Informal Institute for National Security Thinkers and Practitioners

Quotes of the Day:


“Experience is the hardest kind of teacher. It gives you the test first and the lesson afterward.” 
- Oscar Wilde

“Before you argue with someone, ask yourself, is that person, even mentally mature enough to grasp the concept of different perspective? Because if not, there's absolutely no point.” 
- Morgan Freeman

“You should not be afraid of someone who has a library and reads many books; you should fear someone who has only one book; and he considers it sacred, but he has never read it.” 
- Friedrich Nietzsche.”


1. Memes vs. Missiles? Cognitive Access Denial and the North Korea Problem

2. N. Korea could stage provocations to divert domestic attention: defense chief

3. S. Korean military says N. Korea might have provided Russia with short-range ballistic missiles

4. N Korea has shipped 1 million shells to Russia: S Korea intel

5. Pregnant woman among 4 N. Koreans who crossed maritime border

6. S. Korea urges Pyongyang to resume regular contact via inter-Korean liaison line

7. N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees (Part 2)

8. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November - KOREA

9. 5 S. Koreans from Gaza arrived in Egypt via Rafah border: ministry

10. Odd bedfellows: North Korea, Arab world support Palestine for different reasons

11. South Korea, U.S. mark alliance with rap song, fashion and beer

12. Family members of S. Korean detainees in N. Korea recognized as victims of abduction

13. N. Korea appears to have resumed regular flights to Beijing

14. Xi says 'willing to make bigger contributions' in letter to NK leader

15. A country whose 51% of population lives in capital and nearby region

16. North imports record amount of wine and whiskey, despite sanctions

17. ‘More to this place than barbed wire’: South Korea reimagines its DMZ as a path towards peace | North Korea




1. Memes vs. Missiles? Cognitive Access Denial and the North Korea Problem


It is good to see people other than hard core Korea watchers thinking about irregular warfare in north Korea and most importantly information warfare against the Kim family regime.  

Maybe this article will help wake up policy makers and strategists. (And per the author's comments I do not question the utility of ARSOF in this effort. north Korea should be a "laboratory" for US PSYOP forces and the majority of our PSYOP capabilities reside in ARSOF - certainly all of our active duty capabilities do.)


Conclusion:


Converging partner capabilities with psychological operations, cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare can be the Army’s contribution to U.S. information advantage and the irregular warfare application of integrated deterrence. It is time to use these irregular tools against a threat like North Korea and its fellow regimes in China, Russia, and Iran for strategic effects in support of U.S. national interests.



There has been a lot of work done over the years to recommend policies and strategy based on information but they have mostly fallen on deaf ears in Seoul and DC. I will say that one of the paradoxes of information is that most of the ideas accepted for implementation are highly classified discreet surgical activities that never achieve any results that can be publicly recognized if they achieve anything at all. There is no will for an overt comprehensive and systematic information campaign. Ironically, if such a campaign were to be conducted it would probably better facilitate some of those classified discreet information operations with which so many are enamored. But the bottom line is we need to be focused on the fundamentals and the blocking and tackling of basic information warfare rather than trying to be too cool for school.


Here are some references to supplement this excellent piece (the authors have linked to a wide variety of sources with their embedded links to include variations of some of the works of the authors below).


Commander Frederick Vincenzo, “An Information Based Strategy to Reduce North Korea’s Increasing Threat - Recommendations for ROK & U.S. Policy Makers,” Center for New American Security, October 3, 2016, 

https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-information-based-strategy-to-reduce-north-koreas-increasing-threat

 

George Hutchinson, “Army of the Indoctrinated: The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA," Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, April 26, 2022, 

https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hutchinson_KPA_web_0426.pdf  

 

Jieun Baek, “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization,” Harvard Belfer Center, August 2021, 

https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/policy-public-diplomacy-north-korea

 

David Maxwell, “The Nature of The Kim Family Regime: The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State,” Red Diamond, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 19, 2020

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/02/19/the-nature-of-the-kim-family-regime-the-guerrilla-dynasty-and-gulag-state/

and https://drive.google.com/file/d/12DLljRWQtQNje4hqrpwfGuEMvlpyk5Gt/view?usp=sharing

 

(Note this one is linked in the essay below)

Bradley Bowman and David Maxwell, “Maximum Pressure 2.0 A Plan for North Korea,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 5, 2020, “A Plan B for North Korea,” pages 8-13 and “Information and Influence Activities” 


https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/fdd-report-maximum-pressure-2-a-plan-for-north-korea.pdf


Robert Joseph, Robert Collins, Joseph DeTrani, Nicholas Eberstadt, Olivia Enos, David Maxwell, and Greg Scarlatoiu, "National Strategy for Countering North Korea," No. 545, January 23, 2023

https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/


Video: “Conversation with COL (Ret) Dave Maxwell, Potential for North Korea Influence & Information Campaign,” July 14, 2022,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0E9032OEOo 


David Maxwell, “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152,

https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a


Suki Kim, “The Underground Movement Trying to Topple the North Korean Regime,” The New Yorker Magazine, November 16, 2020

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/23/the-underground-movement-trying-to-topple-the-north-korean-regime 


Memes vs. Missiles? Cognitive Access Denial and the North Korea Problem

irregularwarfarecenter.org

October 31, 2023

Steve Ferenzi

Keith Weber

José Madera

Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon.

North Korea’s mafia state is a persistent threat to the U.S. homeland that, if left unaddressed, will metastasize and ultimately drain resources from confronting the pacing threat of China. Recent technological developments, such as its first solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile test in April after an unprecedented 68 missile tests in 2022 (ten times more than in 2021), underscore the increasing danger. Past attempts to restrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, like President Obama’s “strategic patience” and President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaigns, have failed. It is time for a new approach—one that prioritizes the information instrument of power to support integrated deterrence and set conditions for eventual regime transition and denuclearization.

The focus should be on defeating North Korea’s cognitive access denial—that is, penetrating the regime’s wall of censorship, propaganda, and indoctrination, by converging information capabilities across domains. The biggest threat to the Kim family regime is information. A multi-front information and influence campaign may prove decisive over time instead of legacy approaches that continue to fail to meet policy objectives. Indeed, enabling access to outside information must be at the core of any North Korea strategy.

This North Korea problem offers the U.S. Army the opportunity to leverage its “information advantage” capabilities that reside in its psychological operations, cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare formations. Effective deterrence is not just about more combined exercisesmissile defense systems, or troops on the peninsula.

The Army’s Special Operations Forces and Multi-Domain Task Forces—alongside interagency, joint force, and multinational partners—can assist in cracking North Korea open to information. Equally important, the Army can help shape narratives to enable the North Korean people to take matters into their own hands. It’s also an effective way to conduct irregular warfare activities to put the United States and its allies in a position of advantage in the greater global competition between democracy and authoritarianism.

Groundhog Day, or a Korean Spring?

Two trends frame the Korea problem: Pyongyang’s provocations against the United States, and subsequent negotiations and sanctions by the United States in response. North Korea’s “cycle of provocation” spans six decades of terrorist, conventional, and cyber attacks in conjunction with nuclear and ballistic missile testing—all designed to extract economic and political concessions from the United States and maintain internal support from the regime’s elite backers.

Attempts by international coalitions to negotiate and sanction, such as the Six-Party Talks and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2321, have led only to North Korea choosing to invest in further developing its nuclear capabilities. President Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach, while achieving a historic bilateral dialogue, failed to denuclearize North Korea. Like Bill Murray’s character in the movie Groundhog Day, the United States finds itself stuck in a time loop reliving the cycle yet again.

multi-front information and influence campaign targeting regime leadership, North Korea’s citizens, and international stakeholders could break this fruitless cycle. While not a completely new idea (others have proposed a “maximum pressure 2.0” that includes information and influence activities), this campaign elevates information to the primary line of effort and expands its tools.

The need for this approach rests on three essential truths. First, Kim Jong Un will never willingly denuclearize. As in all totalitarian states, the Kim regime has a vital interest in its survival. Nuclear weapons provide the ultimate deterrent, and history indicates the regime will continue to buy more time to develop greater capabilities. One must only observe Ukraine’s situation today—a victim of Russia’s invasion after giving up its nuclear arsenal 30 years ago—to see the folly of denuclearization. Second, North Korea will not peacefully reunite with South Korea while the Kim family is in power as any terms for such national reunification would herald the dynasty’s demise. Third, North Korea is part of the larger China problem. China leverages the North Korean quagmire in its favor to prevent instability on the peninsula that could complicate its Taiwan reunification efforts. New options are necessary.

Breaking the Cycle

Previous efforts to deter North Korean aggression and compel behavior change relied on hard military and economic power. But more of the same will not solve the problem. A focus on information and influence instead offers the best chance of replacing the Kim regime with one more likely to accept denuclearization and eventual reunification under South Korean leadership.

An influence campaign could facilitate nonviolent resistance and induce regime fracture. Unfortunately, in contrast to recent rebellions, North Korea lacks dissident elites or social movements capable of engineering the defection of disgruntled security officers, or a pan-Korean solidarity narrative to unify the people for sustained collective action. An influence campaign can shape conditions to catalyze this over time.

Security apparatus defections are key—increasing the chance of successful nonviolent action and catalytic change by nearly 60 percent. Korea experts David Maxwell and Mathew Ha note that separating the Kim regime from “second-tier leadership” is essential and can be done by sowing doubt, suggesting that the lives of North Koreans could improve if the regime changed its policies. The targeted elite could include about 1,000 military and party officials outside of the core regime who could collectively influence the outcome of any contingency. Information and narratives are critical to undermining these power structures on which the regime depends for survival.

Economic and diplomatic actions would play critical reinforcing roles in encouraging regime defections and fostering internal dissent. Tailored sanctions must continue to target organizations like Office 39 which orchestrate the regime’s global illicit activities and sustain the patronage networks that maintain the elite’s loyalty. Key to this combined economic and diplomatic effort would be integrating high-level North Korean officials into the information and influence efforts as they defect to capitalize on their knowledge of cracks within the regime.

Defeating Cognitive Access Denial

An influence campaign would first have to breach North Korea’s digital iron curtain, which includes layers of state media and information control that deny cognitive access to and among its population and elites. The U.S. military tends to focus on enemy anti-access and area denial systems (A2/AD)—capabilities such as integrated air and missile defense that would prevent joint force entry into a theater of war. This focus is prevalent in the Army’s approach to “multi-domain operations” which highlights the challenge of defeating such lethal systems. However, the Army is also uniquely capable of defeating cognitive access denial systems across the electro-magnetic spectrum and information environment to project influence.

The Army’s framework of “penetrate, dis-integrate, exploit” may be a useful starting point for an influence campaign in North Korea. If rudimentary techniques using thumb drives, balloons, and commercial drones have proven so effective for disseminating information across the Korean border, imagine what a full suite of cross-domain information-related capabilities can bring to the table in bridging the gap between the physical and information environments.

Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), especially its psychological operations units, are tailor-made to shape perceptions and behavior in foreign audiences. By integrating military information support operations and intelligence capabilities with broader cyber, electro-magnetic, and space capabilities throughout the Army and joint force, this new “triad” can deliver “information firepower” through forward-deployed units or U.S.-based action arms like the Joint Military Information Support Operations WebOps Center (“JMWC”) and Information Warfare Center.

Similarly, Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) serve as the Army’s experimental counter-A2/AD platform. An MDTF contains long-range precision fires along with intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space assets (“I2CEWS”)—capabilities critical to disrupting, degrading, and destroying the sensors, communications, and targeting systems that A2/AD relies upon. While its primary role is lethal fires, its information-related capabilities can serve the critical function of facilitating entry into the information environment—especially when coupled with theater assets such as the 915th Cyber Warfare Battalion and newest Theater Information Advantage Detachment.

“The shield is down. Commence attack on the Death Star’s main reactor.”

Cognitive controls, including internet controls, spyware, split mobile phone networks, fixed government-approved radio frequencies, and jamming capabilities, are analogous to lethal anti-access challenges. Expanding the concept of anti-access to include cognitive controls moves us towards a more comprehensive understanding of A2/AD beyond the rigid “death star”-like (in reference to the spherical space station and superweapon used by the evil Galactic Empire in Star Wars) depictions of interlocking air defense range circles on a map. By converging the conduit–centric aspects of information warfare—cyber, electromagnetic, and space capabilities—the Army can penetrate the information barriers surrounding the essential target audiences inside North Korea. This will enable outside information to flood into North Korea, illuminate the regime’s human rights abuses and corruption, and amplify associated grievances.

Inside the Bubble—Connection and Amplification

Once the North Korean population is armed with the relevant information, what’s next? This is where the content-focused psychological operations enter to disintegrate existing perceptions and beliefs and enable resistance partners to exploit the resultant friction. However, two things are necessary to understand: external actors cannot export a revolution, and they cannot create revolutionaries from scratch. Change must come from indigenous actors. What the Army can do is inspire, connect, and amplify their efforts.

North Korea’s social control systems prevent critical players from connecting with each other. The second-tier leadership (military and party officials outside of the core regime) can collectively drive change only if they can communicate and coordinate safely. Moreover, brokers organic to North Korea’s population must be able to facilitate bloc recruitment by connecting disparate groups, both internally and externally, for mass mobilization. Virtual access and sanctuary can be a game-changer, similar to how Google helped Egyptians circumvent state media control in 2011.

Human and virtual infrastructure are necessary but insufficient for mobilization. Rapid and cross-cutting movement requires strategic framing to create shared consciousness for collective action. Social movement experts Robert Benford and David Snow describe how narrative shaping occurs through a frame alignment process. Narrative shaping first requires bridging individual conditions to structural issues, like regime incompetence in handling the COVID pandemic worsening the lives of each citizen beyond their already difficult existence. After bridging to the person, frame amplification then creates a sense of ownership, highlighting that the regime is not just incompetent, but organs like Office 39 and party officials deliberately kept the regime healthy at the expense of its subjects. This is even more effective when the regime creates iconic martyrs, which is inevitable during resistance.

Frame extension is the tipping factor that links various narratives within the population to communicate, for example, that it is not just poor farmers suffering, but it is everyone outside of the Kim family. Finally, frame transformation revitalizes historical narratives, like how China has used the Kim family as a pawn, a buffer (the “lips”) for China (the “teeth”) against the United States since 1950. It may be useful to narrate how Beijing not only makes the Kim family do its bidding today, but how China also hid the severity of the coronavirus outbreak that originated in its country and that would devastate the North Korean population and perpetually-meager economy to keep them dependent. The Army’s array of information advantage capabilities make it uniquely capable of connecting brokers and disseminating and amplifying narratives like these to empower resistance partners.

For skeptics who think an influence campaign will not set conditions for eventual regime transition and denuclearization, these efforts are still valuable as they also could bolster a containment-based approach or contribute to victory if war breaks out due to regime escalation. Army Special Operations Forces and MDTFs could provide theater commanders enhanced decision support through deep analysis of the North Korean population and regime leadership that would allow for precision messaging against specific points of leverage to prepare the environment prior to and during U.S. engagement across the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments.

Whether regime transition, containment, or escalation to war by the regime, understanding the information environment and building the ability to influence North Korea’s key decision-makers ultimately provides options to impose costs on the regime and shape the trajectory of any given approach.

Out With a Boom or a Chorus of People Power?

The accelerating pace of North Korea’s nuclear and strategic missile developments requires the United States to pursue a new approach—one that abandons yesterday’s fruitless Groundhog Day efforts and is instead appropriate for today’s information age. Moreover, to truly achieve a position of advantage in the greater competition between democracy and authoritarianism led by China, the United States must exploit all the capabilities and tools in its information instrument of power.

We must acknowledge this is not just an Army or even a joint fight.It is about integrating interorganizational partners and broader U.S. government entities. The Army’s information and influence operations support broader U.S. public diplomacy efforts conducted by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Principal Information Operations Advisor to the Defense Secretary, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (which operates Voice of America and Radio Free Asia).

Furthermore, as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasizes, these efforts must also include our partners and allies. A multi-front campaign to defeat North Korea’s cognitive access denial systems, enable resistance partners, and set conditions for regime transition best serves U.S. interests in the end.

While some may question ARSOF’s utility and newer formations like the MDTF for this job, earlier and smaller applications such as the Joint Effects Group in Syria demonstrated the outsized return on investment in the information space. This flat organization—comprised of only a handful of information professionals, synchronized psychological operations, civil affairs, electronic warfare, and public affairs operations—assisted with mobilization against the Islamic State through counter-messaging and bolstered alternative local governance efforts such as the Manbij and Raqqa Civic Councils by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The focus on information as a critical capability enabled the liberation of Islamic State-occupied territory and follow-on governance by U.S. partners—foreshadowing how similar information efforts could support the North Korean people against the Kim family regime.

Converging partner capabilities with psychological operations, cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare can be the Army’s contribution to U.S. information advantage and the irregular warfare application of integrated deterrence. It is time to use these irregular tools against a threat like North Korea and its fellow regimes in China, Russia, and Iran for strategic effects in support of U.S. national interests.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy, opinion, or position of the Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Irregular Warfare Center, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the authors’ employers.

Lt. Col. Steve Ferenzi is an Army Strategist and Special Forces officer serving as campaign planner in the U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) J5. He previously led the development of U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) Army Special Operations Forces Strategy. He holds a Master of International Affairs Degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).

Keith Weber serves in the USASOC G5 Regional Plans Division and was previously responsible for the USASOC Indo-Pacific portfolio. He is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and served as a fire control officer on the AC-130U Spooky Gunship. He holds a Masters of International Relations degree from Troy University.

Jose Madera currently supports the SOCCENT Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate. He previously served in the U.S. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) J3. A retired Civil Affairs officer, he is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds graduate degrees from Purdue University, Carnegie Mellon University, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.

irregularwarfarecenter.org


2. N. Korea could stage provocations to divert domestic attention: defense chief


The MINDEF is correct. We think every provocation is a message to us. But that is not always the case. The regime needs to create the threat and cause high tensions in order to justify the sacrifice and suffering of the Korean people in the north as Kim Jong Un prioritizes support to the Kim family regime and the development of nuclear weapons and missiles over the welfare of the Korean people.


N. Korea could stage provocations to divert domestic attention: defense chief | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 2, 2023

SEOUL, Nov. 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's defense minister called Thursday for heightened military readiness to brace for any possible North Korean provocation meant to divert domestic attention from the nation's food crisis.

North Korea has launched a flurry of ballistic missile tests since last year, including a Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile in April and July. It also made two failed attempts to put a military spy satellite into orbit earlier this year.

"There is a high possibility that North Korea could carry out provocations to divert internal complaints related to its food shortage and economic crisis to the outside world," Shin Won-sik said during a virtual conference with operations commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force.


Defense Minister Shin Won-sik (L, top row) presides over a video conference with operation commanders of Army, Navy and Air Force units on Nov. 2, 2023, in this photo provided by the defense ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The comments came as Hamas' surprise rocket attack on Israel renewed concerns in South Korea over Seoul's capabilities to counter a potential attack from North Korea.

North Korea is estimated to operate some 340 long-range artillery pieces, which directly target the greater Seoul area, home to about half of the country's 51.5 million people.

Shin said the South Korean military should shift its posture from "defensive" to "offensive" to fend off a more hostile North Korea, in his thinly veiled attack against the 2018 inter-Korean military reduction agreement he has repeatedly criticized since taking office last month.

The Comprehensive Military Agreement, signed under former liberal President Moon Jae-in amid a reconciliatory mood, calls for setting up maritime buffer zones that ban artillery firing and naval drills to prevent clashes in the intensely guarded region.

"Although some believed North Korea could change, it turned out to be total fantasy and false belief," Shin said. "While the enemy has never changed, we have unilaterally been on the defensive."

During a parliamentary audit last week, Shin estimated the number of Pyongyang's violations of the 2018 accord near the northwestern islands around 3,600, which includes 110 firings of artillery shells and some 3,400 minor violations related to leaving gun ports and port holes of coastal artillery open.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 2, 2023



3. S. Korean military says N. Korea might have provided Russia with short-range ballistic missiles


There is some irony here as most all of north Korean missiles are originally of Soviet design though the north has done a lot of re-engineering and adaptation.


(LEAD) S. Korean military says N. Korea might have provided Russia with short-range ballistic missiles | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 2, 2023

(ATTN: REVISES headline; UPDATES with more details in paras 7-8, 11-13)

By Kim Eun-jung

SEOUL, Nov. 2 (Yonhap) -- North Korea might have provided Russia with short-range ballistic missiles and portable anti-aircraft missiles in addition to artillery rounds for its war in Ukraine, a senior South Korean military official said Thursday.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) made the assessment amid concerns over increasing military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow following the rare summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin in September.

Military officials estimated about 2,000 containers of military equipment and munitions were shipped from North Korea's northeastern port of Rajin to Vladivostok in Russia's Far East, which is sharply up from 1,000 containers revealed by the White House on Oct. 13, citing satellite imagery taken in September.

The volume is presumed to be capable of loading over 200,000 rounds of 122 mm artillery shells or over 1 million rounds of 152 mm shells, which are used by both countries.


North Korean leader Kim Jong-un (R) is greeted by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Vostochny Cosmodrome space launch center in the Russian Far East on Sept. 13, 2023, in this photo released by the North's official Korean Central News Agency the next day. (For Use Only in the Republic of Korea. No Redistribution) (Yonhap)

North Korea may have also supplied other weapons to Russia, including T-series tank ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles, rocket launchers, rifles and machine guns and possibly short-range ballistic missiles.

"There have been indications of North Korea's supply of weapons to Russia since mid-2022, and the arms trade via maritime routes increased in August shortly before Kim Jong-un's visit to Russia," the senior official told reporters on background.

North Korean vessels were spotted traveling to Russia once a week between August and September, but three to four ships have been seen every three to four days since October, according to the JCS.

North Korean containers have been identified across the country, including border areas between North Korea and Russia, the official said, noting the container measures 6 meters long and 2.5 meters wide.

In return, Russia may consider providing technological support for North Korea's military satellite, nuclear weapons, as well as fighter jets and air defense systems, according to the official.

"North Korea is expected to initially receive food and fuel to secure the stability of the regime and prepare for the upcoming winter. (The two countries) are expected to additionally discuss military technology transfer, support for the modernization of conventional forces and joint training down the road," the official said.

The growing military ties between the isolated nations have raised security concerns as Pyongyang is seeking to put a military spy satellite into orbit following two botched attempts to enhance its surveillance capabilities.

Seoul officials believe North Korea is in the final stage of preparations to carry out its third satellite launch after failed attempts in May and August.

"(North Korea) has recently been observed checking (the satellite's) engine and propulsion system as part of the final preparations. But it is premature to predict the timing of its launch," the official said.

The South Korean military said it has been closely monitoring the latest development of Pyongyang-Moscow military cooperation in coordination with the United States and vowed to bolster its military readiness against possibilities of the North's advancing weapons program.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Kim Eun-jung · November 2, 2023


4. N Korea has shipped 1 million shells to Russia: S Korea intel




N Korea has shipped 1 million shells to Russia: S Korea intel

The shells are sufficient to sustain the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for over two months, said the spy agency.

By Lee Jeong-Ho for RFA

2023.11.01

Taipei, Taiwan

rfa.org

UPDATES at 9:27 am ET, Nov. 1

Russia has received more than 1 million artillery shells from North Korea since early August and is also likely helping Pyongyang with technology for its next attempted satellite launch, South Korea’s spy agency said Wednesday.

South Korea’s lawmaker Yoo Sang-beom told reporters about the assessment by the nation’s National Intelligence Service (NIS), following a briefing by the spy agency in parliament.

The suggestions of increased cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow follow a high-profile meeting of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Russia in September.

The two leaders met at the symbol of Russian space prowess in Russia’s Far East, and vowed to form an “anti-imperialist united front.” Pyongyang often refers to the U.S. and its allies as “imperialists.”

“The National Intelligence Service assesses that North Korea has engaged in the transportation of artillery shells and other weaponry on approximately 10 occasions since early August, utilizing Russian ships and transport planes in support of Russia's involvement in the Ukraine conflict,” Yoo told reporters.

These artillery shells were transported by sea, originating from the port of Najin and reaching the Russian ports of Dunai and Vostochny. From there, they were conveyed by train to Ukraine, near the Toretsk ammunition depot, Yoo said the NIS told lawmakers, adding that it is suspected that North Korea may have also employed air transport for weapons transfer.

“The NIS estimates that this method of transfer involved more than 1 million shells, a quantity the agency analyzes as sufficient to sustain the Russian-Ukrainian conflict for over two months,” Yoo said.

In return, the North is most likely to have received technology transfer from Russia.

“There is an indication that technical expertise has been sought from Russia, a factor that may enhance the likelihood of a successful launch (of North Korea’s satellite),” Yoo said.

The next launch of the North’s “satellite,” initially planned for October, has “experienced a delay,” the lawmaker said. “But currently, it is in the final stages of preparation, which involve thorough inspections of the engine and launch vehicle.” Yoo did not provide further details on when a launch might happen.

North Korea attempted and failed to launch satellites into space in May and August – a very public embarrassment to its leader Kim.

Support for Palestine

Yoo also told reporters that Kim has instructed his officials to investigate “comprehensive ways” to support Palestine in the Israel-Hamas war.

“Kim Jong-un recently directed efforts to explore comprehensive support for Palestine,” said Yoo, without providing further details on how the NIS had obtained this intelligence.

“The NIS assesses that North Korea is aiming for multiple ways to capitalize on the Israel-Hamas war,” Yoo continued, adding that it may provide additional weapons to help Hamas in the future.

“North Korea’s previous export of anti-tank shells to Hamas and Hezbollah raises the possibility that it may be attempting to sell weapons to militant groups in the region and other third parties.”

Last week, the Israeli military confirmed that Hamas has used weapons sourced from North Korea and Iran to target Israel.

Last month, RFA reported on the potential use of North Korean weapons by Hamas militants, based on analysis of a video that displayed a man holding what seemed to be a North Korean-made rocket launcher.

Pyongyang has described the current conflict in the Middle East as a “tragedy created entirely by the United States.”

North Korea’s official Korea Central News Agency also claimed last week that Washington “has turned a blind eye to Israel, its illegal occupation of Palestinian territories, continuous armed assaults, civilian casualties, and the expansion of Jewish settlements.”

Edited by Taejun Kang and Mat Pennington.

Recasts lead.

rfa.org


5. Pregnant woman among 4 N. Koreans who crossed maritime border



The desperation of Koreans in the north.


Pregnant woman among 4 N. Koreans who crossed maritime border | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 2, 2023

SEOUL, Nov. 2 (Yonhap) -- A pregnant woman in her 20s was among the four North Koreans who crossed the eastern maritime inter-Korean border on a wooden boat last month in an attempt to defect to the South, a government source said Thursday.

The Coast Guard and military officials secured the 7.5-meter-long boat carrying the North Koreans in waters east of Sokcho, 151 kilometers northeast of Seoul, on Oct. 24 after South Korean fishermen at the scene reported seeing an "unusual" boat.

The group, consisting of three women and one man, has claimed to have fled the North due to a food shortage.

In a parliamentary audit last month, Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho said North Korea appears to be suffering from a severe food shortage, citing their remarks. He also confirmed the three women are family members.

The North Koreans, currently staying at a protection center for defectors run by the National Intelligence Service, are expected to undergo a 12-week resettlement program at Hanawon, a government-run facility for defectors.

It marked the first time since November 2019 that a group of North Koreans has made an attempt to defect to South Korea on a vessel in the East Sea. At that time, South Korea repatriated the two North Koreans, who confessed to killing fellow crew members.

In May, the South Korean military intercepted a North Korean fishing boat carrying a group of defectors that crossed the western Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea.


A wooden boat (in red circle) is towed by a South Korean military vessel toward a port in Yangyang, Gangwon Province, northeastern South Korea, in this file photo taken Oct. 24, 2023, after a group of four unidentified individuals from North Korea crossed the eastern maritime inter-Korean border on the boat and were spotted in waters off the nearby city of Sokcho. (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)


en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 2, 2023


6. S. Korea urges Pyongyang to resume regular contact via inter-Korean liaison line




(LEAD) S. Korea urges Pyongyang to resume regular contact via inter-Korean liaison line | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 2, 2023

(ATTN: ADDS details throughout)

By Lee Minji

SEOUL, Nov. 2 (Yonhap) -- South Korea's unification ministry on Thursday called on Pyongyang to respond to daily routine calls through an inter-Korean liaison communication channel.

The two Koreas had made two phone calls daily, at 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., as part of liaison communication, but the daily routine calls have gone unanswered since April 7.

"As seen in the rescue of a North Korean vessel stranded near the Northern Limit Line in the East Sea on Oct. 29, the communications channel is an indispensable channel for the notification and consultation of maritime rescue and disasters that should not be halted under any circumstance," the unification ministry said in a statement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said Monday the South Korean military provided food and water to the 10-meter-long vessel on "humanitarian grounds" before it was towed away by North Korean authorities several hours after it was spotted by South Korean forces.

Because the North has been unresponsive to all three inter-Korean communication channels, including military lines, the JCS said it notified the North of the situation through the United Nations Command and international maritime communication channels for its assistance.


This file photo, provided by the unification ministry, shows a South Korean liaison officer talking to his North Korean counterpart at the Seoul bureau of their joint liaison office on Oct. 4, 2021. After a two-month suspension, the two Koreas restored cross-border communication lines that Pyongyang suspended in protest against an annual combined military exercise of South Korea and the United States. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

The ministry voiced "regret" over the situation and emphasized that maintaining the liaison channel is a "humanitarian matter" that is linked to the lives and safety of both South Korean and North Korean residents.

"We urge North Korea to promptly resume and normalize the liaison communication channel so that mutual measures can be taken for emergency situations," the ministry said.

"Our Navy attempted to notify the North through the UNC and international maritime communication channels, but normal communication did not take place," a ministry official told reporters on condition of anonymity.

The daily phone calls via inter-Korean communication channels have gone unanswered for over a year in the past.

In July 2021, the North restored the inter-Korean hotline, about a year after it severed the contact channel in June 2020 in protest of anti-Pyongyang propaganda leaflets sent via balloon by North Korean defectors in Seoul.

North Korea again did not answer calls via the liaison line in August that year for about two months apparently due to its protest against Seoul and Washington's military exercises.

In some cases, Pyongyang did not respond to the call due to technical glitches caused by heavy rains.

As seen in the North Korean vessel incident, Seoul has resorted to other options when the liaison communication channels were unavailable.

In July, the unification ministry made a request through the press, asking Pyongyang to give prior notice should it release water from its border dams during the monsoon season.

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · by Lee Minji · November 2, 2023


7. N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees (Part 2)


I look forward to a future when we no longer have to read accounts such as this.




N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees (Part 2)

"Defectors are seen as people who betrayed and fled their country, so they are treated worse than animals," she told Daily NK

By Seulkee Jang - 2023.11.01 4:00pm

dailynk.com

N. Korean defector talks about experience in holding center for forced returnees (Part 2) | Daily NK English

Image: pixabay

Lee Young-joo, a defector, was forcibly repatriated twice and detained in Ministry of State Security-run holding centers in Onsong and Sinuiju before finally making her way to South Korea. Lee sat down with Daily NK on Oct. 20 to share the painful memories of her own repatriation experiences in light of recent news that a large number of defectors detained in China have been forcibly repatriated to North Korea.

One incident in particular stood out in her recollection. During Lee’s time in detention at a Ministry of State Security (MSS) holding center in Sinuiju, she remembers the prison guards being intent on finding “so much as a single bill” that inmates had kept hidden. Officers not only forced prisoners to remove their underwear, but even searched female detainees’ disposable pads. “That’s when I thought to myself,” Lee recalls, “who knew my homeland was this wretched of a place?”

From repatriation to a MSS holding center, forced labor camp, and re-education camp, Lee has experienced North Korea’s hellish detention system firsthand and got a clear look at the “naked face” of the regime. In 2018, Lee recounted the story of her two forced repatriations and three escapes in her book, “The Naked Face of North Korea that Even Kim Jong Un Needs to Know.” A documentary based on her experiences entitled “You Don’t Know” also premiered last year.

After many twists and turns, Lee escaped North Korea and arrived in South Korea in 2011. In South Korea, Lee studied social welfare and earned licenses to work as a social worker and a nurse’s aide. She now works as a nurse’s aide and continues to speak out about the realities of human rights in North Korea. When asked about her advocacy, Lee explained, “I think it’s my calling in life as a survivor to let people know about the horrifying things happening inside North Korea.”

The following is Part 2 of Daily NK’s interview with Lee. Read Part 1 here.

Daily NK (DNK): We’ve heard that repatriated defectors are sent to political prison camps if the [Ministry of State Security] finds out that they were trying to reach South Korea. You also attempted to escape to South Korea, so how did you avoid getting sent to a political prison camp? 

“I am extremely grateful that when I was in Onsong, the Chinese police didn’t hand over my documents. And, again, in Sinuiju, [the MSS] was unable to confirm that I had been trying to go to South Korea, so I was able to avoid being sent to a political prison camp. Once the MSS finishes their investigation at the holding center, you’re then sent off to detention facilities under the jurisdiction of your home region. The absolutely mind-blowing thing about getting escorted back to a prison in your hometown is that the prisoner has to pay for their own bus fare or gas costs. The MSS agents go to your house in your hometown and tell your family, ‘I need to fetch your daughter from a labor camp in Sinuiju, so give me some money to cover transportation and meal costs.’ Then, once they get the money, they go and get you. Even though I don’t want to go to prison, the government has no money, so individuals end up paying for everything.”  

DNK: When you were sent back to North Korea, were there any young children [in the holding centers] there with you? 

“There was a child who looked to be about three years old who had been caught alongside their mom. If a child is repatriated, they are separated from their mother and either sent to live with relatives or at an orphanage. When I was imprisoned in Sinuiju, there was a woman who was in the last month of her pregnancy. One day, the guards came and took her away and gave her an injection to induce an abortion. That night, she started moaning in pain and delivered the baby right there on the cold cement floor. They put the dead baby’s body in a plastic bag and threw it away somewhere. I saw things with my own two eyes that you would think couldn’t possibly happen in real life. Those memories are so hard to even think about that they make me shake.”

DNK: The first time you were sent back to North Korea and were detained at an MSS holding center in Onsong was 17 years ago, back in 2006. Do you think that the holding facilities, sanitation, or human rights protections for detainees might have improved at all in that time?

“Looking at North Korea’s current economic and human rights situation, I don’t see anything that’s improved in the last 17 years. On the contrary, after COVID-19, people’s lives have only gotten harder and the government’s controls have gotten stricter. North Korea is not the kind of place where, if the government just had some more money, they would spend it to improve detention facilities. Defectors are seen as people who betrayed and fled their country, so they are treated worse than animals. [The guards there] see you as animals, so why should they worry about human rights? [Rather than improving,] I think it’s more likely that things are worse than they were 17 years ago.”

DNK: You came to South Korea even after being repatriated twice. That might make you a symbol of hope for those who have been forcefully repatriated and have fallen into despair. 

“My heart truly aches for them. I feel their pain all the more for having experienced it myself. But, all the same, I hope they won’t give up. If they have children in China, I urge them to think of their children as a reason to keep living. If they have faith, they should use that faith to hold on and endure. Then, once they’ve made it out, I hope they’ll raise their voices to the world.”

Translated by Rose Adams. Edited by Robert Lauler. 

Please direct any comments or questions about this article to dailynkenglish@uni-media.net.

Read in Korean

Seulkee Jang

Seulkee Jang is one of Daily NK’s full-time journalists. Please direct any questions about her articles to dailynk@uni-media.net.

dailynk.com



8. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November - KOREA



While a negative assessment may be correct in terms of what north Korea is doing, the limited space of the assessment prevents highlighting all the positive aspects of the strong alliance and the deterrence activities that are taking place.


I would probably have given at least a neutral assessment to balance the positive military and diplomatic activities that take place to ensure the strength of the alliance.


But opinions are like... and your mileage may vary.


Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November - 

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/11/01/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-november-3/#Korea


KOREA

Anthony Ruggiero

Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program Senior Director and Senior Fellow

Trending Very Negative

Previous Trend:

Negative

Following Kim Jong Un’s meeting with Vladimir Putin last month, the White House confirmed that North Korea has shipped 1,000 containers of “equipment and munitions” to Russia “in recent weeks.” Russian-flagged vessels carry the cargo to Russia, where it is transported by railcar to Tikhoretsk, near the Russia-Ukraine border. 

The administration noted that Pyongyang asked Moscow for help on ballistic missiles and other weapons, including aircraft. The Washington Post, based on satellite imagery analysis by the Royal United Services Institute, suggested that the North Korea-Russia “operation is more regular, extensive and ongoing than the White House revealed.” On October 25, the United States, South Korea, and Japan issued a joint statement urging Pyongyang and Moscow “to abide by relevant UN Security Council resolutions and immediately cease all activities that violate them.” 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the seizure of $1.5 million and 17 website domains that North Korean information technology (IT) workers used “to defraud U.S. and foreign businesses, evade sanctions and fund the development of the DPRK government’s weapons program.” The U.S. and South Korean governments published additional guidance to help the public and private sectors identify potential North Korean IT worker activity. As a May 2022 advisory explained, overseas laborers, including IT workers, generate hundreds of millions of dollars annually for the North Korean government. 

In general, though, the administration is doing a poor job of enforcing congressionally mandated sanctions laws that passed by overwhelming bipartisan majorities in 20162017, and 2019. Washington did not issue any North Korea-related designations in October. 



9. 5 S. Koreans from Gaza arrived in Egypt via Rafah border: ministry


5 S. Koreans from Gaza arrived in Egypt via Rafah border: ministry

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 2, 2023

By Yonhap

Published : Nov. 2, 2023 - 19:25

Smoke billows during Israeli bombardment in the Gaza Strip, amid ongoing battles between Israel and the Palestinian Hamas movement in this picture taken from the Israeli side of the border with the Gaza Strip on Thursday. (AFP)

A South Korean family living in Gaza crossed into Egypt through the Rafah border Thursday, Seoul's foreign ministry said.

Media reports earlier said, quoting authorities from Gaza, that around 600 foreign nationals, including South Koreans, were allowed to leave through the Rafah border Thursday, the second such departure since the border opened up to foreigners and aid workers Wednesday for the first time since the armed conflict between Israel and the Islamic militant Hamas group.

"All South Koreans living in the Gaza Strip -- a family of five members -- arrived in Egypt after crossing the Rafah border between Egypt and Gaza at around 11:15 a.m. (local time)," the ministry said in a text message to reporters.

They are known to be a South Korean woman, her naturalized husband of Palestinian descent and their three children.

The ministry said it has sent the consul of the South Korean embassy in Egypt to the Rafah border and is providing consular assistance to the family, including accommodation and medical checkups.

A local source told Yonhap News Agency that the family members are not injured and in relatively healthy condition.

The South Korean government has maintained close communication with the family to ensure their safety since the Israel-Hamas armed conflict and made various diplomatic efforts to help the family cross the border at the earliest date, the ministry added. (Yonhap)


koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 2, 2023



10. Odd bedfellows: North Korea, Arab world support Palestine for different reasons


Axis of authoritarians and seeker of destruction of the rules based international order.


They are all happy to create dilemmas for the like minded democracies and they all share the same level of concern for their population - only slightly above zero %.


Odd bedfellows: North Korea, Arab world support Palestine for different reasons

The Korea Times · November 2, 2023

Hundreds of pro-Palestinian supporters gather for an anti-Israel rally to show their solidarity with the people of Gaza in Tehran's Palestine Square, Oct. 20. North Korea has joined hands with the Arab world to support Palestine in a coalition against Israel and the U.S. But they have different reasons for their opposition, according to experts. EPA-Yonhap

For NK regime, ‘persecutor of all religions,’ Hamas is just another anti-US comrade: experts

By Jung Min-ho

Many countries in the Middle East as well as North Korea have found themselves on the same side as outspoken critics of Israel over its war against Hamas. But the Arab nations and the regime in Pyongyang, a violent persecutor of all religions, have very different reasons for their opposition, according to experts on Thursday.

Speaking to lawmakers during their audit of the government the previous day, the National Intelligence Service said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un recently ordered officials to come up with ways to “comprehensively support Palestine.”

This revelation comes at a time when many Arab states are facing intensifying public and diplomatic pressure to distance themselves from the Jewish state and its key ally, the U.S., with some political leaders such as Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calling for all “Muslim and Arab countries” to unite.

Experts told The Korea Times that North Korea’s participation in the coalition may seem odd. They noted that the regime has no sympathy for Muslims or anyone with any faith and its support for Palestinians can only be understood through the prism of its anti-U.S. campaign.

“North Korea has long maintained a policy of strengthening the international anti-U.S. bloc. Palestine or Hamas is just another partner in that effort,” said Oh Gyeong-seob, a senior analyst at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a state-funded think tank.

In fact, most Arab countries do not have cordial relations with North Korea. Iran and Syria, where anti-U.S. sentiment is the strongest in the region, are among the few exceptions.

Pyongyang has nonetheless been hostile toward Israel, which it views as a U.S. puppet. In its official encyclopedia, North Korea describes the first Arab-Israel conflict as “a war for justice and liberation” against American and Israeli “invaders.”

But analysts said North Korea’s support would not mean much for Palestinians and has no practical impact on the Israel-Hamas war.

“What would they be able to provide? Troops, weapons, food or medical supplies would all be helpful, but North Koreans don’t have much for themselves. Considering the heavy sanctions imposed, it won’t be able to provide support,” Oh said.

There are allegations that North Korean-made weapons have already been used by Hamas. It is possible that the weapons were transferred there several years ago. But speaking at a U.N. General Assembly session in New York on Tuesday (local time), Kim Song, North Korea’s ambassador to the U.N., denied any involvement.

North Korea is one of the most dangerous countries for religious people. Rights experts said that officials mainly target Christians and followers of Shamanism. Anything about Islam is hardly known other than the Ar-Rahman Mosque in the Iranian embassy in Pyongyang. It is known as the country’s first and only mosque.

“I have spoken with thousands of North Korean defectors and checked its state documents. But I have never heard of anything about Islam there,” a rights expert at a state agency, who refused to be named, said. “But it is easy to find a case where a person is sent to a political prison camp for simply possessing a Christian Bible. I believe people with the Quran would also be punished by the same law if they are caught.”

The Korea Times · November 2, 2023



11. South Korea, U.S. mark alliance with rap song, fashion and beer


I am with the US Embassy. We should serve beer in all cafeterias and mess halls! When I came into the Army (now more than 40 years ago) we still had two beer lunches. The good old days.


Excerpts:

Lee Gyu-tag, an associate professor of global affairs at George Mason University Korea, said South Korea was trying to tap into pop culture to bolster support for the alliance but it risked a backlash.
"When soft power is so blatantly used for a purpose, people won't like it and it might even backfire," Lee said.
While some online commentators praised the rap video others said it was "cringey".
Overall, about one in two South Koreans believe the alliance should be strengthened, according to a Gallup Korea poll commissioned by the government in September.
The U.S. Embassy is marking the friendship with a limited edition "Alliance Pale Ale" at its cafeteria in Seoul, made by a South Korean brewery with ingredients from both countries, in cans featuring Korean tigers and U.S. eagles.


South Korea, U.S. mark alliance with rap song, fashion and beer

Reuters · by Hyunsu Yim

SEOUL, Nov 2 (Reuters) - South Korea is marking the 70th anniversary of its U.S. alliance with much fanfare, including a public information campaign featuring a K-pop-inspired rap song, with the partners extolling closer ties as global tensions rise.

The alliance was forged in the 1950-53 Korean War and some 28,000 U.S. troops remain in South Korea, to the fury of North Korea, which defends its development of nuclear weapons citing the danger of what it says is a U.S.-South Korea plan to invade.

While no South Korean government has ever seriously questioned the alliance, and public support is solid if not overwhelming, former U.S. President Donald Trump caused consternation with a suggestion that U.S. forces could pull out.

The conservative President Yoon Suk Yeol hailed the importance of the alliance on a visit to the White House this year, where he sang the hit "American Pie" for President Joe Biden.

The government's information campaign for the anniversary features a video, broadcast on social media and in cinemas, that includes a clip of that sing-song, along with images of the two countries' flags and the rap song.

"A perfect chemistry protecting freedom and solidarity, mutually advantageous for industry and the economy," go some of the lyrics.

The information campaign is intended to "heighten the public's understanding of the South Korea-US alliance", the culture ministry told Reuters.

The South Korean embassy in the United States staged a fashion show last month marking the anniversary, with models in traditional Korean dresses featuring South Korean and U.S. flags.

SOFT POWER

South Korea's showcasing of its U.S. ties comes after rival North Korea has been making much of its relations with its old partner, Russia.

Russia's foreign and defence ministers have both visited North Korea in recent months and its leader, Kim Jong Il, met Russian President Vladimir Putin in September in Russia.

South Korea's spy agency suspects that North Korea has sent Russia more than 10 shipments of munitions for its war against Ukraine, a politician briefed by the agency said on Wednesday.

U.S. forces, meanwhile, have held a series of military exercises in the region including one last month with South Korea and Japanese forces featuring a U.S. B-52 strategic bomber.

Lee Gyu-tag, an associate professor of global affairs at George Mason University Korea, said South Korea was trying to tap into pop culture to bolster support for the alliance but it risked a backlash.

"When soft power is so blatantly used for a purpose, people won't like it and it might even backfire," Lee said.

While some online commentators praised the rap video others said it was "cringey".

Overall, about one in two South Koreans believe the alliance should be strengthened, according to a Gallup Korea poll commissioned by the government in September.

The U.S. Embassy is marking the friendship with a limited edition "Alliance Pale Ale" at its cafeteria in Seoul, made by a South Korean brewery with ingredients from both countries, in cans featuring Korean tigers and U.S. eagles.

Reporting by Hyunsu Yim; editing by Robert Birsel

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab

Reuters · by Hyunsu Yim


12. Family members of S. Korean detainees in N. Korea recognized as victims of abduction



https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20231102000793

Family members of S. Korean detainees in N. Korea recognized as victims of abduction

https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20231102000793

By Yonhap

https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20231102000793

https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20231102000793

Published : Nov. 2, 2023 - 20:52

  •  

Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho (center) greets members of civic groups dedicated to resolving the issue of detainees, abductees and prisoners of war in North Korea in a meeting at his office in central Seoul on Aug. 3. (Newsis)

The unification ministry said Thursday it has decided to recognize family members of long-term South Korean detainees in North Korea as victims of abductions by the isolated country.

The decision came three months after civic groups dedicated to resolving the issue requested Unification Minister Kim Yung-ho in August to grant such family members the status specified in South Korea's law on supporting victims of North Korean abductions.

The recognition will make the family members eligible for state compensation of about 15 million won ($11,234) to 20 million won per family, the ministry said.

Currently, six South Koreans, including pastor Kim Jung-wook, are known to be in detention in North Korea for years, with four of them having family members in South Korea.

The fate of the detainees remains unknown, as North Korea has not provided any information on their well-being.

"For a substantial solution to the issue of detainees, abductees and prisoners of war (in North Korea), the government will cooperate with civic groups to continue to draw attention at home and abroad, and closely coordinate with the international community," the ministry said. (Yonhap)


13. N. Korea appears to have resumed regular flights to Beijing




​Getting back to normal? (Juche normal).




N. Korea appears to have resumed regular flights to Beijing

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 2, 2023

By Yonhap

Published : Nov. 2, 2023 - 10:50

An Air Koryo plane is seen at Beijing Capital International Airport on Aug. 24. (Yonhap)

North Korea's national carrier appears to have resumed regular flights connecting Pyongyang and Beijing, a website showed Thursday, as the reclusive regime reopened its border following more than three years of border lockdown.

The move comes after an Air Koryo flight landed in Beijing on Aug. 22, the first resumption of commercial flights since the North closed its border in January 2020 to fend off COVID-19.

The Beijing Capital International Airport's website showed that a flight departing from Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang was scheduled to arrive in Beijing at 12:30 p.m. and return to the North Korean capital at 3:05 p.m.

Another Air Koryo flight traveled between Pyongyang and Beijing on Tuesday.

The North Korean national carrier had operated routes connecting Pyongyang and Beijing every Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday before flights were suspended due to the yearslong border closure.

Radio Free Asia, a Washington-based media outlet, said Air Koryo operated the flights on Oct. 24, 26 and 28, lending support to the view that the regular flights have fully returned to pre-COVID levels.

Air Koryo has also resumed its pre-COVID flight schedules to Vladivostok, operating flights to the far eastern Russian city every Monday and Friday since Oct. 16.

Following the rare summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin on Sept. 13, Russian officials said regular flight resumption was among the topics discussed during the talks. (Yonhap)


koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 2, 2023



​14. Xi says 'willing to make bigger contributions' in letter to NK leader



As long as Xi can ensure adherence to two of the 3 "No's" no war, no regime collapse and instability, and no nuclear weapons. Two out of three is not bad for China.




Xi says 'willing to make bigger contributions' in letter to NK leader

koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 2, 2023

By Yonhap

Published : Nov. 2, 2023 - 09:48

Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers opening remarks at the Belt and Road Forum at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, on Oct. 18. (Yonhap)

Chinese President Xi Jinping told North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that he is "willing to make bigger contributions" to "defend the region's peace, stability, development and prosperity," Pyongyang's state media said Thursday.

Xi made the remarks as he replied to Kim's congratulatory message marking the 74th founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China. In the Oct. 1 letter, Kim pledged to "strive to consolidate" their bilateral relations and "safeguard peace and stability in the region and the rest of the world."

In the message sent to Kim on Saturday, Xi was quoted as saying he is willing to work together with Kim to help improve bilateral ties at a time when regional and global order is progressing in a grave and complicated direction, according to the North's official Korean Central News Agency.

"The traditional friendly ties between the two countries have become stronger as time passes," Xi said, it added.

Pyongyang has been strengthening its ties with China, the North's traditional ally and economic benefactor, amid the intensifying Sino-US rivalry and the long-stalled denuclearization talks. (Yonhap)


koreaherald.com · by Yonhap · November 2, 2023


15. A country whose 51% of population lives in capital and nearby region



South Korea "redistricting" to change the voting dynamics of Seoul?



A country whose 51% of population lives in capital and nearby region

donga.com


Posted November. 02, 2023 08:52,

Updated November. 02, 2023 08:52

A country whose 51% of population lives in capital and nearby region. November. 02, 2023 08:52. .


The People Power Party has decided to propose a special law to include Gimpo in Gyeonggi Province as part of Seoul this week. Such a decision is questionable as it was made hastily without consideration for how to develop Seoul from the perspective of ‘megacity’ competition with other advanced countries and ensuring balanced development across the country.


Advanced countries are strengthening their competitiveness in both industries and housing by improving the transportation system that integrates large cities and nearby regions to ensure fast and convenient movement. The U.K. has been developing Greater London since 1963 and expanded the boundaries of London to the mouth of the River Thames when it hosted the 2012 London Olympics. France has been pursuing the Grand Paris project since 2007 to expand Paris to Le Havre, a port city, as Paris is so small and disconnected from the suburbs that racial tensions increase. The U.S. also began implementing the ‘mega city’ development strategy by dividing the country into 100 areas, stepping away from its previous plan focused on small cities in the countryside.


If Seoul is to join such a megacity competition, the first issue to be addressed is how to connect Seoul and the Gyeonggi region including Incheon where an international airport and port. Simply including Gimpo and other residential cities through administrative adjustments does not make the capital a competitive megacity. It may increase the inflow of people and materials into Seoul, simply worsening the existing congestion in Seoul.


While the population in Seoul reportedly began to decrease, 9.4 million people still reside in the city. Seoul and its nearby region only account for 11 percent of the country by area, but 51 percent of its population lives there. A series of serious problems – the excess and shortage of labor, surging housing prices, and declining fertility rate – are caused by the excessive concentration in the region. The top priority is to disperse industries and population concentrated in the region by developing rural areas, rather than expanding Seoul.


A special union for Busan-Ulsan-South Gyeongsang Mega City was launched early this year but fell through. The previous method of establishing special zones for the economy or education is not sufficient for the actual development of the rural region. Japan is producing positive outcomes through the integrated efforts of local governments, including Osaka and Kyoto, not its capital and nearby regions. South Korea should come up with plans to develop mega cities in the rural region along with those to reinforce Seoul’s competitiveness.

한국어

donga.com


16. North imports record amount of wine and whiskey, despite sanctions




​Essential goods for the mafia like the crime family cult of the Kim family regime.


Thursday

November 2, 2023

 dictionary + A - A 

Published: 02 Nov. 2023, 18:25



North imports record amount of wine and whiskey, despite sanctions

https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2023-11-02/national/northKorea/North-imports-record-amount-of-wine-and-whiskey-despite-sanctions/1904772


A freight train crosses the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge over the Yalu River that divided China and North Korea on Sept. 27, 2022. [YONHAP]

 

North Korea has imported record quantities of wine and whiskey since loosening restrictions on cross-border rail freight in the past year, according to Chinese customs records.

 

The data, which was examined by Voice of America (VOA), shows that shipments of wine into the North via China from January to September were worth $2.31 million, while whiskey imports in the same period were worth $2.87 million.

 

Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, the North is barred from importing luxury goods.



 

The amount of wine and whiskey imported by the North in the first nine months of the year exceeded previous annual imports, according to the VOA’s analysis of Chinese customs records, which date back to 2001 for wine and 2010 for whiskey.

 

The data shows that the North spent five times as much on wine between January and September than during all of 2022.

 

The total amount of whiskey it imported via China this year came to 171,000 liters, outstripping the 70,000 liters it imported in 2022.

 

The total cost of whiskey, cognac, rum, vodka, tequila and other hard liquors imported between January and September is approximately $5.28 million, according to VOA.

 

In contrast to South Korea, the United States and Japan, which restrict the export of alcohol to North Korea by categorizing it as a sanctioned luxury good, China has not implemented such restrictions.

 

Related Article

China-North Korea trade soars but still falls short of pre-Covid levels

Air Koryo flights appear halted after brief resumption

Ties with Beijing provide Pyongyang with a vital trade lifeline, and the end of the North’s self-imposed border blockade has coincided with a marked resumption in travel and cargo movements via rail, air and sea.

 

On Thursday, the website of Beijing Capital International Airport on Thursday began displaying regular flights by Air Koryo, North Korea’s national carrier.

 

A flight from Sunan International Airport in Pyongyang was shown as arriving in Beijing at 12:30 p.m. and returning to the North at 3:05 p.m.

 

A previous Air Koryo flight traveled between Pyongyang and Beijing on Tuesday.

 

According to the North’s state media on Thursday, Chinese President Xi Jinping told North Korean leader Kim Jong-un that he is “willing to make bigger contributions” to “defend the region's peace, stability, development and prosperity,” signaling continuing close ties between the neighbors.

 

Xi’s remarks were part of his response to Kim’s congratulatory message to mark the 74th founding anniversary of the People's Republic of China on Oct. 1.

 

In his letter, Kim pledged to “consolidate” his regime’s ties with Beijing to “safeguard peace and stability in the region and the world.”

 

According to Pyongyang’s state-controlled Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Xi told Kim in his response that he was willing to work with the North Korean leader to improve bilateral ties.

 

“The traditional friendly ties between the two countries have become stronger as time passes,” KCNA quoted Xi saying.

 


BY MICHAEL LEE [lee.junhyuk@joongang.co.kr]




17. ‘More to this place than barbed wire’: South Korea reimagines its DMZ as a path towards peace | North Korea


Photos and maps at the link: https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/02/more-to-this-place-than-barbed-wire-south-korea-reimagines-its-dmz-as-a-path-towards-peace?utm


These articles pop up periodically. But my question is always how will Korea account for the 1 million mines in the DMZ that are not mapped and located? Can the DMZ ever be safe? I think it will require extensive walking paths and barriers to protect citizens when inside the DMZ 9Or former DMZ).



‘More to this place than barbed wire’: South Korea reimagines its DMZ as a path towards peace | North Korea | The Guardian

At times an easy Sunday walk, at others a tense hike amid military practice targets, this peace trail gives firsthand experience of a place still divided by war

Raphael Rashid in Goseong county

Wed 1 Nov 2023 19.42 EDT

amp.theguardian.com

Show caption

Beachside section of a DMZ peace trail in Goseong, South Korea, lined with barbed wire. It is a restricted zone requiring a military escort. Photograph: Goseong County

North Korea

‘More to this place than barbed wire’: South Korea reimagines its DMZ as a path towards peace

At times an easy Sunday walk, at others a tense hike amid military practice targets, this peace trail gives firsthand experience of a place still divided by war

Raphael Rashid in Goseong county

Wed 1 Nov 2023 19.42 EDT

A three-hour drive east from the bustling streets of Seoul, a checkpoint marks the beginning of a journey to one of the most heavily militarised borders in the world. The military police scrutinise personal identification against a pre-approved list before granting passage.

It is here, in Goseong county, in a restricted section alongside the demilitarised zone (DMZ) on the border with North Korea, that South Korea hopes to promote a literal path to peace.

The 3.6km Goseong route is one of a dozen DMZ peace trails, scattered along the border, that have been opened to tourists this year – Koreans only, for now – to encourage them to explore the idea of unity through hikes within restricted areas offering direct views into the secretive North.

The Korean war ended in July 1953 with an armistice but not a peace treaty, meaning the North and South are still theoretically at war.

On the Goseong route, an eerie calm prevails. The peaceful beach appears undisturbed. The guide shares tales of wildlife encounters, lending the surroundings the air of a leisurely Sunday walk. At one point, there’s even the chance to pat some puppies born from one of the dogs gifted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to former president Moon Jae-in.

Yet, there are signs that betray an underlying unease: a range featuring human-shaped practice targets, watchtowers scattered here and there, the military police escort. It is as if time stands still, a haunting relic of a terrible war frozen in its tracks.

“There are few countries in the world where people live like this, divided,” says local resident Um Taek-gyu, 86, who used to work as a fisherman on the east coast. “There’s more to this place than barbed wire.”

Tourists gaze towards North Korea and the Mount Kumgang range from the Goseong unification observation tower. Photograph: Raphael Rashid/The Guardian

Um is in a position to know. He was displaced from his home town only kilometres away in what is now North Korea when the war broke out seven decades ago and Goseong county was split in two. He never imagined the border would become permanent.

‘I came to see a glimpse of the true essence of peace’

Hiker Kang Min-joo was inspired to join the DMZ Freedom and Peace Grand March, a special seven-day expedition along several of these trails, to understand the past, and its influence on the future. “I wanted to remember how precious and grateful I am for the freedom and peace I have. Many young people like me have become numb to the pain of division.”

Two South Korean military police, part of an escort, stand at the Southern Limit Line on the barbed wire trail of the Goseong DMZ peace trail, just two kilometres away from North Korea. Photograph: Raphael Rashid/The Guardian

Fellow walker Kim Hak-myeon said: “Watching the birds fly back and forth between North and South Korea without any barriers, I came to see a glimpse of the true essence of peace.”

Further along the route, at the Goseong unification observation tower, visitors find themselves at a place that stands as both a vantage point and a poignant reminder of division. It is the nearest viewing point to gaze out over the Mount Kumgang range in North Korea. The coastline leading towards it seems almost within arm’s reach.

Messages and prayers for peace and reconciliation are affixed to a tree at the DMZ Museum in Goseong, South Korea. Photograph: Raphael Rashid/The Guardian

Through binoculars, visitors can peer towards the North. On the left, a road winds its way to the facility where family reunions have taken place. The most recent was in 2018, bringing together 89 elderly people who had been separated from their family members for decades.

Just 40,000 of the 133,000 people registered as part of separated families are still alive. Every month, hundreds of them pass away.

Tours to the Mount Kumgang resort – a tourism destination on North Korean soil that was a rare symbol of inter-Korean collaboration – were once part of an inter-Korean agreement but were suspended in 2008 after the shooting of a South Korean tourist. They have never resumed.

Picture-perfect coastline, with no photography allowed

At the foot of the observation tower is a cage with two white Pungsan dogs, Haerang and Kumgang: the puppies born from one of the dogs given to former President Moon Jae-in by Kim Jong-un after their historic summit in 2018.

Haerang and Kumgang, two white Pungsan puppies born from one of the dogs given to former President Moon Jae-in by Kim Jong-un after their historic summit in 2018. Photograph: Raphael Rashid/The Guardian

Downhill from there is the most dramatic part of the Goseong DMZ peace trail: a short trek alongside the heavily fortified beach.

A steep descent down a set of wooden stairs leads to the sand for a picturesque walk, with the beach nestled amid breathtaking natural beauty. Here, visitors can admire turquoise waters amid the vast expanse of the ocean. For security reasons, photography is strictly prohibited.

This area is, for the most part, off-limits to civilians. On one side, a barrier is adorned with signs warning of mines, and on the other, lies a barbed wire fence with sensors detecting movement that stretches along the sandy beach.

“Korean citizens need to be pre-approved to enter this area, and only 20 people can join each DMZ path on a daily basis,” says Kim Kyung-jin from the defence ministry, who oversees projects linked to the DMZ.

Show more

Foreign tourists cannot join these trips because it is a restricted area, he says, but the defence ministry and other government bodies are in talks to create a pilot programme next year that would allow foreigners on to selected trails.

After about half an hour’s walk, escorted by several military police at the front, middle, and rear, visitors reach the Southern Limit Line. Beyond this point lies the DMZ itself , controlled by the United Nations Command on the southern side of the border situated two kilometres to the north.

This place is not without its share of incidents. Just over two years ago, a man escaped North Korea by swimming several kilometres before coming ashore in Goseong. Another defector, reportedly a professional gymnast, managed to evade detection by leaping over two sets of fences.

‘I am still heartbroken’

Next stop is the DMZ museum, where wooden boats are on display, used by defectors to reach the south in a desperate attempt to seek freedom. On 24 October, a number of North Koreans arrived on a similar boat just south of Goseong. To date, South Korea has received about 34,000 defectors. While the number of arrivals in recent years has plummeted, mostly due to the pandemic and increased border restrictions, their numbers are back on the rise.

An exhibit at the DMZ Museum in Goseong giving an overview of inter-Korean interactions and periods of détente, which notably includes the historic 2000 summit between the leaders of both sides and reunions of separated families. Photograph: Raphael Rashid/The Guardian

The museum also houses exhibits on the transformation of the DMZ into a sprawling ecological park, cannon shells fired from North Korea in 2010, as well as a collection of propaganda pamphlets that provides insight into the ideological tug-of-war between the two sides. North Korean leaflets promised a socialist nirvana, while those from the South tantalised the value of freedom through seductive imagery, including women in bikinis.

Psychological warfare: at the DMZ Museum in Goseong, a collection of historical propaganda leaflets from South and North Korea, each attempting to persuade of the other side’s superiority. For South Korea, this included promoting bikini-clad women. Photograph: Raphael Rashid/Raphael Rashid/The Guardian

Beside the propaganda exhibit is a tree and mural decorated with hundreds of messages of hope and wishing reconciliation. One read, “Even if we cannot fully reunify, let’s live in peace.”

For Um Taek-gyu, separated from his relatives all those decades ago, that pain of separation is still raw.

“Having been separated from my family has given me a lot of sorrow all this time. Even though I’m now living well, I am still heartbroken and cry once a day,” he says, as he wipes tears away.


View on theguardian.com

amp.theguardian.com



De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com


De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161


If you do not read anything else in the 2017 National Security Strategy read this on page 14:

"A democracy is only as resilient as its people. An informed and engaged citizenry is the fundamental requirement for a free and resilient nation. For generations, our society has protected free press, free speech, and free thought. Today, actors such as Russia are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies. Adversaries target media, political processes, financial networks, and personal data. The American public and private sectors must recognize this and work together to defend our way of life. No external threat can be allowed to shake our shared commitment to our values, undermine our system of government, or divide our Nation."
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