Quotes of the Day:
"So this is the rationality paradox. Here is how it works: rationality is the opposite of certainty. Certainty is the opposite of wisdom. Why? Because wisdom is not the sum total of what you know, wisdom is the sum total of what you don't know. In other words, the capacity to reflect critically on your own assumptions. This is also why politicians want to sell you certainty and want to avoid rationality. Certainty is comforting, rationality is discomforting. Which means that to be rational is to question the basis of peoples' certainties."
- Julian De Medeiros
"Be sure you put your feet in the right place, then stand firm."
- Abraham Lincoln
“And on the subject of burning books: I want to congratulate librarians, not famous for their physical strength or their powerful political connections or their great wealth, who, all over this country, have staunchly resisted anti-democratic bullies who have tried to remove certain books from their shelves, and have refused to reveal to thought police the names of persons who have checked out those titles. So the America I loved still exists, if not in the White House or the Supreme Court or the Senate or the House of Representatives or the media. The America I love still exists at the front desks of our public libraries.”
-Kurt Vonnegut, A Man Without a Country
1. Lithuania to get U.S. trade support as it faces China fury over Taiwan
2. Is Russia Poised to Invade Ukraine?
3. Smallpox vials found at lab were mislabeled and didn't contain virus
4. Security assistance in Africa needs an industrial boost
5. The folly of a no-first-use nuclear policy
6. The Politics of War
7. Biden Brings Out the Big Guns for NatSec Noms
8. Are U.S. Missile Defenses Vulnerable to Cyberattacks?
9. Why China Wants More and Better Nukes
10. What Does Russia Want?
11. 'Almost a melding' of US, UK, Aussie services coming: NSC's Kurt Campbell
12. Pentagon Delays Release of Potentially Politicized Report on ‘Extremism’ in the Military – Why?
13. Moscow’s Foreign Policy is Getting Increasingly Ideological
14. Asia's quiet militarization threatens to turn the region into a powder keg
15. Ukrainian defense minister says he's asked Pentagon for military assistance
16. The Decline of Congress
17. Work on ‘Chinese military base’ in UAE abandoned after US intervenes – report
18. US, China commence ‘responsible competition’
19. Biden and Xi move back from the brink
20. Kyle Rittenhouse Is No Hero
1. Lithuania to get U.S. trade support as it faces China fury over Taiwan
I hope we have learned our lesson. Why didn't we do this when CHina conducted economic warfare against South Korea over th eTHAAD issue? We made a strategic error then by not coming to the aid of our ally.
Lithuania to get U.S. trade support as it faces China fury over Taiwan
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken arrives with Lithuania's Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis in the Benjamin Franklin Room of the State Department ahead of a meeting, in Washington, D.C., U.S., September 15, 2021. Mandel Ngan/Pool via REUTERS
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VILNIUS, Nov 19 (Reuters) - Lithuania will sign a $600 million export credit agreement with the U.S. Export-Import Bank next week, Economy Minister Ausrine Armonaite told Reuters, days after China warned it would "take all necessary measures" after Lithuania allowed Taiwan to open a de facto embassy.
China demanded in August that the Baltic state withdraw its ambassador to Beijing and said it would recall China's envoy in Vilnius after Taiwan announced its office would be called the Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania.
Other Taiwan offices in Europe and the United States use the name of the capital Taipei, avoiding a reference to the island itself, which China claims as its own territory.
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U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis in August and agreed on "bilateral coordinated action" to help the country withstand pressure from China.
"We think that economic ties with democratic states are more stable and lasting, they are grounded on the rule of law, so they meet Lithuanian interests better," Landsbergis told reporters in Vilnius on Thursday.
"Lithuania only has itself to blame, it will have to pay for what it did," Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian told a daily press briefing on Friday. read more
Lithuania said earlier this year it would no longer participate in a Beijing-led trade grouping with Central European countries.
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Reporting by Andrius Sytas in Vilnius; Editing by Giles Elgood
2. Is Russia Poised to Invade Ukraine?
Is Russia Poised to Invade Ukraine?
The United States is increasingly concerned by a large buildup of Russian military forces along the border with Ukraine.
The United States is increasingly concerned by a large buildup of Russian military forces along the border with Ukraine. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has publicly warned Moscow against launching military operations against Ukraine, American officials have briefed NATO allies about these concerns, and CIA director Bill Burns reportedly raised the matter with Kremlin officials during recent talks in Moscow. Is Russia preparing for a large-scale invasion of Ukraine? What factors might affect prospects for war? And how should the United States and Europe deal with this danger?
The Center for The National Interest brought together an all-star panel of experts on Friday, November 19 for a discussion of these important questions:
George Beebe is Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for the National Interest, a former head of Russia analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency, and a former adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney on Russia policy.
Melinda Haring is a Deputy Director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and former editor of its UkraineAlert publication. She is the vice-chair of the board of the East Europe Foundation in Kyiv, a member of the supervisory board of the Right to Protection NGO in Ukraine, and a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Michael Kofman is Director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analysis and a Fellow at the Kennan Institute in Washington, DC, specializing in Russia’s armed forces, military capabilities, and strategy.
Dmitry Suslov is Deputy Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies and Senior Lecturer at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Russia. He is the author of numerous publications on US-Russian relations and changes in the world order.
Jacob HeiIbrunn, editor of The National Interest, moderated the discussion.
Image: Reuters.
3. Smallpox vials found at lab were mislabeled and didn't contain virus
As suspected: probable incompetence.
But we should also consider this as a wakeup call. What if?????
Smallpox vials found at lab were mislabeled and didn't contain virus
'Smallpox' vials found at Merck lab were mislabeled and didn't actually contain the deadly virus - just the vaccine for it, CDC reveals
- The CDC says vials discovered in a Merck laboratory in Philadelphia were incorrectly labeled 'smallpox'
- They were discovered by a lab worker cleaning out a freezer on Monday night
- Federal officials say the vials contain 'vaccinia, the virus used in smallpox vaccine' and not the variola virus, which causes smallpox
- Smallpox killed 300 million people in the 1900s and was eradicated with a mass vaccination campaign
- Samples of the virus are only supposed to be stored at two labs in Russia and Atlanta, which is CDC headquarters
PUBLISHED: 18:16 EST, 19 November 2021 | UPDATED: 18:16 EST, 19 November 2021
Daily Mail · by Mary Kekatos U.S. Health Editor · November 19, 2021
Vials labeled 'smallpox' that were discovered in a freezer in a Philadelphia laboratory don't contain any traces of the deadly virus, federal health officials reveals.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) said on Thursday that testing showed the vials contain 'vaccinia, the virus used in smallpox vaccine' and not the variola virus, which causes smallpox.
The vials 'were incidentally discovered by a laboratory worker' who was wearing gloves and a face mask while cleaning out the freezer on Monday night.
There were 15 vials in total - five of which were labeled 'smallpox' and the other 10 labeled 'vaccinia.'
Smallpox was eradicated in 1980 with a successful mass vaccination campaign after it killed an estimated 300 million people in the 20th century alone.
Samples of the deadly virus are only supposed to be kept in two labs: the CDC headquarters in Atlanta and the Vector Institute in Koltsovo, Russia.
The CDC says vials discovered in a Merck laboratory in Philadelphia were incorrectly labeled 'smallpox.' Pictured: A bottle of the smallpox vaccine in 2003
Federal officials say the vials contain 'vaccinia, the virus used in smallpox vaccine' and not the variola virus, which causes smallpox. Pictured: CDC headquarters
The discovery was reportedly made at Merck's Upper Gwenydd facility outside Philadelphia
Mark O'Neill, a spokesperson for the Pennsylvania Department of Health, told the New York Times that the vials were found at a Merck facility in Montgomery County.
It was not clear why the vials were in the freezer.
The CDC said it was 'in close contact with state and local health officials, law enforcement, and the World Health Organization' about the findings.
The finding was first reported by Yahoo News, which obtained a copy of an alert sent to the Department of Homeland Security labeled 'For Official Use Only.'
After they were discovered, the vials were secured immediately and the facility was put on a lockdown that was lifted by Wednesday night.
'Merck is in the process of figuring out why it was there,' the source told NBC10 on Wednesday
Merck did not immediately respond to a request for comment from DailyMail.com.
'There is no indication that anyone has been exposed to the small number of frozen vials,' a CDC spokesperson told Yahoo.
'The frozen vials labeled 'Smallpox' were incidentally discovered by a laboratory worker while cleaning out a freezer in a facility that conducts vaccine research in Pennsylvania.'
The discovery took place at the Merck Upper Gwynedd facility in North Wales, about 30 miles northwest of Philadelphia, according to WCAU.
'CDC, its Administration partners, and law enforcement are investigating the matter, and the vials' contents appear intact. The laboratory worker who discovered the vials was wearing gloves and a face mask. We will provide further details as they are available,' the spokesperson said.
The incident is likely to renew questions about what should be done with the world's Smallpox samples, which are kept in only two labs in the world.
Smallpox is an infection caused by the variola virus. Patients develop a fever and a distinctive, progressive skin rash, according to the CDC.
Most Americans are not vaccinated against the disease and those who are probably have waning immunity, meaning an outbreak could have devastating consequences.
The vaccine leaves a dime-sized lesion that gradually forms a scab and leaves a scar, the CDC says. The lesion is contagious before the scab forms, and those who receive it have to protect the vaccination site from other parts of their body and other people.
The FBI and the CDC are investigating Tuesday's findings. Smallpox is only supposed to be stockpiled in two labs in the world: the CDC in Atlanta and a state-owned lab in Russia
In 2014, a government scientist cleaning out an old storage room at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland - just outside of Washington, DC - found six decades-old glass vials containing freeze-dried smallpox, according to the Washington Post.
The samples were packed away and forgotten in a cardboard box. At the time, it was the first such discovery in the country.
In 2019, an explosion at the state-owned Russian lab holding some of the samples sent one worker to the hospital, though the World Health Organization said the blast didn't occur near the stockpiles, according to NPR.
Earlier this month, Microsoft founder and philanthropist Bill Gates said the US and UK should invest 'tens of billions' in virus research, including how to possibly prevent smallpox attacks from being unleashed in places like airports, according to Yahoo News.
'So along with the climate message and the ongoing fight against diseases of the poor, pandemic preparedness is something I'll be talking about a lot,' he said in an interview with British health policy official Jeremy Hunt.
Daily Mail · by Mary Kekatos U.S. Health Editor · November 19, 2021
4. Security assistance in Africa needs an industrial boost
Strategic competition with China is taking place in Africa. We have to compete effectively and we need to beware of applying ineffective Afghanistan policies in Africa. And Africa requires much more than security assistance operations.
Excerpt:
As the strategic landscape shifts to the Pacific, certain budgets tighten and the United States is forced to restructure its priorities, Congress will have to answer tough questions related to its investments in Africa. If not tailored properly by broader partnerships and aggressive industrial development, America’s security efforts in many African nations run the risk of becoming a microcosm of its policies in Afghanistan: a series of impressive tactical victories culminating in strategic failure.
Security assistance in Africa needs an industrial boost
The Hill · by Michael P. Ferguson, Opinion Contributor · November 20, 2021
As a result, the overwhelming majority of U.S. aid to countries such as Ethiopia goes to emergency response efforts designed to bolster the security sector and react to crises, not necessarily prevent them. This means that infrastructure development, education, governance and other “soft power” initiatives combined amount to less than the emergency response budget.
Prior to America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan, President Biden pledged to remain focused on terror groups that U.S. Africa Command recently assessed as global threats, such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya. The presence of roughly 6,000 U.S. troops on the continent means that the Department of Defense is uniquely positioned to assist in these efforts, particularly with its special operations teams and newly formed adviser units. But security assistance alone is not a panacea for Africa’s challenges.
By the end of 2020, President Trump ordered the removal of all troops from Somalia, though air strikes there have not ceased under the Biden administration.
Security cooperation in Africa continues to encounter challenges not with the capability of U.S. forces sent there but with the capacity of the host nation to translate military gains achieved through its foreign advisors into long-term economic and political stability. Killing terrorists briefs well in meetings, but it does little to erode the institutional frameworks that give extremist organizations their legitimacy, such as government corruption, lack of infrastructure, ideological indoctrination and fragile political and military systems. Crafting effective approaches to security assistance in Africa demands fresh thinking about the nature of public-private partnerships there.
During his testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health Policy in July, Brookings Institution senior fellow Landry Signé highlighted Africa’s tremendous untapped economic potential. The continent witnessed a 300 percent increase in trade over the last decade and is projected to generate an estimated $16.12 trillion in consumer and business spending by 2050. The U.S. government’s Prosper Africa initiative aims to capitalize on this growth, but more programs that cross the public-private sector divide are needed.
Sub-Saharan Africa alone is projected to have more than 600 million mobile phone subscribers by 2025 — nearly twice the population of the United States. While cell phones were almost nonexistent in Africa only 20 years ago, mobile technologies now produce 8.6 percent of the region’s GDP, demonstrating remarkable potential for employment and economic growth. Chinese telecom agencies, such as Huawei, have seemingly cornered this market in Africa, and major U.S. corporations are taking notice.
Google’s announcement last month that it plans to invest $1 billion into Africa’s technology infrastructure – to include the installation of undersea cables – coincided with the company expressing renewed interest in the Pentagon’s cloud computing contract. This opportunity should raise eyebrows in Washington. Until recently, U.S. tech giants were rather hesitant to invest not only in defense projects but also in a continent that by 2050 could hold a quarter of the world’s population.
China, on the other hand, has pledged billions in infrastructure projects across Africa over the next 10 years through its audacious Belt and Road Initiative launched in 2013. As U.S. exports to Africa decreased by 66 percent over the last 15 years, China’s increased by 233 percent, making it the continent’s top trade partner. This allows China to pursue low-risk-high-reward policies that are woven into the long-term political and economic fabric of its African client states. Beijing’s soft power approach deserves more attention, considering the Biden administration’s interim national security strategic guidance and the U.S. government budget for 2022 both prioritize competition with China.
As the strategic landscape shifts to the Pacific, certain budgets tighten and the United States is forced to restructure its priorities, Congress will have to answer tough questions related to its investments in Africa. If not tailored properly by broader partnerships and aggressive industrial development, America’s security efforts in many African nations run the risk of becoming a microcosm of its policies in Afghanistan: a series of impressive tactical victories culminating in strategic failure.
Capt. Michael P. Ferguson is a U.S. military officer, author and analyst with decades of operational experience throughout Southwest Asia, Africa and Europe. He frequently contributes national security content for various outlets.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect official positions or policies of the U.S. Department of Defense or U.S. government.
The Hill · by Michael P. Ferguson, Opinion Contributor · November 20, 2021
5. The folly of a no-first-use nuclear policy
Excerpts:
Perversely, then, adopting NFU might well have the unintended consequence of increasing the likelihood of war. That is not to say that there would be no point to the Biden administration issuing a so-called “sole purpose” declaration. Unlike a declaratory policy of NFU, which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack on the U.S., a sole purpose declaration would state why the United States possesses nuclear weapons, without necessarily imposing constraints on their use.
For example, such a declaration might state that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter attacks on the United States and its allies, without prohibiting the use nuclear weapons preemptively or first, in the event of extreme and unforeseen non-nuclear attacks against them. It wouldn’t in the end be all that different from the posture advocated in the 2018 NPR vision, but it would signal once again that the United States’ nuclear arsenal is meant to be used only in extremis. It would also signal Washington’s willingness to continue to play the role of “balancer of last resort.”
The benefit of such a sole purpose declaration, properly framed, over existing policy is that it would deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy. The benefit of such a policy over NFU is that it would do so without undermining extended deterrence against non-nuclear attack. The former is a prudent way forward; the latter, a strategic folly — and a dangerous one at that.
The folly of a no-first-use nuclear policy
The Hill · by Andrew Latham, Opinion Contributor · November 18, 2021
The Biden administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), launched in July 2021, is likely to be completed in early 2022. Although it will deal with several issues related to the United States’ nuclear deterrent – including the future size, composition and modernization of the nuclear force – perhaps the most important strategic question it will address is whether to adopt a no-first-use declaratory policy.
In contrast to the policy spelled out in the 2018 NPR, which permits the U.S. to use nuclear weapons first “in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States, its allies, and partners,” a no-first-use (NFU) policy would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack.
Supporters of NFU hope that the ongoing review will recommend abandoning the current nuclear posture in favor of a strategy that relies far less on the use of nuclear weapons. To them, and to many Americans, adopting such a nuclear posture seems like a very good idea.
But it isn’t. In fact, it’s a folly — and a dangerous folly at that.
Unsurprisingly, advocates of NFU – including organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and perhaps even President Biden himself – don’t see it that way. To them, NFU is simply the only rational nuclear posture possible.
To begin with, they argue, it is better suited to today’s strategic realities. The U.S. currently enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority and simply does not need a nuclear first-use option to deter or defeat non-nuclear attacks.
Moreover, they argue, no U.S. president would ever order the use of nuclear forces to repel a conventional attack knowing full well that to do so would invite a retaliatory nuclear strike against the American homeland. The threat of first-use in response to conventional attack therefore lacks all credibility. Finally, advocates of NFU argue that adopting such a posture would reinforce the norm against the use of nuclear weapons, thus reducing the existential risk of all-out nuclear war.
Detractors, on the other hand, do view NFU as a dangerous folly.
Among the general criticisms of such an approach are that it would leave the U.S. without the ability to deter non-nuclear non-conventional attacks (involving, say, biological or chemical weapons); that such restraint would not be credible in the eyes of potential adversaries who would always have to assume that the U.S. would retain a practical first-use option; and that there is no reason to believe that other nuclear powers would follow suit.
But in today’s world of great power competition and near-peer rivals, perhaps the most telling criticism of NFU is that such a posture would weaken deterrence against conventional attack. Here the logic is both straightforward and compelling. Although the United States remains the world’s most powerful conventional military power, in recent years China and Russia have made dramatic gains in conventional capabilities.
Indeed, they may well have achieved local military superiority over the United States and its allies in some parts of the world. As a result, Washington cannot casually assume that U.S. and allied conventional forces would be sufficient to deter China or Russia from exploiting their local advantages and launching a conventional attack against America’s regional allies and interests.
Absent the threat of American first use of nuclear weapons, the advantage would thus lie with the aggressor, who would not have to factor even the possibility of the U.S. using nuclear weapons to reverse its early conventional military successes. But the possibility that those early successes might trigger the use of U.S. nuclear weapons on the battlefield – and that this might escalate to a general strategic nuclear exchange – would change the equation significantly.
If that possibility (the “threat that leaves something to chance,” in Thomas Schelling’s timeless formulation) had to be factored into the equation, the incentive to exploit whatever conventional military advantage a great power rival might possess would be greatly reduced. Indeed, under those circumstances, a conventional attack on U.S. interests and allies would be simply irrational.
Perversely, then, adopting NFU might well have the unintended consequence of increasing the likelihood of war. That is not to say that there would be no point to the Biden administration issuing a so-called “sole purpose” declaration. Unlike a declaratory policy of NFU, which would prohibit the use of nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack on the U.S., a sole purpose declaration would state why the United States possesses nuclear weapons, without necessarily imposing constraints on their use.
For example, such a declaration might state that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter attacks on the United States and its allies, without prohibiting the use nuclear weapons preemptively or first, in the event of extreme and unforeseen non-nuclear attacks against them. It wouldn’t in the end be all that different from the posture advocated in the 2018 NPR vision, but it would signal once again that the United States’ nuclear arsenal is meant to be used only in extremis. It would also signal Washington’s willingness to continue to play the role of “balancer of last resort.”
The benefit of such a sole purpose declaration, properly framed, over existing policy is that it would deemphasize the role of nuclear weapons in American strategy. The benefit of such a policy over NFU is that it would do so without undermining extended deterrence against non-nuclear attack. The former is a prudent way forward; the latter, a strategic folly — and a dangerous one at that.
Andrew Latham is a professor of international relations at Macalester College in St. Paul, Minn.
The Hill · by Andrew Latham, Opinion Contributor · November 18, 2021
6. The Politics of War
We should not have to read this essay but we do need to read it and discuss it in all PME institutions as well as all of the "Professional Interagency Education Institutions" (PIEI), if we had any.
Excerpt:
The causal chain from a lack of understanding of warfighting and failure to teach warfighting at the military’s Senior Service Schools to failures to win wars is simply not supported by the facts. How to win battles is taught and should continue to be taught, maybe even expanded to some degree, but not at the expense of other subjects. What may need to be taught more is how to win wars. The causal chain for Afghanistan and Iraq is not an inability to win force on force engagements but policy decisions that were possibly based on an overestimation of what the military could accomplish. The best way to prevent repeating those mistakes is to train our future leaders to understand limitations and what resources are best used to meet political aims. Many of those resources exist outside of the military. Broadly educated military leaders will be able to give the best military advice to the elected decision-makers and ensure they understand what objectives are accomplishable by those in uniform and which ones are better suited to other experts. The military can win all the battles, but sound policy decisions and political objectives are needed to win the wars.
The Politics of War
“Victory has a 1,000 fathers, and defeat is an orphan,” – John F. Kennedy
On the heels of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is a cacophony of voices looking to lay blame. It is right and healthy to examine U.S. policies and actions and the outcomes that follow, especially if doing so may prevent future mistakes. But all too often, the loud voices and pointing fingers use preconceived ideas for a quick answer to these complicated problems and don’t take the time to properly diagnose what went wrong or discuss the roles and responsibilities of all involved. This often leads to a conclusion that doesn’t wholly identify the problem and can drive the wrong policy changes. In this case, those voices are using a bias towards a military filter to examine the outcomes and attribute the recent failures in the Middle East to the U.S. military’s inability to win wars. It is understandable to view Afghanistan using the military as the focus since, for the past 20 years, military successes, failures, and leadership have been the face of Afghanistan. Additionally, war itself is thought of as the purview of the military. However, I argue this is a lens that misidentifies how war decisions are made and thus won’t provide the necessary lessons learned to ensure future success.
This is not an attempt to shift blame to civilian decision-makers and excuse away mistakes made by the military. Instead, it is a discussion on how policy objectives are fundamental to war outcomes. It is a reminder of how our civil-military system is structured and how that structure drives decisions at the appropriate level. Furthermore, it is a reminder that no matter how much one may disagree with the decisions or consequences that are derived from that structure, it is still a structure we want in place because wars are ultimately a political decision. The politicians decide when and how wars are ended, not the military. It is appropriate in government, especially in a democracy, for politicians to be the ones making those decisions.
Wrong Assumptions
Many of the post-Afghanistan recriminations are grounded in the idea that our military no longer knows how to win the Nation’s wars. A recurring theme is that the U.S. no longer trains warfighting and that military schools have become so academically focused that they fail to teach our military leaders how to win. The prescribed solution is to focus more on warfighting at the military service schools. While I fully support ensuring warfighting is thoroughly ingrained as part of the service school curriculum, I disagree that this will result in the fix these pundits are seeking.
First, warfighting is already taught at military schools. The School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), the Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), the School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, and several others exist solely to teach campaign and battle planning. These schools teach military students how to plan integrated military operations across all warfighting domains. Graduates of these schools have been given credit for planning the campaigns for military engagement since their founding. Outside of an academic setting, military planners and leaders hone their craft in realistic, simulated battles at training centers and digitized war games, competing against an extremely well-trained opposing force.
Second, the U.S. military has arguably won every battle since the Chosin Reservoir during the Korean War, and even that battle was but a Pyrrhic victory for the Chinese. The battles in Panama, Grenada, Desert Storm, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq were well-planned and executed campaigns. This does not mean that mistakes were not made and that the lives lost were insignificant, but it is a testament to the education and training of the U.S. military. The mistakes made in Iraq and Afghanistan weren’t in the battle planning and execution phase but in the assumptions of what would happen in the aftermath. Bottom line, the U.S. military has mastered winning battles but needs to examine how it plans for the post-battle to stabilize and enable civilian authority phases. I would argue these last two phases shouldn't be military-centric. Department of State and other supporting agencies should take a lead role with the appropriate level of policymakers deciding on courses of action and objectives.
Wars Are Political
Battle outcomes are the result of military actions, but war outcomes are usually the result of political decisions. Since Vietnam, we should have learned that you can win every battle and still lose the war. Even when the military soundly defeats the enemy, it is still the political leaders that decide what the objectives are and how and when to end the war. If those objectives are unrealistic, then it doesn’t matter how many battles are won, the war will be lost. Normally, wars end with a treaty, pact, surrender document, or something similar. In any case, it is the political leadership that agrees that the war is over. Those authors who question the military’s ability to win wars often quote famous military strategists like Clausewitz and Jomini, but they ignore one of Clausewitz’s most famous ideas, that war is an extension of politics. Clausewitz would be the first to say that war does not exist in a realm of its own; it is guided by political ideas and objectives. The two wars with Iraq provide an apt example of the political nature of war termination.
The first war with Iraq, Desert Storm, has been considered an absolute success by the U.S.-led coalition forces. This multi-national force quickly routed the Iraqi Army and caused its retreat from Kuwait. This retreat was quickly followed by President George H. W. Bush’s announcement of a cease-fire and the end of the war. At the end of this victory, however, a large portion of the Iraqi Army was intact, and Saddam Hussein’s government remained in power to continue challenging the United States. It was a political decision not to continue the advance into Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein, much to the chagrin of some military leadership that wanted to complete the annihilation of the Iraqi military and government.
Contrast the 1991 war with the 2003 U.S.-Iraq War. U.S. forces again quickly defeated the Iraqi military, this time taking over all of Iraq, decimating the entire military, and overthrowing the government. In May, President George W. Bush landed on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln, and under a Mission Accomplished banner, announced victory. The United States then continued to fight in Iraq for the next decade, only to leave Iraq with many believing it was only a quasi-victory, at best.
Only in a political world could a war that ended with the enemy still intact and able to openly express their hostility be seen as a complete victory and a war where the enemy is decimated, and the government collapsed be seen as a loss/quasi-victory. If military action alone decided the outcome of wars, the 2003 Iraqi War would be seen as the greater victory of the two. The United States could have left Iraq with a resounding victory knowing it completely defeated the Iraqi military and government - it is hard to find a more conclusive victory.
In both Iraq wars, political leadership decided when the war was over. Desert Storm was considered a war won by the United States, even though the Iraqi forces weren’t completely defeated, and the government remained in power. This is because the political objective wasn't regime change. The military accomplished the political objective set for it, and that is why it is considered a victory. The second war in Iraq is considered a caveated victory, even though the Iraqi military was completely destroyed, and the government collapsed. The difference is the political decision when to end the war. The political objectives set for the military changed and became unattainable. The same could be said for Afghanistan. The U.S. military, with the Northern Alliance and other coalition partners, had routed the Taliban and Al Qaeda by early 2002 in what was a complete victory. Again, it was a political decision to remain in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, based on politically set objectives. The argument here is not if those decisions were wrong or right, but that they are correctly made at the political level. The point is that political leadership decides how wars end, not the military.
A Political Decision
At this point, it might be read that I am arguing that it would be better if the politicians stayed out of the military's way and let the generals and admirals make all the decisions. That is a complete misunderstanding of the argument. Those who believe in democracy generally want war decisions left up to the elected officials. When to go to war and when to end wars are the opposite sides of the same coin. If the military makes those decisions, then they are the ones in charge, not the elected officials. It is central to a democracy for the elected civilian government to set the political objectives, and it is a vital part of the healthy civil-military relations in the United States for the military to answer to the civilian government. However, that doesn't mean the military doesn't have a role to play in the decision-making.
Best Military Advice
The causal chain from a lack of understanding of warfighting and failure to teach warfighting at the military’s Senior Service Schools to failures to win wars is simply not supported by the facts. How to win battles is taught and should continue to be taught, maybe even expanded to some degree, but not at the expense of other subjects. What may need to be taught more is how to win wars. The causal chain for Afghanistan and Iraq is not an inability to win force on force engagements but policy decisions that were possibly based on an overestimation of what the military could accomplish. The best way to prevent repeating those mistakes is to train our future leaders to understand limitations and what resources are best used to meet political aims. Many of those resources exist outside of the military. Broadly educated military leaders will be able to give the best military advice to the elected decision-makers and ensure they understand what objectives are accomplishable by those in uniform and which ones are better suited to other experts. The military can win all the battles, but sound policy decisions and political objectives are needed to win the wars.
Jason Smith currently serves as Service Chair and as Assistant Professor for Security Studies at the National War College. He has served in the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army, as advisor to the Commandant of the Coast Guard, as Senior Policy Advisor in the U.S. Senate, and on the staff of the National Security Council.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official position or policy of the United States Coast Guard, National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
7. Biden Brings Out the Big Guns for NatSec Noms
Biden Brings Out the Big Guns for NatSec Noms
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Situation Report! As a reminder, we’ll be taking a break from SitRep next Thursday to focus on stuffing our faces. We’ll get back to gracing your inboxes with our presence after Thanksgiving. If a week away from SitRep is too much to handle for you emotionally, just remember that absence makes the heart grow fonder.
Alright, here’s what’s on tap for the week: Biden gets heavyweight backing to break Capitol Hill deadlock on nominees, Washington considers sending home some Afghan evacuees, and a Russian anti-satellite test is raising alarm bells at the Pentagon.
If you would like to receive Situation Report in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Situation Report! As a reminder, we’ll be taking a break from SitRep next Thursday to focus on stuffing our faces. We’ll get back to gracing your inboxes with our presence after Thanksgiving. If a week away from SitRep is too much to handle for you emotionally, just remember that absence makes the heart grow fonder.
Alright, here’s what’s on tap for the week: Biden gets heavyweight backing to break Capitol Hill deadlock on nominees, Washington considers sending home some Afghan evacuees, and a Russian anti-satellite test is raising alarm bells at the Pentagon.
If you would like to receive Situation Report in your inbox every Thursday, please sign up here.
Scoop: Former SecDef Makes Appeal to Senate on NATO Nominee
Unlike some of his predecessors, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates isn’t one to bask in the limelight of Washington politics after leaving office. But the former Pentagon chief for George W. Bush and Barack Obama is making an exception now, in an effort to unstick at least part of the giant logjam of foreign-policy nominees sitting in the Senate awaiting confirmation.
Gates, in a letter to lawmakers obtained exclusively by the SitRep team, is appealing directly to U.S. senators to confirm Julie Smith, President Joe Biden’s nominee to be the next U.S. ambassador to NATO.
Gateskeeping. “At a time when Russia is threatening Ukraine militarily and to cut off energy supplies to our NATO allies, the United States has no ambassador to NATO. It is critically important to fill that position,” Gates wrote in a letter sent to Senate Foreign Relations Committee members and Senate leadership.
Smith—a longtime defense expert in Democratic foreign-policy circles who was a former aide to Gates at the Pentagon—was nominated back in June. Republican Sen. Josh Hawley, who held up Smith’s nomination, told Foreign Policy in a statement on Thursday that he had lifted the blockade, which he said was over raising NATO’s defense spending pledge. “Today’s security environment is far worse than the one we confronted in 2014, and our allies must increase defense spending accordingly,” Hawley said. “Julianne Smith recognizes that need and has committed to push our allies to go beyond the Wales commitment.”
(Biden notably has not yet named an ambassador nominee for Ukraine.)
Cruz control. The letter reflects mounting concern and frustration in the Biden camp about an unprecedented blanket hold on State Department nominees from Republican Sen. Ted Cruz, centered on a dispute over a Russian pipeline project. (Though Biden was slow to roll out ambassador nominees in the first place, now the main problem sits with the Senate.)
The numbers don’t look good. As of this week, Biden has submitted 124 nominees for senior State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development roles to the Senate. Of those, the Senate has confirmed only 30. There are nearly 100 ambassador posts that are vacant now.
Rubio has entered the chat. There are other Biden nominees facing Republican opposition. Sen. Marco Rubio announced this week he was placing a hold on Biden’s ambassador nominee to China, veteran diplomat R. Nicholas Burns, and to Spain, Julissa Reynoso Pantaleón. “Nicholas Burns has a long career in public service, but it is a career defined by the failure to understand the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party,” Rubio said.
The Burns hold is a big deal, given the way China looms over U.S. foreign policy these days.
“Unbelievable. Nothing like benching your starting quarterback if you want a winning strategy for strategic competition? The only winners from this move are in Beijing,” the Democrats on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee tweeted in response to Rubio’s announcement.
Forcing a vote. The holds prevent the Senate from approving less controversial ambassador nominees by unanimous voice vote, or they slow-walk votes on nominees that could be confirmed by votes of, say, 75 to 25. The holds take up valuable floor time on the Senate when Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer is already juggling other major pieces of legislation, including the defense authorization bill.
For now, it’s unclear if Biden will be able to get an ambassador to NATO or China in place before the end of the year.
Let’s Get Personnel
Biden is still plugging away at announcing nominees though. Among nominees the White House announced this week: Dimitri Kusnezov to be undersecretary for science and technology at the Department of Homeland Security; Steven Fagin to be U.S. ambassador to Yemen; Jodi Herman to be assistant administrator for legislative and public affairs at USAID; and Lester Martinez-Lopez to be assistant secretary for health affairs at the Defense Department.
8. Are U.S. Missile Defenses Vulnerable to Cyberattacks?
My guess would be yes.
Excerpts:
The Senate draft version of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) recognizes this need and has proposed language that will hopefully become policy. The bill calls for robust operational cybersecurity testing of U.S. missile defense systems, including sensor networks and command and control systems. One of the key requirements in the NDAA language is an inventory of all networks and systems that support the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System.
Fortunately, DoD has a major program underway that is working toward meeting the requirements set out in a draft NDAA called Comply-to-Connect (C2C). C2C creates an integrated structure of tools and technologies to ensure that only legitimate users can access a network and that their behavior follows acceptable standards. Given the scale of current missile defense systems—involving multiple sites as well as airborne, ship-based, and space-based sensors and weapons—keeping track of who is on the network is a major challenge. C2C is a key means for not only tracking who is on a network but also provides for the detection and neutralization of cyber threats to IT networks.
The technology also is effective at protecting operational technology (OT). OT includes computing and communications systems that manage, monitor and control industrial systems and other hardware. Most networked weapons systems can be considered OT because their software programs are designed to support and direct physical processes, such as the flight of a missile.
China’s progress towards an advanced hypersonic and ballistic missile threat must be viewed as a wake-up call for faster implementation of a mosaic of solutions that ensure our missile defenses are protected. It makes no sense to build new sensor networks and weapons systems to defeat advanced ballistic missile threats while leaving those defenses vulnerable to a cyber Pearl Harbor.
Are U.S. Missile Defenses Vulnerable to Cyberattacks?
China and Russia are rapidly expanding their strategic ballistic missile arsenals. China recently tested an intercontinental hypersonic weapon that would allow it to strike critical targets in the United States in a matter of minutes. To counter this threat, the U.S. is rethinking what kind of missile defenses it requires to protect the homeland, forces abroad, and allies.
The strategic balance is changing in real-time. China is building hundreds of ballistic missile silos and could deploy more than 1,000 strategic nuclear warheads capable of reaching the U.S. mainland by 2030. China also has a massive arsenal of theater-range ballistic missiles capable of threatening U.S. forward-deployed forces and allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
The Chinese test of a hypersonic missile with global reach is a potential game-changer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, called this a “Sputnik moment.” Hypersonic weapons fly at five times the speed of sound or more and can maneuver to evade detection or engagement by missile defenses designed for current types of ballistic missiles. With such a weapon, in theory, China could not only defeat existing missile defenses but execute an incapacitating attack against even our National Command Authority (NCA). A senior U.S. Air Force missile defense commander explained the threat thusly:
“The thing that concerns us with hypersonics is our warning time and our warning capability, as these things launch high and then cruise at a lower altitude than we see our normal ICBMs. So, it is that ability to provide a warning to our national leadership, what that threat is . . .”
The Chinese hypersonic missile threat has made the United States rethink its missile defense approach. U.S. defense officials recognize that America’s missile defense capabilities, while formidable, are designed to track and shoot down traditional ballistic missiles and would struggle with hypersonic systems. MDA is looking at developing a specialized sensor constellation, called the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) system that will provide continuous tracking of both hypersonic and regular ballistic missiles. The HBTSS network could provide high-quality tracking and targeting data to existing theater and homeland missile defenses such as the Aegis/Standard Missile, THAAD and National Missile Defense systems.
Even in the event of a breakthrough system that counters hypersonic threats, that capability needs to be resilient and protected from an “x-factor” threat that would undermine the technological feat it represents. One of the most serious of these is a strategic cyberattack that could render missile defenses useless.
Unfortunately, the potential of a disarming cyberattack against U.S. missile defenses is an all too real possibility. China has demonstrated a sophisticated and robust ability to attack U.S. networks and assets, including weapons systems. A preemptive cyberattack on U.S. missile defenses could be give the leading edge to a Chinese missile attack either in the Indo-Pacific or against the U.S. mainland.
U.S. weapons systems are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats. According to a recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Pentagon weapons testers “found mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities in nearly all weapon systems that were under development” over a period of years.
To date the Pentagon and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) have not done enough to provide the necessary cybersecurity for our missile defense capabilities. This particular vulnerability may be in part because U.S. missile defenses must be networked to be effective. The U.S. has a not-so-great track record when it comes to cybersecurity protection of its missile defense systems. For instance, the 2019 Missile Defense Review failed to discuss ways of protecting missile defense systems from cyberattacks.
According to a report by the DoD Inspector General, evidence from multiple parts of the National Missile Defense System provided evidence of significant inadequate data encryption, a dearth of antivirus programs, no multifactor authentication mechanisms, poor physical security procedures and unpatched software vulnerabilities that had been identified decades ago. Since 2017, MDA has failed to complete an assessment of the cyber vulnerability of its networks and systems.
The Department of Defense (DoD) needs to give priority to protecting its networks, databases, command and control systems, sensor grids, and weapons systems against cyberattacks. This is important with respect to theater and national missile defense systems.
The Senate draft version of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) recognizes this need and has proposed language that will hopefully become policy. The bill calls for robust operational cybersecurity testing of U.S. missile defense systems, including sensor networks and command and control systems. One of the key requirements in the NDAA language is an inventory of all networks and systems that support the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System.
Fortunately, DoD has a major program underway that is working toward meeting the requirements set out in a draft NDAA called Comply-to-Connect (C2C). C2C creates an integrated structure of tools and technologies to ensure that only legitimate users can access a network and that their behavior follows acceptable standards. Given the scale of current missile defense systems—involving multiple sites as well as airborne, ship-based, and space-based sensors and weapons—keeping track of who is on the network is a major challenge. C2C is a key means for not only tracking who is on a network but also provides for the detection and neutralization of cyber threats to IT networks.
The technology also is effective at protecting operational technology (OT). OT includes computing and communications systems that manage, monitor and control industrial systems and other hardware. Most networked weapons systems can be considered OT because their software programs are designed to support and direct physical processes, such as the flight of a missile.
China’s progress towards an advanced hypersonic and ballistic missile threat must be viewed as a wake-up call for faster implementation of a mosaic of solutions that ensure our missile defenses are protected. It makes no sense to build new sensor networks and weapons systems to defeat advanced ballistic missile threats while leaving those defenses vulnerable to a cyber Pearl Harbor.
Now a 1945 Contributing Editor, Dan Gouré, Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington Institute. Gouré has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team.
9. Why China Wants More and Better Nukes
Excerpts:
The United States should therefore consider fundamental changes to how it reassures its Indo-Pacific allies. While some have proposed simply copying the NATO model, Washington and its allies need a mechanism that reflects the region’s particular history, politics, and security dynamics. With this in mind, the United States should establish a secretary-level Indo-Pacific Deterrence Dialogue with Australia, Japan, and South Korea to discuss regional security trends and explore options to enhance deterrence. At the same time, the United States should improve its bilateral EDDs by increasing the level of U.S. participation to the deputy secretary level and deepening joint discussions about deterrence and strategic stability. The United States should also work with its Indo-Pacific allies to explore options for increased cooperation in the potential deployment of U.S. strategic capabilities to the region. These could include NATO-style Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (SNOWCAT), in which allied fighters escort American nuclear-capable aircraft if called on for a nuclear mission, and other operations that would give U.S. allies a more direct role in supporting U.S. extended deterrence capabilities without needing to develop their own nuclear capacity or capability.
It also makes sense for the United States to pursue diplomatic engagement with the Chinese military on nuclear issues, but it should do so with limited expectations. The United States has sought to have direct discussions with the People’s Liberation Army since the George W. Bush administration, yet aside from a single discussion in April 2008, there has been no direct meeting on nuclear issues between the U.S. military and the PLA. Beijing has repeatedly rebuffed past Washington initiatives to discuss these issues or consider China’s participation in multilateral arms control negotiations. It appears that the recent Biden-Xi summit has not changed this trend line, despite continued expressions of interest by the United States.
The accelerating expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal suggests that its leaders have recently decided that its historically small and unsophisticated capabilities were insufficient for Beijing’s needs and ambitions. Although these developments do not necessarily indicate a change in China’s attitude toward using nuclear weapons, they still have profound implications for the United States and its allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific. Washington must begin to make the necessary investments and adjustments—not only militarily but also diplomatically and politically—to adapt to these new strategic realities.
Why China Wants More and Better Nukes
How Beijing’s Nuclear Buildup Threatens Stability
November 19, 2021
Foreign Affairs · by Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge · November 19, 2021
Recent weeks have seen an explosion of worry in the United States about China’s nuclear program. A Pentagon report released in early November warned that China is “accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces” and building a larger, diversified, and more sophisticated nuclear arsenal. The report follows news that China tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic space weapon this summer, which General Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described as “very close” to a “Sputnik moment.”
China’s push to enlarge and improve its nuclear arsenal is not terribly surprising in light of long-standing principles of China’s nuclear strategy and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambitions to build a “world-class military” by the middle of this century. But these developments should nevertheless be concerning for the United States and its allies.
The main reason to be worried is that Beijing’s expanded and improved nuclear arsenal puts the United States and China into a deeper condition of nuclear stalemate in which both sides are vulnerable to the other’s nuclear forces, no matter who strikes first. It may seem paradoxical, but this nuclear stalemate might lead to more rather than less risk-taking by Chinese leaders: they could come to see conventional attacks or nonmilitary gray-zone aggression as a “safer” option, carrying little risk of nuclear escalation. That could mean a heightened likelihood of war.
In the face of these expanding Chinese capabilities, the United States will need to strengthen conventional deterrence by carefully prioritizing investments that credibly back its extended deterrence guarantees at both the nuclear and the conventional levels. The United States should also redouble efforts to reassure allies through high-level discussions and remain open to the possibility of direct dialogue with Beijing.
A BIGGER ARSENAL
China has had the bomb since 1964, but for decades its nuclear arsenal was small and vulnerable to being destroyed. Even in the 1980s, China had considerably fewer nuclear warheads than France or the United Kingdom, and Beijing’s missiles could have barely reached Moscow or Washington. China’s nuclear force was largely based in underground silos with fixed, known locations, and its weapons required lengthy, detectable preparations before launch, all of which undermined their survivability in a crisis or war.
Over the last few decades, however, China has made significant investments to improve its nuclear forces. Although its arsenal remains far smaller and less sophisticated than those of the United States or Russia, the Pentagon now assesses that China may have up to 700 deliverable warheads by 2027 and is likely seeking to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030.
According to the Pentagon, China is also building increasingly sophisticated delivery systems for these warheads, including the nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) atop what is called a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) that China apparently tested this summer. A FOBS, first deployed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, allows a nuclear weapon to take a less predictable path and therefore become more difficult for U.S. missile defense systems to intercept. Other capabilities Beijing is pursuing include a nascent nuclear triad, which would give the country the means to launch nuclear weapons from the air, sea, and land, as the United States and Russia have both been able to do for decades. China’s emerging force structure includes mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads; mobile intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) that can conduct both nuclear and conventional strikes with precision; a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile; and China’s first nuclear-capable air-to-air refuelable bomber. The Pentagon also assesses that China is developing a new stealth bomber with a nuclear mission and is building at least three modern ICBM silo fields that could house hundreds of new missile silos in total. In addition, the Pentagon warns that Beijing likely intends to increase “the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture.” This would mean that China might be willing to immediately launch its own nuclear weapons in response to a warning of an incoming attack before enemy nuclear weapons had landed on Chinese soil—a policy that could risk dangerous miscalculations if the early warning information is wrong.
NUCLEAR BACKSTOP
Due to the opacity surrounding China’s nuclear ambitions, some U.S. and allied observers fear that China will abrogate its “no first use” (NFU) policy, which pledges that China will never use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. These fears intensified in September when former senior Chinese diplomat Sha Zukang called for China to abandon the pledge. Some have pointed to China’s recent hypersonic missile test, in particular, as raising the prospect of China being able to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the United States.
Yet concerns that China’s leaders would consider a nuclear first strike are overblown. This is not because of China’s NFU policy. Rather, it is because no matter how many silos or airfields Beijing may hope to destroy, Chinese strategists know that their country would, at a minimum, still be vulnerable to the U.S. Navy’s 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, each of which carry up to 20 ballistic missiles.
Furthermore, since China tested its first nuclear weapon in 1964, Beijing has consistently emphasized that the main purpose of its nuclear arsenal was to avoid being coerced by nuclear-armed opponents—what Mao Zedong referred to as “nuclear blackmail.” Chinese leaders sought to build strategic forces that could credibly threaten a second-strike retaliation, which they saw as sufficient to deter a nuclear attack or nuclear threats against China. Indeed, Chinese leaders during the Cold War decried the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, vowing not to participate.
It may seem paradoxical, but this nuclear stalemate might lead to more rather than less risk-taking by Chinese leaders.
China’s nuclear modernization today is not necessarily a significant departure from this thinking. Rather, China likely wants to be sure that the United States cannot destroy all of the country’s nuclear forces in a so-called splendid nuclear first strike. Chinese strategists apparently worry that prodigious U.S. counterforce capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, could obviate China’s nuclear deterrent, especially when combined with U.S. missile defenses they fear could “mop up” residual Chinese missiles fired in retaliation.
China’s silos are ultimately very vulnerable to a U.S. attack, but they do significantly expand the number of targets the United States would have to hit in order for a first strike to completely disable China’s nuclear retaliatory capability. The new silos’ locations and hardened construction would likely force the United States to use nuclear weapons to attack them. In essence, adding more ICBM silos raises the bar for the United States to attempt to successfully conduct a counterforce strike—a bar that China may believe was lowered in recent years given reported U.S. advances that would greatly enhance the destructive power of U.S. nuclear warheads and put hardened targets, such as missile silos and nuclear command centers, at greater risk.
The capabilities demonstrated in the orbital hypersonic test in July fit with this logic, revealing that China has the ability to strike the United States with conventional or nuclear weapons from an unpredictable trajectory and possibly in a manner that reduces U.S. warning. This new system could help China ensure that even if the United States attacked with a nuclear first strike, some of China’s remaining forces would still be able to attack the United States, because missile defenses would likely not be able to protect the U.S. homeland against this delivery system. The thinking is that the United States would then be deterred from trying to coerce China with nuclear threats, because there would be no way for the United States to protect its homeland if such threats escalated into a nuclear war.
A NEW BOLDNESS
In isolation, China’s efforts to improve the survivability of its nuclear forces might be seen as stabilizing; this is, after all, the logic of nuclear deterrence. If neither side can protect its population from devasting retaliation, even by striking first, then both sides face a very strong rational incentive not to deliberately start a nuclear war, which should be a stabilizing development. Yet in the context of China’s broader military modernization efforts, China’s improved nuclear capabilities have significant implications for the ability of the United States to maintain conventional military deterrence in Asia.
China seeks to build a conventional force capable of establishing temporary military superiority over the United States in a specific geographic area and for a period of time sufficient to achieve its military and political objectives. Although the primary focus of China’s ambitions is Taiwan, the same principle applies to other disputed areas in the East China and South China Seas that may elicit an armed U.S. intervention: China seeks to build the capability to successfully conduct a short, sharp, conventional war. This sort of campaign would quickly seize objectives, executing a fait accompli that would force the U.S. military to then eject Chinese forces from the seized territory in a costly fight.
U.S. conventional military advantages have been diminishing for years due to the improving reach and capabilities of China’s forces, but Chinese strategists have had to worry that in extremis, the United States might still resort to nuclear threats to defend its interests. As explained by the Pentagon in 2019, “operational scenarios exist in which the U.S. would consider first [nuclear] use.” This means that even though the potential for a conventional Chinese military victory has increased, U.S. deterrence has held in part because Beijing has known that its odds of prevailing in a crisis that escalated to nuclear bargaining were low, because China’s nuclear forces were simply too small and vulnerable.
China’s nuclear improvements seem aimed at reducing these shortcomings. By limiting the vulnerability and increasing the numbers of its nuclear forces, Chinese strategists may grow more confident that the Chinese military can challenge the United States or its allies conventionally, with little fear that the United States would resort to nuclear escalation.
China likely wants to be sure that the United States cannot destroy all of the country’s nuclear forces in a so-called splendid nuclear first strike.
An environment that is more favorable to conventional military aggression by China will have profound implications for U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Although Taiwan will be most directly affected by these dynamics, the increased potential for Chinese adventurism will also be deeply concerning for Japan and several countries in Southeast Asia that dispute China’s claims of sovereignty over much of the South China Sea. Left unaddressed, these dynamics could lead U.S. allies and partners to fear that China could successfully seize a disputed island or Taiwan itself and deter the United States from effectively responding. While Beijing would certainly prefer that these countries react to these developments by accommodating Beijing’s interests and distancing themselves from the United States, most U.S. allies and partners have done the opposite: Australia, Japan, Taiwan, and several countries across Southeast Asia have deepened their relations with the United States over the last several years.
Several U.S. allies and partners have also significantly increased investments in their own conventional military capabilities in order to demonstrate to Washington that they will make meaningful contributions to their own self-defense—and to serve as a hedge against the possibility of U.S. abandonment. Australia increased its 2021 defense budget by more than six percent over the previous year to nearly $33 billion, just one year after its Defense Strategic Update noted that “only the nuclear and conventional capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia.” Yet this same document also called for the Australian Defense Force to “grow its self-reliant ability to deliver deterrent effects”—with some Australian scholars assessing that Canberra was reflecting concerns about “the broader durability of the US alliance system in general, and the waning credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in particular.”
Japan’s government has similarly requested a record $50 billion defense budget, with its most recent Defense White Paper assessing that “uncertainty over the existing order is increasing.” “Military powers with high quality and quantity are concentrated in Japan’s surroundings,” it noted, and “China is continuing and strengthening its unilateral attempts to change the status quo by coercion near the [Chinese-claimed] Senkaku Islands,” a group of uninhabited islands in the East China Sea known in China as the Diaoyu Islands. This reflects profound concerns in Tokyo about the potential for Chinese aggression and is a significant shift for a country with a pacifist constitution that for decades has been reasonably comfortable relying on U.S. extended deterrence commitments.
Taiwan also announced plans to increase its defense budget to nearly $26 billion for 2022, a remarkable increase from $10.7 billion in 2018, with its defense ministry stating, “In the face of severe threats from the enemy, the nation’s military is actively engaged in military building and preparation work, and it is urgent to obtain mature and rapid mass production weapons and equipment in a short period of time.”
Most concerning from the perspective of potential nuclear proliferation, debates about the acquisition of their own nuclear weapons have become more mainstream in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. A deeper nuclear stalemate between the United States and China is likely to accelerate this nascent interest in autonomous nuclear capabilities if allies come to believe that the U.S. security umbrella is becoming less reliable against not only nuclear but also conventional threats.
BUILD DETERRENCE BACK BETTER
Given the dramatic growth of China’s conventional and nuclear military capabilities, combined with deepening concerns surrounding the reliability of U.S. extended deterrence commitments among Indo-Pacific allies and partners, the United States should consider new initiatives to reinforce deterrence. These include significant improvements to the U.S. force posture across the Indo-Pacific and greater investments in conventional capabilities that would buttress the ability of the United States to prevent a Chinese fait accompli, representing a shift in regional conventional strategy from “deterrence by punishment” to “deterrence by denial.” It should also take steps to improve the perceptions of American resolve and commitment in the region in the minds of allies, partners, and adversaries alike.
The potential for increased Chinese conventional adventurism means the United States should focus its investments in capabilities that would deny Chinese efforts to establish temporary military superiority over the islands also claimed by U.S. allies and partners and prevent China from executing a fait accompli. It will require working with allies and partners to develop a revitalized and distributed regional military posture across the Indo-Pacific that is effective, flexible, survivable, and both politically and fiscally sustainable. The potential for Chinese military expansion will also force U.S. strategists to make difficult choices about accepting greater degrees of risk in other parts of the world—especially with no expected significant increases in U.S. defense spending.
Washington should also recognize that its existing mechanisms to reassure U.S. allies in the region of its extended deterrence commitments are under increasing strain. In Europe, the United States has reassured its allies for decades by involving them in regular, high-level discussions about nuclear policy through the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). But there is no similar forum for the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the United States established a decentralized series of midlevel, bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogues (EDDs) with Japan and South Korea. There is no equivalent mechanism in the U.S.-Australian alliance, and the statement from the most recent U.S.-Australian ministerial consultation included no reference to extended deterrence.
The United States should therefore consider fundamental changes to how it reassures its Indo-Pacific allies. While some have proposed simply copying the NATO model, Washington and its allies need a mechanism that reflects the region’s particular history, politics, and security dynamics. With this in mind, the United States should establish a secretary-level Indo-Pacific Deterrence Dialogue with Australia, Japan, and South Korea to discuss regional security trends and explore options to enhance deterrence. At the same time, the United States should improve its bilateral EDDs by increasing the level of U.S. participation to the deputy secretary level and deepening joint discussions about deterrence and strategic stability. The United States should also work with its Indo-Pacific allies to explore options for increased cooperation in the potential deployment of U.S. strategic capabilities to the region. These could include NATO-style Support of Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics (SNOWCAT), in which allied fighters escort American nuclear-capable aircraft if called on for a nuclear mission, and other operations that would give U.S. allies a more direct role in supporting U.S. extended deterrence capabilities without needing to develop their own nuclear capacity or capability.
It also makes sense for the United States to pursue diplomatic engagement with the Chinese military on nuclear issues, but it should do so with limited expectations. The United States has sought to have direct discussions with the People’s Liberation Army since the George W. Bush administration, yet aside from a single discussion in April 2008, there has been no direct meeting on nuclear issues between the U.S. military and the PLA. Beijing has repeatedly rebuffed past Washington initiatives to discuss these issues or consider China’s participation in multilateral arms control negotiations. It appears that the recent Biden-Xi summit has not changed this trend line, despite continued expressions of interest by the United States.
The accelerating expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal suggests that its leaders have recently decided that its historically small and unsophisticated capabilities were insufficient for Beijing’s needs and ambitions. Although these developments do not necessarily indicate a change in China’s attitude toward using nuclear weapons, they still have profound implications for the United States and its allies and partners across the Indo-Pacific. Washington must begin to make the necessary investments and adjustments—not only militarily but also diplomatically and politically—to adapt to these new strategic realities.
Foreign Affairs · by Abraham Denmark and Caitlin Talmadge · November 19, 2021
10. What Does Russia Want?
Excerpts:
Think about the problem as akin to the signal-to-noise ratio in science and engineering. The signal would be evidence of Russian preparations for decisive military action, the noise the Russian-instigated upheavals on potential battlegrounds such as the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine. The more background noise consciously spewed out by an aggressor’s mischief-making, the harder it is to distinguish the signal and rally an effective response.
The approach evokes General George S. Patton’s phantom army in Great Britain, a force fabricated to convince German leaders the Allies would land in Calais in 1944 rather than on the beaches in Normandy. Allied commanders deliberately boosted the noise level to mask the signal. Getting ashore on D-Day was far from easy. But it was easier than it would have been absent Patton’s hoax.
Deception conceals what is true while displaying something false. It befuddles, stretches out, and enfeebles an opponent—increasing the likelihood that a venturesome pugilist can deliver a quick, crushing punch to the gut.
Sowing havoc at the expense of near-abroad nations, NATO, and the United States advances Russian geopolitical goals, while Moscow sees it as worthwhile for the sheer hell of it. That makes Vladimir Putin a more formidable competitor than a better-armed but humorless figure like Xi Jinping.
Putin has a weak hand to play; but he plays it well.
What Does Russia Want?
What do Russians want? Moscow seems to be going out of its way to keep its “near abroad”—Russian-speak for the erstwhile Soviet empire, in particular former Soviet republics adjoining the Russian Federation—stirred up. This seems strange.
For instance, the Russian Army is reportedly staging a buildup along the Russo-Ukraine frontier. Moscow may be conniving with the Belarussian government to flood Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia with refugees from the Middle East. Polish, Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian officialdom called the effort to manufacture a refugee crisis a “hybrid attack” on the European Union. Meanwhile the Russian military tracks and decries NATO naval movements in the Black Sea basin; last summer Moscow threatened to “bomb” naval vessels exercising the right to innocent passage through Crimean waters.
At its root strategy is about setting and enforcing priorities. By exercising self-discipline, political and military leaders conserve resources for commitments that matter most. Proliferating commitments—trying to do it all—consumes and divides up diplomatic and military resources, attenuating the resources available to fulfill any one commitment. Vladimir Putin & Co. seem to be deliberately multiplying hotspots along their borders. Are they guilty of flagrant strategic indiscipline?
Not necessarily.
There is another approach to strategy. Maritime historian Julian Corbett channels philosopher-soldier Carl von Clausewitz, who professed bewilderment at the concept of “war by contingent.” And it is an odd creature. In the normal course of things, warlike leaders design strategies whereby the value they assign the political aim governs the rate at which they expend resources—lives, national treasure, military hardware, and so forth—to attain the political aim. They also gauge how long they’re prepared to keep up expenditures of that magnitude. In other words, what strategic leaders want and how much they want it dictates the price they pay for it.
Easy.
But Corbett observes that it’s also possible to make war by contingent under certain circumstances. This is a pure troublemaking strategy. Rather than set specific political aims, political and military leaders earmark modest means for the campaign and bid expeditionary commanders go forth and make as much mayhem as they can with the forces allotted. Such a strategy, then, has no definite purpose except to make things tough on an antagonist. Successfully executed, a war by contingent helps exhaust the enemy over time—and thus makes a difference in a larger struggle.
The classic example is Lord Wellington’s campaign against Napoleon Bonaparte in Portugal and Spain. During the latter phases of the Napoleonic Wars, Wellington led a small army ashore in Iberia—a “contingent” in Corbett’s lingo—to the west of imperial France. At the same time the major fighting raged to France’s east. The token British ground force fought in concert with local partisans while supported by the Royal Navy. Then as now, hybrid warfare was fiendishly difficult and manpower-intensive to counter. It thrust Napoleon onto the horns of a dilemma. He could resign himself to anarchy along his western frontier, or he could siphon forces from the theater that mattered most in an effort to tame the strategic backwater in Iberia.
Napoleon did the latter—and reduced the martial might he could amass against his foes in Central Europe. The little emperor jokingly dubbed the British-led campaign his “Spanish Ulcer.” It was a nagging, debilitating irritant that distracted his strategic attention while sapping his battle resources.
As Wellington and his redcoats showed, then, adventurism can pay off at low cost. The same holds true during ages of peacetime strategic competition such as our own. Moscow may be mounting hybrid wars by contingent all around the Russian periphery. Why? Well, Russian leaders covet the dominant say-so in the near abroad. They probably see value in keeping neighbors jittery. Nor should we discount mirth as a motive. You get the sense Putin takes glee in geopolitical gamesmanship. If he can inflict ulcers on multiple rivals without bankrupting the treasury, so much the better from his standpoint.
And, as Corbett might attest, strategic logic is satisfied.
There is a more sinister possibility than mischief-making, though. Suppose Moscow resolved to do something dramatic at some point around the Russian periphery. Or perhaps it just wanted to create the option to do something dramatic. If so, Russian magnates might reason that it makes sense to keep the entire frontier zone aflutter before they deal out an offensive blow in some theater. In this case, hybrid wars by contingent would constitute part of a grand deception aimed at making it hard for adversaries to foretell where or when the blow would fall.
It could come anywhere at any time; it could come nowhere.
Think about the problem as akin to the signal-to-noise ratio in science and engineering. The signal would be evidence of Russian preparations for decisive military action, the noise the Russian-instigated upheavals on potential battlegrounds such as the Baltics, Poland, and Ukraine. The more background noise consciously spewed out by an aggressor’s mischief-making, the harder it is to distinguish the signal and rally an effective response.
The approach evokes General George S. Patton’s phantom army in Great Britain, a force fabricated to convince German leaders the Allies would land in Calais in 1944 rather than on the beaches in Normandy. Allied commanders deliberately boosted the noise level to mask the signal. Getting ashore on D-Day was far from easy. But it was easier than it would have been absent Patton’s hoax.
Deception conceals what is true while displaying something false. It befuddles, stretches out, and enfeebles an opponent—increasing the likelihood that a venturesome pugilist can deliver a quick, crushing punch to the gut.
Sowing havoc at the expense of near-abroad nations, NATO, and the United States advances Russian geopolitical goals, while Moscow sees it as worthwhile for the sheer hell of it. That makes Vladimir Putin a more formidable competitor than a better-armed but humorless figure like Xi Jinping.
Putin has a weak hand to play; but he plays it well.
A 1945 Contributing Editor, Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.
11. 'Almost a melding' of US, UK, Aussie services coming: NSC's Kurt Campbell
Excerpts:
The context for President Biden’s almost four-hour discussion Monday night with President Xi Jinping, Kurt Campbell said, is “that the United States is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific, and we’re going to defend and support the operating system that has been so good for so many of us for many years.”
At the broader national security level, Biden tried to convey to Xi that, in the realms of nuclear weapons, cyber and space, “as great powers we have an interest in doing what we can to head off problems — inadvertence, miscalculation, accident; that’s at the first level,” Campbell said.
Those talks, however, are “at the very earliest stages,” Campbell said.
In what appeared to be a reference to a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) with a hypersonic weapon, as well as China’s apparent commitment to substantially increase its numbers of nuclear weapons, the advisor said that “the Chinese are embarking in certain areas, again, in nuclear, cyber and space, and they are undertaking certain practices that we think are destabilizing.”
Talks about arms control and other ways to lessen the risks for accidents and misunderstanding in those realms are just beginning, he said, also noting that the Chinese have long resisted taking part on arms control talks.
'Almost a melding' of US, UK, Aussie services coming: NSC's Kurt Campbell - Breaking Defense
The context for President Biden's almost four-hour discussion Monday night with President Xi Jinpeng, Kurt Campbell said, is "that the United States is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific, and we're going to defend and support the operating system that has been so good for so many of us for many years."
Then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell speaks at U.S. Embassy in Tokyo in 2009 (Photo by Junko Kimura/Getty Images)
WASHINGTON: If China wonders how committed Australia, the US and the UK are to working together, they need look no further than today’s comments by Kurt Campbell, who leads all things Indo-Pacific on President Biden’s National Security Council.
Look for “almost a melding of our services” between the allied navies in a remarkable new phase of allied partnership, Campbell said at the US Institute of Peace this morning.
“We will have more British sailors serving on our naval vessels, Australians and the like on more of our forward-deployed assets in Australia. This leads to a deeper interconnection and, almost a melding in the new respects of our services and working together on common purpose that we couldn’t have dreamed about five or 10 years ago,” Campbell said.
Why is this happening? “Fundamentally, it leads to what we believe is going to be the most essential feature of an effective strategy in the Indo-Pacific, and that’s deeper cooperation with allies and partners,” he said. “These tasks ahead in the Indo-Pacific we cannot take on alone. We must get on in partnership.”
In addition to the “melding” comments, Campbell provided scraps of new information about the AUKUS agreement between Australia, Britain and the US. Jim Miller, former Defense undersecretary for policy, was named to lead the US efforts on AUKUS. Campbell said he’s been “tasked” with leading US efforts in several areas.
First, Miller will “basically design an architecture about how the three countries will work more proactively on defense, on sharing perspectives of the Indo-Pacific.” That will mean coordinating “on a day-to-day basis” how defense, state diplomatic and other officials from all three countries will meet regularly “to harmonize our views and our positions in the Indo-Pacific.”
Most importantly, Miller will also “do whatever possible to provide the Royal Australian Navy with options to build nuclear submarines as rapidly as possible.”
Miller, he said, has 18 months to pull all of that together.
And Campbell did provide some glimpses behind the curtain, especially for those who still wonder why Britain is part of AUKUS. Great Britain, he said, “wants to be much more focused on the Indo-Pacific.” For the US that has benefits because “we want to extend this overall engagement with Europe about Asia.”
But these strengthened security relationships with Australia, Britain and other countries is, Campbell acknowledged, viewed by China as “Cold War thinking,” which they believe is not helpful. In fact, he said the Peoples Republic of China puts such strengthened bilateral security alliances between the US and other countries at the “top of China’s heartburn lists.”
That sort of dissonance is exactly why the National Security Council staffer said this morning that the most important thing for US-China relations are “open, clear lines of communication.”
The context for President Biden’s almost four-hour discussion Monday night with President Xi Jinping, Kurt Campbell said, is “that the United States is here to stay in the Indo-Pacific, and we’re going to defend and support the operating system that has been so good for so many of us for many years.”
At the broader national security level, Biden tried to convey to Xi that, in the realms of nuclear weapons, cyber and space, “as great powers we have an interest in doing what we can to head off problems — inadvertence, miscalculation, accident; that’s at the first level,” Campbell said.
Those talks, however, are “at the very earliest stages,” Campbell said.
In what appeared to be a reference to a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) with a hypersonic weapon, as well as China’s apparent commitment to substantially increase its numbers of nuclear weapons, the advisor said that “the Chinese are embarking in certain areas, again, in nuclear, cyber and space, and they are undertaking certain practices that we think are destabilizing.”
Talks about arms control and other ways to lessen the risks for accidents and misunderstanding in those realms are just beginning, he said, also noting that the Chinese have long resisted taking part on arms control talks.
12. Pentagon Delays Release of Potentially Politicized Report on ‘Extremism’ in the Military – Why?
Excerpts:
All three RAND experts downplayed the significance of the working group’s report being delayed, but Brown, the Maryland congressman, said he was “absolutely” concerned by the Pentagon’s slow pace, and he argued the Defense Department was incapable of addressing this national security threat without congressional action.
Brown, a member of the Armed Services and Veterans’ Affairs Committees, sponsored an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would establish an “Office of Countering Extremism” at the Pentagon.
That, however, is a whole different fight. NatSec Daily reports that: “The White House opposed the congressman’s measure “because it would impose onerous and overly specific training and data collection requirements and would foreclose other options to address extremism.”
Pentagon Delays Release of Potentially Politicized Report on ‘Extremism’ in the Military – Why? - American Defense News
ANALYSIS – In what many call a politicized and ideological witch hunt masquerading as a counter ‘extremism’ effort, the Pentagon’s Countering Extremist Activity Working Group has delayed the release of its long-awaited report.
Despite the contrived partisan urgency to make this an issue to hammer conservatives and supporters of former President Trump, it’s still unclear when Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will be briefed on the report, and the Pentagon has yet to set a date for when it will be made public.
The question is why?
As Politico’s NatSec Daily reports:
Austin first announced the establishment of the Countering Extremist Activity Working Group in an April memo, ordering that its report should be “provided … no later than 90 days from its first meeting on or about April 14, 2021.” More than four months after Austin’s deadline, however, the secretary still has not seen the final product.
Kirby defended the delay to NatSec Daily, saying in a statement: “We appreciate the work stakeholders across the enterprise have put in this important effort. That work is undergoing some additional reviews and coordination. This is an important enough issue to the Secretary and the Department that we want to get it right, and to move forward in the most deliberate way possible.”
This exaggerated “domestic extremism” threat has become the Left’s and Democrats number one boogeyman in 2021. Trying to show that it is a major danger in the US military has been key to their narrative.
The Pentagon’s inability to define the threat, much less quantify it has many experts arguing that the danger is fairly small, and the numbers show it. Delaying the release of this report even longer, adds fuel to this speculation. It has also angered proponents of the narrative, as NatSec Daily notes:
The report’s hold-up has also frustrated Rep. ANTHONY BROWN (D-Md.), a retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel who has called for tougher measures by Congress to curb military extremism. “If you really care about the men and women who serve, you don’t delay on extremism in the ranks.”
Following the unarmed riot at the Capitol, which partisans and ideologues insist on misnaming an “insurrection,” the Defense Department has moved to root out so-called “extremists” in the U.S. military, with Austin directing commanding officers and supervisors in February to conduct a one-day “stand-down” to discuss the issue with their personnel.
Additionally the department sponsored a RAND Corporation study published in September that put forward a framework for helping commanders reduce the risk of military extremism. But the dangers of this effort being politicized, and partisan, are clear.
Many argue this effort must not become a mechanism to purge conservatives, Christians or Trump supporters from the military.
NatSec Daily reported that:
TODD HELMUS, another coauthor of the October RAND study, said the report should recommend implementing “a very strong education and awareness campaign” for incoming troops and seek to “manage perceptions” of the antiextremism efforts, “so this does not become a political lightning rod.”
Helmus also told NatSec Daily that the Pentagon should institute some type of “off-ramping intervention,” though he was pessimistic the working group would back such a proposal. “There needs to be some way of helping people who they do identify as being extremist, and help them get out,” he said.
All three RAND experts downplayed the significance of the working group’s report being delayed, but Brown, the Maryland congressman, said he was “absolutely” concerned by the Pentagon’s slow pace, and he argued the Defense Department was incapable of addressing this national security threat without congressional action.
Brown, a member of the Armed Services and Veterans’ Affairs Committees, sponsored an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that would establish an “Office of Countering Extremism” at the Pentagon.
That, however, is a whole different fight. NatSec Daily reports that: “The White House opposed the congressman’s measure “because it would impose onerous and overly specific training and data collection requirements and would foreclose other options to address extremism.” ADN
Paul Crespo is the Managing Editor of American Defense News. A defense and national security expert, he served as a Marine Corps officer and as a military attaché with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at US embassies worldwide. Paul holds degrees from Georgetown, London, and Cambridge Universities. He is also CEO of SPECTRE Global Risk, a security advisory firm, and President of the Center for American Defense Studies, a national security think tank.
13. Moscow’s Foreign Policy is Getting Increasingly Ideological
Conclusion:
Far from being non-ideological, the key to understanding Russian grand strategy is recognizing that the Kremlin believes values-based ideologies are the source of the most powerful weapons in the current security environment. The weaponization of values means that they are subjected to the rules of the security dilemma—the zero-sum game where the increased strength of one state makes another state feel less secure. Today, Putin sees the ideological-informational domain as characterized by a zero-sum struggle between liberalism and illiberalism. In this ideological competition, the thugs undermining democracy and shutting down the Georgian Pride parade are part of the same challenge as pro-Russian white nationalist militia groups storming the American capital on January 6th to overturn election results. Until democratic policymakers recognize Moscow’s inherently ideological approach to foreign policy, they will be continually betrayed by their own misplaced expectations for cooperation.
Moscow’s Foreign Policy is Getting Increasingly Ideological
Far from being non-ideological, the key to understanding Russian grand strategy is recognizing that the Kremlin believes values-based ideologies are the source of the most powerful weapons in the current security environment.
From the invasion of Ukraine to interference in elections across Europe and the United States, the last ten years have seen a dramatic escalation in the Russian Federation’s activity on the international stage. This increased activity has drawn renewed focus on the nature of the current Russian regime and led to a debate among analysts over the role of ideology in Russian grand strategy.
Representing the non-ideological side of the debate, Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky write for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that “Russia, like any major power, seeks to expand its influence and weaken the position of its perceived adversaries. But there is little evidence that the Kremlin operates according to some master plan or coherent grand strategy to spread its ideology around the world.”
Yet non-ideological descriptions of Russian grand strategy ignore the way the Kremlin believes the global security environment has changed.
Moscow’s perception of the global security environment has been shaped by the nation’s experiences over the last thirty years. From the wars of independence to the democracy movements in former Soviet states, the Kremlin has seen ideological forces drive political change in its region. Keeping with its tradition, Russia’s security elite have viewed this turmoil through the lens of foreign subversion. This is especially the case with democratizing political movements that have led to so-called “color revolutions.” In Moscow, nearly every democratizing civil resistance movement that has occurred in the last twenty years, including the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine and the entire Arab Spring, is believed to be the result of Western governments using information warfare in the form of democracy promotion and soft power.
Russia’s security services have focused on this phenomenon, developing a methodology they believe the United States uses to overthrow targeted states via color revolutions. There are variations, but in general, Moscow believes the United States starts by using information warfare to promote democracy amongst a population in a targeted state. This value-promotion cultivates a democratic “front” within the target state by shaping a population’s value system to want democracy and then attracting them to American leadership via soft power. The co-opted front is then used to generate “controlled chaos,” such as large-scale protests, which present opportunities to overthrow the targeted regime.
Moscow’s belief that the United States has developed a new extremely powerful weapon with value promotion at its core has come to dominate the Kremlin’s threat perception vis-à-vis the West. According to the Kremlin, generating color revolutions constitutes “New Generation War.” Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces argued in 2014 that generating color revolutions is becoming the main means that western countries use to achieve political goals. Retired Russian Col. Gen. Leonid Ivashov said that American soft power is the equivalent of being “attacked with all the means of classical wars—with airstrikes and invasions of large armies.”
Moscow’s belief that a values-based state ideology enables an extremely powerful form of information warfare has created a new set of challenges for the Kremlin. The Russian government hasn’t had a state ideology comparable to Western democracy since the end of the Cold War. Russian president Vladimir Putin himself talked about this challenge during his 2013 Valdai Discussion Club speech, saying “After 1991 there was the illusion that a new national ideology, a development ideology, would simply appear by itself.” Putin continued, “today we need new strategies to preserve our identity,” because a primary focus of modern state competition is “ideological-informational.”
Putin continued his speech by outlining a new state ideology that could solve the problem he described. He defined the ideology as a contrast to western tolerance on social issues like racism, sexism, and gay rights, arguing western democracies were “rejecting their roots,” by accepting multiculturalism and same-sex partnerships, comparing the latter to a belief in Satan. In his annual speech to the Federal Assembly later that year, Putin clarified that Russia’s “values-based approach” international relations meant that Moscow identified itself as a defender of “traditional values.”
Putin’s two 2013 speeches were part of a broader effort to make “traditional values”—defined in ethno-nationalist and homophobic terms—an official ideology of the Russian state. This effort was captured in a 2013 article in the Atlantic subtitled “The Russian president is positioning himself as the world's leading defender of traditional values.” This new state ideology has been enshrined in both Russia’s 2021 and 2015 National Security Strategies, with the latter identifying the preservation and development of traditional Russian values as a long-term national strategic interest.
The addition of traditional values as a state ideology serves Moscow’s domestic and international interests. From a domestic standpoint, an emphasis on traditional values reinforces the strict hierarchies upholding Russian authoritarianism. Internationally, the addition of a values-based state ideology enables the use of value promotion and soft power, allowing Moscow to construct its own color revolution weapon. Social scientists have also found that socially illiberal values like racism translate into “authoritarian personality” traits, meaning the Kremlin could develop its new weapons while undermining the democratic values it is so afraid of.
As previously discussed, the Kremlin believes color revolutions are generated in three steps: value promotion, using value promotion to cultivate a “front,” and using that front to create controlled chaos, usually through protests. Putin’s government has promoted far-right traditional values in myriad ways. This includes promoting LGBTQ+ prejudice and supporting white supremacists across the globe. Perhaps the easiest way to observe Russian value promotion is through the narratives promoted in state media. Julia Davis, who covers the subject for the Daily Beast, writes that the Kremlin uses its state media: “…to attract Western converts with… bigotry—turning Russia into the land of ultimate political incorrectness, the world’s anti-woke capital.”
The promotion of social conservatism then cultivates like-minded groups in the West to serve as a front for Russian interests. After hearing Putin’s 2013 national address to the Federal Assembly, American social conservative Pat Buchanan wrote an article asking, “Is Putin One of Us?” One prominent white nationalist described Russia as “the leader of the free world right now,” because Putin is “promoting traditional values.” This attraction translates into co-option through soft power, allowing illiberal western groups to serve as instruments of the Russian state. Writing in the Atlantic, Michael Carpenter details how Russian intelligence services have used these shared values to co-opt far-right groups, turning them into a front for the Russian government.
The final stage of the color revolution weapon is to use the cultivated front to generate controlled chaos which creates opportunities to overthrow a targeted government. This is exactly what Moscow did in its failed coup in Montenegro. In 2016, immediately after Montenegro joined NATO, Russian security forces attempted to overthrow the government and replace it with the Democratic Front (DF), a group of pro-Russian ethno-nationalist parties. According to Foreign Policy Research Institute, the plan for the coup was for an ethno-nationalist Serb militia group—previously co-opted by Russian intelligence—to use violence to generate mass protests, thereby creating an opportunity to overturn the election results and install a pro-Russian illiberal regime.
The attempt to build its own color revolution weapon demonstrates how the Russian government seeks to spread its influence using ideology and value promotion as core components of its foreign policy. Critics of the argument that Putin has centered far-right ideologies will point out that the Russian government has also cultivated left-wing groups. While this is true, the cultivation of left-wing groups is often used in support of far-right goals. More importantly, there is no left-wing ideology comparable to “traditional values” listed in Russia’s strategic doctrines.
Far from being non-ideological, the key to understanding Russian grand strategy is recognizing that the Kremlin believes values-based ideologies are the source of the most powerful weapons in the current security environment. The weaponization of values means that they are subjected to the rules of the security dilemma—the zero-sum game where the increased strength of one state makes another state feel less secure. Today, Putin sees the ideological-informational domain as characterized by a zero-sum struggle between liberalism and illiberalism. In this ideological competition, the thugs undermining democracy and shutting down the Georgian Pride parade are part of the same challenge as pro-Russian white nationalist militia groups storming the American capital on January 6th to overturn election results. Until democratic policymakers recognize Moscow’s inherently ideological approach to foreign policy, they will be continually betrayed by their own misplaced expectations for cooperation.
Ben Sohl is a recent graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. You can find him on Twitter @ben_sohl.
Image: Reuters
14. Asia's quiet militarization threatens to turn the region into a powder keg
Asia's quiet militarization threatens to turn the region into a powder keg
CNN · by Analysis by Ben Westcott and Eric Cheung, CNN
Once launched, the high-tech vessel will be able to propel planes into the sky at the same speed as its US counterparts, another example of China's rapid military modernization.
It's a trend that is putting the entire region on edge.
In recent months, global attention has been fixed on rising tensions between Taipei and Beijing -- but the threat of conflict in Asia stretches far beyond the Taiwan Strait.
Across the region, countries are engaged in their own quiet arms race to avoid being left behind. But experts warn that any miscalculation could lead to conflict in a region already riven by border disputes and old rivalries.
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In East Asia, Japan and South Korea are rapidly modernizing their militaries in response to threats from China and North Korea, whose leadership is particularly sensitive to signs of military progress nearby. Last month, after South Korea tested a new missile, Pyongyang admonished Seoul for its "reckless ambition."
Meanwhile, India's increased military investment after clashes with China on their disputed Himalayan border risks inflaming tensions with its longtime rival, Pakistan.
Similarly, countries with overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea may struggle to maintain a diplomatic status quo as Beijing aggressively stakes its claim to strategically valuable shipping lanes.
The region is trapped in a "security dilemma" -- a geopolitical spiral where countries repeatedly reinforce their own militaries in response to the growth of their neighbors' forces, said Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
"The potential for a major power war is increasing," he said. "We are building up to a potential crisis."
Satellite images show China's new aircraft carrier with advanced technology 01:36
The military rise of China
Under President Xi Jinping, China's military has rapidly expanded.
China's military budget is growing every year, likely above $200 billion in 2021, and while it is still far below the estimated $740 billion 2022 US defense budget, the PLA is closing the technological gap with the American military.
Along with the third aircraft carrier being built in Shanghai, the Pentagon claimed China recently tested a hypersonic missile.
"What we saw was a very significant event of a test of a hypersonic weapon system. And it is very concerning," said Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley. China said it wasn't a missile but a "routine spacecraft experiment."
And it isn't just China's military buildup that is unsettling the region, but its attitude as well.
Speaking at a celebration of the 100th anniversary of the ruling Chinese Communist Party in July, Xi said China would no longer be "bullied, oppressed or subjugated" and anyone who tried would "find their heads bashed bloody against a great wall of steel."
"The potential for a major power war is increasing ... We are building up to a potential crisis."
Malcolm Davis, senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
"Such moves are extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire. Whoever plays with fire will get burnt," the statement quoted Xi as saying.
Over the past few years, a new breed of combative Chinese diplomats, nicknamed "wolf warriors," have been pushing back hard in press conferences and on social media against any perceived slights toward China.
Arzan Tarapore, South Asia research scholar at Stanford University, said Beijing's aggressive posturing and diplomacy under Xi was alarming its neighbors. "This is not just the brashness of "wolf warrior" diplomacy but an apparent willingness to press its territorial claims with force," he said.
Since the end of World War II, the US has been a major guarantor of peace and stability in the region, particularly through its close security alliances with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.
But the threat of a US withdrawal from the region under former US President Donald Trump, combined with his "America First" policies that saw the country turn inward, undermined trust in Washington's engagement in the region.
Since being elected, Biden has affirmed his commitment to the Indo-Pacific, but the threat of a second Trump administration in 2024 and the chaos that resulted from the US withdrawal in Afghanistan, has led American security partners in Asia to beef up their own militaries against any eventualities, Tarapore said.
"I fear there will always now be a little asterisk when regional countries consider the US -- that it is not immune from domestic instability or strategic madness," Tarapore said.
Taiwan holds ceremony for advanced F-16V fighter jets 02:11
Japan and South Korea build their forces
Two of the countries with the most rapid militarization are those geographically closest to China: Japan and South Korea.
Ahead of his election win in October, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida promised to double the country's military budget if he was reelected -- raising it to 2% of the GDP for the first time since World War II.
There is no timeline for the unprecedented increase, but it would allow the Japanese government to quickly expand its forces at a time when Tokyo feels under growing pressure from neighboring North Korea and China.
Japan recently announced plans to deploy more missiles in 2022 to its Okinawa island chain that sits just a few hundred miles from the Chinese mainland. Experts see the deployment as a deterrent to any moves by Beijing against Taiwan.
It has also expanded its military in recent years with F-35 fighter jets licensed or purchased from the US, along with repurposed aircraft carriers to transport them. The country's Self-Defense Forces are also looking to add high-tech submarines, destroyers and stealth fighters to their arsenal.
While Japan's neighbor North Korea is often in the news for its missile program, South Korea is also rapidly expanding its forces. Seoul is looking to build up its military, partly to make it less reliant on its longtime security partner, the United States.
In September, Seoul announced it had successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), one of the first major trials since Biden agreed to end a 40-year-old treaty limiting South Korea's weapons program.
"I fear there will always now be a little asterisk when regional countries consider the US -- that it is not immune from domestic instability or strategic madness."
Arzan Tarapore, South Asia research scholar at Stanford University
The limits were put in place in 1979 to prevent a missile development arms race between the two Koreas. The end of the treaty is another step by South Korea towards military independence, which could provoke a more intense arms race with the North. South Korea is already planning to commission its first aircraft carrier, for potential deployment in 2033.
While both Japan and South Korea are longtime US security partners, with uneasy relationships with China and North Korea, their bilateral ties are at times marred by historical grievances and territorial disputes.
The two governments regularly clash diplomatically over historic human rights abuses during the early 20th century, when Japan occupied South Korea, and experts said neither government is likely to want the other to pull ahead too far militarily.
"Some right-wing leaders in Tokyo will say, 'look at South Korea, it has an aircraft carrier, a full-fledged aircraft carrier, we need to have one also ... as a matter of national pride,'" Lionel Fatton, Indo-Pacific affairs expert at Webster University in Switzerland, said.
The slow arms race
Not every country allied with the US is seeking more military independence.
In a shock announcement in September, Australia tied itself more closely to Washington by forming a new security alliance with the US and UK in the Indo-Pacific.
Under the agreement, known as AUKUS, the allies will share information, including US technology that could see Australia acquire its own fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. That would allow Australia to extend its reach into the South China Sea while also solidifying a foothold for London and Washington in the region.
The decision made it clear that Australia was choosing the US over China, shifting the balance of the power in the Asia-Pacific.
How Australia became a global example of how to resist Beijing 02:47
It also unsettled nations across Southeast Asia, which are struggling to maintain a cordial relationship with Beijing while protecting their own interests.
Both Malaysia and Indonesia publicly voiced their reservations about the AUKUS deal, with Jakarta saying it was concerned it could lead to a regional arms race. The US ambassador to Indonesia, Sung Kim, said at the time that those concerns were unwarranted.
Indonesia itself is in the midst of attempting a major military modernization. President Joko Widodo called for a $125 billion investment in June, and has increased military patrols of the South China Sea, where China claims a huge swathe of territory that overlaps areas claimed by other nations.
But other claimants to the South China Sea -- including Philippines and Vietnam -- are struggling with their own military buildup, ASPI's Davis said.
In July, Vietnam military expert Nguyen The Phuong wrote that Vietnam's military modernization had effectively ground to a halt, due to budgetary constraints and alleged corruption in the armed forces. And in September, Philippines Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana blamed the US for refusing to provide high-tech weapons to his country, leaving them with "Vietnam War-era" castoffs.
Davis said the traditional stance for ASEAN nations, including Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, has been to avoid conflict in favor of maintaining the status quo and remaining non-aligned.
But he warned any further aggression by Beijing in the South China Sea could push countries to adopt a more militaristic stance.
"If the Chinese declared an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea or took additional territories or started creating additional artificial islands ... (it) could actually then generate the ASEAN states to actually make that step," he said.
Military threats in South Asia
Apart from Taiwan, most experts said the most dangerous military standoff in Asia is the border between China and India.
As recently as June 2020, dozens of Chinese and Indian soldiers were killed in clashes in the Galwan Valley, in an area claimed as part of Xinjiang by China and part of Ladakh by India. Since then multiple unconfirmed reports suggest troops are being sent to the border by both Beijing and Delhi.
India has the third-largest military budget in the world, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, valued at around $72 billion, and fields an army of more than 3 million people.
India has a homemade aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant, in sea trials and is undertaking missile tests to improve its ballistic arsenal.
But Stanford's Tarapore said the approach was still piecemeal. "The Air Force as a whole is in dire need of recapitalization, and the Navy is retiring submarines faster than it is replacing them," he said.
But any additional moves by India to beef up its armed forces may be viewed unfavorably by neighboring Pakistan, Tarapore said. The two nuclear powers have had an uneasy peace for decades, with multiple disputes across their land border.
Tarapore said it was unlikely India could tailor its military growth in a way which wouldn't cause concern in Pakistan -- and so it may not attempt to appease Islamabad and carry on regardless.
"Delhi knows that, short of some unlikely grand political bargain, the specific shape of its military modernization won't mollify Pakistan in any meaningful way, so it may as well do what's needed to meet its pressing military threats," he said.
Taiwan's President confirms US troops are training military on the island 07:32
A safer Asia Pacific?
China is showing no signs of halting its military growth, and Beijing has partially attributed that to one major factor -- the US.
In recent years, the American military has been growing its presence in the Asia Pacific region, including undertaking frequent Freedom of Navigation Operations near Chinese-held islands in the South China Sea and sailing vessels through the Taiwan Strait.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has regularly accused Washington of being responsible for the militarization in the Asia Pacific. And as China builds up its forces in response, so too do the country's neighbors.
As a result, there is no end in sight for militarization in the region and most experts said it will likely speed up, increasing the chance for miscalculation and conflict.
Politicians and experts around the region have compared the arms race and tensions in the Asia Pacific to Europe in the 1930s, shortly before the start of World War II.
Peter Layton, visiting fellow at Griffith University's Asia Institute, said the chance of a war between major powers in the Asia region in the next 10 years is rising, but he hopes economic and trade interdependence between China and its rivals in Asia, as well as the US, could help to deter any military action.
"The question is whether the economic system is strong enough to avoid military conflict," he said. However Layton said while the economic interdependency might prevent war in Asia, it could spark growing economic coercion across the region, such as the trade restrictions China has leveled at Australia over the past year.
"They can ... use positive or negative sanctions to control most people using the power of money," he said.
ASPI's Davis said while he expects the arms race in Asia to make the region more dangerous, he doesn't think nations have "much of a choice."
He believes the Chinese government's aggressive behavior and military modernization will continue no matter how its neighbors react. "Even if we didn't respond, they would keep on going," he said.
In fact, Tarapore said it is possible that military weakness in and of itself could provoke aggression, while military power "may also be frightening to erstwhile aggressors and serve to deter rather than provoke war."
The time is coming, Tarapore said, when countries in Asia will have to choose "what form of safety is most important to us" -- the safety of a military deterrent or any protection offered by acquiescing to Beijing's expansion.
"Arms races are costly. Losing them can be costlier," he said.
CNN's Brad Lendon and Will Ripley contributed to this report.
CNN · by Analysis by Ben Westcott and Eric Cheung, CNN
15. Ukrainian defense minister says he's asked Pentagon for military assistance
Ukrainian defense minister says he's asked Pentagon for military assistance
The Hill · by Jordan Williams · November 19, 2021
Ukraine's defense minister says he has asked the Pentagon for assistance to help defend Ukraine as it deals with increasing tensions over Russia’s military buildup near its borders.
Speaking to reporters at the Ukrainian Embassy in Washington on Friday, Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said Ukraine needs to “cover our sky and our sea,” Bloomberg News reported.
“To stop [Russian] aggression, we need to show the cost will be too high,” the defense minister added, according to Radio Free Europe.
Reznikov’s comments come as U.S. officials have warned that Russia could try to carry out a potential invasion in Ukraine as it did in 2014 when it annexed the Crimean Peninsula.
The Ukrainian defense minister met with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon on Tuesday, during which Austin “reaffirmed unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” according to a readout of the meeting.
“The leaders discussed a range of security issues, including Russia’s destabilizing actions in the region, and agreed to work closely together to advance the shared priorities outlined in the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Defense Framework signed on August 31, 2021,” the readout stated, referring to the commitment under which the U.S. provided an additional $60 million in security aid to Ukraine.
Prior to the framework, the U.S. had committed $2.5 billion to support Ukraine’s military forces since 2014, including more than $400 million in 2021 alone.
The Pentagon didn’t comment when asked about Reznikov’s remarks, but referred to Thursday's meeting.
Russia, for its part, has denied that it is trying to invade Ukraine. In a speech on Thursday, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that the West hasn’t been heeding warnings not to cross Moscow’s “red lines.”
"We're constantly voicing our concerns about this, talking about red lines, but we understand our partners — how shall I put it mildly — have a very superficial attitude to all our warnings and talk of red lines,” he said in part, according to Reuters.
Asked about Putin’s comments, White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters on Friday that the Biden administration continues to “have serious concerns about Russian military activities and harsh rhetoric towards Ukraine and call on Moscow to de-escalate tensions.”
Psaki added that the U.S. has raised concerns directly with Russia about its military activity near the Ukrainian border.
The Hill · by Jordan Williams · November 19, 2021
16. The Decline of Congress
This is a brutal, but I am afraid an accurate, critique of those on both sides of the aisle:
The episode reveals that many Members of Congress now behave as if their job is to become social-media influencers or cable-TV stars, as opposed to accomplishing something. Healthcare and tax policy are so “establishment.” Tweeting a cartoon is a perfect metaphor for today’s House of Representatives.
The Decline of Congress
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
Arizona Rep. Paul Gosar
Photo: Tom Williams/Zuma Press
Congress has a public approval rating of 22%, which makes us wonder what the 22% are watching. It can’t be C-SPAN. If they pay attention to this week’s spectacle involving Arizona Rep. Paul Gosar, the 22% are likely to join the other 78%.
Mr. Gosar, a Republican, illustrates the decline of Congress in profile. He tweeted an anime video of the Congressman attacking a character with the face of Democratic Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and swinging a sword at a character with President Biden’s face.
Mr. Gosar has since deleted the video. He issued a statement saying the video “was not meant to depict any harm or violence against anyone portrayed in the anime. The video is truly a symbolic portrayal of a fight over immigration policy.” He has apologized to his fellow Republicans, though not as of this writing to Ms. Ocasio-Cortez.
The episode reveals that many Members of Congress now behave as if their job is to become social-media influencers or cable-TV stars, as opposed to accomplishing something. Healthcare and tax policy are so “establishment.” Tweeting a cartoon is a perfect metaphor for today’s House of Representatives.
Democrats are naturally trying to exploit the episode for their own social-media and cable-TV gain, and today they plan to vote to censure Mr. Gosar and strip him of his two committee assignments. Their political purpose is to use Mr. Gosar’s tweet to assist their 2022 campaign narrative that the GOP is the party of inciting violence.
This is overkill, if we may use that word in this context, since it was a stupid cartoon, not an actual incitement to violence. The most recent case of actual violence against Members was the 2017 shooting of Rep. Steve Scalise by a deranged supporter of Bernie Sanders at a practice for the annual Congressional charity baseball game. Mr. Scalise nearly died, and without Capitol police on hand with guns, many others would have been shot.
Mr. Gosar, who is 63 years old but acts like a teenager on TikTok, deserves ridicule more than censure, which should be reserved for serious offenses. Stripping Mr. Gosar of his committee assignments is also over the top and will boomerang against Democrats when the GOP next takes power. Minnesota Rep. Ilhan Omar’s Twitter feed will be monitored 24/7 for anti-Semitic outbursts.
It’s not as if the Democrats who run the House take the rest of their duties all that seriously. They’re now awaiting a Congressional Budget Office score of their multi-trillion-dollar spending bill, and they plan to hold a vote literally within hours, before anyone has a chance to read, much less debate, it.
This really is the cartoon Congress.
WSJ · by The Editorial Board
17. Work on ‘Chinese military base’ in UAE abandoned after US intervenes – report
Strategic competition with China is taking place around the world.
Excerpts:
“The Emiratis have said this isn’t happening,” a senior US official said. “I refer you to the Emiratis about this specific project. But I can tell you that we are committed to our enduring partnership between the United States and the UAE.”
The UAE report is the latest example of an increasingly pointed global rivalry between the US and China. On the same day, the state department warned Beijing the US would intervene to defend Philippines ships in the event of an armed Chinese attack, following an incident in which Chinese naval vessels used water cannon against Philippine resupply boats in the South China Sea.
The state department spokesman, Ned Price, called the Chinese action “dangerous, provocative, and unjustified.”.
Work on ‘Chinese military base’ in UAE abandoned after US intervenes – report
Satellite images reportedly detected construction of secret facility at Khalifa port amid growing US-China rivalry
US intelligence agencies found evidence this year of construction work on what they believed was a secret Chinese military facility in the United Arab Emirates, which was stopped after Washington’s intervention, according to a report on Friday.
The Wall Street Journal reported that satellite imagery of the port of Khalifa had revealed suspicious construction work inside a container terminal built and operated by a Chinese shipping corporation, Cosco.
The evidence included huge excavations apparently for a multi-storey building and the fact that the site was covered in an apparent attempt to evade scrutiny.
The Biden administration held urgent talks with the UAE authorities, who appeared to be unaware of the military activities, according to the report. It said the discussions included two direction conversations between Joe Biden and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan, in May and August.
In late September, the US national security adviser, Jake Sullivan and the White House Middle East coordinator, Brett McGurk, went to the UAE and presented the details of the US intelligence on the site to the Emirati authorities, with McGurk returning this week to meet the crown prince. After US officials recently inspected the Khalifa site, construction work was suspended, the report said.
The report comes four years after the Chinese navy established a facility in Djibouti, its first overseas base, which was placed within a Chinese-run commercial port, at Doraleh.
The UAE embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment but told the Wall Street Journal: “The UAE has never had an agreement plan, talks or intention to host a Chinese military base or outpost of any kind.”
“The Emiratis have said this isn’t happening,” a senior US official said. “I refer you to the Emiratis about this specific project. But I can tell you that we are committed to our enduring partnership between the United States and the UAE.”
The UAE report is the latest example of an increasingly pointed global rivalry between the US and China. On the same day, the state department warned Beijing the US would intervene to defend Philippines ships in the event of an armed Chinese attack, following an incident in which Chinese naval vessels used water cannon against Philippine resupply boats in the South China Sea.
The state department spokesman, Ned Price, called the Chinese action “dangerous, provocative, and unjustified.”.
Beijing “should not interfere with lawful Philippine activities in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone,” Price said in a statement. “The United States stands with our Philippine allies in upholding the rules-based international maritime order and reaffirms that an armed attack on Philippine public vessels in the South China Sea would invoke US mutual defense commitments.”
The White House coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, Kurt Campbell, said: “The chief characteristic of US-China relations right now is competition, and we are competing across the board everywhere.”
“We believe it’s possible to compete responsibly in a healthy way, but at the same time, the president … recognizes that it will be important to try to establish some guardrails … that will keep the relationship from veering into dangerous arenas of confrontation,” Campbell said at the US Institute for Peace on Friday.
Campbell said that at their virtual summit at the beginning of the week, Biden and Xi Jinping agreed on tentative steps towards establishing talks between officials of both countries aimed at reducing the risk of conflict by accident or miscalculation, especially when it came to nuclear weapons.
“What we would like to do … is to enlist China in discussions about what we would do if we faced some sort of acts that were inadvertent,” he said. “We are in the very earliest stages of that kind of discussion, and I think it would be fair to say that President Xi indicated that they would at least engage in that discussion, that we would identify potentially who the right people would be for that kind of discussion, and that would involve people on the military side perhaps, and other parts of our governments as well.”
Campbell said that Biden had also sought talks on the nuclear policies of both nations, but suggested Xi had yet to agreed to those kind of discussions.
“We want to just have a very general discussion on what we might call doctrinal issues about … certain steps that you might take in the nuclear realm [that] would be potentially destabilizing,” he said. “China in the past has never been interested in arms control. They have been generally reluctant to talk about operational limitations. And they’ve been very careful about revealing anything associated with key attributes of their defense posture and the like. So I think we go into this carefully.
“I was in the meeting,” Campbell added. “I think President Xi indicated that he was prepared for some of this, but I think that’s going to have to be tested over time.”
18. US, China commence ‘responsible competition’
Who gets to define "responsible?"
US, China commence ‘responsible competition’
The bottom line is that the dysfunctional phase of the US-China relationship may be ending
The only breakthrough that can be ascribed to the virtual meeting between the US and Chinese presidents, Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, on Monday-Tuesday is that there was an easing of visa restrictions on the accredited journalists of the two countries.
But here too a caveat must be added, namely that “a three-point consensus on their visa policies” was actually reached just ahead of the virtual meeting, at the official level.
But then, do not look for concrete results in summit meetings. An important Beijing-datelined commentary by Xinhua is full of pious hopes and yet describes the virtual meeting as “productive” enough.
Biden wanted to schedule this meeting earlier. From mid-August onward, the stars were unaligned for Biden.
The chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the ensuing battering he received in the Washington Beltway; the consequent disarray in the trans-Atlantic alliance; America’s allies increasingly apprehensive that his may be a one-term presidency; the cascading tensions with Russia over Ukraine and NATO’s eastward gait; the precipitous fall in Biden’s rating in American opinion — all these added up.
Meanwhile, economic inflation is building and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen acknowledged publicly that the tariffs on imports from China were contributing to the steep rise in prices.
All in all, if the Biden presidency claimed in April at the Alaska meeting with top Chinese officials that the Americans would negotiate with China from a position of strength, as the virtual summit this week approached, the general impression was that he was holding a weak hand.
A USA Today poll this month put Biden’s approval rating at under 38%. On the eve of the Biden-Xi meeting, a Politico/Morning Consult survey found that 44% of voters approved of Biden’s job as president, but 58% disagreed with the statement “Joe Biden is capable of leading the country.”
US President Joe Biden. Photo: AFP / Anna Moneymaker / Getty Images
White House spokesman Andrew Bates even insisted that Biden was not really an “old friend” of Xi, as the Chinese president keeps repeating. The Washington Post isn’t sure whether Xi keeps using the tantalizing expression as “a term of endearment or an unwelcome moniker.”
The real significance of Tuesday’s meeting was that, as WaPo estimated, it “enabled the two global superpowers to engage on a slew of sensitive issues that have strained ties … But the engagement was [also] an acknowledgment that conflict … can have grave repercussions around the world.”
In brief remarks in front of reporters at the White House before the summit began, Biden told Xi: “As I said before, it seems to be our responsibility – as leaders of China and the United States – to ensure that the competition between our countries does not veer into conflict, whether intended or unintended. Just simple, straightforward competition.
“It seems to me we need to establish a common-sense guardrail, to be clear and honest where we disagree and work together where our interests intersect, especially on vital global issues like climate change.”
In contrast, Xi – fresh from the historic plenary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that bracketed him with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of party leaders – pointed out the need to “increase communication and cooperation” between the two countries and offered that he was ready to work with Biden to “build consensus, take active steps and move China-US relations forward in a positive direction.”
That said, Xi firmly drew a red line on Taiwan, where the two leaders had an “extended” discussion.
The White House readout said the US “strongly opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo.”
But according to the much longer Chinese version carried by Xinhua (2,875 words), Xi “noted the new wave of tensions across the Taiwan Strait, and ascribed the tensions to the repeated attempts by the Taiwan authorities to look for US support for their independence agenda as well as the intention of some Americans to use Taiwan to contain China. Such moves are extremely dangerous, just like playing with fire. Whoever plays with fire will get burned.”
Xi added: “We have patience and will strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and efforts. That said, should the separatist forces for Taiwan independence provoke us, force our hands or even cross the red line, we will be compelled to take resolute measures.”
Xi Jinping, Chinese president and general secretary of the Communist Party of China. Photo: Xinhua
Xi ruled out a compromise. According to Xinhua, “Biden reaffirmed the US government’s long-standing one-China policy, stated that the US does not support ‘Taiwan independence,’ and expressed the hope for peace and stability to be maintained in the Taiwan Strait.
“The US is willing to work with China on the basis of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, increase communication, reduce misperception, and handle differences constructively.”
Without doubt, the future trajectory of the relationship will almost entirely depend on how the US calibrates its stance. Beijing displayed its grit when just hours before the meeting, six Chinese aircraft entered Taiwan’s so-called air defense zone.
Evidently, much business was transacted during the three-and-a-half-hour meeting. US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said Biden “raised the need for strategic stability discussions” and that they need “to be guided by the leaders.”
Overall, Sullivan sought to frame the relationship as one of “steady state” competition in which the lines of communication remain open, while the US works with allies and partners “to confront China where we need to” and work together where “our interests … intersect.”
The Chinese assessment is distinctly more hopeful. A Xinhua report in the People’s Daily highlighted that “under an earnest global gaze,” the two leaders “agreed in a productive virtual meeting … to steer the … relationship back on track. The encouraging consensus, along with other positive outcomes … delivered a direly needed shot of optimism.”
It went on to say, however, that “it is high time that the United States started to act in a truly responsible fashion … A responsible Washington ought to uphold mutual respect with China with all its heart … It means the two countries should treat each other as equals and respect each other’s social system and development path, core interests and major concerns, as well as right to development …
“What is particularly imperative now is that the United States should … cease playing with fire on the Taiwan question, the most important and sensitive issue in China-US relations. No provocation or threat would make China budge an inch.”
The commentary added: “Washington needs to take concrete actions to prove that its call for properly managing US-China ties and proclamation of not seeking to contain China are a strategic choice, instead of a tactical gambit.” The trust deficit is palpable.
The bottom line is that the dysfunctional phase of the US-China relationship may be ending. The key priorities identified at the meeting are sure to be followed up. The government newspaper China Daily voiced confidence that the meeting “will lend stability to bilateral relations and set in motion more intense engagement.”
Chinese commentators are pinning hopes that given the growing inflation pressure domestically and plunging approval ratings for Biden for his handling of the economy, Washington may be eager to work with Beijing by further easing tariffs and related trade issues.
A soybean farm in the United States. China had agreed to buy more US farm products in a phase one trade deal. Photo: Facebook
On trade ties, Xi described the China-US economic and trade relations as mutually beneficial in nature and said the two sides need to “make the cake bigger” through cooperation. The Chinese expectation is that more channels to strengthen communication and cooperation will be established after the summit meeting.
Two dozen US business associations have urged the Biden administration to reduce tariffs on Chinese goods to provide relief to Americans amid rising inflation, arguing that tariffs put in place over the last several years continue disproportionately to cause economic harm to US businesses, farmers, workers and families.
The influential US-China Business Council is hopeful that separate meetings will be scheduled soon to discuss economic and trade issues, while flagging that “economic and trade ties have been a ballast of the relationship and can help manage strategic risks.”
M K Bhadrakumar is a former Indian diplomat.
19. Biden and Xi move back from the brink
Excerpts:
For now, the best that can be hoped for is that the small opening in the otherwise relentless talk of confrontation and potential war will hold up and lead to more serious negotiations among senior officials. A lessening of harsh rhetoric in the media may be one immediate outcome.
The summit yielded an agreement to ease restrictions on visas for American reporters, allowing their return to China, in exchange for reciprocal access for Chinese journalists from official media. Some steps to ease travel restrictions on business and academic visits may follow.
The Chinese media coverage reflected the official line, treating it as a positive shift but also as a win for the regime. “The tone is steadfast but not aggressive,” commented a scholar who closely monitors social media in China. “The Chinese government was relieved. Trump was very aggressive and unpredictable. Biden seems predictable and conciliatory.”
How long this mood will last remains to be seen.
Biden and Xi move back from the brink
It would be naïve to overplay the summit results but the two leaders took a clear step back from confrontation
The three-and-half-hour virtual summit meeting between President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping did not, and could not, solve the fundamental problems that have driven the two great powers toward confrontation.
But both men clearly wanted to challenge the misperception that they are on the brink of conflict, and to prevent an unintended escalation of tensions that might become impossible to manage.
Nowhere was that goal more visible than on Taiwan, the one issue that poses the greatest risk of drawing China and the US into war. Xi and Biden spent considerable time discussing Taiwan, according to the US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.
Both men carefully restated their long-held positions – for China, strong opposition to any steps that would move Taiwan toward a declaration of independence. For the US, a line is drawn against “any effort to shape Taiwan’s future by anything other than peaceful means,” as Sullivan told the Brookings Institution after the meeting.
But Sullivan notably repeated the American adherence to the existence of “One China” and to the series of joint statements going back decades that reiterate this position, a message clearly meant for the Chinese audience.
The summit discussion aimed, he said, at avoiding any “destabilizing actions” by either side, to “manage risk and ensure that competition doesn’t veer into conflict,” to avoid unintended conflicts that arise out of miscommunication.
“Both sides fear it has been spinning out of control — the mutual demonization and mirror-image tit for tat escalation — and want to put a floor under it,” says Robert Manning of the Atlantic Council, a former senior US official and Asia expert.
“I think the idea was to give the bureaucracies in both nations a mandate from the top to seek mechanisms to manage differences and also where to cooperate – climate, Iran, maybe North Korea and Afghanistan all have some overlap of interests.”
The step back from confrontation may have influenced the resistance from the White House to the Japanese desire for an early visit to Washington by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida after his election triumph.
The Prime Minister’s Office and the Foreign Ministry openly sought a White House meeting as early as later this month. But the White House politely pushed the date back, perhaps into next year.
Fumio Kishida is angling to meet with Biden. Photo: AFP
This was mainly driven by Biden’s heavy domestic schedule and the need to accommodate the visits of other allies. But in the view of some, the White House also wanted to put some space between the Xi summit and a Kishida visit, worried it would be viewed as an attempt to balance the effort to improve relations with China.
For the new government in Japan, the summit could pose a challenge. On one hand, it strengthens the hand of those in the cabinet who advocate a more balanced approach toward China, combining efforts to pursue engagement with measures to ensure economic security.
On the other hand, Kishida may face pressure from hardliners in the Liberal Democratic Party who are eager to tighten military cooperation with the US on Taiwan and advocate a more rapid defense buildup.
Limited results on the issues
It would be naïve, however, to overplay the summit results. Beyond the acknowledgment that escalation is in neither side’s interest, there was no visible movement on the agenda of issues presented by both leaders, a list aired frequently during the past 10 months.
President Biden ran through China’s dismal human rights record, from Tibet and Xinjiang to Hong Kong; unfair trade and industrial practices; the military buildup in the South China Sea and the threats to freedom of navigation, and the need for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’
The Chinese responded with their own accusations of American responsibility for creating a new Cold War. The American crimes, Xi reportedly told Biden, included advocacy of high-tech decoupling, economic sanctions, and forging military alliances to confront China, as well as using Taiwan to contain China and interfering in China’s internal affairs.
The meeting did avoid the harsh tones and public posturing that were displayed at the beginning of the Biden administration at the meeting of senior officials held in Alaska.
“Both sides seem to acknowledge that runaway escalation is in neither side’s interest,” former senior State Department official Ryan Hass told a Brookings Institution panel discussing the summit.
But while the meeting placed a floor under the relationship, there is also a clear ceiling on any substantial progress, he warned. “Neither side wants to be seen as softening,” Hass, now at Brookings, said.
Domestic issues come first in both countries
Both leaders are mainly absorbed by problems at home. President Biden’s popularity is sliding in the face of renewed concerns over the handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, unease over the economic future amidst rising inflation and supply chain disruptions, and the impasse in the US Congress which has stalled key legislation including a new massive spending bill.
Domestic priorities clearly shaped the summit with Xi – the meeting only followed the passage of a massive $1 trillion infrastructure spending package, motivated in part by the competition with China.
Biden is spending big to compete with China. Photo: AFP / Olivier Douliery
President Biden “is unwilling to jeopardize his ability to achieve higher priority objectives by making concessions to Beijing merely to create the appearance of a better relationship,” observed Stanford China expert Thomas Finger, a former senior American intelligence official.
Xi is under no less onerous internal pressures, generated by slowing growth, a collapse of the real estate bubble, and a politically-motivated crackdown on China’s private sector tech entrepreneurs. This is compounded by a growing crisis of energy supply and rising prices in the global energy sector.
Market reforms are stalled and “a severe economic slowdown has therefore become a near-term worry, not a distant one,” wrote China economy analyst Daniel Rosen in Foreign Affairs earlier this month. “Xi is running out of time,” Rosen warned.
The open economic warfare between China and the US, begun under the Trump administration and largely continued with Biden, has been a major factor in driving the strategic competition between the two countries.
And it has been useful to both leaders in justifying other policies – in the Chinese case, internal repression and economic autonomy, if not decoupling and in the US case, domestic spending on infrastructure and industrial rejuvenation, as well as “buy American” measures.
There were some glimmers of potential breaks in this economic clash. The climate agreement reached in Glasgow between China and the US was a surprise and could lead to cooperation in other areas, including on public health and energy.
Apparently, the two leaders did spend some time exploring the current energy situation, not only shortages of supply but also price rises.
Increased production of American natural gas for the Chinese market could potentially ease shortages in that market and also offer some significant reduction in the use of more carbon-intensive fuels like coal.
But overall, the summit offered few signs of progress in managing the economic collision that was set in motion in the previous administration and even longer ago. The absence of an elaborated trade policy by the Biden administration was painfully evident at the summit.
Biden reportedly pushed for the implementation of the Phase One agreement reached by the Trump administration, including Chinese purchase commitments, but there is no evidence that is feasible. And there are no talks on the agenda with China beyond that.
Meanwhile, the US Trade Representative and Commerce Secretary are on their way to Asia without any vision of a broader regional approach, though Sullivan made a passing reference to a preliminary discussion on an agreement on digital trade.
The US has sounded the alarm about China’s digital advances. Credit: Illustration.
“The open question for the broader relationship is whether the US and China can constructively manage the slow-motion collision that is now unfolding between their very different worldviews,” commented former trade negotiator Stephen Olson and now a senior researcher for the Hinrich Foundation.
Cooperation and engagement will take place, Olson wrote after the summit, but the clear differences between China and the US will not go away.
“They can however be responsibly managed in a way that ameliorates the fallout. That is in the best interests of both countries, and it will be the defining challenge in US-China relations for the foreseeable future. Whether the Biden-Xi summit moved us any closer to meeting that challenge, however, remains to be seen,” Olson wrote.
For now, a small opening has been made
For now, the best that can be hoped for is that the small opening in the otherwise relentless talk of confrontation and potential war will hold up and lead to more serious negotiations among senior officials. A lessening of harsh rhetoric in the media may be one immediate outcome.
The summit yielded an agreement to ease restrictions on visas for American reporters, allowing their return to China, in exchange for reciprocal access for Chinese journalists from official media. Some steps to ease travel restrictions on business and academic visits may follow.
The Chinese media coverage reflected the official line, treating it as a positive shift but also as a win for the regime. “The tone is steadfast but not aggressive,” commented a scholar who closely monitors social media in China. “The Chinese government was relieved. Trump was very aggressive and unpredictable. Biden seems predictable and conciliatory.”
How long this mood will last remains to be seen.
Daniel Sneider is a Lecturer in International Policy and East Asian Studies at Stanford University. This article first appeared in The Oriental Economist and is republished with permission.
20. Kyle Rittenhouse Is No Hero
The outcome of the Rittenhouse trial was a rule of law success. A conviction would have been a rule by law failure. We must ensure the priority is always that we remain a rule of law nation.
That said, I think this description is very appropriate.
The law allows even a foolish man to defend himself, even if his own foolishness put him in harm’s way.
David French's position:
I am a longtime supporter of gun rights and believe that the Second Amendment’s guarantee of a right to “keep and bear arms” is grounded in an inherent right of self-defense, both inside and outside the home. As a person who’s been threatened more than once, I exercise those rights myself.
But there is also an immense difference between quiet concealed carry and vigilante open carry, including in ham-handed and amateurish attempts to accomplish one of the most difficult tasks in all of policing—imposing order in the face of civil unrest. And there is a dramatic difference between the use of weapons as a last resort, when your life or the lives of others are in immediate danger, and the open carrying of weapons as an intimidation tactic or as an intentionally disconcerting display of political identity and defiance.
That said, I wonder if those who are making this teenager out to be a hero will continue their support for him and come to his financial aid when he loses the civil suit that is likely to follow. He will likely be on the hook for millions of dollars in damages when he loses the civil suit. Perhaps his family as well.
Kyle Rittenhouse Is No Hero
The verdict is not a miscarriage of justice—but an acquittal does not make a foolish man a hero.
As the Kyle Rittenhouse trial comes to a close, two things are becoming clear at once. First, absolutely no one should be surprised if Rittenhouse is acquitted on the most serious charges against him. And second, regardless of the outcome of the trial, the Trumpist right is wrongly creating a folk hero out of Rittenhouse. For millions he’s become a positive symbol, a young man of action who stepped up when the police (allegedly) stepped aside.
The trial itself has not gone well for the prosecution, for reasons that relate to the nature of self-defense claims. Such claims are not assessed by means of sweeping inquiries into the wisdom of the actions that put the shooter into a dangerous place in a dangerous time. Instead, they produce a narrow inquiry into the events immediately preceding the shooting. The law allows even a foolish man to defend himself, even if his own foolishness put him in harm’s way.
And so although the combination of video and testimonial evidence shows a confused and isolated 17-year-old carrying an adult weapon in a dangerous place, it also shows that he was chased by his first victim and attacked with a skateboard by his second victim, and that he shot and wounded his third victim when he pulled out his own handgun. Rittenhouse has presented a considerable amount of evidence that he was not a hunter, but instead felt himself hunted, and fired solely on men who he believed presented a direct threat.
The defense has presented evidence not only that Rittenhouse was attacked, but that there was reason to believe he acted—under Wisconsin law—to “prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself.” The jury will have to determine whether Rittenhouse’s belief was reasonable, and whether it was reasonable for each person he shot.
The narrow nature of the self-defense inquiry is one reason people can escape responsibility for killings that are deeply wrongful in every moral sense. Take, for instance, cases in which bad cops create danger and confusion through incompetence or excessive aggression, and then they respond to the danger or confusion they created by using deadly force.
Examples abound. Police gave confusing and conflicting instructions to Philando Castile before he was shot and killed, and to Daniel Shaver before he was gunned down in a hotel hallway. The killing of Breonna Taylor is another example—police used terrible tactics, but once an occupant of the home fired on them, a grand jury decided, they were legally entitled to fire back.
When Kyle Rittenhouse walked the streets of Kenosha in the midst of urban unrest following the police shooting of Jacob Blake holding a rifle in the “patrol carry” or “low ready” position, similar to the positions used by soldiers walking in towns and villages in war zones, without any meaningful training, he was engaged in remarkably dangerous and provocative conduct. But that dangerous and provocative conduct did not eliminate his right of self-defense, and that self-defense claim is the key issue of his trial, not the wisdom of his vigilante presence.
But that brings us to the danger of Kyle Rittenhouse as a folk hero. It is one thing to argue that the law is on Rittenhouse’s side—and there is abundant evidence supporting his defense—but it is quite another to hail him as a model for civic resistance.
As seen in Kenosha, in anti-lockdown protests in Washington State, and in the riot in Charlottesville, one of the symbols of the American hard right is the “patriot” openly carrying an AR-15 or similar weapon. The “gun picture” is a common pose for populist politicians. Mark and Patricia McCloskey leveraged their clumsy and dangerous brandishing of weapons at Black Lives Matter protesters into an appearance at the Republican National Convention.
Rittenhouse is the next step in that progression. He’s the “patriot” who didn’t just carry his rifle; he used it.
I am a longtime supporter of gun rights and believe that the Second Amendment’s guarantee of a right to “keep and bear arms” is grounded in an inherent right of self-defense, both inside and outside the home. As a person who’s been threatened more than once, I exercise those rights myself.
But there is also an immense difference between quiet concealed carry and vigilante open carry, including in ham-handed and amateurish attempts to accomplish one of the most difficult tasks in all of policing—imposing order in the face of civil unrest. And there is a dramatic difference between the use of weapons as a last resort, when your life or the lives of others are in immediate danger, and the open carrying of weapons as an intimidation tactic or as an intentionally disconcerting display of political identity and defiance.
Most of the right-wing leaders voicing their admiration for Rittenhouse are simply adopting a pose. On Twitter, talk radio, and Fox News, hosts and right-wing personalities express admiration for Rittenhouse but know he was being foolish. They would never hand a rifle to their own children and tell them to walk into a riot. They would never do it themselves.
But these public poses still matter. When you turn a foolish young man into a hero, you’ll see more foolish young men try to emulate his example. And although the state should not permit rioters to run rampant in America’s streets, random groups of armed Americans are utterly incapable of imposing order themselves, and any effort to do so can lead to greater death and carnage.
In fact, that’s exactly what happened in Rittenhouse’s case. He didn’t impose order. He didn’t stop a riot. He left a trail of bodies on the ground, and two of the people he shot were acting on the belief that Rittenhouse himself was an active shooter. He had, after all, just killed a man.
If the jury acquits Rittenhouse, it will not be a miscarriage of justice. The law gives even foolish men the right to defend their lives. But an acquittal does not make a foolish man a hero. A political movement that turns a deadly and ineffective vigilante into a role model is a movement that is courting more violence and encouraging more young men to recklessly brandish weapons in dangerous places, and that will spill more blood in America’s streets.
V/R
David Maxwell
Senior Fellow
Foundation for Defense of Democracies
Phone: 202-573-8647
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
FDD is a Washington-based nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.
