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Quotes of the Day:
“Whenever any government, or church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, ‘this you may not read, this you might not see, this you are forbidden to know,’ the end result is tyranny and oppression, no matter how holy their motives.”
– Robert A. Heinlein
"I know nothing grander, better exercise, better digestion, more positive proof of the past, the triumphant result of faith in human kind, than a well-contested American national election."
– Walt Whitman from Collect, in The Complete Poetry and Prose of Walt Whitman, vol. 2, p. 228 (1948)
"The most important political office is that of the private citizen."
– Louis Brandeis
1. What the east-up view means for Indo-Pacific regional stability
2. North Korea executes 'big shot' couple who became 'arrogant' after the success of their business, accusing them of being 'anti-republic'
3. North Korean workers to make Russian drones, Ukrainian intel says
4. The Case for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Ensuring Information Access for Closed Societies
5. North Korea’s Execution State: When Law Becomes a Tool of Terror
6. America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear
7. What the U.S.-Korea fact sheet reveals about Washington's expectations
8. North Korea created new spy group to monitor ‘anti-socialist’ acts: Researcher
9. Kim Jong Un praises secret police for defending his rule during visit to HQ
10. Trump ‘took Pyongyang by surprise’ with nuclear subs for South Korea, sinking talk hopes
11. Pro-Pyongyang paper says N. Korea aims to build socialist powerhouse by 2035
12. Lee encourages S. Korean troops stationed in UAE
13. S. Korean envoy stresses close cooperation with U.S. to pave way for N.K. dialogue
14. S. Korea stresses need to improve U.S. visa issues for Korean investors for bilateral cooperation
15. S. Korea's 1st submarine to retire after 34 years in service
16. HD Hyundai sets industry record with 5,000 vessel deliveries
17. Hyundai Motor chief upbeat about U.S. market following trade deal
18. Activist group members sent to prosecutors over anti-North leaflet launches
1. What the east-up view means for Indo-Pacific regional stability
Summary:
General Brunson’s “east-up” map repositions South Korea from tripwire outpost to central Indo-Pacific hub, highlighting a strategic triangle with Japan and the Philippines. The article argues this framing boosts deterrence and alliance integration but raises Korean anxieties about entanglement in US competition with China and Russia and expanded obligations abroad.
Comment: As I said this is an inflection point for the alliance and for the Asia-Indo-Pacific. General Brunson has advanced strategic thinking by changing our view of Asia.
What the east-up view means for Indo-Pacific regional stability
A seemingly simple cartographic shift signals a deeper transformation reframing how the US envisions South Korea’s strategic role
by Hanjin Lew and Jio Lew
November 19, 2025
https://asiatimes.com/2025/11/what-the-east-up-view-means-for-indo-pacific-regional-stability/
Image: US Forces Korea
General Xavier T. Brunson’s recent article, “The East-Up Map: Revealing Hidden Strategic Advantages in the Indo-Pacific” has quickly become a major point of discussion in South Korea.
In the article, the commander of all US forces on the peninsula argues that South Korea has long been trapped by what he calls the traditional “north-up” perspective.
Rotating the map so that east appears at the top disrupts the usual sense of distance and reveals what he describes as Korea’s “advantageous positioning” within the Indo-Pacific theater.
Brunson emphasizes that “For much of the past seven decades, United States Forces Korea (USFK) has been seen as a forward outpost – a trip-wire force.” With the east-up orientation, this framing collapses.
Korea appears not as a distant outpost but as a central hub already embedded inside the region’s defensive perimeter.
Brunson notes the geography with clarity: Camp Humphreys is “approximately 158 miles from Pyongyang, 612 miles from Beijing and approximately 500 miles from Vladivostok.”
By shifting the map, Brunson argues, the United States can also see the power of a strategic triangle linking South Korea, Japan and the Philippines.
He writes that these three allies together can generate a regionally integrated network that enhances situational awareness and coordinated responses across multiple domains.
The mixed reaction in South Korea
For those deeply concerned about South Korea’s security, this confirmation brings some relief.
It signals that the US does not see Korea as a dispensable forward post but as a core strategic node whose loss would fundamentally weaken the Indo-Pacific balance of power.
Yet the article also introduces new anxieties.
By presenting Korea as a hub within an emerging multilateral architecture, Brunson implicitly expands Korea’s role beyond deterring North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.
The US appears to be positioning Seoul within a broader framework aimed at China and Russia, a shift that blends reassurance with unease for many Koreans.
The concern is that South Korea may be drawn into an unwanted regional contest with Beijing and Moscow while being encouraged to deepen military cooperation with Japan and the Philippines.
Such a shift comes at a time when South Koreans remain divided over how far the country’s obligations should extend beyond the peninsula.
A long-standing American vision for Asia
Brunson’s framing may feel new, but its intellectual roots reach back to the early Cold War.
In the early 1950’s, US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s advisers explored a collective security pact for the Pacific that would accompany a Japanese peace treaty.
The occupation of Japan would end and it would regain sovereignty.
In the accompanying agreement, to be signed by Japan, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, Japan would be guaranteed protection from the Soviets, and Japan’s former enemies would be safeguarded against the resurgence of Japanese power.
State Department experts believed this pact might persuade Japan’s former adversaries to accept a liberal peace treaty.
The United States would be able to retain military facilities in Japan, and the treaty would not block limited Japanese rearmament. President Truman supported the proposal.
Acheson’s successor, John Foster Dulles, also endorsed it and considered it essential for bipartisan backing.
The purpose was to facilitate Japanese rearmament but to keep it under international control. Such an alliance, permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter, would internationalize Japanese forces, Dulles reasoned, and thereby “ease reconciliation with [Japan’s] present constitution.”
Seoul’s choices
If the United States is elevating South Korea’s strategic status, Seoul should respond with both opportunity-seeking and caution.
A realist reading suggests that Korea must leverage this shift to demand more explicit commitments from the US, especially regarding extended deterrence and nuclear threats.
If Korea is a core ally, it deserves a core voice in shaping the region’s defense posture.
At the same time, Seoul must assess the risks of being drawn deeper into an American confrontation with China and Russia.
Aligning too closely might limit Korea’s diplomatic room and complicate its economic relationships, while failing to prepare for expanded alliance expectations might leave South Korea vulnerable.
The challenge is to maintain national autonomy while strengthening the alliance.
This balance becomes even more critical if Washington envisions South Korea as part of a new multilateral defense network.
Seoul must ensure that any expanded role is matched by reliable commitments, predictable strategy and a shared understanding of Korea’s security priorities.
A cautious but necessary path forward
The east-up map reflects a recognition that stability in the Indo-Pacific depends on anchoring reliable partners at its core.
South Korea’s position is crucial not because it seeks greater influence but because its security, prosperity and democratic resilience are tied to the region’s broader balance.
Brunson’s argument is ultimately about maintaining peace.
By advancing cooperation with like-minded states, Seoul can help uphold a stable order that benefits the entire Indo-Pacific, not merely itself.
Hanjin Lew is a political commentator specializing in East Asian affairs. Jio Lew contributed research for this article.
2. North Korea executes 'big shot' couple who became 'arrogant' after the success of their business, accusing them of being 'anti-republic'
Summary:
North Korea publicly executed a successful bicycle-parts couple for alleged “anti-republic” acts, foreign-currency crimes and spreading anti-state ideas, forcing hundreds, including children, to watch. Their killing, after a brief September trial, aims to terrorize entrepreneurs, curb private business, and signal that anyone exceeding state economic limits can be brutally shot.
Comment: I asked my good friend and colleague from north Korea, Hyun Seung Lee, for his comments on this article. Here is his response:
I couldn’t get detailed confirmation, but the article is highly likely to be true.
North Korea has a long history of targeting people rumored to be rich or successful in the markets — investigating them, confiscating all their assets, and sending them to political prison camps.
For example, in 2014, my cousin's business partner personally invested $1.5 million of his own money to build two apartment buildings in what is now Pyongyang’s Scientists’ District. In the end, the regime seized both buildings, confiscated all his personal assets, and sent him to a political prison camp.
Stories like this have happened repeatedly in the past, which is why I believe this article has a very high probability of being accurate.
North Korea executes 'big shot' couple who became 'arrogant' after the success of their business, accusing them of being 'anti-republic'
Published: 04:53 EST, 18 November 2025 | Updated: 06:17 EST, 18 November 2025
Daily Mail ·
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-15301287/North-Korea-executes-big-shot-couple-arrogant-success-business-accusing-anti-republic.html
North Korea has executed a 'big shot' couple accused of being arrogant and anti-republic after the success of their business.
Hundreds of people, including children, are said to have been forced to watch as a firing squad shot them dead in an open space in Pyongyang.
The pair, in their 50s, ran a private operation that sold, repaired, and rented electric bicycles, battery-powered motorcycle parts, and ordinary bikes.
Although they were formally registered with the Central Committee of the General Federation of Trade Unions in Sadong District, reports say they made significant profits on the side and became known as 'big shots'.
Some residents held resentment toward them because of high wholesale prices, complaints about quality and what locals described as arrogant behaviour.
According to Daily NK, authorities accused them of violating the Rejection of Reactionary Thought and Culture Act. They were also alleged to have worked with an external organisation to illegally move foreign currency and spread anti-state messages.
After their arrest in early August, they were jointly interrogated and given a death sentence in early September. Around 20 people connected to them were reportedly given sentences of exile or reeducation.
The execution, held at an open space in Mirim, was witnessed by residents who had been ordered to attend.
A source said: 'All managers, such as market managers and stall managers, were required to attend, so over 200 residents gathered at the time.'
A photograph from an earlier public sentencing. The couple, accused of being arrogant after the success of their business, were executed with hundreds of residents ordered to watch
According to reports, parents who had no childcare options were forced to bring their young children.
The source added: 'Residents who had no place to leave their children had no choice but to bring them out. Middle school students passing by also joined the adults without any resistance and witnessed the horrific scene.'
Officials told residents that the execution was meant to act as 'a model for preventing economic chaos and educating the public.'
The punishment was widely seen as a warning intended to cut off outside links and tighten the state's control over private business operations.
The timing also raised attention - the execution took place shortly after the country's dictator, Kim Jong-un, returned from a visit to China.
The source said it sent a message that 'there are no exceptions to internal discipline, even when cooperating with foreign countries,' and that it was part of a broader attempt to halt private business practices that go beyond what the state allows.
'It's clear that the intention is to show that anyone who goes even slightly beyond the limits permitted by the state can be punished as an example,' the source said.
'All the business people are afraid after seeing this incident and thinking, 'We could get caught at any time, too.'
Residents who witnessed the killings were described as overwhelmed by fear.
Market activity reportedly dropped sharply for several days. Businesses connected to the couple collapsed, and prices of batteries and related parts suddenly rose or stopped moving altogether.
The decision to allow children to witness the execution also caused alarm.
The source said this had the effect of exposing minors to extreme violence, which many saw as deliberate.
'This incident is not simply about punishing acts of 'disrupting economic order,' the source said. 'It is about instilling fear in the public, especially among the youth, that 'the state can punish anyone if it wants to.'
North Korea has continued to carry out public executions as a means to instil fear and prevent people from doing what it deems as anti-republic.
Most executions are by firing squad, which includes three soldiers shooting multiple rounds at the convicted individual. Executions by hanging have also been reported.
Crowds are often ordered to attend the killings. Offences such as distributing foreign media can lead to a death sentence.
Last year, a 22-year-old was killed for distributing K-pop from South Korea.
Daily Mail · KEVIN ADJEI-DARKO, SENIOR FOREIGN NEWS REPORTER · November 18, 2025
3. North Korean workers to make Russian drones, Ukrainian intel says
Summary:
Ukrainian intelligence says Russia plans to employ about 12,000 North Korean workers at its Alabuga drone plant, expanding overseas forced labor. The cheap workforce would further boost Geran drone production, fund Pyongyang via Green Pine fronts, and give Kim trained personnel to localize Shahed-type strike drones for North Korea’s arsenal.
Comment: My good friend and former colleague at FDD, Mathew Ha co-authored this piece. The question is how much will the nKPA be able to exploit capabilities and lessons for operations in the KTO? Will nK factories be able to produce drones in quantity? Will the nKPA conduct wide scale training to employ them? I fear the answers to those questions will be yes. Certainly the IC will be focusing on these priority intelligence requirements, among others.
By John Hardie & Mathew Ha | November 18, 2025 |
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/11/north-korean-workers-to-make-russian-drones-ukrainian-intel-says.php
Geran-2 production at Russia’s Alabuga drone plant. (Zvezda)
In addition to supplying munitions and troops to aid Russia’s war effort, North Korea is now providing thousands of workers to help Russia produce long-range one-way attack drones, Ukrainian military intelligence reported on November 14. If the report is accurate, this cheap labor could help Moscow further boost drone production while providing an additional revenue stream for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
The Ukrainian military intelligence directorate (HUR) asserted that by the end of 2025, Russia plans to employ “roughly 12,000 North Korean workers” at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in the Tatarstan region. The HUR allegation partially corroborates a June 2025 report from the Japanese outlet NHK, which said that Pyongyang intended to send 25,000 laborers to Alabuga, citing “diplomatic sources in the West and Russia.”
Alabuga is home to the main plant where Russia makes modified versions of Iran’s Shahed-136 drone, which the Russians call the “Geran-2.” The Alabuga factory also produces a jet-powered variant, the Geran-3, as well as Gerbera decoy drones.
The output at Alabuga has exploded since Geran-2 production began in 2023, fueled in part by workers recruited from Africa and Latin America. As of mid-2025, Russia reportedly was churning out around 2,700 Shahed-type drones per month—roughly the same number produced in all of 2023—along with a similar number of Gerberas. This increase in production, along with technical and tactical adaptation, has helped Moscow decimate Ukrainian energy infrastructure as winter approaches.
According to the HUR, local Russian officials and representatives of Jihyang Technology Trade Company, the DPRK firm responsible for supplying the North Korean workers, met in late October to discuss the labor deal. Jihyang Technology Trade Company is one of many “front company names” used by Pyongyang’s Green Pine Associated Corporation, the UN Panel of Experts on North Korea previously reported.
Green Pine, in turn, is controlled by North Korean intelligence and has representatives in countries around the world. The UN panel and the US government have said that Green Pine accounts for around half of DPRK exports of arms and related materiel, constituting an important source of revenue for Pyongyang.
Overseas labor is another longstanding money maker for the regime of DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. North Korean workers are sent abroad to toil in slave-like conditions, with most of their earnings confiscated by the regime. Even before its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia had consistently flouted UN sanctions prohibiting the use of North Korean workers.
Now, amid a domestic labor shortage fueled by military recruitment, Russia appears to be taking the practice to a new level. In October, a Ukrainian intelligence official alleged that Russia was hosting more than 17,800 North Korean workers and planned to add 26,000 more, of whom 6,000 would work construction on occupied Ukrainian territory. A South Korean intelligence official previously told the BBC that in 2024, Russia had received more than 10,000 North Korean workers—a figure supported by official Russian data.
According to the HUR, North Koreans at Alabuga will work shifts lasting at least 12 hours, earning around $2.50 per hour. If all 12,000 laborers each work 12 hours a day and six days per week, they would collectively earn around $113 million over the course of a year.
However, money may not be the only thing the North Korean workers send back to Pyongyang. In June, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, said that Moscow had agreed to help Pyongyang localize Geran-2 production. After returning from Alabuga, the North Korean workers can provide Pyongyang with a ready pool of labor trained to manufacture the Geran-2.
John Hardie is the deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Russia Program and a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal. Mathew Ha is an adjunct fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation (CCTI), where he focuses on North Korea and East Asia.
Tags: North Korea, russia, Russia vs Ukraine, Russian drones, ukraine
4. The Case for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Ensuring Information Access for Closed Societies
Summary:
POTUS' March 2025 order to close USAGM has crippled Radio Free Asia (And VOA though it is not discussed in this report) and badly strained Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, gutting staffs and silencing key language services. The paper argues these outlets are low cost, high impact tools of “peace through strength,” giving closed societies independent news, preserving persecuted cultures, exposing abuses, and informing US policy. Their shutdown creates an information vacuum that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are already filling with propaganda. The authors urge Congress to restore and firewall funding, protect regional offices, modernize content formats, and integrate RFA/RFE/RL into a broader allied information strategy.
Comment: One of our worst strategic national security errors of the 21dt Century.
Nov 17, 2025
Hudson Institue
The Case for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Ensuring Information Access for Closed Societies
Olivia Enos & Alexis Mrachek
Caption
The headquarters of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is seen in Prague, Czech Republic, on March 18, 2025. (Getty Images)
View PDF
Introduction
In March 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order aimed at closing the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM).1 This decision affected Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), both of which are USAGM grantees, and may ultimately lead to their closure. Such a development would be a strategic loss for the United States and the world.
Despite their names, RFA and RFE/RL are so much more than radio. They do provide radio broadcasts to countries with strict information control. But they also offer critical on-the-ground reporting that informs the American public and provides a voice to those persecuted by authoritarian governments in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. Both serve strategic functions that advance US interests by conveying the truth about the value of freedom and human rights. The information they provide produces goodwill toward the United States in authoritarian countries that seek to sow discord with America and to deceive their populations about the importance of freedom.
Since the executive order went into effect, RFA has been forced to suspend news operations for the first time in its 29 years of existence and laid off nearly all of its staff in hopes of fully reopening once funding is restored.2 The closure of critical services, including the Mandarin, Uyghur, Tibetan, Cantonese, Korean, and Burmese services, has left citizens of authoritarian countries without an information lifeline. Policymakers and civil society actors who once relied on RFA’s groundbreaking reporting, especially through its English-language media, are now without a critical source of information to inform foreign policy decisions.
The situation with RFE/RL is similar: It has been forced to cut 90 percent of its freelancers and furlough about 25 percent of its staff. However, as a result of these cuts and other significant measures, it has been able to keep all 23 of its language services—which include Ukrainian, Russian, Belarusian, Armenian, and Persian—on the air and producing content.
There are consequences to ceding the information space. When there is a void, authoritarian actors like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kremlin will fill it. The battle for truth and freedom is being fought but is being lost in the information realm.
RFA and RFE/RL were originally authorized by Congress, which could intervene to save them through end-of-year appropriations or standalone legislation.3 As Congress pursues various forms of appropriations and finalizes legislative priorities for the year, it should create an independent line item to fully fund them both. This would preserve their independence and enable them to continue to carry out a strategic mission in support of the US government, the American people, and the cause of freedom.
The Case for RFA and RFE/RL
RFA and RFE/RL are a perfect example of what Ronald Reagan meant when he advocated peace through strength. Both are relatively cost-effective ways to promote true and accurate messaging that advances US interests. Prior to Trump’s executive order, RFA had an estimated weeklyaudience of 60 million, with a budget of $60.8 million in fiscal year 2024.4 Similarly, RFE/RL’s estimated weekly audience was 47.4 million before the executive order,5 and its budget was $142.2 million in fiscal year 2024.6 This is a pittance in terms of US government spending, with a large impact for the cost. In addition to fostering goodwill toward America, RFA and RFE/RL provide Washington with the ability to shift the balance of power in authoritarian countries away from the government toward the people. They also offer the tools to advance freedom and prevent conflict through strategic messaging.
A closer look at their history and strategic benefits makes the costs of losing them clear.
Radio Free Asia
RFA was created in response to the Chinese government’s 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square, part of broader efforts to promote freedom in closed societies during and after the Cold War. Authorized by the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994,7 RFA made its first broadcast, in Mandarin, to China in 1996.8 Additional funding was authorized through the Radio Free Asia Act of 1998, which expanded RFA’s services beyond China.9 Public Law 111-102 made the RFA permanent,10 and today it has nine services, including Mandarin, Uyghur, Tibetan, Cantonese, Burmese, Laotian, Khmer, Korean, and Vietnamese services.11
RFA continues to be a valuable US foreign policy tool for many reasons, but among the most important are:
- It serves as a lifeline to people in countries with tight information control
- It informs Americans and US policymakers about on-the-ground realities to aid in decision-making.
- Without it, the United States is ceding ground to authoritarians.
- It preserves local cultures.
RFA serves as a lifeline for people in need. Nowhere is this truer than in North Korea, which, more than almost any other country, restricts access to information as a means of control. Those who do access outside information, listen to K-Pop, or watch South Korean dramas can be sentenced to death.12 Despite these tight restrictions, North Koreans were willing to take the risk and listen to RFA. In fact, its Korean broadcasts penetrated the Kim regime’s information blockade until they ended in April 2025.13
Some North Koreans who escaped have said they decided to leave after hearing information that contradicted the party line and learning about life outside the country.14 Such information can also equip North Koreans to work for change from within. Yet their access to information is under greater threat today than it has been in recent years due to decisions in Washington as well as in Pyongyang and Seoul, which have enacted new policies that prevent North Koreans from accessing outside information.15
In Hong Kong, where radio is one of the only sources of outside information that prisoners are permitted to access, political prisoners would reportedly listen to RFA’s Cantonese service.16 RFA broadcasts provided hope and reminded political prisoners that they were not forgotten.
RFA is an invaluable source of information for ordinary Americans and policymakers. RFA’s English-language reporting is often an invaluable source of information to policymakers, in addition to their reporting in other languages. Eliminating it denies the American public a key source of reliable information on events in closed societies. It also affects the readiness of US policymakers to respond to threats to US security and freedom from authoritarian regimes.
For example, RFA was among the first to report on the political prison camps and other atrocity crimes the CCP perpetrates against Uyghurs.17 Much of the groundbreaking reporting by RFA’s Uyghur service provided the factual basis for the atrocity determination issued by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2021.18 RFA was also the first Korean-language news source to report that North Korean soldiers were fighting with Russia in Ukraine.19 And it produced groundbreaking reports on China’s activities at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, and documented essential political developments in Burma before and during the coup in 2021.20
RFA was so effective because, in some ways, it functioned like a local news outlet, with reporters on the ground delivering detailed, accurate reports from countries where information is tightly controlled. There was not another news source quite like it, and the US government relied on it as both a tool and a source.
The absence of RFA programming is creating a void that authoritarian actors such as the CCP are filling. RFA previously broadcasted on 60 shortwave frequencies across China, but since its services went dark, Beijing’s state-controlled media have added 80 frequencies, extended the hours of their broadcasts,21 and jammed frequencies RFA once used. The CCP is making similar moves in North Korea. Even before RFA’s Korean service went dark, the CCP was ramping up efforts to get information into North Korea by increasing exports of MP7 and MP8 players designed specifically for North Korea and loaded with CCP propaganda.22 The CCP’s battle for dominance is not being fought only in the military theater; it is also being fought and won in the information domain as the CCP seeks to replace truth with propaganda.
RFA preserved the culture of persecuted communities. Its Uyghur service was the only independent service available in that language. Without it, the Chinese government’s genocide and crimes against humanity would likely have received less attention. Likewise, RFA’s Tibetan and Cantonese services shined a spotlight on the plight of these communities across China. A persecuted people’s ability to hear news about their community in their own language is fundamentally different than receiving news through another source. By providing this service, RFA weakens authoritarian regimes that seek to erase the cultures of persecuted communities.
RFA’s strategic value is obvious. Without it, the US ability to respond to threats from the CCP, the Kim regime, and other challenges across the Indo-Pacific is weaker. But Washington faces national security threats not only from China but also from Russia and Iran.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was originally two separate entities. Radio Free Europe (RFE) was founded in 1950, while Radio Liberty (RL) was founded in 1953. RFE originally broadcasted to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, while RL broadcasted to the Soviet Union in 17 different languages. Both sought to counter communist and state propaganda by providing trustworthy local news, analysis, and cultural programming to audiences behind the Iron Curtain.23
Congress funded both RFE and RL via the Central Intelligence Agency until 1971, when the Board for International Broadcasting began to fund them. After 1995, they were funded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, known today as the USAGM. The two entities were merged in 1976, becoming Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.24
Fifteen years later, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was in chaos, RFE/RL was one of the few news outlets providing reliable information. It then received official accreditation in Russia, and in August 1991, President Boris Yeltsin permitted it to open a Moscow bureau.25
RFE/RL then launched several new language services for democracies emerging from the USSR’s dissolution and the breakup of Yugoslavia. However, circumstances changed over the next few decades, especially as President Vladimir Putin strengthened his hold on power in Russia and some post-Soviet democracies grew weaker. According to RFE/RL’s website, in 2017, Russia’s Justice Ministry “declared RFE/RL and nine of its Russian-language reporting projects ‘foreign mass media performing the functions of a foreign agent’ and has since named over 40 RFE/RL journalists as individual ‘foreign agents.’”26 But these labels merely prove that RFE/RL is effective in telling the truth about events in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, both locally and on a broader scale.
Since 2022, RFE/RL’s work has been focused largely on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In February 2024, as a result of its efforts to document Russian brutality, Moscow labeled it an “undesirable organization.”27 According to RFE/RL President Stephen Capus, that designation is an example of “how the Russian government views truthful reporting as an existential threat.”28
Persian broadcasts to Iran are another important component of RFE/RL. They began in 1998 as a result of an increasing American focus on the Middle East, and after 2002 were given a new name, Radio Farda.29 In recent years, Radio Farda has rapidly expanded its programming, reaching audiences both inside and outside of Iran.30 This broadcaster plays a key part in countering Iranian regime propaganda by providing unbiased reports, analysis, and cultural content to Persian-speaking audiences.
Like RFA, RFE/RL continues to be a critical asset in US foreign policy for a number of reasons, including:
- It offers citizens of authoritarian countries access to information they otherwise would not have.
- It reveals how authoritarian regimes abuse their citizens.
RFE/RL provides unbiased media and radio programs. It does this in authoritarian countries like Russia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Iran, and in evolving democracies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. RFE/RL also broadcasts to borderline authoritarian states like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.
RFE/RL plays a crucial role in revealing human rights abuses in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Some of the many human rights topics covered by RFE/RL include authoritarian regimes’ exploitation of migrants from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa for criminal purposes;31 repression of religious groups for practicing their faith;32 persecution of Iranian women and girls for removing their hijabs;33 and crackdowns on ordinary citizens for protesting against their corrupt political leaders.34
As noted earlier, in March of this year, President Trump signed an executive order affecting RFA and RFE/RL. The order called for major cuts to seven federal agencies, including the USAGM, which oversees RFE/RL.35 Near the end of the month, however, the USAGM rescinded a letter it had issued terminating RFE/RL’s grant agreement for fiscal year 2025, putting the agreement back into effect.36 Nevertheless, funding issues have persisted, and the European Union has even stepped in to pledge emergency funding for the broadcaster.37
The Way Forward
As the US government considers how to preserve RFA and RFE/RL, it should take careful stock of what makes them unique and effective and seek to preserve these advantages.
First, the unique configuration of these small, agile nonprofits that receive US federal funding is arguably what has made them successful. Both have enough independence from the US government to maintain objectivity, independence, and journalistic integrity while retaining the government’s financial backing. Both also have a unique firewall setup that prevents Congress or the administration from meddling in their reporting.
Second, both entities function much like local journalism outlets. RFA’s team at one time comprised approximately 300 employees and contractors, while RFE/RL has more than 1,300 employees and contractors38 RFA’s main headquarters is in Washington. It was establishing a Taipei office when the executive order went into effect, and it also had offices in Dharamsala for the Tibetan service and in Turkey for the Uyghur service. RFE/RL has headquarters in Prague, providing a perch from which to analyze developments in Europe. BothRFA and RFE/RL have hired local journalists for their expertise and their knowledge of local problems that are of interest to the United States.
Third, RFA and RFE/RL are relatively cost-effective means of preventing conflict in regions where US interests are most under threat: Europe and Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. This is not merely a hypothesis; RFE/RL contributed to the fall of communism in Europe. While Russia continues its war with Ukraine and Iran and the CCP threaten US and global security, Washington should be shoring up efforts to disseminate information, not tearing them down. President Reagan understood it best: peace through strength requires not only kinetic force, but also non-kinetic tools of statecraft to be effective.
Recommendations
If the US government shuts down RFE/RL and RFA, authoritarian states will fill the void with propaganda. In fact, they are already doing so. To give up this strategic advantage precisely at a time when China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are ramping up threats against the United States would be a mistake. Civil society and government need to coalesce to generate the political will to prevent the closure of RFA and RFE/RL.
Without them, the United States will be less well-equipped to fight and win in the information space, make strategic policy decisions in regions of importance, and provide support to persecuted people. To strengthen and maintain RFA and RFE/RL, the US should:
- Ensure adequate funding. Congress should ensure continued appropriations for RFA and RFE/RL. Ideally, each one would receive a separate line item, whether grants or contracts are administered by USAGM or another institution. The best option would be for them to be funded through grants, but they could also be funded through contracts, assuming that legal recourse was adequately ensured for both. Grants would be preferable to contracts because RFA and RFE/RL are serving the public good through quality journalism that is typically conducted through grants and not contracts. A grant-based model provides more agency to RFA and RFE/RL in crafting their proposals and executing their journalistic mission.
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Respect their journalistic integrity and maintain their advantages in any future arrangement. Some have suggested consolidating certain USAGM grantees under a single new international broadcasting entity. Any efforts to do so should ensure the agility, journalistic integrity, and localized structures of RFA and RFE/RL. One potential idea is to use the under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (or the R Family at the State Department) strictly as a conduit for funding RFA and RFE/RL, similar to how the National Endowment for Democracy receives its US government funding.39 In other words, the under secretary would be responsible for ensuring funds are disbursed to RFA and RFE/RL but would not control messaging or meddle in the journalistic independence of these organizations. If the under secretary does anything more than serve as a conduit for disbursing funds, he or she risks turning RFA and RFE/RL into propaganda outlets and sacrificing their journalistic integrity.
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Retain the firewall that protects their journalistic integrity and independence in any future arrangement. According to USAGM’s website, the firewall is “critical to ensuring that the editors, reporters, and other journalists [at USAGM networks] make the final decisions on what stories to cover and how they are covered, and that those decisions are ultimately governed by the highest standards of professional journalism, as required by law”40 (i.e., the United States International Broadcasting Act of 199442 The firewall is also codified in the journalistic standards of each USAGM network, including RFA and RFE/RL.43 To maintain the highest-quality journalism, the firewall should remain integrated into RFA’s and RFE/RL’s journalistic standards.
- Maintain their regional offices. Forcing them to eliminate overseas offices could undermine those elements that make them effective. Local journalists and sources enable them to accurately report the news and identify problems and solutions. RFA should retain its ability to operate in Washington and through offices in Taipei and elsewhere in Asia, and RFE/RL should retain its Prague headquarters.
- Streamline accountability and oversight mechanisms. US broadcasting efforts over the years have struggled to strike the right balance between oversight and accountability. Neither the Broadcasting Board of Governors nor the board associated with USAGM proved to be the optimal oversight mechanism. As a new framework is developed, other models in the US government, including the commissioner model of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, could serve as useful examples.
- Improve coordination between the United States and allies on information-dissemination efforts, information sharing, and burden sharing. After RFE/RL and RFA are again on a stable footing, the US government should create a mechanism to coordinate information-dissemination efforts with allies as well as information sharing and burden sharing. This would strengthen Western efforts against authoritarian regimes.
- Introduce new kinds of RFE/RL content. RFE/RL produces written news stories and standard news videos, which are effective in some ways but may not be optimal for younger audiences. To grab their attention, RFE/RL should produce vertical videos, such as those posted to Instagram Reels and YouTube Shorts, and more catchy, short-form content in general.
- Consider providing free broadband internet to RFE/RL and RFA audiences. The countries where their audiences live, such as Russia, Belarus, and China, often block access to certain websites, including those producing credible, independent news, and their citizens use virtual private networks (VPNs) to circumvent this. However, over time, governments have become skilled at blocking VPNs. To overcome this, the US government could provide RFE/RL and RFA audiences with free broadband internet through Starlink or a similar service so that they can continue to access credible news. This would send shockwaves through the Axis of Upheaval threats (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea).
5. North Korea’s Execution State: When Law Becomes a Tool of Terror
Summary:
The article argues that under Kim Jong Un, North Korea’s expanding legal code weaponizes the death penalty as a tool of regime terror rather than justice. A recent public execution of a successful couple in Mirim, staged before adults and children, illustrates “ideological education” through fear. New laws on quarantine, “reactionary culture,” and language criminalize everyday behavior, while on-the-spot shootings of soldiers, IT workers, and border crossers amount to normalized extrajudicial killings. In contrast to regional abolition debates centered on human dignity, North Korea fuses law, security organs, and propaganda to subordinate all life to the state.
Excerpts:
North Korea’s legal system has evolved into a regime-driven structure that influences every aspect of thought, speech, action, and morality. In this society, where punishment serves to intimidate rather than rehabilitate, the law operates purely as an extension of politics to uphold the regime, distancing itself entirely from the concept of justice.
It is widely acknowledged that North Korea maintains conditions under which summary executions may be carried out without recourse to a court verdict: 1. When North Korean soldiers participating in the Ukraine war violate military law, 2. When overseas dispatched IT workers attempt to escape, and 3. When river crossing or escape attempts are detected in the China-North Korea border region
In these three cases, orders for “on-the-spot summary execution” can be issued. However, this clearly corresponds to extrajudicial killings prohibited by international human rights law. In particular, it demonstrates that North Korea’s death penalty system has reached the stage of normalizing state violence, rather than being merely a matter of the legal system.
Comment: Sometimes I do not think we can fathom the depravity and brutality of the mafia-like crime family cult of the Kim family regime.
North Korea’s Execution State: When Law Becomes a Tool of Terror
Public executions showcase that the death penalty in North Korea continues to function as a political tool.
By Lee Sang-yong
November 18, 2025
https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/north-koreas-execution-state-when-law-becomes-a-tool-of-terror/
Credit: Depositphotos
At the Fifth East Asian Forum for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Tokyo, participants emphasized that abolishing capital punishment is crucial for protecting human dignity, calling it “state violence masked as justice.”
However, around the same time, a completely different scene unfolded in Pyongyang. A couple in their 50s who had made significant money selling bicycle parts were publicly executed by firing squad in front of hundreds of people. This stark contrast symbolically demonstrates that the death penalty in North Korea continues to function as a political tool of terror-based governance.
This public execution took place in mid-October at an open area in Pyongyang’s Mirim district. It was originally scheduled for the Sadong District shooting range, but authorities suddenly changed the location and mandated attendance by approximately 200 or more people, including nearby market managers and stall supervisors.
Parents with nowhere to leave their children brought them along, and even passing middle school students watched the scene. While authorities explained this as “a warning to block economic disorder and provide ideological education to citizens,” it was a ritual of terror designed to imprint on people the message that the state can take your life at any time.
The Kim Jong Un Era: The “Normalization of Executions”
Under the Kim Jong Un regime, North Korea’s legal system has expanded dramatically. However, this expansion has meant not the expansion of freedom and human rights, but rather the refinement of control. Looking at the laws enacted and amended since 2020 as shown in the table below, a common trend is clear: the use of executions as a tool for maintaining the regime. This represents the result of laws redefining people’s everyday actions as political threats, going beyond crime prevention or the maintenance of social order.
Specifically, the enactment of the Emergency Quarantine Law, the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture, and the Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law following COVID-19 has subjected the daily lives of North Koreans to increased regulation and oversight. Watching Korean dramas, using South Korean phrases, or possessing external USB drives are now considered “system-subverting acts” in North Korea. This demonstrates that law in North Korea serves as a tool for instilling fear.
To put it simply, the law has shifted from being a safeguard for citizens to serving as a tool that demands allegiance to the regime. Specifically, execution is now recognized as a symbolic method of control, linking acts of defiance against the regime directly to matters of life and death.
North Korea’s legal system has evolved into a regime-driven structure that influences every aspect of thought, speech, action, and morality. In this society, where punishment serves to intimidate rather than rehabilitate, the law operates purely as an extension of politics to uphold the regime, distancing itself entirely from the concept of justice.
It is widely acknowledged that North Korea maintains conditions under which summary executions may be carried out without recourse to a court verdict: 1. When North Korean soldiers participating in the Ukraine war violate military law, 2. When overseas dispatched IT workers attempt to escape, and 3. When river crossing or escape attempts are detected in the China-North Korea border region
In these three cases, orders for “on-the-spot summary execution” can be issued. However, this clearly corresponds to extrajudicial killings prohibited by international human rights law. In particular, it demonstrates that North Korea’s death penalty system has reached the stage of normalizing state violence, rather than being merely a matter of the legal system.
A Key Consideration in Debates on Death Penalty Abolition
The death penalty abolition forum in Tokyo highlighted that execution concerns human dignity, not just legal change. Countries debated the limits of state power over life, but these discussions have not influenced North Korea.
In North Korea, daily life is closely aligned with state objectives and propaganda. Social order is maintained primarily through the authority of security forces rather than legal frameworks, and silence is upheld by means of intimidation rather than judicial proceedings. As noted by U.N. Special Rapporteur on North Korean Human Rights Elizabeth Salmon during the East Asian Forum, “the expanded application of the death penalty system is causing serious conflict with international human rights standards.”
On the same day that Tokyo emphasized the importance of dignity, Pyongyang demonstrated its military presence once again. The cessation of such actions would mark a pivotal moment at which residents of North Korea could reclaim both their inherent dignity and right to life, thereby realizing the abolition of the death penalty not only as a stated goal but also as a substantive reality.
Authors
Guest Author
Lee Sang-yong
Lee Sang-yong is the director of Daily NK’s AND Center.
6. America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear
Summary:
The U.S. should deliberately support nuclear proliferation by Canada, Germany, and Japan. Selective proliferation, they say, would bolster regional deterrence, share defense burdens, hedge against a retrenching America, and reinforce a liberal rules-based order, while posing limited escalation or accident risks given these allies’ stability and restraint.
Excerpt:
In East Asia, an acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan might push South Korea to act on its long-held nuclear ambitions, but Seoul’s integration into the American security architecture substantially reduces its incentives to do so. Japan’s geographic advantage and the fact that it is not stuck in a frozen conflict (as South Korea is with a nuclear-armed North Korea) make it a more attractive candidate for selective proliferation than South Korea. To be sure, if Seoul decided to forge ahead and build a bomb, it would also be a safe and reliable nuclear custodian. Although Taiwan might theoretically want to follow suit, it has no plausible pathway to act upon this desire because of its precarious geopolitical position in regard to China.
Comment: This should create quite a stir in the national security community. I cannot wait to see the debate on this. I am not sure the integration of South Korea into the US security architecture is a sound argument for South Korea not going nuclear, especially if Japan does. At an off the record conference I attended yesterday our Korean colleagues presented some excellent survey data to include views of South Korea going nuclear. However, the assessment of the rationale for doing so seemed to stem mostly from the declining confidence in US security guarantees.
America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear
Foreign Affairs · More by Moritz S. Graefrath · November 19, 2025
Selective Proliferation Will Strengthen the Global Order, Not End It
eNovember 19, 2025
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An intercontinental ballistic missile system unit in Moscow, May 2025 Shamil Zhumatov / Reuters
MORITZ S. GRAEFRATH is Wick Cary Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma and a Nonresident Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs at Eurasia Group.
MARK A. RAYMOND is Wick Cary Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Oklahoma and Associate Director for International Security Policy at the Oklahoma Aerospace and Defense Innovation Institute.
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Few scenarios scare pundits and policymakers as much as the prospect of nuclear proliferation. Russia’s willingness to dangle the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous interest in nuclear testing, and the imminent expiration of the 2010 New START treaty (which limits the size of Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals) have reminded the world of the abiding destructive potential of nuclear weapons and reanimated fears of their use. American leaders are convinced that the spread of nuclear weapons would deeply hurt U.S. strategic interests and further destabilize the already fragile global order. In recent months, they have doubled down on their commitment to preventing proliferation, and the June strikes against nuclear sites in Iran have shown that Washington will use force to prevent more countries from acquiring the bomb.
For decades, the United States invested in a nuclear order built around nonproliferation, even as Cold War disarmament agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty expired. Opposing proliferation among unreliable states and adversaries makes sense, but a blanket opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons obscures the significant benefits they can bestow. The United States would do well to reconsider its strict adherence to nonproliferation and encourage a small set of allies—namely Canada, Germany, and Japan—to go nuclear. For Washington, selective nuclear proliferation would allow these partners to take on larger roles in regional defense and decrease their military dependence on the United States. For these allies, in turn, acquiring nuclear weapons provides the most dependable protection against the threats of regional foes, such as China and Russia, as well as a United States less committed to its traditional alliances.
Skeptics and nuclear pessimists might blanch at the idea of a world with more nuclear-armed powers, but such concerns are less warranted when proliferation is pursued selectively. Canada, Germany, and Japan have proven track records of rational policymaking and domestic stability that will make both nuclear accidents and any spiral of uncontrolled escalation unlikely. And, if carefully managed, there is ample reason to believe that proliferation in these countries would not lead to widespread efforts by others to develop their own bombs.
Far from ushering in a frightening new era of global instability, selective proliferation would help uphold the post–World War II order. Were Canada, Germany, and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, they would rebalance global military capabilities in favor of a coalition of states committed to the rules-based system and to stopping the erosion of its key norms, especially territorial integrity. Selective proliferation would thus revitalize the increasingly brittle post-1945 order that has so benefited the United States and its allies.
A WIN-WIN
Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly emphasized the need to shift the burden of continental defense onto European allies and decrease their military dependence on the United States. Confronted by the geopolitical challenge of a rising China in East Asia and pressed for resources to address issues at home, Washington has come to see ending European free-riding as a top strategic priority. What stands in the way of Europe’s ability to provide for its own security today—and thus blocks a significant U.S. retrenchment—is the lack of German nuclear forces. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders had hoped to withdraw American forces from Europe but determined that unless Germany acquired a nuclear deterrent, the continent would not be able to guarantee its own security. As the historian Marc Trachtenberg has noted, the United States rightly judged that British and French nuclear forces “could not provide the necessary degree of reassurance” that Europe would be able to deter the Soviet Union and its vast nuclear arsenal. Today, the same roadblock remains. Encouraging Germany to develop its own nuclear weapons would finally create the kind of self-sufficient Europe that enables an American exit.
German leaders and the German public recognize that military dependence on the United States leaves their country vulnerable to Washington’s whims. Shortly after his election in February 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that it was time to “achieve independence” from the United States, and he has since become an outspoken proponent of substantial rearmament. But it will take a long time to build up Germany’s conventional capabilities, and Berlin still lacks a clear vision for how to meet the ambitious defense spending target of five percent of GDP that Merz and other European leaders agreed to at a NATO summit in June. Germany’s ongoing commitments to provide war materiel to Ukraine and the population’s reluctance to undertake military service hinder a speedy conventional military buildup. The development of an independent nuclear force would safeguard Germany against the possibility of a sudden U.S. withdrawal from Europe while offering a feasible and meaningful way to fulfill the five percent pledge.
Japanese proliferation will go a long way toward achieving the United States’ main goal in East Asia, namely, the containment of China through strong local alliances. From Washington’s perspective, the primary threat posed by Beijing is that it might achieve regional dominance and develop the military potential to seriously threaten the United States and its interests by, for example, disrupting semiconductor supply chains or establishing forward bases beyond its territory in East Asia and even further afield. Such Chinese regional hegemony would pose a major challenge to the United States.
Japan already enjoys the defensive benefit of being an archipelago country separated from its adversaries by the sea. If combined with independent nuclear capabilities, that advantage would effectively guarantee Japan’s security in the face of outside threats—and ensure that it does not fall under Chinese control. Beyond better defending itself, a nuclear-armed Japan would provide a more credible and immediate form of extended deterrence to East Asia than the United States can provide. China might doubt Washington’s willingness to risk nuclear war over developments in East Asia, but Japan’s proximity and direct stake in regional stability render its commitments far more credible.
More nuclear weapons might indeed be better.
A nuclear-armed Japan would also insert an extra layer in crisis escalation scenarios, allowing an effective response to Chinese aggression without directly drawing in the United States. When contemplating an attack on Japan, China would be forced to consider the monumental costs of Japanese retaliation independent of any additional American support. Having nuclear weapons would also equip Japan, and perhaps East Asia more broadly, to handle a sudden change in Washington’s security commitment. The Trump administration’s newest National Defense Strategy prioritizes the defense of the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere over the threats emanating from China and Russia, signaling a potentially seismic shift in orientation.
In North America, Canadian proliferation would enhance American homeland security. Given the integration of the Canadian and American militaries within NATO and the bilateral air defense system NORAD, the two countries would be fighting together in virtually any conceivable hemispheric defense scenario. Although Canada does not face immediate threats to its territorial integrity from Russia or China, its relations with both countries have deteriorated significantly over the past decade. A Canadian nuclear deterrent reduces the chance that the United States would be called on to defend its continental neighbor, effectively freeing up American capabilities and removing an avenue of potential geopolitical encroachment. American support for a Canadian nuclear deterrent would also provide crucial reassurance about Washington’s commitment to continental defense at a time when the neighbors’ bilateral relationship is under strain.
For Canada in turn, possessing nuclear weapons signals to the United States that it, too, accepts shared responsibility for continental defense and that Ottawa can deter potential aggressors without American support. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it in March, Canada’s “old relationship” with the United States is “over.” Going nuclear would prepare Ottawa to face this new world by reconfiguring the continental partnership and helping the country go it alone. Further, the challenges of meeting NATO’s five percent spending target are arguably more significant for Canada than they are for Germany. A modest nuclear deterrent offers a solution to this challenge that also results in a meaningful strategic asset in Canada’s arsenal.
Canada, Germany, and Japan each possesses the scientific and industrial capacity to successfully develop nuclear weapons on its own. For instance, Canada’s role as a major supplier of fissile material provides the basis for a joint effort to make these new nuclear capabilities a reality. What the three allies would need—and what the United States can and should provide—is public support and diplomatic cover for their transition to becoming nuclear-armed states, as well as technical and doctrinal guidance to ensure robust command and control safeguards.
NUCLEAR FIX
Traditionally, nuclear proliferation has been understood as a risk to the stability of the international order. As states acquire nuclear capabilities, regional and global balances of power shift, calling into question existing security arrangements. A state with a nuclear deterrent, the thinking goes, can behave predatorily since it is now insulated from attempts to rein it in. This conventional view is wrong—or at the very least too simplistic—as it assumes all proliferators will behave the same way. When states committed to defending international rules and norms acquire nuclear capabilities, proliferation, in fact, increases the stability and strength of the global order.
Canada, Germany, and Japan are among the leading states committed to the rules-based international order. All three frame their foreign policies and even their state identities in terms of good international citizenship. Select nuclear proliferation in these states would rebalance military capabilities and create a unified coalition of nuclear powers committed to thwarting potential revisionists. Such a coalition would help prevent further erosion of the rules, norms, and institutions of the post-1945 order, including the norm against conquest. In addition to the material sources of stability it would provide, selective proliferation would thus strengthen the normative sources of stability essential to international order.
Selective nuclear proliferation should thus be framed and understood as an investment in the revitalization of that order. Effectively, Canada, Germany, and Japan would be helping to fill the gaps that have led Russia to see more favorable conditions for revisionism and that could lead China to make a similar calculation.
BE NOT AFRAID
Many of the typical concerns raised by opponents of nuclear proliferation do not apply to selective proliferation by U.S. allies. For instance, there is no reason to fear that Canadian, German, or Japanese nuclear weapons would end up in the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations; all three are paragons of responsibility, state capacity, and domestic stability. There is also no need to worry about the rationality of these states. If North Korean leader Kim Jong Un can exercise prudence and caution with regard to his nuclear arsenal, leaders in Ottawa, Berlin, and Tokyo can reasonably be expected to do the same.
Another concern is that if a few states pursue nuclear capabilities, a plethora of others will then move to do the same. This argument is unconvincing. Knock-on proliferation is typically the result of preexisting rivalries and heavily conditioned by geographic contiguity, as exemplified by Pakistan’s pursuit of a bomb in response to Indian proliferation. Canadian proliferation is unlikely to spur, say, Mexico, to pursue its own bomb. The European states that would have the greatest incentive to counter German proliferation—the United Kingdom and France—already have their own nuclear forces. Other possible proliferators, such as Poland, might be convinced to forgo an independent nuclear weapons program with multi- or bilateral nuclear sharing agreements. In East Asia, an acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan might push South Korea to act on its long-held nuclear ambitions, but Seoul’s integration into the American security architecture substantially reduces its incentives to do so. Japan’s geographic advantage and the fact that it is not stuck in a frozen conflict (as South Korea is with a nuclear-armed North Korea) make it a more attractive candidate for selective proliferation than South Korea. To be sure, if Seoul decided to forge ahead and build a bomb, it would also be a safe and reliable nuclear custodian. Although Taiwan might theoretically want to follow suit, it has no plausible pathway to act upon this desire because of its precarious geopolitical position in regard to China.
The potential for accidents involving nuclear weapons remains a reasonable concern. Although it is true that the spread of nuclear weapons would technically increase the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war, the risk remains so small that it would likely be outweighed by the tangible benefits to international stability and security. Even during the height of the Cold War, a time fraught with immense strategic and ideological rivalry, the two superpowers successfully avoided a nuclear exchange. One of the virtues of selective nuclear proliferation is that Canada, Germany, and Japan are among the most well-equipped to minimize additional risk. All have highly professional militaries, robust civilian control of those armed forces, and foreign ministries highly skilled in peaceful conflict resolution.
Other objections do not withstand scrutiny. For example, some U.S. experts have opposed proliferation among American allies on the ground that it would undermine the United States’ influence, specifically over Germany and Japan. The claim conflates strategic instruments with objectives. Washington’s fundamental aim in Europe and East Asia is to prevent any single state from dominating either region. Although American influence over allies offers an indirect and uncertain path to preventing the rise of a regional hegemon, nuclear weapons in Germany and Japan would virtually guarantee that result. In other words, selective proliferation sacrifices some U.S. influence, but only in exchange for the objective it was designed to achieve in the first place.
The most understandable hurdle—and potentially the most difficult to overcome—is public opposition to proliferation. Japan’s experience of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains central to its collective memory. Post-1945 pacifism and general skepticism about nuclear energy predispose many Germans to oppose an independent deterrent. And Canada has long resisted even hosting nuclear weapons on its territory, let alone acquiring its own. Overcoming this apprehension will no doubt be difficult, and states will have to convince skeptical citizens that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will not just keep them safer but also boost the overall health of the rules-based order.
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
Implementing selective proliferation will not be easy or without risk. An immediate practical consideration is that Canada, Germany, and Japan would each need to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in which they agreed not to develop a nuclear bomb. Commitment to the proper process for withdrawing from the treaty under international law would signal their intent to stabilize the international order and strengthen international security rather than weaken both. To the extent possible, NPT withdrawals should be carefully broached to key allies in advance to minimize alarm. Although it is unrealistic to expect all other countries to accept such withdrawals, pursuing nuclear proliferation in a responsible and transparent way would signal each country’s good intentions. It is here that American diplomatic cover can prove particularly valuable, coordinating with France and the United Kingdom to ensure that the new nuclear states do not become the target of United Nations Security Council enforcement measures.
To provide as much reassurance to skeptical states as possible, the three proliferators should consider adopting a “no first use” policy, at least while they remain under the American nuclear umbrella. While NATO was unwilling to commit to such a policy during the Cold War, Canada, Germany, and Japan face less stringent security challenges, at least at present, and can therefore contemplate taking this step in order to signal their commitment to maintaining the status quo.
Selective nuclear proliferation requires careful management to fulfill its potential, but it offers genuine ground for optimism. The case for it remains as controversial as ever, but it does matter greatly which countries get the bomb. If the proliferators are allied, stable governments and responsible members of the international community, then more nuclear weapons might indeed be better.
Foreign Affairs · More by Moritz S. Graefrath · November 19, 2025
7. What the U.S.-Korea fact sheet reveals about Washington's expectations
Summary:
The new U.S.-Korea tariff and security fact sheet reassures Seoul by limiting market volatility risks, granting semiconductor tariff parity with any larger partner, and sidestepping rice and beef while promising talks on non tariff barriers. It greenlights ROK nuclear powered submarines, supports expanded civil nuclear fuel cycle rights, and advances OPCON transition. The document promotes cooperation in shipbuilding, AI, space, and advanced industries, including potential Korean construction of U.S. Navy vessels. Washington’s concessions signal a desire for South Korea to become a principal Asia-Indo-Pacific anchor and values based partner, not just a manufacturing platform.
Comment: We are going to continue to study and parse not only the POTROK-POTUS statement but all the 57th SCM statement. There is a lot of substance but amso many questions about implementation. As some of my Korean colleagues suggested yesterday, the statements show a more transactional and practical based relationship than values based. But interestingly they did not portray transactional in an overly negative light. It appears that this is now the accepted reality or new normal. However, some might argue that all relationships are to a large extent transactional. We just do not like to describe them that way.
Voices Nov. 17, 2025 / 11:41 AM
What the U.S.-Korea fact sheet reveals about Washington's expectations
Seoul sees reassurance, but the document also may signal what the United States hopes the alliance will become.
By Nohsok Choi
https://www.upi.com/Voices/2025/11/17/perspective-fact-sheet-provisions/4941763395285/
President Donald Trump (R) and President of South Korea Lee Jae Myung look meet in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington on August 25. Photo by Al Drago/UPI | License Photo
SEOUL, Nov. 17 (UPI) -- South Korea President Lee Jae Myung personally announced the U.S.-Korea tariff and security fact sheet Friday, saying that "President Trump's reasonable and decisive judgment played a major role in producing meaningful results."
One may take this as a simple expression of gratitude from a Korean president who finally saw a long negotiation reach a meaningful conclusion. But it may also have signaled something more -- that embedded within the document are hints of what the United States expects from Korea as the alliance evolves.
The fact sheet offers a blueprint for a more mature bilateral relationship and calls for the detailed follow-up negotiations needed to complete it.
The domestic press responded with terms like "relief," "safety mechanism" and "removal of uncertainty." These reactions reflect the Korean perspective. And indeed, the fact sheet incorporates most of what Seoul was widely understood to have sought.
But the fact that the document aligns so closely with Korean requests may itself suggest -- again, this is an interpretive reading -- that Washington has embedded its own expectations for Korea's future role.
In mind, the agreement may have carried an unspoken message from President Donald Trump -- perhaps a quiet request that Korea assume the role of a principal U.S. anchor in the Indo-Pacific.
There are several elements in the fact sheet that invite this interpretation.
Tariffs: Stability measures, semiconductor parity and agriculture
The first is the tariff agreement.
Korea has long worried about the market instability that a $350 billion U.S.-bound investment commitment could generate. Lee therefore placed special weight on a provision that if the memorandum of understanding risks creating currency volatility or other market instability, Korea may request adjustments to the agreement.
Kim Yong-beom, the presidential policy chief, explained that this clause dispels concerns that the commitment amounted to a "grant" rather than an investment.
The second element involves semiconductor tariffs. Before the agreement was finalized, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said that semiconductor tariff reductions were not part of the deal, raising concern in Seoul.
The final fact sheet, however, states that U.S. tariffs on Korean semiconductors will be no less favorable than those on any future partner whose semiconductor trade volume exceeds Korea's.
Effectively, this means Korea will not be placed at a disadvantage relative to Taiwan, its principal competitor -- a result Seoul had strongly sought.
The third point is agriculture. Sensitive agricultural items, such as rice and beef -- long a source of friction -- were not included in the fact sheet. Instead, the document notes that the two countries will cooperate to "discuss non-tariff barriers affecting trade in food and agricultural products." The United States appears to have considered Korea's sensitivities here.
Security: Nuclear submarines, fuel cycle policy and OPCON
Security issues occupy an equally prominent place.
The fact sheet affirms that South Korea may construct nuclear-powered submarines. Such submarines can operate for much longer periods and across far wider areas than diesel-electric subs, and when equipped with ballistic missiles, they become formidable strategic assets. Their operational range would expand from the Korean Peninsula to the greater Indo-Pacific.
Trump went further, referencing the Philadelphia Shipyard -- now owned by Hanwha Ocean -- as a potential site tied to Korean involvement. One possible reading of this is that he views Korea as a strategic partner in America's broader MASGA shipbuilding revival.
Only six countries possess nuclear-powered submarines: the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and India.
The fact sheet also includes language that supports Korea's ability to enrich uranium and reprocess spent nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. This represents a major shift. Given that North Korea is effectively a nuclear state, support for South Korea's fuel-cycle capabilities may be understood as the strongest possible hedge against Pyongyang's threat. It is also a long-standing national aspiration for Korea.
The White House stated that "within the bounds of the U.S.-Korea Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and applicable U.S. legal requirements, the United States supports a process that may lead to Korea's reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel for peaceful use."
In addition, the document addresses wartime operational control, or OPCON, transfer, reiterating Korea's intention to assume a leading role in its own defense, with the United States expressing support. This marks more progress than in past discussions and touches on one of Seoul's most important defense priorities.
Future alliance: Shipbuilding, AI, space and advanced industries
The fact sheet also outlines cooperation across shipbuilding, AI and space -- from traditional strategic industries to cutting-edge sectors.
Lee said the two governments would pursue institutional reforms that could even allow U.S. Navy vessels to be constructed in South Korea, adding that this creates the foundation for Korean and American shipbuilding to "grow great together."
This could be one interpretation of Lee's remarks -- an aspirational vision that, if it is ever to be realized, will depend on substantial political and industrial alignment in both countries.
The decision to position the AI and AI-semiconductor sector as a central pillar of future U.S.-Korea cooperation is particularly significant.
At the fact-sheet announcement, Lee said Korea would "invest boldly in future AI technologies and further strengthen cooperation with world-leading companies like Nvidia," adding that, "as one of the world's top three AI powers and the AI capital of Asia, Korea will work with the international community to pursue inclusive and sustainable shared prosperity."
The fact sheet also introduces areas of tariff reduction not included in previous rounds: lumber, certain aircraft components, generic pharmaceuticals (including precursors) and select natural resources. Implementation, however, will differ by product.
There remain unsettled areas. Although the tariff on automobiles and auto parts has been reduced to 15%, the absence of a confirmed implementation date continues to create uncertainty.
The Korean government believes the lower rate should take effect on the first day of the month in which the memorandum of understanding on the tariff agreement is signed. But because the fact sheet does not specify an effective date, Korean automakers may have to continue paying the 25% tariff for now.
A larger meaning behind the fact sheet
Overall, most of Korea's core positions appear to have been reflected in the final document. Lee thanked Trump for his "reasonable and decisive" role, and indeed the United States appears to have made multiple concessions.
Why? One plausible interpretation is that Washington increasingly sees Korea not only as a Northeast Asian partner, but also as a key ally across the entire Indo-Pacific. Korea shares democratic and liberal values with the United States and -- uniquely in the region -- embodies civic principles rooted partly in Judeo-Christian heritage.
In this sense, the fact sheet may be read not as a narrow industrial pact, but as an invitation for a deeper, values-based partnership.
Rather than viewing Korea merely as a partner in America's manufacturing revival, it may be more accurate to see the two nations' shared values as calling for expanded strategic cooperation -- again, an interpretive reading, not a confirmed U.S. policy.
From this perspective, the fact sheet functions as more than a joint explanatory document. It can be interpreted as an invitation for the two countries to move forward together toward a genuinely shared future.
Nohsok Choi is the former chief editor of the Kyunghyang Shinmun and former Paris correspondent. He currently serves as president of the Kyunghyang Shinmun Alumni Association, president of the Korean Media & Culture Forum and CEO of the YouTube channel One World TV.
8. North Korea created new spy group to monitor ‘anti-socialist’ acts: Researcher
Summary:
North Korea has created a new “84 Gruppa” security unit, according to escapee testimony, to monitor “anti-socialist” behavior in military-linked, foreign currency–earning enterprises. Formed around 2020–21, it targets exposure to foreign media, slang, and lifestyle “deviance,” tightening ideological control as overseas construction and arms deals expand and gruppa crackdowns intensify.
Comment: Is this an indicator that Kim see's the growth of internal threats forcing him to act to protect himself and his regime? This seems to be the result of the "COVID paradox:" While Kim was deathly afraid of COVID and had to defend against it, he also saw the opportunity it presented to shore up his control and implement draconian population and resources control measures to further oppress the Korean people in the north to ensure survival the regime.
North Korea created new spy group to monitor ‘anti-socialist’ acts: Researcher
Defectors reportedly say the previously unknown 84 Gruppa targets military-linked firms dealing in foreign currency
Jooheon Kim November 19, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/11/north-korea-created-new-spy-group-to-monitor-anti-socialist-acts-researcher/
Image: KCTV
North Korea has established a new spy committee to monitor “anti-state activities” at military-affiliated companies tasked with raising cash for the regime, according to an ROK researcher, in a move that appears to be linked to a broader crackdown on stopping the influx of foreign culture.
Testimonies from recent DPRK defectors point to the creation of the previously unknown 84 Gruppa to monitor civilians in sectors that deal in foreign currency, according to Kim Young-hui, a visiting researcher at the Institute for North Korean Studies at Dongguk University.
The defector-turned-academic told NK News that the committee was likely created around 2021 at the direction of the Workers’ Party of Korea and included personnel from North Korea’s Defense Security Bureau. She speculated that it targets trade companies, factories and the arms industry.
The South Korean government has not published any information about the committee, but Kim said her interviews with 10 defectors who escaped to South Korea between 2020 to 2023 has produced evidence of its existence.
According to Kim, the group’s duties include monitoring for “anti-socialist” behavior, such as watching South Korean dramas or American movies, as well as inappropriate “non-socialist” activity.
“Non-socialist behaviors include things like dressing improperly, indiscriminate use of foreign words, skipping mandatory rural labor mobilization to stay home and watch TV, prostitution, or men and women living together without marriage,” she said.
“Since 2020, more people have been exposed to foreign videos and media, and as a result, it seems that the authorities have been tightening measures to prevent ideological loosening,” Kim added.
Given that many military-linked companies engage with the outside world to earn foreign currency, 84 Gruppa may be tasked in part with ensuring that North Koreans in this sector don’t deviate from state-approved behavior as a result of their interactions with foreigners.
The revelations about its existence notably comes as the DPRK has ramped up dispatches of construction workers to Russia in recent years, while exporting large quantities of weapons to support its invasion of Ukraine.
Choi Ji-cheol, a former DPRK overseas laborer in Russia, noted that many military-linked companies operate in the construction sector. Recalling his more than 10 years working on Sakhalin Island until 2017, he said he saw two such companies there, including a construction firm called Jeonseung, meaning “victory in the war.”
North Korea has ramped up a crackdown on “anti-socialist” activity in recent years, most notably through the passage of the Law on Rejecting Reactionary Ideology and Culture that punishes the distribution of foreign movies and music with prison time and hard labor.
Authorities have also targeted the use of South Korean words and dialects with the Pyongyang Standard Language Protection Act, amid official paranoia about the growing popularity of ROK culture among DPRK youth.
Choi Yu-jin, a military officer who worked as a nurse in a unit tasked with protecting North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, told NK News that one of her comrades was punished for living with a woman whom he was not married to.
“He was discharged from the army on charges of moral misconduct,” the former DPRK officer said Tuesday. “Afterwards, it was impossible for him to find a job.”
The gruppa moniker was previously used by the regime to refer to the several joint commands tasked with cracking down on dissidents, according to Kim.
The 109 Gruppa established around 2004 was assembled using personnel from the Ministries of State Security, Social Security and the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office. According to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, “109” refers to Oct. 9, the date on which former DPRK leader Kim Jong Il issued an order to regulate foreign media and publications.
The 82 Gruppa, another group that included Socialist Patriotic Youth League members, was also created in the 2020s to combat the distribution of illegal videos amongst younger North Koreans, according to Kim.
Martin Weiser, an independent North Korea researcher and NK Pro contributor, observed that the numbers in these group names usually refer to the date when they were created. He raised the possibility that a secret Politburo meeting between July 2 and Aug. 13, 2020 established 84 Gruppa, ahead of the passage of the anti-reactionary thought law in Dec. 2020.
North Korean escapees have noted the widespread appeal of foreign music and films in the DPRK, particularly content from South Korea. According to the U.N., Pyongyang has expanded its use of the death penalty over the past decade to cover a wide range of offenses, including publicly executing people for distributing foreign media.
Edited by David Choi
9. Kim Jong Un praises secret police for defending his rule during visit to HQ
Summary:
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un marked the “80th anniversaries” of core security organs by praising the Ministry of State Security, public security forces, courts and prosecutors as the Party’s “political guard,” urging class-based repression and ideological control while showcasing loyalty rallies, facilities and riot units that reinforce his rule.
Comment. Control is paramount for Kim Jong Un. We should keep in mind that the regime will collapse when two conditions are met: First, the loss of the regime's ability to govern all of north Korea from Pyongyang. Second, is the loss of coherence and support of the military and security services. In short the loss of central governing effectiveness combined with the loss of coherency/support of the military/security services.
Therefore, he must ensure his "political guard" remains loyal to him. And of course ideological indoctrination from birth to death is key to ensuring control.
Kim Jong Un praises secret police for defending his rule during visit to HQ
North Korean leader also visits top court and prosecutors to celebrate 80 years of eliminating political opposition
Colin Zwirko November 19, 2025
https://www.nknews.org/2025/11/kim-jong-un-praises-secret-police-for-defending-his-rule-during-visit-to-hq/
Kim Jong Un with Minister of State Security Pang Tu Sop (left) at the MSS HQ on Nov. 18 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 19, 2025)
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited the headquarters of the country’s secret police, ordinary police and top court on Tuesday to mark their 80th anniversaries, according to state media, calling the law enforcement agencies responsible for defending his absolute rule the “Party’s political guard.”
The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) billed Kim’s visit to the Ministry of State Security in its report on Wednesday as the most important of his three stops.
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the country’s secret police agency tasked with eliminating ideological and political opposition to the three-generation Kim family dictatorship. It is commonly referred to as the Bowibu, the romanization of its former official name (now Bowisong).
KCNA said MSS officials and agents vowed to “build manifold bulletproof walls around the Party Central Committee” after taking group photos with the leader.
Kim called the ministry a “reliable companion and trustworthy assistant of the Party,” and thanked officials including minister Ri Chang Dae for protecting the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) from “hard fights against hostile forces from the first step since its birth as the ruling party.”
In addition to enforcing Kim Jong Un’s dictates against political opposition and managing his large concentration camps, the MSS is in charge of censorship in media and society.
It also oversees border security including passports and entry and exit privileges. The ministry’s revamped General Border Guards Bureau made a prominent appearance in new uniforms at last month’s military parade.
State media does not generally cover the ministry’s activities but did publish a short report on the secretive five-day Fifth Conference of Security Officials in Nov. 2022, saying it was addressing ongoing problems controlling “anti-socialist” acts and other internal security challenges.
MSS chief Ri Chang Dae appears to the right of Kim Jong Un in the top-right image during the leader’s visit to the secret police HQ | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 19, 2025)
A large stone slab nearly four stories tall covers a building on one side of the Kim Jong Il statue square at the MSS HQ, featuring the slogan “Long live the Great Comrade Kim Jong Un, the symbol of Socialist Korea’s strength and flag of a hundred victories in a hundred battles!” (사회주의조선의 강대성의 상징이시며 백전백승의 기치이신 위대한 김정은동지 만세!) | Image: KCTV (Nov. 19, 2025)
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Next door to the MSS at the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) in northeast Pyongyang on Tuesday, Kim praised the Public Security Forces (PSF) for “defending the outposts of the grim revolution accompanying the serious class struggle,” appearing to refer to the rounding up of political opposition to secure the WPK’s position in the early years of the DPRK.
“It is the important mission of the public security organ of the DPRK to guarantee by law and arms the activities of the Party and the government who devote all their energies to defending the Korean-style socialist system and promoting the people’s wellbeing,” Kim said during his visit, according to KCNA.
The DPRK leader greeted MPS head Pang Tu Sop upon arriving, and called the ministry the “red sword of the class[-based ideological system].”
The MPS is known as the country’s criminal police, focusing on enforcing laws and fighting non-political crime, though they also reportedly manage prisons and reeducation centers known as kyohwaso facilities.
DPRK authorities have pushed an important national project this year to rebuild such prisons and even build at least one large new one, according to exclusive NK Pro reporting, possibly in order to formalize and smooth out operations in the nation’s penitentiary system.
It has also introduced new police units wearing riot gear at military parades in recent years, suggestive of proactive efforts against social unrest.
However, the true division of responsibilities and full scope of current duties between the MSS and MPS — what Kim called the “the two core forces of the DPRK” this week — is unclear.
Multiple references in Wednesday’s KCNA report on the MPS visit to “class”-based rules, the North Korean term for ideological rules, suggest there may be overlap between the ministries in enforcing political and ideological laws, as Kim Jong Un has ramped up efforts to tighten his grip on society and boost official adherence to his cult of personality.
State media typically presents “class education” as indoctrination against U.S., South Korean and other foreign cultural influence, but it also reports “anti-socialist” crimes as including more passive threats against Kim’s rule like disinterest or apathy to state directives among young people.
Both the MSS and MPS were organized together under various configurations for decades until the 1970s, and both have also been reorganized multiple times since then.
MPS chief Pang Tu Sop appears holding a red folder that was presented to him by Kim Jong Un in the bottom-right photo | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 19, 2025)
Special MPS riot squads and SWAT teams joined the April 2022 military parade on armored vehicles, while montages of the units training in urban infiltration were shown in state TV coverage of the event | Image: KCTV (May 27, 2022)
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The third Kim activity report on Wednesday covered his visits on Tuesday to the newly built headquarters of the Supreme Court, near the Chongchun sports village in western Pyongyang, as well as to the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office located in the western outskirts of the capital.
According to KCNA, he called on the state judges and prosecutors to “defend the state and the people with the sacred legal right granted by the Party,” and to “remain faithful to their class duty as defenders of the Party, the revolution, the country, the people and the socialist system.”
Both offices were renamed in Jan. 2025.
The newly built Supreme Court headquarters building makes its first appearance in state media | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 19, 2025) | Coordinates: 39.01796° N, 125.68818° E
Kim Jong Un at the Supreme Public Prosecutors Office on Nov. 18 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (Nov. 19, 2025)
The three reports were brief and basic, featuring mostly platitudes about the state organs but no new directives or announcements regarding their duties and activities.
State TV aired video footage of the four visits showing thousands of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officers enthusiastically chanting Kim’s name for long periods, visually emphasizing their loyalty and subservience to a leader who is not subject to any of the country’s laws. This stands in stark contrast to judicial systems with rule of law like South Korea, where the Supreme Court finalized the ouster of President Yoon Seok-yeol earlier this year.
The KCTV footage did not show Kim entering any buildings at the four locations on Tuesday, instead showing him arriving and departing in his extensive motorcade for outdoor-only events, accompanied by a large contingent of bulletproof shield-toting bodyguards. He also handed over an official red “Congratulations” folder to the heads of each ministry and organization.
State media does not generally report on the activities of any of the four law enforcement agencies, including individual crimes, crime statistics and court proceedings. Their operations remain largely opaque, and most of what is known comes from the testimonies of North Korean defectors.
Kim’s visits come as North Korean law enforcement organs have increased cooperation and exchanges with Russia in recent years.
While state media said the visits marked each organ’s “80th founding anniversary,” none were in fact set up 80 years ago in Nov. 1945. Each has roots in the early days of the post-colonial period, but the Soviet Union still oversaw governance in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula at the time.
A map showing the locations of the four headquarters Kim reportedly visited across Pyongyang on Nov. 18 | Image: Google Earth, edited by NK News
Edited by Bryan Betts
Updated on Nov. 19 at 2:14 p.m. KST with additional details about KCTV coverage, and at 3:42 p.m. with screenshots from KCTV
10. Trump ‘took Pyongyang by surprise’ with nuclear subs for South Korea, sinking talk hopes
Summary:
POTUS' surprise approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarines and fuel-cycle capabilities shocked Pyongyang, which now sees Seoul as a quasi-nuclear state. KCNA condemns a ‘nuclear domino’ and arms race, hardening North Korea’s stance and making new Trump-Kim talks unlikely until after its ninth party congress and Trump-Xi summit recalibrate dynamics.
Comment: And POTROK took POTUS by surprise with his submarine ambush that led to the submarine tweet. But was there really any chance of talks with KJU? Or do we really believe that if KJU thought he had an advantage in talking that this announcement that the ROK would have a nuclear powered attack submarine in a decade or more would really sink such talks?
Trump ‘took Pyongyang by surprise’ with nuclear subs for South Korea, sinking talk hopes
Now the North sees the South as a ‘quasi-nuclear weapons state’ with US help, a fourth Trump-Kim summit appears less likely than ever
Park Chan-kyong
Published: 12:27pm, 19 Nov 2025Updated: 4:24pm, 19 Nov 2025
North Korea is expected to remain largely impervious to Western diplomatic overtures for the foreseeable future as it rails against its rivals’ “hostile” policies.
On Tuesday, North Korean state media denounced last month’s summit between US President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung as proof of the “confrontational will” of its adversaries to “remain hostile … to the end”.
The North was taken aback by the outcomes of the Trump-Lee summit, according to Professor Cho Han-bum of the Korea Institute for National Unification.
“The approvals for nuclear-propulsion submarines and the enrichment of spent fuel took Pyongyang by surprise,” he told This Week in Asia. “These projects would seriously undermine its superiority in asymmetrical force over the South.”
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (second from right) inspects what state media described as a new nuclear attack submarine in 2023. Photo: KCNA/KNS/AP
Pyongyang’s state-run Korean Central News Agency on Tuesday denounced US approval of South Korea’s nuclear-powered submarine programme, warning of a “nuclear domino” effect igniting a “hot arms race” in the region.
It also condemned American support for Seoul’s uranium enrichment and nuclear fuel reprocessing projects, accusing Washington of helping South Korea edge closer to “quasi-nuclear weapons state” status.
These developments had gone “far beyond Pyongyang’s expectations”, Cho said, adding that it remained to be seen whether North Korea would feel pressured to return to the negotiating table.
Breaking the deadlock
A joint fact sheet issued after the Trump-Lee summit on October 29 reaffirmed Washington and Seoul’s commitment to North Korea’s “complete denuclearisation” and the implementation of security guarantees laid out during Trump’s 2018 meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore.
Observers caution that the annual US–South Korea joint military drills set for March next year are likely to sustain tensions, leaving little room for dialogue.
North Korea’s ninth party congress, slated for early next year, is widely seen as the next inflection point – setting the trajectory for Pyongyang’s domestic and foreign policy over the next five years, including its dealings with Western nations.
Its outcomes are expected to offer clues about the North’s diplomatic posture and its willingness, or lack thereof, to resume dialogue with Washington and Seoul after a more than six-year hiatus.
Kim (centre) presides over the eighth congress of the ruling Workers’ Party of Korea in Pyongyang in 2021. Photo: KCNA/KNS/AFP
Seoul on Monday proposed fresh military talks with Pyongyang aimed at clarifying the location of the Military Demarcation Line, their de facto border within the inter-Korean demilitarised buffer zone, to pre-empt any accidental armed clashes.
But analysts told This Week in Asia they were deeply sceptical about North Korea’s willingness to engage, noting that it now regarded inter-Korean ties as relations between inherently hostile states after discarding the decades-old constitutional narrative of a divided nation awaiting reunification.
North Korean state media made no mention of Seoul’s overtures for military talks on Tuesday.
“As long as the war in Ukraine continues, the North wouldn’t find any reason to come back to dialogue with Washington,” said Professor Yang Moo-jin of the University of North Korean Studies.
Russian President Putin thanks North Korean leader Kim for sending troops to Ukraine
Washington, meanwhile, will face mounting pressure to engage as the North’s nuclear arsenal expands, according to Kim Yong-hyun, a professor of North Korean studies at Dongguk University.
“While waiting for a chance to resume dialogue, it’s necessary to avoid ratcheting up tension and giving the North a pretext for provocations,” Kim said, adding that Kim Jong-un would not resume talks with the US unless he felt “confident he had the upper hand” given the precedent of their failed Hanoi summit in 2019.
In the meantime, he said Seoul’s recent proposal for military talks represented a genuine effort to forestall tensions and deny Pyongyang a pretext for provocation, however “slim the chances”.
Kim appeared to leave the door to negotiations slightly ajar when the North Korean leader recalled, during a speech in September, his “good memories” of meeting Trump – but only if Washington drops its demands for denuclearisation.
Pyongyang would only consider resuming inter-Korean talks and engaging with Japan “after Kim meets with Trump”, Yang said.
‘More wiggle room’
Looking ahead, some analysts see the prospect of a meeting between Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping next April as a possible catalyst for renewed US-North Korea diplomacy.
“Improved Sino-American ties would grant Pyongyang more wiggle room to engage with Washington,” said Professor Kim Sang-bum of Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies.
“We would be able to fathom where the North is heading over the next five years when it unveils policy directions after the ninth party congress.”
On Monday, former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo told a forum in Virginia that he believed North Korea’s denuclearisation would only happen with Xi’s “permission” and “direction”.
Mike Pompeo (second from right), then US secretary of state, exchanges documents with North Korea’s Kim Yo-jong after her brother Kim Jong-un (front left) meets US President Donald Trump in Singapore in 2018. Photo: EPA-EFE
Washington’s chief diplomat during the first Trump administration reportedly argued that Kim Jong-un’s willingness to negotiate was contingent upon meaningful incentives – a prospect currently hampered by the lack of “carrots” to persuade him.
Recalling the three Trump-Kim summits held during Trump’s first term, Pompeo said: “Each time, he [Kim] reported back to Beijing, both before and after the meetings.”
“This was really Xi Jinping with whom we were negotiating,” he added, according to Yonhap News Agency.
Pompeo also cast doubt on the likelihood of a second Trump administration recognising North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, saying “I would be very surprised if there would be a formal statement”.
Park Chan-kyong
Park Chan-kyong is a journalist covering South Korean affairs for the South China Morning Post. He previously worked at the Agence France-Presse's Seoul bureau for 35 years. He studied political science at Korea University and economics at the Yonsei University Graduate School.
11. Pro-Pyongyang paper says N. Korea aims to build socialist powerhouse by 2035
Comment: Well if they have not been able to make the Socialist Workers' Paradise great in seven plus decades what makes them think they will be successful in the next decade? All they need is one more decade?
Pro-Pyongyang paper says N. Korea aims to build socialist powerhouse by 2035 | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119003600315
By Park Boram
SEOUL, Nov. 19 (Yonhap) -- North Korea has a development plan aimed at building a socialist powerhouse by 2035, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper reported Wednesday.
The Japan-based Choson Sinbo revealed the plan in a travelogue by its delegation that recently visited North Korea for the 80th founding anniversary of the North's Rodong Sinmun newspaper.
"The first stage of the 15-year vision to accomplish a socialist powerhouse by around 2035, where prosperity reigns and the entire people enjoy happiness, will be finalized and a new reform period will begin," the outlet, considered to represent North Korea's official stance, said, referring to a ruling party congress set for early next year.
At its eighth party congress in 2021, North Korea adopted a five-year economic development plan. At the upcoming ninth congress, the country is expected to present another five-year plan outlining its major policy stance.
The latest Choson Sinbo report indicates that North Korea is following a 15-year development road map, implemented in three five-year phases.
Shortly after the 2021 party congress, North Korean media quoted leader Kim Jong-un as writing in a letter to a youth association that the ruling party will undertake a large-scale struggle to establish a socialist powerhouse over the next 15 years to help bring happiness and prosperity to its people.
This image, captured from North Korea's Korean Central Television on Nov. 5, 2025, shows a stationery factory, where leader Kim Jong-un gave a field inspection the previous day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)
pbr@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Park Boram · November 19, 2025
12. Lee encourages S. Korean troops stationed in UAE
Comment: Sometimes I think we forget how many ROK troops are conducting various operations around the world. This is why we can describe South Korea as a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power that is a partner in the arsenal of democracy and that seeks to uphold the rules based international order.
(LEAD) Lee encourages S. Korean troops stationed in UAE | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119010251315
(ATTN: REVISES headline, lead)
By Kim Eun-jung
ABU DHABI, Nov. 19 (Yonhap) -- President Lee Jae Myung on Wednesday met with the South Korean military contingent in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and encouraged their service to promote peace in the Middle Eastern nation.
Lee met with about 50 members of the Akh unit during his stay in Abu Dhabi, ahead of concluding his three-day state visit to the UAE.
"You are carrying out important duties that protect peace in the world and the Middle East, elevate the dignity of the Republic of Korea and safeguard the lives of our people," Lee said, referring to South Korea's official name.
President Lee Jae Myung (L) speaks during a meeting with members of the South Korean military contingent in the United Arab Emirates, the Akh unit, at a hotel in Abu Dhabi on Nov. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)
He expressed gratitude for their service and vowed to remember their dedication.
"The nation will not forget the sacrifices you are making," said Lee, donning the unit's uniform.
The Akh unit has been carrying out various missions in the UAE since its establishment in 2011, including protecting South Korean nationals in the region in case of emergencies. Akh means brother in Arabic.
During his summit with Lee, UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan highlighted the service of the Akh unit and expressed hope for deepening cooperation in related areas.
President Lee Jae Myung (2nd from L, front row) poses for a photo during a meeting with members of the South Korean military contingent in the United Arab Emirates, the Akh unit, at a hotel in Abu Dhabi on Nov. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 19, 2025
13. S. Korean envoy stresses close cooperation with U.S. to pave way for N.K. dialogue
Comment: A diplomat must say diplomatic things. Of course close cooperation is needed. But I frankly do not see how that will pave the way for nK dialogue. We have to answer two questions: What would being KJU to the table for talks and what would be the practical objectives of the talks? - Yes it is better to jaw jaw than war war but we must have a realistic understanding of the nature, objectives, and strategy of the Kim family regime and understand that he does not fit neatly into any conventional international relations theory (or reality).
(LEAD) S. Korean envoy stresses close cooperation with U.S. to pave way for N.K. dialogue | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119000251315?section=nk/nk
(ATTN: ADDS more info in paras 12-16)
By Song Sang-ho and Park Sung-min
WASHINGTON, Nov. 18 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's top envoy to the United States pledged Tuesday to work closely with the U.S. to foster conditions needed for the resumption of diplomacy with North Korea, amid uncertainty over whether Pyongyang would accede to dialogue overtures.
New Ambassador Kang Kyung-wha, who served as Seoul's foreign minister from 2017-2021, made the remarks during her first meeting with Korean correspondents since taking office last month.
"While closely communicating with the U.S. side, (we) will continue (efforts) to secure support for our policy toward North Korea," she said.
"Together with the U.S., our government -- as a peacemaker and a pacemaker -- plans to continue efforts to enable conditions to become ripe for inter-Korean dialogue and dialogue between the North and the U.S.," she added.
South Korean Ambassador to the U.S. Kang Kyung-wha speaks during a press meeting in Washington on Nov. 18, 2025. (Yonhap)
The ambassador used the terms -- peacemaker and pacemaker -- that President Lee Jae Myung used during his White House summit with U.S. President Donald Trump in August to underline his commitment to close cooperation with the U.S. for peace on the divided Korean Peninsula.
She noted that through the two summits between Lee and Trump, including the second in Korea last month, the two countries have agreed to cooperate closely for peace and stability on the peninsula, and concurred on the importance of communication with North Korea.
Pointing to the "complex" international circumstances marked by "many difficult challenges and uncertainties," Kang said that she feels a "heavy sense of responsibility" to implement the Lee administration's "pragmatic" diplomacy, which she said should be propped up by the "robust," "future-oriented" alliance with the U.S.
"Within around five months since the launch of the Lee administration, South Korea and the U.S. successfully concluded the leaders' reciprocal visits to each other's countries," she said.
"As a result, agreements on trade and security have been struck, and we now stand at a new starting point for the South Korea-U.S. alliance."
She expressed her belief that the trust between Lee and Trump and their will for cooperation will serve as a crucial foundation for the development of the alliance.
"At this embassy, we all will make all-out efforts to ensure the hard-won outcomes at the frontline of diplomacy toward the U.S. will be implemented without a hitch," she said.
Commenting on the two countries' recently released joint fact sheet on bilateral trade and security agreements, Kang said that Seoul and Washington have achieved "unprecedented", weighty outcomes.
The outcomes, codified in the document, include Seoul's commitment to investing US$350 billion in the U.S. in return for Washington's lowering of "reciprocal" tariffs on South Korean products to 15 percent from 25 percent, and the U.S.' support for Seoul's push to acquire nuclear-powered submarines.
Kang and her embassy plan to back up efforts to help the two countries proceed with those agreements as planned.
Regarding the submarine project, the embassy is said to believe that domestic procedural issues in the U.S. or potential disagreements within the Trump administration might not pose any serious hurdle given that the fact sheet clearly states the leaders' will on the matter.
Speculation has lingered that Trump's approval for South Korea's submarine construction could trigger an internal debate over proliferation concerns and other issues.
sshluck@yna.co.kr
(END)
en.yna.co.kr · Song Sang-ho · November 19, 2025
14. S. Korea stresses need to improve U.S. visa issues for Korean investors for bilateral cooperation
Comment: Even though ROK and US diplomats are working hard to overcome this own goal by the US, the long term implications of the Georgia ICE Raid debacle could be significant. Because of this there is growing sentiment among younger Koreans that the US is no longer welcoming nor safe for Koreans. Because most of us judge the ROK/US alliance from our personal relationships which are strong despite any alliance friction, we have a blind spot when it comes to people with whom we do not interact (which is the younger generation for many of us). We have to work hard to try to overcome the perceptions that now exist because of our actions in Georgia. Fixing the visa issues will be a good start but it is not sufficient.
S. Korea stresses need to improve U.S. visa issues for Korean investors for bilateral cooperation | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119006900315
By Kim Seung-yeon
SEOUL, Nov. 19 (Yonhap) -- A senior South Korean diplomat has stressed the need to improve U.S. visa issues for Korean companies investing in the United States, calling such efforts essential for keeping the momentum in bilateral cooperation, the foreign ministry said Wednesday.
Jung Ki-hong, ambassador for public diplomacy, made the remark during a meeting with Michael DeSombre, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, in Washington on Tuesday (local time), the ministry said in a release.
The two sides discussed ways to support the stable operations of South Korean businesses in the U.S., including carrying out follow-up measures agreed after more than 300 Korean workers were arrested and detained in a U.S. immigration raid in Georgia in early September.
The incident has led the two countries to form a bilateral visa working group to address challenges faced by Korean businesses entering the U.S.
Separately, Jung also met with Sarah Rogers, under secretary of state for public diplomacy, and discussed efforts to strengthen cooperation on exchanges and other public diplomacy projects, both bilaterally and in a trilateral framework with Japan, the ministry said.
Jung Ki-hong (L), ambassador for public diplomacy, poses with Sarah Rogers, U.S. under secretary of state for public diplomacy, during their meeting in Washington, D.C., on Nov. 18, 2025, in this photo provided by the foreign ministry in Seoul. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
elly@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Seung-yeon · November 19, 2025
15. S. Korea's 1st submarine to retire after 34 years in service
Comment: While we focus on the nuclear powered attack submarine issue, I think we forget that South Korea has had a submarine program that has been superior to the north's for decades.
S. Korea's 1st submarine to retire after 34 years in service | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119002800315
By Lee Minji
SEOUL, Nov. 19 (Yonhap) -- The ROKS Jang Bogo, South Korea's first naval submarine, will retire at the end of the year after 34 years in service, the Navy said Wednesday.
To mark the milestone, the 1,200-ton submarine will embark on a farewell cruise from a naval port in the southeastern city of Jinhae later Wednesday, carrying both the first and last captains of the vessel aboard, according to the armed service.
The submarine was launched at a HDW shipyard in Germany in 1991 and was acquired by the South Korean Navy the following year.
Named after a legendary ninth-century maritime explorer and trader from the Unified Silla Kingdom, the ROKS Jang Bogo has sailed about 633,000 kilometers in total since 1992, a distance equivalent to circling the globe 15 times.
As the country's first naval submarine, the vessel took part in major submarine warfare drills, such as the South Korea-U.S. Silent Shark exercise and the multinational Pacific Reach submarine rescue exercise.
Since last year, the Navy has used the submarine mostly for training crew members and conducting maintenance workshops.
As part of efforts to strengthen its maritime capabilities, the Navy recently launched the first of three 3,600-ton homegrown naval attack submarines that is set to be delivered at the end of 2027. It has already commissioned 3,000-ton submarines for active service.
The 1,200-ton ROKS Jang Bogo submarine is docked at a naval port in the southeastern city of Jinhae on Nov. 18, 2025, in this photo provided by the Navy the following day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
mlee@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 19, 2025
16. HD Hyundai sets industry record with 5,000 vessel deliveries
Comment: Hyundai (and Hanwha) will make American Shipbuilding Great Again (MASGA). This is an impressive accomplishment. No one can say that Korea does not punch well above its weight.
HD Hyundai sets industry record with 5,000 vessel deliveries | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Choi Kyong-ae · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119005500320
SEOUL, Nov. 19 (Yonhap) -- HD Hyundai, South Korea's leading shipbuilding group, said Wednesday it has become the world's first shipbuilder to deliver 5,000 vessels, reaching the milestone 50 years after its inaugural ship delivery.
The 5,000th vessel, delivered last month, was the Diego Silang, the second offshore patrol vessel built for the Philippine Navy. The ship is part of a 10-vessel order secured from the Philippines, the company said in a press release.
HD Hyundai delivered its first vessel -- the 260,000-ton oil tanker Atlantic Baron -- in 1974 and has since supplied ships to more than 70 shipping companies in 68 countries, it said.
"The delivery of 5,000 ships reflects a history of challenges that transformed the global maritime industry. Building on this achievement, we will move toward the next 5,000 vessels and the next 50 years," HD Hyundai Chairman Chung Ki-sun said in the release.
HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering Co. (HD KSOE), HD Hyundai's subholding unit, has won US$14.24 billion in orders so far this year, reaching 78.9 percent of its annual target of $18.05 billion.
HD KSOE oversees three shipyards -- HD Hyundai Heavy Industries Co., HD Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co. and HD Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Co. HD Hyundai Mipo is scheduled to merge with HD Hyundai Heavy next month.
This file photo provided by HD Hyundai shows the Diego Silang, the second offshore patrol vessel built by the South Korean shipbuilder as part of a 10-vessel order from the Philippine Navy. The ship marked the 5,000th vessel delivered by the South Korean shipbuilding group. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)
kyongae.choi@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Choi Kyong-ae · November 19, 2025
17. Hyundai Motor chief upbeat about U.S. market following trade deal
Comment: But the devil is in the details. We really need to see the implementation of the agreements. But it is a good sign that he is bullish after the talks.
Hyundai Motor chief upbeat about U.S. market following trade deal | Yonhap News Agency
en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 19, 2025
https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251119009800315?section=k-biz/index
By Kim Eun-jung
ABU DHABI, Nov. 19 (Yonhap) -- Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Euisun Chung said Wednesday he expects the automaker's business in the United States will improve next year, following South Korea's conclusion of a trade deal that would lower U.S. tariffs on Korean-made vehicles.
Chung made the remarks during a business roundtable in Abu Dhabi held during President Lee Jae Myung's state visit to the United Arab Emirates.
It came days after Seoul and Washington finalized a deal to lower U.S. tariffs on Korean autos from 25 percent to 15 percent in return for Seoul's US$350 billion investment pledge.
"I think the U.S. market will get better next year," Chung told reporters, expressing gratitude for the government's dedicated efforts in securing the trade deal.
Under the agreement, the lowered tariffs will be applied retroactively on the first day of the month in which the legislation needed to implement the investment fund memorandum of understanding is submitted to the National Assembly. If the bill is introduced this month, the tariff cut would take effect retroactively from Nov. 1.
Chung welcomed the retrospective implementation.
"I'm relieved that the retroactive application is set for Nov. 1," he said. "Even having it take effect one month earlier is good for us."
President Lee Jae Myung (R) shakes hands with Hyundai Motor Group Chairman Euisun Chung during a business roundtable in Abu Dhabi, the United Arab Emirates, on Nov. 19, 2025. (Yonhap)
ejkim@yna.co.kr
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en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 19, 2025
18. Activist group members sent to prosecutors over anti-North leaflet launches
Comment: This is so disappointing. Korea (and the US) must do better. Information is the key driver of change on the Korean peninsula. It supports everything we want to accomplish.
"Unification first, then denuclearization; the path to unification is through information and human rights." (U-ROK)
We should also remember what the UN Commission of Inquiry said in 2014. Isolation and denial of information to the Korean people in the north is one of the many human rights violations being committed by the Kim family regime. The report called on the international community to overcome the north's isolation and provide information to the people.
Activist group members sent to prosecutors over anti-North leaflet launches
Published: 19 Nov. 2025, 14:41
Updated: 19 Nov. 2025, 16:40
https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-11-19/national/socialAffairs/Activist-group-members-sent-to-prosecutors-over-antiNorth-leaflet-launches/2458005
Choi Seong-ryong, head of civic group Families of Abductees to North Korea, speaks during a press conference announcing the end of anti-North Korea leaflet launches in Paju, Gyeonggi, on July 8. [YONHAP]
Members of an activist group accused of launching balloons carrying anti-North Korea leaflets and other items from the South's border areas have been referred to prosecutors without detention, the Gyeonggi Yeoncheon Police Precinct said Wednesday.
The group, comprised of 20 members in total, is suspected of violating the Aviation Safety Act and the Framework Act on the Management of Disasters and Safety.
Related Article
The suspects launched a total of 1,025 balloons from areas near the inter-Korean border — including Paju and Yeoncheon County — between January last year and April this year, according to police.
The balloons reportedly carried leaflets criticizing the North Korean regime, along with snacks, bibles and USB drives. Investigators found that the group prepared the materials and high-pressure gas with support from affiliated sponsors and conducted the launches late at night in remote locations.
The police initially took no legal action after the Constitutional Court ruled in September 2023 that banning leaflet launches was unconstitutional.
However, the Gyeonggi provincial government designated Paju, Yeoncheon and Gimpo as “danger zones” in October 2023 under disaster safety law, citing threats to residents’ safety. Police subsequently began a full-scale investigation.
Leaflets criticizing the North Korean regime, along with snacks, bibles and USB drives found in balloons launched by an activist group, seized by the Gyeonggi Yeoncheon Police Precinct [YEONCHEON POLICE PRECINCT]
Based on this designation, the police began receiving related reports in September last year. They investigated 26 related reports and cases, including those transferred from other precincts in northern Gyeonggi, and identified 20 individuals for prosecution.
The suspects face charges under both disaster safety and aviation laws. Under the Aviation Safety Act, launching unmanned free balloons carrying external loads of 2 kilograms (4.4 pounds) or more without prior authorization is prohibited and punishable by a fine of up to 5 million won ($3,410).
“These group members are not North Korean defectors,” a police official said. “They typically operated in small, dispersed teams and launched balloons with payloads exceeding 2 kilograms.”
“Launching leaflets into North Korea poses a serious threat to residents in border areas,” said the official. “We will respond strictly to any such activity in accordance with the law.”
This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.
BY JEON ICK-JIN [lim.jeongwon@joongang.co.kr]
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
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