
After recently threatening to "smash" Taiwan, while his colleagues warned of "sinking U.S. ships and killing thousands of American sailors," Xi greeted Biden last evening as "my good friend." Perhaps this Chinese Communist dictator — once called "a thug" by Biden and a perpetrator of genocide by his administration — is now following the advice of "The Godfather" to "keep your friends close and your enemies closer."
With his new stature as “emperor for life,” Xi may well believe his time to end the generations-long delay on incorporating Taiwan has arrived. Hopefully, Biden emphatically disabused him of that temptation by making clear that war with Taiwan means (a) war with the United States and its allies and (b) instant U.S. diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. An administration official said hours before the call, “This is not a meeting where we expect deliverables to be coming out.” Nevertheless, the president should follow up their conversation by demanding that Xi publicly renounce China’s use of force to take Taiwan, or Biden will publicly announce America’s intent to use force to defend Taiwan.
Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He is a nonresident fellow at the Institute for Corean-American Studies and a member of the advisory board of the Global Taiwan Institute. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.
The Hill · by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor · November 16, 2021
8. Peng Shuai: Doubt cast on email from Chinese tennis star
The WTA is taking a stronger stand than the NBA by challenging the Chinese.
Peng Shuai: Doubt cast on email from Chinese tennis star
Published
16 minutes ago
The head of the Women's Tennis Association (WTA) has cast doubt on an email released by Chinese state media attributed to tennis player Peng Shuai.
Steve Simon, Chairman of the WTA, said in a statement he had a "hard time believing" the email was written by Ms Peng or on her behalf.
One of China's biggest sporting stars, she has not been heard from since she made sexual assault allegations against a top Chinese official.
The email was shared on Wednesday.
Broadcaster CGTN published the correspondence - allegedly written by Ms Peng - online. Written in her voice, it claims she was not missing or unsafe, adding: "I've just been resting at home and everything is fine."
The email also said the sexual assault allegation attributed to her was false.
Many responding on social media have cast doubt on the authenticity of the email - including pointing out that a typing cursor appears to be visible on the screenshot of the email published by CGTN.
— Stephen McDonell (@StephenMcDonell) November 17, 2021
Ms Peng - a former number one-ranked tennis doubles player - had not been heard from since posting an allegation about former Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli on Chinese social media site Weibo in early November.
She alleged she was "forced" into sexual relations with Mr Zhang - who served as China's vice premier between 2013 and 2018 and was a close ally of Chinese President Xi Jinping - in a post that was later taken down. She has not been seen or heard from publicly since.
The WTA and leading voices from the world of tennis have increasingly spoken out about Ms Peng since.
Responding to the email published Wednesday, WTA chair Steve Simon said the email he received "only raises my concerns as to her safety and whereabouts".
"I have a hard time believing that Peng Shuai actually wrote the email we received or believes what is being attributed to her," he said in a statement, adding: "The WTA and the rest of the world need independent and verifiable proof that she is safe."
Mr Simon also reiterated that her sexual assault allegation must be investigated "with full transparency and without censorship".
"The voices of women need to be heard and respected, not censored nor dictated to," he added.
Ms Peng, 35, is a prominent figure in Chinese tennis. She has won two Grand Slams at Wimbledon in 2013 and the 2014 French Open, both alongside Taiwan's Hsieh Su-wei.
9. The challenge of extremism in the military is not going away without a new perspective
Conclusion:
Violent extremism and radicalization occurring in military members may be approached as a psychological issue similar to PTSD and substance abuse, which then would lead to promoting rehabilitation, rather than simply discharge, leading to grievance, and thus abate rather than enhance risk following discharge. Although violent extremism is not a mental illness, and those who commit acts of violent extremism should by all means be held accountable, violent extremism usually begins by becoming aligned with violent actors and ideologically indoctrinated into virulently hateful beliefs and does arise as a result of a myriad of psychological and social factors that can be addressed in a similar manner to other interventions where unhealthy choices are being made. Violent extremists can be rehabilitated with a combination of psychosocial treatment such as cognitive behavioral therapy, which addresses the underlying needs and vulnerabilities which contribute to radicalization as well as addressing the cognitive distortions, emotional needs, ideological challenge, and redirection that usually needs to occur.
There are detriments to the treatment pathway as well, however. Treating violent extremists similarly to servicemembers struggling with PTSD and substance abuse risks reinforcing to both perpetrators and victims of violent extremism that such ideologies and actions are somewhat tolerated in the military and could be interpreted as military leadership being sympathetic to violent extremists. Given these varied benefits and risks to dishonorable discharge and treatment, we propose a middle ground, wherein violent extremists once identified are required, if they have not already committed a crime, to undergo an intensive treatment program but are dishonorably discharged if treatment is refused or if the individual is noncooperative in treatment.
The challenge of extremism in the military is not going away without a new perspective
By Anne Speckhard, Molly Ellenberg and TM Garret
This piece is excerpted and adapted from a larger research publication, which can be found here.
In February of 2021, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced that the U.S. military needs the troops’ help to both prevent and eliminate extremism and extremist ideologies within the ranks. The statement was made in response to the Jan. 6 Capitol Hill riot.
George Washington University’s Program on Extremism showed that 12 percent of those charged with federal crimes related to the Capitol Hill riot on Jan. 6 2021, included military veterans or active-duty members. More than 25 percent of the rioters with military experience were commissioned officers, and 44 percent had been deployed at least once, raising legitimate concerns that they were weapons trained by our military and could be potentially very lethal actors. Perhaps the starkest finding regarding rioters with military experience, however, was that 37 percent of those with military experience were associated with violent extremist groups such as the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys, making them four times more likely to be part of a such a group than rioters without military experience. Even more recently, Franklin Barrett Sechriest, a member of the Texas National Guard, was charged with using an accelerant to set a fire outside of an Austin synagogue, causing $25,000 in damage. According to NBC News, the offender had stickers in his car displaying swastikas and anti-Semitic statements.
RELATED
The Defense Department is in the midst of a review of all of its policies on extremist activity.
The problem of extremism in the military in the U.S. and in other Western democracies is not new but increasingly visible and perhaps growing of late when it comes to white supremacists. Over the years, some of our most notorious domestic violent extremists have had military experience and weapons training that may have helped them to be more dangerous than regular citizens: In 1995, former soldier and Bronze Star recipient, Timothy McVeigh, bombed the Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building, killing 168 and injuring more than 650 others. Later that year, a Black couple was murdered by a Fort Bragg white supremacist group which included several active-duty soldiers. In 2009, Army doctor Nidal Hasan killed 13 and injured more than 30 others at Fort Hood. Outside of the United States, we have seen a similar trend with members of the German military having planned “false flag” terror attacks to kick off a race war, as accounts of members of the German special forces and police being involved in far-right groups continue to surface, despite the German authorities being more attuned to and wary of far-right authoritarian tendencies in their military and law enforcement.
Why do violent extremists recruit military members?
Through analysis of 50 in-depth psychological interviews with current and former members of far right, white supremacist, and hate groups, researchers at the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism have identified four primary reasons why violent extremists seek active-duty and former military to join their groups:
- First, all military members, regardless of their ultimate role, undergo basic training during which they learn how to handle weapons, and many learn far more during their time in the military than what is offered in basic training. They can bring this training to a violent extremist group, teaching members how to use firearms, run drills, and act as bodyguards and enforcers for the group’s leadership. They also have access to the military itself, to intelligence and to weapons — all things that can be valuable to those who seek to enact insider or violent extremist attacks.
- Second, military members develop a sense of discipline and structure while serving, qualities that are highly valued by violent extremist leaders. A violent extremist group cannot survive or achieve its goals if its ranks are full of rowdy young men who are interested only in drinking and picking fights. Indeed, such actions are seen as detrimental to the group’s reputation.
- This idea dovetails with our third finding — that having military members in one’s group lends it an air of legitimacy. In contrast to disorganized groups like the skinheads of the 1990s and early 2000s, or notoriously violent prison gangs like the Aryan Brotherhood, white supremacist groups with many military members are able to paint themselves as orderly and rational, and thus are less likely to be viewed by those they hope to recruit — respectable members of society such as lawyers, doctors, and politicians — as violent or extremist movements.
- Fourth, members with military experience help far right violent extremist groups to appear patriotic. Faced with accusations of fighting against the government, these groups might easily point to their military-linked members, arguing that current and former soldiers would never associate themselves with an unpatriotic or antigovernmental organization. Instead, violent extremist groups may deploy these members as recruiters and hold them up as symbols of their deeply patriotic support of the United States (or other Western country) and defending its European heritage from foreign “invaders.”
RELATED
The Countering Extremism Working Group report was due in July.
Why are military members susceptible to violent extremist recruitment?
Our ICSVE in-depth interviews with current and former white supremacists also highlight several primary motivations for active duty and veteran servicemembers to join these violent extremist groups. The need for belonging is frequently cited as a motivation for joining terrorist and violent extremist groups of all different ilks. For people with prior military experience, the need for belonging often comes in the form as a desire for a lost sense of community and brotherhood. The closeness that is developed amongst soldiers in the same unit is difficult to replicate in the civilian world. Military veterans may feel lonely and without a support system after discharge, so the opportunity to join a group that can offer them a similar sense of camaraderie, mission, and loyalty can be incredibly enticing.
Beyond the loss of a sense of brotherhood after discharge, veterans may also feel aggrieved toward the government for not offering them physical, psychological, or vocational support that they need to succeed in civilian life. But, in contrast to feeling angry at the government, other people with military experience may see far right violent extremist groups as a chance to continue fighting for a noble cause. As detailed previously, many white supremacist groups aim to portray themselves as patriotic defenders of America’s heritage and culture, which they claim are under attack. They use this narrative to radicalize and recruit former servicemembers, especially those who were deployed to combat zones, telling them that they will be able to continue fighting for American values, albeit this time against domestic enemies who seek to destroy the country from within.
Finally, for those struggling with the transition to civilian life, and especially for those dealing with post-traumatic stress disorder, a continued command structure, a semblance of order, and a clear mission can offer feelings of safety and certainty, which in can in turn assuage anxiety and other features of PTSD, such as hypervigilance and hyperreactivity. Additionally, in a violent group, the hyperarousal and hypervigilance that are common in PTSD are more normalized, as one is still, in a sense, in a combat role, preparing for, if not already fighting, a war. Likewise, the camaraderie, attachments, and drinking culture may help mitigate some aspects of PTSD. As such, PTSD symptoms may also be treated, albeit maladaptively, through participation in a violent extremist group.
An opposite challenge: Violent extremists joining the military
This article focuses primarily on the radicalization and recruitment active duty and veteran service members. Another area of concern is when people who are already radicalized join the military seeking to gain weapons training, access to the military itself, and access to weapons. While some of these might openly espouse their ideology and try to recruit others, others will hide that they are radicalized, lest they be discharged or not admitted into the military at all. Therefore, the challenge for the military lays not only in intervening when servicemembers become radicalized, but also in effectively screening out potential recruits who already hold violent extremist ideologies so that they do not receive any training to bring back to their groups (or take any weapons) or gain access to mount insider attacks, nor do they radicalize and recruit their fellow servicemembers.
What should be done to counter violent extremist radicalization and recruitment in the military?
The problem of people in the military being radicalized and recruited to violent extremist groups, particularly those adhering to far right and white supremacist ideologies, as well as members of those groups joining the military in order to receive weapons and tactical training, must be addressed from a holistic perspective. In the past, including during the 2021 stand-down days in which the first author participated, many have claimed that a lack of clarity and specificity regarding military policies surrounding extremism has contributed to the continued spread of violent extremist, particularly far right, ideologies within the ranks. Several routes for dealing with violent extremists in the military have been proposed, each with its own benefits and disadvantages.
Dishonorable discharge may appear to be the simplest course of action. This option allows the military to remove a violent extremist from their ranks who might have radicalized other service members, recruited them to join their group, or even carried out an attack on civilians, military personnel, or military infrastructure. However, dishonorably discharging such a person who has not yet been violent without first taking any other actions can also be dangerous. First, doing so creates a sense of grievance against the military and the U.S. government, which could be exploited by violent extremist recruiters. Second, the need for a positive identity and belonging as key motivators for joining violent extremist groups and being dishonorably discharged essentially nullifies one’s identity and belonging as a member of the military, creating a void to be filled even further by a violent extremist group. Finally, dishonorable discharge without treatment puts the wider community at risk by sending a weapons-trained individual who is aggrieved and searching for an identity out into society, ripe for further radicalization and possible mobilization into violent acts. Therefore, intervention and treatment before or as an alternative to discharge is likely a more responsible option than dishonorable discharge.
RELATED
Detecting and intervening are the keys, according to Rand Corp.
Violent extremism and radicalization occurring in military members may be approached as a psychological issue similar to PTSD and substance abuse, which then would lead to promoting rehabilitation, rather than simply discharge, leading to grievance, and thus abate rather than enhance risk following discharge. Although violent extremism is not a mental illness, and those who commit acts of violent extremism should by all means be held accountable, violent extremism usually begins by becoming aligned with violent actors and ideologically indoctrinated into virulently hateful beliefs and does arise as a result of a myriad of psychological and social factors that can be addressed in a similar manner to other interventions where unhealthy choices are being made. Violent extremists can be rehabilitated with a combination of psychosocial treatment such as cognitive behavioral therapy, which addresses the underlying needs and vulnerabilities which contribute to radicalization as well as addressing the cognitive distortions, emotional needs, ideological challenge, and redirection that usually needs to occur.
There are detriments to the treatment pathway as well, however. Treating violent extremists similarly to servicemembers struggling with PTSD and substance abuse risks reinforcing to both perpetrators and victims of violent extremism that such ideologies and actions are somewhat tolerated in the military and could be interpreted as military leadership being sympathetic to violent extremists. Given these varied benefits and risks to dishonorable discharge and treatment, we propose a middle ground, wherein violent extremists once identified are required, if they have not already committed a crime, to undergo an intensive treatment program but are dishonorably discharged if treatment is refused or if the individual is noncooperative in treatment.
Dr. Anne Speckhard is Director of the ICVSE and serves as an Adjunct Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Georgetown University School of Medicine.
Molly Ellenberg is a research fellow at the ICSVE.
TM Garret Schmid (born Achim Schmid) and publicly known as TM Garret is an extremism researcher and analyst at ICSVE. He is a German-American public speaker, human rights activist, consultant, author, extremism researcher, interfaith activist and founder of C.H.A.N.G.E, a non-profit organization which engages in anti-racism and anti-violence campaigns, food drives, inter-faith work as well as an EXIT program which helps individuals leave extremist groups and ERASING THE HATE, a nationwide tattoo campaign and movement that covers up racist and hate tattoos for free.
Editor’s note: This is an Op-Ed and as such, the opinions expressed are those of the author. If you would like to respond, or have an editorial of your own you would like to submit, please contact Military Times senior managing editor Howard Altman, haltman@militarytimes.com
10. ‘We must work harder,’ SECDEF says as Pentagon grapples with civilian casualties of airstrikes
We must not expect that we can have some kind of "perfect" war. The fog and friction of war will never be eliminated. Even the law of land warfare recognizes there is always a possibility of civilian casualties. But the so-called self-defense workaround is problematic. But I also worry the effects of this workaround and the lack of trust it could engender will put our forces at greater risk as this could lead to greater second guessing by those controlling supporting fires. We must not let the pendulum swing because of these allegations that we are using self defense as a way round the ROE.
What we must do is never ever cover up our mistakes. We must admit our errors and as the SECDEF says, work harder to do our best to minimize those mistakes.
Excerpts:
Asked whether striking targets under the banner of “self-defense” is a workaround for both protective measures to prevent casualties, and to avoid consequences after the fact, Austin tried to clarify that DoD does earnestly avoid targeting civilians, and does not consider even self-defense strikes casually.
“But I would also say that I have no doubt that we can work harder, go beyond that and say we must work harder,” he said. “I’m committed to adjusting our policies and our procedures to make sure that we improve and I’ll be holding all our senior leaders responsible for putting those policies and procedures into effect as we go forward.”
Austin added that procedures will be tightened up wherever possible in the future.
“We have more work to do in that regard, clearly,” Austin said.
‘We must work harder,’ SECDEF says as Pentagon grapples with civilian casualties of airstrikes
The Defense Department is in the middle of two reviews that will take a look at how it conducts air strikes and how it accounts for potential harm to civilians because of them, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters Wednesday.
“The American people deserve to know that we take this issue very seriously. And that we are committed to protecting civilians and getting this right both in terms of how we execute missions on their behalf and how we talk about them afterwards,” Austin said. “And I recognize that and I’m committed to doing this in full partnership with our military leaders.”
Rand Corp. is reviewing the Syria strike, Austin said, and is going through a security review. The congressionally-mandated report for 2021 is due no later than May 1.
“I look forward to reading these two studies into benefiting from them as we conduct operations,” Austin said.
The reviews, and the New York Times coverage of the Syria strike, come at a time when the Pentagon is still taking questions for its handling of an Aug. 29 drone strike in Kabul, which meant to target Islamic State fighters planning an attack on troops at the gate of Hamid Karzai International Airport, but instead left 10 dead, including an aid worker and children.
RELATED
“The strike was a tragic mistake,” Marine Gen. Frank McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, told a Pentagon news conference.
Austin ordered the Air Force’s inspector general to review the initial investigation into the strike. Lt. Gen. Sami Said told reporters in early November that while he had identified some possible improvements to the process for coordinating defensive strikes, he was not personally recommending any discipline for the personnel involved.
“If you had somebody sitting in the strike cell ― the issue of confirmation bias ― saying, ‘Look, you’re correlating this piece of info to reaffirm that that is the vehicle. But what you’re reaffirming, and the activity you’re seeing could be nefarious, if you will, but it could also be very benign,” he said. “So pushing back a little bit, playing that dialogue to go, what is it exactly that we’re looking at? To make sure.”
To follow that up, Austin said, he asked the heads of Central and Special Operations Command to implement the review’s findings.
“... they’ve done that and I’m working my way through their recommendations,” he said.
Asked whether striking targets under the banner of “self-defense” is a workaround for both protective measures to prevent casualties, and to avoid consequences after the fact, Austin tried to clarify that DoD does earnestly avoid targeting civilians, and does not consider even self-defense strikes casually.
“But I would also say that I have no doubt that we can work harder, go beyond that and say we must work harder,” he said. “I’m committed to adjusting our policies and our procedures to make sure that we improve and I’ll be holding all our senior leaders responsible for putting those policies and procedures into effect as we go forward.”
Austin added that procedures will be tightened up wherever possible in the future.
“We have more work to do in that regard, clearly,” Austin said.
Meghann Myers is the Pentagon bureau chief at Military Times. She covers operations, policy, personnel, leadership and other issues affecting service members. Follow on Twitter @Meghann_MT
11. PacNet #53 – What should Washington expect from US-China strategic stability talks? - Pacific Forum
A world of low expectations!
Excerpts:
Washington, then, should have low expectations for US-China strategic stability talks. Profound differences and disagreements mean that discussions will be difficult and frustrating, and it will take time to produce deliverables.
Focusing on crisis management shows some promise, however, and joint work on non-bilateral issues may help build a framework for cooperation. In any case, broad “strategic nuclear” engagement has stronger odds of success than narrow nuclear work. Talks should include nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, missile defense, and emerging technologies and domains that have or could have an impact on bilateral strategic stability.
Finally, to perform well, Washington should ramp up expertise in this area, both inside and outside the US government. It needs more experts who understand both China and strategic stability. This should receive its full attention.
PacNet #53 – What should Washington expect from US-China strategic stability talks? - Pacific Forum
National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said that US President Joe Biden proposed strategic stability talks to Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping during their virtual meeting on Nov. 15 and that “the two leaders agreed that we would look to begin to carry forward discussions on strategic stability.”
The United States has long sought such discussions with China, but Beijing has invariably declined, arguing that “conditions are not ripe” because the US nuclear arsenal is much larger than China’s. Yet while promising that it would stick to “minimum deterrence” (codewords for a small nuclear force), Beijing has been growing its arsenal and, per recent evidence, this growth is advancing much faster than anticipated, with no end in sight.
If strategic stability talks take place, what should Washington expect?
The findings of unofficial US-China meetings offer insights. In the absence of official strategic stability talks, these meetings were, for a long time, the only game in town. They stopped as the broader US-China relationship deteriorated, but some have resumed recently, and they provide important lessons for Washington. I offer five here.
Lesson #1: Expect to be blamed
Beijing will air grievances and appear largely dismissive to US (and allied) concerns. Beijing justifies its military build-up by pointing to “US aggressive moves,” including efforts to build a coalition of democracies against China. Washington will hear criticisms of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) pact, Beijing’s new bête noire. US explanations that Beijing’s actions have triggered those developments will fall on deaf ears, and Washington will be told to be “more rational” and to abandon its “Cold-War mentality” and its quest for “absolute security.”
Of course, Beijing will also accuse Washington of changing its policy vis-à-vis Taiwan, notably by deploying troops there and by suggesting that the United States has defense commitments with Taipei.
As a result, while Beijing will say that it wants to improve the bilateral relationship, it will not articulate specific actions China should take to that end. For Beijing, the United States has destabilized the relationship and therefore the responsibility for stabilizing it rests on Washington.
Lesson #2: Expect challenges to insulate the nuclear dimension from broader competition
Beijing will express rhetorical support for attempts to insulate the nuclear dimension of the relationship from competitive dynamics in broader US-China relations, but it will also stress that such dynamics make it difficult for China not to compete in the nuclear domain.
Beijing will insist that it is not a “revisionist state,” unlike the United States, which has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Open Skies treaties, is developing low-yield nuclear weapons, and is refusing to cooperate on peaceful nuclear uses. For Beijing, these actions “prove” that the United States is not sincere about strategic stability and, after AUKUS, nonproliferation.
Still, Beijing will stress that China and the United States should commit to never fighting a war, especially a nuclear war. Expect reference to the Reagan-Gorbachev 1985 statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and a push for China and the United States to issue a similar statement.
Beijing, however, will go on to say that the chances of war will decrease if the United States refrains from deploying missile defenses or INF-range missiles in the Indo-Pacific. Read: Problems will go away if the United States lets China dominate the region. When Washington refuses and cites alliance commitments (which allies want strengthened because they fear China), Beijing will use this as evidence of US “nuclear aggressiveness.”
Lesson #3: Expect major disagreements over nuclear plans and strategies
Beijing will be angered that China is—will be—a major focus of the key US strategic reviews, notably the Nuclear Posture Review.
Beijing will dismiss US claims that China is now a US “nuclear near-peer” due to qualitative and quantitative force improvements, and possible posture change (to launch-under-attack). It will object that Chinese modernization complicates US-Russia nuclear reductions. It will reject arguments that the United States might consider building its arsenal back up (because it now has two major nuclear-armed adversaries, Russia and China) and that in response to requests from US allies, it might focus extended deterrence on China, not just North Korea.
Beijing will also reject the idea that it is politically impossible for Washington to acknowledge US-China mutual vulnerability—a goal that China has long sought. It will dismiss the charge that the apparent scope and scale of the Chinese build-up (and its open-endedness) suggests that China has given up on nuclear stability with the United States.
Instead, Beijing will maintain that Chinese nuclear strategy remains consistent and continues to be based on the same principles it laid out after it exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. These include the development of a small nuclear force and its use strictly for deterrence purposes, not warfighting. Beijing will stress that Chinese modernization aims solely to ensure that its forces remain survivable, and it will point to its no-first-use policy as the best example of China’s restraint. Beijing will dismiss “US media and think-tank speculations” about Chinese nuclear activities but insist that modernization is essential because China faces a “grave threat” from the United States.
Beijing will express skepticism over US claims that Washington has maintained a restrained posture in the Indo-Pacific, and that US missile defenses are limited. It will point to the US intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies, arguing that China does not worry just about US firepower, but is also concerned by the US ability to search, locate, and neutralize Chinese forces.
Lessons #4: Expect crisis management to have potential
Beijing will reject limits on, let alone reduction of, its strategic weapons, but support efforts to avoid or manage crises and escalation. In other words, arms control is out, and crisis management is in.
Beijing may agree to a “multi-tiered crisis management dialogue” where the two countries define “basic principles” and explain perspectives on issues that concern the other. For instance, that could translate into the United States providing information about its damage-limitation and left-of-launch strategies in exchange for China explaining its co-location of nuclear and conventional systems.
Beijing may also agree to improve implementation of existing crisis management mechanisms, strengthen them, and develop new ones, especially those that address risks in the space and cyber domains, and with artificial intelligence. Beijing may support establishment of an emergency management office. Of course, also expect Beijing to say that a US-China no-first-use policy would reduce the odds of a crisis and, in the event of a crisis, decrease the risks of nuclear escalation.
Cooperation will not be smooth, however. Beijing will warn that a “lack of trust” between the two countries is an impediment to progress and charge Washington with creating “the conditions of cooperation.” Consistent with Lesson #1—that problems in the relationship are the fault of the United States—it will call out Washington for “creating crises with China or near Chinese territory” and demanding that Beijing manage them. Beijing may also make “issue linkages,” saying Chinese cooperation on crisis management will be difficult without US “flexibility” on trade, technology, or another issue.
Lesson #5: Expect cooperation on some non-bilateral nuclear issues
Beijing will show interest in joint work on nuclear security. It will want to engage with Washington to advance the multilateral arms control and nonproliferation regimes, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Beijing will also voice support for US-China efforts to address proliferation crises, but cooperation will remain limited. For instance, while recognizing that North Korea is a problem, Beijing will assert that it can be solved if the United States offered “reasonable security guarantees” to Pyongyang, granted sanctions relief, and normalized US-North Korea relations. Short of that, Beijing will continue to argue that the United States is the problem and confirm the suspicion that it is “using North Korea to justify its regional alliances.”
Bottom line: Keep expectations low and get ready for the long haul
Washington, then, should have low expectations for US-China strategic stability talks. Profound differences and disagreements mean that discussions will be difficult and frustrating, and it will take time to produce deliverables.
Focusing on crisis management shows some promise, however, and joint work on non-bilateral issues may help build a framework for cooperation. In any case, broad “strategic nuclear” engagement has stronger odds of success than narrow nuclear work. Talks should include nuclear weapons, conventional weapons, missile defense, and emerging technologies and domains that have or could have an impact on bilateral strategic stability.
Finally, to perform well, Washington should ramp up expertise in this area, both inside and outside the US government. It needs more experts who understand both China and strategic stability. This should receive its full attention.
PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.
12. Tougher U.S. stance on Taiwan urged by Congressional advisory body
Excerpts:
The report recommends prohibiting or at least better identifying the risks of variable interest entities, where mainland Chinese companies create offshore corporate entities to circumvent China's prohibitions on foreign direct investment in certain industries and list on U.S. exchanges.
The report said U.S. participation in China’s financial markets was increasing -- reaching as much as $1.2 trillion in 2020 -- and “outpacing the U.S. government’s defense” against threats posed by problematic Chinese companies.
The Biden administration has prohibited investment in 24 publicly traded Chinese companies but, Commissioners Jeffrey Feidler and Michael Wessel say, "many more should be on the list."
Tougher U.S. stance on Taiwan urged by Congressional advisory body
U.S. and Chinese flags are seen before a meeting between senior defence officials from both countries at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, U.S., November 9, 2018. REUTERS/Yuri Gripas/File Photo
WASHINGTON, Nov 17 (Reuters) - Urgent measures are needed to strengthen the credibility of U.S. military deterrence of any potential Chinese aggression against Taiwan, according to a report from a bipartisan advisory body to the U.S. Congress published Wednesday.
The influential U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) included a range of recommendations about Taiwan in its annual report to Congress, amid heightened tensions between the democratically ruled island and China.
The report said Congress should authorize and appropriate funds for Taiwan to purchase defense articles from the United States and finance the deployment of cruise and ballistic missiles and other munitions in the Indo-Pacific while increasing funding for surveillance.
"A lack of clarity in U.S. policy could contribute to a deterrence failure if Chinese leaders interpret that policy to mean opportunistic aggression against Taiwan might not provoke a quick or decisive U.S. response," the report said.
China claims Taiwan as its own and has vowed to bring the island under Chinese control, by force if necessary, and tensions across the Taiwan Strait have escalated in recent months.
In a video call this week, Chinese leader Xi Jinping warned Biden that China would respond to provocations on Taiwan. read more
The report addressed a range of economic issues between the United States and China, including recommending Congress consider legislation to address risks to U.S. investors and interests in China investment.
China's capital controls "may limit investors’ abilities to move money out of equity and bond investments and the lack of oversight by trusted authorities may jeopardize investors' funds," Commission chair Robin Cleveland said in an opening statement. "More importantly, numerous companies which will benefit from U.S. investment have been formally identified as threats to U.S. national security interests."
The report recommends prohibiting or at least better identifying the risks of variable interest entities, where mainland Chinese companies create offshore corporate entities to circumvent China's prohibitions on foreign direct investment in certain industries and list on U.S. exchanges.
The report said U.S. participation in China’s financial markets was increasing -- reaching as much as $1.2 trillion in 2020 -- and “outpacing the U.S. government’s defense” against threats posed by problematic Chinese companies.
The Biden administration has prohibited investment in 24 publicly traded Chinese companies but, Commissioners Jeffrey Feidler and Michael Wessel say, "many more should be on the list."
Editing by Shri Navaratnam and Timothy Heritage
13. Is Belarus migrant crisis a new type of war?
No it is not. We have plenty of names for this type of "war." Perhaps the technique of using or weaponizing migrants in this way is unique but concept is described by many of the already existing terms and concepts.
And whenever anyone says we have a new type of war I am always reminded of JFK's famous speech. I think every "new type" of war is always "ancient in its origin."
"This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration, instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It is a form of warfare uniquely adapted to what has been strangely called "wars of liberation," to undermine the efforts of new and poor countries to maintain the freedom that they have finally achieved. It preys on economic unrest and ethnic conflicts. It requires in those situations where we must counter it, and these are the kinds of challenges that will be before us in the next decade if freedom is to be saved, a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training."
https://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkwestpointcommencementspeech.htm
Is Belarus migrant crisis a new type of war?
Belarus appears to be using migration strategically to put pressure on the EU and create discord within the bloc
For months, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has been accused of using illegal migrants as a tool to punish the European Union for imposing sanctions on his regime.
In July, Belarus loosened its restrictions on visas and increased flights on its state-run airline from the Middle East, allowing thousands of would-be migrants to arrive from Iraq,
Syria and other countries. Belarusian security forces then funneled the migrants to the borders with Poland, Lithuania and Latvia – all members of the European Union – and even gave them wire cutters to breach the fences.
In recent weeks, the situation has grown dire, with thousands of migrants now trapped in tents in freezing conditions and nowhere to go. At least 11 migrants have died.
Belarus has been accused by the EU of manufacturing the crisis in revenge for sanctions imposed in June. The EU has not backed down, adopting fresh sanctions on Belarus this week.
European officials have stepped up their use of war-like rhetoric, as well.
So, is the world seeing a “new type of war”, and if so, what does this mean and who stands to gain?
What is hybrid warfare and ‘lawfare’?
“Hybrid warfare” is an emerging concept in war and conflict studies.
It refers to the use of unconventional methods to disrupt or disable an opponent’s actions to achieve strategic objectives without engaging in open hostilities. Russia’s use of cyber attacks against the West are a good example of this.
“Grey-zone” operations are related to hybrid warfare. These are types of coercive actions that are meant to intimidate an opponent, but also fall short of physical conflict. Grey-zone operations are difficult to categorize due to the ambiguity of the actions (and who’s committing them) and the ambiguity of international law about those actions. Sometimes, the actions don’t even justify a response.
For example, Taiwan has accused China of using grey-zone tactics by repeatedly sending fighter jets near its territory to wear down its military capabilities and influence Taiwanese public opinion.
Hybrid warfare and grey-zone operations are often opportunistic and situational in response to a particular vulnerability.
There’s also a third notion that’s relevant in this context called “lawfare”, which refers to using the law itself as a weapon.
Migrants gathered at a checkpoint at the Belarus-Poland border. Photo: Leonid Shcheglov
Is Belarus guilty of these things?
So, how is this all playing out on the Belarus-EU border?
In short, the crisis could be considered an act of hybrid warfare because Belarus is using migration strategically to put pressure on the EU and create discord within the bloc. This amounts to state-sponsored human trafficking aimed at creating a humanitarian crisis to force the EU and its member states to accede to Belarus’s demands, namely ending their sanctions.
Any concessions to Belarus could further embolden the rise of right-wing parties in Europe and widen existing divisions within the EU. There were already fears Poland might be heading for a “Polexit” from the bloc over migration and other issues.
Belarus is also engaging in “lawfare” by coercing EU states to break international and EU law by stopping migrants and returning them to Belarus. This is a violation of the principle of non-refoulment under international law, which prohibits the sending of refugees back to countries where they might get harmed.
Poland passed legislation last month allowing migrants who enter the country illegally to be pushed back and for their asylum claims to be ignored. This week, Polish forces have used tear gas and water cannons against migrants trying to cross the border.
Belarus has released photos like this showing Polish forces using water cannons to repel migrants at a checkpoint on the border. The State Border Committee of the Republic of Belarus Photo: GPK.GOV.BY / The Conversation
What is Russia’s role in all of this?
Lukashenko seems to have borrowed from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s playbook when it comes to hybrid and grey-zone operations against the west. In fact, Russia has been accused of using illegal migration to push its political agenda before.
In late 2015 and early 2016, thousands of refugees and migrants made their way to Norway and Finland from northern Russia, with the help of Russian guides in convoys of old cars. Then, suddenly, the stream of people stopped.
European officials suspected Russia might be facilitating the migrant flows in response to EU sanctions for Moscow’s annexation of Crimea and its hybrid warfare actions in Ukraine in 2014.
Russia was also accused of fomenting the massive exodus of 500,000 Syrian refugees in 2015 to overwhelm neighboring Turkey and EU countries. Then-US Senator John McCain said Russia was seeking
to exacerbate the refugee crisis and use it as a weapon to divide the transatlantic alliance and undermine the European project.
Because of the ambiguous nature of hybrid warfare and grey-zone operations, it was difficult to prove Russia’s involvement or intent. But experts said Russian and Syrian forces targeted hospitals and used barrel bombs to push civilians to move.
Russia has recently conducted joint military maneuvers with Belarus and dispatched bombers to patrol Belarusian airspace. Belarus’s EU neighbors are now warning of a possible military escalation.
What would Russia have to gain from this? Russia could be seeking to exploit the crisis as part of its “reflexive control” grey-zone approach. This refers to using a combination of military, political and economic pressures to weaken the west and cement its own role as a still-relevant global player and potential mediator.
If this is Russia’s aim, it’s cynical statecraft at its best by Putin, who will emerge as the only “winner” from this humanitarian and geopolitical crisis.
14. Pentagon Scrambles to Defend ‘Juicy Targets’ After Rivals’ Space Tests
I am afraid we may need to learn how to not be dependent on space in future contingencies. Just imagine if Russia or China conduct a massive strike in space when they commence operations.
Conclusion:
The debris from Russia’s launch Monday “will be a threat for years to come,” Shaw said. “ We’ll be talking about this for years. It’s simply irresponsible and it will cause so many problems. This isn’t the beginning of activity by Russia. They continue to show disregard for the stability of space.”
Pentagon Scrambles to Defend ‘Juicy Targets’ After Rivals’ Space Tests
U.S. Space Force is taking Russia’s destruction of its own satellite as a warning.
Russia’s direct ascent anti-satellite launch Monday is adding urgency to the U.S. Space Force’s efforts to better defend U.S. space assets, and has left the Pentagon questioning the implications of Russia’s decision to launch, even when it put its own cosmonauts in danger.
“What we’re seeing Russia demonstrate is a weapon. If they can destroy a Russian satellite, they can destroy an American satellite,” U.S. Space Force Lt. Gen. Nina M. Armagno said Wednesday at the Ascend space conference in Las Vegas. “It’s not just Russia, it’s China as well.”
Monday’s ASAT test and China’s July test of a hypersonic missile that entered space and orbited the globe has the Pentagon working quickly to develop countermeasures, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin told reporters Wednesday.
“We are concerned about the weaponization of space,” Austin said. “We're working as hard as we can to ensure that we can defend ourselves against a range of threats going forward.”
For the Space Force, that means finding ways to make space assets “more difficult to find or less juicy,” Armagno said.
“We’re doing this mission area by mission area. We need to take our missile-warning assets, we need to add layers of orbits, hybrid capabilities, smaller satellites, and commercially provided capabilities,” Armagno said. “That will all complicate Russia targeting our prime missile-warning capabilities.”
Austin questioned why Russia would put its own people aboard the ISS at risk; two Russian cosmonauts were among the seven International Space Station crew who had to seek emergency shelter in their spacecraft from the debris field Monday.
“They have the ability, they know exactly what kind of debris field they're going to create,” Austin said. “So we wonder why they would move to do such a thing.”
It’s likely signalling to the United States, said Maj. Gen. Leah Lauderback, Space Force’s director of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.
“It's probably from a deterrence perspective,” Lauderback said at the Ascend conference. “This is a continuation of their intent to degrade and deter us from using our space capabilities.”
Russia’s test Monday was the fourth direct ascent ASAT launch to destroy a satellite. According to U.S. Space Command:
-
In 2007, China hit its Fenyun 1C satellite. Some 3,013 of its 3,679 trackable pieces of debris are still in orbit.
-
In 2008, the U.S. conducted Operation Burnt Frost to destroy an NRO satellite that was failing. None of the 173 pieces of debris remain in orbit;
-
In 2018, an Indian direct ascent launch destroyed Microsat-R. One of its 168 trackable pieces of debris is left in orbit.
-
On Nov. 15, 2021, Russia destroyed its COSMOS 1408 in 2021, generating at least 1,500 pieces of debris that are trackable, meaning they measure 10 cm across or more.
Tens of thousands of smaller pieces of COSMOS 1408 are believed to remain in orbit, but it will take “weeks to months” before the 18th Space Command Squadron is able to fully track the whole debris field generated by the launch, U.S. Space Command said in a statement to Defense One.
Monday’s test is reminiscent of China’s 2007 launch, U.S. Space Command deputy commander Lt. Gen. John Shaw said at the space conference. Just days before Monday’s event, the International Space Station had to maneuver to avoid a collision with debris from Fenyun 1C.
The debris from Russia’s launch Monday “will be a threat for years to come,” Shaw said. “ We’ll be talking about this for years. It’s simply irresponsible and it will cause so many problems. This isn’t the beginning of activity by Russia. They continue to show disregard for the stability of space.”
15. Virginia elections show that Biden needs a bipartisan approach to Iran
Virginia elections show that Biden needs a bipartisan approach to Iran
The Hill · by Mark Dubowitz and Matt Zweig, opinion contributors · November 17, 2021
Elections have consequences. Republican victories in the Virginia governor’s race and House of Delegates, along with an unexpectedly tight gubernatorial race in New Jersey, don’t just signal a domestic political earthquake, but will likely hamper the Biden administration’s efforts to revive the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. If Biden wants any deal to last longer than his time in the White House, he needs to negotiate a deal with bipartisan support from the Senate that the administration will be able to ratify as a proper treaty. Otherwise, history will repeat itself and the next Republican president will pull out of Biden’s deal, just as Donald Trump rejected the deal Barack Obama made with Tehran.
Nothing is permanent in American politics. On Jan. 20, President Biden was inaugurated with slim majorities in the House and Senate, and a nearly 60 percent approval rating. Ten months later, the president’s political clout is clearly on the wane, and his approval rating is underwater. Based on the outcome of the Virginia and New Jersey races, Republicans are now expected to take control of the House and Senate in the 2022 mid-term elections and may be able to mount a successful presidential bid in 2024.
These results are a problem for the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who wants Biden to guarantee that the United States will not pull out of the nuclear deal again. For the moment, Tehran is earning billions from oil sales and other foreign trade thanks to Biden’s decision not to enforce many Trump-era sanctions that remain on the books. But Khamenei wants sanctions to go away completely and stay away for good.
Yet for comprehensive and permanent sanctions relief to succeed, it is necessary to secure the buy-in of large, bipartisan majorities in both the House and the Senate, since lifting sanctions once and for all will require changing the law. If sanctions relief becomes a partisan issue — as it is now — its success will ebb and flow with the political fortunes of the respective political parties.
Biden’s negotiating team will be traveling to Vienna for a meeting on Nov. 29 with representatives of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and Iran, the other parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, as the 2015 deal is formally known.
The announcement of this meeting came on the heels of a joint statement by the leaders of France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, pledging that an Iranian “(r)eturn to JCPOA compliance will provide sanctions lifting with long-lasting implications for Iran’s economic growth.” Biden understands what the Iranians want, and he is determined to deliver it. But the administration cannot guarantee that sanctions relief will be long-lasting without bringing Republicans on board and concluding an agreement that would receive the 67 votes necessary to secure support for ratification in the Senate.
The Iranians have been demanding assurances that any future administration not withdraw from any deal they make with Biden. This is likely an impossible request, especially if Tehran will only accept temporary limits on its nuclear program, weak verification measures, and no restrictions at all on its ballistic missile program. Obama secured the 2015 deal by making all those concessions, yet they are also the reason that Republicans rejected the JCPOA almost unanimously, while even some Democrats refused to support it.
Rather than a treaty, the JCPOA was a political agreement, with no legally binding elements. The negotiators never even put their signatures on the document. It was the kind of deal that presidents can make and break as they see fit, so there are likely no good options for the Biden administration to provide legal guarantees that future administrations will remain in the agreement.
Rather than rushing back into a flawed, temporary, and politically contentious agreement, the administration should rethink its approach and work in a bipartisan manner to develop parameters of an acceptable new agreement that Republicans and Democrats could envision as a binding treaty.
Otherwise, the outcome of this week’s elections means that the rejection of the JCPOA by a future congress and administration is not just possible, but probable, unless Biden recognizes that compromise is the only viable way forward.
Mark Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), where Matthew Zweig is a senior fellow. Follow Mark on Twitter @mdubowitz. FDD is a nonpartisan research institute focused on national security and foreign policy.
The Hill · by Mark Dubowitz and Matt Zweig, opinion contributors · November 17, 2021
16. FBI launches probe after 'smallpox' vials are found in Merck facility
Bio warfare? Incompetence? Do we need to get smallpox boosters?
I wonder how a renewed smallpox vaccination campaign would fare in today's world?
FBI launches probe after 'smallpox' vials are found in Merck facility
FBI launch urgent probe after 'SMALLPOX is found in Merck facility in Philadelphia while cleaning out a freezer': Disease is so deadly samples are only supposed to be kept in two labs in the world
- Fifteen vials, five labeled smallpox, were found at a facility outside Philadelphia
- They were discovered by a lab worker cleaning out a freezer Tuesday night
- The deadly virus killed 300 million people in the 1900s and was eradicated with a mass vaccination campaign
- Samples are only supposed to be stored at two labs in Russia and Atlanta
- Most Americans today are not vaccinated against it; the FBI is now investigating
PUBLISHED: 00:39 EST, 18 November 2021 | UPDATED: 00:44 EST, 18 November 2021
Daily Mail · by Adam Manno For Dailymail.Com · November 18, 2021
Multiple federal agencies are looking into 15 vials - including five alarmingly labeled as 'smallpox' - that were discovered at a pharmaceutical lab outside of Philadelphia Tuesday night.
The vials, 10 of which were labeled 'vaccinia' after the virus used to make smallpox vaccines, were discovered by a lab worker who was cleaning out a freezer, according to the Centers for Disease Control.
Smallpox was eradicated in 1980 with a successful mass vaccination campaign after it killed an estimated 300 million people in the 20th century alone.
Samples of the deadly virus are only supposed to be kept in two labs: the CDC headquarters in Atlanta and the Vector Institute in Koltsovo, Russia.
The FBI and CDC are now investigating Tuesday's discovery.
Fifteen vials, five labeled 'smallpox,' were discovered at a Pennsylvania lab Tuesday night. Above, a bottle of the smallpox vaccine in 2003
The discovery was reportedly made at Merck's Upper Gwenydd facility outside Philadelphia
The FBI and the CDC are investigating Tuesday's findings. Smallpox is only supposed to be stockpiled in two labs in the world: the CDC in Atlanta and a state-owned lab in Russia
The two agencies did not immediately respond to requests for comment from DailyMail.com.
The finding was first reported by Yahoo News, which obtained a copy of an alert sent to the Department of Homeland Security labeled 'For Official Use Only.'
It is not known how the vials ended up at the Merck facility in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania or if they really do contain the virus.
After they were discovered, the vials were secured immediately and the facility was put on a lockdown that was lifted by Wednesday night.
'Merck is in the process of figuring out why it was there,' the source told NBC10 on Wednesday
Merck did not immediately respond to a request for comment from DailyMail.com.
'There is no indication that anyone has been exposed to the small number of frozen vials,' a CDC spokesperson told Yahoo.
'The frozen vials labeled 'Smallpox' were incidentally discovered by a laboratory worker while cleaning out a freezer in a facility that conducts vaccine research in Pennsylvania.'
The discovery took place at the Merck Upper Gwynedd facility in North Wales, about 30 miles northwest of Philadelphia, according to WCAU.
'CDC, its Administration partners, and law enforcement are investigating the matter, and the vials' contents appear intact. The laboratory worker who discovered the vials was wearing gloves and a face mask. We will provide further details as they are available,' the spokesperson said.
The incident is likely to renew questions about what should be done with the world's Smallpox samples, which are kept in only two labs in the world.
Smallpox is an infection caused by the variola virus. Patients develop a fever and a distinctive, progressive skin rash, according to the CDC.
Most Americans are not vaccinated against the disease and those who are probably have waning immunity, meaning an outbreak could have devastating consequences.
The vaccine leaves a dime-sized lesion that gradually forms a scab and leaves a scar, the CDC says. The lesion is contagious before the scab forms, and those who receive it have to protect the vaccination site from other parts of their body and other people.
In 2014, a government scientist cleaning out an old storage room at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland - just outside of Washington, DC - found six decades-old glass vials containing freeze-dried smallpox, according to the Washington Post.
The samples were packed away and forgotten in a cardboard box. At the time, it was the first such discovery in the country.
In 2019, an explosion at the state-owned Russian lab holding some of the samples sent one worker to the hospital, though the World Health Organization said the blast didn't occur near the stockpiles, according to NPR.
Earlier this month, Microsoft founder and philanthropist Bill Gates said the US and UK should invest 'tens of billions' in virus research, including how to possibly prevent smallpox attacks from being unleashed in places like airports, according to Yahoo News.
'So along with the climate message and the ongoing fight against diseases of the poor, pandemic preparedness is something I'll be talking about a lot,' he said in an interview with British health policy official Jeremy Hunt.
Daily Mail · by Adam Manno For Dailymail.Com · November 18, 2021
17. FDD | A Sign That Iran Is Still Pursuing Nukes
The rogue powers, Iran and north Korea will not give up their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Excerpts:
With negotiations between Iran and the remaining members of the JCPOA set to reconvene in Vienna on November 29 and a fresh invitation for the IAEA director general to come to Tehran ahead of another Board of Governors meeting where Iran risks censure for its mounting nuclear violations and impediment of the IAEA mission, focusing on a personnel change may appear as missing the forest through the trees. But such an assessment would be incorrect. After the death of Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s then-defense minister promised that government employees would continue Fakhrizadeh’s path and that SPND would receive greater financial support. Personnel changes that include the promotion of men like Mozaffarinia, whose résumé parallels Fakhrizadeh’s, are a way for Tehran to signal its priorities today.
Moreover, Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy, thwarting of IAEA surveillance, failure to disclose past activities and properly explain undeclared nuclear material, as well as the continued existence, staffing, and funding of SPND should serve as a warning to the U.S. of the flaws of its JCPOA-centric approach to Iran policy. The JCPOA did absolutely nothing to thwart the activities of SPND and its research staff. The newly discovered chief of SPND should therefore serve as another warning to the Biden administration about the urgency with which to recalibrate and reconsider its approach to Iran.
FDD | A Sign That Iran Is Still Pursuing Nukes
Iranian media have reported on the identity of the new head of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear research institute.
fdd.org · by Behnam Ben Taleblu Senior Fellow · November 17, 2021
Personnel is policy, even in nuclear weapons programs that purport not to exist.
On November 13, Iranian media outlets revealed the name of the new director of the Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research, an entity known by its Persian-language acronym, “SPND.” Created in 2011 to support Tehran’s restructured nuclear weapons quest, SPND was led by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, the Islamic Republic’s foremost military-nuclear scientist, from its founding until his death last November. The continued existence, operation, and staffing of SPND is a testament to Tehran’s ongoing interest in at least a nuclear weapons option, if not an actual weapon.
The name of SPND’s new chief, Reza Mozaffarinia, was not trumpeted in a formal press release, but rather relayed in passing amid a story unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program first detected by open-source analysts. The reason for the lackluster press is understandable. Mozaffarinia’s predecessor was targeted and killed last November in what many assume to be an Israeli attempt to stymie Tehran’s nuclear weapons efforts. In the years leading up to his death, Fakhrizadeh’s name appeared in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, books, articles, and even the atomic archive that Israel exposed in 2018, all of which put Fakhrizadeh at the nexus of Iran’s nuclear and military aspirations.
At the time of this writing, it is unknown how soon after Fakhirzadeh’s death Mozaffarinia assumed his new role. This September for example, the Iranian press announced a new deputy minister of defense, Brig. Gen. Seyyed Mehdi Farahi. Some outlets reported that Gen. Farahi formerly served as the head of SPND, while others allege that he held the title of SPND chief while serving as deputy defense minister. In both instances, no timeline was offered, making it unclear whether the conflation in Farahi’s résumé is the result of a disinformation operation or reporting mistake. What is clear today however, is that several Iranian media outlets report Mozaffarinia as the chief of SPND. Accordingly, Mozaffarinia’s background is worth understanding. As Western powers again pin their hopes on resurrecting the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, Mozaffarinia’s service in a string of sanctioned entities tied to Iran’s military and nuclear programs still in operation remains cause for concern.
Mozaffarinia follows in Fakhirzadeh’s footsteps in more ways than one. Both were sanctioned under U.S. counterproliferation authorities and both were connected to Iran’s defense-industrial and research complex, specifically Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) and Malek Ashtar University (MUT). According to the U.S. State Department, which sanctioned SPND under the same counterproliferation authorities in 2014, “SPND took over some of the activities related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear program” that were formerly overseen by a panoply of entities including but not limited to MUT.
MUT is no ordinary university. Created in 1986 amid the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) as a joint act between the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution and Ministry of Higher Education, MUT’s engineering and aerospace programs have produced or supported scholarship relevant to Iran’s missile program as well as hosted dozens of conferences on dual-use topics over the years. MUT was identified by older U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Iran as subordinate to another entity in MODAFL and subject to sanctions.
Iran’s MODAFL, which was established in 1989 pursuant to a postwar restructuring of the defense ministry, oversees a broad swath of subsidiary firms engaged in the procurement, production, and proliferation of systems, components, and technologies with specific military applications. MODAFL subsidiaries include a host of internationally sanctioned firms such as Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO), which is tasked with producing ballistic missiles and overseeing fronts and sanctioned subcontractors that meet the needs of Iran’s missile supply-chain. According to the Treasury Department, AIO and MUT even developed a “missile training program” together in 2003.
MUT and MODAFL were separately sanctioned by the Treasury Department for their support for Iranian proliferation programs, but MODAFL was again designated in 2019 under U.S. counterterrorism authorities for material support to terror groups like the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGC-QF). In past interviews where he is cited as dean of MUT, Mozaffarinia affirmed that one of the main goals of the university was engaging in the “production of emerging and defensive technologies.”
When Mozaffarinia was designated by the U.S. in 2013, Treasury specifically noted his “significant contributions to Iran’s missile program” and leadership positions as dean of MUT and deputy defense minister at MODAFL. From 2018 to 2020, Mozaffarinia appears in the Persian-language press as MODAFL’s deputy for industrial and research affairs, and on several instances as a “commander.” In fact, a 2018 press report reveals Mozaffarinia’s military rank as second brigadier general, a rank used by both Iran’s national military, the Artesh, as well as the IRGC. As MODAFL deputy, Mozaffarinia retained his rank and was often quoted in stories hailing new weapons systems, making Iranian research and development efforts more self-sufficient, as well as participating in defense expositions. Just this May for example, Mozaffarinia partook in a signing ceremony between MODAFL and the Artesh aimed at increasing the Artesh’s drone capabilities.
This combined military and scientific background is expected to serve Mozaffarinia well at SPND, just as it did Fakhrizadeh. While SPND also purports to engage in non-military scientific endeavors ranging from agricultural projects to combating the coronavirus, it’s critical to remember that Washington’s assessment about the entity’s connection to Tehran’s nuclear and military programs has not changed. This had held true even amid the partisan turbulence that gripped the Iran nuclear issue in D.C. in the past decade.
SPND was sanctioned in 2014 by the Obama administration between the interim (JPOA, achieved in 2013) and final (JCPOA, achieved in 2015) nuclear deals, likely indicating that the entity was still active and too big to be ignored or swept under the rug as a concession to Iran amid negotiations. In 2019, the Trump administration affirmed SPND’s role in Iran’s nuclear and defense programs and revealed that the entity had an estimated staff of 1,500. It further noted the “continued proliferation-sensitive research and experiments” of SPND scientists and “SPND’s use of subsidiary organizations, front companies, and procurement agents to acquire dual-use items from third-country suppliers.”
The former administration even designated a total of 31 persons and entities linked to SPND. These individuals and firms offer SPND a broad array of dual-use scientific expertise that included, but not limited to, radiation studies, semiconductor research, electromagnetics, pulse power research, and explosive and shock research. The sanctions were intended as a warning to the next generation of regime-aligned scientists in Tehran who face “reputational and financial risk[s]…by working for Iran’s nuclear program.”
With negotiations between Iran and the remaining members of the JCPOA set to reconvene in Vienna on November 29 and a fresh invitation for the IAEA director general to come to Tehran ahead of another Board of Governors meeting where Iran risks censure for its mounting nuclear violations and impediment of the IAEA mission, focusing on a personnel change may appear as missing the forest through the trees. But such an assessment would be incorrect. After the death of Fakhrizadeh, Iran’s then-defense minister promised that government employees would continue Fakhrizadeh’s path and that SPND would receive greater financial support. Personnel changes that include the promotion of men like Mozaffarinia, whose résumé parallels Fakhrizadeh’s, are a way for Tehran to signal its priorities today.
Moreover, Iran’s nuclear negotiating strategy, thwarting of IAEA surveillance, failure to disclose past activities and properly explain undeclared nuclear material, as well as the continued existence, staffing, and funding of SPND should serve as a warning to the U.S. of the flaws of its JCPOA-centric approach to Iran policy. The JCPOA did absolutely nothing to thwart the activities of SPND and its research staff. The newly discovered chief of SPND should therefore serve as another warning to the Biden administration about the urgency with which to recalibrate and reconsider its approach to Iran.
Behnam Ben Taleblu is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Behnam Ben Taleblu Senior Fellow · November 17, 2021
18. FDD | Washington and Jerusalem Enhance Cooperation to Counter Ransomware
FDD | Washington and Jerusalem Enhance Cooperation to Counter Ransomware
fdd.org · by Annie Fixler CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow and Enia Krivine Senior Director of FDD’s Israel Program and National Security Network·
November 17, 2021
The United States and Israel are forming a new cyber partnership to combat ransomware threats, Deputy Treasury Secretary Wally Adeyemo announced on Sunday during a trip to the Jewish state. The initiative comes on the heels of America’s counter-ransomware virtual summit last month — attended by more than 30 countries, including Israel — and turns principled pledges into concrete action.
Flanked by Israeli Finance Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Director General of the National Cyber Directorate Yigal Unna, Adeyemo affirmed the importance of “international cooperation to address the abuse of virtual currency and disrupt the ransomware business model,” according to a Treasury press release.
The counter-ransomware effort, the press release continues, is part of a larger initiative, the U.S.-Israel Task Force on FinTech Innovation and Cybersecurity, which will encourage “cross-border cybersecurity exercises” focused on global “financial and investment flows.” The task force will also conduct expert technical exchanges aim at promoting innovation in financial services technologies to enhance both cybersecurity and compliance with anti-money laundering standards.
After the virtual summit, the participants pledged to share “lessons learned and best practices for development of policies to address ransom payments,” according to a joint statement issued by the parties. The new U.S.-Israel task force will operationalize this goal by developing a bilateral memorandum of understanding to share financial sector-related information, including information on cybersecurity incidents and threat intelligence. A common understanding of the threat is the first step in developing joint actions that can thwart the operations of criminal and state-backed malicious cyber actors.
A longstanding ally of the United States, Israel is a logical partner for U.S. efforts to enhance international cyber cooperation. Despite its small size, Israel is a recognized leader in technology and cybersecurity. For example, in the first half of 2021, Israeli companies commanded 41 percent of the total funds raised by cybersecurity firms worldwide.
The success of Israeli cyber companies stems in part from a 2010 Israeli government task force that devised a five-year plan to make Israel a global cyber power. The strategy involved a private-public partnership leveraging Israeli academic, military, private-sector, and government resources.
Israel can provide a useful case study as the Biden administration, Congress, and the U.S. private sector seek to address cyber workforce shortages. Jerusalem’s experience fending off attacks by Iranian hackers against the Israeli water sector can also help inform Washington’s critical-infrastructure defense initiatives.
Prevailing against malicious actors in cyberspace requires robust cooperation with countries such as Israel that share America’s commitment to the rule of law, financial transparency, and an open, free, and secure internet. Washington should look to replicate successes from this new initiative with long-term allies such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan. The United States should also pursue collaboration with Estonia, Taiwan, and other countries that, like Israel, are highly digitized democracies with a record of strong partnership with the United States.
American cyber collaboration with allies should be broad but also deep, and thus Washington should seek to expand U.S.-Israel cooperation in cyber. Congress is currently considering the U.S.-Israel Cybersecurity Cooperation Act, which would authorize $30 million over five years to fund cybersecurity research and development. The Israeli government would match the contributions through government funding and private-sector investment.
The legislation aims to create a new arena of cooperation and innovation. It would provide an opportunity for Washington and Jerusalem to work with private-sector companies, academic institutions, and non-profit organizations to confront cybersecurity challenges. Even while the United States and its allies and partners must remain focused on ransomware attacks, Washington must also look ahead and work with its international partners to adapt to meet future cybersecurity challenges.
Annie Fixler is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) and deputy director of FDD’s Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI). Enia Krivine is senior director of FDD’s Israel Program and National Security Network. For more analysis from the authors, CCTI, and the Israel Program, please subscribe HERE. Follow Annie on Twitter @afixler. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CCTI. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by Annie Fixler CCTI Deputy Director and Research Fellow · November 17, 2021
19. The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - November 2021
Excerpt:
During an October 2021 appearance in Washington, D.C., Director-General Grossi voiced agreement that censuring Iran at the upcoming board meeting would make sense.3 This is in line with the authors’ general observation that the IAEA Secretariat has been sounding warning bells in line with its practices as an impartial, technical international organization, but the Board has not responded in ways it has in the past.
The IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - November 2021
by David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Andrea Stricker [1]
November 17, 2021
The Director General remains deeply concerned that nuclear material has been present at three undeclared locations in Iran and that the current locations of this nuclear material are not known to the Agency. The Director General is increasingly concerned that even after more than two years the safeguards issues related to the four locations in Iran not declared to the Agency remain unresolved.
-International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael M. Grossi
This analysis summarizes and assesses information in the IAEA’s periodic safeguards report, NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the most recent of which was issued on November 17, 2021. The IAEA reports that Tehran continues to stonewall its investigation into Iran’s undeclared nuclear material and activities and has not cooperated regarding the agency’s detection of man-made uranium particles at three undeclared sites or answered questions about the use of nuclear material at a fourth site. In the latest report, the IAEA director-general underscores, “even after more than two years the safeguards issues related to the four locations in Iran not declared to the Agency remain unresolved.”
The IAEA also reports that Iran has physically harassed and attempted to intimidate agency inspectors upon entry to nuclear facilities. The Wall Street Journal reported in September that male security guards had harassed female IAEA inspectors on four to seven occasions.2 Iran cited new security procedures. Iran appears to have continued the practice, despite IAEA warnings that the information would be included in its NPT compliance report. Iran responded to the agency that “there is no ground or legal basis for reporting such matters to the Board of Governors.” The IAEA reports that it advised Iran that its security procedures violate the “Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA, to which Iran is a party, and that their implementation prevents Agency inspectors from effectively discharging their functions as provided for under the Safeguards Agreement.”
The IAEA Board of Governors will next meet from November 24 to 26. Since June 2020, the Board has not passed a new resolution regarding Iran’s lack of cooperation with the IAEA, which would provide the IAEA with needed support to pursue Tehran’s compliance with its legal nonproliferation obligations. By withholding action, the Board appears overly concerned with re-starting talks aimed at reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) rather than demanding Iran redress fundamental NPT violations and non-compliance. It is unlikely that Iran will cooperate on these outstanding issues if it receives sanctions relief under the JCPOA.
The Board should pass a new resolution demanding Iran’s compliance and cooperation with the IAEA, including that Iran uphold its obligations regarding agency privileges and immunities during inspections. It should add a condition that if Tehran fails to cooperate, the Board will schedule a special board meeting to more fully redress Iran’s long running and egregious non-compliance with its NPT obligations.
During an October 2021 appearance in Washington, D.C., Director-General Grossi voiced agreement that censuring Iran at the upcoming board meeting would make sense.3 This is in line with the authors’ general observation that the IAEA Secretariat has been sounding warning bells in line with its practices as an impartial, technical international organization, but the Board has not responded in ways it has in the past.
New Developments Regarding Four Locations of Concern4
Location 1: Turquz-Abad warehouse
The agency reports “no interactions between the Agency and Iran” regarding Location 1, and therefore the safeguards issues relating to the location remain unresolved.
Location 1 is an open-air warehouse in the Turquz-Abad district of Tehran which held cargo containers and other items that purportedly contained nuclear-related equipment and material.5 In 2018, the IAEA observed activities consistent with sanitization of the site. Commercial satellite imagery confirms this activity and documents Iran’s earlier, speedy removal of all shipping containers and scraping of the grounds.6
The IAEA requested access to the site and took environmental samples in February 2019, nevertheless detecting processed natural uranium particles that Iran had potentially produced through undeclared uranium conversion activities. Through additional analysis, and as conveyed to Iran in September 2020, traces of isotopically altered uranium particles were detected as well, including “low enriched uranium with a detectable presence of U-236, and of slightly depleted uranium.” A footnote in the September 2021 IAEA report stated that “that the compositions of these isotopically altered particles were similar to particles found in Iran in the past, originating from imported centrifuge components.”7
The September 2021 IAEA report also included more detail about the containers once present at the site, stating that there were indications the “containers that had been stored at this location had contained nuclear material and/or equipment that had been heavily contaminated by nuclear material. The Agency also assesse[d] that while some of the containers at Location 1 were dismantled, others were removed from the location intact in 2018 and moved to an unknown location.” This finding corresponds with evidence available from commercial satellite imagery.
Location 2: Lavizan-Shian
The IAEA reports regarding Location 2 that it conducted new verification activities from November 14 to 16 “at a declared facility in Iran where uranium metal had been produced previously. The purpose of these activities was to verify whether the natural uranium in the form of a metal disc that may have been used at Location 2 was present at this declared facility.” The IAEA is still evaluating the results of its activities.
In September 2020, the IAEA visited what the Institute identified as the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratory (JHL) at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center to conduct verification activities related to Iran’s past uranium metal production. According to the IAEA, “The purpose of these additional activities was to verify whether the natural uranium in the form of a metal disc identified at Location 2 was present at this declared facility.” The IAEA’s findings from that visit were inconclusive, therefore it may have decided to visit the site again.
Location 2 is Lavizan-Shian, a former headquarters of Iran’s nuclear weapons program and a key site during the Amad Plan, Iran’s crash nuclear weapons program to build five nuclear weapons in the early 2000s.8 Iran razed the site in 2003 and 2004 as the IAEA’s investigation into its covert nuclear program intensified.9 The IAEA seeks information from Tehran about “the possible presence at this site between 2002 and 2003 of natural uranium in the form of a metal disc, with indications of it having undergone drilling and processing…” This metal disk was apparently part of nuclear weapons related work detailed in Iran’s Nuclear Archive, portions of which were seized in 2018 by Israel and turned over to the IAEA. Among the files was information about Iran’s work on producing uranium deuteride for a neutron initiator used in nuclear weapons. The information detailed procedures Tehran used to make uranium deuteride, including drilling into a piece of uranium metal.10
A photo from Iran’s Nuclear Archive obtained by the media and shared with the Institute shows a glove box containing a drilling machine, with what appears to be a black object that could be the uranium metal disc at issue. However, from the archive files and information available to the Institute, the location for this work could not be pinpointed, but Israel did not share some files publicly due to their proliferation-sensitive nature.
Location 3: Tehran Plant
The agency reports “no interactions between the Agency and Iran” regarding Location 3, and therefore the safeguards issues relating to the location remain unresolved.
Location 3 is identified in Iran’s Nuclear Archive as the Tehran Plant, a secret former pilot uranium conversion plant under the Amad Plan.11 The IAEA corroborated archive evidence that Iran may have used the site for “possible use or storage of nuclear material and/or conducting of nuclear-related activities, including research and development activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle. This location may have been used for the processing and conversion of uranium ore, including fluorination, in 2003,” the IAEA added. Iran demolished the site in 2004.
The IAEA originally asked for access to the site in January 2020, but Iran refused until August 2020. The IAEA took environmental samples, indicating the presence of undeclared man-made uranium particles.
In its September 2021 report, the IAEA reported additional information, including that Iran removed containers from the site in 2004 and that “there are indications, supported by the results of the environmental samples analysis, that containers moved from Location 3 were subsequently also present at Location 1 [Turquz-Abad].” It further reported that the results of the samples from Location 3 “would not explain all of the particles identified by the analytical results of the environmental samples taken at Location 1.” This finding is in line with Israel’s claim that Location 1 was a storage location for a wide variety of equipment related to Iran’s undeclared nuclear activities.
Location 4: Marivan Site
The IAEA reports regarding Location 4 that “Iran has yet to provide an explanation for the presence of anthropogenic uranium particles at Location 4 and to answer the Agency’s original questions dating from August 2019.” The IAEA attempted to engage Iran regarding Location 4 in September 2021, providing Iran with “graphics based on commercially available satellite imagery that illustrated the activities identified by the Agency as inconsistent with Iran’s statement that there had been no activity at this location between 1994 and 2018.” In an October reply, Iran stated, “‘only the mining activities, which were main activities at this location, have been stopped during the said period’ and that the activities observed at the location had involved guards ‘to secure the properties at location.’”
Per the September 2021 IAEA report on Iran, the IAEA stated it would contact another member state to seek “clarification and confirmation” in response to information provided by Iran that “included a reference to activities conducted at Location 4 in the past by an organization from another Member State.” The member state responded that “the information provided by Iran had contained ‘no information indicating a link’ between the cooperation provided by the aforementioned organization in Iran, mentioned in the supporting documentation provided by Iran, ‘and the anthropogenic uranium particles found by the Agency.’”
Location 4 is the formerly secret Marivan site, near Abadeh, another Amad Plan facility identified in the Nuclear Archive.12 The IAEA noted in its previous report that Location 4 “consists of two proximate areas where the Agency found indications that Iran had, in 2003, planned to use and store nuclear material.” In one area, “where outdoor, conventional explosive testing may have taken place,” the agency found “indications relating to the testing of shielding in preparation for the use of neutron detectors in that same area.” In the second area, from July 2019 onwards, “the Agency observed via commercial satellite imagery, activities consistent with efforts to sanitize the area, including the demolition of buildings.”
Along with the Tehran site, the IAEA sought access to Marivan in January 2020, but Iran refused. Iran finally granted access in August 2020, and the IAEA took environmental samples that revealed the presence of uranium particles.
The IAEA reported in its September 2021 report that in addition to explaining the presence of uranium, Iran must also provide answers regarding “the source of the neutrons that the neutron detectors were to measure” at Location 4. Iran has only provided unsubstantiated information about activities at Location 4, which the IAEA dismissed.
Modified Code 3.1
The IAEA reports no new progress on Iran’s pledge to work toward a solution over its unilateral decision to stop implementing Modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Iran informed the IAEA in February 2021 that it had stopped the implementation of Modified Code 3.1, which entails notifying the IAEA as soon as a decision is taken to build a new nuclear facility. The IAEA again reminded Iran that modified Code 3.1 is a legal obligation that “cannot be modified unilaterally and that there is no mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of implementation of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements.”
1. Andrea Stricker is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). ↩
4.For fuller descriptions of these four locations and their relationship to today, see David Albright with Sarah Burkhard and the Good ISIS Team, Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2021).↩
6. The IAEA’s September 2021 report indicated that the agency only began observing Iran’s relocation of cargo containers and sanitization activities in November 2018. Yet, the agency was informed of these activities prior to the summer of 2018 and did not request to visit the site until Iran had completely emptied and sanitized it. See: David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, Olli Heinonen, and Frank Pabian, “Presence of Undeclared Natural Uranium at the Turquz-Abad Nuclear Weaponization Storage Location,” Institute for Science and International Security, November 20, 2019, https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/presence-of-undeclared-natural-uranium-at-the-turquz-abad-nuclear-weaponiza. ↩
8. Iran’s Perilous Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons.↩
20. FDD | Don’t Believe Predictions of a Rift Between Iran and Syria
Excerpts:
Assad has every reason to believe that his diplomatic rehabilitation will continue even if he remains as close to Tehran as ever. Arab kings and princes may come bearing gifts, but they cannot buy the loyalty that Tehran has earned.
The Biden administration pledged to “put human rights at the center of US foreign policy,” but has tragically lost interest in maintaining Assad’s isolation. Even though US citizens remain in Assad’s prisons, the White House has signaled to the Gulf states that sanctions won’t get in the way of their normalization with Syria. Key White House officials have expressed misplaced hope that the Gulf states can wean Damascus off of Iranian support. Washington is pursuing a misinformed policy of realpolitik, premised on hopes of promoting stability by tolerating a regime once considered intolerable. The beneficiaries will be Assad and Tehran.
FDD | Don’t Believe Predictions of a Rift Between Iran and Syria
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · November 17, 2021
Last week, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad reportedly expelled Javad Ghaffari, the top Iranian commander in Syria, spurring hopes that Damascus is on the brink of a realignment that would draw it closer to the Arab Gulf states, while distancing it from Tehran.
But don’t hold your breath.
When Assad’s downfall seemed imminent during the first years of the Syrian uprising, Iran came to his aid with billions of dollars, a steady supply of oil, and the deployment of Revolutionary Guard Corps advisers and Hezbollah militia fighters. At the height of the Syrian war in 2016, Tehran sent its own troops to fight and die on Assad’s behalf.
Still, gratitude is unlikely to drive Assad’s foreign policy. His grip on power is now secure, so Assad may consider whether a pivot from Iran to the Gulf states would unlock the billions of dollars of foreign capital he hopes would fuel Syria’s reconstruction. Saudi and Emirati investors played a prominent role in the partial economic opening that Assad implemented during his first decade in power, especially in the construction industry.
Diplomatically, Russia is a far more valuable ally than Iran. Moscow continues to leverage its permanent seat on the UN Security Council to shield Assad from sanctions or other punitive action. Russia has also proven itself as a key interlocutor with the United States, securing local ceasefires and deconfliction agreements on terms that favor Damascus.
Militarily, Moscow provides air power that was integral to the counteroffensives that broke the insurgency (in no small part, by deliberately targeting civilians).
In contrast, Assad’s partnership with Iran is a source of constant tension with both the United States and Israel. The latter has conducted an increasingly aggressive bombing campaign to disrupt Tehran’s efforts to turn Syria into a staging ground for future operations against Israel, as well as a conduit for shipments of advanced weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Washington maintains tough sanctions on Assad, yet the Biden administration has dialed down their enforcement, partly to facilitate Arab government’s re-engagement with Assad. If Damascus accepted that invitation, it could potentially secure formal or informal suspension of the most potent US sanctions, including those mandated by the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019, whose goal was to limit Assad’s ability to inflict war crimes on his population.
Despite all this, there are two critical flaws in the logic behind scenarios of a rift between Iran and Syria.
First, it presumes that Assad is prepared to trade the certainty of Syria’s 40-year partnership with Iran for the potential benefits of improving relations with Gulf states. Recall, these are the very states that bankrolled the insurgents who almost brought down the regime.
Second, there is a tendency to forget that the war in Syria is far from over, with Iranian advisers and Shiite militias still playing a critical role — hence the presence in Damascus of Ghaffari, the Revolutionary Guard commander apparently expelled last week.
There remains more than a little uncertainty about what happened to Ghaffari. Al Arabiya and al Hadath, the Gulf media outlets that broke the news of Ghaffari’s expulsion, tend to frame the news in a manner that coincides with the interests of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, who are actively promoting the notion of a Syrian split with Iran.
While a spokesman for Iran’s foreign ministry seemed to confirm Ghaffari’s departure, he described it as the completion of a successful tour of duty. The Gulf outlets’ characterization of that departure as an expulsion drew on a range of anonymous sources, mainly in Damascus. For now, it is best to take the news with a sizable grain of salt and to examine the broader forces tethering Syria to Iran.
Assad controls about 70 percent of Syria’s pre-war territory and population. The areas northeast of the Euphrates River are under the control of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition, with Syrian Kurdish forces governing the region. In the northwest, Turkish and Turkish-aligned forces control part of the region, while jihadi insurgents who oppose Assad and have ties to Al-Qaeda govern the rest.
The war in the northwest remains bloody. After the insurgents bombed a military vehicle in Damascus last month, the regime launched air strikes on a marketplace, killing children who were on their way to school. In the months just prior to the pandemic, Assad launched a major offensive, with Russian and Iranian support, that had the apparent goal of retaking much of the northwest. It was partly successful and displaced more than 900,000 civilians, who sought shelter in tents and bombed out buildings in the middle of winter.
There have been no operations of comparable size since the pandemic began, but Assad is likely biding his time. His own ground forces are dilapidated, and Russia fights mainly from the air, so the regime still depends on Shiite militias organized and directed by Tehran to carry out its military operations. The most effective is Hezbollah, but there are significant Iraqi and Afghan Shiite formations as well.
Tehran also continues to send a steady stream of crude oil tankers to Syria, supplying refineries whose output supports both military operations and civilian needs. Tehran initially provided a multi-billion line of credit to finance the regime’s oil imports, but in practice, what it now sends is likely gratis.
At the height of the US sanctions campaign against Iran, which the Trump administration branded as “maximum pressure,” there were moments when Tehran’s ability to bankroll Damascus seemed questionable. Iranians demonstrated en masse, calling on the clerical regime to use its resources to care for its own rather than spending them on exporting the revolution to Syria and elsewhere. A top Iranian lawmaker said the regime had already spent as much as $30 billion to prop up Assad.
Yet Tehran outlasted the Trump administration, whose successor has tempered sanctions enforcement to facilitate the revival of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Iran’s reserves are growing rapidly, better positioning it to support Damascus, whose finances are in greater disarray than ever thanks to an economic meltdown in Lebanon next door, where Syrian assets are now locked up in an insolvent banking system.
Syria’s former president, Hafez al-Assad, father of Bashar, forged the Syrian partnership with Iran in the early 1980s, after Saddam Hussein launched the Iran-Iraq war. The elder Assad was Saddam’s bitter rival, so he made the enemy of his enemy his friend, putting the imperative of Arab solidarity aside in favor of a Persian alliance. The Syrian-Iranian relationship deepened under Bashar, a response in part to the backlash against Damascus, including US sanctions, that followed the 2005 assassination of Lebanese premier Rafic Hariri. A few years later, Washington re-engaged Syria without expecting Bashar to downgrade ties with Tehran. As noted above, Gulf capital poured in.
Assad has every reason to believe that his diplomatic rehabilitation will continue even if he remains as close to Tehran as ever. Arab kings and princes may come bearing gifts, but they cannot buy the loyalty that Tehran has earned.
The Biden administration pledged to “put human rights at the center of US foreign policy,” but has tragically lost interest in maintaining Assad’s isolation. Even though US citizens remain in Assad’s prisons, the White House has signaled to the Gulf states that sanctions won’t get in the way of their normalization with Syria. Key White House officials have expressed misplaced hope that the Gulf states can wean Damascus off of Iranian support. Washington is pursuing a misinformed policy of realpolitik, premised on hopes of promoting stability by tolerating a regime once considered intolerable. The beneficiaries will be Assad and Tehran.
David Adesnik is a senior fellow and director of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Follow him on Twitter @adesnik. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
fdd.org · by David Adesnik Senior Fellow and Director of Research · November 17, 2021
21. The US Must Turn the Tables on Russia’s Psyops
For the purists in the US military we write Psyops as PSYOP.
Will we or can we learn to "lead with influence?
Views on Warfare:
•What is the major difference in the views of conflict, strategy, and campaigning between China, Russia, Iran, nK, AQ, and ISIS and the US?
–The psychological takes precedence and may or may not be supported with the kinetic
–Politics is war by other means
–For the US kinetic is first and the psychological is second
–War is politics by other means
–Easier to get permission to put a hellfire on the forehead of terrorist than to put an idea between his ears
•Napoleon: In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one
•In the 21st Century the psychological is to the kinetic as ten is to one
•The US has to learn to put the psychological first
–Can a federal democratic republic “do strategy” this way
–Or is it only autocratic, totalitarian dictatorships that can “do strategy” this way?
The US Must Turn the Tables on Russia’s Psyops
A post-Cold War fixation on hard power has sapped us of the 21st century’s most potent force.
Andrei Ilnitsky, an advisor to the Russian defense minister, maintains that the U.S. is waging a “psychological war” against Russia. If only.
Since the Cold War, America’s use of psychological operations, or psyops, has deteriorated amid a fixation on hard power. Russia, meanwhile, has achieved its greatest successes through psychological warfare. It is long past time for the U.S. military to catch up, update its psyops against Russia for the 21st century, and revive its once-robust tradition of winning hearts and minds.
Moscow’s fixation on psyops stems in large part from its perceptions of the role that America’s soft power played in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. They’re right: Psychological warfare, often executed through the spread of American culture across Communist borders, incited dissent in Eastern Europe. During that era, the CIA understood that the best way to combat Soviet influence was through the proliferation of information and culture that worked to counter communist objectives. Most of us who lived in Eastern Europe understand the tremendous clout that American jazz and rock’n’roll, Hollywood films, and modern art had on our worldviews and the fall of the Iron Curtain.
Vladimir Putin remembers. Soon after he came to power, his government introduced its first information security doctrine. Soon after that, he launched an information offensive aimed at gaining “reflexive control” of American society. “Reflexive control” is an old Soviet concept, foreign to most Americans: interfering in another country’s decision-making until the government is compelled to take actions in Russia’s interest. This proceeds through “massive psychological manipulation of the population to destabilize the state and society,” in the words of Russia’s Ministry of Defense, for whom the rise of social media has been a tool of inestimable potency.
The revanchist Kremlin has worked hard to exploit America’s polarization along political and racial lines, aiming to paralyze U.S. politics and decision-making processes. In so doing, Russia hopes that America’s decision-makers will spend time, energy, and resources in ways that benefit the Kremlin.
By creating “information operations forces” in 2017 and devoting more resources to the Internet Research Agency (also known as the Kremlin’s troll factory), Russia has created a robust information warfare machine. Russian state media, trolls, and online proxies exploit disagreements over social issues like abortion, gun control, ethnic groups and police discrimination to incite social chaos in the United States. According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, “propaganda should be smart, competent and effective” in its attempts to sow discord and division.
It is high time that Washington fights back. For better or worse, the best way to neutralize Russia’s efforts is to beat it at its own psyops game, impose “reflexive control” on Russia, and compel the Kremlin to act in line with American interests. Of course, adopting Russian manipulative tactics may not sit well with most Americans. But unlike Russia’s campaigns of disinformation and division, our information psyops need only promote the universal values of liberalism, rule of law, and democracy.
Conveniently enough, the Kremlin’s weak spot is the Russian people’s desire for a more open society. A recent poll suggests that nearly half of young Russians disapprove of Vladimir Putin. Russia has the most internet users in Europe, and many of its younger users are ignoring state-sponsored broadcasting, instead relying on social media platforms for their information. As young Russians seek greater freedoms and liberties, Putin grows increasingly terrified of a color revolution that would strip him of his power.
He also acknowledges, if indirectly, his vulnerability to U.S. psyops. A close reading of the 2016 version of Russia’s information security doctrine reveals a sense of vulnerability to “information and psychological actions” against its own population. “There is a growing information pressure on the population of Russia, primarily on the Russian youth, with the aim to erode Russian traditional spiritual and moral values,” it says. This year’s update to Russia’s National Security Strategy declares that the country’s “cultural sovereignty” and “traditional spiritual-moral values” are under “active attack from the U.S. and its allies.”
The United States must update its own psyops capabilities for this new campaign. Cold War-style leaflets and Radio Free Europe will no longer cut it. National security agencies should replace dated TV and radio tactics with social media and internet-savvy alternatives. U.S. psyops units must collaborate closely with information operations and cyber units.
As Putin continues to defend traditional values in Russia, the U.S. might invest in a group of Russian-speaking social media influencers (much as the CIA created the image of a modern artist Jackson Pollock during the Cold War) to promote liberal values and freedoms to young Russians. The U.S. should also provide online platforms to young Russian artists who have been silenced by the Kremlin.
Rather than continuing to allow Russia exploit an asymmetric psychological warfare competition, the United States needs to make Putin understand that if his regime continues to peddle instability and division, two can play at that game.
22. The Navy's plan to build flying submarines for Navy SEALs
The Navy's plan to build flying submarines for Navy SEALs
America’s special operations forces use a wide variety of vehicles to conduct their covert operations, but few are as dramatic as the Navy’s recent efforts to field a flying submarine that could ferry operators into and out of the battlespace quickly and stealthily.
To date, there has been no evidence to suggest that such a platform is in current operation, but Navy documents from 2010 clearly show that not only was the branch seriously investigating this concept, they concluded that the idea was entirely feasible with the existing technology of the day.
“The submersible aircraft study combines the speed and range of an airborne platform with the stealth of an underwater vehicle by developing a vessel that can both fly and submerge.”
-Rick Goddard & Jonathan Eastgate, Submersible Aircraft Concept Design Study
Could Navy SEALs and other special operations units be operating stealthy flying submarines already? It seems unlikely–but based on the Navy’s research, it may only be a matter of time before this concept does come to fruition.
SDVs: The Navy SEALs’ miniature submarines
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) operators onboard a Mark 11 SEAL delivery vehicle. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Mass Communications Specialist Christopher Perez/Released)
Today, the U.S. Navy’s premier special operations unit, the SEALs, leverage a number of submersible vehicles for these sorts of clandestine infiltration and exfiltration operations, alongside a variety of other mission sets. These SEAL Delivery Vehicles, or SDVs, have come in at least two operational forms: the Mark 8 SDV, which can transport SEALs, and the Mark 9, which leveraged two Mark 31 or Mark 37 torpedoes to engage surface vessels prior to its retirement. Two new SDVs are already headed for operational service, with the Mark 11 Shallow Water Combat Submersible (SWCS) slated to replace the Mark 8 and the more broadly capable Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) expected to offer even greater capability.
“SDVs aren’t sexy. They are uncomfortable and a lot of work, but they fill a critical and unique capability. The guys that do get to work with the SDVs are a strategic national asset,” one former Navy SEAL told Sandboxx News.
Members of SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team Two (SDVT-2) prepare to launch one of the team’s SEAL Delivery Vehicles (SDV) from the back of the Los Angeles-class attack submarine USS Philadelphia (SSN 690) on a training exercise. (U.S. Navy photo by Chief Photographer’s Mate Andrew McKaskle)
But despite the incredible capability offered by these submersible platforms, they come with some significant setbacks. The Mark 8 SDV and its successor, the Mark 11, are both “wet” submersibles, meaning the occupants are exposed to the water (imagine driving an underwater convertible). This reduces weight and power requirements, but limits how long SEALs can travel in cold water without suffering physically adverse effects. Another significant limitation of the Mark 8 is its operational range; once deployed, the Mark 8 SDV can travel a maximum of just 18 miles with a SEAL team onboard.
While figures for the Mark 11 have not been released, it likely won’t offer a massive increase in range over the Mark 8. The much larger Dry Combat Submersible (DCS) can carry two crew members and eight SEALs, twice that of the Mark 8 or 11 SDVs, and because the crew compartment is “dry,” its operational range isn’t limited by the survivability of its occupants in cold waters. However, its relative size, mobility, and range remain limiting factors in where and how it can be employed.
The Submersible Aircraft Concept Design Study
Convair’s proposal for a flying submarine in the 1960s (WikiMedia Commons)
The idea of using submarines to deploy aircraft has been around as long as submarines and aircraft. The British sank one of their M-Class submarines before World War II attempting to add an aircraft hangar to it, the French carried foldable planes in their Surcouf submarine cruiser in the ’30s, and in the 1950s, the United States developed the AN-1 submarine aircraft carrier design, capable of carrying eight fighters within its hull.
All of these efforts, for one reason or another, found their way to the scrap heap, but the idea of combining the stealthy characteristics of a submersible with an aircraft’s ability to cover ground quickly has remained prevalent to this day.
Testing aircraft launches from submarines
The challenges associated with the premise, however, are sizeable. An aircraft is inherently low-density, as weight is a constant concern for airborne platforms. Submarines, on the other hand, are incredibly dense–as dense as the water they’re submerged in. Airplane fuselages are likewise designed with weight in mind and could never survive the pressure of being completely submerged in a hundred feet of water, while submarines have incredibly strong hulls that are too heavy for most airborne applications.
A report published by the Navy in 2010 called the “Submersible Aircraft Concept Design Study,” penned by engineers Rick Goddard and Jonathan Eastgate, aimed to determine the feasibility of an aircraft that could easily transition from flight to operating on the surface of the water, and then to operating below the surface with these challenges in mind. The impetus behind the concept, of course, was finding a way to get special operations troops, referred to as Special Forces within the study, into and out of contested areas under a shroud of secrecy. In practice, the premise simply takes the submarine aircraft carrier concept and removes the carrier. Just as seaplanes were intended to eliminate aircraft’s reliance on airstrips, flying submarines could operate secretly in a maritime environment without a submersible aircraft carrier to support them.
It was with this premise in mind that DARPA published a request for designs in 2008, outlining a list of requirements a flying submarine would need to be able to meet in order to be an effective weapon in a near-peer conflict.
DARPA’s Concept of Operations (CONOP) for flying submarines
The Navy’s 2010 study largely leveraged DARPA’s outlined requirements, or Concept of Operations, for a submersible aircraft aimed at transporting special operators. The first was obvious: that the flying submarine could be deployed from existing Navy or auxiliary platforms. The vehicle had to be able to land and take off unassisted from the surface of the water, with an in-flight range of 400 miles or more. It needed to be able to transit at least 12 miles once submerged, and loiter for up to 72 hours while hiding from detection.
Perhaps most importantly of all, it also had to be able to traverse those same 12 miles beneath the waves and 400 in the sky on the way back, as well.
In keeping with DARPA’s own efforts, the U.S. Navy Special Warfare Center and Office of Naval Research used the same requirements in their study. However, in order to emphasize real-world applications, they further incorporated the requirements that the vehicle must be fully submerged during its 72-hour loiter time, and must be able to complete the entirety of the mission without refueling.
The Navy came up with two flying submarine designs
The study determined that a flying-wing/blended-body design was best suited for managing the rigors of both flight and operating beneath the surface of the ocean. So, the Navy set about creating two potential flying submarine designs that took similar, but slightly different approaches to solving the litany of challenges before them.
The first design, dubbed Variant 1, had a 92-foot wingspan and a total weight of 37,000 pounds. It was 36 feet long, could carry a 750-pound payload, and cruise at speeds of 200 miles per hour while airborne. The second design, logically called Variant 2, was similar, but boasted a larger 109-foot wingspan, a shorter overall length of 34 feet, and the same speed and payload capabilities, despite a slightly higher overall weight of 39,000 pounds.
Both designs leverage multiple watertight compartments, with one keeping the two-person crew separate from a single personnel compartment capable of carrying six special operators, and the other using two smaller personnel compartments that could each hold three. In both designs, the wings would carry fuel in a membrane that would allow any unoccupied space in the wings to be flooded with seawater while submerged. Likewise, the personnel compartments were intended to be free-flooding when the vehicle was underwater.
Two turbofan motors would propel the vehicle while in flight and on the surface of the water, which would be sealed using torpedo-style doors while submerged to protect them from seawater. Submerged propulsion would be managed by a drop-down azimuthing pod with electric motor, capable of maintaining a speed of 6 knots.
Both variants of the flying submarine concept were to operate at depths of around 30 meters (98.4 feet) and be able to take off and land on specially designed inflatable floats.
Design Differences
While the numbers associated with the Variant 1 and Variant 2 designs were very similar, they differed far more on the arrangement of their respective crew compartments. In both arrangements, the quarters were quite cramped, so the team compared the internal volume of their cockpit to the long-duration flying Rutan Voyager, the first aircraft to fly around the world without stopping, and the Apollo capsule that brought astronauts home from the moon.
The Navy’s flying submarine offered 180 cubic feet of space for two pilots during potential missions of up to 84 hours in duration, which was less than the the 216 cubic feet allowed by the Apollo capsule for a longer 144 hour occupied duration and a third occupant, and much more than the 35 cubic feet offered by the Voyager for a 216 hour flight. Based on these comparisons, 180 cubic feet seemed feasible.
Variant 1
In Variant 1, the personnel compartment for special operators was placed forward of the cockpit, as these compartments would flood during submerged operation, placing the pressurized cabin as close to the vehicle’s center of gravity as possible.
In this configuration, the vehicle’s batteries are stored on either side of the personnel compartment, in line with the turbofan engines.
Variant 1
Operators would deploy through a large hatch on top of the vehicle near the equipment locker. Both turbofan engines would be placed far to the rear and as close to the centerline of the vehicle as the cabin would permit, though the study points out that analysis should be done regarding performance during a single-engine failure. If the engines were mounted too far apart and one were to fail, it could place the flying submarine in an unrecoverable flat spin — a problem that cost the Navy as many as 40 F-14 Tomcats.
This arrangement resulted in an exterior appearance that was more triangular in shape than the alternative, explaining its slightly longer dimensions.
Variant 2
Variant 2, on the other hand, sought an even lower profile along the vehicle’s centerline, accomplished by distributing equipment and personnel across a wider area. As discussed in earlier sections, the personnel compartment carrying special operators would be split in two, placing three operators on each side of the pressurized cabin in reclined chairs to maximize headroom while minimizing height.
This design places the turbofan engines, ballast tanks, air pressure system, and some other components in the same places as Variant 1.
The batteries in Variant 2 are placed ahead of the pressurized cabin and between the personnel compartments. Operators would again exit through hatches on top of the vehicle, but would have to swim to its rear to grab their bags, scooters, and other mission-specific equipment.
The result is a shorter, wider exterior design with a slightly lower centerline. This arrangement proved heavier, due to its added width and associated fairing.
How to take a flying submarine to war
According to DARPA’s Concept of Operations and the conclusions drawn by the Navy’s study, the following is an approximation of a flying submarine could be leveraged in covert operations.
The vehicle would be deployed by any surface vessel large enough to carry it and equipped to place it in the water. Two vehicle operators (pilots) would enter the pressurized crew compartment and begin their pre-flight checks as the Navy SEALs or other special operations divers donned their equipment and stored the rest in the vehicle’s gear locker.
Once the flying submarine was in the water atop two specialized inflatable floats that eliminated the suction effect a hull can have on the surface, its two turbofan engines would propel the vehicle to 100 knots, at which point, the unusual aircraft and all on board would take to the sky.
Once airborne, a lightweight fly-by-wire control system fed through a flight control computer would manage the aircraft’s twin-flap control surfaces that allowed roll-independent yaw control, thus eliminating the need for a vertical tail. The vehicle would remain airborne until it was approximately 12 nautical miles from shore, which is the conventional limit of territorial waters. In other words, even if someone were to spot the aircraft flying along its route, it would be seen flying over international waters.
Using the same inflatable floats, the flying submarine would land on the surface of the water. If necessary, the vehicle could then traverse further on the surface of the ocean, turning through modulating the output of the turbofan engines independently. It would then deflate its floats and fill its ballast tanks, submerging the vehicle and flooding all compartments except the pressurized cabin.
The SEALs inside, donning wetsuits and completely submerged in water, would draw breath from the same high-pressure air system that keeps the cabin pressurized and refills the vehicle’s floats. Based on industry capabilities in 2010, the study posits that storing enough air to meet all operational requirements internally would be entirely feasible, so there would be no need for any means of refilling the air tanks.
The vehicle would then deploy its underwater propulsion pod, using an electric motor to propel it forward and a combination of the motor’s orientation and the vehicle’s flight control surfaces for maneuvering.
“It is envisaged that the pilot will be assisted by a flight control system acting between the manual yoke inputs and the final flap deflections and that this system should be able to deal with the smaller deflections needed for underwater maneuvering.”
-Rick Goddard & Jonathan Eastgate, Submersible Aircraft Concept Design Study
The flying submarine, now more submarine than airplane, would approach the shore fully submerged, opening its hatches and deploying the combat divers while deep enough to avoid detection. Once out of the vehicle, the divers would grab their gear from the equipment locker and travel on using submersible scooters or by swimming to shore.
The special operators would then have 72 hours to conduct clandestine operations in enemy territory while the vehicle’s two pilots remained onboard and fully submerged. Once the special operations team completed their mission, they would return to the water, swimming back to the vessel and reentering it while submerged, reconnecting to its onboard air supply. At which point, the pilots would drive the vehicle back into international waters before surfacing, inflating the floats, and taking off once again to fly back to the ship that deployed it or to a different designated recovery point.
What happened to the Navy’s flying submarine concept?
After testing a scale model, the Navy’s report concluded that “feasible vehicle concepts can be generated using current technology and materials” to design and build a real special operations flying submarine, but as far as the public is aware, that’s the end of the story.
To be perfectly clear, it’s difficult to say if this study resulted in further development of a flying submarine or if it was quietly shelved alongside other exotic but seemingly feasible programs.
It’s important to remember that the United States was not particularly concerned with Great Power Competition or the possibility of near-peer conflict in 2010. In fact, this study came two years after a different effort to deploy low-observable drones from the vertical launch tubes of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines was canceled for budgetary reasons and one year before the F-22 Raptor program was canceled after just 186 out of 750 intended fighters were delivered.
Despite being touted as the best air superiority fighter on the planet, the U.S. canceled its order of F-22s after just 186 were delivered. (U.S. Air Force photo)
To be frank, America’s defense apparatus was funding combat operations in multiple theaters against opponents with no notable air or sea power… so efforts to field stealthy or otherwise highly advanced platforms in either environment were simply not the priority.
It’s possible, however, that development continued on the flying submarine concept at a low volume and scale, and to be honest, the United States may even have some such platforms in service today. After all, the F-117 Nighthawk first took to the skies in 1981, but wasn’t revealed to the public until 1988. Today, America has successfully flown a technology demonstrator for its Next Generation Air Dominance program, assembled three B-21 Raiders, and regularly operates the highly secretive RQ-170, all without most of us getting a good look at any of them. It stands to reason that there are other programs we remain entirely in the dark about.
The Navy may have concluded that it was feasible to build a flying submarine, but that doesn’t mean the Navy felt it was practical. The truth is, if there is such a vehicle in service today, we likely won’t know for years to come… but if there isn’t, the Navy’s engineers had an interesting bit of advice for future endeavors.
According to them, the secret is approaching the problem with the intention of building a submersible aircraft, rather than a flying submarine. Apparently, planes do better underwater than submarines do above it.
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23. With special-ops drills in hotspots on opposite sides of the world, the US military says 'they're back'
With special-ops drills in hotspots on opposite sides of the world, the US military says 'they're back'
US special-operations troops train with a drone on Shemya Island, October 2021. The Cobra Dane radar is visible in the background.
US Special Operations Command
- US special-operations troops conducted exercises on opposite sides of the world in late October.
- The exercises reflect concerns about being able to operate on vital territory and in important waterways.
In October, US special operations forces trained on their own and with partners in two important chokepoints on opposite sides of the world, reflecting an increasing focus on those hotspots and others like them amid heightened tensions in Europe and Asia.
In mid-October, US special operations troops deployed to Shemya Island in Alaska's Aleutian Islands as part of the NORAD-led exercise Noble Defender in order "to exercise capabilities for securing key terrain and critical infrastructure," Gen. Glen VanHerck, head of Northern Command and NORAD, told Insider in a statement.
Noble Defender is "a recurring operation" meant to demonstrate NORAD's ability to coordinate US and Canadian forces in defense of North America, VanHerck said.
US special-operations troops on a beach on Shemya Island, October 2021.
US Northern Command
Training in the Aleutians now has the practical value of refamilarizing US forces with terrain that didn't receive much attention after the Cold War. "It's basically saying that they're back," said Rob Huebert, a professor and Arctic expert at the University of Calgary.
US special operators' training activity on Shemya included maritime insertion, special reconnaissance drone launches, close-quarters combat, medical evacuations, and integrated short-range air defense, among other drills.
Those are capabilities that "are increasingly difficult in Arctic conditions," VanHerck said, adding that the troops "demonstrated their professionalism and ability to operate successfully" throughout the exercise.
With Cobra Dane in the background, US special-operations troops train with a Stinger surface-to-air missile on Shemya Island, October 2021.
US Special Operations Command
The US has had military installations on Shemya, which is closer to Russia than the US mainland, since World War II, including the Cobra Dane radar, which Northern Command called "a key sensor for identifying ballistic missile launches."
Cobra Dane was built in the 1970s and has renewed relevance amid the proliferation of aerial threats, such as cruise and hypersonic missiles. "The farther out you can go in terms of your surveillance capability toward the opponent, the better off your systems are," Huebert said.
Given the military significance of the region, the training on Shemya Island wasn't "terribly surprising," Huebert said.
"It's obvious messaging," Huebert told Insider, "because if they wanted to do an exercise on the Aleutian Islands and keep it quiet, that's not very hard to do."
'A hot piece of real estate'
US and Swedish Air Force members fly over Sweden in an MC-130J assigned to the 352nd Special Operations Wing, October 26, 2021
US Air Force/Tech. Sgt. Westin Warburton
While US special-operations forces trained on Sheyma, their counterparts in Europe trained with Swedish commandos in southern Sweden and on Sweden's Gotland Island, in the heart of the Baltic Sea.
Included in their training was the deployment and firing of an M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System on Swedish territory for the first time.
The use of HIMARS demonstrated US and Swedish forces' ability to "quickly employ long-range precision fires across the theater in a time and place of our choosing," the US Air Force's 352nd Special Operations Wing said.
An MC-130J unloads a High Mobility Artillery Rocket System on Gotland Island, October 23, 2021.
US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt
Swedish troops train regularly with the US and other NATO militaries, but Sweden is not a NATO member, and it's unusual for US forces to train on Baltic islands like Gotland, which is seen as "a hot piece of real estate," said Mathieu Boulègue, a research fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Programme at British think tank Chatham House.
Gotland and other small islands belonging to Sweden and Finland have "always been the soft underbelly of security" in the region, viewed as likely targets should Russia want to expand its military footprint or try to deny NATO and its partners freedom of movement in the Baltic, Boulègue said.
Deploying HIMARS displayed the US and Sweden's "continued effort in maintaining interoperability and rapid response readiness in the region," the 352nd Wing said.
A major Russian move against Gotland would be visible almost immediately, but there are suspicions of more subtle activity. A massive Finnish police raid on one of that country's islands in late 2018 prompted rumors of clandestine Russian military activity in the area.
A HIMARS operated by the Wisconsin Army National Guard prepares for a simulated fire on Gotland Island, October 23, 2021.
US Army/Sgt. Patrik Orcutt
Russia has built up its military and "shown that they are willing to use it," Karin Olofsdotter, Sweden's ambassador to the US, told Insider in an interview this spring.
"When we feel that our European security order and so on is under threat, we get nervous," Olofsdotter said. "That's why we are ramping up our security capabilities, and of course, to do that the United States is a paramount partner."
Rising threats
A US military aircraft approaches Shemya Island, October 2021.
US Northern Command
The Baltic Sea and the North Pacific Ocean have both seen more military activity amid tensions between NATO and Russia.
Last month's exercises are also a sign of increasing attention on maritime chokepoints, where peacetime disruptions can upend the global economy and where wartime blockages could allow one military to trap its enemy.
US lawmakers have noted the risk. A provision in one version of the US defense budget for 2022 would require the Pentagon to submit a report on "the security of global maritime chokepoints" against "hostile kinetic attacks, cyber disruptions, and other form of sabotage."
One message of the Gotland exercise was that if Russia planned to achieve "military superiority by denying NATO access to the region — specifically through the Danish Straits, which is the access point to the Baltic Sea — then we can also match you in terms of swiftness of response and readiness," Boulègue said.
Increased attention on the Bering Strait and the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap, which are hard to reach and tough to operate in, is "very specific to the rising Russian threat," Huebert said, but it reflects "a growing recognition of the geopolitical concerns that are arising between the United States and its allies and China and Russia."
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
