Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

"Remember this your lifetime through: Tomorrow there will be more to do. And failure waits for all who stay With some success made yesterday. Tomorrow you must try once more, And even harder than before."

- John Wooden

"Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace it."

- Omar N. Bradley

"Freedom is never more than one generation away from extinction. We didn't pass it to our children in the bloodstream. It must be fought for, protected, and handed on for them to do the same."

- Ronald Reagan

1. North Korea Fires Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

2. Experts: Information Campaign Key to Pressuring North Korea

3. S. Korea's F-35A stealth jets hold guided bomb strike drills targeting N. Korea's missile launchers

4. North Korea fires ICBM into sea off Japan in 'brazen violation' of UN resolutions

5. Yoon orders execution of strengthened extended deterrence measures after N.K. missile launch

6. Yoon says barring MBC reporters from presidential plane was 'unavoidable'

7. South Korea Reveals New Unmanned ‘Navy Sea GHOST’ Concept

8. N. Korean missile launches destabilize region: Pentagon

9. Police Expected the Halloween Crowd. Why Couldn’t They Stop the Disaster?

10. Young South Koreans Don’t Trust a State That Betrays Them

11. What Commentators Get Wrong (and Right) About North Korea

12. North Korea's internet temporarily knocked offline, researcher says

13. Rival parties quarrel over cash transfer to North Korea

14. [INTERVIEW] 'Seoul needs own nuclear weapons for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula'

15. 'Next year is turning point in strengthening US-Korea economic and security alliance': KITA

1. North Korea Fires Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

Kim's desperation over his failed strategy continues. He cannot coerce concessions. US alliances with the ROK and with Japan just keep getting stronger with every missile launch and provocation. Kim is failing.

While his actions are worrying we should not overreact. We continue to successfully deter a resumption of hostilities and a direct attack on and invasion of the South. That is job one. Most importantly if you examine ROK/US military training, US/Japan military training and trilateral ROK/Japan/US cooperation you will see a return to a higher level of readiness training than was taking place before the previous president unilaterally halted the then Ulchi Freedom Guardian (resumed this past August as Ulchi Freedom Shield). This higher level of readiness training is going to be the new normal for the alliance. We will likely continue this full spectrum of training (air, land, and sea) at a high level whether or not Kim conducts provocations. Again, this illustrates that Kim's strategy is failing. He is not going to receive concessions. He is not splitting the ROK/US alliance. He is not driving US forces from the Korean peninsula. He is not forcing an end to extended deterrence. He is not developing superior military capabilities that will allow him to dominate the peninsula (because the ROK/US military capabilities are far superior). He is facing a self induced failed economy. He is facing a population with a greater understanding of the outside world and their place in it, and an understanding of how they are suffering because Kim Jong Un prioritizes regime resources to develop nuclear weapons and missiles and support the elite and military leadership at the expense of their welfare. While we are all rightly concerned about the progress of his ICBM capability, I am actually more concerned with the internal conditions in north Korea and the potential for internal instability that could lead to catastrophic effects.

North Korea Fires Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

The ICBM appeared to have landed inside Japan’s exclusive economic zone, which extends about 200 nautical miles from the coast

https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-fires-suspected-intercontinental-ballistic-missile-11668738964?utm_source=pocket_reader

South Korea’s presidential office convened an emergency security meeting on Friday to discuss the ICBM launch.

The White House condemned the Friday launch, saying it demonstrates that Pyongyang continues to prioritize unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic-missile programs over the well-being of its people.

“The door has not closed on diplomacy, but Pyongyang must immediately cease its destabilizing actions and instead choose diplomatic engagement,” National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said.

North Korea had halted weapons launches for about a week before firing a short-range ballistic missile on Thursday. A few hours prior to the launch, North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui said Washington’s strengthening of extended deterrence to allies in the region was a gamble that it would regret. During trilateral talks among Washington, Seoul and Tokyo on Sunday, President Biden vowed to reinforce extended deterrence to defend allies in the region with a full range of capabilities, including nuclear arms.

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Deputy Pentagon press secretary Sabrina Singh, following Ms. Choe’s Thursday statement, said North Korea’s missile launches continue to destabilize the region and vowed to stand up for Washington’s allies.

Pyongyang has called the U.S. military presence in the region a sign of hostility toward the regime. In state-media statements, North Korea said its recent weapons launches were responses to joint military drills between the U.S. and South Korea. The Biden administration has repeatedly said the exercises are defensive in nature and has offered to meet with representatives of North Korea without preconditions, but the Kim regime has ignored the outreach.

The Friday ICBM launch resembled a test in March, when another North Korean ICBM was launched from the Sunan area and flew about 71 minutes, splashing down about 93 miles west of the Oshima Peninsula in Hokkaido within Japan’s EEZ. The Kim regime championed it as the next-generation Hwasong-17. But Seoul’s military said it appeared to be a dressed-up version of its predecessor, the Hwasong-15.

Before the March launch, North Korea hadn’t conducted a full-range ICBM launch or nuclear test in more than four years. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had issued a self-imposed moratorium on such major provocations as Pyongyang shifted to diplomacy. But nuclear summits with then-President Donald Trump failed to deliver a denuclearization deal.

North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui.

PHOTO: YONG TECK LIM/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Developing a new ICBM that can travel farther than a Hwasong-15 missile and carry multiple warheads has been a priority for Mr. Kim, who detailed such plans in a 2021 policy speech. This year’s ICBM launches outperformed the 2017 launch, staying in the air for about 20 minutes longer and traveling farther.

The Kim regime last tested an ICBM on Nov. 3 along with two short-range ballistic missiles, but the ICBM appeared to suffer some type of malfunction based on the flight trajectory, according to weapons experts.

It wasn’t immediately clear whether the Friday launch was the new Hwasong-17, presented at a military parade in October 2020 and then at a defense expo the following year. The Hwasong-17 is the largest of its kind, according to weapons experts. This year’s ICBM launches featured parts of North Korea’s next-generation ICBM system, U.S., South Korean and Japanese officials have said.

Pyongyang has conducted more than 30 missile tests this year, the most it has launched in a single year. The Kim regime’s provocations have drawn international blowback and prompted increased drills by the U.S. and allies, which North Korea then viewed as a pretext to engage in further provocations.

North Korea’s ballistic-missile tests violate United Nations resolutions and typically draw recriminations from the U.S., Japan and others. But the Kim regime hasn’t faced additional penalties despite U.S.-led efforts, as Russia and China have blocked attempts to enforce additional sanctions.

Washington and Seoul officials have warned Pyongyang stands fully prepared to conduct its first nuclear test since 2017. U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Washington, Seoul and Tokyo have planned a coordinated response if Pyongyang carries out its seventh nuclear test.

Alastair Gale in Tokyo contributed to this article.

Advertisement - Scroll to Continue

Write to Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 18, 2022, print edition as 'Pyongyang Launches ICBM'.

2. Experts: Information Campaign Key to Pressuring North Korea

Some of my thoughts below (which you have likely read many times in my comments). I cannot emphasize how important it is for us to have a human rights upfront approach, a sophisticated influence campaign, and the pursuit of a free and unified Korea.

For those with an interest in influence operations I have pasted some resources below the article for your consideration These are references I put together for a class at JSOU (DPRK and the Gray Zone)

Experts: Information Campaign Key to Pressuring North Korea

November 17, 2022 9:07 PM

Christy Lee

voanews.com

WASHINGTON —

A massive information campaign directed against North Korea could be used as a pressure tactic to compel the regime to deescalate tensions with the West as its leader Kim Jong Un fears his people equipped with outside information more than the U.S. military, said experts.

Experts said in addition to deterrence, Washington should employ an information pressure tactic to prompt the regime to change its behavior.

David Maxwell, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said the North Korean people “armed with information are an existential threat to the regime and considered a great threat than the U.S. military.”

Maxwell continued, “An overt information warfare campaign cannot only support deterrence and diplomacy, but it can also create a dilemma for Kim Jong Un and cause pressure that leads to changes in behavior and decision-making or simply a change inside North Korea.”

Sending North Korea "massive quantities of information from entertainment to news" could open people's understanding about the outside world and their "inalienable and universal rights" as well as the "truth about the Kim regime," Maxwell said. The outside information could even cover such educational topics as improving crop yields, he added.

Getting information to North Koreans would include increasing the number of hours that defector groups broadcast into North Korea, influencing North Korean elites overseas to bring information into the country, and to restart loudspeaker broadcasts at the interKorean border, said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the Rand Corp.

Words and weapons

North Korea, built on a socialistic ideology of self-reliance or Juche, which calls on the regime to become economically and politically independent of foreign reliance, maintains a strict control over its people. Pyongyang shields its citizens from outside information, including all forms of media that could undermine its ability to mobilize its people and resources to work toward its goals.

Calling its nuclear weapons, “the treasure sword” of Juche, North Korea has been continuing to develop its nuclear and ballistic missile programs despite international condemnations and sanctions outlawing them.

Many experts have suggested that North Korea uses its weapons programs to safeguard survival against foreign dominance and to keep the dynastic autocracy of the Kim family in power.

To continue building its weapons program and maintaining the legitimacy of the regime, North Korea’s Propaganda and Agitation Department pumps out propaganda aimed at enforcing its ideology to tie people’s loyalty to the regime. The department also blocks exposure to foreign information.

More recently, due to the growing number of North Koreans watching South Korean television shows, better known as K-dramas or listening to the music known as K-pop smuggled in from China on USB drives, Pyongyang cracked down on offenders, sometimes sentencing them to death in accordance with its anti-reactionary ideology law.

The law, passed Dec. 5, 2020, amid the country’s strict border closures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, allowed widespread suppression of foreign media.

Kim fears pressure

Bennett, of the Rand Corp., said, “Whether or not the information necessarily changes people in North Korea, [the influx of information is] putting pressure on [Kim] about something he really doesn’t want to have happened.”

“Using information proactively by threatening to flood North Korea with different kinds of information is what’s key. That’s how you deter him. And if he is not deterred and goes ahead [with] provocations, then, we send that information into North Korea,” he added.

North Korean defector groups in Seoul airlifted huge balloons filled with anti-Kim leaflets across the inter-Korean border for years until the activity was banned by the former government of Moon Jae-in in March 2021.

South Korean Unification Minister Kwon Yong-se said earlier this month that the anti-leaflet law should be ruled unconstitutional.

In the past, when South Korea blasted K-pop songs and propaganda messages through loudspeakers across the inter-Korean border of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in August 2015, Kim ordered its military to go on a “semi-war state” and fired several rockets and artillery shots.

South Korea’s loudspeaker broadcasting was turned off in April 2018 as a preparation for the inter-Korean summit held that month and has been quiet since.

Sung-yoon Lee, an assistant professor of Korean studies at Tufts University, said, “South Korea should resume loudspeaker broadcasts into the North” and “drape over the speakers an oversized picture of Kim Jong Un, and the North Korean soldiers will not dare shoot.”

Harry Kazianis, president of the Rogue States Project, said informing the North Korean people about the truth of the Kim regime and outside world is “an underappreciated way to pressure Pyongyang” that could be “effective” at changing its behavior.

But Kazianis said he sees “no signs” that the Biden administration is willing to employ an information warfare strategy that could escalate tensions with North Korea.

He added, “However, I think all bets are off if North Korea tests a nuclear weapon, as Biden will be under pressure to do more and respond to critics.”

Different effects

Some experts said getting foreign information into North Korea would not cause immediate or positive changes in the regime’s behavior.

Evans Revere, a former State Department official with extensive experience negotiating with North Korea, “The posture of the regime itself seems unlikely to change in the near term, since public opinion does not really play a role in determining the regime’s policies on nuclear weapons and relations with the United States.”

Susan Thornton, former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs during the Trump administration, said she does not think “an information campaign would have any effect on regime behavior except to make them angry because such information campaign aims to threaten the security of the regime [leading] them to [do] more provocations, not less.”

voanews.com

Required readings:

1. LTG Chun, In Bum, “How North Korea Wages Political Warfare at Home and Abroad...and How to Respond” ORBIS, Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 6, 2020, page 1-18

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1OM-lnGiZHhuUUrI9xsnbR72MN20teWkz/view?usp=sharing

2. Jihyun (Amanda) Won, “The Theory and Practice of North Korean Espionage,” The Intelligencer: The Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies, Winter/Spring 2020, page 9-17.

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Pegm2W2KOnt_WYkqyqT6gN7DRLvEa7h0/view?usp=sharing

3. Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., “North Korea’s Illegal Weapons Trade: The Proliferation Threat From Pyongyang,” Foreign Affairs, June 6, 2018.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2018-06-06/north-koreas-illegal-weapons-trade

4. Robert Collins, “Marked for Life: Songbun, North Korea's Social Classification System,” Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, June 6, 2012, pages 1-27.

https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/HRNK_Songbun_Web.pdf

5. Commander Frederick Vincenzo, “An Information Based Strategy to Reduce North Korea’s Increasing Threat - Recommendations for ROK & U.S. Policy Makers,” Center for New American Security, October 3, 2016, pages 1-15.

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-information-based-strategy-to-reduce-north-koreas-increasing-threat

6. George Hutchinson, “Army of the Indoctrinated: The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea,” April 26, 2022, Read Chapter 5 & 6 pages 57-88.

https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hutchinson_KPA_web_0426.pdf

7. Jieun Baek, “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization,” Harvard Belfer Center, August 2021, pages 20-28.

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/policy-public-diplomacy-north-korea

8. David Maxwell, “The Nature of The Kim Family Regime: The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State,” Red Diamond, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 19,2020

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/02/19/the-nature-of-the-kim-family-regime-the-guerrilla-dynasty-and-gulag-state/

9. Bradley Bowman and David Maxwell, “Maximum Pressure 2.0 A Plan for North Korea,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 5, 2020, “A Plan B for North Korea,” pages 8-13 and “Information and Influence Activities” pages 46-51)

https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/fdd-report-maximum-pressure-2-a-plan-for-north-korea.pdf

10. David Maxwell, “Resilience and Resistance in Asia-Political Warfare of Revisionist and Rogue Powers”, Small Wars Journal, 2020. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/resistance-and-resilience-asia-political-warfare-revisionist-and-rogue-powers

11. David Maxwell, “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152,

https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a

12. Suki Kim, “The Underground Movement Trying to Topple the North Korean Regime,” The New Yorker Magazine, November 16, 2020

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/23/the-underground-movement-trying-to-topple-the-north-korean-regime

13. Anthony H. Cordesman and Charles Ayers, Korean Special, Asymmetric, and Paramilitary Forces, CSIS Special Report, https://www.csis.org/analysis/korean-special-asymmetric-and-paramilitary-forces

14. David Maxwell, “Kim Jong Nam Assassination Showcases North Korea’s Special Operations Capabilities,” FDD Policy Brief, August 22, 2018,

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2018/08/22/kim-jong-nam-assassination-showcases-north-koreas-special-operations-capabilities/

15. David Maxwell, “Irregular Warfare on the Korean Peninsula Thoughts on Irregular Threats for north Korea Post-Conflict and Post-Collapse: Understanding Them to Counter Them” The Small Wars Journal, November 30, 2010

https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/609-maxwell.pdf

S. Korea's F-35A stealth jets hold guided bomb strike drills targeting N. Korea's missile launchers | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · November 18, 2022

SEOUL, Nov. 18 (Yonhap) -- South Korea and the United States conducted a joint air exercise Friday focusing on enhancing the capabilities of striking North Korea's missile-related facilities, hours after it fired another long-range ballistic missile, according to Seoul's military.

The South Korean Air Force's F-35A stealth fighter jets held the exercise striking North Korea's Transporter Erector Launcher vehicles with GBU-12 aerial laser-guided bombs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced.

Four F-35A aircraft also staged a flight along with four F-16 fighters of the U.S. Air Force in a combined attack formation over the East Sea during the drills, it added.

The allies "demonstrated their strong will to respond resolutely to any threats and provocations, including North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) , and their overwhelming ability and readiness to strike the enemy with precision," the JCS said.

Earlier in the day, the North shot what is presumed to be a Hwasong-17 ICBM into the East Sea.

yunhwanchae@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 채윤환 · November 18, 2022

4. North Korea fires ICBM into sea off Japan in 'brazen violation' of UN resolutions

North Korea fires ICBM into sea off Japan in 'brazen violation' of UN resolutions | CNN

CNN · by Gawon Bae,Junko Ogura,Brad Lendon,Rhea Mogul · November 18, 2022

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ramped up missile tests this year.

Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service/AP/FILE

Seoul, South Korea CNN —

North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on Friday, the second missile test by the Kim Jong Un regime in two days, condemned as a “brazen violation” of UN resolutions by the US and its allies.

The ICBM was launched around 10:15 a.m. local time from the Sunan area of the North Korean capital Pyongyang, and flew about 1,000 kilometers (621 miles) east, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said it likely fell in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), about 210 kilometers (130 miles) west of the Japanese island of Oshima Oshima, according to the Japan Coast Guard. It did not fly over Japan.

“North Korea is continuing to carry out provocative actions at frequency never seen before,” Kishida told reporters Friday at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Bangkok, Thailand.

“I want to restate that we cannot accept such actions,” he said.

The Japanese government will continue to collect and analyze information and provide prompt updates to the public, he said. So far, there have been no reports of damage to vessels at sea, Kishida added.

The ICBM reached an altitude of about 6,100 kilometers (3,790 miles) at Mach 22, or 22 times the speed of sound, according to the JCS, which said details were being analyzed by intelligence authorities in South Korea and the US.

On Friday morning US Vice President Kamala Harris gathered on the sidelines of the APEC summit with leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to condemn the launch, in a previously unscheduled media briefing.

“I have asked this group of allies and partners to come together to join us in condemning North Korea’s long range ballistic missile launch,” she said. “I’ve also asked them to join in so that we as allies and partners can consult on next steps. This conduct by North Korea most recently is a brazen violation of the multiple UN Security resolutions. It destabilizes security in the region and unnecessarily raises tensions.”

Hyon Song Wol, head of the North Korean Samjiyon art troupe takes a photo of Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Choe Son-Hui (C) ahead of the welcoming ceremony of North Korea's leader Kim Jong Un (not pictured) at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi, Vietnam March 1, 2019. Luong Thai Linh/Pool via REUTERS

Luong Thai Linh/Pool/Reuters/FILE

North Korea warns US of 'fiercer' military action, tests short-range missile

South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol on Friday also ordered the “active execution” of strengthened extended deterrence measures against North Korea.

The President said Seoul will strengthen its alliance with Washington, and bolster its defense posture and cooperation over security with the US and Japan.

“The government will not tolerate North Korea’s provocations,” his office said in a statement. “The government has overwhelming response capability and willingness to immediately react to any North Korean provocations, so North Korea should not misjudge this.”

It added that North Korea cannot gain anything through continuous provocations, while warning that sanctions against the North will only be strengthened, resulting in Pyongyang’s further international isolation.

Testing missile range

Friday’s missile was about 100 kilometers short in altitude and distance compared to Pyongyang’s missile test on March 24, which recorded the highest altitude and longest duration of any North Korean missile ever tested, according to a report from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) at the time. That missile reached an altitude of 6,248.5 kilometers (3,905 miles) and flew a distance of 1,090 kilometers (681 miles), KCNA reported.

Calling the launch a “significant provocation and a serious act of threat,” the JCS warned the North of violating the UN Security Council’s resolution and urged it to stop immediately.

The Misawa Air Base issued a shelter in place alert after the firing of the missile, according to US Air Force Col. Greg Hignite, director of public affairs for US Forces Japan. It has now been lifted and the US military is still analyzing the flight path, he said.

US President Joe Biden has been briefed on the missile launch and his national security team will “continue close consultations with Allies and partners,” National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said in statement Friday.

“The door has not closed on diplomacy, but Pyongyang must immediately cease its destabilizing actions and instead choose diplomatic engagement,” Watson said. “The United States will take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the American homeland and Republic of Korea and Japanese allies.”

Friday’s launch comes one day after Pyongyang fired a short-range ballistic missile into the waters off the east coast of the Korean Peninsula, and issued a stern warning to the United States of a “fiercer military counteraction” to its tighter defense ties with South Korea and Japan.

It’s the second suspected test launch of an ICBM this month – an earlier missile fired on November 3 appeared to have failed, a South Korean government source told CNN at the time.

Increased missile tests

The aggressive acceleration in weapons testing and rhetoric has sparked alarm in the region, with the US, South Korea and Japan responding with missile launches and joint military exercises.

Leif-Eric Easley, associate professor of International Studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said North Korea is “trying to disrupt international cooperation against it by escalating military tensions and suggesting it has the capability of holding American cities at risk of nuclear attack.”

North Korea has carried out missile tests on 34 days this year, sometimes firing multiple missiles in a single day, according to a CNN count. The tally includes both cruise and ballistic missiles, with the latter making up the majority of North Korean test this year.

There are substantial differences between these two types of missiles.

A ballistic missile is launched with a rocket and travels outside Earth’s atmosphere, gliding in space before it re-enters the atmosphere and descends, powered only by gravity to its target.

A cruise missile is powered by a jet engine, stays inside Earth’s atmosphere during its flight and is maneuverable with control surfaces similar to an airplane’s.

Ankit Panda, senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said that while he wouldn’t see Friday’s presumed ICBM launch “as a message, per se,” it can be viewed as part of North Korea’s “process of developing capabilities Kim has identified as essential for the modernization of their nuclear forces.”

The US and international observers have been warning for months that North Korea appears to be preparing for an underground nuclear test, with satellite imagery showing activity at the nuclear test site. Such a test would be the hermit nation’s first in five years.

Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Center for Non-proliferation Studies, said the ICBM test was designed to validate parts of North Korea’s missile program, something that Kim Jong Un has vowed to do this year.

The recent short-range tests “are exercises for frontline artillery units practicing preemptive nuclear strikes,” Lewis said.

He dismissed any political or negotiating message from the tests.

“I wouldn’t think about these tests as primarily signaling. North Korea isn’t interested talking right now,” Lewis said.

CNN’s Emiko Jokuza contributed to this report.

CNN · by Gawon Bae,Junko Ogura,Brad Lendon,Rhea Mogul · November 18, 2022

5. Yoon orders execution of strengthened extended deterrence measures after N.K. missile launch

This statement from the NAtional Security Strategy of the U.S, is the foundation of extended deterrence.

Our strategy for North Korea recognizes the threat posed by its nuclear, chemical, missile, and conventional capabilities, and in particular the need to make clear to the Kim regime the dire consequences should it use nuclear weapons. Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime. There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive. Short of nuclear use, North Korea can also conduct rapid strategic attacks in East Asia. United States nuclear weapons continue to play a role in deterring such attacks. Further, we will hold the regime responsible for any transfers it makes of nuclear weapons technology, material, or expertise to any state or non-state actor.

(2nd LD) Yoon orders execution of strengthened extended deterrence measures after N.K. missile launch | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 18, 2022

(ATTN: UPDATES with details, government statement; CHANGES photo)

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Nov. 18 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol instructed the National Security Council on Friday to implement strengthened extended deterrence measures following North Korea's launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) earlier in the day, his office said.

Yoon gave the instructions shortly after North Korea fired its second ICBM in two weeks in apparent protest of the United States' renewed pledge to use all means, including nuclear, to defend its allies South Korea and Japan from North Korea's nuclear and missile threats.

"President Yoon ordered a strengthening of the South Korea-U.S. combined defense posture, active implementation of measures to strengthen the executability of the extended deterrence against North Korea agreed between South Korea and the U.S., and a strengthening of security cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan," the presidential office said.

"Also, he ordered action for strong condemnation and sanctions against the North, including a U.N. Security Council response, together with the United States and the international community," it said.

Yoon made the remarks while briefly attending an NSC meeting presided over by National Security Adviser Kim Sung-han on his way to a joint press briefing with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez following their summit talks at the presidential office.

The South Korean government issued a separate statement condemning the ICBM launch as a clear violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions and a "grave provocation" raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.

"Our government has the overwhelming response capability and will to immediately punish any provocation by North Korea, and North Korea must not miscalculate," the statement read.

North Korea's weapons tests have increased in frequency and intensity in recent weeks, as the regime appears set to conduct what would be its seventh nuclear test.

During a trilateral summit in Cambodia on Sunday, Yoon, U.S. President Joe Biden and Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida vowed to work together to strengthen deterrence.

Biden also said the U.S. commitment to defend South Korea and Japan is ironclad, and backed by the full range of capabilities, including nuclear.

The joint statement drew an angry response from North Korean Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui, who warned Thursday of "fiercer" military action "in direct proportion to" the three countries' moves.

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 18, 2022

6. Yoon says barring MBC reporters from presidential plane was 'unavoidable'

Please Mr. President: When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. You made a strategic mistake. Own it, admit it, and apologize for it. Defend the values of freedom and liberty, to include the freedom of the press.

Yoon says barring MBC reporters from presidential plane was 'unavoidable' | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 18, 2022

By Lee Haye-ah

SEOUL, Nov. 18 (Yonhap) -- President Yoon Suk-yeol said Friday it was "unavoidable" that his office barred local TV station MBC's reporters from boarding the presidential plane to cover his Southeast Asia trip, given that the broadcaster had engaged in "malicious" reporting.

MBC reporters took commercial flights to cover Yoon's tour of Cambodia and Indonesia earlier this week after they were informed by the presidential office, two days before his departure, they would not be allowed to board Air Force One due to their repeated "distorted" reporting.

The measure was seen as a response to MBC's airing of Yoon's hot mic moment in New York in September, which the broadcaster subtitled to make it appear that he had used vulgar language to refer to U.S. President Joe Biden. The presidential office has denied there was any mention of Biden.

"You are free to criticize me. I am always open to the criticism of the press and the people," Yoon told reporters as he arrived for work Friday when asked to comment on accusations that he is selective with the press.

"However, excluding MBC from the presidential plane was an unavoidable measure in order to fulfill the president's responsibility of defending the Constitution, because it showed very malicious behavior in trying to drive a wedge in our alliance relationship, which is a key pillar of our national security, using fake news that is different from the truth," he said.

Yoon also said the press is one of four pillars of a democracy, along with the legislative, judiciary and executive branches, and that no one would object in the event the judiciary was held to account for delivering rulings using fabricated evidence, even if it is an independent authority.

"I think freedom of the press is important, but responsibility of the press is also very important from the viewpoint that it is a pillar of democracy. And especially if it is related to ensuring the people's safety, the importance cannot be emphasized enough," he said.

As the president walked away to go up to his office, an MBC reporter shouted at his back, "What did MBC do that was malicious?"

Earlier the same reporter had asked Yoon what he thought about criticism that it was inappropriate of him to invite only two reporters to his cabin on the flight from Cambodia to Indonesia.

"That's a personal issue," Yoon replied. "And it's not like I was being interviewed."

hague@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 이해아 · November 18, 2022

7. South Korea Reveals New Unmanned ‘Navy Sea GHOST’ Concept

South Korea Reveals New Unmanned ‘Navy Sea GHOST’ Concept - USNI News

news.usni.org · by Juho Lee · November 17, 2022

Hanwha Systems image

During a ceremony that marked the 77th anniversary of its founding on Nov. 11, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy revealed a new operational concept combining manned and unmanned systems.

Dubbed the “Navy Sea GHOST” in Korean and “Guardian Harmonized with Operating manned Systems and Technology based unmanned systems” in English, ROK Navy Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Lee Jong-ho introduced the new concept.

“The Navy Sea GHOST concept revealed today, which is based on manned and unmanned artificial intelligence technology, is a ‘game changer’ that will dominate the future battle space. We will devote our efforts and resources into [realizing this vision] and creating a strong and powerful navy,” Lee said.

As part of the “National Defense Revolution 4.0” proposed by the Ministry of National Defense, the Navy Sea GHOST concept envisions a lean and mobile force that involves close cooperation between manned and unmanned systems. Under the concept, the ROK Navy will acquire advanced artificial intelligence technology and several unmanned systems. It’s also planning to strengthen its datalink capabilities to secure communications between different assets.

ROK Navy Image

The Navy Sea GHOST concept is a culmination of over two years of research. In February 2018, the ROK Navy formed a task force to research seven different areas related to the operation of unmanned systems. The ROK Navy also announced the formation of an unmanned fleet, NavalNews reported last month.

The ROK Navy will focus on acquiring various unmanned systems first, including unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV), unmanned surface vehicles (USV), and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). Unlike the anti-submarine warfare unmanned underwater vehicle currently in development, which focuses on surveillance, the ROK Navy said the new UUVs will be able to fulfill combat roles. The new USVs will conduct surveillance, while the UAVs will be capable of operating from ships, performing a variety of tasks. These assets will initially be remotely controlled, but the ROK Navy hopes to make them semi-autonomous in the near future and fully autonomous in the long term.

Sea Ghost concept in Anti Submarine Warfare. Hanwha Systems image

Meanwhile, the ROK Navy will test the underwater autonomous mine surveillance system and neutralization system, currently in development by LIG Nex1 and Hanwha Systems respectively, on ROKS Sohae, a Yangyang-class minesweeper by 2027.

Of particular note is the concept image revealed during the ceremony. The image appears to show a new ship that is very different from any vessel currently operated by the ROK Navy or designs for future ships released so far.

The image likely depicts a new design for the KDDX, given that it’s the only surface vessel program for which the design has not been finalized. The ROK Navy considers any information about KDDX highly sensitive, with several employees of Hyundai Heavy Industries brought to court for taking photos of blueprints. Also on display during the ceremony was the MDV-II, an unmanned mine neutralization system, the Austrian-made S-100 UAV, and a remotely operated vehicle.

A version of this post originally appeared on Naval News. It’s been republished here with permission.

news.usni.org · by Juho Lee · November 17, 2022

8. N. Korean missile launches destabilize region: Pentagon

I would offer another perspective. It is the sustained readiness training of the combined ROK and US military forces that ensures stability through strength. It is the ROK/US Combined Forces Command that deters a resumption of hostilities on the Korean peninsula.

N. Korean missile launches destabilize region: Pentagon | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 18, 2022

By Byun Duk-kun

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17 (Yonhap) -- North Korean missile launches continue to destabilize the region, a Pentagon spokesperson reiterated Thursday, soon after Pyongyang resumed its ballistic missile testing.

North Korea fired a short-range ballistic missile into the East Sea on Thursday (Seoul time) in its latest military provocation that came after an eight-day hiatus.

"It continues to be destabilizing that they launch these ballistic missiles and if they continue to do that, it just further destabilizes the region," deputy spokesperson for the defense department Sabrina Singh told a press briefing.

"Our commitment remains strong to the Republic of Korea and Japan," she added.

The Department of State earlier condemned North Korea's latest missile test as a threat to the region and international community.

Pyongyang staged a record number of missile tests this year, firing a barrage of more than 50 short and long-range missiles since Sept. 25.

"We are always going to stand up for our allies and partners around the world and particularly in the region and we have called on North Korea to stop these ballistic missile launches," said Singh.

bdk@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by 변덕근 · November 18, 2022

9. Police Expected the Halloween Crowd. Why Couldn’t They Stop the Disaster?

Photos at the link.

Police Expected the Halloween Crowd. Why Couldn’t They Stop the Disaster?

An analysis, based on official documents and parliamentary testimony, reveals that authorities in South Korea missed crucial chances to prevent a crowd crush that would kill 158 people.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/17/world/asia/seoul-itaewon-crowd-crush.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm_source=pocket_saves

By Choe Sang-Hun

Choe Sang-Hun has written about a series of man-made disasters in his more than 30 years covering South Korea.

Nov. 17, 2022

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

For years, officials had known that Halloween weekends in Itaewon, a popular nightlife district in Seoul, attracted large crowds, warning internally that people could be “crushed to death.”

For days, they had held meetings and filed reports about their expectations for “disorderly” throngs, with one local police chief asking higher-ups to deploy crowd control officers.

For hours, they had received desperate calls about partygoers trapped in a narrow alleyway, pleas for the authorities to intervene as people were “falling and hurt” in a “bottleneck.”

Each time, the authorities ignored or missed the warnings, crucial chances to prevent a crowd crush in Itaewon on Oct. 29 that would kill 158 people and leave 196 injured. A New York Times analysis, based on witness accounts, investigators’ findings, parliamentary testimony and official documents released to lawmakers, provides troubling new details of the government’s lax approach to safety and the failures in its emergency response.

Image

Emergency workers at the scene of the crowd crush in Seoul’s Itaewon neighborhood on Oct. 29. Poor coordination and communication delayed their response, records of the events show.Credit...Matej Leskovsek/The New York Times

Less than a dozen police officers were in the area until 8 p.m., almost an hour and a half after the first call for help. Emergency dispatchers directed officers to street fights and other lesser incidents, while officials monitoring surveillance cameras didn’t notice anything out of the ordinary. Rescue and crisis management efforts were delayed by a lack of coordination and poor coordination, with many supervisors and top officials unaware of the crisis until 11 p.m. or later.

South Korean authorities and lawmakers are now investigating what went wrong, especially how officials missed early signs of trouble and why it took so long to send help.

“It’s a disaster created by administrative incompetence,” said Min Hyungbae, an independent lawmaker who visited the Itaewon alleyways alone on a recent night. “It’s as if our country is going backward.”

The police and fire departments, as well as various agencies involved in the emergency response, including the local ward office, declined to comment beyond previous public statements. The president’s office said it has ordered a thorough investigation and will take further actions based on its results.

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Despite its technological, economic and cultural achievements, the country has been plagued by a series of human-caused disasters, including a department store collapse, a ferry sinking and catastrophic fires.

Until moving into a new official residence, President Yoon Suk Yeol had lived in an apartment tower built on the site of the department store collapse. On the eighth anniversary of the ferry disaster in April, he said “the sincerest way of commemorating the victims was to make South Korea safe.”

When thousands rallied this month to mourn the Itaewon tragedy, they denounced him for failing to fulfill his promise.

“The way to commemorate the victims is for you to resign!” they chanted.

Image

Many in South Korea place the blame for the Itaewon disaster squarely at the top. Here, a man at the City Hall protest in early November held up a sign that called for the president to step down.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

Ignoring Early Signs

This year’s Halloween gathering, the first since pandemic-related restrictions ended, promised to be big.

Days before, officials discussed ways to make the night safe and manage disorderly crowds, largely sharing concerns of people spilling into car lanes and men wielding “fake weapons” and “bikini girls” who might expose “too much,” according to official documents from the police, the fire department and the Yongsan ward office, which oversees Itaewon. The police, in a news release, reported a spike in the number of people searching “Halloween” and “Itaewon” on the internet.

The growing popularity of the holiday and the potential for “safety accidents” had long worried the authorities. In 2020, when the Halloween crowd was smaller, the police warned in an internal document, obtained by opposition lawmakers, of possible “crush deaths.”

Image

Halloween celebrations in Itaewon were already getting underway on Friday, Oct. 28. Credit...Heo Ran/Reuters

The warrens of bars and restaurants were also made more cramped by unpermitted construction at the Hamilton Hotel like a metal wall, further restricting the lanes around it including the alleyway, where the fatal crowd crush would occur, according to police and Seoul government officials. The local Yongsan authorities imposed fines but did nothing to remove the illegal structures.

The hotel did not comment, citing the pending investigations.

South Korea runs battalions of police officers with specialized training in crowd control. On the day of the tragedy, 4,700 were deployed along the road from downtown Seoul to the president’s office, less than a mile from Itaewon, to monitor tens of thousands of protesters frustrated with his leadership. None were assigned to Itaewon, where an estimated 130,000 people were in attendance that night.

Days before the disaster, the Yongsan police station repeatedly asked the Seoul Metropolitan Police for such officers to be on site for Halloween, the Yongsan police chief, Lee Im-jae, told Parliament.

Mr. Lee said he was told they could not be diverted from the political rallies.

Image

Police officers on the scene after the crowd crush in Itaewon, and hours after desperate calls had started coming into the 112 emergency line. Credit...Matej Leskovsek/The New York Times

On Oct. 25, the chief of the Itaewon police station, which is smaller and supervised by the Yongsan one, told higher-ups that he “desperately” needed more officers to control Halloween traffic, according to parliamentary testimony by the Seoul police chief and opposition lawmakers.

But when police and city officials met with Itaewon business owners the next day to discuss Halloween, they did not make plans for crowd control, Woo Jong-Soo, chief superintendent general of the National Police Agency, said this month.

On Oct. 29, 137 officers were assigned to Itaewon, and at least 52 were detectives specializing in drug crimes. The police invited journalists to cover their busts, according to South Korean media and the reporters themselves.

Image

By Sunday morning, police officers were out in large numbers to guard the site of the disaster.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

When asked whether the government’s war on drugs distracted officials from ensuring crowd safety, the Seoul metropolitan police chief, Kim Kwang-ho, told Parliament last week that “we were significantly focused on drugs.” But the president’s office said the disaster was unrelated to his new antidrug campaign in recent weeks, instead blaming the police and other agencies for failing to anticipate crowd accidents.

Dismissing Desperate Pleas

The police planned to deploy most of the 137 officers after 8 p.m., based on Halloween traffic from previous years. Before 8 p.m., only 11 officers from the Itaewon police station were on duty, according to Lee Hyungseok, an opposition lawmaker who reviewed police records.

The city’s new digital map was in operation to track real-time densities if officials had wanted to monitor the crowds. Separately, the Yongsan ward office, which runs surveillance cameras throughout Itaewon, failed to report anything unusual, Kim Sung-ho, a senior home ministry official, said during a briefing.

Desperate calls from Itaewon started coming into the 112 emergency hotline at 6:34 p.m. People reported “utter chaos” and a crowd “out of control,” according to call logs released to lawmakers.

“It looks like people are going to be squashed to death,” said the first caller, describing masses of people pressing from both ends of the alleyway.

Image

At a gym near the disaster site, lost possessions of people killed or injured in the Itaewon disaster were laid out for family or friends to come and look through them.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

Between then and 10:11 p.m., more than 10 calls came in pointing to a crowd surge.

The first call was dismissed as nothing serious, Hwang Chang-son, a senior official from the National Police Agency, told reporters. The dispatchers did not follow up closely on subsequent calls, either.

Higher-ups also failed to detect a crisis developing, including their supervisor, Senior Superintendent Ryu Mi-jin, who was in her own office upstairs.

“All I can say is that I am sorry,” Ms. Ryu said during a parliamentary hearing, adding that it was customary for the supervisor to be separate. She said she was not informed of the crisis until 11:39 p.m., nearly an hour after rescuers were already on the scene.

Dispatchers at the hotline passed the details on two calls — at 8:37 p.m. and again at 9:01 p.m. — to their counterparts at a separate 119 disaster-response center, asking them to look into reports of a possible crowd crush. But the cases were closed after those dispatchers spoke to the callers, according to the fire department’s answers to lawmakers.

Image

Emergency vehicles on the scene in Itaewon. Dense crowds of pedestrians and cars initially hampered emergency responders’ efforts to get to the victims.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

“We regret that those on duty did not pay enough attention,” Nam Hwa-young, acting chief of the National Fire Agency, which manages the 119 hotline, told Parliament.

Throughout the evening, Kim Baek-gyeom, a sergeant in the Itaewon police station, said he and his colleagues were busy with routine assignments. Around 10 p.m., he said he and two colleagues were sent to check on a possible street fight near the alleyway. When they got there, they saw the crowd crush.

“We heard screams and commotion, and when we pushed our way through, we saw people crushed under a wave of human bodies and holding out their hands asking for help,” Mr. Kim said in a radio interview. “Until then, we had no idea what was happening.”

Triggering Alarms Too Late

A call to the 119 hotline at 10:15 p.m. finally got the authorities’ attention.

“You have to send police, fire engines, whatever you got — people are being squeezed to death,” the caller said, according to the logs. “I see injured people sprawled on the street.”

Eighty-six more calls came into the hotline over the next several hours. Dispatchers could hear screaming, crying, moaning and shouts of “Please help!” and “Don’t push! Don’t push!”

At 10:42 p.m., more than four hours after the initial report about the crowd surge, firefighters reported their first official contact with victims, urgently asking for help. “We are performing CPR on 15 people but we don’t have enough hands,” a firefighter said, according to transcripts of the firefighters’ communications.

Choi Seong-beom, head of the Yongsan fire station, repeatedly asked for more rescuers, according to the transcripts. He also pleaded for more police officers to help clear the streets of crowds and cars blocking ambulances and emergency responders.

Image

Firefighters and emergency responders on the scene. The head of Yongsan’s fire station repeatedly asked for more rescuers to be sent, transcripts show, and for police officers to help clear the streets.Credit...Matej Leskovsek/The New York Times

“There are so many patients who need CPR we can’t count them,” Mr. Choi said.

It was not until 10:48 p.m. that the narcotics detectives — who did not catch a single drug user that night — were redirected to rescue efforts, according to the police. Crowd control officers were assigned to Itaewon only at 11:40 p.m., three hours after the political rallies ended.

A lack of coordination complicated efforts. A dispatcher from the National Emergency Medical Center complained to counterparts in the fire department and Seoul city that the police were blocking some rescuers from the scene. At one point, the dispatcher threatened to “stop sending our teams out,” according to an exchange between the agencies obtained by another lawmaker.

“Stop transporting the dead now,” the dispatcher told 119 counterparts. “We first have to move the 40 people who are still alive, including those in critical condition.”

Image

A line of stretchers waited to transport the dead early Sunday morning.Credit...Matej Leskovsek/The New York Times

The government initially said that there was a limit to what it could do to control spontaneous crowds of partygoers. Prime Minister Han Duck-soo cited a lack of “laws” and “systems.” “My office has done all it could,” Park Hee-young, chief of the Yongsan office, said on Oct. 31.

As public outrage mounted, the government’s tone shifted. “How can you say we could not deal with it because of a lack of system?” the president said last week.

But President Yoon blamed officers in the field. “The 137 officers should have been able to handle it,” he said. “Why did they just look and do nothing for four hours? They were there.”

Image

Yoon Suk-yeol, the president of South Korea, center, and Prime Minister Han Duck-soo, right, at an unofficial memorial outside the Itaewon subway station near where the fatal crush took place.Credit...Jung Yeon-Je/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

A number of mid-ranking police and fire officials have been suspended from their jobs or are under investigation for possible criminal negligence. A police officer under investigation died by suicide last week.

Finding Fault at the Top

South Koreans have expressed gratitude to rescuers. They flooded the website of the Yongsan fire station with thank-you notes and sent fried chicken and tangerines to the Itaewon police station.

Increasingly, they have directed their anger at senior leaders. At a government mourning site near City Hall, a woman who said she lost her son destroyed a condolence wreath from Mr. Yoon. A citizen hung a 46-foot-long banner, demanding the “embarrassing” president resign.

Image

An official mourning spot near City Hall, in Seoul a few days after the disaster.Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

The absence of senior leaders can prove problematic in the country’s hierarchical bureaucracy. “South Korean public servants rarely act unless their bosses tell them what to do,” said Yoon Yong-Kyun, a professor of public safety at Semyung University.

The president learned about the disaster at 11:01 p.m., and his home minister, who was in charge of all police and firefighters, at 11:20 p.m. It was nearly midnight when Seoul issued mobile phone alerts asking citizens to avoid Itaewon.

Image

Seoul’s mayor, Oh Se-hoon, at the site of the deadly crush the day after it happened. Credit...Chang W. Lee/The New York Times

Mr. Kim, the Seoul police chief, did not learn of what happened until Mr. Lee, the Yongsan police chief, called him at 11:36 p.m.

After dealing with the political protests until the early evening, Mr. Lee had planned to check on the Halloween festivities that night. He finished dinner and headed to Itaewon a mile and half away, listening to communications on the police radio along the way.

Traffic was heavy, and after an hour in the car, he decided to get out and walk, his gait casual with his hands behind his back, according to surveillance camera footage. He later said during a parliamentary hearing that he was unaware of the crisis unfolding until he reached Itaewon at 11 p.m.

“I feel so miserable,” Mr. Lee said. “I will be guilty before the victims and their families as long as I live.”

Image

Kim Kwang-ho, the Seoul police chief, second from right, was among the top officials observing a moment of silence for the Itaewon victims at a meeting of the National Assembly this month. Also present were Yoon Hee-keun, left, head of the National Police Agency; Lee Sang-min, the interior minister; and Mr. Oh, Seoul’s mayor.Credit...Yonhap/EPA, via Shutterstock

Halloween Tragedy in Seoul

A Vibrant Refuge in Seoul Goes Quiet After Deadly Crowd Crush

Nov. 5, 2022

Pleas for Help Went Unheeded for Hours in Deadly South Korea Crush

Nov. 1, 2022

Halloween Crowd Crush in Seoul Was ‘Absolutely Avoidable,’ Experts Say

Oct. 31, 2022

A ‘Sea of Bodies’: How a Festive Night in Seoul Turned Deadly

Oct. 30, 2022

Choe Sang-Hun is the Seoul bureau chief for The New York Times, focusing on news on North and South Korea.

A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 18, 2022, Section A, Page 1 of the New York edition with the headline: Missed Chances to Stop a Deadly Crowd Crush in South Korea. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe

10. Young South Koreans Don’t Trust a State That Betrays Them

Excerpts:

How should state leaders respond to the Itaewon tragedy if it wants to repair connections with the nation’s youth? The answer is simple: as if the victims were their own children. For a bereaved parent, excuses for why their child died do not bring them back. Instead, swift and sincere acceptance of responsibility, maximal support for funeral arrangements, and clear policy and personnel reforms for prevention, with input from victim families, can offer solace.

When the state sees itself as a bereaved parent, any insinuation of victim blaming—that the tragedy was somehow driven by party culture or individualistic tendencies of youth—is nonsensical. Any efforts to exploit the national tragedy for partisan gain—whether by the incumbent party to deflect blame or the opposition to weaponize against the incumbent—are equally condemnable. The incumbent government can set strong precedent against such politicization and delegitimize partisan tactics from the opposition by first firmly monitoring the rhetoric and behavior of its own party leadership. If the deaths of more than 150 young women and men are not enough of a wakeup call to the polarized partisan politics of South Korea, perhaps the risk of a destabilizing democracy is.

It was always the idea of family—of nation and state as one—that fueled South Korea’s once-strong national stories. The Itaewon tragedy is an opportunity for the state to reclaim that narrative by bringing the nation’s youth back into the fold. South Korea’s reckoning should also serve as an example to other democracies, such as Ukraine, that are dealing with their own cataclysmic national crises. With the right kind of state response, national tragedies can be powerful opportunities for healing and restoring a democracy’s resilience rather than a path toward democratic breakdown.

Young South Koreans Don’t Trust a State That Betrays Them

The Itaewon crowd crush confirmed a growing distrust of national stories.

By Aram Hur, an assistant professor of political science and public policy at the University of Missouri.

Foreign Policy · by Aram Hur · November 17, 2022

Halloween only arrived in South Korea in the 2000s. But the celebration, embraced by many young South Koreans, will now never be the same. On the night of Oct. 29, excitement quickly turned deadly as a crowd crush in a packed alleyway in Itaewon claimed the lives of 158 people, most of them young women.

The disaster is a scarring national tragedy for South Korea. But it is also a reckoning for South Korea’s democracy. Consumed with partisan politicking and scapegoating, the South Korean government is losing sight of the real risk: a severed connection with the nation’s youth. Weakened ties to the most important constituency for South Korea’s future is not only a political loss for both parties, but a civic loss for its democracy—one that could destabilize the country and threaten its standing as a leading regional democracy.

Unfortunately, this is a familiar story for many South Korean youth. The failure to take responsibility echoes the state’s slow response and efforts to dodge blame in the Sewol ferry disaster in 2014, when a sinking ferry claimed more than 300 lives, most of them high school students on a field trip. That generation, now eight years older and in their early 20s, are again the primary victims of the Itaewon tragedy. More than 100 of the 158 victims so far were in their 20s, according to the Ministry of the Interior and Safety.

The state recently announced that it would use the term “accident,” rather than “disaster,” to avoid tarnishing Itaewon’s reputation as a popular tourist spot. The growing public anger over this decision, especially among young people, relates back to the fact that very little about the Itaewon tragedy feels accidental.

Investigations are still underway, but public reports show that multiple calls to the police asking for help with crowd management went largely unaddressed. Police were understaffed that night, as many had been posted to manage anti-government protests around the city. None of this explains why there was no pre-planning for one of the largest youth celebrations of the year, especially in a country that usually has crowd management down to a science.

State negligence has been followed by state evasion. President Yoon Suk-yeol declared a week of national mourning as a symbolic gesture but was evasive about the state taking any responsibility. Government agencies with security oversight of Itaewon—the Seoul municipal government, Ministry of the Interior and Safety, and the national police—each offered reasons for why they couldn’t be blamed. Seoul’s mayor and the Interior minister have since formally apologized to the families of the victims, but only after public outrage.

Such events are critical junctures in a nation’s lived experience. Whether the state stood with the people or betrayed them in moments of despair is seared into a national people’s memory through what I call national stories in my book, Narratives of Civic Duty: How National Stories Shape Democracy in Asia. I have been researching how national stories work for the past decade. Unlike constitutive myths of the nation, which tend to be origin stories about who we are, national stories are parable-like folklore of the national people that define how we ought to live. They recount relationship lessons learned from a nation’s past to teach national members who to trust and be wary of and to whom they owe their loyalty.

The state is a major protagonist in national stories. Depending on whether national stories paint the state as a friend or foe of the national people, the state can become an object of civic duty or moral opposition.

South Korea’s ethnic nationalism, based on the idea that all Koreans belong to a unified bloodline, went a long way toward sustaining national stories that framed the nation and state as one. Even through state failures, notably the Sampoong Department Store collapse in 1995 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, South Korea’s young democracy benefited from resilient civic duty in the name of the nation. National stories of state betrayal percolated in certain circles. But they were overshadowed by the metanarratives of past national triumphs, from the miraculous development of the 1980s to people-led democratization in 1987.

For the young in South Korea, however, those metanarratives that appealed to their parents or grandparents have lost their luster. They are taking a clear-eyed look at the nation’s future and finding it bleak. The youth unemployment rate has hovered just below 10 percent for the past decade. Korean women are now more likely to remain childless than have at least one child in their lifetime—primarily the result of soaring childcare and housing costs. The severe fertility decline has saddled a shrinking youth generation with the burden of providing for an oversized elderly population.

For many young people, the “Korean Dream” of their parents’ generation—of a war-torn nation rising from the ashes—is a relic of the past. In its place, they find “Hell Chosun,” a historical reference to the last days of the Chosun dynasty, where elite in-fighting and subsequent weakening of the monarchical state led to the suffering of the peasantry.

Today, as partisan elites are preoccupied with beating the other side, youth welfare is losing out. Students who suffered to make their way through South Korea’s notoriously cutthroat education system graduate only to find that there are not enough jobs. Many young women who invested in careers and embraced cosmopolitan values with South Korea’s globalization find themselves unsupported in the workplace, especially if they try to have families.

Both progressive and conservative factions in South Korea have fiercely appealed to young voters during election time. But once elected, leaders from both sides have cooled on the unemployment reduction or egalitarian platforms they promised, instead becoming embroiled in the nationalist issues that define the partisan squabbling of the older generation, such as conflicts with North Korea or Japan.

For many South Korean youth, repeated experiences of state trauma or neglect have hardened the belief that the South Korean government cares more about partisan victories than the nation’s future, seeding oppositional national stories. The stories of Sewol and the state corruption it uncovered, the challenges of unemployment and soaring prices, and now Itaewon paint the democratic state not as a champion but as a betrayer of the nation’s youth.

Civic duty that is subverted through oppositional national stories is dangerously destabilizing to a democracy. When national stories frame the democratic state as a threat to the nation’s best interests, they instill in national members a moral mandate to resist or reject that state, even if it means violating democratic norms. To see how subverted civic duty manifests, look no further than the participants in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on Capitol Hill, who claim to have done so to “save America.” The demographic, largely middle-aged and older, that has lost civic connection in the U.S. is different from that in South Korea. But both groups share the belief that the democratic state no longer cares about the best interests of the common people in the nation.

Youth who have lost a deeper identity connection to their democracy are also worrisome because they tend to seek a sense of political belonging elsewhere. They may turn away from traditional forms of political engagement entirely. They are also vulnerable to aspiring demagogues who promise to champion their interests against “the establishment,” which is the most common form of contemporary democratic backsliding.

South Korea cannot afford to lose the civic loyalty of its youngest citizens. The sociodemographic challenges that lie ahead depend on them. They will bear the brunt of the welfare burden created by declining fertility, the integration challenges from migration, the costs of potential reunification with North Korea, and the responsibility of defending democracy against the authoritarian resurgence in Asia. They are, quite literally, the democracy’s future.

How should state leaders respond to the Itaewon tragedy if it wants to repair connections with the nation’s youth? The answer is simple: as if the victims were their own children. For a bereaved parent, excuses for why their child died do not bring them back. Instead, swift and sincere acceptance of responsibility, maximal support for funeral arrangements, and clear policy and personnel reforms for prevention, with input from victim families, can offer solace.

When the state sees itself as a bereaved parent, any insinuation of victim blaming—that the tragedy was somehow driven by party culture or individualistic tendencies of youth—is nonsensical. Any efforts to exploit the national tragedy for partisan gain—whether by the incumbent party to deflect blame or the opposition to weaponize against the incumbent—are equally condemnable. The incumbent government can set strong precedent against such politicization and delegitimize partisan tactics from the opposition by first firmly monitoring the rhetoric and behavior of its own party leadership. If the deaths of more than 150 young women and men are not enough of a wakeup call to the polarized partisan politics of South Korea, perhaps the risk of a destabilizing democracy is.

It was always the idea of family—of nation and state as one—that fueled South Korea’s once-strong national stories. The Itaewon tragedy is an opportunity for the state to reclaim that narrative by bringing the nation’s youth back into the fold. South Korea’s reckoning should also serve as an example to other democracies, such as Ukraine, that are dealing with their own cataclysmic national crises. With the right kind of state response, national tragedies can be powerful opportunities for healing and restoring a democracy’s resilience rather than a path toward democratic breakdown.

Foreign Policy · by Aram Hur · November 17, 2022

11. What Commentators Get Wrong (and Right) About North Korea

Some interesting analysis comparing the Washington Post and the New York Times and their coverage of north Korea.. As I have said repeatedly we must understand the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime. I do not think the Professor has grasped these three key concepts and thus in my opinion his analysis euffers.

Excerpts:

The first framework takes the position that “North Korea is a hermit state ruled by a paranoid Stalinist.”

...

The other framework is the “tit for tat,” which I associate with North Korea expert Leon Sigal, though he is not alone in his interpretation

...

We see examples of both frames in reporting on North Korea’s recent missile tests in the two leading U.S. newspapers, The Washington Post and The New York Times. The Washington Post’s coverage definitely falls into the menacing hermit state framework. One article opens with: “North Korea is ready to carry out its first underground nuclear test in years, South Korea’s defense chief said Thursday, as he and the Pentagon’s top official delivered a stark warning to Pyongyang that a strike would result in ‘the end of the Kim Jong Un regime.’”

Conclusion:

This matters. If Congressional staffers, members of Congress, Pentagon and State Department officials, international security experts in universities, and researchers in think tanks read only The Washington Post story and the many others like it, they would imbibe a perspective that portrays North Korea as congenitally incendiary. From this perspective, the only reasonable course of action for the U.S. would be to threaten massive force to deter North Korea and wait for its regime to collapse.

The New York Times piece points in a different policy direction. It portrays the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea as players in an action-reaction drama. It contextualizes North Korea’s behavior in collective fears arising from past suffering. In doing so, the article affords North Koreans a modicum of humanity. Plus, it invites reflection on how dysfunctional interactions could be refashioned and mistrust winnowed down.

This is the kind of exemplary journalism we need if North Korea is ever to be brought back into the family of nations.

What Commentators Get Wrong (and Right) About North Korea

An anthropologist argues that unfair portrayals of North Korea as a hopelessly irrational hermit state has huge implications for policy and security.

By HUGH GUSTERSON

17 NOV 2022

sapiens.org · · November 17, 2022

Hugh Gusterson is a professor of anthropology at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. With a Ph.D. from Stanford University, he writes about nuclear culture, drone warfare, counterinsurgency, international security, and ethics. His books include Drone: Remote Control Warfare, People of the Bomb: Portraits of America’s Nuclear Complex, and Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War. Gusterson’s essays have appeared in The Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, The Boston Globe, the San Francisco Chronicle, Science, Nature, and New Scientist. He recently was awarded the Anthropology in Media Award by the American Anthropological Association. Follow him on Twitter @GustersonP.

✽

This month, North Korea tested around two dozen missiles, including an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a range of approximately 5,000 miles. Some fell to sea near South Korea and Japan, including “the first ballistic one to fly over a nautical border with South Korea,” as Bloomberg News put it in an oddly charged phrase.

The leadership of those countries was understandably upset by this display of nuclear chest-beating. Still, South Korea and the U.S. may have been less than wise in threatening “the end of the Kim Jong Un regime” in their joint response.

How are we to understand North Korea’s provocative behavior? In U.S. policymaking circles and in the press, there are two opposing frames for understanding North Korea’s actions when it escalates tensions. One paints North Korea as a volatile, irrational state ruled by dangerous eccentrics. The other suggests there is a rational, albeit escalatory, predictability to North Korea’s actions.

It’s worth taking a closer look at both these frameworks and how they’re presented by policymakers and news outlets. Because if the first frame is correct, there is little point in negotiating with North Korea, and containment should be the goal. If, on the other hand, the second frame is apt, it might be possible to make diplomatic progress with a regime whose actions threaten to destabilize the East Asian security order.

✽

The first framework takes the position that “North Korea is a hermit state ruled by a paranoid Stalinist.”

In case you think I’m exercising rhetorical license, those words are a direct quote from Bill Keller, a columnist who went on to become the editor of The New York Times, the U.S. newspaper of record. He rose to that position a few months after he wrote, “North Korea is a hermit state ruled by a potbellied, 5-foot-3 paranoid Stalinist who likes to watch Daffy Duck cartoons. He and his father before him have run the country into such a state of abject misery that some people are surviving on boiled grass.” (He was writing about Kim Jong Il, the father of North Korea’s current leader, Kim Jong Un.)

According to this framing, North Korea is “an isolated totalitarian state that has never learned how to conduct itself in polite society” (Keller again). It is a bizarre, impulsive state prone to irrationally inflammatory outbursts that have to be managed the way a child’s tantrums are handled. Variants of this perspective are common among media commentators and international security experts. A notable example is a cover of The Economist magazine featuring Kim Jong Il.

The Economist featured Kim Jong Il on its covers a few times, including 'Greetings, earthlings' in June 2000 pic.twitter.com/lgMuRvSF

— The Economist (@TheEconomist) December 19, 2011

The Economist/Twitter

The other framework is the “tit for tat,” which I associate with North Korea expert Leon Sigal, though he is not alone in his interpretation. According to Sigal, in situations where North Korea feels threatened or betrayed by the U.S. and its allies, the country’s leadership often signals its displeasure and resolve by testing missiles or nuclear warheads.

For example, in 1994, the U.S. and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, in which North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear reactor in exchange for a promise that the U.S. would build two reactors of a different design less connected to nuclear weaponry. The U.S. broke that promise. So, North Korea forged ahead with its nuclear weapons program and withdrew from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty by which it had been bound to forswear nuclear weapons.

✽

We see examples of both frames in reporting on North Korea’s recent missile tests in the two leading U.S. newspapers, The Washington Post and The New York Times. The Washington Post’s coverage definitely falls into the menacing hermit state framework. One article opens with: “North Korea is ready to carry out its first underground nuclear test in years, South Korea’s defense chief said Thursday, as he and the Pentagon’s top official delivered a stark warning to Pyongyang that a strike would result in ‘the end of the Kim Jong Un regime.’”

North Korea has not tested a nuclear weapon for five years, despite repeated predictions in the U.S. press that they were on the brink of doing so—predictions that were not corrected when they didn’t actually come to pass. By beginning the article with the words “North Korea is ready to carry out its first underground nuclear test in years,” The Washington Post gives false materiality to yet another such prediction. In the next part of the sentence, the authors slide, in a few words, from a speculative nuclear test to a nuclear “strike”—the most destructive action a state could undertake. This is quite a leap, especially given that the U.S. has conducted more than 1,000 actual (not speculative) nuclear tests.

The Washington Post article then piles on more examples of North Korea’s irresponsible behavior, such as providing artillery shells to Russia and its flurry of missile tests. It quotes U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin describing this action as “irresponsible and reckless.” The article adds that the ICBM test raises “the specter that Pyongyang is focused on realizing its nuclear ambitions on a global scale.”

A crowd gathered in Pyongyang, North Korea, in 2017 to watch news coverage of a missile test launch that Kim Jong Un described as a “curtain-raiser” to more missile flights over Japan.

Kim Won-Jin/AFP/Getty Images

But why? By listing various provocative actions, quoting U.S. and South Korean defense leaders condemning these actions, and never suggesting a motive beyond the accretion of more military power, the article gives the impression that this kind of behavior is inherent in North Korea’s nature. North Korea is an existential threat.

There was, in fact, a plausible reason for North Korea to conduct its barrage of missile tests at that particular moment. But The Washington Post article did not allude to that reason until the eighth paragraph. And it did so with strikingly elliptical phrasing: “The torrent of activity [the North Korean missile tests] coincides with joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises.”

Any propagandist would have to admire the use of the word “coincides.” It is bereft of any hint of causation. North Korea’s missile tests were not a response to massive rehearsals of an attack along their border, according to this formulation. The two things just coincided in time.

✽

The New York Times did much better. It did not skimp on details of North Korea’s provocative behavior: 23 missiles launched in one day, Air Force exercises along the border with South Korea, and artillery shells fired into the demilitarized zone between the two countries—in violation of agreements with South Korea.

But the article provided, in detail, the explanatory context more or less absent from The Washington Post piece. It portrayed the missile activity as a “counter” to Operation Vigilant Storm—the joint U.S.-South Korean military exercise that sent 240 warplanes into the air over six days to conduct 1,600 mock sorties against North Korea.

The article stated: “North Korea has typically protested joint military drills by the United States and South Korea, accusing them of preparing to invade, and cited them as a reason that it was building its nuclear arsenal.”

The author added this insightful observation: “Two B-1B Lancer bombers, taking off from Guam, the U.S. territory in the West Pacific, flew over South Korea, flanked by four South Korean F-35A fighter jets and four American F-16 jets.” The New York Times pointed out that “the North Koreans are particularly sensitive about long-range American bombers over South Korea, after U.S. aerial bombings leveled their country to ashes during the Korean War in the 1950s.” For good measure, The New York Times even illustrated the article with a picture of the B-1s and their escorts.

In June, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with South Korea’s Minister of National Defense Lee Jong-Sup at the Shangri-La Dialogue, where they discussed nuclear threats from North Korea.

Chad J. McNeeley/U.S. Secretary of Defense/Wikimedia Commons

This matters. If Congressional staffers, members of Congress, Pentagon and State Department officials, international security experts in universities, and researchers in think tanks read only The Washington Post story and the many others like it, they would imbibe a perspective that portrays North Korea as congenitally incendiary. From this perspective, the only reasonable course of action for the U.S. would be to threaten massive force to deter North Korea and wait for its regime to collapse.

The New York Times piece points in a different policy direction. It portrays the U.S., South Korea, and North Korea as players in an action-reaction drama. It contextualizes North Korea’s behavior in collective fears arising from past suffering. In doing so, the article affords North Koreans a modicum of humanity. Plus, it invites reflection on how dysfunctional interactions could be refashioned and mistrust winnowed down.

This is the kind of exemplary journalism we need if North Korea is ever to be brought back into the family of nations.

sapiens.org · by Keridwen Cornelius · November 17, 2022

12. North Korea's internet temporarily knocked offline, researcher says

Hmmm... cyber attack?

Excerpts:

Researchers have said such outages show signs of being what they term distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, in which hackers try to flood a network with unusually high volumes of data traffic in order to paralyse it.

"From my experience and what I’ve seen before from monitoring their networks, I’d be surprised if this wasn’t an attack," Ali said.

North Korea's internet temporarily knocked offline, researcher says

Reuters · by Josh Smith

SEOUL, Nov 17 (Reuters) - North Korea's internet was hit by the largest outages in months on Thursday, a cybersecurity researcher told Reuters, after similar service interruptions in January were blamed on suspected cyber attacks.

Internet access is strictly limited in North Korea. It is not known how many people there have direct access to the global internet, but estimates generally place the figure at a small fraction - well below 1% - of the population of about 25 million. Many more have access to internal networks that don't connect to the outside world.

At least two waves of outages struck the isolated country's internet over a period of roughly 2.5 hours, peaking with surges in network stress that made North Korea's entire internet unreachable, said Junade Ali, a British cybersecurity researcher who monitors a range of different North Korean web and email servers.

"This isn’t like a single web server is being taken offline," he said, citing monitoring records that he shared with Reuters. "The network stress is so great their Domain Name System (DNS) servers have been taken offline and eventually the key routers allowing traffic in and out of the country entirely."

North Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs website and Naenara, which is the official portal for the North Korean government, appeared to see the brunt of the suspected attack, before it became so great the entire internet was taken offline, Ali said.

Other major websites affected included the Air Koryo national airline and major internal email servers.

Up to 7 million North Koreans use cell phones daily, and WiFi networks have sharply expanded in recent years as the mobile devices increasingly became a key tool for market activity, though most do not connect to global networks, U.S. researchers said on Tuesday.

Like the suspected attacks in January, Thursday's outages come amid increased missile launches and other military activity by the North, which has drawn condemnation from the United States and its allies.

North Korea fired a ballistic missile on Thursday as it warned of "fiercer military responses" to U.S. efforts to boost its security presence in the region with its allies, saying Washington is taking a "gamble it will regret".

Researchers have said such outages show signs of being what they term distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, in which hackers try to flood a network with unusually high volumes of data traffic in order to paralyse it.

"From my experience and what I’ve seen before from monitoring their networks, I’d be surprised if this wasn’t an attack," Ali said.

Reporting by Josh Smith Editing by Raissa Kasolowsky

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Reuters · by Josh Smith

13. Rival parties quarrel over cash transfer to North Korea

The Sunshine Policy (and Peace and Prosperity Policy) of 1997-20007 was a safety valve for the regime following the Arduous MArch of the famine of 1994-1997. The rise of the 4000 markets following the collapse of the party's public distribution system was the safety valve for the people. Now it is not possible to transfer funds to the regime and the regime has been cracking down on markets. There may not be a safety valve for the regime or the people (though the north's illicit activities still seem to be very "profitable.")

Rival parties quarrel over cash transfer to North Korea

The Korea Times · November 18, 2022

Democratic Party of Korea Rep. Youn Kun-young speaks during an audit by the National Assembly's Environment and Labor Committee, Thursday. Yonhap

Ruling party chief accuses former president of bribing Pyongyang to hold inter-Korean summits

By Ko Dong-hwan

Rep. Youn Kun-young of the main opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) has denied allegations that the former Moon Jae-in government sent millions of dollars in bribes to North Korea to agree to hold inter-Korean summits in 2018 and 2019.

Earlier, Rep. Chung Jin-suk of the ruling People Power Party (PPP) claimed that the two summits took place because Seoul bribed Pyongyang with cash multiple times and said the former South Korean president "must have known about it back then."

During Thursday's meeting with party leaders at the National Assembly, Rep. Chung cited an article published Wednesday by the local daily DongA Ilbo reporting that prosecutors accused Gyeonggi Provincial Government under Lee Jae-myung (who was governor between 2018 and 2021), Asia Pacific Exchange Association (APEA), a private organization based in Seoul, KH Group and Ssangbangwool of transferring money to high-ranking North Korean officials during 2018-19. The lawmaker described alleged money transfers as a national scandal spearheaded by the Moon administration.

The prosecutors, according to the report, alleged that the South Korean entities made the transfers in hopes of securing business opportunities in North Korea. The report added that Ssangbangwool, an underwear maker, smuggled $6.4 million out of South Korea into China and delivered it to North Korean officials, while KH Group presented 10 Rolex wristwatches and the APEA $500,000 to the North Koreans.

But the DPK claimed that the PPP's allegations were not based on facts.

"He is trying to somehow tie the North Korea-bound money transfers to the Moon administration," said Rep. Youn, who had served at the presidential office under Moon. "Even if the companies had actually given the money to Pyongyang as a bribe, how could he accuse the Moon administration of the scandal? An individual's misdemeanor doesn't necessarily mean that of the central government."

People Power Party interim chief Rep. Chung Jin-suk speaks during a party meeting at the National Assembly, Thursday.He also questioned whether North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and former U.S. President Donald Trump, who took part in the 2019 summit with Moon at the border truce village of Panmunjeom, were there "because of Rolex watches."

"Rep. Chung must bear a diplomatic responsibility for having said such nonsense," said Rep. Youn. "The Moon administration didn't transfer a penny to the Kim's regime. Pyongyang didn't even accept the food we had sent through the World Food Programme."

Earlier on Thursday, Rep. Chung accused Moon of violating the UN Security Council's sanctions and international laws by illegally transferring the money to Pyongyang. He asked if there were more firms involved in the alleged illegal North Korea-bound money transfers.

"In 2000, former South Korean president Kim Dae-jung illegally transferred $500 million to Pyongyang by fronting Hyundai Engineering and Construction," said Rep. Chung. "The same thing happened again."

He added that private companies like Ssangbangwool could not have directly bribed Kim Yong-chol, who was the Vice Chairman of North Korean Workers' Party until 2021, unless it received help from the South Korean presidential office or the country's National Intelligence Agency.

"If the South Korean unification minister or national intelligence agency chief had known about this back then and kept silent, this matter should be revisited as a serious affair threatening national security," said Rep. Chung, urging prosecutors to investigate the issue.

The Korea Times · November 18, 2022

14. [INTERVIEW] 'Seoul needs own nuclear weapons for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula'

Counterintuitive?

Excerpts:

The first step of the "four-phase strategy" Cheong proposes is for the government to declare its intent to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if North Korea, say, conducts another nuclear weapons test, or any other event showing the development of its nuclear threat. The declaration would deter the North from proceeding and draw global attention to ― and hopefully a serious discussion over ― the issue.

Given that its Article 10 allows members to leave if adherence to the pact would jeopardize its supreme national interests, he believes South Korea can do so without violating NPT rules.

"The Yoon Suk-yeol administration should use this card as North Korea is now believed to be ready for its seventh nuclear weapons test to increase international pressure on the regime and strengthen justification for South Korea's next move," Cheong said.

If North Korea ignores the warning and proceeds, South Korea should take the second step by withdrawing from the NPT and declaring its intent to develop its own nuclear weapons under the condition that it would halt the process at any time if the North returns to negotiations. All this would put enormous pressure on China, which has reluctantly tolerated the North's advancing nuclear arsenal not far from Beijing despite its own discomfort.

The third step, he said, is to start building nuclear weapons ― possibly "low-yield" weapons, which could be developed without nuclear tests, according to some scientists. By this stage, South Korean officials should have reached a deal with their U.S. counterparts for cooperation, such as the connivance the U.S. gave to Israel when it was unofficially developing nuclear weapons.

Skeptics say the U.S. would not be convinced. Maybe. But Donald Trump, as a presidential candidate in 2016, told the media that he was open to South Korea developing nuclear weapons and even planned to pull U.S. forces completely out of the country. As an increasing number of Republican leaders imitate his strategy of focusing on domestic issues, Cheong thinks there will be "a window of opportunity" in the coming years.

"This is why taking a long-term perspective is important. I think there will be an opportunity. But unless we are prepared, we won't be able to seize it," he said.

Persuading South Korean politicians may be the least challenging part. As many polls show a majority of the people support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, politicians will react to their demands eventually, Cheong said. A poll released in February by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 71 percent of South Koreans supported nuclear weapons. Hong Joon-pyo, Daegu mayor and former presidential contender of the ruling People Power Party, and former lawmaker Yoo Seong-min are among the political heavyweights raising their voices for nuclearization.

The fourth and final phase is to start negotiating with North Korea as a nuclear-armed state for nuclear disarmament on both sides. If the North agrees to get rid of all its nuclear weapons, the South should do the same. But a more realistic goal is to reduce the number of weapons to fewer than 10, which would make it difficult to use them offensively. Cheong called this a state of "semi-denuclearization," which would significantly lower the risks of nuclear attack by either side.

"It is important to convey the message that South Korea has no other choice but to develop nuclear weapons and that it takes the step for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, not just South Korea," he said.

[INTERVIEW] 'Seoul needs own nuclear weapons for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula'

The Korea Times · November 18, 2022

A TV screen shows a file image of a North Korean missile launch during a news program at Seoul Station in Seoul, Nov. 9. AP-Yonhap

Advocacy group launched for South Korea's long-term nuclear strategy

By Jung Min-ho

Cheong Seong-chang, an expert on North Korea at the Sejong Institute A coordinated international effort over the last few decades to stop North Korea from going nuclear has all but failed. South Korea's next mission ― convincing the regime to give up the formidable weapons in a more divided world ― is even more daunting, if not impossible.

Many South Koreans today believe the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is nothing more than just a political slogan that won't bring real changes. According to one expert, the only way to achieve that goal is, ironically, for South Korea to build its own nuclear weapons.

Skeptics have always dismissed the idea of a nuclear South Korea as unrealistic. But Cheong Seong-chang, 57, a senior analyst at the Sejong Institute, a think tank, remains optimistic. In the long run, he said, it is far more achievable than many believe, given the rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

"South Korea needs to start developing its own nuclear weapons, which is the only available way that can ultimately lead to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," Cheong said in a recent interview. "Unless South Korea begins the process, North Korea and China will not budge. Then, the next thing the world will face is a North Korea armed with more advanced, a greater number of nuclear weapons."

Earlier this month, Cheong launched the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy, an advocacy group to develop and promote the necessity for South Korea's nuclear armament and concrete ways to achieve it. More than a dozen experts from various fields, such as international relations scholars and nuclear engineers, and nearly 30 members in their 20s and 30s have joined so far.

The stated objectives of the group are establishing a lasting peace on the peninsula through nuclear balance and developing an internationally acceptable logic for the initiative.

The first step of the "four-phase strategy" Cheong proposes is for the government to declare its intent to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) if North Korea, say, conducts another nuclear weapons test, or any other event showing the development of its nuclear threat. The declaration would deter the North from proceeding and draw global attention to ― and hopefully a serious discussion over ― the issue.

Given that its Article 10 allows members to leave if adherence to the pact would jeopardize its supreme national interests, he believes South Korea can do so without violating NPT rules.

"The Yoon Suk-yeol administration should use this card as North Korea is now believed to be ready for its seventh nuclear weapons test to increase international pressure on the regime and strengthen justification for South Korea's next move," Cheong said.

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, left, and South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup hold a joint press conference in the Pentagon press briefing room in Washington, Nov. 3. AFP-Yonhap

If North Korea ignores the warning and proceeds, South Korea should take the second step by withdrawing from the NPT and declaring its intent to develop its own nuclear weapons under the condition that it would halt the process at any time if the North returns to negotiations. All this would put enormous pressure on China, which has reluctantly tolerated the North's advancing nuclear arsenal not far from Beijing despite its own discomfort.

The third step, he said, is to start building nuclear weapons ― possibly "low-yield" weapons, which could be developed without nuclear tests, according to some scientists. By this stage, South Korean officials should have reached a deal with their U.S. counterparts for cooperation, such as the connivance the U.S. gave to Israel when it was unofficially developing nuclear weapons.

Skeptics say the U.S. would not be convinced. Maybe. But Donald Trump, as a presidential candidate in 2016, told the media that he was open to South Korea developing nuclear weapons and even planned to pull U.S. forces completely out of the country. As an increasing number of Republican leaders imitate his strategy of focusing on domestic issues, Cheong thinks there will be "a window of opportunity" in the coming years.

"This is why taking a long-term perspective is important. I think there will be an opportunity. But unless we are prepared, we won't be able to seize it," he said.

Persuading South Korean politicians may be the least challenging part. As many polls show a majority of the people support South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, politicians will react to their demands eventually, Cheong said. A poll released in February by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 71 percent of South Koreans supported nuclear weapons. Hong Joon-pyo, Daegu mayor and former presidential contender of the ruling People Power Party, and former lawmaker Yoo Seong-min are among the political heavyweights raising their voices for nuclearization.

The fourth and final phase is to start negotiating with North Korea as a nuclear-armed state for nuclear disarmament on both sides. If the North agrees to get rid of all its nuclear weapons, the South should do the same. But a more realistic goal is to reduce the number of weapons to fewer than 10, which would make it difficult to use them offensively. Cheong called this a state of "semi-denuclearization," which would significantly lower the risks of nuclear attack by either side.

"It is important to convey the message that South Korea has no other choice but to develop nuclear weapons and that it takes the step for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, not just South Korea," he said.

The Korea Times · November 18, 2022

15. 'Next year is turning point in strengthening US-Korea economic and security alliance': KITA

We must wield our economic instrument of power with precision so that we do not cause fratricide with our friends, partners, and especially our allies.

'Next year is turning point in strengthening US-Korea economic and security alliance': KITA

The Korea Times · November 18, 2022

The Korea International Trade Association building located at the Trade Tower in Seoul / Courtesy of KITA By Kim Hyun-bin

Next year marks the 70th anniversary of the ROK-U.S. alliance and is a critical turning point to expand bilateral exchanges between Korea and the U.S. to strengthen the economic and security alliance, according to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), Friday.

KITA held the "2023 U.S. Economy Policy Outlook and Market Entry Seminar" jointly with the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM) at COEX in Seoul, Friday.

The seminar touched upon future prospects for the U.S.' trade and economy next year, major policy issues and the midterm election results, factors to consider when investing in the U.S. and successful cases of Korean companies entering the U.S.

"Korea-U.S. trade continues to grow at a double-digit rate this year as it did last year," a KITA official said. "Major Korean companies announced large-scale investments and follow-up investments are expected to expand significantly in the future."

James Kim, chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea (AMCHAM), emphasized that Korea and the U.S. are the closest trading partners, and that changes in one country have a great impact on other countries.

"AMCHAM supports the strong Korea-U.S. partnership and will continue to help many companies from both countries participate in this partnership," Kim said.

In a presentation on "Major Issues and Prospects of the U.S. Economy," Joo Won, head of economic research at Hyundai Research Institute, predicted "the U.S. economy will be somewhat sluggish in 2023 due to high-interest rates. As the U.S. global value chain (GVC) reorganization strategy is entering an era in which production in the U.S. is advantageous, Korean companies need to increase their understanding of the Biden administration's economic policies."

Some experts pointed out that due to the influence of the U.S.' industrial and trade policies, Korean companies will not be able to do business with some countries in order to maintain their business with the U.S., which will be a burden in the future.

However, they pointed out certain manufacturing industries could benefit from increased U.S. subsidies when appropriately utilized.

The Korea Times · November 18, 2022

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Senior Advisor, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

V/R

David Maxwell

Senior Fellow

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

Phone: 202-573-8647

Personal Email: d avid.maxwell161@gmail.com

Web Site: www.fdd.org

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Subscribe to FDD’s new podcast, Foreign Podicy

FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

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