Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“One of the saddest lessons of history is this: if we've been bamboozled, long enough, we tend to reject any evidence of the bamboozle. We are no longer interested in finding out the truth. The bamboozle has captured us. It's simply too painful to acknowledge, even to ourselves, that we've been taken. Once you give us charlatan power over you, you almost never get it back.”

- Carl Sagan.

“A reader lives a thousand lives before he dies…the man who never reads lives only one.”

- George R.R. Martin

“What we don’t know about North Korea is so vast that it makes the Kremlin of the 1950’s look like an open book. The communist northern tier of the peninsula once known as the Hermit Kingdom has lived up to that name with a vengeance, enveloping its 22 million people in a bell jar of propaganda, thought control and mythology glorifying the Kims, often in public pageants that would dwarf a Cecil B. DeMille production.”

- Arnold Kantor, Former U.S. Undersecretary of State

1. DOD Announces Release of 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment

2. UNC Members Reaffirm Defense of South Korea, China Remains Opposed

3. Russia and North Korea: A Growing Strategic Partnership

4. Encountering my activist great-grandfather — and his bones

5. Opinion | Cultural Diplomacy May Seem Pointless. That Won’t Stop Me.

6. A Message to Kim Jong Un From Mother of Japanese Girl Abducted by North Korea in 1977

7. Russian soldier in Ukraine discusses North Korean weapons in video

8. Asia’s space race: Korean rivalry, US alliance go into orbit with militarisation of new frontier

9. North Korea marks 'missile industry day'

1. DOD Announces Release of 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment

The 24 page strategy can be downloaded here: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Nov/17/2003342901/-1/-1/1/2023-DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-FOR-OPERATIONS-IN-THE-INFORMATION-ENVIRONMENT.PDF

Excerpt:

The purpose of the 2023 Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE) is to improve the Department’s ability to plan, resource, and apply informational power to enable integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantages as described in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The 2023 DoD SOIE provides a DoD-enterprise approach to ensure improved integration and oversight of information forces and information capabilities, operations, activities, programs, and technologies. This will allow the Department to refine its abilities to campaign in and through the information environment (IE), across all domains, in a global context, using the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to enable achievement of enduring strategic outcomes.

Effective application of informational power must be more broadly understood and deliberately incorporated into the full range of DoD strategies and operations, activities, and investments (OAIs) to support the advancement of national interests across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic instruments of national power in support of specific defense policy objectives. DoD must embrace a cultural shift wherein information is a foundational element of all military strategies and OAIs, and where the consistent integration of informational and physical power becomes the norm (see Figure 1). This change ensures DoD’s capability to positively affect the drivers of human and automated system behaviors, shaping operational environments, and reinforcing the strength and credibility of the United States.

Information Environment (IE): The aggregate of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors that affect how humans and automated systems derive meaning from, act upon, and are impacted by information, including the individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or use information.

- JP 3-04, Information in Joint Operations, SEP 2022

Note that JP 3-24 is not available in the public domain. Official access to the Joint Electronic Library is required.

north Korea (and Iran) excerpts (just lifts from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 6, 2023)

Iran and North Korea use tactics designed to create regional instability and threaten United States’ interests, allies, and partners. Iran and North Korea have increased their informational capabilities, operations, and activities focusing heavily on the cyber domain, deception, and malign influence. Both Iran and North Korea employ civilian, military, and third-party resources in their attempts to manipulate the IE and often link their efforts to diplomatic and/or strategic actions.

“Iran will continue to threaten U.S. interests as it tries to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states, and minimize threats to the regime. Tehran will try to leverage diplomacy, its expanding nuclear program, its conventional, proxy, and partner forces, and its military sales and acquisitions to advance its goals. The Iranian regime sees itself as locked in an existential struggle with the United States and its regional allies, while it pursues its longstanding ambitions for regional leadership.”4

“North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is continuing efforts to enhance North Korea’s nuclear and conventional capabilities targeting the United States and its allies, which will enable periodic aggressive actions to try to reshape the regional security environment in his favor. Kim probably is attempting to secure North Korea’s position in what he perceives to be an international environment conducive to his brutal authoritarian system, as demonstrated by North Korea’s repeated public support for Beijing and Moscow’s foreign policy priorities.”5

NORTH KOREA DECEPTION ACTIVITES: In 2012, North Korea gave indications of a missile launch, but then announced it was experiencing technical issues. Open-source reports indicated parts of the rocket were taken from the launch pad, reinforcing the understanding that the launch was canceled. The missile was then indeed launched on its originally scheduled day and time, deceiving intelligence communities, and thereby limiting intelligence collection opportunities.

Here is what I do not read in the strategy or in these key principles - there is no outline of unity of effort and who is in charge of synchronizing information activities and themes and messages. From these principles we learn that it is the joint force commander that is responsible for all operations in the information environment. If that is so then we need to give the Joint Force Commander greater authority and permissions to employ information across the spectrum of conflict and most importantly BEFORE conflict occurs. If we are not going to have central control (which is likely impossible) then we need to reduce restrictions and empower commanders and leaders to execute without the heavy handed restrict approach that has persisted in the US government. REmember that as currently constructed with our authorities and permissions it is easier to get permission to put a hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than it is to get permission to put an idea between his ears. I am not sure this strategy has improved upon that.

OIE must be aligned within a spectrum of other government informational capabilities, operations, and activities that span public diplomacy and public affairs to intelligence. The key planning considerations of the 2023 DoD SOIE include:

► The Department of State is lead for public diplomacy. DoD collaborates with interagency partners and offers planning and synchronization support and other resources to enable the effective, whole-of-government integration of informational power.

► Joint force commanders’ requirements for organic capability and capacity to conduct OIE as part of campaigning and integrated deterrence require informed resource prioritization or offsets.

► All military operations and activities affect the information environment. The integration of informational power into strategy, strategic art, operational art, operational design, and operational planning, from the onset of planning initiation, enables effective OIE and information advantage.

► Maintaining an updated joint lexicon for terms related to OIE is critical.

► DoD integration of PA is a key component of OIE across the competition continuum.

► Military Departments/Services continue to provide forces and capabilities for integration into the joint force including for the information joint function. Future joint integration models for effective, efficient, and agile information capability and capacity are continually maturing to match DoD needs.

► Each Service has defined and organized their information forces and capabilities differently. Therefore, OIE units may be comprised of varying information forces and associated capabilities and competencies that include but are not limited to psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, Civil Affairs (CA), Public Affairs (PA), Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) elements, cyberspace forces, space operations elements, with information planners skilled in Special Technical Operations (STO), DoD deception activities (DDA), and Operational Security (OPSEC).

► Maintaining up-to-date architectures and standards in order to assess the efficacy of DoD activities in this space and to enable interoperability, efficiency, information sharing, and cybersecurity8.

Finally do we have Psychological Operations (PSYOP) or Military Information Support Operations (MISO)? Both are mentioned in two places without reference to the other but lumped together will the other functions. Is this an editing issue? Should it be PSYOP or MISSO in both places. And oh by the way these are the only mentions of PSYOP (or MISO) in the entire document. The strategy does not recognize that it is only US Army PSYOP forces that are organized, equipped, trained, educated, and (hopefully) optimized to influence foreign target audiences. That is surely the main effort of all operations in the information environment and yet PSYOP (or MISO) have no substantive mention in the 24 pages of the strategy. I just don't think we get it. Or maybe the future implementation plaan hav more substantive discussion of the importance of PSYOP.

Each Service has defined and organized their information forces and capabilities differently. Therefore, OIE units may be comprised of varying information forces and associated capabilities and competencies that include but are not limited to psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, Civil Affairs (CA), Public Affairs (PA), Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) elements, cyberspace forces, space operations elements, with information planners skilled in Special Technical Operations (STO), DoD deception activities (DDA), and Operational Security (OPSEC).

The 2023 DoD SOIE aligns with the 2022 NDS and Joint Publication 3-04, Information in Joint Operations. The 2023 DoD SOIE focus is on increasing and balancing the institutional and operational synergy among military information support operations, civil affairs (CA), public affairs (PA), joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), cyberspace operations, space operations, special technical operations (STO), defense deception activities (DDA), operations security (OPSEC), new and emerging information activities, and other disciplines and the informational aspects of physical power. The 2023 DoD SOIE and the forthcoming OIE I-Plan will address opportunities to strengthen contemporary programs, support the development of new ones, and simultaneously increase DoD OIE efficiency, effectiveness, and unity of effort, while also integrating the IC much more deeply into the planning, execution, and assessment of OIE.

Finally we do need this cultural shift. But who is going to drive that shift? Who is responsible for driving cultural change in DOD about operations in the information environment?

"DoD must embrace a cultural shift wherein information is a foundational element of all military strategies and OAIs, and where the consistent integration of informational and physical power becomes the norm"

As an aside, north Korea should be a huge laboratory for psychological operations. We should turn loose our PSYOP forces (along with and in support of our ROK counterparts) to design and execute a comprehensive information campaign. Let's get serious about influencing the elite, the second tier leadership, and the Korean people in the north to seek change (and prepare for a free and unified Korea).

DOD Announces Release of 2023 Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment

defense.gov

Today, the Department of Defense released the 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment (SOIE).

The 2023 DOD SOIE will improve the Department's ability to plan, resource, and apply informational power toward integrated deterrence, campaigning, and building enduring advantage as described in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. This will enable the DOD to deter challenges to U.S. vital national interests in any arena or domain.

The 2023 DOD SOIE identifies four lines of effort to enable the Department to fully integrate and modernize operations in the information environment:

People and Organizations
Programs
Policies and Governance
Partnerships

This Strategy is an important step forward in swiftly and seamlessly synchronizing and integrating our operations in the information environment to strengthen integrated deterrence, as well as gain and sustain information advantages for DoD activities and operations.

The 2023 Department of Defense Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment can be found here.

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2. UNC Members Reaffirm Defense of South Korea, China Remains Opposed

Ralph Cossa and I discussed the UNC meeting this past week in this article.

Of course all comments provided to journalists cannot be used in these articles. I am not at all complaining about that. But here are all of my comments that I did provide

First regarding China’s claim about legality they are parroting the north Korean position which supports the objective of trying to dismantle the UN Command in order to drive US forces off the peninsula and give the north a military and political advantage. And China’s long term objective is to drive US forces off of the Asian landmass. So this rhetoric is expected and normal because it suits the north’s and PRC’s objectives.

But the claim to "no legal basis" is wrong. UN Security Council Resolutions 82-85 remain in effect. They have never been rescinded. They established that the north was the aggressor who attacked the South, called member nations to come to the aid of South Korea to defend its freedom, established the UN Command as the military organization to defend the South, and authorized the US to be the executive to support the UN Command (which means pay for it, provide all logistical support for it and appoint the commander of it).

So the PRC’s claims have no basis in fact or international law. But since most people do not recall the history PRC and north Korean claims do influence these are are uninformed, ill-informed, mis-informed, and “dis-informed.” This is why it is important for VOA to inform the public of PRC and nK disinformation (deliberate mis-information)

The UNC meeting is significant. First it is signaling that the member states support the rules based international order which is at the heart of strategic competition. The revisionist powers (PRC and Russia) and the rogue/revolutionary powers (nK and Iran) along with violent extremist organizations are deliberately attacking the rules based international order by conducting malign activities and even going to war (e.g. Putin’s war and Hamas’ attack on Israel).

It is historic in that the ROK is now embracing the strategic importance of the UN Command. Recall President Yoon stressing the importance of the 7 UN based in Japan for the defense of Korea during his August 15 liberation day speech.

In addition, this meeting can enhance deterrence by demonstrating the international commitment to the defense of Korea. If Kim miscalculates and attacks the South, at least the 16 sending states are committed to coming to the defense of The ROK.

The UN Command will play multiple roles in any contingency. It will provide a large supporting logistical effort in support of the ROK/US Combined Forces Command. Again the 7 UN bases in Japan will be pivotal as intermediate staging bases for forces and supplies flowing to the peninsula for the war effort. The UN Command will be provide the logistical support for the forces from the 16 sending states. The command will respond to the Commander of the ROK/US CFC when he requests forces to conduct specific missions and the UN. Commander will ensure the right forces with the right capabilities and the right national caveats are provided to support the CFC commander.

Let me clear up one misconception. USFK will not be conducting contingency missions outside of Korea. Some of the air forces may be used outside of the Korean Theater but if they are called upon to do so it will mean that we are in trouble executing other contingencies. USFK exists for two reasons. It provides the US contribution the to the ROK/US CFC headquarters (e.g., command and control, intelligence, communications, and logistics). It also receives, stages, onward moves, and integrates (RSO&I) ) US forces that are provided to fight under the OPCON of the ROK/US CFC. Anyone who claims that USFK will depart the peninsula for a contingency somewhere else does not know what they are talking about. USFK in Korea has no assets that will be of utility in a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency. That said the US has many forces that are “dual apportioned” for multiple defense plans. This means that if a Taiwan contingency takes place , the forces that are committed there will not be available for Korea if Kim miscalculates and takes advantage of the opportunity to attack the South. This is where the UN Command will make an important contribution . Some of the sending state forces can make for US shortfalls if we are faced with simultaneous or sequential contingencies. Kim Jong Un needs to be informed of this so it can contribute to deterrence and if deterrence fails these forces can contribute to the defense of the ROK.

UNC Members Reaffirm Defense of South Korea, China Remains Opposed

voanews.com · November 17, 2023

Washington —

Seventeen nations have reiterated their commitment to help defend South Korea against any attack from its northern neighbor, eliciting an angry response from China.

The countries are members of the U.N. Command (UNC), a multinational military force that maintains the armistice between North and South Korea. If a conflict breaks out on the peninsula, its members are to coordinate the deployment of weapons and troops in support of the South.

Defense ministers and representatives from the 17 countries gathered this week in Seoul at the invitation of the South Korean ministry for a historic meeting.

Several UNC member states have been participating in U.S.-South Korea joint drills but the meeting on Tuesday marked the first time that UNC member states from Africa, Europe, the Middle East, North and South Americas, and Southeast Asia have come together since the UNC was established 70 years ago.

In a joint statement released after the meeting, the representatives declared they will be "united upon any renewal of hostilities or armed attack on the Korean Peninsula challenging the principles of the United Nations and the security of the Republic of Korea."

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning criticized the UNC at Tuesday’s regular press briefing in Beijing. She said the UNC "has no legal grounds" and "stokes confrontation" on the peninsula.

China's President Xi Jinping, right, arrives for the leaders retreat at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in San Francisco, California, Nov. 17, 2023.

David Maxwell, vice president of the Center for Asia-Pacific Strategy, said Beijing’s claim is inaccurate as U.N. Security Council Resolutions 82 to 85, which gave legitimacy for the establishment and operation of the UNC, "remain in effect" and have "never been rescinded."

"China’s claim about legality is parroting the North Korean position, which supports the objective of trying to dismantle the U.N. Command in order to drive the U.S. forces off the peninsula and give the North a military and political advantage," said Maxwell.

"China’s long-term objective is to drive U.S. forces off the Asian landmass," he added.

Before of the UNC meeting, North Korea’s foreign ministry issued a statement through its state media KCNA describing the body as an "illegal war organization fabricated by the U.S."

Experts said this week’s meeting was significant for signaling deterrence against North Korea and bolstering the U.S. defense commitment for Taiwan at a time when Russia, China and North Korea are seeking to change the territorial status quo.

Ralph Cossa, president emeritus of Pacific Forum, a former special assistant to the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Air Force colonel, said, "UNC is critically important as a deterrent to North Korea, especially if the U.S. is involved in a Taiwan or South China Sea contingency."

He continued, "There is a concern that Pyongyang might want to exploit a cross-strait conflict by moving against the South while the U.S. is tied up elsewhere, so it’s critically important for the other UNC members to demonstrate they are prepared to fill in any gap."

The operation of the UNC in South Korea would ensure that the U.S. military could devote its resources to defending Taiwan without weakening deterrence against North Korea, said experts.

U.S. President Joe Biden has been vowing to defend Taiwan using U.S. forces including soldiers if China attacks the self-ruled island that Beijing considers as its own territory.

Chinese President Xi Jinping told Biden at their meeting on Wednesday that force could potentially be used to unify Taiwan, according to a U.S. official cited by Reuters. The two met at a private estate near San Francisco, where the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit was being held.

Resolution 84, adopted in July 1950 after North Korea attacked the South in June of that year, authorized the U.S. to create and lead the UNC to defend South Korea as the first global collective security force.

Xi said in his speech at a welcome dinner in San Francisco on Wednesday that China remains "firm in safeguarding the international system with the U.N. at its core, the international order underpinned by international law, and the basic norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter."

VOA requested comments from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs about whether it believes remarks by Ning and Xi contradict each other but has received no response.

voanews.com · November 17, 2023

3. Russia and North Korea: A Growing Strategic Partnership

Excerpts:

While Putin has acknowledged “certain restrictions” could limit technology transfers to North Korea, influential Russian commentators have mused about eviscerating the extant UN sanctions regime against North Korea. The Razumnaya Rossiya Telegram channel contended that Russia’s long-term goal is to increase trade with North Korea to the 2006 level of $230 million and asserted that Russia was constructing eleven rapid assembly plants in the Khasan facility near the North Korea border.

These plants would produce 155 mm ammunition, missiles for MLRS systems and howitzers, and military equipment, which would then be transferred to Russia through camouflaged trucks. The White House has also warned that North Korea could disguise its munitions deliveries to Russia as shipments to the Middle East. North Korea’s strengthening ties with Belarus, exemplified by President Alexander Lukashenko’s September 15 conceptualization of a Russia-Belarus-DPRK trilateral axis, could also lead to Belarus acting as a middleman in the Russia-DPRK arms trade.

Beyond military technology transfers, Russia is likely to expand its agricultural exports to North Korea and deepen North Korea’s integration with its network of surrogates in the post-Soviet space. In June 2023, the Siberian region of Kuzbass exported 1,080 tons of wheat to North Korea and grain-for-arms shipments have been mooted. North Korea could also pursue closer ties with Russian-backed breakaway regions in Georgia and Ukraine, as these occupied territories are exempt from sanctions as UN non-members. In 2019, North Korea had 400 guest workers stationed in Abkhazia, situated in the construction sector. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora has discussed hiring North Korean workers to rebuild destroyed infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk.

While Russia’s courtship of North Korea has often been framed as a desperate measure to secure arms, the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship has genuine strategic depth. As Russia and North Korea’s prospects for escaping isolation from the West fade, their progress toward a sanctions-proof partnership will continue unabated.

Russia and North Korea: A Growing Strategic Partnership

BY: SAMUEL RAMANI
NOVEMBER 17, 2023

https://www.38north.org/2023/11/russia-and-north-korea-a-growing-strategic-partnership/

Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin meet in Vladivostok, Russia, in 2019.

On November 1, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) revealed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) had supplied over 1 million artillery shells to Russia. The NIS alleged that North Korea had transferred these shells to Russia in ten shipments and was operating its munitions factories “at maximum capacity to meet Russia’s demand for military supplies.” The NIS concluded that at Russia’s current rate of fire, North Korean shell shipments would allow it to sustain two months of war in Ukraine. These shipments were likely paired with North Korean ammunition, short-range ballistic missile, anti-tank missile and portable anti-air missile shipments to Russia.

The NIS’s revelations alarmed Western policymakers, as they significantly exceeded prior estimates of North Korean military assistance to Russia. On October 20, Colonel Ants Kiviselg, the head of the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center, estimated that North Korea had supplied 350,000 artillery shells to Russia. The NIS’s figures also confirmed fears that North Korean artillery shell shipments to Russia outstripped European military assistance to Ukraine. On the sidelines of the October 26-27 European Council summit, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas admitted that the European Union (EU) had not yet fulfilled its promise to supply one million artillery shells to Ukraine and expressed concern about ammunition production.

Notwithstanding the utility of additional ammunition and shell shipments, Russia’s strengthened partnership with North Korea is not just about gaining a war materiel advantage over Ukraine. Russia sees North Korea as a strategically valuable partner in its struggle against North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) influence in the Indo-Pacific region and an auxiliary to its burgeoning alignment with China. Russia’s assessment of North Korea’s strategic importance, which differs markedly from its historical dismissal of Pyongyang, will likely lead to military technology transfers and strengthened bilateral economic ties.

The Strategic Value of North Korea for Russia

Even though the Soviet Union and North Korea were Cold War-era ideological partners, Moscow often viewed Pyongyang as more of a liability than an ally. Nikita Khrushchev was frustrated by Kim Il Sung’s strenuous opposition to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese rapprochement, which he saw as a critical step toward “peaceful coexistence” with the West. The Sino-Soviet split increased North Korea’s strategic value, as the Soviet Union wanted military support from Pyongyang in the event of a border war with China. But Kim Il Sung’s bellicosity antagonized Soviet officials. When North Korea’s Navy and Air Force attacked the USS Pueblo in January 1968, the Soviet Union feared that Kim Il Sung would drag it into a broader war with the US.

Kim Il Sung capitalized on these fears by extorting increased Soviet military and economic aid to North Korea in exchange for deescalation. Nevertheless, the seeds for a potential rupture between Moscow and Pyongyang were sown. After Kim Il Sung’s 1986 trip to Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev scaled back the Soviet Union’s assistance to North Korea and courted South Korea. Boris Yeltsin continued Gorbachev’s policy, and despite more cordial bilateral relations under Vladimir Putin, Russia consistently voted for United Nations (UN) sanctions over North Korea’s nuclear program.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022, Moscow’s partnership with North Korea has deepened and gained strategic depth. This transformation can be explained by North Korea’s solidarity with Russia, ultranationalist support for closer bilateral relations and Moscow’s sharply anti-Western Indo-Pacific strategy.

Alongside Syria and Belarus, North Korea has voted with Russia on every UNGA resolution pertaining to the Ukraine War and concurred with the Kremlin’s account of the war’s outbreak. On February 28, 2022, North Korea blamed the Ukraine War on the US’s “high-handedness” and “hegemonic policy.” North Korea has used similar rhetoric to express opposition to NATO arms transfers to Ukraine. After Ukraine struck Russian airfields with US-supplied Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) long-range missiles in October 2023, North Korean Ambassador to Russia Sin Hong Chol accused the US of sacrificing Europe’s interests to maintain unipolarity and warned that the US imposed “the most disastrous war on all mankind.”

The rising influence of Russian ultranationalists, who lobbied Putin to invade Ukraine, also explains closer Russia-North Korea relations. Even during Yeltsin’s dissociation from North Korea, Russian ultranationalists courted closer ties with Pyongyang. In October 1994, the far-right Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky traveled to Pyongyang. Zhirinovsky bonded with Kim Jong Il over their shared disdain for the US and Japan, but the Russian Foreign Ministry rebuked his visit, saying, “his has absolutely nothing to do with us.”

Russian ultranationalists have also expressed admiration for North Korea’s Juche ideology and cited it as a model for wartime Russia. Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) leader Gennady Zyuganov has consistently defended North Korea’s right to its own development path, which includes weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), rockets and space technology. The now-deceased Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin, who possibly procured North Korean artillery shells in December 2022, declared in May 2023: “Russia needs to live like North Korea for a number of years, close all the borders, stop playing nice, bring all our kids back from abroad and work our asses off. Then we will see some results.”

Given these sentiments, it is unsurprising that ultranationalists have been the main cheerleaders of closer Russia-North Korea relations. Fascist philosopher Alexander Dugin claimed that Russia had three international allies: Belarus, North Korea, and Iran. State Duma Deputy Andrei Gurulyov expressed regret over Gorbachev and Yeltsin’s detachment from North Korea and hailed Pyongyang’s enduring gratitude for the Soviet Union’s role in “liberating” Korea. Kim Jong Un’s red carpet welcome during his September 13-17 visit to Russia and Sergey Lavrov’s subsequent October 18-19 trip to Pyongyang were hailed by Putin’s ultranationalist coalition.

As tensions between the US and China persist, Russia sees its partnership with North Korea as a useful counterweight to US influence. At the August 15 Moscow Security Conference, Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) chief Igor Kostyukov asserted that the US was putting pressure on Indo-Pacific countries to counter Russia and China. Kostyukov lambasted South Korea for supplying 500,000 155 mm artillery shells to Ukraine via the US and supported North Korea’s assertion that its nuclear program is its sole security guarantee.

Taking cues from Kostyukov, Russian defense commentator Igor Korotchenko argued that the Russia-China-North Korea axis is a counterweight to AUKUS. Gurulyov warned that a war between the US and China over Taiwan would drag the entire Indo-Pacific region and Russia into battle. Gurulyov’s praise of Kim Jong-Un’s military readiness efforts and Russia-North Korea military cooperation can be viewed as preparation for this scenario.

Prospects for Military and Economic Cooperation

As it prepares for a multi-year war in Ukraine, Russia sees North Korea as a long-term supplier of munitions. Despite official Kremlin denials of North Korean arms transfers to Russia, long-term military cooperation is being actively discussed in Russia’s pro-war information space. Ahead of Kim Jong Un’s Vladivostok visit, Colonel Mikhail Khodaryonok, a prominent Russian defense commentator, declared that North Korea has millions of 152 mm shells in its arsenal, which could be dispensed to Russia. North Korea’s KN-25 multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) is also high on Russia’s bucket list, as its 400-km strike radius is longer than Ukraine’s ATACMS.

In exchange for these munitions, Russia will likely provide technological upgrades to the North Korean military. After meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin on November 9, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed concern about possible Russian assistance to North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, nuclear technology, and space launch capacity. The worst-case scenario would consist of Russia supplying up to 1,000 kilograms from its Fissile Material Storage Facility to Pyongyang, as this would allow North Korea to exponentially expand its nuclear arsenal. But of the advanced technologies that Blinken highlighted, Russian assistance is most likely in the realm of space satellites.

After two failed satellite launches in May and August 2023, North Korea likely asked Russia for help. Kim Jong-Un’s decision to meet with Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome provides circumstantial evidence for an arms-for-satellite technology swap between North Korea and Russia. Lee Yong-joon, a former South Korean Foreign Ministry official, argues that Russian assistance would likely rectify North Korea’s satellite launch challenges, as the failed launches were caused by a flawed part. The NIS’s confirmation that North Korean technicians inspected the Chollima-1 satellite’s rocket engines and launcher provides rationale as to why they would seek Russian assistance.

While Putin has acknowledged “certain restrictions” could limit technology transfers to North Korea, influential Russian commentators have mused about eviscerating the extant UN sanctions regime against North Korea. The Razumnaya Rossiya Telegram channel contended that Russia’s long-term goal is to increase trade with North Korea to the 2006 level of $230 million and asserted that Russia was constructing eleven rapid assembly plants in the Khasan facility near the North Korea border.

These plants would produce 155 mm ammunition, missiles for MLRS systems and howitzers, and military equipment, which would then be transferred to Russia through camouflaged trucks. The White House has also warned that North Korea could disguise its munitions deliveries to Russia as shipments to the Middle East. North Korea’s strengthening ties with Belarus, exemplified by President Alexander Lukashenko’s September 15 conceptualization of a Russia-Belarus-DPRK trilateral axis, could also lead to Belarus acting as a middleman in the Russia-DPRK arms trade.

Beyond military technology transfers, Russia is likely to expand its agricultural exports to North Korea and deepen North Korea’s integration with its network of surrogates in the post-Soviet space. In June 2023, the Siberian region of Kuzbass exported 1,080 tons of wheat to North Korea and grain-for-arms shipments have been mooted. North Korea could also pursue closer ties with Russian-backed breakaway regions in Georgia and Ukraine, as these occupied territories are exempt from sanctions as UN non-members. In 2019, North Korea had 400 guest workers stationed in Abkhazia, situated in the construction sector. Russian Ambassador to North Korea Alexander Matsegora has discussed hiring North Korean workers to rebuild destroyed infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk.

While Russia’s courtship of North Korea has often been framed as a desperate measure to secure arms, the Moscow-Pyongyang relationship has genuine strategic depth. As Russia and North Korea’s prospects for escaping isolation from the West fade, their progress toward a sanctions-proof partnership will continue unabated.

4. Encountering my activist great-grandfather — and his bones

Some important history for those who are students of Korean security issues. This history is important.

Encountering my activist great-grandfather — and his bones

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · November 17, 2023

November 17, 2023 at 4:01 a.m. EST

A portrait of Lee Jong-wook sits in front of his burial site at Daejeon National Cemetery in South Korea. (Tina Hsu for The Washington Post)

BUSAN, South Korea — You never expect to meet an ancestor. Not in person, at least.

But I did. My great-grandfather was tall for his time. I discovered this when gravediggers assembled his skeleton at my feet earlier this year.

For 57 years, Lee Jong-wook had been buried on a small plot of family land in Busan, at the southeastern tip of South Korea. In life, he had been deemed a dangerous renegade, a Korean independence activist who posed a security threat to the peninsula’s Japanese occupiers and was imprisoned. But this year, he was recognized for his patriotism, and his body was moved from the family plot to the national cemetery, with full honors.

With the approach of his reburial, I set out to learn about him — and, along the way, discovered how his life and mine bookend a century of a uniquely Korean existence.

On this peninsula, every family has tales that span the dramatic modern history of the Koreas — from Japanese colonization, which ended in 1945, through to the division of one Korea into two. The North turned to communism and poverty, the South to democracy and relative wealth.

That applies to my family, too.

My great-aunt was one of many teenage girls in the 1930s and 1940s who were married off early to avoid being coerced by Japan’s Imperial Army into sexual slavery.

My mom’s parents were among the flood of migrants who fled the North as the Korean War broke out in 1950, with many families split up in the chaos. The war ended in an armistice in 1953, and the Koreas remain separated. My grandfather was separated from his brother and never saw him again.

My parents were married on a day that would turn out to be pivotal to South Korea’s democratization. Hundreds of thousands calling for an end to military-directed government staged protests on June 10, 1987, that ultimately toppled the regime.

I was born in Seoul the summer it hosted the 1988 Olympic Games, an event that symbolized South Korea’s democratic and economic transformation.

As a Korean American — my family immigrated to Guam when I was 7 — I have never felt fully Korean, nor have I wanted to. Being a diasporic Korean means living between cultures, where I feel most myself. As an American news reporter who renounced Korean citizenship, I now live between Tokyo and Seoul, documenting the lives of those my great-grandfather stood for and against. My life would have been unimaginable to my great-grandfather, who had been willing to die for his Korean identity.

Yet our generational arc is a reflection of Korea’s rapid evolution through the 20th century. I wanted to explore his legacy.

I asked my dad for his grandfather’s name and plunged deep into the archives, finding oral histories and handwritten sentencing documents. Then I took a train to Cheonan, south of Seoul, where century-old letters and documents were on display at a museum dedicated to the independence fight. There, I learned of his place in the movement’s history.

Although Imperial Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, it had been steadily exerting control over the peninsula for years before that, while my great-grandfather was a child. Harsh colonial rule — from banning spoken Korean in schools to drafting people to work in poor conditions in Japan — gave rise to a simmering resentment and an underground resistance network.

It boiled over on March 1, 1919, when independence activists staged a rally. They produced preoccupation Korean flags from memory and wrote a Declaration of Independence that established a provisional government.

The occupation continued for 26 more years, but the rally sparked a national grass-roots protest movement and marked an important turning point in the Korean psyche. To this day, South Koreans mark March 1 with a public holiday and a celebratory reenactment of the marches.

That year, my great-grandfather was a 22-year-old living in Ulsan, a small southeastern town noted for its fiery patriotism and its proximity to Japan, just 150 miles across the sea. He and fellow members of a secret youth activist group had heard about the rally and wanted to organize one of their own.

One April evening, about 20 young men unfurled a sheet of white silk and bit down on the middle fingers of their right hands until they drew blood. With that blood, they signed an agreement to sacrifice their lives to the cause of liberating Korea.

The next morning, they launched their protest with their call sign: a soccer ball, kicked into the air. As the men raised their homemade flags and called for liberation, more than 100 other Koreans joined in.

“Long live the independence of Korea,” they yelled. Or in Korean: “Mansei!”

Like many other rallies across the country, theirs turned violent. Startled Japanese police officers scrambled to call in reinforcements, according to archival records. They brawled with the protesters and, wielding their bayonets, dispersed the crowd.

Five people died in fights with police, according to Korean records. After my great-grandfather and 13 other instigators were arrested, their friends continued the protest the next day.

On July 12, 1919, the Ulsan High Court found my great-grandfather guilty of violating the National Security Act and he was sentenced to two years in prison. It did not change his stance. Upon his release, he established a training center to help preserve Korean identity.

His death in 1966 was as fierce as his life. After being diagnosed with a terminal illness, he starved himself so he wouldn’t be a burden to his family. He was buried on the small plot of family land in nearby Busan.

As South Korea progressed toward democracy, independence activists came to be seen in a new light. Around 1980, my great-grandfather posthumously received a presidential commendation, and in 1990, the Order of Merit for National Foundation.

The final and highest honor came when the government decided he belonged among the war heroes and esteemed public servants at Daejeon National Cemetery, South Korea’s version of Arlington.

He was to be reburied on April 11, 2023. I wanted to be there.

Asking the spirits for permission

The spring morning of his disinterment was too cold for a jacket but too warm for a coat. (I chose a jacket, which I regretted for many hours.) The family of my great-uncle, the only surviving son at 88, was handling the day’s tasks, and I had asked to join for this story. At sunrise, we drove to my great-grandfather’s hillside grave.

We met with two Buddhist monks in gray robes and began the hike up a steep path, surrounded by thin trees that towered over us. We carried boxes filled with food, in the Buddhist tradition, to serve to the dead: pears, apples, fish, chestnuts, rice, vegetables and jeon (fritters).

For two hours, the monks recited rhythmic blessings and prayers, keeping the beat with a wooden block. They lighted incense and sought permission from the mountain’s spirits before disturbing the land. They blessed my great-grandfather’s soul ahead of his move.

I wasn’t too familiar with the Buddhist rites because after my family immigrated to Guam, we no longer attended ancestral ceremonies in South Korea.

That day in April, I participated for the first time, bowing and listening to prayers. I caught a waft of incense as I grasped a paper cup of soju (Korean rice liquor) with both hands, rotated it clockwise, then poured it onto the grave as a sign of respect and blessing.

After the ceremony, my relatives hiked down the hill because, in Buddhist practice, it is considered disrespectful to witness an ancestor’s burial ground being disturbed. But I wanted to stay — I needed to, for my story. I made my case to the head monk, and he let me stay.

Three gravediggers arrived in jeans and T-shirts for a routine workday, smoking cigarettes and chitchatting about the quality of the soil.

As they shoveled, I thought about something I’d learned that morning about my great-grandfather’s personality: His anger at injustice would ignite like wildfire, my great-uncle told me. I recalled episodes of my own righteous outrage — starting at age 7, when I cursed out a playground bully. Maybe I inherited some of the embers of his fury.

Then, a gravedigger stepped into the hole in the ground. I braced for an aged wooden coffin to emerge.

Instead, out came a femur.

My great-grandfather’s body had been decomposing directly into the soil. The crew plucked out his bones by hand and assembled his skeleton in front of me as if we were at an archaeological site.

I hadn’t even known his name until earlier this year. Yet I suddenly knew him by his bones. His teeth were still embedded in his jaw. Much of his rib cage remained. His foot bones rattled in rotting brown socks. I could imagine him lying there, in the flesh.

What would he think of me? I chose to learn Japanese, the language he was forced to speak. The two countries are now trying to move past historical baggage from the colonial period, and I’m covering their effort as an American. If he knew all this, would his anger once again burn? Or would he understand?

The workers wrapped up his bones in white cloth and draped a South Korean flag over them.

I joined up with my relatives and we went to the cremation center together. I stood next to my great-uncle and watched his father’s remains go into the incinerator. We bowed until its doors closed, and then waited as his bones were transformed into fine ash. On my periphery, I saw my great-uncle wipe a tear with his handkerchief.

“How do you feel?” I asked him after the cremation.

“There’s nothing to feel,” he said. “Life is so futile. So futile you could cry.”

We delivered the urn to the temple. The next day, we would take my great-grandfather to his final resting place.

A legacy lives on

This April was a yoondal, or a “leap month,” in the lunar calendar. It is considered an auspicious time for destabilizing life changes — moves, renovations, reburials.

At Daejeon National Cemetery, south of Seoul, honor guards marched in stilted unison, and my family and others sent off our loved ones with prayers and white chrysanthemums. All we knew of the seven others buried that day were their names and the names of their spouses. I wondered if any of them had a story like my great-grandfather’s.

In South Korea, there is a saying that independence activism ruins three generations. Many activists were imprisoned and struggled to get jobs because of espionage charges or physical torture, and were unable to afford educations for their children. Others burned through savings to fund their cause or died in prison. Some families still depend on government subsidies meant to compensate them for their sacrifice.

Unlike the excavation the previous day, the reburial was a major family affair. More than two dozen of us in the second, third and fourth generations gathered, including my parents, who’d flown in from Guam.

We each shoveled dirt on my great-grandfather’s new grave and said goodbye. My dad repeated the ritual I had performed the day before: He served a cup of soju, rotated it clockwise, poured it on the fresh earth.

A legacy is a memory, the kind we hope will transcend our time and, if we’re lucky, live on for more than a few generations after us.

The Washington Post · by Michelle Ye Hee Lee · November 17, 2023

5. Opinion | Cultural Diplomacy May Seem Pointless. That Won’t Stop Me.

Excerpts:

Can music pull the world back from the brink? In early 2008, I was working on the New York Philharmonic’s concert in Pyongyang, a project conceived to enhance the atmosphere of the six-party talks on the denuclearization of North Korea. At the time, observers and even many of the musicians themselves questioned whether any potential good would come of the effort. But for those present — a delegation of some 400 Americans including the orchestra, supporters and the largest contingent of foreign journalists to visit North Korea since Madeleine Albright’s 2000 visit as secretary of state — it turned out to be a profoundly inspiring journey.

What happened in Pyongyang, at minimum, was a group of Americans and North Koreans, citizens of sworn enemies, sat in a room together for a couple of hours and listened to Dvorak, Gershwin and, as an encore, the Korean folk song “Arirang,” which is part of the soul of every Korean on either side of the Demilitarized Zone and caused many members of the audience to tear up.

But it was so much more than that. The emotion of that shared occasion in the concert hall is forever etched in my mind, and, I am sure, in the memory of all who were there. Diplomatically, politically and socially, we were far apart, but because of the music, we were humanized for each other, even for a short time. That is real progress.

As we were leaving Pyongyang after two days of music and discussion, a senior orchestra administrator reminisced about the Philharmonic’s 1959 journey to the Soviet Union with Leonard Bernstein, noting that after that tour, it was still another 30 years before the Berlin Wall came down. I think the end of the North Korea story is not yet written.

Opinion | Cultural Diplomacy May Seem Pointless. That Won’t Stop Me.

The New York Times · by Matías Tarnopolsky · November 16, 2023

Guest Essay

Cultural Diplomacy May Seem Pointless. That Won’t Stop Me.

Nov. 16, 2023, 7:11 p.m. ET

Credit...Illustration by Vanessa Saba. Photograph by The New York Public Library

Mr. Tarnopolsky is the president and chief executive of the Philadelphia Orchestra and the Kimmel Center.

While presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping were drawing the world’s attention for their talks in San Francisco this week, a different kind of summitry is happening in China. There, representatives from their two countries are speaking through violins, cellos, oboes and clarinets.

I write from Beijing, almost exactly 50 years after the Philadelphia Orchestra arrived as the first American orchestra to perform in China in a key moment of Ping-Pong diplomacy. I traveled there to be with a group of its musicians for two weeks of concerts mingling American and Chinese musicians, master classes, chamber music performances and panel discussions.

It may seem naïve to argue that a symphony orchestra can help solve the world’s problems. But a lifetime in music has convinced me that it’s not only worth the effort to try to do our part, it is our responsibility. Certainly the American government supports the idea: Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently announced the Global Music Diplomacy Initiative, reinforcing the idea that cultural diplomacy is a powerful force for good in the world. Our visit here is one of the initiative’s first projects.

Since the Philadelphia Orchestra’s historic 1973 visit to China, we have returned 12 times. That decision is not a signal of approval of China’s policies. Rather, our journeys to China signify a belief in the possibility of change through dialogue. They make real the principle that music communicates shared ideas and feelings that words alone cannot convey.

The Asia Society honored the orchestra last month as an Asia Game Changer in recognition of its perseverance, for returning to China as often as it has to continue the musical conversation even at the most difficult periods in the relationship between our two countries. Diplomacy is a slow process. Like the centuries-old and ever-evolving art form of classical music, it teaches patience.

At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting, where the presidential encounter took place, U.S. officials were certainly projecting American values. How does an orchestra project them?

Happily, we don’t have to worry about bans on high-tech trade, investment restrictions or threats to access to critical raw materials. But an orchestra is a microcosm of society and of democratic ideals, where our aims can be achieved only through collaboration, listening and dialogue. Our mere presence in countries with autocratic regimes can seem miraculous.

The concert hall provides a democratizing space. The lights dim, the conductor gives the downbeat, and the orchestra starts to play. From that moment, we are all equals immersed in the same experience, with focused, willing cooperation and commitment to the best possible outcome.

If there is a single essential point about an orchestra, it is that to achieve any kind of impact and to convey the passion and beauty of the music, every musician and every audience member must be connected. When one musician gives a little more, another must give a little less, a constant shaping of music in real time — a shared intuitive conversation. All must be absolutely in tune with one another.

Can music pull the world back from the brink? In early 2008, I was working on the New York Philharmonic’s concert in Pyongyang, a project conceived to enhance the atmosphere of the six-party talks on the denuclearization of North Korea. At the time, observers and even many of the musicians themselves questioned whether any potential good would come of the effort. But for those present — a delegation of some 400 Americans including the orchestra, supporters and the largest contingent of foreign journalists to visit North Korea since Madeleine Albright’s 2000 visit as secretary of state — it turned out to be a profoundly inspiring journey.

What happened in Pyongyang, at minimum, was a group of Americans and North Koreans, citizens of sworn enemies, sat in a room together for a couple of hours and listened to Dvorak, Gershwin and, as an encore, the Korean folk song “Arirang,” which is part of the soul of every Korean on either side of the Demilitarized Zone and caused many members of the audience to tear up.

But it was so much more than that. The emotion of that shared occasion in the concert hall is forever etched in my mind, and, I am sure, in the memory of all who were there. Diplomatically, politically and socially, we were far apart, but because of the music, we were humanized for each other, even for a short time. That is real progress.

As we were leaving Pyongyang after two days of music and discussion, a senior orchestra administrator reminisced about the Philharmonic’s 1959 journey to the Soviet Union with Leonard Bernstein, noting that after that tour, it was still another 30 years before the Berlin Wall came down. I think the end of the North Korea story is not yet written.

Born in Buenos Aires, I was raised in London and embarked on a career in arts administration. My first job in the United States came in 1999, in the artistic department of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, then led by the conductor Daniel Barenboim. I witnessed the founding of his most consequential creation, the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra. Mr. Barenboim formed the orchestra with his longtime friend and intellectual partner, the Palestinian-American scholar Edward Said, who died in 2003. I arranged the first U.S. visit of the orchestra, which brings young Israeli, Palestinian and other Arab musicians together to make music.

The Divan orchestra’s associated conservatory, the Barenboim-Said Academy, with music students from these same backgrounds, now has a permanent home in Berlin. These students keep making music together during one of the most desperate times for the Middle East. There, beyond the notes, technique and theory, the students learn musical citizenship, forming a new generation of ambassadors for positive change in the world.

When I was in China in 2019, I had the opportunity to speak with a senior Chinese official, a member of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, who conveyed in proud terms the success of the growing presence of Western classical music in China. His intent was to demonstrate China’s increasing global influence.

It was a party line talking point, and I was expected to simply praise their success. (I remained silent.) However, as we walked away from the formal meeting, he took me to one side, gently, and congratulated the Philadelphia Orchestra for its quiet commitment to China over the past 50 years.

The bluster was gone. He reminisced about how the orchestra’s 1973 visit had been the subject of joyful dinner table conversation throughout his childhood. He said it had been moving to share the experience with his children.

“Keep doing what you are doing,” he said. “It’s beautiful, and I feel like it’s the only thing that’s working.”

Matías Tarnopolsky is the president and chief executive of the Philadelphia Orchestra and the Kimmel Center.

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The New York Times · by Matías Tarnopolsky · November 16, 2023

6. A Message to Kim Jong Un From Mother of Japanese Girl Abducted by North Korea in 1977

The truly evil nature of the Kim family regime is so hard for us to fathom.

Excerpt:

But 46 years ago, on the evening of November 15, 1977, their 13-year-old daughter Megumi suddenly disappeared on her way home from junior high school in Niigata City, which is about 250 kilometers north of Tokyo.So began the anguish of the Yokota family. Their desperate efforts to search for their daughter is said to have been the largest in the history of Niigata Prefecture’s police department.Sakie, now 87, told me that while she was living in Niigata after her daughter’s disappearance, the local police would called her to confirm whether dead bodies found in the snow were Megumi or not. She said she fell into a state of neurosis.On January 1997, 20 years after their daughter vanished, the family was shocked to learn that North Korean agents had abducted Megumi.

A Message to Kim Jong Un From Mother of Japanese Girl Abducted by North Korea in 1977

The mother of Yokota Megumi, the most famous of the Japanese civilians abducted by North Korea, continues to push for her daughter’s return.

thediplomat.com · by Takahashi Kosuke

The mother of Yokota Megumi, the most famous of the Japanese civilians abducted by North Korea, continues to push for her daughter’s return.

November 14, 2023

Musicians perform at the South Korean Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, during a Nov. 9, 2023, event to seek the return of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea. Megumi’s picture is projected in the background.

Credit: Takahashi Kosuke

If that fateful day hadn’t come, Yokota Shigeru and Sakie would have lived a run-of-the-mill family life, just like any other.

But 46 years ago, on the evening of November 15, 1977, their 13-year-old daughter Megumi suddenly disappeared on her way home from junior high school in Niigata City, which is about 250 kilometers north of Tokyo.

So began the anguish of the Yokota family. Their desperate efforts to search for their daughter is said to have been the largest in the history of Niigata Prefecture’s police department.

Sakie, now 87, told me that while she was living in Niigata after her daughter’s disappearance, the local police would called her to confirm whether dead bodies found in the snow were Megumi or not. She said she fell into a state of neurosis.

On January 1997, 20 years after their daughter vanished, the family was shocked to learn that North Korean agents had abducted Megumi.

The Yokotas, including Megumi’s twin younger brothers, Takuya and Tetsuya, 55, have since become Japan’s most famous crusaders for Japanese abduction victims. Yokota Megumi remains a tragic heroine for the Japanese abductees and for the whole nation.

North Korea claims that Megumi died in 1994, but her family believes that is a lie. She would be 59 years old if she is still alive.

On November 7, ahead of the 46th anniversary of Megumi’s abduction, Sakie held a press conference at her condominium in Kawasaki City, adjoining Tokyo. She called on Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio to hold a summit with North Korea’s supreme leader Kim Jong Un to bring back Megumi and other Japanese nationals abducted by North Korean agents.

“There’s not a day that goes by that I don’t think about Megumi-chan. Every morning when I wake up, I ask her how she’s doing on my own, and I talk to her father’s photo,” Sakie said. (Chan is a Japanese honorific added to children’s names to convey affection.)

Yokota Sakie holds a press conference at her apartment in in Kawasaki City, Japan on Nov. 7, 2023, ahead of the anniversary of her daughter’s abduction. Photo by Takahashi Kosuke.

Shigeru, Megumi’s father, died in June 2020 at age 87 without ever being reunited with his daughter.

Sakie said she had received a phone call from Kishida as an inaugural greeting soon after the premier took office in October 2021. In return, she sent a letter to Kishida, asking him to visit North Korea as soon as possible and realize a summit with Kim.

Sakie strongly believes that in a dictatorial political and social system like North Korea, things can move quickly with a single voice from the supreme leader. Kishida can demand Kim’s bold decision, as Sakie is requesting.

In 2002, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un’s father and predecessor as North Korean leader, decided to return five Japanese abductees after then-Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited Pyongyang.

When asked, “Is there any message you would like to send to Kim Jong Un?” Sakie answered by appealing to Kim’s love for his own daughter, who made her public debut last year:

I wonder if this message will really reach him. Mr. Kim Jong Un has often taken his own cute girl with him. When I see someone like her, I recall Megumi-chan’s narrow eyes and round face when she was little, and that cute girl looks a lot like Megumi-chan. I can see how much you [Kim Jong Un] love and care for her. Our family shares the same kind of feelings you have now.

I want you to know that I am thinking of my child and waiting for her. My child was taken into a place from where your nation has never let her go, and she has been unable to come back for 46 years. I want you to understand how painful it really is. I don’t know if [Kim Jong Un] can surely understand this, but I always hope that I can deliver this message to him.

Although its efforts have failed to result in any more abductees returning to Japan since 2002, Tokyo has garnered international support toward the resolution of the abduction issue.

Most recently, on November 9, the South Korean Embassy in Tokyo jointly hosted a music concert with Asagao no Kai, a group comprising residents who live in the same apartment complex as Sakie in order to call for an early resolution to the abduction issue. This event itself highlighted the significant improvement in Japan-Korea relations.

“In South Korea, we also face the issues of abductees, detainees, and prisoners of war who have not returned [from North Korea]. To this day, North Korea still holds 516 South Koreans who were abducted after the war, while the number of wartime abductees is estimated to be around 100,000,” South Korean Ambassador to Japan Yun Duk-min said.

At the concert, violinist Yoshida Naoya, who was a classmate of Megumi at Yorii Junior High School in Niigata City, and pianist Kim Cheol Woong, a North Korean musician who defected to South Korea in 2001, performed to pray for the return of the Japanese and Korean abductees. Also in attendance were embassy officials from 15 countries, including U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel’s wife as well as the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s wife Akie.

The Japanese government confirmed that North Korea kidnapped 17 Japanese nationals in the 1970s and 1980s. In September 2002, when Koizumi visited Pyongyang, Kim Jong Il admitted for the first time that North Korean agents had kidnapped 13 Japanese nationals; Kim insisted the other four people in the Japanese government’s count never entered North Korea.

Of the 13 Japanese nationals North Korea admits that it kidnapped, five were returned to Japan; Pyongyang claims that the other eight, including Yokota Megumi, are dead.

North Korea claimed Megumi committed suicide in March 1994 and returned to Japan a set of remains. But Japan said that a DNA test proved they could not have been her remains, and her family does not believe that she would have committed suicide.

While in the North, Megumi married a South Korean national and had a daughter, Kim Hye Gyong, whom the Yokotas were allowed to meet in Mongolia in March 2014.

The abducted Japanese nationals, including Megumi, are believed to have been forced to teach Japanese language and culture to North Korean intelligence agents for covert operations against South Korea. There is a widespread belief that in October 2002, Kim Jong Il released the only five abductees who had not trained spies or taken part in terrorist operations against South Korea. As the rest are believed to have more knowledge of covert operations, the North has hesitated to provide any information on them or release them.

Today, North Korea insists that the issue of its abduction of Japanese nationals has been already resolved. Pyongyang appears unwilling to address the issue any further, partly because its bilateral relationship with Tokyo is simply not as important as it once was.

More importantly, there is widespread speculation that Japanese politicians may not actually want to move the issue forward because they believe that North Korea is telling the inconvenient truth: Megumi, and some of the other kidnapping victims, are dead.

However, North Korea’s notorious lack of transparency and long track record of obfuscation make it difficult to parse fact from fiction. The Japanese government should conclude the fate of the abductees through its own verification.

In the meantime, family members of the victims, like Yokota Sakie, will continue their decades-long wait.