Quotes of the Day:

"Countries that fail to adapt soon enough or well enough to the changing character of warfare are condemned to fail or success at unnecessary cost and loss of life."

– Colin S. Gray

"The world only exists in your eyes... You can make it as big or as small as you want."

– F. Scott Fitzgerald

The success of a terrorist operation depends almost entirely on the amount of publicity it receives.

– Walter Laqueur

1. Irregular Warfare (Video from Army University Press)

2. Reframing the Term “Irregular Warfare” in Times of Peace into the Contemporary Idea of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition”

3. North Korean troops thrown into Russia-Ukraine War will be 'strangers in a strange land'

4. Lethal Minds Volume 28: Letter from the Editor

5. The Putin Dilemma: Why Peace in Ukraine Requires Russia’s Defeat

6. Israel Inflicted Severe Damage on Iran’s Missile Program and Air Defenses

7. Allies and Adversaries Brace for U.S. Policy Shifts Whether Harris or Trump Wins

8. Army criminal investigators scrutinize key U.S. general

9. Trump Had an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy. But It Was a Breakdown in American Policymaking.

10. Trump Had an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy. But It Was a Breakdown in American Policymaking.

11.  Opinion: While the Biden Administration Dithers, Ukraine Burns

12. As Russia Advances, U.S. Fears Ukraine Has Entered a Grim Phase

13. How Gender Ideology Captured the State Department

14. The V-22 Osprey Is a Life Saver

15. How Eisenhower Reshaped the Joint Chiefs and U.S. Military Strategy

16. The Army is planning for a new robotics technician MOS

17. America’s Strategy of Renewal: How Did Secretary Blinken Do?

1. Irregular Warfare (Video from Army University Press)

Led by Rich Creed (US Army TRADOC), including Rich Tilley (DOD), BG Beaupere (SF), LTC Stephen Bolton (SF), John Nagl (US Army War College). Martijn Kitzen (Netherlands).

An important 25 minute video everyone should watch this weekend and then discuss.

This provides the best discussion between the Army and Joint definitions of Irregular Warfare.

This covers a lot of ground. I am pleased to see the recognition that IW takes place before, during and after LSCO and on the periphery as well.

They really seem to be making the case that the Gray Zone, and strategic competition is IW and that IW contributes to strategic deterrence. Although they are making the argument about shaping for decisive operations they (and specifically BG Beaupere) recognize that a successful IW campaign does not have to lead to and can actually prevent war or be successful (achieve strategic effects) without going to war (LSCO).

Rich Tilley - range of options.

All emphasize campaigning in IW (although PME and training is discussed no one describes how to develop IW proficient campaign HQ. - but this is only a 25 minute video so they cannot cover everything).

My one criticism is that we are using IW in paces of the Joint Concept for Competing (ACCESS HERE at Small Wars Journal) which is really an excellent joint document to describe what the joint force does in strategic competition but unfortunately has never caught on

Rich Creed - the most likely form of conflict the Army is going to be asked to do.

(Lastly I would add that here is the buried lede - there is no national concept for strategic competition - they all emphasize that IW cannot be conducted alone and that it has to be part of a larger interagency effort. That is why I argue that strategic competition is political warfare and that IW is the military contribution to political warfare. While the military has been working hard on developing concepts to support strategic competition the rest of the US government has not).  

​

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vfPOPVaHvM&list=WL&index=22&t=1126s

Irregular Warfare

Army University Press

1,684 views Premiered 23 hours ago

Currently, the U.S. Army’s Irregular Warfare (IW) doctrine is being reviewed and updated by the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, KS. This film is part of that ongoing discussion and highlights some of the most basic and important parts of current IW doctrine that should remain in place, while suggesting some needed changes as well. The character and form of war are constantly changing, yet its fundamental nature remains the same. Though Great Power Competition is now our primary national security challenge – a departure from conducting almost two decades of continuous irregular war against violent extremist organizations worldwide – the requirement for mastery of irregular warfare persists. Far from abandoning these critical competencies, we will sharpen these capabilities for application against peer competitor, nation-state adversaries. – 2020 Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy IW Reality: Conventional forces have, and always will have, a role in IW across a variety of missions, and a range of military activities IW Myth: Irregular Warfare (IW) is Counterterrorism (CT), CT is Special Operations Forces (SOF), therefore IW is SOF. 00:17: Introduction 01:44: Definitions of Irregular & Regular Warfare 07:26: Strategic Competition 10:12: Application of Irregular Warfare 13:51: Irregular Warfare and People 18:25: Needed Training & Changes 21:42: Conclusion 24:44: Credits

2. Reframing the Term “Irregular Warfare” in Times of Peace into the Contemporary Idea of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition”

Graphics at the link.

An interesting (and useful) discussion but we have to get past arguing over terms and definitions (yes I know words count and they impact resourcing, requirements, budgets, and force structure). But we need to dig deeper than a buzzword term or phrase and apply the necessary intellectual rigor to the concept development, campaign plans, and strategy. We need to stop arguing over the definition of a term. There is no perfect definition that will make everyone happy and a consensus definition will be too watered down to have any meaning (e.g., "Irregular warfare is anything that is not part of regular warfare" – my words not the authors'). As the late Michael Howard said (paraphrasing to apply to this discussion) - we need to just not get the definition too wrong. The Army and Joint definitions are both "not too wrong." (they are both useful in their own ways (see the Irregular Warfare discussion here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1vfPOPVaHvM&list=WL&index=22&t=1126s)

And I must add in all sincerity, the US military must never shy away from warfare. 

Do we really have a shared understanding?

Why did the authors not mention the Joint Concept for Competing? HERE (Anthony Cordesman's concept for competing is referenced). The Joint Concept for Competing is one of the best joint documents produced in the modern (post GWOT) era. Why is no one using it and further developing it into doctrine?

Will the Irregular Warfare Center change its name to "Defense Support of Strategic Competition Center?" (DSSCC)

Excerpt:

In conclusion, the shift from traditional concepts of IW to “Defense Support to Strategic Competition” reflects a shared understanding of the changing character of modern global security challenges. Modern threats and challenges posed by Strategic Competitors implore us to view irregular activities through a more contemporary and relevant lens, where old definitions of IW do not cloud its importance in the current day. By adopting a more flexible and comprehensive approach, the DoD can better align its activities with the goals of Strategic Competition and enhance collaboration with international and interagency partners. This new framework acknowledges the importance of both traditional and irregular methods in achieving long-term security objectives and ensures that the language used accurately reflects the nature of the activities involved prior to conflict or war.

Reframing the Term “Irregular Warfare” in Times of Peace into the Contemporary Idea of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition”

https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/insights/reframing-the-term-irregular-warfare-in-times-of-peace-into-the-contemporary-idea-of-defense-support-to-strategic-competition/

irregularwarfarecenter.org

October 28, 2024

LTC Timothy J. Murphy – Special Operations Center of Excellence – U.S. Army Irregular Warfare Proponent Director, USAJFKSWCS

Dr. Jeffrey V. Gardner – Irregular Warfare Center – Chief of Faculty and Curriculum

Brittany Carroll – Irregular Warfare Center – Senior Military Analyst (Valens Global Contractor)

Download a PDF of this publication by clicking the icon.

In contemporary global security dynamics, the terminology used to describe military and strategic operations is crucial. The terms “irregular” and “warfare” often either fail to resonate with foreign partners and U.S. government interagency partners or raise red flags due to different organizational meanings, as they imply a state of conflict that is not necessarily present. This publication explores the shift from traditional concepts of Irregular Warfare (IW) to a more fitting term, “Defense Support to Strategic Competition,” to describe the Department of Defense’s (DoD) activities short of war in support of interagency organizations and foreign partners. Ultimately, various components within the DoD are capable of providing valuable assistance and support to interagency organizations to create enduring advantages in Strategic Competition. However, a barrier exists in understanding among organizations as to what “irregular warfare” is and how it can be applied in Competition and Crisis prior to an overt military conflict.

For several years, the DoD has had significant challenges selecting the appropriate language that meaningfully conveys its efforts to support a whole-of-government approach to Strategic Competition. In times of relative peace, the DoD can and must utilize its resources to support the Department of State (DoS) and other agencies with activities that are specifically designed to both maintain strategic advantages below the threshold of widespread conflict and prepare an area for U.S. advantage should a conflict erupt. In these times of peace, the DoS typically serves as the lead agency for these activities. The paradox: it is not domestically or internationally appropriate for democracies to execute any kind of “warfare” when those democracies are not technically at war.

Short of war, many modern-day complexities and challenges emphasize the need for non-traditional, irregular, and unconventional approaches to both counter and compete with Strategic Competitors. IW, including its 12 Operations and Activities, fits hand-in-hand with confronting these challenges, though the term “irregular warfare” is insufficient in conveying these efforts when not in a shooting war or Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCO).

 This publication examines the problematic nature of using the term “irregular warfare” as it pertains to DoD activities designed to support whole-of-government and allied and partnered efforts in Strategic Competition. The fact is, Western democracies, including the United States, are reticent to act as though they are in a perpetual state of war. Instead, democracies attempt to keep a high level of transparency while competing with adversaries and cooperating with allies and partners. Only when absolutely necessary do democracies enter into a state of war with an enemy. Therefore, the DoD should relook its IW definition when its operations and activities are being executed during times of peace. This article proposes a more appropriate term for irregular activities when the U.S. is not at war. Further, the name for these irregular activities should reflect the nature of DoD’s supporting role to other agencies, like the DoS, in these “short-of-war” situations. To this end, we should rename DoD’s peacetime irregular activities as Defense Support to Strategic Competition (DSSC). There is DoD precedence for this type of cooperation, as this would be the overseas analogy to how the military provides assistance within the homeland during Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions.Figure 1: Evolution of Irregular Warfare Activities (Source: 2021 IW Mission Analysis the Joint Staff J7)

The Challenges of “Irregular” and “Warfare”

The word “irregular” suggests actions that deviate from the norm, which can be confusing or misleading for international partners who may not share the same terminology or references that are historical or cultural in nature. Moreover, “warfare” inherently implies a state of conflict, which is inappropriate when discussing peacetime activities with U.S. interagency partners like the DoS, USAID, or other interagency organizations. Despite these nuances, many interagency organizations recognize the security challenges posed by Strategic Competition, which lends well to the assistance that DoD can provide.

 These partners operate under the assumption that they are not “at war,” which complicates collaboration if the language used implies otherwise. Simply put, the DoD maintains different and flexible definitions of irregular warfare that are not necessarily shared by its partners and parallel organizations. Short of war, DoD has the ability to use “irregular” activities and tasks to both support and enhance interagency and partner organizations, without traditional war as a primer to conduct said activities. The DoS publicly recognized some current complexities in a December 2023 remarks publication that potentially illuminate avenues for the DoD and/or foreign partner assistance, addressing irregular and non-traditional challenges posed by China and Russia. In a way, these activities would be the Strategic Competition lens of support similar to those of Defense Support to Civil Authorities. The complexities of modern-day challenges pose the need to evolve the definition of irregular warfare to more effectively work with interagency and foreign organizations. At the same time, providing this posed view of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition” could quell concerns among interagency and foreign partners that arise when hearing “irregular warfare” during peacetime. The addition of the word “support” within Defense Support to Strategic Competition also highlights the point that the DoD is not trying to walk into the DoS or any County Team and take over or take charge. During times of peace, the DoD’s role is to make a supporting contribution to Strategic Competition.The Evolution of Irregular Warfare Concepts

The concept of IW has evolved significantly over time and has been influenced by changes in geopolitical landscapes and strategic priorities. Historically, IW was synonymous with activities like counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, especially during the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The 2007 IW Joint Operating Concept defined IW as a struggle among state and non-state actors to influence populations and affect legitimacy, favoring indirect and asymmetric approaches to erode an adversary’s power.

However, as the U.S. strategic focus shifted from GWOT to Strategic Competition with major powers like China and Russia, the definition of IW also needed to adapt. The traditional focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency became less relevant, though not diminished, and the broader scope of Strategic Competition required a new conceptual framework. In recent years, the DoD and a wide range of interagency and foreign partners have publicly recognized the need to address contemporary complexities in a new and joint way. In 2023, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff posed an idea and issued a strategy titled “Joint Concept for Competition,” which recognizes the need for integrated campaigning, cooperation, and integration to tackle Strategic Competition.

 This approach fits the mold of “Defense Support to Strategic Competition” by implementing a joint approach to conduct irregular activities during all forms of Strategic Competition, including short-of-war or “left of bang.” It also includes and encourages the inclusion of foreign partners and organizations across various geographic regions, which have varying perceptions and definitions of irregular warfare and activities.Regional Conceptualizations of IW

Different regions conceptualize IW based on their unique historical and geopolitical contexts. In the Indo-Pacific region, IW is often viewed through the lens of domestic legitimacy struggles between state and non-state actors, heavily influenced by counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and other considerations. This mirrors the earlier U.S. definition during GWOT but no longer applies in the context of Strategic Competition. In some Asian nations the term asymmetric can work, but irregular just does not translate well.

In contrast, European perspectives on IW have been shaped by hybrid and gray zone threats, particularly from Russia. The concept of hybrid warfare, sometimes referred to as irregular warfare or asymmetric warfare, encompasses a range of activities below the threshold of conventional warfare or that occur in sync with conventional warfare, including cyberattacks, disinformation, and political subversion.

 This broader view reflects the diverse threats faced by European nations and the United States, emphasizing the need for a more flexible approach to security. Many of these instances occur prior to actual war or other forms of conflict, but these instances can be addressed through the idea of Defense Support to Strategic Competition.The New U.S. Army and Joint Definitions

The U.S. Army’s 2022 Field Manual (FM) 3-0 redefined IW as the employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains through methods other than military domination of an adversary.

 Verbatim, the definition states IW is “the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.” This definition acknowledges the importance of both traditional and irregular approaches in addressing modern security challenges.Similarly, the Joint Staff’s 2023 definition in Joint Publication 1 (JP-1) describes IW as a form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce others through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities.

 This definition emphasizes the integration of IW with conventional warfare and the need for a comprehensive approach to security.Regardless of definition, it is extremely unlikely and uncommon that the definition of irregular warfare is the same among organizations. By annotating each definition, we can more accurately frame the objective of these efforts into “Defense Support to Strategic Competition” to encompass the short-of-war or pre-conflict activities and efforts.

Congressional Definition and Its Implications

The 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) introduced a new definition of IW, highlighting activities not involving armed conflict that support U.S. policy and military objectives.

 Verbatim, the 2023 Congressional definition of IW states that IW means “Department of Defense activities not involving armed conflict that support predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals.” Through its emphasis of intertwined unarmed conflict and military objectives, this definition underscores the importance of IW in Strategic Competition and aligns with the broader goals of national security.By excluding armed conflict, this definition addresses the concerns of interagency partners and emphasizes the role of IW in peacetime activities. It also highlights the need for a unified approach to Strategic Competition, where military and non-military efforts are coordinated to achieve long-term objectives.

Integrating IW into Modern Challenges Before and During Conflict

The evolving character of IW requires a strategic culture that embraces both traditional and irregular approaches in all phases of war, including pre-conflict. Integrating IW with conventional warfare can enhance the effectiveness of military campaigns and ensure a comprehensive response to diverse and current threats. IW activities and missions, such as cyber operations, counterterrorism, counter threat finance, foreign internal defense, and many other activities can shape the environment before and during conflict, providing a strategic advantage to any organization, not just the DoD.

 These activities can accomplish a puzzle-like fit into interagency and foreign organization activities to counter adversary efforts that target both the domestic and foreign ally interests. Threats from China and Russia, among other nations, are not limited to one geographic region. Incorporating irregular tasks prior to conflict or war bolsters a unified prevention or defense against Strategic Competitor actions.Figure 3: DoD’s Irregular Approach to Campaigning. This “irregular” approach utilizes Defense Support to Strategic Competition when at peace. Once a “triggering event” or political decision pushes the U.S. into conflict, the DoD utilizes warfare to achieve its objectives. This warfare takes two forms: irregular warfare and conventional warfare. Irregular warfare may be utilized as the primary form of war or can be used in support of a broader conventional warfare strategy (DSSC activities can continue outside the conflict area to support warfare within the conflict zone). What remains constant across the Competition Continuum is the DoD’s irregular approach. Irregular activities under Defense Support to Strategic Competition can transition to irregular warfare when the U.S. decides that warfare is required to achieve its national objectives. (Source: LTC Tim Murphy, USA, SF)

Conclusion

In conclusion, the shift from traditional concepts of IW to “Defense Support to Strategic Competition” reflects a shared understanding of the changing character of modern global security challenges. Modern threats and challenges posed by Strategic Competitors implore us to view irregular activities through a more contemporary and relevant lens, where old definitions of IW do not cloud its importance in the current day. By adopting a more flexible and comprehensive approach, the DoD can better align its activities with the goals of Strategic Competition and enhance collaboration with international and interagency partners. This new framework acknowledges the importance of both traditional and irregular methods in achieving long-term security objectives and ensures that the language used accurately reflects the nature of the activities involved prior to conflict or war.

Office of Irregular Warfare and Competition, Joint Staff Joint Force Development and Design Directorate (J-7), “Irregular Warfare Mission Analysis” Published on 19 October 2021.

The Future of Security Assistance in an Era of Strategic Competition, Jessica Lewis, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, National Defense University, U.S. State Department, https://www.state.gov/the-future-of-security-assistance-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition/

Lewis, Jessica, https://www.state.gov/the-future-of-security-assistance-in-an-era-of-strategic-competition/

2007 Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept, Department of Defense, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf

The U.S. Joint Chiefs New Strategy Paper on Joint Concept for Competing, Anthony H Cordesman, CSIS, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-joint-chiefs-new-strategy-paper-joint-concept-competing

Fabian, Sandor and Gabrielle Kennedy, Perspectives Apart: Unveiling the Indo-Pacific Understanding of Irregular Warfare, Irregular Warfare Center, June 3 2024, https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/insights/perspectives-apart-unveiling-the-indo-pacific-understanding-of-irregular-warfare/

Fabian, Sandor and Gabrielle Kennedy, The Conceptualization of Irregular Warfare in Europe, Irregular Warfare Center, April 20 2023, https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/research-reports/the-conceptualization-of-irregular-warfare-in-europe/

FM 3-0, Operations, October 2022, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

FM 3-0, Operations, October 2022, https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN36290-FM_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf

Army University Press, 2024, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/Call-for-Papers-Irregular-

FY24 National Defense Authorization Act, 118th Congress, United States, https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text

10 USC Ch. 3: General Powers and Functions, From Title 10 – Armed Forces, Subtitle A – General Military Law, Part I – Organization and General Military Powesr, U.S. House of Representatives, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title10/subtitleA/part1/chapter3&edition=prelim

Defense Primer: What is Irregular Warfare? Congressional Research Service, January 2024. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12565

irregularwarfarecenter.org

3. North Korean troops thrown into Russia-Ukraine War will be 'strangers in a strange land'

Comments from a number of retired General Officers, Dr. Bruce Becthol, and me. Below this I have pasted a draft paper I am working on that provides more detail and nuance: Comparing Trust, Respect, and Communication between North Korea/Russia and South Korea/U.S.

North Korean troops thrown into Russia-Ukraine War will be 'strangers in a strange land'

North Korea and Russia have a history of military cooperation, but they are nothing close to a real military coalition, say retired senior U.S. military leaders.

Jeff Schogol

Posted on Nov 1, 2024 2:22 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

North Korean troops may soon fight alongside the Russian military against Ukrainian forces, but it remains to be seen how the two countries’ militaries will mesh at the tactical level, especially given the language barriers.

About 10,000 North Korean troops have arrived in Russia so far, of which about 8,000 have deployed to the Kursk region, where Ukrainian forces have captured some Russian territory, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken told reporters on Thursday.

“We’ve not yet seen these troops deploy into combat against Ukrainian forces, but we would expect that to happen in the coming days,” Blinken said at a meeting of top U.S. and South Korean foreign and defense officials. “Russia has been training DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea] soldiers on artillery; UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles]; basic infantry operations, including trench clearing, indicating that they fully intend to use these forces in frontline operations.”

Although North Korean and Russian troops could be fighting together, building a truly joint force requires years of effort, retired U.S. commanders told Task & Purpose.

NATO, for example, spent decades integrating troops from its 32 member nations so they could truly work together on the battlefield, said retired Navy Adm. James Stavridis, who served as the Supreme Allied Commander at NATO from 2009 to 2013.

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Developing such a level of cooperation among so many different militaries has required constant exercises and training, dedicating English as the single language for operations, and developing procurement systems to make sure that each nation’s troops can communicate with each other and all their equipment works together, Stavridis told Task & Purpose.

“To simply throw 10,000 North Koreans on the battlefield will demonstrate how challenging it is to achieve the kind of operational proficiency that NATO has,” Stavridis said. “I don’t think the North Koreans, therefore, are going to make a significant range difference in the fight. Most of them will be thinking about how they can survive in what will appear to them to be a very bewildering war. They will be, quite literally, strangers in a strange land.”

Adjacent units vs. shoulder-to-shoulder

While Russia and North Korea have a history of military cooperation dating back to the Korean War, it’s nowhere close to what the alliance between the United States and South Korea looks like, said retired Army Gen. Vincent K. Brooks, who led U.S. Forces Korea from 2016 to 2018

“I suspect that Russia and North Korea are going to struggle on coordination,” Brooks told Task & Purpose. “They’ll find some ways to work through it. They may have some liaison officers, for example, who have studied in Russia. But if it’s side by side, it will be two adjacent units side-by-side as opposed to shoulder-to-shoulder fighting in the assault.”

North Korea and Russia do not have any of the commonalities that underpin U.S. alliances, Brooks said. The two do not have a history of training together, they have not designated a single language for operations, and they do not even share a similar ideology.

“In terms of generational connectivity, rehearsal, common doctrine, common language, it’s not going to be there,” Brooks said. “But they do have common calibers of weapons, equipment, and so, they’ll find that to be interoperable, but that’s about it.”

North Korean soldiers march during a mass rally on Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang on Sept. 9, 2018.

AFP photo via Getty Images by Ed Jones.

By contrast, the alliance between the United States and South Korea shows what a true military coalition looks like, Brooks said. The 2nd Infantry Division is a combined American and South Korean unit. Every U.S. Army combat unit on the peninsula has also included South Korean soldiers since 1950.

“There’s an overlap at integration that happens at the top,” Brooks said. “That’s at the human level. Beyond that, there’s also significant doctrinal overlap. We train together. We train with each other’s weapons. We train with each other’s tactics. That creates a very different circumstance than what North Korea is going to experience.”

Working with allies vs. working with ‘allies’

Each spring and fall, U.S. and South Korean troops conduct large-scale military exercises to make sure they are prepared to defend against any threat, according to a statement from Eighth Army, which oversees all U.S. Army units deployed to the Korean peninsula.

“For decades, U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) troops have honed their skills and strengthened their partnership to operate seamlessly as one warfighting force, each complementing the other’s strengths,” the statement says. “There is no other U.S. Army duty station in the world that works and trains with allies as closely as we do here in South Korea.”

A critical element of the partnership between U.S. and South Korean forces is the Combined Forces Command, or CFC, a unified command where leaders from both militaries work together.

“CFC embodies the trust and integration between our nations, enabling us to coordinate and deploy our forces as a unified team,” the statement continues. “Through its oversight, CFC ensures that U.S. and ROK troops are aligned in planning, preparation, and readiness to meet any challenge.”

U.S. Marine Corps, Republic of Korea Marines Corps, New Zealand Army and Australian Army conduct amphibious assault training at Doksukri Beach, South Korea, March 12, 2016.

Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Briauna Birl.

Beyond South Korea, the U.S. military has a long experience of working with allies and other partners, said Brooks, who trained with a total of 88 foreign militaries during his nearly 40-year Army career. His first experience training with an ally occurred when he was a lieutenant during an 82nd Airborne Division deployment to Germany

“At some point in time, we were side by side with some German infantry battalions,” Brooks said. “We did some parachute drops. They jumped on our parachutes and our equipment. We then jumped with their parachutes, their jump masters and their equipment. And we exchanged jump wings. In the U.S. military, that experience will be continuously updated at every rank and every assignment as it was for me.”

Effective allies meet the same standards

A key component of NATO’s success in integrating different militaries at the tactical level has been developing a series of standards that all 32 members must meet, said retired Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove, who served as head of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO Allied Command Operations from 2013 to 2016.

“This, in turn, drives commonality and compatibility of equipment, because if you’re going to work alongside another nation but your radios don’t talk on NATO-standard frequencies, then you’re not going to be a part of what NATO does,’ Breedlove told Task & Purpose. “Everything we do in NATO drives everyone to the same set of operating standards and operating compatibility when it comes to kit.”

These standards are emphasized during NATO exercises, such as Trident Juncture, in which member nations are unable to participate unless they can operate within the alliance’s framework, he said.

“It’s all latched together in how we do day-to-day business to prepare us so that when we’re on the battlefield, everything works,” Breedlove said.

The U.S. military has also spent decades combining the separate military branches into a joint force, he said. American officers must complete joint assignments to be considered for promotion to senior leadership positions.

“This business of jointness and this business of working in a coalition or an alliance is how Western officers are birthed and raised,” Breedlove said. “I would tell you that in the autocratic nations of the world, the jointness is not so apparent and the ability to work in coalition is not so apparent.”

Don’t underestimate the North Koreans

North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia is not unprecedented. North Korea has sent its troops on several overseas combat deployments over the years, said Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., a political science professor at Angelo State University in Texas.

North Korean pilots flew combat missions during the 1973 Yom Kippur War; up to 3,000 North Korean troops participated in the Angolan Civil War in the 1970s and 1980s; North Korean crews operated multiple rocket launchers for the Syrian army in Lebanon in 1982; North Koreans operated Ethiopian tanks during the Ethiopian-Eritrean war from 1998 to 2000; and North Korea reportedly deployed two battalions to fight in the Syrian civil war, Bechtol told Task & Purpose.

It would be wrong to play down the capabilities that the North Korean troops will bring to the battlefield in Ukraine, said retired Army Gen. Robert B. Abrams, who led U.S. forces in Korea from 2018 to 2021.

“As a rule of thumb, I never underestimate an enemy, and I think in this case there is reason to not underestimate the North Korean troops,” Abrams told Task & Purpose. “Without the benefit of classified intelligence, I’m still confident in stating Kim Jong Un likely sent some of his best troops. North Koreans are conditioned for cold and harsh conditions. This is a reputational event for North Korea, and they don’t want to be embarrassed on the world stage by having their troops fail miserably.”

It is not yet clear how the two sides will overcome interoperability issues, such as the language barrier, Abrams said. The Russians could try to use interpreters and issue the North Koreans Russian radios.

Still, Abrams said he did not expect the North Korean troops to change the tactical situation on the ground in any significant way given how lethal the battlefield is. He noted that the Russians are suffering about 10,000 casualties every 8-to-10 days.

“I think there will be a strategic impact — principally by raising the profile of North Korea on the international stage and by whatever technology Russia has promised to give North Korea in return for deploying those North Korean troops,” Abrams said. “This has the potential to raise tensions even higher in northeast Asia.”

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Jeff Schogol

Senior Pentagon Reporter

Jeff Schogol is a senior staff writer for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years, with previous bylines at the Express-Times in Easton, Pennsylvania, Stars & Stripes, and Military Times. You can email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com, direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter, or reach him on WhatsApp and Signal at 703-909-6488.

taskandpurpose.com · by Jeff Schogol

Comparing Trust, Respect, and Communication Between the North Korea–Russia and South Korea–U.S. Alliances

By David Maxwell

As North Korean troops begin deployment to Russia with the prospect of fighting alongside Russian forces in Ukraine, communication challenges are becoming evident. While military operations often rely on clear communication, the relationship between Russian and North Korean forces goes beyond linguistic issues. To succeed on the battlefield, trust and mutual respect between the forces are equally crucial. Interpretation and translation can only bridge some of these gaps, and without trust, there is a risk of miscommunication and failure on the battlefield.

The Challenge of Language Interpretation and Cultural Understanding

Military communication is complex. Hand signals and tactical gestures can be universally understood across forces, conveying basic commands like "attack" or "stop." However, more intricate orders require interpreters with a deep understanding of both languages and cultures. A simple Google translation can convey words but lacks the nuance of military concepts and operational standards. Interpreters need to understand complex military tactics and the cultural context of the forces they are communicating between to ensure that orders are not merely understood but acted upon with clarity.

North Korean and Russian forces do not have a history of joint training or interoperability. By contrast, the U.S. and South Korean alliance has focused on living, working, and training together over the past 70 years. This integration has led to a deep-rooted understanding of military operations and the capability to conduct combined operations effectively. Programs such as the Korean Augmentees to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) are instrumental in fostering trust. This program, initiated in 1950, places Korean soldiers within U.S. Army units, facilitating better communication and shared understanding. The high level of interoperability at the command levels and the cross-pollination of doctrine have strengthened the alliance and improved operational efficiency.

The Role of Trust in Combined Military Operations

A foundation of trust is essential in any successful military alliance. Trust is built over time through shared experiences, such as training exercises and even casual bonding among soldiers. You cannot “surge trust.” One report suggests a ratio of one translator and three Russian officers per 30 North Korean soldiers. If these officers are expected to control the North Korean troops, the arrangement could lead to a breakdown in command structures. Without mutual trust, North Korean soldiers may feel subjugated or distrusted, potentially undermining their morale and cooperation with Russian forces.

There are two critical aspects of building trust between forces. First, soldiers must live, work, and train together to create a bond. Veterans often note that shared combat experiences, training hardships, and social interactions (e.g. sharing beer, soju, or vodka) help build camaraderie. However, given the lack of past cooperation between North Korean and Russian troops, there is minimal opportunity for such bonding to occur. Instead of the unity that U.S. and South Korean forces experience through joint exercises, the Russian and North Korean forces are likely to encounter friction due to unfamiliarity with each other's military culture and operational expectations.

The second aspect required for trust is respect. Reports from Ukrainian intelligence reveal that Russian forces refer to North Korean troops in derogatory terms, suggesting a lack of respect for their Korean counterparts. Negative perceptions or cultural biases within the Russian forces could create resentment among the North Koreans, diminishing the potential for a cohesive military effort. To build a successful combined force, Russian leaders must acknowledge and respect the experience and contributions of the North Korean soldiers rather than viewing them as subordinates or expendable assets.

The Limitations of Basic Communication Tools

Recently, a booklet containing basic Korean military commands was reportedly distributed to Russian forces, suggesting a minimalistic approach to language training. These phrases include simple commands like “Attack!” or “Get down!” While these basic expressions might help Russian forces communicate in critical moments, they fall short of conveying complex military strategies or nuanced commands. This issue is exacerbated by the lack of trained interpreters capable of providing real-time, contextually accurate interpretations.

For instance, the South Korean and U.S. forces have spent decades refining their communication protocols. Interpreters and translators embedded in these forces are familiar with military jargon and the cultural nuances of both nations. Additionally, they undergo continuous training to ensure that they can handle the intricacies of operational planning and battlefield directives. In contrast, Russian efforts to teach a limited set of Korean phrases to their soldiers may prove ineffective on the battlefield, where rapid and precise communication is paramount.

Consequences of Inadequate Trust and Respect

The reliance on basic translations without building trust and respect could result in operational chaos. Military leaders and experts agree that trust between forces is necessary to execute effective combat operations. Without well-trained interpreters and a history of joint training, it would be challenging for North Korean and Russian forces to conduct coordinated operations. The U.S. and South Korea's combined forces have conducted interoperability training for decades, yet even with these established protocols, communication is continuously honed through joint exercises.

With North Korean soldiers reportedly struggling to understand the Russian military’s combat terminology, the expectation of a seamless partnership may be unrealistic. Russian reports suggest that the North Korean military is finding it difficult to learn even the basics of military communication, further complicating operational effectiveness. An atmosphere of distrust, coupled with language barriers and cultural misunderstandings, could compromise the effectiveness of both forces in Ukraine.

Building a Sustainable Partnership for Battlefield and Strategic Success

If Russian and North Korean forces wish to build an effective alliance, they must address these foundational issues beyond language. Investing in comprehensive interpreter training, fostering mutual respect, and creating opportunities for joint training exercises would be more effective long-term solutions. Learning basic phrases might be a short-term fix, but without trust and respect, there is no foundation for the kind of cooperation that successful military partnerships demand.

Ultimately, if Russia views North Korean forces as expendable or subservient, it will be nearly impossible to build the trust needed for successful joint operations. Building effective partnerships requires time, commitment, and a genuine respect for each other’s capabilities. In this regard, the Russian and North Korean forces have a long way to go if they hope to work together as a cohesive and effective military unit.

Not only are trust, respect and effective communication required for the battlefield they are required for effective policy making and strategy development. Fortunately, these relationships that have developed among the military have also been built among policy makers in South Korea and the U.S. This includes both professional civil servants and political appointees. There is nothing comparable between Russian and North Korea.

Conclusion

Although perhaps not apparent to the casual reader, this comparison has particular meaning for the outcome on the Korean peninsula. The differences between them are the reasons why one will achieve success and the other will not. The alliance based on trust and respect will always defeat a transactional alliance. If there is war or regime collapse on the Korean peninsula the South Korea–U.S. alliance will prevail in defending Korea and making the Korean peninsula safe for all Korean people. Now that the military alliance has publicly committed to a free and unified Korea in the 56^th Security Consultative Meeting, it will provide military support to achieving the political end state of a unified Korea, a United Republic of Korea.

David Maxwell is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who has spent more than 30 years in the Asia Pacific region. He specializes in Northeast Asian Security Affairs and irregular, unconventional, and political warfare. He is Vice President of the Center for Asia Pacific Strategy and a Senior Fellow at the Global Peace Foundation. Following retirement, he was Associate Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He is on the board of directors of the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea and the OSS Society and is a contributing editor to Small Wars Journal.

4. Lethal Minds Volume 28: Letter from the Editor

Lethal Minds Journal

Lethal Minds Volume 28

Volume 28, 01 November, 2024

https://lethalmindsjournal.substack.com/p/lethal-minds-volume-28?r=6k2oa&triedRedirect=true

Nov 01, 2024

Letter from the Editor

At Lethal Minds Journal, we want to be “The Voice of the Barracks.” More accurately, we want to host your voice, from the barracks, in that effort. As part of that, I write to you each month, generally in a way that would not offend my mother’s sensibilities or create questions I don’t want to answer from my child.

But the truth is, the barracks don’t always speak that way.

Sometimes, the voice of the barracks is a squad leader unambiguously offering some much-needed truth to a wayward soldier. Sometimes, it’s a company Gunnery Sergeant explaining very directly how it’s going to be to Marines. So it goes from time to time here at Lethal Minds Journal. So, bring it in, form a school circle, and listen up when I say, “Stop propagating ideas that are patently untrue, a distortion of reality, or just really fucking dumb. You’re hurting the country.”

We are in a time of information overload, a time when people somehow simultaneously have more means to rapidly verify the truth of the information presented to them and increasingly decide not to. Maybe the world is more comfortable when we exist unchallenged in our siloes of reality.

Maybe freedom is scary. It should be.

It’s not easy to be a citizen in a nation with a still revolutionary form of government, one that tries to balance rights and responsibilities, obligations and opportunities against a changing landscape composed of 321 million disparate opinions. Relative to those opinions, I ascribe to the idea attributed to Voltaire, “I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” But while it is wholly reasonable and deeply American to criticize a political representative, oppose or support legislation, and demand change or redress for issues that affect our lives, choosing to believe and spread facially stupid things plays directly into the hands of the “enemies foreign and domestic” dividing us amongst ourselves.

E pluribus unum, motherfucker.

F. Scott Fitzgerald asserted, “The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." I have a method I use to try to pass that test. I question myself first as a means of avoiding the traps laid by bot farms and cyber operators trying to convince me I am stronger with them than standing together with my fellow Americans, even the ones with whom I disagree vociferously.

If for no other reason than affirming my autonomy as a citizen, I don’t accept without criticism or question opinions that trigger happy dopamine transmissions just because they come from my side of an issue. I try not to immediately discount opinions that give me that increasingly American sense of righteous outrage because they come from the other side. I seek to poke holes in my own logic as aggressively as I do that of Americans who think differently.

It is often uncomfortable.

I wish I had the certainty of people who ‘do their own research’ and recommend YouTube videos from a guy who puts aluminum foil over his windows. But speaking from a place of high suspicion and low information is not a good look when you have virtually all of the information in the world available in the 6 x 4 electronic rectangle you are probably staring at right now. You just have to be a critical consumer because everything is a conspiracy when you don't know how anything works.

The world is a grey place. Things work out well and poorly. Results are fair and unjust. Performances are flawless and incompetent. That’s how it is with human beings, who have been at the essence of every concerted effort to accomplish every goal in history. It has always been flawed humans, for good and ill, who have made things happen. Or not.

Demand the most from them, from us. But with that demand comes an obligation to contribute as much as you take. One way you can do so is by sharing your thoughts here. We want your opinions, professional lessons learned, thoughts, and art. All you have to be is a veteran or current service member. We will even consider “friends thereof” on a case by case basis if we think it accrues to the benefit of service members.

Fire for Effect,

Russell Worth Parker

Editor in Chief - Lethal Minds Journal

Submissions are open at lethalmindsjournal.submissions@gmail.com.

Dedicated to those who serve, those who have served, and those who paid the final price for their country.

Lethal Minds is a military veteran and service member magazine,

dedicated to publishing work from the military and veteran communities.

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5. The Putin Dilemma: Why Peace in Ukraine Requires Russia’s Defeat

The Putin Dilemma: Why Peace in Ukraine Requires Russia’s Defeat

A peace agreement that makes territorial concessions contingent on NATO membership for Ukraine would draw a bright red line that would ensure safety for over 80% of Ukraine, the author writes.

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/41484

by Aurel Braun | November 2, 2024, 2:01 pm

Vilnius, Lithuania - July 4 2023: Flags of NATO and of Ukraine during Nato summit 2023 in the centre of Vilnius, Europe

Putin’s Russia Will Continue to be a Post-Ukraine-War Threat If We Let It: It’s a truism that all wars must end, and Russia’s campaign against Ukraine is no exception. Under a personalist regime run by Vladimir Putin for almost a quarter century, Russia is particularly difficult to assess or predict, for it is not an ordinary state, and certainly not in a positive sense. 

Currently, Putin, physically a small man, has a giant international footprint. Similarly, Russia is a remnant of a failed superpower, with a uni-dimensional energy-based economy that in nominal terms is only about the size of Italy’s, yet exercises outsize international influence. 

Predictions for the aftermath of the conflict, whether Russia will decline or pose some unforeseen threat to NATO, leave much to be hypothesized in the realm of domestic driving forces and policy. Predictions for the aftermath of the conflict, whether Russia would be in decline, or pose some unforeseen threats to NATO, are not just intrinsically uncertain but depend to a remarkable degree on the present status, Russian domestic driving forces of policy, and on how the conflict will end and how that end is perceived. 

In Putin’s Russia, domestic factors are intertwined to an exceptional degree with foreign policy decisions. This overwhelming domestic influence and the oversized external threat posed by Moscow defy normal measurements of power. This should not suggest that we ignore the reality that even if we use purchasing power parity (PPP) for GDP, Russia’s economy is still but a small fraction of that of the U.S. or China and far smaller than that of India. 

Other Topics of Interest

Ukrainians Anxious Over War Aid if Trump Wins US election

Ukrainians Fear the Worse if Trump Wins.

Nonetheless, Russia, which barely qualifies as a great power, continues to project power and threaten neighbors far above its punching weight. 

What Accounts for Putin’s Disruptive Power? 

The answer includes the largest nuclear arsenal in the world; Moscow’s repeated nuclear threats and the Kremlin’s ruthless willingness to project power, especially in the former Soviet space. This reinforces a neglected geopolitical rule: the ability to project power and threaten neighbors and international stability are not strictly correlated with economic weight or trade competitiveness. 

Putin’s overall unlimited power ambitions; the absence of meaningful domestic restraints on his power,  Western fecklessness, wishful thinking in responding to Russian aggression, and Ukraine fatigue among Western states all contribute to continuing threats. Moreover, Russia’s “disruptive assets” may foreshadow potential future Russian threats to NATO following a possibly irresponsible settlement of Russia’s war against Ukraine.Still, fundamental shortcomings do eventually have an impact, especially if opponents respond intelligently. Putin, unable or unwilling to resolve the fundamental economic and political problems within Russia, has looked to international adventures as a means of diversion and of converting external “successes” into domestic popularity and political legitimacy. 

Ironically though, he has trapped himself. 

Looking at what I would call “a 30-year rule” whereby 1975 the defeated and devastated fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, (The Federal Republic) and militaristic Japan, had become thriving, democracies, successful economies, and fiercely competitive international traders, Russia, the largest territorial state in the world, with unparalleled natural resources and a well-educated population, is actually an embarrassing laggard. This only exemplifies the failure of the Russian Federation under the Putin regime.

Under Putin, Russia has wasted historical opportunities to transform itself into a modern successful state, the state has sacrificed lives and treasures in a disastrous war in Ukraine and has become increasingly dependent on China and rogue states like Iran and North Korea, with the risk that in the future it could become a vassal of Beijing’s. 

Further, The Kremlin’s threats have reinvigorated NATO and drove two key neutral states, Sweden, and Finland to become members of the Alliance. Russia under Putin is indeed a failed state where he mortgaged his country’s future for his own retention of power. 

Yet, fundamental weakness in a nuclear state with a large army is paradoxically provocative. Putin‘s massive domestic failures make Russia a continuing threat, great power or not. External diversion is critical to his staying in power. 

Any kind of settlement in Ukraine that would allow Putin to hold the territory that he has illegally conquered, especially combined with a prohibition for Ukraine to join, NATO would embolden him and legitimize his warmongering as a successful policy.

This fact cannot be emphasized enough.

For Russia to cease to be a threat to NATO in the future, the ideal war termination would be the implementation of the strategy outlined by former British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, “Russia should ultimately fail and be seen to fail”.  

Realistically, that lofty goal currently may be unattainable. NATO and Ukraine, though, are hardly helpless. 

Despite very difficult odds, Ukraine has prevented significant loss of territory in the past year and took some areas in the Kursk Oblast of Russia. President Zelensky claims to have a victory plan, but the reality is that Kyiv’s forces remain hard-pressed. 

The U.S. and NATO though generous overall, and with a power capacity vastly exceeding that of Russia, have been often too timid and too slow in providing Ukraine with key aid. The West could do more, our nuclear deterrence remains credible and the Putin regime is containable and ultimately vulnerable. Personalist regimes, in Putin’s case one that is more Mafia than Machiavelli, are transitory. 

Putinism is unlikely to long survive his departure. 

Still, for the sake of peace now, Ukraine and the West may need to agree to some territorial concessions, but for NATO to manage a future Russian threat, it must ensure that Russia is perceived to have lost overall in its aggression in Ukraine. 

But how?

A peace agreement that makes territorial concessions contingent on NATO membership for Ukraine would draw a bright red line that would ensure sovereignty and safety for over eighty percent of Ukraine, contain Russia, and position the Alliance well to await Putinism’s eventual collapse under its toxic weight. 

The article was reprinted The National Interst with the author's permission. You can find the original here.

Aurel Braun

Aurel Braun is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Toronto and an associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center.

6. Israel Inflicted Severe Damage on Iran’s Missile Program and Air Defenses

Imagery at the link.

This could provide Israel greater freedom of action until the Iranians can rebuild their air defenses. And unless the Iranians can improve their air defenses even when they are rebuilt Israel will likely be able to destroy them again and penetrate Iranian air space at will.

Israel Inflicted Severe Damage on Iran’s Missile Program and Air Defenses

Tehran confronts new vulnerabilities as it considers a further attack on Israel

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-inflicted-severe-damage-on-irans-missile-program-and-air-defenses-207aafae?st=8s83cs&reflink=desktopwebshare_permalink

By Laurence Norman

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, Lara Seligman

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 and Michael R. Gordon

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Updated Nov. 2, 2024 12:02 am ET

WASHINGTON—Israel’s punishing airstrike against Iran last month shredded Tehran’s strategic air defenses and severely damaged missile production facilities, leaving it badly exposed to future attacks, U.S. and Israeli officials said.

That has sharply raised the risks for Iran should it follow through on threats to carry out another round of missile strikes against Israel in coming days, current and former officials said.

On Oct. 26, Israel struck key facilities for producing solid-fueled missiles at the sprawling Parchin military site near Tehran and at the Shahroud ballistic missile and space center run by Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, commercial satellite photos have shown. It also knocked out Russian-made S-300 missile defense systems. 

Tehran still has hundreds of missiles that can reach Israel and do significant damage should they penetrate Israeli defenses, according to Western officials. But the damage to Iran’s air defenses would make it easier for Israel to retaliate against even more sensitive targets, including the country’s leadership, energy infrastructure and perhaps nuclear sites. That is a risk Tehran will have to factor in.

“The operational debate in Iran is likely dominated less by what can Iran do but how will Iran defend itself when Israel retaliates,” said Norman Roule, a former Middle East specialist at the Central Intelligence Agency. “This is unlikely to be an easy discussion and may produce sharp debates within Iran’s senior leadership.” 

Israel hit around 20 targets last late month, staying within the red lines Washington had pushed for the attack. While Iran initially played down the attack, some senior Iranian officials are now talking about mounting an aggressive retaliation. 

“We will give an unimaginable response to the enemy,” Gen. Hossein Salami, the head of the Revolutionary Guard, said this past week.

The Israeli attack was carried out in three waves, beginning with Iran’s strategic air defenses. Strikes landed within about 7 yards of S-300 batteries, rendering the Russian-made defense systems inoperable. It could take several months for Iran to fix or replace those systems if they receive Russian assistance, a regional security official said. 

The next wave arrived about 80 minutes later, focusing on ballistic missile production. The final wave, an hour later, struck radars, headquarters, antennas and some missile launchers. 

The operation was intended to demonstrate to Iran that the Israelis could strike all over the country. “We wanted them to realize they were exposed,” a regional security officer said Friday. 

Some U.S. officials said that Iran’s production of solid-fueled missiles could be delayed by a year or more.

Israel’s main targets at the missile facilities were so-called planetary mixers, which are used to blend components for solid rocket fuel used in its most advanced missile. The mixers can’t be easily replaced, analysts said.

While most of Iran’s missiles are liquid-fueled, the attack delivered a blow to some of Iran’s most valued weapons programs

Israel hit around a dozen mixing facilities at three sites, most of which were destroyed. In addition to Parchin, two buildings at Iran’s ballistic-missile complex at Khojir and buildings at the Revolutionary Guard’s Shahroud space center site were damaged, said Fabian Hinz, research fellow for defense and military analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Shahroud has long been used to produce solid propellant fueled space launchers, but there is strong evidence that the Revolutionary Guard has also been using it to build ballistic missiles. There is one solid propellant facility Israel apparently didn’t hit—possibly because it was producing solid propellant motors for shorter-range missiles, Hinz said.

Israel’s strikes, according to experts and former officials, had a second potentially significant impact, facilitating a future strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities by making it less risky to operate in Iranian airspace.

“I think Iran is the most vulnerable they have been in many years to another Israeli attack,” said retired Gen. Frank McKenzie, the former commander of U.S. Central Command. 

The Revolutionary Guard, which has lost senior officers in previous Israeli airstrikes in Syria and Lebanon, is eager to strike back, according to regional analysts. But other Iranian officials are likely to be more cautious. 

The degree of precision Israel showed in its attacks underscored to Iran’s leadership how vulnerable the country’s military and civilian assets and infrastructure have become, analysts said.

“Israel not only opted to destroy the defensive shield protecting some of Iran’s nuclear and oil installation, but also to reinforce the message that Iran was so deeply penetrated that Israel would know precisely where and how to hit effectively Iran’s most sensitive missile and nuclear weapons related facilities,” said Ariel Levite, a senior fellow in the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a former Israeli official. 

Though Israel stayed away from Iran’s nuclear sites in last month’s attacks, it did hit a building at Parchin that had been used by Iran to conduct suspected nuclear weapons research, satellite imagery showed.

The strikes on S-300 air defense batteries have made it easier for Israel to hit Tehran’s nuclear sites if it decides to do so in future attacks, said Michael Horowitz, the Israel-based head of intelligence for the consulting firm Le Beck.

“These phased attacks are complex, as airplanes can’t stay in the air forever and would have to come back home at some point. Now, phase one of the attack is done—this makes things easier for any future attack,” he said.

With Iran’s most advanced missile defenses out of operation, Israel could move aerial refueling tankers closer to the border, which would enable its warplanes to carry heavier payloads and less fuel, Horowitz said.

Iran’s space program is considered by Western officials as a pathway for it to develop intercontinental missiles, giving its engineers experience in developing powerful booster rockets that could be used for longer-range missiles.

Solid-propellant missiles are considered more reliable than those with liquid fuel because they can be stored far longer and are less volatile. Solid-fueled missiles are much more practical to use in a swift, large-scale mass attack, such as the one Iran launched against Israel on Oct. 1.

The Revolutionary Guard unveiled the Kheibar Shekan missile in 2022. Last year, it inaugurated the Fattah-1. The Guard said the missiles have a range of around 1,400 kilometers, or about 870 miles, putting Israel in their reach.

Israel also hit two long-range Iranian radars near the Iraqi border and carried out a limited strike around the Abadan refinery in a possible warning about future hits on oil facilities.

Dan Lyon and Alexander Ward contributed to this article.

Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com, Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com

7. Allies and Adversaries Brace for U.S. Policy Shifts Whether Harris or Trump Wins

Allies and Adversaries Brace for U.S. Policy Shifts Whether Harris or Trump Wins

Trump-proofing relations with Washington has given way to future-proofing against swings in U.S. priorities, diplomats say

https://www.wsj.com/politics/policy/u-s-allies-and-adversaries-brace-for-u-s-policy-shifts-whether-harris-or-trump-wins-165704c9?mod=latest_headlines

By Alexander Ward

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 and Vera Bergengruen

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Nov. 1, 2024 4:58 pm ET

Kamala Harris supporters gathered to hear her speak near the Washington Monument earlier this week. Photo: Amid Farahi/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—As foreign governments await U.S. election results, they are preparing for a more unpredictable partner in Washington, no matter who wins the presidency.

Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump have mapped out starkly different foreign policy views, leading both allies and adversaries to brace for unsettling shifts, whether a Democrat or a Republican sits in the Oval Office.

Neither Harris nor Trump has dwelled on foreign affairs during the campaign. Their public comments suggest they disagree—sometimes dramatically, sometimes only by degrees—on how they would tackle the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, relations with China, the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other major U.S. alliances, immigration and other priorities.

But the potential for upheaval is driving many governments to rethink longstanding assumptions about U.S. reliability and to look for fallback options for protecting their interests and critical alliances, diplomats say. 

“Maybe it forces some countries to get real,” a European Union diplomat said. “Because I think when Democrats win, there is some sort of illusion that things can go back to what they used to be.”

Before the 2016 and 2020 U.S. elections, diplomats spoke of “Trump-proofing” alliances and commitments. With Trump’s return a possibility and Harris’s foreign policy differences with President Biden largely undefined, some now refer to it as “future-proofing.” 

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Vice President Kamala Harris met in Washington in July. Photo: Roberto Schmidt/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images

The risk of dramatic policy shifts is far greater under Trump than Harris, diplomats and foreign officials concede. A Trump victory could derail decades of American leadership in NATO and shrink support for Ukraine aid. But some say they view Harris’s possible victory only as a stopgap, slowing down but not reversing a more nationalistic American foreign policy.

“The U.S. will become less of a partner by default, as it is now, and more a partner of choice given the unpredictability,” said a senior European diplomat.

European officials see the U.S. generally as a less dependable ally than a decade ago, pursuing a more transactional foreign policy. Domestically, foreign policy has become more partisan, said Duke University’s Rachel Myrick. “This dynamic can be especially concerning to allies and partners, who rely on U.S. commitments to last beyond one president’s term in office.”

In Brussels, EU officials are holding frequent meetings in preparation for an economic battle with Washington, especially if Trump follows through on vows to impose 10% tariffs on imports.

One senior European diplomat said the bloc is planning countertariffs on U.S. goods made in Republican-held districts, “but of course, everyone here wants to avoid an EU-U.S. trade war first.”

President Biden and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on the sidelines of this year’s NATO summit. Photo: Susan Walsh/Associated Press

There is less concern Harris would abandon the trans-Atlantic relationship or cease backing Kyiv, but like Trump, she is likely to push European countries to spend more on their own defense. “The free ride on defense is over, and it is time to break the news to our voters,” a senior official from a Nordic country said.

French President Emmanuel Macron has long argued that Europe needs “strategic autonomy,” the ability to handle its own security needs without American support. His government, following the tenor of politics in the U.S., has once again raised the proposal.

“We cannot leave the security of Europe in the hands of voters in Wisconsin every four years,” Benjamin Haddad, France’s Europe minister, told a local television station this week. “Let’s get out of collective denial. Europeans must take their destiny into their own hands, regardless of who is elected the American president.” 

It isn’t just Europe that is nervous. Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Arab Gulf states have sought to counter swings from one administration to the next by seeking closer defense ties with Washington that would provide consistency over the long term—and by reaching out to U.S. adversaries Iran and China as a hedge against Washington’s fickleness.

Both Harris and Trump favor ending the conflict in the Middle East pitting Israel against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as against Iran. Both also appear eager to scale back U.S. military involvement in the Middle East, continuing a long-term U.S. trend.

On China, officials say the confrontational approach toward Beijing forged by Trump in his first term is likely to persist if he returns to the White House—and to a lesser extent if Harris wins as well. Both have pledged to be tough on China; their chief point of disagreement is how to confront it. 

Donald Trump has pledged steep increases in tariffs on imports from China. Photo: Joe Raedle/Getty Images

Trump has promised to impose higher tariffs than those he enacted during his presidency and declared that China would bear the steepest increases. While the Biden administration kept Trump’s tariffs in place, Harris has criticized Trump’s call for sharply higher duties on imports—a relief to some governments.

There is “maybe a grudging acceptance that the U.S. isn’t going to move back toward an economically liberal globalizing position,” said Chong Ja Ian, a political scientist at the National University of Singapore. “But it is better than the unpredictability and potential tariffs and tit-for-tat that could result from a Trump administration.”

Harris is likely to continue Biden’s efforts to knit Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and other U.S. allies more closely together in a regional coalition to counter China, diplomats say. There would be “a lot more worry with a Trump administration because Trump has shown himself in his past term to be willing to jeopardize alliance relationships,” Chong said.

In Latin America, officials say they have come to expect unprecedented whiplash depending on whether a Republican or Democrat is in office.

Trump’s hard-line immigration policies, which eight years ago were considered radical, have now become mainstream for the party he reshaped. Officials worry the mass deportations he has promised could destabilize the region and deprive Mexico and Central America of billions of dollars in remittances. 

Austin Ramzy, Rory Jones, Kim Mackrael, Daniel Michaels contributed to this article.

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com and Vera Bergengruen at vera.bergengruen@wsj.com

8. Army criminal investigators scrutinize key U.S. general

I have heard that almost all general officers face investigations throughout their career (during their general officer times) but most do not reach the public eye (and most allegations are unfounded).

Army criminal investigators scrutinize key U.S. general

Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla has been one of the Biden administration’s key emissaries to Israel and other Middle Eastern partners since the Gaza war began.​

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/11/01/general-michael-erik-kurilla-army-criminal-investigative-division/

Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, seen during his February 2022 confirmation hearing to become the head of U.S. Central Command, has been one of the Biden administration’s most high-profile emissaries to Israel and other Middle Eastern partners since the Gaza war has destabilized the region. (Jabin Botsford/The Washington Post)

By Dan Lamothe

November 1, 2024 at 4:04 p.m. EDT

Army criminal investigators are reviewing an “incident” involving the top U.S. general overseeing military affairs in the Middle East, defense officials said Friday, a potential complication for the Biden administration as it continues to grapple with a region-wide crisis spawned by the war in Gaza.

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The Army’s Criminal Investigation Division (CID) is “aware of an alleged incident and is currently looking into it,” spokesman Mark Lunardi said in a statement. In a separate email, he confirmed that Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, head of U.S. Central Command, was a party to their review and said he had no additional information to provide.

Army headquarters and senior officials on Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s staff at the Pentagon all referred questions to Army CID. A Central Command official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity, said that while he was aware of media reports about the issue, he had no information to provide.

The news site Military.com reported Thursday night that Kurilla was under investigation for pushing a U.S. airman during a September trip to Israel. Citing an unidentified defense official with direct knowledge of the incident, the report said that Kurilla had become frustrated with his communications access and got into an argument with a member of the flight crew on a C-17, an Air Force transport plane.

Army CID’s statement stopped short of saying that a criminal investigation has been opened against the general. No other officials contacted by The Washington Post disputed other aspects of the account, but some said they could not comment because the review is ongoing.

The situation casts a shadow over Kurilla, a decorated combat commander who has maintained a low profile throughout his tour leading Central Command despite an intense focus on the U.S. military’s role supporting Israel, its off-and-on skirmishes with militants in Syria and Iraq who are closely allied with Tehran, and ongoing efforts to degrade Yemen’s Houthi movement, whose attacks on commercial shipping vessels in the Red Sea have prompted U.S. airstrikes.

Kurilla, 58, has overseen Centcom since April 2022 in what is typically a three-year assignment. He previously led some of the Army’s top organizations, including the XVIII Airborne Corps, the 82nd Airborne Division and the 75th Ranger Regiment, and he earned two Purple Hearts for wounds suffered in combat in Iraq.

Kurilla has made multiple trips to the Middle East this year amid the Biden administration’s attempts to navigate the crisis there, visiting Israel at least four times since the fighting in Gaza began.

In congressional testimony in March, he assessed that the Middle East faced its “most volatile security situation in the past half century,” and that the deadly Hamas militant attack on Israel in October 2023 has created the conditions for adversaries to “sow instability” in the region and beyond.

Kurilla was back in Israel this week, White House spokesperson Karine Jean-Pierre told reporters on Wednesday.

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By Dan Lamothe

Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 15 years, traveling extensively, embedding with five branches of service and covering combat in Afghanistan.follow on X @danlamothe

9. Trump Had an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy. But It Was a Breakdown in American Policymaking.

​A hit job or objective analysis? Where you stand depends on where you sit.

Trump Had an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy. But It Was a Breakdown in American Policymaking.

A second Donald J. Trump presidency would almost certainly mark a return to an era of foreign policy decrees, untethered to any policy process, at a moment of maximum international peril.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/us/politics/trump-foreign-policy.html

As president, Donald J. Trump was never a true isolationist, in spite of his rhetoric. Credit...Pete Marovich for The New York Times

By David E. Sanger

David E. Sanger has covered the foreign and national security policy of five American presidents. He is the author, most recently, of a book about the revival of superpower conflict. He reported from Washington.

Oct. 31, 2024

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

Sign up for the On Politics newsletter.  Your guide to the 2024 elections. Get it sent to your inbox.

What Donald J. Trump promised in his first term in office was America First. What he delivered, as his allies, adversaries and many of his former aides remember it, was chaotic foreign policymaking.

Most of what Mr. Trump has said in his campaign to return to office suggests that in a second term, he plans more of the same, that he considers unpredictability to be his signature weapon. He revels in it, telling The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board in October that he wouldn’t have to threaten China with the use of American military force over Taiwan because President Xi Jinping “respects me and he knows I’m crazy,” using an expletive before “crazy” for emphasis.

Foreign policy experts often cast the choice Americans will make next week as one that will decide whether America moves back toward isolationism or stays with some version of President Biden’s alliance-building, internationalist approach.

That is partially true: If Mr. Trump is defeated, his single term in office could very likely be viewed in history as a blip in America’s post-World War II approach to the world.

If Ms. Harris loses, however, it would mean that Mr. Biden’s term was the definitive end of an era in which the United States was a reliable guarantor of Western security.

Mr. Trump was never a true isolationist, of course, and for all his internationalist talk Mr. Biden has demonstrated more than a few streaks of nationalism. But should Mr. Trump prevail, it will almost certainly mark a return to an era of foreign policy decrees, untethered to any policy process, at a moment of maximum international peril.

To be sure, Republicans now point out that the United States was not entangled in two foreign wars during the Trump administration, and tensions with China were not as acute as they are now.

But when Mr. Trump was president, his aides would cringe at the onset of a weekend, knowing that their boss, roaming the White House, would tweet out policy changes after talking on the phone to a major donor, or a foreign leader who had called directly to plead his case, routing around the State Department or national security officials.

Image

Mr. Trump making a call in the Oval Office in 2020. Foreign leaders and major donors would sometimes call him to make their case for a policy change. Credit...Stefani Reynolds for The New York Times

That is how Mr. Trump decided one weekend to pull American forces out of northern Syria, after a call with Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that blindsided aides. When Mr. Trump realized he had been played by the Turkish leader, who wanted to go after Kurds in his own military operation, he half-retreated, posting that “if Turkey does anything that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider to be off limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey.”

Or that moment in October 2020, in the midst of his failed re-election effort, when Mr. Trump declared that the 2,500 American troops in Afghanistan would be “home by Christmas,” for which there was no military plan. The British went into a panic, thinking that their own troops would be left with no way out, since they depended on American airlift.

Mr. Trump’s own secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was given the unpleasant duty of convincing Mr. Trump to back off the deadline — an incident Trump team members have apparently forgotten as they criticize Mr. Biden for his disastrously executed retreat from the country the following year.

Such reversals have continued during the current campaign, in which Mr. Trump has flipped on policies he set as president. Four years ago, he promised to use his presidential power to force TikTok’s Chinese owners to sell the wildly popular app to an American company. The company he had in mind was Oracle, whose chief executive ranked among his biggest supporters. “We’ll either close up TikTok in this country for security reasons, or it’ll be sold,” he declared in September 2020.

It was a rare case in which Mr. Trump won over Democrats, Republicans and Mr. Biden, who signed legislation — now being challenged in the courts — that could ban the app in January unless it can find a government-approved American buyer.

But in September, Mr. Trump changed his position, perhaps because many MAGA personalities have large TikTok followings, and perhaps under pressure from another billionaire supporter who holds a major stake in TikTok’s Chinese parent company.

Policy-by-Impulse

Image

H.R. McMaster, one of a series of national security advisers to Mr. Trump, tried to prevent him from being manipulated by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.Credit...Tom Brenner/The New York Times

To read the memoirs of Trump officials who tried to manage foreign-policy-by-declaration is to page through a litany of anger-management incidents and decisions made without benefit of any real policy process or consultation of allies. But perhaps the most striking is how Mr. Trump’s aides — or at least those whom he later fired — recount story after story of keeping a naïve president from being manipulated by authoritarians, from Kim Jong-un of North Korea to Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.

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There was the moment recalled by H.R. McMaster, Mr. Trump’s second of four national security advisers, when Mr. Trump wanted to send a congratulatory note to the Russian leader and attached a clipping from The New York Post with the headline, “Putin Heaps Praise on Trump, Pans U.S. Politics.” But it was only days after Russian agents had deployed a rare nerve agent to try to kill the dissident Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Britain.

Mr. McMaster never sent the note, prompting Mr. Trump’s anger. “Putin would have almost certainly used the note to embarrass you” and alleviate international condemnation over the Skripal incident, Mr. McMaster told the president, according to his recently published memoir, “At War With Ourselves.” He also recalled warning Mr. Trump that the note, when public, would “reinforce the narrative that you are somehow in the Kremlin’s pocket.”

Mr. McMaster was soon replaced with the hawkish John R. Bolton, whose own memoir, “The Room Where It Happened,” was filled with scathing stories that portrayed Mr. Trump as clueless. At one point Mr. Trump asked him why the United States was placing sanctions on North Korea.

Mr. Bolton recalled replying, “Because they are building nuclear weapons and missiles that can kill Americans.” Mr. Trump said, “That’s a good point.”

Mr. Bolton was fired not long afterward.

Mr. Trump’s camp describes Mr. McMaster and Mr. Bolton, as well as former defense secretary James Mattis and former secretary of state Rex Tillerson, who shared similar stories, as disgruntled ex-employees. But even one of the former president’s most enthusiastic supporters, Robert O’Brien, his last national security adviser, told a group of Times reporters in 2020 that he would print out Mr. Trump’s weekend tweets, bring them to the office, and tell aides to come up with a policy that would agree with whatever the president said. That, of course, turned the usual process of assessing the implications of a presidential decision on its head.

With Ukraine, Looking for Deals

Image

Mr. Trump meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine in New York in September. Mr. Trump has at times portrayed himself as a defender of Ukraine, but he has also praised Russia’s invasion. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Mr. Trump once portrayed himself as Ukraine’s defender, the man willing to give it weaponry — mostly Javelin anti-tank weapons — that President Barack Obama had refused it. “Ukraine wouldn’t be having a chance without them,” he told a crowd in March 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion. “That was all sent by me.”

But early in his 2016 run he complained that the United States should not care about Ukraine more than Germany and other European neighbors. During his presidency, Mr. Trump famously withheld security assistance to Ukraine and asked President Volodymyr Zelensky to implicate Mr. Biden, then a presidential candidate, in Ukraine-related scandals.

In the days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mr. Trump, by then out of office, initially called Mr. Putin’s move “genius” and “savvy.” He dialed that back after he was widely condemned for it. Now he insists that the war never should have happened because the right “deal” would have prevented it, presumably one in which Ukraine would have agreed to placate Mr. Putin by turning over part of its territory.

That approach appears to be what Mr. Trump has in mind when he says he would end the war “in 24 hours,” or perhaps even before taking office. That probably means he would force Ukraine to accede or lose American military aid, which he has opposed. In the latter part of the campaign he has also overstated the depletion of American arms stockpiles, claiming in August that “now we have no ammunition because we’ve given it all away.”

But to underscore the incoherence of his policy, when he spoke to The Wall Street Journal in October he again portrayed himself as Ukraine’s great defender. “I said, ‘Vladimir, if you go after Ukraine, I am going to hit you so hard, you’re not even going to believe it. I’m going to hit you right in the middle of fricking Moscow,’” Mr. Trump said — describing a conversation with Mr. Putin that no aides have ever reported took place.

He has told similar stories about threats to other leaders, in other places.

Trump’s China Strategy: Tariffs

Image

Mr. Trump and President Xi Jinping of China in 2019. Mr. Trump said in October that he wouldn’t have to threaten China with the use of U.S. military force over Taiwan because Mr. Xi “respects me.” Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

China is the most challenging problem in American national security: Its leader has vowed the country will be the world’s No. 1 economic, military and technological power by 2049, the 100th anniversary of Mao’s revolution. It is already the fastest-growing nuclear power, a program that became clear during Mr. Trump’s term and accelerated during Mr. Biden’s. And the coming together of Russia and China — with ever-deeper links to North Korea and Iran — has become the newest, and arguably among the most dangerous, geopolitical developments in recent years.

Almost none of that has been discussed or debated in this presidential campaign. Vice President Kamala Harris has said almost nothing about it. Mr. Trump, for his part, has offered a single solution to all ills: tariffs, “the most beautiful word in the dictionary. More beautiful than love, more beautiful than respect.”

It has a populist ring, even if many economists say Mr. Trump’s promise of tariffs of “100 percent, 200 percent, 1,000 percent” would strike consumers hard, the poor hardest, and might tank the American economy. But it also does not address the vast security challenge that China poses, from the South China Sea to Taiwan to cyberspace, or the technology competition that is at the core of the China challenge.

During his term in office, Mr. Trump’s foreign policy team reoriented American national security strategy toward a focus on superpower conflict and began to develop plans for restricting China’s ability to obtain key technology — in advanced semiconductors, work on quantum computers and artificial intelligence — from the U.S. and its allies. Some of Mr. Biden’s aides have credited the Trump administration, if grudgingly, for focusing the government on those key elements.

But Mr. Trump himself often undercut them, offering to lift key export controls in return for the elusive big trade deal with China that he never achieved. And the other day, he attacked the CHIPS and Science Act, passed with overwhelming Republican support, complaining that it had given government support to key American competitors.

“We put up billions of dollars for rich companies,” he said on Joe Rogan’s podcast, referring to the $52 billion in government seed money to build advanced semiconductor plants in the United States. So far Intel, Samsung, Taiwan Semiconductor and others have begun to build facilities on American soil, though the effort is running more slowly than projected.

“You didn’t have to put up 10 cents,” Mr. Trump insisted. “You tariff it so high that they will come and build their chip companies for nothing.”

On the Middle East, a P.R. Problem

Image

Mr. Trump with leaders of the Muslim community in Novi, Mich., in October. Muslim and Arab Americans have emerged as a key constituency in the swing state of Michigan.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

If Ms. Harris loses on Tuesday, one reason may be that she has lost the support of Arab Americans and young voters who believe the Biden administration failed to use its leverage to limit Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza following last year’s Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas. Most estimates put the loss of life from the Israeli military action at more than 40,000, including Hamas terrorists.

There are few more complex issues on the diplomatic agenda than how to balance Israel’s self-defense with the creation of a new dynamic in the Middle East and alleviate the humanitarian crises worsened by multiple wars. Mr. Trump has largely steered clear of both the political and moral complexities. His strongest argument has centered on the optics of the bombing campaign. In April he said Israel was “absolutely losing the PR war,” and added, “Let’s get back to peace and stop killing people. And that’s a very simple statement.”

But he has offered no cease-fire plan and no ideas for winning the release of hostages held by Hamas. When he spoke to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Israel killed the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, he expressed his admiration for the skill of the operations and then told him: “Do what you have to do.”

Dylan Freedman contributed reporting.

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

See more on: The Israel Hamas War, 2024 Elections: News, Polls and Analysis, Russia-Ukraine War, President Joe Biden, Robert C. O'Brien, Donald Trump

10. Trump Had an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy. But It Was a Breakdown in American Policymaking.

​A hit job or objective analysis? Where you stand depends on where you sit.

Excerpts:

Foreign policy experts often cast the choice Americans will make next week as one that will decide whether America moves back toward isolationism or stays with some version of President Biden’s alliance-building, internationalist approach.

That is partially true: If Mr. Trump is defeated, his single term in office could very likely be viewed in history as a blip in America’s post-World War II approach to the world.

If Ms. Harris loses, however, it would mean that Mr. Biden’s term was the definitive end of an era in which the United States was a reliable guarantor of Western security.

Mr. Trump was never a true isolationist, of course, and for all his internationalist talk Mr. Biden has demonstrated more than a few streaks of nationalism. But should Mr. Trump prevail, it will almost certainly mark a return to an era of foreign policy decrees, untethered to any policy process, at a moment of maximum international peril.

To be sure, Republicans now point out that the United States was not entangled in two foreign wars during the Trump administration, and tensions with China were not as acute as they are now.

But when Mr. Trump was president, his aides would cringe at the onset of a weekend, knowing that their boss, roaming the White House, would tweet out policy changes after talking on the phone to a major donor, or a foreign leader who had called directly to plead his case, routing around the State Department or national security officials.

​...

If Ms. Harris loses on Tuesday, one reason may be that she has lost the support of Arab Americans and young voters who believe the Biden administration failed to use its leverage to limit Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza following last year’s Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas. Most estimates put the loss of life from the Israeli military action at more than 40,000, including Hamas terrorists.

There are few more complex issues on the diplomatic agenda than how to balance Israel’s self-defense with the creation of a new dynamic in the Middle East and alleviate the humanitarian crises worsened by multiple wars. Mr. Trump has largely steered clear of both the political and moral complexities. His strongest argument has centered on the optics of the bombing campaign. In April he said Israel was “absolutely losing the PR war,” and added, “Let’s get back to peace and stop killing people. And that’s a very simple statement.”

But he has offered no cease-fire plan and no ideas for winning the release of hostages held by Hamas. When he spoke to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Israel killed the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, he expressed his admiration for the skill of the operations and then told him: “Do what you have to do.”

Trump Had an ‘America First’ Foreign Policy. But It Was a Breakdown in American Policymaking.

A second Donald J. Trump presidency would almost certainly mark a return to an era of foreign policy decrees, untethered to any policy process, at a moment of maximum international peril.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/31/us/politics/trump-foreign-policy.html

As president, Donald J. Trump was never a true isolationist, in spite of his rhetoric. Credit...Pete Marovich for The New York Times

By David E. Sanger

David E. Sanger has covered the foreign and national security policy of five American presidents. He is the author, most recently, of a book about the revival of superpower conflict. He reported from Washington.

Oct. 31, 2024

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

Sign up for the On Politics newsletter.  Your guide to the 2024 elections. Get it sent to your inbox.

What Donald J. Trump promised in his first term in office was America First. What he delivered, as his allies, adversaries and many of his former aides remember it, was chaotic foreign policymaking.

Most of what Mr. Trump has said in his campaign to return to office suggests that in a second term, he plans more of the same, that he considers unpredictability to be his signature weapon. He revels in it, telling The Wall Street Journal’s editorial board in October that he wouldn’t have to threaten China with the use of American military force over Taiwan because President Xi Jinping “respects me and he knows I’m crazy,” using an expletive before “crazy” for emphasis.

Foreign policy experts often cast the choice Americans will make next week as one that will decide whether America moves back toward isolationism or stays with some version of President Biden’s alliance-building, internationalist approach.

That is partially true: If Mr. Trump is defeated, his single term in office could very likely be viewed in history as a blip in America’s post-World War II approach to the world.

If Ms. Harris loses, however, it would mean that Mr. Biden’s term was the definitive end of an era in which the United States was a reliable guarantor of Western security.

Mr. Trump was never a true isolationist, of course, and for all his internationalist talk Mr. Biden has demonstrated more than a few streaks of nationalism. But should Mr. Trump prevail, it will almost certainly mark a return to an era of foreign policy decrees, untethered to any policy process, at a moment of maximum international peril.

To be sure, Republicans now point out that the United States was not entangled in two foreign wars during the Trump administration, and tensions with China were not as acute as they are now.

But when Mr. Trump was president, his aides would cringe at the onset of a weekend, knowing that their boss, roaming the White House, would tweet out policy changes after talking on the phone to a major donor, or a foreign leader who had called directly to plead his case, routing around the State Department or national security officials.

Image

Mr. Trump making a call in the Oval Office in 2020. Foreign leaders and major donors would sometimes call him to make their case for a policy change. Credit...Stefani Reynolds for The New York Times

That is how Mr. Trump decided one weekend to pull American forces out of northern Syria, after a call with Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that blindsided aides. When Mr. Trump realized he had been played by the Turkish leader, who wanted to go after Kurds in his own military operation, he half-retreated, posting that “if Turkey does anything that I, in my great and unmatched wisdom, consider to be off limits, I will totally destroy and obliterate the Economy of Turkey.”

Or that moment in October 2020, in the midst of his failed re-election effort, when Mr. Trump declared that the 2,500 American troops in Afghanistan would be “home by Christmas,” for which there was no military plan. The British went into a panic, thinking that their own troops would be left with no way out, since they depended on American airlift.

Mr. Trump’s own secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, was given the unpleasant duty of convincing Mr. Trump to back off the deadline — an incident Trump team members have apparently forgotten as they criticize Mr. Biden for his disastrously executed retreat from the country the following year.

Such reversals have continued during the current campaign, in which Mr. Trump has flipped on policies he set as president. Four years ago, he promised to use his presidential power to force TikTok’s Chinese owners to sell the wildly popular app to an American company. The company he had in mind was Oracle, whose chief executive ranked among his biggest supporters. “We’ll either close up TikTok in this country for security reasons, or it’ll be sold,” he declared in September 2020.

It was a rare case in which Mr. Trump won over Democrats, Republicans and Mr. Biden, who signed legislation — now being challenged in the courts — that could ban the app in January unless it can find a government-approved American buyer.

But in September, Mr. Trump changed his position, perhaps because many MAGA personalities have large TikTok followings, and perhaps under pressure from another billionaire supporter who holds a major stake in TikTok’s Chinese parent company.

Policy-by-Impulse

Image

H.R. McMaster, one of a series of national security advisers to Mr. Trump, tried to prevent him from being manipulated by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.Credit...Tom Brenner/The New York Times

To read the memoirs of Trump officials who tried to manage foreign-policy-by-declaration is to page through a litany of anger-management incidents and decisions made without benefit of any real policy process or consultation of allies. But perhaps the most striking is how Mr. Trump’s aides — or at least those whom he later fired — recount story after story of keeping a naïve president from being manipulated by authoritarians, from Kim Jong-un of North Korea to Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.

2024 Election: Live Updates

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Nov. 2, 2024, 9:36 a.m. ET40 minutes ago

• On the issues: Where Harris and Trump stand on climate change.
• Here’s the latest on the presidential race.
• For one mother and son, the 8-hour wait to vote in Bucks County, Pa., was worth it.

There was the moment recalled by H.R. McMaster, Mr. Trump’s second of four national security advisers, when Mr. Trump wanted to send a congratulatory note to the Russian leader and attached a clipping from The New York Post with the headline, “Putin Heaps Praise on Trump, Pans U.S. Politics.” But it was only days after Russian agents had deployed a rare nerve agent to try to kill the dissident Sergei Skripal and his daughter in Britain.

Mr. McMaster never sent the note, prompting Mr. Trump’s anger. “Putin would have almost certainly used the note to embarrass you” and alleviate international condemnation over the Skripal incident, Mr. McMaster told the president, according to his recently published memoir, “At War With Ourselves.” He also recalled warning Mr. Trump that the note, when public, would “reinforce the narrative that you are somehow in the Kremlin’s pocket.”

Mr. McMaster was soon replaced with the hawkish John R. Bolton, whose own memoir, “The Room Where It Happened,” was filled with scathing stories that portrayed Mr. Trump as clueless. At one point Mr. Trump asked him why the United States was placing sanctions on North Korea.

Mr. Bolton recalled replying, “Because they are building nuclear weapons and missiles that can kill Americans.” Mr. Trump said, “That’s a good point.”

Mr. Bolton was fired not long afterward.

Mr. Trump’s camp describes Mr. McMaster and Mr. Bolton, as well as former defense secretary James Mattis and former secretary of state Rex Tillerson, who shared similar stories, as disgruntled ex-employees. But even one of the former president’s most enthusiastic supporters, Robert O’Brien, his last national security adviser, told a group of Times reporters in 2020 that he would print out Mr. Trump’s weekend tweets, bring them to the office, and tell aides to come up with a policy that would agree with whatever the president said. That, of course, turned the usual process of assessing the implications of a presidential decision on its head.

With Ukraine, Looking for Deals

Image

Mr. Trump meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine in New York in September. Mr. Trump has at times portrayed himself as a defender of Ukraine, but he has also praised Russia’s invasion. Credit...Doug Mills/The New York Times

Mr. Trump once portrayed himself as Ukraine’s defender, the man willing to give it weaponry — mostly Javelin anti-tank weapons — that President Barack Obama had refused it. “Ukraine wouldn’t be having a chance without them,” he told a crowd in March 2022, shortly after the Russian invasion. “That was all sent by me.”

But early in his 2016 run he complained that the United States should not care about Ukraine more than Germany and other European neighbors. During his presidency, Mr. Trump famously withheld security assistance to Ukraine and asked President Volodymyr Zelensky to implicate Mr. Biden, then a presidential candidate, in Ukraine-related scandals.

In the days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mr. Trump, by then out of office, initially called Mr. Putin’s move “genius” and “savvy.” He dialed that back after he was widely condemned for it. Now he insists that the war never should have happened because the right “deal” would have prevented it, presumably one in which Ukraine would have agreed to placate Mr. Putin by turning over part of its territory.

That approach appears to be what Mr. Trump has in mind when he says he would end the war “in 24 hours,” or perhaps even before taking office. That probably means he would force Ukraine to accede or lose American military aid, which he has opposed. In the latter part of the campaign he has also overstated the depletion of American arms stockpiles, claiming in August that “now we have no ammunition because we’ve given it all away.”

But to underscore the incoherence of his policy, when he spoke to The Wall Street Journal in October he again portrayed himself as Ukraine’s great defender. “I said, ‘Vladimir, if you go after Ukraine, I am going to hit you so hard, you’re not even going to believe it. I’m going to hit you right in the middle of fricking Moscow,’” Mr. Trump said — describing a conversation with Mr. Putin that no aides have ever reported took place.

He has told similar stories about threats to other leaders, in other places.

Trump’s China Strategy: Tariffs

Image

Mr. Trump and President Xi Jinping of China in 2019. Mr. Trump said in October that he wouldn’t have to threaten China with the use of U.S. military force over Taiwan because Mr. Xi “respects me.” Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

China is the most challenging problem in American national security: Its leader has vowed the country will be the world’s No. 1 economic, military and technological power by 2049, the 100th anniversary of Mao’s revolution. It is already the fastest-growing nuclear power, a program that became clear during Mr. Trump’s term and accelerated during Mr. Biden’s. And the coming together of Russia and China — with ever-deeper links to North Korea and Iran — has become the newest, and arguably among the most dangerous, geopolitical developments in recent years.

Almost none of that has been discussed or debated in this presidential campaign. Vice President Kamala Harris has said almost nothing about it. Mr. Trump, for his part, has offered a single solution to all ills: tariffs, “the most beautiful word in the dictionary. More beautiful than love, more beautiful than respect.”

It has a populist ring, even if many economists say Mr. Trump’s promise of tariffs of “100 percent, 200 percent, 1,000 percent” would strike consumers hard, the poor hardest, and might tank the American economy. But it also does not address the vast security challenge that China poses, from the South China Sea to Taiwan to cyberspace, or the technology competition that is at the core of the China challenge.

During his term in office, Mr. Trump’s foreign policy team reoriented American national security strategy toward a focus on superpower conflict and began to develop plans for restricting China’s ability to obtain key technology — in advanced semiconductors, work on quantum computers and artificial intelligence — from the U.S. and its allies. Some of Mr. Biden’s aides have credited the Trump administration, if grudgingly, for focusing the government on those key elements.

But Mr. Trump himself often undercut them, offering to lift key export controls in return for the elusive big trade deal with China that he never achieved. And the other day, he attacked the CHIPS and Science Act, passed with overwhelming Republican support, complaining that it had given government support to key American competitors.

“We put up billions of dollars for rich companies,” he said on Joe Rogan’s podcast, referring to the $52 billion in government seed money to build advanced semiconductor plants in the United States. So far Intel, Samsung, Taiwan Semiconductor and others have begun to build facilities on American soil, though the effort is running more slowly than projected.

“You didn’t have to put up 10 cents,” Mr. Trump insisted. “You tariff it so high that they will come and build their chip companies for nothing.”

On the Middle East, a P.R. Problem

Image

Mr. Trump with leaders of the Muslim community in Novi, Mich., in October. Muslim and Arab Americans have emerged as a key constituency in the swing state of Michigan.Credit...Kenny Holston/The New York Times

If Ms. Harris loses on Tuesday, one reason may be that she has lost the support of Arab Americans and young voters who believe the Biden administration failed to use its leverage to limit Israel’s bombing campaign in Gaza following last year’s Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas. Most estimates put the loss of life from the Israeli military action at more than 40,000, including Hamas terrorists.

There are few more complex issues on the diplomatic agenda than how to balance Israel’s self-defense with the creation of a new dynamic in the Middle East and alleviate the humanitarian crises worsened by multiple wars. Mr. Trump has largely steered clear of both the political and moral complexities. His strongest argument has centered on the optics of the bombing campaign. In April he said Israel was “absolutely losing the PR war,” and added, “Let’s get back to peace and stop killing people. And that’s a very simple statement.”

But he has offered no cease-fire plan and no ideas for winning the release of hostages held by Hamas. When he spoke to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after Israel killed the leaders of Hezbollah and Hamas, he expressed his admiration for the skill of the operations and then told him: “Do what you have to do.”

Dylan Freedman contributed reporting.

David E. Sanger covers the Biden administration and national security. He has been a Times journalist for more than four decades and has written several books on challenges to American national security. More about David E. Sanger

See more on: The Israel Hamas War, 2024 Elections: News, Polls and Analysis, Russia-Ukraine War, President Joe Biden, Robert C. O'Brien, Donald Trump

11. Opinion: While the Biden Administration Dithers, Ukraine Burns

Opinion: While the Biden Administration Dithers, Ukraine Burns

Ten percent down installment plans are no way to fight let alone win wars and yet that is exactly what the Biden administration has been doing to Ukraine.

By Mark Toth

By Jonathan Sweet

November 2, 2024, 12:03 pm

kyivpost.com · by Mark Toth, Jonathan Sweet · November 2, 2024

Wars are not fought let alone won on an installment plan. And if you only put 10 percent down, you certainly will pay a higher price later.

Yet, that is exactly what the Biden-Harris administration has been doing to Ukraine. To date, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have only received 10% of the military aid approved by Congress in April.

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The ramifications of this inexcusable seven-month delay of getting US military aid to the battlefields of Ukraine are enormous. Not just in terms of the here and now, but also how it will adversely affect Ukraine’s capacity to go on the offensive in the Spring.

As it is, the AFU is already operating at a disadvantage due to the initial 8-month funding delay after Kevin McCarthy’s House speakership collapse in August 2023. Now, the Harris-Biden administration is compounding that damage by overseeing its own delays in getting military aid to Ukraine.

Washington’s politicization of Ukraine is literally killing AFU troops and Ukrainian civilians alike.

The initial delay resulted in Ukraine tactically withdrawing from Avdiivka last February. Now, due to the White House dawdling, the AFU was forced to also tactically withdraw from Vuhledar in eastern Ukraine.

Meanwhile, Russian forces continue to make incremental gains across the Kupiansk to Kharkiv front in the Donbas. And the Kremlin is backstopping its own losses by putting North Korean boots on the ground in Ukraine and the Kursk Oblast in Russia.

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While the White House dithers, the AFU is bleeding a staggering number of troops, munitions and equipment. Earlier this week, in response, Oleksandr Lytvynenko, Ukraine’s national security chief, told the Verkhovna Rada – Ukraine’s parliament – that the AFU needs to draft an additional 160,000 soldiers.

Consequently, the war in Ukraine is now at an inflection point – and it is one of the Harris-Biden administration’s making. Zelensky’s frustration with the White House is very real and it is entirely warranted.

In addition to its trickle-down release of Congressional allocated military aid dollars, the White House, according to a report in the New York Times, appeared to have intentionally leaked that Zelensky had asked the US for Tomahawk missiles.

Consequently, the war in Ukraine is now at an inflection point – and it is one of the Harris-Biden administration’s making. Zelensky’s frustration with the White House is very real and it is entirely warranted.

Zelensky was justifiably incensed. His response? “And this was confidential information between Ukraine and the White House. How should we understand these messages? So, it means [that] between partners there’s nothing confidential?”

Indeed, Biden’s messaging to Ukraine is muddled. Whereas managing messaging and appeasing the Kremlin is seemingly more important to the White House.

Ukraine cannot win under the current conditions being imposed by President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris. Essentially, the White House has taken an IV approach to aiding Ukraine. The slow drip of military aid is enough to ensure Kyiv survives to fight another day but not nearly enough to achieve victory.

As Bob Woodward suggests throughout his latest book “War,” the White House appears far more concerned about Russia’s response to U.S. actions than any kinetic cost incurred by Ukraine or its citizens. Putin’s imaginary red lines and nuclear bluffing are all too often far too real inside of the Oval Office.

War at its core is a battle of logistics superiority – sustaining the army – and the Biden administration is in danger of ceding defeat. Now, the battlefield consequences are likely to be faster in coming. More AFU tactical withdrawals like in Avdiivka and Vuhledar loom – and the very real risks of frontline AFU positions collapsing are growing.

It is critical that Ukraine be able to go on the offensive in the Spring. Crimea remains the decisive terrain of this war – and yet the Biden administration has failed to forge a viable pathway to ensure the AFU can fight and win what would be its version of Yorktown or the Battle of the Bulge.

Biden and Harris’ failings are also spilling over into the NATO coalition itself. Zelensky is clearly concerned about the morale of the AFU – and is equally alarmed about its overall capacity to remain in the fight against Putin.

Zelensky condemned NATO’s “zero” response to North Korea’s deployment of troops to the frontlines – and he has been criticized by Radosław Sikorski, Poland’s foreign minister, as well as Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, its defense minister, for demanding the expedition of MiG-29 fighter jet deliveries to Ukraine.

This is how wars are lost. And it is the White House that is egregiously losing the war in Ukraine at this point.

They have left the AFU vulnerable and badly exposed. The Biden administration is hamstringing their ability to strike deep into the Russian interior with western made weapons to interdict troop formations and weapon systems, ballistic missile and drone launch sites, and ammunition storage facilities before they can be used in Ukraine.

The result? The deaths of thousands of AFU troops and civilians and the loss of valuable terrain in the Donbas region.

Now, the AFU must also contend with North Korean ground forces. But only when they enter Ukraine. Affording sanctuary to the enemy is no way to win a war. Nor is the White House fearing a decisive battle.

The incessant fear of a Russian nuclear response continues to cause escalation paralysis for the Biden administration. Woodward records a peer-to-peer conversation between the then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley and Russian Gen. Valery Gerasimov early in the war.

When Gerasimov was asked under what condition Russia would use nuclear weapons, he responded, “If there’s an attack on Russia that threatens the stability of the regime – condition one. Second, if a foreign power attacks Russia with a weapon of mass destruction, that's chemical, biological or nuclear. Third, Russia reserves the right to use tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a catastrophic battlefield loss.”

Gerasimov’s third condition certainly explains Biden’s ‘just enough’ strategy and ‘weaken Russia’ approach to the war. Fear of winning outweighed the fear of losing. Enabling Ukraine to defend itself became the strategy – a war of attrition that eventually would bring both to the negotiation table was seen as the best course of action. Not for Ukraine – but for the U.S.

No one envisioned nearly three years of combat in Ukraine. No one foresaw the resolve of the Ukrainian people to defend their country, or the sheer stubbornness of Putin to lay waste to Ukraine at whatever cost necessary.

Fear of winning outweighed the fear of losing. Enabling Ukraine to defend itself became the strategy – a war of attrition that eventually would bring both to the negotiation table was seen as the best course of action. Not for Ukraine – but for the U.S.

The White House’s management of the war is failing. If this war is to be won and Putin defeated, then Biden and Harris must act now. 32 months into the war, and the White House still does not have a plan – nor seemingly are they willing to back Zelensky’s.

The White House has many retired flag officers to assist in developing a winning strategy – Gen. David Petraeus, Gen. Philip Breedlove, Adm. James George Stavridis, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges and Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster.

They have the decades of experience and background to work through the critical tactical and logistical issues facing Ukraine with the Pentagon – and the battlefield knowledge to ensure that the decisive battle in Crimean gets fought and won.

Ten percent down can get you into a kinetic war. But it cannot end or win it. Nor will White House criticism and leaks. Winning wars requires 110% commitment and a determination to win. Thus far, both are woefully lacking in the Biden administration.

Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy. Col. (Ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as an Army intelligence officer

Copyright 2024. Jonathan E. Sweet and Mark C. Toth. All rights reserved.

The views expressed in this opinion article are the authors’ and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.

kyivpost.com · by Mark Toth, Jonathan Sweet · November 2, 2024

12. As Russia Advances, U.S. Fears Ukraine Has Entered a Grim Phase

​Excerpts:

American military and intelligence officials have concluded that the war in Ukraine is no longer a stalemate as Russia makes steady gains, and the sense of pessimism in Kyiv and Washington is deepening.

The dip in morale and questions about whether American support will continue pose their own threat to Ukraine’s war effort. Ukraine is losing territory in the east, and its forces inside Russia have been partially pushed back.

The Ukrainian military is struggling to recruit soldiers and equip new units. The number of its soldiers killed in action, about 57,000, is half of Russia’s losses but still significant for the much smaller country.

Russia’s shortages of soldiers and supplies have also grown worse, Western officials and other experts said. And its gains in the war have come at great cost.

If U.S. support for Ukraine remains strong until next summer, Kyiv could have an opportunity to take advantage of Russia’s weaknesses and expected shortfalls in soldiers and tanks, American officials say.

As Russia Advances, U.S. Fears Ukraine Has Entered a Grim Phase

Weapons supplies are no longer Ukraine’s main disadvantage, American military officials say.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/01/us/politics/russia-ukraine-war.html?referringSource=articleShare&smid=nytcore-ios-share&utm

Damage from a Russian bombing attack in Sloviansk, Ukraine, last month. Ukraine is losing territory in the east, and its forces inside Russia have been partially pushed back.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

By Julian E. BarnesEric SchmittHelene Cooper and Kim Barker

Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper reported from Washington, and Eric Schmitt and Kim Barker from Kyiv.

Nov. 1, 2024

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia and Ukraine? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

American military and intelligence officials have concluded that the war in Ukraine is no longer a stalemate as Russia makes steady gains, and the sense of pessimism in Kyiv and Washington is deepening.

The dip in morale and questions about whether American support will continue pose their own threat to Ukraine’s war effort. Ukraine is losing territory in the east, and its forces inside Russia have been partially pushed back.

The Ukrainian military is struggling to recruit soldiers and equip new units. The number of its soldiers killed in action, about 57,000, is half of Russia’s losses but still significant for the much smaller country.

Russia’s shortages of soldiers and supplies have also grown worse, Western officials and other experts said. And its gains in the war have come at great cost.

If U.S. support for Ukraine remains strong until next summer, Kyiv could have an opportunity to take advantage of Russia’s weaknesses and expected shortfalls in soldiers and tanks, American officials say.

U.S. government analysts concluded this summer that Russia was unlikely to make significant gains in Ukraine in the coming months, as its poorly trained forces struggled to break through Ukrainian defenses. But that assessment proved wrong.

Russian troops have advanced in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. They have clawed back more than a third of the territory that Ukrainian forces seized in a surprise offensive in the Kursk region of western Russia this year. The number of Russian drone strikes across Ukraine has increased from 350 in July to 750 in August and 1,500 in September.

“The situation is tense,” said a Ukrainian major stationed on the Ukrainian side of the border near Kursk who goes by the call sign Grizzly. “We are constantly losing previously occupied positions, the enemy has an advantage in men and artillery, and we are trying to hold the line.”

Russia’s Swift March Forward in Ukraine’s East

Russia gained more territory in Ukraine in October than in any other month in the past two years.

Gone is the Russian force that repeatedly stumbled as it invaded Ukraine in 2022. The Russian military, according to a senior U.S. military official, has evolved and is “on the march.”

As a result, some American intelligence agencies and military officials are pessimistic about Ukraine’s ability to stop Russian advances as Kyiv tries to find ways to build up forces exhausted by nearly three years of war.

Still, Russia has fallen short of its own goals. Most notably, it has not been able to take the city of Pokrovsk, a logistics hub for Ukrainian forces. And independent experts say Russia’s shortages of radar, armored vehicles and, most critically, troops will come to a head next year.

The most important immediate development for Ukraine, however, will not be on the battlefield but at the ballot box in the United States. Former President Donald J. Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris have laid out very different visions for future American support.

Image

A resident running between buildings during a Russian mortar attack on Siversk, in eastern Ukraine, this week.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times

Mr. Trump has promised to bring the war to a quick end, and his running mate, Senator JD Vance, has outlined a peace plan that looks a lot like one advanced by President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.

Ms. Harris, on the other hand, has vowed to fight on, warning that if Russia was not stopped in Ukraine, its forces could attack NATO.

The election, and its uncertain outcome, is weighing heavily on Ukrainians.

After a meeting with President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv last week, American officials said the Ukrainian leader looked worn and stressed, anxious about his troops’ battlefield setbacks as well as the U.S. elections.

Image

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine meeting with members of the Nordic Council in Reykjavik, Iceland, this week.Credit...Halldor Kolbeins/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

“It’s a very tough fight, and it’s a tough slog,” Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III told reporters traveling with him to Ukraine last week.

In Ukraine, morale is eroding in the face of the Russian drive and a fear that Western support and the flow of supplies are coming to an end.

“It is very difficult at the front now,” said Yevhen Strokan, a senior lieutenant and commander of a combat drone platoon in the 206th Territorial Defense Battalion. “There is a lack of everything, there are few people, there are more Russians and they have more weapons.”

The pessimism extends to Western capitals.

“Everyone is feeling bad across the board,” said Frederick W. Kagan, a scholar with the American Enterprise Institute who has advised the U.S. military. “It has been a very long, hard year and the Russians are still grinding forward.”

Got a confidential news tip?The New York Times would like to hear from readers who want to share messages and materials with our journalists. nytimes.com/tips

But Russia, Dr. Kagan said, is trying to suggest its victory is as inevitable as it was in World War II.

“The Russians would like you to believe this is 1944 on the eastern front,” he said. “It isn’t.”

Ukraine’s Problems

Image

A soldier unloading an artillery shell in the Pokrovsk region of Ukraine in September. Russia has not been able to take the city, a logistics hub for Ukrainian forces.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Earlier this year, Ukrainian troops were struggling with shortages of ammunition supplies amid U.S. delays in approving more assistance.

Even after Congress approved more aid in April, Ukrainian officials have complained that the arms flowed too slowly, making it hard to resupply the front lines.

“This is the rule of the war,” Mr. Zelensky said this week. “Because you have to count on very specific things in very concrete time, otherwise you can’t manage this situation, you cannot manage defending lines, you can’t secure people, you can’t prepare for the winter.”

On Tuesday, Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, and Andriy Yermak, a top adviser to Mr. Zelensky, met for two hours in Washington. They discussed the Biden administration’s plans to speed artillery systems, armored vehicles and air defense ammunition to Ukraine before the end of the year.

But American military officials say weapons supplies are no longer Ukraine’s main disadvantage.

Ukraine has sharply narrowed Russia’s artillery advantage, U.S. officials said, and Ukrainian soldiers have used explosive drones to lay waste to Russian armored vehicles.

Ukraine’s biggest shortcoming now is troops, U.S. officials said.

Ukrainian officials have struggled to put in place a military draft that brings in enough troops. The country has hesitated to lower the conscription age, worried about the long-term demographic impact. Ukraine has limited itself to what one official called a more “democratic and measured” response to the shortage of troops, but as a result it is running low on soldiers.

Image

A town in the Pokrovsk region destroyed by Russian strikes.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

Ukraine has used cellphone numbers, email addresses and other electronic means to get additional people to register for the military, U.S. officials said. It has also used more coercive means — like dragging people from concert halls — to find and enlist people eligible for the draft.

While many have signed up for the military out of patriotism, not enough have joined. And Ukraine’s failure to give its soldiers any real breaks from the fighting has discouraged people from serving.

The Pentagon assesses that Ukraine has enough soldiers to fight for six to 12 more months, one official said. After that, he said, it will face a steep shortage.

Ukraine diverted some of its newly created brigades to support the incursion in Kursk instead of using them as originally planned to defend eastern and southern Ukraine or to build up reserves for an expected counteroffensive in 2025, Pentagon officials say.

“They’re working hard to bring more people on board,” Mr. Austin told reporters traveling with him, when asked about the troop shortages. “They’ve got to train those people. They have to regenerate combat power.”

In his meeting with Mr. Zelensky in Kyiv, Mr. Austin underscored the importance of not only defending Pokrovsk and Kursk, but also of “force regeneration and recruitment,” a senior Pentagon official said.

In a separate meeting with their Ukrainian counterparts, Mr. Austin, Christopher G. Cavoli, the top U.S. general in Europe, and other commanders discussed military planning for the winter and the kind of arms and munitions that the United States may send in the next five months, the senior Pentagon official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential discussions.

In an impassioned speech in Kyiv, Mr. Austin condemned naysayers who might seek to end the conflict on Moscow’s terms. He said there was “no silver bullet” to turn the tide of the war in Ukraine’s favor.

“What matters is the way that Ukraine fights back,” Mr. Austin said. “And what matters is staying focused on what works.”

He added, “Moscow will never prevail in Ukraine.”

Staggering Losses

Image

An artillery battery in Selydove, in Ukraine’s Donetsk region, last month.Credit...Nicole Tung for The New York Times

A possible opening for Ukraine might be Russia’s low supply of armored vehicles.

To offset its losses of advanced tanks, Russia tapped its huge stocks of far older tanks. But Ukrainian drones have destroyed many of Russia’s armored vehicles, particularly older models.

As a result, U.S. military officials say, Russia has relied on small infantry units to advance in eastern Ukraine. But American officials believe that many of the battlefields have become “a meat grinder” for Russian soldiers.

Mark Rutte, NATO’s new secretary general, said on Monday that more than 600,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or injured since the start of the war. Those losses are behind North Korea’s deployment of about 10,000 troops to Russia, forces that Moscow wants to use to help push Ukraine out of Kursk, U.S. officials say.

A senior American military official said the decision to bring in those forces was “ill-conceived and desperate.”

Other Western diplomats dispute that the development is a sign of desperation and say it is a move meant to scare the West. Whatever the motivation, U.S. officials acknowledge that Russia is finding more troops and continues to sign up 25,000 to 30,000 new contracted recruits per month.

Russia’s success is partly a result of a shifting recruiting message, as it now relentlessly tells would-be soldiers that the war in Ukraine is really a fight against NATO, U.S. officials said. Russian bonuses have also drastically increased.

By combining these strategies, Mr. Putin may not need to order a politically unpopular broad draft, U.S. military and intelligence officials say.

But Russia’s resources “are finite, and Putin cannot reckon with these costs indefinitely,” the Institute for the Study of War said in a report on Sunday.

Russia’s heavy recruiting has caused other problems. In brief remarks on Monday, Mr. Putin acknowledged a labor shortage. The Institute for the Study of War has repeatedly highlighted reports of industrial factories having to compete with the military, which offers robust bonuses to potential recruits.

Russia has increased its production of missiles, but elsewhere its defense industry is struggling, particularly to build new radar systems. And despite the Russian advances this year, the Ukrainians have continued to thwart some of Moscow’s bigger plans.

Ukraine deflected Russia’s drive to Pokrovsk, pushing the forces southwest of the city.

Oleksandr Shyrshyn, a 30-year-old battalion commander, said it seemed as though Ukraine’s partners had lost interest in the war and were more concerned about relations with Moscow “than justice.”

But despite that, many Ukrainians are not giving up. “Fighting is our only way out,” he said.

Marc Santora, Dzvinka Pinchuk and Evelina Riabenko contributed reporting from Kyiv.

Julian E. Barnes covers the U.S. intelligence agencies and international security matters for The Times. He has written about security issues for more than two decades. More about Julian E. Barnes

Eric Schmitt is a national security correspondent for The Times, focusing on U.S. military affairs and counterterrorism issues overseas, topics he has reported on for more than three decades. More about Eric Schmitt

Helene Cooper is a Pentagon correspondent. She was previously an editor, diplomatic correspondent and White House correspondent. More about Helene Cooper

Kim Barker is a Times reporter writing in-depth stories about national issues. More about Kim Barker

13. How Gender Ideology Captured the State Department

Excerpt:

These efforts raise a critical question: Does gender theory advance the U.S.’s national interests? The answer appears to be no. But that is hardly an obstacle for State’s gender activists. They want to hang the rainbow flag throughout the benighted parts of the world. This mission trumps all others.

Christopher F. Rufo

How Gender Ideology Captured the State Department

An executive order prompted the agency to recast its mission.

https://www.city-journal.org/article/how-gender-ideology-captured-the-state-department?skip=1

/ Eye on the News / Politics and law, The Social Order

Oct 30 2024

/ Share

The U.S. Department of State is charged with advancing American interests abroad through complex and delicate diplomatic missions, as well as maintaining the safety of those missions and the Americans serving them.

The institution’s lodestar should be the national interest, but under President Joe Biden, the State Department has demoted that critical objective in favor of a new global agenda: to spread radical gender theory to foreign nations.

The shift began at the top. President Biden and, in turn, the apparatus beneath him led America’s leftward charge on the world stage. Upon taking office in 2021, the administration used the previous year’s racial unrest as a pretext to issue a slew of executive orders and memoranda entrenching left-wing ideologies in all levels of the federal government, under the guise of “diversity, equity, and inclusion,” or DEI.

As part of this initiative, the White House required each federal agency to submit detailed DEI progress reports regularly, appoint a chief diversity officer, and create “Agency Equity Teams,” whose leaders were tasked with “delivering equitable outcomes.” These requirements contributed to what the president called “an ambitious whole-of-government equity agenda.”

The gender component of this agenda spread to the State Department through the president’s “Memorandum on Advancing the Human Rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex Persons Around the World.” Published in February 2021, this memorandum directed State and other agencies to monitor closely and report on the “LGBTQI+” policies of our allies, to “broaden the number of countries willing to support and defend” the radical Left’s understanding of gender—for example, by funding pro-transgender “civil society advocates” in order to shift public opinion in those countries—and to tie in the principles of gender theory to America’s foreign-aid programs.

If necessary, the memo maintained, agencies should use “the full range of diplomatic and assistance tools” to ensure foreign governments’ compliance with this agenda, including “financial sanctions, visa restrictions, and other actions.”

The policy’s most visible expression was Secretary Antony Blinken’s 2021 authorization allowing American embassies to fly rainbow flags. This symbolic gesture was just the tip of the iceberg, however. Under Blinken’s leadership, State has woven critical theory into the fabric of America’s foreign policy. “I want to be crystal clear about this,” the secretary said upon appointing the agency’s first chief diversity officer in June 2021. “Promoting diversity and inclusion is the job of every single member of this department. It’s mission critical.”

To that end, Blinken spearheaded the adoption of an internal diversity plan that commits the department to hiring “a workforce that reflects the diversity of the United States . . . and implementing a comprehensive recruitment plan that targets underrepresented groups”; conducting a sophisticated “DEIA Climate Survey”; and, bizarrely, producing a “crowdsourced digital storytelling campaign” called #FacingDiplomacy, a self-flagellating chronicle of “the historic impact of discrimination in the Department.”

Material incentives ensure compliance with this official ideology: the “advancement of DEIA” is now considered “as an element for all employees as part of their job performance criteria, career advancement opportunities, and senior performance pay.”

The heart of the department’s effort, though, is not to increase adherence at home but to spread it abroad. State recruited a cadre of gender activists to entrench these theories into foreign policy.

One key figure is gender activist Jessica Stern, whom the president appointed as special envoy to advance the human rights of LGBTI+ persons. She was previously the executive director of OutRight Action International, helped to found the United Nations LGBTI Core Group, and was responsible for the first UN resolution to include the term “gender identity.”

Another key figure is Zakiya Carr Johnson, who stepped in as the department’s chief diversity officer earlier this year. Like Stern, Johnson also has a history of activism, having spent six years at a left-wing NGO in Brazil, as well as at other “inclusive” organizations, such as Atlantic Fellows, ODARA Solutions, and her own start-up, Black Women Disrupt.

These women are not figureheads. They aggressively press gender theory into foreign policy. Johnson, in particular, regularly promotes the State Department’s ideological agenda on social media, spotlighting her exchange with the Brazilian high representative for gender issues, meeting with the Chilean ambassador to applaud his “#FeministForeignPolicy,” or speaking at the Colombian embassy about “diversity” and “inclusion.”

The diversity agenda has been translated to the day-to-day operations at embassies around the world. Some embassies are even screening security positions for adherence to DEI. In a job posting for a security escort position at the U.S. Consulate General in Lagos, for example, applicants are told that “[t]he U.S. Mission in Nigeria supports Diversity, Equity, Inclusion and Accessibility (DEIA),” and that “[a]ll genders are welcome to apply.” Some two-thirds of the job summary is dedicated to DEI, as if U.S. security officers should be more concerned with gender pronouns than terrorist attacks.

Inside the embassies, gender has become a near obsession. State’s latest annual LGBTQI+ progress report lists countless present and future efforts across all foreign agencies to make the world safe for queer theory, from “Pride Events at Headquarters” to “Gender Equity in the Mexican Workplace.” Among these is a department-wide partnership with the Global Equality Fund, a public-private entity “dedicated to advancing and defending the human rights of LGBTQI+ persons around the world” that has directed funds to 116 “grassroots” LGBTQI+ organizations in 73 countries.

State itself asserts that U.S. diplomatic efforts should reflect progressive ideology. In a special report on “DEIA Promotion” by the department’s advisory commission on public diplomacy, State evaluates “how U.S. missions adapt existing programs to DEIA principles,” which are to inform “all aspects of the Department’s policymaking as well as efforts to address barriers to opportunity for individuals historically and currently burdened by inequality and systemic discrimination.” Realpolitik, in other words, should give way to critical theory.

These efforts raise a critical question: Does gender theory advance the U.S.’s national interests? The answer appears to be no. But that is hardly an obstacle for State’s gender activists. They want to hang the rainbow flag throughout the benighted parts of the world. This mission trumps all others.

Christopher F. Rufo is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a contributing editor of City Journal, and the author of America’s Cultural Revolution.

Photo by OLIVIER DOULIERY/AFP via Getty Images

14. The V-22 Osprey Is a Life Saver

I never had the opportunity to fly in one.

The V-22 Osprey Is a Life Saver

By Karsten Heckl

November 02, 202

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/11/02/the_v-22_osprey_is_a_life_saver_1069462.html

Despite what you hear or read, the V-22 Osprey is, by design, a life-saving aircraft. 

A simple browser search on the V-22 Osprey will provide dozens of results that use charged terms to describe the tiltrotor aircraft. Some of the articles even assert that the V-22 fleet should be permanently grounded and replaced by more conventional helicopters which are thought to be safer. 

But is this reputation deserved? 

Steve Busby, the author of Groupthink Gives V-22 a Bad Rap, argues “the V-22’s safety record is not an unusual outlier and the perception that the Osprey unnecessarily places service members’ lives at risk is a fallacy resulting from groupthink.” Perhaps this “groupthink” is what has stoked a misconception surrounding the unconventional tiltrotor design of the V-22. 

According to Mr. Busby, the Osprey’s mishap rate falls “squarely in the middle of the type/model/series aircraft currently flown by the U.S. Marine Corps.” Of course, every loss of a servicemember is a tragedy regardless of cause. All the services who operate the V-22 must thoroughly investigate mishaps and mitigate the associated risks. As the military continues to lift groundings and return Osprey fleets to normal operations, it’s time to give an honest, objective reexamination of the aircraft’s reputation and recognize the ability of the V-22 to save the lives of the servicemen and women it supports. 

The ordinary mishap rate compared to similar aircraft is only a portion of the story. The tiltrotor design of the V-22 not only enables it to takeoff, hover, and land like a helicopter, but also fly like a fixed wing airplane at altitude. For the last 17 years, these characteristics have helped save the lives of American servicemembers, allies, and partners. Due to its high speed, long range, and one-of-a-kind flight profile, the Osprey can take off without a runway, fly for 900 miles (depending on the profile), then stop and land without a runway. No other aircraft in the world can do that.

Because the V-22 can cruise in “airplane mode,” it can fly significantly further than other comparable aircraft. At 1,012 statute miles, the range of the MV-22B (the USMC variant) is more than 40 percent greater than the next closest comparable aircraft, the UH-60M Blackhawk. This added range is more than just a convenience. Longer range means that the MV-22B can begin combat missions from well outside the range of most adversary’s offensive weapons systems. For example, for a Marine Air Ground Task Force embarked on amphibious warships, this longer range allows the Amphibious Fleet to remain well offshore and beyond the range of most of the threat’s weapons systems. In these instances, the capabilities of the MV-22B dramatically improve the survivability of both Marines and sailors.

Speed is an inherently beneficial characteristic to any combat aircraft. For a search and rescue mission, speed is a life saver. The less time elapsed between a traumatic injury and medical care, the greater the chance of survival. Downed pilots’ lives depend on the speed of CV-22, the Air Force special operations tiltrotor aircraft. The Osprey’s maximum speed is, on-average, 66 percent faster than conventional combat helicopters. The CV-22 can cover a 200 nautical mile recovery mission in only 44 minutes compared to 72 minutes for a conventional combat helicopter. Those 28 minutes could be a matter of life and death. 

In a combat environment, one of the biggest risks to rotorcraft is small arms fire. One of the MV-22’s most powerful flight capabilities is its ability to rapidly get through a small arms engagement envelope. In 2008, while deployed to Iraq with Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 162, we took advantage of the Osprey’s unique flight envelope with tactics, techniques, and procedures specifically created to help mitigate small arms threats. One procedure was to takeoff vertically, then accelerate to 220 knots while remaining below 200 feet. Upon reaching cruise speed, you simply pulled the nose of the aircraft smoothly up to a very steep angle while slowing to climb airspeed where we would remain for the rest of the climb out. The MV-22s would fly through the small arms envelope in, literally, a matter of seconds. 

Another attribute of the V-22’s combat capability is how it performs against infrared (IR) threats. On most aircraft, the heat from the engine exhaust impinges on the fuselage creating an ideal target for IR guided weapons. On the V-22, the engines are mounted on the tips of the wings, well away from any aircraft surfaces and directly centered under the 38-foot proprotors that blow hurricane force airflow around the engine. This airflow of engine heat away from the fuselage along with the infrared suppressor installed on each engine significantly reduces the heat signature and subsequent risk from IR weapons systems. 

Also in Iraq, we capitalized on tiltrotor flight capabilities to develop the “thermal cool approach” technique. Here we would execute a shallow spiraling approach at reduced engine power to conduct cool, quiet approaches, barely visible to IR sensors in the most high-risk landing zones. 

The MV-22 is a remarkable aircraft with flight capabilities that have completely changed the calculus for Marine Corps operations. Through greater range and speed, adaptive flight profiles, and infrared suppression, the Osprey does more than improve mission success rates; it saves the lives of service men and women that depend on them. 

LtGen Karsten Heckl (USMC, ret.) last served as the deputy commandant for combat development and integration, and commanding general of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

15. How Eisenhower Reshaped the Joint Chiefs and U.S. Military Strategy

Excerpt:

Eisenhower did change the strategic direction of the nation and the composition of the military services. He shifted from the Truman administration’s short-term strategic focus on “The Year of Maximum Danger” to George Kennan’s “long-haul” containment strategy that ultimately won the Cold War thirty years after he had left office. He also subtly changed the force structure of the military to support his new strategy, cutting nearly 500,000 men from his 1,5000,000-man Army to pay for expanding the Air Force’s bomber fleet while simultaneously creating an entirely new ICBM force from scratch. He also drove through a modernization of the Navy, sacrificing 100 ships from the nearly 1,000 vessel fleet to pay for new nuclear power plants, a new class of “supercarriers” and nuclear-tipped missiles carried in an entirely new class of submarines. To the extent that Eisenhower pursued a “hidden hand” management style, as one scholar famously said, his handling of the Joint Chiefs revealed that it was an iron hand. While Eisenhower, as the last general to sit in the Oval Office, can be seen as a special case, his administration both serves as a case study in modern strategic formulation as well as absolute civilian control over the military.

How Eisenhower Reshaped the Joint Chiefs and U.S. Military Strategy

When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, he aimed to overhaul the Pentagon and balance America’s defense spending with economic sustainability, an approach he called the “Great Equation.” To execute his vision, Eisenhower revamped the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appointing new leaders he believed would back his strategic shift toward nuclear deterrence and reduce reliance on conventional forces.

The National Interest · by Jerry Hendrix · October 31, 2024

“They Have A Boss” - Ike’s Management of the Joint Chiefs - “I know better than any of you fellows about waste in the Pentagon and about how much fat there is to be cut because I've seen those boys operate for a long time.” When Dwight Eisenhower became president, he came with an agenda to massively reorganize and reform what he considered to be a vastly bloated federal bureaucracy, especially in the Department of Defense, and to drive through an entirely new national security strategy. But to accomplish his goals, he knew that he would need allies amongst both civilian appointees and the uniformed leadership in that vast organization.

Regarding the civilian leadership, the change of government allowed Eisenhower to usher out the by now nearly professional (the Roosevelt and Truman administrators combined for twenty years of political rule) political administrators who had headed up the multitude of three-letter-agencies that had emerged under the New Deal and replace them with businessmen who had experience running large organizations. As for the military, perhaps due to his familiarity with the current generation of military service leaders, Eisenhower wanted to install a new slate of uniformed heads of the military services, who also comprised the Joint Chiefs, to dramatically alter the nation’s military strategy.

The Great Equation

“Ike” arrived in the White House with a political and economic goals of restoring a healthy balance between the nation’s security requirements and its economic needs. During the 1952 presidential campaign he had referred to it as “the Great Equation.” Having observed the massive amounts of deficit spending needed to fund the Korean Conflict (which was still raging when he came into office), he had made it clear during his party platform that he planned to address both the nation’s rising inflation and the communist menace. The former soldier, to the degree that anyone could be a “former” five-star general, feared that runaway defense spending during World War II and the Korean conflict had placed the nation under the burden of a “Cross of Iron.’ When he assumed office the entire federal budget amounted to $76B with some 70% of those outlays going to the Department of Defense.

Eisenhower wanted to cut defense outlays by almost a third, but to do that he needed to shift the focus of the American military to high-tech nuclear weapons, which were largely lodged within the Air Force, as a deterrent force while tasking America’s allies in Europe and Asia to provide more conventional (ground) forces in their regions. This would allow him to cut the US Army and Marine Corps. The Navy was also in for some cuts to its battle force, but nowhere near the steep declines envisioned for the land and amphibious forces. To accomplish this, Eisenhower, a former Army Chief of Staff, knew that he needed support from inside the Pentagon, and he knew that “those boys” in the “five-sided-puzzle-palace” would resist his efforts to “cut the fat.”

In November 1952, shortly after his election, he began to discuss his plan to impose change upon the Department of Defense within his inner circle and even amongst conservative congressional leaders. He wanted new leaders, hand-picked allies, in the relatively new Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, which had emerged, along with the new “National Military Establishment” out of the National Security Act of 1947.

Dismissing the Joint Chiefs

The President-Elect knew that the term of the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, his old friend and West Point classmate, General of the Army Omar Bradley, was due to expire in the summer of 1953. Additionally, Army Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, was approaching the end of his second, two-year term. Eisenhower could have reappointed Collins, the general had not reached mandatory retirement age yet, but Ike decided not to. No one in the Army questioned the new president on this decision. Afterall, he was the victor of North Africa, Normandy, and Europe. The Army wouldn’t begrudge him a new Chief of Staff.

The Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt Vandenberg represented another type of challenge. Vandenberg was one of the Air Force’s “boy generals” having entered World War II as a major and emerged from the conflict, which killed such a disproportionate number of airmen, as a three-star lieutenant general. Vandenberg had been appointed as the uniformed head of the air service in 1948 and should have either retired or accepted orders to another assignment in 1952, but Truman extended him as the Air Force Chief of Staff for another two-year term, for a potential total of six years in that newly created office, just to reach 30 years of service and full retirement benefits. “Ike” let “Van” know quickly that, having achieved his thirty years of service in the summer of 1953, it was time to move on. So, going into office, Eisenhower understood that he already was more than halfway towards a complete turnover of “the Chiefs.”

This was an era long before the Space Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau did not have seats on the Joint Chiefs in 1953. Additionally, the role of a Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs would not come into existence until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. So, in early 1953 the Joint Chiefs were comprised of their Chairman, and the uniformed heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Thus, it was that the head of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), then Admiral William Fechteler, was the only member of the team who reasonably expected to serve well into Eisenhower’s first term.

History and events had been hard on the CNO’s office in the years leading up to 1953. After nearly four years of wartime leadership under Fleet Admiral Earnest King, the office of CNO had been headed successively by three men who served two years or less. War hero Chester Nimitz had been made CNO as a reward for his leadership in the Pacific war, but was eager to retire after 42 years of service. Admiral Louis Denfield, Nimitz’s successor, was fired by the Secretary of the Navy after only a year and ten months for his role in “The Revolt of the Admirals” fight between the Air Force and the Navy over long range bombers and aircraft carriers. Denfield’s replacement, Admiral Forrest Sherman, served as the Navy’s leader for only a year and nine months before dying suddenly of a heart attack while touring naval installations in Europe. Fechteler, an uninspiring administrator by all accounts, was the Navy’s hope for stability, but Eisenhower didn’t care.

Charlie Wilson Recommends a New JCS

Shortly after assuming office, the new president acted. Given that the Army had held the Chairmanship first, the thought was that the Navy would be up next. In fact, there was some expectation that Fechteler would ascend to the head of the table. However, Charles Wilson, the CEO of General Motors, the world’s largest corporation and Ike’s pick to become Secretary of Defense, had developed a rapport with Admiral Arthur Radford, the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command, during he and Eisenhower’s trip to visit the Korea in November 1952. Eisenhower, who was aware that Radford had been close to Douglas MacArthur, had some concerns, but provisionally gave Wilson some leeway.

Wilson also provisionally recommended elevating the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Nathan Twining, as Vandenberg’s replacement. The president supported this. Like his recommendation for the Air Force’s top job, Wilson advocated for the Army’s Vice Chief of Staff, General John Hull, to be promoted to the top position, but here Eisenhower thought he knew better. Eisenhower picked General Matthew Ridgeway, who had replaced MacArthur in Korea in 1951 and Eisenhower himself at NATO in 1952. Ike respected Ridgeway immensely and thought that “Matt” would understand and support him in his reforms. Finally, the new administration approached Fechteler, who really couldn’t believe he was being moved out of his job. Facing a choice of retirement or a “promotion” to the senior Navy position in Europe, Fechteler signaled that he would take the assignment to the continent swapping places with Admiral Robert “Mick” Carney who was provisionally announced as the next Chief of Naval Operations.

Asking the Policy Question

The ”provisional” context is important. The new civilian secretaries for the Army, Navy and Air Force were told to order the new nominees to Washington, DC ahead of their confirmation hearings. Eisenhower wanted to confer with the nominees to ensure that they would be supportive of his “Great Equation” and, hence, his defense reforms and accompanying cuts. Twining, who was already naturally supportive of the direction Eisenhower wanted to go, was confirmed in his role in June of 1953. Radford arrived from Honolulu in July and began to backbench Bradley in meetings of the National Security Council to get a sense of where Eisenhower was going strategically. He picked up the importance of balancing the domestic economy with national defense needs quickly and backed Eisenhower.

Ridgeway and Carney arrived next, and were summoned, along with Radford and Twining, to the White House for a group meeting with Eisenhower. The five-star president explained what he wanted from them. He desired them to elevate their perspectives above their service’s interests. He felt that he had done this while commanding the alliance forces in Europe during the war and when he had formed the NATO supreme command, and he wanted them to do it now. He wanted them to consider the economic strength as a component of national security. As such he tasked them to create a new military strategy that would place greater emphasis on strategic weapons and deemphasized conventional forces as a means of reducing the costs associated with the national defense. He also held up their nominations until they delivered. The resulting product, the “New Look” military strategy emerged shortly thereafter.

Eisenhower was delighted with the document and used it to justify making significant cuts to the Army and Marine Corps, and, to a lesser degree, the Navy while “plussing-up” the Air Force. Not surprisingly, the heads of the Army and Navy quickly rebelled. Both Ridgeway and Carney pushed back on the assumptions underlying the “New Look” in their public congressional testimony. Eisenhower reacted strongly, “By God, this has got to stop,” he told a staff member, “These fellows like Carney and Ridgway don’t yet realize that they… have a boss.” Both men were dismissed after only two years of service in their respective roles. Ridgeway was replaced by General Maxwell Taylor, Carney by a very junior Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, who had stood nearly 100 numbers down the seniority list of Navy admirals when he was selected. Both men were extensively interviewed by administration officials to establish that they would, in fact, support Eisenhower’s policies.

Civilian Control of the Military

Eisenhower did change the strategic direction of the nation and the composition of the military services. He shifted from the Truman administration’s short-term strategic focus on “The Year of Maximum Danger” to George Kennan’s “long-haul” containment strategy that ultimately won the Cold War thirty years after he had left office. He also subtly changed the force structure of the military to support his new strategy, cutting nearly 500,000 men from his 1,5000,000-man Army to pay for expanding the Air Force’s bomber fleet while simultaneously creating an entirely new ICBM force from scratch. He also drove through a modernization of the Navy, sacrificing 100 ships from the nearly 1,000 vessel fleet to pay for new nuclear power plants, a new class of “supercarriers” and nuclear-tipped missiles carried in an entirely new class of submarines. To the extent that Eisenhower pursued a “hidden hand” management style, as one scholar famously said, his handling of the Joint Chiefs revealed that it was an iron hand. While Eisenhower, as the last general to sit in the Oval Office, can be seen as a special case, his administration both serves as a case study in modern strategic formulation as well as absolute civilian control over the military.

Editor's Note: Much of this document is drawn from primary sources in the Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, KS, the Charles E. Wilson Papers at Anderson University in Anderson, IN, the National Archives II complex at College Park, MD and the memoirs of Arthur Radford, Matthew Ridgeway, Robert Carney, as well as Arleigh Burke’s oral history and Phillip Meilinger’s biography of Hoyt Vandenberg. The insights regarding the importance Eisenhower placed on forming an entirely new Joint Chiefs is drawn largely from Wilson’s private and professional correspondence with Eisenhower during the transition period following the election but prior to inauguration day.

About the Author

Dr. Jerry Hendrix, PhD, is a retired Navy captain, and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, located in Indianapolis, IN. Dr. Hendrix is the author of the 2009 Theodore Roosevelt’s Naval Diplomacy and 2020’s To Provide and Maintain a Navy. He is the recipient of the United States Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan Award for Literary Achievement.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.

The National Interest · by Jerry Hendrix · October 31, 2024

16. The Army is planning for a new robotics technician MOS

The question is will a robot technician ever be able to be replaced with a robot?

Probably not because nothing could ever replace a warrant officer (said in all good humor because as NCOs are the backbone of the Army , warrant officers are the nervous system).

The Army is planning for a new robotics technician MOS

The robot and autonomous system-focused warrant officers would initially be part of Army special operations forces to help manage and integrate the new tech into operations.

Patty Nieberg

Posted on Oct 31, 2024 1:01 PM EDT

taskandpurpose.com · by Patty Nieberg

Army special operations officials are developing a new robotics tech warrant officer career field that would be dedicated to incorporating robots and autonomous systems into military operations.

The new military occupational specialty is still pending approval, but U.S. Army Special Operations Command is “piloting the development of a Robotics and Autonomous Systems MOS for the Army,” Lt. Col. Allie Scott, director of public affairs for USASOC, told Task & Purpose. “Once approved, the MOS will be open to any Army MOS, and eventually to non-prior service recruits, as a [robotics and autonomous systems-focused] career path.”

The warrant officers who would become 390A Robotics Technicians would initially be part of Army special operations forces formations, officials with the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School told Task & Purpose — the same school that would be tasked with training these new warrant officers.

The 390A soldiers would possess technical expertise when it comes to robots and autonomous systems. The school is also planning for higher-level warrant officers at the 3 and 4-grade levels “which will take some time to develop” to be able to advise commanders on how to deploy the new technology in tactical operations, Elvia Kelly, a spokesperson for the special warfare school said.

“We’re moving out on the establishment of a robotics tech warrant officer because we think we need somebody that can plan robotics and autonomous systems operations, integrate those operations into broader operations, and then somebody that can manage the attritable consumable platforms and the payloads and then deliver that capability to soldiers that are at the forward edge,” Maj. Gen. Jason Slider, commander of the special warfare school, told Task & Purpose.

Officials said the MOS is “contingent” on approval and resourcing from Army headquarters, Special Operations Command and Army Human Resources Command.

“We are confident that we will be affecting this transition,” Christopher Surridge, a spokesperson for the Army told Task & Purpose.

A Quadruped Ghost robotic dog is deployed as part of an urban assault during a series of Human Machine Integration experiments in a training environment as part of Project Convergence – Capstone 4 at Fort Irwin, California on March 16, 2024.

Army photo by Spc. Marquis McCants.

Once approved, the Army intends to open the new military occupational specialty to the most “qualified” soldiers which would include those with backgrounds in robot and autonomous systems and “who preferably have experience in special operations or maneuver tactics and understand regulations governing the use of [Unmanned Aircraft Systems] is a starting point,” Kelly said.

“We already have those people in your formations. You’ve seen them — coders, builders, drone builders, drone flyers, hobbyists — they already exist. The people are here,” Lt. Gen. Jonathan Braga, commander of Army Special Operations Command said at a warrant officer forum at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference in Washington D.C. in October.

Initial interest has come from Special Forces noncommissioned officers with “operational experience” with robots and autonomous systems as well as warrant officers and NCOs trained as RQ-7 Shadow drone operators. Since the Army is moving away from using Shadow drones, “these soldiers are looking for another avenue to continue their service as UAS subject matter experts, and 390A may be a good fit for some of them,” Kelly said.

Some of the first soldiers that Army officials in charge of force structure plan to convert into the new robot technician jobs, will come from 180A soldiers who are experts in planning and carrying out operations in unconventional warfare, according to Surridge.

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The warfare school’s first pilot class is “tentatively scheduled” to start in January 2026 and will last five months, Army officials told Task & Purpose. These soldiers would be part of the new 21st-century career field focused on robotics and autonomous systems which would help inform future Army decisions and “develop the deep expertise necessary on the modern battlefield,” said Scott with Army Special Operations Command.

Also around that time, the Army plans to open up the MOS to recruits without prior service, Surridge said.

Prepping for the modern battlefield

The creation of the new MOS comes from lessons learned on battlefields in Iraq, Syria and Eastern Europe where robots and autonomous systems are being used to drop munitions and perform reconnaissance missions in lieu of putting actual soldiers in harm’s way. As the Army undergoes a transformation in the way it uses emerging technology, Gen. James Rainey, who leads Army Futures Command has said: “We have the ability, and I think the moral responsibility, to not trade blood for first contact with the enemy.”

Braga, who is in charge of the service’s special operations, said the new position addresses a “risk” that the Army is putting on soldiers and the broader military by not having a dedicated career field for experts in robots and autonomous systems.

“I don’t think it’s an additional duty that we can rest our laurels on and think we’re going to out-compete the Chinese and the Russians at by being an additional duty in an already saturated career field,” he said at AUSA, adding that this emerging technology will impact every MOS and branch across the service.

With special operations leading the charge, Braga hopes it will eventually lead to transformation across the broader land force.

“Does this work for the rest of the Army? We’re smaller inside Army Special Operations Command and we’re fortunate to have great people to experiment,” Braga said. “I hope it leads to other thought experiments across the Army.”

Sgt. Tyler Tressler, a squad leader assigned to Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, holds his position during the final exercise of the 10X Dismounted Infantry Platoon Project at Fort Moore, Georgia Sept. 20, 2024.

Army photo by Christopher Estrada.

The Army is still developing its training and doctrine for “human-machine integration” which will dictate how the service plans to use robots alongside human formations but officials have previously said that they envision uses for refueling and port logistics to free up soldiers to make battlefield decisions.

Beyond the national security needs, Braga suggested that growing robotics expertise in the service could help attract new, young talent to the service which just hit its recruiting goal after a two-year slump.

“We’re missing the ball when we go out and talk to every high school in America that you don’t specifically talk to robotics and STEM clubs and say, ‘We got a jersey for you. Come on in and build badass drones for the U.S. Army,’” Braga said at AUSA.

Officials are planning for the new warrant officers to be incorporated into the Army’s latest force structure, updated in February 2024, which removed 3,000 authorized special operations billets. The changes are part of the military’s departure from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as it begins planning for potential large-scale conflicts.

How exactly the new field would fit into the service’s existing force structure, was not immediately clear.

Slider, commander of the warfare school said that the new MOS design came from the need for greater robot and autonomous system expertise in future conflicts. The school currently teaches an internal Army special operations course based on lessons learned from wars abroad but Slider said that the “cognitive load” required to manage and incorporate new technology into training and operations is “too great” to come from a single course where soldiers only earn an additional skill identifier.

The special warfare school plans to partner with the Army’s Artificial Intelligence Integration Center on developing the 390A robotics technician’s coursework. As a prerequisite, the school plans to send 390A candidates to its Robotics and Unmanned Systems Integration Course where students learn to fly and build drones, manage battery packs and payloads, and deal with jamming and counter-drone measures.

Candidates for the new MOS would first attend Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Novosel, Alabama. After finishing, these soldiers would attend the Warrant Officer Basic Course at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute, officials said.

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17. America’s Strategy of Renewal: How Did Secretary Blinken Do?

Excerpts:

Overall, the Biden administration’s strategy of renewal has placed the United States in a stronger geopolitical position than it was four years ago. The emphasis on rebuilding alliances and investing in economic competitiveness has yielded tangible results. However, the long-term success of these initiatives depends on the continued commitment of allies and the ability of the United States to avoid overextending itself militarily and economically. Additionally, alliances and partners are not an end state. The ability to sustain and use the allies and partners to good effect is the promise, but not always the reality.

 Final Grade: B+

The Biden administration’s strategy of renewal, and Secretary Blinken’s commitment to it, deserves a grade of B+. The administration has made considerable progress in rebuilding American credibility and leadership, particularly in revitalizing alliances and partnerships while investing in domestic competitiveness. However, challenges remain in maintaining a delicate balance in relations with China, ensuring the effectiveness of infrastructure investments abroad, and sustaining allied support in ongoing conflicts like Ukraine and the Middle East. The strategy has laid a solid foundation for American leadership, but its ultimate success will depend on consistent and disciplined follow-through.

America’s Strategy of Renewal

How Did Secretary Blinken Do?

https://www.strategycentral.io/post/america-s-strategy-of-renewal?postId=3129dbc6-1b1d-470d-a08d-bd482b4aca85&utm

Strategy Central

For And By Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth, November 2, 2024

Introduction

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent article, “America’s Strategy of Renewal,” serves as both a retrospective and a strategic overview of the diplomatic actions taken by the Biden administration during its tenure. This strategy is defined by two core pillars: strengthening economic competitiveness at home and revitalizing international partnerships. Blinken presents the overarching strategy as a comprehensive effort to restore American leadership and credibility in a rapidly changing global landscape, especially in response to challenges posed by major powers such as China and Russia. Below, we explore the administration’s achievements, analyze their merits, and offer an overall assessment of the effectiveness of this strategy.

 Key Achievements Under America’s Strategy of Renewal

Secretary Blinken lays out four years of achievement:

• NATO Expansion and Reinforcement: The Biden administration supported NATO's expansion by welcoming Finland and Sweden into the alliance, thereby enhancing its strength and cohesion. NATO also increased defense spending commitments, with 23 of 32 allies meeting their 2% GDP target.
• Domestic Economic Revitalization: Historic investments were made through the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, focusing on revitalizing U.S. manufacturing, bolstering technology sectors, and fostering clean energy initiatives. These measures helped the United States become the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment.
• Reinforcing Alliances in Asia: The administration strengthened alliances in Asia, such as the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea relationships, while reinvigorating partnerships like the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) to advance a free Indo-Pacific.
• AUKUS Partnership: A trilateral defense partnership was formed between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), emphasizing cooperation in nuclear-powered submarine technology and broader scientific and industrial endeavors.
• Support for Ukraine: In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States coordinated military support and humanitarian aid, while imposing sanctions on Russia with a coalition of over 50 countries. This included the establishment of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to support Ukraine’s defense capabilities.
• Global Infrastructure Investments: Through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, the U.S. committed to facilitating $600 billion in infrastructure development across developing nations, providing alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
• COVID-19 Vaccine Diplomacy: The U.S. led international efforts to distribute COVID-19 vaccines, supporting global health initiatives and strengthening international partnerships.
• Engagement with China: While reinforcing a competitive stance towards China, the Biden administration resumed military-to-military communication and sought cooperation in areas like climate change and nuclear nonproliferation.
• Expansion of International Organizations: The administration backed reforms of international institutions like the UN and the IMF, and pushed for the expansion of the UN Security Council to better represent current global dynamics.

 Analyzing the Achievements: Merits and Potential Faults

The Biden administration’s focus on domestic economic renewal and alliance revitalization can be viewed as a direct response to the perception of American decline. By investing heavily in technology and infrastructure, the administration has attempted to counter the narrative of U.S. irrelevance and to dissuade adversaries from testing American resolve. These domestic investments have attracted significant foreign investment and created new job opportunities, fostering a stronger foundation for international engagement.

The success of the CHIPS and Science Act and other similar initiatives demonstrates the administration’s recognition that economic strength is fundamental to geopolitical influence. This renewed focus on economic competitiveness has not only helped strengthen U.S. industrial capacity but also reduced dependence on China for critical technologies.

In the realm of alliances, the administration's success in expanding NATO and reinforcing alliances in the Indo-Pacific shows a significant effort to counter the growing influence of China and Russia. The swift and coordinated international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine—from military support to economic sanctions—highlighted the effectiveness of these renewed partnerships.

However, there are also potential weaknesses in the strategy. The emphasis on building stronger defense alliances and enhancing military postures, while necessary, risks escalating tensions with rival powers such as China and Russia. The administration's approach to balancing competition with cooperation in its China policy has also proven challenging, as maintaining constructive dialogue while pushing back against Chinese influence has yielded mixed results. While economic investments at home have boosted U.S. growth, there remains criticism from some allies over the perception that American protectionism could undermine global trade relationships.

Furthermore, the success of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment, which aims to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative, remains uncertain. The ability of the U.S. and its allies to deliver impactful infrastructure projects will ultimately determine whether this initiative can truly provide a viable alternative to China’s expansive influence in developing regions.

 Evaluating the Overall Effectiveness of the Strategy

The overarching goal of the Biden administration’s strategy was to restore American leadership in an increasingly competitive international environment. The results of this strategy have been mixed but largely positive. The administration has undoubtedly succeeded in demonstrating that the United States is not in decline, as evidenced by its economic resurgence and the strengthening of alliances worldwide. The NATO expansion and increased cohesion within the alliance are particularly noteworthy achievements that enhance the collective security framework against authoritarian threats.

The Biden administration’s emphasis on competitive coexistence with China—recognizing it as a “pacing challenge” while keeping channels for cooperation open—is a nuanced approach that reflects the complexities of the relationship. However, the effectiveness of this balanced approach remains to be seen, especially as tensions over Taiwan and other regional flashpoints continue to escalate.

The administration's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine also underscores a renewed American commitment to global stability and a rules-based international order. By rallying European and Asian allies to impose unprecedented sanctions and provide military support, the U.S. demonstrated its ability to lead a unified response to aggression. Nevertheless, sustaining this level of support in the face of prolonged conflict will be a key challenge moving forward. The Middle East is another area of major diplomatic and military investment since the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel by Hamas. The Secretary’s almost two dozen trips to seek a peaceful resolution to the spread of fighting since that event has not yielded significant public results. But the issue has time to develop and may yet break in favor of the administration’s policy goals.

Overall, the Biden administration’s strategy of renewal has placed the United States in a stronger geopolitical position than it was four years ago. The emphasis on rebuilding alliances and investing in economic competitiveness has yielded tangible results. However, the long-term success of these initiatives depends on the continued commitment of allies and the ability of the United States to avoid overextending itself militarily and economically. Additionally, alliances and partners are not an end state. The ability to sustain and use the allies and partners to good effect is the promise, but not always the reality.

 Final Grade: B+

The Biden administration’s strategy of renewal, and Secretary Blinken’s commitment to it, deserves a grade of B+. The administration has made considerable progress in rebuilding American credibility and leadership, particularly in revitalizing alliances and partnerships while investing in domestic competitiveness. However, challenges remain in maintaining a delicate balance in relations with China, ensuring the effectiveness of infrastructure investments abroad, and sustaining allied support in ongoing conflicts like Ukraine and the Middle East. The strategy has laid a solid foundation for American leadership, but its ultimate success will depend on consistent and disciplined follow-through.

Bibliography

1. Blinken, Antony J. "America's Strategy of Renewal." Foreign Affairs, November/December 2024. [Link](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/antony-blinken-americas-strategy-renewal-leadership-new-world)

2. "CHIPS and Science Act Summary." U.S. Congress, 2022. [Link](https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/4346)

3. Sanger, David E. "Biden’s Strategy on China Balances Competition and Cooperation." The New York Times, March 2023. [Link](https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/15/us/politics/biden-china-strategy.html)

4. Smith, Karen. "NATO Expansion and the New Security Architecture." Atlantic Council, May 2024. [Link](https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/nato-expansion-security/)

5. Miller, James. "Evaluating the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment." Brookings Institution, June 2024. [Link](https://www.brookings.edu/global-infrastructure-investment)

6. Gordon, Michael R. "AUKUS and the Future of Indo-Pacific Security." Wall Street Journal, September 2024. [Link](https://www.wsj.com/articles/aukus-indo-pacific-security)

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com