Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:

“Whenever any government, or church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, ‘this you may not read, this you might not see, this you are forbidden to know,’ the end result is tyranny and oppression, no matter how holy their motives.”

– Robert A. Heinlein

"I know nothing grander, better exercise, better digestion, more positive proof of the past, the triumphant result of faith in human kind, than a well-contested American national election."

– Walt Whitman from Collect, in The Complete Poetry and Prose of Walt Whitman, vol. 2, p. 228 (1948)

"The most important political office is that of the private citizen."

– Louis Brandeis

1. Report: China preparing its population for war with U.S.

2. A Chinese firm bought an insurer for CIA agents - part of Beijing's trillion dollar spending spree

3. Ukraine hits targets in Russia with U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles, military says

4. China’s Demographics Problem Grows

5. SWJ–El Centro Book Review – Hidden War: How Special Operations Game Wardens are Reclaiming America’s Wildlands from the Drug Cartels

6. The Case for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Ensuring Information Access for Closed Societies

7. To Evade Sanctions, the Kremlin Turns to a Convicted Money Launderer

8. The surreal 45-day trek at the heart of Nato’s defence

9. Trump Sends Pentagon Officials to Ukraine in Effort to Restart Peace Talks

10. Trump Said to Authorize C.I.A. Plans for Covert Action in Venezuela

11. Terrifying internet vulnerability EXPOSED Cloudflare crash

12. Saudi Arabia wants to buy nearly 300 U.S. tanks, White House says

13. U.S. Backs $1 Billion Loan to Restart the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant

14. Explaining The Lack of Proficiency in Arab Armies with Solutions to Modernize

15. China solves Japanese spy cases, vows counter-intelligence crackdown

16. The Remaking of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs

17. In Search of a Defense Doctrine

18. Interoperability: Winning Happens in the Off-Season – The Imperative for Warfighting Success in a Coalition Warfighter Exercise

19. Why the U.S. Is Losing the Cognitive Competition

20. Sabotage as a “New Normal”

21. How the Frontier Spirit and the Outback Temperament Collide in AUKUS

22. America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear

23. AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare

25. Congress’s DISRUPT Act: The Blueprint for Political Warfare Against the “Dark Quad”

1. Report: China preparing its population for war with U.S.

Summary:

The U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission’s 728-page report concludes Beijing is preparing its population and military for possible war with the United States, especially over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Japan. It warns PLA “exercises” resemble rehearsals for invasion or blockade, shrinking warning time. The study details rapid Chinese nuclear, amphibious, space, cyber, and hypersonic build ups, expanded gray zone coercion, and deepening coordination with Russia, Iran, and North Korea. It urges a proactive U.S. strategy to rebuild industrial strength, harden supply chains, strengthen alliances, and contest CCP influence to prevent a China dominated, authoritarian world order.

Comment: The referenced report (and accompanying video) can be accessed here: https://www.uscc.gov/annual-report/2025-annual-report-congress. Note how many reports and articles are routinely referencing the CRInK or Dark Quad of China, Russia, Iran, and north Korea in recent days.

As always, here is my assessment of the PRC: China seeks to export its authoritarian political system around the world in order to dominate regions directly and/or indirectly through proxies, co-opt or coerce international organizations, create economic conditions favorable to China alone, while displacing democratic institutions through subversion. It takes a long term approach, employing unrestricted warfare and its three warfares to set conditions and achieve objectives, with the main objective being the unification of China (i.e., the recovery of Taiwan).

Report: China preparing its population for war with U.S.

washingtontimes.com · Bill Gertz

Congressional study urges countering the global spread of Chinese communist system

- Tuesday, November 18, 2025

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/nov/18/report-china-preparing-population-war-us/

The Chinese Communist Party and its military forces are preparing the entire country for a future war with the United States over Taiwan, the hot spots in the South China Sea or disputed territory near Japan, according to a new report by a congressional China commission.

The 728-page annual report by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission also warns that the U.S. and allied effort to counter Chinese communist expansion and replacement of the U.S.-led democratic system is an urgent problem.

“Countering China’s aggression is now a truly global challenge,” the report said.

China’s large-scale military modernization advanced significantly and was not affected by extensive purges of key military leaders, the report said.

Over the past year, increases took place in nuclear warhead stockpiles, new amphibious warships, deployment of more advanced stealth fighter jets and greater fielding of drone weapons, the report said.

The military modernization has strengthened the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities for launching an attack on Taiwan, the report states.

“China has continued to rapidly advance its capabilities to launch a successful invasion of Taiwan,” said the report, noting intensified PLA operations near Taiwan and deployment of new forces for an amphibious attack.

The operations “have made it so that the PLA could pivot from a routine exercise to an actual blockade or invasion with almost no advance warning.”

An alarming indicator of a potential conflict with China was disclosed in what the report called a divergence between Chinese and English language propaganda on Taiwan.

Chinese statements sent to international audiences downplayed the prospect of a Taiwan invasion.

Contrary to that, Chinese domestic propaganda has stated that “provocations” by Taiwan could justify military action in the near future.

The split “suggests Beijing may be taking initial steps to prepare its people for the possibility of war,” the report said.

“While there is no indication that China is planning an imminent invasion — and Beijing still hopes to pressure Taiwan to surrender without a fight — the United States and its allies and partners can no longer assume that a Taiwan contingency is a distant possibility for which they would have ample time to prepare,” the report said.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered the PLA to be ready for military action by 2027. In May, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait “could be imminent” and would be devastating for the region and the world.

China also toughened its rhetoric against the U.S. in an official white paper that accused Washington of violating its “right to develop” through tariffs and sanctions and a U.S. alliance system that Beijing said is interfering in China’s internal affairs, the report said.

The critical report has been released as President Trump and his administration engage in trade talks with China, aiming to smooth over differences and stabilize ties.

Mr. Trump said on Truth Social this month that his recent meeting with Mr. Xi, whom he called “a friend of mine,” was a victory. China relented on curbing rare earth mineral exports and agreed to resume purchases of U.S. soybeans.

“This was a Big Victory for the U.S.A. and, indeed, the World!” he said. “Also, it was a wonderful outcome for China, and the fact that these two Major Powers left the meeting, as it began, with an excellent relationship, and specific plans for future talks and meetings.”

Cast in unusually blunt language, the bipartisan commission report warns that Beijing is systematically expanding its power and influence around the world in seeking global dominance with the goal of replacing the U.S.-led democratic and free market order.

The study said that if Beijing is successful, “a China-dominated world order would be less stable, less secure, less prosperous and less free.”

“Such an order would be defined by weaponized interdependence, state surveillance and coercive control over global norms,” the report said.

“It will be incumbent upon the United States to counter Beijing’s bid for hegemony with a positive vision for the future that promotes prosperity, security and freedom at home and around the world.”

To effectively counter the challenge, the United States must use defensive actions and an assertive, proactive strategy to rebuild American industrial strength, promote international rules and form coalitions that will counter Chinese ambitions, the report said.

“Over the past year, China has sought to present itself as a responsible world leader despite engaging in a range of destabilizing activities that have undermined global peace and security,” the report said.

On Taiwan, the report said the world is in a crucial phase of Beijing’s long-standing bid to impose sovereignty over the island democracy.

Randall Schriver, commission vice chairman and a former Pentagon and State Department official, said the danger of a Chinese attack on Taiwan is increasing.

Mr. Schriver said Mr. Xi has declared that China’s “great rejuvenation” must be completed by 2049 and that annexing Taiwan is a key element.

On 2027, the date given to the PLA to be ready to attack, Mr. Schriver said China’s goal is “more a statement of capability than an actual go date.”

The date does not indicate that the PLA will carry out an invasion or blockade, with a blockade being launched without warning, he said.

“On the question about an attack and warning time, we’re losing warning time,” said Mr. Schriver, noting that the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Samuel Paparo, has described PLA activities around Taiwan as appearing “not so much like exercising as it does rehearsal.”

“I think what he means by that is these aren’t just moves to exert pressure and have presence to make a point,” Mr. Schriver told reporters at a press conference.

“They’re actually rehearsing certain aspects of amphibious invasion, communication links, logistics support, etc., so that all decreases warning time significantly if they choose to take the step of going from coercion to actual attack.”

China is also engaged in provocative military, economic and influence operations short of war against Taiwan, the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Japan near the Senkaku Islands, the report said.

Beyond Taiwan, the report stated that China is bolstering military forces for combat in all domains of warfare in preparation to defeat “strong enemies” — code for the United States, the report said.

One key area of enhanced warfighting highlighted in the report is the PLA’s rapid expansion of space warfare capabilities that could be used against American forces in the Indo-Pacific through satellite attacks.

“Beijing’s investment in counterspace systems — including direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons and co-orbital interference platforms —illustrates its strategy of blinding and disorienting U.S. forces in the opening phase of a conflict,” the report said.

The PLA is using significant resources to develop technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing for use by China’s military and intelligence services.

Globally, China is deepening cooperation with Russia, Iran and North Korea, which has allowed “pariah economies” to survive international economic restrictions, the report said.

The cooperation is undermining U.S. statecraft and providing China with a live testbed for sanctions evasion and wartime logistics, the report said.

Working with rogue states also provides China with a network of supporters in a military crisis. The support could include technology transfer, diversional regional actions, economic and energy lifelines, and undermining U.S. and allied deterrence, the report said.

The report includes extensive new details on the PLA’s forces and capabilities, which are rapidly gaining strength and reach.

“We’re very clear-eyed about China’s growing capabilities,” Mr. Schriver said. “They’re advancing military capabilities very rapidly, including the introduction of new capabilities such as self-propelled landing barges, the world’s largest amphibious ship and hypersonic missiles that could target U.S. forward-deployed forces,” he said.

Inside China, the report states that despite economic problems, China stepped up a multiyear anti-corruption campaign that is a cover for CCP efforts to quash internal dissent and crack down on religious institutions that the government says are promoting separatism and undermining party rule.

The CCP is using what it regards as the current “turbulent” international environment to justify greater repression and control and to enforce “absolute political loyalty” for the 93 million members of the ruling party, the report said.

To support that goal, spending on domestic security and controls has increased sharply and greater numbers of officials and military leaders were purged over perceived insufficient loyalty, the report said.

“Considered in the aggregate, these actions reflect Beijing’s continued rapid preparations for the possibility of conflict and its systematic efforts to erode U.S. deterrence across the military, economic, technological, cyber, and diplomatic domains,” the report said.

China also has been “weaponizing” control of supply chains to advance CCP strategic interests, said the report, noting intensified controls in the past five years.

“China has already deployed export controls on critical minerals as a coercive tool, including to seek policy concessions in trade negotiations with the United States and to punish other countries,” said the report, noting critical minerals are among several sectors where the U.S. is reliant on Chinese sources.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

washingtontimes.com · Bill Gertz

2. A Chinese firm bought an insurer for CIA agents - part of Beijing's trillion dollar spending spree

Summary:

The Chinese conglomerate Fosun, backed by $1.2 billion in loans from four state banks, quietly bought Wright USA, an insurer of CIA and FBI personnel, exposing sensitive personal data to potential Chinese intelligence access and helping spur tighter 2018 US investment-screening laws. New AidData research shows this was part of a far broader, state-directed, $2.1 trillion global investment push since 2000, targeting both developing and wealthy countries and aligning with Beijing’s industrial strategies like Made in China 2025. Western governments, once caught off guard, now scramble to scrutinize and sometimes unwind Chinese deals in sensitive sectors.

Comment: What did Lenin allegedly say? “When it comes time to hang the capitalists, they will vie with each other for the rope contract.” But we can and must do better. Let's recognize the Chinese strategy, understand it, EXPOSE it, and attack it with a superior political warfare strategy.

A Chinese firm bought an insurer for CIA agents - part of Beijing's trillion dollar spending spree

Celia Hatton

58 minutes ago

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g311jn1m9o

Getty Images

Since 2018, the United States has been tightening its laws to prevent its rivals from buying into its sensitive sectors – blocking investments in everything from semiconductors to telecommunications.

But the rules weren't always so strict.

In 2016, Jeff Stein, a veteran journalist covering the US intelligence community, got a tip-off: a small insurance company that specialised in selling liability insurance to FBI and CIA agents had been sold to a Chinese entity.

"Someone with direct knowledge called me up and said, 'Do you know that the insurance company that insures intelligence personnel is owned by the Chinese?'" he remembers. "I was astonished!"

In 2015, the insurer, Wright USA, had been quietly purchased by Fosun Group, a private company believed to have very close connections with China's leadership.

US concerns became immediately clear: Wright USA was privy to the personal details of many of America's top secret service agents and intelligence officials. No one in the US knew who might have access to that information now the insurer and its parent, Ironshore, were Chinese-owned.

Wright USA wasn't an isolated case.

The BBC has exclusive early access to brand new data that shows how Chinese state money has been flowing into wealthy countries, buying up assets in the US, Europe, the Middle East and Australia.

Jeff Stein's story brought a swift reaction in Washington

In the past couple of decades China has become the world's biggest overseas investor, giving it the potential to dominate sensitive industries, secrets and key technologies. Beijing considers the details of its foreign spending overseas – how much money it's spending and where - to be a state secret.

But on the terms of the Wright USA sale, Stein says: "There was nothing illegal about it; it was in the open, so to speak. But because everything's intertwined so closely in Beijing, you're essentially giving that [information] up to Chinese intelligence."

The Chinese government was involved in the deal: fresh data seen by the BBC reveals that four Chinese state banks had provided a $1.2bn (£912m) loan, routed through the Cayman Islands, to allow Fosun to buy Wright USA.

Stein's story ran in Newsweek magazine. And there was a swift reaction in Washington: triggering an inquiry by the branch of the US Treasury that screens investments, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Shortly after, the company was sold again - back to Americans. It's unclear who ordered that sale.

Fosun and Starr Wright USA, the company that now owns Wright USA, did not respond to a BBC request for comment.

High-level US intelligence sources confirm the Wright USA sale was one of the cases that led the first Trump administration to tighten its investment laws in 2018.

Very few could have understood at the time that this Chinese state-backed spending appears to have been part of a much bigger strategy carried out by Beijing to invest and buy assets in every continent.

"For many years, we assumed that virtually all of China's money flows were going to developing countries," says Brad Parks, executive director of AidData. "And so, it came as a great surprise to us when we realised that actually there were hundreds of billions of dollars going into places like the US, the UK and Germany, happening right underneath our noses."

AidData is a research lab based in Virginia that specialises in tracking how governments spend their money outside their borders. It's based at William & Mary, one of America's oldest universities and it gets its funding from governments and charitable organisations around the world. For the past 12 years, AidData has had a major focus on China.

A four-year effort involving 120 researchers has led to the first known effort to tally all of China's state-backed investments around the world. The group's entire dataset is available open source although the BBC was given exclusive advance access.

AidData's key discovery: since 2000, Beijing has spent $2.1 trillion outside its borders, with a roughly equal split between developing and wealthy countries.

Getty Images

More than 70% of the container shipping terminals at Rotterdam, the largest seaport in Europe, are Chinese-owned

"China has a kind of financial system that the world has never seen," says Victor Shih, director of the 21st Century China Centre at University of California San Diego. China has the largest banking system in the world – larger than the US, Europe and Japan put together, he adds.

That size, along with the amount of control Beijing exerts over state banks, gives it unique capabilities.

"The government controls interest rates and directs where the credit goes," Mr Shih says. "This is only possible with very strict capital control, which no other country could have on a sustainable basis."

Some of the investments in wealthy economies appear to have been made in order to generate a healthy return. Others fall in line with Beijing's strategic objectives, set out a decade ago in a major government initiative called Made in China 2025.

In it the Chinese authorities outlined a clear plan to dominate 10 cutting-edge industries, like robotics, electric vehicles and semiconductors by this year.

Beijing wanted to fund big investments abroad so key technologies could be brought back to China.

Global alarm at the plan led China to drop public mention of it, but Victor Shih says it "stayed very much alive" as a guiding strategy.

"There are all kinds of plans still being published," he says, "including an artificial intelligence plan and a smart manufacturing plan. However, the mother of all plans is the 15th five-year plan."

At a key meeting of the Communist Party last month, China's leaders set the goal of accelerating "high-level scientific and technological self-reliance and self-improvement" until 2030.

AidData's new database highlights state-backed spending overseas that matches the 10 sectors targeted in 2015. The BBC's earlier reporting detailed how the Chinese government bankrolled the purchase of a UK semiconductor company.

The United States, the UK and many other major economies have tightened their investment screening mechanisms after each country appears to have been caught off-guard by deals like the sale of the insurer, Wright USA.

AidData's Brad Parks says wealthy governments didn't realise at first that Chinese investments in each country were part of Beijing's larger strategy.

"At first blush, they thought it was just a lot of individual initiative from Chinese companies," he says. "I think what they've learned over time is that actually Beijing's party state is behind the scenes writing the cheques to make this happen."

However, it must be underlined that such investments and purchases are legal, even if they are sometimes obscured within shell companies or routed through offshore accounts.

"The Chinese government has always required Chinese enterprises operating overseas to strictly comply with local laws and regulations, and has consistently supported them in conducting international co-operation based on mutual benefit," the Chinese embassy in London told the BBC.

"Chinese companies not only provide quality products and services to people around the world, but also contribute actively to local economic growth, social development and job creation."

China's spending patterns are changing, the AidData database shows, with Beijing's state money flowing to countries that have decided to welcome Chinese investment.

In the Netherlands there's been debate around Nexperia, a troubled Chinese-owned semiconductor company.

It shows up in the AidData database too – Chinese state banks loaned $800m to help a Chinese consortium acquire Nexperia in 2017. Two years later, the ownership passed to another Chinese company - Wingtech.

Nexperia's strategic value was highlighted when the Dutch authorities took control of the company's operations in September - in part, the Dutch government said, over concerns that Nexperia's technology was at risk of being transferred to other parts of the larger Wingtech company.

That bold move had resulted in Nexperia effectively being cut into two – separating Dutch operations from its Chinese manufacturing.

Nexperia confirmed to the BBC that its Chinese business had stopped operating within Nexperia's governance framework and was ignoring instructions.

The company said it welcomed China's commitment to resuming exports of its critical chips to global markets.

Xioaxue Martin, a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague, says many in the Netherlands were surprised at how the government handled the case, since they've always managed their relationship with China carefully in the past.

"We're a country that has always done very well with open trade, free trade. And this is really the merchant side of Dutch policy," she says. "Only recently we found that actually, hold on - geopolitics makes it necessary to have more industrial policy, to have this investment screening, when in the past there wasn't that much attention for this."

Xiaoxue Martin is clear – it's easy to go too far down the path of fearing what could happen as a result of doing so much business with a superpower like China.

"There's a danger of making it seem as if China is this monolith, that they all want the same thing, and that they're all out to get Europe, and to get the United States, when obviously that's not the case," she says.

"Most companies, especially if they're private, they just want to make money. They want to be treated as a normal company. They don't want to have this negative reception that they're getting in Europe."

If China is so far ahead of its rivals in its plans to buy into sensitive sectors, does that mean the race to dominate these arenas is already over?

"No! There's gonna be multiple laps," maintains Brad Parks. "There are many Chinese companies that are still trying to make these types of acquisitions. The difference is, now they're facing higher levels of scrutiny to vet these inbound sources of foreign capital.

"So China makes its move. China is not the follower any more, it is the leader. It is the pace setter. But what I'm anticipating is that many G7 countries are going to move from the back foot to the front foot.

"They're going to move from defence to offence."

3. Ukraine hits targets in Russia with U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles, military says

Ukraine hits targets in Russia with U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles, military says

Ukraine hasn't previously stated openly that it uses the advanced U.S.-provided ballistic missile systems on targets inside Russia.

NBC News · Reuters · November 18, 2025

https://www.nbcnews.com/world/ukraine/ukraine-hits-targets-russia-us-supplied-atacms-missiles-military-says-rcna244712

KYIV, Ukraine — Ukraine’s military said Tuesday it had attacked military targets in Russia with U.S.-supplied ATACMS missiles, calling it a “significant development.”

Ukraine has not previously stated openly that it uses the advanced U.S.-provided ballistic missile systems on targets inside Russia, although the restriction on doing so was lifted by the outgoing Biden administration a year ago.

“The use of long-range strike capabilities, including systems such as ATACMS, will continue,” the military general staff said in a statement on Tuesday.

Kyiv received the systems in 2023 but was initially restricted to using them only on its own territories, nearly a fifth of which are occupied by Russia.

Joe Biden, who was U.S president at the time, lifted those restrictions in November 2024, a move which was initially criticized by his successor Donald Trump.

Ukraine has requested U.S.-made Tomahawk missiles that have a range of 1,550 miles, saying they will help bring Russia to the negotiating table.

Although Trump initially pondered the idea of selling them to Kyiv, in November he said he was “not really” considering the move.

NBC News · Reuters · November 18, 2025

4. China’s Demographics Problem Grows

Summary:

China faces accelerating population decline, ultra-low fertility, and a skewed sex ratio rooted in the One Child policy and son preference. Millions more men than women limit potential births even if fertility rises. Aging, later marriage, and high female employment deepen the crunch, constraining growth versus younger rivals like India.

Comment: How can we exploit this? Can this be incorporated into an information warfare (IWar) strategy? Can or will this lead to domestic instability in China?

Society

China’s Demographics Problem Grows

Male-female imbalance a factor

Philip Bowring

Nov 18, 2025

https://www.asiasentinel.com/p/china-demographics-problem-grows?utm

Photo from Chinahush

China’s leaders have known for some time that they have a demographics problem, with their concern growing at the threat to future prosperity and dynamism. The population decline is set to accelerate, with China’s male-female imbalance presenting limiting factors not faced by the rest of Asia.

The median age is already 40.2, nearly the same as older developed countries such as the UK (40.8) and higher than the United States at 38.5. China’s fertility rate appears to be about 1.1, or half the population replacement level.

Various programs in China, as in other countries such as South Korea with similar challenges, are focused on issues such as financial support for children, greater equality in the workplace, provision of nursery facilities, etc. Such incentives make sense but so far have had limited success in other countries. They may yet have an impact in China – though it is rather more difficult to force couples to have more children than it was to limit them to one child, as was the case with the One Child policy introduced in 1979 and only formally abandoned in 2015.

But compared with other countries facing the same birth collapse, China’s prospects for raising the fertility rate face a major additional obstacle, the imbalance between numbers of men and women of the childbearing age bracket. This is the indirect consequence of One Child – a deep-rooted patriarchal bias towards male children which led to widespread abortion of female foetuses. This is not just a product of the past. Although the imbalance of sexes at birth has narrowed, there is still a significant gap.

This year, according to UN World Population Prospects 2024, there are 44.4 million men in the 25-29 age group, which should be on the cusp of procreation, but only 38.4 million women. The gap in absolute terms diminishes with the subsequent cohorts but remains in double-digit percentages.

Age 20-24 - 42.5 million men; 36.3 million women

Age 15-19 - 45.6 million men; 38.9 million women

Age 10-14 - 48.5 million men; 41.8 million women

Age 5-9 - 42.7 million men; 37.5 million women

Age 0-4 - 24.9 million men; 22.5 million women

The data thus shows the very sharp decline in overall births and the continuation of imbalance. In other words, even if the authorities have some success in raising the fertility rate (number of births per woman) the number of births will be held back by the ongoing sex imbalance.

China, like most countries, has also been seeing a trend toward later marriage. By 2021, the average birthing age for women had reached 28.8 years and was rising. It is probably now about 30 years, less than Hong Kong and South Korea, now at 32, and Europe in the 30-32 range, but may well continue to rise to their levels.

This trend is a further limit on total births. So too is women’s fairly high (60 percent) workforce participation rate. In parts of Europe, this is partly offset by nursery and other support measures and assumptions that males play a larger role in looking after the very young. That will probably come in China but maybe not while the Politburo is, as now, 100 percent male and the male birth bias continues. While the steep decline in the 0-4 cohorts compared with 5-9 may be attributed to Covid, there is scant sign of a sustained recovery in total births, nor of elimination in the imbalance. Nature has always provided a small surplus of male births – globally, a ratio of about 104 to 100 – because of higher early death rates of boys. But China’s remains well above the natural rate by about 5 percent.

The Chinese Communist Party finds it difficult to admit and confront the disasters – the One Child policy, the Great Leap Forward, the Proletarian Cultural Revolution – that it has inflicted on the country. Until it does, it may merely tinker with a demographic challenge which has already been set in stone for 30-plus years. By 2050, there will be only about 720 million in the 15-64 age bracket compared with 976 million today and their average age will be much higher.

Unless automation and AI come to the rescue, the demographics could lead to increased demand for female labor, further holding back maternity. Meanwhile, India’s 15-64 working age group is set to surpass 1 billion.

China’s situation is, of course, far from unique. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan all have similar fertility rates, with Singapore vainly seeking to solve its problem for four decades. But among large countries, China stands out for its gender imbalance, which exacerbates the problem. India has had a similar problem, but its ratio of male births has declined from 109 to 105 between 2004 and 2024. In India, the imbalance also varies greatly by region.

Of course, social attitudes in China, as well as government policies, can change remarkably quickly, but any such change takes two decades or more to alter the demographic fundamentals. And no country so far has been able to solve the falling birth rate problem except by immigration of working-age migrants.

5. SWJ–El Centro Book Review – Hidden War: How Special Operations Game Wardens are Reclaiming America’s Wildlands from the Drug Cartels

Summary:

This review of John Nores’s Hidden War describes California game wardens’ ‘special operations’ campaign against cartel-run marijuana grows. It highlights MET’s tactical planning, hazardous raids, environmental remediation, canine partners, and adaptation to cartel TTPs. The book offers unique, field-level insight into a hidden domestic battlespace shaping U.S. wildlands security.

Excerpt:

In summation, the work will likely have little appeal to mainstream academics given its tactical focus, law enforcement memoir narrative, and almost utter lack of traditional citations (save for pp. 245, 247 related to the appendices). Rather, its audience will be the practitioners, scholar practitioners, and more applied security academics (those with grit under their fingernails; the PhDs with guns) readership which helps make SWJ (& El Centro) unique. Hidden War is a fascinating and informative read—you will not be disappointed.

SWJ–El Centro Book Review – Hidden War: How Special Operations Game Wardens are Reclaiming America’s Wildlands from the Drug Cartels

by Robert Bunker

11.18.2025 at 02:06am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/18/swj-el-centro-book-review-hidden-war-how-special-operations-game-wardens-are-reclaiming-americas-wildlands-from-the-drug-cartels/

Lt. John Nores, Jr. (Ret), Hidden War: How Special Operations Game Wardens are Reclaiming America’s Wildlands from the Drug Cartels. Appleton: Caribou Media Group, 2022. 2nd Edition. [ISBN: 978-1951115333, Softcover, 256 pages]

The author of the book, Lt. John Nores, Jr. (Ret), was part of the California Department of Fish and Wildlife’s (CDFW) Marijuana Enforcement Team (MET). The unit’s focus was on identifying, responding to (making arrests and eradicating the grow site), and remediating the environmental damage done by the illicit cultivation. These represent high risk operations for the MET personnel involved who can be considered ‘special forces level equivalent’ game wardens due to their dedication, outdoor fieldcraft, conditioning, and combat training (including sniper team) capabilities.

The author’s prior book on this subject matter— War in the Woods: Combating the Marijuana Cartels on America’s Public Lands published in 2010—has previously been reviewed at SWJ–El Centro. The new work initially came out in 2019 and has been slightly updated in the second edition which came out a few years later. This newer book chronicles the activities and operations the author was involved with from the early 2000s through the later 2010s.

Hidden War contains a dedication page, praise (short promos) for the work, foreword by Jack Carr (former Navy SEAL), introduction, ten chapters, an afterword, five addendums, and a short acknowledgement section. The ten chapters of the book take us through glimpses of Nores’s career, the establishment and evolution of the MET, and the many operations (some which resulted in gun fights with heavily armed cartel operatives) in which he and his comrades were involved.

The work also contains about ninety-five mostly black and white pictures, along with a color inset pictures section, related to the MET and the many operations undertaken. Such imagery is important and allows the reader to better comprehend the terrain, weaponry and equipment, personnel, and rugged terrain in which the marijuana grows exist.

The book has an adrenaline-fueled, tactical vibe to it. Further, the author has a clear love of unspoiled wilderness and respect for our citizens who follow hunting, fishing, and related outdoor (hiking and camping) rules and a clear disdain for those who engage in criminal behaviors and willfully damage this environment. As a law enforcement professional, he can also clearly be seen to respect and uphold the latter’s rights and remain ethical in his interactions with them.

The book is well written, though some redundancy was noted, but still flows well. It can be considered an easy and enjoyable read. The work provides a wealth of cartel TTPs related to their grows in California—how they are laid out with their sleeping areas and kitchens, nuances such as the use of handmade wooden cattle hoof stilts to disguise grower tracks (p. 70), and the use of sharpened and poisoned deer bone to kill the MET canines (p. 198), and the use of toxic weed killers such as Qu Furan (p. 183).

While the training, mission planning, and operations of the MET that were discussed were as expected the very hard work involved in eradicating a marijuana grow and its hasty (and later more involved) remediation were unexpected aspects of the work in which the California game wardens were involved. Specialized PPE (personal protective equipment) needs for HAZMAT (hazardous materials) and the tactical gear (weight carried was a critical issue) required for the combat environment the grows represented for the MET personnel was also surprising. Portraying their unit and mission dedication, these specialized game wardens would seek out the best training they could find—usually paying for it out of their own pockets.

One clear component of the work conveyed was the need for the high levels of training, initial ground recon of a site, and mission planning and preparation that the MET engaged in prior to its operations against a targeted grow. Failure to do so could see not only mission failure resulting in the escape of the cartel growers but the endangerment of the officers (and their canines) involved in the operation—as well personal safety issues related to the illegal and armed growers themselves. It is far better to hit a grow fast and hard professionally with no one getting hurt while the arrests were made than to engage in a botched and amateurish action resulting in a needless gunbattle. Hence, the need for apprehension and QRF (quick reaction force) teams, sniper overwatch, and canine support to be integrated into a well-developed tactical action plan.

An example of the use of terrain by the cartel operatives for their grows and how the MET represented a dynamic learning organization can be seen in this passage from the book related to the June 2012 – Croy Road – South Santa Clara County Operation:

After covering the final 100 yards, Hunter stopped the team. The trail we used to enter the complex [on an earlier recon] had been completely altered. Dry manzanita branches covered the entrance and scattered across the footpath. This noisy trail trap would, at best, spook the growers when we entered, and at worst, allow them to ambush us. However, unlike in 2005 when Mojo was shot and almost killed after our team moved through a similar noisy brush tunnel, we were much more prepared now (p. 53).

The real significance of Hidden War is that it is unique. It provides the reader entry into a world very few Americans even know exist—written by a peace officer who lived, and actually thrived, in this stressful conflict environment for many years. The extent of the cartel grows that exist domestically are both mind boggling in their numbers and the dangers they can pose to hikers and hunters who accidently wander into them given that they can be heavily booby trapped and protected by well-armed cartel members.

The late old school actor W.C. Fields said, “Never work with children or animals” given their unpredictability and scene stealing potentials. The sections of the work on canines used by the MET had mixed reviews in regard. Police dogs provided a critical utility as MET human-canine teaming members, protected their handlers, and faced both physical (were targeted by cartel members) and environmental (many died of cancer young—likely from the HAZMAT conditions they encountered) dangers. However, a new dog taken on a mission can act unpredictable at times (p. 179) and the sections of book discussing the canines were scene stealers; reading about the exploits of the renowned Phebe (aka ‘the Fur Missile’) was immensely enjoyable.

While the book addendums can be considered side shows to the work itself, three elements contained within them are of note. One is the very small number of game wardens that exist domestically which is discussed by James Swan (pp. 226–233). The second is the sheer number of illicit trespass marijuana cultivation sites found on public, tribal, and private/industrial lands in California (p. 241). The third is the numerous types of toxicants recovered at the covert marijuana grows in California (pp. 246–247).

In summation, the work will likely have little appeal to mainstream academics given its tactical focus, law enforcement memoir narrative, and almost utter lack of traditional citations (save for pp. 245, 247 related to the appendices). Rather, its audience will be the practitioners, scholar practitioners, and more applied security academics (those with grit under their fingernails; the PhDs with guns) readership which helps make SWJ (& El Centro) unique. Hidden War is a fascinating and informative read—you will not be disappointed.

El Centro readers can additionally draw upon the work “El Centro Annotated Subject Bibliography: Mafia (Cartel) Water Theft, Water Resource Control, and Community Extortion” for further resources and publications focusing on criminal water theft which domestically in the US is typically tied into illicit cartel marijuana grow

Tags: Cannabis, Cartel TTPs, Environmental degradation, fish and game enforcement

About The Author

Robert Bunker
Dr. Robert J. Bunker is Director of Research and Analysis, C/O Futures, LLC, a Research Fellow with the Future Security Initiative (FSI), Arizona State University, and an Instructor at the Safe Communities Institute (SCI) at the University of Southern California Sol Price School of Public Policy. He holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history and has undertaken hundreds of hours of counterterrorism training. Past professional associations include Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College and Futurist in Residence, Training and Development Division, Behavioral Science Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico. Dr. Bunker has well over 700 publications—including about 50 books as co-author, editor, and co-editor.

6. The Case for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Ensuring Information Access for Closed Societies

Summary:

POTUS' March 2025 order to close USAGM has crippled Radio Free Asia (And VOA though it is not discussed in this report) and badly strained Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, gutting staffs and silencing key language services. The paper argues these outlets are low cost, high impact tools of “peace through strength,” giving closed societies independent news, preserving persecuted cultures, exposing abuses, and informing US policy. Their shutdown creates an information vacuum that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are already filling with propaganda. The authors urge Congress to restore and firewall funding, protect regional offices, modernize content formats, and integrate RFA/RFE/RL into a broader allied information strategy.

Comment: One of our worst strategic national security errors of the 21dt Century.

Nov 17, 2025

Hudson Institue

The Case for Radio Free Asia and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Ensuring Information Access for Closed Societies

Olivia Enos & Alexis Mrachek

Caption

The headquarters of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is seen in Prague, Czech Republic, on March 18, 2025. (Getty Images)

View PDF

Introduction

In March 2025, the Trump administration issued an executive order aimed at closing the United States Agency for Global Media (USAGM).1 This decision affected Radio Free Asia (RFA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), both of which are USAGM grantees, and may ultimately lead to their closure. Such a development would be a strategic loss for the United States and the world.

Despite their names, RFA and RFE/RL are so much more than radio. They do provide radio broadcasts to countries with strict information control. But they also offer critical on-the-ground reporting that informs the American public and provides a voice to those persecuted by authoritarian governments in Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. Both serve strategic functions that advance US interests by conveying the truth about the value of freedom and human rights. The information they provide produces goodwill toward the United States in authoritarian countries that seek to sow discord with America and to deceive their populations about the importance of freedom.

Since the executive order went into effect, RFA has been forced to suspend news operations for the first time in its 29 years of existence and laid off nearly all of its staff in hopes of fully reopening once funding is restored.2 The closure of critical services, including the Mandarin, Uyghur, Tibetan, Cantonese, Korean, and Burmese services, has left citizens of authoritarian countries without an information lifeline. Policymakers and civil society actors who once relied on RFA’s groundbreaking reporting, especially through its English-language media, are now without a critical source of information to inform foreign policy decisions.

The situation with RFE/RL is similar: It has been forced to cut 90 percent of its freelancers and furlough about 25 percent of its staff. However, as a result of these cuts and other significant measures, it has been able to keep all 23 of its language services—which include Ukrainian, Russian, Belarusian, Armenian, and Persian—on the air and producing content.

There are consequences to ceding the information space. When there is a void, authoritarian actors like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kremlin will fill it. The battle for truth and freedom is being fought but is being lost in the information realm.

RFA and RFE/RL were originally authorized by Congress, which could intervene to save them through end-of-year appropriations or standalone legislation.3 As Congress pursues various forms of appropriations and finalizes legislative priorities for the year, it should create an independent line item to fully fund them both. This would preserve their independence and enable them to continue to carry out a strategic mission in support of the US government, the American people, and the cause of freedom.

The Case for RFA and RFE/RL

RFA and RFE/RL are a perfect example of what Ronald Reagan meant when he advocated peace through strength. Both are relatively cost-effective ways to promote true and accurate messaging that advances US interests. Prior to Trump’s executive order, RFA had an estimated weeklyaudience of 60 million, with a budget of $60.8 million in fiscal year 2024.4 Similarly, RFE/RL’s estimated weekly audience was 47.4 million before the executive order,5 and its budget was $142.2 million in fiscal year 2024.6 This is a pittance in terms of US government spending, with a large impact for the cost. In addition to fostering goodwill toward America, RFA and RFE/RL provide Washington with the ability to shift the balance of power in authoritarian countries away from the government toward the people. They also offer the tools to advance freedom and prevent conflict through strategic messaging.

A closer look at their history and strategic benefits makes the costs of losing them clear.

Radio Free Asia

RFA was created in response to the Chinese government’s 1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square, part of broader efforts to promote freedom in closed societies during and after the Cold War. Authorized by the United States International Broadcasting Act of 1994,7 RFA made its first broadcast, in Mandarin, to China in 1996.8 Additional funding was authorized through the Radio Free Asia Act of 1998, which expanded RFA’s services beyond China.9 Public Law 111-102 made the RFA permanent,10 and today it has nine services, including Mandarin, Uyghur, Tibetan, Cantonese, Burmese, Laotian, Khmer, Korean, and Vietnamese services.11

RFA continues to be a valuable US foreign policy tool for many reasons, but among the most important are:

It serves as a lifeline to people in countries with tight information control
It informs Americans and US policymakers about on-the-ground realities to aid in decision-making.
Without it, the United States is ceding ground to authoritarians.
It preserves local cultures.

RFA serves as a lifeline for people in need. Nowhere is this truer than in North Korea, which, more than almost any other country, restricts access to information as a means of control. Those who do access outside information, listen to K-Pop, or watch South Korean dramas can be sentenced to death.12 Despite these tight restrictions, North Koreans were willing to take the risk and listen to RFA. In fact, its Korean broadcasts penetrated the Kim regime’s information blockade until they ended in April 2025.13

Some North Koreans who escaped have said they decided to leave after hearing information that contradicted the party line and learning about life outside the country.14 Such information can also equip North Koreans to work for change from within. Yet their access to information is under greater threat today than it has been in recent years due to decisions in Washington as well as in Pyongyang and Seoul, which have enacted new policies that prevent North Koreans from accessing outside information.15

In Hong Kong, where radio is one of the only sources of outside information that prisoners are permitted to access, political prisoners would reportedly listen to RFA’s Cantonese service.16 RFA broadcasts provided hope and reminded political prisoners that they were not forgotten.

RFA is an invaluable source of information for ordinary Americans and policymakers. RFA’s English-language reporting is often an invaluable source of information to policymakers, in addition to their reporting in other languages. Eliminating it denies the American public a key source of reliable information on events in closed societies. It also affects the readiness of US policymakers to respond to threats to US security and freedom from authoritarian regimes.

For example, RFA was among the first to report on the political prison camps and other atrocity crimes the CCP perpetrates against Uyghurs.17 Much of the groundbreaking reporting by RFA’s Uyghur service provided the factual basis for the atrocity determination issued by then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in 2021.18 RFA was also the first Korean-language news source to report that North Korean soldiers were fighting with Russia in Ukraine.19 And it produced groundbreaking reports on China’s activities at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, and documented essential political developments in Burma before and during the coup in 2021.20

RFA was so effective because, in some ways, it functioned like a local news outlet, with reporters on the ground delivering detailed, accurate reports from countries where information is tightly controlled. There was not another news source quite like it, and the US government relied on it as both a tool and a source.

The absence of RFA programming is creating a void that authoritarian actors such as the CCP are filling. RFA previously broadcasted on 60 shortwave frequencies across China, but since its services went dark, Beijing’s state-controlled media have added 80 frequencies, extended the hours of their broadcasts,21 and jammed frequencies RFA once used. The CCP is making similar moves in North Korea. Even before RFA’s Korean service went dark, the CCP was ramping up efforts to get information into North Korea by increasing exports of MP7 and MP8 players designed specifically for North Korea and loaded with CCP propaganda.22 The CCP’s battle for dominance is not being fought only in the military theater; it is also being fought and won in the information domain as the CCP seeks to replace truth with propaganda.

RFA preserved the culture of persecuted communities. Its Uyghur service was the only independent service available in that language. Without it, the Chinese government’s genocide and crimes against humanity would likely have received less attention. Likewise, RFA’s Tibetan and Cantonese services shined a spotlight on the plight of these communities across China. A persecuted people’s ability to hear news about their community in their own language is fundamentally different than receiving news through another source. By providing this service, RFA weakens authoritarian regimes that seek to erase the cultures of persecuted communities.

RFA’s strategic value is obvious. Without it, the US ability to respond to threats from the CCP, the Kim regime, and other challenges across the Indo-Pacific is weaker. But Washington faces national security threats not only from China but also from Russia and Iran.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty was originally two separate entities. Radio Free Europe (RFE) was founded in 1950, while Radio Liberty (RL) was founded in 1953. RFE originally broadcasted to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, while RL broadcasted to the Soviet Union in 17 different languages. Both sought to counter communist and state propaganda by providing trustworthy local news, analysis, and cultural programming to audiences behind the Iron Curtain.23

Congress funded both RFE and RL via the Central Intelligence Agency until 1971, when the Board for International Broadcasting began to fund them. After 1995, they were funded by the Broadcasting Board of Governors, known today as the USAGM. The two entities were merged in 1976, becoming Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.24

Fifteen years later, when the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was in chaos, RFE/RL was one of the few news outlets providing reliable information. It then received official accreditation in Russia, and in August 1991, President Boris Yeltsin permitted it to open a Moscow bureau.25

RFE/RL then launched several new language services for democracies emerging from the USSR’s dissolution and the breakup of Yugoslavia. However, circumstances changed over the next few decades, especially as President Vladimir Putin strengthened his hold on power in Russia and some post-Soviet democracies grew weaker. According to RFE/RL’s website, in 2017, Russia’s Justice Ministry “declared RFE/RL and nine of its Russian-language reporting projects ‘foreign mass media performing the functions of a foreign agent’ and has since named over 40 RFE/RL journalists as individual ‘foreign agents.’”26 But these labels merely prove that RFE/RL is effective in telling the truth about events in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, both locally and on a broader scale.

Since 2022, RFE/RL’s work has been focused largely on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In February 2024, as a result of its efforts to document Russian brutality, Moscow labeled it an “undesirable organization.”27 According to RFE/RL President Stephen Capus, that designation is an example of “how the Russian government views truthful reporting as an existential threat.”28

Persian broadcasts to Iran are another important component of RFE/RL. They began in 1998 as a result of an increasing American focus on the Middle East, and after 2002 were given a new name, Radio Farda.29 In recent years, Radio Farda has rapidly expanded its programming, reaching audiences both inside and outside of Iran.30 This broadcaster plays a key part in countering Iranian regime propaganda by providing unbiased reports, analysis, and cultural content to Persian-speaking audiences.

Like RFA, RFE/RL continues to be a critical asset in US foreign policy for a number of reasons, including:

It offers citizens of authoritarian countries access to information they otherwise would not have.
It reveals how authoritarian regimes abuse their citizens.

RFE/RL provides unbiased media and radio programs. It does this in authoritarian countries like Russia, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Iran, and in evolving democracies in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. RFE/RL also broadcasts to borderline authoritarian states like Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan.

RFE/RL plays a crucial role in revealing human rights abuses in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Some of the many human rights topics covered by RFE/RL include authoritarian regimes’ exploitation of migrants from the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa for criminal purposes;31 repression of religious groups for practicing their faith;32 persecution of Iranian women and girls for removing their hijabs;33 and crackdowns on ordinary citizens for protesting against their corrupt political leaders.34

As noted earlier, in March of this year, President Trump signed an executive order affecting RFA and RFE/RL. The order called for major cuts to seven federal agencies, including the USAGM, which oversees RFE/RL.35 Near the end of the month, however, the USAGM rescinded a letter it had issued terminating RFE/RL’s grant agreement for fiscal year 2025, putting the agreement back into effect.36 Nevertheless, funding issues have persisted, and the European Union has even stepped in to pledge emergency funding for the broadcaster.37

The Way Forward

As the US government considers how to preserve RFA and RFE/RL, it should take careful stock of what makes them unique and effective and seek to preserve these advantages.

First, the unique configuration of these small, agile nonprofits that receive US federal funding is arguably what has made them successful. Both have enough independence from the US government to maintain objectivity, independence, and journalistic integrity while retaining the government’s financial backing. Both also have a unique firewall setup that prevents Congress or the administration from meddling in their reporting.

Second, both entities function much like local journalism outlets. RFA’s team at one time comprised approximately 300 employees and contractors, while RFE/RL has more than 1,300 employees and contractors38 RFA’s main headquarters is in Washington. It was establishing a Taipei office when the executive order went into effect, and it also had offices in Dharamsala for the Tibetan service and in Turkey for the Uyghur service. RFE/RL has headquarters in Prague, providing a perch from which to analyze developments in Europe. BothRFA and RFE/RL have hired local journalists for their expertise and their knowledge of local problems that are of interest to the United States.

Third, RFA and RFE/RL are relatively cost-effective means of preventing conflict in regions where US interests are most under threat: Europe and Eurasia, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. This is not merely a hypothesis; RFE/RL contributed to the fall of communism in Europe. While Russia continues its war with Ukraine and Iran and the CCP threaten US and global security, Washington should be shoring up efforts to disseminate information, not tearing them down. President Reagan understood it best: peace through strength requires not only kinetic force, but also non-kinetic tools of statecraft to be effective.

Recommendations

If the US government shuts down RFE/RL and RFA, authoritarian states will fill the void with propaganda. In fact, they are already doing so. To give up this strategic advantage precisely at a time when China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are ramping up threats against the United States would be a mistake. Civil society and government need to coalesce to generate the political will to prevent the closure of RFA and RFE/RL.

Without them, the United States will be less well-equipped to fight and win in the information space, make strategic policy decisions in regions of importance, and provide support to persecuted people. To strengthen and maintain RFA and RFE/RL, the US should:

Ensure adequate funding. Congress should ensure continued appropriations for RFA and RFE/RL. Ideally, each one would receive a separate line item, whether grants or contracts are administered by USAGM or another institution. The best option would be for them to be funded through grants, but they could also be funded through contracts, assuming that legal recourse was adequately ensured for both. Grants would be preferable to contracts because RFA and RFE/RL are serving the public good through quality journalism that is typically conducted through grants and not contracts. A grant-based model provides more agency to RFA and RFE/RL in crafting their proposals and executing their journalistic mission.
Respect their journalistic integrity and maintain their advantages in any future arrangement. Some have suggested consolidating certain USAGM grantees under a single new international broadcasting entity. Any efforts to do so should ensure the agility, journalistic integrity, and localized structures of RFA and RFE/RL. One potential idea is to use the under secretary for public diplomacy and public affairs (or the R Family at the State Department) strictly as a conduit for funding RFA and RFE/RL, similar to how the National Endowment for Democracy receives its US government funding.39 In other words, the under secretary would be responsible for ensuring funds are disbursed to RFA and RFE/RL but would not control messaging or meddle in the journalistic independence of these organizations. If the under secretary does anything more than serve as a conduit for disbursing funds, he or she risks turning RFA and RFE/RL into propaganda outlets and sacrificing their journalistic integrity.
Retain the firewall that protects their journalistic integrity and independence in any future arrangement. According to USAGM’s website, the firewall is “critical to ensuring that the editors, reporters, and other journalists [at USAGM networks] make the final decisions on what stories to cover and how they are covered, and that those decisions are ultimately governed by the highest standards of professional journalism, as required by law”40 (i.e., the United States International Broadcasting Act of 199442 The firewall is also codified in the journalistic standards of each USAGM network, including RFA and RFE/RL.43 To maintain the highest-quality journalism, the firewall should remain integrated into RFA’s and RFE/RL’s journalistic standards.
Maintain their regional offices. Forcing them to eliminate overseas offices could undermine those elements that make them effective. Local journalists and sources enable them to accurately report the news and identify problems and solutions. RFA should retain its ability to operate in Washington and through offices in Taipei and elsewhere in Asia, and RFE/RL should retain its Prague headquarters.
Streamline accountability and oversight mechanisms. US broadcasting efforts over the years have struggled to strike the right balance between oversight and accountability. Neither the Broadcasting Board of Governors nor the board associated with USAGM proved to be the optimal oversight mechanism. As a new framework is developed, other models in the US government, including the commissioner model of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, could serve as useful examples.
Improve coordination between the United States and allies on information-dissemination efforts, information sharing, and burden sharing. After RFE/RL and RFA are again on a stable footing, the US government should create a mechanism to coordinate information-dissemination efforts with allies as well as information sharing and burden sharing. This would strengthen Western efforts against authoritarian regimes.
Introduce new kinds of RFE/RL content. RFE/RL produces written news stories and standard news videos, which are effective in some ways but may not be optimal for younger audiences. To grab their attention, RFE/RL should produce vertical videos, such as those posted to Instagram Reels and YouTube Shorts, and more catchy, short-form content in general.
Consider providing free broadband internet to RFE/RL and RFA audiences. The countries where their audiences live, such as Russia, Belarus, and China, often block access to certain websites, including those producing credible, independent news, and their citizens use virtual private networks (VPNs) to circumvent this. However, over time, governments have become skilled at blocking VPNs. To overcome this, the US government could provide RFE/RL and RFA audiences with free broadband internet through Starlink or a similar service so that they can continue to access credible news. This would send shockwaves through the Axis of Upheaval threats (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea).

7. To Evade Sanctions, the Kremlin Turns to a Convicted Money Launderer

Summary:

Russia’s A7 payments platform, fronted by convicted fraudster Ilan Shor and backed by state banks, uses shell companies, falsified trade documents, and a ruble-pegged stablecoin to evade sanctions and move billions abroad. Its criminal-style methods create vulnerabilities, inviting law-enforcement action and deterring increasingly cautious foreign partners and legitimate Russian firms.

To Evade Sanctions, the Kremlin Turns to a Convicted Money Launderer

Elise Thomas

Tuesday, November 18, 2025, 10:13 AM

Ilan Shor claims his Russian sanctions evasion network, A7, has moved $86 billion. Here’s how—and what can be done to stop it.

lawfaremedia.org · Elise Thomas

https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/to-evade-sanctions--the-kremlin-turns-to-a-convicted-money-launderer

Why would a bank hire a convicted thief to run a payments company?

This was the question I kept returning to as I was investigating A7, a Russian cross-border payments service specifically designed to enable large-scale sanctions evasion, and its associated cryptocurrency A7A5. A7 was officially launched by Promsvyazbank (PSB), a heavily sanctioned Russian state-owned military bank, in October 2024. In a press release announcing the launch, PSB called A7 a “unique settlement mechanism” that would “support Russian participants in foreign economic activity and their trading partners in the face of anti-Russian sanctions pressure.” A7 is also financially backed by VEB.RF, a key Russian state development institution.

It’s not surprising that state-owned PSB and VEB.RF want to enable sanctions evasion for Russian businesses, especially when faced with Russia’s worsening economic situation. A7 has received public backing from the highest levels of the Kremlin, including Putin himself. But here’s the weird thing: A7 is led (and majority owned) not by a Russian banker or bureaucrat but by a convicted criminal named Ilan Shor.

Shor is a former Moldovan banking executive who was convicted of fraud and money laundering in 2014 for a scheme in which he and his associates siphoned a billion dollars out of several Moldovan banks via a complex network of foreign shell companies. While under house arrest, he escaped from Moldova in 2019, fleeing first to Israel and then to Moscow.

In the years since, Shor appears to have become a figurehead in what Moldovan officials claim is an industrial-scale political interference scheme in support of pro-Russian parties and political influence in Moldova. The allegations by Moldovan law enforcement and intelligence officials include vote-buying and other forms of illicit political finance; staged rallies and paid protesters; coordinated inauthentic social media campaigns; and a range of other activities. Recent investigations by the BBC and others have exposed what appears to be a sprawling campaign run by Shor’s nongovernmental organization Evrazia.

The Kremlin’s interference efforts in the lead-up to Moldova’s parliamentary election on Sept. 28 were so intense that President Maia Sandu publicly warned that her country’s independence was at stake. Ultimately, the elections were a win for the pro-European voices in Moldova and a blow to the Kremlin’s ambitions.

While all of this was going on, however, Shor was also up to his neck in a different kind of skullduggery: heading up A7’s efforts to enable billions of dollars in sanctions evasion. At the Far Eastern Economic Forum in September 2025, Shor claimed that A7 had facilitated over 7 trillion rubles (about $86 billion) in transactions in less than a year of operating. If true, this would equate to roughly 11.8 percent of Russia’s foreign trade in that time period. The company has opened multiple offices across Russia and the occupied Ukrainian territories. According to import payment figures included in an A7 presentation in August, the overwhelming majority (78 percent) of A7’s payments are going to or coming from China.

In September, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally oversaw the opening of A7’s Vladivostok office to focus on trade with Asia. Shortly after, A7 opened its first public international offices in Nigeria and in Zimbabwe, with opening ceremonies attended by the finance ministers of both African nations as well as the local Russian ambassadors and the Russian deputy finance minister.

Meanwhile, as detailed in my earlier investigation published in June, A7 was busily building out its operations in Kyrgyzstan. This included creating their own cryptocurrency, A7A5. A7A5 was billed as the world’s first stablecoin pegged to the ruble and is supposedly backed one-to-one by fiat ruble deposits held in PSB bank accounts. An investigation by the cryptocurrency tracing company Elliptic has estimated that roughly $8 billion in stablecoin transactions have moved through wallets likely owned by A7 in the past 18 months (although it is not entirely clear what these transactions represent; a Financial Times investigation found very strange patterns of trades that do not reflect normal trading behavior). A7A5 was recognized as Russia’s first official digital financial asset on Sept. 30, making it the first cryptocurrency in which Russian businesses can legally conduct foreign trade.

This activity has not escaped the notice of Western governments. A7, its subsidiaries, and the Kyrgyzstan company Old Vector, the official issuer of A7A5, have all themselves come under sanctions from the U.S. and U.K. in recent months. On Oct. 24, the EU also levied sanctions against A7 and Old Vector, and banned transactions involving A7A5 across the EU. So far, A7’s attitude has been to scoff that the sanctions will have no impact on their work. It’s not clear what the actual level of impact has been, but it is evident that so far the sanctions have not stopped them from being able to operate. A Financial Times analysis in October found that the equivalent of roughly $6 billion had moved through cryptocurrency wallets linked to A7A5 (although, as noted above, it’s not entirely clear what this movement actually represents).

A7 is a big swing for PSB. They’ve invested massive amounts of both actual monetary capital and political and reputational capital into making this endeavor work. It’s potentially high reward, but it’s also high risk.

So this again raises the question: Of all the people you could pick to run this important new project involving billions of dollars, why would you choose a convicted criminal fraudster and money launderer like Ilan Shor?

In my latest investigation, I think I’ve landed on the answer. Who better than a criminal to help you launder money across borders?

The key finding is that A7 appears to be using an international network of shell companies to move its clients’ money globally via a form of trade-based money laundering. This conclusion is based on internal A7 documentation that has been publicly uploaded by Russian regional governments and shared on Telegram; digital forensic investigations that enabled me to identify at least 10 of A7’s foreign shell companies, mostly based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE); and social media discussions between Russian importers-exporters.

Here’s an example of how it works (see Figure 1): Say that a Russian company is seeking to import electronics from China and needs to make a payment to the Chinese supplier. If it is unable to make the payment directly due to sanctions, it can sign a contract with A7 (or its subsidiaries A7 Agent and A71). It then pays A7 the amount for the supplier plus A7’s fees in rubles in Russia. A7 communicates to its “subagent,” that is, a shell company in a foreign jurisdiction, perhaps the UAE.

The UAE company falsifies documents to make it appear as if the Chinese supplier is selling to the company rather than the real Russian buyer—in order to avoid raising the suspicions of banks or financial authorities—and then makes the payment to the supplier. The process for export payments is essentially the same in reverse, albeit slightly more convoluted.

Figure 1. Screenshot from an A7 presentation for potential clients, showing import payment flow (auto-translated with Google Translate).

This process of systematically obscuring the true origins and destinations of payments by layering them through a series of offshore shell companies and false documentation is often associated with money laundering. It is also strikingly reminiscent of how Shor pulled off his earlier theft of a billion dollars from Moldova’s banking system.

What Shor and A7 have built is a system that is markedly similar to the large-scale Russian criminal money laundering network known as the “Global Laundromat,” which has been exposed in recent years and in which Shor himself was directly implicated.

Unlike that network, however, A7 is backed by both the financial resources and the political heft of Russian state institutions. The money has enabled A7 to grow incredibly fast; the political backing appears to be opening doors. For example, the presence of the Nigerian and Zimbabwean finance ministers at the openings of A7’s offices suggests that the African governments are aware that A7 is not an ordinary business.

Russia’s worsening economic situation may be driving the Kremlin’s willingness to throw its weight behind a project like A7. A7’s fusion of suspect techniques with state resources geared toward enabling sanctions evasion at scale has echoes of Iran’s shadow banking system. This hybrid operation has allegedly allowed A7 to move tens of billions of dollars in violation of sanctions—but it also creates unique weaknesses.

If A7’s operations are in fact criminal, they would obviously be vulnerable to traditional law enforcement mechanisms: sanctioning shell companies, freezing bank accounts, and indicting individuals facilitating criminal acts.

The challenge facing A7 is that it is trying to attract clients who are not criminals—with methods that are often associated with criminal activity. Criminals laundering money have limited options and a high tolerance for risk; legitimate businesses do not. This makes trust, or lack thereof, a key chink in A7’s armor.

Comments in Telegram groups for Russian importers-exporters reflect a notable level of skepticism about A7, raising questions about its opaque methods, suspiciously low fees, and circuitous payment routes. They also point dubious fingers specifically at the involvement of Ilan Shor, asking whether an organization led by a convicted thief can really be trusted with their money.

The success of A7 also depends on foreign counterparts being willing to take the risks of working via this network. Foreign suppliers and buyers have to be willing to accept transacting via shady intermediaries with possibly false documents in odd jurisdictions, with no real guarantees that their money will end up where it needs to be nor options for redress if it goes wrong. If foreign counterparts refuse to go along with it, A7’s entire business model would be in real trouble.

In addition to law enforcement action, then, simply raising awareness about the nature of A7’s operations and the potential risks for foreign counterparts—from the possibility of funds being seized to the legal risks to themselves of participating in a money laundering operation—could have a significant impact on A7’s capacity to operate.

Similarly, increasing awareness about Shor’s criminal history could raise serious questions in the minds of foreign counterparts. Is a man who stole a billion dollars in client funds really the person they want to entrust with their own money?

A7’s value to the Russian state is its dual nature: its ability to simultaneously act as a legal, legitimate business within Russia and perhaps as an illicit money laundering network outside of it. These fused halves of the A7 operation bake in inherent weaknesses as well as strengths. With the right pressure in the right places—where the licit and the illicit parts of A7’s operation butt up against each other—A7’s network could yet fall apart under the weight of its own internal contradictions.

lawfaremedia.org · Elise Thomas

8. The surreal 45-day trek at the heart of Nato’s defence

Summary:

NATO planners fear that crumbling bridges, mismatched rail gauges and peacetime bureaucracy could cripple efforts to rush forces from western ports to the eastern flank in a crisis. Moving a large army now takes about 45 days; the goal is three to five. The EU is mapping 500 priority rail and road upgrades, including Rail Baltica and German bridges, while designing a “military Schengen” to speed cross-border movements. Massive logistics, legal limits and civilian infrastructure gaps still pose risks, but generals argue credible deterrence against Russia requires proven plans to move hundreds of thousands of troops quickly.

Comment: I seem to recall we used to be quite good at movements throughout western Europe back in the days of REFORGER. Of course the infrastructure of Eastern Europe is more challenging. Though I do remember after we went through Bradley transition in 1983-1984 we made the movement from Vilsek to Hohenfels in the middle of the night and when we came through a small village a Mercedes was parked on the street instead of the sidewalk and when the first Bradley cut the corner too sharply it ran right over the Mercedes.

The surreal 45-day trek at the heart of Nato’s defence

Europe wrestles with crumbling bridges, narrow tunnels and red tape as it plans how to move an army eastward

Laura Pitel in Berlin, Alice Hancock in Brussels, Steven Bernard in London and Sam Learner in New York

PublishedNov 18 2025

Financial Times · Laura Pitel · November 18, 2025

https://www.ft.com/content/0a07238e-3657-4d1b-8460-35cfc6f8cd66

US general Ben Hodges was overseeing a military exercise in Europe when an unexpected incident occurred at a Polish railway station.

As dozens of Bradley infantry fighting vehicles thundered through, some of them had their gun turrets ripped off by the platform roof. “Nobody got hurt,” said Hodges, who was at the time the commander of US forces in Europe and has since retired. “But that was thousands of dollars of damage. And 10 vehicles that weren’t going to be ready to fight for some time.”

A decade later, crumbling bridges, mismatched rail gauges and labyrinthine bureaucracy remain significant hurdles to moving military assets across Europe. In the wake of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, France was unable to send tanks to Romania on the shortest land route through Germany and instead had to ship them via the Mediterranean.

These examples serve as a stark reminder that Europe’s race to re-arm is not limited to procuring weapons or building up big armies. It must also be possible to swiftly transport troops, equipment and ammunition from the west — where the bulk of Nato’s forces are based — to the alliance’s eastern flank.

Nato vessel HNLMS Tromp at Rotterdam — a key port for military equipment arriving by sea from the UK © Frank de Roo/ANP/AFP/Getty Images

Currently it would take roughly 45 days to move an army from the strategic ports in the west to countries bordering Russia or Ukraine, EU officials estimated as they prepared to publish a new proposal on “military mobility” on Wednesday. The aim, they said, was to bring that down to five or even three days.

Alexander Sollfrank, the German lieutenant general in charge of readying his nation for its central role in such an operation, said every element must work “like a Swiss watch”.

The aim, he said, would be to send a strong message of deterrence to Moscow, saying: “We know what you’re up to and we are ready. Look, we are here.”

But before Nato troops started moving across the continent, the first challenge would be political recognition of a looming crisis, according to military officials.

When Russia amassed troops and weapons on the border with Ukraine in the months leading up to the 2022 invasion, some western leaders were sceptical that President Vladimir Putin would give the order to invade.

“How fast can we determine what they’re starting to do?” said Hodges. “Then it’s the speed of decision. Decision makers saying we need to mobilise, pull ammunition out of depots. The clock is ticking and you want to do something before the Russians attack.”

European leaders would also need to agree with the US’s president on the nature of the threat and the appropriate Nato response. Donald Trump’s oscillating attitude towards Russia has raised concerns in Europe as to the extent of American participation, but Washington has said it remains committed to the alliance and its mutual defence clause.

Once Nato approval was secured, the eastward movement of troops and equipment would begin.

The exact numbers planned for different scenarios are secret. So too are the routes they would take.

But Nato diplomats said analysts’ estimates of some 200,000 troops, about 1,500 tanks and more than 2,500 other pieces of armour being shipped from the US, Canada and the UK across mainland Europe were broadly correct.

“Military mobility is an essential component of effective security and defence and the right infrastructure helps allies ensure we can get the right forces to the right place at the right time,” said a Nato official.

Members of the US Army unload heavy combat equipment including Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles near the Pabradė military base in Lithuania © Petras Malukas/AFP/Getty Images

Hodges, the retired American general, said US mapping of key European routes had improved significantly since the gun turret incident.

But Alberto Mazzola, executive director at the European rail industry body CER, said Europe was only just gathering a good overview of the problems. “We need to check which of tunnels in Europe are fit for this,” he said.

The EU’s standard loading gauge — the maximum dimensions of freight trains so that they can safely pass under bridges and through tunnels — is too narrow for military transport. The tilt of the tracks can also pose a problem. “If you have a heavy load then the load could just fall off,” one EU official said.

To tackle the issue of mismatched railway gauges in the Baltics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are in the midst of a €24bn project to integrate them into the European rail network. The Rail Baltica project was designed with military movements in mind, readying it to carry oversized loads.

Aligning the rail gauge was critical from an efficiency and security point of view, said Rail Baltica chief executive Marko Kivila. Unloading and loading soldiers created a “bottleneck” and left them vulnerable to attack, he said.

Moving military assets from Spain and Portugal would hit similar snags, as the Iberian peninsula also operates on different gauges than the rest of the continent.

Significant work must also be done on the road network, particularly in Germany, whose geographical location and role as the host of 37,000 US troops makes it central to the plan.

A section of the collapsed Carola Bridge in Dresden is emblematic of Germany’s poor roads © Odd Anderson/AFP/Getty Images

Last year, a 100-metre section of Dresden’s Carola Bridge collapsed, in the process becoming a symbol of the dire state of the country’s roads.

The French Leclerc tank deliveries to Romania in 2022 took weeks instead of days after German customs rejected them because they were too heavy to be transported on roads. Instead the cargo was shipped from the port of Marseille to Alexandroupoli in Greece and then on by rail to Romania.

Across the EU, member states have flagged some 2,800 transport infrastructure “hotspots” in dire need of upgrading — a list officials in Brussels further cut down to 500 priority projects.

Nato countries, with the exception of Spain, agreed in June to increase defence spending by 2035 to 5 per cent of GDP a year, 1.5 per cent of which can be spent on infrastructure. In Germany, defence officials are lobbying to ensure that vital routes are prioritised as part of a €500bn plan to upgrade roads, bridges and railways.

Military signs from the cold war in Münster, Germany © Credit: Steffan Hill/Alamy

One of the strange quirks of moving troops eastward is that they would cross countries that are not at war, meaning army chiefs would have to abide by customs rules and labour laws governing how long lorry drivers can spend on the road.

“If there’s an actual war that has been declared as such, all these bureaucratic obstacles fall,” said Jannik Hartmann, associate fellow at the Nato Defence College in Rome. “But if this is declared we are already too late. This is the crucial point . . . This isn’t yet a state of war.”

Officials are working on a “military Schengen” that at least standardises patchy regulations governing the movement of armies. Germany, Poland and the Netherlands last year signed an agreement to simplify cross-border military transport among themselves.

François Kalfon, a French lawmaker working on military transport, noted that “for the same convoy of trucks” you could have multiple sets of requirements in each country. The paperwork is unlikely to become digital — Nato prefers hard copies for fear of cyber attacks.

Military vehicles, including a British armoured vehicle and a medical truck, cross the Vistula, Poland’s longest river © Sean Gallup/Getty Images

In an attempt to accelerate the upgrade, governments are turning to the private sector. The German armed forces this year signed a €260mn contract with a services division of the arms group Rheinmetall to provide support to convoys passing through the country. That means providing them with everything from beds and canteens to tank maintenance centres.

The Bundeswehr also has an agreement with the cargo division of the state-owned rail company Deutsche Bahn.

But Sollfrank, the German general, said there was still “an incredible number of different vehicles and an unbelievable amount of different ammunition”, making this a thorny task. “You can’t plan every single tiny screw in advance. That doesn’t work,” he said. “But you can think of options . . . And this planning is happening.”

A light division of some 15,000 soldiers and 7,500 vehicles could require up to 200 trains each with up to 42 carriages — 8,400 wagons in total, according to CER. The EU’s vehicle industry body ACEA has called for “joint tenders and harmonised specifications” in order to incentivise production of the heavier vehicles required.

This enormous Europe-wide effort might appear alarmist. But Sollfrank said it was essential.

“We have to think the unthinkable,” he said. “It’s about deterrence. Deterrence only works if we’re credible. And we are only credible when we have plans — and we are ready.”

Additional reporting by Henry Foy in Brussels

Financial Times · Laura Pitel · November 18, 2025

9. Trump Sends Pentagon Officials to Ukraine in Effort to Restart Peace Talks

Summary:

President Trump sent Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and two top generals directly to Kyiv to gauge battlefield realities and revive peace talks with Ukraine and, later, Russia. The unconventional Pentagon delegation reflects frustration with failed overtures and a belief Moscow may respond better to military-brokered negotiations amid intensified Russian attacks.

Excerpts:

The White House initiative comes amid an escalation of heavy Russian drone and missile attacks across Ukraine in recent weeks, and as Moscow reports territorial gains in the southeastern Zaporizhzhia region.

The U.S. delegation in Kyiv, which includes Gen. Chris Donahue, the top U.S. Army commander in Europe, and Gen. Randy George, the Army chief of staff, was expected to discuss developments on the battlefield and weapons production while in Ukraine, in addition to ideas for halting the war.

...

Few senior U.S. officials have visited Ukraine since Trump returned to the White House. Hegseth granted permission for the senior Army officials to visit, as military members cannot enter the country without defense secretary approval, one of the officials said.

Comment: Interesting delegation to say the least.

Trump Sends Pentagon Officials to Ukraine in Effort to Restart Peace Talks

WSJ

Push comes after the White House has seen multiple previous overtures to Moscow yield little progress on halting the war

By Lara Seligman

Updated Nov. 18, 2025 10:19 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/trump-sends-pentagon-officials-to-ukraine-in-effort-to-restart-peace-talks-8cd9ddd4

A firefighter works on burning cars near an apartment building hit by a Russian drone strike in Kharkiv, Ukraine. Sofiia Gatilova/Reuters

President Trump dispatched Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and two four-star generals to Kyiv to revive negotiations on the war.
The White House believes Moscow might be more open to military-brokered negotiations after previous attempts failed.
Driscoll’s mission is to restart peace talks on Trump’s behalf, following an escalation of Russian attacks in Ukraine.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

President Trump dispatched Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and two four-star generals to Kyiv to revive negotiations on the war.

President Trump dispatched a high-level Pentagon delegation to Kyiv for talks Wednesday in the administration’s latest attempt to revive negotiations on halting Russia’s war with Ukraine, according to senior U.S. officials.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll, along with two four-star Army generals, was scheduled to hold discussions with President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainian officials, as well as top military and industry representatives, two of the officials said. Driscoll is planning to meet with Russian officials at a later date.

The White House decision to turn to Driscoll and senior military officers is driven in part by the belief that Moscow might be more open to military-brokered negotiations and by frustration that multiple previous attempts have yielded little.

“Secretary Driscoll is traveling to Ukraine to get a sense of facts on the ground. He will participate in meetings in Ukraine and report his findings back to the White House,” said a senior administration official. “The president has been clear that it is time to stop the killing and make a deal to end the war.”

Driscoll’s mission is to restart peace talks on Trump’s behalf, another of the officials said.

Driscoll’s boss, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, hasn’t visited Kyiv since taking office in January. The decision to send the civilian head of the Army, whose job is focused mainly on training and equipping soldiers, is unusual. But Trump often relies on unorthodox emissaries, including former real-estate developer Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy.

It isn’t clear whether Driscoll was sharing a new negotiating proposal with Zelensky from the White House, which has previously called for freezing the two sides’ troops along current battle lines in eastern Ukraine to jump-start talks on a settlement.

The idea of sending Driscoll, a Yale Law School classmate of Vice President JD Vance, to Ukraine and later to Russia came out of a conversation between Trump and Vance, according to one of the officials.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll will try to get peace talks restarted. Michael Brochstein/Zuma Press

The Trump administration has attempted multiple times to bring the conflict launched by Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2022 to an end through a negotiated settlement. But Ukrainian and Russian officials haven’t held direct talks for months, and U.S. efforts reached a stalemate since the summit between Trump and Putin in Alaska in August. Russia has shown little interest in halting the war except on its own terms.

In October, Trump canceled a planned follow-up meeting with Putin in Budapest and imposed new sanctions on Russia’s oil companies after Russian government officials made clear they had no intention of making a deal.

The White House initiative comes amid an escalation of heavy Russian drone and missile attacks across Ukraine in recent weeks, and as Moscow reports territorial gains in the southeastern Zaporizhzhia region.

The U.S. delegation in Kyiv, which includes Gen. Chris Donahue, the top U.S. Army commander in Europe, and Gen. Randy George, the Army chief of staff, was expected to discuss developments on the battlefield and weapons production while in Ukraine, in addition to ideas for halting the war.

Donahue has been a key figure in sending weapons to Ukraine, dating back to his time as the commander of the Army’s 18th Airborne Corps in 2022 when it formed a unit to help coordinate military aid to Kyiv.

Trump at the White House on Tuesday indicated he was still hopeful that he could stop the fighting. “I’ve actually stopped eight wars. I have another one to go with Putin. I’m a little surprised at Putin. It is taken longer than I thought.”

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

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Driscoll has led an effort to revamp the Army’s decades-old acquisition system. Trump called Driscoll a “killer” in an Oval Office announcement that he was deploying the National Guard to Memphis, Tenn., and refers to him as “the drone guy,” a reference to Driscoll’s focus on fielding a million new drones for the Army. Along with his position as Army Secretary, Trump named Driscoll to lead the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms.

Witkoff, who has been the administration’s point man on negotiations with the Kremlin, helped prepare Driscoll for the talks in Kyiv, one of the officials said. The two know each other from working on Trump’s presidential campaign.

Driscoll and George flew to Germany on Monday, where they received intelligence briefings at a U.S. military base with Donahue, the officials said. The group discussed the battlefield over maps with soldiers who have been working on Ukraine for years. They then flew to Poland on Tuesday and boarded an overnight train for Kyiv late Tuesday night.

Few senior U.S. officials have visited Ukraine since Trump returned to the White House. Hegseth granted permission for the senior Army officials to visit, as military members cannot enter the country without defense secretary approval, one of the officials said.

Write to Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 19, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Sends Pentagon Officials to Ukraine in Effort to Restart Peace Talks'.

WSJ

10. Trump Said to Authorize C.I.A. Plans for Covert Action in Venezuela

Summary:

President Trump has authorized CIA covert action plans in Venezuela while massing U.S. naval and Marine forces in the Caribbean under “Operation Southern Spear.” With the carrier Gerald R. Ford and 15,000 troops in theater, planners are preparing sabotage, cyber, and information operations alongside potential strikes on drug infrastructure and Maduro-aligned units. Simultaneously, Trump has reopened back-channel talks in which Nicolás Maduro has floated delayed resignation and oil access for U.S. firms. The White House has rejected a drawn-out transition but is escalating pressure through terrorism designations and lethal boat strikes while keeping diplomacy and possible force on the table.

Excerpts:

Even as Mr. Trump has told the C.I.A. to prepare multiple possible secret operations inside Venezuela, he has also opened up back-channel negotiations with Mr. Maduro after cutting off such talks last month for a brief time, people briefed on the matter said.

In those informal talks, Mr. Maduro has signaled a willingness to offer access to his country’s oil wealth to American energy companies.

Mr. Trump acknowledged those talks, in a fashion, on Sunday.

“We may be having some discussions with Maduro, and we’ll see how that turns out,” Mr. Trump said.

Comment: So if a covert action is exposed in the press is it still a covert action? (note attempt at humor). I wonder how long the planners thought they could maintain plausible deniability? Certainly they did not expect exposure in the press this early. Though I suppose that could have been the plan as part of either an influence or deception operation.

But it would be a real "coup" (pun intended) if this results in Maduro voluntarily stepping down and US companies gaining access to Venezuelan oil.

Trump Said to Authorize C.I.A. Plans for Covert Action in Venezuela

NY Times · Eric Schmitt · November 18, 2025

By Tyler Pager Julian E. Barnes and Eric Schmitt

Reporting from Washington

Nov. 18, 2025

Leer en español

The president has signed off on possible operations inside Venezuela but has also reopened back-channel communications with the government of President Nicolás Maduro.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/18/us/politics/trump-covert-action-venezuela.html

The next phase of the Trump administration’s escalating pressure campaign on the government of President Nicolás Maduro could be sabotage or some sort of cyber, psychological or information operations.

Reporting from Washington

Nov. 18, 2025

Leer en español

With the largest U.S. aircraft carrier now positioned in the Caribbean, President Trump has approved additional measures to pressure Venezuela and prepare for the possibility of a broader military campaign, according to multiple people briefed on the matter.

Mr. Trump has signed off on C.I.A. plans for covert measures inside Venezuela, operations that could be meant to prepare a battlefield for further action, these people said. At the same time, they said, he has authorized a new round of back-channel negotiations that at one point resulted in President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela offering to step down after a delay of a couple of years, a proposal the White House rejected.

It is not clear what the covert actions might be or when any of them might be carried out. Mr. Trump has not yet authorized combat forces on the ground in Venezuela, so the next phase of the administration’s escalating pressure campaign on the Maduro government could be sabotage or some sort of cyber, psychological or information operations.

The president has not made a decision about the broader course of action to pursue in Venezuela, nor publicly articulated his ultimate goal beyond stemming the flow of drugs from the region. And military and C.I.A. planners have prepared multiple options for different contingencies.

Military planners have prepared lists of potential drug facilities that could be struck. The Pentagon is also planning for strikes on military units close to Mr. Maduro. Mr. Trump held two meetings in the White House Situation Room last week to discuss Venezuela and review options with his senior advisers.

The U.S.S. Gerald R. Ford during a NATO exercise in September. It moved into the Caribbean over the weekend.

Any covert action by the C.I.A. would probably come before such military strikes.

Both the White House and the C.I.A. declined to comment on Mr. Trump’s order.

Even as Mr. Trump has told the C.I.A. to prepare multiple possible secret operations inside Venezuela, he has also opened up back-channel negotiations with Mr. Maduro after cutting off such talks last month for a brief time, people briefed on the matter said.

In those informal talks, Mr. Maduro has signaled a willingness to offer access to his country’s oil wealth to American energy companies.

Mr. Trump acknowledged those talks, in a fashion, on Sunday.

“We may be having some discussions with Maduro, and we’ll see how that turns out,” Mr. Trump said.

While Mr. Trump emphasizes Venezuela’s role in the drug trade or illegal immigration when he discusses the issue in public, he has discussed in private the country’s huge oil reserves and American companies gaining access to them.

Venezuelan officials have told Americans that Mr. Maduro might be willing to step down, after a transition of two to three years, according to the people briefed on the matter. Any delay in Mr. Maduro’s giving up power is a nonstarter with the White House.

But despite the apparent impasse, the back-channel negotiations show that a diplomatic solution is still possible.

People briefed on the discussions say it is not clear what outcome the president favors. Mr. Trump could agree to a diplomatic deal to gain more access to the Venezuela oil resources for American companies, he could push for a resolution that allows Mr. Maduro to voluntarily give up power, or he could demand that the United States forcibly remove the Venezuelan dictator.

Even with the endgame uncertain, the White House has settled on a strategy of ratcheting up the pressure on Mr. Maduro, while giving Mr. Trump options on how he might want to bring the campaign against Venezuela to a conclusion.

Called “Operation Southern Spear,” the massive buildup of American naval forces in the Caribbean is the largest since the Cuban Missile Crisis and the blockade of Cuba in 1962. The carrier Gerald R. Ford arrived in the Caribbean over the weekend, and there are now 15,000 troops in the region, including Marines on amphibious ships and personnel at military bases in Puerto Rico.

But the military buildup is only the most obvious of a multifaceted pressure campaign.

The State Department has announced that, effective Nov. 24, it will designate Cartel de los Soles a terrorist organization. While Cartel de los Soles is not a cartel in the traditional sense, it is a way for the Trump administration to label a broad swath of Mr. Maduro’s government a terrorism organization, potentially paving the way for military action but also pressuring the government.

Mr. Trump’s public comments in recent days have reflected the uncertainty over the endgame, even as he increases the pressure. Mr. Trump said on Monday that he had not ruled out ground forces going into Venezuela, and held out the possibility of direct negotiations with Mr. Maduro.

“I don’t rule out anything,” Mr. Trump said. “We just have to take care of Venezuela.”

The United States has launched 21 known strikes on boats that the administration says were smuggling drugs, killing at least 83 people. Mr. Trump has said ample intelligence justifies the strikes, but administration officials have not provided detailed evidence of the cargo the boats were carrying.

Those strikes have been conducted without congressional authorization, prompting criticism from legal experts and Democrats in Congress that the administration is intentionally targeting civilians who may be suspected of crimes but are not combatants.

Mr. Trump, at least after the first strikes in October, said the United States had targeted fentanyl, a deadly synthetic opioid that has caused tens of thousands of overdose deaths. But military officials, in closed door meetings with Congress, have acknowledged that the boats are carrying cocaine, not fentanyl.

Tyler Pager is a White House correspondent for The Times, covering President Trump and his administration.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades.

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times. He has reported on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism for more than three decades.

11. Terrifying internet vulnerability EXPOSED Cloudflare crash

Summary:

A routine configuration change at Cloudflare crashed services worldwide, crippling websites and critical systems that rely on its network “gatekeeper.” The firm denies a cyberattack, but experts question how one change felled such redundant infrastructure. The outage, echoing a recent AWS crash, highlights systemic internet fragility and growing cyber-warfare fears.

Comment: Too many eggs in too few baskets? Is the internet designed for convenience and efficiency or security, resilience, and redundancy? What should be the priority? (rhetorical question of course)

Terrifying internet vulnerability EXPOSED Cloudflare crash

Daily Mail ·

By HARRIET ALEXANDER, US SENIOR FEATURES WRITER

Published: 18:21 EST, 18 November 2025 | Updated: 21:18 EST, 18 November 2025

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-15304057/internet-blackout-Cloudflare-crash-amazon.html

For a company that promises to 'build a better internet,' the drama was mortifying.

To millions around the world who – perhaps, unwittingly – depend on Cloudflare's services, the blackout was unnerving.

The Silicon Valley firm that is the foundation of a fifth of all websites worldwide, was brought to its knees on Tuesday morning.

The issue was first detected at 6:48am Eastern Time.

Internet users experienced the outage as maddening connectivity issues. Elon Musk's X, Sam Altman's ChatGPT, Spotify and Shopify were among the sites grinding to a halt. More essential organizations, such as the New Jersey transit system, New York City's emergency management offices and the French national railway company SNCF were also reportedly impacted.

By 9:42am the Cloudflare said a 'fix' had been 'implemented' and by 12:44pm the service was fully restored.

Dane Knecht, Cloudflare's chief technology officer - whose X bio boasts: 'I help invent the future' - was grovelling in his apology.

'I won't mince words: earlier today we failed our customers and the broader Internet,' he said, adding that it 'caused real pain' and the 'issue, impact it caused, and time to resolution is unacceptable.'

For a company that promises to 'build a better internet,' the drama was mortifying. To millions around the world who – perhaps, unwittingly – depend on Cloudflare's services, the blackout was unnerving

By 9:42am the Cloudflare said a 'fix' had been 'implemented' and by 12:44pm the service was fully restored (Pictured: Matthew Prince, co-founder and chief executive officer of Cloudflare Inc, on Oct. 21, 2019)

He blamed Cloudflare's system crash on 'a routine configuration change,' saying it 'cascaded into a broad degradation to our network and other services.'

'This was not an attack,' he said, categorically.

However, even though there is no evidence that Cloudflare was the victim of cybercrime, eyebrows were raised.

'I'm very suspicious when I see something like this that doesn't really smell right,' James Knight, senior principal at Digital Warfare, which helps companies identify and shore up online vulnerabilities, told the Daily Mail.

Knight, who has 30 years of experience in cyber threats, including classified work as an 'ethical hacker,' told the Daily Mail that these giant internet companies have 'an inordinate amount of redundancy when it comes to a lot of these things', with multiple back-ups in place.

He believes that any update would likely have been trialled multiple times on a test site, before being done live.

Although Cloudflare is hardly a household name, its security - and that of companies like it - affects us all. A popular meme doing the rounds on Tuesday showed a teetering stack of blocks labeled 'The Entire Internet', with Cloudflare depicted as two tiny matchsticks propping up the entire structure.

Cloudflare essentially serves as the 'door' through which all of us pass when we use one of their many client websites.

Internet users may believe they are accessing Uber, Zoom or LinkedIn directly: in reality, they connect to a Cloudflare data center in one of 330 cities worldwide and Cloudflare then patches the user through to the website they wish. It makes the connection significantly faster, and, in theory, safer, with Cloudflare fending off all attempts to take down the site.

But Cloudflare's 'gatekeeper' position makes it a tempting target for anyone wanting to land a blow on global commerce, communications and connectivity.

In September, the company announced that they had thwarted the largest ever 'distributed denial-of-service' (DDoS) attack, in which criminals bombarded Cloudflare's systems with a battery of requests, trying to make their websites keel over.

That attack saw 11.5 terabytes-per-second of data, which is equivalent to downloading Netflix's entire content library every second, hurled at Cloudflare for 35 seconds. And that digital assault came just three months after the previous record DDoS attack of 7.3 terabytes-per-second.

Downdetector, a site that monitors online outages, shows the Cloudflare glitch affected X, Spotify, OpenAI, Uber and the dating site Grindr, along with many others

EXCLUSIVE

The alarming reality EXPOSED by the global internet meltdown... and why Amazon's crash is only the beginning

Knight claimed very few actors are capable of such massive hacking events.

'It could be the Chinese, trying to bring down companies to affect their profit margins. Or Russia, which is obviously interested in striking back against those involved in Ukraine,' said Knight describing the motivations of hostile foreign nations. 'There's no question about it: cyber warfare units are really, absolutely, incredible.'

'If this were a cyber attack - which we don't have evidence of at the moment - than what's the motivation? It's either monetary or power at the end of the day,' said Knight.

The Cloudflare outage also comes hot on the heels of a dramatic blackout of Amazon Web Services in September. The internet behemoth issued a similar explanation: they too, they said, had simply updated their systems and accidently caused a spectacular crash.

At the end of October, analytics firm CyberCube announced that the cost of Amazon outage could run to $581 million.

'A lot of these things have been coming up,' said Knight, 'I'm just seeing the pattern: we've got Cloudflare, where just one thing went wrong, and all of a sudden the whole system's down.

In general, Knight says, the US government has good reasons to tell the US companies to conceal the extent of any possible cyberattacks, if they can be seen as undermining US national security and global stability.

Knight said this was unlikely to be the end of the digital turmoil and warned Americans to brace for further outages.

Daily Mail · HARRIET ALEXANDER, US SENIOR FEATURES WRITER · November 18, 2025

12. Saudi Arabia wants to buy nearly 300 U.S. tanks, White House says

Comment: The buried lede - $ 1 trillion investments. As an aside, I wonder how Saudi Arabia intends to employ 300 tanks?

MBS earlier in the day told President Trump that Saudi Arabia would raise its stateside investments to $1 trillion, up from $600 billion.

Saudi Arabia wants to buy nearly 300 U.S. tanks, White House says

Axios · Colin Demarest · November 19, 2025

https://www.axios.com/2025/11/19/trump-saudi-arabia-crown-prince-mbs-tanks?utm

10 hours ago - World

Colin Demarest

An Abrams tank with the 1st Cavalry Division at the National Training Center in November. Photo: Tyler Williams/DVIDS

Saudi Arabia committed to buying hundreds of U.S.-made tanks, part of a larger spending-and-security conversation between the two countries, the White House said.

Why it matters: It's a massive, long-term commitment — and one that appears to shrug off doubts regarding the tank's role on the battlefield of the future.

Driving the news: The Trump administration on Tuesday announced a slew of deals with Riyadh following consultations with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The arrangement for "nearly" 300 tanks, in particular, will enable "Saudi Arabia to build up its own defense capabilities" while "safeguarding hundreds of American jobs," it said.

Zoom in: General Dynamics Land Systems makes the Abrams main battle tank. It's used by the U.S. Army and has been adopted overseas, including by Ukraine.

A company spokesperson referred questions about the plan to the State Department.

Zoom out: MBS earlier in the day told President Trump that Saudi Arabia would raise its stateside investments to $1 trillion, up from $600 billion.

U.S. Backs $1 Billion Loan to Restart the Three Mile Island Nuclear Plant

WSJ

By Costas Paris

Follow

Nov. 18, 2025 4:15 pm ET

Constellation Energy aims to bring mothballed plant back to life to power Microsoft AI agreement

https://www.wsj.com/business/energy-oil/three-mile-island-nuclear-power-plant-ba857bc9?mod=hp_lead_pos11

The shuttered Three Mile Island nuclear power plant stands in the middle of the Susquehanna River near Middletown, Pa. Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

The Trump Administration will provide a $1 billion federal loan to Constellation Energy to restart the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.
Constellation Energy will revive the plant’s undamaged reactor, closed in 2019, to sell power to Microsoft under a 20-year deal.
The restart of Three Mile Island, renamed Crane Clean Energy Center, is expected to add 800 megawatts of power generation.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

The Trump Administration will provide a $1 billion federal loan to Constellation Energy to restart the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.

The Trump Administration will give Constellation Energy CEG 0.20%increase; green up pointing triangle a $1 billion federal loan to restart the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania that suffered a partial core meltdown in 1979.

Energy Secretary Chris Wright said Tuesday that restarting the plant will help bring down electricity prices and that the administration will act to bring more nuclear generation online.

“We want to bring as much addition of reliable electricity onto the grid to stop these price rises,” he said, adding that such moves will help “reshore manufacturing in our country.”

Constellation announced last year that it would restart the Three Mile Island site of the country’s worst nuclear power accident, to help generate electricity for Microsoft MSFT -2.70%decrease; red down pointing triangle, which needs more power to fuel its artificial intelligence business.

The deal calls for Constellation to revive the plant’s undamaged reactor, which was too costly to run and closed in 2019. The power generated will be sold to Microsoft under a 20-year deal. The tech industry has a nearly insatiable demand for 24-hour-a-day power for AI data centers.

The Trump administration is a strong proponent of nuclear power and has vowed to quadruple U.S. nuclear generation by 2050. The plan involves restarting existing reactors and developing 10 large-scale new ones that will expand nuclear capacity from 100 gigawatts currently to 400 gigawatts.

The lights are turning back on at Three Mile Island, the site of America’s worst nuclear meltdown. In January, WSJ went inside to learn more about the delicate process of rebooting a nuclear power plant.

The U.S. has added only three new big reactors since the 1990s. The most recent ones were years delayed and over budget. Years of flat U.S. power demand created a battle for market share, and nuclear plants had a tough time competing against many renewable projects and natural-gas-fired power plants that tapped into a cheap source of fuel from the U.S. shale boom.

Perceptions of nuclear power have evolved after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the ensuing energy crunch in Europe that stemmed from sanctions on Russian energy such as natural gas. Countries including France, Japan and the U.K. are also looking to add nuclear power to their national grids.

Wright said Three Mile Island will add around 800 megawatts of power generation to the grid. Constellation has said it would pay about $1.6 billion to restart the plant in 2027.

The plant had two reactors, with one permanently shut down after the accident, while the second was shut down in 2019. It is the second reactor that Constellation aims to reboot.

The company has renamed the site the Crane Clean Energy Center. Under the Trump administration, Constellation said it has been possible to “vastly expedite this restart without compromising quality or safety. It’s a great example of how America first energy policies create jobs, growth and opportunities and make the grid more reliable.”

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s new focus is on less bureaucracy and more safety, Wright said. “With the new generation of reactors that’s even easier,” he said.

Write to Costas Paris at costas.paris@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 19, 2025, print edition as 'U.S. Will Give $1 Billion Loan To Restart Three Mile Island'.

WSJ

14. Explaining The Lack of Proficiency in Arab Armies with Solutions to Modernize

Summary:

Many Arab armies are intentionally kept weak: plagued by sectarianism, corruption, coup fears, poor training, politicized officer corps, reliance on foreign patrons, and doctrines focused on regime protection over national defense. It recommends empowering officers and NCOs, easing sectarian bias, and modernizing doctrine to build cohesive forces.

Excerpts:

A major hurdle to modernizing stagnant Arab armies is the trust between the lower ranks and the general staff. Because most of the Middle East and North Africa have totalitarian or hybrid regimes, the ruling elite ultimately wants to keep the status quo, even if it means breaking the national security apparatus.

Formulating a revitalized doctrine towards modernization will require trust between Arab autocracies and not just their general staff but also their field command. In Western militaries, generals unofficially act as unofficial diplomats, with Lieutenant Colonels and full-bird Colonels managing and directing regiments and battalions. Assigning additional responsibilities to field commanders in MENA militaries can also be essential to growth.

Furthermore, continued enhancement for officers in Western military academies and reinvigorating the non-commissioned officer corps will produce results in small-unit leadership and cohesion among regional garrisons.

Mending sectarianism within Arab militaries and emphasizing national pride will also be instrumental. Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, Druze, and others should be able to rise the ranks, regardless of ethnic and religious background, just as the Western world does.

Stagnation amongst militaries in the Middle East and North Africa is a recurring but fixable issue. Enhancing the capabilities of field officers, creating a non-commissioned officer corps, mitigating sectarian bias, and mending trust between senior leadership and ruling heads of state should be prioritized if the region wishes to catch up to other peers, such as Israel and Turkey, which have more proficient armed forces.

Comment: I guess you can start modernizing by sending 300 tanks to Saudi Arabia. Some recommendations that seem sound, but are they attainable? I recommend we keep in mind one of the eight points of irregular warfare. This of course applies beyond irregular warfare and should be understood as common sense.

Understand the indigenous way of war and adapt to it. Do not force the US way of war upon indigenous forces if it is counter to their history, customs, traditions, and abilities.

https://maxoki161.blogspot.com/2018/07/eight-points-of-special-warfare.html

Explaining The Lack of Proficiency in Arab Armies with Solutions to Modernize

by Julian McBride

11.19.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/19/explaining-the-lack-of-proficiency-in-arab/

Photo by PV2 Andrew W. McGalliard/US Army (The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoW) visual information does not imply or constitute DoW endorsement.)

Arab armies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA region) currently do not perform as proficiently as Western militaries in North America, Europe, or even East Asian militaries. Because of stagnation, corruption, and a lack of a constitution, Arab militaries are plagued by human rights abuses and a lack of unit cohesion.

Numerous wars and conflicts in the region have seen Arab armies suffer unnecessary casualties, minimal unit cohesion, and failed reconstructions of their wartime doctrines. Whereas other regional militaries, such as Israel and Turkey, excel, the rest struggle to adapt with proficiency and modernization.

Despite numerous challenges, militaries in the Arab world remain in a state of perpetual limbo. Some are currently adopting new doctrines and tactics to revitalize their armed forces and restore the readiness level the region lacks. Reviewing several key points, we can examine why MENA armies were constituted to avoid becoming competent and proficient.

Lack of Cohesion in Different Sects

In the ancient and medieval eras, the Arab world was united under the umbrella of various empires, forming caliphates and sultanates. Under the allegiance of ruling authorities, Arabs under united armies conquered the Romans, Crusaders, and even the Mongol Ilkhanate, as the latter three suffered major problems of infighting and usurpations.

After the Sunni-Shia split in the seventh century, which led to various sectarian conflicts, the unity among Arabs gradually decreased. Various Sunni caliphates and kingdoms would fight Shiite empires and vice versa. The old Sunni caliphates saw Shias as ‘heretics’ in an age where religious persecutions set the tone before modern-day nation-states.

Instead of equal status of all religious and ethnic groups, with the opportunity to climb up the military hierarchy, rank and file ended up being defined by the dominant religious sect of each MENA nation. For example, in Lebanon, the army fractured in the seventies as Maronites, Druze, Sunnis, and Shias alike all aligned to various political parties and affiliations.

Despite fractured unity among Sunni and Shia Arabs, both Islamic religious sects maintained strong loyalty among their regional tribes, which predated Islam itself, compared to the new modern nation-states. However, a stronger bond to a tribe than a modern MENA country could make the difference in unity, cohesion, camaraderie, command, and control.

In the economic powerhouse Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, a Shiite Muslim may not be able to rise through the ranks as easily as his Sunni counterpart. The former Ba’athist Iraq under Saddam Hussein practiced such sectarianism by placating Sunni Muslims over other sects such as Shiites, Turkmen, Kurds, and Assyrians. Placating an ethnic or religious group will not only lead to envy but also heighten sectarianism and the need for revenge–especially as the modern Middle Eastern borders were arbitrarily drawn.

Against the backdrop of the US invading Iraq, the Sunni-dominated Republican Guard and Army were disbanded. When the sectarian majority-Shiite government of Baghdad countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Morocco, the UAE, and Egypt, relied on imports to bolster their armies.

The Gulf states rely not only on American arms exports but also on American forward forces garrisoned in their countries to protect them from existential threats such as the Iranian-led Axis. Simultaneously, Iranian-led Axis nations such as Yemen and former President Assad’s Syria relied on arms imports from Tehran and Moscow.

In the Levant, Lebanon’s Security Forces never fully recovered from the civil war, and even today, the US State Department helps pay the salaries of the army as Beirut’s treasury continues to deteriorate. Simultaneously, the collapse of the Syrian military is correlated with the lack of direct material support from Russia and Iran in late 2024.

Against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the October 7th Hamas attacks against Israel, neither Moscow nor Tehran could efficiently support Assad due to significant losses in personnel and logistics. Already withdrawing a sizable contingent from Syria, Russian forces were able to do little except advise an already disorganized Syrian army. Furthermore, Israeli air superiority over Syria and the decimation of Hezbollah left the IRGC regional leadership exposed to IDF decapitation strikes.

Poor and Minimal Training

During the 1948 Arab Israeli War and the Day War, the Jordanian Army was able to offer stiff resistance to the Israeli Defense Forces as Britain molded the Kingdom to emulate the UK’s Armed Forces due to the Hashemites in Amman being of British descent.

Despite the extensive training of the Jordanian Army, whose officers frequently gained Western training and assistance, other Arab countries did not have such opportunities. On paper, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco have capable forces in terms of global firepower; however, their nominal preparations for conventional and unconventional conflicts have a negative impact on their capabilities.

Egypt, which has one of the largest militaries in the region, suffered major casualties in various conflicts against Israel, a ‘Vietnam’ quagmire in Yemen, and even a major counterinsurgency in the Sinai Peninsula. While numerous authoritarians in Cairo saw the Egyptian Armed Forces as a military capable of projecting force to any crisis, miscalculations on motivated troops and overestimating capabilities led to Egypt’s aforementioned disasters.

Likewise, Saudi Arabia’s military failed to achieve any substantial objectives during the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen. Saudi Arabia, in the nineties, was able to hide their military’s flaws as direct intervention by the United States during the Gulf War annihilated much of Saddam’s Republican Guard.

In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition failed to achieve any of its objectives and, to this day, relies on American military technology and exports to keep the kingdom safe. Without direct American assistance during the intervention, such as advisers or special operations forces on the ground to combat the Houthis, the Saudis showed they were more of a self-defense military than an expeditionary one.

The then-Assad-led Syrian army faces major security problems as its main backers, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, became preoccupied with their conflicts as well. The lack of preparation for training the Syrian military into a professional force led to Assad’s downfall, as the Syrian dictator lived lavishly under the protection of foreign powers instead of motivating and molding his armed forces.

Lack of Trust in Officers

Ruling governments, secular, and authoritarian, seldom have faith in the officer corps for fear of potential coups, uprisings, or defections, as seen in the early months of the Syrian Civil War. Due to this mistrust, field commanders are unable to make critical decisions independently, which leads to battlefield catastrophes.

During the Six-Day War, the Egyptian army could have moved to a defensive posture after the Israeli shock and awe. However, Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt, did not allow his officers to withdraw their garrisons and equipment in time, as his propaganda made it seem like the Egyptians were on the offensive.

The Egyptian President also underestimated his garrisons in the Sinai by assuming the Egyptian Armed Forces had adequate equipment and coordination to prepare for the inevitable confrontation with Israel. Utilizing site surveys together with his field officers, Nasser perhaps could have made a more comprehensive decision before closing the Strait of Tiran, which inevitably baited the Israelis to strike first.

Costly decisions of Nasser, who failed to take advice and suggestions from his field commanders, led to a general retreat of Egyptian troops by the Israeli military in the Sinai in 1967. In the Western world and even Israel, field commanders are allowed to have more autonomous decision-making and authority over platoon and squad-sized elements to complete the mission.

Another major example would take place in Northern Iraq in 2014 during ISIS’s shocking lightning offensive. The inexperienced Iraqi army, constituted to be more pro-Shia compared to the Sunni-led Republican Guard, panicked as the officers did not have the critical decision-making to hold Mosul. The US failed at overseeing the post-Saddam Iraqi army to be secular and non-aligned to any ethnoreligious dispute, which extremist factions took advantage of.

The lack of communication between the command staff in Baghdad and field commanders in Mosul had disastrous results. The Iraqi army fled en masse during ISIS’s lightning offensive in Northern Iraq in 2014. Tens of thousands of disoriented Iraqi troops would furthermore be captured and executed in gruesome ways by the terrorist organization.

Only a few years later, the little freedom that field officers in Syria were given was exposed by rebel and Islamist groups. The Assad regime, which rose to power from the Syrian Ba’athists, made sure its regime was coup-proof by limiting the command of field officers and general staff, giving little command and control to overstretched forces. Due to such limitations and lack of communication by Bashar al-Assad, who hastily fled without giving orders to field officers during the major 2024 rebel offensive, the middle-echelon officers either surrendered their garrisons, abandoned their posts, or were overrun.

Leadership Keeps the Military from Enhancing Capabilities in Fear of Coups

Against the backdrop of the Ottoman Empire’s capitulation and partition, also known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement and Treaty of Sèvres, many of the newly formed Arab states included Western-installed leaders.

Coup attempts and usurpations by military officers took place frequently during the Cold War, including the shocking and execution of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq. The fear of their militaries becoming too powerful was a prominent concern of Arab leaders, and therefore, steps were taken to hamper the growth of armies.

In fear of Arab military officers becoming too ambitious, high-ranking colonels and generals may not have limited authority over unit movements without the signature of a defense minister, the President, the Prime Minister, or the Emir. In the Gulf states, you must be part of the ruling elite to have authority over the slightest troop movement and garrison. Often, officers have little authority, and those who become popular amongst their constituents can suddenly be forced to retire early in fear that a field commander or general staff could move to power.

The Doctrine is to Protect the Elite over the Citizens

Overall, the primary purpose of Arab armies is not to defend their citizens—they are constituted to protect the ruling elite. In the Middle East and North Africa, Arab military and security forces are rife with human rights abuses against their own citizens, including sexual assaults and acts of torture.

Compared to fighting adversaries such as Israel, MENA militaries have been constituted to quell uprisings and civil unrest. Examples could be found in Lebanon in the 1950s, Syria in the 1980s and 2000s, Bahrain in 2011, Egypt in 2013, and numerous others.

The common structure of perpetual military stagnation in the Arab world is rooted in various conundrums, including sectarianism, a lack of trust in officers, fears of coups, reliance on foreign powers, inadequate training, and a ghost defense industry. Until MENA countries can address such problems, further internal conflicts and perhaps more battlefield humiliations in the region could very much continue.

Solutions Towards Enhancement and Modernization

A major hurdle to modernizing stagnant Arab armies is the trust between the lower ranks and the general staff. Because most of the Middle East and North Africa have totalitarian or hybrid regimes, the ruling elite ultimately wants to keep the status quo, even if it means breaking the national security apparatus.

Formulating a revitalized doctrine towards modernization will require trust between Arab autocracies and not just their general staff but also their field command. In Western militaries, generals unofficially act as unofficial diplomats, with Lieutenant Colonels and full-bird Colonels managing and directing regiments and battalions. Assigning additional responsibilities to field commanders in MENA militaries can also be essential to growth.

Furthermore, continued enhancement for officers in Western military academies and reinvigorating the non-commissioned officer corps will produce results in small-unit leadership and cohesion among regional garrisons.

Mending sectarianism within Arab militaries and emphasizing national pride will also be instrumental. Sunnis, Shiites, Christians, Druze, and others should be able to rise the ranks, regardless of ethnic and religious background, just as the Western world does.

Stagnation amongst militaries in the Middle East and North Africa is a recurring but fixable issue. Enhancing the capabilities of field officers, creating a non-commissioned officer corps, mitigating sectarian bias, and mending trust between senior leadership and ruling heads of state should be prioritized if the region wishes to catch up to other peers, such as Israel and Turkey, which have more proficient armed forces.

Tags: Iraq, Israel-Arab War, Middle East, North Africa, Saudi Arabia

About The Author

Julian McBride
Julian McBride is a former US Marine, forensic anthropologist, and independent journalist born in New York. His bylines can be found in Byline Times, 19FortyFive, Heritage Daily, The Defense Post, Journal of Forensic Psychology, Modern Warfare Institute, Manara Mag, The Strategist, Pacific Forum, E-International Relations, Global Taiwan Institute, NKInsider, Modern Diplomacy, Small Wars Journal, and UK Defence Journal.

15. China solves Japanese spy cases, vows counter-intelligence crackdown

Summary:

China’s Ministry of State Security says it has cracked multiple Japanese espionage cases and vows a tougher counter-intelligence campaign amid a sharp diplomatic clash with Tokyo. Beijing links the warning to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks that a Taiwan conflict could trigger Japan’s “survival-threatening situation,” enabling Self-Defence Force deployment. The MSS denounces Takaichi as the first post-1945 Japanese leader to threaten armed intervention in Taiwan, accusing her of reviving militarism and undermining the political basis of China-Japan ties. Beijing warns any Japanese military involvement in a Taiwan crisis would be treated as aggression and met with resolute, forceful countermeasures.

Comment: I do not think we consider Japanese espionage capabilities. Probably because there are not many movies made with Japanese spies as protagonists. I wonder if the war of words between Beijing and Tokyo will escalate or continue for some time? Has Xi met his match in PM Takaichi? She seems very willing to stand up to him so far. How will Xi retaliate?

China solves Japanese spy cases, vows counter-intelligence crackdown

China’s top anti-espionage agency promises to crush ‘insidious plots to split the nation’ as tensions over Japanese leader’s comments grow

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3333425/china-solves-japanese-spy-cases-vows-counter-intelligence-crackdown?utm

Yuanyue Dangin Beijing

Published: 6:21pm, 19 Nov 2025Updated: 7:30pm, 19 Nov 2025

China’s top anti-espionage agency said it had solved several infiltration and espionage cases involving Japanese spy agencies in recent years and vowed to step up counter-intelligence work amid serious diplomatic tensions between Beijing and Tokyo.

On Wednesday, the Ministry of State Security said in a social media article that it had “cracked a series of espionage cases involving Japanese intelligence agencies infiltrating and stealing secrets from China”.

It added that this had “effectively safeguarded the security of the nation’s core secrets”.

The ministry vowed that China’s state security officers would “resolutely crush any insidious plots to split the nation on the secret service front” and “firmly oppose any despicable acts by foreign countries trying to disrupt regional peace and stability”.

Wednesday’s article did not detail any specific cases of espionage, and such cases have rarely been disclosed to the public.

In May, China confirmed a Japanese citizen had been sentenced for espionage. Japanese media previously reported that a Japanese man in his fifties had been detained in Shanghai in December 2021 and was prosecuted in August 2023.

In another case, Beijing municipal state security authorities arrested a staff member of the Japanese pharmaceutical company Astellas Pharma. China’s foreign ministry confirmed in August last year that the employee had been prosecuted for espionage.

Beijing and Tokyo are engaged in a serious diplomatic dispute over remarks made by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi about Taiwan.

Speaking to the Japanese parliament on November 7, Takaichi stated that the use of force against Taiwan could be deemed a “survival-threatening situation”, thereby enabling Tokyo to deploy the Japan Self-Defence Forces.

The Japanese leader has refused to retract the remarks, further infuriating Beijing.

Takaichi’s comments suggested that Japan might intervene should Beijing use force against Taiwan, indicating a shift from the long-standing “strategic ambiguity” policy pursued by previous Japanese leaders.

Why have Takaichi’s Taiwan comments sent China-Japan ties into a tailspin?

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary. Most countries, including Japan and the United States, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the self-ruled island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

The ministry’s article criticised Takaichi for “persisting in her erroneous remarks without remorse despite repeated solemn representations from China”.

It added that her “various misguided actions are motivated by extremely sinister intent, are of an extremely grave nature, and carry extremely serious consequences.”

The article described Takaichi as the “first Japanese leader to express ambitions for armed intervention in Taiwan”.

It also said she was “the first to issue military threats against China” since Japan’s 1945 defeat in World War II.

Takaichi’s actions “conceal dangerous signs of resurgent militarism and ambitions to forcibly intervene in China’s reunification process”, the article stated.

Sino-Japanese relations have been turbulent in recent years. Sources of tension include the discharge of radioactive water from the Fukushima power plant, a territorial dispute over the Diaoyu Islands, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan, rising nationalist sentiment in both countries and defence cooperation between Tokyo and Washington.

For years, Beijing has also accused Japan’s right-wing forces of whitewashing the nation’s wartime history and attempting to amend the pacifist constitution, alter its non-nuclear policy and expand military capabilities.

Takaichi’s remarks are expected to further exacerbate these tensions.

Beijing has repeatedly accused Takaichi of “fundamentally undermining the political foundation of Sino-Japanese relations” and lodged multiple protests to Tokyo. It has also warned that Japanese military intervention would be regarded as an act of “aggression”.

Beijing has vowed to respond with resolute countermeasures if Tokyo resorts to force in the Taiwan Strait.

Yuanyue Dang

Yuanyue joined the Post in 2022 after working as a feature writer for various Chinese media outlets. He graduated from the Chinese University of Hong Kong with a bachelor's degree in journalism and holds a master’s degree in anthropology from University College London.

16. The Remaking of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs

Summary:

Since POTUS' second term, US foreign aid has been radically reshaped. USAID has been shuttered, 83% of its projects cut and the rest moved under State, while the FY2026 humanitarian budget is slated to fall 46%. Long-term, resilience programs have been scrapped for short “lifesaving” grants. Researchers estimate hundreds of thousands of excess deaths already and up to 14 million preventable deaths by 2030. Critics warn shifting programs like Food for Peace toward USDA will favor commodity interests over local needs, turning a prevention-focused system into reactive, politically driven relief that leaves future crises more likely and deadlier.

Comment: Americans have to ask themselves is this the direction we want to go? I think the prevailing notion is that charity begins at home and that we have to reduce government spending. Can anyone articulate the cost benefit ratio of foreign aid? Can we make the case using SECSTATE's the foreign policy criteria?

Does it make America safer?
Does it make America stronger?
Does it make America more prosperous?

https://www.state.gov/implementing-the-presidents-executive-order-on-reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/

The Remaking of U.S. Foreign Aid Programs

https://thedispatch.com/newsletter/morning/the-fallout-from-usaids-shutdown/

The former United States Agency for International Development (USAID) building is seen at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center on July 8, 2025.(Photo by Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images)

When civil war erupted in South Sudan in 2013, Jeremy Konyndyk, the director of the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, rolled out the U.S. government’s humanitarian aid playbook. As the conflict between two opposing government factions quickly spiraled into multi-sided infighting and mass atrocities, U.S. officials funneled money to distribute food aid, nutritional interventions like peanut paste, and clean drinking water among civilians fleeing the fighting.

But, as Konyndyk, now the president of Refugees International, told TMD, disaster response requires far more than emergency food and water supplies. He designated medical teams to deploy to areas of the country at risk of famine, as malnutrition-related disease usually causes more deaths than outright starvation. Social workers and doctors attempted to provide basic health care, especially for women, who were at greater risk of violence and often in need of pregnancy care. And tens of thousands of households were provided with fishing and agricultural kits to blunt the long-term need for emergency aid.

Now, a crisis has engulfed the region again—this time in Sudan. But as of this year, far fewer of the initiatives that Konydyk would have overseen are being carried out.

It’s a sign that the restructuring of the U.S. government’s foreign assistance programs, launched at the start of President Donald Trump’s second term, is starting to have repercussions. The U.S., formerly the global leader in international humanitarian assistance, has radically altered its approach to foreign disasters—from civil wars to hurricanes to disease outbreaks. It’s also spending far less money: The Trump administration’s proposed budget for humanitarian programs for fiscal year 2026 is 46 percent lower than 2025’s, while the administration is also “clawing back” money meant to be spent in 2025.

While some funding earmarked for aid projects has resumed, bureaucratic reorganizations and the cancellation of swaths of programs, most notably the shuttering of USAID, have narrowed the scope of the country’s foreign assistance programs from long-term projects to narrow and shifting crises.

The new administration cut 83 percent of USAID’s projects and transferred the rest to the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. “This era of government-sanctioned inefficiency has officially come to an end,” Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced in a July Substack post. In September, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved his plan to move the remaining functions of USAID, traditionally a mostly independent agency, under the State Department’s auspices.

Researchers have attempted to map the effects of the abrupt end of so many aid projects, ranging from AIDS-prevention programs to women’s health clinics to projects designed to build agricultural resilience against drought and disease. A June study in The Lancet estimated that by 2030, the ongoing cancellation of USAID programs could result in around 14 million preventable deaths. Impactcounter.com, a model assembled by Boston University mathematician Brooke Nichols, estimates that, so far, the discontinuation of various aid programs has led to roughly 625,000 additional deaths from diseases such as malaria and cholera, as well as malnutrition.

But modelling the effect of aid that makes real but small changes—like hygiene kits in Cameroon—is a complex task. “It’s not a body-bag situation,” Nichols noted, pointing out that the difference between 10 people dying of malaria a year in a given area, versus five, is challenging to measure. But Nichols also argued that her model made many conservative assumptions, such as presuming that many programs would continue to distribute funding at the same rate.

And experts and practitioners who spoke to TMD attested to an undeniable on-the-ground reality. “The direction of child mortality is really problematic,” Vincent Smith, the director of agricultural policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute and an expert on global food security, told TMD.

With food aid, for example, Smith noted that while some experts were moved from USAID to the State Department, aid distribution was still “enormously fractured” compared to before, adding that his own projections showed that the government had failed to spend around $1.2 billion of the $2 billion allocated to decades-old flagship program Food for Peace in 2025.

Bill O’Keefe, the executive vice president for mission, mobilization, and advocacy at Catholic Relief Services (CRS), told TMD that his organization had 80 projects with a total value of around $500 million and thousands of staff abruptly terminated with little warning or rationale. “There really wasn’t visibility into the process or access to the people who were ultimately responsible,” O’Keefe said.

Later, O’Keefe learned that the administration only sought to fund projects it deemed “lifesaving.” In practice, this meant abandoning programs like Shared Future, a CRS-run program that offered job training and small business grants for Christians and other religious minorities in northern Iraq displaced by the Islamic State. “The challenge is, you can give a person a fish today,” he said, “but you don’t teach them to fish. You’re gonna just be stuck handing them more fish.”

The shift in focus to short-term aid also eliminates one of USAID’s core competencies, said J. Brian Atwood, who was the administrator of USAID for more than six years under former President Bill Clinton. “I call USAID the ‘crisis averted’ agency,” he told TMD, pointing out that many of its projects are aimed at preventing disasters before they happen, such as a would-be famine threatening more than 16 million people in the Horn of Africa in 2000 during a severe drought. Early warning systems enabled USAID to rush food into the area before famine set in.

Other places not currently experiencing an acute crisis have lost almost all USAID funding. Haydee Diaz, the country officer for Catholic Relief Services in Honduras and the Caribbean, told TMD that money for large-scale projects “disappeared overnight.” For Prosperamos, a program aimed at educating farmers in techniques to grow more crops that would last through the lean season, preventing the need to take out loans or consume livestock, “we were asked to stop all activity immediately,” she said.

Long-term resiliency programs, like those authorized under the Global Food Security Act of 2016, were a hallmark of USAID’s development mission, said Dina Esposito, the former director of the Food for Peace program and USAID’s Bureau for Resilience, Environment, and Food Security. In one of her roles, Esposito led a team of around 500 agronomists, food scientists, soil scientists, veterinarians, and geneticists. But none of them survived the Trump administration’s purge. “Not a single one of them was picked up by the State Department,” she said. “Virtually nothing has been sustained.”

Esposito also said that administration officials are discussing moving the Food for Peace program, which buys U.S. agricultural goods in bulk and packages them as aid, from the State Department to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Such a move would risk that “it will essentially become a commodity-driven program to serve first and foremost the commodity interest groups, and secondarily, the hungry person,” she said.

Esposito noted that during her time at USAID, food producers had attempted to get the U.S. government to purchase products that were inappropriate for aid missions, such as canned salmon for regions with 100-degree heat or walnuts that would perish during ocean voyages. Both Smith and Esposito argued that moving Food for Peace to the USDA, as some Midwestern senators have advocated, risks creating a program that prioritizes bulk purchases from American farmers.

The State Department has made much of the fact that it still provides emergency aid in certain situations. A Disaster Assistance Response Team and tens of millions of dollars in funding were deployed to the Caribbean in the wake of Hurricane Melissa this past week. And $295 million in aid is allocated to combating the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Sudan—though, according to the U.N.’s aid donor tracker, most of those funds were transferred before USAID’s closure.

And that figure is still less than half of what was allocated to Sudan in 2024, despite the conflict’s mounting civilian toll. It’s also challenging to determine how that money is being spent, as the Trump administration has dismantled relevant government watchdog agencies.

As for the programs still receiving funding, O’Keefe told TMD that grants were being renewed on three- or six-month bases, making it difficult to plan for responses to crises that can last years. “You’re in sort of perpetual anxiety,” he said. O’Keefe also noted that for countries with poor diplomatic relationships with the U.S.—most notably Taliban-run Afghanistan, whose people are currently suffering from unprecedented levels of malnutrition—approval of new projects has dried up.

American foreign aid has not ceased to exist—but its character has changed, from one focused on long-term, development-oriented goals to a narrower focus on rapid emergency response and political imperatives.

Humanitarian workers worry that such an approach will only make future crises worse: “The mainstream media presents a constant stream of international disasters,” O’Keefe said, “and not enough of, ‘Well, let’s stand back. Why did this happen?’” The U.S. government may have stopped asking too.

17. In Search of a Defense Doctrine

Summary:

The Pentagon lacks a coherent defense doctrine, lurching between restraint rhetoric and scattershot missions from border enforcement and drug-boat strikes to threats against Venezuela and interventions in Nigeria. This unfocused activism diffuses resources, confuses priorities, and leaves the U.S. less prepared to deter China.

Excerpts:

Operations in either Venezuela or Nigeria would represent large undertakings by the military. Each would draw resources that would otherwise be focused elsewhere. And each represents a new departure from the second Trump administration’s ostensible commitment to reducing U.S. military commitments abroad.

There are myriad legitimate reasons and justifications for the United States to try to topple the Maduro regime or to intervene to stop the slaughter of innocents in Nigeria. But neither are one-off operations, and would require a longer-term U.S. commitment to prevent the situations from devolving into greater chaos. And the administration has yet to articulate to the American people why these theaters are vital national security interests.

Last week, Secretary Hegseth unveiled his “Ten Principles of the Golden Age of American Warfighting.” Many of the 10 were inward-looking, focused on restructuring the military and shifting aspects of its culture. Only one, “Deter China,” identified a specific foreign adversary or competitor. But none of America’s recent military undertakings have prepared us to deter China. The U.S. would be better served if the secretary of defense provided honest assessments about the opportunity costs of reactive and short-sighted campaigns. What’s needed is sober recommendations about how to allocate military power to deter, counter, and, if necessary, defeat our strategic rivals.

Comment: Referenced in the essay are these 10 principles of warfighting from the SECWAR:

TEN PRINCIPLES OF THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN WARFIGHTING:

1. America first

2. Peace through strength

3. Common sense

4. Revive the warrior ethos

5. Rebuild the military

6. Reestablish deterrence

7. Defend the homeland

8. Deter China

9. Strengthen burden-sharing among allies

10. Revive the defense industrial base

https://x.com/DOWResponse/status/1988674692295659650?s=20

In Search of a Defense Doctrine

The Trump administration’s incoherent military strategy leaves the U.S. vulnerable to global threats.

thedispatch.com · Mike Nelson

Mike Nelson / November 19, 2025

https://thedispatch.com/article/military-pete-hegseth-defense-strategy-china/

U.S. presidents often find themselves adapting their defense policy to balance what they envisioned during their campaigns with what events require once they’re in office. George W. Bush campaigned on a shift away from adventurism and nation-building, but the 9/11 attacks turned his focus and cemented his legacy, forever associating him with the kinds of foreign involvement he had previously criticized. Barack Obama attempted to disentangle the U.S. from the Global War on Terror to pursue a “pivot” to the Pacific, only to surge troops to Afghanistan and witness the spread of Sunni jihadism in the Levant.

Donald Trump is no exception. His 2024 campaign for reelection and early days back in office signaled a more restrained vision for the use of U.S. military might, but the Pentagon has painted a different picture entirely. Rather than offering a clear plan for how America can and should use its military power, the Department of Defense seems to dart from one shiny object to another. But unlike the Bush or Obama administrations, this departure seems less a result of real-world circumstances and more the product of the Trump administration’s lack of a coherent defense strategy.

Since taking the helm 10 months ago, the Trump administration has alternately advocated for a reduced military footprint overseas, wielded the military as a tool to strong-arm allies, used servicemembers as a de facto law enforcement or border force, and threatened to initiate large-scale combat operations in two countries. Even the limited and correctly decided strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities represented a shift from a stated desire to be less involved in the Middle East.

At a time when near-peer adversaries are ramping up their defense production and threatening the limits of American influence, more focus, discipline, and planning are required. Instead, the Department of Defense has sent conflicting messages about its goals and priorities. In addition to causing confusion among military planners, this scattershot approach has the potential to spread focus too thin, ensuring that instead of properly dealing with the most critical threats with sufficient seriousness, we will instead pursue multiple avenues in ways that yield incomplete results for all of them.

Trump campaigned largely on reversing what he characterized as the foreign policy missteps and military adventurism of his predecessors. His call for “no more forever wars,” together with his push for greater burden-sharing among U.S. allies, seemed to indicate a decreased reliance on the projection of hard power. Meanwhile, initial staffing at the Pentagon seemed to indicate a strong preference for the low-calorie variant of isolationism—restrainerism. Most notably articulated by current Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby, this line of thinking suggests the U.S. has become overextended in foreign conflicts and providing forward defense to overseas allies, and, as a corrective to preserve our combat power to deter—or if necessary defeat—China, should withdraw from several of our current efforts.

But while Colby may be the best-known of the restrainer voices, others within the initial defense team have shown a preference for this school of thought. Dan Caldwell, a former senior adviser to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Alexander Velez-Green, the nominee for deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, have both written extensively in favor of reducing U.S. military deployments, operations, and commitments across the Middle East and Europe—not only combat operations, but also forward presence meant to deter Russia. Caldwell was subsequently dismissed by Hegseth in April amid an investigation into leaks from the department.

Restrainerism presents its own challenges, as it largely fails to address or counter the current nefarious efforts of rivals in order to prioritize preparations for a conflict over Taiwan. In other words, it ignores the challenges and conflicts we currently face to prepare for ones we might face in the future. But the DoD has not even followed this model of preserving resources to confront a single adversary. Instead, Hegseth’s directions—from ordering law enforcement operations to threatening NATO allies to making preparations to topple adversarial regimes—create conflicting demands on limited resources while failing to address our primary adversaries or priority theaters.

The secretary of defense has, over the last 10 months, expanded the roles and presence of active duty troops at the southern border, deployed active duty forces in response to anti-ICE protests in Los Angeles, and authorized at least 20 strikes on alleged drug trafficking boats in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific—all suggesting a military focus closer to home. This new emphasis would be reinforced by reported language in the forthcoming National Defense Strategy, which places a higher priority on the Western Hemisphere than previous strategies focused on the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific.

Hegseth just last week announced the beginning of Operation Southern Spear, a U.S. Southern Command-led mission that ostensibly “defends our Homeland, removes narco-terrorists from our Hemisphere, and secures our Homeland from the drugs that are killing our people.” But what the operation will actually do remains unclear. The American military has built up a tremendous naval presence in the Caribbean, nominally in support of Southern Spear. As of yet, however, this massive draw on our maritime capabilities has produced a handful of strikes on relatively low-value targets. This is not to say that efforts to crack down on the illicit drug trade aren’t worthwhile. But a massive naval commitment and the use of costly precision-guided munitions for marginal impact does not seem like a great return on investment.

Whether Southern Spear is merely an extension of the previous efforts to target maritime narcotics smuggling, an effort to intimidate the regime of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, or even preparation for larger combat operations against Venezuela is not entirely clear, but it is the latest in a series of actions by the DoD that indicate a lack of focus, preparation, or planning.

Southern Spear’s launch came less than two weeks after Trump announced that the DoD was “preparing for action” to “kill Islamic Terrorists” who are committing atrocities against Nigerian Christians. While the protection of innocent civilians is a noble cause, the use of American military force would be a departure from the restraint camp and a shift that is more aligned with the Responsibility to Protect school of thought. The doctrine, which calls for international intervention to prevent crimes against humanity, governed American operations in the Balkans and Libya.

Operations in either Venezuela or Nigeria would represent large undertakings by the military. Each would draw resources that would otherwise be focused elsewhere. And each represents a new departure from the second Trump administration’s ostensible commitment to reducing U.S. military commitments abroad.

There are myriad legitimate reasons and justifications for the United States to try to topple the Maduro regime or to intervene to stop the slaughter of innocents in Nigeria. But neither are one-off operations, and would require a longer-term U.S. commitment to prevent the situations from devolving into greater chaos. And the administration has yet to articulate to the American people why these theaters are vital national security interests.

Last week, Secretary Hegseth unveiled his “Ten Principles of the Golden Age of American Warfighting.” Many of the 10 were inward-looking, focused on restructuring the military and shifting aspects of its culture. Only one, “Deter China,” identified a specific foreign adversary or competitor. But none of America’s recent military undertakings have prepared us to deter China. The U.S. would be better served if the secretary of defense provided honest assessments about the opportunity costs of reactive and short-sighted campaigns. What’s needed is sober recommendations about how to allocate military power to deter, counter, and, if necessary, defeat our strategic rivals.

thedispatch.com · Mike Nelson

18. Interoperability: Winning Happens in the Off-Season – The Imperative for Warfighting Success in a Coalition Warfighter Exercise

Summary:

Coalition success in large-scale combat hinges on interoperability built “in the off-season.” WFX 25-4 shows how early relationship-building, shared procedures, and technical data-integration work in MIP/ASCA greatly improved multinational fires, airspace control, and targeting, proving deliberate pre-exercise preparation enables decisive, coalition victory overall.

Excerpts:

Conclusion

WFX 25-4 demonstrated operational success, validating the IIIAC Targeting Team’s efforts. Their effective employment of joint fires created dilemmas for the World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR). The data demonstrates a decisive outcome: the WCOPFOR suffered substantial combat power losses and were unable to withstand III Armored Corps’ targeting and operations. The results included the destruction of over 1,200 tanks, 108 9A52 Smerch rocket launchers, and over 600 artillery pieces. Additionally, the WCOPFOR lost more than 500 systems – including Air Defense Artillery assets, jammers, Ground Control Stations, Target Acquisition radars, and Fire Control radars – and sustained nearly 100,000 casualties.

III AC achieved operational success in the WFX 25-4 simulation. However, the true value lies in organizational learning and enhanced interoperability with partners. Focused development during the “off-season” strengthens interoperability across the competition continuum and ensures a heightened state of readiness. The IIIAC FSE’s approach has fostered momentum and cohesion. Prioritizing interoperability cultivates unity of command, shared understanding, and trust—critical elements for successful multinational operations.

Interoperability: Winning Happens in the Off-Season – The Imperative for Warfighting Success in a Coalition Warfighter Exercise

by Abel Almanza Jr., by John ‘Jay’ Bradley

11.19.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/19/interoperability-warfighter-exercises/

Editor’s Note: this article is being republished with the permission of the Field Artillery Professional Bulletin. The original article was published on August 13, 2025 and is available here.

Introduction

As the United States National Security Strategy highlights, “Our alliances and partnerships around the world are our most important strategic asset” and we will not fight alone in future conflicts. Future multi-domain operations require deliberate efforts to foster interoperability across diverse cultures, national systems, and operational doctrines. For nearly two decades, the U.S. military concentrated on counterinsurgency operations, adapting its tactics and equipment to the challenges of asymmetric warfare. In response to emerging threats from near-peer adversaries and a changing geopolitical landscape, the U.S. military is refocusing on large-scale combat operations (LSCO). This shift during competition is essential for deterring aggression and maintaining a competitive edge. It also presents a significant interoperability challenge. Warfighter Exercises (WFXs) offer a unique opportunity to train and evaluate interoperability with international allies.

However, the true benefit lies in setting the conditions before the WFX. This article argues that a deliberate focus on interoperability—encompassing technical, procedural, and human dimensions—during the “off-season” between WFXs is crucial for maximizing training effectiveness and ensuring decisive victory against near-peer threats in a coalition WFX environment. The decisive outcome of WFX 25-4, enabled by the III Armored Corps (IIIAC) Fire Support Element’s (FSE) focus on interoperability in the off-season, highlights the critical importance of comprehensive interoperability training. Maximizing interoperability development in the off-season enables decisive victory as a coalition during a WFX and, more importantly, prepares warfighters for real-world operations. As many coaches have said, championships are won in the off-season.

Human Dimension

WFXs are vital for preparing for LSCO, and lessons from WFX 23-4 underscored the critical importance of strong interpersonal relationships. That exercise revealed that delaying relationship-building until the exercise’s warm-start led to differing assumptions, strained communication, and a fragmented common operational picture (COP), ultimately hindering interoperability with allied forces due to unaddressed warfighting differences and varied approaches to LSCO. This highlighted the need to prioritize relationship-building before future WFXs.

Recognizing the need to train for LSCO against near-peer adversaries and significantly increase interoperability, the approach to WFX 25-4—the largest and most complex WFX to date, involving four globally dispersed divisions from separate nations under a U.S. corps—shifted dramatically. Fires planners deliberately framed the exercise as a valuable training opportunity, not a “no-win” scenario. This meant prioritizing investment in professional relationships between personnel from each division and enabling brigades in the months leading up to the exercise. This proactive relationship-building fostered shared understanding, effective communication, and a cohesive environment essential for seamless combined, joint, and multi-domain operations, ultimately maximizing readiness and lethality. The FSE prioritized building relationships and shared understanding by hosting monthly touchpoints, participating in multilateral interoperability programs, and orchestrating events like Airspace Symposiums and “ASCA Universities” all designed to foster both technical and human interoperability. Investing in these human connections proved a significant return on investment, enhancing interoperability, reducing friction, and building a more robust and responsive fighting force capable of achieving decisive victory.

A cornerstone of this strategy was monthly multinational touchpoints, designed not just for operational coordination, but to foster a shared understanding of each nation’s operational culture. These weren’t just briefings; they were opportunities to connect personally. For example, during one session, the German contingent led a discussion on their decentralized command philosophy, openly addressing concerns from the U.S. team about potential delays in decision-making. This transparency sparked productive dialogue and built confidence. Each nation took turns leading discussions and planning efforts, ensuring all voices were heard. Cultivating trust through genuine interpersonal connections was crucial in fostering the collaborative environment needed to advance a corps-level Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) capability. By fostering open communication and mutual respect, the corps created a space where seasoned personnel, long steeped in established doctrines, felt comfortable challenging existing paradigms and embracing new approaches. These relationships facilitated a more nuanced dialogue, positioning doctrinal evolution as a shared opportunity for improvement. The resulting trust enabled the corps to collectively envision and implement a practical and enhanced ASOC capability, effectively bridging the gap above division Joint Air Ground Integration Centers (JAGICs).

“Airspace Symposium has allowed us to meet face to face and to address the initial topics related to procedures, notably those of the US Air Force. and to meet the JAGIC chiefs of the American, British, and German divisions. This is essential and has allowed us to break down barriers and manage in real-time and in coordination with the other JAGIC chiefs during the Warfighter exercise.” – Chef d’escadron (OF-3) Jérémie Kern, Dragoon 34 Combined ASOC

While participation in the Multilateral Interoperability Program (MIP), the execution of “ASCA University,” and the Airspace Symposium were crucial for system and process improvements, the most valuable return on investment came from the informal interactions these engagements sparked. Adjacent events provided opportunities to build rapport—sharing meals and experiences beyond professional duties. For example, a British officer organized an impromptu rugby viewing party after discovering a shared interest, fostering camaraderie and a deeper understanding of each other’s backgrounds. These connections humanized colleagues, building empathy and a willingness to collaborate. This proactive approach cultivated a network of trusted partners, leading to more seamless combined arms operations, enhanced interoperability, and a more resilient alliance prepared for success in WFX 25-4. Ultimately, investing in these relationships proved critical to achieving a cohesive and effective fighting force before warfighting training progression events.

Fires and targeting leaders from IIIAC and the 10th Panzer Division met in Salado, Texas, at Johnny’s Steaks and Bar-Be-Que to build camaraderie and foster interpersonal relationships, ultimately enhancing interoperability.

Procedural Dimension

Even with meticulous planning, concerns lingered before WFX 25-4. IIIAC had limited experience collaborating with and understanding the operational planning and execution processes of a NATO Multi-Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC). Limited training opportunities between WFX events can lead to friction during the exercise, especially concerning communication protocols, targeting procedures, and the integration of multi-domain assets. The differences in organizational culture, operational doctrine, and command structures between IIIAC and the NATO MCLCC initially presented challenges to achieving seamless interoperability and a unified COP.

Successfully integrating targeting, airspace control, and management across different units required extensive coordination, primarily facilitated by liaison officers (LNOs). While critical to execution, these LNOs relied on a clear, shared understanding of procedures. This understanding was developed through defined expectations and LNO integration training discussed in monthly meetings and reinforced through training at MIP and “ASCA University.” The IIIAC FSE adapted established doctrine to meet the needs of multinational allies and their varying operational capabilities. This continuous refinement, tested during CPX III, resulted in a robust revision of the IIIAC WFX standard operating procedure (SOP) and refined tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that strengthened the link between echelons executing targeting and synchronizing the fight in the corps and division deep areas. Importantly, these procedures weren’t hindered by rigid adherence to doctrine; instead, they evolved through practical application, adaptive iteration during training, and a focus on what worked. These methods of preparation and continuous learning are vital in the modern operational environment.

To address systems interoperability challenges during WFX 25-4, the IIIAC developed and implemented new TTPs.

While predictable challenges with procedural interoperability were proactively mitigated, emergent operational changes often necessitated reactive adjustments requiring procedural agility. During CPX III, the introduction of a new battlefield framework incorporating a Multi-Component Land Combat Capability (MCLCC) deep fight significantly altered the corps’ approach to deep operations up to the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This fundamental shift initially caused confusion, particularly regarding the division forward boundary, which was incorrectly interpreted as restrictive. A key misunderstanding emerged between III Armored Corps and higher echelons concerning the corps’ role in joint targeting. The Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) initially believed the corps should not utilize air interdiction assets short of the FSCL, a position that contradicted Air Force Special Instructions (SPINS) outlined in the operations order. This discrepancy required III AC to reassess its air support request (ASR) process within WFX. Furthermore, the situation prompted debate about the corps’ authority to require subordinate divisions to contribute to the land component’s target nomination list (TNL) process, revealing broader ambiguity in understanding roles and responsibilities within joint targeting. At the MCLCC level, confusion also existed regarding the optimal method for requesting and controlling joint resources – whether to prioritize the ASR process or rely solely on the TNL process for air interdiction.

Recognizing this inherent challenge to interoperability, proactive engagement during the “off-season” becomes paramount. Consistent interaction and training with multiple echelons, including allies and partners, can lay a solid foundation for procedural interoperability and enable success when dynamic or rapid operational framework changes emerge. This underscores the critical need for enhanced cross-component training and familiarization to bridge these knowledge gaps, foster more effective joint operations in future operations and real-world scenarios, and ultimately ensure a shared understanding of roles, responsibilities, and procedures. Without dedicated effort to improve cross-component understanding, the challenges experienced during WFX 25-4 and CPX III are likely to be repeated. Therefore, investment in continuous training and familiarization programs before WFX is essential to mitigate these risks, increase readiness, and enhance the overall effectiveness of joint operations.

Technical Dimension

Achieving systems interoperability—the seamless exchange of data—is a significant challenge within the Mission Command information systems (MCIS) ecosystem. Even a single misconfigured IP address or firewall can disrupt shared understanding and hinder operations. Prioritizing early and frequent system connections and leveraging established data exchange protocols transforms potential training frustrations into valuable opportunities for enhancement.

IIIAC’s network architecture visualization depicts the flow of data between diverse MCIS across the corps, spanning multiple warfighting functions.

After WFX 23-4, IIIAC G34 Fires identified a significant deficiency in existing interoperability capabilities. The assessment revealed minimal effective support for joint targeting data exchange between U.S. and allied systems. Furthermore, the utilization of the Artillery Systems Cooperation Activities (ASCA) protocol was limited primarily to specific field artillery functions, hindering its broader application in a multi-domain, combined arms environment. This limited interoperability posed a substantial risk to coordinated joint fires and overall mission effectiveness.

Validating Level II interoperability during WFX 25-4 was a key training objective for IIIAC and FORSCOM. This requirement stipulated the exchange of data between MCIS of U.S. and allied nations. Specifically, for Fires, the goal was to eliminate “swivel chair” integration between all fire control systems (AFATDS, ATLAS, ADLER, and FC-BISA). Data exchange ensures effective and coordinated joint fires during LSCO by enabling the timely and accurate transmission of targeting data, fire support requests, and command directives across disparate systems.

Recognizing the critical need for full allied participation in the joint targeting process, IIIAC prioritized the seamless sharing of essential targeting data with the allied division. This encompassed providing the No-Strike List (NSL), Joint Target List (JTL), and Restricted Target List (RTL), effectively equipping the allied division with the comprehensive information and constraints necessary for collaborative targeting and adherence to established rules of engagement.

To overcome this interoperability gap, IIIAC leveraged existing Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) in novel ways to facilitate joint targeting data exchange. This involved adapting their functionalities to transmit targeting information in a manner that transcended established protocols. This unconventional approach prioritized rapid data sharing and collaborative targeting, enhancing joint fires coordination despite the limitations of legacy systems.

Personnel from III Armored Corps, supported by U.S. Army Coalition Interoperability Assurance & Verification (CIAV) and PM-Mission Command experts, guide French, British, German, and Hungarian fires and targeting personnel at MIP WG#92 in Greding, Germany, enhancing interoperability and establishing vital TTPs for WFX 25-4.

IIIAC also targeted effective employment of the ASCA protocol, underutilized during WFX 23-4. Recognizing the relationship between ASCA and MIP, IIIAC hosted an “ASCA University” during a MIP working group in Greding, Germany. This initiative demonstrated how MIP and ASCA could mutually support each other in multinational operations. However, this exposed gaps where some nations’ C2IS couldn’t seamlessly pass data to their national Fire Control Systems (FCS). IIIAC used U.S. systems to bridge this divide, utilizing ASCA and MIP protocols to facilitate data transfer from allied C2IS through U.S. systems and then down to the respective nations’ FCS. This reduced reliance on “swivel chair” operations during the WFX, streamlining the fire support process.

IIIAC’s conceptual data exchange architecture for WFX 25-4 aimed at linking national C2IS and FCS, enabling interoperability through a standardized framework facilitating battlefield geometry and fire support data transfer.

IIIAC leveraged MIP to understand national systems interoperability efforts. They actively engaged with MIP experts, using it to identify interoperability gaps, refine data standards, and enhance readiness for the WFX. The MIP provided a closed testing network to refine interoperability TTPs. This yielded valuable feedback for the MIP governing body to inform future iterations of the MIP Information Exchange Model.

During planning, IIIAC inadvertently hindered data exchange by not enforcing strict adherence to operating guidelines (developed at MIP working group #92) when creating battlefield geometries in C2 systems. This prevented seamless data transfer via ASCA, forcing manual replication of the battlefield framework. This highlighted the impact of non-compliance and underscored the need for data standardization and adherence to data exchange protocols.

To bridge the airspace interoperability gap between the NATO Integrated Command and Control (ICC) system and the U.S. Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS), IIIAC developed solutions. These focused on providing allied divisions with client-based Operational TAIS (facilitated through the Digital Liaison Detachment) to enhance airspace coordination and create a more comprehensive airspace COP. This improved interoperability, supporting effective targeting and fires by enabling meticulous airspace planning and mitigating fratricide risks. Utilizing events like MIP and ASCA University during the off-season enabled the team to resolve system interoperability issues and develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) that contributed to success during WFX 25-4.

Recommendations

Warfighters must deliberately set conditions to enable interoperability in advance of a WFX. This framework outlines key steps units can take to maximize interoperability with multinational allies and partners.

Framework for Enhancing Interoperability in Preparation for WFXs

I. Cultivate Relationships Through Periodic Multinational Touchpoints:

Purpose: Foster trust, understanding, and open communication.

Activities: Monthly/Bi-Monthly Meetings, Social Events, Joint Planning Sessions, Site Visits.

II. Leverage International Military Programs for Innovation and TTP Development:

Purpose: Capitalize on existing forums for knowledge sharing and TTP development.

Activities: Multilateral Interoperability Engagement (MIP, CWIX, BOLD QUEST), ASCA University, Cross-Functional Teams.

III. Engage Joint Programs Early to Equip Allies for Success:

Purpose: Ensure allies have the necessary tools and training.

Activities: Data Sharing (NSL, JTL, RTL), Training and Education, Resource Allocation.

Key Considerations: Early Planning, Continuous Improvement, Focus on Human Dimension.

Conclusion

WFX 25-4 demonstrated operational success, validating the IIIAC Targeting Team’s efforts. Their effective employment of joint fires created dilemmas for the World Class Opposing Force (WCOPFOR). The data demonstrates a decisive outcome: the WCOPFOR suffered substantial combat power losses and were unable to withstand III Armored Corps’ targeting and operations. The results included the destruction of over 1,200 tanks, 108 9A52 Smerch rocket launchers, and over 600 artillery pieces. Additionally, the WCOPFOR lost more than 500 systems – including Air Defense Artillery assets, jammers, Ground Control Stations, Target Acquisition radars, and Fire Control radars – and sustained nearly 100,000 casualties.

III AC achieved operational success in the WFX 25-4 simulation. However, the true value lies in organizational learning and enhanced interoperability with partners. Focused development during the “off-season” strengthens interoperability across the competition continuum and ensures a heightened state of readiness. The IIIAC FSE’s approach has fostered momentum and cohesion. Prioritizing interoperability cultivates unity of command, shared understanding, and trust—critical elements for successful multinational operations.

Tags: field report, Fire Support, III Corps, large scale combat operations, LSCO, WFX

About The Authors

Abel Almanza Jr.
Chief Warrant Officer Five Abel Almanza Jr. is the Senior Field Artillery Targeting Technician for III Armored Corps, bringing over 30 years of dedicated service to the field artillery community. Throughout his distinguished career, CW5 Almanza has held a multitude of Targeting Officer positions at both the tactical and operational levels, providing critical support to garrison and combat operations. His expertise is further enhanced by a Master of Science in Strategic Leadership from Charleston University and his completion of the Warrant Officer Senior Staff Education Course.
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John ‘Jay’ Bradley
Colonel John ‘Jay’ Bradley is a field artillery officer currently serving as the III Armored Corps Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD). He has previously served in numerous field artillery tactical level leadership positions to include Commanding 3rd Battalion, 27th Field Artillery Regiment, 18th Field Artillery Brigade. He has served several tours in support of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM and Spartan Shield and holds a Masters of International Relations from Websters University and a Masters of Strategic Leadership from the U.S. Army War College.

19. Why the U.S. Is Losing the Cognitive Competition

Summary:

The US is losing the cognitive contest because it fixates on technology over irregular warfare expertise. Adversaries like China and Russia integrate propaganda, lawfare, economics and HUMINT. She urges rebuilding regional expert analysts and collectors, empowering creative SOF intel, and resourcing human centric IW to avoid kinetic war.

Excerpts:

The need for contextual, human-centric understanding for being able to develop plans and operations for cognitive warfare that can compete with our adversaries and keep us from a kinetic fight is paramount. Those who try to make warfare or intelligence into a science miss the truth, that to be proficient in either, art is a must. We need expertise to be able to decipher the stories, motives, and aspirations that make cognitive warfare unique. Regional intelligence experts discern the patterns, motives and vulnerabilities of adversaries; key needs for developing IW campaigns and for influencing individuals and societies. We need seasoned human intelligence personnel, targeters, and analysts who are experts on the adversary to be able to do this. We also need to develop and reward creativity, which is a must for this world.

We also have to be upfront and acknowledge the need to manipulate our adversaries. U.S. decision makers must concede that to win the next war, cognitive warfare is a must and it is essential for these leaders to take calculated risks to mount those campaigns to influence and manipulate.

The cost of cognitive warfare is but a rounding error when compared to the development of new technical intelligence collection platforms and the platforms’ massive infrastructures. This rounding error is a key lynchpin for irregular warfare and irregular warfare is our most likely avenue for avoiding a kinetic war. Human operatives, out of the box thinking, and expert analysts and human intelligence personnel are the needed bridges that connect data into actionable insights to allow our SOF community to practice the type of irregular warfare we have proven historically that the U.S..S. can provide and must provide to counter our adversaries and win the cognitive war we are currently experiencing.

Why the U.S. Is Losing the Cognitive Competition

thecipherbrief.com ·

Your Trusted Source for National Security News & Analysis

November 19th, 2025 | 7:16 AM EST

Renee Pruneau Novakoff

Former Deputy Director of Intelligence for Sensitive Activities and Special Programs, Office of the Secretary of Defense

Renee Pruneau Novakoff served for over forty years in the Department of Defense and several Intelligence agencies to include NSA, CIA, ODNI, and DIA. Her last assignment was in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, providing oversight and guidance for the Defense Department’s special programs and sensitive activities to include Human intelligence, Information Operations, counter supply. Previously, Ms. Novakoff served as Joint Staff Director for Collection Management where she was responsible for leading the Defense Collection Enterprise. She also served as Joint Staff Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy. Ms. Novakoff also served as the Principal Deputy National Intelligence Manager for Russia, Europe, and Eurasia at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Prior to that assignment she was the Acting National Intelligence Manager for Western Hemisphere.

EXPERT OPINION — In order for the U.S. to successfully compete for global influence against its adversaries and to avoid a kinetic fight, we must excel at cognitive warfare; that is military activities designed to affect attitudes and behaviors. This type of warfare is a subset of irregular warfare (IW) and combines sensitive activities to include information operations, cyber, and psychological operations to meet a goal. To develop these kinds of operations, the U.S. needs intelligence professionals who are creative and experts in their field. Additionally, the U.S. intelligence and operations sectors need to be comfortable working together. Finally, the U.S. needs decision makers who are willing to take risks and employ these methods. Without these components, the U.S. is doomed to fail in competing against its adversaries who practice cognitive warfare against us on a regular basis.

U.S. focus on IW and its subset, cognitive warfare, has been erratic. The U.S. struggles with adapting its plans to the use of cognitive warfare while our leaders have consistently called for more expertise for this type of warfare. In 1962, President Kennedy challenged West Point graduates to understand: "another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin, that would require a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, forces which are too unconventional to be called conventional forces…" Over twenty years later, in 1987, Congress passed the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that established Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Defense Department’s Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) office. Another twenty years later, then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that DoD needed “to display a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which we possess in conventional combat.”

After twenty years of best practices of IW in the counter terrorism area, the 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy emphasized the need to institutionalize irregular warfare “as a core competency with sufficient, enduring capabilities to advance national security objectives across the spectrum of competition and conflict.” In December 2022, a RAND commentary pointed out that the U.S. military failed to master IW above the tactical level. I submit, we have failed because we have focused on technology at the expense of expertise and creativity, and that we need to balance technology with developing a workforce that thinks in a way that is different from the engineers and scientists that create our weapons and collection systems.

Adversaries Ahead of Us

IW and especially cognitive warfare is high risk and by definition uses manipulative practices to obtain results. Some policy leaders are hesitant to use this approach to develop influence strategies which has resulted in the slow development of tools and strategies to counter our adversaries. U.S. adversaries are experts at IW and do not have many of the political, legal, or oversight hurdles that U.S. IW specialists have.

Chinese military writings highlight the PRC’s use of what we would call IW in the three warfares. This involves using public opinion, legal warfare, and psychological operations to spread positive views of China and influence foreign governments in ways favorable to China. General Wang Haijiang, commander of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) Western Theatre Command, wrote in an official People’s Republic of China (PRC) newspaper that the Ukraine war has produced a new era of hybrid warfare, intertwining “political warfare, financial warfare, technological warfare, cyber warfare, and cognitive warfare.” The PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative and Digital Silk Road are prime examples of using economic coercion as irregular warfare. Their Confucius Centers underscore how they are trying to influence foreign populations through language and cultural training.

Russia uses IW to attempt to ensure the battle is won before military operations begin and to enhance its conventional forces. Russia calls this hybrid war and we saw this with the use of “little green men” going into Crimea in 2014 and the use of the paramilitary Wagner forces around the world. Russia also has waged a disinformation campaign against the U.S. on digital platforms and even conducted assassinations and sabotage on foreign soil as ways to mold the battle space toward their goals.

What Is Needed

U.S. architects of IW seem to primarily focus on oversight structures and budget, and less on how to develop an enduring capability.

Through the counterterrorism fight, the U.S. learned how to use on-the-ground specialists, develop relationships at tribal levels, and understand cultures to influence the population. The U.S. has the tools and the lessons learned that would enable a more level playing field against its adversaries, but it is not putting enough emphasis on cognitive warfare. A key to the way forward is to develop SOF personnel and commensurate intelligence professionals to support the SOF community who understand the people, the geography, and the societies they are trying to influence and affect. We then must go further and reward creativity and cunning in developing cognitive warfare strategies.

The Department of Defense and the intelligence community have flirted with the need for expertise in the human domain or social cultural sphere for years. The Department of Defense put millions of dollars into socio cultural work in the 2015-time frame. This focus went away as we started concentrating more on near peer competition. Instead, we focused on technology, better weapons and more complex collection platforms as a way to compete with these adversaries. We even looked to cut Human Intelligence (HUMINT) to move toward what some call a lower risk approach to collection—using technology instead of humans.

SOF personnel are considered the military’s most creative members. They are chosen for their ability to adapt, blend in, and think outside the box. This ingenuity needs to be encouraged. We need a mindful balancing of oversight without stifling that uniqueness that makes IW so successful. While some of this creativity may come naturally, we need to ensure that we put in place training that speaks to inventiveness, that pulls out these members’ ability to think through the impossible. Focused military classes across the services must build on latest practices for underscoring creativity and out of the box thinking. This entrepreneurial approach is not typically rewarded in a military that is focused on planning, rehearsals, and more planning.

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Focusing on Intelligence and Irregular Warfare

An important part of the equation for irregular warfare is intelligence. This foundation for irregular warfare work is often left out in the examination of what is needed for the U.S. to move IW forward. In the SOF world, operators and intelligence professionals overlap more than in any other military space. Intelligence officers who support IW need to have the same creative mindset as the operators. They also need to be experts in their regional areas—just like the SOF personnel.

The intelligence community’s approach to personnel over the past twenty or so years works against support for IW. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the intelligence community has moved from an expertise-based system to one that is more focused on processes. We used to have deep experts on all aspects of the adversary—analysts or collectors who had spent years focused on knowing everything about one foreign leader or one aspect of a country’s industry and with a deep knowledge of the language and culture of that country. With many more adversaries and with collection platforms that are much more expensive than those developed in the early days of the intelligence community, we cannot afford the detailed expert of yore anymore. The current premise is that if you know the processes for writing a good analytical piece or for being a good case officer, the community can plug and play you in any context. This means, we have put a premium on process while neglecting expertise. As with all things—we need to balance these two important aspects of intelligence work.

To truly understand and use IW, we need to develop expert regional analysts and human intelligence personnel. Those individuals who understand the human domain that they are studying. We need to understand how the enemy thinks to be able to provide that precision to the operator. This insight comes only after years of studying the adversary. We need to reward those experts and celebrate them just as much as we do the adaptable plug and play analyst or human intelligence personnel. Individuals who speak and understand the nuances of the languages of our adversaries, who understand the cultures and patterns of life are the SOF member’s best tool for advancing competition in IW. Developing this workforce must be a first thought, not an afterthought in the development of our irregular warfare doctrine.

CIA Director William Casey testified before Congress in 1981:

“The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on the scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. Technical collection is of little help in the most difficult problem of all—political intentions. This is where clandestine human intelligence can make a difference.”

Not only are analytical experts important in support of IW but so are HUMINT experts. We have focused on technology to fill intelligence gaps to the detriment of human intelligence. The Defense Intelligence enterprise has looked for ways to cut its HUMINT capability when we should be increasing our use of HUMINT collection and HUMINT enabled intelligence activities. In 2020, Defense One reported on a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) plan to cut U.S. defense attaches in several West African countries and downgrade the ranks of others in eight countries. Many advocate for taking humans out of the loop as much as possible. The theory is that this lowers the risk for human capture or leaks. As any regional expert will tell you, while satellites and drones can provide an incredible amount of intelligence from pictures to bits of conversation, what they cannot provide is the context for those pictures or snippets of conversation. As Director Casey inferred, it is only the expert who has lived on the ground, among the people he/she is reporting on who can truly grasp nuances, understanding local contexts, allegiances, and sentiments.

While it is important to continue to upgrade technology and have specialists who fly drones and perform other data functions, those functions must be fused with human understanding of the adversary and the terrain. While algorithms can sift through vast amounts of data, human operatives and analysts ensure the contextual relevance of this data. Technologies cannot report on the nuances of feelings and emotions. The regional experts equip SOF operators with the nuanced understanding required to navigate the complexities that make up the “prior to bang” playing field. This expertise married with cunning and creativity will give us the tools we need to combat our adversary in the cognitive warfare domain.

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Conclusion

The need for contextual, human-centric understanding for being able to develop plans and operations for cognitive warfare that can compete with our adversaries and keep us from a kinetic fight is paramount. Those who try to make warfare or intelligence into a science miss the truth, that to be proficient in either, art is a must. We need expertise to be able to decipher the stories, motives, and aspirations that make cognitive warfare unique. Regional intelligence experts discern the patterns, motives and vulnerabilities of adversaries; key needs for developing IW campaigns and for influencing individuals and societies. We need seasoned human intelligence personnel, targeters, and analysts who are experts on the adversary to be able to do this. We also need to develop and reward creativity, which is a must for this world.

We also have to be upfront and acknowledge the need to manipulate our adversaries. U.S. decision makers must concede that to win the next war, cognitive warfare is a must and it is essential for these leaders to take calculated risks to mount those campaigns to influence and manipulate.

The cost of cognitive warfare is but a rounding error when compared to the development of new technical intelligence collection platforms and the platforms’ massive infrastructures. This rounding error is a key lynchpin for irregular warfare and irregular warfare is our most likely avenue for avoiding a kinetic war. Human operatives, out of the box thinking, and expert analysts and human intelligence personnel are the needed bridges that connect data into actionable insights to allow our SOF community to practice the type of irregular warfare we have proven historically that the U.S..S. can provide and must provide to counter our adversaries and win the cognitive war we are currently experiencing.

20. Sabotage as a “New Normal”

Summary:

Russian-backed sabotage across Europe has become a “new normal”: low-cost, deniable attacks on military and civilian infrastructure that disrupt support to Ukraine, test NATO red lines, and exploit critical vulnerabilities like undersea cables. He urges precise terminology, infrastructure resilience, integrated counter-sabotage planning, and clearer NATO deterrent messaging to constrain Moscow.

Excerpt:

It behooves the defense community to accept state-sponsored sabotage as part of the new normal and consider deterrent options for sabotage. Some NATO experts already assess that select Russian defense officials question NATO’s Article V commitment, a perspective that may change with a more robust response to Russian sabotage. While Moscow would likely continue to leverage plausible deniability, NATO messaging (or a precisely worded declaration categorizing sabotage as an offensive action) could serve as a red line that would deter more malign activity. The integration of counter-sabotage planning into Western collective defense strategy will mitigate the alarming trend of sabotage aimed at weakening Ukraine and fracturing NATO and contribute to long-term stability in Europe.

Comment: I think it is the "old normal." I concur we have to take the threat seriously. But do "red lines" work in deterring sabotage? Do "red lines" work at all?

Sabotage as a “New Normal”

irregularwarfare.org · Rick Chersicla · November 19, 2025

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/sabotage-as-a-new-normal/

“Efforts will be made in such countries to disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity.” –George Kennan, The Long Telegram

Since 2022, there has been a spate of high-profile sabotage attacks across Europe: a suspicious fire in Berlin, explosions at a Bulgarian arms factory, and damage to undersea communications cables chief among them. This brazen campaign of sabotage, presumably perpetrated or sponsored by Russian security services, proxies, and the occasional unwitting, manipulated recruit, are at a “level previously unseen” according to German foreign intelligence service director Bruno Kahl. Similarly, Ken McCallum, the head of Britain’s MI5, said that “The GRU in particular is on a sustained mission to generate mayhem on British and European streets.” Russian-backed attacks on energy and transportation infrastructure are not limited to Ukraine, but now also extend across Europe.

While the frequency of incidents has slowed, neither NATO nor Ukraine are likely to see a total cessation of events given the relatively low risk, high reward nature of modern sabotage. Acts of sabotage are likely to persist as a characteristic of the European security environment and anticipate upticks leading to elections and other key events. Sabotage is the new normal.

Positive but Misleading Trends

Sabotage has, as of late, been used synonymously with the somewhat murky and contentious term Russian hybrid operations, inviting ambiguity and vagueness. “Hybrid warfare” can range from the spectacular—such as the 2024 attempted assassination of Germany’s Rheinmetall CEO—to the disruptive but more criminal in nature, such as the acts of arson against property of former British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, in addition to sabotage. However, it is important to isolate the growing pattern of Russian-backed sabotage with a precise definition in order to identify its distinctive effects and purposes.

The term sabotage is best used in the traditional sense: to refer to attacks or incidents that cause physical damage to, or the destruction of, military (and, increasingly, civil) infrastructure and equipment. The inclusion of civilian infrastructure is the most concerning characteristic in a departure to what has long been a primarily military endeavor. However, currently nothing appears to be off-limits as undersea telecommunications cables that enable the global economy by way of transporting gas, data, and power across bodies of water and borders become targets.

In what might be perceived as a positive trend, two recent reports indicate a decline in Russian sabotage attacks. Leading American political scientist and author Seth Jones noted in a March CSIS report that Russian attacks in Europe quadrupled between 2022 and 2023, then nearly tripled again between 2023 and 2024. But, Mr. Jones noted a precipitous drop-off in the first six months of 2025, with only four incidents qualifying as sabotage or attempted sabotage by Russia. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) also said in an August 2025 report that sabotage operations this year had declined, but that the threat remained as Europeans struggled to coordinate a response.

The West has not been totally passive, and the decline is likely due at least in part to the reinvigorated efforts to counter this threat. As Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty notes, some European powers have “expelled dozens of Russian intelligence officers, many working under diplomatic cover, dating back to before the Ukraine invasion.”

Proving that Western actions are driving the decline in sabotage activities is difficult , however. Measuring deterrence is particularly challenging, as it requires correlating actions taken or messages issued to successfully deterring an actor. In short, it is inherently difficult to prove a negative. The downwards trend in sabotage could just as likely be tied to the increased role President Donald Trump is playing during Ukraine-Russia negotiations, given the enmity between Presidents Zelensky and Putin.

While these reports reflect a positive trend for the West, it would be wrong to be lulled into a false sense of security. Increased coordination may have already helped Europe move beyond the high-water mark of Russian-sponsored sabotage, but the threat remains. Sabotage will likely prove to be too tempting to ignore for a revisionist power such as Russia, given its proven track record of disrupting the West for what is a relatively low cost.

The Siren Song of Sabotage: Low Risk, High Reward

Russia simply gets too much from this bad behavior to stop. Even without knowing the inner workings of the Kremlin, it is a safe assumption that the primary aim of the post-2022 sabotage campaign has been to diminish the West’s support for Ukraine. This goal, at least, appears to still be unrealized, but the disruption has secondary effects that benefit Moscow. Acts of sabotage, regardless of their size or efficacy, keep European governments off-kilter as constituents question leaders who fail to protect the power grid. As a result, sabotage distracts Western powers even if it doesn’t achieve the larger strategic aim of sapping the West’s support for Ukraine. These attacks target Allied unity as they undermine Western resilience and coherence between Allies regarding what constitutes an appropriate response. While intelligence sharing has increased, it is difficult to coordinate a unified response, even between treaty allies.

In addition to the political benefits of diminishing support for Ukraine, Moscow’s sabotage campaign serves concrete military ends as well. In some cases, sabotage has the tactical impact of destroying military resources intended for Kyiv, or at least slowing their delivery. In some cases, Moscow may be setting conditions for any potential military eventuality, such that the destruction of military and some civilian infrastructure certainly serves that purpose. Moscow will see little downside to accelerating in any post-deal future.

Implausible Deniability: A Golden Age of Sabotage?

A golden age of sabotage may be upon us, as modern society makes it easier, cheaper, faster, and safer than ever to recruit someone, witting or otherwise, to commit acts of sabotage. Intelligence agencies can now recruit individuals remotely using messaging apps such as Telegram, as was the case with Englishman Dylan Earl, who was recruited to set fire to a warehouse holding equipment bound for Ukraine by a handler he never met in person.

One emergent technique is to hire local criminals to carry out acts of sabotage, rather than sending trained intelligence agents. This tactic has been used in both England and Spain, with the head of London’s Metropolitan Police counterterrorism section noting that “it’s a relatively new thing to see criminal proxies used on behalf of state actors.” In a period The Economist dubbed the “summer of sabotage” in 2024, European capitals expelled Russian spies and Moscow relied largely on local criminals as assets to accomplish disruption operations—an act of either desperation or pragmatism. MI5 Chief Ken McCallum commented that the use of proxies reduced the professionalism of these operations, but the willingness to accept comparative amateurs may suggest that operational success was less important or simply harder to come by.

One Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) journal article outlines how Russian-sponsored sabotage demonstrates characteristics of a “gig economy,” a primarily online marketplace for freelancers seeking short-term employment. As the RUSI report highlights, the wide breadth of recruits—from engineers to hockey players—reflects a change in reach and tactics for Russian security services, or at least an easier reach into varied pools of recruits.

Using criminals or “gig” saboteurs as assets or cut-outs increases deniability. Incidents of sabotage, whether they’re executed by agents, criminals, freelancers, or the unwitting, fall under the umbrella of the larger “shadow war” against the West. Given the countries effected by sabotage and its timing during the war in Ukraine, there is no real denying Moscow’s involvement, no matter how vociferously the Kremlin denies it. By publicly denying involvement and still sponsoring these acts, Moscow participates in implausible theater on the international stage. Aided by modern technology such as encrypted messaging apps, however, implausible deniability still serves as deniability in the eye of the beholder.

Vulnerabilities in European infrastructure, including undersea cables and digital systems, present sabotage opportunities. Moscow increasingly exploits these susceptibilities through quiet military operations and cyber-attacks, mitigating attribution and escalation dynamics through remote virtual systems, military deception, and deniability. But given the opportunities and existing Allied vulnerabilities, should state-sponsored sabotage be viewed as more than just a nuisance or disruption? Moscow may very well view modern sabotage as a new novel offset given their own strategic problem to solve: a unified and motivated NATO on their doorstep. As with the thinking behind previous “offset” strategies, modern sabotage could be the way Russia is thinking about how to remedy their own perceived gaps against the strategic dilemma of NATO’s 32-flags.

The New Normal

Sabotage is a way for Moscow to test the West’s red lines. It is possible that Putin’s regime is aiming to normalize these disruptions so that they’re accepted as the status quo while avoiding entanglement into a wider conventional war. While NATO is coalescing around the challenge, there is little incentive for Moscow to stop enabling and funding acts of sabotage against both military and civilian infrastructure.

The West will need to incorporate thinking about counter-sabotage into steady-state campaigning efforts such as Baltic Sentry that dedicate multi-national efforts to respond to sabotage and build resiliency. For example, strengthening electrical grids and other infrastructure redundancies would fortify European nations against disruption and limit catastrophic risks. If sabotage events are not already incorporated into military and interagency exercises, they should be—their inclusion could improve Europe’s response to these events if the challenges to a unified response are first defined and overcome in fictional scenarios. Precision of language—calling out physical sabotage separate from propaganda, cyber-attacks and other “grey zone” activities—would help draw a line in the sand and mitigate effective sabotage.

The United States took a risk in disclosing details of Moscow’s invasion preparations in 2022 and intelligence assessments that could serve to spoil some sabotage operations. While Moscow would likely continue to deny accusations of sabotage, publicly linking support to actions that counter Russian objectives—such as supplying Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine—could also serve as an indirect way to coerce Moscow into decreasing support for sabotage.

It behooves the defense community to accept state-sponsored sabotage as part of the new normal and consider deterrent options for sabotage. Some NATO experts already assess that select Russian defense officials question NATO’s Article V commitment, a perspective that may change with a more robust response to Russian sabotage. While Moscow would likely continue to leverage plausible deniability, NATO messaging (or a precisely worded declaration categorizing sabotage as an offensive action) could serve as a red line that would deter more malign activity. The integration of counter-sabotage planning into Western collective defense strategy will mitigate the alarming trend of sabotage aimed at weakening Ukraine and fracturing NATO and contribute to long-term stability in Europe.

Rick Chersicla is an active-duty Army Strategist and 2025 non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative’s (IWI) Project Europe. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

Main Image: Generated by DALL-E, OpenAI, using descriptions of the Diehl Metall Factory fire in Berlin, Germany. Russian agents researched fire safety protocols for the building prior to the sabotage and the IRIS-T is a largely sought after varied range infrared air-to-air and surface-to-air missile system produced by Diehl.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

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irregularwarfare.org · Rick Chersicla · November 19, 2025

21. How the Frontier Spirit and the Outback Temperament Collide in AUKUS

Summary:

AUKUS is constrained by clashing strategic cultures: America’s restless, innovation-driven frontier ethos versus Australia’s cautious, collectivist “outback” temperament focused on resilience and denial. He urges treating cultural alignment as a core deliverable through exchanges, joint innovation teams, and eased tech barriers so the pact can sustain trust, deterrence, and capability.

Excerpts:

If AUKUS is to succeed, it will have to reconcile the fundamental fact that for Australia, the partnership is about assurance more than disruption. With the U.S. review of AUKUS complete and the alliance reaffirmed, the partnership enters a new phase. The allies should gain and maintain momentum while learning how to make success repeatable. The next stage should focus not only on proving boldness but on building the habits that let boldness endure. It is essential to meet the milestones for Pillar I and to get some wins on the board for Pillar II, but the deeper task is cultural, turning bursts of collaboration into a sustainable rhythm of trust and delivery.

That requires treating cultural alignment as a strategic deliverable, not an afterthought. It begins with translating understanding into capability. The secondments and embeds already shaping Pillar I should be mirrored in Pillar II, with joint innovation teams building a shared lexicon for risk, tempo, and trust. Governments should lead, but they should also invite and enable their private sectors and universities to do the same. The habits of collaboration that make AUKUS work at the political level will have to be mirrored in the shipyards, research labs, and classrooms where its success will ultimately be built. And it requires investing in the human architecture of trust: loosening technology-transfer restrictions, accelerating clearances, and measuring progress by collaboration as much as by hardware delivered. The goal is not just faster innovation but sustainable cooperation — the ability to move quickly without breaking faith.

If AUKUS can do that, it will represent more than a technological partnership. It will mark the emergence of a post-imperial imagination, as three Anglosphere democracies together learn innovation without domination, practice deterrence without hubris, and balance collaboration with sovereignty. The ghosts of the past still speak, but they need not haunt. What matters now is whether the three partners can listen wisely and build a genuinely new alliance culture fit for the Indo-Pacific century.

How the Frontier Spirit and the Outback Temperament Collide in AUKUS

warontherocks.com · November 19, 2025

Ryan Shaw

November 19, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/how-the-frontier-spirit-and-the-outback-temperament-collide-in-aukus/

Ten months was a long wait for Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s first visit to the Trump White House. But the timing — just days before Halloween — felt oddly appropriate. The optics were smooth, as expected: a ceremonial welcome, reaffirmations of solidarity and mateship, and carefully staged reminders that the Indo-Pacific remains central to U.S. strategy. The Pentagon did not release its long-delayed AUKUS review on schedule, despite earlier rumors. But the president, joined by the Navy secretary, did confirm that Washington will move forward and even accelerate the trilateral pact with Britain to share nuclear-powered submarines (Pillar I) and co-develop advanced military technologies (Pillar II). The two leaders even signed a long-sought, multi-billion-dollar deal to exploit Australia’s critical minerals.

But the stagecraft was too thin a veil to hide the darkness plaguing the underlying statecraft. Besides President Donald Trump’s offhand jab at Australia’s ambassador to the United States, Kevin Rudd, the visit was overshadowed by ongoing tariff disputes and rumors that the forthcoming U.S. National Defense Strategy will tilt resources back toward the Western Hemisphere. There was even friction over AUKUS itself, as American officials have tried to extract stronger Australian commitments on defense spending and potential roles in a future conflict with China, while many Australians doubt Washington’s commitment to seeing the deal through.

The strained optimism only underscored the sharp contrast in temperament between the two leaders. Albanese’s soft-spoken, bureaucratic pragmatism could hardly differ more from Donald Trump’s performative bravado. But these are not costumes or mere quirks of individual personality — they are pitch-perfect caricatures of national character: Trump, the privileged New Yorker branded as a Jacksonian champion of the people; Albanese, the public-housing technocrat who personifies Australia’s civic stoicism. They seem drawn from different stock because they are, and those differences of temperament reflect contrasting strategic cultures on which the fate of AUKUS may hinge.

Both archetypes draw on myths forged on their nations’ formative frontiers. And while the speeches at the White House evoked the memory of Australian and American soldiers who fought side-by-side in shared conflicts since World War I, the occasion was clearly haunted by older ghosts: the restless ambitions and quiet insecurities that shaped those first frontiers. If AUKUS is meant to launch a joint push into new frontiers — undersea, space, cyberspace, and artificial intelligence — the early friction suggests it might be worth recalling how differently each democracy faced its first frontier. Doing so can not only shed light on the cultural misalignment that has beset the project so far but also help illuminate a path forward.

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The Frontier vs. the Outback: Geography, Geology, and Geopolitics

At first glance, the two nations have much in common. Australia is roughly the size and shape of the continental United States. Both began as British colonies, displaced indigenous peoples across vast interiors, and fashioned national myths out of the struggle to tame wilderness at the edge of empire. One might expect those common origins to have produced a shared frontier spirit — a kindred sense of possibility and progress — but the outcomes could hardly be more different. As historian Dennis Phillips said, “Australia and the United States may be roughly the same size and shape, but so too are a stick and a snake. It’s the difference that counts.”

And counting the difference turns out to be straightforward. Starting with geography: In the age of sail, London to Boston was a month-long journey; to Sydney was half a year. Geology mattered, too: Australia had five times more desert than America.

Together, they shaped geopolitics. By the time of the first British settlement in Australia, the United States had already been independent for a dozen years and had a population approaching four million. Australia would not reach those numbers for another century or gain full independence for almost two. America’s frontier was infused with the missional energy of Manifest Destiny — the conviction that conquest was not just a right, but a duty. It gained urgency from imperial competition against Britain, France, Spain, and then Mexico, and even between the northern and southern states, over the spread of slavery. There was no similar contest in Australia. With its origins as a penal colony, its slow path to independence, and its desolate interior, Australian colonists had less reason to look west for inspiration than to look back toward London for guidance.

While the American frontier promised mobility and opportunity, Australia’s settlers confronted isolation, scarcity, and an environment that refused to yield to ambition. Between miners and trappers, farmers and ranchers, even railroad companies, the American West was a bonanza for private enterprise. In contrast, historians call Australia’s the “big man’s frontier,” where power and land were concentrated in a few hands; the Australian interior was managed from above rather than seized from below.

The result was not a common frontier ethos, but two distinct cultures. In America, the frontier bred a myth of conquest and continual striving — restless, inventive, and impatient with limits. In Australia, it was a myth of endurance and communal resilience — a culture more reserved than restless, more collectivist than individualist, skeptical of grand visions and more inclined toward steady pragmatism than boundless hope. Out of these contrasts grew the archetypes that still echo today: the American sodbuster and cowboy, self-reliant and forward-driving, versus the Australian “battler,” wary but stoic, cooperative, with a good-humored conviction that “she’ll be right.”

Historians will raise objections and name exceptions to every one of these tropes. But it is the nature of myths that it doesn’t really matter whether they are true. The point is that we act as if they were, even today. You can still feel the difference when you visit the west coast or deep interior of either country. Perhaps Australian novelist Miles Franklin was right when she said, “Australia never had a frontier. She had an outback.”

Myths in the Machine: Innovation, Speed, and Deterrence

It should be no surprise, then, that the three partner countries bring to the AUKUS project not just leaders with different styles, but entirely different national approaches to innovation, speed, and deterrence. There is a long history of mutual misunderstanding between Australians and Americans, each assuming its own way is better and the other’s, therefore, wrong. Australian writer Henry Lawson once had an American character tell his Aussie mates, “You’ve got a glorious nation over here, but you don’t get up early enough.” In truth, though, both frontier styles were rational adaptations to their circumstances, and both impulses will be essential to AUKUS’s success.

In the American ethos, anything that can be done should be done. Why climb the mountain? Because it is there. Innovation is not just a means to an end — it is an end unto itself. From the transcontinental railroad to Silicon Valley, the state has often underwritten the risk (and, in truth, did much of the “winning of the West”), but it is the private sector that carries the American myth of progress just beyond the next horizon. It is not that Australians are incapable of innovation — that would be as inaccurate as it is insulting — they just need a better reason to do it. From the Overland Telegraph to the Snowy Mountains Scheme, Australia’s great national projects have been collective undertakings, managed by the state. Innovation there is coordinated, not competitive, designed to endure, not to dazzle. If America’s frontier taught its people to “move fast and break things,” the lesson of the Australian frontier was to stay calm, work together, and not get ahead of themselves.

Whatever the preference for speed, as Stephen Covey observed, speed depends on trust. That’s especially true in a defense alliance built on the careful sharing of classified information. Here, too, the allies differ. Americans build trust through performance and competition — by proving themselves useful in motion. Australians build it through steadiness and assurance — by showing up, doing the work, and keeping their word.

Even deterrence, the raison d’être of the partnership, looks different to each ally. The United States achieved continental security by projecting power — pushing its defenses ever outward. Its strategic reflex is deterrence by punishment: to make aggression costly anywhere it appears. In the United States, even a so-called “strategy of denial” means meeting threats on distant shores to keep the homeland inviolate.

Australia’s perspective is virtually the opposite. Having no illusions about size or reach, Canberra’s new Defence Strategy embraces deterrence by denial in the literal sense — denying access to its northern approaches and maintaining stability across its immediate neighborhood. It is a strategy of distance, not domination — protection, not projection. Americans look outward, Australians inward — one defines safety by reach, the other by resilience.

Learning to Live with Ghosts

If AUKUS is to succeed, it will have to reconcile the fundamental fact that for Australia, the partnership is about assurance more than disruption. With the U.S. review of AUKUS complete and the alliance reaffirmed, the partnership enters a new phase. The allies should gain and maintain momentum while learning how to make success repeatable. The next stage should focus not only on proving boldness but on building the habits that let boldness endure. It is essential to meet the milestones for Pillar I and to get some wins on the board for Pillar II, but the deeper task is cultural, turning bursts of collaboration into a sustainable rhythm of trust and delivery.

That requires treating cultural alignment as a strategic deliverable, not an afterthought. It begins with translating understanding into capability. The secondments and embeds already shaping Pillar I should be mirrored in Pillar II, with joint innovation teams building a shared lexicon for risk, tempo, and trust. Governments should lead, but they should also invite and enable their private sectors and universities to do the same. The habits of collaboration that make AUKUS work at the political level will have to be mirrored in the shipyards, research labs, and classrooms where its success will ultimately be built. And it requires investing in the human architecture of trust: loosening technology-transfer restrictions, accelerating clearances, and measuring progress by collaboration as much as by hardware delivered. The goal is not just faster innovation but sustainable cooperation — the ability to move quickly without breaking faith.

If AUKUS can do that, it will represent more than a technological partnership. It will mark the emergence of a post-imperial imagination, as three Anglosphere democracies together learn innovation without domination, practice deterrence without hubris, and balance collaboration with sovereignty. The ghosts of the past still speak, but they need not haunt. What matters now is whether the three partners can listen wisely and build a genuinely new alliance culture fit for the Indo-Pacific century.

BECOME A MEMBER

Ryan Shaw is a professor of practice in history and strategy at Arizona State University, where he directs Security & Defence PLuS, a partnership with King’s College London and UNSW Sydney supporting AUKUS research and education. A retired Army strategist, he commanded a cavalry troop in Iraq, taught history at West Point, and provided strategic advise to senior military leaders. He holds a PhD in history from Yale University and has published widely on history and national security.

Image: Lt. Corey Todd Jones via DVIDS

warontherocks.com · November 19, 2025

22. America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear

Summary:

The U.S. should deliberately support nuclear proliferation by Canada, Germany, and Japan. Selective proliferation, they say, would bolster regional deterrence, share defense burdens, hedge against a retrenching America, and reinforce a liberal rules-based order, while posing limited escalation or accident risks given these allies’ stability and restraint.

Excerpt:

In East Asia, an acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan might push South Korea to act on its long-held nuclear ambitions, but Seoul’s integration into the American security architecture substantially reduces its incentives to do so. Japan’s geographic advantage and the fact that it is not stuck in a frozen conflict (as South Korea is with a nuclear-armed North Korea) make it a more attractive candidate for selective proliferation than South Korea. To be sure, if Seoul decided to forge ahead and build a bomb, it would also be a safe and reliable nuclear custodian. Although Taiwan might theoretically want to follow suit, it has no plausible pathway to act upon this desire because of its precarious geopolitical position in regard to China.

Comment: This should create quite a stir in the national security community. I cannot wait to see the debate on this. I am not sure the integration of South Korea into the US security architecture is a sound argument for South Korea not going nuclear, especially if Japan does. At an off the record conference I attended yesterday our Korean colleagues presented some excellent survey data to include views of South Korea going nuclear. However, the assessment of the rationale for doing so seemed to stem mostly from the declining confidence in US security guarantees.

America’s Allies Should Go Nuclear

Foreign Affairs · More by Moritz S. Graefrath · November 19, 2025

Selective Proliferation Will Strengthen the Global Order, Not End It

eNovember 19, 2025

An intercontinental ballistic missile system unit in Moscow, May 2025 Shamil Zhumatov / Reuters

MORITZ S. GRAEFRATH is Wick Cary Assistant Professor of International Security at the University of Oklahoma and a Nonresident Fellow at the Institute for Global Affairs at Eurasia Group.

MARK A. RAYMOND is Wick Cary Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Oklahoma and Associate Director for International Security Policy at the Oklahoma Aerospace and Defense Innovation Institute.

More by Mark A. Raymond

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Few scenarios scare pundits and policymakers as much as the prospect of nuclear proliferation. Russia’s willingness to dangle the threat of deploying tactical nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine, U.S. President Donald Trump’s ambiguous interest in nuclear testing, and the imminent expiration of the 2010 New START treaty (which limits the size of Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals) have reminded the world of the abiding destructive potential of nuclear weapons and reanimated fears of their use. American leaders are convinced that the spread of nuclear weapons would deeply hurt U.S. strategic interests and further destabilize the already fragile global order. In recent months, they have doubled down on their commitment to preventing proliferation, and the June strikes against nuclear sites in Iran have shown that Washington will use force to prevent more countries from acquiring the bomb.

For decades, the United States invested in a nuclear order built around nonproliferation, even as Cold War disarmament agreements such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty expired. Opposing proliferation among unreliable states and adversaries makes sense, but a blanket opposition to the further spread of nuclear weapons obscures the significant benefits they can bestow. The United States would do well to reconsider its strict adherence to nonproliferation and encourage a small set of allies—namely Canada, Germany, and Japan—to go nuclear. For Washington, selective nuclear proliferation would allow these partners to take on larger roles in regional defense and decrease their military dependence on the United States. For these allies, in turn, acquiring nuclear weapons provides the most dependable protection against the threats of regional foes, such as China and Russia, as well as a United States less committed to its traditional alliances.

Skeptics and nuclear pessimists might blanch at the idea of a world with more nuclear-armed powers, but such concerns are less warranted when proliferation is pursued selectively. Canada, Germany, and Japan have proven track records of rational policymaking and domestic stability that will make both nuclear accidents and any spiral of uncontrolled escalation unlikely. And, if carefully managed, there is ample reason to believe that proliferation in these countries would not lead to widespread efforts by others to develop their own bombs.

Far from ushering in a frightening new era of global instability, selective proliferation would help uphold the post–World War II order. Were Canada, Germany, and Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, they would rebalance global military capabilities in favor of a coalition of states committed to the rules-based system and to stopping the erosion of its key norms, especially territorial integrity. Selective proliferation would thus revitalize the increasingly brittle post-1945 order that has so benefited the United States and its allies.

A WIN-WIN

Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly emphasized the need to shift the burden of continental defense onto European allies and decrease their military dependence on the United States. Confronted by the geopolitical challenge of a rising China in East Asia and pressed for resources to address issues at home, Washington has come to see ending European free-riding as a top strategic priority. What stands in the way of Europe’s ability to provide for its own security today—and thus blocks a significant U.S. retrenchment—is the lack of German nuclear forces. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. leaders had hoped to withdraw American forces from Europe but determined that unless Germany acquired a nuclear deterrent, the continent would not be able to guarantee its own security. As the historian Marc Trachtenberg has noted, the United States rightly judged that British and French nuclear forces “could not provide the necessary degree of reassurance” that Europe would be able to deter the Soviet Union and its vast nuclear arsenal. Today, the same roadblock remains. Encouraging Germany to develop its own nuclear weapons would finally create the kind of self-sufficient Europe that enables an American exit.

German leaders and the German public recognize that military dependence on the United States leaves their country vulnerable to Washington’s whims. Shortly after his election in February 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz announced that it was time to “achieve independence” from the United States, and he has since become an outspoken proponent of substantial rearmament. But it will take a long time to build up Germany’s conventional capabilities, and Berlin still lacks a clear vision for how to meet the ambitious defense spending target of five percent of GDP that Merz and other European leaders agreed to at a NATO summit in June. Germany’s ongoing commitments to provide war materiel to Ukraine and the population’s reluctance to undertake military service hinder a speedy conventional military buildup. The development of an independent nuclear force would safeguard Germany against the possibility of a sudden U.S. withdrawal from Europe while offering a feasible and meaningful way to fulfill the five percent pledge.

Japanese proliferation will go a long way toward achieving the United States’ main goal in East Asia, namely, the containment of China through strong local alliances. From Washington’s perspective, the primary threat posed by Beijing is that it might achieve regional dominance and develop the military potential to seriously threaten the United States and its interests by, for example, disrupting semiconductor supply chains or establishing forward bases beyond its territory in East Asia and even further afield. Such Chinese regional hegemony would pose a major challenge to the United States.

Japan already enjoys the defensive benefit of being an archipelago country separated from its adversaries by the sea. If combined with independent nuclear capabilities, that advantage would effectively guarantee Japan’s security in the face of outside threats—and ensure that it does not fall under Chinese control. Beyond better defending itself, a nuclear-armed Japan would provide a more credible and immediate form of extended deterrence to East Asia than the United States can provide. China might doubt Washington’s willingness to risk nuclear war over developments in East Asia, but Japan’s proximity and direct stake in regional stability render its commitments far more credible.

More nuclear weapons might indeed be better.

A nuclear-armed Japan would also insert an extra layer in crisis escalation scenarios, allowing an effective response to Chinese aggression without directly drawing in the United States. When contemplating an attack on Japan, China would be forced to consider the monumental costs of Japanese retaliation independent of any additional American support. Having nuclear weapons would also equip Japan, and perhaps East Asia more broadly, to handle a sudden change in Washington’s security commitment. The Trump administration’s newest National Defense Strategy prioritizes the defense of the U.S. homeland and the Western Hemisphere over the threats emanating from China and Russia, signaling a potentially seismic shift in orientation.

In North America, Canadian proliferation would enhance American homeland security. Given the integration of the Canadian and American militaries within NATO and the bilateral air defense system NORAD, the two countries would be fighting together in virtually any conceivable hemispheric defense scenario. Although Canada does not face immediate threats to its territorial integrity from Russia or China, its relations with both countries have deteriorated significantly over the past decade. A Canadian nuclear deterrent reduces the chance that the United States would be called on to defend its continental neighbor, effectively freeing up American capabilities and removing an avenue of potential geopolitical encroachment. American support for a Canadian nuclear deterrent would also provide crucial reassurance about Washington’s commitment to continental defense at a time when the neighbors’ bilateral relationship is under strain.

For Canada in turn, possessing nuclear weapons signals to the United States that it, too, accepts shared responsibility for continental defense and that Ottawa can deter potential aggressors without American support. As Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney put it in March, Canada’s “old relationship” with the United States is “over.” Going nuclear would prepare Ottawa to face this new world by reconfiguring the continental partnership and helping the country go it alone. Further, the challenges of meeting NATO’s five percent spending target are arguably more significant for Canada than they are for Germany. A modest nuclear deterrent offers a solution to this challenge that also results in a meaningful strategic asset in Canada’s arsenal.

Canada, Germany, and Japan each possesses the scientific and industrial capacity to successfully develop nuclear weapons on its own. For instance, Canada’s role as a major supplier of fissile material provides the basis for a joint effort to make these new nuclear capabilities a reality. What the three allies would need—and what the United States can and should provide—is public support and diplomatic cover for their transition to becoming nuclear-armed states, as well as technical and doctrinal guidance to ensure robust command and control safeguards.

NUCLEAR FIX

Traditionally, nuclear proliferation has been understood as a risk to the stability of the international order. As states acquire nuclear capabilities, regional and global balances of power shift, calling into question existing security arrangements. A state with a nuclear deterrent, the thinking goes, can behave predatorily since it is now insulated from attempts to rein it in. This conventional view is wrong—or at the very least too simplistic—as it assumes all proliferators will behave the same way. When states committed to defending international rules and norms acquire nuclear capabilities, proliferation, in fact, increases the stability and strength of the global order.

Canada, Germany, and Japan are among the leading states committed to the rules-based international order. All three frame their foreign policies and even their state identities in terms of good international citizenship. Select nuclear proliferation in these states would rebalance military capabilities and create a unified coalition of nuclear powers committed to thwarting potential revisionists. Such a coalition would help prevent further erosion of the rules, norms, and institutions of the post-1945 order, including the norm against conquest. In addition to the material sources of stability it would provide, selective proliferation would thus strengthen the normative sources of stability essential to international order.

Selective nuclear proliferation should thus be framed and understood as an investment in the revitalization of that order. Effectively, Canada, Germany, and Japan would be helping to fill the gaps that have led Russia to see more favorable conditions for revisionism and that could lead China to make a similar calculation.

BE NOT AFRAID

Many of the typical concerns raised by opponents of nuclear proliferation do not apply to selective proliferation by U.S. allies. For instance, there is no reason to fear that Canadian, German, or Japanese nuclear weapons would end up in the hands of rogue states or terrorist organizations; all three are paragons of responsibility, state capacity, and domestic stability. There is also no need to worry about the rationality of these states. If North Korean leader Kim Jong Un can exercise prudence and caution with regard to his nuclear arsenal, leaders in Ottawa, Berlin, and Tokyo can reasonably be expected to do the same.

Another concern is that if a few states pursue nuclear capabilities, a plethora of others will then move to do the same. This argument is unconvincing. Knock-on proliferation is typically the result of preexisting rivalries and heavily conditioned by geographic contiguity, as exemplified by Pakistan’s pursuit of a bomb in response to Indian proliferation. Canadian proliferation is unlikely to spur, say, Mexico, to pursue its own bomb. The European states that would have the greatest incentive to counter German proliferation—the United Kingdom and France—already have their own nuclear forces. Other possible proliferators, such as Poland, might be convinced to forgo an independent nuclear weapons program with multi- or bilateral nuclear sharing agreements. In East Asia, an acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan might push South Korea to act on its long-held nuclear ambitions, but Seoul’s integration into the American security architecture substantially reduces its incentives to do so. Japan’s geographic advantage and the fact that it is not stuck in a frozen conflict (as South Korea is with a nuclear-armed North Korea) make it a more attractive candidate for selective proliferation than South Korea. To be sure, if Seoul decided to forge ahead and build a bomb, it would also be a safe and reliable nuclear custodian. Although Taiwan might theoretically want to follow suit, it has no plausible pathway to act upon this desire because of its precarious geopolitical position in regard to China.

The potential for accidents involving nuclear weapons remains a reasonable concern. Although it is true that the spread of nuclear weapons would technically increase the possibility of inadvertent nuclear war, the risk remains so small that it would likely be outweighed by the tangible benefits to international stability and security. Even during the height of the Cold War, a time fraught with immense strategic and ideological rivalry, the two superpowers successfully avoided a nuclear exchange. One of the virtues of selective nuclear proliferation is that Canada, Germany, and Japan are among the most well-equipped to minimize additional risk. All have highly professional militaries, robust civilian control of those armed forces, and foreign ministries highly skilled in peaceful conflict resolution.

Other objections do not withstand scrutiny. For example, some U.S. experts have opposed proliferation among American allies on the ground that it would undermine the United States’ influence, specifically over Germany and Japan. The claim conflates strategic instruments with objectives. Washington’s fundamental aim in Europe and East Asia is to prevent any single state from dominating either region. Although American influence over allies offers an indirect and uncertain path to preventing the rise of a regional hegemon, nuclear weapons in Germany and Japan would virtually guarantee that result. In other words, selective proliferation sacrifices some U.S. influence, but only in exchange for the objective it was designed to achieve in the first place.

The most understandable hurdle—and potentially the most difficult to overcome—is public opposition to proliferation. Japan’s experience of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains central to its collective memory. Post-1945 pacifism and general skepticism about nuclear energy predispose many Germans to oppose an independent deterrent. And Canada has long resisted even hosting nuclear weapons on its territory, let alone acquiring its own. Overcoming this apprehension will no doubt be difficult, and states will have to convince skeptical citizens that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will not just keep them safer but also boost the overall health of the rules-based order.

PROCEED WITH CAUTION

Implementing selective proliferation will not be easy or without risk. An immediate practical consideration is that Canada, Germany, and Japan would each need to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in which they agreed not to develop a nuclear bomb. Commitment to the proper process for withdrawing from the treaty under international law would signal their intent to stabilize the international order and strengthen international security rather than weaken both. To the extent possible, NPT withdrawals should be carefully broached to key allies in advance to minimize alarm. Although it is unrealistic to expect all other countries to accept such withdrawals, pursuing nuclear proliferation in a responsible and transparent way would signal each country’s good intentions. It is here that American diplomatic cover can prove particularly valuable, coordinating with France and the United Kingdom to ensure that the new nuclear states do not become the target of United Nations Security Council enforcement measures.

To provide as much reassurance to skeptical states as possible, the three proliferators should consider adopting a “no first use” policy, at least while they remain under the American nuclear umbrella. While NATO was unwilling to commit to such a policy during the Cold War, Canada, Germany, and Japan face less stringent security challenges, at least at present, and can therefore contemplate taking this step in order to signal their commitment to maintaining the status quo.

Selective nuclear proliferation requires careful management to fulfill its potential, but it offers genuine ground for optimism. The case for it remains as controversial as ever, but it does matter greatly which countries get the bomb. If the proliferators are allied, stable governments and responsible members of the international community, then more nuclear weapons might indeed be better.

Foreign Affairs · More by Moritz S. Graefrath · November 19, 2025

23. AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare

Summary:

AI lets foreign and domestic actors wage hyper-targeted, low-cost disinformation and deepfake campaigns at scale, threatening elections, diplomacy, and social cohesion. As adversaries expand these capabilities, the Trump administration has dismantled key U.S. counter-disinformation offices, leaving the country under-defended and in urgent need of rebuilt institutions, public–private cooperation, and coordinated, whole-of-government response.

Excerpts:

A perfect storm is brewing. U.S. adversaries are investing heavily in disinformation campaigns, AI advancements are ushering in a more dangerous form of conflict, and the second Trump administration has weakened the defenses that are meant to shield the United States and its partners from foreign malign influence.

There is no simple solution, but any serious U.S. defense against disinformation must entail both technological innovation and institutional restructuring. It should involve the United States’ close allies and take a whole-of-government approach, one that includes a successor to the GEC and the reconstitution of other offices responsible for fighting disinformation. To aid in this effort, the Trump administration should issue a national security directive that unequivocally declares AI-amplified foreign malign influence a clear and present danger to the United States. This directive should mobilize the intelligence community to produce a new, comprehensive assessment of U.S. adversaries’ disinformation capabilities, which would help focus future intelligence collection and targeting priorities on the most pressing threats. It should also establish a permanent interagency structure, led by the National Security Council, to ensure that tools available in different parts of the government, such as U.S. Cyber Command’s offensive units and the Treasury Department’s sanction mechanisms, are used in a coordinated fashion in the fight against foreign malign influence.

Defending against information warfare will also require partnership between the public and private sectors, organized by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. The creation of formal channels for collaboration with social media platforms, leading AI research labs, and cybersecurity firms would enable the U.S. government to share intelligence about particular threats, codevelop advanced technologies to help detect AI-generated content, and establish industry-wide best practices to counteract AI’s magnification of disinformation. Through the White House’s involvement, the fight against information warfare, now a niche policy concern, would become a central organizing principle of U.S. national defense.

Taking these steps is not meant to police free speech but rather to protect the right of American citizens to engage in dialogue that is unpolluted by foreign disinformation. With the 2026 U.S. midterm elections quickly approaching, the time to act is now. If the Trump administration fails to shore up the United States’ defenses, the subtle and persistent influence campaigns deployed by its adversaries could undermine the democratic way of life that Americans hold dear.

Comments: How do we defeat a perfect storm? Although it is not fashionable to say, the fundamental action is to uphold our values. If we sacrifice our values, we lose.

Again I hope these words from POTUS' 2017 NSS are reprised in the forthcoming NSS. We all have the responsibility to fight within the conditions of this perfect storm.

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access the 2017 NSS HERE

Some of my thoughts from long ago are here:

The Cyber Underground – Resistance to Active Measures and Propaganda: “The Disruptors” - Motto: “Think For Yourself”

https://archive.smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/the-cyber-underground-%E2%80%93-resistance-to-active-measures-and-propaganda-%E2%80%9Cthe-disruptors%E2%80%9D-mot-0

AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare

Foreign Affairs · More by James P. Rubin · November 19, 2025

James P. Rubin and Darjan Vujica

And America’s Defenses Aren’t Ready

November 19, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/artificial-intelligence-supercharging-disinformation-warfare

Banners displaying a new AI deepfake detector, Barcelona, March 2025. Bruna Casas / Reuters

JAMES P. RUBIN was Senior Adviser to U.S. Secretaries of State Antony Blinken and Madeleine Albright and served as Special Envoy and Coordinator of the State Department’s Global Engagement Center during the Biden administration. He is a co-host, with Christiane Amanpour, of the podcast The Ex Files.

DARJAN VUJICA was Director of Analytics at the U.S. State Department’s Global Engagement Center from 2019 to 2021 and Emerging Technology Coordinator at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi from 2024 to 2025.

More by Darjan Vujica

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In June, the secure Signal account of a European foreign minister pinged with a text message. The sender claimed to be U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio with an urgent request. A short time later, two other foreign ministers, a U.S. governor, and a member of Congress received the same message, this time accompanied by a sophisticated voice memo impersonating Rubio. Although the communication appeared to be authentic, its tone matching what would be expected from a senior official, it was actually a malicious forgery—a deepfake, engineered with artificial intelligence by unknown actors. Had the lie not been caught, the stunt had the potential to sow discord, compromise American diplomacy, or extract sensitive intelligence from Washington’s foreign partners.

This was not the last disquieting example of AI enabling malign actors to conduct information warfare—the manipulation and distribution of information to gain an advantage over an adversary. In August, researchers at Vanderbilt University revealed that a Chinese tech firm, GoLaxy, had used AI to build data profiles of at least 117 sitting U.S. lawmakers and over 2,000 American public figures. The data could be used to construct plausible AI-generated personas that mimic those figures and craft messaging campaigns that appeal to the psychological traits of their followers. GoLaxy’s goal, demonstrated in parallel campaigns in Hong Kong and Taiwan, was to build the capability to deliver millions of different, customized lies to millions of individuals at once.

Disinformation is not a new problem, but the introduction of AI has made it significantly easier for malicious actors to develop increasingly effective influence operations and to do so cheaply and at scale. In response, the U.S. government should be expanding and refining its tools for identifying and shutting down these campaigns. Instead, the Trump administration has been disarming, scaling back U.S. defenses against foreign disinformation and leaving the country woefully unprepared to handle AI-powered attacks. Unless the U.S. government reinvests in the institutions and expertise needed to counter information warfare, digital influence campaigns will progressively undermine public trust in democratic institutions, processes, and leadership—threatening to deliver American democracy a death by a thousand cuts.

INFORMATION AGE

For much of the modern era, many proponents of democracy have deemed the circulation of information to be purely a force for good. U.S. President Barack Obama famously articulated such a conviction in a speech to Chinese students in Shanghai in 2009, when he said that “the more freely information flows, the stronger the society becomes, because then citizens of countries around the world can hold their own governments accountable.” Social media has accelerated the dissemination of information and made it easier for citizens to monitor, discuss, and raise awareness about government activities. But it has also undermined public trust in institutions and created online echo chambers through the promotion of personalized content and algorithms focused on engagement, limiting exposure to diverse viewpoints and deepening polarization among users.

Only in the last few years has the world finally recognized the urgency of the threats coming from the digital information domain. In a speech in October, French President Emmanuel Macron drew a link between the exploitation of technology and democratic backsliding. Europe, he argued, has been “incredibly naive” to entrust its “democratic space to social networks that are controlled either by large American entrepreneurs or large Chinese companies.” The political scientist Francis Fukuyama recently referred to this online public space as “an ecosystem that [rewards] sensationalism and disruptive content” and is shaped by the “unchecked power” of companies whose “interest of profit-maximization” leads to the unilateral amplification or suppression of particular voices—an outcome that goes against the core principles of democracy.

Advancements in AI have increasingly sharpened those threats to democracy. For the last half decade, countering foreign malign influence felt like tracking battleships in a game of naval warfare. U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia deployed large, state-controlled media outlets, including China’s CGTN, for instance, and Russia’s RT; clumsy fake social media profiles; and swarms of bots to push destabilizing narratives across the globe. Their methods were dangerous, but also blunt and easy to spot. Today, that era seems quaint. The disinformation battleships of old are still out there, but the rise of AI has opened the competition to a much wider array of combatants. Information warfare is now more akin to battle by autonomous drones—hyperpersonalized, relentlessly adaptive, and cheap enough for any actor to use against its adversaries. Foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns are now engineered to seek out specific vulnerabilities—an individual’s political leanings, social values, or even online shopping habits—and deliver targeted attacks designed to maximize the effects on their audiences’ attitudes and behavior.

Propaganda campaigns have historically been constrained by the human labor required for content creation, translation, and target selection. AI removes those manpower demands, thus enabling information warfare to be waged at a speed and level of sophistication that many countries are not prepared to combat. Faced with an unstoppable onslaught of divisive political messaging, social cohesion could break down and government decision-making processes could become paralyzed. The digital information environment is now a theater of conflict in which domestic and foreign policy aims can be undermined by adversaries—all without requiring the attackers to leave the safety of their own territory.

BOTS WITHOUT BORDERS

The use of AI for intelligence gathering, disinformation campaigns, and malign influence operations is already spreading around the world. In El Salvador, for instance, President Nayib Bukele is fusing his sophisticated state propaganda apparatus with AI-powered tools, including bot networks. In addition to attracting foreign investment by putting the country’s technological modernity on display, the use of AI bots is designed to help insulate the government from international criticism of its democratic backsliding by burying or rewriting narratives that allege human rights abuses.

AI is also being used to destabilize. OpenAI, the artificial intelligence company responsible for ChatGPT, recently announced that it had removed several ChatGPT accounts linked to Chinese actors. This covert influence operation, dubbed “Uncle Spam,” used AI to create fake online personas and polarizing social media posts that deliberately argued multiple sides of contentious U.S. political issues, such as tariffs, with other social media users. The overall goal was to deepen political fractures within the United States. The component of “Uncle Spam” that was most corrosive to U.S. national security, however, was its attempt at intelligence gathering, which involved the use of AI tools to scrape and analyze vast amounts of personal data from platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and Bluesky, including user profiles and follower lists belonging to American citizens. The Chinese-linked actors could use this information to refine their targeting methods, potentially giving Beijing an advantage in future rounds of information warfare.

Disinformation online can have consequences offline, too. In India, for example, a growing collection of AI-generated images and videos have spread hateful, anti-Muslim messaging, worsening existing interreligious tensions and fueling threats of psychological terror and physical violence against minority groups. According to a BBC report, in Sudan, where a civil war rages, AI voice cloning has been used on TikTok to impersonate former Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, who was ousted by the military in a 2019 coup and has not been seen in public for some time. Such a use of AI can degrade public trust in official sources of information and accelerate the breakdown of civil order amid an already brutal conflict.

Perhaps the most profound example of AI’s power to disrupt occurred in Romania, where the 2024 presidential election was marred by foreign interference. A sweeping disinformation campaign, which Romanian intelligence services identified as linked to Russia, artificially boosted the online presence of Calin Georgescu, a far-right, pro-Russian fringe candidate. The operation included deepfakes, comments from tens of thousands of AI-powered bot accounts, and, according to authorities, payments to hundreds of influencers on social media platforms such as TikTok. The efficacy of the disinformation campaign was enough to put the legitimacy of the vote itself in question after Georgescu won in the first round of the election. Romania’s Constitutional Court decided to annul the results, forcing a revote. The whole episode demonstrated that in some cases, AI-powered disinformation can not only threaten but also invalidate the fundamental processes of democracy.

STANDING DOWN

Even as the threat grows increasingly severe, the United States is more vulnerable to information warfare than ever before. In 2016, at the end of the Obama administration, the U.S. government started strengthening its ability to identify and counter foreign propaganda and disinformation—most notably with the establishment of the Global Engagement Center within the State Department. The GEC, along with other government offices focused on information warfare, used teams of geopolitical analysts and social media monitoring tools to unearth foreign influence campaigns. The State Department and the intelligence community also began studying adversarial tactics more closely and increased information sharing with foreign partners. But the U.S. government still struggled to keep up with advances in disinformation tactics.

The Biden administration made some progress. In 2023, the State Department, through the GEC, initiated a program to expose and disrupt Russia’s information warfare campaigns in Africa and Latin America. The program employed a whole-of-government defense against disinformation: working with intelligence agencies to sanitize intelligence, stripping it of sensitive sources and methods to make it suitable for public use; with the Pentagon to assess the impact of information warfare on U.S. security; with the Treasury Department to impose sanctions; and with the White House to coordinate policy timing. In February 2024, a GEC-led effort resulted in the unearthing and dismantling of African Stream, an online media platform based in Kenya and secretly funded by Russia that spread anti-U.S. messaging, including stories that undermined confidence in American health programs. Perhaps most important, in September 2024, Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that the United States would impose sanctions on Rossiya Segodnya, the parent company of the state-controlled television network RT. The sanctions were ordered after the State Department made public crucial intelligence that demonstrated how RT had become a clearinghouse for Russian covert information operations.

But the second Trump administration has cut or severely weakened the government offices responsible for identifying and countering foreign malign influence and disinformation campaigns. The GEC is among those offices, as are the Director of National Intelligence’s Foreign Malign Influence Center, the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force, and parts of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, housed under the Department of Homeland Security. Eliminating this collection of offices means the U.S. government is no longer able to adequately identify, track, assess, and defend against adversaries in the information space.

The Trump administration’s dismantling of these key agencies constitutes an irresponsible act of unilateral disarmament. After all, the bad actors are not going away. At the beginning of October, Ahmed Kaballo, the founder of African Stream, announced the launch of Sovereign Media, a self-described “anti-imperialist coalition” that promises to combat the “relentless censorship and algorithmic suppression” enacted by the “Western ruling elite.” Sovereign Media’s funding sources are unclear, but Kaballo is a longtime beneficiary of Russian largesse. Without the U.S. agencies that previously served as disinformation watchdogs, it is hard to know whether anyone in the Trump administration is taking a serious look at Sovereign Media or the many other foreign media outlets with connections to adversarial governments. Those actors, cumulatively, could do real harm to American interests as they flood the Internet with false narratives about the United States—especially as AI makes it increasingly difficult for citizens, both American and foreign, to separate false narratives from real ones.

ALL HANDS ON DECK

A perfect storm is brewing. U.S. adversaries are investing heavily in disinformation campaigns, AI advancements are ushering in a more dangerous form of conflict, and the second Trump administration has weakened the defenses that are meant to shield the United States and its partners from foreign malign influence.

There is no simple solution, but any serious U.S. defense against disinformation must entail both technological innovation and institutional restructuring. It should involve the United States’ close allies and take a whole-of-government approach, one that includes a successor to the GEC and the reconstitution of other offices responsible for fighting disinformation. To aid in this effort, the Trump administration should issue a national security directive that unequivocally declares AI-amplified foreign malign influence a clear and present danger to the United States. This directive should mobilize the intelligence community to produce a new, comprehensive assessment of U.S. adversaries’ disinformation capabilities, which would help focus future intelligence collection and targeting priorities on the most pressing threats. It should also establish a permanent interagency structure, led by the National Security Council, to ensure that tools available in different parts of the government, such as U.S. Cyber Command’s offensive units and the Treasury Department’s sanction mechanisms, are used in a coordinated fashion in the fight against foreign malign influence.

Defending against information warfare will also require partnership between the public and private sectors, organized by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. The creation of formal channels for collaboration with social media platforms, leading AI research labs, and cybersecurity firms would enable the U.S. government to share intelligence about particular threats, codevelop advanced technologies to help detect AI-generated content, and establish industry-wide best practices to counteract AI’s magnification of disinformation. Through the White House’s involvement, the fight against information warfare, now a niche policy concern, would become a central organizing principle of U.S. national defense.

Taking these steps is not meant to police free speech but rather to protect the right of American citizens to engage in dialogue that is unpolluted by foreign disinformation. With the 2026 U.S. midterm elections quickly approaching, the time to act is now. If the Trump administration fails to shore up the United States’ defenses, the subtle and persistent influence campaigns deployed by its adversaries could undermine the democratic way of life that Americans hold dear.

Foreign Affairs · More by James P. Rubin · November 19, 2025

25. Congress’s DISRUPT Act: The Blueprint for Political Warfare Against the “Dark Quad”

I really do not care what we call it. But we need an interagency organization to execute the DISRUPT Act and conduct political warfare for the United States.

Congress’s DISRUPT Act: The Blueprint for Political Warfare Against the “Dark Quad”

nationalsecurityjournal.org · David Maxwell · November 18, 2025

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/congresss-disrupt-act-the-blueprint-for-political-warfare-against-the-dark-quad/

The DISRUPT Act Demands a New U.S. Political Warfare Service

The 2025 Defending International Security by Restricting Unlawful Partnerships and Tactics (DISRUPT) Act represents Congress’s most ambitious bipartisan initiative to counter the coordinated challenges posed by China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

By mandating an interagency plan to “disrupt, frustrate, and constrain” adversary cooperation, the Act implicitly acknowledges that the United States is engaged in a global contest of systems, one that cannot be won through traditional deterrence alone.

Effective implementation of the DISRUPT Act requires the creation of a Political Warfare Service 2.0 (PWS 2.0), following in the footsteps of World War II’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS), to operationalize interagency political and irregular warfare strategy.

Only such an institution can provide the organizational agility, unity of effort, and strategic imagination necessary to meet the integrated threats of the 21st century.

The DISRUPT Act: Congress’s Call to Strategic Arms

Introduced by Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) and Delegate James Moylan (R-GU), and supported in the Senate by Senators Chris Coons (D-DE) and David McCormick (R-PA), the DISRUPT Act (full text) was attached to the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).

The bill directs the Secretaries of State, Defense (War), Commerce, and Treasury, along with the Directors of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), to establish task forces and a coordinated strategy to address what the legislation terms “adversary alignment.”

Congress explicitly identifies a pattern of deepening cooperation among authoritarian regimes, such as arms transfers from North Korea to Russia, Chinese dual-use technology exports, Iranian missile proliferation, and joint disinformation campaigns. These are all designed to erode U.S. and allied influence.

The Act warns that conflict with any one of these adversaries could cascade into multiple simultaneous theaters, overwhelming America’s current command structures and planning tools.

The Strategic Challenge: The Dark Quad and the New Convergence

For the first time since 1945, the United States faces not a single peer competitor, but a coalition of revisionist powers united by a shared goal of undermining the liberal international order.

This emerging “Dark Quad” of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRInK) combines industrial capacity, military technology, and information operations in ways that threaten to create a seamless global front of authoritarian influence. The RAND Corporation’s 2018 An American Way of Political Warfare warned that adversaries have mastered the art of operating in the “gray zone,” where political subversion, economic coercion, cyber intrusion, and proxy warfare converge. The CRInK network represents the institutionalization of that gray-zone model on a global scale.

The Missing Institution: Toward a Political Warfare Service 2.0

The United States once possessed such an instrument. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), founded in 1942 under Major General William J. Donovan, integrated intelligence, covert action, resistance support, psychological operations, and unconventional warfare into a single strategic entity.

It provided President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with both global situational awareness and an agile means of shaping events behind enemy lines. A Political Warfare Service 2.0 (PWS 2.0) or Office of Strategic Disruption (OSD) would fill this void, uniting the existing fragments of America’s irregular and political warfare capabilities into an integrated command for strategic competition and gray-zone campaigning.

Operationalizing the DISRUPT Act

The DISRUPT Act mandates reports and task forces, but to move from assessment to action, Congress and the executive branch must institutionalize mechanisms of coordination and execution. A PWS 2.0 would provide five essential functions: strategic fusion, global campaign design, digital modernization, allied integration, and institutional education.

This structure would transform the DISRUPT Act’s intent into an enduring capability.

Building the Policy Foundation: A Modern NSDD for Irregular Warfare

Implementation of PWS 2.0 requires presidential authority and leadership. The White House should issue a new National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on Irregular and Political Warfare, modeled on President Ronald Reagan’s 1982 NSDD-32, which codified Cold War political warfare strategy.

Such a directive should define irregular and political warfare as essential missions, establish interagency roles, empower a PWS 2.0, and institutionalize metrics for gray-zone success. George Kennan’s 1948 memorandum on the Inauguration of Political Warfare should be updated for the 21st Century.

Institutional and Cultural Resistance

The most formidable obstacles are bureaucratic, not conceptual. Agencies guard their authorities jealously; interagency initiatives often dissolve into turf disputes. Overcoming this resistance requires presidential leadership and congressional mandate. A PWS 2.0 should report jointly to the NSC and DNI, ensuring strategic alignment and operational flexibility.

Implications for the Indo-Pacific and Beyond

The logic of the DISRUPT Act extends naturally to the Asia-Indo-Pacific, where the fates of Korea and Taiwan are increasingly intertwined. China’s alignment with Russia and North Korea threatens to link the Eurasian and Pacific theaters into a single front.

A Political Warfare Service would allow the United States to synchronize efforts across these regions by integrating deterrence in Northeast Asia with global information and economic campaigns.

Recommendations

Establish a Political Warfare Service (PWS 2.0) modeled on the OSS.

Issue a Presidential NSDD on Political and Irregular Warfare and update George Kennan’s 1948 memo.

Digitize strategic planning with AI-enabled tools.

Institutionalize education through a National Political Warfare Center.

Integrate allies into the DISRUPT framework.

Campaign in the gray zone to defeat CRInK malign activities..

What’s in a Name?

Critics will assail the Political Warfare Service. Rightly so. We have a proliferation of names for every phenomenon, and every institution, organization, and agency to address the phenomena.

This causes definition and terminology paralysis, preventing the intellectual rigor necessary to effectively address national security challenges, as more time is spent naming challenges than acquiring the deep knowledge and understanding required to address them.

It doesn’t matter what name is used. What is necessary is to operationalize the DISRUPT Act with a strategy and an interagency organization that can campaign to disrupt the Dark Quad or CRInK in support of U.S. national security objectives.

The name does not matter. The strategy and our nation’s ability to campaign in the gray zone do.

Conclusion: Reclaiming the Initiative

The DISRUPT Act is more than a policy proposal; it is a recognition that the United States is once again engaged in a world-spanning contest of wills. The convergence of authoritarian powers demands institutional transformation.

Just as General Donovan’s OSS provided the blueprint for contributing to victory in the last systemic struggle, a Political Warfare Service 2.0 must now provide the architecture for this one.

About the Author: David Maxwell

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian security affairs and irregular, unconventional and political warfare. He is vice president of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a senior fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. After he retired, he became associate director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is the editor at large for the Small Wars Journal.

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nationalsecurityjournal.org · David Maxwell · November 18, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com

If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."

Access NSS HERE

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AI Is Supercharging Disinformation Warfare

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STANDING DOWN

ALL HANDS ON DECK

Congress’s DISRUPT Act: The Blueprint for Political Warfare Against the “Dark Quad”

The DISRUPT Act Demands a New U.S. Political Warfare Service

The DISRUPT Act: Congress’s Call to Strategic Arms

The Strategic Challenge: The Dark Quad and the New Convergence

The Missing Institution: Toward a Political Warfare Service 2.0

Operationalizing the DISRUPT Act

Building the Policy Foundation: A Modern NSDD for Irregular Warfare

Institutional and Cultural Resistance

Implications for the Indo-Pacific and Beyond

Recommendations

What’s in a Name?

Conclusion: Reclaiming the Initiative

About the Author: David Maxwell