Apologies for the tardiness today: The Cloudflare web outage affected Constant Contact.

Quotes of the Day:

"The real power of propaganda is not to convince or even confuse: it's to give you a sense of belonging."

 – Peter Pomerantsev, How to Win an Information War: The Propagandist Who Outwitted Hitler

"Moral indignation is jealousy with a halo." 

– H. G. Wells

"I am not in this world to live up to other people's expectations, nor do I feel that the world must live up to mine." 

– Frederick Perls

1. "Cognitive Warfare" fails the cognitive test

2. Seven Contemporary Insights on the State of the War in Ukraine

3. Seizing the Initiative against Russia: Putting the United States in Control

4. Poland Says Rail Explosion Was ‘Unprecedented Act of Sabotage’

5. Poland sends forces to probe Ukraine rail link blown up in ‘sabotage’

6. What Happens if the Supreme Court Takes Trump’s Tariffs Away?

7. Security Council Backs Trump’s Plan for Postwar Gaza

8. Opinion | Why China Is Picking a Fight With Japan

9. Trump Says U.S. Intends to Sell F-35 Jet Fighters to Saudi Arabia

10. Donald Trump's Venezuela Military Build Up Is Just Art of the Deal Geopolitics

11. SOF News: A-29 Drone Fighter and More Drone News

12. Taiwan’s Lexington Without Concord: Sovereignty, Resilience, and the Price of War

13. The pilot of an F-22 just controlled a drone wingman in flight

14. Proxies in Hybrid Operations: Insights from the Partnership for Peace Consortium Workshop | Helsinki, Finland, August 2025

15. Replicator 3 Should Be the Sustainment Revolution

16. The Hidden Cost of a Missile: Why the Headlines Get Cost Wrong

17. Pentagon vulnerable to malicious use of publicly available info, GAO finds

1. "Cognitive Warfare" fails the cognitive test

Summary:

Matt Armstrong critiques Frank Hoffman’s defense of the term “cognitive warfare,” arguing it adds little beyond long-standing concepts of political warfare and public diplomacy. Focusing on labels and organizational charts obscures the real problem: U.S. leaders dismiss nonmilitary instruments of power while adversaries integrate them to bypass America’s “Maginot Line” of military deterrence. Armstrong shows that what is now called “cognitive warfare” was thoroughly theorized by Kennan and others as political warfare, centered on purpose, power, and shaping will, not just “messages” or technology. Renaming the problem will not fix the strategic neglect of these tools.

Comment: Matt Armstrong and Frank Hoffman are two of the smartest people I know and anything they write is worth reading. This is an excellent example of how to disagree and express contrasting views. However, I think in the long run they will find more agreement, especially in the area of Political Warfare; a concept which all three of us fully embrace even if most of the policymakers, press, and pundits loathe the term. Also note there is some important background history in terms of George Kennan and also some important and useful references for those who study and research these areas.

"Cognitive Warfare" fails the cognitive test

Is anyone asking why are we trying to pattern our efforts off of those of our adversaries?

Matt Armstrong

Nov 17, 2025

https://mountainrunner.substack.com/p/cognitive-warfare-fails-the-cognitive

The estimable Frank Hoffman penned1 something that is part literature review of the term “cognitive warfare” and part defense of the term. I trust Frank’s assessments and generally defer to his experience and analytical rigor. In “Assessing Cognitive Warfare,” however, his work is incomplete; it reads as if it were lifted from a larger work. The result is a noble, if flailing, argument that “cognitive warfare” is a term that should be defended. This is, in part, because another nation uses it and because it has some unique value because… I’m not sure… is it because synonymous terms tried by the US over the past century haven’t stuck?

A problem with Frank’s article is endemic to similar literature: there is an implied, if not explicit, argument that it’s what we call these things that hamstring and limit the executive and legislative branches from understanding, implementing, and prioritizing such efforts to support national security. This is similar to the argument that if we only shifted the organizational chart (i.e., centralize authority under a separate organization to conceive and execute policies in the, er, “cognitive domain”), life would be much better. The latter—often heard as “bring back USIA”—is based on a profoundly defective understanding of what the US Information Agency did—and did not do—and the interagency and global environments in which it operated.

For example, Frank wrote, “In Cognitive Warfare, the message is the munition, and the target is the mind of either specific individuals (e.g., elites, influencers, policymakers) or the collective population of a democratic state.” This sounds remarkably like—if not identical to—the term “public diplomacy.” Though the term “public diplomacy” wasn’t adopted until the late 1960s, years after it was half-heartedly used to name a center at Tufts as part of a public relations compaign to elevate a struggling USIA, it applied to programs that were central to peacetime US foreign policy since 1945, efforts that were “permanently” authorized by legislation in 1948 (yes, by the Smith-Mundt Act). Frank doesn’t tell us why the need to specify the target as a “democratic state” is necessary. Is it because it’s only used in such countries with a free press? Well, I suppose that would be a reason to seek an alternative to “public diplomacy” since it didn’t have such a limitation.

To be clear, there are plenty of reasons not to use the term public diplomacy. The main one is because it was adopted as part of a bureaucratic struggle in the 1960s. As a result, the term is generally, if not nearly always, considered to apply only to some programs and offices under the State Department and, sometimes, to the now-largely-defunct US Agency for Global Media. Go back a couple of decades and talk to people about why the Defense Department adopted “strategic communication.” You’ll often hear it was because an alternative to “public diplomacy” was needed, because PD was something only the State Department did.2

It’s common to read that “public diplomacy” was “coined” in 1965, but it wasn’t. Relevant to this discussion, the term was commonly used before to describe the Russian practice of speaking to the press to conduct public diplomacy, knowing that their State Department counterparts wouldn’t lower themselves to do the same. The US press and foreign thinkers called this “public diplomacy.” There are several reasons USIA was created, one of which included the traditional notion that any public engagement in international affairs was a separate and inconsequential line of effort.3 It’s good to learn from our adversaries, but adopting “public diplomacy” didn’t help. In fact, it probably hurt. We always knew that “cognitive warfare” was waged, which is partly why the Smith-Mundt Act was passed (it was introduced in January 1945 and gained traction based on the understanding that public opinion mattered, and that disinformation and misinformation were harmful to our national security and to other nations). It’s just that the executive branch stopped caring, favoring containment with a Maginot mentality.4

Frank had “reservations about introducing a new term into a crowded field,” but these were overcome because “‘cognitive’ is superior to terms like information or influence.” I agree to the extent that “information” is deeply problematic in this context. It can be an anodyne term for a munition separated from intent and context.

He likes cognitive warfare over psychological warfare because the latter “is a broad field, and cognition narrows the subject to key features. It directs attention to the target and desired effect.” He’s also “less enthralled with the ‘warfare’ label,” a position shared by many since 1945 who were biased against “psychological warfare” and “political warfare.” The former because it was seen as an inherently military topic, and the latter because, well, it was irrelevant to international affairs outside of covert operations (or, put another way, because the priority was on containment with a Maginot mentality).

Frank added that he thinks that the “Chinese terminology is better,” but it’s not clear (at least to me) if he is referring to “cognitive domain,” “cognitive domain operations,” “domain of consciousness,” “cognitive confrontation,” or something else.

In the end, what is “cognitive warfare”? It is “not new,” he writes, adding that “a number of novel technologies that significantly enhance the reach and efficacy of activities that target the way decision-makers and individuals think about a crisis situation.” So, are we tethering the term to specific novel technologies? Similar “novel technologies” and their potential impact can be found in several points in history. An early relevant example comes from the president of Harvard University, who warned of the “formidable inflammability of our multitudinous population, in consequence of the recent development of telegraph, telephone, and bi-daily press.” The speed and reach of these new media technologies could make the US population “more inflammable than it used to be, because of the increased use in comparatively recent years of these great inventions.” That was 1898. I can provide examples from nearly every decade since then as information moved faster and farther with “novel technologies.” In 1940, noted British psychologist Sir Frederic Charles Bartlett wrote that “People, the elements of culture, the media of economic existence, ideas—all these can move with a freedom never before matched in history.”

If we take out the novelty of the speed of ideas and information (including disinformation and misinformation), what do we have? Let’s look at Frank’s definition of cognitive warfare:

My starting definition of Cognitive War is the application of targeted and tailored messages and nonviolent methods used against civilian and military decision-makers or the general population of a target state to gain a positional advantage in the cognitive domain or gain desired political, military, and informational outcomes.

Since “Cognitive War,” not “warfare,” only appears in this definition, I’ll only briefly state what should be obvious: that “war” is far more limiting than “warfare” in bureaucratic circles discussing responsibilities.

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What stands out in this definition is the emphasis on means—“messages and nonviolent methods”—and the absence of economic outcomes. This doesn’t seem to be an oversight, as “economic” appears only once in the article.

I also don’t understand why “to gain positional advantage in the cognitive domain” isn’t *TO* “gain desired political, military, and information outcomes.” Why is it “or”? For what reason do you want an advantage in what people perceive than for a purpose?

Bluntly, it’s not clear to me how this definition isn’t “political warfare.” It is more expansive than many common interpretations of “information warfare,” which almost exclusively focus on messages. It is probably more aggressive than most would be comfortable in thinking of “public diplomacy,” which is partly why the term exists and largely why the term and related methods are considered irrelevant to analyses such as Frank’s, despite their absolute similarity.

This is, at best, a literature review that oversteps by attempting to stake out a space for a redundant, overly narrow term that provides little value. Frank naturally looks at conceptual comparables, none of which are too narrowly defined because they recognize the problem with the focus on a munition. Not that my opinion matters, but I’ve said for a dozen or more years that the chief problem of “information warfare” is that the term focuses on a munition. Stripped down, the same is true of “cognitive warfare.” Though Frank nudges the readers to think about more than “information,” his sources and discussion virtually constrain the discussion to information, with other efforts appearing as tactical support to the main show of information.

There is a not-so-hidden restraint that hinders the potential of Frank’s analysis: he’s clearly writing for a military audience. The result is an analysis that is far more narrowly focused than the literature he reviewed. The Chinese, Frank shows, see the “cognitive domain” and its purpose precisely as US analysts defined political warfare in the 1950s and 1960s. Literally exactly. “The PLA has long extolled ‘disintegrating the enemy’ via politico-psychological attacks and subversion as a means of undermining an opponent’s will to fight,” as described by one author cited by Frank. Quoting Chinese authors, Frank shares:

Cognitive domain operations take the human brain as the main combat space and focus on striking, weakening, and dismantling the enemy’s will to fight, using human psychological weaknesses such as fear, anxiety and suspicion as a breakthrough point, focusing on soft-kill methods to create an atmosphere of insecurity, uncertainty and mistrust within the enemy, and increasing their internal friction and decision-making doubts.

Missing from Frank’s analysis is the fact that both the Chinese and Russian discussions of “cognitive warfare” intend it to be used not just before kinetic activities, but also to undermine and prevent the adversary from effectively taking military action. It is an end run around our Maginot Line. Meanwhile, Frank is speaking to and invoking the military. See his section “Revision of Information Operation,” for example, and the suggestion that “Our special operations personnel bring a lot to this arena.” He states that the “US government has shuttered intelligence and law enforcement cells and agencies designed to thward foreign malign information efforts,” but fails to call why this happened (because this administration doesn’t care; while prior administration’s “merely” didn’t prioritize the mission), just as he fails to remind the reader those were reactionary defenses operating within the inner perimeter, so to speak.

I’m not an expert on Clausewitz, but I do appreciate Frank’s note that Clausewitz is relevant here, and that those “encultured with violent visions, per Clausewitz, will struggle with this concept.” They shouldn’t, but they do. This is because of the Maginot mentality. The discussions cited in this article are not new, as Frank noted. Except they are to us because we have willfully ignored this aspect of international affairs in our schools that train foreign policy professionals, in foreign policy analyses, and across the military schoolhouses. For example, look at the problems facing Psychological Operations: if we actually embraced the facts presented by Frank and others as tactical, operational, and strategic concerns, aren’t the PSYOP troops (and Civil Affairs, and Foreign Area Officers) best prepared to take the lead? Apparently not because they are never—ever—mentioned.

It’s not clear to me how “cognitive warfare” adds any additional meaning or utility beyond that of “political warfare.” In fact, it’s a step backward: an awkward term that requires new analysis. Worse, while it doesn’t focus on a munition (i.e., “information”), it fails to focus on a purpose. Frank’s definition, for example, seeks “to gain a positional advantage in the cognitive domain or…” Or? Advantage in the cognitive domain to do what? For what purpose? To win their heart? (Have I told you about the bombmaker rolled up in Kandahar many years ago? When asked why he made IEDs, he said he was trying to make enough money to move his family to the US. We won his heart, but we failed to properly affect his will to act in the desired way.)

Let’s test the term. Stepping back, would George Kennan have achieved greater effect with “cognitive warfare”? On July 22, 1946, as the head of Secretary of State George Marshall’s Policy Planning Staff, Kennan distributed the “Draft of Information Policy on Relations with Russia,” in which he wrote, “They evidently seek to weaken all centers of power they cannot dominate, in order to reduce the danger from any possible rival.” Sounds like cognitive warfare to me.

He expanded on the idea in a later document commonly regarded as the starting point for how the US government understood and defined political warfare (which is correct if you focus on the term and not the underlying concepts, which were recognized two years earlier, but “information” was inadequate then, too): Kennan’s memo dated May 4, 1948, titled “The inauguration of organized political warfare.”

Political warfare is the logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. In [the] broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP), and “white” propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of “friendly” foreign elements, “black” psychological warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states…

Understanding the concept of political warfare, we should also recognize that there are two major types of political warfare—one overt and the other covert. Both, from their basic nature, should be directed and coordinated by the Department of State. Overt operations are, of course, the traditional policy activities of any foreign office enjoying positive leadership, whether or not they are recognized as political warfare. Covert operations are traditional in many European chancelleries but are relatively unfamiliar to this Government.

For the Clausewitz reference, Kennan likely relied on the 1943 translation of “On War” by O.J. Matthijs Jolles. According to Clausewitz, war is not separate from a state’s political activities, nor are all means separate from peace.

We know, of course, that war is only caused through the political intercourse of governments and nations; but in general, it is supposed that such intercourse is broken off by war, and that a totally different state of things ensues, subject to no laws but its own. We maintain, on the contrary, that war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with an admixture of other means. We say ”with an admixture of other means,” in order thereby to maintain at the same time that this political intercourse does not cease through the war itself, is not changed into something quite different, but that, in its essence, it continues to exist, whatever may be the means which it uses, and that the main lines along which the events of the war proceed and to which they are bound are only the general features of policy which run on all through the war until peace takes place.

Reading Kennan’s “logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace” based on the Jolles translation can lead to a different interpretation than doing so with the modern Howard-Paret translation. Howard-Paret’s “with the addition of other means” is additive, like icing on a cake. Jolles’s “with an admixture of other means” captures the complexity: an ingredient is blended in, similar to changing a recipe by adding flavoring or coloring. They are similar but not identical. Political warfare was warfare during times of peace, essentially waging cold war rather than hot war. The objectives could be the same, with only a thin line of rules, great power relations, and views on industrial warfare separating the two.

In 1954, Robert Strausz-Hupé and Stefan T. Possony built on Kennan’s support of Clausewitz by arguing that there is a condition of “war in peacetime.” Political warfare remains a mix of tactics rather than just the addition of new tools, but it becomes clearer in what it is and what it is not.

Wars are fought to impose one’s political will on a foreign state. But military techniques are not the only ones to achieve this objective. Propaganda and political warfare can be defined as a continuation of war with the admixture of nonmilitary means of pressure. The purpose of this pressure is to make war unnecessary; or to create the most favorable conditions for the implementation of one’s own policies and military plans should war become inevitable.

Political warfare, briefly, is a systemic activity, mostly of a secret nature, to influence and direct the policies of other nations. The ultimate objective of political warfare would be reached if the government of nation A would make not only its own decisions but also the decisions for nation B and do so without resorting to coercion by force of military occupation.

The refinement continued to emphasize a purpose rather than just a means. In 1962, William Kintner and Joseph Kornfeder updated their definition to describe “a form of conflict between states in which a protagonist nation tries to impose its will on opponents without directly using armed force.”

Political warfare combines the operations of diplomacy and propaganda, frequently backed by the threat of military force. Political warfare aims to weaken, if not to destroy, the enemy by use of diplomatic proposals, economic sorties, propaganda and misinformation, provocation, intimidation, sabotage, terrorism, and by driving a wedge between the main enemy and his allies.

In 1959, in his book The Weapon on the Wall, Murray Dyer made a strong attempt to propose a term more acceptable to various government actors: “political communication.” William R. Kintner and Joseph Z. Kornfeder praised Dyer’s efforts in their 1962 book, The New Frontier of War: Political Warfare, Present and Future, but they argued that “communication” disconnects methods and intent, which hampers understanding of the actions’ nature and urgency.

Kintner, who had served in the US Army as Chief of the Plans Branch for the United Nations Command, in the Secretary of Defense’s office, as an instructor at the US Command and General Staff College, with the Central Intelligence Agency, and later as a Professor of Political Science at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, had some experience with the subject. Kornfeder did, too, as an insider: he studied at Lenin University’s political warfare college in Moscow and co-founded the Communist Party USA.

James Burnham’s 1961 definition of political warfare is interchangeable with the Chinese definition of cognitive warfare:

True political warfare, as understood and practiced by our enemy, is not mere rivalry or competition or conflict of some vague kind. Political warfare is a form of war. It is strategic in nature. Its objective, like that of every other form of war, is to impose one’s own will on the opponent, to destroy the opponent’s will to resist. In simplest terms, it aims to conquer the opponent.

The purpose, Burnham wrote, “is always to increase one’s power in some definite way or to decrease the power of the opponent… The power objective may be grandiose—conquest of a nation, disintegration of an empire; or the minor takeover of a trade union, scaring a parliament into defeating a bill, or the sabotage of a factory. But whether big or small, the objective is always power.”

For the record, my definition of political warfare is:

The use of power with hostile intent through discreet, subversive, or overt means short of open combat against another. Political warfare is not just rivalry or competition, nor is it limited to strategic or tactical objectives. It can operate across political, societal, economic, or psychological domains to bring about change.

I should add that a public diplomacy program seen as utterly benign and boring in, say, Paris could, using the exact same script, be accurately perceived as political warfare in Beijing or Moscow.

“Cognitive warfare” is a step backward for the same reasons Kintner and Kornfeder criticized Dyer, who had proposed “cognitive warfare” under a different label.

As we debate labels, are we hoping policymakers will come to their senses and act? Have they failed because the right terms haven’t been adopted, are too complex, or are too easily diminished by bureaucratic squabbling? No, it’s because they—and by “they” I mean executive branch leadership from Presidents (plural) on down through cabinet Secretaries and below, and legislative leaders and university international relations and political science professors—don’t see any of this as truly relevant to international affairs. Those other things are just too messy, too complex, and too unpredictable.

Our adversaries, however, get it. That’s why we see so many analyses of what they are writing about this and how they are organizing and operating. They realize that they must “get it” for our Maginot Line of military deterrence is strong. Why commit a frontal engagement when bypassing the chief defenses, the only defenses we have really committed to for many decades, is cheap and far easier and without repercussion? Meanwhile, we fail to fund, prioritize, delegate, authorize, and let operate virtually everything that is not solidly within the Maginot Line of defense. Though starkly evident today, it has been true for decades and decades. The result is a scholarship that grasps at what our adversaries are doing to justify doing something—anything—even if it is only reactive.

1

Should we put “pen an article” in the same bucket as “dial a phone”?

2

Digging deeper, it was clearly something only part of the State did. For example, DRL was never described as doing “public diplomacy.”

3

Armstrong, Matt. 2020. “Operationalizing Public Diplomacy.” In Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy, edited by Nancy Snow and Nicholas John Cull, 82–95. New York: Routledge. If you’re reading this, you might also like Anisimov, Oleg. 1955. “A New Policy for American Psychological Warfare.” The Russian Review 14 (3): 175–83. And, Congressional Research Service. 1977. Survey of proposals to reorganize the U.S. foreign affairs agencies, 1951-1975. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off, specifically pages 48-66 reviewing information and cultural programs, starting with the Jackson Committee (1953), Second Brookings Plan (1959), the Sprague Committee (1961), the Lloyd Free Task Force (1961), the Fascell Subcommittee (1968), and the US Advisory Commission on Information (1973), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report (1973), the Barbara White Study (1973), and the Stanton Panel (1975), and the Murphy Commission (1975). Other reports and recommendations on fixing USIA aren’t mentioned, including one by the USIA assistant director that the agency should influence, not merely inform, audiences abroad.

4

“Cognitive warfare” was central to Russian and later Chinese policy. If you’re curious, see Lawson, Murray G. 1962. Communist propaganda around the world: apparatus and activities in 1961. Washington: US Information Agency. If you want confirmation that the White House didn’t care, you will do no worse than reading about the creation of the Active Measures Working Group: Schoen, Fletcher, and Christopher J. Lamb. 2012. Deception, disinformation, and strategic communications: how one interagency group made a major difference. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press. See the section on creating IAWG, specifically the chapters “Devaluing the Counter-Disinformation Mission: 1959–1977” and “Rebounding to Take the Offensive: 1977–1981.” For example, “The inclination to challenge Soviet disinformation declined over the 1960s until, by 1975, there was no organized, overt effort to expose Soviet disinformation at all.”

2. Seven Contemporary Insights on the State of the War in Ukraine

Summary:

Mick Ryan’s CSIS white paper distills seven current insights from multiple research trips to Ukraine. The war is a fast evolving contest of adaptation across battlefield, strikes, information, and industry. Drone saturation near the front cripples vehicle movement, yet infantry remain decisive for holding and seizing ground. Russia now slightly outpaces Ukraine in drone innovation and tactical learning through standardized systems and Rubicon units. Ukrainians frame a new battle triangle of intelligence, operations, and drones with electronic warfare that extends, not replaces, classic arms. Overall, the study maps conflict trajectories and lessons for Western force design.

Comment: Access the reference CSIS White Paper here to read all seven insights. https://www.csis.org/analysis/seven-contemporary-insights-state-ukraine-war

Seven strategic insights based on knowledge gained on my recent visit to Ukraine, as well as previous visits and other research. This new report is published by CSIS.

Mick Ryan

Nov 17, 2025  https://mickryan.substack.com/p/seven-contemporary-insights-on-the

It is very likely that Russian efforts to “learn how to learn better” in the past three years have achieved critical mass and are now paying dividends at the tactical and strategic levels.

As many of you know, I recently returned from another research visit to Ukraine, my second of 2025. I posted a few insights here as a result of the trip.

My first dispatch, which covered Ukrainian military training as well as a certain incident with a snake, is available to read at this link. My second one is available here. My third dispatch, an interview with Nataliie Lutsenko, is available at this link. The fourth dispatch is here. My fifth dispatch, about Ukraine’s assault forces, can be read at this link. The sixth dispatch, on air defence, is available here.

I have now written a white paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC, which provides seven strategic insights that are based on knowledge gained on my recent visit as well as previous visits and other research.

The war in Ukraine remains a rapidly evolving conflict. The battlefield, strategic strike, information operations, and industrial production campaigns remain crucial to both Ukraine’s and Russia’s war efforts. In all of these endeavors, there is an ongoing adaptation spiral occurring that is spinning out innovative techniques and technologies. At the same time, this is providing insights for Western strategists and force structure planners.

This white paper provides contemporary insights into the war and offers assessments on what they mean for possible conflict trajectories in the coming months. These insights are based on the author’s multiple visits to Ukraine, including one in October 2025. The seven key findings offer external observers not only an update on this rapidly changing war, but a view from the ground into how the character of war itself is evolving.

1. Drone Issues: Saturation and Russian Evolution

The eastern front line continues to be saturated with drones. As a result, within 15 kilometers (km) of the front line, vehicle movement is difficult to impossible. Infantry soldiers must instead march to their positions for 10–15 km.¹ Where armored vehicles and artillery are deployed, they can be subject to dozens of attacks per platform per day.² Ukraine has invested in decoys and deception activities, and headquarters are being built deep underground. The question is whether this saturated environment, which has built in scale and intensity over the last three and a half years, is possible elsewhere (e.g., the noncontiguous Pacific theatre). If so, how quickly might combatants build the kind of drone deployment seen in Ukraine?

Despite the heavy use of drones, infantry troops remain more important than ever to hold ground. And despite their growing proficiency with drones, infantry remain essential to Russian operations to seize terrain. It does so in small teams of between two and four soldiers, and sometimes, with single individuals covered with thermal blankets. An indication of how essential infantry troops remain can be found in the organization of Ukraine’s combat brigades. While nearly every Ukrainian brigade has one to two drone battalions, they all retain three to five infantry battalions as well.

This drone saturation is mainly occurring in the air. Despite the huge efforts to develop and deploy uncrewed ground combat vehicles, some interlocutors have indicated that these have been less successful in combat units than hoped for.³ The exception to this is forward resupply and casualty evacuation. At sea, Ukraine is deploying a new generation of naval drones, although the country has already generated significant success in the eastern region of the Black Sea by reopening Western sea trade routes and keeping key ports open.

Russian innovation in drones probably now just outstrips that of Ukraine, according to frontline combat leaders.⁴ The slight Russian lead has several contributing factors: First, Russia was a first mover with fiber-optic controlled drones and continues to lead in their development and employment. These provide a stealthier platform and superior continuous high-definition imagery for targeting. Second, Russia has standardized its drone production around a limited number of models, whereas Ukraine employs dozens if not hundreds of different models. This has logistics, training, and production implications. Finally, the Russian Rubicon units have transformed Russian drone operations and the targeting of Ukrainian drone control centers. Russian procedures have been standardized, and the sharing of lessons between Russian drone units has improved. Rubicon units are able to innovate with their tactics quickly. Russia sees drone control centers as the Ukrainian tactical center of gravity, and therefore, these are now the Russian tactical focus.⁵

2. The New Battle Triangle

Despite the findings of the above section, Ukraine is not a drone war, it is a war where drones have gained prominence. In Ukraine and elsewhere, drones do not replace human capacity—they extend it. Neither have they replaced artillery, tanks, infantry, engineers, or logisticians in Ukraine—they have complemented them.⁶ The Ukrainians view drone operations as improving existing conventional systems, changing how they are used, and covering gaps in conventional capacity, but not replacing them. They also talk of a new battle triangle with intelligence, operations, and drones and electronic warfare at the three points.⁷

As the Ukrainians have discovered on the frontline around the besieged eastern Ukrainian city of Pokrovsk and elsewhere, drones cannot replace a soldier holding ground. This is one of the enduring truths of war and bears frequent restating lest the message get lost in the preaching by drone advocates.

This is not to suggest that drones are not important. But much of the data used by analysts is often sourced from drone units, which are constantly on the hunt for resources. Perhaps more importantly, counter-drone technologies are improving rapidly. One wonders if drones and counter-drone systems will achieve parity in many circumstances in future conflicts. As such, the dominance achieved by drones in this war, particularly in the 2022–23 period, may not be seen again.

More evidence-based research by trained military operations researchers is required to delve beyond existing drone dogmas. There is also a need for more strategic debate about the future role of these machines, mainly as partners and extenders of existing capability, rather than as replacers.

3. The Adaptation Battle

Across this author’s Ukraine visits between 2022 and 2025, it has become clear that the Ukrainians have improved their ability to learn and adapt. Units observe battlefield trends and learn from the engagement with the enemy. They share lessons with higher headquarters, and there has been an improved capacity for analyzing lessons at the general staff level with a dedicated organization responsible for this function.

Despite this, according to tactical leaders, Russia has moved ahead (marginally) in the tactical adaptation battle. This involves more rapidly changing and successful Russian tactics, as well as more systematic, whole-of-frontline recording and distribution of improved new tactical methods. It combines its evolving infiltration ground tactics with its use of fires (particularly attack drones and glide bombs with improved electronic warfare resilience and longer range) to attack where it identifies gaps or weaker Ukrainian units.⁸

Ukrainian commanders describe Russia’s latest tactics as “1,000 bites,” where small teams seek gaps in Ukrainian frontline positions, which can be up to 1,000 meters apart, and which generally do not have depth positions.⁹ When a gap is found, the Russians pour through infantry and drones, seeking headquarters and drone operations centers. Where they cannot find a gap, glide bombs or even Shahed drones are used to create one, especially in urban environments.

This is not always successful, but as its recent deep penetration on its Pokrovsk axis of advance demonstrated, this can have operational impacts if successful. It should be expected that Russia will continue to test and evolve its tactics to achieve similar penetrations of the first line of Ukrainian defenses.

While a year ago, it would have been fair to state that Russia had a lead in systemic, strategic adaptation and Ukraine had the lead in tactical adaptation, this no longer seems to be the case. It is very likely that Russian efforts to “learn how to learn better” in the past three years have achieved critical mass and are now paying dividends at the tactical and strategic levels.

How much additional tactical and strategic momentum this provides the Russians and their sclerotic ground operations remains to be seen. But it is not a positive development for Ukraine, nor for the rest of Europe.

You can read and download my full white paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, at this link.

3. Seizing the Initiative against Russia: Putting the United States in Control

Summary:

The US must seize the initiative from Russia by replacing reactive, incremental policies with a sustained campaign of pressure across military, economic, and information domains. Western limits on Ukrainian capabilities and fear of escalation have given Russia safe havens, time to adapt, and momentum for a long war. Washington should enable a clear Russian military failure in Ukraine, deny sanctuaries, exploit Russian vulnerabilities globally, and treat Russia–China–Iran–North Korea as an integrated threat. Momentum, not single “gamechangers,” will force the Kremlin into hard choices, strip its cognitive warfare advantage, and reduce the risk of a wider war.

Comment: Long read. Read the entire report at the link below.

Seizing the Initiative against Russia: Putting the United States in Control

November 16, 2025

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/seizing-the-initiative-against-russia-putting-the-united-states-in-control-2/

Introduction

To deter and win future wars, America must be able to seize the initiative against any actor it may need to fight. Wars are rarely won through reactive approaches.

Russia is on a trajectory toward protracting and expanding the current war. As long as the Kremlin perceives that it has the initiative, it has little reason to compromise its aims in Ukraine, to reduce its intensified attacks against NATO, or to limit its cognitive warfare offensive on US decision-making. The US must contest the initiative in Ukraine, Europe, and in the cognitive space to alter Russia’s current trajectory toward a longer and larger war. Only by seizing the initiative can the U.S. impose its will on Russia or any opponent.

Russia has been fighting with a free hand because of the West’s decision to grant it effective safe havens by restricting the range and capabilities of systems provided to Ukraine and by a policy of gradual change that gives the Kremlin time to adapt. Russia has been allowed to build up its defense industrial base with help from China, Iran, North Korea, and to keep its manpower and materiel safely in rear areas — often as the result of restrictive Western policies ostensibly aimed at avoiding “escalation.”

The United States and partners can change this dynamic by changing their approach. No single measure will yield a decisive advantage against Russia — but achieving momentum through a continuous series of actions can. Pressure on Russia needs to shift from a stream to a waterfall, from linear incremental changes to a campaign of pressures that generate mass, velocity, and cascading effects.

The Kremlin’s strategy, unlike ours, recognizes Russia’s vulnerability to momentum. The Kremlin’s main effort is ensuring that we never think in terms of seizing the initiative against Russia: that we discuss tactics, not strategy; focus on reactive countermeasures, not proactive and sustained campaigns; and deploy individual measures, not massed effects.

Continued at this link:  https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/seizing-the-initiative-against-russia-putting-the-united-states-in-control-2/

4. Poland Says Rail Explosion Was ‘Unprecedented Act of Sabotage’

Summary:

Poland blames an “unprecedented” rail blast near Ukraine border for attempted train bombing, highlighting escalating suspected Russian sabotage and drone-linked gray-zone attacks on European infrastructure.

Excerpts:

The suspected attack comes at a time of heightened tensions in the region. In recent weeks, a series of suspected Russian drones has disrupted airports, grounded flights and put citizens on edge across Central and Eastern Europe, thrusting some countries into a gray-zone conflict with Moscow.

In September, NATO-member warplanes shot down several Russian drones over Poland, the first time the alliance has engaged Russian drones over a member’s territory after what officials contend was a test of its defenses by Moscow.

Sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns have allowed Russia to assert itself in the region without directly entering a war with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Comment: Little green men at work?

Poland Says Rail Explosion Was ‘Unprecedented Act of Sabotage’

WSJ

A passenger train was forced to make an emergency stop after damage was spotted on tracks

By Gareth Vipers and Karolina Jeznach

Updated Nov. 17, 2025 3:27 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/poland-says-rail-explosion-was-act-of-sabotage-d9f6b877

Police investigate a section of railroad track near the village of Mika in central Poland. PRZEMYSLAW PIATKOWSKI/EPA/Shutterstock

• Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk described a rail network explosion near the Ukraine border as an “unprecedented act of sabotage.”
• A passenger train was forced to stop after track damage, with additional damage found elsewhere on the crucial aid route to Ukraine.
• The incident follows a series of suspected Russian drone disruptions across central and Eastern Europe.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk described a rail network explosion near the Ukraine border as an “unprecedented act of sabotage.”

WARSAW—Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk described an explosion on the country’s rail network near the Ukraine border as an “unprecedented act of sabotage,” casting it among a string of suspected attacks targeting European infrastructure in recent months.

A passenger train traveling between Warsaw and the eastern city of Lublin was forced to make an emergency stop early Sunday after damage was spotted on the tracks. The route is a crucial part of the network for delivering aid to Ukraine.

“Blowing up the rail track on the Warsaw-Lublin route is an unprecedented act of sabotage targeting directly the security of the Polish state and its civilians,” Tusk said in a social-media post Monday.

The goal of the sabotage was to blow up the train, Tusk said, adding that additional damage had been identified elsewhere on the route. “We will catch the perpetrators, regardless of who their backers are,” he added. The incident occurred near the village of Mika, roughly 62 miles south of the capital.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, right, speaks with authorities near the damaged rail line. Chancellery of the Prime Minister/Getty Images

In a separate incident further down the track, a train carrying 475 passengers was forced to stop Sunday evening after damage to an overhead line shattered the windows in one of the carriages, according to local authorities. There was a heavy police presence on the line Monday as officers conducted inspections.

The suspected attack comes at a time of heightened tensions in the region. In recent weeks, a series of suspected Russian drones has disrupted airports, grounded flights and put citizens on edge across Central and Eastern Europe, thrusting some countries into a gray-zone conflict with Moscow.

In September, NATO-member warplanes shot down several Russian drones over Poland, the first time the alliance has engaged Russian drones over a member’s territory after what officials contend was a test of its defenses by Moscow.

Sabotage, cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns have allowed Russia to assert itself in the region without directly entering a war with members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Kremlin has repeatedly denied any involvement in acts of sabotage or drone incursions in Europe.

While disruption from drones has become a regular occurrence, a physical attack on Poland’s critical infrastructure would mark a serious escalation.

Early on in the war in Ukraine, Poland’s security agency detained Russian agents installing cameras along Poland’s rail lines and the critical cargo of weapons they carried into Ukraine. Many arms cargoes were struck once they crossed the border.

Gen. Wiesław Kukuła, chief of the general staff of the Polish Army, called the sabotage an act of aggression. “The enemy is preparing for war, setting the conditions for an act of aggression on Poland,” Kukuła said Monday on the country’s state-run radio station.

Write to Gareth Vipers at gareth.vipers@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 18, 2025, print edition as 'Polish Premier Calls Blast ‘Unprecedented Sabotage’'.

WSJ

5. Poland sends forces to probe Ukraine rail link blown up in ‘sabotage’

Summary:

Poland calls rail-line blast to Ukraine sabotage, deploys military to inspect 120km route amid rising Russian hybrid threats, underscoring Warsaw’s vital logistics hub for Kyiv.

Comment: "Hybrid threats?" Or new generation warfare or nonlinear warfare? Or irregular warfare. Or sabotage.

Poland sends forces to probe Ukraine rail link blown up in ‘sabotage’

Defense News · Jaroslaw Adamowski · November 17, 2025

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/11/17/poland-sends-forces-to-probe-ukraine-rail-link-blown-up-in-sabotage/

WARSAW, Poland — A blast that destroyed a train track in a village south of the country’s capital Warsaw was an act of sabotage, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said on Nov. 17, one day after the resulting damage was detected on the rail link used to connect Poland with Ukraine.

“Unfortunately, the worst suspicions were confirmed. An act of sabotage occurred on the Warsaw-Lublin line (in the village of Mika). An explosive device detonated and destroyed the railway track,” Tusk said in a post on social media platform X.

The prime minister called the act “an unprecedented act of sabotage” aimed at the Polish state.

“This route is also crucially important for delivering aid to Ukraine. We will catch the perpetrators, whoever they are,” Tusk added.

The blast did not inflict any casualties. Mika is located around 100km (62 miles) from Warsaw.

Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, Poland’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, has announced his ministry has deployed military services to assist in the investigation and check other segments of the Warsaw-Lublin rail track.

“The military will check a section of around 120 km (along the rail track) which runs to the [Polish-Ukrainian] border in Hrubieszów,” Kosiniak-Kamysz said in an X post.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Poland has positioned itself as one of Kyiv’s staunchest allies, triggering backlash from Russia.

Warsaw has delivered large volumes of weapons and gear to Kyiv, operating a major logistics hub out of the south-eastern city of Rzeszów.

Russia and its ally Belarus have both deployed additional forces and weapons along their borders with Poland.

Numerous European countries, including Poland, have since been targeted by hybrid warfare techniques that include acts of sabotage, cyberattacks, espionage and arson. The continent’s security services believe these are largely inspired by Moscow.

Alongside its efforts to supply weapons to the Ukrainian military, Poland has also pushed for Ukraine’s future accession to NATO.

However, over the past months, Polish authorities have conceded the lack of political momentum in Washington and some European capitals means Ukraine will not receive an invitation to join the alliance anytime soon.

About Jaroslaw Adamowski

Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

6. What Happens if the Supreme Court Takes Trump’s Tariffs Away?

Summary:

Trump’s tariff-centric foreign policy relies on emergency powers under IEEPA, now under Supreme Court scrutiny. If the Court curtails this authority, his coercive trade deals, threats, and investment-for-tariff bargains could unravel. Alternative legal tools are narrow and Congress is unlikely to restore powers, meaning tariff coercion may fade after Trump.

What Happens if the Supreme Court Takes Trump’s Tariffs Away?

nationalsecurityjournal.org · ByRobert Farley

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/what-happens-if-the-supreme-court-takes-trumps-tariffs-away/

Can Trump’s Tariff-First Foreign Policy Survive a Supreme Court Rebuff?

U.S. President Donald Trump is a fan of tariffs. Against decades of advice from economists and politicians on both sides of the aisle, Trump has made tariffs the cornerstone of his foreign and domestic policy.

President Donald Trump participates in an welcome line at Qasr Al Watan in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, Thursday, May 15, 2025. (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

He uses the threat of tariffs to make peace between foreign antagonists and to help out friends in duress.

Unfortunately for the administration, however, its authority to levy and manage tariffs is in question, and a case on the issue before the U.S. Supreme Court seems poised to go against Trump.

What effect might a check from the Supreme Court have? For one, it might seriously complicate the effort to use tariffs to craft a coercive foreign policy.

Tariff Authority

The U.S. Constitution places revenue-generating activities firmly under the authority of the legislative branch.

However, over the years Congress authorized the executive to use a variety of legal tools to manage tariff policy without direct congressional intervention. Trump has used the International Economic Emergency Powers Act (IEEPA) to levy tariffs.

The Act is a grant of emergency executive authority Congress made in the 1970s.

It allows a president to conduct a wide range of policies (including tariffs) without Congressional supervision in the case of an economic emergency.

Trump’s authority to use this act is now under serious threat. The Supreme Court has been largely sympathetic to the Trump administration this year, but justices sharply questioned the government’s position at a recent hearing on the IEEPA. The administration might have to find a new legal justification for tariffs if it wants to maintain its policy approach.

Long and Short Run Thinking

Tariffs do have short-term effects. They generate some revenue but increase prices to consumers; they change patterns of trade by forcing partners to seek better arrangements elsewhere; and they generate bad feelings diplomatically.

However, the important effects of tariffs occur over the long term.

Historically, interest in tariffs is driven less by revenue and more by their effects on domestic industry.

Sufficiently high tariff rates can protect industries from foreign competition and can even drive industrial revival by creating downstream demand for domestic products.

Crucially, however, investors must have a sufficiently long time horizon to build new factories, supply chains, and workforces. This means producers have to believe the tariff protections will be around for a long time.

Trump has also used tariffs as a coercive foreign-policy tool. When war flared between Thailand and Cambodia, Trump threatened tariffs to bring both parties to the table. Same with India and Pakistan. Trump has threatened tariffs on Russia’s trading partners, including India.

When Brazil displeased Trump by prosecuting a former president accused of instigating a coup, Trump threatened tariffs. And tariffs are core to the long-term trade deals Trump has reached with various trading partners. Most of the deals offer lower tariff rates in exchange for investment over a long period of time.

This is where the Supreme Court’s decision matters. If Trump cannot legally impose tariffs, or manage them from the executive branch, these deals all become precarious.

Will South Korea pony up the $300 billion in investment that it promised in exchange for lower tariffs, if Trump doesn’t actually control tariff policy? Probably not. Every deal that Trump has compelled a foreign government to undertake, economic or political, becomes worthless if he loses the ability to levy tariffs.

Other Tools

If the Supreme Court strikes down Trump’s tariff authority, all is not immediately lost. The administration has multiple other avenues for imposing and maintaining tariffs, although none is as flexible or legally sound as what Trump has already tried.

These methods include a variety of legal tools that have gathered dust for decades and are generally unsuited to the tariff war the president wants to wage. But in certain cases, some of them may work for a time. What they will not do, however, is give the president the flexibility to use tariffs to accomplish coercive foreign-policy ends.

What about Congress? Tariffs are currently polling heavily in the negative, suggesting that Trump’s supporters in Congress would have to take substantial risks to create a legal framework for Trump’s desired tariff policy.

The Senate GOP caucus has already demonstrated little interest in running that kind of risk, which is unsurprising for a party that just a few years ago was categorically committed to free trade.

Conceivably Trump could try to assemble a bipartisan coalition on tariff authority, but that seems extremely unlikely given polarization and negative feelings among Democrats. All things considered, the collapse of Trump’s authority over tariffs seems more a matter of “when” than “if.”

What Happens Next?

These political realities also suggest that the use of tariffs as a coercive foreign-policy tool will not survive the Trump administration, and possibly not even the midterm elections.

Few Republicans have expressed the kind of support for tariffs that would suggest an interest in running on the issue in 2028.

Democrats have become more hostile to trade barriers because of their association with Trump. It is possible that Trump’s scheme to distribute $2,000 to every American based on tariff revenue will shift public opinion—but then again, the plan isn’t even popular in his own party.

All this means that the United States runs an enormous long-term risk by relying on tariff policy to compel foreign countries to bend the knee.

As soon as doubt takes hold about the capacity and willingness of the U.S. to levy and maintain large-scale tariffs, Trump’s coercive power will evaporate.

About the Author: Dr. Robert Farley, University of Kentucky

Dr. Robert Farley has taught security and diplomacy courses at the Patterson School since 2005. He received his BS from the University of Oregon in 1997, and his Ph. D. from the University of Washington in 2004. Dr. Farley is the author of Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force (University Press of Kentucky, 2014), the Battleship Book (Wildside, 2016), Patents for Power: Intellectual Property Law and the Diffusion of Military Technology (University of Chicago, 2020), and most recently Waging War with Gold: National Security and the Finance Domain Across the Ages (Lynne Rienner, 2023). He has contributed extensively to a number of journals and magazines, including the National Interest, the Diplomat: APAC, World Politics Review, and the American Prospect. Dr. Farley is also a founder and senior editor of Lawyers, Guns and Money.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · ByRobert Farley

7. Security Council Backs Trump’s Plan for Postwar Gaza

Summary:

U.N. Security Council backs Trump’s Gaza plan, authorizing international stabilization force and interim Board of Peace, aiming at demilitarization and Palestinian statehood; Russia, China abstain.

Security Council Backs Trump’s Plan for Postwar Gaza

WSJ

By Robbie Gramer

Follow and Summer Said

Follow

Updated Nov. 17, 2025 6:47 pm ET

U.N. vote, on which China and Russia abstained, will pave the way for new governance in the Palestinian enclave

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/security-council-expected-to-back-trumps-plan-for-post-war-gaza-d500fb3b

The U.N. Security Council voting Monday on the resolution. Eduardo Munoz/Reuters

• The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution establishing a legal mandate for an international stabilization force in Gaza.
• The resolution lays the groundwork for a transitional government in Gaza with a “Board of Peace” to oversee reconstruction.
• Russia and China abstained from the vote, while Israel and Hamas both expressed opposition to aspects of the plan.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The U.N. Security Council passed a resolution establishing a legal mandate for an international stabilization force in Gaza.

The U.N. Security Council voted to back President Trump’s Middle East peace plan on Monday following a flurry of backroom diplomacy by top Trump officials and U.S. allies.

The resolution forms the central plank of the Trump administration’s next steps to implement a lasting peace in Gaza following the two-year Israel-Hamas war. The resolution passed the 15-member Security Council with 13 votes in favor and two countries—Russia and China—abstaining.

The resolution sets up the legal mandate for an international stabilization force and lays the groundwork for a new transitional government in Gaza through a “Board of Peace” that would initially oversee Gaza’s reconstruction.

The resolution’s passage marks a significant diplomatic victory for Trump’s ambitions to bring peace to the Middle East. But it still leaves questions about the future of Gaza unanswered, including whether there is a credible path to Palestinian statehood and what role, if any, an international stabilization force would have in disarming Hamas.

Some countries involved in the peace talks, including Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, Azerbaijan and Indonesia, have expressed interest in joining the international stabilization force for Gaza, but these countries have told U.S. officials they first need a mandate from the United Nations to participate. As such, senior Trump administration officials see the U.N. resolution as a crucial next step in implementing the president’s plan.

The U.S. gained more support for its efforts within the Security Council after painstaking behind-the-scenes negotiations over the text of the resolution to allay the concerns of Arab and European countries over the future governance of Gaza, according to the U.S., and Arab officials involved in the deliberations and drafts of the resolution viewed by The Wall Street Journal. The new draft made changes to include more specific details on Palestinian self-determination and the future role of the Palestinian Authority in governing Gaza.

The resolution cites a possible path forward for Palestinian statehood, but only if the right conditions are in place following the Board of Peace’s oversight of Gaza’s reconstruction and reforms to the Palestinian Authority.

“After the [Palestinian Authority] reform program is faithfully carried out and Gaza redevelopment has advanced, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood,” the resolution states.

Trump lauded the vote in a social-media post, saying it “will go down as one of the biggest approvals in the History of the United Nations, will lead to further Peace all over the World, and is a moment of true Historic proportion!”

Trump’s ambassador to the U.N., Mike Waltz, spoke frequently in recent weeks with his Russian and Chinese counterparts as well as other envoys of major U.N. powers to clear hurdles to get the draft resolution ready to be passed, the U.S. officials said.

Waltz praised the result of the vote, saying that the resolution would help “deny Hamas any opportunity to reconstitute and to ensure the people of Gaza can be fed.”

Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and former senior adviser during his first term in office, also played a leading role in garnering support for the U.S. resolution, these officials said. A representative for Kushner didn’t respond to a request for comment.

Eight other Middle Eastern and Muslim countries—Qatar, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan and Turkey—joined with the U.S. to urge a swift passage of the resolution.

Senior Trump administration officials have repeatedly said U.S. troops won’t be deployed as part of the International Stabilization Force, though the U.S. will still play a key diplomatic role in standing up the force.

The resolution authorized the International Stabilization Force through 2027 and gives the force a mandate of demilitarizing Gaza and overseeing its borders. Details on the size of the force and which countries would contribute are still being negotiated. The “Board of Peace” that the resolution backs is a proposal for an international body to temporarily govern Gaza in place of Hamas.

“The demilitarization of Hamas is a basic condition of the peace agreement,” said Danny Danon, Israel’s ambassador to the U.N. “There will be no future in Gaza as long as Hamas possesses weapons.”

China, Russia and Algeria were adamant that in any resolution there should be clear and strong guarantees that the Security Council would retain authority over the situation in Gaza. According to the revised draft of the resolution, a new mandate was added for reporting on progress in Gaza to the Council every six months.

Hamas and other Palestinian factions Monday denounced the resolution and called it dangerous, saying they oppose any clause relating to the disarmament of the Palestinian factions or harming “the Palestinian people’s right to resistance.” They added that they reject any attempt “to subject the Gaza Strip to international authority” and are against any foreign military presence inside Gaza.

The resolution doesn’t specify how Hamas would disarm, which the U.S. and Israel see as a crucial part of any long-term peace plan.

Egypt, which played a major role alongside the U.S. in facilitating the Israel-Hamas cease-fire, is pushing Hamas to disarm on its own as part of the peace plan.

In the latest discussions, the group told Egyptian officials that they would agree to their heavy weapons being dismantled and stockpiled inside Gaza under the supervision of Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, but only if Israel fully withdraws its forces from Gaza and there is a credible path to a Palestinian state. Hamas’s military wing suggested to Egyptian mediators that they should be able to retain their personal firearms for self-defense.

Write to Robbie Gramer at robbie.gramer@wsj.com and Summer Said at summer.said@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 18, 2025, print edition as 'Security Council Backs Trump’s Gaza Proposal'.

WSJ

8. Opinion | Why China Is Picking a Fight With Japan

Summary:

China unleashes vitriolic attacks, travel warnings, and coast guard pressure on Japan after Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi states a Chinese assault on Taiwan could trigger Japanese collective self-defense. Beijing aims to bully, block her hawkish agenda, and mobilize Japan’s China-dependent business and political elites to weaken the new prime minister.

Comment: Weaken the PM? Perhap she is a Nietszche fan - that which does not kill me makes me stronger? Is the real competition going to be between the PRC and Japan? How does this escalate? What happens if it escalates beyond rhetoric? Or will economic relations moderate the rhetoric over time? It seems the PM is willing to stand up to China and that Xi may not be able "to put her in her place" as he would like. Will "wolf diplomacy" work on the PM and Japan?

Opinion | Why China Is Picking a Fight With Japan

WSJ

By Walter Russell Mead

Follow

Nov. 17, 2025 5:11 pm ET

Beijing sees a frank comment on Taiwan as a chance to weaken the prime minister.

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/why-china-is-picking-a-fight-with-japan-cd31a9f2

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Tokyo, Oct. 21. Eugene Hoshiko/Associated Press

China’s wolf warriors have a new target. Reuters reports that they’re resorting to barnyard language to attack Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s new prime minister. “Has her head been kicked by a donkey?” asked a social-media account linked to the state broadcaster CCTV. “If she continues to spew [scatological vulgarity] without any boundaries like this, Takaichi might have to pay the price!”

“We have no choice,” posted China’s consul general in Osaka, “but to cut off that dirty neck that has lunged at us without a moment’s hesitation. Are you ready?” That post has been taken down, but plenty of others jumped in. As the crisis escalated, Chinese officials urged Chinese tourists and businesspeople to avoid travel to Japan, warned students of risks they allegedly faced there and sent a flurry of coast guard ships to patrol waters claimed by Japan.

Ms. Takaichi’s “crime” was to give an honest and straightforward answer to a question in Parliament. Katsuya Okada of the Constitutional Democratic Party had asked what Chinese actions in or around Taiwan would constitute “a survival-threatening situation” for Japan.

It’s a serious question. Under national security legislation passed in 2015, “survival-threatening” situations could trigger an armed Japanese response. Ms. Takaichi’s answer was clear. An armed attempt by China to force Taiwan under its control could constitute the kind of survival-threatening situation the 2015 legislation envisioned, and Japan’s forces might well support the U.S. and other allies under those circumstances.

While no previous Japanese leader had put things quite so clearly, there was no real change in Japan’s underlying position. A Chinese attack on Taiwan would pose a massive threat to Japan. In the short term, war would disrupt trade, blocking imports of food and energy without which Japan couldn’t survive, and placing tens of thousands of Japanese visitors, students and businesspeople in Taiwan at risk.

Some Chinese reaction was inevitable. Countries that have territorial claims must constantly assert those claims to keep them alive. From Beijing’s standpoint, Taiwan is a province of China, and the rest of the world has no right to interfere in how China treats it. If Japan says that it might intervene in a conflict between mainland China and Taiwan, China must protest, or it is admitting there are doubts about its claim. Similarly, anytime the U.S. sells arms to Taipei, China must lodge a protest to demonstrate that it takes its own claim seriously and hopes to enforce it one day.

But if a reaction was inevitable, a crisis wasn’t. China could have made a pro forma protest and moved on in a couple of weeks. Instead, Beijing has decided to turn a modest kerfuffle into a major confrontation. Why?

Beijing’s motivations can be hard for outsiders to read, but two things seem to be happening. First, the Chinese Communist Party has a long tradition of bullying. Whether it is dealing with opponents at home or obstreperous foreign governments, Beijing’s first instinct is often to intimidate, threaten and, when possible, to compel. If this works, fine. If it doesn’t, China can always switch to a less confrontational approach.

Second, Beijing hopes to undermine Ms. Takaichi’s power before she can fully consolidate her position. She is a protégée of the hawkish former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. And since the somewhat pacifist Komeito Party refused to serve under her in a coalition government, she’s been able to bring a hawkish smaller party into the governing coalition.

China worries that Ms. Takaichi, unchecked, will take more steps to strengthen Japan’s military posture. A Kyodo News report suggests that her government may be considering an end to Japan’s longstanding ban on nuclear weapons on its territory. As China carries out the fastest nuclear arms-building program in world history, it wants weak, nonnuclear neighbors.

China hopes that pitching a fit over Ms. Takaichi’s statement could activate her domestic opponents. Lots of Japanese companies depend on Chinese factories for key imports, and many others depend on access to Chinese markets. Many powerful figures in Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party have close ties to these companies. Others represent constituencies where China-linked businesses are major employers, or where tourism is a major source of income. Many of Ms. Takaichi’s parliamentary colleagues are skeptical of the first female prime minister in Japanese history. Focused economic pressure from China just might persuade the party barons to deliver a strong behind-the-scenes message to their leader.

Ms. Takaichi says Margaret Thatcher is her role model. Let’s hope that this Iron Lady is as tough and resourceful as the first.

Journal Editorial Report: The week's best and worst from Allysia Finley, Mene Ukueberuwa and Kim Strassel.

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 18, 2025, print edition as 'Why China Is Picking a Fight With Japan'.

WSJ

9. Trump Says U.S. Intends to Sell F-35 Jet Fighters to Saudi Arabia

Summary:

POTUS plans to sell F-35 stealth fighters to Saudi Arabia ahead of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s White House visit, signaling Riyadh’s rehabilitation. The prospective sale raises concerns over Israel’s qualitative military edge, possible technology leakage to China, human-rights abuses, and reduced U.S. leverage on normalization, nuclear cooperation and AI.

Comment: I am sure the Pentagon, State, and the IC have all conducted a thorough risk analysis here. But what are the benefits that outweigh the risks?

Trump Says U.S. Intends to Sell F-35 Jet Fighters to Saudi Arabia

WSJ

By Michael R. Gordon

Follow and Alexander Ward

Follow

Updated Nov. 17, 2025 7:06 pm ET

Announcement underscores rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman ahead of White House meeting Tuesday with president

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-says-u-s-will-sell-f-35-jet-fighters-to-saudi-arabia-dffabaf4

An F-35 jet fighter performs at an air show in Dubai. Amr Alfiky/Reuters

• President Trump says the U.S. plans to sell F-35 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia, making the announcement ahead of a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
• The potential F-35 sale raises concerns about eroding Israel’s military advantage and reducing U.S. leverage for regional normalization.
• The U.S. has a longstanding policy, codified in legislation, to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” in the Middle East.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• President Trump says the U.S. plans to sell F-35 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia, making the announcement ahead of a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

President Trump said Monday that the U.S. would sell advanced F-35 jet fighters to Saudi Arabia, announcing his decision the day before he meets at the White House with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

“We will be doing that. We will be selling F-35s,” Trump told reporters, who didn’t provide any specifics about the deal.

Trump’s willingness to sell the stealthy fighters is a clear signal that Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader, has been rehabilitated in the eyes of the White House despite the kingdom’s role in the 2018 murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

But the looming deal has spurred concerns that an unconditional sale of the cutting-edge U.S. weapon system could erode Israel’s military advantage in the Middle East and reduce Washington’s leverage to encourage Saudi Arabia and Israel to normalize relations, a step that diplomats in the region say isn’t imminent.

“Having these things end up in the Saudi air force several years hence without normalization would be a misuse of American leverage,” said John Hannah of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, a onetime adviser to former Vice President Dick Cheney.

The Israeli Air Force is equipped with the F-35, which it has used to strike targets in Iran and other targets in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia will become the only other Middle Eastern country to have the jet fighter once deliveries are made. The U.S. has a longstanding policy, which is codified in law, to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over other Middle East countries.

“Americans can expect more good deals for our country spanning technology, manufacturing, critical minerals, defense, and more,” said White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly, of the Saudi leader’s White House visit.

Trump didn’t address whether the eventual delivery of F-35s might be linked to an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel on establishing diplomatic ties, a longstanding U.S. goal.

An F-35 deal is just one goal of the Washington visit by Mohammed bin Salman, or MBS, as he is widely known. Saudi Arabia’s de facto leader also wants access to advanced U.S. computer chips, help for a prospective civilian nuclear power industry and a statement that the two nations’ security interests are aligned.

His visit will come with all the trappings of a formal state visit, the culmination of a yearslong effort to repair his image and relations with the White House. The effort began under the Biden administration and has accelerated under Trump, whose goal is to cement lucrative deals for U.S. companies, persuade Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel and make Saudi Arabia a more central partner in the Middle East.

The crown prince’s visit will feature a White House dinner and will be followed on Wednesday by a U.S.-Saudi investment summit at the Kennedy Center, which could advance Riyadh’s goal of strengthening ties with the American businesses that will outlast a change in U.S. administrations.

The Saudi leader cares the most about access to artificial intelligence, said Michael Ratney, who served as the U.S. ambassador in Riyadh from 2023 to 2025. “He wants an agreement on reliable and predictable exports of the most advanced chips that would fuel their data centers in Saudi Arabia,” Ratney said.

The visit has spurred criticism from human-rights activists who have alleged that Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to cast himself as a regional partner masks a heavy- handed intolerance of dissent at home.

“Saudi Arabia’s crown prince is trying to rebrand himself as a global statesman, but the reality at home is mass repression, record numbers of executions, and zero tolerance for dissent,” Sarah Yager, the Washington director of Human Rights Watch said in a statement. “U.S. officials should be pressing for change, not posing for photos.”

For all of the expectations, some of the agreements will fall short of the accords that were under discussion a few years ago. An agreement on the U.S. -Saudi security partnership that Trump and Mohammed bin Salman are expected to issue won’t take the form of a treaty, which would require ratification by the Senate.

American and Saudi officials worked on a treaty during the Biden administration that would have committed the U.S. to defend the kingdom, strengthening decades-old defense ties. The initiative was part of a push to encourage the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack on Israel and the resulting conflict of Gaza has complicated that effort, with Saudi Arabia insisting it wouldn’t join other Arab countries that have recognized Israel under the so-called Abraham Accords until there is a clear pathway toward a Palestinian state.

On Monday evening, the United Nations Security Council passed Trump’s plan for Gaza, providing a legal mandate for the enclave’s reconstruction and an international stabilization force to keep order. The measure, which mentions a possible “pathway” to Palestinian state, was backed by Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are also expected to announce talks on a civil nuclear cooperation agreement, in which the U.S. would provide vital technology. Neither has said what such an agreement might entail, including whether Riyadh would be allowed to enrich uranium on its territory or what arrangements might be put in place to ensure that nuclear technology couldn’t be used for military purposes.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

Is a strengthened partnership with Saudi Arabia worth the potential U.S. concessions? Join the conversation below.

To sell a major weapon system such as the F-35 to Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration would need to formally notify Congress, which could block such a sale if the Senate and the House each pass a resolution of disapproval. Trump could veto such a measure, which the Senate and House would need a two-thirds vote to override.

Congress has never successfully blocked a proposed arms sale through such a procedure, according to the Congressional Research Service.

Bradley Bowman of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and a former Congressional staffer, said that lawmakers should press the Trump administration on what assurances it has received from Saudi Arabia that sensitive F-35 technology wouldn’t be obtained by China, which is Riyadh’s largest trading partner and has helped the kingdom develop ballistic missiles.

“You can’t give Saudi Arabia the U.S.’s most advanced fighter and have it not affect Israel’s qualitative military edge, which law requires Washington to maintain,” Bowman said. “The administration owes Congress answers on what additional steps it plans to take to maintain Israel’s relative edge.”

A potential sale of F-35s to the United Arab Emirates was stymied because of U.S. concerns about expanding ties between Beijing and Abu Dhabi.

Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

WSJ

10. Donald Trump's Venezuela Military Build Up Is Just Art of the Deal Geopolitics

Summary:

POTUS' deployment of the USS Gerald Ford carrier group and 12,000 troops near Venezuela, plus strikes on “narco-terrorist” boats, is coercive diplomacy, not prelude to invasion. Balestrieri argues it fits POTUS' “escalate to negotiate” pattern: brandish force, then leverage fear and sanctions to push Maduro toward a negotiated transition.

Comment: Is Maduro the kind of leader who would make a deal under these circumstances and pressures? What kind of deal would he accept? And what happens if they do not make a deal? Do we go through with military action? Bluffs only work if you are willing to follow through. And what happens if there is no deal and we do not take military action? Our future bluffs will likely not be very credible. Are we forcing ourselves into a position where we have to take military action if Maduro does not capitulate?

Donald Trump's Venezuela Military Build Up Is Just Art of the Deal Geopolitics

nationalsecurityjournal.org · By Steve Balestrieri

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/donald-trumps-venezuela-military-build-up-is-just-art-of-the-deal-geopolitics/

Key Points and Summary – The deployment of the USS Gerald Ford strike group and some 12,000 U.S. troops near Venezuela has sparked fears of an impending war and regime-change operation against Nicolás Maduro.

-Washington is hitting suspected narco-terrorist boats and designating Maduro’s Cartel de los Soles a terrorist group, yet officials privately insist there are no plans for an invasion.

The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) successfully completes the third and final scheduled explosive event of Full Ship Shock Trials while underway in the Atlantic Ocean, Aug. 8, 2021. The U.S. Navy conducts shock trials of new ship designs using live explosives to confirm that our warships can continue to meet demanding mission requirements under harsh conditions they might encounter in battle. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Novalee Manzella)

-Accomplished defense writer Steve Balestrieri argues the buildup fits Trump’s “escalate to negotiate” playbook seen with North Korea, NATO, and tariffs: brandish overwhelming force, then leverage it for talks and power-sharing.

-Full-scale war is unlikely; the real endgame is coercive diplomacy and a negotiated Venezuelan transition.

Should The US Really Go To War With Venezuela?

The USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier strike group has been deployed to the region around Venezuela as the US has been carrying out strikes against what Washington has described as narco-terrorist boats carrying illicit drugs heading to the United States.

Since September, US strikes have killed at least 80 people in 20 attacks on small boats accused of transporting drugs in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean.

But many believe that the actual reason behind all of the reported 12,000 American troops in the region is that they are there to put pressure on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.

The buildup of American military might with the Ford carrier strike group, as well as a growing force of warships, fighter aircraft, bombers, marines, drones, and spy planes in the Caribbean, is the largest deployment there since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

But is the US actually going to war with Venezuela, and if it is, what is the endgame?

Ford’s Carrier Strike Group is Part Of “Operation Southern Spear.”

US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth has stated that the dozen or so ships in the region are part of what he dubbed “Operation Southern Spear.”

Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.), of the House Armed Services Committee, said during a Friday interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press NOW” that Secretary of State Marco Rubio “denied” there are any plans to carry out land strikes inside Venezuela or seek regime change during a recent classified briefing with lawmakers regarding the ongoing boat strikes.

The world’s largest aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) sails in the Mediterranean Sea, Dec. 31, 2023. The U.S. maintains forward deployed, ready, and postured forces to deter aggression and support security and stability around the world. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jacob Mattingly)

The Trump administration has insisted that Maduro is an illegitimate leader, after he fraudulently rigged his election last fall, and is a narco terrorist leader. The administration said on Sunday that it will designate the Cartel de los Soles as a terrorist organization and that Maduro is its leader.

There is concern that the US will begin land strikes inside Venezuela, which could lead to a ground invasion to force regime change.

The United States Will Not Invade Venezuela

While the US’s increasingly clear objective is to remove Maduro and his military cronies from power, the US will not invade Venezuela, which is probably the only way Maduro and the military establishment could be forced out.

The American public would not support an invasion, and despite the impressive number of troops in the region, it isn’t enough to facilitate a ground incursion.

And air strikes, even inside Venezuela, wouldn’t be enough to drive Maduro from power. Neither would the $50 million bounty that the US put on Maduro as a narco-terrorist.

President Trump’s Playbook, “Escalate to Negotiate”

Despite the president’s bold war of words on Maduro and the illegitimate regime in Venezuela, Trump has been against large-scale military interventions, especially those involving prolonged deployments and nation-building.

A U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortress, assigned to the 2nd Bomb Wing, receives fuel from a KC-135 Stratotanker, assigned to the 340th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron, during a multi-day Bomber Task Force mission over Southwest Asia, Dec. 10, 2020. The B-52 is a long range bomber with a range of approximately 8,800 miles, enabling rapid support of Bomber Task Force missions or deployments and reinforcing global security and stability.(U.S Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Joey Swafford)

President Trump has addressed complex national security questions by employing the strategy outlined in his book, “The Art of the Deal.” And that strategy is to “escalate to negotiate.”

Back in 2018, after North Korea tested ICBMs capable of hitting the United States, Trump threatened it with “fire and fury like the world has never seen.” He then held three summits on denuclearization with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.

During his first administration, officials reported that Trump privately expressed a desire to withdraw from the NATO alliance on multiple occasions. However, his administration’s official policy ultimately remained one of pressuring allies to increase spending rather than an outright exit, and he later called leaving the alliance “unnecessary” after some progress was made on spending goals.

Trump threatened to withdraw the United States from NATO if other members did not increase their own levels of military spending. Most did, and so Washington has remained in place, where it was always intended to be.

Just this past spring, Trump raised tariffs on almost every country in the world, only to pause many of the levies to negotiate with states for lower trade barriers.

Trump’s imposed tariffs will raise $2.4 trillion in revenue over the next decade on a conventional basis and reduce US GDP by 0.6 percent, all before foreign retaliation. Accounting for adverse economic effects, the revenue raised by the tariffs falls to $1.8 trillion over the next decade.

The Endgame in Venezuela? Negotiation

What the president is doing here isn’t ramping up for a prolonged and costly invasion; it is setting the table for lengthy negotiations and power sharing.

He said as much on Sunday, when he didn’t offer details other than that ” possible discussions with Maduro, but he said, “Venezuela would like to talk.”

It won’t be easy, nor will it be quick. But this is where things are headed. It isn’t as big a headline as the US conducting air strikes inside Venezuela, but it follows Trump’s strategy in dealing with other crises.

A U.S. Air Force B-52H Stratofortress aircraft flies in a seven-ship formation during the Hyundai Air and Sea Show at Miami Beach, Florida, May 24, 2025. The flyover represented the Air Force’s total force, integrating active duty, guard, and reserve pilots flying the B-1B Lancer, B-2 Spirit, F-22 Raptor, A-10 Thunderbolt II, B-52H Stratofortress, F-16C Fighting Falcon, and F-15C Eagle aircraft. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Bailee A. Darbasie)

However, if Trump can force Maduro into some form of negotiation, it would be another feather in his administration’s cap.

Washington will leverage negotiations with the threat of US military might, while getting international support to help rebuild Venezuela’s shattered economy.

By employing the Teddy Roosevelt “big stick” approach, the possibility of war escalation is always present; however, bringing Maduro and the opposition together offers a way to circumvent a situation that isn’t in the best interests of anyone.

About the Author: Steve Balestrieri

Steve Balestrieri is a National Security Columnist. He served as a US Army Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer. In addition to writing on defense, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and is a member of the Pro Football Writers of America (PFWA). His work was regularly featured in many military publications.

More Military

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‘New’ Mach 4 MiG-41 6th Generation Stealth Fighter Has Warning for U.S. Air Force

Boeing’s F-47 NGAD 6th Generation Stealth Fighter Is No ‘Mission Impossible’

nationalsecurityjournal.org · BySteve Balestrieri

11. SOF News: A-29 Drone Fighter and More Drone News

Comment: Curated Drone news.

A-29 Drone Fighter and More Drone News

November 18, 2025 John Friberg Drones 0

https://sof.news/drones/20251118/

Below the reader will find recent news about unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are used in conflicts (Ukraine, Africa, etc.), new developments in drone use, and training by military units for using drones during combat operations.

“Ukraine’s drone revolution is forcing Europe to confront an uncomfortable truth: you can’t defend a continent with million-dollar missiles against $20k drones”, David Kirichenko, Twitter, 17 Nov 2025.

Curated articles on the topics below are provided:

• Featured Topic: A-29 Super Tucano Drone Fighter
• SOCOM Solicitation for Drone Training
• U.S. Army and 1 Million Drones?
• Evolution of the MQ-9 Drone
• Multi-Dimensional Drone Swarm
• Chinese AI Drones and Threat to US
• Ukraine: Training is Everything
• Kyiv Needs Funding for Drone Production
• Ukraine: Mass Production of Interceptor Drones
• Assessing Drones on the Future Battlefield
• Russia’s ‘Unmanned Systems Forces’
• U.S.-Japan counter Drone Training
• Drones in Sudan
• Switzerland Anti-Drone Camouflage
• Drones and Drug Cartels
• Greece Trains on Domestically Built Drones

Featured Topic

A-29 Super Tucano – A New Drone Fighter. Aircraft manufacturer Embraer has announced that its A-29 Super Tucano aircraft will be adding counter-drone missions to its combat capability. New sensors, data links, and precision weapons will upgrade current and future A-29 operators to detect, track, and destroy unmanned aerial systems (UAVs). The aircraft will be fitted with specific data links for receiving initial target coordinates and queuing, a sensor for laser tracking and designation, as well as laser guided rockets and wing-mounted .50 machine guns.

Ukrainian forces have introduced the use of small propeller-driven fixed-wing aircraft for close-range intercepts of Russian drones. This tactic began in April 2024 and has increased as time has gone on. One of the aircraft used by the Ukrainians is the Soviet-era Yakovlev Yak-52 – a two-seat trainer with a speed ideal for engaging Russian drones. Another is the Aeroprakt A-22, a light sport plane that is also very agile and can engage the drones as well. Most of these missions take place during the day with the aircraft crews using hand-held assault rifles or machine guns at close range. In time, as 2025 progressed, these light aircraft have been fitted with sensors for drone detection, fixed gun mounts, and electronic warfare jammers to disrupt drone signals.

The current Ukrainian method of employment of these light fixed-wing aircraft drone killers is quite simple. Ground sensors and air defense systems detect Russian drones and the prop-aircraft is notified to intercept. The aircraft crew maneuver into a position that allows it to employ automatic weapons or shotguns to destroy or disable the drone. This is a low-cost method to destroy drones when compared to the high cost use of surface to air missiles or fighter jets.

The counterdrone mission is added to the traditional missions performed by the Super Tucano which include close air support, air patrol, air interdiction, armed ISR, and air escort. The A-29 is currently employed by 22 air forces around the world. The United States selected the A-29 as the counterinsurgency aircraft for the Afghan Air Force (AAF). Afghan pilots were trained in the United States and then flew as many as 20 Tucanos for the AAF. Read more in “Embraer to Expand A-29 Super Tucano Capabilities to Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems”, Embraer, November 11, 2025.

U.S. and Drones

SOCOM Solicitation for Drone Training. United States Special Operations Command has issued a call for a contractor to train its forces to build and fly first person view (FPV) drones. The contract would provide training to FPV operators in the fabrication and flying of the small drones at the entry level. The 10-day course would cover fundamental training and flight instruction. Read the solicitation on www.sam.gov as well as two PDFs (RFQ and PWS) found at the bottom of the web page. Read more on this topic in “Navy SEALs want to start a 10-day school to learn drone warfare”, Task & Purpose, November 17, 2025.

U.S. Army and 1 Million Drones? China’s industrial base can build at least 8 million drones a year. The US might be able to build a lot less – certainly not enough. The US Army plans to step up procurement but there are some bumps in the road that will need to be leveled out. “The US Army Wants to Build 1 Million Drones. Can it Deliver?”, National Interest, November 15, 2025.

Evolution of the MQ-9 Drone. The General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper was introduced in 2007 with more than 300 built since then. It carries a variety of sensors and weapons and can send feeds to ground stations thousands of miles away. Remotely operated, it can function as an ISR platform or conduct armed interdiction missions against ground targets. Persistent surveillance (time in air following a target) combined with a strike package makes it a very effective counterterrorist weapon. Use of the drone expanded during the Obama administration. “What’s so Great about the MQ-0 Reaper Drone?”, by Harrison Kass, National Interest, October 26, 2025.

Multi-Dimensional Drone Swarm. The use of artificial intelligence (AI) is significantly altering the use of drones on the battlefield. The U.S. is attempting to keep pace with Ukraine, Russia, China, and other nations. A recent attempt at this ‘keeping pace’ effort is a contract awarded to XTEND Reality Inc. which calls for multiple types of drones flown by AI pilots working together under the control of a single human operator. “Pentagon Acquires Combat Proven “Multi-Dimensional Drone Swarm”, Forbes, November 13, 2025.

Chinese AI Drones and Threat to US. China is building millions of drones that can operate in swarms using advanced artificial intelligence technology. The use of AI-controlled drones offers China a way of countering traditional US advantages in manned aircraft, naval forces, and global basing. China recognizes, with insight from the Ukraine conflict and Yemeni Houthi harassment of US and other nations military and commercial vessels, that drones can use inexpensive autonomous systems to provide balance against superior forces. “China’s AI Drone Swarms Should Terrify the United States”, National Interest, November 16, 2025.

Drones and the Ukraine – Russia Conflict

Ukraine: Training is Everything. Ukraine is currently the world leader in drone warfare and Europe is looking for lessons learned for its own defense against possible Russian aggression. Thus far Europe is concentrating on the technological aspects of drone warfare; but it is equally important to recognize the training aspects associated with successful drone employment. “Ukraine’s drone war lesson for Europe: Technology is nothing without training”, by David Kirichenko, Atlantic Council, November 10, 2025.

Kyiv Needs Funding for Drone Production. Ukraine says that with enough funding it can produce up to 20 million drones next year to use against Russian forces that have invaded. The war in Ukraine is now about who can ramp up the production of cheap drones faster. “Ukraine: Kyiv urges allies to help fund its drone production”, Deutsche Welle, November 16, 2025.

Ukraine: Mass Production of Interceptor Drones. Three interceptor drone manufacturers have started production and eleven more are preparing their production lines. The new drones are based on a domestically developed technology called ‘Octopus” that has been tested in intercepting Russian Shahed drones. The goal is to manufacture 1,000 of these interceptor drones each day. Each Octopus interceptor costs about 10% of what a Russian Shahed drone costs. The United Kingdom is collaborating in the Octopus drone production with UK facilities producing thousands monthly. “Ukraine begins mass production of interceptor drones to bolster air defense”, Reuters, November 14, 2025.

Ukraine FPV Drones Reach out to 40 Miles. Using small drones with upgraded hardware and a relay system Ukrainian FPV operators have been able to deploy first person view quadcopter drones out to 37 miles to strike targets. The relay system entails a drone bouncing its signal off another drone to extend its range to the pilot. The drones range in cost from $500 to $700 depending on whether it has a thermal camera. Business Insider, November 13, 2025.

Assessing Drones on the Future Battlefield. Tsiporah Fried provides an essay on how the Russia-Ukraine war is a tactical and technological inflection point on the battlefield. When the war first started it was a war of maneuver, that transitioned to a war of artillery, and then on to a war of drones. Drones are now a profound disruption of operational art – much like the German blitzkrieg concept of World War II. However, as nations develop counter-drone technologies the importance of drones could diminish. “The challenge is to transform their tactical disruption into lasting operational and strategic effect”. Read more in “The Impact of Drones on the Battlefield: Lessons of the Russia-Ukraine War”, Eurasia Review, November 15, 2025.

Russia’s ‘Unmanned Systems Forces’. A new command has been created to oversee Russia’s drone operations, development, testing, and training. This new organization mirrors one created by Ukraine last year, even using the same name. Each nation is attempting to stay ahead of the other in drone technology and fielding. “Russia Creates New Military Branch Dedicated to Drone Warfare”, The War Zone, November 13, 2025.

Drones Around the World

U.S.-Japan Counterdrone Training. Japan Ground Self Defense Force units and roughly a battalion-sized U.S. Army contingent wrapped up Exercise Rising Thunder 25 at Yakima Training Center after two weeks of live fire and counter-drone training built around small UAS threats. “U.S. and Japanese Ground Forces Reforge Their Alliance for the Counter Drone Fight”, Army Recognition, November 14, 2025.

Drones in Sudan. Both sides of the Sudan conflict, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), are using drones in the two-year long conflict. The use of drones has contributed to the war’s growing death toll and has caused extensive damage to vital infrastructure such as hospitals, airports, military bases, and seaports. The drones are supplied by regional powers: Turkey, UAE, Iran, Russia, and others; each with their own set of ambitions and interests in the Sudan conflict. “Good Enough Drones Have Become Geopolitical Chips”, by Steven Feldstein, Foreign Policy, November 17, 2025. (subscription)

Switzerland Anti-Drone Camouflage. Switzerland has awarded contracts to three different firms for systems that will reduce optical, infrared, and radar signatures. These multispectral systems will protect against the growing use of drones and sensor-based reconnaissance that today’s battlefields present. The systems reduce exposure to human observers but also has advanced materials that absorb or disrupt electromagnetic waves. “Switzerland invests in advanced camouflage against drones”, Defence-Blog, November 12, 2025.

Drones and Drug Cartels. First person view (FPV) drones are now being used by Mexican drug cartels to target members of the government, police, and military of Mexico. Drone attacks in Mexico now number in the hundreds each year. Drug cartels are adopting military-style tactics to control territory and undermine the rule of law; drones are just one aspect of that evolution. Read more in an article by Zita Ballinger Fletcher: “How cartels are adopting drone tactics from Ukraine”, Defense News, November 14, 2025.

Greece Trains on Domestically Built Drones. In Exercise Aisios Oionos 25 private Greek companies provided new and innovated drone systems for the Greek military to test and train on. “Greece Conducts First Military Drill Using Domestically Built Combat Drones”, Greek Reporter, November 15, 2025. See also “As NATO pushes for faster innovation, drones flood a test battlefield in Greece”, Associated Press, November 14, 2025.

**********

Image. An A-29 Super Tucano flies over Kabul, Afghanistan n April 2016. (Photo by Sgt Larry E. Reid, USAF)

About John Friberg

216 Articles

John Friberg is the Editor and Publisher of SOF News. He is a retired Command Chief Warrant Officer (CW5 180A) with 40 years service in the U.S. Army Special Forces with active duty and reserve components. Since retirement from the Army he has worked as a contractor both domestically and overseas.

12. Taiwan’s Lexington Without Concord: Sovereignty, Resilience, and the Price of War

Summary:

Taiwan sits at the center of US–China rivalry, facing constant “Lexington moments” of PLA coercion without a “Concord”-like path to resolution. Tang argues Taiwan confronts a sovereignty trilemma: constitutional ambiguity about the ROC, de facto but vulnerable autonomy, and sharp international constraints. Beijing’s gray-zone pressure, cyberattacks, and disinformation erode resilience without triggering war. Survival hinges on unity between DPP and KMT, civic defense and fact-checking, investments in LEO satellites and Han Kuang deterrence, and deeper economic and diplomatic ties through CPTPP, ASEAN, and crisis hotlines. Taiwan’s task is reform, not revolution resilience as its modern Concord.

Excerpts:

Conclusion: Resilience as the New Revolution

Revolutions are often remembered for their victories, but they begin in loss. The American Revolution, remembered for its victory, began with great sacrifice of losing over 25,000 lives, families torn apart, and communities scarred. Taiwan faces similar uncertainties, but with modern threats: frequent incursions, cyberattacks on key industries, and an arms backlog of more than $20 billion that complicates defense. These test the island’s ability to deter aggression, reassure its people, and maintain the trust of its allies. As such, any misstep is a risk. 

Taiwan’s “Lexington Without Concord” reflects a sovereignty trilemma: constitutional ambiguity, de facto autonomy, and international constraints. War is not inevitable if Taiwan centers resilience on this framework. To address ambiguity, Civic Defense Education fosters bipartisan unity, countering DPP–KMT divides. For autonomy, 2025 Han Kuang exercises and LEO satellites bolster defenses and secure communications. To ease constraints, crisis hotlines and ASEAN engagement build multilateral trust, reducing miscalculation risks. 

Taiwan’s challenge is a revolution rooted in resilience, not rebellion. Its trilemma demands internal cohesion and external agility to absorb Beijing’s pressures without breaking. While the Revolutionary analogy illuminates Taiwan’s path, its modern stakes require a new “Concord” of patience and strength.

Taiwan’s survival depends on unity at home and diplomacy abroad, balancing patience with strength. With these, more than any muskets or missiles, is how Taiwan will continue to shape its own history. 

Taiwan’s Lexington Without Concord: Sovereignty, Resilience, and the Price of War

by Tang Meng Kit

|

11.18.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/18/taiwans-lexington-without-concord-sovereignty-resilience-and-the-price-of-war/

Introduction

Taiwan today serves as a critical pivot between the United States-China rivalry and lies at the heart of Indo-Pacific security. For Beijing, Taiwan is unfinished business; for Washington and its allies, it is a keystone of regional security and global supply chains. 

Tensions escalated with Beijing’s large-scale “Joint Sword 2024B” military exercise demonstrated a show of force; while Pentagon warns of a possible Chinese invasion within two years. Therefore, Taiwan’s security is deeply intertwined with broader regional stability. 

Tensions have surged with Beijing’s “Joint Sword 2024B” military exercises, deploying 153 aircraft and 43 ships in a bold show of force, while the Pentagon warns of a possible Chinese invasion by 2027, driven by PLA modernization.12 Taiwan’s security thus shapes broader regional stability, with missteps risking escalation across the Indo-Pacific.

This tense situation evokes a historical echo: the “Lexington Without Concord.” In 1775, the battles of Lexington and Concord marked the start of the American Revolution: an initial chaotic clash (Lexington) followed by colonial regrouping and resistance (Concord). Taiwan faces repeated “Lexington moments” such as PLA incursions, cyberattacks, and diplomatic isolation but lacks a clear “Concord” for unified, peaceful resolution, heightening vulnerability. While the analogy highlights Taiwan’s flashpoints, it has limits: colonial America had time to exhaust diplomacy, whereas Taiwan’s compressed timeline demands swifter resilience.

In contrast, Taiwan, experiences repeated “Lexington moments” such as military incursions, cyberattacks, and diplomatic isolation, but lacks a clear “Concord” – a structured, peaceful resolution or unified response.

At the core lies what might be called Taiwan’s sovereignty trilemma:

1. Constitutional ambiguity: Taiwan’s Republic of China (ROC) constitution still claims mainland China, complicating its status.
2. De facto autonomy: Taiwan operates as a vibrant democracy with a $400 billion semiconductor-driven economy.
3. International constraints: limited diplomatic recognition (only 12 formal allies) restricts Taiwan’s global leverage.

Unlike colonial America, which exhausted diplomatic options before war, Taiwan faces no slow burn. Highlighted by President Lai Ching-te’s May 2025 statement affirm Taiwan’s non-subordination to China, this provoked sharp rhetoric from Beijing. The tempo of coercion is faster and the margin for error gets narrower.

Despite these challenges, war is not inevitable; but avoiding it requires more than arms and deterrence. The island must find its own Concord – fostering resilience, unity and diplomacy. In this case, resilience refers to the capacity to withstand military incursions, cyberattacks, and diplomatic isolation through preparedness, unity, and adaptability; strengthened by internal cohesion and diplomatic engagement. 

The 2025 Han Kuang exercises and New Southbound Policy bolster this resilience, despite a $21.54 billion U.S. arms backlog.8910 By fostering unity and strategic patience, Taiwan can safeguard sovereignty and regional stability.

Revolutionary Lessons: Self-Determination and the Price of War

History shows that revolutions rarely start with clarity. When the Second Continental Congress convened in 1774, the American colonies were split – loyalists hoped of compromise with Britain while the patriots demanded for self-rule. The Olive Branch Petition of 1775 was aimed at a final peace offering, but King George III outrightly dismissed it. With diplomacy rebuffed and compromised shut out, the colonies stumbled into war. The violence at Lexington and Concord marked the start of a war that would claim 25,000 American lives.

The events following Lexington are as significant as the battle itself. Faced with the reality of war, the Continental Congress quickly united the colonies by forming the Continental Army in June 1775 and appointing George Washington as its leader. They began reaching out to France for diplomatic and material aid and tightened their boycotts to weaken Britain’s economic grip. 

Amid chaos, a strategy of internal unity coupled with external outreach emerged. That mix transformed scattered resistance into collective defiance. This strategy echoes Taiwan’s 2025 challenge, where internal divisions threaten resilience against Beijing’s pressures. The parallel is clear but limited: unlike the colonies’ gradual unification, Taiwan’s compressed timeline demands swifter consensus to counter gray-zone threats.

Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Kuomintang (KMT) mirror the Loyalist–Patriot split, clashing over identity and strategy. The DPP, led by President Lai Ching-te, asserts Taiwan’s non-subordination to China, a view backed by 80% of Taiwanese opposing unification. Yet, disputes over defense budgets expose fractures that weaken Taiwan’s stance.

Lai’s “Ten Speeches on National Unity” campaign, launched to foster consensus like the Continental Army’s formation, has faltered. By mid-2025, the partially delivered initiative was criticized as prioritizing political optics over issues like housing, leaving partisan divides unbridged. This fragility risks Taiwan’s ability to withstand PLA incursions or cyberattacks on TSMC, which could spark a modern “shot heard round the world.” Unity remains Taiwan’s cornerstone for survival.

The lesson from Lexington is clear: a single spark, be it an incursion, miscalculation, or cyberattack can quickly lead to open conflict before political consensus is reached. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) incursions and cyber operations against critical sectors like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Limited (TSMC) could ignite a modern ‘shot heard round the world’. To survive, the island must set aside partisan and factional differences and bult common institutions and jointly agree on defense and security. As shown by the American experience, unity is essential for survival against existential threats.

Taiwan’s Legal-Diplomatic Status: The Sovereignty Trilemma

At present, Taiwan’s sovereign status is shaped by a persistent trilemma. Like colonial America, it finds itself in a similar diplomatic limbo: divided at home, unrecognized abroad, and forced to navigate a fragile yet determined path forward. The echoes of the American Revolution are clear: contested legitimacy, uncertain autonomy, and dependence on support that often arrives too late. It is also unable to forge a cohesive response to repeated “Lexington moments” of coercion.

The first challenge is constitutional ambiguity. From the standpoint of international law, Taiwan fulfills the Montevideo Convention. It has a population of 23 million, a defined territory, a democratic and effective government, and the capacity for international trade and diplomacy. Its $600 billion economy is driven by TSMC’s global semiconductor dominance and more than $130 billion in U.S. trade underscore its practical sovereignty and strategic relevance.

However, this de facto independence is undermined by constitutional ambiguity. The 1947 Republic of China (ROC) Constitution still claims sovereignty over mainland China, creating legal confusion and internal division. This tension mirrors the ideological split of the 1775 Continental Congress, where American colonists debated between reconciliation with Britain and independence.

In Taiwan, the DPP sees constitutional reform as essential to asserting a distinct national identity, while the KMT clings to the existing framework as a stabilizing cultural link to China. This impasse has real-world consequences, such as budgetary disputes and weakened national resolve, as seen in the 2025 defense budget disagreement. This weakens the collective resolve needed for a “Concord” of national unity.

To transcend this divide, Taiwan must prioritize civic education and bipartisan dialogue, placing national survival above party loyalties. Expanding civic defense programs, such as training 15,000 citizens in 2024, is a step toward fostering the collective unity needed to navigate its complex legal and geopolitical challenges.

The second challenge is de facto autonomy, which itself presents a paradox: functionally sovereign yet lacking formal recognition. The island operates as an independent state: it holds regular and democratic elections, manages foreign trade, commands a credible military, and leads the world in advanced semiconductor manufacturing, with TSMC alone generating nearly $400 billion in exports in 2024. Its autonomy is also backed by military preparedness, exemplified by the 2025 Han Kuang exercises involving 22,000 reservists and scenarios simulating blockades.

And yet, Taiwan remains diplomatically marginalized. Like colonial militias before French intervention in the American Revolution, Taiwan’s resilience is clear, but autonomy without robust external support remains precarious. Taiwan’s autonomy lacks the external alliances needed for a “Concord” of sustainable security. PLA military pressure and cyber intrusions highlight the risks of this diplomatic marginalization.

To convert fragile autonomy into sustainable security, Taiwan must invest in technological resilience, specifically by deploying low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites to protect communications and harden its infrastructure against disruption in times of crisis.

The third challenge is international constraint. Externally, Taiwan faces acute diplomatic constraints. With only 12 formal allies, mainly in Latin America and the Pacific, Taiwan is diplomatically isolated due to the One-China policy and Beijing’s interpretation of UN Resolution 2758, which excludes Taiwan from international bodies like the WHO. Though the U.S. remains its primary security partner, a $21.54 billion backlog in arms deliveries weakening deterrence: amid Beijing’s growing military power and incursions. This recalls the American colonies’ reliance on French support before 1778 – always delayed, conditional, and incomplete. Limited recognition hinders Taiwan’s ability to build a diplomatic “Concord,” leaving it exposed to Beijing’s pressure.

This is the essence of Taiwan’s trilemma: a democracy that is militarily vulnerable yet economically indispensable. Its defense budget grows steadily, but it remains a fraction of China’s. Conversely, Taiwan’s pivotal role in global supply chains provides an unique economic leverage that Beijing cannot fully counter. This is the essence of the trilemma: militarily vulnerable yet economically indispensable. This mirrors the colonies’ pre-1778 reliance on delayed French support. Still, Taiwan seeks to soften these constraints by expanding engagement with ASEAN forums and advocates for regional observer status. It is also promoting crisis hotlines between Beijing and Washington.

The trilemma also captures Taiwan’s fragile equilibrium. Pushing too hard on constitutional reform incurs Beijing’s fire and fury. Lean too much on autonomy without allies and coercion intensifies. Depending too heavily on limited recognition and sovereignty feels hollow. Beijing exploits every gap possible with cyberattacks, disinformation, and diplomatic pressure. 

The American Revolution suggests a way forward: unity at home, recognition abroad, and resilience on the ground. In this case, the island must draw lessons carefully to avoid turning its own Lexington moment into a point of no return. Ultimately, the trilemma is not about whether Taiwan is a state. It is about how long it can balance these contradictions without triggering a crisis it cannot control.

Gray-Zone Pressure and Taiwan’s “Lexington Without Concord”

Taiwan’s most immediate challenge is not invasion but the constant drip of gray-zone pressure. Unlike an outright invasion, which would provoke a decisive U.S.-led response, gray-zone tactics are more dangerous because they erode Taiwan’s resilience incrementally, normalize aggression, and exploit ambiguity to avoid international retaliation. This is where the “Lexington Without Concord” analogy feels sharpest: provocations pile up, tensions rise, but the pathway to resolution is deliberately blocked.

The PLA actions have become more provocative. The Joint Sword 2024B exercises put 153 aircraft and 43 ships into the waters and skies around Taiwan, blurring the line between training and blockade. By 2025, near-daily incursions were forcing Taiwan’s air force and coast guard to scramble constantly. Beijing’s intention is clear and effectively normalizes aggressive actions, gradually eroding Taiwan’s operational readiness without triggering war. This persistent pressure seeks to desensitize Taiwan and its allies to aggressive posturing, undermining operational readiness without firing a shot.

Hybrid threats have increased military harassment. In mid-2025, Taiwan’s government agencies, banks, and TSMC were all targeted with Cobalt Strike malware. These cyberattacks aim to disrupt Taiwan’s economic leverage and expose digital vulnerabilities, potentially crippling global supply chains. The U.S. Cyber Command assisted with countering these attacks, highlighting the link between Taiwan’s digital security and global supply chains. However, reliance on external support also exposes Taiwan’s vulnerability, as even small breaches could cause serious economic and strategic harm.

Disinformation campaigns have surged ahead of Taiwan’s 2025 local elections. The Taiwan FactCheck Center noted a surge of false claims that the Central Election Commission rigged results favoring the ruling DPP. Spread through bots and altered videos, these efforts undermine trust in democracy, deepen partisan divides, and fuel social polarization. These parallels show how propaganda intensified Loyalist-Patriot tensions during colonial America.

Despite pressure, regional support for Taiwan has subtly grown. Japan has stepped up, holding joint missile defense and maritime exercises and committing $10 billion in semiconductor investment. Meanwhile, ASEAN is negotiating a South China Sea Code of Conduct, with Taiwan participating indirectly in talks. These moves show Taiwan is less isolated than Beijing wants.

Historically, unlike the American Revolution’s clear turning point at Lexington and Concord, Taiwan faces a “Lexington Without Concord.” Beijing’s gray-zone tactics avoid decisive conflict, keeping Taiwan in constant low-level siege in terms of military, digital, and psychological aiming at wearing it down without uniting it through crisis.

Alternate Trigger Scenarios: When Defense Looks Like Offense

Besides an invasion, the next greatest danger for Taiwan would be misperception. In such an adversarial environment, a mere defensive maneuver can look like provocation.

In the same vein as US arms sales, the 2025 Han Kuang exercises that aimed at public reassurance and deterrence strengthening, would trigger a similar reaction from Beijing as they are taken as “splitting the motherland.” What Taipei sees as essential for survival, Beijing frames and misreads as evidence of a creeping conflict. In this mirror hall, shields look like swords.

Domestic politics compound this dilemma. Taiwan’s democracy fuels activism that often collides with Beijing’s sensitivities. Grassroots movements, seen locally as democratic expression, are recast by Beijing as foreign-backed separatism, raising the risk of a coercive response to peaceful civic action. Senator Marco Rubio’s mid-2025 visit to Taipei, meant to show U.S. support, was seen by Beijing as provocation, triggering increased military drills.

History reminds us how easily tense moments can spiral out of control. The “accidental shots” at Lexington in April 1775 ignited into a full-scale war that changed the course of history. Taiwan’s present risk lies in a similar dynamic where small sparks, whether a military drill or a student protest, can trigger a larger conflict that neither Taipei nor Beijing sought.

To mitigate this, Taiwan must pre-announce 2026 Han Kuang drills via MOFA schedules and engage in ASEAN forums to clarify defensive intent. These measures reduce ambiguity, ensuring Taiwan’s “Lexington” does not escalate without a “Concord” of resilience and dialogue.

Reform Instead of Revolution: Policy Recommendations

History reminds us that diplomacy and collaboration can be more effective than conflict. After the battles of Lexington and Concord, The Founding Fathers faced an impossible situation: divided colonies, a powerful empire and no guarantee of outside support. They responded pragmatically with a dual approach: the Continental Army was formed; and they reach out diplomatically, especially with France. 

This strategy of building internal strength and seeking external support was key for their survival and independence. Taiwan in this instance should learn from this by enhancing defenses while avoiding provocation and deepening democracy for resilience, with each policy addressing its sovereignty trilemma: constitutional ambiguity, de facto autonomy, and international constraints.

Diplomacy is paramount, easing international constraints. Establishing U.S.-China-Taiwan crisis hotlines reduces miscalculation risks. Without these channels, crises may escalate unintentionally.  At the same time, Taiwan should continue pursuing membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to strengthen economic ties and show its commitment to a fair, rules-based global economy. Regional engagement is vital. Taiwan’s participation in ASEAN forums can foster good partnerships and frameworks for disaster relief, health security, and technology sharing. These help to promote goodwill, trust and reduce conflicts.

Military preparedness must go hand in hand with diplomacy, strengthening autonomy. Taiwan cannot abandon its deterrence, but it can shape how it is perceived. National Han Kuang exercises are crucial but could be better managed to reduce misperceptions. Pre-announcing the 2026 drills would emphasize their defensive nature and ease Beijing’s concerns. Investing in low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite defenses is critical to safeguard communication and deter cyber and space threats, especially against key infrastructure like TSMC.

Societal resilience counters constitutional ambiguity. Programs like Kuma Academy’s civil defense training, which has engaged over 15,000 citizens, extend defense beyond the military. The Taiwan FactCheck Center counters Beijing’s disinformation, helping maintain public support for the status quo, preferred by 62 percent of the population. This societal preference supports measured resilience instead of hasty confrontation.

Finally, Taiwan needs unity at home – cross-party consensus is critical to resolve constitutional ambiguity. The American Revolution only found direction when the colonies put aside internal disputes to face an existential threat. Taiwan’s two main parties must do the same. They can disagree on constitutional reform or budget priorities, but they must agree on survival and autonomy. Without these shared minimum consensus, Taiwan’s democracy risks becoming its Achilles’ heel.

In short, Taiwan’s future depends not on sudden upheaval but on quiet and deliberate reform. By enhancing diplomacy, refining deterrence, strengthening social resilience, and building cross-party unity, Taiwan can turn its “Lexington Without Concord” into a moment of endurance and not escalation.

Conclusion: Resilience as the New Revolution

Revolutions are often remembered for their victories, but they begin in loss. The American Revolution, remembered for its victory, began with great sacrifice of losing over 25,000 lives, families torn apart, and communities scarred. Taiwan faces similar uncertainties, but with modern threats: frequent incursions, cyberattacks on key industries, and an arms backlog of more than $20 billion that complicates defense. These test the island’s ability to deter aggression, reassure its people, and maintain the trust of its allies. As such, any misstep is a risk. 

Taiwan’s “Lexington Without Concord” reflects a sovereignty trilemma: constitutional ambiguity, de facto autonomy, and international constraints. War is not inevitable if Taiwan centers resilience on this framework. To address ambiguity, Civic Defense Education fosters bipartisan unity, countering DPP–KMT divides. For autonomy, 2025 Han Kuang exercises and LEO satellites bolster defenses and secure communications. To ease constraints, crisis hotlines and ASEAN engagement build multilateral trust, reducing miscalculation risks. 

Taiwan’s challenge is a revolution rooted in resilience, not rebellion. Its trilemma demands internal cohesion and external agility to absorb Beijing’s pressures without breaking. While the Revolutionary analogy illuminates Taiwan’s path, its modern stakes require a new “Concord” of patience and strength.

Taiwan’s survival depends on unity at home and diplomacy abroad, balancing patience with strength. With these, more than any muskets or missiles, is how Taiwan will continue to shape its own history. 

Tags: Grey Zone Operations, Han Kuang exercises, INDO-PACIFIC, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Taiwan, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company

About The Author

• 
  
• Tang Meng Kit
• Tang Meng Kit is a Singaporean freelance analyst and commentator who works as an aerospace engineer. He graduated from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, Singapore in 2025.

13. The pilot of an F-22 just controlled a drone wingman in flight

Summary:

An F-22 pilot at Nellis used a cockpit tablet to command an MQ-20 Avenger drone, a first demonstration of manned-unmanned teaming for the Raptor, using open-architecture datalinks from General Atomics, Lockheed Skunk Works, and L3Harris, advancing the Air Force’s collaborative combat aircraft program and future CCA-equipped fighter concepts and tactics.

Comment: Likely the way of the future. Planes, ships, submarines, and fire team member robots perhaps.

The pilot of an F-22 just controlled a drone wingman in flight

defenseone.com · Thomas Novelly

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/11/pilot-f-22-just-controlled-drone-wingman-flight/409586/

An F-22 Raptor assigned to the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron (TES), takes off for a mission from Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, Aug. 26, 2025. U.S. Air Force / Airman 1st Class Heather Amador

The General Atomics linkup is a first for the Air Force’s collaborative combat aircraft effort.

By Thomas Novelly

Senior Reporter

November 17, 2025 06:26 PM ET

• Air Force
• Technology
• Industry

Updated: 9:58 p.m. ET.

High above a Nevada test range, an F-22 pilot took control of a combat drone last month, a first for the Air Force's robot wingman effort.

The pilot used a tablet for “command and control” of the MQ‑20 Avenger combat drone during an Oct. 21 flight at the Air Force’s Nevada Test and Training Range, according to a Monday press release by MQ-20 maker General Atomics, which worked on the demonstration with F-22 builder Lockheed Martin and defense company L3Harris.

General Atomics said the exhibit is the latest in a series of demonstrations backed by its own internal research and development funding to show “the art of the possible” in manned-unmanned teaming. L3Harris used its datalinks and software radios with Lockheed Martin’s open radio architectures to showcase the “non-proprietary, U.S. government-owned communications capabilities,” the news release said.

C. Mark Brinkley, a General Atomics spokesperson, said the demo is believed to be the first of its kind with an F-22. The announcement, which coincides with the Dubai Airshow in the United Arab Emirates this week, comes as General Atomics vies to win the Air Force’s ongoing collaborative combat aircraft competition; a first-increment production design contract is to be awarded in 2026.

“General Atomics is in a pretty unique situation here, given that we already have operational uncrewed jets to use for experimentation,” Brinkley said. “The MQ-20 Avenger, tricked out with mature mission autonomy software, is a perfect CCA surrogate and allows us to move fast and move first.”

After General Atomics’ announcement, Lockheed Martin’s secretive Skunk Works research arm said it had “led and orchestrated” the demonstration.

“This effort represents Skunk Works bringing its diverse and unique expertise to the table to lead the way demonstrating the future of air combat, where single-seat aircraft command and control drones with simple and intuitive interfaces in the cockpit,” OJ Sanchez, Skunk Works’ vice president and general manager, said in an emailed statement.

Last month, the service’s ambitious 10-year fighter jet plan highlighted the service’s push to acquire CCAs to fly with F-22s. The 24-page plan, which was obtained by Defense One, called drone wingmen the “key to controlling future highly contested environments.” F-22 modernization was listed as a top priority, in part, because of its integration with CCAs.

“F-22 remains the threshold platform for CCA integration,” the report reads, adding that the drones will later help next-generation F-47 fighter jets “meet highly contested mission demands.” Production on the F-47 is underway; first flight is expected in 2028.

General Atomics is competing against defense company Anduril for the CCA work. Both companies flew prototypes in recent months, less than two years after launching their development efforts. General Atomics photos released earlier this month revealed the company flew a second CCA this month, just days after Anduril announced its first flight.

Brinkley said General Atomics was eager to begin testing the Air Force’s future concept.

“We don’t want to wait for the CCA fleet to be fielded to begin leaning in on F-22 teaming,” Brinkley said. “We already know the F-22 will play a critical role in crewed-uncrewed teaming operations, and General Atomics is in a unique position to get started now.”

14. Proxies in Hybrid Operations: Insights from the Partnership for Peace Consortium Workshop | Helsinki, Finland, August 2025

Summary:

A PfP Consortium workshop at Finland’s Hybrid COE examined how states use proxies in hybrid operations that blend political, informational, cyber, economic, religious, and kinetic tools. Participants traced continuities from mercenaries to today’s militias, hackers, churches, corporations, and criminal networks that offer deniability and low-cost leverage. Case studies from Sweden, Moldova, Romania, and the South Caucasus highlighted Russia’s adaptive proxy ecosystem, fusing state and non-state actors to erode trust and institutions. The group proposed a four-pillar response framework: anticipate proxy strategies, inform publics and policymakers, harden critical vulnerabilities, and responsibly engage democratic non-state actors, feeding into a new joint research agenda.

Comment: I like the four pillar response framework which is similar to RUEA: recognize the adversary's strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack the strategy with a superior form of political warfare. 

Proxies in Hybrid Operations: Insights from the Partnership for Peace Consortium Workshop | Helsinki, Finland, August 2025

irregularwarfare.org · Kevin D. Stringer, Svenja Mach · November 18, 2025]

https://irregularwarfare.org/uncategorized/proxies-in-hybrid-operations-insights-from-the-partnership-for-peace-consortium-workshop-helsinki-finland-august-2025/

From August 5-7, 2025, the Partnership for Peace Consortium’s (PfP-C) Irregular Warfare and Hybrid Threats Working Group met at the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (HCOE) in Helsinki, Finland to examine the theme of “Proxies in Hybrid Operations.” The workshop gathered academics, practitioners, and analysts from 12 countries (Finland, Sweden, Latvia, Georgia, Germany, United States, Moldova, Romania, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Poland, Israel) to explore how states design and employ proxies and non-state actors in hybrid campaigns combining political, informational, cyber, economic, religious, and kinetic tools.

As an additional benefit and through the institutional affiliation of the participants, the event assembled several of the key organizations working in irregular warfare and hybrid threats, namely HCOE, the Partnership for Peace Consortium, the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies (GCMC), and the Irregular Warfare Initiative (IWI). This working laboratory on proxies in hybrid operations aligned well with the spirit of IWI’s mission to bridge the gap between scholars and practitioners to support the community of irregular warfare professionals. Keeping in that spirit, this article aims to share the working group’s outputs to further drive the public dialogue on the role of irregular warfare in national security.

Framing the Hybrid Threat Environment

Through historical reflection, conceptual debate, and comparative case studies, workshop discussions moved from definitional challenges and historical continuities to regional analyses and a forward-looking, applied research agenda. The shared goal was to translate empirical insights into operationally relevant recommendations and advance a structured framework for anticipating and countering proxy activity.

Proxies have long been a part of statecraft, from early mercenary forces and colonial auxiliaries to ideological movements during the Cold War, where proxy conflict played a prominent role as a core instrument of great-power competition. Today, the concept encompasses a far broader spectrum of actors, including militias, hacktivists, corporations, religious extremists or institutions, and criminal networks. Several participants suggested adopting the broader term non-state actors to reflect their diversity, autonomy, and fluidity. Whatever the terminology, their appeal remains clear: they offer plausible deniability, extend a measure of influence at low cost, and destabilize adversaries without open confrontation.

Russia’s Proxy Strategy

The Working Group brought together irregular warfare professionals from a range of national backgrounds, many representing countries that directly experience Russia’s use of proxies as instruments of influence, coercion, and control. These experts provided concrete insights into how Moscow’s proxy networks target their respective states through hybrid operations, illustrating the scope, adaptability, and strategic coherence of Russia’s evolving approach.

A closer look at Russia’s activities revealed the significance and pressing relevance of this topic. Russia’s reliance on proxies as part of its hybrid warfare toolkit represents both continuity with Soviet practices and significant innovation in the post-Cold War era. Emerging in the 1990s, these practices initially targeted former Soviet republics before expanding across Europe and, more recently, Africa. The Kremlin has systematically employed proxies because they are cost-effective, deniable, and highly adaptable. Their versatility makes them useful across varied operational environments–from cyber operations to influence campaigns–while also allowing the state to exploit specialized expertise it may not possess itself.

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 intensified Russia’s reliance on proxies as core instruments of hybrid warfare. Confronted with international isolation and sanctions, Moscow increasingly externalized its capabilities–particularly in the cyber and information domains–to sustain influence under constrained conditions. The line between state and non-state actors has blurred in the process: cybercriminal groups, private firms, and hacktivist collectives operate in close coordination with Russian intelligence agencies, offering technical expertise, flexibility, and plausible deniability.

Russia’s extensive use of disinformation networks highlights the centrality of information warfare in its proxy strategy. These operations amplify propaganda, distort narratives, and undermine societal resilience across Europe. While Moscow has historically cooperated with a wide range of violent and extremist actors, these partnerships remain a secondary element within a broader ecosystem of influence tools that blend cyber operations, media manipulation, and covert state support. Together, these methods illustrate how proxy warfare has evolved into a defining and adaptive feature of Russia’s contemporary statecraft. For concrete examples, Swedish, Moldovan, Romanian, and Georgian participants provided the following cases for analysis and examination:

Sweden: The Russian Orthodox Church as an Instrument of Hybrid Influence

The Russian Orthodox Church, long intertwined with state ideology, has filled the ideological and organizational void left by the collapse of Soviet structures. Across Europe, church-linked entities have established facilities in strategically sensitive locations–often near military airbases, transport corridors, or critical infrastructure that could hold operational significance in a military confrontation. These strategic nodes aid in projecting soft power, intelligence collection, and logistical coordination, offering strategic advantages relative to their cost. Operating under the guise of religious or cultural engagement, such institutions enjoy extensive legal protections afforded to faith-based organizations in host countries like Sweden, where their religious status limits governmental oversight and enables activities that might otherwise attract scrutiny.

Moldova: A Frontline Laboratory for Russian Proxy Warfare

Moldova exemplifies how Russia employs proxies as instruments of political, economic, informational, and social interference. Moscow’s proxy network spans criminal groups, clergy, youth movements, and media outlets. Its hybrid toolbox includes illegal financing through cryptocurrencies, disinformation campaigns, electoral corruption, and energy coercion. While Moldova has sought to counter these activities by restricting Russian media, proxies have adapted by shifting their operations to Telegram, TikTok, and VK. Beyond destabilizing Moldova’s internal politics, these proxies erode public trust, obstruct EU integration, and disseminate pro-Russian narratives portraying Moscow as a legitimate security and cultural alternative to the West.

Romania: The Weaponization of Proxies in Electoral Interference

Romania’s strategic geography makes it a key target for Russian interference, with regional stability depending heavily on its internal resilience. The 2024 presidential elections were marred by alleged foreign-backed hybrid operations, including coordinated disinformation campaigns, influencer-driven manipulation on TikTok, and cyber intrusions. The objectives were to erode trust in democratic institutions, amplify polarization, and undermine national security. In this sense, Romania has become a testing ground for Russia’s proxy-based influence operations within the EU, exposing the persistent lack of a coherent and coordinated European response.

South Caucasus: Russia’s Expanding Proxy Architecture

Russia’s proxy strategies also extend into the South Caucasus, where Georgia and Armenia present contrasting but interconnected cases. In Georgia, the ruling Georgian Dream party has adopted anti-Western narratives that align with Moscow’s strategic interests, leveraging themes of “deep state” conspiracy, anti-LGBT rhetoric, and sovereignty discourse. Armenia, by contrast, has sought to distance itself from Moscow following the 2020 peace agreement with Azerbaijan and the 2023 annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh, yet it remains highly vulnerable due to entrenched pro-Russian elites and limited Western support. As traditional pro-Moscow actors lose legitimacy, the Kremlin has begun cultivating new figures in business, media, and clerical circles to maintain its foothold in Georgian and Armenian society. Through such proxies, Russia continues to exert influence via economic leverage, manipulation of media narratives, and targeted pressure on critical infrastructure. The strategic risk for the wider South Caucasus remains considerable: a pro-Russian Georgia obstructs both Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s Western integration, while a future, “frozen” front in Ukraine would enable Moscow to redirect resources and deepen its influence across the Caucasus.

From Analysis to Response Frameworks

An important conclusion from the workshop was that analyzing proxies requires more than identifying the actors involved–it demands an in-depth understanding of the strategic logic behind their use. Effective analysis must consider the national drivers shaping a state’s proxy strategy and the vulnerabilities that make a target susceptible to external influence. Each case reflects a distinct interplay between history, ambition, resources, and the capacity to exploit social, political, or economic fault lines.

Russia’s approach stands out for its breadth and adaptability. Moscow integrates state and non-state actors, aligning them opportunistically with its geopolitical objectives and each target’s specific vulnerabilities. Its strategy prioritizes erosion of trust and institutions beyond settling for short-term disruptions. Proxies, therefore, serve as core instruments of Russian influence, and in turn, help astute observers understand Moscow’s strategic aims.

Towards a Framework: Four Pillars of Hybrid Threat Response

Building on these insights, the next analytical step was to develop frameworks for responding to proxy groups and hybrid threats. A comprehensive response to proxy-based hybrid threats could rest on four interlinked pillars that turn academic research into actionable frameworks.

First, analyzing current and future proxy strategies and target selection is key to anticipating emerging networks and domains of contestation. This analysis includes mapping proxy ecosystems by region and function, conducting comparative studies across major actors such as Russia, Iran, China, and North Korea, and examining how cognitive and cyber operations are integrated into proxy warfare. Future research should also assess how domestic vulnerabilities inform targeting and how international law can better address and penalize proxy activity.

Second, informing the public and policymakers through transparent communication and accessible analysis can mitigate disinformation and close the gap between academic insight and operational response. Priorities include measuring the impact of proxy-driven disinformation on democratic institutions, designing visualization tools for real-time influence tracking, and identifying best practices for countering narrative manipulation and enhancing strategic communication.

Third, strengthening the resilience of critical vulnerabilities–including infrastructure, elections, and social cohesion–requires integrating legal, technical, and societal innovation. Hybrid resilience audits, proxy-based simulations, and improved civil-military cooperation can enhance institutional preparedness, while community-based approaches can build decentralized societal resilience.

Finally, democratic states and alliances must explore how to responsibly engage non-state actors in defensive and preventive capacities without replicating coercive practices. This option entails defining legal and ethical frameworks for cooperation, exploring models like adapted Security Force Assistance activities and public-private partnerships, and mapping soft proxy potential among NGOs, cultural institutions, and digital influencers to support democratic resilience.

Toward a Research Agenda on Proxy Warfare

Taken together, these four pillars provide both an analytical and operational bridge between the identification of proxy strategies and the development of coherent response mechanisms. They also open pathways for a future research agenda: focusing on anticipating proxy strategies, enhancing awareness, strengthening resilience, and responsibly engaging non-state actors in democratic defense.

In this spirit, the Working Group’s discussions led to the establishment of a new collaborative research initiative to consolidate the group’s empirical findings and conceptual reflections into an open-access research report that can both inform and advise practitioners and policymakers. The project seeks to cover an important set of pressing issues: the post-2022 transformation of proxy warfare; the use of criminal organizations, diaspora groups, and religious institutions as proxy instruments; and the emergence of cyber proxies. A significant advantage to this constellation of topics is that they will be heavily informed by practitioners with field experience across multiple frontlines of hybrid threats. Taken together, the Working Group offers a mechanism with the necessary ingredients and expertise to derive real-world solutions to the irregular warfare problems confronting democracies today.

Kevin D. Stringer, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is a Lecturer at the University of Northwestern Switzerland and Co-Chair of the Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Irregular Warfare and Hybrid Threats Working Group. Stringer earned a PhD from the University of Zurich, an MA from Boston University, an MSS from the U.S. Army War College, and a BSc from the U.S. Military Academy.

Svenja Mach, Law Graduate from Goethe University Frankfurt, is a Research Assistant at A&O Shearman and Academic Assistant and Tutor at Goethe University Frankfurt. Mach specializes in public international law with a focus on security and defence policy and is a core member of the Partnership for Peace Consortium’s Irregular Warfare and Hybrid Threats Working Group.

The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

Main Image: Generated by DALL-E, OpenAI.

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irregularwarfare.org · Kevin D. Stringer, Svenja Mach · November 18, 2025

15. Replicator 3 Should Be the Sustainment Revolution

Summary:

Replicator’s first two waves build unmanned mass without the sustainment to keep it combat-credible. Hardware always decays; Indo-Pacific drones will be complex, corrosion-prone, manpower-intensive systems, not disposable quadcopters. The myth of a “small tail” is dangerous. Replicator-3 should deliberately design a forward, distributed sustainment architecture: expeditionary maintainer teams, additive manufacturing, resilient power (e.g., small reactors), and partner-nation support hubs. He urges tying procurement to minimum sustainment funding, incentivizing industry for uptime and robust supply chains, and using foreign military financing to build regional sustainment. Without this, America gets impressive inventories and a fragile deterrent.

Comment: I had only heard how the Replictor was going to be a game changer. I was not aware of the issues highlighted in this essay.

Replicator 3 Should Be the Sustainment Revolution

warontherocks.com · November 18, 2025

Nick Johnson

November 18, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/replicator-3-should-be-the-sustainment-revolution/

Under the Arizona sun, mothballed aircraft glisten in perfect rows at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. In the brackish calm of the James River, reserve ships drift, their gray hulls streaked with rust. Both rest in quiet suspension, reminders that hardware decays without care. Future force design will share this truth: Hardware degrades if it is not sustained. Procurement is the flashy step, sustainment the sticky one.

Replicator is the Pentagon’s catalyst to deliver new capability at speed and scale. The Defense Department and steward, Defense Innovation Unit, have broken down Replicator into multiple lines of effort. Replicator is fielding thousands of affordable, autonomous systems for asymmetric offensive power. Replicator-2 is focused on a credible defensive layer as threats evolve to a similar force concept. Replicator-3 should be the next step, building the sustainment network that keeps the future force combat-credible. It should shepherd the design of a new sustainment architecture that resources and forward deploys the infrastructure, manpower, and foreign partnerships to keep pace with production.

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A Production Revolution Without a Sustainment One

In response to China’s military expansion, the Pentagon is racing to field vast numbers of unmanned systems across the Pacific – a strategy that risks building an arsenal faster than it can be sustained. This is not a call to slow procurement; production is the essential first step. Replicator has focused rightly on speed, scale, and affordability, but less on how thousands of systems will be kept operational and tactically effective once fielded. The issue is not that the Department of Defense ignores sustainment, it’s that sustainment isn’t resourced or structured properly for the type of systems or speed we’re buying them.

Audits by the Government Accountability Office show the historical reality. From 2011 to 2021, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers averaged 25 days of maintenance delays per ship and 23 severe casualty reports, a complete loss of a mission area, per year. An additional Government Accountability Office report attributes these shortfalls to corrosion, component reliability, and continued shortfalls in depot capacity and workforce skills. The Defense Department spends billions on sustainment but lacks focus and structure. If manned fleets with onboard maintainers and mature infrastructure struggle to stay ready, an unmanned surge built in haste will be operationally hollow.

America’s deterrent is only as strong as the network that sustains it. We are fielding thousands of unmanned systems without a credible plan to store, service, or power them once deployed on the notion that systems are attritable. A Replicator-3 should fuse the industrial and logistical revolution, planning for sustainment as much as production.

The False Premise of a Smaller Tail

A persistent myth in defense debates holds that unmanned systems carry a smaller sustainment tail. They do not – at least not for the long-range, maritime, sensor-dense systems the Indo-Pacific will require. Whether scaling SM-6 shooter capable hulls or deploying hundreds of unmanned all-domain systems across the battlespace, sustainment demands multiply as firepower does. Adoption of condition-based maintenance practices, modular components, and attritable designs for smaller systems can reduce depot work. However smaller more numerous systems will increase organizational and intermediate level maintenance as they scale. Without the forward sustainment infrastructure, the United States will not capture the capability through capacity promised by modern technology.

Small unmanned systems may simplify some repairs, but the technicians, tooling, and forward infrastructure to execute them remain under-resourced and lack structure. While a focus on commercial components and software-defined design will reduce supply chain strain, platforms face the same mechanical decay realities as civilian aircraft and boats – their batteries die, spark plugs foul, lubricants degrade, and components corrode. An unmanned augmented force is strategically sound, but its sustainment architecture remains underdeveloped and unfit for scale.

The services recognize this even if public discussion lags. The Navy has formed squadrons for surface and sub-surface drones and a career field for robotic warfare specialists. The Air Force is establishing collaborative combat aircraft squadrons. Those organizational moves quietly admit what defense discourse rarely includes: unmanned does not mean unsustained.

The Indo-Pacific Is Not Ukraine

Ukraine shows that unmanned systems can be produced and expended in huge quantities. While small quadcopters are the next evolutionary step of the recoilless rifle, a future Indo-Pacific conflict presents a different geopolitical and physical environment – an away game dependent on allied access; defined by vast distances, salt, humidity, and maritime logistics; and a region not yet in active conflict.

The systems fit for the Pacific are not disposable quadcopters. They are large, power-hungry, sensor-laden machines, modernized and modularized extensions of today’s warships and aircraft. Shedding hotel loads and life-support systems reduces unit cost, but not complexity in aggregate. That complexity drives unique design and sustainment demands that diverge sharply from Ukraine’s attrition model and drawing direct corollaries is a mistake.

Unmanned systems that aren’t hardened against corrosion and capable of long idle endurance will not be successful in the Indo-Pacific. They should also be able to maintain secure long-range control, use modular architectures, and be built on open sustainment rights for government upkeep. And let’s not forget manpower and forward-deployed infrastructure. Manning requirements for unmanned systems are significant, which might seem counterintuitive to some observers. Without those features, attritable mass becomes disposable fragility.

Building for Production, Not Readiness

Defense unicorns like Anduril and Saronic are investing heavily in production infrastructure stateside, reindustrialization vital to future defense challenges. However, that capital is overwhelmingly tied to manufacture, not sustainment. The forward support network of storage, equipment, tooling, and technicians required to keep distributed fleets operational in theater is not being co-invested at the necessary scale.

Advocates often invoke liberty ships and B-24 bombers as analogs for mass production of modern unmanned craft. The comparison flatters our nostalgia. Those programs surged after heavy wartime attrition; we have not yet reached that point. The systems we build today we will have to sustain tomorrow. If conflict comes later than expected, many could sit idle for years, demanding disciplined upkeep to remain combat-ready.

Some argue virtual training can preserve readiness, but trust between operator and machine is forged only in real operations. Faults in heterogeneous hardware/software integration and basic administrative friction appears only through use, not simulation. These systems will require practiced precision by their operators and maintainers. If crews never fly or sail these systems in peacetime, they will not trust them in crisis and history proves some will not work at all in conflict.

What Should Change

The trend towards cheaper, smarter, and numerous unmanned systems has the necessary momentum to succeed. However, leadership within the Defense Department, Congress, and industry need to focus on the sustainment tail.

The future sustainment network should not resemble a conventional supply base nor current maintenance infrastructure. It should be adaptive, dispersed, hardened, semi-autonomous, built to operate under persistent threat, and limited resupply. Nodes across the region should support storage, forward maintenance, and rapid iteration. Infrastructure cannot rely solely on access to established bases or Military Sealift Command’s aging fleet. The Defense Department should invest in small modular reactors such as those developed by Radiant to power regional maintenance facilities and additive manufacturing nodes like those offered by Rangeview to produce replacement parts in theater. Further forward, systems like Edge’s Moonshine Hydrogen, which produces hydrogen energy from aluminum and seawater, offer off-grid energy for small units and can sustain power, connectivity, and conditioning requirements for distributed containerized systems and munitions.

Automation doesn’t erase labor – it redistributes it. Even Waymo’s autonomous vehicle fleet employs nearly 1,700 engineers and technicians to sustain roughly 1,500 cars. The military needs its own version of that model: small, expeditionary teams that link logistics to combat power by swapping components, servicing batteries, refueling, patching software, and launching systems from austere environments. The Navy’s new Robotic Warfare Specialist is a start, but each service will need its own distributed maintainer force.

Replicator-3 should close the gap between production speed and forward sustainment capacity. That requires three parallel efforts. First, quantify the sustainment floor by tying a minimum sustainment ratio to procurement budgets so forward infrastructure and manpower are funded from the start. Second, tie industry incentives to resilience, not output, rewarding contractors for uptime, dual-source supply chains, and verified sustainment data. Third, use foreign military financing and sales to build regional sustainment capacity as a collective defense function, funding partner-led nodes and shared system pools to anchor distributed capability – one that lets smaller nations visibly contribute without firing a shot.

The Strategic Cost of Inaction

A numerically impressive but poorly sustained unmanned force will weaken deterrence. Replicator-3 should take on the harder work: build the sustainment foundation that keeps the future force enduring.

Otherwise, commanders will face the same wrenching choices Government Accountability Office research describes: cannibalize, wait for repairs, or ration capability. Pacific systems will never be cheap enough to discard en masse; they should be ready and reliable. Modernization succeeds not only by buying inventory but by guaranteeing readiness.

Sustainment problems are solvable if we design, fund, and structure their requirements now. Procurement will always be the headline, but sustainment should be the organ. If the Defense Department is serious about unmanned mass as a core pillar of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, Replicator-3 should be the sustainment revolution – a deliberate effort to design, resource, and forward-deploy the infrastructure, manpower, and partnerships to match the pace of production. Otherwise, we will have a spectacular arsenal on paper and a fragile deterrent in reality.

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Nick Johnson is an officer in the U.S. Navy currently serving as the fires and effects officer for Naval Special Warfare Group ONE. He is a TOPGUN graduate, former strike fighter tactics instructor, and F/A-18 Super Hornet pilot. He is a member of the Dark Trident Research Group, which advises the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He previously served as a defense ventures fellow with Anduril Industries, where he focused on autonomous system behavior and mission autonomy.

The views in this article are those of the author’s and do not represent the policies or positions of the Dark Trident Research Group, the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense unless and until the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Petty Officer 1st Class Jasmine Mieszala via DVIDS

warontherocks.com · November 18, 2025

16. The Hidden Cost of a Missile: Why the Headlines Get Cost Wrong

Summary:

The debates over firing multimillion-dollar missiles at cheap Houthi drones fixate on sticker price and ignore the true “cost-per-effect.” Acquisition unit cost is only a slice of real cost, which includes crews, ships, logistics, training, command-and-control, and production scalability. He urges standardized, independent cost frameworks that distinguish direct, indirect, common, and negligible costs, and that treat sunk R&D differently from future decisions. Analysts must also factor alternative tactics and the ability to build, replenish, and adapt weapons in wartime. Headlines sneer at $4 million interceptors, but the real failure is lacking cheaper options with equal effect.

Excerpts:

Done right, cost-per-effect analysis can drive smarter investments and operational choices. A comprehensive approach may reveal that long-range missiles are more cost-effective in certain scenarios, because their superior effectiveness outweighs their high cost. Conversely, it may show that cheaper systems or even change in tactics achieve the same outcome at far lower cost.

But until analysts do the work, those headlines over million-dollar missiles versus thousand-dollar drones are just noise. Sneering at $4 million missiles misses the broader truth: Those missiles may be the best bad option available. The real problem isn’t that commanders are using expensive interceptors. It’s that they don’t have cheaper alternatives that are equally effective.

The Hidden Cost of a Missile: Why the Headlines Get Cost Wrong

warontherocks.com · November 18, 2025

Erik Schuh

November 18, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/the-hidden-cost-of-a-missile-why-the-headlines-get-cost-wrong/

Since late 2023, the U.S. Navy has fired nearly $1 billion worth of munitions to protect ships in the Red Sea from low-cost Houthi drones and missiles. The headlines that followed have rightly pointed out the absurdity of firing multi-million dollar missiles against cheap drones. But those headlines miss the bigger picture.

Behind each intercept lies a vast and expensive ecosystem: the carrier strike group and its escorts, the logistics tail that keeps them fueled, the training pipeline for crews, and the command-and-control networks that make the engagement possible. In reality, the cost of downing each drone is not a few million dollars, but hundreds of millions in operational and sustainment expenses. Yet, that pricey shot may have saved an even greater loss: a $2.5 billion Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and, especially, its sailors.

This tension between the cost of an action and the value of its outcome sits at the heart of a Pentagon buzzword: “cost-per-effect.” What exactly counts as “cost” and how we define a meaningful “effect” is not as simple as the headlines suggest. If the Department of Defense gets cost-per-effect wrong, it risks favoring systems that appear cheap on paper but demand costly infrastructure, or buying affordable systems that are so limited operationally that they undermine the very effect they’re meant to produce.

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What Does “Cost” Really Mean?

When analysts talk about the cost of a capability, it turns out they might not all be speaking the same language. The most commonly cited metrics — shown in those headlines — tend to be acquisition costs. For example, the average procurement unit cost or the program acquisition unit cost are standard cost metrics that roll up development and procurement dollars divided by the number of units. These figures are useful for budgeting but often don’t capture what it will cost to actually use the system.

Take the Navy’s SM-2 and SM-6 missiles used to shoot down Houthi drones. Their price tags, roughly $2.2 million and $4.3 million respectively, are only part of the picture. The real cost includes the destroyer that fires them, the crew that mans the system, the fuel and maintenance to keep it at sea, and the logistics network that make each shot possible. While no one should allocate all these costs to one engagement, ignoring them entirely risks dramatically underestimating what it truly costs to achieve even a simple tactical effect like intercepting a drone.

Part of the problem stems from there not being a standardized cost approach within the Department of Defense for comparing operational costs across capabilities. Each service applies its own methodology, and even then, those cost estimates vary widely. Additionally, multiple offices can be considered authoritative sources for cost numbers on the same capability. This is where independent cost agencies like the Office of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation or the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency come into play. Whereas program offices are incentivized to understate costs, these independent agencies develop Non-Advocate Cost Assessments — a far more realistic foundation for comparing capabilities.

Defining “Effect”

If defining cost is hard, defining effect is even harder. Joint doctrine defines an effect as simply the outcome of an action. The definition is broad because an effect can virtually be anything. Ranging from using force (destroying a target) to other means (cyber operations) or tactical (one drone shot down) to strategic (preventing an enemy from winning the war). To compound the problem, some effects are intangible or only observable in the long run. How, for instance, do analysts measure the effect of a deterrence operation?

In the Red Sea scenario, there were multiple effects ranging from tactically defending naval vessels to strategically keeping shipping lanes open. Focusing narrowly on the missile engagements, the tactical effect was clear: protect U.S. forces from drones. To do that, the Navy had a variety of capabilities: long-range missiles, gatling guns, small arms, and non-kinetic weapons. While the smaller weapons were cheaper, these are the last line of defense before hitting the destroyer. It turns out a layered defense is more effective and therefore the first line of defense — missiles — were the first and best option. Also, no commanding officer is going to bet their $2.5 billion ship — and hundreds of sailors — on the cheapest possible option. They will use the best available tool, even if it’s expensive.

Doing Cost-per-Effect Right

To use cost-per-effect as a meaningful tool, analysts need to be honest about the full cost of delivering an effect and not just what a missile costs on paper. That starts with a clear definition of the desired effect — in this case, protecting U.S. naval forces from aerial threats — and then identifying every cost necessary to achieve it.

Of course, not all costs should be included. One way to do this is to get away from gross acquisition costs and move towards a comparative cost framework. Gross costs still matter for budgeting, but cost-per-effect analysis should illuminate trade-offs, not what to budget. One cost fallacy that persists in the Pentagon is the attachment to sunk costs irrespective of whether the program continues to be valuable. For example, missiles already in inventory have already passed their research and development phase, so those sunk costs shouldn’t distort future cost-effectiveness evaluations. The Army has recently shown how to correct this mindset by cutting multiple programs that no longer align with the modern fight.

The next challenge is distinguishing direct from indirect and common costs. While direct costs are directly associated with the capability, such as the tanker aircraft that refueled it or the sensors that guided it, indirect costs cannot be identified directly to the unit or personnel that support the system being analyzed. An example would be the costs associated with the installation support among the home port of that Navy destroyer. While they help make that destroyer operational, it is too difficult to include all indirect costs in the analysis. Common costs on the other hand are those costs that are the same across all capabilities being compared. An example would be the satellites used for command and control among all assets in a carrier task force. Lastly, there are negligible costs that represent less than 1 percent of the overall cost. Negligible costs help determine how far back the analyst goes in the pipeline of direct costs to consider. Eventually the costs become so insignificant that the effort to obtain those numbers doesn’t match the change in value to make it worth collecting.

Beyond the Battlefield

So far, this framework has focused on a single dimension: how a capability performs operationally. But cost-per-effect isn’t just about technology. It should also consider whether changes in tactics, techniques, or procedures could achieve the same outcome. In some cases, adapting how forces fight can yield greater cost-effectiveness than fielding new capabilities.

Another overlooked dimension lies upstream of cost analysis: the ability to actually produce and sustain capabilities at scale. Ukraine has reminded the defense industry that cheap, adaptive, and scalable solutions win wars of attrition. The Red Sea scenario highlighted the same lesson: the cost difference between million-dollar missiles and inexpensive drones tell only part of the story. What’s often overlooked is those missiles take to produce and whether production can scale quickly. Upstream of cost analysis lies the ability to build capabilities that can meet tomorrow’s fight. A weapon’s cost-effectiveness is meaningless if it cannot be produced quickly or in sufficient quantity. True cost-per-effect must therefore account for not only how efficiently a weapon performs in combat, but also how rapidly it can be produced, replenished, and adapted under wartime conditions.

Why It Matters

Done right, cost-per-effect analysis can drive smarter investments and operational choices. A comprehensive approach may reveal that long-range missiles are more cost-effective in certain scenarios, because their superior effectiveness outweighs their high cost. Conversely, it may show that cheaper systems or even change in tactics achieve the same outcome at far lower cost.

But until analysts do the work, those headlines over million-dollar missiles versus thousand-dollar drones are just noise. Sneering at $4 million missiles misses the broader truth: Those missiles may be the best bad option available. The real problem isn’t that commanders are using expensive interceptors. It’s that they don’t have cheaper alternatives that are equally effective.

BECOME A MEMBER

Erik Schuh is an Air Force officer serving as an operations research analyst. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Air Force, or the U.S. Space Force.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jonathan Nye

warontherocks.com · November 18, 2025

17. BRICS Is Missing Its Chance

Summary:

POTUS' second term has revived BRICS as a hedge against US unpredictability, but expansion deepens divisions. Members share resentment of US dominance yet differ on antagonism toward Washington, economic interests, and China’s leadership. Internal contradictions, weak cohesion, and cautious multialignment mean BRICS attracts members but cannot reshape global governance.

Excerpts:

Despite renewed urgency created by Trump’s return to power, BRICS remains hamstrung by the same structural weaknesses that have long limited its effectiveness: divergent national interests, conflicting economic priorities, and a deep mistrust of one another’s geopolitical ambitions. Expansion has only magnified those challenges, adding more actors and contradictions to an already unwieldy organization. Beijing may view Trump’s bellicosity as conclusive proof of the United States’ unreliability, but other members are reluctant to align too closely with China or to subordinate their own national agendas to a single leader. Group cohesion remains a long way off.

For the foreseeable future, the grouping is likely to continue muddling through—attracting new members, producing grand declarations, and occasionally coordinating positions, but falling well short of becoming the basis of a new model of global governance. Trump has reminded BRICS members why the bloc matters, while simultaneously exposing why it cannot rise to the occasion.

Comment: BRICS is not as strong, effective, or capable as we thought?

BRICS Is Missing Its Chance

Foreign Affairs · More by Oliver Stuenkel · November 18, 2025

United by Trump’s Hostility, but Too Divided to Seize the Moment

November 18, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-africa/brics-missing-its-chance

A BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro, July 2025 Ricardo Moraes / Reuters

OLIVER STUENKEL is a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and an Associate Professor at the School of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas in São Paulo.

ALEXANDER GABUEV is Director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin.

• More by Alexander Gabuev

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This year, the BRICS—a ten-country group whose first five members were Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—has gained a renewed sense of purpose thanks to one catalyst: the United States. With U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the bloc looks, more than ever, like a necessary hedge against an increasingly erratic and fragmented global order. Many of Trump’s actions—including his chaotic tariff crusade against friends and foes, strikes on Iran and legally dubious military actions in Latin America, and withdrawal from the UN-supported Paris agreement on climate change—have sparked condemnation from the BRICS. Trump’s policies have put in stark relief BRICS’ raisons d’être: to help its members adapt to and build a less Western-centric world, gain greater leverage in their dealings with Washington, and find alternatives to Western-dominated institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

But despite their shared interests, BRICS as a grouping is not ready to seize the moment. Its members—which now include Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Indonesia, and the United Arab Emirates—are too divided to turn the group into a real challenge to Washington. They vary significantly in their degree of antagonism toward the United States, and each wishes to maintain strategic autonomy. As a result, the bloc will struggle to mount joint action. To unite and marshal their collective strength, the BRICS would have to turn into something akin to the G-7—a U.S.-led group of economically advanced countries that, in the interest of promoting their common purpose and values, willingly sacrifice a significant degree of strategic autonomy. But the BRICS countries, whose bond is based mainly on a collective rejection of U.S. hegemonic power, won’t find the cohesion that could make the bloc an effective geopolitical force.

POWER IN NUMBERS

While previous U.S. presidents have largely ignored the BRICS, Trump has adopted a more confrontational stance. He has called the BRICS an “anti-American bloc” and has repeatedly threatened to impose 100 percent tariffs on its members if they were to replace the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. For now, the Trump administration is not going after the bloc as a whole but picking fights with individual countries. Some BRICS members, such as China and Russia, are better equipped to weather U.S. pressure than others, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa. But all now have a clearer understanding that they are stronger together than apart: the more domineering the United States behaves, the more important the group is to its members.

For years, Beijing has warned fellow BRICS members that the U.S.-led order is unstable and subject to the political mood swings of Washington and its allies. The Chinese leadership has presented Trump’s return, and the United States’ unreliability as a partner in development, as evidence that Beijing’s push to build parallel institutions, such as the New Development Bank, was not premature but prescient. And the consequences of Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs, including volatility in the U.S. bond market and a fluctuating U.S. dollar, have spurred some developing countries to take steps to hedge against their exposure to the dollar. For China and its partners in the BRICS, these developments present an opportunity to leverage financial services that are not controlled by the United States, develop tools to reduce their dependence on the U.S. dollar, and facilitate trade in alternative currencies.

Moscow, too, sees advantage in the chaos that the Trump administration has sown. During the Biden administration, the United States and other Western countries imposed unprecedented sanctions against Russia in response to the Kremlin’s war of aggression against Ukraine. Trump’s return to the White House presented Russian President Vladimir Putin with an opening to improve, if not normalize, relations with Washington. Trump has dramatically scaled back financial support for Ukraine, but he continues to issue periodic threats against Moscow and has sanctioned Russia’s two largest oil producers. This is why Russia realizes that it needs to strengthen its partnership with fellow BRICS countries and leverage the grouping as a support network to withstand the Western sanctions pressure and to erode U.S. global dominance in finance and technology.

Trump’s policies have put in stark relief BRICS’ raisons d’être.

Trump’s crusade against Brazil, India, and South Africa has likewise set in motion forces that should, in theory, bring the BRICS members closer. Trump imposed 50 percent tariffs on Brazilian imports earlier this year, arguing that an investigation of former president Jair Bolsonaro was politically motivated. When Brazil’s top court convicted Bolsonaro of attempting a coup, Trump escalated further, sanctioning a Brazilian Supreme Court justice tied to the case and cancelling the visas of several Brazilian judicial and government officials.. These measures have only pushed Brazil to deepen its ties with fellow BRICS members. As one of Lula’s advisers recently pointed out, Trump’s attacks “are reinforcing our relations with the BRICS, because we want to have diversified relations and not depend on any one country.” Even before the Bolsonaro conviction, Lula had been currying favor with BRICS allies and paying official visits to China and Russia as well as Vietnam, which became a BRICS partner in June. But Trump’s bellicose approach is sure to accelerate this trend.

South Africa’s diplomatic friction with the United States has had similarly predictable results. Relations hit a new low following Trump’s meeting with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in May. In a tense encounter that was widely broadcast and dissected across South African media, Trump ambushed Ramaphosa with false and inflammatory claims about a “white genocide” targeting Afrikaner farmers. Trump’s rhetoric echoed fringe conspiracy theories and played to segments of his domestic base, but it left South Africans across the political spectrum shocked and offended. The Trump administration had previously expelled South Africa’s ambassador, threatened to impose steep trade penalties, and canceled aid programs. For the South African leadership, the disastrous White House meeting was yet more evidence that the United States had ceased to be a trustworthy partner. Facing a peculiarly hostile administration in Washington, Pretoria has ample reason to pursue greater intra-BRICS cooperation—not out of ideological affinity with its members but out of the strategic necessity to protect itself against an erratic and punitive United States.

Even in India, a country that has spent the better part of the past two decades cultivating close ties with Washington, policymakers are keenly aware that they must hedge in the face of Trump’s unpredictability. This year, Washington has deported thousands of Indian nationals, stalled negotiations over a bilateral trade agreement, and imposed 50 percent tariffs on Indian products. Indian policymakers are now firmly committed to a strategy of “multialignment,” in which BRICS serves not just as a platform for cooperation among countries of the so-called global South but also as a geopolitical insurance policy when U.S. commitments are no longer credible.

Similar sentiments are palpable throughout the other BRICS capitals, where leaders fear that close partnership with the United States may become a liability. Unsurprisingly, the number of countries hoping to join BRICS, either as full members or partner countries, keeps growing. That list includes Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Vietnam. The desire to diversify partnerships has not emerged because of Trump alone, of course. Turkey, for example, expressed interest in becoming a full member of BRICS well before Trump’s return. But the president’s second term has elevated multialignment from distant aspiration to urgent strategy.

MUDDLING THROUGH

And yet BRICS is not ready to take advantage of this moment. As the group has grown in size, so have its internal contradictions. This is not entirely surprising. Both Brazil and India, fearing the loss of their own influence and concerned about the group’s cohesion, had long opposed expansion, before giving in to Chinese pressure in 2023. Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates all joined in the last three years.

At a BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Rio de Janeiro in April, member states failed, for the first time, to issue a joint communiqué. The deadlock underscored mounting divisions within the bloc over the pace and direction of de-dollarization, the level of antagonism toward the United States, and Beijing’s aspirations for leadership in the grouping. In this case, the source of disagreement was a topic of long-standing symbolic importance to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: reform of the United Nations Security Council. Both Egypt and Ethiopia objected to language that would have acknowledged South Africa’s aspirations for a permanent seat, highlighting the complications introduced by the group’s recent expansion. And this July, in an unprecedented development, several heads of state failed to participate in-person in a BRICS summit, and only half of the bloc’s ten member countries sent delegations; the others attended remotely.

The U.S. bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities in June could have unified BRICS. Several member governments were appalled by the strikes, arguing that the United States acted unilaterally, dangerously, and without regard for international norms. For China and Russia, the strikes confirmed long-standing critiques of U.S. militarism; for Brazil and South Africa, countries that have historically prioritized nonintervention and peaceful conflict resolution, the attack was seen as a reckless move that undermined global stability. For India, the assault was not only a violation of international law, but also an attack on a vital energy supplier. Yet in the end, the BRICS’ joint statement, published several days after the bombing, was remarkably vague, failing even to mention Israel or the United States, revealing the grouping’s incapacity to speak with one voice.

As BRICS has grown in size, so have its internal contradictions.

Friction is visible on other fronts, as well. China’s heavily subsidized exports, including steel, textiles, and cars, threaten local industries in countries such as Brazil and South Africa. The resulting tensions complicate intra-BRICS economic coordination, as governments face domestic pressure to adopt protectionist measures against Chinese goods. Although China is eager to use BRICS as a platform to expand its influence and advertise its governance model, other members remain wary of subordinating their interests to Beijing’s ambitions. A recent virtual summit of BRICS leaders, convened by Lula and aimed at developing a common strategy against U.S. tariffs, produced few tangible results.

Despite renewed urgency created by Trump’s return to power, BRICS remains hamstrung by the same structural weaknesses that have long limited its effectiveness: divergent national interests, conflicting economic priorities, and a deep mistrust of one another’s geopolitical ambitions. Expansion has only magnified those challenges, adding more actors and contradictions to an already unwieldy organization. Beijing may view Trump’s bellicosity as conclusive proof of the United States’ unreliability, but other members are reluctant to align too closely with China or to subordinate their own national agendas to a single leader. Group cohesion remains a long way off.

For the foreseeable future, the grouping is likely to continue muddling through—attracting new members, producing grand declarations, and occasionally coordinating positions, but falling well short of becoming the basis of a new model of global governance. Trump has reminded BRICS members why the bloc matters, while simultaneously exposing why it cannot rise to the occasion.

Foreign Affairs · More by Oliver Stuenkel · November 18, 2025

18. Pentagon vulnerable to malicious use of publicly available info, GAO finds

Summary:

GAO warns Pentagon missions and personnel are increasingly exposed as adversaries mine public digital footprints from troops, civilians, contractors and families. Most DOD components lack consistent training and required threat assessments on force protection, insider threats, OPSEC and mission assurance. GAO issued 12 recommendations; DOD largely concurred with most findings.

Comment: Does OPM hack now seem relatively minor to the amount of information publicly available?

Pentagon vulnerable to malicious use of publicly available info, GAO finds

Stars and Stripes · Wyatt Olson · November 18, 2025

https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2025-11-17/dod-digital-info-malicious-actors-19800094.html?utm

Defense Department service members, civilian employees, contractors and family members knowingly or unknowingly leave behind sensitive information via digital activity that can be used by malicious actors, as shown in this graphic. (Government Accountability Office)

The Pentagon’s missions and personnel are increasingly vulnerable to “malicious actors” who can disrupt operations by aggregating digital information from data brokers, websites and other sources, a government watchdog concluded in a report issued Monday.

An 18-month audit by the Government Accountability Office of 10 Defense Department components — all five military services, U.S. Cyber Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, National Security Agency, Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency — found that all but one “did not consistently train personnel on risks of digital information in the public across all relevant security areas,” the report states.

U.S. Special Operations Command provided a digital force protection training course aimed at helping personnel manage their online identities, among other things, the report states.

“Eight of ten components did not conduct assessments of threats across the required security areas of force protection, insider threat, mission assurance, and operations security,” the report states.

“While the department has taken actions related to a wide field of traditional security areas, its actions to reduce safety, security, privacy, and operational risks posed by the digital profile are limited,” the report states.

The security risks posed by malicious actors — criminals, terrorists and adversarial nations — have increased with the proliferation of ubiquitous digital devices, social media and “big data” that can now be combed using artificial intelligence.

“The digital activity of DOD’s service members, contractors, and family members — from websites visited to emails sent to photos posted on social media — can generate volumes of traceable data that can threaten their privacy and safety, and ultimately our national security,” the report states.

“These digital footprints represent a piece of a larger puzzle that, when tied to other sources, can create a digital profile and adversely affect military functions and missions.”

A malicious actor can create a digital footprint for an individual by purchasing personal information from a data broker for just pennies and combining it with online posts and location “pings” from cellular towers from devices such as fitness trackers, the report states.

The report illustrates a hypothetical scenario in which the operations of an aircraft carrier could be disrupted or sabotaged by a malicious actor using Pentagon news releases, media reports, online activity, social media posts and ship coordinates routinely posted by maritime aficionados.

The DOD concurred with 11 of 12 recommendations made by the GAO and partially concurred with one.

Among the recommendations were that:

-The secretaries of the Air Force and Army and the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency conduct required assessments in the security areas of force protection, insider threats and mission assurance

-U.S. Cyber Command, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency conduct required assessments in the security areas of force protection, insider threats, operational security and mission assurance

-The Navy secretary ensure that the service is conducting required assessments in the security areas of force protection, insider threats, operational security and mission assurance

Stars and Stripes · Wyatt Olson · November 18, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com