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Quotes of the Day:
“Experience is the hardest kind of teacher. It gives you the test first and the lesson afterward.”
- Oscar Wilde
“Before you argue with someone, ask yourself, is that person, even mentally mature enough to grasp the concept of different perspective? Because if not, there's absolutely no point.”
- Morgan Freeman
“You should not be afraid of someone who has a library and reads many books; you should fear someone who has only one book; and he considers it sacred, but he has never read it.”
- Friedrich Nietzsche.”
1. Memes vs. Missiles? Cognitive Access Denial and the North Korea Problem
2. The Army needs to invest in psychological operations, not cut them
3. Personnel cuts and force redesign ahead for Army special operations
4. Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fifth Edition
5. Report: Special operations forces need to rethink language training
6. Marine Corps Command in Charge of Middle East Cancels Annual Ball Due to 'Unforeseen Operational Commitments'
7. To solve national security problems, the US may have to rethink higher education
8. Janet Yellen made the worst mistake in Treasury history when she failed to lock in cheap debt, elite investor Stanley Druckenmiller says
9. Frustrated Zelensky Says Ukraine’s War Effort Is Being Underestimated
10. A Platform Storing TikTok Corporate Secrets Was Inspected By The Chinese Government
11. Import records illuminate Ukraine’s desperate hunt for arms and ammo
12. U.K. MPs propose mandatory training to prevent Chinese spies
13. Al-Aqsa Storm Heralds the Rise of Non-state Special Operations
14. The Weaponization of Language in Irregular Warfare: Moldova, a Case Study
15. Israeli army battles Hamas fighters in drive towards Gaza City
16. Republicans confront Tuberville over military holds in extraordinary showdown on Senate floor
17. The Hamas War Is Far More Dangerous to Israel Than the Yom Kippur War
18. China, U.S. to Meet for Rare Nuclear Arms-Control Talks
19. Israel’s New Calculus: Strike Hamas at All Costs
20. I COULD BARELY EVEN SPELL GFM…
21. Poll: U.S. public's support for Ukraine begins to wane
22. Senior Pentagon official calls on DOD components to more fully embrace irregular, asymmetric warfare
23. What the Pentagon Has, Hasn't and Could Do to Stop Veterans and Troops from Joining Extremist Groups
24. How an AI company parsed misinformation early in Israel-Hamas war
25. Ukraine has taken 17,000 Russians off the battlefield without firing a shot, US Army special-ops general says
26. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November
27. Why the Philippines is exiting the Belt and Road
28. Modernization Theory and the Delusions of American Strategy
29. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2023
30. Iran Update, November 1, 2023
1. Memes vs. Missiles? Cognitive Access Denial and the North Korea Problem
I am posting this here for those who do not read the Korea News and Commentary. I think people other than those with an interest in Korea should read this.
It is good to see people other than hard core Korea watchers thinking about irregular warfare in north Korea and most importantly information warfare against the Kim family regime.
Maybe this article will help wake up policy makers and strategists. (And per the author's comments I do not question the utility of ARSOF in this effort. north Korea should be a "laboratory" for US PSYOP forces and the majority of our PSYOP capabilities reside in ARSOF - certainly all of our active duty capabilities do.)
Conclusion:
Converging partner capabilities with psychological operations, cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare can be the Army’s contribution to U.S. information advantage and the irregular warfare application of integrated deterrence. It is time to use these irregular tools against a threat like North Korea and its fellow regimes in China, Russia, and Iran for strategic effects in support of U.S. national interests.
There has been a lot of work done over the years to recommend policies and strategy based on information but they have mostly fallen on deaf ears in Seoul and DC. I will say that one of the paradoxes of information is that most of the ideas accepted for implementation are highly classified discreet surgical activities that never achieve any results that can be publicly recognized if they achieve anything at all. There is no will for an overt comprehensive and systematic information campaign. Ironically, if such a campaign were to be conducted it would probably better facilitate some of those classified discreet information operations with which so many are enamored. But the bottom line is we need to be focused on the fundamentals and the blocking and tackling of basic information warfare rather than trying to be too cool for school.
Here are some references to supplement this excellent piece (the authors have linked to a wide variety of sources with their embedded links to include variations of some of the works of the authors below).
Commander Frederick Vincenzo, “An Information Based Strategy to Reduce North Korea’s Increasing Threat - Recommendations for ROK & U.S. Policy Makers,” Center for New American Security, October 3, 2016,
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/an-information-based-strategy-to-reduce-north-koreas-increasing-threat
George Hutchinson, “Army of the Indoctrinated: The Suryong, the Soldier, and Information in the KPA," Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, April 26, 2022,
https://www.hrnk.org/uploads/pdfs/Hutchinson_KPA_web_0426.pdf
Jieun Baek, “A Policy of Public Diplomacy with North Korea: A Principled and Pragmatic Approach to Promote Human Rights and Pursue Denuclearization,” Harvard Belfer Center, August 2021,
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/policy-public-diplomacy-north-korea
David Maxwell, “The Nature of The Kim Family Regime: The Guerrilla Dynasty and Gulag State,” Red Diamond, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, February 19, 2020
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/02/19/the-nature-of-the-kim-family-regime-the-guerrilla-dynasty-and-gulag-state/
and https://drive.google.com/file/d/12DLljRWQtQNje4hqrpwfGuEMvlpyk5Gt/view?usp=sharing
(Note this one is linked in the essay below)
Bradley Bowman and David Maxwell, “Maximum Pressure 2.0 A Plan for North Korea,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, December 5, 2020, “A Plan B for North Korea,” pages 8-13 and “Information and Influence Activities”
https://www.fdd.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/fdd-report-maximum-pressure-2-a-plan-for-north-korea.pdf
Robert Joseph, Robert Collins, Joseph DeTrani, Nicholas Eberstadt, Olivia Enos, David Maxwell, and Greg Scarlatoiu, "National Strategy for Countering North Korea," No. 545, January 23, 2023
https://nipp.org/information_series/robert-joseph-robert-collins-joseph-detrani-nicholas-eberstadt-olivia-enos-david-maxwell-and-greg-scarlatoiu-national-strategy-for-countering-north-korea-no-545-january-23-2023/
Video: “Conversation with COL (Ret) Dave Maxwell, Potential for North Korea Influence & Information Campaign,” July 14, 2022,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0E9032OEOo
David Maxwell, “Unification Options and Scenarios: Assisting A Resistance”, International Journal of Korean Unification Studies Vol. 24, No. 2, 2015, 127–152,
https://www.kinu.or.kr/pyxis-api/1/digital-files/d3f8fb63-4f8c-49c9-a4fa-901d3120bd5a
Suki Kim, “The Underground Movement Trying to Topple the North Korean Regime,” The New Yorker Magazine, November 16, 2020
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/11/23/the-underground-movement-trying-to-topple-the-north-korean-regime
Memes vs. Missiles? Cognitive Access Denial and the North Korea Problem
irregularwarfarecenter.org
October 31, 2023
Steve Ferenzi
Keith Weber
José Madera
Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon.
North Korea’s mafia state is a persistent threat to the U.S. homeland that, if left unaddressed, will metastasize and ultimately drain resources from confronting the pacing threat of China. Recent technological developments, such as its first solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile test in April after an unprecedented 68 missile tests in 2022 (ten times more than in 2021), underscore the increasing danger. Past attempts to restrain North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, like President Obama’s “strategic patience” and President Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaigns, have failed. It is time for a new approach—one that prioritizes the information instrument of power to support integrated deterrence and set conditions for eventual regime transition and denuclearization.
The focus should be on defeating North Korea’s cognitive access denial—that is, penetrating the regime’s wall of censorship, propaganda, and indoctrination, by converging information capabilities across domains. The biggest threat to the Kim family regime is information. A multi-front information and influence campaign may prove decisive over time instead of legacy approaches that continue to fail to meet policy objectives. Indeed, enabling access to outside information must be at the core of any North Korea strategy.
This North Korea problem offers the U.S. Army the opportunity to leverage its “information advantage” capabilities that reside in its psychological operations, cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare formations. Effective deterrence is not just about more combined exercises, missile defense systems, or troops on the peninsula.
The Army’s Special Operations Forces and Multi-Domain Task Forces—alongside interagency, joint force, and multinational partners—can assist in cracking North Korea open to information. Equally important, the Army can help shape narratives to enable the North Korean people to take matters into their own hands. It’s also an effective way to conduct irregular warfare activities to put the United States and its allies in a position of advantage in the greater global competition between democracy and authoritarianism.
Groundhog Day, or a Korean Spring?
Two trends frame the Korea problem: Pyongyang’s provocations against the United States, and subsequent negotiations and sanctions by the United States in response. North Korea’s “cycle of provocation” spans six decades of terrorist, conventional, and cyber attacks in conjunction with nuclear and ballistic missile testing—all designed to extract economic and political concessions from the United States and maintain internal support from the regime’s elite backers.
Attempts by international coalitions to negotiate and sanction, such as the Six-Party Talks and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2321, have led only to North Korea choosing to invest in further developing its nuclear capabilities. President Trump’s “maximum pressure” approach, while achieving a historic bilateral dialogue, failed to denuclearize North Korea. Like Bill Murray’s character in the movie Groundhog Day, the United States finds itself stuck in a time loop reliving the cycle yet again.
A multi-front information and influence campaign targeting regime leadership, North Korea’s citizens, and international stakeholders could break this fruitless cycle. While not a completely new idea (others have proposed a “maximum pressure 2.0” that includes information and influence activities), this campaign elevates information to the primary line of effort and expands its tools.
The need for this approach rests on three essential truths. First, Kim Jong Un will never willingly denuclearize. As in all totalitarian states, the Kim regime has a vital interest in its survival. Nuclear weapons provide the ultimate deterrent, and history indicates the regime will continue to buy more time to develop greater capabilities. One must only observe Ukraine’s situation today—a victim of Russia’s invasion after giving up its nuclear arsenal 30 years ago—to see the folly of denuclearization. Second, North Korea will not peacefully reunite with South Korea while the Kim family is in power as any terms for such national reunification would herald the dynasty’s demise. Third, North Korea is part of the larger China problem. China leverages the North Korean quagmire in its favor to prevent instability on the peninsula that could complicate its Taiwan reunification efforts. New options are necessary.
Breaking the Cycle
Previous efforts to deter North Korean aggression and compel behavior change relied on hard military and economic power. But more of the same will not solve the problem. A focus on information and influence instead offers the best chance of replacing the Kim regime with one more likely to accept denuclearization and eventual reunification under South Korean leadership.
An influence campaign could facilitate nonviolent resistance and induce regime fracture. Unfortunately, in contrast to recent rebellions, North Korea lacks dissident elites or social movements capable of engineering the defection of disgruntled security officers, or a pan-Korean solidarity narrative to unify the people for sustained collective action. An influence campaign can shape conditions to catalyze this over time.
Security apparatus defections are key—increasing the chance of successful nonviolent action and catalytic change by nearly 60 percent. Korea experts David Maxwell and Mathew Ha note that separating the Kim regime from “second-tier leadership” is essential and can be done by sowing doubt, suggesting that the lives of North Koreans could improve if the regime changed its policies. The targeted elite could include about 1,000 military and party officials outside of the core regime who could collectively influence the outcome of any contingency. Information and narratives are critical to undermining these power structures on which the regime depends for survival.
Economic and diplomatic actions would play critical reinforcing roles in encouraging regime defections and fostering internal dissent. Tailored sanctions must continue to target organizations like Office 39 which orchestrate the regime’s global illicit activities and sustain the patronage networks that maintain the elite’s loyalty. Key to this combined economic and diplomatic effort would be integrating high-level North Korean officials into the information and influence efforts as they defect to capitalize on their knowledge of cracks within the regime.
Defeating Cognitive Access Denial
An influence campaign would first have to breach North Korea’s digital iron curtain, which includes layers of state media and information control that deny cognitive access to and among its population and elites. The U.S. military tends to focus on enemy anti-access and area denial systems (A2/AD)—capabilities such as integrated air and missile defense that would prevent joint force entry into a theater of war. This focus is prevalent in the Army’s approach to “multi-domain operations” which highlights the challenge of defeating such lethal systems. However, the Army is also uniquely capable of defeating cognitive access denial systems across the electro-magnetic spectrum and information environment to project influence.
The Army’s framework of “penetrate, dis-integrate, exploit” may be a useful starting point for an influence campaign in North Korea. If rudimentary techniques using thumb drives, balloons, and commercial drones have proven so effective for disseminating information across the Korean border, imagine what a full suite of cross-domain information-related capabilities can bring to the table in bridging the gap between the physical and information environments.
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), especially its psychological operations units, are tailor-made to shape perceptions and behavior in foreign audiences. By integrating military information support operations and intelligence capabilities with broader cyber, electro-magnetic, and space capabilities throughout the Army and joint force, this new “triad” can deliver “information firepower” through forward-deployed units or U.S.-based action arms like the Joint Military Information Support Operations WebOps Center (“JMWC”) and Information Warfare Center.
Similarly, Multi-Domain Task Forces (MDTFs) serve as the Army’s experimental counter-A2/AD platform. An MDTF contains long-range precision fires along with intelligence, information operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space assets (“I2CEWS”)—capabilities critical to disrupting, degrading, and destroying the sensors, communications, and targeting systems that A2/AD relies upon. While its primary role is lethal fires, its information-related capabilities can serve the critical function of facilitating entry into the information environment—especially when coupled with theater assets such as the 915th Cyber Warfare Battalion and newest Theater Information Advantage Detachment.
“The shield is down. Commence attack on the Death Star’s main reactor.”
Cognitive controls, including internet controls, spyware, split mobile phone networks, fixed government-approved radio frequencies, and jamming capabilities, are analogous to lethal anti-access challenges. Expanding the concept of anti-access to include cognitive controls moves us towards a more comprehensive understanding of A2/AD beyond the rigid “death star”-like (in reference to the spherical space station and superweapon used by the evil Galactic Empire in Star Wars) depictions of interlocking air defense range circles on a map. By converging the conduit–centric aspects of information warfare—cyber, electromagnetic, and space capabilities—the Army can penetrate the information barriers surrounding the essential target audiences inside North Korea. This will enable outside information to flood into North Korea, illuminate the regime’s human rights abuses and corruption, and amplify associated grievances.
Inside the Bubble—Connection and Amplification
Once the North Korean population is armed with the relevant information, what’s next? This is where the content-focused psychological operations enter to disintegrate existing perceptions and beliefs and enable resistance partners to exploit the resultant friction. However, two things are necessary to understand: external actors cannot export a revolution, and they cannot create revolutionaries from scratch. Change must come from indigenous actors. What the Army can do is inspire, connect, and amplify their efforts.
North Korea’s social control systems prevent critical players from connecting with each other. The second-tier leadership (military and party officials outside of the core regime) can collectively drive change only if they can communicate and coordinate safely. Moreover, brokers organic to North Korea’s population must be able to facilitate bloc recruitment by connecting disparate groups, both internally and externally, for mass mobilization. Virtual access and sanctuary can be a game-changer, similar to how Google helped Egyptians circumvent state media control in 2011.
Human and virtual infrastructure are necessary but insufficient for mobilization. Rapid and cross-cutting movement requires strategic framing to create shared consciousness for collective action. Social movement experts Robert Benford and David Snow describe how narrative shaping occurs through a frame alignment process. Narrative shaping first requires bridging individual conditions to structural issues, like regime incompetence in handling the COVID pandemic worsening the lives of each citizen beyond their already difficult existence. After bridging to the person, frame amplification then creates a sense of ownership, highlighting that the regime is not just incompetent, but organs like Office 39 and party officials deliberately kept the regime healthy at the expense of its subjects. This is even more effective when the regime creates iconic martyrs, which is inevitable during resistance.
Frame extension is the tipping factor that links various narratives within the population to communicate, for example, that it is not just poor farmers suffering, but it is everyone outside of the Kim family. Finally, frame transformation revitalizes historical narratives, like how China has used the Kim family as a pawn, a buffer (the “lips”) for China (the “teeth”) against the United States since 1950. It may be useful to narrate how Beijing not only makes the Kim family do its bidding today, but how China also hid the severity of the coronavirus outbreak that originated in its country and that would devastate the North Korean population and perpetually-meager economy to keep them dependent. The Army’s array of information advantage capabilities make it uniquely capable of connecting brokers and disseminating and amplifying narratives like these to empower resistance partners.
For skeptics who think an influence campaign will not set conditions for eventual regime transition and denuclearization, these efforts are still valuable as they also could bolster a containment-based approach or contribute to victory if war breaks out due to regime escalation. Army Special Operations Forces and MDTFs could provide theater commanders enhanced decision support through deep analysis of the North Korean population and regime leadership that would allow for precision messaging against specific points of leverage to prepare the environment prior to and during U.S. engagement across the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments.
Whether regime transition, containment, or escalation to war by the regime, understanding the information environment and building the ability to influence North Korea’s key decision-makers ultimately provides options to impose costs on the regime and shape the trajectory of any given approach.
Out With a Boom or a Chorus of People Power?
The accelerating pace of North Korea’s nuclear and strategic missile developments requires the United States to pursue a new approach—one that abandons yesterday’s fruitless Groundhog Day efforts and is instead appropriate for today’s information age. Moreover, to truly achieve a position of advantage in the greater competition between democracy and authoritarianism led by China, the United States must exploit all the capabilities and tools in its information instrument of power.
We must acknowledge this is not just an Army or even a joint fight.It is about integrating interorganizational partners and broader U.S. government entities. The Army’s information and influence operations support broader U.S. public diplomacy efforts conducted by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the Principal Information Operations Advisor to the Defense Secretary, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (which operates Voice of America and Radio Free Asia).
Furthermore, as the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy emphasizes, these efforts must also include our partners and allies. A multi-front campaign to defeat North Korea’s cognitive access denial systems, enable resistance partners, and set conditions for regime transition best serves U.S. interests in the end.
While some may question ARSOF’s utility and newer formations like the MDTF for this job, earlier and smaller applications such as the Joint Effects Group in Syria demonstrated the outsized return on investment in the information space. This flat organization—comprised of only a handful of information professionals, synchronized psychological operations, civil affairs, electronic warfare, and public affairs operations—assisted with mobilization against the Islamic State through counter-messaging and bolstered alternative local governance efforts such as the Manbij and Raqqa Civic Councils by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The focus on information as a critical capability enabled the liberation of Islamic State-occupied territory and follow-on governance by U.S. partners—foreshadowing how similar information efforts could support the North Korean people against the Kim family regime.
Converging partner capabilities with psychological operations, cyber, space, and electromagnetic warfare can be the Army’s contribution to U.S. information advantage and the irregular warfare application of integrated deterrence. It is time to use these irregular tools against a threat like North Korea and its fellow regimes in China, Russia, and Iran for strategic effects in support of U.S. national interests.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy, opinion, or position of the Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Irregular Warfare Center, U.S. Special Operations Command, or the authors’ employers.
Lt. Col. Steve Ferenzi is an Army Strategist and Special Forces officer serving as campaign planner in the U.S. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) J5. He previously led the development of U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s (USASOC) Army Special Operations Forces Strategy. He holds a Master of International Affairs Degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and is a Non-Resident Fellow with the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU).
Keith Weber serves in the USASOC G5 Regional Plans Division and was previously responsible for the USASOC Indo-Pacific portfolio. He is a retired U.S. Air Force officer and served as a fire control officer on the AC-130U Spooky Gunship. He holds a Masters of International Relations degree from Troy University.
Jose Madera currently supports the SOCCENT Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate. He previously served in the U.S. Special Operations Command Korea (SOCKOR) J3. A retired Civil Affairs officer, he is a graduate of the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds graduate degrees from Purdue University, Carnegie Mellon University, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the U.S. Army War College.
irregularwarfarecenter.org
2. The Army needs to invest in psychological operations, not cut them
I recall this anecdote when USSOCOM was established. It was not clear what forces would be designated as special operations and be assigned to USSOCOM. General Lindsey, the first USSOOCM was apparently not sure that Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces should be assigned to USSOCOM since they have missions that go well beyond SOF and are required to support the full spectrum of conflict from peacetime engagement through large scale combat operations and post conflict operations. Someone convinced them that if he failed to bring them into USSOCOM the services (e.g, the bean counters) would relegate all CA and PSYOP to the reserve components and there would be no immediate capability to employ these forces in contingencies. At the time there was only one active CA battalion and one active duty PSYOP Group.
And this is the key point, PSYOP is a crucial yet underutilized tool. We are so risk averse and afraid of anything related to information. As some PSYOP officers lamented to me at Leavenworth a few years ago: "It is easier to get permission to put a Hellfire missile on the forehead of a terrorist than it is to get permission to put an didea between his ears." Now that may seem extreme but it is a useful illustration to show how risk averse we are to the use of information while being very comfortable killing people. We should remember that a mistake in the information domain will last for a 24 and at most 48 hour news cycle and at worst we will be embarrassed by some mistake that we made. Yet in a kinetic operation a mistake that kills a wedding party will be catastrophic on multiple levels.
Excerpt:
A crucial yet underutilized tool in the U.S. strategic arsenal can help counter the multifaceted threats sophisticated adversaries pose: military information support operations, or MISO, carried out by psychological operations forces. In layman’s terms, MISO is designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors.
The Army needs to invest in psychological operations, not cut them
militarytimes.com · by Col. Robert “Bob” Curris (retired) · November 1, 2023
The United States, as a global superpower, finds itself at a critical juncture in the evolving landscape of international security and geopolitics. The post-Cold War era, characterized by U.S. preeminence as the lone superpower has given way to a world where great power competition, which refers to the competition between the U.S., Russia and China, has reemerged. In this complex and volatile environment, the United States faces a myriad of threats ranging from traditional military challenges to asymmetric warfare, cyber threats, and operations in the information environment.
A crucial yet underutilized tool in the U.S. strategic arsenal can help counter the multifaceted threats sophisticated adversaries pose: military information support operations, or MISO, carried out by psychological operations forces. In layman’s terms, MISO is designed to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors.
These activities fall under the umbrella of U.S. Special Operations Command. While other countries have been making significant investments in this domain, the U.S. military’s psychological operations capabilities, in contrast, have been severely constrained by a lack of adequate funding and resources.
Psychological operations were subordinated to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command upon its creation in December 1989. Army Special Operations Command is responsible for ensuring psychological operations forces are ready for military information support operations.
In the Cold War era, the Department of Defense developed a comprehensive strategy for psychological operations that went beyond propaganda. This strategy included establishing specialized units, developing cutting-edge technologies, and creating sophisticated methodologies for influencing target audiences. These capabilities were actively deployed in various theaters of conflict, from the jungles of Vietnam to the rugged terrains of Afghanistan.
A 1985 Pentagon study called for increased funding, improved joint coordination, and greater utilization of psychological operations in peace and in war. In a gradual process that started in the 1990s, military strategy has shifted — moving from information warfare to more conventional forms of warfare. Budget documents from recent years show a decline in funding and personnel.
Recent reporting indicates that there are conversations to dissolve unfilled billets and enablers within Army Special Operations, but it’s not clear what the reduction to the PSYOP force would actually be under proposed cuts. PSYOP has always been a special operations force in its own right, which is a history that is often forgotten or denied. But what can’t be denied is that PSYOP is a congressional interest item with direct mention in the current National Defense Authorization Act. So having Congress verify whether the current trajectory will further erode military information support capabilities and affect national security is a fair and honest question. That is especially true in an age marked by technological advancements that will make information warfare even more critical in the coming years.
Countries like Russia and China have developed specialized units within their military structures dedicated solely to information warfare and have been actively deploying these capabilities in various conflict zones, from Ukraine to the South China Sea.
The current National Security Strategy speaks directly to influence in its strategic overview and the last four National Defense Authorization Acts, or NDAA, are very specific about influence and military information support operations. The inclusion of military information support operations in the NDAA shows an understanding that we live in an age where information is as potent a weapon as any piece of military hardware, and the ability to influence perceptions, shape behaviors, and guide decision-making processes among target audiences is paramount.
Any moves to further deteriorate the psychological operations force require intervention from Congress and national leadership. Such decisions would be in direct opposition to strategic guidance and congressional directives.
Army Special Operations Command should be held to account for decisions made that could create an influence vacuum above the tactical level. It should be required to provide a plan on how it will support the other psychological operations requirements, including support to cyber and to civil assistance and information in times of natural disasters.
A decline in psychological operations capabilities is a strategic error that will have severe implications for U.S. national security. The time for half-measures is over; the United States Congress and defense senior leadership must act decisively to restore psychological operations and the military information support operations mission to its rightful place in the pantheon of national security tools. Failure to act now will have long-term implications for the United States’ ability to protect its interests and counter the growing threats posed by adversaries who are increasingly leveraging information warfare as a tool for achieving their strategic objectives.
Retired Army Col. Robert “Bob” Curris is a former 4th PSYOP Group Commander and former Psychological Operations Commandant with 30+ years of experience in the military, both enlisted and officer time, 19 of which were in psychological operations. Bob has operational deployment experience in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.
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3. Personnel cuts and force redesign ahead for Army special operations
We all need to take a deep breath and look at this logically. In every crisis there is an opportunity. I would recommend focusing less on the cuts and more on the redesign.
We cannot approach from the perspective of defending the numbers currently even if we cannot fill all the positions because someday we may need those numbers - despite the fact that all models show that we will never be able to fill those positions. On the other hand the argument that now that we have lost Afghanistan and major operations are over in Iraq that we can just cut SOF. We must focus on determining what is the right organization in the right numbers.
Recall this from recent history. In 2006 the QDR directed SOF growth: 3 additional Ranger Companies, a Special Operations Aviation battalion, a PSYOP group and CA Brigade (up from a single active CA battalion - and separate from SOF an active duty Army CA Brigade), a Sustainment Brigade (up from a battalion), and 5 special Forces battalions adding a fourth battalion to each active duty Special Forces Group. Based on modeling and planning we estimated that we could complete the growth by 2013 -in 7 years. We were able to grow most of the force well before 2013 except for Special Forces. We could not go from the authorization of 270 ODAs (even though we could not fill all the ODAs pre- GWOT) to 360 ODAs. We could not achieve this goal. Therefore, USASOC conducted some creative force design and established the 4th battalions to focus on advanced UW and other skills and then turned back the force structure we could not fill.
Pre-GWOT when we could not fill all our ODAs we had teams of sometimes 7-10 SF soldiers, rarely ever 12. We would sometimes "rob" other teams of personnel to fill up one ODA to full strength when they were deploying. One of my battalion commanders said this is foolish. He took all available personnel and filled as many ODAs as possible and then declared the unfilled ODAs as not mission capable on the USR. This meant we had companies with 4-5 ODAs rather than 6. But senior leadership reacted negatively and directed that all ODAs have personnel assigned so we would have all 6 ODAs on paper at least. The fear was we would lose that force structure. So rather than have 4-5 full or near full strength ODAs would have 6 understrength ones with force structure we could never fill.
What I fear now in reading some of the comments in the article is that Congress will weigh in and prevent the force cuts and just jam the Army. Yes, Congress has always been SOF's guardian angel. We would not have SOF without Congress. Jamming the Army might make some feel good but I fear we will "win the battle and lose the war."
I also attribute the enabling capability argument to the "lost" 5th SOF truth - Most special operations require non-SOF support. The late COl John Collins (AKA The Warlord) coined all 5 SOF truths in 1987 (written in Congressman Earl Hutto's forward to one of COL Collins CRS reports on US and Soviet SOF). But the 5th SOF truth was left by the wayside when USSOCOM was established. I do not know this for a fact but I speculate that USSOCOM did not want to advertise this 5th SOF truth because now USSOCOM had its one funding line (MFP 11) and R&D and acquisition authorities yet still received all service common equipments as well as personnel for non-SOF MOS from the services. USSOCOM leadership might have wanted to emphasize SOF self sufficiency rather than dependence. Then after the GWOT Col Collins was talking to Admiral Olson and reminded him there was a 5th SOF truth. Admiral Olson directed all the SOF truth displays to be revised and include the 5th SOF truth. This was important during the GWOT when we were deployed by group and battalion as this required a lot of centralized support, Before the GWOT were only deploying individual ODAs and some AOBS and would deploy battalions and groups only for major exercises.
The bottomline is rather than a food fight with us in SOF hoping Congress will weigh in and prevent any cuts we should be thinking creatively about how we can best organize with the resources available. I know it is sacrilege for some but sometimes smaller is better. I do know that there is criticism in many corners that SOF has grown too large and because of that has become too bureaucratic. Remember when we ran SF MTTS all over the world under the C2 of the Institute of Military Assistance which today is SWCS at Fort Liberty. We even planned and executed White Star in Laos with a very small ad hoc organization out of Fort Liberty (then Bragg of course).. We have been creative in the past (establishing great SOF organizations like MACV-SOG or operating programs like the CIDG or Phoenix in Vietnam). And we have lots of archetypes to choose from (the best of course being the OSS which we should look to for inspiration and perhaps revitalization at least on the SOF side.)
Personnel cuts and force redesign ahead for Army special operations
armytimes.com · by Todd South · November 1, 2023
The Army will cut as many as 3,000 positions in Army special operations forces despite pushback from key leaders in the SOF community and members of Congress.
“There will be cuts to Army SOF,” Chris Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict said Tuesday at the National Defense Industrial Association’s 34th annual symposium on the topic. “The Army’s in a tough place, not only from recruiting…but they’re trying to transition to a different fight as we all are, and I think one of the impacts of that is requests by the Army to cut some of the Army special operations forces.”
Army Times reported in mid-October that many of the cuts would be to unfilled billets within U.S. Army Special Operations Command and would eliminate as much as 10% of the positions in that command.
RELATED
The fate of Army Special Operations Forces
The most likely combat is irregular warfare. The Army may cut its lead forces for that kind of fight.
Officials at the symposium noted that many of the cuts to both positions and actual personnel will come at the expense of support and enabling jobs such as logistics, civil affairs and psychological operations, not traditional operators.
But that provided little comfort to leaders and supporters of the SOF community.
Maier noted the vital role that enablers play both in current and future operations.
“The enabler piece is often underplayed and seen as secondary but really is a huge value proposition of this community and one we’re going to need to protect,” he said. “We need to protect those high-end capabilities that’s really going to be, when we talk about hyper-enabled units that are probably not going to be the same types of units in the past that are going to exclusively have operators.”
That’s a reference to countering more sophisticated information operations, psychological operations and civil affairs needs that SOF leaders view as crucial to dealing with peer adversaries such as the Russian and Chinese militaries.
Army Times did not receive a response following a request for comment from the office of Secretary of the Army Christine Wormuth’s office.
“I’m being told, ‘oh, don’t be concerned, it’s not to the actual operators, it’s only many of the support personnel, our civil affairs, our intelligence, our logistics,” said Rep. Mike Waltz, R-Fla., in a prerecorded message played at the symposium. “Those are the people that we need to make the trains run. Those are the people that free up our operators to do what they do best. And oh, by the way they have a critical mission in their own right.”
Some of the rationale for cutting SOF, officials said, is coming from a limited view of what the force has done over the past 20 years and what its capabilities are moving forward.
Rep. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, said that within the Pentagon SOF is seen almost as a “one-trick pony” that’s focused solely on counterterrorism.
And with the Global War On Terrorism’s end, the idea among top brass is they can now downsize the force to save money and manpower for other conventional needs, especially given the Army’s recruiting struggles in recent years.
“So, when you just simply say I’m going to cut 3,000 out of USASOC and we’re going to be fine, I don’t buy that,” Ernst said. “If we are not supporting SOF they are gradually going to fade into the background and again, once they are gone, once they are diminished, it will take time to rebuild. And we don’t have time on our hands.”
Retired Army Lt. Gen. Ken Tovo, former USASOC commander, pushed back on the idea that SOF’s only role has been counterterrorism.
“That is what the bean counters and the budgeteers are using as a narrative and a justification to try and cut the force today,” Tovo said.
The retired three-star pointed to years of SOF work that developed special operations and crisis response brigades in Iraq that led the fight to defeat the Islamic State, years-long training partnerships in the Baltic states and Ukraine alongside decades of work building partner forces in Central and South America, all of which happened as the force was heavily involved in counterterrorism post-9/11.
Some of the empty billets being cut are not empty because the capabilities are unnecessary, officials said, but because those positions can be hard to fill.
The assistant secretary said several of the unfilled positions being cut came from psychological operations positions in USASOC, “because we haven’t been able to fill some of these billets for years.”
The problem, he said, is that can create a kind of self-defeating cycle.
“If we’re not using those forces in a way that really contributes to our future and our SOF value proposition, we’re probably not going to fill those as much and then we’re in this situation where we’re not filling them as much so we’re not able to project that power,” Maier said.
Given his example, the cuts create a situation in which unfilled positions stay unfilled, so the Army must do without that tool, such as psychological operations, in the future.
The way the conventional forces interact with SOF is by working with them, in planning, exercises, training and deployment, officials said. Many of the special operations community’s contributions come before the fight, by being in the region with partners so that conventional forces have access to an area before they arrive.
“So, we really need to do a better job, chapter by chapter, of telling the role of special operations forces and why they are significant to our nation,” Ernst said.
Current reviews could shake up the force further, as Elizabeth Phu, principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for SO/LIC, explained in a three-prong approach the force is taking.
The Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict office is currently working on a SOF Operating Concept 2040, which would lay out what the force needs to look like, given likely risks, threats and adversaries over the next 15 years. At the same time, the office is conducting a capabilities gap assessment to identify where special operations should build certain capabilities for a future fight.
That could mean more cyber and psyops and fewer “trigger pullers” or a variety of other personnel configurations.
Once the two reviews are complete, the office will be looking at an “organizational redesign” that considers the defense department’s needs for using SOF in strategic competition, counterterrorism and crisis response, she said.
About Todd South
Todd South has written about crime, courts, government and the military for multiple publications since 2004 and was named a 2014 Pulitzer finalist for a co-written project on witness intimidation. Todd is a Marine veteran of the Iraq War.
4. Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fifth Edition
For those who would like a handy and relatively comprehensive SOF overview this was published on November 1st.
You can download the 162 page publication here: https://jsouapplicationstorage.blob.core.windows.net/press/466/U_SOFRM_2023.pdf
Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fifth Edition
https://jsou.edu/Press/PublicationDashboard/240?utm
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Reference Manuals
Published on 11/1/2023
Out of Print
The fifth edition of the Special Operations Forces Reference Manual provides general information on U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF). It provides an introduction to SOF command structure and also contains text, charts, and graphics detailing SOF unit organization, equipment, and areas of responsibility.
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5. Report: Special operations forces need to rethink language training
Language education and training is hard. First and foremost those with the aptitude and desire to develop their language skills must be nurtured, supported and rewarded - not simply with language pay but through long term deployments in target language countries. This is really the key to language learning and sustainment - immersion. If I were king for a day I would ensure every SOF soldier (SF, CA, and PSYOP) spends at least six months per year deployed in the country of the target language. Obviously denied areas is a challenge but it can be creatively offset. Put them to work in those countries conducting special operations and through immersion they will develop and sustain their language capabilities. We can build all the language facilities in te US, provide everyone with the best language learning software but without immersion the perishable skill will perish. And we should remember language is the key pathway to cultural understanding but you only gain real understanding through immersion among the people.
Report: Special operations forces need to rethink language training
Special operators speak 80 languages across the military but often don't sustain that skills, a new report says.
BY PATTY NIEBERG | PUBLISHED NOV 1, 2023 6:54 PM EDT
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · November 1, 2023
U.S. Green Berets and elite Marine special operators are learning languages that aren’t always useful on deployments and missions abroad, a Government Accountability Office report found.
And those elite troops often let their skills in those languages lapse as their careers go on.
The new report sites examples like Special Forces soldiers who learn French as their assigned language, but find it useless in most European assignments, especially since the U.S. trains directly with French forces less often than many other allies in the region. Other soldiers who were trained to speak Russian told GAO investigators that rarely do in Eastern Europe and in some countries the language is even considered “culturally offensive.”
And language skills fade, those troops said, with many telling the GAO that competing training priorities get in the way of sustaining their language skills.
“There’s a lot of skills that we have to maintain and most of those skills are related to survivability and lethality,” a retired Green Beret officer told Task & Purpose, noting that when “push comes to shove” the first thing that’s going to get dropped from a training schedule is the requirement to keep up with a language that’s not relevant to a deployment.
“Imagine if I spent a month in Indonesian language school and then got on a plane and went to Afghanistan and got killed,” he said. “Imagine how my wife or my parents would feel going ‘maybe he could have been training instead of sitting in a language that nobody speaks in the country.’”
The GAO found that more than just three of eight active-duty Army SOF formations — five Special Forces Groups plus Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units — had 80% of personnel achieve a minimum proficiency on languages they were trained in during fiscal years 2018 to 2022.
Foreign language has long been a core skill for some special operations troops, whose missions are often to work and train with foreign militaries or recruit and train foreign fighters in unconventional, guerilla-style warfare.
According to the report, about 13,000 U.S. special operations troops are trained to speak a foreign language, of which roughly 10,500 are in the Army, either in Special Forces, Psychological Operations or Civil Affairs. Marine Forces Special Operations Command, or MARSOC, has about 600 of its top combat operators — known as Critical Skills Operators or, informally, Marine Raiders — trained in a foreign language, according to the GAO.
The Air Force Special Operations Command and Naval Special Warfare Command do not have a foreign language requirement for any of their personnel, the report said.
Special operators across the military speak 80 languages. The report also noted that the Army spends over $30 million each year training its troops in a foreign language, far more than the other services, who spend about $2 million each.
Learning the wrong language
While special operators are tasked with speaking a variety of languages, sometimes troops never get a chance to even use it, let alone practice in their free time.
“I spent four months in language school to learn that language and I couldn’t find anybody on the planet to speak Indonesian,” said the former Green Beret, a retired Lt. Col. with over 15 years in Special Forces.
Despite that, the Green Beret vet said the sense of understanding foreign cultures and “working with people who don’t look like me, translated very well to Afghanistan.”
“The real story is we’re still exposing people from the most advanced developed country in the history of mankind to cultures that aren’t like theirs,” he said. “It does set the condition for them to perform better when we’re working with partner forces.”
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Since the Army and Marine Corps special operations commands do not assess whether assigned languages are “relevant” to deployments, one Green Beret questioned learning Russian when his job was to work with forces opposed to Russia.
“Learning the language of our enemies instead of our allies, kind of makes it harder for us to use our language. One of my biggest complaints has been, why don’t we learn our allies’ languages?” he said according to the report.
SOF personnel quoted in the report and interviewed by Task & Purpose acknowledged the benefits of learning foreign languages like better interpersonal communication and relationships with partner forces.
“The culture is wrapped around the language so if you can understand the language, you can understand more of the culture. If you can understand the culture, that will take you places where no conventional forces or not even forces or not even SOF without language skills can go,” said David Cook, director of the Special Operations Association of America, told Task & Purpose. “That’s the whole goal.”
But sometimes, it doesn’t always translate to the field. Cook described his personal woes about learning Modern Standard Arabic which is the written, formal version of the language. He did not learn any of the Arabic dialects which he said would have been more useful when talking to partner forces or Middle Eastern populations.
“A lot of times I found that our partners couldn’t speak modern standard and that made them ashamed and it actually did the exact opposite of what it was supposed to do,” Cook said.
A perishable skill
The GAO also found inconsistent consequences for SOF troops that don’t complete annual language training along with a lack of monitoring from unit commanders.
Less than half of SOF personnel completed any foreign language sustainment training and among those who did, the average number of annual hours spent maintaining their proficiency was less than required due to competing demands, according to GAO investigators.
SOCOM recommends 80 hours of annual sustainment training for languages like Spanish and French, and at least 120 hours annually on more challenging languages like Russian and Chinese.
GAO found between 2,200 and 3,200 of more than 7,000 Army SOF personnel per year completed sustainment training with a high of 56 hours to a low of 35. For the Marines, less than half completed any training and the ones that did some averaged between 21 and 24 hours annually.
Training officials from one Army SOF formation said that while all personnel are required to take annual language proficiency assessments, they were unaware of any consequences like delays or inability to deploy for service members who failed. Other Marine SOF personnel noted that leadership focused on training exercises over sustained language skills when it came to promotions.
“The Secretary of Defense should be holding unit commanders accountable for the language for efficiency,” Cook said. “On the flip side, there’s not enough people with the right skills at the right times that have to meet the whole laundry list of requirements.”
The latest on Task & Purpose
taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg · November 1, 2023
6. Marine Corps Command in Charge of Middle East Cancels Annual Ball Due to 'Unforeseen Operational Commitments'
Now that is an indicator. Are our adversaries getting that message? I would hate to be on the receiving end of the Marines' wrath if I were an adversary responsible for causing the Marines to have to cancel their sacred birthday celebration. (And I am not being sarcastic here).
Or this could be merely the commander respecting those in harm's way already and that he does not think Marines in the US should be celebrating at this time.
Marine Corps Command in Charge of Middle East Cancels Annual Ball Due to 'Unforeseen Operational Commitments'
military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · November 1, 2023
Marine Corps Forces Central Command, which is in charge of the service's operations in an increasingly unstable Middle East currently roiled by last month's surprise Hamas attack on Israel, announced Wednesday that it would be canceling its annual Marine Corps ball due to "unforeseen operational commitments and the nature of our current mission."
A spokesperson for the command, also known as MARCENT, told Military.com after the announcement that the cancellation of the ball was a "prudent measure," given the situation unfolding out of Israel.
The service currently has a rapid response force in the region, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, or 26th MEU. As of last month, that unit had not been tasked with a specific mission, and the MARCENT spokesperson, Capt. Joe Wright, said that the command's posture in the Middle East has not changed.
"Regretfully and with a strong sense of duty, I write to inform you of a decision that I had to make regarding the Marine Corps 248th Ball, scheduled for 16 November 2023," Maj. Gen. Christopher McPhillips, the commander of MARCENT, wrote Wednesday. "Due to unforeseen operation commitments and the nature of our current mission, it is with great regret that we must cancel this year's event," he said.
The MARCENT X account, on the social media site formerly called Twitter, deleted the letter within minutes of posting. Wright said that the message was "pulled on Twitter because Twitter doesn't have the intended audience that we're trying to reach there."
Wright also said that the letter, unchanged, would be posted on Facebook instead later on Wednesday, adding that "we just got ahead of ourselves." The letter was dated Oct. 31.
"The intent of the letter from the outset was to inform folks that were planning on going to the ball to let them know, regrettably, it's not going to happen this year," Wright told Military.com. "And just to give them notice, well ahead of time, so that they can recoup the money that they might have committed to the planning or reservations."
The Middle East, an area that has seen more than two dozen attacks on U.S. personnel in the last few weeks in Iraq and Syria, has Marine Corps forces on alert as Israel has begun a ground incursion into Gaza following the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. Last week, the Pentagon said that it launched airstrikes at targets in eastern Syria linked to the Iranian military.
Wright confirmed that the ball cancellation was made due to the situation in Israel and the resulting uncertainty in the region, but added that there were "no major operational changes or changes in force posture."
Aside from being a prudent measure, Wright said, the move was meant to free up planning staff in the event the situation in the Middle East changes.
"It's just a matter of making sure that the staff maintains an alert mindset," he said.
-- Drew F. Lawrence can be reached at drew.lawrence@military.com. Follow him on X @df_lawrence.
military.com · by Drew F. Lawrence · November 1, 2023
7. To solve national security problems, the US may have to rethink higher education
This is quite a statement.
Excerpts:
“I think graduate school in the sciences in the United States is ridiculous. It's too costly. It takes too long. It doesn't serve the needs of the students. And we need to rethink it,” O’Toole said Wednesday during a Center for the New American Security event on biotechnology and the economy. “I know, education is supposed to be the realm of the states, not the feds. But this is clearly a matter of national security and the feds are going to have to get involved. Sooner would be better than later.”
O’Toole, who previously served as the Department of Homeland Security’s top science and technology official, said revamping the education system starts with attracting more teachers.
To solve national security problems, the US may have to rethink higher education
Advanced STEM degrees take too much time and cost too much, said the former science and tech head at Homeland Security.
defenseone.com · by Lauren C. Williams
A job fair for students at Shandong University of Science and Technology in Qingdao, China, on Sept. 23, 2023. Costfoto / NurPhoto via Getty Images
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Threats
Advanced STEM degrees take too much time and cost too much, said the former science and tech head at Homeland Security.
|
November 2, 2023 05:05 AM ET
By Lauren C. Williams
Senior Editor
November 2, 2023 05:05 AM ET
The state of American higher education, particularly in the sciences, is a bit “ridiculous,” and fixing it is critical to national security, said Dr. Tara O’Toole, senior fellow and executive vice president of In-Q-Tel.
“I think graduate school in the sciences in the United States is ridiculous. It's too costly. It takes too long. It doesn't serve the needs of the students. And we need to rethink it,” O’Toole said Wednesday during a Center for the New American Security event on biotechnology and the economy. “I know, education is supposed to be the realm of the states, not the feds. But this is clearly a matter of national security and the feds are going to have to get involved. Sooner would be better than later.”
O’Toole, who previously served as the Department of Homeland Security’s top science and technology official, said revamping the education system starts with attracting more teachers.
“After Sputnik, we created the National Defense Education Act, which is the primary reason I made it to medical school, because it threw a lot of money at revising the high school curriculum in science, supporting [advanced placement] courses and so forth. And that attracted both teachers and students. We have to do something like that,” she said.
It’s an urgent need. The U.S. is lagging far behind China when it comes to mathematics, and just two-thirds of college students get their bachelor’s degree in six years, she said.
“That's a terrible commentary on college, and it's even worse when you get to graduate school, and even worse if you look at the sciences, so we need to look at the whole educational system,” O’Toole said.
The country needs more science-literate government leaders, she said. One way to do that is increasing the number of science-oriented fellowships and making it easier for workers to upskill in technical fields while they're in the federal government.
“These people do great jobs, but we need to create slots for them,” O’Toole said. “And China also has an immense talent pipeline that we cannot lay claim to…and I think Congress is having a hard time grappling with these new technologies and what to do about them.”
The comments come just a year after the White House issued an executive order on advancing biotechnology, which tasked the government with expanding education opportunities in biotechnology and biomanufacturing. But part of the problem could be that many people still don’t know exactly what biotech is.
“It is food, it is health. It is materials, and as all of the things that societies are depending on. And so it shouldn't surprise us that other countries are looking to these technologies, and we really need to as well in a much more concerted way,” said Megan Palmer, Ginkgo Bioworks’ senior director of public impact. “Not knowing and not being able to grapple with what biotechnology is and might be has really stopped us from being able to invest.”
Longer-term goals and strategies have started to take form since last year’s executive order, she said, but there’s still work left to do.
“Biotechnology is democracy's greatest ally,” Palmer said. It “enables everyone, everywhere, to participate in and benefit from these types of innovations. And that's a vision and a reality that I believe the U.S. and … partners and allies can uniquely advance and offer.”
8. Janet Yellen made the worst mistake in Treasury history when she failed to lock in cheap debt, elite investor Stanley Druckenmiller says
Janet Yellen made the worst mistake in Treasury history when she failed to lock in cheap debt, elite investor Stanley Druckenmiller says
markets.businessinsider.com · by Theron Mohamed
- Janet Yellen made the worst mistake in the US Treasury's history, Stanley Druckenmiller says.
- The Treasury chief should have issued more long-term government debt at low interest rates, he said.
- Druckenmiller noted that many American households and businesses managed to lock in lower rates.
NEW LOOK
Janet Yellen made the worst mistake in the history of the Treasury, which has helped pave the way for a debt disaster, Stanley Druckenmiller says.
Yellen, who was appointed Treasury secretary in January 2021, should have issued more long-dated government bonds before the Federal Reserve began hiking interest rates early last year, Druckenmiller said. The billionaire investor and head of Duquesne Family Office made the comments to elite trader Paul Tudor Jones during a fireside chat at a recent Robin Hood Foundation event.
"When rates were practically zero, every Tom, Dick, Harry, and Mary in the United States refinanced their mortgage," Druckenmiller said. "Unfortunately we had one entity that did not, and that was the US Treasury."
"Janet Yellen — I guess because political myopia, whatever — was issuing two years at 15 basis points when she could have issued 10 years at 70 basis points or 30 years at 180 basis points," Druckenmiller continued, referring to the terms of the debt issued by the Treasury.
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"I literally think if you go back to Alexander Hamilton, it was the biggest blunder in the history of the Treasury. I have no idea why she's not been called out on this, she has no right to still be in that job after that," Druckenmiller said.
"Every caddy I knew, every locker-room person, everybody in America was refinancing their mortgages, every corporation was extending their debt," he added.
Druckenmiller warned that Yellen's error has worsened the state of America's finances. If rates stay where they are, the government's yearly interest expense will amount to 4.5% of GDP by 2033, and 7% by 2043 — equivalent to 144% of annual discretionary spending today, he said.
"The politicians that are telling you and think they're not going to cut entitlements, it's just an outright lie, the numbers absolutely don't work, it's a fantasy," he said. "Honestly, I think the math has gone crazy."
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A combination of pent-up demand, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and pandemic-related shortages drove inflation to 40-year highs last year. The Fed has hiked rates from nearly zero to north of 5% since then, as higher rates tend to cool price growth by encouraging saving over spending and making borrowing more expensive.
Druckenmiller's point is that the government should have locked in lower rates on its long-term debt when it had the chance, similar to how many American homeowners cheaply refinanced their mortgages. Notably, the latter trend has softened the impact of the Fed's rate hikes on US households, fanning fears of stubborn inflation and rates staying higher for longer.
The Duquesne chief is one of several high-profile commentators to sound the alarm on government debt. JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon and hedge-fund billionaires Ray Dalio and Leon Cooperman have all warned the US economy may be headed for a crisis if it doesn't address its leverage problem.
markets.businessinsider.com · by Theron Mohamed
9. Frustrated Zelensky Says Ukraine’s War Effort Is Being Underestimated
I do not think anyone can effectively dispute this argument. But I do not want to find out if it is wrong.
Excerpt:
“I can guarantee you that without our support, Putin will be successful,” Mr. Austin told a Senate hearing. “If we pull the rug out from under them now, Putin will only get stronger and he will be successful in doing what he wants to do in acquiring his neighbor’s sovereign territory.”
...
“If we continue our joint cooperation, we will win,” Oleksiy Danilov, the head of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, said in an interview on Tuesday. “If you leave us to our own devices, it will be much more difficult for us then.”
Mr. Zelensky has acknowledged in recent weeks the risk that the world’s attention could shift away from Ukraine. In his nightly address, he noted how his country’s forces had driven Russia’s Black Sea Fleet away from Ukraine’s western coast and forced some ships to relocate away from the illegally-occupied Crimean peninsula. That has limited Moscow’s ability to use its ships to strike Ukraine and helped Kyiv to secure a shipping route to export its grain.
“Ukraine’s success in the battle for the Black Sea is what will be in history textbooks,” Mr. Zelensky said.
But, in a sign of his frustration, he added, “It’s not discussed as often now.”
Frustrated Zelensky Says Ukraine’s War Effort Is Being Underestimated
As U.S. officials warned senators against halting military aid, President Volodymyr Zelensky said his troops’ achievements were “perceived as a given.”
Ukrainian troops during training in the Donetsk region on Saturday. Both sides have been burning through huge quantities of ammunition.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times
By Constant Méheut
Reporting from Kyiv, Ukraine
Nov. 1, 2023
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President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has expressed frustration over what he has labeled unrealistic expectations for rapid success on the battlefield amid concerns that slow progress against entrenched Russian forces will discourage Kyiv’s allies from sustaining military aid.
“The modern world quickly gets accustomed to success,” Mr. Zelensky said in his nightly address on Tuesday, complaining that Ukrainian troops’ achievements “are perceived as a given.”
Mr. Zelensky’s comments came as the Biden administration seeks congressional approval for a $105 billion aid package that includes assistance for both Israel and Ukraine. But some Republicans oppose sending more aid to Ukraine — and have moved to separate the funding request from aid for Israel.
Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III warned American senators on Tuesday that if they cut off funding to Ukraine, as some Republicans have vowed to do, President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia would win the war.
“I can guarantee you that without our support, Putin will be successful,” Mr. Austin told a Senate hearing. “If we pull the rug out from under them now, Putin will only get stronger and he will be successful in doing what he wants to do in acquiring his neighbor’s sovereign territory.”
Funding for Ukraine has become a toxic issue among Republicans. Some argue that too much money has already been spent on backing Kyiv’s war effort with little progress to show for it, and support prioritizing military aid to Israel in its war against Hamas in Gaza.
The State of the War
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Growing Frustration: President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine has complained over what he has labeled unrealistic expectations for rapid success on the battlefield amid concerns that slow progress against Russian forces will discourage Kyiv’s allies from sustaining military aid.
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Russian Soldiers Detained: The arrest in an occupied area of Ukraine of two Russian soldiers was a rare admission by Moscow that its forces may have committed a crime against Ukrainian civilians. But experts warned that it might just be political posturing.
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A Bloody Price: The fight for the battered Ukrainian city of Avdiivka has emerged as the fiercest battle of the war. Waves of Russian assaults have not broken through so far.
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‘Franken’ Weapons: To meet Ukraine’s demand for more air defenses, the United States is producing so-called FrankenSAM systems that marry advanced Western weaponry with Soviet-era items still in Kyiv’s stockpiles.
“The American taxpayers have become weary of funding a never-ending stalemate in Ukraine with no vision for victory,” eight U.S. House Republicans wrote in a letter addressed to President Biden on Tuesday.
Image
Firing toward the Kreminna front line in the Donetsk region on Saturday. Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times1
While the naysayers represent a minority overall in Congress, the shift in Republican sentiment has left Ukraine’s boosters in the party angry, alarmed and working to figure out how to reverse the trend before a lapse in funding hampers Ukraine on the battlefield.
The aid package put forward by the Biden administration includes over $60 billion for Ukraine, which would help Kyiv sustain what has largely become a war of attrition against Moscow.
Both sides have been burning through enormous quantities of ammunition. On Wednesday, Ukrainian officials said that Russia had shelled nearly 120 settlements over the last 24 hours — more than in any single day so far this year.
“This is a record number of towns and villages that have come under attack,” Ihor Klymenko, Ukraine’s minister of internal affairs, said in a statement. The east and south of Ukraine were the hardest hit, according to Mr. Klymenko, who said at least three civilians were killed and that residential buildings and an oil refinery came under fire.
Ukraine officials have warned that Moscow was likely to renew its assaults on energy infrastructure as winter looms, but say they are prepared for such a campaign, having improved defenses around energy facilities and received more air defense systems from Western partners.Editors’ Picks
But Kyiv’s forces are also contending with fierce fighting along the front line. Russia has been on the offensive around the eastern towns of Avdiivka and Kupiansk in recent weeks. Ukrainian troops have faced repeated assaults and shelling, but have largely withstood the attacks and ceded little ground.
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Shelling damage in Avdiivka, the town around which some of the fiercest recent fighting has taken place.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times
Vitalii Barabash, the head of the military administration in Avdiivka, said the town, already devastated by months of shelling, was bracing for another wave of attacks. “The enemy is regrouping, bringing in equipment and personnel,” Mr. Barabash told national television on Tuesday. “We hear and see it.”
In an effort to hamper Moscow’s fighting abilities, Ukraine has increasingly targeted Russian military equipment and depots using long-range strikes. And to sustain what many analysts believe will be a protracted fight, Ukraine has stepped up its domestic weapons production, committing over $1 billion to drone manufacturing.
However, analysts say that with the current growth of military production in Russia, Moscow will likely have a material advantage on the battlefield in the coming months. Which is why continued assistance from allies like the United States — Kyiv’s largest military backer — is critical, according to Ukrainian officials.
“If we continue our joint cooperation, we will win,” Oleksiy Danilov, the head of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council, said in an interview on Tuesday. “If you leave us to our own devices, it will be much more difficult for us then.”
Mr. Zelensky has acknowledged in recent weeks the risk that the world’s attention could shift away from Ukraine. In his nightly address, he noted how his country’s forces had driven Russia’s Black Sea Fleet away from Ukraine’s western coast and forced some ships to relocate away from the illegally-occupied Crimean peninsula. That has limited Moscow’s ability to use its ships to strike Ukraine and helped Kyiv to secure a shipping route to export its grain.
“Ukraine’s success in the battle for the Black Sea is what will be in history textbooks,” Mr. Zelensky said.
But, in a sign of his frustration, he added, “It’s not discussed as often now.”
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A soldier of the 63rd Mechanized Brigade in a contested frontline area near Kreminna.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
Marc Santora contributed reporting.
Constant Méheut has covered France from the Paris bureau of The Times since 2020. More about Constant Méheut
A version of this article appears in print on Nov. 2, 2023, Section A, Page 13 of the New York edition with the headline: Ukraine’s Military Success Isn’t a Given, Zelensky Says. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
10. A Platform Storing TikTok Corporate Secrets Was Inspected By The Chinese Government
No risk. No threat. Nothing to see here.
A Platform Storing TikTok Corporate Secrets Was Inspected By The Chinese Government
Forbes · by Emily Baker-White · November 1, 2023
A ByteDance app called Feishu that holds nearly all of TikTok’s internal communications was subject to a “wide-ranging inspection” before the CCP’s 20th National Congress last fall. But TikTok says no proprietary information was accessed.
By Emily Baker-White, Forbes Staff
TikTok's internal workplace collaboration platform, which hosts some of the company's most sensitive information, was inspected by the Chinese government ahead of the Chinese Communist Party's 20th National Congress, Forbes has learned.
Conducted in October of 2022, the review covered a broad swath of internal information related to Feishu, TikTok's main workplace tool, including “product network security, data security, personal information, and daily operations," according to a document reviewed by Forbes.
Feishu is a ByteDance product comparable to Google Docs and Microsoft Office that hosts TikTok employees’ documents, chats, meetings, calendars, and other business records. Over the past year, Forbes has reviewed hundreds of internal TikTok materials stored in Feishu, including attorney-client privileged information, draft content policies, and information related to TikTok’s United States Data Security entity, which is supposed to cordon off American user data.
This is the first report revealing a direct level of access by Chinese government officials to a product that hosts some of TikTok’s most secret information, and the documents show that — at least for now — TikTok remains reliant on its parent company ByteDance’s systems, which are subject to Chinese regulatory control.
Seth and Haurek did not answer questions about whether ByteDance has previously made TikTok employee communications available to the Chinese government.
The review was referenced in a set of briefings TikTok security personnel received from ByteDance in October 2022 about preparations for the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th National Congress — a weeklong event, occuring once every five years, where the party selects its leadership committee and defines its strategy for the next five year term. The company had tightened its security protocols and increased the number of people it had working on content moderation, steps not unlike those U.S. tech companies took ahead of the 2016 and 2020 presidential elections.
But it had also opened its doors to Chinese regulators for an “on-site regulatory inspection,” and “fulfill[ed] ad hoc inspection requirements from the National Radio and Television Administration (Beijing), Cyberspace Administration of China, National Government Offices Administration, and Cybersecurity corps,” according to a document reviewed by Forbes. Along with Feishu, which is also used by some domestic Chinese companies, the inspection also covered products including Toutiao, Douyin and Ocean Engine, which are available in China.
TikTok was not among the covered products, according to ByteDance spokesperson Jodi Seth. “While some ByteDance products are not available in China, other products like Douyin and Toutiao, do operate in China and follow Chinese laws and regulations. The inspections referenced in the document are to test for and guard against privacy and security vulnerabilities," she said.
When asked whether the inspection gave Chinese regulators access to proprietary TikTok information within Feishu, TikTok spokesperson Alex Haurek said, “no, because they were not focused on employee communications.” Seth and Haurek did not answer questions about whether ByteDance has previously made TikTok employee communications available to the Chinese government.
After publication of this story, Seth provided an additional statement: "We have not made internal employee communications available to the government as part of this review. We would only provide such communications for a specific purpose, such as an investigation of criminal activity, in accordance with local law the same way we comply with valid legal requests in any country."
Xiao Qiang, the head of UC Berkeley’s China Internet Center, told Forbes that government inspections of tech companies in China are routine, especially before big events like the National Congress. As for whether such inspections could include a review of the TikTok records stored within Feishu, “it depends on the level of the inspections,” he said.
Got a tip about TikTok or ByteDance? Reach out to Emily Baker-White securely at ebakerwhite@forbes.com or emilybakerwhite@protonmail.com.
Documents reviewed by Forbes also showed that preparations for the 20th National Congress went beyond inspections; one noted that ByteDance planned to do “enhanced public sentiment monitoring.” Forbes previously reported on word lists used by ByteDance to track public conversations on dozens of topics ranging from Tibet and Taiwan to “Uyghur-Han couples,” and “Special prohibited words for Xi and Peng.”
The document also noted that ByteDance had “expanded the security intel to cover 6 more highly active politics-related external telegram groups during the 20th National Congress.” Seth told Forbes that ByteDance undertook the Telegram monitoring to guard against hackers using methods like phishing to infiltrate the company’s systems. Telegram did not respond to a request for comment.
TikTok’s CEO, Shou Zi Chew, has said under oath that the company has not shared TikTok user data with the Chinese government and would defy an order from the CCP to do so. TikTok’s parent, ByteDance, has not made such a promise, though a draft agreement between ByteDance and the government (which the parties have not yet agreed to) would require ByteDance to “irretrievably destroy” all U.S. user data within its possession. The draft agreement would also give U.S. authorities the right to inspect TikTok’s US offices and products, in a potentially similar manner to the Chinese government’s inspection of ByteDance’s China offices.
Through initiatives known as Project Texas in the U.S. and Project Clover in Europe, TikTok has sought to reduce the extent to which TikTok users’ private information is available to employees in China. After these projects are completed, in theory, Chinese employees at ByteDance would be unable to turn over foreign user data to the Chinese government, even if they were asked to do so. But neither Project Texas nor Project Clover is yet complete, and it is not clear that the plans would satisfy governments in the U.S. and EU.
Meanwhile, ByteDance has continued to partner with the Chinese government in its domestic business. As of 2019, there was a room in the company’s Beijing headquarters that housed a team of Chinese government cybersecurity police officers, so that when content moderators identified illegal behavior, the company could instantly report it. Also in 2019, ByteDance entered into a strategic partnership with Beijing Time, a state-controlled media outlet, and partnered with the state-owned conglomerate China Mobile. It has signed a 10-year infrastructure contract with the state-owned China Telecom United Corporation.
Seth described the Beijing Time partnership as a licensing agreement, and noted that all companies doing business with telecom providers in China must work with state-owned entities. She said regarding the room that houses Chinese cybersecurity officers: “In accordance with Chinese law, online platforms operating in China are required to permit inspectors to examine content moderation processes focusing on areas like fraud and cyber crimes."
Like other Chinese tech companies (and even some American ones, including Disney), there is also an internal CCP committee at ByteDance. According to the China Digital Times, an outlet helmed by Qiang, the Berkeley scholar, the Chinese government instructed tech companies in the country to establish these committees in late 2017. Now-deleted Chinese state media articles and social media posts preserved by the China Digital Times show photos of ByteDance committee meetings. One photo preserved by the group showed a plaque awarded to ByteDance by the government for “innovation in party building.”
Seth, the ByteDance spokesperson, said that ByteDance itself does not have a party committee, but that its subsidiary, Douyin Group, does. She said that the plaque shown in the China Digital Times report was for the Douyin committee, rather than a general ByteDance committee, and that the Douyin committee does not inform the company’s business decision making.
Qiang told Forbes that corporate party committees are important because they provide unofficial ways for party leaders to communicate with companies. He noted that these channels can be “even more important” than their formal counterparts, because they “don’t have to be official government-level.”
This story has been updated with additional comment from ByteDance.
MORE FROM FORBES
MORE FROM FORBESAs TikTok Ban Looms, ByteDance Battles Oracle For Control Of Its AlgorithmBy Emily Baker-WhiteMORE FROM FORBESA Draft Of TikTok's Plan To Avoid A Ban Gives The U.S. Government Unprecedented Oversight PowerBy Emily Baker-WhiteMORE FROM FORBESTikTok Has Pushed Chinese Propaganda Ads To Millions Across EuropeBy Iain MartinMORE FROM FORBESAs Many As 700,000 Turkish TikTok Accounts Were Hacked Before The Country's Presidential ElectionBy Emily Baker-WhiteMORE FROM FORBESSecurity Failures At TikTok's Virginia Data Centers: Unescorted Visitors, Mystery Flash Drives And Illicit Crypto MiningBy Emily Baker-White
Forbes · by Emily Baker-White · November 1, 2023
11. Import records illuminate Ukraine’s desperate hunt for arms and ammo
Import records illuminate Ukraine’s desperate hunt for arms and ammo
Kyiv is paying exorbitant prices for Soviet-designed materiel, and has even managed to obtain Swiss ammo despite Geneva's ban.
defenseone.com · by Sam Skove
Two purchases of Swiss ammunition for Ukraine appear to violate Geneva’s prohibition on such transfers, while other Ukrainian arms deals have been concluded at exorbitant prices. That’s according to Ukrainian import records that illustrate Kyiv’s desperate hunt for defense materiel for its fight against Russian invaders.
In July alone, Ukrainian entities imported at least $346,067,021 worth of ammunition, including Soviet-designed munitions from factories in eastern Europe, according to Ukrainian documents gathered by Import Genius, an aggregator of trade data. These deals are unrelated to the billions of dollars in military aid provided by the U.S. and other supporters.
The documents show at least two Ukrainian imports of Swiss-made ammunition.
On July 14, Ukrainian Armor, an armored-vehicle-and-munition company, took receipt of 500,000 .308 Winchester rifle cartridges and 145,000 .338 Lapua Magnum rifle cartridges, according to documents for the .308 rounds (Google translation) and the .338 rounds (Google translation). The records designate both rounds as armor-piercing. The .338 round is designed for long-range sniping, according to its manufacturer.
The import records show that the ammunition was made by SwissP Defence, a Swiss company whose website says it specializes in the military and law enforcement market. The rounds were delivered by Polish defense importer UMO to Ukrainian Armor, a privately-held defense manufacturer that is reportedly one of the largest private suppliers of the Ukrainian military.
Switzerland has banned shipments of munitions to both Russia and Ukraine. The hotly debated embargo previously prevented Germany from sending Swiss-made 35mm ammunition for Gepard anti-aircraft guns sent to Ukraine.
In June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy asked the Swiss parliament to end the ban, calling it “vital” to allow re-export of weapons to Ukraine. The parliament’s upper house has supported lifting the ban but its lower house has consistently voted against it, most recently in late September.
The Swiss-made rifle ammunition, however, is just a small part of a vast supply of defense goods that Ukraine has purchased from arms companies and third-party arms dealers, the import records show.
Other shipments included the sale of 50 M113B AIFV armored personnel carriers in multiple shipments from Belgium, which have since been spotted on the battlefield. The sale is documented across 50 separate import declarations like this one (Google translation).
The transfer was managed not by a country, however, but by Global Military Products, a third-party arms dealer.
Based in Florida, the company has processed arms and ammo worth hundreds of millions of dollars for Ukraine, working both directly with Kyiv and as a contractor to the U.S. government. The company’s founder was previously recorded by the FBI discussing bribery in a since-dropped corruption case.
Ukraine’s hunger for combat vehicles, particularly amid preparations for its mid-2023 counter-offensive, also led it to buy 30 M113A3 infantry fighting vehicles in multiple shipments in July from private U.S. dealer International Parts Supply Corporation. This sale is also documented in multiple import declarations, like this one (Google translation).
Bulgaria, whose vast arms industry is still churning out Soviet-designed munitions, is among the largest suppliers of arms to Ukraine listed in Import Genius records.
In July, Ukraine took receipt of 131 shipments of Bulgarian munitions, for a total value of over $90 million. Many of these were delivered by Polish arms-export companies, confirming previous reporting that Russian-leaning Bulgaria was sending weapons through Poland rather than shipping directly.
Other top sources include Romania, for a total of $22 million; the Czech Republic ($20 million); and Turkey ($22 million).
Such purchases often come at exorbitant cost, unlike the weapons delivered free of charge as military aid from the U.S. and its allies.
On July 5, Ukraine received 1,000 152mm shells for its aging Soviet-designed weapons from a Bulgarian arms manufacturer via Poland’s Government Strategic Reserves Agency. The invoice price is listed (Google translation)as 110,667,265 hryvnia, or about $3,000 a shell.
That appears to be roughly triple what Russia is paying per shell, experts said. Pavel Luzin, a specialist on Russia’s military at the Jamestown Foundation, estimated that Russia pays around $1,000 or more for the typical 152mm shell. That’s a good estimate, agreed Dean Lockwood, an analyst at Forecast International, a sister brand of Defense One.
Russia paid Iran at most $1,190 for 152mm rounds in a September 2022 deal, according to documents viewed by Sky News obtained from an unidentified security source.
Ukraine paid a lower rate for less-powerful 122mm artillery rounds, but still about one-third more than equivalent Russian rounds, documents note.
On July 3, Ukraine received 6,144 122mm rounds manufactured by Bulgarian arms giant VMZ for $1,196 each in multiple shipments. The rounds were delivered to Ukrainian state arms importer Progress by Polish arms trader Alfa, according to import records (Google translation).
On July 13, Ukraine’s Defense Procurement Agency received 2,472 rounds of Czech-made 122mm in multiple shipments for $1,140 apiece from Czech firm STV Group. This deal is documented in import declarations like this one (Google translation).
Russia, by contrast, bought 122mm shells at a maximum price of $726 from Iran, according to the Sky News documents. One Russian news outlet put the price of a 122mm shell at $500 or more.
Pavel Beran, director of Special Projects at STV Group, said his company seeks to sell its wares at “fair and competitive prices that correspond to the current market situation.” Beran said a shortage of components has made supplying munitions “very challenging over the last almost two years” and said the company is working to increase ammunition production.
Among the priciest rounds listed in the documents were unguided 122mm rockets, which Ukraine fires in volleys of up to 40 from Grad launchers. One July 18 shipment from Polish company Alfa to Ukrainian state arms importer Progress lists an invoice price equivalent to $5,434 for each round, which were made by Bulgarian arms firm VMZ, per import records (Google translation).
Iranian prices for similar rounds were $1,860 a round.
The price discrepancy is in keeping with reporting by Ukrainska Pravda that Ukraine was buying munitions from Bulgaria, with Alfa and Progress acting as intermediaries. Ukrainska Pravda found that many of the goods sold by Alfa to Ukraine were never delivered or were defective.
The newspaper further found that 122mm shells sold to Ukraine by Alfa via Progress were 57 percent more expensive than direct sales between Alfa and the Ukrainian government. The newspaper reported that the price from Alfa was 760 euros, while the price via Progress was 1,195 euros, with the contract signed in late April.
The deal between Progress and Alfa was overseen by Oleksandr Myronyuk, a Ukrainian official who was found to have $1 million hidden in a sofa during a search.
While Ukrainska Pravda did not publish the source of their information, Defense One’s data from Import Genius shows the same companies, Alfa and Progress, processing deliveries of the same munitions for the same price as listed as Ukrainska Pravda.
Defense One has requested comment from the embassy of Switzerland in the United States and from company officials at SwissP, UMO, and Alfa. None had responded by publication time.
defenseone.com · by Sam Skove
12. U.K. MPs propose mandatory training to prevent Chinese spies
Perhaps this should be a mandatory subject in high school and higher education. We all need to be able to defend against Chinese espionage. With the thousand grains of sand we are probably all targets.w
U.K. MPs propose mandatory training to prevent Chinese spies
The move came after British authorities publicly warned about China’s espionage practices.
By Amelia Loi for RFA Cantonese
2023.11.01
rfa.org
A group of British lawmakers has proposed mandatory security training for all members of parliament and parliamentary personnel in order to prevent “foreign interference.”
“The new geopolitical axis, consisting of Iran, the Kremlin, Pyongyang and Beijing, brings with it many new challenges, including sanctions targeting lawmakers who oppose authoritarian regimes, digital attacks on their online and mobile networks, and malicious intent on social platforms attack and damage,” said Lord David Alton who was among several British MPs who put forward the training proposal to the Speaker of the House of Lords and the Speaker of the House of Commons.
“It’s a combination of intimidation, silencing and coercion. Add to this the fact that agents from hostile countries such as China have been revealed to be operating within Parliament.”
The proposal, drafted by the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), mandates that all lawmakers and personnel receive mandatory digital and operational security training on a regular basis, as well as the publication of a list of those who have failed to complete the training.
IPAC is an international cross-party group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China.
It also recommends that relevant departments provide basic network security tools, such as VPNs, password management tools and screen protectors; regularly issue warnings to MPs about new phishing, malicious applications and other network attacks; and establish mechanisms to allow MPs to report information leakage and other situations, and assist in subsequent crisis management.
The proposal came after the director of MI5 and other intelligence chiefs from the Five Eyes Alliance issued a public warning about China’s espionage practices.
“I don’t think [British] MPs were very security conscious before because the foreign interference activities that have emerged in recent years are actually very new,” Glacier Kwong, head of Hong Kong security policy at IPAC, told RFA Cantonese. “I don’t think they have had much contact with Chinese or Russian interference in the past.”
She believes that as the U.K. general election approaches, foreign spies will become more active in their attempts to collect intelligence and influence policy formulation. And activities such as disinformation wars and flooding the social platforms of parliamentarians with spam messages will also become more prevalent, she said.
“As there are going to be new tactics, there are going to be more foreign interventions, and with the general election coming up, there are going to be more of these interventions, so the relevant departments are going to have to enhance their countermeasures,” Kwong added.
Translated by RFA staff. Edited by Elaine Chan.
rfa.org
13. Al-Aqsa Storm Heralds the Rise of Non-state Special Operations
Conclusion:
Israel is not the only state to be surprised by violent non-state special operations. The 2007 Karbala raid, for example, executed by Asaib al-Haq militia members disguised as U.S special forces, succeeded in taking hostages at a U.S. military base in Iraq. As these examples proliferate, it is becoming increasingly clear that states’ monopoly over special operations is over. The growing proliferation of military technologies, coupled with the consistent underestimation of militant groups, is allowing non-state actors to take on states and demonstrate the power to hurt.
Al-Aqsa Storm Heralds the Rise of Non-state Special Operations - War on the Rocks
LEO BLANKEN, IAN RICE, AND CRAIG WHITESIDE
warontherocks.com · by Leo Blanken · November 2, 2023
The shock of Hamas’ Oct. 7 assault continues to reverberate around the world amidst fears it will be the catalyst for a wider regional war. Many observers are comparing it to the 1973 Yom Kippur war, arguing that Israel repeated many of the same mistakes in failing to anticipate the attack. But this was more than an intelligence failure. It was failure of imagination. Israel grew comfortable managing its relationship with Hamas in Gaza, keeping rocket attacks and suicide bombings to a relatively low level for almost a decade. Moreover, as we saw in a visit last month, Israel’s top security officials are obsessed with the non-state threat posed by Hizballah to the north and concerned with unrest in the occupied West Bank. There was little expectation that Hamas could launch anything Israeli forces couldn’t handle with their then-limited security posture near Gaza.
What Israel missed is the growing democratization of technology, which is rapidly providing new and dangerous capabilities to non-state actors. Stephen Biddle, in his book Nonstate Warfare, argues that this is allowing violent non-state actors to achieve military capabilities that had previously been reserved for states. When carefully integrated into hybrid military-terror campaigns, these can challenge states that insist on maintaining dated misperceptions of their foes. Our research finds non-state actors are increasingly developing special operations capabilities, which are creating strategic and political effects beyond their tactical use.
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(Under)estimating Actors Like Hamas
Hamas’ surprise attack had two dimensions. The first was “strategic surprise.” This refers to an adversary achieving strategic effects by attacking a known enemy using known methods but catching them unaware “at an unexpected time or place.” For example, the Pearl Harbor attack achieved strategic surprise even though the possibility of Japan using carrier-based aircraft was anticipated as a potential threat. The second dimension of the Hamas attack was “doctrinal surprise.” This refers to an actor employing “known technologies and capabilities in unexpected ways to produce powerful new effects.” Hamas achieved this by combining many elements of what the U.S. military refers to as a multi-domain military operation — and did so with a level of precision, coordination, and planning that shocked observers.
How were the extensive preparations necessary to plan and execute such an attack missed by Israel and others? The essential logic of generating military force is predicated on amassing physical and human capital. Nation-states have performed this task extraordinarily well for the last 1,000 years, and some consider this effort to be the defining activity of states. Other entities, such as multinational corporations, social movements, and extremist groups, by contrast, are commonly believed to face systematic barriers — legal, normative, fiscal, organizational, and human — that prevent them from generating and sustaining such military force. Despite the inherent advantage that nation-states enjoy, however, they are in turn inherently vulnerable to such force. With a fixed geographic footprint, population, infrastructure, and economic base, nations are susceptible to attack in a way that non-state actors generally are not.
Non-state actors use terrorism to leverage state vulnerabilities to achieve political and psychological effects through the application of purposeful violence without the machinery and resourcing associated with conventional military power. This is why so many observers are concerned about terrorist groups acquiring “magic bullet” technology, such as nuclear weapons and strategic cyber effects, or repurposing readily available tech, such as flying commercial airliners into skyscrapers, to scale up their acts of terror.
What is less understood is how non-state groups seek to overcome the challenge of generating military power through the leveraging of established techniques, such as basic military training and detailed planning, alongside easily acquired technology like AK-47s and motorcycles. This can allow a non-state group to generate an approximation of military power to achieve strategic effects, even if they cannot sustain it for long periods of time. If such approximated military power is applied at the right time and place, it may have an outsized impact. As one of us wrote in these pages five years ago, “marginal improvement of tactical prowess in violent non-state groups may lead to outcomes that have strategic implications.” Indeed, Israel has underestimated non-state actor capability more recently. Despite its claims to have humbled Hizballah in the 2006 war, even supporters like former President George W. Bush wrote in his memoirs that Israel had underperformed in the conflict against a capable non-state actor.
There are several possible reasons for Israel’s underestimation of Hamas. The first reason is that non-state actors have an inherent advantage in concealing their choices in investments, doctrine, and force structure. The second relates to a general tendency in recent years for security professionals in the West to focus on cutting-edge technology while neglecting the “mundane” (but still important) bases of generating force. The final reason is a seemingly inescapable prejudice when considering actors such as Hamas or the Islamic State that conflates such groups’ ideologies and perverse actions with their competence. This underestimation provides expanded policy options for the political and military leadership of a non-state actor like Hamas.
Choosing Non-state Special Operations
It is too early to know with certainty why Hamas made a major strategic pivot by preparing and launching the Oct. 7 attacks. What we do understand from our research is that the type of non-state actor matters; militant groups like Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic State (at its peak) govern significant populations, which allows them to generate the resources to develop a variety of military capabilities. And when strategic planners are looking to change the dynamics of a conflict, they often turn to special operations.
Hamas’ surprise operation harnessed thousands of militants infiltrating Israel by multiple means. It integrated technology to breach obstacles and suppress overwatch positions and sought to maximize death and destruction for political effect in what is best understood as a non-state version of a raid. This fits our framework for a non-state special operation. By special operations, we are referring to the individual and, in this case, collective tactical engagements that generated effects greater than the engagements themselves. In general, special operations are small unit actions that generate effects that directly support campaign outcomes and are often associated with bespoke training, equipment, and tactics that allow small units to achieve outsized results.
A classic example is the German glider-borne assault onto the concrete fortress of Ében Émael in Belgium at the start of the 1940 invasion of France. An 80-man assault engineer detachment managed to knock out the vital Belgian fortress capable of raining fire upon the approaching German columns. The assault allowed the Germans to rapidly move through the Netherlands and then Belgium to enter France from the north, but more importantly, the success of this thrust fulfilled the Allies’ preconception that the invasion was indeed following the same path as 1914. The entire effort was a feint to allow the true main effort of the invasion force to pour through the thinly defended Ardennes. In the end, a daring and innovative assault was used to initiate a larger campaign.
Just as state actors can devise campaigns to achieve their ends, other entities can conceive and execute such tactical actions even though they do not have the same capacity and institutions. The al-Aqsa campaign has dominated the collective security studies debate in the past weeks. What is not being addressed are the structural similarities to how states organize, equip, train, and employ small units to achieve outsized effects, or what Colin Gray calls the strategic utility of special operations. Tailor-building a small unit to achieve specific outcomes can provide two main opportunities for an actor. First is economy of force. The placement of the specific element at the right time and place can generate effects that larger organizations cannot. With a relatively small number of fighters, Hamas has skillfully achieved an economy of force and managed to capture global attention through its employment of a new set of tactics against its immediate Goliath of an adversary.
Second, employing elements to achieve outsized effects can help decision-makers reimagine the possibility of an outcome by employing innovative means. The Republic of Korea Army Special Warfare Command’s motto “Make the Impossible, Possible” directly speaks to this point of expanding options. Hamas clearly caught Israel off guard. The group possessed the imagination to develop a plan and the tactical capability to accomplish it, as the al-Aqsa campaign was a departure from the group’s typical style of attacks. Where bombings and small-scale kidnappings have been the group’s drumbeat of violence, this campaign demonstrated a willingness and skill to operate in the open above the so-called military horizon — the conceptual line where actors operate in visible military formations.
Special operations can also provide additional options to influence the will and perception of both friendly and enemy actors. Such operations can demonstrate acumen and guile, be designed to embarrass the enemy, or bolster the morale of supporters. Arguably the most famous example that hits all these influence purposes was the 1942 Doolittle Raid against Japan, which included a premeditated media campaign to accompany the results. Similarly, Hamas supporters appear less concerned with how the attacks were carried out on innocents and more interested in Hamas’ ability to successfully conduct a surprise attack against a sleeping Israel and the emphasis on the air-land-sea approaches to initiate the assault. The best evidence available for this effect is the international rallies in support of Hamas and the return of attention to the Palestinian plight to regional discourse.
Conclusion
Israel is not the only state to be surprised by violent non-state special operations. The 2007 Karbala raid, for example, executed by Asaib al-Haq militia members disguised as U.S special forces, succeeded in taking hostages at a U.S. military base in Iraq. As these examples proliferate, it is becoming increasingly clear that states’ monopoly over special operations is over. The growing proliferation of military technologies, coupled with the consistent underestimation of militant groups, is allowing non-state actors to take on states and demonstrate the power to hurt.
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Leo Blanken is an associate professor in the defense analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is the author of Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansionand co-editor of Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure.
Ian Rice is a lecturer in the defense analysis department at the Naval Postgraduate School. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces officer and researches the dynamics of military occupations and non-state special operations.
Craig Whiteside is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College resident program at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He is a co-author of The ISIS Reader.
Image: Fars News Agency
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Leo Blanken · November 2, 2023
14. The Weaponization of Language in Irregular Warfare: Moldova, a Case Study
We should keep in mind that the new Joint Pub 1, Warfighting recognizes that irregular warfare is on the same level as conventional warfare meaning that both need to be prioritized.
We need a "deterrence troika" – (can't use triad or trinity): nuclear deterrence, conventional deterrence and unconventional or irregular) deterrence.
And we must heed Robert Gates' wise words.
Excerpts:
Modern warfare will rely heavily on IW, which can be a cornerstone of effective integrated deterrence. Given that the European theater still relies heavily on the US security guarantee, the US IW enterprise must be leveraged. Effective IW also requires the United States to rely heavily on its allies. To construct a truly credible integrated deterrence framework, American planners will need to prioritize multinational engagements to first understand and then counter localized Russian IW techniques. The Russian IW playbook that focuses on people, stokes social divisiveness, exacerbates identity politics, and drives legal expediencies will attain Russian goals if left unchecked. For US integrated deterrence to succeed vis-à-vis Russia, allied European nations must shape the environment to protect the rules-based order and counter artificial realities. Western democratic, multicultural, and pluralistic societies function only when all peoples have equal rights and opportunities. An essential component of IW in Europe is understanding how to protect both.
The existing US IW enterprise can significantly contribute to the conventional component of deterrence. Expanding IW knowledge and skill also requires collaboration with the Europeans. In the case of the weaponization of the Romanian language, understanding the socio-cultural, historical, and religious dimensions of the pre- and post-Soviet project of de-Romanization can substantially aid in demolishing anti-Western influence campaigns across Europe and even in the United States. Truly understanding these IW mechanisms would mend “deficiencies in US capabilities to engage effectively” both in conventional and unconventional ways. US Special Operations Command and the US intelligence community may help provide a foundation for such measures.
As US Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced in 2008, the West will not succeed in integrated deterrence until it “displays a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which [it possesses] in conventional combat.” As the issue of Russia’s weaponization of the Romanian/Moldovan language reveals, there remains much the United States has yet to learn in IW. Still, implementing IW with localized European assistance and building on existing Special Operations relationships will take the United States a step further on the long road toward IW mastery and establishing a more secure Europe.
The Weaponization of Language in Irregular Warfare: Moldova, a Case Study - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Olga Raluca Chiriac, Dan Dungaciu · November 2, 2023
Three documents released by US President Joe Biden’s administration in 2022 highlight the significance of integrated deterrence: the , Nuclear Posture Review, and Missile Defense Review. Indeed, integrated deterrence reflects the primary way the Department of Defense (DoD) pursues its goal of national defense: with the coherent application of US, allied, and partner instruments of national power in pursuit of mutual national interest. Within this direction, allies and partners take on a more nuanced role, something relevant to the irregular warfare (IW) enterprise. This approach further requires that in addition to conventional interoperability, the allied IW enterprise focuses resources on better understanding, engaging, and leveraging regional and socio-cultural capabilities, understanding the human terrain in which the US and its allies and partners will have to potentially operate.
The Russian Federation is known to be very skillful in leveraging asymmetries to its advantage, and Russia’s use of IW through its operations in the Republic of Moldova is a perfect example. While not obvious to the unfamiliar eye, Moscow, both under Soviet and post-Soviet rule, has used IW to achieve its strategic aims. In the case of Republic of Moldova, the goal is to keep Moldovan capital Chișinău under Russian influence while simultaneously deepening divides between Moldova, Ukraine, and Romania. These efforts are designed to prevent Moldovas accession to the EU and integration into Western institutions and ultimately to undermine the rules-based international order.
In exerting influence in Europe, the Russian Federation executes IW according to its own doctrine. The full-scale conflict in Ukraine provides us with a wealth of lessons in military art, a central one being that IW is an important component of the conflict spectrum, albeit approached and executed differently by near-peer competitors. Commentary and analysis tends to agree that when Russian forces invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022, they did so according to a well-established playbook. Proposed solutions, however, converge towards a focus on conventional capabilities and force structure, leaving out core issues relevant to the post-Soviet space, including the history and socio-cultural traits of the local populace. IW is the focal point of this current conflict and it is as important to develop and integrate IW capabilities as much as conventional forces. This article explores one example of how language is weaponized to attain strategic and geopolitical goals.
Russia’s “De-Romanization” Tactics
The Russian Federation continued to engage asymmetrically after the fall of the USSR and most times used Soviet methods, only updating them to the present operational environment. The case of de-Romanization and the weaponization of the Romanian/“Moldovan” language in both Ukraine and Moldova is the reverse of what Russia has done to establish and protect its own identity: destroy the essence of an ethnic group (in this case, the Romanians), deport them, take away religious freedoms and education rights, and then leverage this in order to sow hate and fear by blaming it on someone else (in the Moldovan case, on Ukraine). Conversely, Moscow justified the annexation of Crimea and other strategic choices by evoking the concept of “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir). The essence of Russkiy Mir is to protect Russian identity, values, tradition and language from alleged attackers , i.e, the collective West. This method is very powerful because it is not limited by borders: de-Romanization was applied in the artificially constructed Republic of Moldova as much as in Ukraine.
It is not the first time Moscow has used such methods. The Soviet deportations of ethnic Romanians from Bassarabia and Northern Bukovina (present day Republic of Moldova and areas of Ukraine) first took place between late 1940 and 1951 and were part of Joseph Stalin’s policy of political repression of any potential opposition to Soviet power. The Romanian population in the occupied territories of Bassarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Herța region (illegally annexed following the German Russian Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact) were a continuous threat for the Soviet dictator and his regime because they represented a constant potentiality of re-unification with Romania and resistance against Soviet oppression and communism. Similarly, today, Moscow is working to encourage any de-Romanization laws and behaviors as it continues to try to destroy the Ukrainian nation. After the fall of the USSR, the Russian Federation “carried the torch” of the Soviet Union’s asymmetric engagement in Eastern Europe, including de-Romanization through the weaponization of the Romanian/Moldovan language. Moldavian is a dialect of Romanian. It is written identically, and Moldova and Romania share the same literary language. The standard alphabet used in Moldova is identical to the Romanian alphabet, which uses the Latin script, not Cyrillic.
The pre- and post-Soviet de-Romanization projects in Ukraine and Moldova have produced glaring departures from historical fact, an alternative reality employed in fighting IW. According to the last Ukrainian population census dating back to 2001, Romanians constitute the third-largest ethnic group (after Ukrainians and Russians) in Ukraine: a total of 409,608 people, or 0.85% (of which 258,619 or 0.53% are “Moldovans” and 150,989 or 0.32% are “Romanians”) of the population. Nonetheless, the circumstances of these Romanians in Ukraine are complicated, for historical, political and, more recently, geopolitical reasons. The Soviet period allowed, for example, university exams in Romanian (which was then purposely called “Moldavian”) in some sections of Cernăuți.
Surprisingly (because it was during the Soviet rule), the Gorbachev period was the most beneficial for the ethnic Romanians of Ukraine. The struggle for recognition was supported by foreign contributors, and elementary schools and high schools were opened (for example: in the Cernăuți region alone, five more schools were added to the 87 already in existence). Between 1991 and 1992, in all Romanian-speaking regions, the Romanian language was removed and by the end of the 1990s, the process of de-Romanization resumed. In 1998, the Romanian language remained in the Cernăuți and Maramureș regions, but in Odessa and Bugeac it was switched to the Soviet artificial construct of “Moldavian language”. This occurred administratively and tacitly, without an official statement or any request from parents or students. It was gradual and silent. The Russia-friendly regimes installed in Ukraine and Moldova helped Moscow, rather than the population.In 1998, Ukrainians began to change how they referred to the “Moldavian” dialect. It became “Romanian language (Moldavian language),” then by 1999, the “Moldovan language (Romanian language),” after which it was reduced to “Moldovan language.” Again, all this occurred without any requests to change the language of instruction in schools. Everything was done administratively, without any written, legal basis. This is representative of the power of IW and Russian influence. In 2010, after the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005, the situation continued, culminating with the Education Law of 2017, followed by the language law and the recent minorities law of December 2022. Meanwhile, Chișinău officially declared that all learning processes in the Republic of Moldova should be done in Romanian, and the official transition to “Romanian language” and the amendment of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova makes unnecessary and inexplicable any insistence for maintaining the Soviet narrative of the “Moldovan language.”
Thus, the so-called “Moldovan language,” a Soviet creation initiated on Oct. 12, 1924, to artificially produce a so-called Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic as a counter to the reunification of Bassarabia with Romania, became an effective weapon in Russian IW against Moldova, Ukraine, Europe, and, implicitly the rules based order. This was IW at its finest.
The Russian IW Playbook
The Russian IW playbook is precisely tailored to the target populace. In the Moldova-Romania-Ukraine region, Russia’s weaponization of the Romanian language is a means to pursue its strategic goal of controlling and manipulating both the population and the international community. By rebranding the Romanian language as “Moldovan,” Russia impeded Moldova from pursuing a European path and simultaneously tried to sabotage Romanian-Ukrainian relations. Weaponizing the language created internal discord between ethnic Russians and Romanians and fueled mistrust in the Union and its institutions. The Western values of the rules-based order respect the rights and freedoms of all minorities was subliminally replaced with messaging that the “Moldovan identity” would lose sovereignty. This in turn created deeper division between ethnic Romanians and Ukrainians through language differences, Russia frustrated Ukraine’s European Union (EU) integration process. By perpetuating fake narratives and making false accusations, Russia also hid its expansionist goals. Russian propagation of the fake narrative that Romania is looking to reunify with Moldova reflects absurdity in the face of reality: Romania supports not only Ukraine in its fight for state survival but also Moldova in its bid for EU membership. Romania also remains a staunch North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ally and security provider for the Euro-Atlantic space, especially in the Black Sea. On his recent visit to Romania, president Volodymyr Zelenskyy made it a point to thank Romania for its military and humanitarian assistance.
Russia’s perpetuation and formalization of the Soviet-style distinction between the ethnonyms Romanian and “Moldovan” (not recognized by Romania) and the glottonyms Romanian language and “Moldovan language” (recognized by neither Romania nor Moldova), a clear IW mechanism, is mirrored in the Russian world, where the Russian language and culture are protected from an alleged attack from the collective West. Originally, the distinction, both linguistic and ethnic, between Romanian and “Moldovan” was administrative. After the emergence of the USSR, all Romanian speakers who had been previously part of the Tsarist Empire were called “Moldovans,” and those who had been part of the Austro-Hungarian or Habsburg Empire were called “Romanians.” Hence the paradox that, for example, the first post-independence Moldovan prime minister, Mircea Druc, was “Romanian,” because he was originally from Cernăuți, while the rest of the population was made up of “Moldovans” who had been part of the Tsarist and later Soviet Empire. Unfortunately, the distinction was perpetuated in Kyiv after Ukraine’s independence for strategic reasons. If the two minorities, namely the Romanian and the “Moldovan,” were put together, they would become the country’s second-largest minority ethnic group after the Russians, and possibly obtain more significant rights (for example education and religious right) and even certain political advantages (more formal political representation). Separately, however, they ranked fifth and eighth, respectively, among minority group populations.
Nevertheless, this mechanism has its disadvantages. Most saliently, it produces anti-Ukrainian sentiment and feeds into Russian propaganda across Europe. In Germany, for instance, a new political party ran with a platform opposing support for Ukraine. The same strategy applied: use anti-Ukrainian propaganda in order to advance the Russian agenda. Remember, this kind of IW is not limited by borders. It is socio-cultural. Another mechanism emphasizes the denial of the Romanian population’s “native population” (autochthonous) status in Ukraine, which would have protected it from recent unfavorable legislative changes.
A final mechanism, with major effects in the medium- and long-term, is the 2017 Education Law passed during the Poroshenko presidency. Ukraine implemented the law without the consent of the Venice Commission and despite contestations by Bucharest authorities for violating European norms regarding ethnic minorities. Practically, the situation of Romanians in Ukraine, under the codices of a drastic education law, became difficult. For the medium- and long-term, only diminished mechanisms exist for preserving Romanian national identity. There is no registered Romanian church that could facilitate the preservation of the socio-cultural and religious traditions of the several hundred thousand Romanians/Moldovans in Ukraine. Practically, the Romanian minority, unable to obtain Romanian citizenship because Ukraine only permits one citizenship, will enter a period of pronounced decline.
Conclusions for the IW Enterprise
Modern warfare will rely heavily on IW, which can be a cornerstone of effective integrated deterrence. Given that the European theater still relies heavily on the US security guarantee, the US IW enterprise must be leveraged. Effective IW also requires the United States to rely heavily on its allies. To construct a truly credible integrated deterrence framework, American planners will need to prioritize multinational engagements to first understand and then counter localized Russian IW techniques. The Russian IW playbook that focuses on people, stokes social divisiveness, exacerbates identity politics, and drives legal expediencies will attain Russian goals if left unchecked. For US integrated deterrence to succeed vis-à-vis Russia, allied European nations must shape the environment to protect the rules-based order and counter artificial realities. Western democratic, multicultural, and pluralistic societies function only when all peoples have equal rights and opportunities. An essential component of IW in Europe is understanding how to protect both.
The existing US IW enterprise can significantly contribute to the conventional component of deterrence. Expanding IW knowledge and skill also requires collaboration with the Europeans. In the case of the weaponization of the Romanian language, understanding the socio-cultural, historical, and religious dimensions of the pre- and post-Soviet project of de-Romanization can substantially aid in demolishing anti-Western influence campaigns across Europe and even in the United States. Truly understanding these IW mechanisms would mend “deficiencies in US capabilities to engage effectively” both in conventional and unconventional ways. US Special Operations Command and the US intelligence community may help provide a foundation for such measures.
As US Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced in 2008, the West will not succeed in integrated deterrence until it “displays a mastery of irregular warfare comparable to that which [it possesses] in conventional combat.” As the issue of Russia’s weaponization of the Romanian/Moldovan language reveals, there remains much the United States has yet to learn in IW. Still, implementing IW with localized European assistance and building on existing Special Operations relationships will take the United States a step further on the long road toward IW mastery and establishing a more secure Europe.
Dr. Olga Raluca Chiriac is the Project Europe Head of Engagement @ Irregular Warfare Initiative of the Modern War Institute at West Point, a Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the University of Bucharest and Fellow at the Research Institute of the University of Bucharest where she co-directs the Black Sea Area Studies Program. She is a US State Department Title VIII Black Sea Fellow Program Alumna and an Associated Researcher with the Joint Special Operations University in Tampa FL.
Prof. Dr. Dan Dungaciu is Professor at the Faculty of Sociology and Social Work of the University of Bucharest and president of the Black Sea University Foundation. Prior to this, Dr. Dungaciu served several terms as the director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy. He is holder of the special state distinction “Merit of Honor” Republic of Moldova (2009). In 2006 he served as Undersecretary of State at the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania. In 2010 he held the position of president adviser for European integration for the President of Moldova.
Main photo: Soldiers from the North Carolina and Alabama National Guard join their Moldovan and Romanian peers at the opening ceremony for Operation Fire Shield 2019 hosted by Moldova, Sept. 16 at Bulboaca Training Area, Moldova. Here, a Moldovan Soldier raises the Moldovan Flag as a Romanian soldier and a U.S. Army Soldier render honors.
15. Israeli army battles Hamas fighters in drive towards Gaza City
Topics:
'HAMAS HAS PREPARED WELL'
'WE OPEN OUR EYES ON DEAD PEOPLE'
Israeli army battles Hamas fighters in drive towards Gaza City
Reuters · by Nidal Al-Mughrabi
- Summary
- LATEST DEVELOPMENTS:
- Palestinian medics say three teenagers were killed by Israeli army fire in the West Bank. Israeli military and medics say Palestinian gunmen kill an Israeli motorist.
GAZA/JERUSALEM, Nov 2 (Reuters) - Israeli tanks and troops pressed towards Gaza City on Thursday but met fierce resistance from Hamas militants using mortars and hit-and-run attacks from tunnels as the Palestinian death toll from nearly four weeks of bombardments mounted.
At the southern end of the besieged enclave, foreign passport-holders were being allowed out through the Rafah crossing into Egypt.
The war is closing in on the Gaza Strip's main population centre in the north, where the Islamist group is based and where Israel has been telling people to leave as it vows to annihilate Hamas once and for all.
"We are at the gates of Gaza City," Israeli military commander Brigadier General Itzik Cohen said.
Fighters of Hamas and its ally Islamic Jihad were emerging from tunnels to fire at tanks, then disappearing back into the network, residents said and videos from both groups showed, in guerrilla-style operations against a far more powerful army.
"They never stopped bombing Gaza City all night, the house never stopped shaking," said one man living there, asking not to be identified by name. "But in the morning we discover the Israeli forces are still outside the city, in the outskirts and that means the resistance is heavier than they expected."
Israeli officers have stressed the difficulties of fighting in an urban environment. The strategy appears for now to concentrate large forces in the northern Gaza Strip rather than launch a ground assault on the entire territory.
The latest war in the decades-old conflict began when Hamas fighters broke through the border on Oct. 7. Israel says they killed 1,400 people, mostly civilians, and took more than 200 hostages in the deadliest day of its 75-year history.
Israel's ensuing bombardment of the small Palestinian enclave of 2.3 million people has killed at least 8,796 people, including 3,648 children, according to Gaza health authorities.
Though Western nations and the United States in particular have traditionally supported Israel, harrowing images of bodies in the rubble and hellish conditions inside Gaza have triggered appeals for restraint and street protests around the world.
Israel's right-wing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu knows, however, that his career and legacy depend on crushing Hamas.
'HAMAS HAS PREPARED WELL'
Residents reported mortar fire throughout the night in areas around Gaza City and said Israeli tanks and bulldozers were sometimes driving over rubble and knocking down structures rather than using regular roads as planes bombed from overhead.
Brigadier General Iddo Mizrahi, chief of Israel's military engineers, told Army Radio troops were in a first stage of opening access routes in Gaza. "This is certainly terrain that is more heavily sown than in the past with minefields and booby-traps," he said. "Hamas has learned and prepared itself well."
After a total blockade of Gaza for more than three weeks, foreign passport-holders and some severely wounded people were being allowed out. Palestinian border official Wael Abu Mehsen said 400 foreign citizens would leave for Egypt via the Rafah crossing on Thursday, after at least 320 on Wednesday.
Another 60 critically injured Palestinians would be crossing too, Mehsen added.
Israel's latest strikes have included the heavily-populated area of Jabalia that was set up as a refugee camp in 1948.
[1/5]A man reacts as Palestinians search for casualties a day after Israeli strikes on houses in Jabalia refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip, November 1, 2023. REUTERS/Mohammed Al-Masri Acquire Licensing Rights
Gaza's Hamas-run media office said at least 195 Palestinians were killed in the two hits on Tuesday and Wednesday, with 120 missing and at least 777 people hurt.
"It is a massacre," said one person on the scene as people desperately hunted for trapped victims.
Israel, which accuses Hamas of hiding behind civilians, said it killed two Hamas military leaders in Jabalia.
With Arab nations increasingly vocal in their outrage at Israel's actions, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights also expressed concern that Israel's "disproportionate attacks...could amount to war crimes".
The Israeli military said on Thursday another soldier had died in the Gaza fighting, bringing to 17 the number killed since ground operations were expanded on Friday.
Troops had killed "dozens of terrorists", it added.
Violence has also spread to the occupied West Bank, with Israeli military raids to arrest suspected militants touching off confrontations with gunmen and people throwing stones.
Palestinian medics said three teenagers were killed there by Israeli army fire early on Thursday. Israeli military spokespeople had no immediate comment.
Separately, the military and medics said Palestinian gunmen killed an Israeli motorist in the West Bank. There was no immediate claim for that from Palestinian factions.
'WE OPEN OUR EYES ON DEAD PEOPLE'
As international calls for a "humanitarian pause" in hostilities go unheeded, conditions are atrocious in Gaza, with food, fuel, drinking water and medicine all running short.
"We open our eyes on dead people and we close our eyes on dead people," said Dr Fathi Abu al-Hassan, a U.S. passport holder waiting to cross into Egypt on Wednesday.
Hospitals, including Gaza's only cancer hospital, are struggling due to fuel shortages. Israel has refused to let humanitarian convoys bring in fuel, citing concern that Hamas fighters would divert it for military use.
Ashraf Al-Qudra, a spokesperson for the Gaza health ministry, said the main power generator at the Indonesian Hospital was no longer functioning.
The hospital was switching to a back-up generator but would no longer be able to power mortuary refrigerators and oxygen generators. "If we don't get fuel in the next few days, we will inevitably reach a disaster," he said.
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was due to depart on Thursday for his third visit to Israel in less than a month.
He plans to meet Netanyahu on Friday to voice solidarity with its close ally but also to reassert the need to minimize Palestinian civilian casualties, his spokesperson said.
Blinken will also stop in Jordan, one of a handful of Arab states to have normalised relations with Israel. On Wednesday, though, Jordan withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv in protest at the assault on Gaza.
Reporting by Nidal al-Mughrabi in Gaza, Dan Williams, Emily Rose, Maytaal Angel in Jerusalem; additional reporting by Reuters bureaux worldwide; Writing by Stephen Coates and Andrew Cawthorne; Editing by Miral Fahmy and Angus MacSwan
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
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Nidal Al-Mughrabi
Thomson Reuters
A senior correspondent with nearly 25 years’ experience covering the Palestinian-Israeli conflict including several wars and the signing of the first historic peace accord between the two sides.
Reuters · by Nidal Al-Mughrabi
16. Republicans confront Tuberville over military holds in extraordinary showdown on Senate floor
I saw some videos of remarks by Senators, including Senator Graham. Have Senators been as bluntly critical of a single senator in this way since the McCarthy era?
Republicans confront Tuberville over military holds in extraordinary showdown on Senate floor
AP · November 1, 2023
WASHINGTON (AP) — Republican senators angrily challenged Sen. Tommy Tuberville on his blockade of almost 400 military officers Wednesday evening, taking over the Senate floor for more than four hours to call for individual confirmation votes after a monthslong stalemate.
Tuberville, R-Ala., stood and objected to each nominee — 61 times total, when the night was over — extending his holds on the military confirmations and promotions with no immediate resolution in sight. But the extraordinary confrontation between Republicans, boiling over almost nine months after Tuberville first announced the holds over a Pentagon abortion policy, escalated the standoff as Defense Department officials have repeatedly said the backlog of officials needing confirmation could endanger national security.
“Why are we putting holds on war heroes?” asked Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan of Alaska, himself a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. “I don’t understand.”
Wrapping up for the night at almost 11 p.m., Sullivan said the senators will keep returning to the floor to call up nominations. If the standoff continues and officers leave the military, he said, Tuberville’s blockade will be remembered as a “national security suicide mission.”
South Carolina Sen. Lindsay Graham told Tuberville, who mostly sat quiet and alone as they talked, that he should sue the military if he thinks the policy is illegal. “That’s how you handle these things,” Graham said.
After Tuberville objected to a vote on a two-star general nominated to be a deputy commander in the Air Force, Graham turned and faced him. “You just denied this lady a promotion,” Graham said angrily to Tuberville. “You did that.”
Tuberville said Wednesday there is “zero chance” he will drop the holds. Despite several high-level vacancies and the growing backlog of nominations, he has said he will continue to hold the nominees up unless the Pentagon ends — or puts to a vote in Congress — its new policy of paying for travel when a service member has to go out of state to get an abortion or other reproductive care. President Joe Biden’s administration instituted the policy after the Supreme Court overturned the nationwide right to an abortion, and some states have limited or banned the procedure.
“I cannot simply sit idly by while the Biden administration injects politics in our military from the White House and spends taxpayers’ dollars on abortion,” Tuberville said.
This image from Senate Television video shows Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., speaking on the Senate floor Wednesday, Nov. 1, 2023. (Senate Television via AP)
Showing obvious frustration and frequent flashes of anger, the Republican senators — Sullivan, Graham, Iowa Sen. Joni Ernst, Indiana Sen. Todd Young and others — read lengthy biographies and praised individual nominees as they called for vote after vote. They said they agree with Tuberville on the policy, but questioned — as Democrats have for months — why he would hold up the highest ranks of the U.S. military.
Sullivan said Tuberville is “100 percent wrong” that his holds are not affecting military readiness. Ernst said the nominees are being used as “political pawns.” Utah Sen. Mitt Romney advised Tuberville to try to negotiate an end to the standoff. All of them warned that good people would leave military service if the blockade continues.
As the night wore on, Sullivan and Ernst — herself a former commander in the U.S. Army Reserve and Iowa Army National Guard — continued to bring up new nominations and appeared to become increasingly frustrated. They noted that they were bringing up the nominations “one by one” as Tuberville had once called for, and asked why he wouldn’t allow them to go forward. Tuberville did not answer.
This image from Senate Television video shows Sen. Joni Ernst, R-Iowa, speaking on the Senate floor Wednesday, Nov. 1, 2023. (Senate Television via AP)
“I do not respect men who do not honor their word,” Ernst said at one point.
Sullivan said “China is smiling” as the United States blocks its own military heroes. “As an American, it almost wants to make you weep.”
The GOP effort to move the nominations came after Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., said Wednesday morning they are trying a new workaround to confirm the officers. Schumer said the Senate will consider a resolution in the near future that would allow the quick confirmation of the now nearly 400 officers up for promotion or nominated for another senior job.
The resolution by Senate Armed Services Chairman Jack Reed, D-R.I., and Independent Sen. Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona would tweak the rules until the end of this session of Congress next year to allow a process for the Senate to pass multiple military nominations together. It would not apply to other nominations.
To go into effect, the Senate Rules Committee will have to consider the temporary rules change and send it to the Senate floor, where the full Senate would have to vote to approve it. That process could take several weeks and would likely need Republican support to succeed.
“Patience is wearing thin with Senator Tuberville on both sides of the aisle,” Schumer said.
Schumer separately moved to hold confirmation votes as soon as Thursday on three top Pentagon officers affected by the holds — Adm. Lisa Franchetti to be the chief of naval operations, Gen. David Allvin to be chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force and Lt. Gen. Christopher Mahoney to serve as assistant commandant for the U.S. Marine Corps.
Sullivan had gathered enough signatures to force a vote on Franchetti and Allvin and spoke out in frustration about the issue at the weekly GOP lunch on Tuesday, according to a person familiar with Sullivan’s comments who requested anonymity to discuss the closed-door meeting.
Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell has also criticized the holds, saying on Tuesday that they are “a bad idea” and he’d tried to convince the Alabama Republican to express his opposition some other way.
Tuberville said earlier on Wednesday he disagrees with the Democratic effort to try to get around his hold and and pass the nominations in large groups, arguing that the workaround would “burn the city down” and take away one of the only powers that the minority party has.
The new efforts to move the nominations come after the Marine Corps said that Gen. Eric Smith, the commandant, was hospitalized on Sunday after “suffering a medical condition” at his official residence in Washington. Smith, who is currently listed in stable condition and is recovering, was confirmed to the top job last month, but had been holding down two high-level posts for several months because of Tuberville’s holds.
Smith himself was blunt about the demands of serving as both assistant commandant and acting commandant for months in the wake of Gen. David Berger’s retirement after four years as the top Marine. In public remarks in early September, Smith described his grueling schedule as he juggled the strategic and oversight responsibilities of commandant and member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the personnel and management duties of the No. 2 job. “It is not sustainable,” Smith said. “What doesn’t stop is the clock. The adversary doesn’t take a pause.”
When Schumer announced the vote this week on Mahoney’s nomination to be assistant commandant, he said Smith’s sudden medical emergency is “precisely the kind of avoidable emergency that Sen. Tuberville has provoked through his reckless holds.”
Tuberville has challenged Schumer to put each individual nomination on the floor. But Democrats have been hoping to force Tuberville’s hand as the number of stalled nominations has grown. “There’s an old saying in the military, leave no one behind,” Senate Armed Services Chairman Jack Reed said in July.
That strategy has become more difficult as months have passed, and as Tuberville has dug in. In September, Schumer relented and allowed confirmation votes on three of the Pentagon’s top officials: Gen. CQ Brown, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Randy George, Army Chief of Staff, and Smith as commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.
AP · November 1, 2023
17. The Hamas War Is Far More Dangerous to Israel Than the Yom Kippur War
As an aside, Yonatan Netanyahu’s book Self-portrait of a hero: The letters of Jonathan Netanyahu (1963-1976) had a lot of influence on me in the early 1980s. It is an inspirational read. I just looked it up on Amazon and it is selling for $92 for the hardcover and $115 or the paperback and $49 for the mass market paperback. That said there is another book called The Letters of Jonathan Netanyahu: The Commander of the Entebbe Rescue Force by by Jonathan Netanyahu (Author), Iddo Netanyahu (Foreword), Benjamin Netanyahu (Foreword), Herman Wouk (Introduction) for $5.49 in Kindle, $35 in hardcover (publish in 2001), and $16.95 in paperback (published in 2023). As far as I can tell from Amazon this is a reprint or republication of the original book that was published in 1980. I think I will go down to the basement and search my unpacked books and see if I can find the first edition I had.
Herman Wouk had this to say about it (and I concur based on my memory of it):
A remarkable work of literature, possibly one of the great documents of our time --Herman Wouk
Excerpts:
Israeli society is strong, as demonstrated by all the reservists, including those who demonstrated week after week against Netanyahu's constitutional amendments, who immediately joined their military units, many flying back from destinations abroad. Netanyahu is risking further fracturing this compact.
It is worth remembering that Netanyahu benefited from his brother, Yonatan Netanyahu’s heroism back in 1976 in the rescue of civilian hostages from Entebbe airport in Uganda kidnapped by Palestinian and German terrorists. Yonatan Netanyahu, who commanded the special operations raid to rescue them, was Israel’s only casualty.
His brother sacrificed his life for the country, and today, “Bibi” Netanyahu should, like his brother, put the country’s interests first and resign.
The Hamas War Is Far More Dangerous to Israel Than the Yom Kippur War
This current war with Hamas is a far more dangerous threat to Israel than the 1973 Yom Kippur War, almost exactly fifty years ago. In 1973, it was solely a military contest, one that the Israelis, despite suffering staggering losses, could manage to turn around. No one thought that the existence of the State of Israel was at risk then.
The National Interest · by Henri J. Barkey · November 1, 2023
This current war with Hamas is a far more dangerous threat to Israel than the 1973 Yom Kippur War, almost exactly fifty years ago. In 1973, it was solely a military contest, one that the Israelis, despite suffering staggering losses, could manage to turn around. No one thought that the existence of the State of Israel was at risk then.
This time, it is different. This is a political war, and initial indications are that Israel is losing it.
This is far more dangerous because what is at stake is its legitimacy in the eyes of many. The Israelis may think and believe that this is wrong and that the brutality of the October 7 attack is being overlooked. It does not matter; impressions are impressions, and they do not disappear, and the carnage in Gaza feeds daily into the Hamas narrative.
Let's face it: Hamas may have already won the political battle.
At the heart of this Israeli debacle lies one person: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He is, of course, ultimately responsible for Israel being unprepared and for pursuing constitutional changes that were strictly intended for his personal benefit.
But Netanyahu’s role in this tragedy is far greater; he is a leader with no international credibility. Over the years, his arrogance, lack of empathy, espousal of illegitimate and callous policies in the occupied West Bank, and probably most shocking to all, appointing overtly racist politicians to his cabinet and diplomatic corps. Imagine for a moment the descendants of the Holocaust, humanity's worst xenophobic experience, have self-described racists at the highest levels of their government.
He has alienated and is disliked by many of the leaders who even support Israel. His presence at the head of the government makes it very easy for people not to believe Israeli claims and arguments. He demonstrated his total inability to assume accountability for his failures by publicly blaming the intelligence leadership for the October 7 attack (he had to withdraw the statement under public pressure).
In addition to the world community, therefore, why should Israelis trust Netanyahu to conduct this war with the country’s interests at heart? He knows he is finished politically and will not survive the political accounting that will take place once the conflict is over. He has been reduced to hoping to extract some “victory” from this war with Hamas to salvage his reputation. After all, he is the longest-serving prime minister in the country’s history, and this catastrophe will be what he will be remembered for forever.
He also refuses to grasp the bigger political picture and insists on prosecuting a disastrous war that Israelis were clearly unprepared for. As a result, this conflict is going to get worse by the day, as demonstrated by all bombs that kill Palestinian civilians erode any support.
History also provides a path. The Agranat Commission, after the 1973 War, blamed the political leadership and the higher ranks of the Israeli Defense Forces for the failures. Prime Minister Golda Meir fared somewhat better than Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the hero of the 1967 Six-Day War. He offered to resign at least twice, but Meir refused to accept it. His impeccable reputation was sullied. It must be remembered that the 1973 war ended with what most observers consider to be an Israeli victory as the Israelis crossed the Suez Canal, encircled the Egyptian Third Army, and pushed Syrian forces back beyond their starting point.
The failures of 1973 ultimately led to the emergence of the right-wing at the expense of the long-ruling Labor Party in Israel. This time, too, one can expect a similar outcome to occur as Israeli voters severely punish Netanyahu and the right wing. However, unlike Labor, which peacefully accepted its fate, one cannot be sure that the right in Israel still believes in democracy.
If Netanyahu really wants to be remembered somewhat favorably or rather less adversely, he should resign and support the creation of a national unity government under the leadership of someone who will inspire confidence at home and abroad. One name that has been bandied about is retired Air Force general Amos Yadlin.
Israeli society is strong, as demonstrated by all the reservists, including those who demonstrated week after week against Netanyahu's constitutional amendments, who immediately joined their military units, many flying back from destinations abroad. Netanyahu is risking further fracturing this compact.
It is worth remembering that Netanyahu benefited from his brother, Yonatan Netanyahu’s heroism back in 1976 in the rescue of civilian hostages from Entebbe airport in Uganda kidnapped by Palestinian and German terrorists. Yonatan Netanyahu, who commanded the special operations raid to rescue them, was Israel’s only casualty.
His brother sacrificed his life for the country, and today, “Bibi” Netanyahu should, like his brother, put the country’s interests first and resign.
About the Author
Henri J. Barkey is the Cohen professor of international relations at Lehigh University and an adjunct senior fellow for Middle East studies at the Council of Foreign Relations.
Image Credit: Creative Commons.
The National Interest · by Henri J. Barkey · November 1, 2023
18. China, U.S. to Meet for Rare Nuclear Arms-Control Talks
China, U.S. to Meet for Rare Nuclear Arms-Control Talks
Washington meeting comes as concerns grow over an arms race with Beijing and Moscow
https://www.wsj.com/politics/national-security/china-agrees-to-arms-control-talks-with-u-s-87a44b38?st=fe7umy4sr7jprru&mc_cid=c3cbdd7f6f&mc_eid=70bf478f36
By Michael R. Gordon
Follow
Nov. 1, 2023 4:06 pm ET
President Biden meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G-20 leaders’ summit in Bali, Indonesia, last year. PHOTO: KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS
The Biden administration is preparing to hold a rare discussion with China on nuclear-arms control as the U.S. seeks to head off a destabilizing three-way arms race with Beijing and Moscow.
The meeting scheduled for Monday is the first such talks with Beijing since the Obama administration and will focus on ways to reduce the risk of miscalculation, U.S. officials said.
The discussion doesn’t signal the start of formal negotiations to set limits on each side’s nuclear forces, as Washington has long done with Moscow. Instead, Monday’s session will provide American officials with an opportunity to probe their Chinese counterparts about Beijing’s nuclear doctrine and the ambitious buildup of its nuclear arsenal, which for decades has been much smaller than the U.S.’s and Russia’s.
“The Chinese leadership is still preparing for long-term competition with the United States,” said Tong Zhao of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “The hope is if this exchange can be maintained and can happen regularly in the future, that might open up opportunities for more substantive conversations.”
More urgently, Washington is grappling with the challenge of how to deter twin nuclear threats from China and Russia, including the politically fraught question of whether the U.S. will need to expand its nuclear forces in the years ahead.
In a parallel effort, the Biden administration is also trying to draw Russia into separate arms-control talks, after Moscow pulled back from the New Start treaty while still observing its limits on warheads. The administration has sent Moscow a confidential paper outlining ideas on managing nuclear risks now and after that agreement, which cuts American and Russian long-range nuclear weapons, expires in February 2026.
A senior Biden administration official said the U.S. is hoping to initiate “a conversation on what a framework after New Start could look like” while also reducing nuclear dangers while tensions are high over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Russia has yet to respond to the Biden administration’s proposal for fresh talks, U.S. and Russian officials say.
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Russian President Vladimir Putin said there would be “close foreign policy coordination” with China during a meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping on Wednesday. President Putin’s spokesperson said the two leaders would discuss the Israel-Hamas conflict. Photo: Sergey Guneev/Sputnik/Kremlin Po/Shutterstock
The opening with China comes as Washington and Beijing, after a near free fall in relations over the past year, are starting to talk about an array of trouble spots in preparation for a summit between President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping later this month.
The two powers in recent months have agreed to open or resume channels to discuss maritime issues, commercial and trade matters and restrictions on exports of technology, among other disagreements.
But the rapprochement is delicate. Beijing has stiff-armed Biden administration requests to restore regular contacts between military leaders. China has yet to confirm Xi’s participation in a summit, though the two sides reached “an agreement in principle” on the meeting.
Arms control and nonproliferation, which are among the subjects to be taken up in Monday’s meeting in Washington, have been among the thorniest of topics. The meeting was agreed to as part of a broader push to create a better political atmosphere for the anticipated summit meeting, said Carnegie’s Zhao. He said that his expectations for the arms-control discussions were modest.
Visitors touring an exhibition of military vehicles with ballistic missiles in Beijing last year. PHOTO: ANDY WONG/ASSOCIATED PRESS
China, for its part, has said little about what it expects from the arms-control talks. On Monday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said that differences over Taiwan represent the biggest obstacle to improved U.S.-Chinese relations and that Beijing wants to “stabilize relations.” That, he said, will include “China-U.S. consultations on arms control and nonproliferation.”
China signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty during the Clinton administration. But China rejected proposals during the Trump administration that it join talks with the U.S. and Russia to negotiate formal limits on nuclear forces on the grounds that its nuclear arsenal is much smaller than those of Washington and Moscow.
That argument has begun to wear thin with Western experts as China’s nuclear forces have expanded. China had more than 500 operational nuclear warheads as of May, is likely to field more than 1,000 warheads by 2030 and then continue growing its force until 2035, according to a Pentagon report issued last month on China’s military power.
As a consequence, “the United States is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries,” said a report issued last month by a congressionally appointed panel on the U.S. Strategic Posture.
The U.S. and Russia are currently limited to 1,550 deployed warheads on their long-range missiles and bombers under the New Start treaty. In total, the U.S. has about 3,700 warheads of all types in its nuclear stockpile while Russia has about 4,490, according to the Federation of American Scientists.
National security adviser Jake Sullivan proposed a way to gradually draw China into an arms-control dialogue in a June speech to the Arms Control Association, a Washington-based group.
Sullivan said that a multinational arrangement could be worked out under which China and the other four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council would agree to notify each other of missile test launches.
Such a step, he said, could be followed by arrangements to establish channels for “crisis communications” among those countries and discussions of nuclear doctrine, policy and spending. The permanent Security Council members are China, the U.S., Britain, France and Russia.
The senior Biden administration official said that the U.S. plans to follow up those ideas next week and discuss potential steps that might be carried out on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The U.S. also plans to probe China on its nuclear expansion, doctrine and concept of strategic stability.
“We need to have a discussion with them to better understand their point of view on these topics,” the official said. “And hopefully that could lead to a discussion of the practical steps that we could take to manage strategic risks, including further down the road, conversation on mutual restraint in terms of behavior or even capabilities.”
Monday’s talks will be led by Mallory Stewart, a senior State Department official, and Sun Xiaobo, the head of the arms-control department at the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
Charles Hutzler contributed to this article.
Write to Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com
Copyright ©2023 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the November 2, 2023, print edition as 'Beijing, U.S. to Hold Arms-Control Talks'.
19. Israel’s New Calculus: Strike Hamas at All Costs
Please go to the link to view the graphics and photos.
Israel’s New Calculus: Strike Hamas at All Costs
Israeli strikes on Jabalia neighborhood is latest in a broader, more aggressive war against Hamas
https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israels-new-calculus-strike-hamas-at-all-costs-b6b3196f
By Dov LieberFollow, David S. CloudFollow, Chao DengFollow and David LuhnowFollow
Nov. 1, 2023 6:13 pm ET
Airstrikes on a densely populated neighborhood in Gaza this week show Israel is waging a broader and more ferocious war against Hamas, an approach that aims to destroy the Palestinian militant group but has sparked an international backlash.
The repeated strikes on the Jabalia neighborhood—a refugee camp that has turned into a warren of permanent homes and apartment buildings—come amid a three-week-long air campaign by Israel that is the most intense in its history and rivals any aerial bombardment this century, military analysts say.
Israel’s campaign to eliminate Hamas has faced a deluge of criticism as the civilian death toll has risen and the humanitarian crisis has worsened, prompting repeated calls for Israel to agree to a cease-fire and to end its blockade.
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A second airstrike hit Jabalia, Hamas said on Wednesday, one day after an Israeli strike hit a refugee camp in Jabalia, killing dozens. Photo: Mohammed Saber/Shutterstock
The ferocity of Israel’s campaign has also put pressure on the U.S., which has supported Israel’s right to defend itself but has increasingly stressed the importance of minimizing civilian casualties and increasing humanitarian aid.
Israel says it has hit more than 11,000 targets, with missiles, bombs and artillery, in Gaza, an area half the size of New York City that is home to around two million people. That compares to some 1,500 strikes the last time Israel fought Gaza militants in 2021.
Human rights groups have warned of a mounting humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The Hamas-run health ministry in Gaza says the strikes have killed some 8,796 people, most of them women and children. The figures don’t distinguish between civilians and militants. The strikes have also displaced hundreds of thousands and turned large parts of Gaza into rubble. Israel says the attacks have destroyed crucial military infrastructure and killed key leaders of Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization.
Israeli military in Gaza
Israeli ground operations
Areas of significant fighting
Claimed Israeli advances
Israeli forces extended their position across the coastline
As-Siafa
Mediterranean Sea
Atatra
Erez
Beit Lahia
Blast Nov. 1
Beit Hanoun
Jabalia
West
Bank
Israeli airstrike
Oct. 31
Jerusalem
Sderot
Gaza
Gaza City
JORD.
ISRAEL
Israeli forces advance to Beit Hanoun
EGYPT
GAZA STRIP
Wahsh
Al Zahra
Sa’ad
Juhor ad Dik
Bureij
Local media and Palestinian militias claimed to engage Israeli forces in the central Gaza strip
ISRAEL
Kibbutz Re’im
2.5 miles
Sources: Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project (incursions); staff reports (blasts)
Israel also says it has moved “significant” ground forces into Gaza. The troops appear to be digging in on the northern coastline of Gaza, where their flank is protected and can receive cover fire from Israel’s Navy, said Michael Horowitz, the Israel-based head of intelligence for the consulting firm Le Beck. Israeli troops appear to be making short raids into central Gaza to attack Hamas, and then falling back to more protected areas, he said.
The air and ground assault comes after the killing of more than 1,400 people in Israel—the worst massacre in its history—prompted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government to launch a war to drive Hamas from power in Gaza, where the group has ruled since 2007.
It is a far different kind of war than Israel has fought, at least since it invaded Lebanon in 1982. Its sweeping goals have shown a willingness by Israel to target Hamas’s leaders with fewer restraints than in the past—in their homes and underground bunkers in populated areas.
The attacks and broader bombing campaign underscore the delicate balance Israel is trying to strike between destroying Hamas and minimizing civilian deaths in an urban area where Hamas’s military capabilities are interwoven within residential neighborhoods and in hundreds of miles of tunnels beneath them.
Israel has defended its tactics in the air campaign, saying it has for weeks urged civilians to vacate northern Gaza to protect themselves. More than 800,000 people have left their homes, many of them fleeing south or taking shelter in hospitals, schools and international aid facilities in hopes of escaping the fighting.
In Tuesday’s attack, Israel said it used airstrikes to hit a Hamas command-and-tunnel network under Jabalia, killing the commander who was leading Hamas’s forces against Israeli forces operating in northern Gaza at that time, and who also played a pivotal role in the Oct. 7 attacks. On Wednesday, Israeli military spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari said Israel understood civilians were in the area on Tuesday and could be affected, but argued the Hamas commander, Ibrahim Biari, was a legitimate military target.
Human-rights groups have warned of a mounting humanitarian crisis in Gaza. PHOTO: BASHAR TALEB/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Israel’s strikes have turned large parts of Gaza into rubble. PHOTO: FADI WAEL ALWHIDI/ZUMA PRESS
The attack caused hundreds of casualties, according to the Gaza officials, who didn’t give further details. Israel’s military said dozens of militants were killed by the strike, but it was still working to ascertain a more precise number. The strike was followed Wednesday by several more large strikes in populated areas.
Israel faced a growing diplomatic backlash in the wake of Tuesday’s strike. Bolivia cut off diplomatic relations, while Jordan, Colombia and Chile recalled their ambassadors. The United Arab Emirates, which has built friendly ties with Israel since normalizing relations in 2020, condemned the strike, warning that “indiscriminate attacks will result in irreparable ramifications in the region.”
The U.N. Human Rights Office said it had serious concerns that the attack on Jabalia could be disproportionate and amount to war crimes.
U.S. officials have been pressing their Israeli counterparts to avoid civilian casualties, including asking what a senior defense official described as “tough questions” about potential Israeli strikes on population centers and civilian infrastructure in Gaza.
“We are working very, very hard to continue to make sure that our Israeli friends are prosecuting these operations with as much due care to minimizing civilian casualties as possible, and that work will continue,” White House National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Wednesday.
The Pentagon has emphasized that it is advising and guiding Israeli forces, rather than issuing directives or putting restrictions on their use of U.S.-provided weapons.
On Tuesday, Kirby said it was “obvious to us” that Israeli forces were working to minimize casualties, but added: “Sadly, our own experience as a military over the last 20 years has shown us that even with our best intentions and all the efforts that we put into avoiding civilian casualties, we still cause them.”
Before and after airstrikes in Jabalia
Oct. 31
Nov. 1
SATELLITE IMAGE 2023 MAXAR TECHNOLOGIES
Tuesday’s attack reflects Israel’s shift to more bare-knuckle tactics. Unlike many such strikes in the past, Israel’s air force didn’t give any advance warning. In the past, Israel has often either called residents directly to warn them or dropped nonexplosive or low-yield munitions onto the roofs of buildings and houses, as a warning to noncombatants inside.
A senior Israeli officer said the air force was no longer giving advanced warning. “That is definitely not something we use before every attack because we’re in a different situation,” the officer said in an Oct. 21 briefing with reporters, adding that commanders still have the option to use a so-called roof knock.
For Israel, the dilemma is obvious: Giving warning helps civilians escape harm, but also allows militants themselves to flee. This time Israel’s calculus has changed, say analysts: It will order strikes it might have avoided in the past because of the risk of killing or injuring bystanders.
Amos Yadlin, a former Israeli Air Force general and head of Israeli military intelligence, said Israel’s shifting war tactics are due to its understanding following the Oct. 7 massacres that Hamas isn’t interested in the welfare of its people and can’t be deterred from trying to achieve its aim of destroying Israel.
“We are not targeting Gaza’s civilians on purpose. We have obligations to defend Israeli civilians. We are in a war with the aim that the brutal massacre of Oct. 7 will never happen again,” he said.
Israeli officials say Hamas fighters hide among civilians, believing they won’t be targeted, or that if they are, the deaths of noncombatants will produce international pressure that will force them to curtail the attacks before Hamas is destroyed.
Hamas leader Azat Al-Rishq denied that the group uses civilians as shields. “This adds to the series of lies on which their narrative is built,” he said on his Telegram channel.
Critics say Israel might not be complying with the requirements of international law to minimize civilian casualties. Legal experts say civilian infrastructure can become a legitimate military target if used by militants, but any attack must be proportional in terms of the military value of the target.
“Israel’s use of heavy artillery and aerial bombs in densely populated areas raises significant concern about the indiscriminate killing and injuring of civilians,” says Omar Shakir, Israeli and Palestinian issues director for Human Rights Watch.
Human rights activists point to the high percentage of children, women and older men in the death toll in the current conflict as an indication of Israel’s worsening offense.
The U.N. Human Rights Office said that Israel’s attack on Jabalia could be disproportionate and amount to war crimes. PHOTO: ANAS AL-SHAREEF/REUTERS
Israeli airstrikes have killed over 8,500 people in Gaza, according to Hamas-run health authorities. PHOTO: ANAS AL-SHAREEF/REUTERS
Michael Meier, a visiting law professor at Emory University and a former U.S. government expert in the law of armed conflict, said Israel’s decision to strike in the Jabalia neighborhood wasn’t itself a violation of the laws of war, as long as the target was considered important enough militarily to justify the risk of civilian casualties and steps were taken to minimize the harm to noncombatants.
“What I would want to know is, ‘How important was this guy that he had to be taken out in the middle of a crowded refugee camp,’” Meier said. He pointed out that international law also applies to Hamas, which isn’t supposed to position legitimate military targets in civilian areas.
The sheer volume of Israeli attacks and the number of munitions dropped rivals any such campaign in recent years, including the most intense phases of the U.S. bombing campaign against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria, according to Airwars, a London-based conflict monitor.
“So far this is the most intense air campaign we’ve monitored,” including the 2021 war in Gaza, U.S. campaigns against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign in Libya in 2011, said Emily Tripp, the director of Airwars.
Between 38,200 and 44,500 buildings in the strip have been damaged or destroyed, according to satellite imagery analysis between Oct. 7 and 29 by Jamon Van Den Hoek, a professor at Oregon State University, and Corey Scher, a researcher at CUNY Graduate Center. That is the equivalent of 13.3-15.5% of the strip’s infrastructure.
“These tallies are approaching a full-scale war,” said Van Den Hoek. “It is an exceptionally high level of destruction that is comparable to the hardest hit areas in Ukraine such as Mariupol and Bakhmut,” he said, referencing two cities that were destroyed by Russia.
Palestinians in Gaza say the bombing has been the most frightening they have experienced. Many cite friends and relatives who have been killed while at home or sheltering. “Everywhere is being bombarded. Everywhere has destroyed places,” said Raghad Abdeen, a 19-year-old dental student from her parent’s home in Gaza City.
Palestinians in Gaza say the bombing has been the most frightening they have experienced. PHOTO: BASHAR TALEB/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Gordon Lubold contributed to this article.
Write to Dov Lieber at dov.lieber@wsj.com, David S. Cloud at david.cloud@wsj.com, Chao Deng at chao.deng@wsj.com and David Luhnow at david.luhnow@wsj.com
20. I COULD BARELY EVEN SPELL GFM…
Global Force Management. After the budget process, and force structure development, GFM may be one of the most important processes in DOD. (War Plans and strategy come a distant 4th and 5th)
This is an excellent short tutorial on GFM.
I COULD BARELY EVEN SPELL GFM…
BILL DONNELLY NOVEMBER 2, 2023 8 MIN READ
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/gfm/
EDITOR’S NOTE: We do our best to ensure the hyperlink citations are not behind paywalls or firewalls, but when it comes to discussing joint doctrine, there are limited options. You’ll find that there are a number of hyperlinks in this article that are only accessible to Common Access Card (CAC) holders. Apologies to those that can’t access the documents, but we felt it was important to make the information available to those that could.
Understanding GFM enables joint officers to positively affect the process rather than becoming “victims” of GFM.
“I’m going to work in the GFM branch?” I thought as I got off the phone with my new command sponsor near the end of my year as a student at the U.S. Army War College in 2017. Just a few months later, I found myself as the Global Force Management (GFM) Branch Chief in the J-35 at a combatant command (CCMD), jumping right into the mix of the GFM process. Before attending the War College, I had little experience with and only basic knowledge of GFM. The course provided a good foundation for the joint assignment and set me up for success, but like many joint billets, much of the learning was on the job. Once I arrived, I found that it was interesting work and satisfying to be part of a team contributing to a warfighting command’s mission. While only a few joint professional military education (JPME) graduates will likely experience this exact scenario, most will be involved with or affected by GFM in their follow-on assignments. They may serve on a CCMD staff, the Joint Staff, a service headquarters, or various other billets that provide input to or receive the outcome of GFM. Can the joint force afford a lack of understanding of this important area and its processes? Based on my experience, I believe we cannot. All joint officers need a working knowledge of GFM to support the warfighting mission of their command. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) identification of GFM as a special area of emphasis in JPME is a step in this direction. Understanding GFM enables joint officers to positively affect the process rather than becoming “victims” of GFM.
GFM as a New Special Area of Emphasis
The Chairman recently directed special emphasis on GFM in JPME. In an unclassified but not publicly released December 2022 memorandum sent to the services and National Defense University, the Chairman at the time, General Mark Milley, established GFM as one of three new special areas of emphasis for JPME in academic years 2024 and 2025. Why GFM, and not another of the myriad acronyms commonly used as a verb and noun in DoD parlance? GFM is certainly not new and has had some place in most JPME curricula for some time. According to the memorandum, a 2021 study team “identified a lack of understanding of GFM throughout the [j]oint force” and recommended that GFM be specifically required in JPME. The memo also states that “GFM is the action that links the [j]oint force to operational demand. Specifically, it is the way the Department of Defense (DoD) links combatant command (CCMD) requirements with force provider capabilities and capacities.” That sounds a lot like something we strive to teach and emphasize here at the Army War College, especially in our Military Strategy and Campaigning course.
More Than Just the “Three A’s” What is GFM?
GFM has its statutory foundation in Title 10 US Code. It is a series of five related, integrated processes: directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment—not just the “three A’s” of assignment, allocation, and apportionment that most officers are familiar with. GFM is not perfectly sequential but put simply (descriptions of the five processes are paraphrased from the CJCS memo, which references the GFM Implementation Guidance, except where otherwise noted or linked):
The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directs the Services to provide certain force elements at specific levels of readiness via the Directed Readiness Tables (DRTs, managed by the Joint Staff J8) to execute the National Defense Strategy and make them available to the joint force for a contingency. Think “have these forces ready, in this quantity and readiness level, for this period of time.”
The SecDef assigns (via the “Forces For Unified Commands” memo assignment tables, managed by Joint Staff J8) forces to CCMDs and the U.S. Element of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (USELEMNORAD) for operational use to accomplish authorized missions. The services retain some forces for training, readiness, or to perform service-specific functions. Think “you can have these forces, with combatant command (COCOM) authority, to use as you see fit to accomplish assigned missions.”
The SecDef allocates, or temporarily redistributes, forces amongst CCMDs to accomplish directed missions. The annual GFM Allocation Plan (GFMAP, managed by Joint Staff J3) communicates these allocations for a fiscal year. Forces are further redistributed as needed (via the Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB)) amongst CCMDs to meet emergent operational needs throughout the year. These reallocations are temporary, with the timing directed by the SDOB. Think “you can have these forces temporarily, under a specified command and control arrangement for a specific period of time, to use as needed to accomplish assigned missions. This may change throughout the year.”
The Chairman informs planning via apportionment. Services, in the words of one Joint Staff speaker, “report back” quarterly on how they are meeting the readiness requirements and what capabilities (not specific forces) can reasonably be expected to be available for planning across the joint force (via apportionment tables, managed by Joint Staff J8). Think “these are the capabilities, limited by what we actually have in the inventory, that your planners can expect to have available if a plan has to be executed.”
The Chairman assesses and evaluates how the process worked and identifies imbalances over a certain period of time, making necessary recommendations and adjustments (managed by Joint Staff J8). Think “Did we get it right? Are we balanced? Ready enough? What do we need to change?”
Back to allocation, the most familiar of the five processes. This is where emergent Requests for Forces (RFFs) are validated and, if approved and sourced, result in an adjustment to the GFMAP and a force transfer in support of an operation or CCMD. Allocation generally gets the most attention (and contention) throughout the year as new requirements emerge and create a need to redistribute finite forces. But allocation and the process of reallocating forces as requirements emerge is just one part of the process. How forces are assigned and allocated in the first place across the CCMDs and how the services man, train, and equip their capabilities to provide to the joint force is critically important. According to one Joint Staff expert, getting that part right upfront can reduce churn in the allocation process throughout the year.
Why It Matters
The Chairman’s memo states that “GFM is an integral and statutory part of [j]oint military planning and execution at the OSD, Joint Staff, Military Department and Service, and CCMD levels” and is one way that the Secretary and Chairman exercise statutory requirements. It is part of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), which enables the Chairman to maintain a global perspective and provide military advice for the Secretary and President. GFM directly impacts how a Combatant Command is resourced to fulfill its regional and global missions, and it drives how the services man, train, equip, and maintain the readiness of the forces they provide to the CCMDs.
But what if an officer or DoD civilian never (or hopes to never) directly work in the GFM world? As a JPME graduate and future joint officer, why does GFM matter? Although there are staff assigned specifically to GFM billets at joint and combatant commands, GFM cannot simply be treated as something “the GFM guys” do and understand, a phenomenon I sometimes experienced in my joint assignment. Simply knowing the basic terminology may not be enough for a joint officer to effectively do their job in the joint force and advocate for resources for their command’s mission. A JPME graduate should expect to be involved in or impacted by all GFM processes. Even if they are not directly involved, knowing how it works will enable them to assist their commander in articulating resource requirements and risk. Not understanding it or assuming others will take care of it could be a disservice to the whole organization. Knowing how to define requirements and risk within the construct of the GFM system can lead to better decisions on the right distribution of resources at the right time across the joint force.
Getting After GFM in JPME
GFM is a complex animal, and it would be a challenge for any JPME program to teach it in full detail. Add to that competition with other valid topics for finite space in a packed curriculum, and the challenge increases. As one way to address the new Chairman’s directive here at Carlisle, the Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations is incorporating a new lesson specifically addressing Global Integration and GFM. This will build on previous lessons and provide students an opportunity to “apply GFM concepts to the [j]oint planning execution processes that implement national, defense, and military strategy objectives,” as directed in the CJCS memo. To really capitalize on this knowledge, however, JPME students should get additional “reps and sets” on GFM across multiple courses, particularly in exercises and wargames, which are part of the core curriculum. Students can choose to go further through the selection of several elective courses that include GFM in the curriculum, but this is limited to those students who self-select. Ideally, JPME should strive to integrate GFM fundamentals into the core curriculum and apply them when exercising the Joint Planning Process and the JSPS. Other JPME institutions have taken a similar approach, and collaboration between the schoolhouses will only strengthen the effort.
Conclusion
Global Force Management is an important part of how we resource the joint force and ensure commanders have the capabilities they need to conduct joint warfighting. Graduates of JPME need to show up to their next jobs with a better understanding of GFM and how the joint force implements it. The Chairman’s directive sets the right direction for GFM in JPME to address this need. It is up to the JPME schoolhouses to implement this guidance and improve the “GFM IQ” of our joint officers.
Bill Donnelly is a colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps currently serving as a Faculty Instructor and as the Marine Corps Senior Service Representative at the U.S. Army War College. His last assignment was as commanding officer of Marine Aviation Training Support Group-22 in Corpus Christi, TX. He is a 2017 graduate of the U.S. Army War College resident course.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Recruits with Echo Company, 2nd Recruit Training Battalion, complete obstacles during the Crucible at Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, Feb, 21. The Crucible is a 54-hour culminating event that requires recruits to work as a team and overcome challenges in order to earn the title United States Marine.
Photo Credit: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Warrant Officer Bobby J. Yarbrough/Released
21. Poll: U.S. public's support for Ukraine begins to wane
How do we sustain support for Ukraine?
4 hours ago -Politics & Policy
Poll: U.S. public's support for Ukraine begins to wane
https://www.axios.com/2023/11/02/poll-americans-support-ukraine-republicans?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm
Data: Gallup; Chart: Axios Visuals
The share of Americans who say the U.S. is doing "too much" to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia aggression jumped to 41% last month — driven by growing concern among Republicans, according to a new survey by Gallup.
Why it matters: The findings come as newly-established Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) plans to bring a vote this week on aid for Israel — decoupling it from Ukraine aid and border funds.
- There has been growing division among Republican lawmakers over how far the U.S. should go in providing additional aid for Ukraine.
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Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell continues to double down on his support.
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Johnson has indicated support for at least some additional aid for Ukraine, even if not the $61 billion asked for by the White House in a sweeping $106 billion package.
By the numbers: A plurality of Americans now say the U.S. is doing too much to help Ukraine, while one-in-three say the U.S. is helping the "right amount" — down from 43% in June. Just 25% say the U.S. is not doing enough.
- 62% of Republicans now say the U.S. is doing too much to help Ukraine — up from 50% in June.
- 44% of Independents say the U.S. is doing too much to help Ukraine — a jump of 10 percentage points since June.
- Only 14% of Democrats said the U.S. is doing "too much."
Zoom in: 80% of Democrats said they would rather the U.S. help Ukraine reclaim its territory than end the conflict as quickly as possible —the same level it's been since the question was first asked in August 2022.
- 55% of Republicans want the U.S. to try to end the conflict as soon as possible, while 41% say they would choose Ukraine reclaiming its territory.
22. Senior Pentagon official calls on DOD components to more fully embrace irregular, asymmetric warfare
We need two things:
First, the 1980's low intensity conflict (LIC) is today's Irregular Warfare and we need the full realization of the vision and intent of Senators Nunn and Cohen to have a DOD entity responsible for all of LIC (and today IW).
Second, we need an American Way of Irregular Warfare. We need to fully flesh out the unique principles of Irregular Warfare. Not all of the principles of war apply to IW and while some do, there are other principles that may be necessary for understanding IW.
It would seem to me that job one of the Irregular Warfare Center should be to develop the American War of Irregular Warfare and establish the fundamental principles of IW.
But to Mr. Maier, if USSOCOM does not do it, who will? Will we continue to have IW as an intellectual orphan in DOD and the broader national security community. If USSOCOM does not provide the preponderance of effort in IW (for which the vast majority of its forces are organized, trained, educated, equipped, and optimized) who does (yes I know the Army has conducted more IW throughout history than it has conventional operations but only grudgingly).
Who in DOD is going to be the champion of IW? Will it continue to be the hobby horse of a few true believers while everyone else continues to pay lip service to it (unless they can exploit it for budget and force structure purposes)?
Senior Pentagon official calls on DOD components to more fully embrace irregular, asymmetric warfare
Special operations forces shouldn't be the primary lead for irregular warfare, according to a top DOD official.
BY
MARK POMERLEAU
NOVEMBER 1, 2023
defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · November 1, 2023
Special operations forces have long held the primary responsibility for irregular warfare within the U.S. military, but other Department of Defense components should now take on a larger role, according to a senior official.
“I actually push back on the notion that that [U.S. Special Operations Command] should be the lead for irregular warfare. I think we need the rest of the department to embrace it as well,” Chris Maier, assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low-intensity conflict, said at the NDAI SO/LIC Symposium Tuesday.
Maier said that at the most basic level, irregular warfare takes place below the threshold of large-scale armed conflict, or what experts refer to as “the gray zone.” Gray-zone activity has significantly increased in recent years as adversaries have sought to undermine the U.S. and its allies without triggering a robust military response.
What makes irregular warfare so difficult, Maier asserted, is the DOD is focused primarily on major military operations.
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“In some of the biorhythms of the department, there’s not a lot of focus on individuals or small units doing asymmetric things — it’s on big formations doing big things,” he said.
“I kind of use the model of counterterrorism a little bit here, where, when we were really focused on counterterrorism as a department, as a nation, yes, SOF was the lead, but SOF wasn’t the only ones doing it. The services were providing tremendous support in the form of enablers, but also operational impacts,” he continued. “I think we need to get to a place where SOCOM may be the intellectual lead [for irregular warfare], may in some cases even be the operational lead, but we’re going to need the rest of the department to embrace this, fund this, enable this. They’re going to have to do a lot of this themselves.”
Top officials at last year’s conference questioned whether there need to be changes to how the DOD conducts irregular warfare and information operations now that the department’s main focus is on great power competition.
Maier believes the DOD is has a lot more work to do when it comes to addressing irregular warfare and asymmetric issues like the gray zone.
“There’s many synonyms for it, which should tell you we don’t even really know in some cases precisely what we’re talking about,” he said.
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Moreover, when it comes to information operations, the U.S. has lagged behind others, primarily due to the different risk calculations from senior policy makers on how to use information, according to Maier.
Terrorist organizations don’t use the information space like nation-state actors such as China, Russia and Iran do, Maier said. As a result, there has been varying risk calculations at senior policy levels as to how much the U.S. military should go tit for tat in the information environment.
“How much should the Department of Defense as a core military organization be doing that influence? Some of what we’ve attempted to tighten up over the last couple of years is ensuring that we’re using our information tools towards military objectives. This has given us frankly, a little bit more space then to be able to do things more innovatively from our senior policy makers,” he said.
What sets the Pentagon apart from many of its partners and allies is that the majority of information billets reside within special operations units, making it harder to fill them. This has become especially true given recruitment issues throughout the services, particularly the Army, which had to make cuts to its special operations forces.
“When we talk about Army SOF cuts, it’s not going to be probably news here, but we took some of the unfilled billets off the table, because that made sense to do, not take human beings out and some of those came out of our psyops enterprise because we haven’t been able to fill some of these billets for years,” Maier said, acknowledging these cuts. “If we’re not using these forces in a way that really contributes to our future and our SOF value proposition, we’re probably not going to fill those as much. Then we’re in this situation where we’re not filling them as much, so we’re not able to then project that power in unique and exquisite ways that we need to that. At the end of the day, you’re going to have to be informed by that risk environment we’re in.”
defensescoop.com · by Mark Pomerleau · November 1, 2023
23. What the Pentagon Has, Hasn't and Could Do to Stop Veterans and Troops from Joining Extremist Groups
What the Pentagon Has, Hasn't and Could Do to Stop Veterans and Troops from Joining Extremist Groups
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin,Steve Beynon,Travis Tritten,Drew F. Lawrence · November 1, 2023
A platoon of soldiers filed into a briefing room at Fort Carson, Colorado, on a spring day in 2021. Some sat on the floor after the seats by the cookie-cutter office tables filled. Some flipped through their phones, likely scrolling dating apps or playing games, expecting another unannounced monotonous thing a soldier had to get through to clock out at the end of the day.
The platoon leader walked in. He said they were going to talk about extremism, fulfilling an obligation that had been ordered for all service members by the secretary of defense to much fanfare in Washington, D.C., nearly 1,500 miles away. The requirement was unveiled in February 2021 -- less than a month after the insurrection of Jan. 6 -- amid a growing realization that tens, if not hundreds, of veterans were among the rioting crowd.
But the young officer was clearly improvising, relying on a couple of notes jotted down in a standard-issue green Army notebook. Little had been offered from on high to soldiers like these to guide what they should talk about, or how they could help dissuade those in the ranks from being lured by radical groups. No briefing documents, or research, or really anything.
"No one was really paying attention," an active-duty noncommissioned officer recalled of the briefing. "I remember the commander talking about what he thought were radical groups like Black Lives Matter. I think he sorta missed the point and wasn't too aware of the actual insider threat we were supposed to talk about."
The platoon leader finished his remarks -- box having now been checked -- and the soldiers went on their way. Possibly the single greatest effort in recent history to combat extremism in the military had quietly concluded.
For years, military officials had been dismissing calls for greater action against efforts by groups to radicalize either those in uniform or who had recently jettisoned their camis despite examples like the Klu Klux Klan operating, sometimes openly, on military bases. A constant drumbeat of arrests of individuals harboring extremist ideals has lingered for years, with many experts pointing to Army veteran Timothy McVeigh who killed 168 people in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing as the forefather of a troubling community.
Experts worry that the current environment of political violence is increasing the risk. In 2020, members of a group that included two Marines and styled itself as a "modern day SS" were arrested on allegations that they were plotting to destroy the power grid in the northwest U.S. In February, in a completely unrelated case, a former Guardsman and self-identified Nazi was also arrested for plotting to destroy an electrical substation -- this time in Maryland.
The attack on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6 created a new sense of urgency, a willingness to talk about the problem, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's stand-down order marked a move by military leadership to get its arms around the extremism problem.
But the military and its transition programs have largely failed to provide what experts say is necessary to steer troops and veterans away from extremist causes and groups, which have been growing in power and persuasion in the U.S., a multi-year investigation by Military.com found. Instead, the briefings on extremism took on a familiar and largely inconsequential pattern, as recounted in interviews with 14 active-duty troops serving in the Army who attended separate stand-downs worldwide.
Experts argue there are ways to help make service members and veterans less susceptible to radicalization, and those who have deradicalized describe moments that helped counter the lure of extremist groups.
"It seems that a lot of people get involved in radicalization because they don't feel listened to," Arno Michaelis, a former Nazi who has worked to help many leave the extremist world behind, said in an interview.
Michaelis pointed in particular to opportunities in which those who hold a grievance are forced to confront the humanity of the group they've demonized.
"When they are listened to -- and especially when they're listened to by someone that they claim as an enemy because of their skin color, their religion or their sexuality or whatever -- it becomes all the more powerful, because then it completely defies the narrative of 'us versus them.'"
But the stand-down, haphazardly organized with commands largely left to themselves, typically didn't transmit that information, or really anything else that would help prevent radicalization, to troops.
"Well what does extremism even mean? To some people, patriotism is extremism," one Army officer recalled a lieutenant asking at a briefing.
This story is the third and final installment in a series on the rise of extremism and its effect on troops and veterans. Part 1 looked at how extremist groups are targeting and radicalizing those who have served their country in uniform. Part 2 tackled the threat radicalized troops pose.
One Day of Diversion from Extremism
The stories from troops who were present for the extremism stand-down paint a grim picture of what has been the Pentagon's largest and most visible effort to tamp down extremism within the ranks in recent history.
A defense official who worked on anti-extremism efforts told Military.com that the cursory efforts like the troop-led discussions instead of a more robust, formalized approach were a conscious choice -- a strategic decision not to use precious time and funding on a problem that leadership considers minor.
Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III speaks with Indiana National Guardsmen during a visit to the U.S. Capitol building, Jan. 29, 2021. (DoD photo by Air Force Staff Sgt. Brittany A. Chase)
Soldiers recalled that the events were little different than many of the mandatory trainings they have to endure and the mood reflected similar boredom. They all described a standard "check the box" lecture that was held in classrooms and auditoriums from Fort Liberty, North Carolina, to Fort Riley, Kansas, to Fort Campbell, Kentucky. For most, it blended into other daily briefings mandated by senior officials.
Many units turned to the classic PowerPoint presentation. Some commands went to the trouble of producing videos for the event that ran from brief introductions to one that was an hour and half long, created by an Air Force psychologist.
But while the production quality of the presentations ran the gamut, the substance appears to have been devoid of significant discussion of how troops are often targeted by extremist organizations like the Oath Keepers, how veterans often rise to top leadership positions at these organizations, or even why so many service members and veterans ended up at the siege of the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6 just weeks prior.
Videos created as part of the stand-down, like the one produced by the Defense Logistics Agency, were chock full of stock images and leaned on the decades-old "if you see something, say something" slogan. Others, like the video for the Air Force's 96th Test Group, quickly dove into technical lingo about ingroups and outgroups to discuss the topic with the air of an academic presentation instead of something that has real-world consequences.
Some of the troops who spoke with Military.com also recalled their briefings conflating groups associated with left-wing protests such as Black Lives Matter and Antifa and far-right groups such as the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers even though experts agree that the latter is a much larger danger for Americans today.
The result was training that cost the services, combatant commands and Joint Staff just $535,000 out of a budget that is more than $700 billion, according to a letter sent by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley to Congress in early 2022.
The official plan to combat extremism that was released months after the stand-downs put much of the responsibility on individual commanders to police their troops, and officials for the military stressed that there were no plans to look at service members' social media accounts, though such public-facing feeds could reflect increasing radicalization.
Experts on the military and extremism say that active-duty commanders are not only ill-equipped to tackle the issue, they're also too busy and not sufficiently informed.
And unlike other problems facing service members, the military has not set up special programs that either target the issue with counseling instead of punishment, as in the case of alcoholism, or offer commanders unique reporting tools, as in the case of sexual assault.
Instead, disciplinary punishment is the only real option left for a commander who is interested in addressing the issue.
The former official familiar with the Defense Department efforts to combat extremism told Military.com that leadership understood that most of the people who would be caught up in a push for greater punishment would be in their teens or early 20s.
"Having an approach which is so draconian that they get slammed, as soon as you say they're part of Group X, which they may or may not have understood what Group X actually stands for, is, frankly, not fair," the former official said.
While there is some evidence units have sought outside assistance to help tackle this problem by inviting extremist experts to educate their formations, those instances seem to be restricted to elite units or academic settings and don't touch the vast majority of troops.
Jon Lewis, a research fellow at the Program on Extremism at George Washington University, said he has been invited to lecture special operations units as well as cadets at West Point about domestic extremism over the last year.
Lewis said his course was integrated into days-long training that focused on other topics, to include foreign terrorist organizations. He found that it was effective to use that baseline knowledge, something that all Global War on Terrorism troops are familiar with one way or another, to talk about the domestic side of the coin by comparing and contrasting the two.
Like many of the other experts Military.com has interviewed on the topic, Lewis also noted that the message to troops should focus on how many extremist groups -- Oath Keepers, the Boogaloo Movement, Atomwaffen Division and other domestic extremist groups -- deliberately target service members and veterans into their ranks.
Extremism as Political Football
The limited efforts military leadership have taken to combat extremism have faced increasing resistance from some lawmakers who have argued there is no significant issue with extremism and that to suggest otherwise is anti-veteran or anti-service members.
In an October 2021 House Veterans Affairs committee hearing, Rep. Jim Banks, R-Ind., described the efforts to combat radicalization as an insult.
"The fact that you're going to save our veterans from becoming political terrorists is offensive to every veteran in America," he said.
Another Republican, Rep. Andrew Clyde from Georgia called efforts to screen troops for extremist ideology something that "smacks of the 'Thought Police'" during a Homeland Security committee hearing in the weeks following Jan. 6.
Both Banks and Clyde served in the Navy.
Since the riot and insurrection of Jan. 6, the topic of extremism within the ranks has become a political football, and Republicans in Congress have used the annual National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, to halt any effort to root out extremists.
A Senate committee report released as part of the NDAA for 2023 stated the view of the Armed Services Committee very plainly: "Spending additional time and resources to combat exceptionally rare instances of extremism in the military is an inappropriate use of taxpayer funds, and should be discontinued by the Department of Defense immediately."
A man wearing an Oath Keepers shirt stands outside the Kenosha County Courthouse, Nov. 19, 2021 in Kenosha, Wis. (AP Photo/Paul Sancya, File)
Meanwhile, Military.com's investigation found that cases of domestic terrorism have skyrocketed in the last decade and the groups behind many of these incidents are actively recruiting veterans into their fold, where they often quickly move into leadership positions.
For example, of the 11 top Oath Keepers whom federal officials charged with seditious conspiracy for their role in the Jan. 6 siege, five were military veterans.
While many efforts to fully halt the department's work on extremism failed -- largely along party lines -- top defense leaders have had to sit before committees and be grilled on the necessity and cost of these policies over the last few years. Legislators on the right have also signaled that they are not done with these efforts.
Experts say there are ways to ward off extremism, and even reach those who have already taken up the ideology, though little is being done right now to lay that groundwork for the active-duty force. However, in the veteran community, some not-for-profit organizations are working hard to take action.
It is veterans -- not active-duty service members -- who make up the vast majority of those from the military community who are arrested for extremist activity, a fact that is partially related to the significant difference in scale of the two groups, but also attributed by some experts to specific moments of vulnerability in veterans' lives.
In particular, they point to a vacuum left immediately after service members leave behind their uniforms, a loneliness from a loss of community and a purposelessness from a loss of mission that can compound into fertile ground for extremist recruiting.
Of all the arrests stemming from the siege on Jan. 6, 131 defendants had a military background, according to data collected by the George Washington University Program on Extremism. Of those 131 people, 117 were veterans.
A recent survey by Rand Corp. found that nearly 1 in 3 veterans agree with the racist "Great Replacement Theory" -- a cornerstone of white supremacist ideology that claims powerful elites are trying to replace native-born Americans with immigrants and people of color who share their political beliefs. It's often also known as "white genocide."
Dr. Carl Castro, a professor at the University of Southern California and a 30-year Army veteran, said that, while leaving the military presents service members with great opportunity, it's also a period of risks.
"If you don't get a job, if you're unemployed for a long period of time, you start feeling your sacrifices by serving in the military were not appreciated," he explained. "I've never spoken to a single veteran or service member leaving the military, and they say, 'My plan is to start this radicalized group. ... It's what happens when their other plans don't work out."
Castro said those in the military community can be protected from the deception often tied to radicalization through a better understanding of the way the government functions and the issues facing different communities. But that work has to start early.
"These are the kinds of things that you can inculcate … in military personnel when they join and throughout their career," he added.
Jeremy Brown -- a 47-year-old man who is currently serving a seven-year prison sentence in Florida on weapons charges and awaiting trial for his role in the Jan. 6 insurrection -- is one example of a veteran who went down the rabbit hole of extremism after service, according to his family. Court records allege he helped the Oath Keepers stockpile weapons at a hotel just outside of Washington, D.C., where the militia group planned follow-on insurgent attacks against police and National Guardsmen.
Brown has a 20-year background in Special Forces and retired from the Army in 2012. His ex- wife, Elizabeth Brown, said Jeremy's fall into extremism started after he failed his second attempt to get into the Army's secretive Delta Force -- considered one of the most elite military units in the world.
Failing to get into Delta sent Brown into a tailspin, she said, describing him as charismatic and physically fit, but always a bit of an outsider as he tried to make it in the special operations community. He was driven and seemed to get what he wanted; failing those Delta tryouts was the first time he was told no.
He became a fundamentalist Christian and then turned to anti-government beliefs around the time of their divorce and when Elizabeth was granted exclusive custody of their children.
In an interview with Military.com from his prison cell, Brown denies the federal allegations and says he was not armed when at the Capitol.
"I've done nothing wrong," Brown said. "I have no regrets."
Military Separation and Solutions
To help service members with the transition from military service to civilian life, they are required to go through the Transition Assistance Program, or TAP. Although the program has its roots in the massive demobilization that occurred in the wake of the Cold War's end, it was made mandatory in 2011 after it became clear that post-9/11 veterans were struggling to get jobs at a far greater rate than civilians.
The working group that the Pentagon stood up to study extremism did make minor changes to the curriculum to help inoculate soon-to-be veterans against recruitment by extremist groups.
The report that was released in December 2021 said that the Pentagon added language to the course that "reinforces the key messages from the stand-down and underscores the need to honor the oath of office and to support and defend the Constitution," as well as ways to make reports about extremism to law enforcement.
Although the courses are mandatory, many service members have reported mixed to poor results from their TAP experience. Its aim to avert unemployment and chaotic transitions has been somewhat successful. Veteran unemployment is now on par or lower than the civilian rate.
However, as a way to avert radicalization, it's far from a solution. That's simply not the program's goal despite the fact that extremist groups actively target veterans like Brown for recruitment with similar calls to service and offers of comradeship and belonging. In the process, organizations like Patriot Front, Atomwaffen, Oath Keepers and the Nazis actively recruit members and veterans and gain a valuable asset.
The Pentagon's primary responsibility is to identify extremists, not necessarily deradicalize them, but on-the-ground experts say that the military is making progress, albeit slowly.
"The most significant thing about the [extremism] working group was that they defined extremism for the first time," said Kris Goldsmith, an Iraq combat veteran who runs Task Force Butler, a nonprofit that researches and tracks extremism online. "Having the definition of the problem is the first step."
But what if all domestic extremists were booted from the military? Where would they go next?
Lewis, the extremism researcher, argued that -- without better care from institutions like the Department of Veterans Affairs and Pentagon -- it is a recipe for further isolation, and by extension increases the likelihood that the veteran could become further engrossed in extremist activity.
"If that individual just has his entire life pulled out from under him and is now just placed back into his community with presumably no support network and no understanding by those around him that this individual is, let's say, a violent white supremacist," Lewis said. "I don't think that is doing the job the right way."
Once discharged, the only real connection most veterans are left with to their military service is the VA, which is also not able to act as a way to help troops avert radicalization.
Chris Buckley, an Army veteran who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan and later went on to join the Klu Klux Klan, said that the lack of direct outreach on extremism is helping fuel recruitment.
"I think that there's an attraction to filling a void, to compensating or providing some relief to some feelings of abandonment," he told Military.com in an interview. "When a soldier doesn't have a war, he'll find one, and sometimes they end up in the wrong war."
The lack of substantial deradicalization and diversion solutions means that veterans who go down the path of extremist ideology are left with basically no government resources to help them if they're targeted, recruited and utilized by organizations that often espouse violent and dangerous ideology.
On top of that, experts who actively track and study extremists say that America has become far more sympathetic to their ideals in recent years.
Goldsmith explained that the problem of extremism is only getting worse and "a big part of that is the normalization not just of extremist rhetoric and politics, but of acts of extremism."
Many of the veterans who have become radicalized and later left that life behind describe their way out as being a serendipitous or chance encounter that led to a realization that hate and violence was not for them. Others say that outside pressure helped make that choice for them.
Buckley, who first joined the Army straight out of high school, eventually rose to the rank of sergeant in the 201st Engineer Battalion of the Kentucky Army National Guard. It was a connection with Michaelis, the former Nazi, that changed his trajectory.
Michaelis said that he'd "probably talked to 50 people over the past 12 years" about leaving extremism and was quick to add that "they're not always successful," while describing Buckley as "far and away my biggest success story."
The root of his deradicalization was exposure.
"I took him to Los Angeles, and we went and fed 400 homeless people dinner one night at the LA mission downtown," Michaelis said. "That was done without any sort of agenda -- and that's a really important part of the de-radicalization process is that you don't want to butt heads with someone on political issues, you don't want to butt heads on the actual nuts and bolts of ideology."
Instead, he told Buckley that they were just going to feed dinner to people who needed help.
"I didn't want to be like 'well, now you're going to understand that it's people of color who are oppressed and blah, blah, blah,'" he said. Buckley "picked up the ideological implications of all things without me having to say anything."
-- Konstantin Toropin can be reached at konstantin.toropin@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @ktoropin.
-- Steve Beynon can be reached at Steve.Beynon@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @StevenBeynon.
-- Travis Tritten can be reached at travis.tritten@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Tritten.
-- Drew F. Lawrence can be reached at drew.lawrence@military.com. Follow him on Twitter @df_lawrence.
military.com · by Konstantin Toropin,Steve Beynon,Travis Tritten,Drew F. Lawrence · November 1, 2023
24. How an AI company parsed misinformation early in Israel-Hamas war
We have to fight the war in the information domain.
How an AI company parsed misinformation early in Israel-Hamas war
Defense News · by Colin Demarest · November 1, 2023
WASHINGTON — When Hamas militants raided Israel in early October, killing and abducting more than 1,000 people, videos, images and text flooded social media. Rumors and shoddy information proliferated, blurring the line between fact and fiction.
Artificial intelligence and data analysis firm Primer monitored the situation from afar using its Command software. It demonstrated its AI-enabled parsing capabilities at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual convention in Washington days later, promising to identify kernels of truth among the chaos in the Middle East.
“Just aggregating lots of data, particularly if it’s a really noisy environment and the facts have yet to be established, can be really problematic because you’re just making a big pile for the user to go through,” Primer CEO Sean Moriarty told C4ISRNET on the show floor. “As you might imagine, data is all over the place. There’s all sorts of open-source intelligence data. The question is: What can a professional do with it, using their knowledge and experience? And that comes down to speed, power and accuracy.”
The Command software is designed with the single-pane-of-glass motif in mind. The program takes queries from users, much like a Google search; pulls vast amounts of data, namely social media feeds and news articles; and populates the results with summaries, context and name-entity recognition. It extracts people, places and things of note, handles translations, and presents sources that explain the process like math homework.
In a demo at the AUSA event, the software sorted through information related to the Israel-Hamas war and then produced a continuously refreshed timeline of events. Some of the points were geolocated, generating a heat map of posts and interactions.
“What it’s actually doing is interrogating these disparate sources, identifying anomalies where information is in conflict, and scoring it,” said Moriarty, who previously led Ticketmaster. “Anywhere there is a hot spot, our folks are looking to see what signal we can pull.”
The Command software is tailored for defense applications, according to the company, whose advisers include a former principal deputy director of national intelligence and former leaders of U.S. Special Operations Command and Africa Command.
Primer in June announced a $69 million funding round to help accelerate product delivery to government and commercial customers.
Mark Brunner, the president of the company’s federal team, said the goal of Command is to reduce “the latency between sensor and shooter.” That language is often used to describe the Pentagon’s Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control effort, or CJADC2, which seeks to seamlessly link forces across land, air, sea, space and cyberspace.
“Sense, make sense, decide and act — we’re the ‘make sense’ people in that loop,” Brunner said. “If you’re a customer and you’re on the watch floor at SOCOM or the Army intel fusion center, our platform gives you the ability to ingest not only [open-source intelligence] from these various sources, but in over 100 languages.”
Military analysts and others in the intelligence community must sift through sometimes overwhelming volumes of information. Some of it can be correct, some of it can be incorrect and some can be purposely deceptive.
The U.S. Defense Department is spending money on AI and machine learning to augment such workloads and pick out patterns that may have been previously missed.
“What we have, though our product here, is the ability to ingest vast amounts of data, run it through our GPUs, and actually summarize and contextualize that data,” said Chris Lacy, who led the Command demonstration. “The key things an analyst is immediately going to look for — it is categorizing that and showing that [in] real time to the analyst as soon as they walk in the door.”
“As soon as the breaking news happened,” he added, “I put in a monitor and just started tracking it.”
The Defense Department sought $1.4 billion for artificial intelligence in fiscal 2024, which began Oct. 1. A continuing resolution that maintains funding rates from the prior year is in place until mid-November.
About Colin Demarest
Colin Demarest is a reporter at C4ISRNET, where he covers military networks, cyber and IT. Colin previously covered the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration — namely Cold War cleanup and nuclear weapons development — for a daily newspaper in South Carolina. Colin is also an award-winning photographer.
25. Ukraine has taken 17,000 Russians off the battlefield without firing a shot, US Army special-ops general says
Now that is a substantial measure of effectiveness for psychological operations. It is the one everyone wants.
Ukraine has taken 17,000 Russians off the battlefield without firing a shot, US Army special-ops general says
Business Insider · by Stavros Atlamazoglou
Russian soldiers during the Vostok military exercise at a training area south of Vladivostok in September 2018.MLADEN ANTONOV/AFP via Getty Images
- Russia has taken hundreds of thousands of casualties since attacking Ukraine last year.
- Thousands more troops have deserted, a reflection of the Russian military's deep morale problems.
- Ukrainian information warfare has helped drive those Russians away, according to a top US general.
In the 20 months since Russia attacked Ukraine in the largest offensive military operation in Europe since World War II, hundreds of thousands of Russian troops have been killed or wounded.
Since invading on February 24, 2022, Russian forces have lost ground in Ukraine and had thousands of pieces of artillery, armor, and other equipment destroyed. Defeat has followed defeat, and the outlook for President Vladimir Putin and for Russia doesn't look good.
Ukraine isn't only using bullets and bombs against Russian forces. Thanks to its information operations, Kyiv has helped take 17,000 Russians off the battlefield without even firing a shot, according to the head of US Army Special Operations Command.
When messaging leads to desertions
President Vladimir Putin at a Navy Day parade in St. Petersburg in July 2017.Valya Egorshin/NurPhoto via Getty Images
Rapid advances in communications technology and the widespread use of social-media platforms have made it easier for state and non-state actors to reach vast audiences to promote their own interests and undermine those of their rivals.
Ukraine's messaging efforts have been an important tool for convincing thousands of Russians to leave their posts, according to Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, commanding general of US Army Special Operations Command.
"Messaging has played a huge role just in the tactical and operational sense" in Ukraine, Braga said at the Association of the US Army's annual conference in October.
"We've supported our Ukrainian partners there. You've had 17,000 Russians desert," Braga said. "That's 17,000 soldiers you didn't have to blow up on the battlefield or destroy. That has weakened the defensive mechanisms" of Russian forces.
Using the avenues provided by social media, a military or intelligence service can gather detailed information about an adversary, its equipment, and its personnel and deploy that information to target individual troops and undermine their morale.
Russians draftees begin military training in Rostov in October 2022.Arkady Budnitsky/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
"At the tactical level, eroding will and morale with individual soldiers, to eroding the overall capability of the unit, it's inherent and it's a traditional military activity to impose doubt into the minds of the adversary," Braga said.
Ukraine has mounted a remarkable array of operations in the information space. Whether it's cajoling allies to send more weapons or mocking Russia's battlefield shortcomings, the Ukrainians have shown great skill in using information to their advantage.
There are countless examples of poor Russian morale those Ukrainian operations can take advantage of, and the Kremlin has tried to counter the effects Braga described. Those include brutal measures like executing soldiers who retreat or fail to follow orders, much like the Soviets did in World War II.
To be sure, Russia has its own potent propaganda machine. During the Cold War, the KGB used information operations as part of a larger "active measures" campaign to subvert the West and undermine NATO.
In the weeks leading up to Ukraine's large-scale counteroffensive this summer, the Kremlin sent guidelines to news outlets, instructing them to describe Ukrainian capabilities in a positive light to heighten perceptions of the Russian military's success when it repelled Kyiv's forces.
Keyboard commandos
US soldiers with role players during the Psychological Operations Qualification Course at Camp Mackall in North Carolina in June 2021.US Army/K. Kassens
The US military also recognizes the potential of information operations, and as the commander of US Army special-operations forces, Braga knows a thing or two about conducting them.
The threat of near-peer warfare with China or Russia has pushed the US military and intelligence community to invest more in information operations so it can shape the information battlefield before, during, and after hostilities.
In the US special-operations community, the Army's Psychological Operations Groups and the Civil Affairs Brigade do most of the work when it comes to information operations and shaping the narrative. US Army Special Forces soldiers are also tasked with developing specific cultural and linguistic knowledge to facilitate their training of partner forces.
Those "soft" skills can also be used against adversaries, especially those who can't be convinced to quit the fight through force of arms alone.
"It's our responsibility to impose cost and belief in the adversary's mindset. At the ultimate, warfare is about a contest of wills. You can have an annihilation strategy" to destroy the enemy, Braga said, but "at the end of the day, you have to convince a human to stop doing what they're doing."
Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations and Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He has a B.A. from the Johns Hopkins University, an M.A. in strategy, cybersecurity, and intelligence from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and is currently pursuing a Juris Doctor degree from Boston College Law School.
26. Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November
Access all the foreign policy assessments here: https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/11/01/biden-administration-foreign-policy-tracker-november-3/
November 1, 2023 | FDD Tracker: October 5, 2023-November 1, 2023
Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker: November
John Hardie
Russia Program Deputy Director
Listen to analysis2 min
Trend Overview
By John Hardie
Welcome back to the Biden Administration Foreign Policy Tracker. Once a month, we ask FDD’s experts and scholars to assess the administration’s foreign policy. They provide trendlines of very positive, positive, neutral, negative, or very negative for the areas they watch.
Following the October 7 killing spree by Hamas, President Joe Biden delivered a powerful address decrying the attack as “sheer evil.” His administration swiftly provided Israel with military aid, including Iron Dome batteries and interceptors to defend against Hamas rockets. The Pentagon also deployed additional U.S. forces, including two carrier strike groups, to deter escalation by Iran and Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the United States counseled Israel on its war plans and worked to get humanitarian aid into Gaza.
Missing from the administration’s response: consequences for Iran, which provided military and financial aid to Hamas and may have had a direct hand in orchestrating the October 7 attack. The Biden team has not recommitted to enforcing sanctions against Iran, enriched by U.S. ransom payments and non-enforcement of U.S. sanctions. After a spate of attacks against American forces by Iran-backed militias, the administration responded with airstrikes against two Iran-linked facilities in Syria. Still, the Iran-backed attacks have continued.
Amid the Middle East crisis, the administration also pressed Congress to continue aid for Ukraine. Biden sent lawmakers a $106 billion request that includes funding for Ukraine and for the U.S. military and defense-industrial base. Unfortunately, Congress has yet to act.
Check back next month to see how the Biden administration handles these and other challenges.
Trending Positive
Trending Neutral
Trending Negative
Trending Very Negative
Cyber
Defense
Europe and Russia
Gulf
Israel
Indo-Pacific
International Organizations
Latin America
Syria
China
Sunni Jihadism
Turkey
Iran
Korea
Lebanon
Nonproliferation and Biodefense
27. Why the Philippines is exiting the Belt and Road
Excerpts:
Chinese projects likely to face Manila’s axe include the Samal Island-Davao City Connector project; the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project; the New Centennial Water Source — Kaliwa Dam Project; the Philippine National Railways South Long Haul Project or the PNR Bicol; the Mindanao Railway Project Tagum-Davao-Digos segment; and a closed-circuit television project in several cities in Metro-Manila.
“We [in the senate] convened an oversight on [China’s] ODA [Official Development Assistance], so I know that many of the ODA-funded projects are delayed due to the implementation of the right of way and bidding,” Gatchalian said in an interview.
“China’s grace period is shorter with only five to seven years compared to Japan with five to almost 10 years, which means (with China) we would need to immediately pay and it would be more expensive. Let’s compare the economics: it is cheaper in Japan,” he said.
But as the Philippines effectively pulls out of China’s BRI, the risk of a more volatile downward spiral in bilateral ties is rising. And it remains to be seen whether Japan, the US, South Korea and Europe will actually fill the infrastructure gap China had earlier pledged to address.
Why the Philippines is exiting the Belt and Road
Manila announces termination of China-backed infrastructure projects as geopolitics takes policy precedence over economics
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · November 2, 2023
MANILA – Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr was among the 23 national leaders who attended last month’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit in Beijing, marking the 10th anniversary of the US$1 trillion globe-spanning infrastructure-building program.
At the event, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced close to $100 billion in new state policy bank financing for the initiative. In a white paper published last month, China maintained “the ultimate goal of the BRI is to help build a global community of shared future.”
But the Philippines won’t be among the recipients of China’s largesse or shared future as Marcos Jr’s administration swerves decidedly away from China’s monied but troubled program for paving its global influence.
In a major development with geopolitical implications, the Philippine Department of Transportation has announced the full termination of a series of big-ticket infrastructure projects with China in favor of Japanese and Western rivals.
According to the Philippine Senate, nearly all of China’s key investment initiatives in the Philippines are now in doubt due to both economic and political factors. The upshot is a new nadir in Philippine-China relations, a dramatic about-turn from the six years of warm engagement under the pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte presidency.
For the Philippines, China has largely engaged in “pledge trap” diplomacy during the Duterte administration, a cynical ploy that entailed forward-deployed concessions in the South China Sea in exchange for largely illusory investment pledges. China pledged as much as $24 billion in infrastructure projects under Duterte, nearly none of which have been delivered.
Marcos Jr’s apparent departure from the BRI is rooted in deep bilateral grievances over contested territories in the South China Sea. Most recently, the Marcos Jr administration expressed vocal outrage over China’s harassment of Philippine resupply and patrol missions on and around the Second Thomas Shoal, where Manila maintains troops on a grounded ship.
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A member of the Philippine Coast Guard while being shadowed by a Chinese Coast Guard ship at Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands in the disputed South China Sea. Photo: Asia Times Files / Facebook Screengrab / Philippine Star via AFP
Following a recent collision between Chinese and Philippine sea vessels, US President Joe Biden made it clear that America will respond to any attack on Philippine ships, aircraft or soldiers stationed in the South China Sea as outlined under the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).
From Beijing’s perspective, however, the Marcos administration has walked back its earlier commitment to pursue a “new golden era” of bilateral relations by actively courting a stronger US military presence on its soil.
Under an expanded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the Pentagon is set to gain access to a whole host of military facilities close to both the South China Sea as well as Taiwan’s southern shores.
Upon closer examination, however, it’s becoming clear to many observers that the BRI is under strain amid China’s economic slowdown, property crisis and various investment debacles overseas.
From its peak in 2018, China’s overall BRI-related activities are down by some 40%, according to recent reports. This is partly due to declining financing from Beijing as well as regulatory hurdles and financial fragility in various recipient countries.
A recent research report published by Boston University found that while China’s development finance institutions provided partner nations with about $331 billion between 2013 and 2021, “many of the recipients of Chinese finance are subject to significant debt distress.”
By some accounts, China spent as much as $240 billion to bail out BRI recipient nations on the verge of bankruptcy, most dramatically in the case of Sri Lanka and increasingly in Pakistan and Laos.
Heightened China-Philippine sea tensions have coincided with a virtual collapse in bilateral investment deals. Though two-way trade between the two neighbors remains robust, although largely in Beijing’s favor, nearly all of Beijing’s infrastructure investment pledges made during the Duterte era are now in jeopardy.
Just days after a Chinese vessel collided with a Philippine resupply mission in the South China Sea, Philippine Transportation Secretary Jaime Batista announced that the Philippines is scrapping $4.9 billion worth of Chinese big-ticket infrastructure projects, involving two railway projects on the northern island of Luzon and another on Duterte’s home southern island of Mindanao.
“We have three projects that won’t be funded by the Chinese government anymore. We can’t wait forever and it seems like China isn’t that interested anymore,” Bautista told a forum organized by European investors in Manila. Instead, the Philippines is now seeking alternative “better” deals from traditional investment partners like Japan, South Korea, the US and the European Union.
The Filipino official complained about the lack of financial commitment and perceived as relatively onerous terms of Chinese-funded projects in comparison to Japan’s concessional loan programs. Japan is currently developing a multi-billion subway project in Manila and several major “connectivity” initiatives in industrialized regions of the country.
In fact, the Marcos Jr administration warned as early as last year of the potential cancellation of Chinese-backed projects due to the lack of any meaningful progress on the ground. The issue was also raised during the Philippine president’s state visit to Beijing in January, to no avail of a renewed Chinese commitment.
According to Philippine Senator Sherwin Gatchalian, as many as six big-ticket Chinese projects are now being “reconsidered” due to Chinese delays, concerns over lending terms and broader geopolitical frictions.
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Where’s the money? Then-Philippine Transport Secretary Art Tugade (left) and China Railway Design Corporation and Guangzhou Wanan Construction Supervision Co Ltd. Consortium (CRDC) Representative Weidong Guo sign the Project Management Consultancy contract for the Tagum-Davao-Digos segment of the stalled Minadano Railway Project. Photo: Philippine Department of Transportation
Chinese projects likely to face Manila’s axe include the Samal Island-Davao City Connector project; the Chico River Pump Irrigation Project; the New Centennial Water Source — Kaliwa Dam Project; the Philippine National Railways South Long Haul Project or the PNR Bicol; the Mindanao Railway Project Tagum-Davao-Digos segment; and a closed-circuit television project in several cities in Metro-Manila.
“We [in the senate] convened an oversight on [China’s] ODA [Official Development Assistance], so I know that many of the ODA-funded projects are delayed due to the implementation of the right of way and bidding,” Gatchalian said in an interview.
“China’s grace period is shorter with only five to seven years compared to Japan with five to almost 10 years, which means (with China) we would need to immediately pay and it would be more expensive. Let’s compare the economics: it is cheaper in Japan,” he said.
But as the Philippines effectively pulls out of China’s BRI, the risk of a more volatile downward spiral in bilateral ties is rising. And it remains to be seen whether Japan, the US, South Korea and Europe will actually fill the infrastructure gap China had earlier pledged to address.
Follow Richard Javad Heydarian on X at @Richeydarian
asiatimes.com · by Richard Javad Heydarian · November 2, 2023
28. The Real Washington Consensus: Modernization Theory and the Delusions of American Strategy
Excerpts:
For all its asterisks and misinterpretations, modernization theory was a contribution to thinking about what is universal in human development and how foreign policy might prepare for a coming age in which the benefits of modernity are more open to all. It was also a recognition that how one thinks about the world determines how one acts in it.
“The United States will work pragmatically with any partner willing to join us in constructive problem-solving, reinforcing and building new ties based on shared interests,” the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy declared. But pragmatism is what states call a theory they would rather not talk about, and it comes at a cost. In the absence of some broad understanding of what drives social and political change, the United States will continue to lurch from one crisis to the next, overburdened as a great power yet underemployed as a leader—one that may be in relative decline but that still has the awesome power to define global priorities, mobilize coalitions, and serve as the closest thing the world has to a planetary voice for cooperation, justice, and human survival.
All these roles depend on the United States’ own pathway through modernity, where the forces of change are no different from those at work in other countries. Immigration and shifting demographics will alter the public assessment of vital interests abroad. Income inequality will fuel new waves of populism. Affective polarization—the sense among voters and their leaders that the other side is not merely wrong but malicious—will present problems for the peaceful transition of power and the respect for national institutions, especially in what has effectively become a federation of one-party states. An electoral system blatantly corrupt by the standards of other established democracies, awash in private money and with weak mechanisms of internal reform, will embolden authoritarians who promise to destroy it all in one cleansing fire.
Being explicit about the way the world works is not an academic luxury. It is a way not just of forecasting the future but also of hedging against it—a tool for contingency-proofing, to the degree possible, a great power’s global vision against the domestic developments that could bring everything crashing down. Rostow believed history had demonstrated that every society can get to a specific point of human development, irrespective of language or culture. But he had no illusions that things ended there, not even for the pioneers of high consumption such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Once modernity became the taken-for-granted way of organizing the globe, once scarcity had been lessened and minds opened, further stages of development—hopeful ones as well as disasters—lay ahead. Modernization theory offered no comfort about what these stages might be. Surveillance capitalism, weaponized interdependence, the rise of artificial intelligence? Now, Rostow might have said, you take it from here.
The Real Washington Consensus
Modernization Theory and the Delusions of American Strategy
November/December 2023
Published on October 24, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Charles King · October 24, 2023
Among American foreign policy whisperers and assessors of the state of the world, no one had a more checkered reputation than Walt Rostow—academic economist, influential author, adviser to presidents, and, as the U.S. diplomat Averell Harriman once called him bitingly, “America’s Rasputin.” In the administrations of Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, nearly every strategic move Rostow advocated turned out to be wrong, from escalating the commitment of U.S. combat troops for South Vietnam to rejecting peace talks with the North Vietnamese. Since he continued to defend those positions after most other people had concluded they were mistakes, his name became a byword for a specific kind of Washington virtue: offering terrible advice but at least doing so consistently. “[Zbigniew] Brzezinski aspires to be the Henry Kissinger of this administration,” the historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., noted in his diary in May 1978 as the administration of President Jimmy Carter was developing a harder line toward the Soviet Union. “I fear he will end up the Walt Rostow.”
But before Rostow became a punch line, he was a thinker. Despite his policy errors and his diminished status inside the Beltway, his ideas and worldview lodged themselves deep inside the collective unconscious of the American foreign policy establishment—and remain there today, although sometimes in ways that are hard to see at first.
Rostow had come into the White House from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology after publishing the must-read foreign policy book of 1960, The Stages of Economic Growth. Around the world, the Soviet Union was peddling a seductive model of development, one built from a one-party dictatorship, state monopolies, and five-year plans. To Rostow, the West desperately needed its own theory for how societies evolve, a coherent set of principles translatable into a practical blueprint. It should be drawn not from airy Marxism, he believed, but from concrete history: the pathway that Western Europe and North America had already trod from the Enlightenment onward. In his book, Rostow offered a framework for how U.S. foreign policy could spur economic and social change abroad, especially in what was then known as the Third World. Countries develop in predictable stages, he argued, from preconditions for growth to economic takeoff, toward the goal of a modern consumer society. The trick was to accumulate the capital, know-how, and—crucially—Western values that would allow takeoff to occur.
Rostow’s book was where many readers first encountered what came to be called “modernization theory.” On Rostow’s reading of the historical evidence, politics, economics, and mentalities came bundled together. Modern economies were impossible without modern minds, which in turn formed the habits of playing by the rules and respecting abstract institutions that were fundamental to democracy. Some of those ideas ran back to early social scientists such as Max Weber and Émile Durkheim and would be elaborated by many of Rostow’s contemporaries, such as the American sociologist Talcott Parsons. But Rostow’s aim was more than academic. Fighting communism in theory was the first step toward countering it in practice. To make that point, he gave his book an unsubtle but memorable subtitle: “A Non-Communist Manifesto.”
After reading The Stages of Economic Growth, an American could come away convinced that global poverty and economic development were challenges on par with the arms race. Rather than thinking of foreign affairs as merely a grand chessboard, Rostow insisted, U.S. policymakers should aim the country’s resources at jump-starting other countries’ internal evolutions—a process that would essentially reverse-engineer the route to success that the United States and other industrialized societies had traversed since the eighteenth century. In the end, most of the assistance programs that were born in Rostow’s era, from the Peace Corps to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), bore his stamp. But in the drive to bring the Third World up to the level of the First, Rostow believed, Americans could take comfort in one deep truth: that ultimately history, common sense, and human nature were on their side. Consumerism would enable social transformations that, sooner or later, would increase the likelihood of global convergence with the values, interests, and preferences of the United States.
For more than half a century, the worldview that Rostow articulated has remained a mainstay of American thought at the intersection of foreign policy and political economy. It still influences foreign aid programs and democracy assistance. It is evident in Americans’ sense of strategic disappointment and bafflement—at the direction of Russia since the end of the Cold War, at the resurgence of right-wing nationalism among European allies, at the renewed appeal of nonalignment among middle powers and poorer countries. The tenets of modernization theory even inform the analysis of domestic politics in the United States. Seven years after the numb bewilderment of election night 2016, American liberals and moderate conservatives still view the phenomenon of Donald Trump as an atavistic throwback to what Rostow called “traditional society”: regional economic backwardness, social stagnation, and, as he put it, “the inaccessibility of modern science, its applications, and its frame of mind.”
More than any other intuition or outlook, modernization theory still has the greatest claim to being a genuine Washington consensus. “U.S. foreign policy is rooted in a belief that the way to lasting peace and prosperity is actually to integrate diplomacy, defense, and development, the three Ds,” the USAID administrator, Samantha Power, said during a trip to Fiji in August. Yet in an age of renewed superpower competition and global realignments, the task for American thinkers and doers is to reimagine what is taken for granted about how societies work internally, how they change, and how—even whether—external actors can influence the process.
Modernization theory was born in an age when the alternatives to democracy and the market were clear. Today, more than at any point since the Cold War, new competitors have their own theories to offer, as well as the resources to realize them: the global loan-sharking of China’s Belt and Road Initiative; the civilizational counterrevolution spearheaded by leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan; and even the vision of a benevolent tech-bro oligarchy represented by figures such as Elon Musk. Developing a coherent account of how the world really works—and what American foreign policy can do to nudge the country’s own long-term interests into closer alignment with humanity’s—will be one of this decade’s signature intellectual challenges.
RACE TO THE TOP
It is a particular obsession of great powers to build grand theories about how and why the rest of the world is not like them. Americans, of course, have long been concerned with their own country’s providential specialness. It is a theme that runs back—in the way the story is told today—to the Massachusetts Bay Colony and Governor John Winthrop’s “city upon a hill” sermon of 1630. But by the middle of the nineteenth century, American thinkers were beginning to develop something new: not a paean to American exceptionalism but a general, historically informed account of how societies evolve—one influenced in no small measure by the example they found on their own doorstep.
In the 1840s, the New York lawyer, businessman, and amateur scholar Lewis Henry Morgan traveled the rural back roads of his state and was struck by the social transformation playing out before his eyes. The once powerful Haudenosaunee, or Iroquois, Confederacy—the multicentury alliance among the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca, and Tuscarora peoples—was fading in the face of white expansion. The greatest Native American alliance to exist on the continent was passing into obscurity, a development that Morgan set about to document in real time.
Over the next several decades, Morgan translated his observations into a monumental study of the Haudenosaunee and then, in 1877, a work he called Ancient Society. His aim was to derive general conclusions from both the changes he had witnessed in his own lifetime and the vast scholarship on ancient Greece and other bygone eras. Simpler forms of association—families and tribes—had over time given way to modern cities and states, Morgan noted. In the process, human societies all seemed to travel through the same waypoints. He named these stages “the savage,” “the barbarous,” and “the civilized.” Each had its own qualities of language, religion, and behavior: how to express abstract ideas of time, say, or whether the weather was produced by capricious gods or discernible patterns of heating and cooling. Moreover, these stages were comparable across cultures: peoples at the same stage of history did things more or less the same way. What his Haudenosaunee neighbors had experienced was not so much displacement or disaster, he concluded, as their own process of slouching toward civilization, a development that had been accelerated, for good and ill, by their encounter with white Americans farther along the same human highway.
Morgan would turn out to have an outsize influence on science and the public understanding of social difference, both in the United States and abroad. Charles Darwin quoted him. Karl Marx jotted down notes on his ideas. The Smithsonian Institution made Ancient Society required reading for its research staff, and his findings would inform government policy on forced Native American assimilation. When the Library of Congress opened its domed Thomas Jefferson Building in 1897, designers were so taken with Morgan’s framework that they literally carved it in stone. The building’s window arches featured keystones in the shape of male heads representing Morgan’s understanding of the principal types of humanity. On the front were civilized Europeans and their diaspora, looking out toward the U.S. Capitol. Barbarous Chinese, Japanese, and Turks wrapped around the sides. Savage Africans and Melanesians were relegated to the back. It was a graphic illustration of the principal stages of human development as white Americans perceived them at the time. (And it is still on display today.)
The task for American thinkers and doers is to reimagine how societies change.
Morgan’s outlook on society was evolutionary. It was perfectly possible for a human community to move from the back of the Library of Congress to the front, as it were, given enough time and effort. No race or culture was stuck in one natural station. That claim, however, set Morgan and his followers apart from another powerful strain of American thought: one that, by the early twentieth century, was quickly becoming the dominant way of analyzing national greatness and decline.
“In America we have nearly succeeded in destroying the privilege of birth; that is, the intellectual and moral advantage a man of good stock brings into the world with him,” wrote the naturalist and philanthropist Madison Grant. A pioneering conservationist, Grant was a friend of Theodore Roosevelt and had helped found the Bronx Zoo. But his widest influence came from a sweeping survey of human history, The Passing of the Great Race, which he published in 1916. In the years to come, Grant’s work would become a defining text for a new generation of globally aware citizens and policymakers.
Expanding the franchise to Black Americans had become “an unending wail for rights” leading to a “rule of the average” in U.S. politics, Grant argued. In contrast to Morgan’s claims, biological races were immutable, he felt, a fact evident from the massive experiment in social reform and nation-building he had witnessed in his own lifetime: Reconstruction and the reassertion of white power in the Jim Crow era. “It has taken us fifty years to learn that speaking English, wearing good clothes, and going to school and to church . . . [do] not transform a negro into a white man,” he wrote. Even worse, Grant warned, the literal body politic of the United States was now being threatened by race defilement, especially given the influx of new arrivals from southern and eastern Europe since the 1890s. “The cross between a white man and an Indian is an Indian; the cross between a white man and a negro is a negro; the cross between a white man and a Hindu is a Hindu; and the cross between any of the three European races and a Jew is a Jew,” Grant stated plainly near the beginning of his book.
Some people found these claims ghastly and nonsensical. The Columbia University professor Franz Boas, the founder of American anthropology, was so outraged that he gave The Passing of the Great Race negative reviews in two different periodicals. In a famous public debate in Chicago, W. E. B. Du Bois made a laughingstock of a younger associate of Grant’s, Lothrop Stoddard. But the worldview Grant espoused—the deep reality of inherited race, the ranking of world communities by their racial station, the struggle for survival among incompatible racial types—would reshape American thought and practice. The American eugenics movement sprang from the ideas Grant promoted. The Johnson-Reed Act, a racially preferential immigration policy passed by Congress in 1924, came about in part because of his lobbying. It would remain largely in place for the next four decades.
A THEORY OF EVERYTHING
Walt Rostow was born the same year The Passing of the Great Race appeared. His father, Victor Rostowsky, had been the publisher of an underground socialist newspaper in Odessa, which was then a Russian imperial port. Like other Russian Jewish activists at the time, he escaped the tsarist police by sailing, steerage class, for New York, shortening the family name along the way.
He made sure his three sons were unmistakably American. Walt was named for the poet Walt Whitman, and his two brothers for the socialist Eugene Debs and the essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson. The household sparkled with ideas and debate. Grand speculations about human nature, the tides of history, and the possibilities of government were traded across the dinner table. Not long after enrolling as an undergraduate at Yale at the age of 15, Rostow had already come around to the concerns that would drive his professional life. “I would work on two problems,” he later remembered. “One was economic history and the other was Karl Marx.”
In ways that might be less apparent today, both interests were infused with scholarly ambition as well as practical urgency. Rostow had grown up in a country that had ready-made answers to the great problems in the social sciences. They were confidently on display in school curricula, in natural history museums, and in the everyday hierarchies of segregated water fountains, streetcars, and movie theaters—the visible world justified by widely accepted theories of racial civilization and timeless barbarism.
But Rostow’s own lifetime had seen these truths begin to crumble. The rise of the Nazis had shown the real-world consequences of a country’s remaking its government according to a warped theory of history. The American eugenics movement began to ebb. American children, schooled since the 1890s to recite the pledge of allegiance by stretching out the right arm toward the flag, a gesture known as the Bellamy salute, were quietly instructed to place hands on hearts instead.
Rostow and Johnson in the White House, Washington, D.C., February 1968
U.S. Archives
In 1936, a Rhodes scholarship to Oxford allowed Rostow to witness another country’s response to the rise of fascism. He also began to research a case study that he felt contained the keys to social change: an analysis of how the first modernizer, Great Britain, had wrenched itself from an agricultural economy into an industrial one without succumbing to dictatorship.
After earning a Ph.D. in economics at Yale, Rostow joined the war effort as a bombing analyst for the Office of Strategic Services, a job that would later have a profound, and horrific, impact on his approach to Vietnam. By 1950, back in academia as a member of the economics department at MIT, he began to sense that good theory might hold the secret to dismantling bad practice. He had “earlier promised to produce an alternative to Marxism as a theory of modern history,” he wrote the American politician and diplomat Adlai Stevenson in 1958 while on leave at Cambridge University, “and I have used my sabbatical to make my bid.” He had begun to sketch out his own account of social evolution, rooted in economics but drawing on a particular reading of American and world history—leaping over Grant, in a way, and reaching back toward Morgan. The result was The Stages of Economic Growth.
On the first page, Rostow pleaded for the modesty of his own theory while also announcing it as a new, universal take on social and economic development. The concept at the core of his book—the stages through which societies pass in moving from traditional society to modernity—was both “arbitrary and limited” and “in no absolute sense, a correct way,” he wrote. Yet in all the societies he had surveyed, from the nineteenth-century vanguard of industrialization such as Great Britain and France, to later modernizers such as Japan and Russia, to countries straining to catch up, such as Turkey and China, there was a “uniformity” in the pathway to development that sprang up from the historical data. In short, countries move from traditional society to “maturity” through a combination of cultural change, technological innovation, and elite choice—the realization that a growth-oriented economy and public welfare are the principal goals of governance.
Chapter by chapter, Rostow described in detail the five stages of growth he had gleaned from history: traditional society, preconditions for takeoff, takeoff, the drive to maturity, maturity, and high mass-consumption. His prose was that of a system builder and an optimist, and in both ways, there was no escaping the gravitational pull of Marx—which was also, in a way, the pull of Lewis Henry Morgan, from the concept of developmental stages to the view that all of history leads inexorably toward countries that happen to be the wealthiest and most powerful today. Marx had built “a system full of flaws,” as Rostow put it, “but full also of legitimate partial insights, a great formal contribution to social science.”
Modernization theory was not so much wrong as self-limiting.
Yet as he saw it, his Marxist contemporaries, by contrast, were playing pantomime, advocating grotesque policies that flowed from their own wishful thinking about history and human nature. “Gentlemen, I have very important news,” Rostow would declare dramatically to his White House staff in 1967, announcing the assassination of Che Guevara. “They finally got the SOB. The last of the romantic guerrillas.” Lenin, Guevara, Ho Chi Minh—each had consistently chosen the wrong course when the right one was blindingly apparent. “It is they,” Rostow concluded, referring to political leaders in former colonial states, “who, having helped achieve independence, under the banners of human freedom, appealing to those values in the West which they share, must now accept a large part of the responsibility for making those values come to life, in terms of their own societies and cultures, as they complete the preconditions and launch themselves into self-sustained growth.”
History knew its business. The grand sweep of social and economic change was a single journey of liberation and improvement, one that any country or culture might choose to join. All politicians had to do was get out of the way. It was a truth that Rostow believed applied equally well to his own country. One of the ancillary aims of The Stages of Economic Growth was to introduce Americans to their own history—not Plymouth Rock and Washington crossing the Delaware, but the great arc of the human past, in which the United States had simply followed the well-worn path of other modernizing societies.
The difference in Rostow’s own day, however, was the rapidity with which other countries were doing the same thing. The principal problem for the future was how to ensure peace in a coming age of what he called “the diffusion of power.” If current trends followed the past as he understood it, the coming world would contain many more countries that had become full adults. “It is fairly safe to predict that, by 2000 or 2010 . . . India and China . . . will be, in our sense, mature powers.” The idea of a bipolar world was already an illusion by the time he sat down to write, Rostow believed. No countries were mere spectators in the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. It would become an even dimmer fantasy, he predicted, in decades to come.
Once he went into government—in the Kennedy White House, then the State Department, then as Johnson’s national security adviser—Rostow was an engine of memos, slogans, and proposals. “Walt can write faster than I can read,” Kennedy once said, apparently not as a compliment. Rostow’s career rested on the accidental coming together of intellect and experience: in political economy and, during World War II, in bomb targeting. His opinions on both would shape an entire era in U.S. foreign policy, from the creation of a federal infrastructure for overseas development assistance to the escalation of the war in Vietnam.
After leaving government in 1969, he spent the next several decades totting up the good calls and the bad ones—the former his, he believed, the latter those of defeatists who failed to understand the mechanics of history. The Vietnam War had been a victory for the United States and a benefit to the world, he argued. It had successfully staved off communism long enough for capitalism to take off across much of Asia. As time went on, the only person who seemed to be convinced by that line of reasoning was Rostow himself. Like Morgan, Grant, and even the Marxists he battled throughout his career, Rostow had succumbed to the occupational hazard of embracing big history. The long run only comes into view when you ignore the nearer miseries.
WHAT ROSTOW GOT RIGHT
The fate of modernization theory tracked that of its greatest popularizer. By the 1970s, the objections from social scientists had become legion. Rostow was at best naive, ignorant of the ways in which the world of the late twentieth century, replete with structural disadvantages that kept poor countries poor, was not that of the nineteenth. At worst, he was an imperialist manqué, justifying interventions, military and otherwise, by former colonizers in the internal affairs of newly independent states. And to judge from the actions of high-consumption societies, Western values seemed the last thing the West really believed in. For someone who worked closely with Kennedy, it took a leap of the imagination to believe that the dominance of “family and clan connections,” as he put it, was exclusive to traditional societies. It took an even greater leap to see saturation bombing in Vietnam as a historical necessity.
As Rostow’s early critics argued, modernization theory seemed less science than folk theory—one society’s quaint attempt to make sense of all the others. Political economy was not a time machine, his detractors pointed out. In examining inequalities of national income and power in the global system, wealthier countries were not simply staring back at earlier versions of themselves. All societies lived in the here and now, with their own internal and external obstacles to growth. Development required smart policies—in trade, finance, and governance—not just a set of inputs to kick poorer countries into modernity. There was no reason even to believe that modernity itself was just one thing, the variety that came with a Renaissance, a Reformation, and an Industrial Revolution. Rostow had taken a slice of history and derived universal laws from it. His was a kinder form of the historical determinism of a Morgan or a Grant perhaps, but no less blinkered and time-bound.
His critics notwithstanding, Rostow, who died in 2003, could look at the later decades of his life as a kind of quiet vindication. If socialism had offered the most dynamic program for political and economic change in Rostow’s childhood—as it had been for his father, bent over his printing press in Odessa—that role now came to be occupied by modernization. In South Korea, in Turkey, and even in China, political elites came to use precisely that term, sometimes in direct translation into local languages. “We must run while they walk,” Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere had said in the 1960s of his own country’s postcolonial development according to socialist principles. But as the decades wore on, as the message of nationalization, autarky, and single-party systems faded, what remained was the idea of a country racing headlong into modernity, catching up with the rest of the developed world.
Rostow in July 1967
Yoichi Okamoto / LBJ Library
When Marxist economies and communist states finally collapsed in eastern Europe and Eurasia, the array of policies adopted in response by the United States and its European allies seemed to crib Rostow. Advisers, bankers, investors, and consultants descended on countries that were busy cementing market economies and opening to external trade and investment. Democracy assistance programs provided funds and know-how. Election monitors and democracy watchers reported on practices that they classified as either progress toward freedom or democratic backsliding, as if each country could be assigned to a specific stage of political development. The expectations were clear. Demand for choice in consumer goods would fuel demand for choice in elected officials. Globalization would shift local identities. Democracy at home would buttress peaceful behavior abroad.
For all Rostow’s insistence on the stepwise development of human societies, however, his version of modernization did not end with global peace, prosperity, and millennial happiness. The place he stopped was with the diffusion of power. The United States would have to plan for a time when the advantages of modernity, as he saw them, were no longer confined to the western appendage of Eurasia and a few of its former colonies. A world in which lots of societies were “mature”—filled with consumer goods and an expectation of progress, brimming with national and individual ambition—was very different from the one he knew in 1960, but it might be glimpsed on the horizon. In that sense, modernization theory was not so much the culmination of American exceptionalism as a warning against it. Prepare for the future, Rostow cautioned, by imagining how the United States would behave, in its foreign policy and in its own self-understanding, in a world where it was not particularly special at all.
In that respect at least, Rostow was broadly right. A national economy that strives for growth, a political system that assumes some kind of mass participation, and a society that expects welfare and progress have all become far closer to human universals than they were a half century ago. But from this point forward, all bets are off. There is no reason to expect that economic behavior, political institutions, and social values will always be bundled and unidirectional. Since 1981, the World Values Survey, a cluster of cross-national surveys, has arrayed societies along two dimensions of self-reported values: “traditional” versus “secular-rational” values, meaning the balance among things such as religiosity, respect for authority, secularism, and individuality; and “survival” versus “self-expression” values, meaning the balance among security, distrust of outsiders, liberty, and personal happiness. As the survey data have shown, none of these things is fixed. Even in high-modern societies, the sum of values and behaviors is more like a kaleidoscope than a way station along a predetermined developmental path.
Pragmatism is what states call a theory they would rather not talk about.
Similar lessons apply to Rostow’s major area of concern, economic development. In the last quarter century, global progress has been remarkable, if uneven. Even accounting for the effects of climate change, by the middle of this century, human well-being—less poverty, lower child and maternal mortality, and more primary education—is likely to be at a level that would have astonished Rostow’s generation. The World Bank’s World Development Report is today more likely to focus on sovereign debt, data management, and technology as the most pressing issues in promoting human welfare, rather than health, water, sanitation, and absolute poverty. But as the economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo have argued, “speculating on a grand scale” does not help explain where specific policies have succeeded or failed, much less whether external aid is, in general, good or bad. Except in the broadest possible sense—Rostow’s metrics of higher income and more investment—countries do not move through discrete stages. Instead, the challenge is to know what works in specific contexts—the textured environment of hard incentives and existing habits—and to build in an ability to pivot when a solution does not pan out.
Modernization theory was not so much wrong as self-limiting. To the degree that Americans look on Hungary, India, Russia, Turkey, or even the United States with a sense of disappointment—at the weakening of democracy, at the deepening of old social fissures such as ethnicity or religion, at the ineffable sense that things are going backward—it is because of the staying power of the worldview Rostow popularized. But as Rostow himself warned, the essence of strategy was straining to imagine beyond the horizon. In fact, when he reflected on his own contributions in his memoirs in 1972, his assessment was rather surprising. One of his goals, he wrote, had been to chart the inadequacies of life in an era of high mass consumption. The goal of human life was not to make and acquire more stuff, he felt, even though an economist might use that as a shorthand. It was “the adventure of seeing what man can and will do when the pressure of scarcity is substantially lifted from him.”
There was no reason to believe that the early modernizers had any advantage in this regard, or to expect that they would also be in the vanguard of finding ever newer frontiers to breach. “Babies, boredom, three-day weekends,” the steady “increase in real income”—his worry was that, in fully modern societies, all these things would one day soon lose their charm. In knowing more about how the stages of growth played out in different settings, Americans might at last be able to see more clearly how diverse societies “have, in different ways, organized themselves for growth without suppressing the possibility of human freedom.” At the core of Rostow’s thinking was a set of humanistic commitments that contrasted wildly with the cruelty of his policy advice—the source of the most famous quip about him, that he was “a sheep in wolf’s clothing,” a phrase attributed to the writer and government official Townsend Hoopes (although no evidence seems to exist that anyone ever said it).
Rostow knew that once a country becomes modern, things can still go terribly wrong. “Billions of human beings must live in the world, if we preserve it,” he wrote in the final paragraphs of The Stages of Economic Growth. “They have the right to live their time in civilized settings, marked by a degree of respect for their uniqueness and their dignity.”
THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS
The challenges of Rostow’s era have their analogs today. He was worried about nuclear annihilation, which might be a stand-in for climate change. He was concerned about the allure of the alternative model offered by Marxism, which might well be compared to the role played by today’s populist and nationalist reactions to neoliberalism. The essentials of U.S. strategy—counter China and Russia, deter attacks on the homeland, build resilience, and cooperate on climate change, food insecurity, and communicable diseases—are different from the ambitions that Rostow had in mind. Yet he would have understood the American desire to believe that capitalism, democracy, and a pro-American foreign policy are endpoints of the same process of social development. In The Stages of Economic Growth, what he thought he had provided his fellow Americans was a way of unbundling those expectations.
For all its asterisks and misinterpretations, modernization theory was a contribution to thinking about what is universal in human development and how foreign policy might prepare for a coming age in which the benefits of modernity are more open to all. It was also a recognition that how one thinks about the world determines how one acts in it.
“The United States will work pragmatically with any partner willing to join us in constructive problem-solving, reinforcing and building new ties based on shared interests,” the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy declared. But pragmatism is what states call a theory they would rather not talk about, and it comes at a cost. In the absence of some broad understanding of what drives social and political change, the United States will continue to lurch from one crisis to the next, overburdened as a great power yet underemployed as a leader—one that may be in relative decline but that still has the awesome power to define global priorities, mobilize coalitions, and serve as the closest thing the world has to a planetary voice for cooperation, justice, and human survival.
All these roles depend on the United States’ own pathway through modernity, where the forces of change are no different from those at work in other countries. Immigration and shifting demographics will alter the public assessment of vital interests abroad. Income inequality will fuel new waves of populism. Affective polarization—the sense among voters and their leaders that the other side is not merely wrong but malicious—will present problems for the peaceful transition of power and the respect for national institutions, especially in what has effectively become a federation of one-party states. An electoral system blatantly corrupt by the standards of other established democracies, awash in private money and with weak mechanisms of internal reform, will embolden authoritarians who promise to destroy it all in one cleansing fire.
Being explicit about the way the world works is not an academic luxury. It is a way not just of forecasting the future but also of hedging against it—a tool for contingency-proofing, to the degree possible, a great power’s global vision against the domestic developments that could bring everything crashing down. Rostow believed history had demonstrated that every society can get to a specific point of human development, irrespective of language or culture. But he had no illusions that things ended there, not even for the pioneers of high consumption such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Once modernity became the taken-for-granted way of organizing the globe, once scarcity had been lessened and minds opened, further stages of development—hopeful ones as well as disasters—lay ahead. Modernization theory offered no comfort about what these stages might be. Surveillance capitalism, weaponized interdependence, the rise of artificial intelligence? Now, Rostow might have said, you take it from here.
Foreign Affairs · by Charles King · October 24, 2023
29. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-november-1-2023-0
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace. Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces.
- Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area.
- The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.
- The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy.
- Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in various sectors of the front.
RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 1, 2023
Nov 1, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2023
Karolina Hird, Riley Bailey, Grace Mappes, Angelica Evans, and Frederick W. Kagan
November 1, 2023, 8pm ET
Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.
Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace.[1] In an essay entitled "Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It" and an interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi outlined the current operational environment in Ukraine and noted that, despite several previously successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2022, the war is now "gradually moving to a positional form."[2] Zaluzhnyi heavily stressed that the current positional nature of the war is largely a result of military parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces, noting that a deep and dramatic Ukrainian penetration of Russian lines will likely not be possible with the relative technological and tactical equilibrium currently between Ukrainian and Russian forces.[3] In his interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that technological and tactical parity between opposing forces in Ukraine has resulted in a "stalemate" similar to the case of the First World War.[4] In the more extensive essay on the subject, Zaluzhnyi notably refrained from classifying the situation as a full stalemate and instead framed it as a "positional" war resulting from aspects of this technological-tactical parity.[5] According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine's ability to overcome this technological-tactical parity will be contingent on Ukraine's ability to secure five main operational components that have become particularly significant since the summer of 2023 — gaining air superiority; breaching Russian mine barriers in depth; increasing the effectiveness of counterbattery combat; creating and training the necessary reserves; and building up electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.
Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces. Regarding the issue of air superiority, Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to significantly improve drone capabilities to gain air superiority along the frontline.[6] Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to overload Russian air defenses, neutralize Russian strike drones, and degrade Russian visibility over the front by deploying cheap drones en masse, developing specific drones meant to target Russian strike drones, and employing EW complexes throughout the front.[7] Zaluzhnyi argued that to overcome the challenges of EW use on the frontline, Ukrainian forces need to introduce necessary command and control (C2) processes for EW complexes, increase EW production capabilities, and streamline engagements with volunteer organizations that provide smaller EW complexes to Ukrainian forces.[8] Zaluzhnyi also recommended that Ukrainian forces improve counter-EW measures and develop new drones with EWs in mind.[9] To gain counterbattery superiority, Zaluzhnyi recommended that Ukrainian forces use more reconnaissance and strike drones to improve Ukrainian counterbattery fire and argued that Ukrainian forces need to strengthen GPS support for Ukrainian counterbattery units and increase the number of counterbattery assets.[10] Zaluzhnyi stated that improved sensors, more widespread and varied mine clearing capabilities, and anti-drone equipment will allow Ukrainian forces to more successfully breach Russian mine barriers in depth while under concealment.[11]
Zaluzhnyi also highlighted wider administrative adaptations and domestic developments in addition to his specific tactical battlefield solutions. Zaluzhnyi specifically called on Ukraine to introduce a Unified State Register for draftees, reservists, and those liable for military service to prepare a necessary reserve for Ukrainian forces.[12] Zaluzhnyi more broadly called on Ukrainian officials to incentivize Ukrainian citizens to join the military reserve and expand the number of citizens that Ukrainian forces are allowed to train.[13] Zaluzhnyi also noted that improving Ukrainian C2 and logistics support will be critical to improving operations writ large.[14] Zaluzhnyi stated that the formation of a "single information environment" for C2 through the use of modern information technology will allow Ukrainians to get ahead of Russian forces in terms of situational awareness.[15] Zaluzhnyi particularly highlighted the need for Ukraine to develop its own defense industry to sustain operations, long-range strike capabilities, and an asymmetric munitions arsenal to break out of military parity with Russian forces.[16]
Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces near Avdiivka have largely slowed the pace of ground attacks north and south of Avdiivka in favor of heavy indirect fire against Ukrainian frontline positions and near rear areas. Russian forces may be conducting an interdiction campaign against Ukrainian assets in the Avdiivka area, but this heavy fire is more likely air and artillery preparation for the battlefield ahead of another wave of Russian assaults.[17] Other milbloggers also characterized the current Russian operations as “preparatory support,” presumably for later assaults.[18] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun also notably stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct “meat assaults” (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training “Storm-Z” assault units made largely of convict recruits for future assaults without equipment.[19]
Russian forces may be preparing to transition to such infantry-led frontal assaults following heavy artillery preparation to compensate for heavy materiel losses in Avdiivka over the course of October. Open-source geolocation project GeoConfirmed used commercially available satellite imagery to verify that Russian forces have suffered at least 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles since October 9, losing 99 vehicles during the first wave of assaults between October 9 and 13, 94 vehicles during the second wave between October 14 and 23, and four confirmed and 18 potentially lost vehicles between October 24 and31.[20] GeoConfirmed characterized the Russian effort near Avdiivka as the costliest Russian effort thus far in the war in Ukraine.[21]
The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater. Various Russian elements have engaged in similarly catastrophic mechanized attacks with infantry-led frontal assaults on fortified Ukrainian positions along several different axes over the course of 2022 and 2023, suggesting that the ultimate fault in the lack of strategic adaptation lies with the General Staff. Russian forces previously suffered significant personnel and materiel losses during an unsuccessful offensive against Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast in winter 2022-2023, which was characterized by multiple waves of mechanized attacks against fortified Ukrainian positions.[22] These infantry-heavy assaults completely destroyed the Russian units involved in them, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), which reportedly had to reconstitute several times due to losses suffered near Vuhledar.[23] By contrast, elements of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps, operating under the command of the Southern Military District's 8th Combined Arms Army, and elements of the Central Military District's 41st Combined Arms Army, have recently conducted analogous costly mechanized assaults near Avdiivka.[24] The fact that two very distinct groupings of forces have engaged in similarly ineffective operations suggests that the Russian military command is struggling to learn and disseminate lessons across the theater or, in the case, even within the same military district.[25] The Russian General Staff is in principle responsible for learning lessons, adapting Russian doctrine, and disseminating lessons and new approaches throughout the force. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for this failure both in his capacity of chief of the Russian General Staff and as overall theater commander. The contrast between Gerasimov’s failure in this regard and General Zaluzhnyi’s thoughtful and public evaluation of the challenges facing Ukraine and the solutions to them is notable.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Zelenopillya (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and along a section of the railway line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced from Shcherbaky (18km west of Orikhiv) towards Myrne (16km southwest of Orikhiv) and made gains west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[28]
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu stated during a conference call on November 1 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson directions, grouping Ukrainian activity in the Kherson direction with directions recognized as currently part of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts.[29] Putin described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the “next [Ukrainian] counteroffensive” and dismissed all Ukrainian offensive operations as failures during a press conference in Beijing on October 18.[30]
Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 1 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59 missiles and 20 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian air defenses downed all three of the Kh-59 missiles and 18 Shahed drones.[31] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck an oil refinery in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also struck the Myrhorod airfield in Poltava Oblast.[33] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces are targeting “weak points” in Ukrainian air defenses.[34] Ihnat added that Russian forces are looking at several different courses of action to replenish weapons stocks for continued strikes this fall and winter.
The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on November 1 that sources close to the Russian military leadership stated that the Russian Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets and Caspian Flotilla will return to direct subordination under Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolai Evmenov on December 1.[35] The Russian Northern Fleet (NF) will also lose its status as a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district effective December 1, and its ground, aviation, and air defense forces will be transferred to the newly re-created Leningrad Military District. TASS noted that this information has not been officially confirmed. The Russian federal portal of draft regulator legal acts published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which proposed stripping the NF of its status as a joint "strategic territorial association,” signaling that this change would happen in the future but not specifying a date. [36] It remains unclear how Russia intends to mobilize, train, and organize forces previously under its fleets into new military district-level formations, but this restructuring writ large suggests that Russia intends to reconsolidate control of ground forces under the military district structure, including the newly re-created Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, while separating the naval assets under the Russian Navy.
Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia. Russian regional news outlets reported on November 1 that the Wagner Group has resumed recruiting in Perm and Novosibirsk oblasts under Pavel’s leadership.[37] Russian outlet Ngs.ru reported that a Wagner representative in Novosibirsk stated that Wagner is no longer recruiting criminals or people with illnesses.[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Pavel is the new leader of the remnants of Wagner and expressed hope that Pavel’s appointment is an indication that Wagner will survive its subordination to Rosgvardia.[39]
Key Takeaways:
- Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace. Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces.
- Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area.
- The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff’s wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
- Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.
- The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy.
- Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in various sectors of the front.
We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
- Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine (comprised of two subordinate main efforts)
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and encircle northern Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast
- Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis
- Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts
- Activities in Russian-occupied areas
- Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued localized offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 1 and made confirmed gains. Geolocated footage published on October 31 indicates that Russian forces advanced east of Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk).[40] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled over 10 Russian assaults near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Ivanivka (21km southeast of Kupyansk), Stelmakhivka (15km northwest of Svatove), and Nadiya (14km southwest of Svatove).[41] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Russian forces continue their attempts to recapture Kupyansk but have not achieved any strategic success in the Kupyansk direction.[42] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian aviation in the Kupyansk direction continues to target Ukrainian crossings across the Oskil River.[43] Another Russian milblogger posted footage purporting to show elements of the Russian 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) capturing an unspecified stronghold in the Kupyansk direction.[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct any offensive actions in the Lyman direction on November 1.[45] A Russian milblogger claimed on October 31 that Russian forces made marginal advances in the direction of Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna) and Torske (14km west of Kreminna), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[46]
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on November 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces repelled two Ukrainian assaults near Synkivka and that elements of the Russian Central Grouping of Forces repelled two Ukrainian assaults near Hrekivka (20km southwest of Kreminna) and the Serebryanske forest area (10km south of Kreminna).[47] Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik claimed that Russian forces repelled six Ukrainian assaults along the Novodruzhesk-Hryhorivka line (14km southeast of Kreminna to 11km south of Kreminna), eight Ukrainian assaults along the Berestove-Pereizne line (30km to 28km south of Kreminna), and three Ukrainian assaults along the Vovchoyarivka-Ivano-Darivka line (25km southeast of Kreminna to 23km south of Kreminna) over the past week.[48]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction on November 1 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully tried to improve their positions near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut) and attacked near Pivdenne (20km southwest of Bakhmut) but did not advance.[49] Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo noted that Russian forces are bringing reserves to the Bakhmut area to renew active offensive operations after being on the defensive, although ISW has not yet observed indicators of Russian reserves arriving in the Bakhmut direction or the presence of additional Russian troops in the Bakhmut area.[50] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces attacked northwest of Bakhmut from Berkhivka (directly northwest of Bakhmut) towards Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut).[51]
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions in the Bakhmut direction but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Zelenopillya (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and a section of the railway line between Klishchiivka and Andriivka.[52] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops continue counteroffensive operations south of Bakhmut.[53]
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on November 1 and reportedly advanced. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces, including mobilized servicemen from Siberia, advanced from positions in Krasnohorivka (7km northwest of Avdiivka) across the railway track towards Novokalynove and Keramik (both about 12km northwest of Avdiivka).[54] A Russian media aggregator claimed that Russian forces advanced west and south of Avdiivka near Sieverne (5km west of Avdiivka) and Pervomaiske (11km southwest of Avdiivka) on October 31.[55] Several Russian sources claimed on November 1 that there is heavy fighting north of Avdiivka near the waste heap area, and one milblogger noted that Russian forces are preparing to begin attacks on the industrial zone of the Avdiivka Coke Plant in northern Avdiivka.[56] A Ukrainian soldier reported that Russian forces are also conducting attacks south of Avdiivka from Vodyane (6km southwest of Avdiivka) towards Sieverne.[57] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Avdiivka, Sieverne, Pervomaiske, Keramik, and Stepove (5km northwest of Avdiivka).[58]
Ukrainian forces conducted limited counterattacks near Avdiivka on November 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. Geolocated footage posted on November 1 shows a Ukrainian counterattack north of Krasnohorivka, but the source of the video claimed that Russian forces ultimately repelled the attack and forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw.[59] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked near the waste heap north of Avdiivka and near Krasnohorivka.[60] One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are successfully holding back Russian attacks near Tonenke (6km west of Avdiivka).[61]
Russian forces continued offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 1 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked in Marinka (on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City) and near Novomykhailivka (12km southwest of Donetsk City).[62] A Russian milblogger posted footage reportedly of a tank of the 5th Brigade of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps striking Ukrainian positions in Marinka.[63]
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations west and southwest of Donetsk City on November 1 and made a confirmed advance. Geolocated footage published on October 31 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced south of Novomykhailivka.[64]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces did not conduct any confirmed or claimed ground attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 1.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on November 1 and reportedly recently advanced. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful assaults near Prechystivka, (19km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) Zolota Nyva (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[65] A Russian milblogger claimed that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) are advancing near Rivnopil (8km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and that elements of the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade, likely referring to the 143rd Motorized Rifle Regiment, and the 394th Motorized Rifle Regiment (both of the 127th Motorized Rifle Division) attacked west of Staromayorske.[66] The Russian “Vostok” battalion, which is reportedly operating southeast of Velyka Novosilka, claimed that Russian forces made some advances in unspecified areas near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on October 31.[67]
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1 and reportedly advanced. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced from Shcherbaky (18km west of Orikhiv) towards Myrne (16km southwest of Orikhiv) and made gains west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[68] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Novoprokopivka (2km south of Robotyne) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[69]
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances on November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Robotyne.[70] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces attacked Ukrainian positions near Verbove on October 31 and November 1.[71]
Russian milbloggers continue to claim that Ukrainian forces hold positions and conduct attacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Poyma (12km southeast of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and Pishchanivka (14km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and that there are meeting engagements near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[72] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in Krynky, where Ukrainian forces continue to reinforce their positions and where Russian forces conduct heavy air and TOS-1A thermobaric artillery strikes.[73] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces mined the area near Krynky to complicate Russian infantry attacks in the area.[74]
Ukrainian forces targeted Russian rear areas in southern Ukraine on November 1. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Russian forces shot down seven Ukrainian missiles targeting occupied Crimea over occupied Kherson Oblast and that two of the missiles landed in an abandoned area on the Arabat Spit, causing no damage or casualties.[75] Russian occupation authorities deployed smoke screens at the Kerch Strait Bridge presumably in response to the missile threat, but one Russian milblogger characterized the smoke screens as akin to “poultice for a dead person,” remarking on their ineffectiveness.[76]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russian authorities continue to praise the apparent successes of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB). The head of Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec, Sergei Chemezov, claimed on November 1 that Rostec has increased its production volume of tanks sevenfold, its production volume of armored vehicles by a factor of four and a half, and its production volume of unspecified types of ammunition by 60 times over the past year.[77] Chemezov added that Rostec is fulfilling the Russian DIB’s need for electronic components.[78]
The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 1 that Russia is forming new Rosgvardia units to conduct anti-sabotage measures in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson Oblasts.[79] These units will reportedly be based near Voronezh City in Russia and comprised of around 10,000 servicemen, including former Wagner personnel.
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
A Russian milblogger claimed on November 1 that individual combat units are driving the increased prevalence of drones and drone operators in the Russian military, not increased resources and attention from the Russian MoD.[80] The milblogger criticized the Russian MoD’s “official view” that drones are more suited for special forces and Spetsnaz detachments as opposed to combined arms formations. Another Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military for giving Russian officials downed Ukrainian drones for their “museums” and not researching and reverse engineering the downed drones.[81]
Activities in Russian-occupied areas (Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural, economic, military, and governance systems)
Russian occupation officials continue efforts to control residents’ access to information in occupied territories. Kherson Oblast occupation officials promoted satellite television services through the “Russkyi Mir” broadcasting program on October 31 and claimed that frontline residents would receive 25,000 free Russkyi Mir satellite TV sets by the end of the year.[82] Kherson Oblast occupation chairperson Andrey Alekseenko stated that Russian occupation officials plan to install 55,000 Russkiy Mir satellite TV sets in occupied Kherson Oblast by the end of 2024.[83] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that Russian officials use the broadcasting program for propaganda and confiscate residents’ personal satellite dishes to prevent residents from accessing Ukrainian channels.[84]
Russian occupation officials are likely using public health services to coerce residents in occupied territories into receiving Russian passports. Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo stated on November 1 that occupation authorities will start administrating free flu shots in occupied Kherson Oblast and will require residents’ passports for the vaccinations.[85] Russian occupation officials have increasingly denied social services to residents with Ukrainian passports and will likely use public health services to augment ongoing passportization efforts.[86]
Russian occupation officials continue to use various education and vacation schemes to deport Ukrainian children and eradicate their Ukrainian national identity. A Russian milblogger amplified a crowdfunding campaign on October 31 for sending 100 Ukrainian children to the Olympus children’s camp in occupied Crimea and claimed that the crowdfunding campaign has helped 14,000 Ukrainian children vacation in Crimea.[87] The head of the Kherson branch of the “Combat Brotherhood“ veterans organization, Igor Telegin, stated on October 31 that the youth military patriotic organization ”Yunarmia” will send more than 200 members from occupied territories to attend a military education school in Crimea, where they will undergo basic military training.[88]
Russian Information Operations and Narratives
Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Kremlin narratives about the “failed” Ukrainian counteroffensive during a Russian MoD conference call on November 1. Shoigu claimed that Russia has defeated the Ukrainian military despite the supply of new weapons from NATO.[89] Shoigu claimed that the Russian military has destroyed 37 Ukrainian aircraft over the past month and noted that this is nearly twice the number of F-16 aircraft that Western partners have promised Ukraine. Shoigu claimed that Russian air defenses should be able to destroy Western-provided F-16s in approximately 20 days. Shoigu additionally stated that Russian forces are conducting “active defense” along the front in an effort to temper domestic expectations about localized Russian offensive operations in various sectors of the front.
A Russian milblogger expressed concern over Russia’s growing diplomatic isolation. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger expressed concern on November 1 that Serbia may becoming increasingly pro-Western following the dissolution of its parliament and elections in December 2023.[90]
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks and Wagner Group activity in Belarus)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko had a phone conversation on November 1 to discuss bilateral cooperation ahead of the upcoming summit of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) heads on November 23.[91]
Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Force Commander Major General Andrei Lukyanovich emphasized on November 1 the improvements that the Belarusian Air and Air Defense Forces are undergoing.[92] Lukyanovich stated that Belarusian Air Forces are phasing in new and modernized weapons and that the Belarusian government is improving measures to provide military personnel with social support.[93]
Chief of the Belarusian General Staff and First Deputy Minister of Defense Major General Viktor Gulevich presented a bill to the Belarusian House of Representatives on November 1 regarding the amendment of laws on national security issues.[94] The draft law includes provisions for improving the military registration system, streamlining processes to notify citizens about conscription events, and ameliorating compensation for those liable for military service.[95]
Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update.
30. Iran Update, November 1, 2023
Maps/graphics/citations: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-1-2023
Key Takeaways:
- Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated al Mayadeen reported that an Israeli armored unit advanced from the northwestern Gaza Strip south along the coast.
- Axis of Resistance and Palestinian media reported that the al Qassem Brigades clashed with an IDF unit in Beit Hanoun.
- Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate. Multiple Palestinian militias appeared to conduct joint indirect fire attacks on locations in Israel, which would suggest greater coordination between these groups.
- Anti-Israel militancy and protest activity in the West Bank returned to regular levels after surging on October 31. The Lions’ Den released a statement calling for further anti-Israel militancy in the West Bank.
- Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks into Israel as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria.
- Iran and LH are continuing to promote the expectation in the information space that LH will announce some kind of escalation against Israel on November 3.
- Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are signaling that they may escalate against US forces in Iraq and Syria, as LH similarly messages against Israel.
- The Houthi movement may have conducted an attack targeting southern Israel, which would mark the fourth attempted Houthi attack on Israel since the war began.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.
IRAN UPDATE, NOVEMBER 1, 2023
Nov 1, 2023 - ISW Press
Download the PDF
Iran Update, November 1, 2023
Johanna Moore, Andie Parry, Kathryn Tyson, Annika Ganzeveld, Peter Mills, Amin Soltani, and Nicholas Carl
November 1, 2023: 2pm ET
The Iran Update provides insights into Iranian and Iranian-sponsored activities abroad that undermine regional stability and threaten US forces and interests. It also covers events and trends that affect the stability and decision-making of the Iranian regime. The Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) provides these updates regularly based on regional events. For more on developments and in Iran and the region, see our interactive map of Iran and the Middle East.
Note: CTP and ISW have refocused the update to cover the Israel-Hamas war. The new sections address developments in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as noteworthy activity from Iran’s Axis of Resistance. We do not report in detail on war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We utterly condemn violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Click here to see CTP and ISW’s interactive map of Israeli ground operations. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Key Takeaways:
- Lebanese Hezbollah-affiliated al Mayadeen reported that an Israeli armored unit advanced from the northwestern Gaza Strip south along the coast.
- Axis of Resistance and Palestinian media reported that the al Qassem Brigades clashed with an IDF unit in Beit Hanoun.
- Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate. Multiple Palestinian militias appeared to conduct joint indirect fire attacks on locations in Israel, which would suggest greater coordination between these groups.
- Anti-Israel militancy and protest activity in the West Bank returned to regular levels after surging on October 31. The Lions’ Den released a statement calling for further anti-Israel militancy in the West Bank.
- Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted six attacks into Israel as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets.
- The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria.
- Iran and LH are continuing to promote the expectation in the information space that LH will announce some kind of escalation against Israel on November 3.
- Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are signaling that they may escalate against US forces in Iraq and Syria, as LH similarly messages against Israel.
- The Houthi movement may have conducted an attack targeting southern Israel, which would mark the fourth attempted Houthi attack on Israel since the war began.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.
Gaza Strip
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Erode the will of the Israeli political establishment and public to launch and sustain a major ground operation into the Gaza Strip
- Degrade IDF material and morale around the Gaza Strip
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)-affiliated al Mayadeen reported that an Israeli armored unit advanced from the northwestern Gaza Strip south along the coast to Salah Khalaf Street and later attempted to move east, inland, to al Nasr Street and al Toum Street.[1] The commander of the IDF 162nd Division stated that Israeli forces had reached “the gates of Gaza City,” possibly corroborating this reporting.[2]
Axis of Resistance and Palestinian media reported that the al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—clashed with an IDF unit in Beit Hanoun on November 1. The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its militants destroyed at least four Israeli Merkava tanks with Yasin-105 anti-tank weapons.[3] The al Qassem Brigades also claimed to have bombed a gathering of IDF soldiers near Beit Hanoun using a quadcopter drone.[4] The al Quds Brigades—the militant wing of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)—claimed that its fighters fought an IDF unit in Karamah, southwest Beit Lahia.
The al Qassem Brigades claimed that its militants engaged Israeli forces attempting to enter the Zaytoun neighborhood west of Gaza City. The al Quds Brigades militants reportedly fired Yasin-105 anti-tank weapons and conducted a mortar attack on advancing Israeli forces.[5] Palestinian media reported that militants were successful in destroying an Israeli armored personnel carrier during the fighting.[6] The al Quds Brigades claimed that its forces supported the fighting at Zaytoun and caused an unspecified number of Israeli casualties.[7]
Palestinian militias in the Gaza Strip conducted indirect fire attacks into Israel at their usual rate on November 1. The al Qassem Brigades claimed responsibility for eight indirect fire attacks.[8] The al Quds Brigades claimed responsibility for another three indirect fire attacks.[9] The Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades—the militant wing of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—claimed to launch mortars into southern Israel.[10] Palestinian media reported that the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades—the self-claimed militant wing of Fatah— conducted three rocket attacks.[11]
Multiple Palestinian militias appeared to conduct joint indirect fire attacks on locations in Israel, which would suggest greater coordination between these groups. The al Qassem Brigades and Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades independently claimed mortar and rocket attacks on Nirim, southern Israel, at the same time.[12] The al Quds Brigades and al Qassem Brigades jointly claimed mortar attacks on the Erez crossing into the Gaza Strip.[13]
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
Recorded reports of rocket attacks; CTP-ISW cannot independently verify impact.
West Bank
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward the West Bank and fix them there
Anti-Israel militancy and protest activity in the West Bank returned to regular levels on November 1, after surging the day prior. CTP-ISW recorded five small arms clashes between Palestinian militants and Israeli forces, and two instances of Palestinian militants conducting IED attacks in the West Bank.[14] Israeli forces also uncovered buried IEDs in the Jenin refugee camp.[15] CTP-ISW recorded five demonstrations in support of the Gaza Strip.[16] Demonstrators in Nablus and Ramallah flew Hamas flags.[17]
The Lions’ Den—a West Bank-based Palestinian militia—released a statement on October 31 calling for further anti-Israel militancy in the West Bank.[18] The group reiterated its calls for mobilization and attacks against Israeli targets. The group also suggested that Israel could face a multi-front escalation on November 3, likely in reference to Hassan Nasrallah’s planned speech that day.[19] CTP-ISW previously noted that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are creating the expectation in the information environment that Nasrallah will announce some kind of escalation on November 3, which could include Hezbollah increasing its rate of attacks or using more advanced military systems against Israel.[20] The Lions’ Den has indicated growing alignment with Hamas in recent days, as CTP-ISW previously reported, even though the group has historically claimed that it is not affiliated with any specific Palestinian faction.[21]
Israeli forces arrested Fatah Secretary General in Jenin Ata Abu Ramila in an overnight raid on November 1.[22] Ramila is one of the few high-level Fatah officials whom Israeli forces have arrested since October 7.[23] The IDF accused Ramila of inciting, promoting, and financing terrorism in Jenin, which is a hotspot for Palestinian militant activity in the West Bank.[24] Ata Abu Ramila previously called for all Palestinian militias to unite and fight together against Israel in January 2023.[25] Israel continued raids throughout the West Bank, arresting 46 people affiliated with Hamas and other West Bank militias on November 1.[26] Israeli forces have arrested 1,830 people in the West Bank since October 7, according to Palestinian Authority media Wafa.[27] CTP-ISW cannot verify the accuracy of this report.
This map is not an exhaustive depiction of clashes and demonstrations in the West Bank.
Southern Lebanon and Golan Heights
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Draw IDF assets and resources toward northern Israel and fix them there
- Set conditions for successive campaigns into northern Israel
Iranian-backed militants, including LH, conducted six attacks into Israel on November 1 as part of an ongoing attack campaign targeting IDF radar and sensor sites and military targets. LH claimed four indirect fire and anti-tank missile attacks on IDF positions in northern Israel.[28] Unknown militants conducted two indirect fire and anti-tank missile attacks into northern Israel as well.[29] The IDF continues to conduct airstrikes and artillery strikes on Iranian-backed militants, who are attempting to launch indirect fire from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[30]
Iran and Axis of Resistance
Axis of Resistance campaign objectives:
- Demonstrate the capability and willingness of Iran and the Axis of Resistance to escalate against the United States and Israel on multiple fronts
- Set conditions to fight a regional war on multiple fronts
The Islamic Resistance in Iraq—a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias—claimed responsibility for a one-way drone attack targeting US forces in Syria on November 1. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq claimed it fired two drones targeting US forces at the al Tanf Garrison in southeastern Syria and achieved “direct hits.”[31] The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has attacked al Tanf Garrison four times since October 18. The group has conducted 27 total attacks on US forces in the Middle East since October 18.
Iran and LH are continuing to promote the expectation in the information space that LH will announce some kind of escalation against Israel on November 3. CTP-ISW previously reported that LH has released two dramatic videos in recent days ahead of LH Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah’s planned speech on November 3, creating the expectation of a significant announcement on the Israel-Hamas war.[32] This speech is significant in that it will be Nasrallah’s first public statement on the war. Iranian state media has further amplified the news of the upcoming speech and the dramatic videos, describing them as a “sign of future events.”[33]
-
Supreme Leader International Affairs Adviser Ali Akbar Velayati held a phone call with LH Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem on October 31 for further political coordination.[34] Velayati praised Nasrallah’s leadership and wished him success in his fight against Israel, according to Iranian state media.
-
Unidentified LH members published an open letter on November 1, expressing solidarity with Palestinian militants fighting Israel in the Gaza Strip.[35]
Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are signaling that they may escalate against US forces in Iraq and Syria, as LH similarly messages against Israel. Three Iranian-backed Iraqi militias released statements on November 1 to escalate their attacks on US military positions. The leader of Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba said that the Islamic resistance is liberating Iraq militarily and that “what is coming is greater.”[36] Ashab al Kahf responded to Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, quoting the statement and saying that Ashab al Kahf will strike American bases “until our land is liberated.”[37] Saraya Awlia al Dam similarly said that it is ready to fight against the “aggression in Iraq and in other arenas.”[38] All three groups have attacked the US forces in Iraq previously.[39] The groups are affiliated with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq.[40]
The Houthi movement may have conducted an attack targeting southern Israel overnight on October 31, which would mark the fourth attempted Houthi attack on Israel since the war began. The IDF said that it intercepted an “aerial attack” over the Red Sea but that there was no threat to civilians and the attack did not enter Israeli territory.[41] Local journalists and social media accounts reported that the attack was intercepted near Eilat in southern Israel.[42] A Houthi Shura Council member posted “Eilat” in Arabic and Hebrew on X (Twitter) shortly before the IDF confirmed an attack.[43] The attack came after the Houthis launched drones, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles targeting Israel earlier on October 31 and threatened more attacks.[44]
Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara on November 1.[45] Abdollahian praised Erdogan’s “strong and accurate positions” on the Israel-Hamas war and announced that Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi will soon travel to Turkey. Erdogan has expressed strong support for Hamas in recent days, describing the Palestinian militia as a “liberation group” on October 25 and organizing a pro-Palestine rally in Istanbul on October 28.[46] Abdollahian’s visit to Turkey is likely part of Iran’s ongoing effort to unite Muslim countries against Israel. Iran has historically—and especially since the start of the war on October 7—sought to rally Muslim countries against Israel and frame itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause, as CTP-ISW previously reported.[47] Abdollahian has traveled to Turkey four times since August 2021 and last traveled to Turkey in March 2023 to evaluate the impacts and damage of the February 2023 Turkey-Syria earthquake.[48]
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei discussed the Israel-Hamas war with a group of students on November 1, marking the fifth time he has publicly discussed the war since October 7.[49] Khamenei called on Muslim countries to impose an oil and food embargo on Israel, echoing previous calls from other Iranian officials, such as Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian, to impose such an embargo.[50] Khamenei also warned Muslim countries that Israel may threaten them in the future if they do not help Hamas defeat Israel. Khamenei repeated previous Iranian claims that Israel does not care about Israeli hostages in the Gaza Strip and that the United States is directing Israel’s war against Hamas.[51] CTP-ISW previously assessed that Hamas and its allies are preparing the information environment to blame Israel for the possible deaths of hostages in the Gaza Strip, especially if Hamas begins killing those hostages.[52]
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
| 
