​Quotes of the Day:

"There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest." 

– Elie Wiesel

"Adapt or perish, now as ever, is nature's inexorable imperative." 

– H. G. Wells

"You can stand tall without standing on someone. You can be a victor without having victims." 

– Harriet Woods

1. Trump Administration Pushes New Plan for Ending Ukraine War

2. Opinion | Dick Cheney and the Fruits of Regime Change

3. Army names 9 installations that could be chosen for nuclear microreactor project

4. Commercial innovation, not government production, will win the drone war

5. Japan's no longer ambiguous stance on Taiwan

6. China Is Priming Its People and the World for a New Pressure Campaign on Taiwan

7. The Pentagon Can’t Trust GPS Anymore. Is Quantum Physics the Answer?

8. Why Australia’s terrorism definition still works

9. ARSOF Civil Affairs Trains with AI

10. Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones

11. Vertical integration of rare Earth elements for US autonomous dominion

12. As we await the Pentagon’s posture review, here’s one country we should keep troops in

13. SOCOM to evaluate industry hardware solutions for powering AI workloads

14. Can a tabletop game explain why America lost the Vietnam War?

15. New Army unit seeks to disrupt ‘malign influence’ in Indo-Pacific

16. Army leaders ordered to check in daily with soldiers over the holidays

17. How a Nazi trial ended the just-following-orders defense for US troops

18. What 3 former SOUTHCOM commanders say troops should know about Venezuela

19. US paratrooper lands in Tokyo suburb after chute malfunctions during training

20. Building maritime drones in months—not years—could be key to creating the Navy’s hybrid fleet

21. Shadow navy: How China's civilian fleet could be a potent weapon in a Taiwan invasion

22. How to Topple Maduro: And Why Regime Change Is the Only Way Forward in Venezuela​ by Elliot Abrams

23. Resistance is Victory: Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report and Resisting Cognitive Coercion

24. The New Soft-Power Imbalance: China’s Cautious Response to America’s Retreat

25. Transition Period Warfare: How the US Army Should Organize to Fight in a Time of Rapid Change

1. Trump Administration Pushes New Plan for Ending Ukraine War

​Summary:

POTUS' administration has drafted a 28-point Ukraine peace plan requiring Kyiv to cede all of Donbas, freeze NATO aspirations and accept no peacekeeping force, in exchange for Russian pledges not to attack again and restore economic ties. Ukraine and European allies view the proposal as dangerous appeasement of Kremlin demands.

Excerpts:

But the blueprint, which was worked out by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner in consultation with Kremlin confidant Kirill Dmitriev, is likely to run into strong opposition in Kyiv and from European governments, according to a European official.

President Trump supports the new plan, which materialized after he told aides to craft new proposals that include incentives for the two sides to reach a deal, officials said. To catalyze an agreement, Washington is counting on Russia’s desire for revived economic relations with the West and Ukraine’s need for reconstruction funds.

...

The details about Trump’s new plan emerged as U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and two senior U.S. Army generals met in Kyiv with Ukraine’s defense minister and chief of defense to discuss battlefield plans and potential peace talks in meetings; it marked the highest-level visit by American officials since Trump returned to the White House.

Though Driscoll was briefed by Witkoff before heading to Ukraine, he didn’t plan to outline any of the ideas in the proposal, according to a U.S. defense official.

Trump Administration Pushes New Plan for Ending Ukraine War

WSJ

By Alexander Ward

Follow, Laurence Norman

Follow, Michael R. Gordon

Follow

 and Josh Dawsey

Follow

Updated Nov. 19, 2025 9:14 pm ET

The 28-point proposal drafted by some of president’s closest aides is likely to face strong opposition from Ukraine

https://www.wsj.com/world/trump-administration-pushes-new-plan-for-ending-ukraine-war-cade0ea1

A Ukrainian unit fires a rocket-launch system toward Russian troops in October. Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

• The Trump administration drafted a 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, proposing territorial concessions to Russia and no peacekeeping force.
• The plan, crafted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio and others, aims to leverage Russia’s economic desires and Ukraine’s reconstruction needs.
• Ukraine would cede the Donbas region and abandon NATO aspirations for several years; Russia would promise no further attacks.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• The Trump administration drafted a 28-point peace plan for Ukraine, proposing territorial concessions to Russia and no peacekeeping force.

WASHINGTON—The Trump administration has drafted a 28-point peace plan that calls for Ukraine to make major territorial concessions to Russia and drop demands for a peacekeeping force to deter future attacks by Moscow, U.S. officials said, resurfacing ideas that Kyiv has already rejected.

The administration is attempting the same approach it used to achieve a U. S.-brokered cease-fire in Gaza last month—draft a multi-point outline and then push the warring parties to accept it, officials said.

But the blueprint, which was worked out by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, special envoy Steve Witkoff and Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner in consultation with Kremlin confidant Kirill Dmitriev, is likely to run into strong opposition in Kyiv and from European governments, according to a European official.

President Trump supports the new plan, which materialized after he told aides to craft new proposals that include incentives for the two sides to reach a deal, officials said. To catalyze an agreement, Washington is counting on Russia’s desire for revived economic relations with the West and Ukraine’s need for reconstruction funds.

Trump’s yearlong effort to broker a peace deal hasn’t yielded results so far. He has held a summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska and multiple meetings with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Zelensky has expressed willingness to pause the war to start negotiations, while Putin has issued maximalist demands that have irritated Trump and his aides.

On Wednesday, Trump again lamented that his relationship with Putin hadn’t led to a swiftly brokered peace deal. Trump had promised during the 2024 presidential campaign to negotiate such a deal within 24 hours of his return to the White House. “I’m a little disappointed in President Putin right now, he knows that,” Trump said.

Trump has signaled his disappointment in Russian President Vladimir Putin since their summit last August. drew angerer/AFP/Getty Images

White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said Trump “has grown frustrated with both sides for their refusal to commit to a peace agreement.” But, she continued, “the president and his team never gives up, and the United States has been working on a detailed and acceptable plan for both sides to stop the killing and create a durable, lasting peace.”

As the administration renews its push for a peace deal, Trump’s top envoy for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, has told colleagues that he is planning to leave his position in January, an administration official said. Kellogg has been one of Kyiv’s most ardent supporters within the administration.

U.S. officials familiar with the proposal said it calls for Ukraine to hand over all of the eastern Donbas region to Russia, including land Kyiv now controls. Ukraine would have to agree at least for several years to abandon joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Kyiv wouldn’t be permitted to have an international peacekeeping force inside the country. Kyiv and European nations have seen such a force as vital to deter future Russian attacks after a peace settlement is agreed upon.

In return, Moscow would promise not to further attack Ukraine or other countries in Europe, according to the officials, and would codify that promise in legislation.

Elements of Trump’s new plan track to what Putin offered during August meetings with Witkoff and later during a summit with Trump in Alaska.

WSJ documents the sudden shifts in President Trump’s views as he tries to negotiate an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Photo: Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

Trump doesn’t view it as his job to get Ukraine back its land that Russia has already taken, a senior administration official said. Instead, he is aiming for a deal that halts the fighting concentrated in eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces have made slow but steady territorial gains at great cost nearly four years after Moscow’s full-scale invasion.

However Ukraine and other European nations have long argued that yielding to Russia’s core demands would seriously undermine Kyiv’s sovereignty and security. The plan reverses a position Ukraine and U.S. allies have pressed Trump to adopt—that Kyiv should not be forced to hand over any territory unilaterally that its forces control.

Analysts say that forcing Ukraine to withdraw from the Donbas—where it has mounted its greatest resistance to Russian advances and still holds strategically important defensive positions—would make it easier for the Kremlin’s forces to push into other regions of the country.

The Trump administration hasn’t clarified what guarantees the U.S. and its allies would provide Kyiv. Trump officials indicated in August that the U.S. could provide air support and other indirect help for a European-led “reassurance force” that would be deployed in Ukraine after a peace settlement was reached to deter future Russian attacks.

Russia has strongly opposed such a peacekeeping force, which would be ruled out under the new plan, earlier reported by Axios.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky ozan kose/AFP/Getty Images

Proponents of the U.S. proposal say Russia’s steady but incremental gains on the battlefield and a corruption scandal involving associates of Zelensky will add pressure on Kyiv to make a deal. But that assumption was challenged by one Western official, who said that Zelensky has even less room to maneuver as a result of a corruption probe and that backing away from his country’s fundamental security positions would only further erode his standing at home.

European allies have been caught off guard by reports of the plan. Johann Wadephul, Germany’s foreign affairs minister, told reporters Wednesday that his country hadn’t been briefed on the specifics of the proposal. Various officials said the framework as they understood it featured many elements on the Kremlin’s wishlist long deemed to be unacceptable.

As European officials publicly voiced concern about the plan, Secretary of State Marco Rubio cast it as an “exchange of serious and realistic ideas” and not a diktat that the U.S. is seeking to impose on the two sides.

“Achieving a durable peace will require both sides to agree to difficult but necessary concessions,” Rubio wrote in a social-media message. “That is why we are and will continue to develop a list of potential ideas for ending this war based on input from both sides of this conflict.”

The new Trump plan marks a shift in the White House’s position in September when the president mused publicly about providing long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine and said that Kyiv was in a position to win back all of its lost territory because Russia was in economic trouble.

“I think Ukraine, with the support of the European Union, is in a position to fight and WIN all of Ukraine back in its original form,” Trump said in a social-media post then.

Last month Trump canceled a planned second summit with Putin and said it would be a “waste” because the Kremlin hadn’t signaled flexibility from its demands.

Earlier this week, as Russian attacks on Kyiv and other cities killed dozens of civilians, Ukraine announced that it used U.S.-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems to strike inside Russia, the first time it has launched the weapon against targets on sovereign Russia territory since Trump returned to office. Previously, the Trump administration had restricted Kyiv’s cross-border employment of the missile.

The details about Trump’s new plan emerged as U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll and two senior U.S. Army generals met in Kyiv with Ukraine’s defense minister and chief of defense to discuss battlefield plans and potential peace talks in meetings; it marked the highest-level visit by American officials since Trump returned to the White House.

Though Driscoll was briefed by Witkoff before heading to Ukraine, he didn’t plan to outline any of the ideas in the proposal, according to a U.S. defense official.

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com, Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com, Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com and Josh Dawsey at Joshua.Dawsey@WSJ.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 20, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Administration Pushes New Plan to End Ukraine War'.

WSJ

2. Opinion | Dick Cheney and the Fruits of Regime Change

​Summary:

Dick Cheney was right that removing Saddam’s regime would undercut terror-sponsoring dictatorships, despite Iraq war failures and absent WMDs. Swaim credits regime change with eliminating a major threat, enabling Iraqi elections, weakening Iran’s position indirectly, and ultimately paving the way for Gulf–Israel alignment and the Abraham Accords.

Opinion | Dick Cheney and the Fruits of Regime Change

WSJ

He has largely proved right about Iraq and the broader Middle East.

By Barton Swaim

Follow

Nov. 19, 2025 4:40 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/dick-cheney-and-the-fruits-of-regime-change-9d81b219

Dick Cheney and George W. Bush in Washington, Sept. 11, 2001. European Pressphoto Agency

The obituaries of Dick Cheney rightly stress his role in launching the Iraq war in 2003. The premise of these is that the war was misguided and fruitless, a product of post-9/11 irrationalism and naiveté about the Middle East. That premise is wrong. Cheney, whose funeral will take place on Thursday at the National Cathedral in Washington, saw then what his despisers still miss.

Henry Kissinger, in a chapter on the Middle East in his 2001 book, “Does America Need a Foreign Policy?,” asked how America could achieve stability in a Middle East dominated by Iran and Iraq—two countries hostile to each other, to their neighbors and to the U.S. “Traditional diplomacy would counsel improving relations with either Iraq or Iran so that at least one of them can form part of the balance of power in the region.” Since neither option was a possibility, “for the time being, no dramatic initiatives are available to reverse this state of affairs.”

Kissinger’s book was published in June 2001. His analysis of American imperatives in the Middle East was plausible—up to the moment when hijacked passenger jets hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Balance-of-power thinking on Middle East policy, with its endless search for “stability,” had given us almost 3,000 dead on American soil. “Dramatic initiatives” suddenly seemed necessary.

A few years later, after the effort to rebuild Iraq had gone badly and Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction failed to turn up, Cheney’s detractors made defamatory claims about his motives: that he aimed to give Halliburton, the company he’d led in the 1990s, a sweetheart deal on Iraq’s oil; that Cheney and President George W. Bush had been captured by the all-powerful “Israel lobby,” and so on.

But Cheney’s reasoning was obvious to non-ax-grinders. He was a Reaganite Cold Warrior who had rejected the idea of the Soviet Union as a regrettable but permanent presence in the world. The U.S. would defeat the U.S.S.R., not live with it. The same outlook led him to conclude that America didn’t have to live with the terror-generating Iran-Iraq double hegemony in the Middle East.

The Bush administration mistakenly thought Iraq’s WMDs would justify the decision to invade. The argument made sense at the time: Multiple United Nations resolutions had demanded that Baghdad relinquish its WMDs, and Saddam did all he could to make the world think he had them. Iraq had launched unprovoked invasions of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990. The thought that Saddam could do so again, this time with chemical or biological weapons, was reasonable.

But as Stephen F. Hayes documents in his excellent 2007 biography, Cheney thought Iraq’s supposed possession of WMDs was only part of the more fundamental problem: the regime’s support for terrorism. In 2002-03, Cheney paid numerous visits to Central Intelligence Agency headquarters in Langley, Va., and barraged analysts with questions. He remained unsatisfied with the agency’s intelligence on Iraq’s use of terrorism. The 9/11 Commission later claimed to find no evidence that Saddam had collaborated with al Qaeda. But what we knew was pretty damning: that he had tried to assassinate George H.W. Bush, that known terrorists had safe harbor in Iraq, and that the regime financed anti-Israel suicide attacks. The idea that Saddam would scruple to support al Qaeda seems preposterous even now.

The war’s many blunders are well-known. Wanton suicide attacks, Abu Ghraib. Bold talk of spreading democracy—more Mr. Bush’s preoccupation than Cheney’s—didn’t survive the second term. But regime change in Baghdad also brought blessings.

Barack Obama tried hard to squander them. He withdrew U.S. troops willy-nilly and allowed ISIS to take what the U.S. had won. Mr. Obama had the chance to isolate Iran, the Middle East’s other major exporter of terror, and instead, perversely, strengthened it. That the world escaped the horrors of a nuclear-armed Tehran is a happy miracle.

The Gulf Arab states, meanwhile, sought a bulwark against Iranian aggression. With post-Saddam Iraq too weak to provide one, they eventually lit on the only plausible answer: closer alliances with the U.S. and . . . Israel. Thus was born, in time, the Abraham Accords, an economic and diplomatic normalization treaty involving Israel, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Sudan and, most recently, Kazakhstan. The accords wouldn’t have been dreamed of in a world in which Saddam, one of his sons or some other Baath Party goon reigned in Baghdad.

Another counterfactual: Absent regime change in 2003, Iraqis wouldn’t have voted in last week’s parliamentary elections. Today’s Iraq is far from the democratic republic we hoped it would become, but neither is it a threat to its neighbors and the world. Still another: The crown prince of Saudi Arabia wouldn’t have appeared this week in Washington with the U.S. president and spoken, however cautiously, of one day normalizing relations with Israel.

It is a bitter irony that many of Mr. Trump’s most fervent fans regard Dick Cheney as an old-guard, unimaginative patrician who got us into foolish wars. In truth, Cheney supported regime change in Iraq for precisely the reason Mr. Trump’s fans say they love him: Cheney thought the experts were wrong and that the existing state of affairs was no longer defensible. And—mistakes in execution aside—he was right.

Former Vice President Dick Cheney served under four Republican Presidents and protected America in the wake of 9/11.

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 20, 2025, print edition as 'The Fruits of Regime Change'.

WSJ

3. Army names 9 installations that could be chosen for nuclear microreactor project

​Excerpt:

The locations that could receive microreactors by 2030 as part of the Army’s new Janus Program are: Fort Benning, Ga.; Fort Bragg, N.C.; Fort Campbell, Ky.; Fort Drum, N.Y.; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.; and Redstone Arsenal in Alabama.

Army names 9 installations that could be chosen for nuclear microreactor project

Stars and Stripes · Corey Dickstein · November 18, 2025

https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2025-11-18/army-microreactors-9-installations-janus-program-19808296.html

Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll speaks at the opening ceremony of the AUSA Monday, Oct. 13, 2025, in Washington. (Eric Kayne/Stars and Stripes)

The Army on Tuesday named nine U.S. installations that could receive nuclear microreactors in the coming years as the service looks to the technology for increased and more resilient power production on its bases.

The locations that could receive microreactors by 2030 as part of the Army’s new Janus Program are: Fort Benning, Ga.; Fort Bragg, N.C.; Fort Campbell, Ky.; Fort Drum, N.Y.; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Wainwright, Alaska; Holston Army Ammunition Plant in Tennessee; Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash.; and Redstone Arsenal in Alabama.

Army Secretary Dan Driscoll announced the Janus Program last month, pledging to partner with commercial industry to place the small nuclear power reactors on some of the Army’s posts which will require more power access in the decades to come as the service increases its use of artificial intelligence capabilities and new-age weaponry. Driscoll and other officials last month declined to name what installations they were considering for the microreactors.

The nine sites were chosen after an evaluation of “mission critical installations, energy requirements and resiliency gaps, power infrastructure, environmental and technical considerations,” the service said in a news release Tuesday. Officials said it was possible that not all the named installations would receive microreactors in the coming years, but the Army envisions placing them at many more installations in the coming decades.

“These early site selections align with the Department of War’s goal of accelerating the pace of deploying on-site nuclear generation at our installations,” Jordan Gillis, the Army’s assistant secretary for installations, energy and environment, said in a prepared statement. “Through the use of the Army’s unique nuclear regulatory authorities, we are deploying a resilient, secure and reliable energy supply for critical defense operations and in support of the most lethal land-based fighting force in the world.”

Army officials said last month the Janus Program would be a public-private program in which commercial companies own and operate nuclear microreactors on Army installations and under the service’s oversight.

Microreactors are nuclear reactors about 100 to 1,000 times smaller than conventional nuclear reactors, some of which can be small enough to be transported on a semi-truck’s tractor-trailer, according to the Idaho National Laboratory, which oversees much of the Department of Energy’s nuclear power research. The reactors can produce up to 50 megawatts of power and can function entirely independently of the traditional electric grid, according to the laboratory.

The Pentagon’s Defense Innovation Unit has given commercial companies until Dec. 15 to submit prototyping bids for the microreactors to be placed at Army installations by the end of 2030. DIU wants the companies to build microreactors capable of producing up to 20 megawatts of power.

Army officials have described the latest generation of microreactors as a “significant technological advancement, in safety, security and waste management.”

“They are safe by design, not by intervention protocols,” according to the Army news release. Still, the DIU instructions to commercial bidders require that the microreactors include “passive safety features,” limits on radiation output, and a mandate that operational controls be accessible only from “within the Army installation.”

Army officials said last month they would work closely with the local communities surrounding the installations.

“The Army shares a commitment to public safety and transparency with our host communities and recognizes that the communities surrounding these installations have vested interest in their operations,” the Tuesday statement read. “The Army is committed to providing transparent information throughout the planning process and welcomes public engagement and feedback.

Stars and Stripes · Corey Dickstein · November 18, 2025

4. Commercial innovation, not government production, will win the drone war

​Summary:

Pentagon plans for a government-run drone factory would stifle innovation, worsen fragile supply chains, and pour money into aging depots. DoW and Army should instead harness commercial firms through purchase commitments and off-take agreements to scale cheap, adaptable drones and sustain America’s competitive edge rapidly.

Excerpts:

But at a time when the entire nation should be focused on expanding production capacity for the industries of the future, this is not the moment to turn inward and build parallel, government-owned manufacturing systems. The government’s role is to catalyze and incentivize, not to replicate what the private sector does best. The goal should be an industrial base that can surge on demand and continuously update hardware and software, ensuring America’s competitive advantage against adaptive adversaries.

The new acquisition philosophy is the right one: Compete for ideas, contract for speed, and buy at scale. Commercial purchase commitments and off-take agreements — not government plants — are the right tools for that.

Commercial innovation, not government production, will win the drone war - Breaking Defense

Inside the 2026 NDAA is a proposal to create a government-owned production facility for drones. Nadia Schadlow at the Hudson Institute explains why that’s not the best way to make drones at scale and at speed.

By Nadia Schadlow on November 19, 2025 2:32 pm

breakingdefense.com · Nadia Schadlow

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/commercial-innovation-not-government-production-will-win-the-drone-war/

The central theme of Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s recent speech on acquisition reform was that commercial companies and technologies are at the foundation of a strong defense industrial base and military innovation. As he put it, the department wants to harness more of America’s cutting-edge companies to focus their talent and technologies on our toughest national-security problems. New results won’t appear overnight, but the direction launched by Hegseth is the right one.

That’s why defense policymakers should be cautious about a provision now under consideration in the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that could undercut the dynamism we need in one of our most critical emerging defense sectors: unmanned autonomous systems.

Tucked into the bill is a proposal based on the SkyFoundry Act of 2025, to establish a government-owned innovation hub and production facility that would produce up to one million small unmanned aircraft systems under the oversight of the US Army Materiel Command. The Army recently reiterated this plan to build one million drones over the next 2-3 years.

For many reasons, producing drones at a government-owned facility would be a mistake.

First, directing production to government-owned facilities runs counter to the broader effort now underway to strengthen America’s manufacturing base by fostering a vibrant commercial sector. A central theme of both the first and second Trump administrations has been to revitalize US industry through partnership with the private sector rather than by expanding government production. President Donald Trump’s Made in America initiatives framed manufacturing as a collaboration with business, not a government enterprise.

Consistent with that vision, Trump’s June 2025 executive order on achieving drone dominance focuses on commercialization — advancing drone development, production, and export through industry leadership. Hegseth’s July drone dominance memo reaffirmed these points, directing the Army to accelerate acquisition from commercial suppliers. Even the Army itself has echoed this message, calling for the rapid fielding of low-cost unmanned systems developed by the private sector.

Second, an Army that produces its own drones as opposed to purchasing from the dozens of American companies now in this space could cut our soldiers off from the innovation and rapid adaptation that are essential to winning on today’s and tomorrow’s battlefields. After all, it is the private sector that drives innovation. Deputy Secretary Steve Feinberg’s initiatives have emphasized the need to draw in new companies and commercial innovation so that the Pentagon can source, field, and update capabilities from industry more quickly and at greater scale. Hegseth’s recent speech underscored the same point —lowering barriers to entry for firms so that innovations can reach the department faster.

Third, directing government production in a key sector risks perpetuating the supply chain problem that is already a drag on America’s drone industry. Supply chains for drones are fragile and many of the magnets, key motors, and electronics vital to autonomous systems come from China. Until the United States and its allies can produce these inputs, US companies will remain vulnerable. China has already restricted the export of batteries, motors, and flight controllers to the US, Europe, and Ukraine. Army production of drones would divert limited supplier from American companies, thus reducing the chances of a healthy, competitive sector down the line.

Finally, the track record of the government-owned facilities that make up the so-called “organic industrial base” (OIB) is problematic. Established decades ago under federal law to ensure that the United States could mobilize in wartime, the OIB is burdened by aging infrastructure and outdated equipment. Government Accountability Office reports have repeatedly found that, while some improvements have been made, the depots still face a multibillion-dollar backlog of maintenance and modernization projects — roughly $3 billion by some estimates — and that much of the capital equipment is well past its service life.

Why pour money into an aging system that relies on the government rather than energizing commercial manufacturing? Moreover, the Army’s own modernization leadership has emphasized the importance of facilities that can conduct digital repair, not large-scale serial production.

Some elements of the SkyFoundry proposal could be constructive, if properly adapted. For example, establishing a joint government–industry working group could help identify capability gaps, align investment priorities, and accelerate fielding. The Defense Production Act’s authority to conclude so-called “voluntary agreements” could provide a mechanism for doing this without triggering concerns about collusion. In addition, the government could catalyze faster innovation by offering its facilities to private-sector firms to test, prototype, and develop new technologies — similar to the Department of Energy’s laboratory system. And the SkyFoundry provision to create a hub for lessons learned in recent wars could be useful too.

Of course, the Department of War and the Army have vital roles to play in ensuring that American soldiers have access to the best drones possible. As the department has demonstrated in recent months, it possesses powerful instruments to catalyze the private sector to take on important defense problems. By using its power to make purchase commitments and off-take agreements and a range of other innovation-related authorities, the DoW can help address the Army’s drone shortage while also ensuring that the “valley of death” is not littered with promising drone companies.

But at a time when the entire nation should be focused on expanding production capacity for the industries of the future, this is not the moment to turn inward and build parallel, government-owned manufacturing systems. The government’s role is to catalyze and incentivize, not to replicate what the private sector does best. The goal should be an industrial base that can surge on demand and continuously update hardware and software, ensuring America’s competitive advantage against adaptive adversaries.

The new acquisition philosophy is the right one: Compete for ideas, contract for speed, and buy at scale. Commercial purchase commitments and off-take agreements — not government plants — are the right tools for that.

Nadia Schadlow is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute and a co-chair of the Hamilton Commission on Securing America’s National Security Innovation Base. She served as deputy national security advisor for strategy in the first Trump administration. She also serves as a strategic advisor for a US drone company.

breakingdefense.com · Nadia Schadlow

5. Japan's no longer ambiguous stance on Taiwan

​Summary:

Japan has abandoned ambiguity, declaring any Chinese attack or blockade of Taiwan a survival-threatening situation that will trigger JSDF action and US support. Beijing responds with threats, economic pressure and hybrid warfare. Tokyo boosts defense ties, prepares evacuation and blockade options, and treats Taiwan’s fate as existential to its security.

Comment: As some have commented, I think Prime Minister Takaichi could follow in Margaret Thatcher's footsteps and be known as the Iron Lady of Asia. 

Japan's no longer ambiguous stance on Taiwan - Asia Times

Japan’s new line infuriates China precisely because it must now prepare for both Japanese and US intervention

asiatimes.com · Julian McBride

https://asiatimes.com/2025/11/japans-no-longer-ambiguous-stance-on-taiwan/

Against the backdrop of rising threats, Japan has gradually remilitarized its self-defense forces (JSDF) to prepare for sudden contingencies. Meanwhile, after several decades of stagnation, Taiwan is taking its defense seriously. This comes as China’s military grows its own capabilities, which could be used against the self-governing island in the future.

On November 7, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated that any use of military force by China against Taiwan would be considered a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan, prompting Tokyo to consider deploying its defense apparatus.

Tokyo’s 2025 position is broader than that of other regional actors regarding the defense and sovereignty of Taipei, a shift that will likely affect Beijing’s strategies of coercion and aggressive maritime maneuvers.

Japan’s new Taiwan stance

Japan’s stance, once ambiguous, is now explicit: an attack on Taiwan will be regarde as an attack on Japanese maritime, economic and security interests.

During the Lower House Budget Committee, Takaichi clarified that her remarks were part of a broader strategy aligned with prior Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) PMs, such as the now-deceased Shinzo Abe, who introduced collective self-defense in 2015.

However, according to the Asahi publication, Takaichi’s stance differs from Abe’s, as the late prime minister never stated that an invasion or blockade of Taiwan would have warranted a Japanese military response.

Previously, Japan was unclear about whether it would intervene if Taiwan came under military pressure from China. In the specific case of a Chinese navy (PLAN) military blockade, Japan considers the wartime scenario existential, meaning the JSDF would have to respond with various measures.

The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) would be tasked with the evacuation of Japanese citizens and essential personnel, such as members of the Taiwanese parliament and prominent dissidents. If China’s warships threatened evacuations, the JMSDF could respond militarily with proportional force.

Simultaneously, if a PRC blockade were to take effect, Japan would allow US forces to operate in its maritime space, while also providing logistics and various forms of intelligence.

China’s pushback

Beijing has responded strongly to Takaichi’s comments, resulting in firm diplomatic pushback. Shortly after the remarks became public, the Chinese Consul General of Osaka, Xue Jian, posted a now-deleted threat implying beheading directed at the Japanese prime minister on Twitter/X.

China formally summoned Japanese Ambassador Kenji Kanasugi in response to Takaichi’s stance. The Chinese foreign ministry warned Japan to “stop playing with fire” and said that Beijing would view intervention in Taiwan as an “act of aggression.” Later, the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister also summoned Kanasugi to urge a retraction of Takaichi’s comments, but Kanasugi refused.

On Friday, November 14, China’s Defense Ministry escalated with more veiled threats by stating Japan would suffer a “crushing defeat” if the JSDF intervenes in a potential war over Taiwan. Both Beijing and Tokyo are increasingly expanding their military capabilities through navies, air forces, precision missiles and technology.

Japan’s ruling LDP is preparing proposals in response to China’s threats, including possibly expelling the Chinese Consul General in Osaka. Other Japanese parties condemn Beijing’s inflammatory rhetoric, seeing it as harmful to future relations.

The United States has expressed support for Japan and condemned the provocations directed at its close ally. US Ambassador to Japan, George Glass, characterized the episode as another example of Beijing’s coercive diplomacy, stating, “the mask slips again.”

He further commented on China’s diplomatic approach, stating, “time for Beijing to behave like the good neighbor it repeatedly talks about but fails to become.”

Existential angst

Taiwan lies south of Japan and is close to key shipping lanes. If its sovereignty is threatened by a Chinese military blockade, Japan would face an existential threat to its economy. Japan is already struggling with a demographic crisis, stagnant wages and high national debt. Over $5 trillion in Japanese imports and exports pass through maritime shipping lanes.

Secondly, Chinese dominance around the Taiwan Strait, or a full capitulation by Taipei, would be dire for the allied US containment strategy in the Indo-Pacific, of which Japan is part. Taiwan is part of the ‘First Island Chain’ strategy that negates the freedom of movement of China’s nuclear submarines in the region.

If Taiwan were blockaded and fell, a breakout of the PLAN would occur. Beijing could then threaten Tokyo’s vital shipping lanes in the Philippines and South China Sea. Rising PLAN capabilities were a major factor in the new defense pact between the Philippines and Japan. This pact was solidified in September 2025.

Furthermore, Tokyo recognizes the existential threat Beijing faces towards its own Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ)—particularly in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands. If Taipei were to fall, Beijing could allocate even greater naval resources towards the East and South China Sea to force Tokyo into a state of economic coercion.

China’s wargaming strategy

A Chinese direct invasion or blockade of Taiwan will require amphibious and aerial assets that would dwarf the D-Day landings. Because of this scenario, China will need every resource it can muster without diverting defense assets to other critical theaters, which a new Japan contingency can hinder.

The PLAN is preparing for the possibility of American intervention, given that US policy towards Taiwan’s security remains officially ambiguous, though the issue is vital to Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy and economic interests.

However, the PLAN must now account for Japanese involvement. As previously mentioned, the JMSDF would participate in evacuating Japanese citizens and prominent Taiwanese officers, politicians and activists, but Tokyo could also use its navy in other ways against the PLAN.

A US war game plan is to block PRC energy imports through the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea to force Beijing to withdraw from an assault on Taipei. The JMSDF could also take part in economic blockades around these areas if the Taiwan emergency threatens Tokyo’s own maritime and economic security.

If the United States decided not to intervene in a Taiwan emergency because of growing support for isolationism at home, while Japan acted immediately, China would still face a difficult dilemma. China would fear that Japan’s actions could become the catalyst for US involvement.

Currently, over 55,000 American military personnel are in Japan (USFJ). Exercises, cooperation, logistics and intelligence sharing between the US and the JSDF take place weekly. Any Chinese strike on JSDF bases during a Taiwan emergency risks striking US forces in Japan, directly or indirectly. This could immediately draw an ambiguous America into the war.

Diplomatic and hybrid escalation

Beijing will likely pressure Tokyo to reverse its Taiwan policy using several means. On November 15, China advised its citizens to avoid travel to Japan, which could reduce tourism and limit work opportunities for Chinese expats. However, this policy could also worsen Japan’s labor shortages, as it partially relies on Chinese workers.

Measures taken by Beijing could affect Japan’s economy but also reinforce domestic support for Takaichi, whose approval rating is already among the highest since Shinzo Abe’s administration.

According to a Kyodo News public opinion poll, 48% of Japanese netizens support collective defense in a Taiwan emergency, a high for Japan that could further increase Takaichi’s approval rating.

Beijing could seek to increase pressure on Japanese society to prompt Takaichi and the Diet to reconsider their policy, potentially through further maritime activities near the Ryukyu Islands under the pretext of “fishing vessels” or by employing Chinese Coast Guard tactics. Similar tactics have been used against the Philippines and Vietnam.

China could also utilize proxies such as North Korea with missile tests over the Sea of Japan that will test the will and endurance of the Japanese government. There are fears that Beijing will use Pyongyang as a proxy over Seoul’s growing Jeju Island naval command task force, and Tokyo can expect the same hybrid tactics.

Lastly, Japan’s Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) will be on high alert for acts of espionage and sabotage if tensions with China continue to escalate. Taiwan itself is dealing with several thousand potential Chinese agents who could enact hybrid warfare on the island to soften up an invasion, and likewise, threats of incapacitation of critical infrastructure and sea cables could happen to Japan during an emergency contingency.

Takaichi and the Japanese Diet face a critical foreign policy challenge with the Taiwan emergency contingency. In response, China may employ hybrid warfare tactics, economic measures and disinformation campaigns. Japan’s new stance now requires Beijing to prepare for the possibility of both Japanese and American intervention.

Julian McBride is a defense analyst and contributing editor at 19FortyFive.

asiatimes.com · Julian McBride

6. China Is Priming Its People and the World for a New Pressure Campaign on Taiwan

​Summary:

China is escalating a coordinated “pen and gun” campaign on Taiwan, fusing propaganda and cultural control with gray-zone coercion of Taipei’s backers, especially Japan, to isolate the island, harden domestic resolve, and psychologically pressure Taiwan into negotiation, while keeping a military invasion or Plan B credible amid perceived U.S. wavering, deterrence, aid, ambiguity.

Excerpts:

Its prime-time slot is filled with a new historical drama, “The Silent Honor,” which lionizes Communist Party agents operating in Taiwan after the Nationalists fled to the island in 1949 following their loss of the civil war to Mao’s forces. The series frames the agents’ espionage—and eventual execution—as martyrdom for the cause of “unification.”

In a parallel move suggesting a top-down mandate to reorient cultural output toward national struggle, state-owned drama troupes are receiving approval only for war-themed plays, said people briefed on the matter, while other genres are being rejected.

This domestic messaging is an intensification of an already amped-up atmosphere of Taiwan reunification rhetoric in China. And it is being matched by the gun.

Chinese leadership is focusing on neutralizing Taiwan’s supporters, notably Tokyo, following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Nov. 7 warning that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would trigger Japan’s involvement in any conflict.

In a response that shocked the world, China’s Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted a threat on X to “cut off” Takaichi’s “dirty neck.” The post was later deleted, but people close to Beijing’s decision-making said it was a deliberate, state-sanctioned action designed to test Japan’s resolve.

Comment: I suppose the pen and the gun are mightier than the pen and sword. Is our wavering and ambiguity providing fuel to Chinese plans and actions? Do they see opportunity now?

China Is Priming Its People and the World for a New Pressure Campaign on Taiwan

WSJ

ByLingling Wei

Nov. 19, 2025 11:00 pm ET

Beijing’s strategy, known as ‘the pen and the gun,’ employs a domestic media campaign and aggressive rhetoric toward Taipei’s friends

https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-is-priming-its-people-and-the-world-for-a-new-pressure-campaign-on-taiwan-1608e4d6

Chinese President Xi Jinping has made bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s control a key tenet of his ‘China Dream’ of national revival. florence lo/Reuters

• China is intensifying its “pen and gun” strategy against Taiwan, using state media to shape domestic opinion while lashing out at Taiwan’s supporters.
• Beijing is targeting Taiwan’s supporters, notably Japan, through diplomatic threats and military posturing near disputed territories and Taiwan.
• China aims to coerce Taiwan into capitulation without military conflict, while also preparing for a potential military action.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• China is intensifying its “pen and gun” strategy against Taiwan, using state media to shape domestic opinion while lashing out at Taiwan’s supporters.

Mao Zedong once said that China must wield both the pen and the gun against its adversaries. It is a strategy China is now intensifying for Taiwan.

With its so-called pen, China’s state television is preparing the domestic Chinese population for a new phase of pressure against Taiwan.

Its prime-time slot is filled with a new historical drama, “The Silent Honor,” which lionizes Communist Party agents operating in Taiwan after the Nationalists fled to the island in 1949 following their loss of the civil war to Mao’s forces. The series frames the agents’ espionage—and eventual execution—as martyrdom for the cause of “unification.”

In a parallel move suggesting a top-down mandate to reorient cultural output toward national struggle, state-owned drama troupes are receiving approval only for war-themed plays, said people briefed on the matter, while other genres are being rejected.

A still from the trailer of ‘The Silent Honor,’ a TV drama about Communist Party agents operating in Taiwan after the Nationalists fled to the island in 1949.

This domestic messaging is an intensification of an already amped-up atmosphere of Taiwan reunification rhetoric in China. And it is being matched by the gun.

Chinese leadership is focusing on neutralizing Taiwan’s supporters, notably Tokyo, following Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s Nov. 7 warning that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would trigger Japan’s involvement in any conflict.

In a response that shocked the world, China’s Consul General in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted a threat on X to “cut off” Takaichi’s “dirty neck.” The post was later deleted, but people close to Beijing’s decision-making said it was a deliberate, state-sanctioned action designed to test Japan’s resolve.

Simultaneously, China’s military signaled its readiness to escalate last weekend, sending four armed China Coast Guard vessels close to an island chain that both Beijing and Tokyo claim as their own. Japanese fighters rushed to intercept a Chinese military drone hovering near Yonaguni, Japan’s westernmost island and the closest point to Taiwan.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said earlier this month that a Chinese seizure of Taiwan would trigger Japan’s involvement in any conflict. Jung Yeon-je/AFP/Getty Images

These seemingly distinct events, according to the people close to China’s decision-making, represent a classic example of Beijing’s pen-and-gun strategy: using its iron grip on media and culture to shape domestic opinion while lashing out at Taiwan’s supporters to isolate the island.

There is little indication of an imminent military strike against Taiwan, a self-governing democracy of 24 million people that China claims as its own. But China has been ramping up its military incursions in the Taiwan Strait, intending to keep the squeeze on Taipei, at a time when Beijing sees the Trump administration wavering in its commitment to the island.

“This is the new baseline normal,” said Jason Hsu, a former Taiwan lawmaker and now a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, a Washington think tank. “It prepares domestic audiences, signals resolve externally and shapes the psychological battlespace long before any military move.”

China’s strategy, described by those close to Beijing’s decision-making as Plan A, aims to coerce Taiwan into capitulation without firing a shot. The goal is to make the island’s position so economically, diplomatically and psychologically unbearable that negotiation with the Chinese leadership becomes the only viable option.

Looming behind this strategy is Plan B, a military takeover. This distinction is crucial, Hsu and other analysts said. Beijing is systematically fostering an environment where “gray zone” activities such as economic coercion or political interference become the norm, lowering the threshold for direct conflict.

A giant screen in Beijing displays news reports of Chinese military drills around Taiwan earlier this year. florence lo/Reuters

The push comes as Beijing perceives a strategic opening in the relative quiet on Taiwan from the U.S., which China sees as the only country capable of halting its agenda.

President Trump, unlike his predecessor Joe Biden, has avoided explicitly stating whether the U.S. would intervene militarily if China were to invade Taiwan. Trump has said public commitments would weaken his negotiating position with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who he said promised not to invade during his term. Yet recent moves, including the Trump administration’s delay in military aid, have fueled anxiety in Taipei that American support is being sacrificed for an economic deal with China.

Administration officials have characterized the shift as pragmatic deterrence that forces Taipei to fund its own defense capabilities while avoiding symbolic gestures that could grant Beijing a pretext for a Ukraine-style conflict.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth expressed concerns about China’s naval activity around Taiwan in a meeting with Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun in late October, indicating the U.S.’s stance on the island hasn’t changed. The U.S. approved a $330 million sale of aircraft parts to Taiwan last week, the first of Trump’s second term.

Beijing is acting now to break a cycle that has hardened over a decade. Since 2016, Taipei’s governing Democratic Progressive Party has cultivated a distinct Taiwanese identity and strengthened ties with global capitals. Beijing has labeled Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te a “dangerous separatist.”

Beijing’s calculated moves appear to reflect its fear that the mainland’s “hearts and minds” battle for the island is all but lost.

Decades ago, a significant portion of the Taiwanese population identified as “Chinese” or “both Chinese and Taiwanese.” Today, polls consistently show a supermajority, often exceeding 60% to 70%, who identify exclusively as Taiwanese. According to the people close to Chinese decision-making, Beijing sees Taiwan’s national identity solidifying.

Taiwan flags displayed ahead of National Day celebrations in Taipei last month. ann wang/Reuters

This view, these people said, explains why the “pen” is being wielded with such specific historical intent.

The recent broadcast of the spy drama follows a familiar playbook. In 2017, Xi used the airing of “The Qin Empire III,” a drama about the events that set the stage for China’s unification under its first emperor, to build public momentum before abolishing presidential term limits.

Since coming to power in late 2012, Xi has made bringing Taiwan under Beijing’s control a key tenet of his “China Dream” of national revival. Now, well into an unprecedented third term, he has repeatedly emphasized that “reunification” is inevitable and can’t be stopped by outside forces.

The current focus on the martyrdom of figures like the Chinese agents portrayed in “The Silent Honor” is serving as a similar effort to shape public views, the people close to Beijing’s decision-making said.

Complementing this domestic messaging is a sharpened focus on external targets, specifically Tokyo. In addition to lashing out at Takaichi and sending ships toward disputed islands, authorities in China have urged Chinese tourists to temporarily avoid traveling to Japan, advised Chinese students and applicants to reassess risks associated with studying in the country, and postponed the release of at least two Japanese films. Those actions sent shares of Japanese retail and tourism giants such as Shiseido tumbling.

SHARE YOUR THOUGHTS

How should the U.S. and Japan respond to China’s campaign to isolate Taiwan? Join the conversation below.

Analysts describe the Chinese moves as a coordinated effort to align Beijing’s internal and external objectives. By mobilizing the domestic population for a potential struggle while simultaneously seeking to cut off Taiwan’s international support, the strategy aims to create enough pressure to force a political settlement.

For officials in the U.S. and its regional allies, the critical uncertainty is whether this campaign marks the full extent of Beijing’s current plans, or if it signals the beginning of a more aggressive phase.

Write to Lingling Wei at Lingling.Wei@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 20, 2025, print edition as 'China Opens New Era of Taiwan Pressure'.

WSJ

7. The Pentagon Can’t Trust GPS Anymore. Is Quantum Physics the Answer?

​Summary: 

With GPS increasingly jammed and spoofed, the Pentagon is funding quantum sensors and other alternatives to satellite navigation. Australian startup Q-CTRL flight tested a laser based magnetometer that reads Earths magnetic field and compares it to maps, outperforming inertial systems, though cost, durability and mapping gaps still pose serious obstacles.

Comment: Seems like a replacement system will be challenging. Can we get there? Especially since we are vulnerable right now.

The Pentagon Can’t Trust GPS Anymore. Is Quantum Physics the Answer?

WSJ

New devices navigate without satellites or risk of enemy jamming signals

Reporting and photography by

Mike Cherney

Nov. 19, 2025 10:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/tech/the-pentagon-cant-trust-gps-anymore-is-quantum-physics-the-answer-d7b2d4e6

Q-CTRL engineers prepare for a test flight of a device that could reduce reliance on GPS.

• Scientists are exploring the use of quantum sensors as a secure alternative to GPS with military and civilian applications.
• A recent test involved a device that shines lasers at atoms that behave like compass needles.
• GPS signal jamming and spoofing has become commonplace, leading scientists to explore the quantum properties of atoms to aid navigation in contested environments.

An artificial-intelligence tool created this summary, which was based on the text of the article and checked by an editor. Read more about how we use artificial intelligence in our journalism.

• Scientists are exploring the use of quantum sensors as a secure alternative to GPS with military and civilian applications.

GRIFFITH, Australia—At a tiny airport in the Australian countryside last month, a small plane took off carrying a device that could transform how U.S. drones, aircraft and ships navigate across future battlefields.

The flight carried an instrument that shines lasers at atoms, which behave like compass needles to measure Earth’s magnetic field in real time. Readings from the device can be compared to a magnetic-field map, helping a user determine their location—and offering a backup to satellite-based navigation like GPS.

For the U.S. and its allies, finding new ways to navigate is crucial. In the Ukraine war, Russia is jamming and spoofing—blocking and faking signals—so frequently that satellite navigation isn’t dependable. Other potential adversaries, including China and North Korea, possess similar capabilities.

GPS spoofing by militaries has become a civilian hazard as well, presenting a risk to commercial aircraft.

“This problem hasn’t been as urgent until right now, when we are seeing the end of reliable GPS,” said Russell Anderson, a principal scientist at Q-CTRL, the Australian startup that ran the test flight. “It is the arms race of the current day, in terms of navigation.”

Scientists around the world are exploring whether harnessing the quantum properties of atoms can help navigate accurately in so-called contested environments. But it is still unclear whether the devices, which work well in labs and field tests, would perform reliably on actual military missions.

The Pentagon is hoping to solve that problem. In August, the research and development agency at the Defense Department launched a program to help make quantum sensors more robust.

The agency said the extraordinary sensitivity of the devices makes them fragile in real-world environments, where vibrations or electromagnetic interference can degrade performance. Australia-based Q-CTRL was selected to participate; another company, Safran Federal Systems in Rochester, N.Y., also said it was awarded a contract.

The work is taking on increasing urgency. Russia and China have advanced their electronic-warfare capabilities. European officials have accused Russia of widespread jamming of aircraft.

The problem with GPS is the signals are typically weak, making them easy to block. The U.S. has been rolling out a new, more powerful GPS signal for the military called M-code that is more resilient to jamming, but there has been a holdup in getting funding for the receivers needed to use it, said Todd Harrison, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute who focuses on defense strategy and space policy.

“The U.S. military now realizes future battlefields will be fully contested in the electromagnetic domain unlike anything we have seen before,” he said.

Quantum devices, potentially working together, could tip the balance, proponents say. Quantum clocks, for example, could boost the precision and accuracy of timekeeping. Another quantum sensor, also being developed by Q-CTRL, can navigate by detecting small changes in gravity.

“Quantum sensing is a priority,” said Tanya Monro, the chief scientist for Australia’s Department of Defence, which hosted a trial of the Q-CTRL gravity sensor on one of its ships. “There is an absolute, driving need to be able to operate with complete denial of GPS.”

The Q-CTRL device on the plane in Griffith, a city of about 27,000, is called an optically pumped magnetometer. It shoots lasers at atoms of rubidium, a soft, silvery-white metal, that are held in a gaseous form in a small glass vial. The lasers help measure changes in the atoms’ internal compass needle, which is used to calculate the strength of the magnetic field.

Q-CTRL’s software then removes interference from outside sources, such as the aircraft itself, producing an accurate measurement of the Earth’s magnetic field in that location, which can be compared to a magnetic map. Such maps show deviations from the average field strength over the surface of the Earth.

Michael J. Biercuk at his lab in Sydney.

“You can go out in the woods, and with a map and your eyes identify, ‘Well, there’s a hill and there’s a valley and there’s a stream, so I think I’m right here on the map,’” said Michael J. Biercuk, the American quantum physicist who founded Q-CTRL. “You can do exactly the same thing with these magnetic signals.”

Biercuk said there is no realistic way to jam quantum magnetometers or gravimeters from a distance, short of an energy pulse that would fry all the electronics on a plane and cause it to crash. He said Q-CTRL has subjected the sensors to shaking and dynamic maneuvers with good results—including more than 140 hours of continuous operation on the Australian ship.

In Griffith, Q-CTRL engineers tested three magnetometers in different locations on the airplane, given that the external interference in each spot is different.

The units were tested against a high-end inertial navigation system—which estimates position by using gyroscopes and accelerometers. These systems are already used as GPS backups and on submarines, which can’t access GPS when underwater. But inaccuracies build up over long distances.

All three locations performed comparably, Biercuk said. Over an 80-mile test window, a sensor on the tip of the plane’s wing resulted in an average position estimate within about 620 feet of the true position, and the margin of error didn’t increase with the duration of the flight, he said. The performance was more than 10 times better than the inertial navigation system.

GPS is still very precise, when it’s available. GPS-enabled smartphones are typically accurate to within 16 feet under open sky, according to one study.

A flight navigation map.

One of the sensors was placed at the tip of the plane’s wing for the test flight.

There are challenges with the magnetometer approach. One is the need to have detailed magnetic maps, which may not always be available or up-to-date. Another is to make the device inexpensive enough for cheap drones like those that have transformed military strategy in Ukraine.

“Quantum offers a lot of potential,” said Allison Kealy, a professor at Swinburne University of Technology in Melbourne, Australia, who specializes in positioning and navigation. She noted, though, that “I think they’re like any other sensor. They have their strengths and weaknesses.”

Others are exploring different techniques. Advanced Navigation, a company in Australia that makes inertial navigation systems, is preparing to launch a sensor that measures an aircraft’s velocity in three dimensions by shooting lasers at the ground. That works in tandem with inertial navigation systems to improve accuracy over longer distances.

“No one solution fits all problems,” said Max Doemling, chief product officer at Advanced Navigation, which has collaborated with Q-CTRL in the past. Doemling said his company would be interested in using quantum sensors when the technology is ready.

Yuval Cohen inspects the wingtip unit.

In Griffith, not everything went smoothly at Q-CTRL’s flight tests. At one point, there was a communication issue involving the wingtip sensor, and it was swapped out for a different unit.

More work is ahead, some of the Q-CTRL scientists said, to show the sensors can handle different scenarios that a military platform might face.

“Can it survive a rocket launch? Can it survive a crash landing?” said Yuval Cohen, a Q-CTRL researcher. “You don’t really know, until you do the testing.”

Write to Mike Cherney at mike.cherney@wsj.com

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 20, 2025, print edition as 'Militaries Try Out Alternatives to GPS'.

WSJ

8. Why Australia’s terrorism definition still works

​Summary:

Australia’s long standing Criminal Code definition of a terrorist act remains effective, needing only minor refinements. Its motivational elements, including political and religious, are vital for capturing diverse threats. They oppose broadening protest exclusions, favor tweaks like adding psychological harm, and urge retaining a rights respecting framework.

Comment. I still think Bruce Hoffman's dinfition is the gold standard. It is a form of political warfare.

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider `target audience' that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is very little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale.

Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism

Why Australia’s terrorism definition still works | The Strategist

aspistrategist.org.au · John Coyne, Chris Taylor, Susan Thomson · November 19, 2025

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-australias-terrorism-definition-still-works/

The definition of a ‘terrorist act’ included in Australia’s Criminal Code since 2002 has been important in protecting Australia’s national security and reinforcing the resilience of our democratic institutions. That definition, currently the subject of an inquiry by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM), continues to be relevant and effective. It should be retained with minimal revision.

We welcomed an opportunity to engage with the INSLM to discuss the definition of a ‘terrorist act’ as outlined in section 100.1 of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Our subsequent submission to his inquiry reflects a policy and operational perspective grounded in the realities of operational and strategic counterterrorism, rather than a legalistic or academic critique.

Since its introduction, the terrorism definition has been reviewed seven times by different institutions and jurisdictions, yet no substantive amendments have been adopted. One interpretation might be that the number of reviews and recommendations reflects some kind of failing. We suggest that it instead reflects the reality that recommended revisions have simply not had public nor political support.

We reject the premise that absence of change implies deficiency. The burden of proof lies with those advocating for revision to demonstrate that an alternative definition would better serve Australia’s interests by being more effective, more proportionate, more protective of rights and more consistent with international obligations. To date, no such case has been convincingly made.

A core strength of the current definition is its inclusion of a motivational element: that a terrorist act must be committed with the intent of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. This is not a semantic flourish; it’s foundational. As our submission notes:

Terrorism is first and foremost a crime directed against the state and the nation, regardless of the specific target of the action or threat. Terrorism’s unique effect on society and government makes it particularly damaging to social cohesion within a democracy. For terrorism is an exercise in the negation of politics—in so far as violence for political, religious or ideological purposes within a constitutional democracy and society simply cannot be tolerated. It represents an unacceptable challenge to the lawful monopoly on violence by the democratic state. All the other ills (including the terrible harms visited on people or the population) are important but secondary to this point.

Some have proposed removing ‘religious’ and ‘political’ motivations, arguing that ‘ideological’ alone is sufficient. We disagree. In an era of increasingly mixed and hybrid motivations—where attackers may be driven by a blend of grievances, ideologies and personal pathologies—narrowing the definition would be counterproductive.

The inclusion of ‘religious’ motivation is necessary for the definition’s operational functionality. The INSLM inquiry’s own issues paper finds that nearly 95 percent of terrorism convictions in Australia have involved religious motivation, predominantly linked to Islamist extremism. This is not a function of the law’s wording, but a reflection of the threat environment.

Aspects of Australia’s terrorism threat landscape have changed significantly since 2002. The rise of online radicalisation, proliferation of lone actors—often minors—and emergence of new ideological drivers such as misogyny and ethnonationalism have reshaped the operational environment.

In our view, these changes reinforce, rather than undermine, the need for a broad and flexible definition. The current framework accommodates this complexity. For example, ASPI’s past research into misogynist incel ideology demonstrates how emerging threats can potentially be captured under the existing legal structure when they are ideologically motivated and violent.

The law is not responsible for the social conditions giving rise to radicalisation. It is, however, central to enabling early intervention and disruption, especially when warning times are shrinking.

We support the current exclusion of ‘advocacy, protest or dissent’ from the terrorism definition. However, we caution against further expanding this exclusion, as some have suggested. In a time of worrying political polarisation and attempts to legitimise politically motivated violence in democratic societies, weakening this boundary would be unwise. Serious property damage, when committed with terrorist intent, must remain within the scope of the law. Terrorism is about intent and effect, not just physical injury.

We are not opposed to all change. There are opportunities for limited, sensible improvements that preserve the law’s intent and operational utility. These include potentially:

—Expanding the definition of ‘harm’ to include psychological harm, aligning it with other legal contexts;

—Explicitly including hostage-taking and kidnapping as terrorist acts to aid prosecution; and

—Separating terrorist acts and threats into distinct offences, while not inadvertently disincentivising agencies from acting early and precisely to disrupt threats.

These refinements would enhance clarity and prosecutorial effectiveness without compromising the effective operation of the law.

Australia’s terrorism definition has stood the test of time. It has enabled security agencies and police to act decisively and proportionately in the face of evolving threats. It has not eroded civil liberties in any demonstrated, substantive way, and it continues to enjoy public and parliamentary support.

In a period marked by social division and rising extremism, now is not the time to weaken the legal foundations of Australia’s counterterrorism framework. We encourage the INSLM to prioritise operational effectiveness and national resilience in his considerations. The current definition is not perfect, but it is principled, practical and proven.

aspistrategist.org.au · John Coyne, Chris Taylor, Susan Thomson · November 19, 2025

9. ARSOF Civil Affairs Trains with AI

​Summary:

ARSOF Civil Affairs units used the Atlas Lion 26-1 exercise to validate teams in realistic large-scale combat scenarios, then pioneered an AI and machine-learning tabletop certification, replacing human evaluators. The AI model objectively assessed thousands of data points to standardize training, enhance readiness, and shape future Army Civil Affairs preparation.

ARSOF Civil Affairs Trains with AI

November 20, 2025 DVIDS Civil Affairs 0

https://sof.news/arsof/civil-affairs-arsof/arsof-ca-artificial-intelligence-ai/

Story by Maj. Justin Zwick, 3rd SFG(A).

Soldiers from the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group, executed a team-level validation exercise conducted October 20 – 24 2025. This annual training event enhances unit readiness and prepares Soldiers for complex missions worldwide. Following months of individual and collective training, Civil Affairs teams validated their skills in a realistic training scenario, designed to test Soldiers’ skills in a complex and dynamic environment.

Army Special Operations Forces Civil Affairs (ARSOF CA), is a branch of Soldiers specially trained to understand and influence the civil component of the operational environment. Civil Affairs professionals serve as an integral component in providing Commanders with key information about a region’s civilian population, enabling commanders to maintain operational tempo, preserve combat power, and consolidate gains. Capable of operating within the full spectrum of operations, ARSOF CA teams integrate with key populations and organizations to best understand civil networks to support national and theater-level objectives.

During Atlas Lion 26-1, two 4-person teams from Bravo Company of the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion navigated complex scenarios designed to evaluate months of tactical training. From engaging with local nationals to evacuating simulated casualties under hostile conditions, teams worked through multifaceted scenarios in a large-scale combat operations environment to prepare Soldiers for the unforeseen challenges overseas.

“This training environment replicates a large-scale combat operations environment. When we train, we train for the future,” explained Lt. Col. Michael Veglucci, Commander of the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion. “This gets after our core competencies and our Civil Affairs battle drills.”

After a week of validating their CA collective tasks, the 91st Civil Affairs Battalion partnered with Delta Company, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, to execute a comprehensive tabletop exercise. This exercise leveraged a one-of-a-kind artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) model that enabled leaders to certify their Company in the unit’s critical tasks, a groundbreaking shift in how the Army assesses readiness.

In a first full iteration for the formation, ARSOF CA conducted a company-level certification exercise without using humans as external evaluators. For decades, units relied on observers to monitor training and assess Soldier competencies. Today, that work is being done by AI.

Civil Affairs Soldiers, who typically find themselves engaging with civil populations to solve complex problems, suddenly found themselves interacting with role players and civilian leaders built into the AI model.

In an innovative approach to transform how Soldiers prepare for future conflicts across multiple operational environments, AI is helping standardize training. AI enables commanders to rapidly scale training without proportionally increasing resources. What was once expensive and resource-intensive feat is now being done with the stroke of a keyboard.

“What makes this AI model unique is that it is limitless in complexity and cohesion to give the training audience a valuable and effective training opportunity,” said Moran Keay, CEO and founder of Motive International, who ran the training. “This training provides commanders with an objective assessment of their formation’s ability to execute critical tasks before sending anyone overseas.”

During Atlas Lion, the AI model analyzed tens of thousands of data points using key performance indicators, a task previously impossible for human evaluators. By leveraging thousands of pages of doctrine, documents, and regulations, the model provided an unbiased assessment of the Company’s ability to conduct Civil Affairs tasks critical to mission success.

While some express skepticism about the role of AI in evaluating Soldiers whose primary role is to engage with civilian populations, the Army is adapting, modernizing, and transforming how it trains and certifies its troops.

As the Army continues to identify innovative ways to train and certify formations, Civil Affairs Soldiers are shaping the future of training. Through innovation and forward-thinking leadership, ARSOF CA is not only enhancing their readiness but also setting the standard for how the Army will train and certify its Soldiers to meet the demands of tomorrow’s missions.

**********

This story by Maj. Justin Zwick of the 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) was first published by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS) on November 13, 2025.

Image: U.S. Army Soldier assigned to 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne) takes notes during briefing about Artificial Intelligence training during a tabletop exercise as part of Atlas Lion at Fort Bragg, N.C. Oct. 27, 2025. The Atlas Lion Table-Top Exercise is an AI supported simulation designed to validate Civil Affairs Company’s core competencies in a digital training environment, ensuring readiness for real-world operations by validating their ability to effectively support civilian populations and local governance. (U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Natalia Hernandez)

10. Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones

​Summary:

Proliferating electronic warfare, cyberattacks, EMP, and anti-satellite weapons will eventually neutralize advanced systems, forcing war back to analogue foundations. Drawing on Ukraine’s trenches and jamming, he says modern militaries risk paralysis when GPS, drones, and networks fail. Enduring wisdom from Sun Tzu and Clausewitz highlights adaptability, friction, and political purpose. Future superiority will belong to forces that can live off the land, decentralize command, and fight with maps, rifles, fieldcraft, and disciplined violence while also exploiting technology. The smartest generals will harness advanced systems yet rigorously train for their sudden loss in fully denied environments and communications.

Excerpts:

Einstein once warned that if World War III were fought with nuclear weapons, World War IV would be fought with sticks and stones. His words, once symbolic, now seem literal. Though, to be clear, this is not a future of true primitive warfare, but one where the technological paradox forces a return to analogue essentials: hand loaded artillery, the rifle, the map, and the soldier’s sheer fieldcraft. The trajectory of modern warfare points not toward endless technological dominance but toward its collapse.

...

The general of tomorrow will not be the one who masters technology, artificial intelligence, or machines. He will be the one who both harnesses them and trains for their failure. When the satellites fall silent and the battlefield goes dark, war will return to its oldest form – fought by those who can see, move, and shoot without power. And that, paradoxically, will make them the most advanced soldiers of all.

Comment: Scary future. EMP or any capability that disrupts our electromagnetic spectrum scares me. Something I do not think we do well is train for the failure of advanced systems. 

Future War Will Be Fought with Sticks and Stones

by Casey Christie

|

11.20.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/20/future-war-will-be-fought-with-sticks-and-stones/

Introduction

In an era defined by artificial intelligence, drones, and satellite-guided warfare, it may seem absurd to suggest that the future of war lies in trenches, artillery, and rifles. Yet history has a way of circling back on itself and as nations race to develop increasingly advanced systems of destruction, they also create the means of their own paralysis. The next great war will not be won by the most technologically advanced army, but by the one that can still fight when all technology fails. This is not a romantic return to the past, nor a doomsday prediction, but a logical outcome of warfare’s evolution. Each new military breakthrough has produced a corresponding countermeasure, driving modern battle toward a point of diminishing returns. Directed-energy weapons now drop entire drone swarms from the sky. Cyber-attacks can paralyze command networks. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) systems threaten to fry electronics across vast regions. Logically, therefore, when all sides possess such capabilities, the advantage shifts not to the most advanced, but to the most adaptable.

The next great war will not be won by the most technologically advanced army, but by the one that can still fight when all technology fails.

The Paradox of Progress

For over a century, the trajectory of war has been defined by progress – faster aircraft, smarter bombs, and more connected command networks. Yet every step toward technological supremacy also increases fragility. Modern militaries are built upon vulnerable foundations: GPS, communications satellites, and data-dependent logistics. An adversary that can disrupt those systems does not need to outgun its opponent; it only needs to unplug it. The U.S., the U.K., China, and Russia are all developing EMP and high-power microwave weapons designed to do exactly that. The U.S. Department of Defense has warned repeatedly that an EMP detonation could disable unshielded electronics across an entire theatre of operations. Russia claims to have a number of non-nuclear EMP devices that have allegedly been tested for battlefield use. China’s military doctrine openly discusses “information dominance” as a means of blinding an adversary before the first shot is fired. If such weapons are ever used at scale, the result would be immediate regression as drones would fall, satellites would go silent, and precision-guided munitions would become scrap metal. Armies would be forced to fight with what still works: small arms, fieldcraft, artillery, and ground tactics that predate the digital age.

Lessons from Ukraine: The Return to Analogue

The war in Ukraine has already previewed this future and ushered in the return of trench warfare – something once thought consigned to the past. Both sides employ extensive electronic warfare, jamming GPS and communications across the front. Ukrainian units now use runners, paper maps, and wired field telephones because radios are routinely intercepted or disabled. Drones now dominate the battlefield – until they don’t, as when weather or jamming grounds them, troops revert to trench warfare that could be mistaken for the Somme. These realities have forced Western military planners and command structures to reconsider their assumptions – the U.S. Army’s recent training updates include renewed emphasis on map reading, camouflage, and radio silence. NATO exercises now simulate environments where GPS and satellite communications are denied. Even the British Army’s Future Soldier Program, heavily invested in digital modernization, includes contingencies for operating “off grid.” The lesson is simple: the most dangerous weapon in modern war may be the switch that turns everything off.

Enduring Wisdom: Sun Tzu’s Relevance in a Digital Age

Despite two millennia of technological progress, Sun Tzu’s The Art of War remains a more reliable manual for survival than any AI algorithm. His principles – planning, deception, adaptability, and the exploitation of enemy weakness – apply as much to cyber warfare as to swordplay. “All warfare is based on deception,” he wrote, and in a world of false signals, spoofed sensors, and electronic camouflage, those words have never been truer. In a world of super technology, Sun Tzu’s insistence on simplicity is what modern commanders risk forgetting. He warned against relying on elaborate systems that collapse when reality intervenes. The side that can maintain order in chaos, that can fight without instruction or connection, is the one that withstands. His enduring lesson is this: the ultimate weapon is understanding, not technology and is highly relevant in the digital age.

The Continuing Logic of Clausewitz

The Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz and his seminal On War still define strategic thought in warfare. His reminder that war is “a continuation of politics by other means” grounds every tactical innovation within political purpose. Yet the modern obsession with technology has inverted that logic – policy now often serves the tools rather than the other way around. Clausewitz warned that the “fog of war” would always obscure clarity and that friction would defeat even the best-laid plans. Digital warfare magnifies both – artificial intelligence may predict patterns, but crucially it cannot anticipate chaos, no one can. Clausewitz’s “friction” is still the great equalizer: the uncertainty that no algorithm can erase. As technology races ahead, his central truth remains unchanged – the human mind, not the machine, decides wars.

Strategic Theory and the Nature of War

Strategic theory distinguishes between the character and the nature of war. Its character changes with time, technology, and culture. Its nature, though, does not. The character of modern war may be digital, autonomous, and data-driven – but its nature remains human, violent, and political. Theorists from J.F.C. Fuller to Colin Gray have argued that every revolution in military affairs ultimately redistributes, rather than removes, risk. Today’s technological “revolution” will be no different. When the digital layer collapses, the elemental logic of war – to close with and destroy the enemy – reasserts itself. This is the enduring truth that modern strategists and students of war must remember: innovation cannot replace understanding.

The Coming Age of Denial Warfare

Military theorists describe this emerging environment as “denial warfare” – the battle to deny the enemy access to data, communications, or energy. In such a world, supremacy belongs to whichever side can fight in the dark. The first days of a major-power conflict will likely see cyber-attacks, orbital strikes, and EMP detonations designed to erase technological advantage. When that blackout comes, advanced militaries may find themselves less prepared than irregular forces. Armies dependent on drones and networked sensors will struggle, while units trained for self-sufficiency will endure. The general who prepared his men to live off the land, fight without GPS, and communicate by physical means will prove more modern than any AI strategist.

The general who prepared his men to live off the land, fight without GPS, and communicate by physical means will prove more modern than any AI strategist.

Preparing for the Collapse of Connectivity

Future readiness will not be measured by how much technology an army can deploy, but by how well it can survive its loss. Militaries must invest as heavily in analogue resilience as they do in digital capability. Shielded communications, manual targeting systems, and non-digital logistics should no longer be viewed as relics of the past but as insurance for the future. Command decentralization will be critical, as once electronic communication fails, local initiative replaces centralized control. This demands training soldiers to think independently, not just follow data feeds. It also requires re-learning the fundamentals of warfare: cover, concealment, close combat, and absolute violence in action. As Clausewitz rightly stated, violence should be used “unsparingly.” And in a world now dominated by remote warfare, this principle can be too easily forgotten.

Conclusion

Einstein once warned that if World War III were fought with nuclear weapons, World War IV would be fought with sticks and stones. His words, once symbolic, now seem literal. Though, to be clear, this is not a future of true primitive warfare, but one where the technological paradox forces a return to analogue essentials: hand loaded artillery, the rifle, the map, and the soldier’s sheer fieldcraft. The trajectory of modern warfare points not toward endless technological dominance but toward its collapse.

While this scenario remains a contingency – a future that may or may not come to pass – its possibility is the ultimate test of strategic foresight. The general who neglects to train his troops for this singular eventuality, the forced return to analogue warfare, is not merely unprepared; he is strategically doomed to fail.

When the satellites fall silent and the battlefield goes dark, war will return to its oldest form – fought by those who can see, move, and shoot without power. And that, paradoxically, will make them the most advanced soldiers of all.

The general of tomorrow will not be the one who masters technology, artificial intelligence, or machines. He will be the one who both harnesses them and trains for their failure. When the satellites fall silent and the battlefield goes dark, war will return to its oldest form – fought by those who can see, move, and shoot without power. And that, paradoxically, will make them the most advanced soldiers of all.

Tags: Future of War

About The Author

• 
  
• Casey Christie
• Casey Christie is the Managing Director of Christie and Associates, a London-based private military security and intelligence firm. With decades of experience in security, intelligence, and risk analysis, he has written extensively on geopolitical threats, security and defense, and modern warfare. His work has been published in The Times of London, The South African Sunday Times, and Ukraine's Kyiv Post, among others.

11. Vertical integration of rare Earth elements for US autonomous dominion

​Summary:

US dependence on China for rare earths threatens AI enabled military power. He urges vertically integrated domestic mining, refining, and magnet production modeled on MP Materials, backed by long term government investment and procurement, paired with agile drone innovation ecosystems to secure autonomous dominance and bipartisan economic renewal.

​Excerpts:

Skeptics may contend that subsidizing the domestic rare earth supply chain constitutes corporate welfare, while the rapid fielding of autonomous systems borders on reckless adventurism. Yet the alternative of the United States depending on adversaries for critical inputs and procurement cycles that can easily be shut off is just as risky. Just as Congress once recognized aerospace and nuclear power as inherently strategic industries worthy of public investment and rapid development, it must now do the same for rare earth supply chains and autonomous systems.

US policymakers must act now so that when the next generation of autonomous drones takes flight in a future conflict, every magnet in their motors, every alloy in their rotors, and every line of code is anchored in expedient American innovation. These reforms can offer a bipartisan strategy that ties economic renewal in rare earth elements to military adaptation.

Vertical integration of rare Earth elements for US autonomous dominion - Breaking Defense

In a world where artificial intelligence and unmanned systems are key to readiness against China, the US should develop a domestic supply chain, writes Kevin Chen in this essay.

breakingdefense.com · Kevin Chen

By Kevin Chen on November 19, 2025 11:30 am

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/vertical-integration-of-rare-earth-elements-for-us-autonomous-dominion/

This essay is part of the Pathfinder series, a coproduction between Breaking Defense and the Center for a New American Security. Click here to find out more.

America’s national security is imperiled by its dependence on China for the rare earth elements (REEs) essential to artificial intelligence (AI), autonomous systems, and precision-guided weapons. Without secure access to refined REEs, even the most sophisticated algorithms and defense platforms become inoperable.

China’s dominance across the REE supply chain­ — from supply to mining to refining — creates a single point of failure for US military readiness. In a crisis, Beijing could weaponize these choke points, halting production of the AI-enabled drones, electronic warfare systems, and missiles that underpin US deterrence in theaters from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific.

Rebuilding A Domestic Supply Chain

Washington should treat REEs not as commercial commodities but as strategic national assets. A bipartisan path forward lies in the vertical integration within US borders of domestic mining, separation, refining, and magnet alloying capacity. MP Materials’ operations in California offer a prototype for such an effort.

Based in Las Vegas, MP Materials owns and operates the Mountain Pass mine in California, the only active rare earth mine and processing site in North America. According to company analysts, MP is working to expand its capacity downstream to domestically produce separated oxides and permanent magnets. It recently struck a major public–private partnership with the Department of Defense (DoD) to accelerate the construction of a completely domestic US rare earth magnet supply chain. This 10X Facility will help ensure domestic magnet manufacturing, expand heavy rare earth separation, and establish long-term price floor guarantees that reinforce US independence in the REE chain.

Under the agreement, the DoD becomes MP’s largest shareholder, commits to a 10-year price floor, and agrees to purchase all magnets for defense and commercial use from the new facility. MP’s recent statements emphasize that the company has invested nearly $1 billion to reindustrialize the full rare earth supply chain, completely ceasing exports of concentrate to China and accelerating downstream operations to the American military and US private companies.

The Next Phase Of Resilience For MP Materials

MP’s expansion also highlights a key risk. Without policy support for refinement and magnet production, the United States might only reshore upstream mining or, worse, extract raw concentrate and ship it abroad to adversarial companies, leaving the United States vulnerable to foreign control over the most critical stages of the supply chain. MP’s ambition demonstrates how domestic investment can rebuild an end-to-end rare earth supply chain vital to US technological and national security competitiveness, but only if the government treats MP Materials as a model to replicate rather than a standalone venture.

Congress should support MP Materials and similar firms by extending federal assistance beyond mining to include magnet fabrication, offtake procurement, and integration with defense manufacturing. Additionally, pairing MP’s scaling capacity with national labs and university consortia can create a Manhattan Project for magnets that could counter China’s head start in the field.

From Materials To Military Innovation

America’s long-term security depends not only on a vertically integrated REE chain, but also on transforming them into battlefield innovation. Even with a stable domestic supply, the United States risks falling behind adversaries that can rapidly field new REE-based systems. The war in Ukraine illustrates an opportunity. Russia’s initial armored advances were blunted not by high-end Western munitions but by fleets of jury-rigged drones, prototyped in small workshops and refined by frontline feedback. Ukraine’s defense innovation ecosystem has embraced grassroots drone development, open collaboration, and rapid iteration, underscoring the need for the United States to pair its material advantages with similar agility in design and deployment.

US military culture and acquisition, by contrast, remain locked in decades-old procurement practices that stifle experimentation. The only way to break free is to institutionalize rapid development for drone and autonomous systems innovation and create, in essence, an industry that blends openness, private sector competition, live battlefield feedback, and modular architecture. Such a reimagined development cycle should maintain a public design repository under permissive licensing so that vetted US startups and allied teams can propose, test, and evolve designs. Additionally, placing embedded liaisons with frontline units and operators to field-test and iterate designs in real environments would ensure ingenuity for this next phase of warfare.

A Bipartisan Strategy For Security And Renewal

A completely domestic industrial base of REEs able to mass-produce drones at scale, coupled with an adaptive design culture, would ensure dominance and security for decades to come. Politically, both prongs offer bipartisan appeal. Democrats can frame vertical integration as green industrial policy, as American plants reduce toxic refining abroad, create union jobs, and strengthen supply chains for both defense and clean energy. Republicans can emphasize insulating America from Beijing’s leverage to reduce the risk of wartime shortages and reinforce US technological sovereignty.

Skeptics may contend that subsidizing the domestic rare earth supply chain constitutes corporate welfare, while the rapid fielding of autonomous systems borders on reckless adventurism. Yet the alternative of the United States depending on adversaries for critical inputs and procurement cycles that can easily be shut off is just as risky. Just as Congress once recognized aerospace and nuclear power as inherently strategic industries worthy of public investment and rapid development, it must now do the same for rare earth supply chains and autonomous systems.

US policymakers must act now so that when the next generation of autonomous drones takes flight in a future conflict, every magnet in their motors, every alloy in their rotors, and every line of code is anchored in expedient American innovation. These reforms can offer a bipartisan strategy that ties economic renewal in rare earth elements to military adaptation.

Kevin Chen is a former data scientist and intelligence analyst currently pursuing a master’s degree in public policy at the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs. Chen has over three years of experience in the US intelligence community applying AI/machine learning to national security challenges. He now focuses on AI governance, US-China technological competition, and the intersection of emerging technology and global affairs at Yale. Chen graduated from Dartmouth College in 2022 with a BA in data science. He is from Knoxville, Tennessee, and is fluent in Mandarin Chinese.

breakingdefense.com · Kevin Chen

12. As we await the Pentagon’s posture review, here’s one country we should keep troops in

​Summary:

The United States must maintain its rotational forces in Lithuania and the Baltic region. Lithuania sits at the vulnerable Suwalki Gap, fronts Kaliningrad, spends seriously on defense, backed Iraq and Afghanistan, confronts Russia and China, and exemplifies burden sharing, so withdrawal would undermine NATO deterrence and credibility.

Comment: I can name a number of others too. But the question is will the Global Force Posture review usher in radical changes? We should accept that it will likely be so because it seems as if a fundamental principle of this administration is disruption. Which faction in the Pentagon and the Administration will win out with their views? But we need this kind of analysis for every one of our allies.

As we await the Pentagon’s posture review, here’s one country we should keep troops in

defenseone.com · Luke Coffey

https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2025/11/we-await-pentagons-posture-review-heres-one-country-we-should-keep-troops/409611/

U.S. Army soldiers prepare to breach a building during the Engineer Thunder 2025 exercise in Lithuania on Sept. 11, 2025. U.S. Army / Pfc. Gabriel Martinez

Lithuania is geographically vulnerable and strategically important—for several reasons.

|

November 18, 2025 04:42 PM ET

Well into November, there’s no sign of the Global Posture Review expected last summer. One of the most important policy reviews of a new administration, it examines the U.S. military’s presence around the world—and what changes might be made.

It is no secret that some senior officials involved in the review would like to see a smaller U.S. military presence in Europe. Indeed, they are already taking steps to make it happen. Last month, it was announced that around 1,000 rotational U.S. troops in Romania would not be replaced once they return home. This sparked criticism on Capitol Hill and raised questions about America’s posture elsewhere in Europe, especially in the Baltic region.

The United States today keeps a robust but modest rotational presence in the three Baltic state of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. America is not alone: NATO allies maintain multinational battlegroups across the Baltics—British-led in Estonia, Canadian-led in Latvia, and German-led in Lithuania—with Germany now building to a permanently based armored brigade of 5,000 troops in Lithuania by 2027.

Having this foreign presence in the Baltics makes sense for both regional and transatlantic security. The Baltic states are geographically vulnerable inside NATO—vulnerable in strictly military terms and, in a crisis, on whether the alliance has the military capability and political will to fully live up to its Article 5 security guarantees. Geography works against reinforcement: Lithuania connects to the rest of NATO only through the narrow Suwałki Gap with Poland, while the militarization of Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarusian territory complicates any rapid flow of forces by air or by sea.

This is why maintaining forces on the ground is essential to the successful defense of the Baltic states—and why removing any U.S. forces from the region, especially now amid heightened Russian aggression, would send the wrong message to both friends and foes.

Within the region, Lithuania is particularly important. The United States keeps roughly 1,000 soldiers there, with two battalions routinely deploying for nine-month tours. There are three reasons why President Trump should ensure these troops should remain there.

The first reason is geography. Lithuania’s location serves as the hinge between Northern and Eastern Europe, abutting both the Suwałki Gap and Kaliningrad—flashpoints in any major conflict scenario. In the event of a major war securing Lithuania will be key.

Secondly, Lithuania aligns with Trump’s world view on issues like energy, China, and burden sharing. Compared to its fellow EU members, Vilnius was ahead of the curve on energy security. Recognizing the importance of the energy security issue, Lithuania opened a NATO Center of Excellence for Energy Security in 2013. Lithuania’s floating LNG import terminal at Klaipėda was first proposed in 2011 and became operational in 2015. This was a major blow to dependence on Russian gas years before most Europeans started to act.

Vilnius likewise read the China challenge early. In 2019, Lithuania became the first European country to identify Beijing as a national-security threat in its official strategy documents. Two years later, it became the first EU country to withdraw from the 17+1 initiative launched by China to foster cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries. It has also welcomed Taiwan’s establishment of a representative office in Vilnius, and has been outspoken about China’s human-rights abuses in Xinjiang.

For Washington, Lithuania is a model of burden-sharing. By share of national income, it ranks among the very top supporters of Ukraine. At home, Lithuania already spends 3 percent of GDP on defense and has approved a surge past 5 percent beginning in 2026—exceeding NATO spending targets.

Finally, Lithuania has been a trustworthy and loyal partner to the United States for decades. Roughly 5,000 Lithuanian troops served in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2021, and was one of a small handful of countries that led a Provincial Reconstruction Team (in Ghor Province). And 930 Lithuanians served in Iraq, beginning in 2003, when many Western European countries refused to do so. America should be eternally grateful for this.

So it is in America’s national-security interest to keep U.S. troops in the Baltic region in general, and specifically in Lithuania. It is also a signal to other allies: if you align with U.S. interests, and invest seriously in your own defense, Washington notices.

As the Pentagon finalizes the long-awaited Global Posture Review, America’s military presence in Europe—especially in the Baltic states—should remain a central pillar of U.S. strategy and transatlantic security. Any withdrawal from the region will send the wrong message.

Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.

13. SOCOM to evaluate industry hardware solutions for powering AI workloads

​Summary:

U.S. Special Operations Command, via SOFWERX, will evaluate turnkey GPU server solutions to power large language model workloads for over 100 users at a remote site. Vendors must deliver high performance, energy efficient, air gapped systems supporting training, finetuning, inference and RAG, with strong security, scalability, reliability and operational resilience.

SOCOM to evaluate industry hardware solutions for powering AI workloads

The command wants to partner with vendors whose solutions are selected by SOCOM’s J24 Intelligence Data Science Team.

By

Jon Harper

November 18, 2025

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper

https://defensescoop.com/2025/11/18/socom-ai-large-language-models-artificial-intelligence-workloads-hardware/

Officials from U.S. Special Operations Command are gearing up to assess and downselect industry hardware offerings that can support SOCOM’s growing use of AI and large language models.

The organization is looking to enter into procurement contracts or other agreements with vendors whose solutions are favorably evaluated by subject matter experts from SOCOM’s J24 Intelligence Data Science Team, according to a special notice about the effort.

The initiative comes as Defense Department components are keen on acquiring generative artificial intelligence tools — including large language models — to aid enterprise and warfighting tasks.

“The U.S. Government’s data science portfolio is rapidly expanding its reliance on large-scale AI workloads, especially LLMs and high-speed inference pipelines. To sustain this growth and to maintain a strategic edge, the program requires cutting-edge GPU acceleration, capable of delivering the throughput and memory bandwidth needed for state-of-the-art training, finetuning, and deployment. Advanced GPUs will provide a high-performance, energy-efficient, and future-ready foundation for advanced AI workloads, while ensuring low response times, reliability, and room for future growth,” officials wrote in the special notice about plans for hardware-enabled AI acceleration.

SOFWERX — an innovation hub located in Tampa, Florida, that connects SOCOM with innovators to help solve some of special operations forces’ most difficult challenges — is preparing to host a technology assessment event in collaboration with the J24 team.

The aim of the gathering is to “determine the best solution to upgrade a remote location with high-performance Graphics Processing Unit (GPU) servers to support large language model (LLM) workloads for up to 100+ concurrent users. The system will be fully turnkey, including all GPUs, memory, storage, networking, cooling, and power infrastructure, ready for immediate operation. This configuration ensures fast, reliable Artificial Intelligence (AI) performance today and scalability for future growth,” according to the notice.

Officials did not identify the remote location where the tech might be installed.

“Vendors must provide a turnkey solution that minimizes on-site assembly, configuration, and troubleshooting, ensuring the server is ready for immediate use with minimal IT intervention,” officials noted.

SOCOM wants to deploy advanced GPU hardware that offers a high bandwidth, energy-efficient capability to power LLM inference, finetuning, and retrieval-augmented generation workloads, which help optimize the output of large language models.

The command also seeks tech that can support GPU-to-GPU communication within the server and connectivity to the site’s broader network.

“The GPUs must be delivered as part of a complete, rack-mounted server solution suitable for immediate deployment in the data center at a remote site,” per the notice.

“The solution must support deployment to two networks, within air-gapped or otherwise strictly isolated environments. The server(s) and all GPUs shall be physically and logically isolated from each other, and any non-approved networks (no dual-homed network connections),” officials wrote.

Assessment criteria for vendor offerings include performance and scalability, infrastructure fit and reliability, cost and lifecycle considerations, and multi-network deployment and support, according to a SOFWERX list.

Performance metrics will include the ability to handle large-scale AI workloads, including LLM training, finetuning and high throughput inference; GPU-to-GPU communication bandwidth and latency within the server; overall compute throughput; and memory capacity and bandwidth to support “very large models.”

A Q&A session for potential offerors is slated for Dec. 3 via teleconference.

The deadline for solution submissions is Dec. 9, according to participation instructions posted by SOFWERX.

Those downselected will be invited to participate in an assessment event at SOFWERX in January.

Written by Jon Harper

Jon Harper is Editor-in-Chief of DefenseScoop. He leads an award-winning team of journalists in providing breaking news and in-depth analysis on military technology and the ways in which it is shaping how the Defense Department operates and modernizes. You can also follow him on X: @Jon_Harper_

defensescoop.com · Jon Harper

14. Can a tabletop game explain why America lost the Vietnam War?

​Summary:

A detailed Vietnam War board game, Vietnam 1965-1975, shows how U.S. firepower advantage is eroded by terrain, insurgency, political instability, and domestic morale limits. Players experience attrition, endless Communist regeneration, and a credit card style commitment system that forces withdrawal, illustrating why overwhelming strength could not ultimately secure victory there.

Comments: Can and will we learn from this game? From a forthcoming paper.

Irregular warfare practitioners see this clearly. They have watched insurgencies weaponize grievance and narrative. They have seen political warfare used to divide allies and paralyze governments. They have learned, often the hard way, that legitimacy and information move faster and cut deeper than armor and artillery.

They know that:

Influence beats firepower when firepower cannot be used.

Narrative shapes the space where deterrence either holds or collapses.

Partners trust the country that shows up in their villages, not only in their summits.

Authoritarian states exploit every seam in our structure, from legal gaps to bureaucratic turf.

Can a tabletop game explain why America lost the Vietnam War?

militarytimes.com · Michael Peck Nov 18, 2025, 08:30 PM

https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/military-history/2025/11/19/can-a-tabletop-game-explain-why-america-lost-the-vietnam-war/

How could America lose the Vietnam War?

Even now, 50 years after the last American helicopters left Saigon, the answer is elusive. Despite pouring immense resources into Vietnam — including nearly 3 million military personnel, and suffering 58,000 dead — the world’s most powerful nation was unable to defeat an enemy that seemed hopelessly inferior in military power.

Accusations still fly at a long list of alleged culprits: “pinkos,” war hawks, hippies, the China Lobby, Jane Fonda, John Wayne, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon. But can a tabletop wargame — that began life as a college student’s project — offer insight?

“Vietnam 1965-1975” was conceived in the early 1980s when Nick Karp, a Princeton University student, needed to complete his senior thesis. So Karp designed a board game that was published as a hobby game in 1984, and is still available today from GMT Games.

A game of firepower

As befitting such a massive struggle, “Vietnam 1965-1975” is a massive game. The GMT edition includes a 44-page manual, a 5-foot-by-3-foot map and 1,328 small cardboard pieces that depict combat battalions and regiments, as well as various informational markers.

The order of battle alone illustrates the polyglot nature of the conflict. On the Allied side are more than a dozen U.S. Army and Marine divisions and brigades that fought in Vietnam, or could have been sent, plus numerous independent artillery and mechanized battalions. Alongside them is the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, plus contingents of Australian, South Korean, Thai and Philippines troops. Opposing this coalition is the National Liberation Front and North Vietnamese Army divisions — mostly infantry, backed by some artillery and mechanized units — and a plethora of Viet Cong battalions.

The game is played over an L-shaped map stretching from the hills of the Demilitarized Zone in the north to the rice paddies of the Mekong Delta in the south.

Each turn — equivalent to one season of real time — the Allied and NLF players conduct various “operations” including search and destroy, clear and secure, hold and patrol, bombardment and strategic movement. To win the 1965-1975 campaign scenario, the Communists either have to capture Saigon, or control the bulk of the South Vietnamese population. The Allies need only surpass their real-life counterparts: If South Vietnam survives until early 1975, they win.

At first glance, the game looks like a slam dunk for the U.S. The Allies have copious amounts of tactical airpower, artillery and naval gunfire. Helicopters can whisk U.S. and ARVN troops over rough terrain, while tank and armored cavalry units prowl the roads. Strategic bombing can disrupt the North Vietnamese war effort and interdict troops and supplies moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Combat is resolved by rolling dice. The game’s combat system favors whoever can employ the most firepower in a battle, and that is rarely the Communists. It’s not that the Allies won’t take casualties. But the NVA and VC will suffer many more.

Huey helicopters, carrying troops of the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade, settle in for a landing near the Montagnard village of Plei Ho Drong in August 1965. (Horst Faas/AP)

Death by a thousand cuts

So why doesn’t America crush the Communists by 1968, and LBJ win reelection instead of leaving the White House? Because like the proverbial death by a thousand cuts, a lot of little things undermine what seems like overwhelming power.

For starters, the terrain is mostly unfavorable for Western-style mechanized armies. Jungles and hills impede movement and provide defensive bonuses during combat. Allied firepower is immensely lethal but restricted unless the battlefield is declared a free fire zone, which undercuts support for the Saigon government.

Much of the Allied frustration comes from the difficulty of counterinsurgency. The map divides South Vietnam into 35 regions, each with a certain level of population. Dice are rolled each turn for each region to determine what percentage is pro-Saigon or pro-Communist, which in turn determines how much manpower is available to recruit ARVN or Viet Cong troops. The more VC/NVA units in a region, the greater the population that backs the Communists. Yet the presence of Allied troops in a region doesn’t generate support for Saigon, perhaps because ARVN troops had a reputation for robbing the peasants.

To win the support of the populace, the obvious solution is to destroy the Viet Cong in the countryside. But that’s easier said than done. Though weak in combat power, Viet Cong guerrillas have a special ability to evade Allied search-and-destroy operations. Cornering even a weak VC battalion can require three or four U.S. battalions — the ARVN aren’t mobile enough — and there are too few U.S. troops to hunt down all the VC.

Every turn, Communist units are wiped out, only to be replaced by new ones. NVA regiments infiltrate the South via the Ho Chi Minh trail through Cambodia and Laos. Fresh VC units sprout in every region, using local pro-Communist manpower as well as arms sent down from the North.

A war of whac-a-mole

The game captures the dilemma that confounded the Pentagon. To stop the Viet Cong from controlling the countryside means Allied troops have to fan out to surround the guerrillas. But splitting up to hunt VC leaves the Allies vulnerable to being jumped by North Vietnamese regulars that can be lethal against the ARVN or an isolated American unit.

“The game’s operational core shows how U.S. commanders whose forces possessed far greater firepower and mobility than their opponents could rarely bring those seemingly decisive advantages to bear against Communist units that generally fought only when it suited them,” Kevin Boylan, a Vietnam War historian and wargame designer, told Defense News. “The game illustrates how this fundamental asymmetry at the operational level caused the war to drag on so long that a critical mass of the American people lost patience with it at the strategic level.”

“Vietnam 1965-1975” melds both the operational and strategic aspects of the war.

For example, South Vietnam’s unstable political system has battlefield consequences. The game assigns each ARVN corps and division a randomly chosen commander with varying levels of competence and loyalty to the regime. Each turn, dice are rolled for loyalty, and a bad roll means that some ARVN formations will stay immobile in their bases that turn. If enough commanders are disloyal, there will be a coup that can shake up the ARVN command structure.

A close-up of one of the pieces from “Vietnam 1965-1975." (GMT Games)

A credit card war

But if there is one mechanism in the game that best explains why America ultimately failed in Vietnam, it’s the “morale” and “commitment” system. Essentially, the game depicts the U.S. war effort as a sort of credit card where America starts with a huge credit limit.

The U.S. begins the game in the summer of 1965 with a “morale level” of 520 and a “commitment level” of 25 (reflecting American aircraft and advisers already in South Vietnam). Want to send the 1st Cavalry Division or the 3rd Marine Division? That will cost you around 10 “commitment points” apiece. A battalion of 155mm artillery or a Navy cruiser? They’re one point each.

At first, the Allied player is like a college kid with a new Visa card. There are practically limitless resources on the shelf. Aircraft, helicopters, supplies to equip ARVN divisions, South Korean troops, replacements for American casualties. Everything is available, but everything costs commitment points.

Meanwhile, there are a litany of factors that decrease morale, including sending fresh troops to Vietnam, invading Laos or Cambodia, losing provincial capitals, bombing North Vietnam or if the Communists declare a special offensive. Morale also goes down each turn as commitment grows over time, reflecting the inevitable fatigue of a long war. Unless the Allies wipe out a lot of Viet Cong in a turn, morale will only go down, not up.

Eventually, the bill becomes due. The rule in “Vietnam 1965-1975” is simple and unequivocal: U.S. commitment cannot exceed morale. If it does, then America must reduce its forces in Vietnam to balance the books.

And so the long U.S. withdrawal begins. An infantry brigade here, a tank or artillery battalion there. Once the tipping point is reached, each turn the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia shrinks a little more. And a little more. Perhaps the pullout begins in 1969, as Nixon chose to do as part of his “Vietnamization” of the war. Or in 1968, or 1970. But sooner or later, South Vietnam will have to fight on its own in a desperate battle to stave off Communist invasion from within and without.

Can history be changed?

That American society became too weary and fractured to continue fighting in Vietnam is hardly a revelation. But while a book or a documentary can describe history, the fascination of a historical wargame is the chance to experiment with it. Both sides in “Vietnam 1965-1975” can pursue a variety of strategies.

For example, the Allies can choose to accelerate the buildup in Southeast Asia by dispatching troops more quickly than LBJ did, taking an extra hit to morale in order to hit the Communists sooner. Or, Washington can send fewer troops in a bid to preserve public support and delay the U.S. withdrawal. American troops can fight more aggressively in the early war, suffering additional casualties and morale loss in hopes of suppressing the Communists before they take root in the countryside. Or, they can adopt a more passive strategy that minimizes U.S. losses but leave the VC unmolested as they take over the countryside.

The Communists have options, too. Spread VC units across Vietnam to control the population, or concentrate and risk heavier losses to capture provincial capitals? Avoid contact with U.S. troops while going after weaker ARVN units, or conduct hit-and-run raids on U.S. units to inflict casualties and undermine American morale? Either way, the Communists will patiently wait for the Americans to leave before going for final victory.

Can America win the game? It seems unlikely. Once U.S. troops and airpower are gone, the ARVN seems too brittle to defeat the NVA and VC. Indeed, Karp himself admits that his goal in designing the game wasn’t to create a fair contest between two players, but rather to model a crucial period in American history. The game was aimed at “reproducing a mood and understanding of competing priorities, not scrupulously documenting inevitably contingent details,” he told Defense News.

“I wasn’t trying to make a deep statement about favorites to win, nor the futility of the war either,” he added. “The victory conditions are far off, the road to achieve them vague and wandering.” In fact, Karp said he would “no way be offended” if players modified the game “either to improve their play experience or to better conform to their understanding of history.”

Every war is unique, and there is a danger in searching for too many lessons of the Vietnam War. But this tabletop game illuminates a problem that resonates today. U.S. troops fought for years in Afghanistan and Iraq before the American public and its leaders grew weary of the global war on terror. How long — and at what cost — will the American public endure fighting in distant lands, be it in Eastern Europe or Taiwan?

“The United States had the raw military and economic power to prevail if it had waged total war in Indochina,” Boylan said. “But, as the game makes clear, the American people had no stomach for that. And the war was effectively unwinnable at the level of commitment that they were willing to sustain.”

About Michael Peck

Michael Peck is a correspondent for Defense News and a columnist for the Center for European Policy Analysis. He holds an M.A. in political science from Rutgers University. Find him on X at @Mipeck1. His email is mikedefense1@gmail.com.

Share:

militarytimes.com · Michael Peck Nov 18, 2025, 08:30 PM

15. New Army unit seeks to disrupt ‘malign influence’ in Indo-Pacific

​Summary:

Army Pacific activated the 65 soldier 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment at Fort Shafter to counter malign influence across the Indo Pacific. The unit integrates intelligence, PSYOP, EW, PA, civil affairs, IO, and cyber to pursue information dominance, support partners, and contest Chinese and other adversary propaganda and coercion campaigns.

Excerpts:

Though the real-life operations of this unit remain unclear, this type of formation could be used to oppose information campaigns waged by America’s adversaries, said Vinci, who is also the author of “The Fourth Intelligence Revolution: The Future of Espionage and the Battle to Save America.”

For example, in the Indo-Pacific theater, he said, campaigns by those who oppose the U.S. could be intended to reduce local support of American involvement or shift that community’s allegiances “over to China.”

Comment: We must win in the information space and influence the human domain. Will we eventually man these units with Information Warfare (IWar) branch soldiers? And the real question is how are they going to employ their capabilities across the spectrum of conflict to include during peace and competition to achieve strategic effects in the information and human domain?  

New Army unit seeks to disrupt ‘malign influence’ in Indo-Pacific

militarytimes.com · Eve Sampson · November 19, 2025

The U.S. Army earlier this month activated a new unit aimed at “disrupting malign influence” in the Indo-Pacific region, bringing information operations into the conventional battlespace.

Headquartered on Fort Shafter, Hawaii, the 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment, or 1st TIAD, was officially launched Nov. 7, the unit’s public affairs officer said in a statement Tuesday, adding that the unit is “a direct reporting unit” to the U.S. Army Pacific commander.

The unit’s purpose is to “gain and maintain a strategic advantage through information dominance in the Indo-Pacific region by disrupting malign influence, increasing cooperation with key partners, and promoting regional stability through a shared commitment for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” according to an Army fact sheet. It will be responsible for a region spanning 36 countries across northeast, southeast, south Asia and Oceania.

The unusual 65-soldier formation combines military intelligence, psychological operations, electronic warfare, public affairs, civil affairs, information operations and cyber operations into a set of dedicated teams.

“There is talk, and I’m not going to speculate on the size of that talk, but there is talk for growth,” Command Sgt. Maj. Avery Bennett, the unit’s senior enlisted adviser said in a statement when asked about the size of the detachment.

The Hawaii unit is the first of three Theater Information Advantage Detachments to activate, Capt. Avery Smith II, a member of the 1st detachment’s engagement team, said in a statement. Second TIAD is projected to activate at Fort Gordon, Georgia, in the spring of 2026 and 3rd TIAD will follow at Wiesbaden, Germany, in the fall.

The creation of this new unit may mark a fundamental change in how the military understands the battlespace, one national security analyst said.

“It’s a signal that we’re now treating information operations as part of the conventional fight and that means doing it at a much larger scale,” said Anthony Vinci, adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, who added that “conventional forces are orders of magnitude larger and are more worried about issues that can affect large numbers of people.”

Though the real-life operations of this unit remain unclear, this type of formation could be used to oppose information campaigns waged by America’s adversaries, said Vinci, who is also the author of “The Fourth Intelligence Revolution: The Future of Espionage and the Battle to Save America.”

For example, in the Indo-Pacific theater, he said, campaigns by those who oppose the U.S. could be intended to reduce local support of American involvement or shift that community’s allegiances “over to China.”

About Eve Sampson

Eve Sampson is a reporter and former Army officer. She has covered conflict across the world, writing for The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Associated Press.

16. Army leaders ordered to check in daily with soldiers over the holidays

Comment. A powerful memo. You can read the memo at the link. There are few senior civilian leaders who could write such a memo.

Army leaders ordered to check in daily with soldiers over the holidays

militarytimes.com · Eve Sampson · November 19, 2025

https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2025/11/19/army-leaders-ordered-to-check-in-daily-with-soldiers-over-the-holidays/?utm

Editor’s note: This report contains discussion of suicide. Troops, veterans and family members experiencing suicidal thoughts can call the 24-hour Suicide and Crisis Lifeline at 988 and dial 1, text 838255 or visit VeteransCrisisLine.net.

Soldiers in the Army will receive a check-in from their leadership each day during the holiday season to combat suicide and self-harm, Army Secretary Daniel Driscoll announced in a memo that was disseminated across the force Tuesday.

Now through Jan. 15, 2026, an officer or noncommissioned officer “will check in on every soldier daily to see if they need help,” Driscoll said in the memo, with a plea for those struggling to “pick up your phone” and accept help during a season he said could leave people especially at risk.

Army officials on Wednesday confirmed the memo is authentic.

Amazing leadership and memo from @SecArmy.

Give it a read, it’s worth your time. pic.twitter.com/zt4XyjjnEv

— Happy Captain (@EODHappyCaptain) November 19, 2025

In the memo, which has since been posted — and widely shared — on social media, Driscoll, who served in the Army, recounted his own struggles during Ranger School.

“Ranger School’s Winter Mountain Phase nearly broke me. I slipped and fell, couldn’t get up, and the cold crushed me. I was done in that moment. But my Ranger buddies picked me up and helped me start moving again,” he said, adding “that was the inflection point for me: I realized no one can go through life alone, we all break eventually, and we need each other.”

Driscoll called on the force to prioritize supporting each other during the holiday season and noted grim statistics.

“Last year, we lost 260 soldiers to suicide,” he said, adding that “signing those letters of condolence — and knowing we could have helped — is heart-breaking. I wish we never had to write another one.”

Driscoll did not specify in the memo if that number represented active-duty soldiers or those across the Army’s different components. Driscoll also referenced the 11th Airborne Division in Alaska, which he said had not lost a soldier to suicide in over a year.

The 2023 “Annual Report on Suicide in the Military” conducted by the Department of Defense found that 523 service members across different branches and components of service died by suicide during the calendar year.

The report also found that young, enlisted male soldiers tallied the most suicide deaths, and that suicide rates for active-duty service members “gradually increased” between 2011 and 2023.

At the bottom of Driscoll’s memo, he included QR codes that link to mental health support.

About Eve Sampson

Eve Sampson is a reporter and former Army officer. She has covered conflict across the world, writing for The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Associated Press.

17. How a Nazi trial ended the just-following-orders defense for US troops

​Comment: I am looking forward to seeing the Film Nuremberg though I understand some critics have panned it.

How a Nazi trial ended the just-following-orders defense for US troops

militarytimes.com · Richard Sisk · November 19, 2025

https://www.militarytimes.com/veterans/military-history/2025/11/19/how-a-nazi-trial-ended-the-just-following-orders-defense-for-us-troops/?utm

They started calling it the “Nuremberg defense” when lawyers for Lt. William Calley at his court martial argued that he was only following orders in the March 1968 slaughter of hundreds of Vietnamese in what became known as the My Lai Massacre.

George Latimer, Calley’s main lawyer, cited Nuremberg in his summation, telling the court, “I could hardly stand here and tell you in good conscience that people, like at Nuremberg, could be excused or justified” in mass murder by claiming they were acting on the orders of a superior, according to court documents.

“But I think when you put untrained troops out in areas and they are told to do certain things, they have a right to rely on the judgment and the expertise [of their leaders],” Latimer said. “Then you are bound to give credence in effect to orders from their company commander.”

The argument for Calley, in what was the most high-profile court martial to come out of the Vietnam War, did not hold up. It also didn’t work at the end of World War II for the defendants at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, including Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, who cheated the hangman by taking cyanide on the night he was to be executed.

Calley had taken the stand in his own defense to state that Capt. Ernest Medina, his company commander, had told him to kill everybody in the village. They were all Viet Cong or sympathizers, Calley said he was told, and Medina’s order was to “waste them.” Medina was later tried at court martial and acquitted.

Calley said he had learned in training “that all orders were to be assumed legal, that the soldier’s job was to carry out any order given him to the best of his ability.”

His understanding was that failure to follow orders could result in the death penalty, Calley said. The jury deliberated for nearly 80 hours over 13 days in 1971 before finding Calley guilty of premeditated murder.

Specification 2 of the charges stated that “at My Lai 4, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of South Vietnam, on or about 16 March 1968, with premeditation,” Calley used rifle fire to murder no fewer than 70 men and women of various ages.

Specification 4 stated that one of the victims murdered by Calley was two years old. Some estimates put the total death toll in My Lai at more than 500.

Lt. William L. Calley, Jr., pictured during his court martial at Fort Benning, Georgia, on April 23, 1971. (Joe Holloway, Jr./AP)

Calley was sentenced to life in prison. President Richard Nixon intervened in the case to order Calley’s removal from the stockade to house arrest at his Fort Benning apartment.

His sentence was later reduced to 10 years by Army Secretary Howard Calloway and he was paroled in 1974.

The case against Calley had its direct underpinnings in the Nuremberg trial of 22 defendants, according to Gary Solis, a Marine company commander in Vietnam who later had a long career as a judge advocate general, serving alternately as a military prosecutor, a defense lawyer and a judge.

“I believe that is the key result of Nuremberg — obedience to orders is no longer a defense to war crimes. That was not new Nuremberg law that was being created in the courtroom but rather new enforcement,” Solis told Military Times.

“That’s the basis on which they were convicted. That was new enforcement — the unspoken awareness on the part of civilized nations” of the duty to hold war criminals to account, he added.

The legacy of Nuremberg is now reflected in the U.S. Manual of Courts-Martial, which states that service members have a duty to disobey an order that “a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be illegal.”

Nov. 20 marks the 80th anniversary of the trial’s start at Nuremberg’s Palace of Justice.

Jackson faces off against Göring

On Aug. 8, 1945, the U.S., France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and Britain signed the London Agreement and Charter, also known as the Nuremberg Charter, which set up International Military Tribunal at the Palace of Justice in the German city of Nuremberg to try Nazi leaders on charges of crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, the crime of aggressive war and conspiracy to commit the first three crimes.

Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert H. Jackson, named by President Harry Truman as chief prosecutor in the trial, asserted that the Charter represented the first time that four victors in war had come to an agreement on “the principle of individual responsibility for the crime of attacking the international peace.”

On Oct. 21, 1945, with 22 defendants assembled in the dock, about 400 visitors in the gallery and 323 accredited members of the press in attendance, Jackson began the trial with an opening statement of surpassing eloquence.

“The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace of the world imposes a grave responsibility,” Jackson said. “The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant and so devastating, that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored because it cannot survive their being repeated.”

Opening statement at Nuremberg being delivered by Robert H. Jackson. (U.S. Army Signal Corps)

History would give righteous affirmation to the fact that “four great nations, flush with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason,” Jackson added.

The trial proceeded with an enormous amount of documentation entered into the record on the crimes of the defendants and the playing of gut-wrenching films of the liberation of the death camps by the U.S. Army Signal Corps.

In his 2025 film adaptation, “Nuremberg” director James Vanderbilt chose to focus on the interplay between the Army psychiatrist Douglas M. Kelley, played by Rami Malek, and Göring, played by Russell Crowe in a riveting performance.

Kelley’s job was to determine the mental fitness of the defendants to stand trial. The movie, however, has him coming repeatedly to Göring’s jail cell to debate the ethics of the Third Reich. At one point in the film, Malek as Kelley tells Göring “Let’s talk about Hitler. I’m curious” about what made people follow him. Crowe as Göring replied, “He made us feel German again.”

The movie also has Göring showing his contempt for the allies by telling Kelley, “You won and we lost, not because you are morally superior. In the end, you know what sets you apart from us — nothing.”

Additionally, it depicts Jackson breaking down in his cross examination of Göring only to be rescued at the last minute by David Maxwell-Fyfe, the British prosecutor, while Kelley watches in dismay from the front row of the court.

None of that happened, according to John Q. Barrett, the Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law at St. John’s University and a biographer of Jackson.

Barrett, who was consulted on the movie by the producers, said that the cross examination of Göring took place in March 1946, but Kelley had returned to the states two months earlier in January.

“The movie is Hollywood and it’s fictional,” Barrett told Military Times in defending Jackson’s cross examination of Göring, although “it did have some low moments.”

There was a mistranslated document, and “Jackson had to eat that,” but there were also many authenticated documents and “many damning admissions” by Göring that established his guilt.

“They won the case,” Barrett said.

The actual transcript of the cross examination showed Jackson hammering at Göring on the will left by Adolf Hitler in his Berlin bunker before committing suicide.

Former chief of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Wilhelm Göring, before his trial in Nuremberg. (AP)

“And there came a time in 1945 when Hitler made a will in Berlin whereby he turned over the presidency of the Reich to your co-defendant, Admiral [Karl] Dönitz,” Jackson said. “You know about that?”

“That is correct,” Göring replied. “I read of this will here.”

“And in making his will and turning over the government of Germany to Admiral Dönitz, I call your attention to this statement,” Jackson said. “‘Göring and [Gestapo chief Heinrich] Himmler, quite apart from their disloyalty to my person, have done immeasurable harm to the country and the whole nation by secret negotiations with the enemy which they conducted without my knowledge and against my wishes, and by illegally attempting to seize power in the state for themselves. And by that will he expelled you and Himmler from the party and from all offices of the state.’”

“I can only answer for myself,” Göring responded. “What Himmler did I do not know. I neither betrayed the Führer, nor did I at that time negotiate with a single foreign soldier. This will, or this final act of the Führer’s, is based on an extremely regrettable mistake, and one which grieves me deeply — that the Führer could believe in his last hours that I could ever be disloyal to him.

“It was all due to an error in the transmission of a radio report and perhaps to a misrepresentation which [Hitler’s private secretary Martin] Bormann gave the Führer. I myself never thought for a minute of taking over power illegally or of acting against the Führer in any way.”

Göring never wavered in his fealty to Hitler, and never apologized for being complicit in issuing and carrying out orders that led to the deaths of millions.

The contrast was striking between the unrepentant Nazi and what happened with former Lt. William Calley at age 66. At a Kiwanis club in Columbus, Georgia, in 2009, nearly 42 years after he led troops on a killing spree into the village of My Lai, Calley apologized for his part in the massacre.

“There is not a day that goes by that I do not feel remorse for what happened that day in My Lai,” Calley told members of the club, according to the Columbus, Georgia-based Ledger-Enquirer. “I feel remorse for the Vietnamese who were killed, for their families, for the American soldiers involved and their families. I am very sorry.”

Calley was then asked why, if Capt. Medina had indeed told him to kill all the villagers, he had obeyed what was clearly an unlawful order.

“If you are asking why I did not stand up to them when I was given the orders, I will have to say that I was a second lieutenant getting orders from my commander,” he said. “And I followed them — foolishly, I guess.”

Share:

militarytimes.com · Richard Sisk · November 19, 2025

​18. What 3 former SOUTHCOM commanders say troops should know about Venezuela

​Summary:

Former SOUTHCOM commanders Barry McCaffrey, James Stavridis, and Wesley Clark warn that any U.S. strikes on Venezuela demand clear objectives, legal justification, and planning for the aftermath. They note U.S. air and naval superiority and low risk for initial strikes, but highlight urban terrain, militias, possible insurgency, humanitarian crises, and limited impact on regional drug production. They stress that Venezuela would differ from Iraq, Afghanistan, and past Banana Wars, and caution against mission creep without public support or staying power. Troops must understand rules of engagement, political end state, and regional consequences before any operations expand further across Latin America.

What 3 former SOUTHCOM commanders say troops should know about Venezuela

Their concerns include whether U.S. troops would have a clear military objective for any looming operations against Venezuela.

Jeff Schogol, Drew F. Lawrence

Published Nov 19, 2025 11:05 AM EST

taskandpurpose.com · Jeff Schogol, Drew F. Lawrence

https://taskandpurpose.com/news/us-military-operations-venezuela/?utm

The U.S. military could be poised to launch the largest combat operations in Latin America since the invasion of Panama nearly 36 years ago.

Since September, the U.S. has launched 21 strikes against suspected drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, killing a total of 82 people, a Pentagon official told Task & Purpose.

Now, President Donald Trump’s administration is reportedly considering expanding U.S. military operations in Latin America to possibly include strikes against targets inside Venezuela, claiming that the country’s leader, Nicolás Maduro, is in charge of a criminal organization that smuggles drugs into the United States.

Task & Purpose spoke with three former four-star generals who each led U.S. Southern Command, which has purview over Latin America and the Caribbean, along with a retired senior military commander with deep knowledge of the region for this story. Their concerns included whether U.S. troops would have a clear military objective for any operation against Venezuela and the chances of ground combat devolving into an insurgency. The former commanders also believed the U.S. military holds clear advantages in air power over Venezuelan defenses and conventional forces.

U.S. forces massing in the region

About a dozen Navy ships are currently deployed to the Caribbean, including the USS Gerald R. Ford, the Navy’s newest and most advanced aircraft carrier; the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima; and two other ships in its amphibious ready group. About 2,200 Marines with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Group are embarked on all three ships.

Additionally, a squadron of Marine Corps F-35 Lightning II fighter aircraft has been sent to Puerto Rico, where the former Naval Station Roosevelt Roads has become a staging area for U.S. forces in the region. Other American aircraft, including an AC-130J Ghostrider, have been spotted operating in El Salvador. Discussions are also ongoing between the United States and Ecuador about basing American troops in the country again for the first time in more than a decade.

Task & Purpose spoke to three former commanders of U.S Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, about their concerns as the U.S. considers strikes on Venezuela. From left to right, Army Gen. (ret.) Barry McCaffrey, SOUTHCOM commanding general 1994-1998; Navy Adm. (ret.) James Stavridis, 2006-2009; Army Gen. (ret.) Wesley Clark, 1996-1997. Alex Wong/Getty Images for Meet the Press; NATO Photo by French Air Force MSgt Edouard Bocquet; DoD photo by R. D. Ward

“Militarily, the table is set quite effectively for air strikes,” said retired Navy Adm. James Stavridis, who led U.S. Southern Command, or SOUTHCOM, from 2006 to 2009. “Now it’s up to [President Trump] to decide.”

If the U.S. military uses carrier-based aircraft, drones, and Tomahawk cruise missiles to attack Venezuela, the risks posed to American service members would be relatively low, Stavridis told Task & Purpose.

“Venezuela has older, untested, and poorly maintained air defense systems,” Stavridis said. “Their manned aircraft cannot match U.S. fourth- and fifth-generation fighters. Look for successful strikes directed against counter-narcotic and military targets, probably in the next few days if the President decides to move forward.”

It is unclear whether any U.S. military action against the Maduro regime or targets elsewhere in Latin America would be limited to air and missile strikes or include any American troops on the ground.

The ships and aircraft now in the Caribbean are capable of launching an air campaign that could “obliterate 100 different targets a day” for about three weeks, said retired Army Gen. Barry McCaffrey, who led SOUTHCOM from 1994 to 1996.

A Marine monitors unmanned aerial system footage during a reconnaissance and surveillance exercise on Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico, on Nov. 12, 2025. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Maurion Moore.

But Venezuela has a small air force and Navy, so there would be few military targets for such a massive air campaign, McCaffrey told Task & Purpose.

“You’re not going to fire Tomahawk missiles at a palmetto-covered cabin in the mountains of Venezuela that’s a transit point for coca,” McCaffrey said.

If conventional ground forces were committed, however, they’d be in a region unlike any that U.S. troops have operated in for a generation. The capital city of Caracas is modern and densely populated by 3 million residents. The capital is accessible from nearby coastline and port facilities, but the city’s central district is about 10 miles inland. Outside of the capital district and a few urbanized coastal regions, the country is primarily rainforest and rugged mountains.

Up to 80% of Venezuela’s population is estimated to live in urban areas, according to Henry Ziemer, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, D.C. Drug cartels often use cities in Latin America to export narcotics and extort the local population, Ziemer told Task & Purpose.

“The chances that will be an urban characteristic to a campaign are incredibly high — close to 100%,” Ziemer said.

When Trump was asked at a Monday White House news conference if he would rule out deploying U.S. ground combat forces to Venezuela, he replied: “I don’t rule out that. I don’t rule out anything. We just have to take care of Venezuela.”

Insurgencies and ‘Banana Wars’ of the past

McCaffrey said that it is “unlikely” that any strikes in Venezuela would involve ground combat forces other than special operations troops. Even then, it is questionable how effective any U.S. troops would be in countering drug production, which mostly takes place in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, he said.

Although Venezuela’s military is not particularly effective, the Maduro regime is arming its state militia, and that raises the possibility that any U.S. troops deployed to Venezuela would be faced with fighting an insurgency, a retired senior U.S. military commander told Task & Purpose.

But fighting paramilitary forces in Venezuela would be markedly different from the counter-insurgency campaign that U.S. troops waged during the Global War on Terrorism, the retired commander said.

“The terrorist insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would say, would be in comparison infinitely more dedicated — certainly, not only willing to be killed fighting Americans, but looking forward to the fact that they would be heroes fighting the Americans,” the commander said. “So, it wouldn’t be, I don’t think, anything close to what we experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Instead, any ground campaign in Venezuela would likely be closer to the “Banana Wars,” a series of U.S. military interventions in the Caribbean and Latin America from 1898 to 1934, the retired commander said. During that time, U.S. troops repeatedly occupied countries in the region and fought against local forces.

‘What is the objective?’

Retired Army Gen. Wesley Clark, who led SOUTHCOM from 1996 to 1997, said that the U.S. must define its military goals before committing forces.

“I think we have to be very careful to know what the objective is — that’s the first thing. What is the objective?” Clark said. “And then realistically, what are the rules of engagement required to attain that objective?”

Clark pointed to other contemporary examples of American military operations in the region that — while not direct comparisons to the current climate around Venezuela — are helpful to understand the considerations around military action there.

In 1983, the United States and several Caribbean countries invaded Grenada to prevent a communist takeover.

In 1989, troops forced their way into Panama to oust dictator Manuel Noriega and protect American interests.

Five years later, thousands of U.S.-led coalition troops entered Haiti to return President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to office.

It is an open question whether the goals of any U.S. military action in Venezuela would include ousting Maduro.

Marines secure the propellers of an AH-1Z Cobra on the flight deck of the amphibious assault ship USS Iwo Jima while underway in the Caribbean Sea on Oct. 23, 2025. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Joseph Miller.

Referring to the invasion of Iraq, Clark said that then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld “didn’t plan for the long occupation” and because there was little to no consideration for what would happen after Saddam Hussein was deposed, “it didn’t work.”

“We’ve got to be careful with something like this that you have thought it through and have the staying power,” he said. “Once you’ve messed it up, you can’t just sort of wave your hands and say, ‘Okay, I solved another problem. That’s it. We got rid of Maduro.’ Yeah, you may have, but you may have created a huge humanitarian catastrophe that will generate more conflict and more refugees.”

Clark pointed to Venezuela’s size and the ability of local militias to blend in with the civilian population as examples of challenges troops would face if they were sent into the country. Following his emphasis on the importance of having an objective and legal justification for intervention in Venezuela, Clark noted a cascade of questions critical for troops to understand.

“When that gunboat comes out from the harbor in Caracas, is it presumed hostile? You sink it on site? Do you send some kind of warning to it?” he said, for example. “Do you have the authority to disarm people, stop them and disarm them, and if they resist, to sink them? How does it work?”

“That’s what’s got to be worked out,” Clark added. He noted the political opposition to Maduro, most notably María Corina Machado, a recent Nobel Peace Prize laureate who the Venezuelan government barred from running for president in 2024 and who is now in hiding.

“Presumably, if you are going to plan that you’re going to go ashore and restore order in Caracas and help Mrs. Machado become president,” Clark said, “You’ve got to have answers to all those questions.”

Task & Purpose Video

Each week on Tuesdays and Fridays our team will bring you analysis of military tech, tactics, and doctrine.

Watch Here

Jeff Schogol

Senior Pentagon Reporter

Jeff Schogol is the senior Pentagon reporter for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for nearly 20 years. Email him at schogol@taskandpurpose.com or direct message @JSchogol73030 on Twitter.

Drew F. Lawrence

Contributor

Drew F. Lawrence is an award-winning reporter and producer specializing in military and national security coverage. A graduate of George Washington University’s School of Media and Public Affairs, Lawrence has also been published in Military.com, CNN, The Washington Post, Task & Purpose and The War Horse. Originally from Massachusetts, he is a proud New England sports fan and an Army veteran.

taskandpurpose.com · Jeff Schogol, Drew F. Lawrence

19. US paratrooper lands in Tokyo suburb after chute malfunctions during training

​Comment: I know there is no explaining the situation to the local officials and civilians. The fact that the soldier had a major parachute malfunction but successfully deployed his reserve is of course celebrated by us because he was unhurt. But to the local population the fact that they were there training nearby is an affront to them. 

US paratrooper lands in Tokyo suburb after chute malfunctions during training

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto · November 20, 2025

U.S. and Japanese troops jump from a C-130J Super Hercules over Yokota Air Base, Japan, on May 18, 2025. (Kendrick Jackson/U.S. Marine Corps)

YOKOTA AIR BASE, Japan — A U.S. Army paratrooper was forced to land in a Tokyo suburb Tuesday evening after drifting off course during parachute training, prompting a complaint from a local official.

The soldier, who had jumped from a C-130J Super Hercules, landed in Hamura city beyond the drop zone at Yokota, according to a statement emailed Thursday by the spokesman for U.S. Forces Japan, Air Force Col. John Severns.

The soldier deployed a backup parachute after the main chute failed, according to a Thursday news release from Fussa city citing information from the North Kanto Defense Bureau, a regional branch of Japan’s Ministry of Defense.

The paratrooper was not seriously injured, according to the release.

No one on the ground was hurt, a police spokesman in neighboring Fussa city said by phone Thursday. A witness called Fussa police at 4:37 p.m. Tuesday to report the incident.

The soldier landed on the roof of a home, Japan’s Yomiuri newspaper reported Wednesday, quoting local police who would not confirm that detail to Stars and Stripes.

Hamura and Fussa are among several municipalities bordering Yokota, home to USFJ, 5th Air Force and the 374th Airlift Wing.

Hamura Mayor Hirotaka Hashimoto lodged a “strong complaint” Wednesday with the defense bureau. Bureau officials met with the mayor to apologize, according to a news released on the city’s website.

The Air Force is “committed to performing safe flight operations in the interest of our one community,” USFJ’s statement said. “We make every effort to minimize the impact to local communities while ensuring we maintain proficiency in our flight operations for the defense of Japan.”

The incident recalls a 2018 mishap in which part of a U.S. military parachute drifted onto a junior high school tennis court in Hamura, spurring the Air Force to suspend jump training over western Tokyo.

Seth Robson

Seth Robson

Seth Robson is a Tokyo-based reporter who has been with Stars and Stripes since 2003. He has been stationed in Japan, South Korea and Germany, with frequent assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti, Australia and the Philippines.

Hana Kusumoto

Hana Kusumoto

Hana Kusumoto is a reporter/translator who has been covering local authorities in Japan since 2002. She was born in Nagoya, Japan, and lived in Australia and Illinois growing up. She holds a journalism degree from Boston University and previously worked for the Christian Science Monitor’s Tokyo bureau.

Stars and Stripes · Seth Robson and Hana Kusumoto · November 20, 2025

20. Building maritime drones in months—not years—could be key to creating the Navy’s hybrid fleet

​Summary:

The Navy is moving from experimentation to down selecting maritime drone programs, with lawmakers insisting mass producibility drive contract awards. Citing startups like Saronic, which built a 150 foot autonomous surface vessel in about six months, Rep. Rob Wittman urges rapid, scalable production timelines for surface and undersea unmanned fleets.

Building maritime drones in months—not years—could be key to creating the Navy’s hybrid fleet

defenseone.com · Lauren C. Williams

https://www.defenseone.com/business/2025/11/building-maritime-drones-monthsnot-yearscould-be-key-creating-navys-hybrid-fleet/409648/

Saronic Technologies is building a 150-foot autonomous ship in its Franklin, La. shipyard. Courtesy Saronic

“That’s the kind of pace we need,” said House Armed Services Committee Vice Chair Rob Wittman.

By Lauren C. Williams

Business Editor

November 19, 2025 06:07 PM ET

• The Navy is finally in a place where it can start picking winners in its pursuit of maritime—specifically underwater—drones, but the ability to produce them en masse should be a prime consideration when awarding contracts, according to one lawmaker.

“I think they're making some good progress. I remember going to Newport…and seeing all kinds of great research projects. But when I asked, ‘When's the down-select going to happen?’ People look at me like…’We're just having fun experimenting with these platforms,’” Rep. Rob Wittman, R-Va., vice chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said Tuesday during Defense One’s State of Defense Business event. “I think the Navy has finally gotten to that place. The key is not just, now, down-selecting, but how do you go to scale quickly with those operations?”

The congressman used an example of one company that built a 150-foot autonomous surface vessel in about six months to show how it can be done.

Saronic, a drone-boat startup based in Austin, Texas, announced during a panel at a General Catalyst Institute event Monday that it’s on track to complete its build of its Marauder vessel, which has a 3,500 nautical mile range, by December. Wittman was also a speaker at the event.

“So we acquired a shipyard in Franklin, Louisiana…the shipyard was closing down. So one of the things we think about is…how do we bring brand new capacity online in this country in a way that wouldn’t exist otherwise,” CEO and co-founder Dino Mavrookas said. “We laid our first weld on June 24 of this year, and that ship is going to be in the water by the end of the year.”

Saronic has already started building its second Marauder, side-by-side with the first one, and is “already seeing production efficiency gains,” Mavrookas said.

Saronic isn’t the only defense tech company focused on producing sea drones in large quantities. Anduril recently announced plans to build an autonomous surface vessel prototype in South Korea with HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, before producing them at their shipyard in Seattle, Wash. HavocAI also announced plans to build a 100-foot drone boat this year.

The concept of building robot boats in months, instead of years, should translate to underwater vessels too, Wittman said on Tuesday.

“That’s the kind of pace we need,” he said. “How do we make sure that we are not only awarding contracts, but awarding contracts at scale and with timeliness—and that is performing and delivering those platforms within very strict time frames?”

21. Shadow navy: How China's civilian fleet could be a potent weapon in a Taiwan invasion

​Comment: Please go to the website to view the full interactive experience with extensive graphics and satellite images.

Shadow navy: How China's civilian fleet could be a potent weapon in a Taiwan invasion

Reuters · Allison Martell

https://www.reuters.com/graphics/USA-CHINA/TAIWAN-INVASION/zjpqdekmlvx/?utm

,

VISUAL INVESTIGATION

China’s shadow navy trains to take Taiwan

China is mobilizing an armada of civilian ships that could help in an invasion of Taiwan – a mission that could surpass the Second World War’s Normandy landings. Reuters used ship tracking data and satellite images to monitor the role civilian vessels played in Chinese maritime exercises this summer. The drills revealed that China is devising concrete invasion plans, naval warfare experts say, and rehearsing new techniques aimed at speeding up beach landings of troops and equipment in a bid to overwhelm Taiwan’s defenders.

Published Nov. 20, 2025 06:00 AM EST

An interactive section showing maps and satellite images of the Chinese coast and paths of ships moving along the coast.

On August 17, 12 civilian vessels are located in their home waters off the Chinese coast. The vessels will soon set off for a landing beach in Guangdong Province. To trace their movements, Reuters tracked signals sent from their transponders and reviewed satellite imagery to confirm ship locations.

On August 17, 12 civilian vessels are located in their home waters off the Chinese coast. The vessels will soon set off for a landing beach in Guangdong Province. To trace their movements, Reuters tracked signals sent from their transponders and reviewed satellite imagery to confirm ship locations.

Six are roll-on, roll-off ferries that are used to carry vehicles and passengers across the Bohai Sea in northeastern China. Six are deck cargo ships widely used in Asia to carry heavy freight like construction materials.

Signals from the vessels’ transponders show they stop at several ports along the way to the landing beach, but cloud cover obscures satellite views of these stops, making it difficult to decipher what happens there.

Just over an hour past sunset, one of the six cargo ships pings 40 kilometers offshore from a beach near the town of Jiesheng, in Guangdong, close to what appears to be a military base. Over the next six hours, the other 11 arrive. Under cover of darkness, they all move closer to shore.

A few hours later, three of the cargo ships approach the beach. Reuters worked with satellite data provider BlackSky Technology to watch what happened next.

A few hours later, three of the cargo ships approach the beach. Reuters worked with satellite data provider BlackSky Technology to watch what happened next.

The first of five images captured between 8:41 a.m. and 12:44 p.m. shows a beach landing operation underway. The fleet practices landing techniques, including one shown here for the first time.

Reuters showed satellite images from this exercise to five amphibious-warfare experts in Taiwan and five in the U.S. The images, they said, showed that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, was continuing to experiment with different types of civilian vessels as part of ongoing landing drills.

Through fog, the satellite captures a cargo vessel unloading vehicles directly onto the beach, using its attached ramp. Vehicles are lined up on the deck, and at least one is on the sand. Reuters is the first to publish satellite imagery of civilian cargo ships making beach landings during a PLA amphibious landing exercise.

Through fog, the satellite captures a cargo vessel unloading vehicles directly onto the beach, using its attached ramp. Vehicles are lined up on the deck, and at least one is on the sand. Reuters is the first to publish satellite imagery of civilian cargo ships making beach landings during a PLA amphibious landing exercise.

Nearby, the cargo vessel Huayizhixing arrives at the beach, fully laden with about 20 vehicles.

These ships are similar to military landing craft widely used during the Second World War and since. Civilian versions, some 90 meters long, are cheap, plentiful and widely used by commercial shippers in China.

With a ramp, open deck and a shallow draft – the vessel’s depth below the waterline – they can deliver a wide variety of cargo to beaches, without port facilities.

To the west, four narrow rectangular craft cruise toward shore. They match images of a self-propelled temporary pier system that was first spotted at similar exercises in the early 2020s, when it was used to land vehicles on beaches.

Experts who track this shadow navy had speculated in a 2025 U.S. Naval War College report that there were technical problems with this pier system because it was not seen after 2023. The image shows it is back in action.

At the bottom of the image, what appears to be a line of amphibious assault vehicles – a kind of swimming armored vehicle usually carried by military ships – cruises toward the beach. In past exercises, these have launched from the roll-on, roll-off ferries.

At the bottom of the image, what appears to be a line of amphibious assault vehicles – a kind of swimming armored vehicle usually carried by military ships – cruises toward the beach. In past exercises, these have launched from the roll-on, roll-off ferries.

Eleven days later, on September 3, China’s President Xi Jinping rode in an open-topped limousine past a massive People’s Liberation Army parade in Beijing, celebrating China’s victory over Japan 80 years earlier.

“Comrades, you’ve been working hard,” his amplified voice boomed as he swept along the ranks.

Xi did not mention Taiwan in a speech after the parade, but gaining control over the island is a paramount goal for the Chinese leader and his ruling Communist Party. China views democratically governed Taiwan as part of its territory and has never renounced the use of force to take control of the island. Taiwan’s government rejects China’s claims, saying only the island’s people can decide their future.

​​China’s quest to take over Taiwan is at the center of intensifying rivalry between Beijing and Washington for dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Earlier this month, China issued the latest reminder of its growing naval muscle with the commissioning of its third aircraft carrier, the 80,000-tonne Fujian, a bigger and much more advanced warship than the two carriers already in service, according to naval experts. From tiny atolls deep in the Pacific Ocean, to the strategic archipelagos of Japan and the Philippines, China and the U.S. are engaged in preparations for a potentially fateful showdown.

“The Taiwan question is purely an internal affair of China, and how to resolve it is entirely a matter for the Chinese people,” the foreign ministry in Beijing said in response to questions. China is willing “to pursue the prospect of peaceful reunification, but we will never allow anyone or any force to separate Taiwan from China by any means whatsoever,” the ministry said. China’s defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

In response to questions, Taiwan’s defense ministry referred Reuters to comments made in September by Defense Minister Wellington Koo, who said that the island maintains “continuous oversight” of China’s use of roll-on, roll-off vessels. “We closely monitor how they support military operations,” Koo said, adding that Taiwan has “developed relevant contingency plans.”

The arsenal of weapons on display during Xi’s parade included amphibious assault vehicles that would be crucial for seizing control of Taiwan. Reuters also observed civilian ships loading similar amphibious assault vehicles in this year’s naval exercises.

With a fleet of these civilian ships drafted to serve alongside the world’s biggest navy, China can exploit the full scope of its massive maritime power in preparing for an attack on Taiwan. The PLA has legal authority to take control of civilian shipping for military purposes.

The way China used civilian cargo vessels in this summers’ exercises is “a substantial moving of the needle” towards being able to carry enough troops, equipment and supplies to the beaches of Taiwan as part of an invasion, said Thomas Shugart, a former U.S. submarine officer who closely follows China’s fleet.

“This is a very significant development,” said Shugart, referring to China using deck cargo ships to offload vehicles directly onto the beach, which he recently wrote about on X. “It is a huge increase in their first wave capacity, in their ability to take heavy vehicles straight to the beach in a first wave.”

China’s civilian ships are the product of its vast commercial shipbuilding industry, which serves customers all over the world. In less than three decades, China’s shipyards have built the world’s biggest navy and now account for about 53% of global shipbuilding. By comparison, the U.S. accounts for 0.1%.

This massive commercial fleet would be crucial in a full-scale Taiwan invasion, an operation that could surpass the Second World War’s Normandy landings in scale and complexity.

To be sure, China’s advances in training, tactics and equipment wouldn’t necessarily guarantee success. Taking the island would be a formidable challenge for a landing force embarking from the Chinese coast. Waters in the Taiwan Strait are often treacherous with storms, rough seas, powerful tides and fog. Towering mountains line most of Taiwan’s east coast, and the few more suitable landing sites on the densely populated north and west coast closest to China have been identified for decades, allowing the island’s military to prepare to defend them.

China would have to solve many tactical challenges before it could successfully invade Taiwan, said J. Michael Dahm, a former U.S. naval intelligence officer and senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

“Just because a force can demonstrate a capability to do something once in the course of a day, doesn’t mean they can do it day after day after day after day,” he said.

The Chinese military only has enough ships and landing craft to carry about 20,000 troops and their equipment across the strait in the first wave of a landing, according to Taiwanese and American military experts. These experts calculate that the PLA would need to deploy 300,000 to 1 million or more troops to subdue the island’s defenders. These forces would need to be supported with shipments of supplies and ammunition – hence the need for an armada of civilian vessels.

The ships deployed in the drills Reuters monitored this summer would amount to a small fraction of the fleet required.

New beach landing strategy

Still, China’s naval capabilities keep growing, the Reuters analysis shows. Throughout the summer, we tracked the movements of more than 100 civilian vessels that have participated in drills like the August one or are owned by operators that often participate in military exercises.

In July, we identified an exercise underway at the beach near Jiesheng, and spotted several deck cargo ships cruising toward the beach, loaded with vehicles.

A swarm of these civilian vessels could sharply boost the size of the forces deployed for an invasion and potentially enable China to carry out assaults at a bigger number of sites on Taiwan, according to Taiwanese and U.S. experts on amphibious warfare.

Admiral Lee Hsi-min, a former chief of Taiwan’s armed forces and one of the island’s leading thinkers on defense and security, said the satellite images of the August exercises revealed the PLA was now experimenting with craft smaller than the bigger civilian vessels used in earlier drills.

“My guess is that they are trying to develop a kind of large number of small amphibious landing ships supported by the civilian sector,” Lee said. “During wartime, they would conduct multi-point, small amphibious landing operations.”

This could be more difficult for Taiwan’s defenders to repulse than landings at fewer sites, he added.

Reuters’ findings show China has reached a point where it is developing concrete invasion plans, said Yuster Yu, a retired Taiwanese naval officer who served on Taiwan’s National Security Council. “This kind of thing worries me more than their aircraft carriers,” he said. “It shows they are serious about putting troops on the ground.”

The roll-on, roll-off ferries have participated in Chinese military exercises since at least 2019, according to a U.S. military report. Images from state media show that some of them can drop off or pick up amphibious assault vehicles directly from the water, using retrofitted ramps.

Deck cargo ships have moved military equipment during some earlier exercises, said Dahm, who has written extensively about China’s shadow navy. But this summer is the first time these vessels have been seen unloading vehicles directly onto a beach, according to seven naval warfare experts Reuters interviewed.

“The PLA continues to demonstrate new capabilities that are putting them on a path to having the amount of capability and capacity that they need to conduct a full-scale invasion,” Dahm said.

These ships are numerous and play an important role in Chinese commercial coastal shipping. But ship registration databases are not detailed enough to distinguish them from other cargo vessels, so a precise tally is not possible.

“The simple design and relative ease of construction of deck cargo ships means they can quickly be built in large numbers,” researcher Conor Kennedy wrote in a 2024 report about these vessels published by the U.S. Naval War College.

Several of the cargo ships we tracked were docked before the August exercise in the Chinese city of Taizhou. There, satellite images show dozens of similar vessels moored near shipyards. They are sold for less than $3 million, according to the yards’ social media posts.

The roll-on, roll-off ferries cost more, but far less than a large military amphibious assault ship. In 2020, one Bohai ferry operator said its newest ship cost 410 million yuan, about $60 million. The latest America-class amphibious assault ship under construction for the U.S. Navy, roughly equivalent to China’s Type 076 version which has just completed sea trials, is estimated to cost more than $3.8 billion, according to Pentagon budget estimates.

Ferry companies identified by Reuters as having vessels involved in the August exercise didn’t respond to requests for comment. Reuters was unable to contact the cargo ship companies.

The cargo ships from the summer exercises appear to be transporting military trucks or utility vehicles that would carry troops and general supplies like arms and food, said Sean O’Connor, an analyst with Janes, the defense intelligence firm. Not all vehicles in the imagery are clear enough to identify.

Cargo ships could land after the first amphibious assault vehicles swim to shore, and play a crucial role in resupplying them before China gains control of Taiwanese infrastructure, Dahm said.

“Once that armor gets ashore, it only has maybe two days before it starts running out of stuff,” he said. “It’s going to run out of bullets. It’s going to run out of gas.”

Satellite images of the August exercise taken by BlackSky and Planet Labs show vehicles building up on shore during the exercise.

By 2:59 p.m. on August 23, about six hours after signals from three of the cargo ships revealed they were at the beach near Jiesheng, Reuters counted at least 330 vehicles on or near the shore. Some were clustered at the landing sites we identified along that beach, suggesting they arrived aboard the shadow navy ships. Reuters couldn’t determine if all the vehicles on the beach were offloaded during the exercise.

Source: Planet Labs PBC

Source: BlackSky

Source: BlackSky

Source: Planet Labs PBC

Satellite image of the beach near Jiesheng. The beach area is empty, with no vehicles visible.

Satellite image of the beach near Jiesheng captured on August 23, 2025, at 8:41 a.m. The beach is beginning to populate with vehicles. There are also vehicles approaching on a cargo ship. The cargo has its ramp down, about to offload the vehicles.

Satellite image of the beach near Jiesheng captured on August 23, 2025, at 12:44 p.m. More vehicles are populating the beach.

Satellite image of the beach near Jiesheng captured on August 23, 2025, at 2:59 p.m. Reuters counted over 330 vehicles on shore and in the surrounding area.

Military experts suggest one objective of these high-profile amphibious exercises could be to intimidate Taiwan in the hope that it would accept Beijing’s rule rather than suffer a bloody invasion. Xi and other Chinese leaders routinely insist they favor a peaceful takeover. However, this outcome seems increasingly unlikely, especially after China mounted an ongoing crackdown on freedoms in Hong Kong. Opinion polls suggest that the overwhelming majority of Taiwan’s 23 million people do not support a union with China.

A successful invasion could garner immense domestic prestige for the Communist Party. It could also mean China supplants the U.S. as Asia’s dominant power. However, it could also lead to disaster, with China at war with the U.S. and its key allies, a conflict that would almost certainly convulse the global economy. Military failures could also threaten the party’s hold on power.

The outcome of a Chinese attack could depend heavily on the response of the United States, the island’s most important ally. For decades, the U.S. refused to say how it would react to an invasion, a policy dubbed “strategic ambiguity.”

President Joe Biden appeared to break with this policy, confirming on a number of occasions during his term that U.S. forces would defend Taiwan if it was attacked.

Asked about President Donald Trump’s position on Taiwan, a White House spokesman said: “The policy of the United States is to maintain Taiwan’s defensive capability relative to that of China. And as the president has said, Chairman Xi Jinping will not attack Taiwan while President Trump is in office.”

A portable port

Missing from the exercises that Reuters observed was a new temporary pier system launched in March, which renewed fears that China was continuing to prepare for an invasion. Instead, we saw vessels that match the older floating pier system that has not been spotted since 2023.

Assembled off a landing beach, big cargo ships and ferries could dock at these floating piers, speeding the unloading of troops, equipment and supplies.

The testing of this system suggests the PLA fears it might be unable to seize or prevent the demolition of Taiwan’s existing ports and cargo-handling facilities in the early phases of an invasion, according to military experts. Admiral Lee said vehicles and supplies could be driven from the roll-on, roll-off ships onto the floating piers and then directly onto land.

Satellite images show that during the August 23 exercise, the pier was assembled and then dismantled in about 3.5 hours. Vehicles clustered on the shore suggest it was at least briefly used to drive vehicles to the beach.

These pier systems can be set up quickly in ideal conditions, but weather, sea conditions and other logistics can introduce difficulties and delays. Multiple military experts pointed to the U.S. effort to build a temporary pier to deliver aid to Gaza last year. Construction took roughly three weeks, and the system had to be dismantled multiple times because of bad weather. In ideal conditions, U.S. officials told Reuters, the U.S. pier system can be operational within 24 hours.

‘Cognitive warfare’

One senior Taiwan defense official, who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter, questioned the viability of using civilian ferries and cargo ships in an invasion. The official said it would be nearly impossible for China to deploy landing craft like the ones Reuters observed during an invasion, because they would be vulnerable to small, portable weapons such as shoulder-fired missiles.

The official said China was waging “cognitive warfare” against Taiwan and its allies when it publicized reports of menacing landing exercises and amphibious assault rehearsals. The psychological impact was a “bigger threat” than the maneuvers demonstrated in the drills, the official said.

The sheer size of an invasion force, which would be difficult to hide, also presents a challenge for the PLA. Chinese military doctrine emphasises the use of deception to achieve surprise in warfare, according to Taiwanese and western experts.

One way to obscure such a force would be to launch an attack from many sites in China. Reuters observed several embarkation drills this summer where small vessels, likely amphibious assault vehicles, cruised from beaches through the water and entered ferries from a ramp at the back.

This means the PLA could load troops and armored vehicles from multiple beaches on the Chinese coast that had suitable road or rail connections. For troops storming Taiwan, these vehicles would provide crucial firepower and protection.

Taiwan’s defense ministry said in a report last month that China was honing its capacity to mount a surprise attack with its regular military exercises near the island. These drills could suddenly switch to active combat to catch Taiwan and its international allies off guard, the report said.

Chinese leaders value the element of surprise, according to a report by Ian Easton, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College, who has studied the use of deception in Chinese military strategy.

Within hours of the August landing drills, the 12 shadow navy ships left the waters off the beach near Jiesheng, heading north. The ferries returned to civilian duty on their normal routes in the Bohai Sea. After the latest in this series of summer exercises, it remains uncertain if the PLA is prepared yet for an invasion if ordered to cross the Taiwan Strait.

“I don’t think anybody can definitively say, one way or another, are they ready now,” said Easton. “All war is a gamble, it’s always a gamble, and there’s always surprises. And it never goes as planned, for the attacker or for the defender.”

Methodology

Naval exercises China conducts every summer off its coast have for years offered glimpses of its potential strategies for an invasion of Taiwan. Until now, these have provided isolated snapshots, usually one or two images of each exercise.

Reuters sought to take a more comprehensive look, using ship-tracking data and more frequent satellite imagery to document the exercises as they unfolded. We spent more than a year analyzing the movements of civilian ships that form China’s “shadow navy.”

We started by making a list of civilian ships spotted in previous military exercises. We then identified their owners and used LSEG ship-ownership data to build a list of those companies’ other vessels. We used LSEG ship-tracking data to follow these ships’ movements.

The tracking data comes from thousands of civilian ships operating in Chinese waters that broadcast their positions to enhance navigation safety as required under an international maritime convention. The data can be misleading: Crews sometimes make errors or seek to mask their movements by not sending data, reporting a false location or even pretending to be a different vessel. But when paired with satellite images, we almost always found shadow navy ships where their signals said they were.

We developed a tool that used the tracking data to map key vessels’ positions in real time and monitor their proximity to the sites of previous military exercises. All told, we followed the movements of more than 100 civilian ships. During the summer, we worked with satellite and data company BlackSky Technology to add views from space to our tracking effort. When ferries left their usual routes and approached beaches or ports, BlackSky tasked its satellites to gather images of the area.

In the past, researchers have only had one or two commercial satellite images a day to work with during Chinese naval exercises. Because BlackSky’s satellites can revisit the same site up to 15 times a day, Reuters was able to track military exercises as they unfolded.

In mid-July, our ship-tracking tool showed a ferry approaching a beach near Jiesheng, Guangdong. When we turned to BlackSky’s images, they showed the ferry, but also something we had never seen before – three cargo ships that we had not been tracking, operating right at the beach.

Two days later, imagery from Planet Labs, another commercial satellite data provider, showed the same cargo vessels cruising towards the beach – this time with vehicles on deck. We used LSEG’s tracking data to build a database of all ships operating in the area during this time, and identified three cargo ships that were new to us.

We continued tracking the vessels, and in August, the same three cargo ships joined three others, along with six ferries, at the same site to conduct the landing exercise laid out in detail in our story.

Additional sources

Esri World Imagery, LSEG

By

Allison Martell, David Lague, Clare Farley and Minami Funakoshi

Additional reporting by

Yimou Lee in Taipei; Idrees Ali and Trevor Hunnicutt in Washington

Illustrations by

Arathy Aluckal, Adolfo Arranz and Kosato Nakhro

Edited by

Sarah Cahlan, Janet Roberts, Peter Hirschberg and Feilding Cage

Reuters · Allison Martell

22. How to Topple Maduro: And Why Regime Change Is the Only Way Forward in Venezuela​ by Elliot Abrams

​Summary:

Current U.S. policy toward Venezuela is ambiguous and risks leaving Maduro defiant and emboldened. Sanctions, indictments, and diplomacy have failed to dislodge a narco terrorist regime tied to China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia. The U.S. should use limited but decisive strikes to force regime change, install the elected opposition, and restore stability.

Excerpts:

The only way for Trump to be able to declare victory credibly is for Maduro to go. Trump is obviously reluctant to launch strikes inside Venezuela. It’s a fair guess that it isn’t the problem of how to legally justify and defend such strikes that is deterring him, but his own doubts about the chances of success. And if Trump backs down, he would not acknowledge defeat; he would instead claim that his only goal had been to depress drug trafficking. He would declare victory and cite statistics showing that the number of drug shipments on boats in the Caribbean had gone down—which it would have.

But once the U.S. fleet is withdrawn, those shipments will inexorably rise again—and the Cartel de los Soles and its putative leader, Maduro, will be back in business with the wind in their sails. Moreover, refugee flows from Venezuela would continue, and Venezuelans would not return home in large numbers, while Maduro would remain in power. So although Trump may feel he is not yet committed, in fact his own prestige and American credibility are already on the line. His advisers should persuade him that he’s already past the point of no return: the game is on, and either he wins or Maduro wins.

Comment: But isn't an ambiguous policy useful in some instances?

How to Topple Maduro

Foreign Affairs · More by Elliott Abrams · November 20, 2025

And Why Regime Change Is the Only Way Forward in Venezuela

Elliott Abrams

November 20, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-topple-maduro

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro waving to supporters in in Caracas, November 2025 Leonardo Fernandez Viloria / Reuters

ELLIOTT ABRAMS is a Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He served as Special Representative for Venezuela in the first Trump administration and as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America in the Reagan administration.

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

On the last day of October, CBS’s 60 Minutes asked U.S. President Donald Trump about his policy on Venezuela and his thoughts about that country’s dictator, Nicolas Maduro. “Are Maduro’s days as president numbered?” asked Norah O’Donnell. “I would say yeah,” Trump replied. “I think so, yeah.”

This phlegmatic response was a good summary of current U.S. policy: Washington favors Maduro’s downfall, but its position lacks clarity and is not backed by the actions—including military strikes inside Venezuela—that would bring about the outcome U.S. officials appear to want. And therein lies the danger for Trump and his administration: that after a great deal of chest-thumping and a show of naval force aimed at Maduro, they will leave him in place. In that scenario, Maduro would emerge as the survivor who bested Trump and showed that American influence in the Western Hemisphere is limited at best.

Removing Maduro, on the other hand, would advance Washington’s interests, protect U.S. national security, and benefit Venezuelans and their neighbors. Regime change would result in reduced migration to the United States, less drug trafficking, more freedom and prosperity in Venezuela, and an end to the country’s cooperation with China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia, which gives countries hostile to U.S. interests a base of operations on the South American mainland.

The use of American military force to overthrow Maduro would not be without risk. It could fail to end the Maduro regime and could incite demonstrations against the United States. But regime change would not require any ground deployments of U.S. forces except, at most, Special Forces raids against regime figures who have already been indicted for narcoterrorism by U.S. law enforcement. The potential gain for the United States from the collapse of the Maduro regime far outweighs the risk, because it would end a brutal dictatorship that relies on drug trafficking to stay afloat and would open the door to Venezuelan economic recovery. That would end the mass migration of Venezuelans and reduce the role of Venezuela in cocaine flows to the United States.

Most recently, Trump has left open the possibility of more talks with Maduro while also signaling that deploying U.S. troops to Venezuela remained an option, as well. The Trump administration should eliminate this ambiguity and make clear that it intends to deal not only with the symptoms of the problem—trafficking in gold, drugs, and human beings; mass migration; violent crime; and instability—but with their root cause: the Maduro regime.

THE DRUG LORD DICTATOR

In 2019, toward the end of his first term, Trump initiated a pressure campaign against the Maduro regime. At the time, I served as special representative for Venezuela in the U.S. State Department and helped organize diplomatic efforts and severe economic sanctions to delegitimize and undermine Maduro. Nearly 60 countries joined the United States in recognizing Juan Guaidó, who had been National Assembly speaker, as the legitimate interim president of Venezuela. The theory was that the presidency was vacant because Maduro had stolen the 2018 presidential election—which he had.

But those U.S. efforts failed, because economic and diplomatic pressure was simply insufficient against a regime willing to use violence and brutal repression against the Venezuelan people to stay in power. When Trump left office in 2021, Maduro was still ruling Venezuela. In the ensuing years, the repression, economic ruin, refugee flows, and trafficking in drugs, gold, and human beings have continued. But in the 2024 presidential election, the opposition figure Edmundo González crushed Maduro in a landslide, making clear that Venezuelans want an end to the dictator’s rule. Still, Maduro refused to accept the result.

Back in 2020, Maduro had been indicted by U.S. federal prosecutors, who charged him with, among other things, conspiring to commit narcoterrorism and leading a drug-trafficking organization known as Cartel de los Soles, or “cartel of the suns.” The State Department announced a $15 million reward for information that led to his arrest; this past January, that amount was raised to $25 million. Last summer, the Department of the Treasury sanctioned the cartel as a specially designated global terrorist entity, and the reward amount was doubled, to $50 million.

In addition to this diplomatic, political, economic, and legal pressure, the Trump administration has added more direct forms of coercion. In the Trump first term we used to say “all options are on the table,” but the administration made no military moves against Maduro. And a lack of enthusiasm for and commitment to the goal of bringing down the regime (plus perhaps a lack of capability) meant that Washington took no effective covert actions, either. By contrast, in the past few months, the United States has struck nearly two dozen ships in the Caribbean and the western Pacific, and its largest and most advanced aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, arrived there on November 16.

Typically, the U.S. Fourth Fleet, covering Latin America and adjacent waters, has no vessels permanently assigned to it and has only four to six surface ships under its command. Today, about a dozen surface ships including the Gerald R. Ford and a nuclear attack submarine, plus a considerable amount of airpower assets, have been sent to the region. This suggests that the list will expand to include targets inside Venezuela. “We are certainly looking at land now, because we’ve got the sea very well under control,” Trump said in mid-October. Around the same time, U.S. officials told The New York Times that Trump had authorized the CIA to carry out a program of covert action inside Venezuela, although its parameters and objectives remain secret.

Economic and diplomatic pressure is simply insufficient against Maduro.

So far, the Trump administration has characterized all these steps as intended to stop the Maduro regime’s drug trafficking, not to overthrow the dictator. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio put it, “This is a counterdrug operation.” The New York Times recently reported that Rubio held a private meeting with House and Senate leaders earlier this month during which he “insisted that ousting Mr. Maduro was not the administration’s objective.” But if Maduro is not the legitimate leader of Venezuela and is instead a narcoterrorist and a cartel kingpin, it would be difficult to understand why the Trump administration would surround the country with a gigantic armada only to leave him in power.

This is not the only anomaly in the current policy. Despite stringent U.S. economic sanctions, Trump continues to permit Chevron to drill for oil in Venezuela—and give some of it to the Maduro regime, as a form of tax payment. Maduro then sells that oil for cash. As a result, this “Chevron exception” to the sanctions helps him stay in power.

Trump has also withdrawn the temporary protected status that the Biden administration conferred on hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans who sought refuge in the United States. In effect, this means the Trump administration is telling them to return to a country for which the State Department’s travel warning tells Americans this: “Do not travel to or remain in Venezuela due to the high risk of wrongful detention, torture in detention, terrorism, kidnapping, arbitrary enforcement of local laws, crime, civil unrest, and poor health infrastructure. All U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents in Venezuela are strongly advised to depart immediately.” It continues: “Violent crimes, such as homicide, armed robbery, kidnapping, and carjacking, are common. . . . Police and security forces have instituted a brutal crackdown on pro-democracy or anti-regime demonstrations.” Describing Venezuela as a hell on earth led by a vicious criminal and then ending temporary protected status suggests mixed motives and no clear policy.

Finally, leaving Maduro in place also leaves in place his ties with China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia. In Trump’s first term, the administration received reliable reports about Iranian plans to transfer missiles to Venezuela—which the administration concluded would be unacceptable and would be stopped, with the use of force, if need be. That threat was conveyed to Venezuela and Iran, and the transfers were never made. Iranian drones that can reach Israel from Iranian territory can also reach U.S. territory from Venezuela—potentially hitting Puerto Rico and U.S. facilities there. Today, Iran uses Venezuela as a base for Hezbollah activity, money laundering, acquisition of blank passports for use by its agents, and other actions that Trump should stop by putting an end to the regime that enables them. Otherwise they will continue, and they will grow whenever it is to Iran’s advantage. As for Cuba, the Maduro regime gives it between 30,000 to 50,000 barrels of oil per day, on average, for free or with a huge discount—a critical source of support for the communist regime in Havana. A democratic government in Caracas would end that subsidy for repression. It would also remove the Russian military personnel usually in the country to train Venezuelan forces, and it would end the country’s reliance on Russian and Chinese military equipment.

FROM PSYOP TO SPECIAL OPS?

So far, Trump’s approach mostly resembles a psychological operation, also known as a psyop. The public revelation that there is a covert CIA program seems to be part of that. If an electricity transformer blows up in some part of Venezuela, it would be hard to say whether it was the result of years of poor maintenance or an act of sabotage. The doubling of the reward for Maduro was clearly meant to incentivize regime officials or military leaders to break with him now. Presumably, one of the CIA’s jobs is to convey to them that Maduro is going down—but they need not go down with him. That messaging should include discussion of a potential amnesty (something that has accompanied every Latin American transition to democracy) and assurances that, under a democratic government, the Venezuelan military would be better equipped and more professional, with plenty of room for advancement when some top Maduro cronies are weeded out. The current strikes on boats and the consequent reduction in maritime drug traffic may help reduce the cash Maduro has to continue buying military support.

But Venezuela’s military is permeated with Cuban and Cuban-trained intelligence agents whose precise task is to avoid coups. Over the years, there has been plenty of military unrest in Venezuela, and hundreds of officers have been arrested and remain in the regime’s hellish prisons (or have died there). Last year, a former Venezuelan army lieutenant who became a dissident, Ronald Ojeda, was murdered while living in exile in Chile—a killing that Chile’s leftist government blamed on “instructions or orders given by the Venezuelan authorities.” The case shows not only the criminal and terrorist nature of the Maduro regime but the extent of its nervousness about any military dissidence.

Trump’s actions thus far have raised the stakes for him and for the United States, and the Venezuelan democratic opposition is fully behind him. María Corina Machado, the leader of the opposition and recent Nobel Peace Prize winner, called Trump’s moves “absolutely correct” and called Maduro “the head of this narcoterror structure that has declared war on the Venezuelan people and [on] democratic nations in the region. . . . Maduro started this war, and President Trump is ending that war.”

But victory for the democratic opposition and Trump, and the end of the regime, are not guaranteed. It is possible that if the U.S. flotilla can be kept in place and economic sanctions tightened, the regime’s income will steadily decline and, with it, the ability to keep buying support. But the regime has had decades to coup-proof itself with massive help from Cuba. Merely starving it will not be enough: it must be forced out of power with military strikes, which will throw the regime’s support structures, including in the military, into disarray and make them fear for their own futures.

This criminal regime must be forced from power if Venezuela is to have a decent future.

The point of military action should be to cripple the regime’s drug trafficking and demonstrate to the top leaders of the Venezuelan military and everyone except the small Maduro inner circle that the game is up, that Maduro is doomed, and that the best way for them to protect their own futures is to remove him and negotiate the installation of the next government. They will see the beginning of the use of force by the United States, but they will not know where it might end: they will be left wondering whether there will be more strikes at military targets or at regime physical assets, whether Washington will use Special Forces to apprehend indicted regime leaders, and whether the United States might even carry out a small invasion. Trump is wise to say he has not ruled anything out because the limited use of force is in its way another psyop, threatening something larger if Maduro is not removed. The goal is to replace regime confidence with fear, and insiders’ displays of loyalty with their search for escape hatches.

And the escape hatch should be clear: Maduro’s departure from power, followed by the installation of the legitimate government led by González, followed by economic recovery, free elections, and the kind of negotiated amnesty (for all but the top figures of the regime) and national reconciliation that has been possible in other Latin American countries after dictators have fallen. The loyalty of the army and police to the new government cannot be assumed, of course, but if it can pay them using frozen assets or loans, their fealty to the departed Maduro will rapidly disappear. Soldiers are also Venezuelan citizens, after all, who have seen how their own families and neighbors have been forced to live or flee under Maduro’s reign.

It would be neither wise nor necessary to deploy U.S. ground forces to Venezuela. But creating the conditions for Maduro’s overthrow will require hitting more than just drug-trafficking boats in international waters, because such strikes do not telegraph to Venezuelans that the regime is truly under great threat of losing power. First, Washington should expand its target list to include drug-trafficking speedboats in ports in addition to those on the high seas, because the threat must be brought home to the Venezuelan military. To protect U.S. planes that may strike targets in Venezuela (and to demonstrate that such strikes are planned), U.S. forces should destroy Venezuela’s air defense systems, F-16 fighter aircraft at the Palo Negro Air Base, and Sukhoi jets at the air base located on La Orchila, an island about 100 miles off the coast. Airstrikes should also target small airstrips in western Venezuela used for drug trafficking and bases in western Venezuela used by the National Liberation Army (known by its Spanish acronym, ELN), a Colombian terrorist group aligned with Maduro and also engaged in narcotics traffic.

No single step would have a greater effect on the Venezuelan military, intelligence services, and police than removing Diosdado Cabello, the regime’s chief thug, who is currently serving as interior minister and thus controls the police. Cabello was indicted in New York in 2020 for conspiracy to commit narcoterrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine, and the U.S. State Department has offered a reward of $25 million for information leading to his capture owing to his participation “in a corrupt and violent narco-terrorism conspiracy between the Cartel of the Suns . . . and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization.” Removing him from power would show everyone in the regime’s security organs that they were not safe, and that its power to protect itself and them was fast eroding.

Maduro rules over a country with a collapsed economy, 270 percent inflation, vast poverty, and a populace that voted in a landslide to end his days in power. It is not likely that his regime could withstand such an assault. No such policy is without risk—including the fact that failure could leave Maduro in power and weaken American credibility and prestige. That outcome would strengthen not only Maduro and other leaders of his ilk, such as Miguel Díaz-Canel in Cuba and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, it would guarantee more drug trafficking and more migration from Venezuela. But the risks of the status quo are even greater.

PAST THE POINT OF NO RETURN

“Regime change” is hardly a phrase associated with Trump, but the goals he has stated in Venezuela require it. The Maduro regime depends on illicit activities to remain in power, and U.S. descriptions of Maduro as a criminal are accurate. Unlike the South American regimes that returned to the barracks during democratic transitions in the Reagan years (when I served as assistant U.S. secretary of state for Latin America), the Maduro regime isn’t a military dictatorship. The military juntas of the past were amenable to negotiated agreements with democratic political parties wherein they left power in exchange for some form of amnesty for their coups and related crimes. Maduro and his top lieutenants, by contrast, are drug traffickers, under U.S. indictment for narcoterrorism and other crimes such as money laundering. They will not peacefully negotiate the end of their rule because they know that doing so would mean prison. That is why they must be forced from power if Venezuela is to have a decent future. While, in theory, all the indictments could be quashed in return for their leaving power—the deal that was rejected by Panama’s Manuel Noriega—only the clear U.S. intent to remove the regime will make Venezuela’s criminal leaders even consider such an alternative outcome. And they know that even if the United States agrees to end criminal prosecutions, Venezuela or the International Criminal Court may come after them. Such negotiations can be tried but are an illusory path; this criminal regime must be forced from power if Venezuela is to have a decent future.

Venezuela is a far better candidate for regime change and a return of democracy than were countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. After bringing down the dictator Marcos Pérez Jimenez in 1958, Venezuelans enjoyed two generations of democracy and built a large and educated middle class until Hugo Chávez and Maduro brought repression and ruin. The country has no significant ethnic or religious divisions. It has a long tradition of close financial, commercial, social, educational, and military contacts with the United States. It is the alienation from the United States in the last 20 years—and the links to China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia—that is anomalous. Rebuilding democratic institutions, clearing out the Cuban influences in the intelligence service, and attacking the country’s vast corruption will take years of hard work. But that is what a huge majority of Venezuelans voted for last year, despite all the efforts of the Maduro regime to intimidate them and to rig the election.

The only way for Trump to be able to declare victory credibly is for Maduro to go. Trump is obviously reluctant to launch strikes inside Venezuela. It’s a fair guess that it isn’t the problem of how to legally justify and defend such strikes that is deterring him, but his own doubts about the chances of success. And if Trump backs down, he would not acknowledge defeat; he would instead claim that his only goal had been to depress drug trafficking. He would declare victory and cite statistics showing that the number of drug shipments on boats in the Caribbean had gone down—which it would have.

But once the U.S. fleet is withdrawn, those shipments will inexorably rise again—and the Cartel de los Soles and its putative leader, Maduro, will be back in business with the wind in their sails. Moreover, refugee flows from Venezuela would continue, and Venezuelans would not return home in large numbers, while Maduro would remain in power. So although Trump may feel he is not yet committed, in fact his own prestige and American credibility are already on the line. His advisers should persuade him that he’s already past the point of no return: the game is on, and either he wins or Maduro wins.

Foreign Affairs · More by Elliott Abrams · November 20, 2025

23. Resistance is Victory: Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report and Resisting Cognitive Coercion

​Summary:

Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report reframes deterrence as national resistance, stressing gray zone harassment, cognitive warfare, and narrative warfare as existential threats to sovereignty. It details PLA salami slicing at sea and in the air, and Beijing’s efforts to rewrite history and identity. Taipei responds by building whole-of-society resilience, media literacy, rapid truth clarification, AI driven multilingual messaging, urban resistance and mobilization exercises, and preplanned organized resistance concepts. The report distinguishes harassment from war while treating cognitive and narrative attacks as warfare, and urges partners to counter PRC coercion, making Taiwan a leading model of irregular deterrence.

Excerpts:

Policymakers and defense planners outside of Taiwan should follow Taiwan’s lead and reinforce its efforts in building resistance against China’s irregular operations. Gray zone harassment should be countered at every turn. While freedom of navigation patrols through the Taiwan Strait might be militarily insignificant, they provide a strategic and diplomatic signal that the world is watching and does not recognize China’s claims over Taiwan. In addition, the psychological impact of China’s naval blockade drills could be hamstrung by counter-blockade drills and rehearsals by the United States and its allies. This would further sharpen the deterrent effect by showing that third parties could effectively intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, even against naval operations short of conventional warfare. Finally, clear and consistent messaging can resist China’s cognitive and narrative warfare on the incredible risk of catastrophic defeat that China propagates. The strength and resolve of the Taiwanese people should be amplified, and the possibility of third-party intervention should be a constant theme, including through provision of defense services and foreign military sales that will add credibility to such information campaigns.

Taiwan remains an ever-improving model of resistance and resilience for democratic nations that face authoritarian pressure. By reinforcing Taiwan’s efforts and pursuing supportive strategies, policymakers will best enable this nation to hold the front line of sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific for the rest of the world.

Resistance is Victory: Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report and Resisting Cognitive Coercion

irregularwarfare.org · Brian Kerg · November 20, 2025

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/resistance-is-victory-taiwans-2025-national-defense-report-and-resisting-cognitive-coercion/

In October 2025, Taiwan published its latest National Defense Report. This document, released every two years by the Ministry of National Defense (MND), periodically informs the people of Taiwan, “what it has done, what it is doing, [and] what it prepares to do” in their defense. It is an expansive paper that describes myriad areas of national security, including strategy, military organizations, force structure, acquisition and finances, domestic resilience, and international cooperation, among other topics.

Taiwan’s 2025 National Defense Report reframes deterrence as national resistance, integrating cognitive resilience, societal mobilizations, and maritime defense into a coherent strategy of irregular deterrence.

It is notable how much of this year’s report features an overarching emphasis on resistance. Specifically, it describes how the MND is preparing Taiwan as a nation and the Taiwanese as a people to resist gray zone harassment, cognitive warfare, and narrative warfare by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). These activities all support the most significant strategic threat identified by the report: a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. While such an invasion would necessarily be characterized by naval and amphibious operations, the report flags the ongoing and continuing irregular means by which the PRC is attempting to undermine Taiwanese sovereignty and legitimacy on the world stage and within the minds of the Taiwanese people.

This subversion includes “salami slicing” intended to erode accepted lines of territorial sovereignty and legal jurisdiction. Cognitive and narrative warfare combines to transform the way people view Taiwan’s place in the world and its future in a way favorable to China’s interests. This entire approach is intended to erode Taiwan’s sovereignty; if this erosion occurs, it would translate into major advantages for China in a potential unification campaign, whether through a naval quarantine, naval blockade, or amphibious assault.

In turn, the report breaks new ground in describing how Taiwan is reinforcing societal resistance and resilience. The goal is to build cognitive hardening now, making Taiwan stronger against the psychological operations it faces every day. Meanwhile, clearly providing whole-of-society means for resisting an invasion will make the Taiwanese more resilient should they have to fight a defensive war.

The following analysis consolidates these elements from the report to provide a clearer picture of Taiwan’s significant progress against one of China’s most insidious threats to Taiwan’s self-determination and peaceful existence. By understanding the irregular threat and its intended aim, policymakers and security practitioners can be better postured to enable Taiwan’s defense, both in the cognitive domain and across the Taiwan Strait.

The Irregular Threat

Taiwan identifies gray zone harassment as the most immediate and complex threat posed by the PRC, integrating military, informational, and economic pressure. In their definition, Taiwan identifies gray zone harassment as low-intensity, unlawful, quasi-military actions that fall below the threshold of armed conflict.

These actions include an escalating material presence and increasing frequency of PRC air and naval harassment, often involving the crossing of the median line, into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), or approaching the 24-nautical mile line to gradually increase pressure and intimidate. The report also emphasizes the increasing frequency, jointness, and integration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) naval forces during these drills. They encompass simulated naval blockades, incorporate civilian roll-on/roll-off vehicles for amphibious shipping, and integrate China’s coast guard and maritime militia, while PLA amphibious forces conduct landing exercises on Chinese beaches.

The explicit goal is to normalize the idea of the Taiwan Strait being under PRC jurisdiction. The more immediate outcome is to test Taiwan’s early warning capabilities, consume resources to impact its military readiness, and intentionally obscure the line between peace and war to catch Taiwan and its allies unprepared. The ultimate objective is to position PLA forces such that they can shift quickly from seemingly routine conduct of drills to wartime operations, facilitating a PRC unification by military force if Xi Jinping deems it necessary.

The Battle for Minds: China’s Cognitive Warfare Campaign

Connected to gray zone harassment, which blurs the line of legally accepted norms around Taiwanese sovereignty, is the PRC’s cognitive warfare. This involves tools of “invisible cognitive suppression” that manipulate information and reshape historical meaning in the minds of target audiences.

The MND’s report observes that the PRC uses social media and mainstream media to carefully design and deliver thematic propaganda, focused against specific targets for psychological operations. China’s frequent naval drills are presented to international audiences as an internal matter dealing with a domestic disturbance, reinforcing the false claim that Taiwan has always been and remains an inalienable part of China.

The recurrent themes promoted across these channels include military intimidation, defamation of Taipei’s government policies, and controversial messages aimed at dividing society and manufacturing internal discord. The PRC wants Taiwanese audiences to believe some combination of the following untruths: that Taiwan is part of China; that Taiwanese people are exclusively Chinese; that unification with China is inevitable and in their best interests; and that resisting Chinese unification would be futile and disastrous to their interests.

Rewriting History: China’s Narrative Warfare Strategy

Narrative Warfare, described as a supporting arm of cognitive warfare, seizes the authoritative interpretation of facts through stories and discourse, primarily aimed at changing Taiwanese consciousness and vying for discourse power internationally.

China deliberately exaggerates the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) historical contributions during the Second Sino-Japanese War while minimizing or erasing the contributions of the Republic of China (ROC) military in the fight against Imperial Japan. This constructs the false narrative that the CCP led national liberation and was the sole force in the resistance, undermining the substantial role of the ROC while attempting to weaken Taiwanese pride, identity, and national resilience. This was illustrated during China’s recent Victory Day Parade, at which Beijing honored the role of the CCP in Japan’s defeat, while calling Taiwan’s insistence on its own wartime contributions a “shameless betrayal of the entire Chinese nation.”

The PRC consistently uses international press conferences and multilateral venues to deny Taiwan’s sovereignty and reject the legitimacy of external intervention. The story repeatedly told by China is that its naval blockade drills defend its sovereign territory from external interference and are a warning to Taiwanese ‘separatist forces.’ This aims to shape a regional order and international issue framework favorable to the PRC’s political stance, weakening the influence of the United States and its allies in supporting Taiwan’s right to peacefully determine its future.

Understanding these threats is crucial, but Taiwan’s response represents an even more significant development for defense planners worldwide.

Fighting Back: Taiwan’s Psychological Readiness and Resilience

The report asserts that in response to the PRC’s constant incursions into its ADIZ and exclusive territorial waters, Taiwan’s armed forces are undertaking immediate actions to interdict and eject PLA forces. In addition, it states that Taiwan’s military is refining its defensive operational plans by rehearsing and verifying them through immediate combat readiness drills. While it emphasizes coastal defense and beachhead combat, the report also highlights new comprehensive inland defenses that present the most rigorous defense-in-depth plans seen to date. In short, Taiwan’s defense policies and postures are rapidly evolving in response to China’s aggression.

Building Mental Resilience Against Information Warfare

The ROC military recognizes that psychological readiness is the essential foundation for combat effectiveness. To support this, the MND is undertaking a host of proactive and preemptive initiatives to prepare its military and civilian populations to resist PRC messaging. ROC military personnel are continuously educated to understand the threat and deepen their pride in their country.

Starting in 2025, the weekly Juguang Garden military television program added regular analyses of regional situations and PRC cognitive warfare. This is intended to build media literacy and help service members recognize the PRC’s strategies of inducement and united front tactics.

The MND actively promotes media literacy education for all sectors of Taiwan’s government. It produces educational videos, such as “Media Literacy” and “Cognitive Primary School,” for use by government agencies and local governments.

The Taiwanese government also publicly clarifies false information immediately through the “Real-time News Clarification Zone” on its website. It uses official social media accounts to share and augment these clarifying messages.

To quickly respond to threats and boost international outreach, the MND deployed Artificial Intelligence (AI) “virtual anchors” starting with the Han Kuang 40 exercise in 2024. This system can rapidly generate video clips in as many as 18 languages, significantly increasing cross-cultural dissemination to gain international support and recognition.

Resilience and Resistance

Taiwan is strategically shifting toward resistance and unconventional defense, highlighting key public exercises and preparedness documents. Notably, several exercises dedicated toward all out mobilization, integrating civilian agencies, and protecting critical infrastructure were integrated into a single, more complex Urban Resilience Exercise. In addition, Han Kuang 41, this year’s annual iteration of an exercise simulating nation-wide defense against Chinese invasion, involved the most significant incorporation of urban terrain, reserve mobilization, and civilian involvement to date.

The former All-Out Defense Response Manual was revised and retitled In Case of Crisis: Taiwan’s National Public Safety Guide. This revision integrates the whole-of-society resilience concept and incorporates lessons from international examples like Ukraine.

The MND translated and published the Resistance Operating Concept. Originally published by the U.S. Joint Special Operations University Press, the publication spells out a plan to develop a nationally endorsed, organized resistance movement before an enemy invades. Advanced planning in this way ensures a resistance movement is in place prior to the potential loss of sovereignty and territory, ensuring a pre-invasion plan to preserve national resilience against aggression.

The MND also translated Urban Warfare in the Twenty-First Century, a text arguing that the largest and most intense battles of the modern era frequently occur in dense urban areas. The bulk of Taiwan’s population lives in its major cities, most notably Taipei, and preparing the people to fight and endure in this terrain is critical to bolstering national resolve.

Assessing the Direction of Taiwan’s National Defense

A key insight into Taiwanese military thinking is that the report uses the term ‘gray zone harassment’ instead of ‘gray zone warfare’, the term more commonly used by Western defense analysts. Harassment is a more precise characterization of the PRC’s salami slicing strategy. It clearly indicates that while the Taiwanese military views such harassment as insidious and dangerous, Taiwan perceives it as a categorically different phenomenon than war and warfare.

The inverse is also true when assessing Taiwan’s perception of Chinese psychological operations. While deliberately referring to the physical actions of PLA naval and aircraft incursions into its ADIZ and across the median line as harassment, the battle China is waging in the mind is unambiguously described as ‘cognitive warfare,’ and the fight over meaning is ‘narrative warfare.’ While this conflict is not violent, the outcome of the battle is understood to be existential. If the Taiwanese people, policymakers, or military believe their sovereignty cannot be defended because China’s military might is too great, or that Chinese unification is the lesser of two evils, then the war is lost before a shot is fired. Similarly, if international audiences believe the same, they will be deterred from intervening on Taiwan’s behalf or otherwise provide diplomatic and military support.

Policymakers and defense planners outside of Taiwan should follow Taiwan’s lead and reinforce its efforts in building resistance against China’s irregular operations. Gray zone harassment should be countered at every turn. While freedom of navigation patrols through the Taiwan Strait might be militarily insignificant, they provide a strategic and diplomatic signal that the world is watching and does not recognize China’s claims over Taiwan. In addition, the psychological impact of China’s naval blockade drills could be hamstrung by counter-blockade drills and rehearsals by the United States and its allies. This would further sharpen the deterrent effect by showing that third parties could effectively intervene on Taiwan’s behalf, even against naval operations short of conventional warfare. Finally, clear and consistent messaging can resist China’s cognitive and narrative warfare on the incredible risk of catastrophic defeat that China propagates. The strength and resolve of the Taiwanese people should be amplified, and the possibility of third-party intervention should be a constant theme, including through provision of defense services and foreign military sales that will add credibility to such information campaigns.

Taiwan remains an ever-improving model of resistance and resilience for democratic nations that face authoritarian pressure. By reinforcing Taiwan’s efforts and pursuing supportive strategies, policymakers will best enable this nation to hold the front line of sovereignty in the Indo-Pacific for the rest of the world.

Brian Kerg is a Non-Resident Fellow in the Indo-Pacific Security Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a 2025 Non-Resident Fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a 501(c)3 partnered with Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.

Main Image courtesy of Military News Agency (MNA), the public affairs corps of the ROC Ministry of National Defense.

The views expressed here are those of the author and do not represent the positions or opinions of the US Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the US government.

If you value reading the Irregular Warfare Initiative, please consider supporting our work. And for the best gear, check out the IWI store for mugs, coasters, apparel, and other items.

​24. The New Soft-Power Imbalance: China’s Cautious Response to America’s Retreat

​Summary:

U.S. soft power erosion creates only a partial opening for China. Beijing gains relative appeal as a pragmatic, accessible partner yet cuts development lending, avoids replacing USAID, and offers no compelling governance model. Global views remain mixed, so China enjoys passive gains while sidestepping deeper commitments.

Excerpts:

Subtle resentments and fears of China’s economic power rarely get captured in surveys, but they do show up in other ways. Even in a country such as Ethiopia, which is more favorably disposed toward China, university students across the country have expressed to me a mix of approval and apprehension about the long-term implications of Belt and Road projects. Many invoked the high debt owed to China (Ethiopia is China’s second-largest loan recipient in Africa) and the possibility that China could end up taking over critical projects and sectors if Ethiopia can’t pay back its loans. In Central Asia, where many countries are also relatively pro-China, organized protests against Chinese infrastructure and energy projects, among other issues, have grown more common in the last decade. Among countries that prefer to hedge between major powers or to avoid alignment, the withdrawal of the United States generates even more unease, as it leaves China’s presence uncontested.

It would be premature to declare the relative improvement in China’s soft-power position a definitive victory for the country. For now, Beijing seems to be holding back rather than fully taking advantage of the United States’ decline. It presents itself as a reliable and accessible developmental partner, as it did before the second Trump administration, but it has also been cautious about expending more resources abroad. China’s ideological message still draws largely on resentment toward the West, rather than presenting a compelling alternate international vision or offering concrete, replicable policy lessons. Many foreign publics remain wary of China, especially when it comes to global leadership.

Yet Beijing’s conservative approach may be strategic, rather than a sign of weakness or disregard for soft power. China is avoiding overcommitment and opening itself up to greater scrutiny over its domestic politics and global vision while still enjoying passive gains from the U.S. withdrawal. Unlike the Washington of the past, Beijing is more interested in legitimizing its distinctive path than in convincing others to follow in its footsteps. Highlighting the stark contrasts between China and the United States may suffice for now.

Comment: Are we going to totally cede the information and soft power spaces? Or will we learn from the past (both recent and Cold War past) and reassert ourselves in these spaces?

The New Soft-Power Imbalance

Foreign Affairs · More by Maria Repnikova · November 20, 2025

China’s Cautious Response to America’s Retreat

Maria Repnikova

November 20, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/new-soft-power-imbalance

Holding a Chinese flag in Rome, May 2025 Aleksandra Szmigiel / Reuters

MARIA REPNIKOVA is the William C. Pate Endowed Chair in Strategic Communication at Georgia State University and the author of the forthcoming book Competing for Soft Power: China’s Image-Making in Africa.

Print Subscribe to unlock this feature or Sign in.

Save Sign in and save to read later

Since the start of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump has been dismantling the traditional channels of American soft power. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is no longer operational, and Voice of America is tied up in legislative and court battles. The State Department has significantly reduced its staff and programming. Restrictive new visa and immigration policies have made the United States less accessible and less attractive to potential visitors, and Washington’s coercive and transactional dealings with U.S. allies have damaged trust abroad. In The New York Times, Jamie Shea, a former NATO official, referred to these sweeping changes as the United States’ “soft power suicide.”

Many experts and commentators have interpreted the United States’ loss as China’s gain. The late political scientist Joseph Nye, who developed the concept of soft power, cautioned earlier this year that China “stands ready to fill the vacuum that Trump is creating.” Yanzhong Huang, a scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations, similarly contended that the Trump administration’s actions have “boosted China’s charm offensive.”

But as I argued in 2022 in Foreign Affairs, the U.S.-Chinese soft-power competition is not a zero-sum quest for influence. The two countries take distinct approaches to building soft power: China has tended to rely on drawing in other countries with pragmatic benefits, whereas the United States has placed ideals and values at the center of its outreach. Recipient countries, especially those in the so-called global South, have perceived Chinese and U.S. offerings as complementary, accepting both rather than seeing a need to choose one over the other.

Over the last three years, and especially since Trump’s reelection, China’s relative position has undoubtedly improved. As the United States retreats, China looks to the world like the more accessible and reliable partner. But this has not turned China into a global leader in soft power. Although Beijing still emphasizes its pragmatic offerings in its diplomacy, it has reduced, rather than expanded, its international assistance to lower-income countries, and has shown few signs of stepping in to replace USAID. Nor is China positioning itself to fill the United States’ former role of promoting a particular governance model to the world. Beijing is generally looked upon more favorably than before, yet that change in attitude varies significantly from region to region, and even the countries that hold the most positive views of Chinaview its actions with a mix of appreciation and resentment. China may be passively gaining stature from the United States’ soft-power retreat, but that is not enough to guarantee greater global influence in the years ahead.

STAYING THE COURSE

Chinese interpretations of soft power differ from Nye’s original definition, which emphasizes culture, values, and foreign policy as the key ingredients of a country’s ability to influence others without coercion. In Chinese writings, cultural power is fused together with material power: Beijing considers its economic development model, technological innovation, and material assistance to developing countries, not just its traditional culture and principles, to be vectors of soft power.

When Chinese leaders try to appeal to developing countries, they consistently underscore China’s pursuit of mutual economic benefit and its understanding of human rights as a concept rooted in economic rights and material well-being, rather than in individual and political freedom. Diplomacy is about offering something practical to other countries, whether that is trade deals (which are often announced with some kind of cultural spectacle), infrastructure projects, or training and educational programs that bring thousands of officials, policymakers, journalists, and students to China.

And with the arrival of the Trump administration, developing countries have few alternatives to what China is offering. According to the Lowy Institute, a think tank in Australia, the administration’s cuts to USAID have made China’s bilateral development assistance commitments the largest in the world. Steep U.S. tariffs have ensured that China, which still embraces trade (even if it is criticized for its unfair practices), is the more economically accessible of the two countries. China’s openness to international visitors—it now allows 30-day visa-free entry to citizens of more than 70 countries—also sharply contrasts the increasingly restrictive United States.

U.S.-Chinese soft-power competition is not a zero-sum quest for influence.

Yet China does not appear to be ramping up its developmental assistance, even though Trump’s policies provide it an opportunity. Beijing’s recent pledges of lending assistance to developing countries have been smaller than in the past, and there is little sign so far of that trend changing. At a May summit between China and the 33-country Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, for instance, Beijing promised members of the bloc $9.2 billion in credit—less than half of what it pledged at the same summit in 2015. In September, China pledged $1.4 billion in loans to the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a ten-country economic and security association, down from the $5 billion it pledged in 2014. These reductions reflect Beijing’s effort to “revise” its Belt and Road Initiative by focusing on “small and beautiful” projects—downsizing, in effect—which is likely a response to both China’s domestic economic pressures and the soaring debt that many BRI countries have accumulated. Although China is still offering loans to many neighboring, resource-rich countries, as well as to higher-income countries, such as the United States and Russia, it is increasingly wary of over-lending to developing countries. In some cases, such as in Ethiopia, it has paused new loans entirely.

There are few signs that China aims to fill other gaps left by USAID, either. Prior to 2025, China’s foreign-aid budget (separate from its development finance funds) was a fraction of the United States’ pre-2025 budget, and much of it was disbursed as concessional loans, rather than grants. This year, only in a handful of cases—such as increasing its contributions to Cambodia’s largest demining organization and offering informal assurances that it will provide humanitarian aid to Nepal—has Beijing jumped in to meet the needs of countries affected by the USAID cuts. These isolated examples do not add up to a wholesale reorientation of Chinese diplomacy.

China is not holding back economically across the board. In recent years, Chinese trade with and private investment in countries across Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia have increased. The primary drivers of this expansion, however, have been commercial actors, rather than the state (although the lines between the two can be blurry).

THE CHINA MODEL?

The United States has also reduced its promotion of democratic values and human rights abroad, no longer taking pains to position itself as an aspirational democracy. This leaves another vacuum that China could, in theory, fill with an ideological agenda of its own—but Beijing may not be willing or able to do so. China’s approach to soft power has generally focused less on the promotion of political ideals and values than that of the United States. This may be slowly changing, particularly as Chinese officials talk about principles such as noninterference and promote an alternative path to modernization and democracy in summit diplomacy and in the training sessions they run for foreign-policy makers. But China’s messaging does not offer, as the United States’ messaging once did, a clear vision of the country’s role in the global order, nor a coherent model to “export.” This may be intentional, as it gives China flexibility and helps it present itself as a less imposing global power than the United States has been.

A main theme of Beijing’s ideological promotion today is to differentiate China from the West. In speeches and public commentaries, Chinese officials often denounce Western hegemony and portray China as a responsible and stable major power. In a comment in Russian media in July, for example, China’s ambassador to Russia criticized the United States for abandoning the postwar global order and described China, by comparison, as a country able to keep its promises. In September, at the SCO summit in Tianjin, Chinese leader Xi Jinping called for a “fairer” world order, and launched the Global Governance Initiative to demonstrate his commitment to advancing the goal of multipolarity.

In discussions with African leaders and policymakers, Chinese academics and diplomats tend to contrast the nonintrusive, benevolent China with the more interventionist and impulsive United States. China’s approach to modernization, for example, is presented as inclusive of national differences rather than dictating a set of Western rules. Highlighting the unfairness of U.S. policies, both real and perceived, can foster grievance-based unity that can bring some countries closer to China. The Chinese-led SCO, for instance, has expanded its agenda from border security to global diplomacy, and has grown from a group of six countries in 2001 to one with ten full members, 14 dialogue partners, and two observers today, with more countries waiting to join. Yet China’s messaging does not go much further than criticizing the dominance of the United States and demanding more say in international institutions and governance mechanisms. It falls short of delineating and inspiring an alternative world order.

Labubu dolls in London, November 2025 Isabel Infantes / Reuters

Similarly, the recent tumult in U.S. democracy would seem to give China an opportunity to promote its governance model to a more receptive international audience. What constitutes this model, however, is not entirely clear. As I found in a study of training seminars for African policymakers, Chinese educators and officials do not try to sell the Chinese political system as something wholly different, but instead adopt and invert Western concepts to promote it. China is presented as just another version of democracy, but one that is more efficient and adaptive to public feedback. The Chinese leaders of these training sessions, moreover, rarely provide a roadmap for how to imitate China, even when it comes to topics such as poverty alleviation in which China is widely regarded as successful. In one striking scene at a seminar in Addis Ababa, an Ethiopian official asked the Chinese lecturer to at least provide some specific advice on how Ethiopia could mimic China’s accomplishments. Another Chinese expert chimed in to say, “We are not here to give advice,” shutting down further discussion. Technical trainings related to agriculture or Chinese technology transfers likely do offer more specific lessons, but African officials and journalists have told me that concrete suggestions about China’s broader developmental and political experience are limited. Without them, Beijing may present its own example as something to aspire to, but not as a model for other countries to follow.

This is not to say that China is not making new inroads. In recent months, the growing popularity of Chinese popular culture products such as Labubu dolls, the animated film Ne Zha 2, and several popular video games, along with Chinese technologies including the artificial intelligence platform DeepSeek, have inspired such headlines as “How China became cool.” This kind of cultural influence can translate to greater affinity for China’s values and governance principles, especially when foreign publics latch onto films and video games that glorify Chinese history, traditions, and futuristic technology. Exports such as Labubu dolls and DeepSeek more plainly relate to commercial and technological acumen—something that can bolster China’s material soft power but will not necessarily spread its vision.

RELATIVE GAINS

Soft power is always challenging to measure definitively. One approximation is public opinion polls, which have shown China receive at least a passive boost in popularity since Trump’s reelection. A July Pew survey across 24 countries found that more people still view the United States favorably than they do China, but the gap is closing. The United States has suffered a large decline in positive perceptions since spring 2024—favorable views of the country dropped 20 percentage points in Canada, for instance—whereas China has made marginal gains. In another recent survey across five major Latin American countries, more people preferred China to the United States as an economic partner in every country polled.

But these positive signs come with caveats. Perceptions of China still vary significantly. Unlike in Africa and Latin America, where opinion toward China is generally favorable, China’s reputation is overwhelmingly negative in the Asia-Pacific and in Europe. In these regions, concern about the security threat Beijing poses likely outweighs attraction to the economic opportunities it has to offer, even as Washington pulls back.

Moreover, appreciation of China as an economic partner does not translate to trust in China’s global leadership. In the Pew survey in July, a median of 66 percent of respondents across 25 countries did not have confidence in Xi “to do the right thing regarding world affairs.” Such contrasting views of China on economic and ideological levels also come up in conversations with policymakers. Ethiopian officials who took part in diplomatic training programs in China told me that they admired China’s economic prowess and appreciated its material offerings, but they remained skeptical of Beijing’s promises of cooperation bringing mutual gain, asking, “Is it a win-win or a China win?” Many struggled to articulate China’s perspective on global affairs beyond a pursuit of self-interest.

China does not offer a clear vision of its role in the global order.

Subtle resentments and fears of China’s economic power rarely get captured in surveys, but they do show up in other ways. Even in a country such as Ethiopia, which is more favorably disposed toward China, university students across the country have expressed to me a mix of approval and apprehension about the long-term implications of Belt and Road projects. Many invoked the high debt owed to China (Ethiopia is China’s second-largest loan recipient in Africa) and the possibility that China could end up taking over critical projects and sectors if Ethiopia can’t pay back its loans. In Central Asia, where many countries are also relatively pro-China, organized protests against Chinese infrastructure and energy projects, among other issues, have grown more common in the last decade. Among countries that prefer to hedge between major powers or to avoid alignment, the withdrawal of the United States generates even more unease, as it leaves China’s presence uncontested.

It would be premature to declare the relative improvement in China’s soft-power position a definitive victory for the country. For now, Beijing seems to be holding back rather than fully taking advantage of the United States’ decline. It presents itself as a reliable and accessible developmental partner, as it did before the second Trump administration, but it has also been cautious about expending more resources abroad. China’s ideological message still draws largely on resentment toward the West, rather than presenting a compelling alternate international vision or offering concrete, replicable policy lessons. Many foreign publics remain wary of China, especially when it comes to global leadership.

Yet Beijing’s conservative approach may be strategic, rather than a sign of weakness or disregard for soft power. China is avoiding overcommitment and opening itself up to greater scrutiny over its domestic politics and global vision while still enjoying passive gains from the U.S. withdrawal. Unlike the Washington of the past, Beijing is more interested in legitimizing its distinctive path than in convincing others to follow in its footsteps. Highlighting the stark contrasts between China and the United States may suffice for now.

Foreign Affairs · More by Maria Repnikova · November 20, 2025

25. Transition Period Warfare: How the US Army Should Organize to Fight in a Time of Rapid Change

​Summary:

​Warfare is in a robotic transition period where drone and missile kill webs make traditional divisions easy targets. He urges the Army to redesign divisions around drone enhanced units, creating robotics, reconnaissance and strike brigades to win RDOAs, followed by exploitation brigades that maneuver through these corridors today.

Excerpt:

As technology continues to advance, the US Army must balance proven formations with evolving tactics and capabilities. Drones’ capabilities—and consequently, the drone threat—will only continue to evolve, and their overall simplicity and relative low cost will ensure everyone from nonstate actors to belligerent states will utilize them to compete with and fight against the United States. Manned formations will be required to hold key terrain at least for the foreseeable future—but formations composed of soldiers alone are increasingly a relic of a past era. The most effective units on tomorrow’s battlefield will be characterized by optimized mixes of soldiers and robotic platforms. The time gap between now and the next evolutionary leap in warfare is unknown, but the US Army must be ready to fight and win in this gap. That means rethinking our formations now.

Transition Period Warfare: How the US Army Should Organize to Fight in a Time of Rapid Change - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · Joshua Suthoff · November 20, 2025

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/transition-period-warfare-how-the-us-army-should-organize-to-fight-in-a-time-of-rapid-change/

Military leaders and analysts consistently highlight the importance of predicting what the future formation should look like to win the next war. Current conflict areas and the rise of drones highlight the need for professional militaries to adapt to remain relevant against evolving threats. The Army Transformation Initiative and its transformation in contact efforts continue to expedite changes in organization and equipping. However, key to the US Army maintaining relevancy is how it adapts the division, as the unit of action, along with its subordinate brigades. Although the division formation has seen some recent organizational changes with artillery, engineers, and sustainment, key and most critical is the lethality of the division headquarters and assigned combat brigades. The speed of drone evolution, supported by AI, is uncomfortable for professional armies. This discomfort is exacerbated when considering procurement times and reliance on traditional combat-tested formations or tactics. This fear is reinforced by the idea that professional Western armies, like that of the United States, will successfully execute maneuver warfare in the new drone-infested operating environment. The sheer size and mass of US Army divisions and brigades is considerable, making them inviting targets for an enemy commander’s kill web. One combat principle remains true: Making contact with the smallest element possible limits vulnerability, and this applies from the squad to the division level. Today, a corollary to that imperative has emerged: That smallest element must be a drone-enhanced unit.

Assuming divisions will be able to rapidly transition from movement to maneuver under contact for the first time in decades without significant friction and casualties is unrealistic. Division-level maneuver is never rehearsed outside of a combined arms rehearsal or digital warfighter exercise. Current exercise design and training environments do not adequately recreate the enemy kill web possible on the modern battlefield. Attempts at innovation at the division level are capability focused, without deep thought on the organizational structures that most effectively employ new capabilities. Despite these shortcomings, there is an opportunity to experiment and learn across formations now.

Getting the next formation right for the future battle requires leaders to be comfortable with the uncomfortable. Understanding what is prioritized for adaptation and what must be kept to execute successful maneuver warfare is critical. The challenge is to develop a framework to find this balance of proven concepts and the uncomfortable but necessary changes the US Army must undertake. The framework should be used to inform the design and task organization for the US Army division. Getting the design and doctrinal template of a US Army division right is critical for winning the next war.

Robotic Transition Period Warfare

First, it is important to recognize that we are in a transitional period of warfare and continuous adaptation is required. Warfare is quickly moving past the era of traditional maneuver, which defined the character of warfare from World War II until the invasions of the post-9/11 wars. This period of warfare will never return. Although robotics in combat are not new, the US military’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations of the early twenty-first century expedited the development of drone warfare, and subsequent conflicts, from the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have dramatically increased the pace of this development. Change will continue to be driven at a rapid pace as belligerents iterate new drone and missile developments and efforts to counter them, presenting a constantly shifting and credible threat to traditional formations, platforms, and tactics. What are some defining characteristics of this transition period warfare?

1. Robotic Rise: The number of robots and low-cost missiles fed by increased situational awareness will only continue to increase. This concentration of precise and fast weapons will create periods of extreme, high-intensity combat for manned forces on the battlefield. Additionally, drones will be used outside of targeting and strike operations in all aspects of battlefield tasks.
2. No Man’s Land: The proliferation of robots and increasing ease of use—and consequent development of their accompanying kill webs—will translate into fewer soldiers required along the contact line. Maneuver is only possible and survivability is only maximized once friendly robots and disaggregated forces have set conditions for follow-on operations. A key task for first-contact units will be the establishment of areas of opportunity where enemy drone activity is suppressed. These areas—call them RDOAs (Reduced enemy Drone activity / Opportunity Area—will allow larger, traditional, and manned formations to operate, exploit, and survive within. Comparable to actions after an airfield seizure, the RDOA allows for forces to go on the offensive from a position of relative advantage. Survivability and infiltration tasks will remain a focus of US Army training, but training cannot model the current Russian way of unsupported infantry probing in areas with high concentrations of sensors and robots.
3. Priority Target: Electronic warfare systems and other counterdrone systems will be at the top of a belligerent’s high-payoff target lists. Commanders will know they must keep their drones in the fight and degrade where possible the enemy commander’s capability. There is no doubt that the next counter is antiradiation missiles at the tactical-unit level focused on high energy microwave, laser, and electronic warfare systems.
4. Required Adaptation: Units with traditional task organization and mass will not survive using current tactics, doctrinal templates, and manning. Tactics and formations will require continuous adjustment to counter threats and remain relevant.

A Change to Warfighting Function

The fourth characteristic is critical because it requires leaders to change—and to question traditional, and even recent, drone-related success. The robotic transition period of warfare will change certain functions and traditional roles. First, in mission command, junior leaders will see an increase in cognitive load as they confront an enhanced threat and seek to maintain situational awareness. The constant drone threat will require US Army forces to operate and fight in small, decentralized teams until conditions are set for a convergence of forces on an objective. Leaders from the squad to the battalion level will have to be comfortable with fighting in isolated units with minimal communications. This requires leaders at the lowest levels—teams and squads—to have both the confidence and the knowledge to operate accordingly.

In addition, considering maneuver forces, unless RDOAs are established, Army rotatory-wing aviation will be forced to remain tens of kilometers behind the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Air assault and out-of-contact attacks will not be feasible. Sustainment forces must operate in small teams of consolidated categories of supply to survive and simultaneously meet requirements. Their ability to rapidly respond to and support resupply will be critical in exploiting opportunities in RDOAs.

Finally, maneuver forces must lead with robots and focus first on defeating the enemy’s robotics network and supported kill web. Robots cannot be treated as an enabler, but must be considered a part of maneuver forces that could be the main effort until conditions are set for fully manned warfare or larger formations. Although the ground domain is cluttered, it can be assumed that the next conflict will be in and around dense urban areas. This terrain both facilitates and requires leading with robots. As drones move into an increasingly important role the US Army will need to designate specific tasks that these platforms will execute.

In the air domain, primary tasks will be reconnaissance, first-person-view attack roles, resupply, casualty evacuations, and loitering munitions. Weather, threats, and weight restrictions will limit some air operations, and the Army will need to field a ground drone capability to ensure layered and continuous effects. US Army ground drones, ideally built on a universal platform, will lead operations and will execute the following tasks: direct and indirect fire attack, resupply, mobility and countermobility, breaching, reconnaissance, air defense, and electronic warfare. The Ukrainian Army has already demonstrated some of these tasks with ground robots. Most recently a ground robot conducted a casualty evacuation behind enemy lines, successfully recovering the wounded service member while not risking others in the process. These tasks are complex operations even with AI augmentation and will require human direction and discernment. When considering protection and security tasks, ground drones will be critical in establishing and maintaining situational awareness and the perimeter of an RDOA. Their endurance and fixed attention support economy of force and warfighter management.

Given drones’ potential and the characteristics of this warfare transition period, the Army should consider experimenting with the task organization of the division unit. This experiment would be comparable to the 1st Cavalry Division’s testing helicopter employment prior to deploying to Vietnam. Instead of helicopters, the future division would reorganize into robotics and exploitation (R&E)–focused units. As the Army Transformation Initiative continues, the lessons learned from this experiment would inform the whole of the Army. The designated division and the experiment would lead the Army’s efforts to determine the right mix of soldiers and robots. One major benefit of drones is the economy of force they bring in a much smaller package. This translates into a lethal, yet more deployable package that requires less sustainment. In an Indo-Pacific scenario—like Chinese aggression against Taiwan—this unit would facilitate rapid force projection and be critical in deterrence and opening engagements.

The two centerpieces of the R&E division are the robotics, reconnaissance, and strike (RRS) brigade and the exploitation brigade. The RRS brigade would have three primary mission sets that are tailored for the evolving battlefield. First, the R&E would conduct counterreconnaissance along the FLOT and contact area. This would facilitate the second mission, conducting reconnaissance and strike attacks to degrade enemy drone operations and the enemy kill web. This builds toward the third mission, creating local drone superiority and establishing an RDOA. Tied into division and corps enablers and the joint force, the RRS brigades set conditions for the R&E division in the deep and close fights. The size and duration of the RDOA would depend on the terrain, enemy threat, available drone inventory, and friendly mission requirements. This also translates into multiple brigade headquarters managing the reconnaissance and security fight, supporting burden sharing.

The drone-to-soldier ratio for the RRS is around 7:3. Risk created by electronic warfare pockets or weather to the RRS is mitigated by fiber-optic-enabled drones, its smaller footprint, and support by other division enablers. Drones are cared for and operated by soldiers conducting operations from the division’s organic vehicle platforms (Bradleys, infantry squad vehicles, and Strykers). The mix would be approximately three battalions of multifunctional reconnaissance units and one drone-enhanced maneuver battalion (infantry or armor). This reduced package allows the brigade to have a small signature on and behind the FLOT and serve as an early entry force for the R&E division. AI would be leveraged to facilitate drone employment by operators outnumbered by drones. The brigade combat team type does not matter for this experiment, as the RRS and exploitation brigades would be mutually supporting. Utilizing system-of-record platforms is cost-effective and allows more time for experimentation than waiting for the approval and production of vehicles that don’t currently exist. This type of experiment and design is feasible since it is loosely modeled on the existing combat brigade structure. There would be no change to the R&E division’s fires and sustainment brigades until lessons learned dictate another adaptation.

Once the RRS brigades establish the RDOA, the exploitation brigades would execute traditional offensive and defensive tasks and exploit opportunities and conditions set by the RRS brigades. The drone-to-soldier mix in the exploitation brigade would be inverse, 3:7. Since these are like formations the division commander can allocate resources and task organize across the brigades to meet mission requirements. Based on conditions, the more traditional organized divisions (drone-enhanced) will flow through the RDOA behind the R&E division.

As technology continues to advance, the US Army must balance proven formations with evolving tactics and capabilities. Drones’ capabilities—and consequently, the drone threat—will only continue to evolve, and their overall simplicity and relative low cost will ensure everyone from nonstate actors to belligerent states will utilize them to compete with and fight against the United States. Manned formations will be required to hold key terrain at least for the foreseeable future—but formations composed of soldiers alone are increasingly a relic of a past era. The most effective units on tomorrow’s battlefield will be characterized by optimized mixes of soldiers and robotic platforms. The time gap between now and the next evolutionary leap in warfare is unknown, but the US Army must be ready to fight and win in this gap. That means rethinking our formations now.

Lieutenant Colonel Josh Suthoff recently served as the commander of 3-4 Cavalry. He currently serves in Colorado where he lives with his wife and five children.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Austin Thomas, US Army

mwi.westpoint.edu · Joshua Suthoff · November 20, 2025

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com