|
Quotes of the day:
“It is hard to free fools from the chains they revere.”
- Voltaire
“There is nothing more confining than the prison we don't know we are in.”
- Shakespeare
"The eyes of others our prisons; their thoughts our cages."
- Virginia Woolf
1. One this Day in 1970: The Son Tay Raid
2. U.S. Special Operations and the Shadowy Promise of Irregular Campaigns
3. A split emerges as Biden struggles to deter attacks on U.S. troops
4. The West's Incoherent Critique of Israel's Gaza Strategy
5. Are Retired Flag Officers Overparticipating in the Political Process?
6. Introduction to the China Landpower Studies Center
7. Was the Russian Invasion of Ukraine a Failure of Western Deterrence?
8. Most Americans support Israel, new poll finds
9. How to Stop a Mass Movement
10. Commercial Flights Are Experiencing 'Unthinkable' GPS Attacks and Nobody Knows What to Do
11. Gaza Hospital Blast Shows America Is Not Ready for Chinese Disinformation
12. Send America’s Floating Hospitals to Gaza
13. Three upcoming events that could torpedo Pacific peace
14. Taiwan's presidential front-runner picks U.S. envoy as running mate
15. The Pentagon thinks The Rock can fight lagging military recruitment
16. ‘Russia is weaponizing time,’ Ukraine tells NATO
17. Defense Secretary Austin meets with Zelenskyy in Ukraine
18. Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve
19. Accounts of daily life with the Delta Force through 18 months of global training
20. How the Islamic State Propaganda Machine is Exploiting the Israel-Hamas Conflict
21. DoD Commends Release of 2023 Women, Peace, and Security Strategy and National Action Plan
22. Philippines launches joint sea, air patrols with U.S. military
23. Opinion | Evidence confirms Israel’s al-Shifa claims, so critics move the goal posts
24. Why Israel Slept
25. A Paradigm Shift in America’s Asia Policy
26. Could JFK Have Gotten America Out of Vietnam?
1. One this Day in 1970: The Son Tay Raid
We were honored to have the late CSM Joe Lupyak speak at a Dining In in Okinawa in 2000. He told us for many years he thought this mission was a failure until the Raiders had a reunion with the POWs who thanked the Raider profusely for giving them hope and forcing the Vietnamese guards to treat them better from the point of the readi onward. Every one of the POWs deemed the raid a success for what it did for them.
What soldiers will do for fellow soldiers.
Photos and images at the link: https://www.psywarrior.com/sontay.html
The Son Tay Raid
psywarrior.com
We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, from a camp called Son Tay. This is something American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers. The target is 23 miles west of Hanoi. - Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons
By the spring of 1970, there were more than 450 known American POWs in North Vietnam and another 970 American servicemen who were missing in action. Some of the POWs had been imprisoned over 2,000 days, longer than any serviceman had ever spent in captivity in any war in America's history. Furthermore, the reports of horrid conditions, brutality, torture and even death were being told in intelligence reports.
In May of 1970, reconnaissance photographs revealed the existence of two prison camps west of Hanoi. At Son Tay, 23 miles from Hanoi, one photograph identified a large "K" - a code for "come get us" - drawn in the dirt. At the other camp Ap Lo, about 30 miles west of North Vietnam's capital, another photo showed the letters SAR (Search and Rescue), apparently spelled out by the prisoner's laundry, and an arrow with the number 8, indicating the distance the men had to travel to the fields they worked in.
SR-71
Reconnaissance photos taken by SR-71 "Blackbirds" revealed that Son Tay "was active". SR-71 reconnaisance aircraft took most of the Son Tay target photos from above 80,000 feet while streaking over North Vietnam at more than three times the speed of sound.
Aerial Photo of Son Tay
The camp itself was in the open and surrounded by rice paddies. In close proximity was the 12th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment totaling approximately 12,000 troops. Also nearby was an artillery school, a supply depot, and an air defense installation.
Five hundred yards south was another compound called the "secondary school", which was an administration center housing 45 guards.To make matters more difficult, Phuc Yen Air Base was only 20 miles northeast of Son Tay.
It was determined that Son Tay was being enlarged because of the increased activity at the camp. It was evident that the raid would have to be executed swiftly. If not, the Communists could have planes in the air and a reactionary force at the camp within minutes.
Son Tay itself was small and was situated amid 40-foot trees to obstruct the view. Only one power and telephone line entered it. The POWs were kept in four large buildings in the main compound. Three observation towers and a 7-foot wall encompassed the camp. Because of its diminutive size, only one chopper could land within the walls. The remainder would have to touch down outside the compound.Another problem the planning group had to consider was the weather. The heavy monsoon downpours prohibited the raid until late fall. Finally, November was selected because the moon would be high enough over the horizon for good visibility, but low enough to obscure the enemy's vision.
Buffalo Hunter drone
The National Security Agency (NSA) tracked the NVA air defense systems and artillery units nearby. Also, in addition to the "Blackbirds", several unmanned Buffalo Hunter "Drones" were sent to gather intelligence on the camp as well. Buffalo Hunter drones flew reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam during the 1960s and early 1970s to collect tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence. These unmanned aircraft were launched from airborne DC-130 Hercules cargo aircraft that remained over friendly territory; after their photo flight, the drones flew back to a location where they could be landed and have their film recovered; drones were reusable. At the peak of the Buffalo Hunter operations, the drones made 30 to 40 flights per month over North Vietnam and adjacent areas of Indochina controlled by communist forces. Although seven "Buffalo Hunter" unmanned reconnaissance drones were flown at treetop level to take photos of the Son Tay prison between early September and late October 1970, not a single drone actually suceeded in flying over the facility, forcing the Strategic Reconnaissance Center (SRC) at Offutt AFB, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, to use the SR-71 to provide the requisite imagery. The POW camps were the highest priority for SAC's imagery assets (drone and SR-71) operating over North Vietnam at that time and the failure to image the Son Tay facility was deeply felt by SAC personnel.
The drones flights were unsuceesful and it was feared that the NVA would spot them if they continued. In July, an SR-71 photo recon mission depicted "less active than usual" activity in the camp. On Oct. 3, Son Tay showed very little signs of life. However, flights over Dong Hoi, 15 miles to the east of Son Tay, were picking up increased activity. The planners were scratching their heads. Had the POWs been moved? Had the NVA picked up signs that a raid was imminent?
BG Donald D. Blackburn
Col Arthur D. "Bull" Simons
Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn, who had trained Filipino guerrillas in World War II, suggested a small group of Special Forces volunteers rescue the prisoners of war. He chose Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons to lead the group.
Col Simons went to Fort Bragg, home of the Army Special Forces and asked for volunteers. He wanted 100 men possessing certain identified skills and preferably having had recent combat experience in Southeast Asia. Approximately 500 men responded. Each was interviewed by Simons, and Sergeant Major Pylant. From that group 100 dedicated volunteers were selected. All the required skills were covered. All were in top physical condition. Although a force of 100 men was selected, Simon's believed that the number might be excessive. However as some degree of redundancy and a reservoir of spares were deemed necessary, it was decided that they would train the 100.
The ground component commander selected was Lt Colonel "Bud" Sydnor from Fort Benning, Georgia. Sydnor had an impeccable reputation as a combat leader. Additionally selected to be a member of the task force from Fort Benning was another superb combat leader, Capt Dick Meadow. Meadows would later lead the team that made the risky landing inside the prison compound.
"Barbara" code name of a model of the Son Tay compound built by the Central Intelligence Agency and used in the training of the Son Tay assault force. "Barbara" is now on display at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Museum at Fort Bragg, NC.
Since the compound was more than 20 miles west of Hanoi, planners of the operation believed Son Tay was isolated enough to enable a small group to land, release prisoners and withdraw. In addition to a table model of the Son Tay prisoner of war camp, code named "Barbara", A full-scale replica of the compound was constructed at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, where a select group of Special Forces soldiers trained at night. The mock compound was dismantled during the day to elude detection by Soviet satellites. Despite security measures, time was running out. Evidence, although inconclusive, showed that perhaps Son Tay was being emptied.
On November 18, 1970, the Son Tay raiders moved to Takhli, Thailand, a CIA operated secure compound. It was here that final preparations were made. The CIA compound at Takhli became a beehive of activity. Weapons and other equipment checks were carefully conducted. Ammunition was issued. Simons, Sydnor and Meadows made the final selection of the force numbers. Of the original 100 SF members of the force, 56 were selected for the mission. This was unwelcome news for the 44 trained and ready, but not selected. It was known from the beginning that the size of the force would be limited to only the number considered essential for the task.
Map of North Vietnam with Son Tay POW Prison
(Source: Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama)
Only Simons and three others knew what the mission was to be. Five hours before takeoff November 20, Simons told his 56 men:
We are going to rescue 70 American prisoners of war, maybe more, from a camp called Son Tay. This is something American prisoners have a right to expect from their fellow soldiers. The target is 23 miles west of Hanoi.
A few men let out low whistles. Then, spontaneously, they stood up and began applauding. Simons had one other thing to say:
You are to let nothing, nothing interfere with the operation. Our mission is to rescue prisoners, not take prisoners. And if we walk into a trap, if it turns out that they know we're coming, don't dream about walking out of North Vietnam-unless you've got wings on your feet. We'll be 100 miles from Laos; it's the wrong part of the world for a big retrograde movement. If there's been a leak, we'll know it as soon as the second or third chopper sets down; that's when they'll cream us. if it happens, I want to keep this force together. we will back up to the Song Con River and, by Christ, let them come across that God damn open ground. we'll make them pay for every foot across the sonofabitch.
Later in their barracks at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base Simons' men stowed their personal effects - family photos, letters, money, anything that should be returned to their next of kin. The raiders were then transported in closed vans to the base's biggest hangar. Inside the hanger, a four engine C-130 waited to take them on board. The raiders made a final weapon and equipment check that lasted one hour and 45 minutes.
The plan was not unduly complicated. Using in-flight refueling, the six helicopters would fly from Thailand, across Laos and into North Vietnam. While various diversions were taking place locally and across North Vietnam, the task force would close on the camp under cover of darkness. The single HH-3H "Banana 1" with a small assault force, would be crashed-landed inside the prison compound, while two HH-53s "Apple 1 and Apple 2" would disgorge the bulk of the assault force outside. The wall would be breached and the prison buildings stormed. Any North Vietnamese troops found inside would be killed and the POWs would be taken outside and flown home in the HH-53s.
Assault Group Blueboy
On Nov. 20, 1970, at approximately 11:18 p.m., tthe raiding force of six helicopters, accompanied by two C-130Es called Combat Talons, departed Udorn, Thailand, for the final phase of their mission. At the same time, diversionary attacks were being launched all over the country. The U.S. Navy created a diversion by initiating a huge carrier strike against North Vietnam's port city of Haiphong. Ten Air Force F-4 Phantoms were flying MIG combat air patrol to screen the force from enemy fighters, while an F-105 Wild Weasel decoy force launched a raid on enemy surface-to-air missle sites. Five A-1 Skyraiders with the call sign "Peach One to Five", arrived on station to suppress ground fire around the enemy camp.
Air Force "Jolly Green"
As the group neared the prison, the two "Jolly Greens", dubbed "Apple-4" and "Apple-5" hovered at 1,500 feet to act as reserve flareships in the event the C-130s' flares did not ignite.
Suddenly, Major Frederick M. "Marty" Donohue's HH-53 helicopter, call sign "Apple-3", developed trouble. Without warning, a yellow trouble light appeared signaling transmission problems. Donohue calmly informed his co-pilot, Capt. Tom Waldron, to "ignore the SOB". In a normal situation, Donohue would have landed. But this was no normal mission. "Apple-3" kept going. As Donohue's chopper "floated" across Son Tay's main compound, the door gunners let loose 4,000 rounds a minute from their mini-guns. The observation tower in the northwest section of the camp erupted into flames. With that, Donohue set down at his "holding point" in a rice paddy just outside the prison.
As Maj. Herb Kalen tried to negotiate a landing inside the compound, the almost lost control of his chopper, call sign "Banana-1", that was carrying the assault group code-named "Blueboy".
The 40-foot trees that surrounded Son Tay were, in actuality, much larger. "One tree", a pilot remembered, "must have been 150 feet tall ... we tore into it like a big lawn mower. There was a tremendous vibration ... and we were down."
Luckily, only one person was injured; a crew chief suffered a broken ankle. Regaining his composure, Special Forces Captain Richard Meadows scurried from the downed aircraft and said in a calm voice through his bullhorn: "We're Americans. Keep your heads down. We're Americans. Get on the floor. We'll be in your cells in a minute." No one answered back, though. The raiders sprung into action immediately. Automatic weapons ripped into the guards. Other NVA, attempting to flee, were cut down as they tried to make their way through the east wall. Fourteen men entered the prison to rescue the POWs. However, to their disappointment, none were found.
As the raiders were neutralizing the compound, Lt. Col. John Allison's helicopter, call sign "Apple-2", with the "Redwine" group aboard, was heading toward Son Tay's south wall. As his door gunners fired their mini-guns on the guard towers, Allison wondered where "Apple-1" was. Code-named "Greenleaf", it was carrying "Bull" Simons. Allison put his HH-3 inside the compound and the Special Forces personnel streamed down the rear ramp. Wasting no time, they blew the utility pole and set up a roadblock about 100 yards from the landing zone (LZ). A heated firefight ensued. Guards were "scurrying like mice" in an attempt to fire on the raiders. In the end, almost 50 NVA guards were killed at Son Tay.
"Apple-1", piloted by Lt.Col. Warner A. Britton, was having troubles of its own. The chopper had veered off the mark and was 450 meters south of the prison and had erroneously landed at the "secondary school." Simons knew it wasn't Son Tay. The structures and terrain were different and, to everyone's horror, it was no "secondary school" - it was a barracks filled with enemy soldiers - 100 of whom were killed in five minutes.
As the chopper left, the raiders opened up with a barrage of automatic weapons. Capt. Udo Walther cut down four enemy soldiers and went from bay to bay riddling their rooms with his CAR-15. Realizing their error, the group radioed "Apple-1" to return and pick up the raiders from their dilemma.
Simons, meanwhile, jumped into a trench to await the return of Britton when an NVA leaped into the hole next to him. Terrified, and wearing only his underwear, the Vietnamese froze. Simons pumped six shells from his .357 Magnum handgun into the trooper's chest, killing him instantly.
Britton's chopper quickly returned when he received the radio transmission that Simon's group was in the wrong area. He flew back to Son Tay and deposited the remaining raiders there. Things were beginning to wind down. There was little resistance from the remaining guards.
Meadows radioed to Lt.Col. Elliot P. "Bud" Sydnor, the head of the "Redwine" group on the raid, "Negative items". There were no POWs. The raid was over. Total time elapsed was 27 minutes.
What went wrong? Where were the POWs? It would be later learned that the POWs had been relocated to Dong Hoi, on July 14. Their move was not due to North Vietnam learning of the planned rescue attempt but because of an act of nature. The POWs were moved because the well in the compound had dried up and the nearby Song Con River, where Son Tay was located, had begun to overflow its banks. This flooding problem, not a security leak, resulted in the prisoners being transported to Dong Hoi to a new prison nicknamed "Camp Faith". Murphy's Law - "Whatever can go wrong will go wrong" - had struck again.
Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons, answers questions about the Son Tay POW Rescue Raid from the Pentagon Press Corps. Also in the picture are (left to right): Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Air Force Brigadier General Leroy J. Manor, who commanded the overall operation.
In the “Commander’s Comments” section of his after-action report, Brig. Gen. Leroy J. Manor, wrote:
Each man knew precisely what his task was under each contingency and was an expert in his area?from demolittion specialist to the radio operator. The rapid and smooth transition to an alternate plan at the objective testifies to ability of the force to adapt to varying condition. Innovations were made in equipment, procedures, and tactics. The capability was developed to enter cell block regardless of degree of security or hardness of construction. Night viewing devices were obtained to provide maximum visibility for the road block elements. A night firing optic was obtained from commercial sources which was adapted to the weapons and increases night firing effectiveness threefold. The communications gear and procedures were specially adapted to provide defendable command and control on the ground. Redundancy in communications was considered essential and provided. The extensive joint training with the helicopter and A-1 elements assured a closely knit team which was essential to survival and extremely effective.
Was the raid then a failure? Despite the intelligence failure, the raid was a tactical success. The assault force got to the camp and took their objective. It's true no POWs were rescued, but no friendly lives were lost in the attempt. Furthermore, and more importantly, the raid sent a clear message to the North Vietnam that Americans were outraged at the treatment our POWs were receiving and that we would go to any lenghth to bring our men home. At Dong Hoi, 15 miles to the east of Son Tay, American prisoners woke up to the sound of surface-to-air missles being launched, the prisoners quickly realized that Son Tay was being raided. Although they knew they had missed their ride home, these prisoners now knew for sure that America cared and that attempts were being made to free them. Morale soared. The North Vietnamese got the message. The raid triggered subtle but important changes in their treatment of American POWs. Within days, all of the POWs in the outlying camps had been moved to Hanoi. Men who had spent years by themselves in a cell found themselves sharing a cell with dozens of others. From their point of view the raid was the best thing that could have happened to them short of their freedom. In the final assessment, the raid may not have been a failure after all.
Political cartoonist R.B. Crockett of the Washington Star said it best, and first, the day after the news of the Son Tay raid broke. At the top of the Star's editorial page was a drawing of a bearded, gaunt POW. His ankle chained to a post outside his hutch. He looks up watching the flight of American Helicopters fade into the distance. Below the cartoon is a three word quote: "Thanks for trying".
For his efforts in planning and conducting the Son Tay Raid Colonel Arthur D. "Bull" Simons was presented the Distinguished Service Cross by president Richard M. Nixon in a White House Ceremony
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird presenting awards to the Special Forces
soldiers and airman who assaulted the Son Tay compound
Brigadier General Leroy J. Manor, Colonel Simons, SFC Adderly, and TSgt Leroy W. Wright were decorated by President Nixon at the White House on November 25, 1970 for their parts in the rescue attempt. The remainder of the raiders were decorated by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on December 9, 1970. Listed below is a complete list of awardees.
Son Tay Awards for Valor Recipients
United States Army
Distinguished Service Cross
COL Arthur D. Simons, LTC Elliot P. Sydnor, CPT Richard J. Meadows, MSG Thomas J. Kemmer, SFC Tyrone J. Adderly and SSG Thomas E. Powell
Silver Star
LTC Joseph R. Cataldo, CPT Thomas W. Jaeger, CPT James W. McClam, CPT Dan H. McKinney, CPT Eric J. Nelson, CPT Glenn R. Rouse, CPT Daniel Turner, CPT Udo H. Walther, 1LT George W. Petrie, Jr., MSG Calen C. Kittleson, MSG Joseph W. Lupyak, MSG Billy K. Moore. MSG Herman Spencer, SFC Donald D. Blackard, SFC Earl Bleacher, Jr., SFC Leroy N. Carlson, SFC Anthony Dodge, SFC Freddie D. Doss, SFC Jerry W. Hill, SFC Marion S. Howell, SFC John Jakovenko, SFC Jack G. Joplin, SFC Daniel Jurich, SFC David A. Lawhon, Jr., SFC Gregory T. McGuire, SFC Billy R. Martin, SFC Charles Masten, SFC Donald R. Wingrove, SFC Joseph M. Murray, SFC Noe Quezada, SFC Lorenzo Robbins, SFC Ronnie Strahan, SFC Salvador M. Suarez, SFC Donald E. Taapken, SFC William L. Tapley, SFC Richard W. Valentine, SSG Charles G. Ericson, SSG Kenneth E. McMullen, SSG Walter L. Miller, SSG Robert F. Nelson, SSG David Nickerson, SSG Paul F. Poole, SSG John E. Rodriquez, SSG Lawrence Young, SGT Terry L. Buckler, SGT Gary D. Keel, SGT Keith R. Medenski, SGT Franklin D. Roe, SGT Patrick St. Clair and SGT Marshal A. Thomas
Distinguished Flying Cross
1LT George W. Williams, CWO Ronald J. Exley, CWO Jackie H. Keele, and CWO John J. Ward
United States Air Force
Distinguished Service Medal
Brigadier General Leroy J. Manor
Air Force Cross
LTC John V. Allison, LTC Warner A. Britton, MAJ Frederic M. Donahue, MAJ Herbert D. Kalen and TSG Leroy M. Wright
Silver Star
LTC Albert P. Blosch, LTC Royal A. Brown Jr., LTC Herbert R. Zehnder, MAJ Eustace M. Bunn. MAJ Irl L. Franklin, MAJ John Gargus, MAJ James R. Grochnauer, MAJ Alfred C. Montrem, MAJ Kenneth D. Murphy, MAJ Harry L. Pannill, MAJ Edwin J. Rhein, MAJ Richard S. Skeels, MAJ John C. Squires, CAPT John M. Connaughton, CAPT David M. Kender, CAPT Norman C. Mazurek, CAPT Thomas L. Stiles, CAPT William D. Stripling, CAPT Thomas R. Waldron, MSgt Harold W. Harvey, MSgt David V. McLeod Jr., MSgt Maurice F. Tasker, TSgt Dallas R. Criner, TSgt Billy J. Elliston, TSgt William E. Lester, TSgt Charles J. Montgomery Jr., TSgt Jimmy O. Riggs, TSgt Paul W. Stierwalt, TSgt Lawrence Wellington, SSgt Daniel E. Galde, SSgt Melvin B. D. Gibson, SSgt Aron P. Hodges. SSgt Donald LaBarre and SSgt James J. Rogers.
The Son Tay Raid would not be Colonel Simons last attempt to free prisoners in a foreign country. In early 1979 , after his retirement, Colonel Simons was asked by Ross Perot, then Chairman of EDS, to plan and conduct a rescue operation to free two Electronic Data Systems, Inc (EDS) employees who were taken hostage by the Iranian government. In February 1979,Colonel Simons planning efforts proved successful as he organized a mob in Tehran which stormed Gazre prison where the EDS employees were being held hostage. The two Americans, along with 11,000 Iranian prisoners, were freed. Col. Simons and his party fled 450 miles to Turkey, and were later returned to the United States. Noted author, Ken Follet, wrote a best selling novel, On Wings of Eagles, (Morrow & Company, 1983) about the rescue. The book was later made into an NBC TV mini series.
Colonel Simons died of heart complications three months later.
Son Tay Raiders Patch
Son Tay Raiders Reunion in Kansas City
Members of the team gathered for their 44th anniversary reunion in early October 2014, in Kansas City, Kan., where they were honored during pre-race ceremonies of the NASCAR Hollywood Casino 400 held at Kansas Speedway. The ceremony was the culmination of weekend activities honoring the veterans of the raid.
If you would like to learn more about the Son Tay Raid I recommend that you visit the Son Tay Association Webpage or read the following: The Raid by Benjamin F. Schemmer(Harper & Rowe, 1976); The Secret Vietnam War: The United States Air Force in Thailand, 19611975, by Jeffrey D.Glasser (McFarland & Company); Bring our POWs Back Alive, by Dale Andradé, Vietnam Magazine, February 1990; and SOG - The Secret Wars of American Commandos in Vietnam by John L. Plaster (Simon & Schuster, 1997).
psywarrior.com
2. U.S. Special Operations and the Shadowy Promise of Irregular Campaigns
Brian Petit is one of our main thought leaders in Special Forces. I use his book (Going big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero, by Brian S. Petit ISBN 978-1-4787-0385-3) as a foundational text in my course on "Unconventional Warfare and Special Operations for Policy Makers and Strategists."
We need irregular warfare proficient campaign headquarters, Brian Petit would be an outstanding advisor to the commander of such a headquarters.
Excerpts:
Special operations forces, a growing arm of American power, might just be a match for the moment. If so, their employment will require irregular campaigns that are conceptualized, crafted, and connected to all U.S. power projection modes. If part of a coherent strategic approach, made-to-measure irregular campaigns provide options for the United States and present dilemmas to her adversaries. These three special operations approaches — probe and pick, the middle way, and deep commit — show how irregular campaigns can influence the future and, indeed, meet the moment.
U.S. Special Operations and the Shadowy Promise of Irregular Campaigns - War on the Rocks
warontherocks.com · by Brian Petit · November 21, 2023
American special operations forces, 70,000 strong and drawn from four services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps), are engaged on a dizzying number of fronts. These forces are called on to counter Russia’s hot and cold wars in Europe, to bolster allied forces on the Korean peninsula, to deter Chinese expansionism in the Indo-Pacific, to contest violent extremist organizations, to fight intractable wars in Syria and the Levant, and to patrol vast spaces with African security forces. One reason is that special operations forces are selected, educated, and trained to operate across the competition-conflict-war spectrum. Whether fighting at scale in major theater wars or applying power indirectly via proxies, information, and civil affairs, special operations forces have proven scalable, rapid, and lethal.
The roles for U.S. special operations forces have expanded significantly since Sept. 11, 2001, and so should the conceptualization of their employment. Special operations forces are a campaigning organization. The U.S. military defines a campaign as “a framework to orchestrate and synchronize simultaneous activities and operations aimed at accomplishing or enabling policy aims.” Put simply, a campaign is a continuous series of military actions, moves, and signals guided by an authoritative hand with the resources and will to follow through beyond disruptions, setbacks, and shocks. Ideally, campaigns integrate all elements of U.S. power.
Herein lies a problem: the U.S. military’s campaigning methods and tools are often reductive of the irregular warfare modes of power projection that characterize special operation forces’ contributions. To manage this, special operations forces are creating their own irregular warfare campaign constructs. Such campaigns are necessary as U.S. adversaries pioneer their own campaigns that bypass U.S. strengths in favor of exploiting places, populations, and problems that erode U.S. influence.
Become a Member
In recent years, special operations forces have innovated successful models such as Colombia, the Philippines, and Syria. As special operations forces stay firmly in the counter-terror world and are used simultaneously for strategic competition, the joint force should not merely drag and drop employment templates from one theater to the next. Creativity is required.
At times, special operations forces are called on to crisis manage, conduct singular missions such as hostage rescue, or provide stop-gap solutions to chaotic environments. These are operations, not campaigns. Alternately, within the larger joint force campaigns that possess a logic tied to clear objectives, special operations forces can provide irregular campaigning methods that confront threats not well addressed by other forms of U.S. power. Irregular campaigns, when artfully conceptualized and crafted, provide options that alter enemy decisions, bolster partner performance, and demonstrate reach in the outlying spaces where Russia, China, and Iran prefer to contest U.S. power. To improve the understanding and application of irregular campaigns, select campaigns or aspirants to campaigns are instructive. Using three modes that I describe as probe and pick, the middle way, and the deep commit, these approaches have yielded excellent results or, in some cases, small and smart hedging investments. By making plain how special operations campaigns take shape, policymakers and military planners can employ special operations to their greatest strategic impact.
Probe and Pick
The first approach is the “probe and pick” method. This method is for underdeveloped policy places or roiling operating environments where U.S. interests are limited, where no policy solution is obvious, and when no path to engage is without hazard. Such environments might include the Levant, Myanmar, Nepal, Serbia, Venezuela, Moldova, and select archipelagic regions in the Asia-Pacific.
These environments merit some engagement that demonstrates U.S. interest and intent but are adjustable. Special operations forces’ footprints, in these instances, are not a definitive marker of U.S. political or military will. Special operations forces act as policy frontiersmen, exploring what type of U.S. policy actions are deemed suitable in the security arena. Special operations forces act as corporeal expressions of policy by virtue of presence, activity, and influence, aligned with foreign partners. Here, U.S. policymakers want to probe but also seek the flexibility to pick (or decline) options served up by forward-deployed special operations teams.
Probe and pick deployments may stay on the low burner in perpetuity, never developing into something bigger, singularly purposeful, or enduring. Nepal is one such case, where special operations forces remain consistently engaged, but with a small number of troops conducting month-long exercises, training exchanges, and high-altitude mountaineering events.
To special operators on the ground, these can feel like unproductive or half-hearted efforts, no matter the origin of the policy restraints. In the case of Nepal, it is the host country that limits the U.S. presence. Moldova fits into this category as well. Moldova balances its security by keeping U.S. military investments limited to basic border, cyber, and security force engagements, in line with their proclaimed policy of neutrality. In such cases, special operations engagements are a signal of greater possibilities or are indicators of limited appetites for U.S. involvement. The approach in such cases is to stay active and episodically engaged so that if policies change or interests grow, the United States has a relational toehold from which to grow.
The Middle Way
The second option is the “middle way.” This approach is typified by rotational deployments on heel-to-toe schedules. These operations are ostensibly guided by some overarching strategic road map that prioritizes and synchronizes U.S. resources.
The middle way accepts that not all areas can be appropriately understood, resourced, and leveraged in a manner that military doctrine describes as a “main effort.” U.S. special operations forces are deployed in 80 countries on any given day. The commitment of steady-forward special operations forces in such places as Thailand, Georgia, East Europe, the Balkans, Chad, and Lebanon typify this approach. In these environments, special operations teams have episodic breakthroughs and moments of inspired genius, alternating with spells of plodding results that are barely detectable.
One approach that led to a light-footprint, long-dwell mission is the U.S. involvement in the southern Philippines (2001–2014). I commanded a U.S. special operations task force in the Philippines in 2008. Our approaches were defined by restraint and patience, a marked departure from the high-tempo, deterministic strategies then underway in the desert wars of Iraq and Afghanistan (campaigns in which I also took part). The Philippines campaign aimed to corral regional, al-Qaeda-affiliated terror networks, but not at the cost of upsetting U.S. strategic (naval and air) access to a Pacific ally. Despite its decade-plus commitment in the southern Philippines, the main headquarters never expanded beyond the plat of a tract home. The mission remained narrowly scaled and geographically bounded, with a light presence and a limited mandate. This quiet campaign was assessed by the United States and the Philippines as successful. Such campaigns do not end with a ticker tape parade. They quietly and soberly transition.
In the middle way, a single, specialized operator or a small team may identify and exploit unforeseen areas where U.S. advisory assistance can produce great benefit at a relatively low cost. Examples include forward liaisons in sponsoring countries that skillfully program special operations (or other) events and place talent into the cognitive spaces or physical regions where the partner and the environment are ripe to achieve meaningful gains. Special operations forces emplace such liaisons in Africa, Europe, Asia, South America, and the Middle East. When enabled sufficiently, a forward-based element can align finicky, floating variables into a synchronized whole and cause a seismic leap forward in progress. Prior to the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Special Operations Command Europe utilized such a coordinator in Ukraine who achieved success, if imperfectly, in weaving together semi-synchronized efforts to help build Ukrainian special operations forces.
From this posture arises a type of operational art: the harmonious sequencing of activities and operations that, taken together, create effects beyond what the light footprint would indicate is possible. This might involve bombs, relationships, access, materiel, or ideas. This big leap forward is neither scripted nor can it be templated. It involves the intersection of variables that can only be mapped and exploited by the experienced and attentive eye of an empowered human sentinel.
Alternately, the middle way provides camouflage for mediocrity or misdirected energy. Precisely because this environment has erratic openings and closings and many moments of unobserved activity (or inactivity), it is hard to detect and root out underperforming units. In these challenging environments, some teams just muddle through, blind to the opportunities that a better team might otherwise identify. If operating remotely, such teams are also far removed from the in-stride course corrections that campaigns require from a synchronizing headquarters. Operational art, in these cases, remains a foggy idea waiting for a deft-handed actor.
The Deep Commit
Where and when special operations forces are directed to compete, contest, or fight, the results are often excellent. This third model describes the “deep commit” approach. Modern examples include the special operations and CIA pairing in Afghanistan in October 2001 that routed the entrenched Taliban in weeks. Another case is the March 2003 northern front of Operation Iraqi Freedom where a special operations task force, paired with Kurdish formations, swept through and collapsed Saddam Hussein’s line of defense. These are examples of doctrinal U.S. unconventional warfare, a mode of irregular warfare that is led by special operations forces but is enabled by joint forces and contributing government agencies.
The Cold War offers useful models that avoid large-scale maneuver warfare. One deep commit example is that of Edward Lansdale, a World War II Office of Strategic Services operative and sui generis intelligence officer. In the era of staunch anti-communism, Lansdale became a strategic advisor to the Philippine national leadership in the 1950s and later, in the 1960s, a dissenting voice on the American approach in Vietnam. Lansdale, labeled either the “Ugly American” or the “Quiet American” depending on one’s viewpoint, was known for his embrace of local people, local problems, and local solutions. Special operations forces are at their best when, like Lansdale, they view U.S. power from the eyes of the affected, non-American populations on the receiving end of U.S. policy actions.
Another Cold War example that speaks to organizational choices is the Berlin-based, U.S. Army Special Forces “Detachment-A” or “Det-A.” Instead of rotating special operations forces into Berlin, the method was to specially select and forward employ a semi-permanent detachment (40 to 90 servicemen). Thus, Det-A could — and would be expected to — grasp the policy, the risk, and the threat and craft approaches and stylized tactics that pricked but did not provoke. Here, leaders acknowledged the severe consequences of mishaps on the tension-filled border of a divided Germany. Special operations leadership then brought down the risk with studied organizations focused only on this liminal space.
In murkier environments, the deep commit approach has a reduced muscularity and a less visible face. Such actions emplace select talent and expressly crafted force packages at key intersections where they can best leverage special operations power. U.S. counter-terror organizations, often out of the public eye in places such as the Middle East, typify this approach. This is about micro-moves and heterarchical networks instead of mass and blunt firepower. Where the United States contests in quieter spaces, special operations forces can draw on this body of work.
Special operations forces, a growing arm of American power, might just be a match for the moment. If so, their employment will require irregular campaigns that are conceptualized, crafted, and connected to all U.S. power projection modes. If part of a coherent strategic approach, made-to-measure irregular campaigns provide options for the United States and present dilemmas to her adversaries. These three special operations approaches — probe and pick, the middle way, and deep commit — show how irregular campaigns can influence the future and, indeed, meet the moment.
Become a Member
Brian Petit, a retired U.S. Army colonel, teaches and consults on strategy, planning, special operations, and resistance. He is an adjunct for the Joint Special Operations University and a 2023 non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a joint production of Princeton’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project and the Modern War Institute at West Point.
Commentary
warontherocks.com · by Brian Petit · November 21, 2023
3. A split emerges as Biden struggles to deter attacks on U.S. troops
Graphics and photos the link: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/11/19/iranian-proxy-attacks-us-troops/?
A split emerges as Biden struggles to deter attacks on U.S. troops
Frustration is building within the Defense Department, officials say, over the surge in Iranian proxy attacks on American military positions
By Alex Horton, Dan Lamothe and Abigail Hauslohner
November 19, 2023 at 6:00 a.m. EST
U.S. troops enter Bradley fighting vehicles in northeast Syria. (Darko Bandic/AP)
Listen
6 min
Share
Comment
1383
Add to your saved stories
Save
A surge in attacks on deployed U.S. forces has roiled some within the Defense Department, where officials, frustrated by what they consider an incoherent strategy for countering the Iranian proxies believed responsible, acknowledge the limited retaliatory airstrikes approved by President Biden have failed to stop the violence.
Sign up for Fact Checker, our weekly review of what's true, false or in-between in politics.
“There’s no clear definition of what we are trying to deter,” said one defense official, who like others spoke on the condition of anonymity to be candid. “Are we trying to deter future Iranian attacks like this? Well, that’s clearly not working.”
Seething anger in the Middle East over U.S. support for the Israeli military campaign in Gaza, where thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed in the past six weeks, has heightened concern among Biden and his deputies that any overreaction to the attacks on U.S. personnel could incite a wider conflict. In conjunction with the airstrikes, administration officials have urged Tehran repeatedly over the past month to rein in the militia groups it supports, cautioning that the United States has “the right” to respond “at a time and place of our choosing.” But those warnings have gone unheeded.
Locations of all 61 attacks on U.S. troops since the Israel-Gaza war began
Attacks from Oct. 17 to Nov. 17
TURKEY
IRAN
Bashur
Tal Baydar
Rumalyn
9
3
4
SYRIA
Irbil air base
Shaddadi
5
5
Euphrates
7
Green Village
8
Al-Asad air base
Baghdad Diplomatic
Support Center
14
Tanf garrison
5
1
IRAQ
ISRAEL
JORDAN
GAZA
SAUDI ARABIA
100 MILES
Source: U.S. Department of Defense
SAMUEL GRANADOS / THE WASHINGTON POST
Since Oct. 17, U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria have faced near-daily assaults from rocket fire and one-way drones, recording at least 61 incidents and about as many injuries in that span. Pentagon data obtained by The Washington Post shows that the attacks have targeted 10 bases used by American personnel who are spread across both countries.
In response, Biden has authorized three rounds of airstrikes, all in eastern Syria. The most recent, on Nov. 12, targeted sites the Pentagon identified as used by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and “Iran-affiliated groups.” A U.S. official said that as many as seven militants were killed, a “rough estimate” as the United States continues to assess the results.
The strikes have destroyed purported warehouses holding weapons and ammunition, a command post and a training facility, officials have said. Yet each operation has failed to slow the drumbeat of hostile activity, which in all cases resumed almost immediately. The 61 attacks on U.S. troops have come at a startling frequency as well: There were about 80 similar incidents between January 2021 and March of this year, the Pentagon has said.
A senior defense official said the Pentagon has provided additional options to the president beyond the actions that have been taken to date. This person affirmed, too, that within the Defense Department there is growing doubt about the present approach.
In a statement, National Security Council spokesperson Adrienne Watson said that Biden has demonstrated that “he will never hesitate to take action to protect U.S. forces” and that the president is “fully prepared to take further measures as needed at any given moment to protect our people.”
Skip to end of carouselIsrael-Gaza war
Al-Shifa hospital complex as captured by Maxar Technologies on October 19. (Samuel Granados/The Washington Post)
The Gaza Strip is under a near-total communications blackout, and aid has halted as the Israel Defense Forces continues its search of the al-Shifa Hospital complex.
For context: Understand what’s behind the Israel-Gaza war.
End of carousel
Iran has long provided support to militias seeking to dislodge the American presence in Iraq and Syria, where approximately 3,500 troops are deployed to prevent a resurgence of the Islamic State terrorist group. Tehran also backs Hezbollah in Lebanon, whose leaders have threatened to open a new front against Israel, and the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Pentagon said that Houthis destroyed a $30 million U.S. Reaper drone over the Red Sea in recent days, and U.S. warships have in the past few weeks intercepted weapons fired from Yemen in the direction of Israel.
Christine Abizaid, director of the National Counterterrorism Center, told House lawmakers on Wednesday that, despite the unabated attacks on American personnel, Iran and its proxies are “trying to walk a very fine line in the region.” There appears to be a concerted effort, she said, to avoid “overt actions that risk opening them up to a more direct conflict with Israel or the United States while still exacting costs by enabling anti-U.S. and anti-Israel attacks.”
Share this article
No subscription required to read
Share
In their public statements, Defense Department officials have sought to downplay the attacks in Iraq and Syria, describing them as often inaccurate and causing little damage to U.S. infrastructure. The troops who have been hurt all have returned to duty, they’ve said, classifying the reported brain injuries and other collateral as “minor.” The United States has also added more air defense systems into the region, which have shot down several of the drones, according to the Pentagon data.
But as the attack count has continued to climb, so too has the concern that it is only a matter of time before one claims a U.S. service member’s life.
“I don’t sense any deterrence,” Sen. Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in an interview. “They keep shooting, waiting for us to respond. We don’t, so they keep shooting. And eventually one of those drones, or one of those missiles or rockets, is going to kill an American. And then we’ll be off to the races.”
“I’m not suggesting we start a full-fledged war with Tehran,” he added. “But I do think our posture has to be a little more aggressive than just strictly defensive, because one of these days, we’re going to miss one of those drones.”
The senior U.S. defense official acknowledged that the Pentagon sees few good alternatives to the measures taken thus far, which, in addition to the limited retaliatory airstrikes and buildup of air defense weapons, include the deployment of two aircraft carriers near Israel and Iran. Carrying out strikes in Iraq, for instance, has the potential to exacerbate anti-American sentiment there, where U.S. troops are deployed at the invitation of the government in Baghdad. Direct strikes on Iran would amount to a massive escalation.
The Pentagon continues to refine response options, a U.S. official said.
At a news conference Tuesday, Defense Department spokeswoman Sabrina Singh rejected the suggestion that these sustained attacks on American forces revealed shortcomings in the administration’s deterrence strategy. That the war in Gaza has not spread, she said, is evidence the approach is working.
The three retaliatory operations taken to date, Singh said, are intended “to signal and to message very strongly to Iran, and their affiliated groups, to stop.” When a reporter challenged the assertion, noting that the militia fighters “keep striking” U.S. troops, Singh said the military response has been “very deliberate” and that Iran “is certainly seeing that message.”
Joseph Votel, a retired Army general who as the head of U.S. Central Command oversaw all military operations in the Middle East from 2016 to 2019, said it may be too early to tell if the administration’s strategy can or will stifle the attacks on U.S. troops.
“When you do things to try to change people’s behavior, it takes time for that to set in,” said Votel, now a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, a think tank. “Now we have to think about the volume and the responsiveness, and how that has an effect over time.”
Whether it’s happening fast enough, he said, is “subject to interpretation.”
Missy Ryan contributed to this report.
Israel-Gaza war
Hostages: A tentative deal being considered could release at least 50 women and children being held by Hamas. President Biden said he has been “deeply involved” in ongoing negotiations.
Al-Shifa Hospital: Israeli forces conducted a raid on the besieged al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, searching for evidence of the Hamas infrastructure that Israeli and U.S. officials say is under the facility.
Around the world: Protests showing support for Israelis and Palestinians are growing calls for a cease-fire. Concerns over antisemitism on college campuses in the United States have sparked an investigation from the Department of Education.
Oct. 7 attack: A Post video analysis shows how Hamas exploited vulnerabilities created by Israel’s reliance on technology at the “Iron Wall” to carry out the deadliest attack in Israel’s history.
Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip has a complicated history. Understand what’s behind the Israel-Gaza war and see the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
By Alex Horton
Alex Horton is a national security reporter for The Washington Post focused on the U.S. military. He served in Iraq as an Army infantryman. Twitter
By Dan Lamothe
Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 15 years, traveling extensively, embedding with five branches of service and covering combat in Afghanistan. Twitter
By Abigail Hauslohner
Abigail Hauslohner is a Washington Post national security reporter focused on Congress. In her decade at the newspaper, she has been a roving national correspondent, writing on topics ranging from immigration to political extremism, and she covered the Middle East as the Post's Cairo bureau chief. Twitter
4. The West's Incoherent Critique of Israel's Gaza Strategy
Excerpts:
There are still plenty of legitimate criticisms to be made of Israel's strategic approach to Gaza and to the Palestinian population more broadly. Prior to the October 7 attacks, Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank were rising and fueling a clash. For the last decade and a half, Israel's approach to Hamas in Gaza has largely been kinetic in nature—the “mowing the grass” strategy—without any concerted effort to improve the underlying poverty, unemployment, and decrepit infrastructure that were fertile ground for the October 7 bloodbath. Even today, Israel has offered no coherent plan for how to govern and rebuild Gaza if it does succeed in destroying Hamas.
Even so, the uncomfortable, ongoing truth is that the battlefield geography of Gaza means that any operation in Gaza, however targeted it may be, would turn into what we see unfolding today: a bloody, highly destructive ground operation, with a lot of civilians caught in the crossfire. While Israel can mitigate some of these effects, neither Israel nor any other military can prevent them entirely. In this war, there is no happy medium.
The West's Incoherent Critique of Israel's Gaza Strategy
rand.org · by Raphael S. Cohen
Since Hamas's October 7 massacre of more than 1,200 Israelis, a multitude of voices—from U.S. senators to the Chilean president, from the Norwegian prime minister to United Nations officials—has attempted to strike a similar line: that while Israel has the right to self-defense, its current operation in Gaza is disproportionate. Presumably, this same group would support a more targeted operation, but when pressed to explain what such an operation would look like, they demur, and instead say that one should ask “military experts.”
Well, I am a military expert. I have studied military operations in Gaza for a decade now. What would a more targeted operation look like? I have no idea.
Israel has tried more limited operations in Gaza before. In 2012, it conducted limited air campaigns like Operation Pillar of Defense or, more recently, 2021's Operation Guardian of the Walls. It also tried limited ground campaigns in Operation Cast Lead from 2008 to 2009, as well as Operation Protective Edge in 2014. During all of these campaigns, many voices similar to those now criticizing Israel's actions criticized those more targeted operations as disproportionate. For Israel, the lesson from these prior conflicts is that limiting its operations may not actually placate its critics.
But more important, from Israel's perspective, is the fact that these limited operations were not successful. Israel has tried to kill Mohammed Deif, the commander of Hamas's military wing, seven times already, to no avail. The Israeli success rate against Hamas infrastructure has proved similarly limited. Yehia Sinwar, Hamas's Gaza leader, claimed that Operation Guardian of the Walls only succeeded in damaging a mere 5 percent of Hamas's tunnel network beneath Gaza in 2021. And one need only look at the October 7 attacks for evidence that Hamas's military capabilities remained very much intact after all previous, more targeted operations.
One need only look at the October 7 attacks for evidence that Hamas's military capabilities remained very much intact after all previous, more targeted operations.
Moreover, once we unpack what Israel's right to self-defense actually means in practical terms, the differences between so-called targeted operations and what Israeli operations have been to date begin to blur. At a minimum, a right to self-defense should allow Israel to rescue its hostages, prevent Hamas's ability to launch another October 7–style attack—which it has already promised to do—and kill or capture those responsible for October 7.
With more than 200 hostages embedded somewhere among 2 million or more residents of Gaza, a rescue presents the ultimate needle-in-a-haystack problem for Israel. Ideally, Israel would have exquisite intelligence about each hostage's whereabouts. More likely, though, Israel needs to comb through Gaza, building by building, street by street, tunnel by tunnel. That is a slow, painstaking endeavor, one that forces Israel into the large-scale ground operation that we presently see unfolding. Hamas, of course, will resist such an incursion, leading to intense firefights in some of the most densely packed areas on Earth.
There are, however, inevitable second-order consequences once we stipulate that Israel has the right to try to rescue hostages by force without knowing their exact locations. Israel needs to have control over who can and cannot leave Gaza, if only to prevent Hamas from smuggling its hostages to places unknown. Control over access also means controlling fuel going into Gaza. Hostage rescue is a delicate business where even seconds matter, given that Hamas has threatened to execute its hostages.
The second goal—to prevent Hamas from launching another October 7–style attack—requires a similar approach. Hamas does not have traditional military bases. Instead, most of Hamas's military capabilities are underground, in a vast, estimated 500-kilometer network of tunnels running throughout the Gaza Strip. The Israeli military says—and outside media have documented on many occasions—that many of these tunnels run under civilian infrastructure, including mosques, hospitals, and schools.
Detecting and destroying these tunnels also forces Israel to go into Gaza on the ground. Although Israel has pioneered a range of technological solutions for tunnel detection, these methods remain imperfect and often require troops to be relatively close to their targets, increasing the chances of large-scale firefights in populated areas. Clearing those tunnels, once they are found, poses still more challenges. Airstrikes inevitably destroy whatever is above the tunnels. But even if soldiers instead try to pack a tunnel full of explosives to destroy it, few buildings in the world, much less in Gaza, are designed to withstand that kind of subterranean blast.
Finally, let's turn to the third objective: killing or capturing those responsible for the October 7 attacks. Israel estimates that some 3,000 Hamas and other militants entered Israel during the attack. Some of these militants were killed in the attack, but many escaped back to Gaza. Moreover, if we include in Israel's right to self-defense the elimination of those who helped plan and organize the attack, the number grows even larger. The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center places Hamas's total membership—let alone the smaller militant groups—at 20,000 to 25,000 as of September 2022. In practical terms, killing or capturing those responsible for October 7 means either thousands or potentially tens of thousands of airstrikes or raids dispersed throughout the Gaza Strip. Raids conducted on that scale are no longer a limited, targeted operation. It's a full-blown war.
There are still plenty of legitimate criticisms to be made of Israel's strategic approach to Gaza and to the Palestinian population more broadly. Prior to the October 7 attacks, Israeli settler attacks on Palestinians in the West Bank were rising and fueling a clash. For the last decade and a half, Israel's approach to Hamas in Gaza has largely been kinetic in nature—the “mowing the grass” strategy—without any concerted effort to improve the underlying poverty, unemployment, and decrepit infrastructure that were fertile ground for the October 7 bloodbath. Even today, Israel has offered no coherent plan for how to govern and rebuild Gaza if it does succeed in destroying Hamas.
Even so, the uncomfortable, ongoing truth is that the battlefield geography of Gaza means that any operation in Gaza, however targeted it may be, would turn into what we see unfolding today: a bloody, highly destructive ground operation, with a lot of civilians caught in the crossfire. While Israel can mitigate some of these effects, neither Israel nor any other military can prevent them entirely. In this war, there is no happy medium.
Raphael S. Cohen is director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at RAND Project AIR FORCE.
This commentary originally appeared on Foreign Policy on November 13, 2023. Commentary gives RAND researchers a platform to convey insights based on their professional expertise and often on their peer-reviewed research and analysis.
rand.org · by Raphael S. Cohen
5. Are Retired Flag Officers Overparticipating in the Political Process?
The article can be downloaded in PDF at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3263&context=parameters
It is published in the Winter 2023-2024 edition of Parameters. But it was originally published in the Spring of 2020.
Zachary E. Griffiths
Abstract
Retired United States general and flag officers participate politically as individuals and in groups. Purportedly, participation damages civil-military relations. This article argues these activities, including but not limited to endorsements of candidates, do little harm to US democratic institutions and to the nonpartisan reputation of the military institution.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3263
Recommended Citation
Zachary E. Griffiths, "Are Retired Flag Officers Overparticipating in the Political Process?," Parameters 53, no. 4 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3263.
6. Introduction to the China Landpower Studies Center
Looks like an excellent Army initiative.
Opens in January 2024.
The article can be downloaded in PDF at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3264&context=parameters
Richard D. Butler
Abstract
Welcome to the Director’s Corner for the China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC). This will be a regular feature in Parameters that will discuss critical military and security issues related to China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It will also highlight the Center’s research agenda and key activities. My objective in this first installment is to outline the purpose, organization, capabilities, research agenda, and expected products of the Center.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3264
Recommended Citation
Richard D. Butler, "Introduction to the China Landpower Studies Center," Parameters 53, no. 4 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3264.
Introduction to the China Landpower Studies Center
Richard D. Butler
Welcome to the Director’s Corner for the China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC).
This will be a regular feature in Parameters that will discuss critical military and security issues related to China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). It will also highlight the Center’s research agenda and key activities. My objective in this first installment is to outline the purpose, organization, capabilities, research agenda, and expected products of the Center.
Purpose and Mission
The Center will open in January 2024, and it is intended to be an approachable organization. It will tackle the complex and pressing questions about China’s emergence as a global power and its implications for the US military. It will provide senior leaders and practitioners with a better understanding of the strategies, capabilities, and the integration of the PLA into the CCP’s campaign to turn the rules-based international order to its advantage. Further, the Center will share insights and recommendations for developing better deterrence strategies and campaigns for the United States and our allies.
7. Was the Russian Invasion of Ukraine a Failure of Western Deterrence?
The full article can be downloaded in PDF at this link: https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3256&context=parameters
As an aside, there is no mention of SOF's contribution to deterrence (through unconventional deterrence).
Bettina Renz
Abstract
In February 2022, many observers initially evaluated the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a failure of Western deterrence. That assessment was and is flawed inasmuch as the West never articulated a clear strategy to deter such an invasion. Engaging with relevant conceptual debates about how deterrence works and relating this information to what the West did and did not do in the run-up to the invasion, this article shows that deterrence efforts were based on problematic assumptions about the Kremlin’s motivations. The study concludes with lessons for Western military and policy practitioners with the intention to enable better future thinking about how to deter Russia.
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
10.55540/0031-1723.3256
Recommended Citation
Bettina Renz, "Was the Russian Invasion of Ukraine a Failure of Western Deterrence?," Parameters 53, no. 4 (2023), doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3256.
One of the many questions observers asked when Russia launched a large-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 was why Western deterrence had failed.1 As a long-time analyst of Russian foreign and security policy, I found it surprising that this question attracted so much attention. The West had long been concerned with the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy. After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the West began to strengthen its own deterrence posture because of fears over a possible Russian incursion into NATO territory. The West also supported Ukraine in reforming its armed forces to stand up to ongoing and future Russian aggression. As evidence of an impending invasion mounted toward the end of 2021, I hoped the difficulties and potential risks of a full occupation of Ukraine would stop the Kremlin from proceeding. The possibility that the Kremlin’s failure to act would result from Western deterrence never crossed my mind. After all, the West had not articulated or communicated a clear strategy to dissuade Russian President Vladimir Putin from invading. A closer look at why some observers nevertheless believed Western deterrence should have prevented the February 2022 invasion offers valuable lessons for future thinking about how to deter Russia.
8. Most Americans support Israel, new poll finds
Some good news. But we should expect common sense and the desire to do the right thing from the American people.
Most Americans support Israel, new poll finds
BY JULIA MANCHESTER - 11/20/23 11:37 AM ET
https://thehill.com/policy/international/4318844-most-americans-support-israel-new-poll-finds/
The majority of Americans say they support Israel, according to a new survey from Harvard CAPS-Harris Poll shared with The Hill on Monday.
Eighty percent of voters said they supported Israel amid its ongoing war with Hamas, a Palestinian militant group that the US labels a terror organization. However, the polling showed the percentage of support for Israel increasing by age group.
Fifty-five percent of 18- to 24-year-olds said they supported Israel, while 65 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds said the same. Seventy-five percent of 35- to 44-year-olds said they supported Israel, and 95 percent of voters older than 65 years old said the same.
“When asked the clear question on whether voters support Israel or Hamas, Americans give a clear answer that they support Israel and proposed congressional aid,” said Mark Penn, the co-director of the Harvard CAPS/Harris Poll.
“They also support four-hour pauses and other help to those in Gaza but believe Israel has the right to continue its campaign unless hostages are released.”
Calls for a cease-fire have grown as the Palestinian death toll reaches over 11,000 in Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza. The war started last month after Hamas launched a terror attack on Israel, killing roughly 1,200 people.
President Biden and his administration have been largely supportive of Israel, despite the growing criticism against the country’s bombardment in Gaza and calls for a cease-fire.
According to the latest Harvard CAPS-Harris poll, 66 percent of voters said Biden should support Israel and not pull back. However, younger voters also were more likely to say Biden should pull back his support, the poll found. Sixty-one percent of 18- to 24-year-olds said Biden should pull back, while 84 percent of voters over 65 years old said he should support Israel.
The divide between younger and older voters on the matter continues when it comes to calls for a cease-fire. Sixty-four percent of 18- to 24-year-olds, 66 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds and 71 percent of 35- to 44-year-olds say a cease-fire is right.
But that number starts to decrease amid older voters. Forty-four percent of 45- to 54-year-olds, 50 percent of 55-to 65-year-olds and 57 percent of voters older than 65 said a cease-fire is wrong because it gives more power to Hamas.
The latest findings come as other polls show Biden’s standing among young voters plummeting, with many blaming him for his handling of the war in Gaza. An NBC News poll released on Sunday showed Biden’s approval rating among 18- to 34-year-olds at 31 percent, down from 46 percent in September.
The Harvard CAPS-Harris Poll was conducted between Nov. 15-16 with 2,851 respondents surveyed. It is a collaboration of the Center for American Political Studies at Harvard University and the Harris Poll. Results were weighted for age within gender, region, race/ethnicity, marital status, household size, income, employment, education, political party, and political ideology where necessary to align them with their actual proportions in the population. Propensity score weighting was also used to adjust for respondents’ propensity to be online.
9. How to Stop a Mass Movement
We should continue to pay attention to Eric Hoffer and his book The True Believer. His work remains relevant today.
My foundational reading list for all practitioners of political, irregular, and unconventional warfare:
•In addition to Clausewitz, The Sun Tzu, ARIS, Mao, The USMC Small Wars Manual, Sam Sarkesian, Jack McKuen, and Military and Civilian Reading Lists:
1.Ted Gurr – Why Men Rebel, 1970
2.Eric Hoffer – The True Believer, 1951 (23d ed., 2002)
3.Crane Brinton – Anatomy of a Revolution, 1965
4.Anna Simons – “21st Century Cultures of War: Advantage Them,” (FPRI, April 2013)
5.Montgomery McFate – Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars, and Subjects the Margins of Empire (2018)
1.China’s Unrestricted Warfare (1999)
2.Paul Smith – On Political War 1989
3.Gene Sharp – From Dictatorship to Democracy, 2002
4.Saul Alinksy – Rules for Radicals, 1971
5.Mark Boyatt: Special Forces: A Unique National Asset "Through, With and By" 2016
6.Current USAJFKSWCS UW doctrine (Note: USSOCOM UW Doctrine is FOUO)
How to Stop a Mass Movement
Hope. That is what the longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer identified as the propellant for mass movements like Hamas, or for the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties in their revolutionary heyday.
By
James Holmes
Published
6 days ago
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 6, 2023
Hope. That is what the longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer identified as the propellant for mass movements like Hamas, or for the Chinese and Soviet Communist parties in their revolutionary heyday.
Hoffer’s is a counterintuitive take. It cuts against the imagery normally associated with such movements, in which glowering adherents shout slogans and brandish arms. You would think hate, not hope, sets mass movements ablaze.
Yet Hoffer’s take makes sense. Set forth in his classic treatise The True Believer, it helps those squaring off against mass social movements discern what they are facing, and acquainting oneself with the foe is an indispensable first step toward victory.
How True Believers Are Created
Hoffer was an American original, part of the Grapes of Wrath generation of the 1930s that migrated to the sunny uplands of California. He loaded and unloaded freighters in San Francisco, discovered he had a knack for philosophy, started writing, and eventually landed an adjunct position at UC Berkeley. This self-made philosopher was awarded the Medal of Freedom shortly before his death in 1983.
Hoffer catalogs the ingredients of mass movements and explains how they work together to kindle what he calls extravagant hope among potential believers.
The first ingredient is discontent. True believers nurse far-reaching grievances with the way things are. Hoffer starts out by claiming that human beings tend to look for the “shaping forces of our existence” outside themselves. They survey the world and are either satisfied with their place in it, or not. Thus “people with a sense of fulfillment think it a good world and would like to conserve it as it is, while the frustrated favor radical change.”
Attitudes toward change are the key difference between conservators and enemies of the status quo. Conservators apply themselves to ward against change to a beneficent order. The frustrated — prospective recruits to a mass movement — want to tear down a loathsome status quo and replace it with something entirely different. That is a quintessential revolutionary aim.
Powering the Mad Cause
Second comes a sense of power. It takes not just discontent with the existing order, but a sense that the movement can sweep away that order, to fuel the desire for change. This is not actual power, mind you — at their inception these movements have little or none — but it is a sense of power. They believe they can bring about seismic goals given enough fervor, united action, and perseverance. Hoffer’s commentary echoes the line from Wordsworth about the atmosphere pervading France at the French Revolution’s onset: Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive, but to be young was very heaven!
French revolutionaries were frustrated with the ancien régime, convinced themselves they could amass the power to overthrow it, and accomplished the seemingly impossible. How to get people to defy daunting odds is a pivotal question. Hoffer strongly hints that inexperience is a virtue among true believers. After all, experience might discourage potential followers from joining a venture with odds stacked heavily against it. But if you do not know that what you’re attempting is impossible, you might well rush in.
And once in a while, a seemingly mad cause might succeed.
Faith and Religiofication
Third, movement adherents must have faith in the future. Hoffer observes that faith sustains even sober desires for incremental change. But there is a millenarian element not just to religious but also to secular movements striving to uproot the existing order. Religious movements tend to promise the faithful rewards in the afterlife. Secular movements in effect promise to build heaven on earth, delivering riches that vary from movement to movement, according to what kind of brave new world it wants to found.
It is critical to determine the nature of the future in which true believers place their faith.
The fourth key attribute is leadership. “Those who would transform a nation or the world,” says Hoffer, “cannot do so by breeding and captaining discontent or by demonstrating the reasonableness and desirability for the intended changes or by coercing people into a new way of life.” Rational appeals are insufficient, if not outright counterproductive. Instead, aspiring leaders “must know how to kindle and fan an extravagant hope. It matters not whether it be hope of a heavenly kingdom, of heaven on earth, or plunder and untold riches, of fabulous achievement or world dominion.”
That being the case, the central task for leaders of a mass movement is “religiofication,” a neologism denoting the “art of turning practical purposes into holy causes.” The inspirational leader knows how to rouse believers’ passions, summoning up “reckless daring” from them. “For the hopeful,” Hoffer writes, “can draw strength from the most ridiculous sources of power — from a slogan, a word, a button.”
A range of causes lend themselves to religiofication. Nationalism is one prime mover for revolutionary endeavors. For instance, the philosopher observes, “the phenomenal modernization of Japan would probably not have been possible without the revivalist spirit of Japanese nationalism.” Marxism-Leninism is another. Hoffer attributes the Chinese Communist Party’s triumph in China’s civil war to party supremo Mao Zedong’s ability to electrify sentiment among the peasantry where Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek could not. And, of course, religion has fueled mass movements since time immemorial, from the Crusades to 9/11.
Bringing a Mass Movement to Zero
So there is Eric Hoffer’s diagnosis of what animates mass movements. Hoffer does not put it this way, but I think he would agree that extravagant hope is a product of multiplication — not addition — of the factors he lists. It comes from multiplying the degree of frustration with the status quo by followers’ sense of power, by their faith in the future, by their leaders’ capacity for religiofication.
If so, Hoffer points the way to a counterstrategy: Guardians of the status quo could defeat a mass movement by driving just one of those factors to zero.
After all, the biggest number multiplied by zero is zero.
Granted, it may be impossible to disabuse the inner circle of true believers of their extravagant hope, but it may be possible to dishearten supporters less ardently devoted to the cause. If inexperience helps a movement attract supporters, for example, the experience of repeated military defeat ought to cause the less fanatical to waver. Extravagant hope will fade, deadening the movement’s efforts. Some adherents might leave the movement altogether, simplifying the task of suppressing the zealots.
So take it from a longshoreman: To beat a mass movement, study the psychology that makes it tick.
James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Distinguished Fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare, Marine Corps University. The views voiced here are his alone.
19fortyfive.com · by James Holmes · November 6, 2023
10. Commercial Flights Are Experiencing 'Unthinkable' GPS Attacks and Nobody Knows What to Do
Unrestricted warfare?
This is scary as hell.
Commercial Flights Are Experiencing 'Unthinkable' GPS Attacks and Nobody Knows What to Do
Vice · by Alex Cheban · November 20, 2023
ALEX CHEBAN VIA WIKIMEDIA COMMONS.
Commercial air crews are reporting something “unthinkable” in the skies above the Middle East: novel “spoofing” attacks have caused navigation systems to fail in dozens of incidents since September.
In late September, multiple commercial flights near Iran went astray after navigation systems went blind. The planes first received spoofed GPS signals, meaning signals designed to fool planes’ systems into thinking they are flying miles away from their real location. One of the aircraft almost flew into Iranian airspace without permission. Since then, air crews discussing the problem online have said it’s only gotten worse, and experts are racing to establish who is behind it.
OPSGROUP, an international group of pilots and flight technicians, sounded the alarm about the incidents in September and began to collect data to share with its members and the public. According to OPSGROUP, multiple commercial aircraft in the Middle Eastern region have lost the ability to navigate after receiving spoofed navigation signals for months. And it’s not just GPS—fallback navigation systems are also corrupted, resulting in total failure.
According to OPSGROUP, the activity is centered in three regions: Baghdad, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. The group has tracked more than 50 incidents in the last five weeks, the group said in a November update, and identified three new and distinct kinds of navigation spoofing incidents, with two arising since the initial reports in September.
While GPS spoofing is not new, the specific vector of these new attacks was previously “unthinkable,” according to OPSGROUP, which described them as exposing a “fundamental flaw in avionics design.” The spoofing corrupts the Inertial Reference System, a piece of equipment often described as the “brain” of an aircraft that uses gyroscopes, accelerometers, and other tech to help planes navigate. One expert Motherboard spoke to said this was “highly significant.”
“This immediately sounds unthinkable,” OPSGROUP said in its public post about the incidents. “The IRS (Inertial Reference System) should be a standalone system, unable to be spoofed. The idea that we could lose all on-board nav capability, and have to ask [air traffic control] for our position and request a heading, makes little sense at first glance— especially for state of the art aircraft with the latest avionics. However, multiple reports confirm that this has happened.”
Signal jamming in the Middle East is common, but this kind of powerful spoofing is new. According to Todd Humphreys, a UT Austin professor who researches satellite communications, extremely powerful signal jammers have been present in the skies near Syria since 2018. “Syria was called ‘the most aggressive electronic warfare environment on the planet’ by the head of [U.S. Special Operations Command],” Humphreys told Motherboard.
Humphreys directs the Radionavigation Laboratory at UT, which developed software that’s used by a powerful receiver on the International Space Station that’s used to study global navigation satellite signals from low-earth orbit. Today, Humphreys and the team of graduate students in his lab are constantly studying the signals in the region.
“Apart from run-of-the-mill jamming (e.g., with chirp jammers), we have captured GPS spoofing signals in our radio trawling,” he said. “But, interestingly, the spoofing signals never seemed to be complete. They were either missing key internal data, or were not mutually consistent, and so would not have fooled a GPS receiver. They seemed to be aimed at denial of service rather than actual deception. My students and I came to realize that spoofing is the new jamming. In other words, it is being used for denial of service because it's more effective for that purpose than blunt jamming.”
There is currently no solution to this problem, with its potentially disastrous effects and unclear cause. According to OPSGROUP’s November update, “The industry has been slow to come to terms with the issue, leaving flight crews alone to find ways of detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing.”
If air crews do realize that something is amiss, Humphreys said, their only recourse is to depend on air traffic control.
“The GPS and IRS, and their redundant backups, are the principal components of modern aircraft navigation systems,” Humphreys said. “When their readings are corrupted, the Flight Management System assumes an incorrect aircraft position, Synthetic Vision systems show the wrong context, etc. Eventually, if the pilots figure out that something is amiss, they can revert to [VHF omnidirectional range]/ [distance measure equipment] over land. But in several recent cases, air traffic control had to step in and directly provide pilots ‘vectors’ (over an insecure communications channel) to guide them to their destination. That's not a scalable solution.”
Humphreys called the new spoofing attacks “highly significant.”
“If the pilot figures out what's going on and ignores the GPS and the corrupted IRS, then the spoofing's effect is limited to denial of service,” Humphreys said. “But an important distinction with GPS jamming is that whereas jamming denies GPS, it doesn't corrupt the IRS. Spoofing does, which is highly significant as regards airline safety.”
“It shows that the inertial reference systems that act as dead-reckoning backups in case of GPS failure are no backup at all in the face of GPS spoofing because the spoofed GPS receiver corrupts the IRS, which then dead reckons off the corrupted position,” he told Motherboard. “What is more, redundant GPS receivers and IRSs (large planes have 2+ GPS receivers and 3+ IRS) offer no additional protection: they all get corrupted.”
Humphreys and others have been sounding the alarm about an attack like this occurring for the past 15 years. In 2012, he testified by Congress about the need to protect GNSS from spoofing. “GPS spoofing acts like a zero-day exploit against aviation systems,” he told Motherboard. “They're completely unprepared for it and powerless against it.”
According to Humprheys, the reports from OPSGROUP beginning in September were “the first clear case I know of in which commercial aircraft were flying off course due to GPS spoofing.”
The entities behind the novel spoofing attacks are unknown, but Humphreys said that he and a student have narrowed down possible sources. “Using raw GPS measurements from several spacecraft in low-Earth orbit, my student Zach Clements last week located the source of this spoofing to the eastern periphery of Tehran,” he said.
Iran would not be the only country spoofing GPS signals in the region. As first reported by Politico, Clements was the first to identify spoofing most likely coming from Israel after Hamas’ Oct. 7 attacks. “The strong and persistent spoofing we're seeing over Israel since around October 15 is almost certainly being carried out by Israel itself,” Humprheys said. “The IDF effectively admitted as much to a reporter with Haartz.” Humphreys said at the time that crews experiencing this GPS spoofing could rely on other onboard instruments to land.
Humphreys said the effects of the Israeli spoofing are identical to those observed in late September near Iran. “And these are the first clear-cut cases of GPS spoofing of commercial aircraft ever, to my knowledge,” he said. “That they happened so close in time is surprising, but possibly merely coincidental.
Vice · by Alex Cheban · November 20, 2023
11. Gaza Hospital Blast Shows America Is Not Ready for Chinese Disinformation
Let us learn from our mistakes. But most importantly let's anticipate the future. We are seeing emerge right before our very eyes on our phone, computer, and TV screens.
Excerpts:
Whether it be the PRC’s aggressive intimidation of Filipino fisherman in the Scarborough Shoals, to China’s constant encroachment of the Senkaku Islands, to Russia and China’s repeated and joint aerial shows of force against their neighbors, the U.S. and its partners need to do a better job laying the predicate for future Chinese aggression — and the coordinated disinformation that will accompany it.
Much of Chinese propaganda, moreover, is aimed at the Global South. Accordingly, the U.S. should undermine PRC efforts to cast itself as a champion of developing countries by highlighting China’s rapacious economic policies, its trade violations, and its oppression of national minorities, notably the Uyghurs.
These efforts would just be a start. As the global security situation grows increasingly uncertain, America’s strategic adversaries will look for opportunities to take advantage of free societies to undermine alliances and shared security. U.S. and allied media and governments need to anticipate these disinformation operations. Given the stakes, after Jenin and Al-Ahli, we have to do better.
Gaza Hospital Blast Shows America Is Not Ready for Chinese Disinformation
Published 11/20/23 09:00 AM ET
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
themessenger.com · November 20, 2023
Hamas’s claim that Israel intentionally bombed the Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza on October 16 was quickly debunked by internet sleuths. But by the time U.S. and European intelligence agencies publicly refuted Hamas’ claims, Israel’s reputation had suffered significant damage. Iran and its proxies called for a “day of rage” around the globe. Public pressure forced the leaders of Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to cancel their meetings with President Joe Biden.
Hamas has successfully integrated disinformation operations into its terrorist campaign against Israel — and the world is watching.
Gaza has become a laboratory for other bad-faith actors, such as China, to observe and refine information warfare and gray-zone attacks. Given the gullibility the worldwide information ecosystem displayed during the Al-Ahli incident, media and policymakers need to anticipate disinformation campaigns by developing protocols to combat disinformation in real time.
The Al-Ahli incident was not the first time Palestinian groups falsified mass casualties. In 2002, a Palestinian spokesman claimed that Israel massacred over 500 men, women, and children in Jenin in the West Bank. This led to global condemnation of Israel before numerous independent groups unraveled the claims. Given this history, the Biden administration should have been proactively ready to challenge Hamas’ claims as soon as they went viral.
Disinformation as a foreign policy tool predates Hamas, of course. The Soviet Union promulgated extensive, state-driven information grey-zone strategies. It targeted fissures in Western societies through “active measures” — information campaigns designed to stimulate emotional responses. The USSR used such methods to weaken NATO unity and to attribute nefarious Western intent in the Global South.
China is now undertaking similar forms of cognitive warfare. As Josh Baughman and Peter R. Singer argue, China has learned from Palestinians how to “win international support by portraying an image of being weak and the victim.” They cite a recent article from the People’s Liberation Army newspaper that lays out social media approaches to misdirect and shape understanding of an ongoing conflict.
This tactic is evident in China’s smear campaign against Japan’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)-approved release of treated water from the Fukushima nuclear plant. Though few governments have joined Beijing in boycotting Japanese seafood, the campaign has elicited public protests in Seoul. Xi’s propaganda aims to undermine the improvement in Japan–South Korean relations. Meanwhile, Chinese vessels continue to fish in Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
With the West focused on Europe and the Middle East, Beijing has an opportunity to undertake territorial aggression against Taiwan, shoals in the South China Sea, or Japan’s Senkaku Islands. This will likely entail Chinese military and paramilitary provocations coupled with state media–driven disinformation campaigns, social media manipulation, and the use of generative AI to shape narratives at home and abroad. Given the PRC’s power, these efforts are likely to dwarf Hamas’ propaganda in both scale and frequency.
It is essential that Western media and policymakers anticipate and develop effective protocols to combat comprehensive information campaigns. As the Al-Ahli incident reinforced, reporters and officials should read any such accounts with skepticism, verify information, check sources, and refrain from making provocative pronouncements prematurely. Putting information manipulation efforts in context will enhance objective reporting.
Another more ambitious countermeasure would be the creation of an international consortium to debunk claims from known bad-faith actors. The U.S. and its partners should create mechanisms for rapid intelligence sharing and declassification to expose disinformation before it spreads. The Biden administration used this “downgrade and share” approach when it declassified evidence of Russian troop movements on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, forestalling Russian claims of Ukrainian aggression. Formalizing this practice in the future, using images from U.S. and allied naval vessels, unmanned aerial vehicles, and satellites, could combat disinformation by proving China’s culpability for the aggression.
But the United States and its allies need to do more to prepare the broader information environment ahead of a crisis. Western nations also need to lay the predicate for this disinformation by shaming China in international institutions as a nation that does not respect the truth or regard others as equals.
Whether it be the PRC’s aggressive intimidation of Filipino fisherman in the Scarborough Shoals, to China’s constant encroachment of the Senkaku Islands, to Russia and China’s repeated and joint aerial shows of force against their neighbors, the U.S. and its partners need to do a better job laying the predicate for future Chinese aggression — and the coordinated disinformation that will accompany it.
Much of Chinese propaganda, moreover, is aimed at the Global South. Accordingly, the U.S. should undermine PRC efforts to cast itself as a champion of developing countries by highlighting China’s rapacious economic policies, its trade violations, and its oppression of national minorities, notably the Uyghurs.
These efforts would just be a start. As the global security situation grows increasingly uncertain, America’s strategic adversaries will look for opportunities to take advantage of free societies to undermine alliances and shared security. U.S. and allied media and governments need to anticipate these disinformation operations. Given the stakes, after Jenin and Al-Ahli, we have to do better.
Kenneth R. Weinstein is Japan Chair at Hudson Institute.
William Chou is Japan Chair Fellow at Hudson Institute.
themessenger.com · November 20, 2023
12. Send America’s Floating Hospitals to Gaza
But I am sure there will be push back from all the force protection gurus who will say it cannot get any closer than Hamwa missile range.
Send America’s Floating Hospitals to Gaza
The Navy’s Comfort and Mercy could bring medical care and US “soft power” to the war-torn area.
November 18, 2023 at 12:00 AM EST
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2023-11-18/israel-hamas-latest-send-us-navy-s-hospital-ships-to-gaza?accessT=true&sref=hhjZtX76
By James Stavridis
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
Lifelines.Photographer: Robyn Beck/AFP/Getty Images
In my military career, I was frequently deployed on the US Navy’s massive nuclear-powered aircraft carriers into combat and on more routine peacetime missions.
I embarked in the USS Abraham Lincoln as a commodore in the late 1990s, and I sailed around South America in the USS Eisenhower as a four-star admiral in command of US Southern Command in 2009. These are fearsome machines of war, apex predators at sea with significant land-attack powers as well.
But in many ways, the most satisfying deployment I commanded was not a carrier: It was USNS Comfort, a 60,000-ton hospital ship with nearly 1,000 beds and a main battery consisting not of combat jets but of doctors and nurses. The ship has nearly 100 intensive-care beds, with total accommodations for more than 1,300 people if necessary.
The author, on right, in command of the USNS Comfort.Source: US Navy
I was lucky to have the Comfort under my command in Latin America and the Caribbean, where her crew performed hundreds of thousands of lifesaving and life-changing patient treatments over the course of six months. Today, we must think seriously about a riskier mission: sending both the Comfort and her sister ship, the Mercy, to the eastern Mediterranean during the Israel-Hamas war.
BloombergOpinion
Sam Altman’s Firing at OpenAI Was Ineffective Effective Altruism
Madame Vice President? Taiwan’s Hsiao Shakes Up the Polls
Alibaba Shows Gap Between Chip Haves and Have-Nots
Tokenize Stocks, Bonds, Funds, But Proceed With Care
The need is clear: Nearly two million Gazans, nearly half of them children, are in the middle of a war zone. Civilian casualties are mounting by the hour despite efforts of the Israel Defense Forces to minimize “collateral damage” as they undertake a justified series of counterattacks against the terrorists.
Hospitals ashore are overwhelmed, and being used by the terrorists as shields to prevent Israel from destroying their command-and-control networks, bunkers full of fuel and ammunition, and other military logistics. As Israeli forces close in to root out the terrorists, it is incumbent on Hamas to evacuate patients out of the immediate war zone. Instead, as has been widely reported, the terrorists are refusing to share a vast stockpile of medicine and lifesaving equipment with the people they claim to represent.
Moving one or both hospital ships to the Mediterranean would allow President Joe Biden’s administration to accomplish several important objectives.
First and most obviously, the US would be providing significant humanitarian and medical aid during a cruel and terrible conflict. I have seen firsthand the motivation, determination, and medical skill of the Comfort’s crew. Those medical professionals could be augmented by voluntary civilian personnel, which happens routinely on both ships as they head to crises. During my command of the Comfort, we worked with many nongovernmental organizations, but principally with the men and women of Project Hope, and I’m certain many would volunteer in today’s crisis.
A second benefit for the US would be to show our concern for Palestinians. President Biden has visited Israel, provided substantial intelligence and military assistance to its forces, and deployed two nuclear aircraft carriers to the region to deter Iran. By sending the Comfort and the Mercy, we would show we also understand the trauma facing the people of Gaza. A demonstration of US good faith could, when this shooting stops, help it get Israel and the Palestinians back on the path to a two-state solution.
Third, such a deployment would send a strong signal to the Global South generally, where there is significant skepticism about US actions in the Middle East. Our wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya — as well as our appropriate aid to Israel — have not been broadly supported in nations like Brazil, Nigeria, Pakistan and South Africa, for example.
Would such a deployment be complex and risky? Of course. The Mercy is now operating in the Pacific as she normally does, and the Comfort is refitting in a US shipyard. They are minimally manned when not on actual missions, so moving quickly would require activating reservists or drawing military medical personnel from other assignments stateside. Mobilizing both military reservists and civilian medical volunteers is a complicated process.
The hospital ships would face some level of risk. While they could anchor miles off the coast and use boats and helicopters to transport patients (something we routinely do), it is conceivable that Hamas, Hezbollah or even Iran might sponsor a terrorist attack against the ship. A USS Cole scenario with a small boat laden with explosives and a suicide crew — or an unmanned vehicle — is a worrisome possibility. A potential missile strike from Hamas is another danger. But both the US and Israeli navies can provide combatant warships to protect the floating hospitals.
A final challenge would be doing triage on the ground and ensuring no terrorists flow into the patient population. Screening by gender and age would be necessary, and commanders might simply prioritize the very youngest victims.
If the plan proceeds, the Navy could also send several of the speedy catamarans of the USNS Spearhead class, which move at up to 45 knots, to do ship-to-shore transits. Each of them can carry hundreds of passengers.
We’ve sent in the nuclear carriers and, so far, they are accomplishing their mission of deterring Iran from dangerous adventurism. But we should also send our “soft power” forces to the eastern Mediterranean on an equally important mission.
Stavridis is also vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is on the boards of American Water Works, Fortinet, PreVeil, NFP, Ankura Consulting Group, Titan Holdings, Michael Baker and Neuberger Berman, and has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity sector.
More From Bloomberg Opinion:
Want more Bloomberg Opinion? OPIN <GO> . Or subscribe to our daily newsletter .
This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
To contact the author of this story:
James Stavridis at jstavridis@bloomberg.net
To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Tobin Harshaw at tharshaw@bloomberg.net
James Stavridis is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist, a retired US Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.
13. Three upcoming events that could torpedo Pacific peace
Maps and graphics at the link: https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/three-upcoming-events-that-could-torpedo-pacific-peace?utm
Three upcoming events that could torpedo Pacific peace - The Sunday Guardian Live
sundayguardianlive.com · by CLEO PASKAL · November 19, 2023
Across the Pacific, aided in some cases by the domestic policy confusion of others, the Chinese Communist Party is on the march.
Three things are going on that could turbo charge Chinese strategic expansion in the Pacific.
U.S. DEFENCE ARCHITECTURE IN THE PACIFIC
The first two involve what are known as the “Compact States”. The United States has Compacts of Free Association (COFAs) with three independent countries: the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM).
Through the COFAs, the three countries have voluntarily granted the United States uniquely extensive defense and security access in their sovereign territories. In the words of the Compacts: “The Government of the United States has full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters in or relating to the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia [and Palau].”This includes the prerogative for the United States to set up and operate U.S. military bases and a veto over other countries’ military access to the region. Also as part of the agreement, citizens from the Compact countries can live and work freely in the U.S. and they serve at very high rates in the U.S. miliary.
No other countries on the planet have such deep defense relationships with the United States. The Compacts extend the U.S. defensive perimeter to the waters of America’s treaty allies, the Philippines and Japan, and through them to Taiwan. This “Corridor of Freedom” (including freedom of movement) underpins American strategic planning in the Pacific.As a result, the Compact states, two of which also recognize Taiwan, are at the receiving end of a long running, well-funded, focused, and multifaceted attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s goal is to undermine these entities’ relationships with the United States, weaken their state institutions, and ultimately to create the conditions in which, as one senior Chinese official told U.S. Admiral Timothy Keating: “You take Hawaii east. We’ll take Hawaii west.”
1. COMPACT RENEWAL
The financial and services components of the Compacts need to be periodically renewed—for example those covering postal services and education programs. We are in that renewal period now. The terms have been agreed between the U.S. and the countries, but they need to be passed by the U.S. Congress.
The renewals have been collateral damage in the internal Congressional battles that have seen, for example, the failure to pass a budget and the changing of the Speaker of the House. Technically the funding and services expired for FSM and RMI on September 30th, but the current stop-gap measures will keep them afloat until February. Palau’s situation is more complicated. Palau’s current agreement runs to 2024 but it was agreed its agreement would be renewed along with the other two. However, it wasn’t included in the stop-gap deal. Unless renewed, on January 1st Palau falls into serious debt leaving a huge opening for China.
Not only is Palau a key component of the U.S. Corridor of Freedom, it also recognizes Taiwan, making it an even bigger target for China. Palau has been here before. From 2010 to 2018, due to similar complications with Congress, its funding was discretionary rather than mandatory, permeating its economy with uncertainty. China took full advantage.
Beijing worked to build up Palau’s dependence on Chinese tourism. In 2008, there were 634 Chinese tourists in Palau, less than 1% of all tourists. By 2015, it was more than 91,000, or around 54%.
Then, in 2017, China pulled the plug, making it clear that, unless Palau switched from Taiwan to China, the tourists wouldn’t come back. This devastated the economy and left empty and crumbling Chinese-leased real estate and developments across the country.
Palau, however stood firm. But it was not easy, especially after Covid added a second hit. Now a potential delay in Compact renewal could give the PRC another opening.
The U.S. goal is to get the Compacts included in the Congressional National Defense Authorization Act, which may be passed in December. But, though it is possible to get a waiver, some on the Republican House side are asking for “offsets”, meaning any dollar given to the Compact states needs to be taken from somewhere else. While the budget for the three countries over 20 years is US$7.1 billion, the offsets required are only around US$2.3 billion.
If you average that out, it comes to under US$40 million per country per year—or half an F-35 (and good luck finding places to land an F-35 in the region, apart from even more expensive aircraft carriers, once the PRC takes hold of the Compact states).
Expert Grant Newsham has estimated that should the Compacts fail, the cost to the U.S. of paying for the ships, aircraft, missiles, submarines and troops required to secure the 5.6 million square kilometers covered by the Compact states is around US$100 billion. A year.
As Congresswoman Radewagen put it, the Compacts are: “One of most important tools that the United States has in supporting democracy and good governance while denying China the ability to project strategic power throughout the vast Pacific region.”
Congressional dithering is putting that at risk. And the crisis point may come sooner than most think.
2. MARSHALL ISLANDS ELECTIONS
On November 20th, the Marshall Islands, a Compact state that recognizes Taiwan and hosts a critical U.S. military base (Kwajalein) is having elections. There are deep and long-standing PRC political warfare operations running to try to ensure that PRC-friendly candidates are elected. There was an indication of how serious the attempts are in the recent case of PRC-origin Cary Yan and Gina Zhou. They obtained Marshall Islands passports and then set about trying to undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the Marshall Islands. Around April 2018, an NGO controlled by Yan and Zhou hosted a conference in Hong Kong attended by, among others, members of the RMI legislature. The NGO paid for the travel, accommodations, and entertainment of the RMI officials. There they publicly launched an initiative to establish the so-called Rongelap Atoll Special Administrative Region (the “RASAR”).
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement described RASAR as: “a multi-year scheme that included establishing a nongovernmental organization and allegedly bribing officials in the Republic of the Marshall Islands with the intention of establishing a semi-autonomous region, akin to Hong Kong, in the U.S.-defended Marshall Islands.”
On September 2, 2022, Yan and Zhou were extradited from Thailand to the United States and charged with conspiring to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), violating the FCPA, conspiring to commit money laundering, and committing money laundering.
Yan and Zhou each pled guilty to one count, with Yan getting 42 months and Zhou 31 months.
But the U.S. didn’t give Marshallese authorities the information they needed to charge their own corrupt officials, some of whom are reportedly running in the upcoming election. And Zhou’s sentence was so light that she finished serving her time soon after the case was closed, and the United States deported her back to the Marshall Islands. She is currently there, walking free, able to re-establish her linkages with local elites, and showing by her mere presence that there is little downside to taking or giving Chinese bribes.
Should pro-PRC candidates win on the 20th, not only is the relationship with Taiwan at risk but, combined with the mess of the Compact renewal, there could be a rising tide of Beijing-backed political warfare that could wash away—or at least severely erode—U.S. defense relations in the country.
3. PACIFIC GAMES
If you want to see what that can mean, look to the southern Pacific and the Solomon Islands, where, since 2019, relations with Beijing have grown so close, the two countries have signed a security agreement that allows for the deployment of People’s Liberation Army troops in the country to quell civil dissent, as well as to protect Chinese citizens and major project.
On November 19th, Solomons open the Pacific Games, a regional sporting event. Largely funded by China, it has the look of “vanity trap” diplomacy for the pro-PRC Prime Minister of Solomons, Manasseh Sogavare. It is much more than that.
Sogavare has used the Games as an excuse to delay elections and to bring in large “security” support (including personnel and drones) from China. Not wanting to be left out, Australia has also sent equipment and hundreds of troops/police/support personnel, as have others, giving legitimacy to Sogavare and the PRC deployment. Who exactly they will be defending the Games against is unclear.
According to opposition leader Peter Kenilorea Jr.: “We have some 1,000 police and military personnel on the ground here now. Three choppers and some serious equipment. We are a small country. Everyone knows each other. All it takes is Prime Minister Sogavare to meet with the supposedly disgruntled ex-militants from our ethnic tension years to release the pressure.
“These folks have worked for and have been led on by Sogavare for years. Many of them would know Sogavare personally. But whatever promises made to them have not been fulfilled. Sogavare is milking this. [It] could well be the justification of another extension of parliament he so desperately craves, given if elections were held today, he would lose his seat.”
Both Australia and China have said some of their security forces will stay after the Games. If elections aren’t held soon, will Australian and Chinese troops work together to put down a pro-democracy groundswell? Or will they fight each other on the capital island of Solomons, Guadalcanal?
The people of the Pacific shouldn’t be in this position. They are among the most courageous in fighting for sovereignty and freedom. But, across the region—aided in some cases by the domestic policy confusion of others—the Chinese Communist Party is on the march. And what happens in the next few weeks could cascade into serious reversals for democracy, and great advances for Beijing.
Cleo Paskal, non-resident senior fellow for the Indo-Pacific at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, is columnist for The Sunday Guardian.
sundayguardianlive.com · by CLEO PASKAL · November 19, 2023
14. Taiwan's presidential front-runner picks U.S. envoy as running mate
Taiwanese envoy to the US - not a US envoy to Taiwan.
How will China react to this?
Taiwan's presidential front-runner picks U.S. envoy as running mate
Hsiao Bi-khim's international experience, political success seen as plus for campaign
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Taiwan-elections/Taiwan-s-presidential-front-runner-picks-U.S.-envoy-as-running-mate?utm
THOMPSON CHAU, Contributing writer
November 20, 2023 17:38 JS
TAIPEI -- Taiwan's presidential front-runner Lai Ching-te on Monday picked top envoy to the U.S. Hsiao Bi-khim as his running mate in an appeal to young and progressive voters, with the opposition in disarray ahead of January elections.
The 52-year-old Hsiao has been widely praised in diplomatic circles for her influence with U.S. officials as China moves to extinguish Taiwan's international presence.
"I'm Hsiao Bi-Khim, I'm back. It's my duty to support Taiwan," she said Monday as Lai formally introduced her as the VP candidate. "For the sake of our country, I will dedicate myself wholeheartedly.
Describing herself as a "warrior cat," Hsiao took a shot at China's claims to Taiwan: "Although the whole world hopes that the status quo in the Taiwan Strait will be maintained, it has been constantly subjected to unilateral changes from the other side."
Hsiao, Taiwan's first female de facto ambassador in Washington, was previously a successful politician who earlier in her career pulled off an unlikely parliamentary victory in an opposition stronghold.
"Hsiao tirelessly maximized the opportunities of engaging in Washington," said Ivan Kanapathy, a senior U.S. National Security Council official under American leaders Donald Trump and Joe Biden. "She forged relationships with key policymakers, academics, businesses, civil society, and other diplomats to bolster Taiwan's international space and thus enhance deterrence and resilience."
Hsiao attended Biden's inauguration in 2021, the first Taiwanese de facto ambassador to do so in decades, underscoring her status in Washington, analysts say.
Washington and Taipei don't have official diplomatic ties but work closely to push back against China's territorial claims.
Lai, head of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is comfortably leading opinion polls with less than two months to go before the presidential and legislative elections on Jan. 13. His chances were buoyed over the weekend when the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People's Party (TPP) failed to agree on a joint ticket that could challenge the ruling DPP's hold on power.
Terry Gou, the 73-year-old founder of Foxconn, a big Apple supplier, is also vying for the presidency, further dividing the opposition.
The race comes against the backdrop of Chinese saber-rattling and economic coercion aimed at the island democracy of 24 million. Communist China has never ruled Taiwan but won't rule out a military attack to take control.
Beijing -- which previously sanctioned Hsiao and branded her as a "separatist" for supporting Taiwanese sovereignty -- has endorsed the KMT's framing of next year's polls as a vote between war and peace, a stark choice seen as aimed at intimidating Taiwanese voters.
Born in Japan's Kobe city to a Taiwanese father and an American mother, Hsiao gave up her U.S. citizenship in 2000 when serving in the first-ever DPP government under President Chen Shui-bian.
In 2016, Hsiao beat a powerful lawmaker in opposition-controlled Hualien County. Two years later, conservatives sought to oust her through a recall vote over her vocal support for same-sex marriage; the bid failed.
"Electorally, Hsiao has done 'a mission impossible' -- she has the distinction of being the only DPP member since 2004 to ever win a legislator seat in eastern Taiwan's seat of Hualien, which is widely acknowledged to be an opposition stronghold," said Wen-ti Sung, a Taiwan expert at the Australian National University.
If elected next year, Hsiao would be one of just a few women to become a deputy head of state in the Chinese-speaking world.
Michael Cunningham, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, called Hsiao's appointment "a smart move," as President Tsai Ing-wen prepares to leave office due to term limits.
"By nominating Hsiao as his running mate, Lai is also sending a message that he's serious about his pledge to follow Tsai's moderate path if he's elected, rather than getting rid of all of Tsai's advisers and moving in a more radical direction," Cunningham told Nikkei Asia. "Hsiao is widely respected in both Taipei and Washington, where she's seen as exceptionally smart and dedicated. U.S.-Taiwan relations have strengthened since she came to Washington."
15. The Pentagon thinks The Rock can fight lagging military recruitment
The Pentagon thinks The Rock can fight lagging military recruitment
If you can smell what the Rock is cooking, he and the government would like you to enlist.
BY NICHOLAS SLAYTON | PUBLISHED NOV 19, 2023 4:53 PM EST
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
Actor and wrestler Dwayne Johnson with U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George at the Pentagon. (Photo by Henry Villarama/U.S. Army).
Finally, the Rock has come back to Capitol Hill and the Pentagon.
Yes, really. Dwayne “The Rock” Johnson, one of the biggest movie stars currently and the man who once helped break the news of SEAL Team 6’s successful killing of Osama bin Laden (again: yes, really), stopped by the halls of the Pentagon this week as part of a wider trip to the area. He talked with military and government leaders about several topics, including how to combat poor military recruitment numbers.
The People’s Champion visited the Pentagon on Nov. 15. His main reason for the stop was to meet with U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy A. George. However, the self-proclaimed Most Electrifying Man in Sports Entertainment also took the time to meet with servicemembers at the Pentagon, stopping for selfies and group photos.
Subscribe to Task & Purpose Today. Get the latest military news and culture in your inbox daily.
The Rock also met with Senators of both parties in Washington, D.C. They discussed the military but also the XFL (Johnson is an owner). Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT), who arranged the meeting, said that Johnson is “going to advocate for people to join the military over a period of time,” according to NBC4 Washington. What that and the two meetings mean specifically — if Johnson will appear in recruitment ads or use his large social media presence to advocate for enlisting — was not specified. However Tester did note Johnson’s large following.
Currently the military is struggling with bringing in new troops. The Army fell short of its goal two years in a row, while the end of the previous fiscal year in September saw the Air Force and Navy also fail to meet their goals. Different branches have tried several options, including enlistment bonuses and other incentives. The Army has been on a media push — after pulling a series of ads starring an actor going through legal trouble — lately with its “First Steps” ad series. The latest, “Jump,” came out earlier this month.
Alongside the recruiting challenges the military is facing, there still remain several vacancies for military leadership roles due to Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-Ala) blocking votes on nominees and promotions.
Johnson himself is not a veteran, but he has a history of working with the Pentagon. He’s recorded holiday greeting videos for overseas servicemembers and performed concerts for troops (the latter including him dressed as Elvis).
Presumably there were no jabronis in attendance at the Pentagon on Wednesday.
The latest on Task & Purpose
Did a stimulant known as ‘the drug of jihad’ fuel Hamas terror on Oct. 7?
Nicholas Slayton
Nicholas Slayton is a contributing editor for Task & Purpose, covering conflict for over 12 years, from the Arab Spring to the war in Ukraine. His previous reporting can be found on the non-profit Aslan Media, The Atlantic, Al Jazeera, The New Republic, The American Prospect, Architectural Digest, The Daily Beast, and the Los Angeles Downtown News. You can reach him at nicholas@taskandpurpose.com or find him on Twitter @NSlayton and Bluesky at @nslayton.bsky.social. Contact the author here.
taskandpurpose.com · by Nicholas Slayton
16. ‘Russia is weaponizing time,’ Ukraine tells NATO
‘Russia is weaponizing time,’ Ukraine tells NATO
At Halifax conference, Western policy leaders struggled to meet a concatenation of crises.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
BY PATRICK TUCKER
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY EDITOR, DEFENSE ONE
NOVEMBER 20, 2023 07:38 PM ET
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
NATO
HALIFAX, Nova Scotia—The premise of the annual Halifax International Security Forum is simple: like-minded democracies working together are far stronger than whatever threatens them. But never in the forum’s 14 years have global events presented attendees, or the policy community of Western-aligned democracies, with greater challenges.
In 2021, the event spotlit concerns that China might invade Taiwan within just a few years, while a senior Ukrainian delegation tried to draw attention to the Russian buildup on its border. Last year, the assembly stood in solidarity with Ukraine while spending little time on the Middle East. This year’s event showed how the policy elite are struggling to find a coherent response to multiple converging crises.
But the message from Ukrainians at this year’s event was clear: your support is more important now than ever before.
“We live every day between hope and belief. Because when we are stronger, we believe in our victory. We believe that we will be supported. If the situation is a little bit more difficult, we hope,” said Andriy Kostin, Ukraine’s prosecutor general. “Russia is weaponizing time.”
Next to him, Gen. Robert Brieger, an Austrian who currently serves as the chairman of the EU military committee, said that the EU has rapidly increased production of new military equipment, for both EU members and Ukraine.
“The ambition is to produce one million 155mm artillery ammunition rounds by spring next year,” Brieger said. “Probably we will not fully reach this ambition.”
The Austrian general was sober to the point of sullenness in his remarks, acknowledging that June’s baby coup by Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin had not weakened Putin to the extent many were hoping.
“I consume the open resources, and my impression is that despite this Wagner incident last summer, the regime is stable,” he said.
Moreover, Brieger acknowledged that historic sanctions on the Kremlin had not eliminated Russia’s ability to continue its campaign against Ukraine.
“Russia has an enormous potential to ramp up production capacity, and they proved it during World War II. This is a big economy,” he said. “Probably not the high-end products, but vast numbers of material and big numbers of human resources—not well-trained, not very motivated—but still a factor on the battlefield.”
Ukraine continues to notch important but incremental battlefield gains, but the resolve of Western democratic allies is showing signs of weakness, in part because of changing political realities in various countries. In Slovakia, a populist, more Kremlin-friendly regime won elections in October. In January, Austria announced it would stop sending military aid to Ukraine, but said it would maintain support in other ways.
That theme of intractability carried through various sessions and conversations at Halifax, many of which focused on the Middle East, and particularly on Israeli military operations in Gaza. The Biden administration has portrayed U.S. support for Ukraine and U.S. support for Israel’s operation as fundamentally linked and, following Hamas’ Oct.7 attack on Israel, asked Congress to approve a $100 billion in aid for Israel, Taiwan, and especially Ukraine. But Republicans are putting new conditions on aid to Ukraine, such as increased funding for security on the U.S. border with Mexico.
Former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak criticized the right-wing government of Benjamin Netanyahu for failing to talk meaningfully about a post-war governance structure for the Palestinians in Gaza. Barak argued, as he has over the course of his career, that a two-state solution is essential for Israeli security. The former Likud Party leader suggested that an international coalition of Arab states could serve as a type of interim government, clearing the way for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank to preside over a Palestinian state. He suggested that its land area might be some 9 percent smaller than the border negotiated in 1967, to accommodate some current Jewish settlements.
But even Barak was forced to acknowledge what he called a “sad reality.”
“More than half of the Israeli public believe the opposite: that there should be a one-state solution,” he said, meaning Israel should control the entire territory.
On the stage, PBS correspondent Nick Schifrin quickly chimed in.
“More than half of Israelis don’t believe in” a two-state solution, Schifrin said. “More than half of Palestinians don’t believe in two-state and nobody in the current coalition [government of Israel] believes in two-state. But that’s certainly the vision.”
With no long-term solution on offer, Israel’s tactics in Gaza are under scrutiny. Outside the Halifax conference center, protestors loudly demanded a ceasefire.
U.S. officials are often asked about the high civilian casualties from Israeli strikes against civilian infrastructure targets, which U.S. and Israeli officials say Hamas uses for military purposes. State and Defense officials routinely fall back on the line that Israel has “a right to defend itself.” In recent days, even the State Department has adjusted some of its messaging about unconditional support for Israel and is now calling for humanitarian pauses in the fighting to allow aid to reach Gaza and civilians to flee. For the first time, U.S. President Joe Biden is considering sanctions against the Israeli settlers who are using the conflict in Gaza to drive Palestinians from their homes in the West Bank.
And more and more policy professionals are openly questioning whether the current operation meets any standard of self-defense, or if it's even contributing to the security of Israel.
“The bloody scorched-earth campaign in Gaza will fail to deliver security for Israelis while inflicting horrible suffering on Gaza’s civilians, providing Hamas with an invaluable propaganda victory and recruitment tool, and fueling anti-Israel sentiment across the world,” said Eurasia Group founder Ian Bremmer, considered a centrist analyst.
Bremmer also recently made the point that as terrible as Hamas’s actions toward Israel have been, the group of 30,000 or so militants using tunnels and crudely-motorized paragliders does not pose an actual existential threat to Israel, the most advanced military in the Middle East and one of the most advanced in the world.
Compare that to Ukraine’s plight: a true existential threat from a more powerful, nuclear-armed military.
On Monday, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Kyiv to “reassure” allies in the Ukrainian government. But the first question he faced in his press conference was about the possibility that Israel might be using U.S.-provided weapons to commit war crimes. Austin, who also announced a new round of military aid for Ukraine, could only return to familiar talking points on how the United States “expects” Israel to minimize civilian casualties.
The Biden administration would rather people focus on helping Ukraine to survive, not least because its support for Israel is hurting him politically. Joe Biden’s approval rating stands at 40 percent, the lowest of his presidency. His support for Israel’s operation in Gaza has particularly hurt his popularity among young people, who disapprove of it by 70 percent, an NBC News poll found.
Among the topics barely covered during the conference was the possibility of a second Trump administration. The Halifax crowd of U.S. and European policy professionals represents exactly the sort of group that Donald Trump has vowed to get rid of. Trump has also threatened to leave NATO and to push Ukraine to concede territory to Russia.
During a dinner with various European and Ukrainian military and government officials (they did not allow their names or affiliations to be reported), one told Defense One that only recently had European partners begun to discuss the possibility of a second Trump administration and only “informally.” But, said another, if Trump were to prevail and pursue a new era of American isolationism, there would be no replacement for America’s role in supporting Ukraine.
defenseone.com · by Patrick Tucker
17. Defense Secretary Austin meets with Zelenskyy in Ukraine
Defense Secretary Austin meets with Zelenskyy in Ukraine
militarytimes.com · by Tara Copp · November 20, 2023
KYIV, Ukraine — U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin made an unannounced visit to Kyiv on Monday in a high-profile push to keep money and weapons flowing to Ukraine even as U.S. and international resources are stretched by the new global risks raised by the Israel-Hamas conflict.
Austin, who traveled to Kyiv by train from Poland, met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and Chief of Staff Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
While there Austin announced the Pentagon would be sending an additional $100 million in weapons to Ukraine from U.S. existing stockpiles, including artillery and munitions for air defense systems. The package also includes another High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS.
Austin said Ukraine’s effort to defeat Russian forces “matters to the rest of the world” and that U.S. support would continue “for the long haul.”
Zelenskyy said Austin’s visit was “a very important signal” for Ukraine. “We count on your support,” Zelenskyy said, thanking Congress as well as the American people for their backing.
This is Austin’s second trip to Kyiv since Russia’s 2022 invasion, but he’s making it under far different circumstances, as the world’s attention is drawn to the Middle East and signs of fatigue set in with the almost 21-month Russia-Ukraine war.
Austin’s first visit occurred in April 2022, just two months after the start of the war. At the time, Ukraine was riding a wave of global rage at Moscow’s invasion, and Austin launched an international effort that now sees 50 countries meet monthly to coordinate on what weapons, training and other support could be pushed to Kyiv.
But the conflict in Gaza could pull attention and resources from the Ukraine fight. The U.S. has worked feverishly since the Oct. 7 attacks by Hamas on Israel, and the weeks of devastating bombardment on Gaza by Israel that has followed, to prevent the conflict from turning into a regional war. Even as Austin stood in St. Michael’s Square in Kyiv, the first question asked at a press briefing at the end of the short visit was about Israel’s use of U.S.-provided weapons in that conflict, instead of about Ukraine.
Both conflicts have already seen significant U.S. military support. To back Israel and keep that conflict from spreading, the U.S. has already committed two carrier strike groups, scores of fighter jets and thousands of U.S. personnel to the Middle East, and has had to shift its force posture and conduct airstrikes against Iranian-backed militant groups that are now hitting U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria on a regular basis.
For Ukraine, the U.S. has already provided more than $44 billion — and allies have sent an additional $35 billion — in weapons packages that range from millions of bullets to air defense systems, advanced European and U.S. battle tanks and, finally, pledges for F-16 fighter jets.
But Ukraine still needs more, and after almost 20 months of shipping arms to Ukraine, cracks are beginning to show. Some European countries such as Poland have scaled back support, noting their need to maintain adequate fighting ability to defend themselves.
Ukrainian officials have strongly pushed back on suggestions they are in a stalemate with Russia after a long-awaited counteroffensive over the summer did not radically change the battle lines on the ground. In a visit to Washington last week, Andriy Yermak, head of the president’s office, provided no details but confirmed that Ukrainian forces had finally pushed through to the east bank of the Dnieper River, which has essentially served as the immovable front line between Ukrainian and Russian forces for months.
However, as winter sets in it will become more difficult for either side to make large gains due to ground conditions. That could further work against Ukraine if U.S. lawmakers perceive there’s time to wait before more funds are needed. Ukraine and the U.S. expect that this winter Russia will go after Ukraine’s infrastructure again, like the power grid, making air defenses critical.
Fred Kagan, a senior resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, said it would be a mistake to think there is time to wait.
“If we stop providing aid to Ukraine, it’s not that the stalemate continues. The aid is actually essential to preventing the Russians from beginning to maneuver again in ways that can allow them to defeat Ukraine,” Kagan said. “So the cost of cutting off aid is that Russia wins and Ukraine loses and NATO loses.”
Further complicating the support is that the Pentagon has only a dwindling amount of money left in this year’s budget to keep sending weapons to Ukraine, and Congress is months late on getting a new budget passed and has not taken up a supplemental spending package that would include Ukraine aid.
Since the war began in February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $44.2 billion in weapons to Ukraine, but the funding is nearly gone. The Pentagon can send about $5 billion more in weapons and equipment from its own stocks. But it only has about $1 billion in funding to replace those stocks. As a result, recent announcements of weapons support have been of much smaller dollar amounts, such as the $100 million package announced in Kyiv by Austin, than in months past.
“You have seen smaller packages, because we need to parse these out,” Pentagon deputy press secretary Sabrina Singh said Thursday. “Because we don’t know when Congress is going to pass our supplemental package.”
Officials have been urging Congress to provide additional money, but a growing number of Senate Republicans have opposed additional Ukraine aid without securing support for other unrelated provisions, such as stricter immigration laws and additional funding for border control. A stopgap spending bill passed last week to avoid a government shutdown during the holidays did not include any money for Ukraine.
Copp reported from Washington.
About Tara Copp
Tara Copp is a Pentagon correspondent for the Associated Press. She was previously Pentagon bureau chief for Sightline Media Group.
18. Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve
Excerpts:
The ongoing transformation articulated in Force Design 2030 must address these ongoing changes in war’s character.46 The Marine Corps’ capabilities priortized for transformation, such as long-range precision fires, advanced loitering munitions, and electronic warfare, support ongoing trends.47 Other changes in warfare will require careful consideration to ensure the Marine Corps remains relevant and ready for the future.
To position itself for this future, the Marine Corps needs to absorb lessons from Ukraine, as well as understand China’s systems-confrontation approach.48 When updating MCDP-1 Warfighting, Hart’s original version of bidimensional dislocation should be retained, as well as the importance of the human dimension. War remains fundamentally a contest of human wills—there is more to war than blowing up targets. Leadership, military command, morale, and the will to fight are key ingredients of success, as Ukraine demonstrates. Prioritizing the destruction of matériel deemphasizes moral and cognitive factors, an all-too-common orientation within some circles in the U.S. military.49
Properly understood and updated, maneuver warfare remains critical to the future. Seizing the initiative, seeking an information advantage, exploiting tempo, and employing surprise and deception remain relevant. The recent Hamas attack on Israel shows that surprise can still be achieved, regardless of new intelligence and sensing capabilities. But the means required to knock an adversary off balance and generate the series of violent shocks that break his ability to respond must be applied in an expanded set of domains.
One soldier who pronounced the death of maneuver quipped that “philosophies do not win battles.”50 True, but it takes intellectually prepared commanders to win battles, and that is what this debate is about. The maneuver warfare doctrine of the 1980s was an effort to reshape forces with the hardware and software to defeat large-scale opponents. That challenge is no less relevant today and even more urgent.
Maneuver Warfare Is Not Dead, But It Must Evolve
Marine Corps Essay Contest—Second Prize
Sponsored by U.S. Naval Institute
The attrition versus maneuver argument is an irrelevant distraction.
By Colonel Pat Garrett, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired), and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired)
November 2023 Proceedings Vol. 149/11/1,449
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2023/november/maneuver-warfare-not-dead-it-must-evolve?mc_cid=223eaa62cc&mc_eid=70bf478f36
usni.org ·
Maneuver warfare is a fraud, and maneuver as a warfighting function is dead. At least, that is what some scholars and military analysts claim. We disagree. However, there are ongoing changes in the character of war fueling perceptions that should be addressed. Warfare’s changing character often alters the balance between offense and defense, and the U.S. military faces one of these periodic shifts today.
These changes require professionals to think creatively about the implications. As warfare evolves, remaining ready in the face of technological change is key to the profession of arms. The challenges posed in today’s operating environment complicate maneuver and should stimulate updates to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1: Warfighting.
Current Debate
A U.S. Marine with the Maritime Special Purpose Force, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, provides security in an urban environment training course on Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in November 2022. While there are higher costs for urban operations, both movement and offensive maneuver are still possible in steel and masonry canyons. U.S. Marine Corps (Rafael Brambila-Pelay).
Since its post-Vietnam advent, maneuver warfare has always been a contested concept, despite its successful imprint on U.S. Marine Corps and Army doctrine.1 The roots of this 40-plus year argument can be traced back to the post–World War I writings of Basil Liddell Hart.2 The war’s massive human and matériel toll, accentuated by both sides’ pursuit of attrition strategies, propelled his search for alternatives that might produce more decisive results at reduced costs. Over the course of history, Hart found, “in all decisive campaigns, the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to his overthrow.”3 This concept of dislocation lies at the heart of today’s maneuver warfare.4
Attrition as a strategy received further criticism after Vietnam, where the decade-long U.S. attempt to wear down North Vietnam’s war-making abilities manifestly failed to achieve its desired aim, even though the United States had overwhelming combat and logistical superiority. Both the Army and Marine Corps turned their conceptual focus back to the burgeoning Soviet threat in Europe and the Middle East. The Army’s AirLand Battle concept sought to leverage new technologies, especially deep-attack systems, integrated with mechanized maneuver forces.5 Prompted by writings from Vietnam veterans, as well as ideas from Bill Lind and John Boyd, the Marine Corps began to explore maneuver warfare.6 The latter stressed decision-making and cognitive factors often overlooked in U.S. military theory.7 Despite the status it has achieved in Marine Corps doctrine, maneuver warfare has generated critics over the past decade.8
Several scholars have recently resurrected this debate, once again underscoring attrition and the physical destruction of an adversary as a surer path to victory. These critics have three substantial arguments. First, including the term “cognitive paralysis” as a method or goal in emerging concepts is suspect. This evolution from dislocation to paralysis appeared in the emerging Army multidomain operations concept.9 Academics have found trying to gain “strategic paralysis” against major competitors problematic. They contend that imposing multiple dilemmas to paralyze an enemy must be rethought in favor of attrition, explicitly questioning the historical basis of Hart and Boyd’s writings.10
Second, they argue the changing character of war makes maneuver harder to execute successfully.11 The proliferation of new intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition, and reconnaissance capabilities makes offensive maneuver easier to detect and robs maneuver warfare of any chance of surprise.
Finally, they contend maneuver warfare is irrelevant to urban operations, which they presume to be a prominent future operating environment given the record density of population in cities.12 More than 55 percent of the world now lives in a city, and the World Bank projects that level will exceed two-thirds by 2050.13 This density seems to make canalizing ground formations inevitable, which appears to offset the mobility advantages of mechanized armies.14
What the Critics Get Right
Today’s attrition advocates are correct that technology trends improve targeting and surveillance and enhance the range and precision of strike assets. The “sense-to-strike” function is now a tightly compressed kill chain.15 Offensive maneuver forces will be hard pressed to obtain decisive results. This will be particularly true for offensive operations that require penetrating prepared and layered defenses, such as seen in the Russia-Ukraine war.16 The critics also are correct in noting the importance of endurance, logistics, and munitions inventories.17
The critics are right about the aspirational stretch behind strategic paralysis, too, and will be happy to hear that the Army has dropped it as a theory of victory. That service’s latest doctrine now states:
Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail.18
While the primacy given to destruction in this definition may satisfy the critics, more important is the emphasis on four different and parallel defeat mechanisms in pursuit of disruption and the reduced coherence of the adversary’s ability to command. Marine Corps doctrine has been aligned with this since 1997.19
Why Attrition Is Insufficient
The firepower/attrition versus maneuver argument is a red herring. Black and white distinctions between destruction and maneuver, or physical and psychological effects, are oversimplified and overlook the interactive and reciprocal effects of actual combat. Attrition is too often used as a synonym for fires, which by themselves are a necessary but rarely sufficient component in warfare.20 Reducing an adversary’s capability is required to produce the shock or loss that induces him to recognize that the campaign cannot be continued. Under certain circumstances, a strategy of attrition may be necessary and effective.21 More often, the synergy of combinations is needed.
Second, arguments about the growing difficulty of conducting maneuver given the ongoing technology revolution are not easily dismissed. The current technological shift favors defense.22 Yet, the same was true in 1863 at Gettysburg, 1904–5 in Manchuria, and along the Western Front from 1914 to 1918. Following each battle, the military profession evolved its tactics and weapons to regain maneuver on the battlefield.23 Yet, there are situations in which offensive maneuver is required: to recover a salient, improve positional advantage, or overcome an attempted fait accompli against a U.S. ally.24 The challenge is how to design a force that can generate both fires and maneuver to succeed in an operating environment that privileges the defense.
Critics too often conflate the maneuver warfare concept with maneuver/movement. The former “seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions.”25 Rapid movement is part of it, but so is firepower/destruction. The key is to avoid applying fires purely in an extended grinding down of an enemy’s defenses and instead focus on rendering the enemy incapable of effective counteraction “by shattering their moral, mental, and physical cohesion—their ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole.”26
Third, attrition is a two-edged sword; like tempo, it is relational. It is not a one-sided game. Ultimately, it is a function of interaction with an opponent who is attempting to reduce U.S. capacity as well. Current Marine Corps doctrine does not ignore attrition; in fact, it explicitly recognizes that modern warfare “often involves extremely high attrition of selected enemy forces.” The distinction is that the focus is not on a slow and expensive reduction of the enemy’s matériel, but on the disruption it causes. Instead of pursuing the cumulative destruction of each enemy platform as the victory mechanism, the aim is “to attack the enemy ‘system’”—to incapacitate the enemy systemically.”27
Finally, urbanization is a legitimate concern; urban combat somewhere in the future is a near certainty.28 The experiences of Mogadishu, Fallujah, and Mosul give plenty of cause for concern. However, maneuver into and around cities is feasible, including air, subterranean corridors, and riverine options. True, there are many “surfaces” and higher costs for urban operations, but both movement and offensive maneuver are possible, if often difficult, in steel and masonry canyons.29 Moreover, urban operations are hard for a defender whose command and logistics likewise can be isolated and exploited. There are ways to crack this nut if the Marine Corps prepares for it, including unmanned and remote options.30 Understanding the “flows” of urban systems is important, and unmanned systems and sensor packages can help facilitate effective fire and maneuver.31
Yet, while attrition may be necessary, it is not on its own sufficient. Truly monodimensional solutions are theoretically possible but historically rare. We do not discount the value of fires, but the record for liberating territory and achieving decisive results purely through attrition is thin at best.32 Even in the most grinding campaigns, outcomes typically turn on the degree to which attrition and maneuver successfully complement each other. Instead of a return to the costly and stagnant operational designs that sparked Hart’s writings, there are several promising elements for a combination approach, one focused on the disruption of the adversary’s ability to direct the combination of fires and maneuver—a true system-disruption objective.
U.S. Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 2, Combat Logistics Regiment 2, 2nd Marine Logistics Group, conduct a three-mile hike during Marine Rotational Force-Europe 23.1 in Setermoen, Norway, in January 2023. The Marine Corps must design a force that can generate both fires and maneuver to succeed in any operating environment. U.S. Marine Corps (Christian M. Garcia)
The Solution
Given favorable terrain and time for proper preparation, ongoing developments in sensing, precision, and speed of engagement favor the defense. Force design and doctrine must account for that. Mobile and armored platforms are needed but must be rethought with respect to weight, speed, sensing, and firepower tradeoffs.33
Technology, especially robotics, affords options that allow offensive maneuver to offset the inherent advantages of the defense.34 No single approach is likely to be effective alone, especially crossing the more transparent “dead zone” across future battlefields. As General Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff of the British Army, underscores: “Success will be determined by combined arms and multi-domain competence.”35
Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General Mark Milley, finds this consistent with the new U.S. Joint Warfighting Concept, which calls for expanded maneuver as a key tenet.36 This challenges commanders to think creatively about “maneuver through land, sea, air, space, cyber, the electromagnetic spectrum, information space, and the cognitive realm.”37
To succeed, maneuver forces increasingly will need to employ unmanned systems. Improved mobile air defense and counter–unmanned aerial systems will facilitate maneuver, while robotics, lethal autonomous unmanned aerial and ground vehicles, and advanced electronic warfare capabilities will enable mobility. These unmanned systems can maneuver in swarms and complicate targeting, forcing expenditure of high-cost munitions to kill cheaper unmanned systems.38 Ultimately, these trends mean that “maneuver” will be reflected across the full array of warfighting domains.
The ongoing fight in Ukraine offers a glimpse of the future. Some military analysts characterize the war as attrition-based and the antithesis of maneuver warfare. Some even see Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensive as a strategy of attrition.39 Certainly, the war has featured intensive expenditures of artillery ammunition.40 But the stunning Ukrainian counteroffensive to capture Kharkiv in September 2022 should be seen as an exemplar of maneuver warfare given the feints, deception, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System strikes, and maneuver forces used. Operational surprise was used against weak Russian elements (a gap) that led to their rapid collapse.41 As noted in Time:
The Russians were caught off guard. Many fled in disarray, leaving behind weapons and equipment. Local reports painted a humiliating picture of retreat, describing soldiers stealing civilians’ clothes, bicycles, and cars to escape. In six days, the Ukrainian military retook an estimated 3,000 square km of Russian-held territory, including strategically important rail hubs used to resupply its forces.42
This was classic dislocation and a manifestation of maneuverist thinking. As Russian operations against Kyiv clearly demonstrate, firepower is not enough.43
Today, Ukraine is doing much more than just matching Russia’s methods. Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the United Kingdom’s Chief of Defence Staff, recently characterized Ukraine’s latest approach as “starve, stretch and strike.” In the first phase, the Ukrainians struck deep against Russian command-and-control nodes and logistics to dislocate its commanders and starve the defenders of supplies. In the “stretch” phase, the Ukrainians are probing Russian lines seeking gaps and forcing Russian reactions that are potential mistakes. In the culminating phase, precision fires and full domain maneuver from the trained assault brigades and overhead drones will exploit the defender’s disrupted defense. Liddell Hart would be satisfied.
Recommendations
Reports of the death of maneuver warfare are premature, but its continued utility depends on adaptation.44 Updating maneuver warfare to “system disruption warfare” would better stress disrupting adversary systems across all domains. This comports with existing Marine Corps doctrine. “Surfaces and gaps” must be thought of in all dimensions, including time, and domains, not simply as dashing through weak spots in a cloud of dust, driving for the enemy’s rear.45 Moreover, combined arms must shift from simple “steel-on-target” thinking to degrading an opponent’s ability to observe and disrupting the coherence of his whole system. This is not to diminish firepower and lethality, but instead to promote the integration of all warfighting functions across all domains.
The ongoing transformation articulated in Force Design 2030 must address these ongoing changes in war’s character.46 The Marine Corps’ capabilities priortized for transformation, such as long-range precision fires, advanced loitering munitions, and electronic warfare, support ongoing trends.47 Other changes in warfare will require careful consideration to ensure the Marine Corps remains relevant and ready for the future.
To position itself for this future, the Marine Corps needs to absorb lessons from Ukraine, as well as understand China’s systems-confrontation approach.48 When updating MCDP-1 Warfighting, Hart’s original version of bidimensional dislocation should be retained, as well as the importance of the human dimension. War remains fundamentally a contest of human wills—there is more to war than blowing up targets. Leadership, military command, morale, and the will to fight are key ingredients of success, as Ukraine demonstrates. Prioritizing the destruction of matériel deemphasizes moral and cognitive factors, an all-too-common orientation within some circles in the U.S. military.49
Properly understood and updated, maneuver warfare remains critical to the future. Seizing the initiative, seeking an information advantage, exploiting tempo, and employing surprise and deception remain relevant. The recent Hamas attack on Israel shows that surprise can still be achieved, regardless of new intelligence and sensing capabilities. But the means required to knock an adversary off balance and generate the series of violent shocks that break his ability to respond must be applied in an expanded set of domains.
One soldier who pronounced the death of maneuver quipped that “philosophies do not win battles.”50 True, but it takes intellectually prepared commanders to win battles, and that is what this debate is about. The maneuver warfare doctrine of the 1980s was an effort to reshape forces with the hardware and software to defeat large-scale opponents. That challenge is no less relevant today and even more urgent.
1. Craig Tucker, “False Prophets: The Myth of Maneuver Warfare and the Inadequacies of FMFM-1 Warfighting,” Ft. Leavenworth Command and Staff College, 1995; Wilf Owens, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud,” Small Wars Journal, 5 September 2008; and Maj Joseph Williams, USMC, “Mindlessness in Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette (August 2021): 63–5.
2. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d ed. (New York: Penguin, 1991), 5–6; Richard Swain, “B. H. Liddell Hart and the Creation of a Theory of War, 1919–1933,” Armed Forces & Society 17, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 35–51; and Azar Gat, A History of Military Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 645–95.
3. Brian Bond, Liddell-Hart: A Study of His Military Thought (London: Cassell, 1979), 55.
4. Hart, Strategy, 5–6.
5. Huba Wass de Czege, “Army Doctrinal Reform,” in The Defense Reform Debate, Asa Clark, ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 101–104.
6. Marinus, “Marine Corps Maneuver Warfare: The Historical Context,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 2020): 85–7. See also William Lind, The Maneuver Warfare Handbook (London: Routledge, 1985).
7. Antulio J. Echevarria Jr., War’s Logic: Strategic Thought and the American Way of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 169–92. For an exposition on Clausewitz and Boyd, see Martin Samuels, “The Finely-Honed Blade: Clausewitz and Boyd on Friction and Moral Factors,” MCU Expeditions, 2020.
8. LtCol Thaddeus Drake, USMC, “The Fantasy of MCDP 1,” Marine Corps Gazette (October 2020): 33–36: Williams, “Mindlessness in Maneuver Warfare,” 63–65; and LtCol Nate Lauterbach, USMC, and Heather Venable, “Why Attack Weakness? A Reconsideration of Maneuver and Attrition,” Marine Corps Gazette (September 2021): 98–101.
9. On creating simultaneous multiple dilemmas, in Air Force doctrine see Air Force Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-99, Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All-Domain Operations, Curtis LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education, 2020, 1.
10. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Manoeuvre versus Attrition in U.S. Military Operations,” Survival (August/September 2021): 131–48; Heather Venable, “Paralysis in Peer Conflict? The Material Versus the Mental in 100 Years of Military Thinking,” War on the Rocks, 1 December 2021; and Michael Kofman, “A Bad Romance: U.S. Operational Concepts Need to Ditch Their Love Affair with Cognitive Paralysis and Make Peace with Attrition,” Modern Warfare Institute, 31 March 2021.
11. Gady, “Manoeuvre versus Attrition,” 132; and Amos C. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” The RUSI Journal 166, 6-7 (2021): 16–17.
12. Anthony King, Urban Warfare in the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 84.
13. Tadros Wahba et al., Demographic Trends and Urbanization (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 2021), 9.
14. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” 15–16.
15. Chris Brose, The Kill Chain, Defending America in the Future of High-Tech Warfare (New York: Hachette, 2020), 198–203.
16. Stephen Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver,” War on the Rocks, 22 November 2022.
17. Antulio J. Echevarria, “It’s Time to Recognize Sustainment as a Strategic Imperative,” War on the Rocks, 15 February 2023.
18. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0: Operations (Washington DC: Headquarters, U.S. Army, October 2022), 1–2.
19. Marinus, “Defeat Mechanisms,” Marine Corps Gazette (July 2021): 101–6; and LtCol Frank Hoffman, USMC (Ret.), “Defeat Mechanisms in Modern Warfare,” Parameters 51, no. 4 (Winter 2021/2022): 49–66.
20. Lamar Tooke, “Blending Maneuver and Attrition,” Military Review 80, no. 2 (March-April 2000): 10–11; and J. Boone Bartholomees Jr., “The Issue of Attrition,” Parameters 40, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 5–19.
21. On attrition, see Carter Malkasian, A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002); and Cathal Nolan, The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2017), passim.
22. Col T. X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), “The Tactical Defense Becomes Dominant Again,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 103 (4th Quarter 2021): 10–17.
23. Paul Lockhart, Firepower: How Weapons Shaped Warfare (New York: Basic Books, 2021), 181–86; and Peter Hart, Fire and Movement; The British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).
24. Biddle, “Ukraine and the Future of Offensive Maneuver.”
25. U.S. Marine Corps, MCDP 1: Warfighting (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1997), 4-4.
26. MCDP 1, Warfighting, 4-5.
27. MCDP-1, Warfighting, 4-5.
28. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” 6.
29. For counterarguments, see John Spencer, “Maneuver Warfare and the Urban Battlefield,” Modern Warfare Institute, 11 March 2021.
30. Russell Glenn, Heavy Matter: Urban Operations’ Density of Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2000); Russell Glenn and Todd Helmus, A Tale of Three Cities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007); and Gian Gentile et al., Reimagining the Character of Urban Operations for the U.S. Army: How the Past Can Inform the Present and Future (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017), xiii-xiv.
31. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015), 52–115.
32. Surprisingly, the pro-attrition crowd spends little time looking at the history of their preferred option. On air power limitations, see Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). On developments against limited opponents see Phil Haun, Colin Jackson, and Timothy Schultz, eds., Air Power in the Age of Primacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022).
33. For some ideas about reconceptualizing the tank, see Azar Gat, The Future of the Tank and the Land Battlefield, The Institute for National Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv, 20 July 2023.
34. See Col T. X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.), “Technologies Converge and Power Diffuses: The Evolution of Small, Smart, and Cheap Weapons,” Policy Analysis, no. 786 (Washington, DC: The Cato Institute, 2016).
35. GEN Patrick Saunders, British Army, RUSI Land Warfare Conference, keynote speech, London, 26 June 2023.
36. GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, “Strategic Inflection Point,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 110 (3rd Quarter, 2023): 6–15.
37. Milley, “Strategic Inflection Point,” 12.
38. Eric Schmitt, “The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: Drone Swarms,” Wall Street Journal, 8 July 2023; and David Hambling, “Ukraine Wins First Drone vs. Drone Dogfight Against Russia,” Forbes, 4 October 2022.
39. Franz-Stefan Gady and Michael Kofman, “Ukraine’s Strategy of Attrition,” Survival 65, no. 2 (April/May 2023): 7–22.
40. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory,” RUSI Special Report (July 2022), 3–4; “Artillery Is Playing a Vital Role in Ukraine,” Economist, 2 May 2022; and Adam Pasick, “A Grinding Artillery War in Ukraine,” The New York Times, 6 May 2022.
41. Julian E. Barnes, Eric Schmidt, and Helene Cooper, “The Critical Moment Behind Ukraine’s Rapid Advance,” The New York Times, 13 September 2022; and Kateryna Stepanenko, Grace Mappes, George Barros, Layne Philipson, and Mason Clark, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment,” Institute for the Study of War, 9 September 2022.
42. Simon Schuster and Vera Bergengruen, “Inside the Ukrainian Counterstrike that Turned the Tide of the War,” Time, 26 September 2022.
43. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Julian E. Barnes, and Natalia Yermak, “Russia Learns Firepower Alone Is Not Enough,” The New York Times, 18 June 2023.
44. For a thorough assessment of maneuver warfare, see Christopher Tuck, “The Future of Manoeuvre Warfare,” in Mikael Weissmann and Niklas Nilsson, eds., Advanced Land Warfare; Tactics and Operations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2023).
45. Lawrence Freedman, “There Is Only One Way to Win a War of Attrition,” New Statesman, 1 August 2023.
46. Gen David Berger, USMC, Force Design 2030 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, March 2020); HON Robert Work, “Marine Force Design Overdue Despite Critic’s Claims,” Texas National Security Review 6, no. 3 (Summer 2023); and Berger, Force Design Annual Update 2023 (Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 5 June 2023).
47. Shashank Joshi, “A New Era of High-Tech War Has Begun,” Economist, 9 July 2023, 2–3.
48. Jeffrey Engstrom, Systems Confrontation and System Destruction Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018). See HON Robert Work, “A Joint Concept for Systems Warfare,” Center for a New American Security, December 2020.
49. For a balanced perspective on the human and moral dimensions of war, see Mick Ryan, War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 165–208.
50. Fox, “Manoeuvre Is Dead?” 7.
usni.org · November 1, 2023
19. Accounts of daily life with the Delta Force through 18 months of global training
Photos at the link: https://www.sandboxx.us/news/accounts-of-daily-life-with-the-delta-force-through-18-months-of-global-training/?mc_cid=223eaa62cc&mc_eid=70bf478f36
Accounts of daily life with the Delta Force through 18 months of global training
sandboxx.us · November 20, 2023
I recall the morning I drove in to work and saw a row of Polaris snowmobiles parked at the motor pool. I finished a bout of my morning physical training (PT) workout and had a shower. In those days I alternated a five-mile run with a six-to-eight-mile rucksack (ruck) force march carrying a 45-pound rucksack in the mornings. I don’t know which one was harder. On the ruck days it was the ruck days I felt were the hardest; but on days of the run… the run was definitely the hardest.
People would say and swear that I was a badass because of my daily PT regimen. Well, I sit before you all today in my wheelchair with titanium knees, another wrecked joint, and a scar of a completely excised belly. These things I hope to one day overcome… Regrets, I’ve had a few, but then again too few to mention. I did it my way (ha ha ha).
Those morning sessions were all discretionary PT, i.e. the individual could do what he wanted. However, there were plenty of “surprise” gut-check events, but as long as the individual was able to complete them, he was free to continue as he saw fit. Fail, and you found the Unit drumming up a new PT regime for you to complete over the next number of months… or be invited to leave. I never pissed cold on those surprise events; they kept a fellow honest and up to par. The Unit did not tolerate languor or monotony.
Going back on that morning, however, I was overcome by my interest in those pesky snowmobiles. At the breakfast table, I inquired if any of the brothers knew why the motor pool hosted a contingent of snowmobiles. The answer was they were for our A-squadron to conduct cold weather training in northern Vermont that winter. That would have to be cool somehow, even though it didn’t feature intentionally destroying… stuff! Nevertheless, although it’s hard to suck the fun out of snowmobiles, Delta would try its best to do that.
That cold weather training would be part of our 18-month-long training cycle.
Delta soldiers engage in training in severe cold weather. (US Army/Staff Sgt. Kent Redmon)
For the cold weather portion, we were hosted by the Tenth Mountain Division at Camp Ethen Allan in Vermont.
The way we got all the heavy gear to Ethen Allen was by overland tractor/ trailer. I got stuck as a driver because I had been to a Commercial Driver’s License (CDL) school. I damned myself for having obtained the license in the first place. There were three of us qualified to drive so we drove a lot.
Driving a big rig and immersing myself in the trucker’s society was interesting to be sure. I listened nonstop to the trucker’s chatter on my CB radio. It made me aware, to a degree, of the proliferation of human trafficking. (Years later, I went on to work on a task force that hunted human traffickers and human traffic networks, then on to write a book on my experience with the trafficking scourge.)
With the temperature at minus 45 degrees Fahrenheit, we didn’t accomplish much at Camp Ethen Allan other than just trying to stay at room temperature. Sleep is not the big thing in temperatures that low. I mostly stayed awake because I was afraid I would freeze to death if I fell asleep. I kept watch on my tent mate to make sure he wasn’t freezing to death… I was a rookie and made no qualms about it.
The worst thing that happened to us there was during one long night move when we suffered one broken leg, two snowmobiles with a pretty penny damage to them, and a partridge in a pear tree.
The broken-leg man was Kelly P. We all just called him Kelly when interfacing with him, but when referencing him we all referred to him as “that rat-phuq bas**rd.” We called that a spirit name. I wondered fervently what my spirit name was… Someone gave it away in a group chat and it turned out to be “language boy.” Eff them all, but I was okay with the name in that it was not a derogatory reference like… well, like Kelly’s nickname, for example – right?
The author’s assault team in Guyana. The man to the right is a Navy SEAL. (Courtesy of author)
With weeks of dangerous cold weather training behind, it was time to thaw out with generously hot weather in the jungles of British and French Guyana. We did plenty of heavy work with live-fire weapons drills, but most of our tenure of training was in a helicopter on water.
We had to use helicopters everywhere we went, but we had to board and deboard our helo transportation using small rubber-raiding boats. They wouldn’t let us just climb a helo that was touching down on the ground.
The big Chinook dual-blade medium transport was a great challenge by day, and by night presented a longing to be back at our jungle camp where it was reasonably safe, save from the insects.
Once there was no longer enough meat on our bones for the culinary whims of the resident insects, we flew back to Ft. Bragg where we parachuted back to our home base. We took off in aircraft of all kinds to travel to training sites and were always made to parachute back home just because we could.
A week of high-speed driving was our next stop for our training requirement. We redeployed home on a Friday from the jungle training and rolled out again on Monday for a one-week high-speed driving course in Arizona.
The whole driving experience was one of skill, technique, and destroyed cars. A critical time of the day after driving so offensively was that first hour returning from the race track driving rental cars to our hotel rooms. It took the men a wait time of about one hour to lose the desire to drive offensively and settle back into the domestic traffic schema. The commander’s warning notwithstanding, there was at least one car wreck with a broken collarbone gift for one of the boys.
The author in Jordan during the training cycle. (Courtesy of author)
To wrap up the 18-month training cycle, we flew to Jordan to conduct a 600-kilometer rough-country trek. That was by far the hardest work experience of the 18 months. It was all about the grandiose chore of changing a hundred or so tires that gave up in the rocky lava fields of Jordan.
At the end of the 18-month training cycle comes… the beginning of the next training cycle. Sometimes the desire to jack it all in approached us dangerously close, but a Navy SEAL once told me that under such circumstances… “don’t ring the bell.”
Don’t ring the bell is an expression the SEALs use. It comes from BUD/S – the SEALs’ qualification course – during which when a man quits, he is instructed to ring a large bell in their PT yards. This signals to the whole compound that another one quit just then. It is an occasion for the other candidates to reflect on the dream they had months or days ago when they first started BUD/S.
“He rang the bell, but I never will do that.”
By Almighty God and with Honor
geo sends
Read more from Sandboxx News
sandboxx.us · November 20, 2023
20. How the Islamic State Propaganda Machine is Exploiting the Israel-Hamas Conflict
Excerpts:
IS propaganda may be having the intended effect. On Oct. 22, French intelligence thwarted a plot by a three-man terrorist cell planning multiple attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe – including a car bombing at an Israeli embassy in Paris. Other anti-IS operations resulting in arrests have also taken place across Europe, and independent or unofficial propagandists and supporters of the group have become heavily involved in spreading pro-IS narratives to build support and incite violence. On Oct. 21, four Syrians were arrested in possession of knives and a hammer after detonating a pipe bomb at an Israeli embassy in Cyprus, and on Oct. 19, a Jordanian was detained in Texas on firearms charges and suspicion of preparing an attack; however, it is unclear if these incidents were inspired by IS.
There is also some threat within Israel itself, which IS has been criticizing since its foundation in 2014 and has been targeted domestically on occasion in past years. In fact, on Oct. 29, Israeli police and Shin Bet arrested three men in Sakhnin and Arraba on suspicion of plotting to commit violence on behalf of the Islamic State. On Nov. 16, Israeli police arrested three more suspects in Jerusalem who allegedly possessed pro-IS propaganda materials and had links to militants abroad. Given the intensity of the conflict between Hamas and Israel, few expect the situation to improve any time soon. And even as IS continues to have a particular disdain for Hamas, it does not mean that the jihadists will forgo taking advantage of the fighting for their own purpose—pushing supporters to strike in the West, nudging fence-sitters toward action, and aiming to radicalize a growing pool of angry individuals. These actions will push them closer toward extremist violence that will very likely have deadly results in the West.
How the Islamic State Propaganda Machine is Exploiting the Israel-Hamas Conflict - Irregular Warfare Initiative
irregularwarfare.org · by Lucas Webber, Colin P. Clarke · November 21, 2023
Since the Hamas raid on Israel on Oct. 7, the Islamic State (IS) has been attempting to exploit the resulting conflict to inspire its followers to commit acts of terrorism. Working through its central command apparatus, branches, and affiliates, as well as its legions of online supporters, IS seeks to capitalize on hostile sentiments stirred up throughout the Muslim world by Israel’s assault on Hamas in Gaza, launched in response to an attack that killed over 1,400 in Israel.
The Israeli counterattack has led to thousands of civilian casualties, including many children, with devastating images being shared throughout the world daily. In response, IS has called for its followers to join the fight and commit militant violence against Jewish, Israeli, and Western targets across the globe. There is likewise a real threat of IS Central and its branches carrying out coordinated external attacks and continuing to incite supporters to act. Current events are emboldening the Islamic State to continue inciting its followers while also looking to recruit new members. IS sees a real opportunity to mobilize radicalized Hamas supporters, taking advantage of the opportunity to capitalize upon the frenzy of rage that has accompanied large-scale mass protests, including many in the West.
It did not take long for IS followers to capitalize on the rage resulting from what many in the Muslim world considered to be the collective punishment of the Palestinian population living in Gaza. On Oct. 13, a 20-year-old man from Russia’s northern Caucasus region stabbed a teacher to death at a school in Arras, France. The perpetrator referenced the Hamas attack on video prior to the attack while identifying with the Islamic State cause. Then, on Oct. 16, a 45-year-old man of Tunisian descent shot and killed two Swedish soccer fans in Brussels. The gunman posted a video online stating he was acting on behalf of IS.
A number of pro-IS propaganda networks, publishing in a range of languages, sought to exploit the momentum, link the Brussels attack to Israel’s military operations in Gaza, and exalt the perpetrator as an example for other supporters to emulate. When looking at these unofficial but IS-aligned media outlets for instance, Al-Adiyat described the act as “blood for blood” and revenge for the suffering of Palestinians, while Al-Zuhd threatened that the “storm” would spread to the other capital cities of the West and beyond. Within hours of the attack, a pro-IS group chat with the express purpose of updating supporters on developments in Gaza was created.
Several days after the attack in Brussels, the Islamic State’s Central Command issued its most overt and aggressive call since the incident for attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and Western targets. IS celebrated the Brussels terrorist, boasted about European countries releasing statements about the elevated risk of IS attacks, and promised all nations that form part of the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh that they will continue to bleed at the hands of IS jihadists. In the editorial, IS labeled Hamas and Hezbollah apostates, denigrating the former as a stooge of Iran and the latter as a Shia group. IS further suggested that all its supporters and all Muslims should strike inside Israel and “ target the Jewish presence throughout the world, whatever the form of this presence, especially the Jewish neighborhoods in America and Europe,” as well as Israeli embassies. They should also, IS said, “arm themselves with whatever military equipment is available to them, especially the explosive belts that were absent from the arena of confrontation with the Jews.” The communique likewise demanded that IS supporters conduct attacks inside the West – in retaliation for their war on IS and for US-led Western support for Israel.
The Islamic State’s Af-Pak branch, which has emerged as the organization’s most internationally-minded network, has also been vocal since early in the conflict alongside aligned pro-IS Khorasan Province propagandists. ISKP’s Al-Azaim Foundation for Media Production released a video on the war, and its partnered South Asian outlet Al-Zuhd published statements encouraging followers to make hijrah to Palestine as was done in Iraq and took the opportunity to criticize the Taliban’s lack of action to protect Gaza. The latest issue of its flagship Voice of Khurasan magazine, published on Nov. 19, places great emphasis on the conflict by taking aim at Hamas for being “traitors of Islam”, allying with Iran, and “playing with the innocent blood and souls of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip on behalf of the Rafidah,” while threatening Israel with destruction via a future IS-led war that will bring down the “Zionist army”.
Interestingly, while IS pushes its supporters to carry out violence on the heels of Oct. 7, the group has refrained from praising Hamas, unlike al-Qaeda and some affiliates. Numerous al-Qaeda-linked groups praised Hamas while also celebrating the death of Israelis. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, al-Qaeda’s South Asian franchise, labeled the Hamas attack the deadliest blow to Israel in the long history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, noting that “the attack exposed the cowardice of Israeli soldiers.” Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen lauded the Hamas attack and spoke about the “myth” of Israeli military might, prodding its supporters in the Muslim world to harness the momentum of the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” the name Hamas gave to its operation. Al-Shabaab’s statement declared: “we salute all the brave heroes, the brave commandos, and all those stationed in the Holy Land, and we say to all of them: May God reward you with good on behalf of the Islamic Ummah [worldwide Islamic community], and may God reward you for your jihad and your noble deeds.” Numerous other jihadist groups seemed to take pride in the Hamas attack, including Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Hurras al-Din, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Ansar al-Islam, to name just a few.
To most jihadism scholars, it was unsurprising that IS eschewed joining al-Qaeda in praising Hamas. For years, IS has denigrated Hamas and labeled it un-Islamic because the Gaza-based group recognized the law of man, sitting for and winning elections in 2006. Moreover, IS criticizes Hamas for its interpretation of sharia and regularly castigates the group for receiving support from Iran, a Shia country that is often on the receiving end of IS’s takfirist sectarian attacks. Still, even as IS maintains its disdain for Hamas, it will not refrain from acting in an opportunistic manner to take advantage of a heightened threat environment. There is also an element of outbidding at play, with IS seeking not just to capitalize on the moment but also to position itself as the true defender of the Palestinian cause.
As mentioned in recent congressional testimony from FBI Director Christopher Wray, the Hamas-Israel conflict could inspire violent extremists and lone actors to attempt attacks on US soil. According to Wray, “Here in the United States, our most immediate concern is that violent extremists—individuals or small groups—will draw inspiration from the events in the Middle East to carry out attacks against Americans going about their daily lives.” In the past, IS has leveraged its ability to inspire individuals online, urging supporters in the West to launch lone-actor attacks against a range of targets. While inspired attacks are typically less lethal than coordinated plots, they can still be deadly, and consume counterterrorism bandwidth.
In its weekly newsletter al-Naba, IS urged its followers to participate in its propaganda campaign against Israel and to conduct attacks against priority targets, which included targeting Jewish neighborhoods in America, Europe and the rest of the world; attacking the Jewish and “Crusader” embassies with burning and vandalism; targeting Jewish temples (synagogues) spread everywhere; attacking Jewish nightclubs and targeting their visitors with death; and targeting Jewish economic interests spread throughout the world. A subsequent al-Naba issue, released in mid-November, criticized the rulers of Arab states and other Muslim countries for fake posturing, enabling, and even being complicit in the Israeli assault on Gaza.
IS propaganda may be having the intended effect. On Oct. 22, French intelligence thwarted a plot by a three-man terrorist cell planning multiple attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets in Europe – including a car bombing at an Israeli embassy in Paris. Other anti-IS operations resulting in arrests have also taken place across Europe, and independent or unofficial propagandists and supporters of the group have become heavily involved in spreading pro-IS narratives to build support and incite violence. On Oct. 21, four Syrians were arrested in possession of knives and a hammer after detonating a pipe bomb at an Israeli embassy in Cyprus, and on Oct. 19, a Jordanian was detained in Texas on firearms charges and suspicion of preparing an attack; however, it is unclear if these incidents were inspired by IS.
There is also some threat within Israel itself, which IS has been criticizing since its foundation in 2014 and has been targeted domestically on occasion in past years. In fact, on Oct. 29, Israeli police and Shin Bet arrested three men in Sakhnin and Arraba on suspicion of plotting to commit violence on behalf of the Islamic State. On Nov. 16, Israeli police arrested three more suspects in Jerusalem who allegedly possessed pro-IS propaganda materials and had links to militants abroad. Given the intensity of the conflict between Hamas and Israel, few expect the situation to improve any time soon. And even as IS continues to have a particular disdain for Hamas, it does not mean that the jihadists will forgo taking advantage of the fighting for their own purpose—pushing supporters to strike in the West, nudging fence-sitters toward action, and aiming to radicalize a growing pool of angry individuals. These actions will push them closer toward extremist violence that will very likely have deadly results in the West.
Lucas Webber is a researcher focused on geopolitics and violent non-state actors. He is cofounder/editor at militantwire.com and is on Twitter/X @LucasADWebber.
Colin P. Clarke is a Senior Research Fellow at The Soufan Center. He is the Director of Research at The Soufan Group, where his research focuses on domestic and transnational terrorism, international security, and geopolitics. Prior to joining The Soufan Group, Clarke was a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he spent a decade researching terrorism, insurgency, and criminal networks.
Main image: Members from the Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service present Marine Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with a flag from Bartilah, a town recaptured just outside of Mosul from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This flag symbolizes the efforts of Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve composed of U.S. Army Soldiers, U.S. Marine Corps Marines, U.S. Navy Sailors, United States Air Force Airmen and coalition military forces. (Dominique A. Pineiro/U.S. Navy)
21. DoD Commends Release of 2023 Women, Peace, and Security Strategy and National Action Plan
The 50 page Women, Peace, and Security Strategy and National Action Plan can be downloaded here:https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/U.S.-Strategy-and-National-Action-Plan-on-Women-Peace-and-Security.pdf
DoD Commends Release of 2023 Women, Peace, and Security Strategy and National Action Plan
defense.gov
Release
Immediate Release
Nov. 20, 2023 |
On October 31, 2023, the anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), the White House released the 2023 U.S. WPS Strategy and National Action Plan. This was the second U.S. Government WPS strategy, reflecting the progress made and lessons learned since the release of the 2019 Strategy on WPS.
The 2023 Strategy is a result of coordination among the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense (DoD).
WPS principles are integral to U.S. national security and advance National Defense Strategy objectives by enhancing the recruitment, readiness, and retention of our joint force and defense workforce; shaping DoD operations to incorporate a gender perspective; and working with allies and partners on WPS implementation to build resilience against competitors' coercive actions.
In the last four years, DoD has made significant strides implementing and institutionalizing WPS. Notable efforts across DoD include:
- Advancing women's meaningful participation in the U.S. military, including by enhancing protections against sexual assault and harassment. Secretary Austin directed the establishment of the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military to take bold action to address sexual assault and harassment in the U.S. military. The subsequent report identified more than eighty recommendations for DoD to improve climate and culture, prevent sexual assault and sexual harassment, better care for survivors, and hold perpetrators accountable.
- Investing in and establishing a Gender Advisory Workforce by creating Gender Advisor positions across the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and Services, and the Combatant Commands. These full-time Gender Advisors will promote women's meaningful participation in the U.S. military across DoD Components and in the military and security forces of partner nations.
- Embedding WPS principles into defense engagements with partner nations around the world. In the Western Hemisphere, Secretary Austin and Chilean Defense Minister Maya Fernandez agreed to create a WPS Subcommittee to the Defense Consultative Committee, the annual bilateral meeting between the United States and Chile led by the DoD Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chilean Ministry of Defense. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command created a regional gender advisor course to train personnel from partner nation militaries to develop the skills necessary to operationalize and institutionalize WPS practices within the defense sectors of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
Following the release of the 2023 WPS Strategy, DoD will now turn to implementation.
The 2023 U.S. WPS Strategy and National Action Plan can be found at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/31/fact-sheet-release-of-the-2023-women-peace-and-security-strategy-and-national-action-plan/
Subscribe to Defense.gov Products
Choose which Defense.gov products you want delivered to your inbox.
Subscribe
The Department of Defense provides the military forces needed to deter war and ensure our nation's security.
defense.gov
22. Philippines launches joint sea, air patrols with U.S. military
Philippines launches joint sea, air patrols with U.S. military
Reuters · by Mikhail Flores
- Summary
- Patrols start in northernmost Philippine island near Taiwan
- US, Philippines deploy combat, surveillance planes, navy ships
- Manila beefs up U.S. ties this year as relations with China sour
MANILA, Nov 21 (Reuters) - The militaries of the Philippines and the United States launched joint patrols on Tuesday in waters near Taiwan, officials of the Southeast Asian nation said, a move likely to fan further tension with China.
Security engagements between the treaty allies have soared this year, including a decision to almost double the number of Philippine bases the American military can access, some facing Taiwan, and their largest-ever joint military drill in April.
This week's three-day joint air and maritime exercise was a "significant initiative" to boost interoperability between the two, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said.
"I am confident this ... will contribute to a more secure and stable environment for our people," he said on social media platform X.
The drill would start off in Mavulis island, the Philippines' northernmost point, located about 100 km (62 miles) off Taiwan, said Eugene Cabusao, spokesperson for the Northern Luzon command.
It will end in the West Philippine Sea, the name Manila uses for waters in the South China Sea that fall within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
The Philippine military said three navy vessels, two FA-50 light combat aircraft and a A-29B Super Tucano light attack plane would participate, while the United States would send a littoral combat ship and a P8-A maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft.
The news comes a day after Marcos told a forum in Hawaii the situation in the South China Sea had become more "dire", with the Chinese military inching closer to the Philippine coastline.
The patrols, which are likely to irk China, are a sign the Philippines is stepping up its defence posture amid what it described as China's "aggressive activities" in the highly strategic waters, long seen as a potential flashpoint between the United States and China.
China's embassy in Manila did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the exercise.
China claims most of the South China Sea on the basis of a "nine-dash line" that stretches as far as 1,500 km (900 miles) south of its mainland, cutting into the EEZs of rival claimants Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.
Marcos has forged closer ties with Washington since assuming office last year after a testy relationship with former President Rodrigo Duterte, who had pivoted closer to Beijing in exchange for infrastructure projects and investments.
Ties with China have soured under Marcos, with repeated standoffs between Chinese and Filipino vessels in waters claimed by both countries, prompting heated exchanges of rhetoric and concerns of an escalation.
Marcos recently met Chinese President Xi Jinping in a bid to reduce the tension.
The joint patrol with the United States showed the Manila was making a stand over the South China Sea, said Jay Batongbacal, director of the Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea in Manila, the capital.
"It shows that the Philippines is really firming up its posture on West Philippine Sea issues," Batongbacal said.
Reporting by Mikhail Flores and Karen Lema; Editing by Martin Petty and Clarence Fernandez
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.
Acquire Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Reuters · by Mikhail Flores
23. Opinion | Evidence confirms Israel’s al-Shifa claims, so critics move the goal posts
Such is the way in information warfare.
Opinion | Evidence confirms Israel’s al-Shifa claims, so critics move the goal posts
The Washington Post · by Jennifer Rubin · November 20, 2023
For weeks, many mainstream media outlets and Israel’s harshest critics around the world have condemned Israel for fighting in and around the al-Shifa Hospital in the Gaza Strip. Doctors there denied there were terrorists present. They denied it was a legitimate military target. No hostages there, we were told. Now we know those assertions were flat wrong.
News of an agreement for the imminent release of dozens of hostages, a five-day pause in fighting and a surge of humanitarian aid should not obscure the controversy surrounding the hospital.
The Israel Defense Forces, as news outlets reported last week, found “automatic weapons, grenades, ammunition and flak jackets” as well as “an operational command centre and technological assets belonging to Hamas, indicating that the terrorist organization uses the hospital for terrorist purposes.” Moreover, the IDF revealed evidence of a tunnel:
Breaking: The IDF released footage of a terror tunnel on the grounds of the Shifa Hospital.
Add this to the list of Hamas’ war crimes. #FreeGazaFromHamas #AlShifaHospital pic.twitter.com/ogUAn1v7HO
— Israel ישראל (@Israel) November 16, 2023
In addition, Israeli forces found a Hamas truck loaded with weapons:
EXPOSED:
In the Shifa Hospital complex, IDF troops found a hidden booby-trapped vehicle containing a large number of weapons, including:
· AK-47s
· RPGs
· sniper rifles
· grenades
· other explosives
See for yourself: pic.twitter.com/TApCThR9OM
— Israel Defense Forces (@IDF) November 16, 2023
And, tragically, the IDF found in the immediate area the bodies of two hostages taken on Oct. 7. (Later on Sunday, the IDF revealed more extensive footage of the tunnel and video of two hostages entering the hospital.)
Meanwhile, the Biden administration has been forthcoming about its own independent evidence of terrorist activity in and around the hospital, as the Wall Street Journal reported: “The signals intelligence, which was picked up in recent weeks, was among several pieces of U.S.-gathered information, the people said.” It was among the information that led the White House and Pentagon to announce Tuesday for the first time that the United States believed Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, known as PIJ, were using al-Shifa Hospital ‘as a way to conceal and support their military operations and hold hostages.’” U.S. intelligence, the report said, “was based on multiple streams of data and was collected independently of Israel.”
Media reports generically have conceded that a “hospital or medical facility can lose its special legal status if it is used for a military purpose that is ‘harmful to the enemy,’ rather than just for medical care.” However, they have yet to make clear that Israel correctly characterized al-Shifa.
After the evidence was presented, did the media go back to the sources that misled them about terrorist activity? I have yet to see that. Cable and network news shows that featured critics claiming this was purely a hospital have not invited those guests back to explain their misstatements. The news organizations have not leveled with audiences that they were manipulated.
The New York Times, invited to tour the hospital with IDF, declared, “The controlled visit will not settle the question of whether Hamas, the armed Palestinian group that rules Gaza, has been using Al-Shifa Hospital to hide weapons and command centers, as Israel has said.” Really? I suppose if you believe all this evidence was cleverly manufactured it doesn’t “settle” the matter. Otherwise, it demolishes claims that this was purely a civilian facility.
Critics demand that Israel now show it was a “command center,” a generic term without definition and without legal significance. It was used as a military facility. Period. For some, no evidence will ever be enough to undermine the credibility of sources whose false claims about the hospital have too often been accepted at face value.
There are legitimate questions as to whether civilians got sufficient warnings and were given adequate time to leave. Israel’s individual operations should be scrutinized to determine how much warning was given, whether the military objective was sufficient to justify civilian losses and whether civilians were protected to the greatest extent possible. And Israel should be forthcoming in providing evidence of its efforts to protect patients and doctors. That is how the laws of war operate, with specificity and attention to the intent of the parties. However, efforts to characterize the hospital siege in and of itself as proof of Israeli “war crimes” were inaccurate; media accounts should reflect that and underscore the falsity of information they were given.
Pro-Hamas apologists and other anti-Zionists desperately have tried to turn Israel — the victim of horrific war crimes, including badly underreported crimes of sexual violence — into the perpetrator of war crimes, or worse, a practitioner of genocide. However, facts are stubborn things. Facts refute this crass effort to “flip the narrative.”
Let’s be clear: Hamas openly commits to the destruction of Israel and the eradication of Jews. That is the very definition of genocide. Israel is not at war with the Palestinian people. It is at war with Hamas, which viciously attacked innocents. If there were any doubt about the former, remember that Israel has issued numerous warnings to Palestinian civilians, agreed to daily humanitarian pauses, opened civilian corridors to allow travel from north to south, provided entry into Gaza for trucks with humanitarian aid and even fuel (even though Hamas previously stole fuel for military purposes). A possible longer pause in fighting and the massive influx of aid belie the accusation that Israel is indifferent to the plight of Gaza civilians.
And, as the Times of Israel reported, “Patients, staff and displaced people on Saturday left Shifa Hospital … leaving behind only a skeleton crew to care for those too sick to move and Israeli forces in control of the facility.” The IDF denied it ordered the evacuation, saying it had “been asked by the hospital’s director to help those who would like to leave do so by a secure route.” (The IDF also said it gave the hospital more than 1,600 gallons of water and 5,000 pounds of food.)
We will have no shortage of investigations and debate about Israel’s targeting and efforts to protect civilians. Meanwhile, the media should learn from this episode. It must be far less credulous in accepting accusations from Israel’s foes, especially entities Hamas might control or influence. And it must be candid about the extent to which Israel has warned civilians and provided aid.
The Washington Post · by Jennifer Rubin · November 20, 2023
24. Why Israel Slept
Excerpts:
In the wake of the trauma of October 7, Israel finds itself in a new reality. Going forward, it will have to set aside perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions that have become customary in recent years and return to some foundational principles that it has neglected.
To deal with the presence of threatening military forces along its borders, Israel may find it necessary to shift from a reactive strategy of retaliation to a more proactive approach involving preventive strikes. Dismantling the Hamas regime in Gaza will help restore deterrence. The country will also need to reassess, enhance, and potentially overhaul its early-warning system, especially by increasing the use of human intelligence sources. The IDF will also need to shift its focus to anticipating breaches and building secondary lines of defense. The onus of achieving decisive outcomes will always rest on Israel’s shoulders. Despite Israel’s enduring commitment to self-reliance, however, it may prove necessary to formulate a more closely coordinated joint strategy with the United States, the country’s most steadfast ally, and even some additional partners.
The last time Israel faced a challenge even remotely like this was in 1973. And at first, the Yom Kippur War seemed like a defeat for Israel; the Arab states certainly saw it that way. In the end, however, Israel came out on top, and its victory led to a groundbreaking peace agreement with Egypt—an outcome that set in motion virtually every positive development that has taken place in the region since then. It is too early to tell whether Israel will be able to once again turn suffering and loss into peace and progress. But even in this grim new reality, there is some cause for hope.
Why Israel Slept
The War in Gaza and the Search for Security
November 21, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by Amos Yadlin and Udi Evental · November 21, 2023
In a barbaric surprise attack launched by Hamas on October 7, more Jews were slaughtered than on any day since the Holocaust. Thousands of elite Hamas militants from the Gaza Strip infiltrated small communities and cities in southern Israel, where they proceeded to commit sadistic, repulsive crimes against humanity, filming their vile deeds and boasting about them to friends and family back home.
The assault was devastating for the Israeli people. Around 1,200 people were killed that day (the equivalent of around 42,500 Americans, adjusting for population) and some 240 were kidnapped—including young children and elderly people—and taken into Hamas’s vast tunnel network beneath Gaza.
It was also devastating for the Israeli state. On that fateful day, the country’s long-standing security doctrine crumbled in the face of a perfect storm; as a consequence, its intelligence and military institutions were unable to keep citizens safe. For years, the country’s political and military establishment had allowed intolerable threats to gather by seeking to maintain the status quo in the conflict with the Palestinians and to establish a modus vivendi with the de facto Hamas state in Gaza based on deterrence, aiming to extend periods of tranquility.
Israel cannot return to the status quo that existed before October 7. The state’s task now is to bring all the hostages back home and to make it impossible for Hamas and other adversaries, notably the Iranian-backed Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, to carry out further terrorist attacks against Israeli citizens or pose direct threats to their security. Simultaneously, the government and the political establishment must accept responsibility for their strategic errors. They should prioritize national security interests above political survival and work to foster unity among Israelis, preparing them for the demanding times and challenges that lie ahead. And once the danger posed by Hamas has been eliminated, Israel must renew the process of promoting stable security and political arrangements with the Palestinians.
A necessary paradigm shift is now underway. But a paradigm can shift in many different directions. For the sake of Israel’s future, this one must push the country’s defense institutions and security strategy back toward certain basic principles from which they have strayed in recent years.
KNOW YOUR ENEMY
Israel’s national security doctrine was initially crafted in the mid-twentieth century under the country’s first prime minister, David Ben-Gurion. Over the decades, it has been updated to include four main pillars: deterrence, early warning, defense, and decisive victory.
Deterrence is an intricate art. Its waning can be discerned in real time, yet its definitive breakdown becomes evident only in retrospect. In this case, there were plenty of reasons why Hamas ceased to be deterred and concluded the time was right to attack. Because of Israel’s overreliance on deterrence, and its tacit acceptance of a prolonged buildup of Hamas forces in Gaza (facilitated by Iranian funding and expertise), the group had achieved an unusually high level of operational readiness to carry out a major attack. It had also identified significant vulnerabilities in Israel’s defenses around Gaza. Hamas may have calculated there was a good chance that a major assault and the likely Israeli response might spark violence on other fronts, including inside Israel—as was the case with an escalation of the fighting in Gaza in May 2021 that provoked clashes among Arabs and Jews in cities across Israel.
Meanwhile, the progress of talks intended to produce the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia heightened the concerns of both Hamas and Iran, which fear the further consolidation of a bloc opposed to the Islamic Republic and its allies and proxies—the so-called axis of resistance—and worry about Israel’s deeper integration into the region. Hamas presumably believed a major attack would thwart this process.
Deterrence’s waning can be discerned in real time, yet its breakdown becomes evident only in retrospect.
Hamas was likely encouraged by the impression that Israel’s internal political crisis—sparked by extensive protests against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s proposal to curtail the power of the Israeli Supreme Court—had diverted attention from Gaza and significantly undermined Israel’s social cohesion and steadfastness. It is worth noting that officials with Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and the minister of defense had all cautioned Netanyahu about Israel appearing historically weak in the eyes of its adversaries. Despite these warnings conveyed in recent months through a series of letters, Netanyahu chose to disregard them.
According to Israel’s security doctrine, when deterrence fails, the intelligence community assumes the vital role of providing early warning, enabling the IDF to prepare and respond effectively to the threat. But a catastrophic misconception had taken hold within the Israeli intelligence community in recent years, just as happened in the run-up to the Yom Kippur War in 1973. During that time, the intelligence community wrongly assessed that Egypt and Syria would not dare to engage in a war they could not win, failing to comprehend Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat’s goal of breaking the status quo.
As a jihadi terror organization aligned with Iran and its axis of resistance, Hamas’s fundamental aspiration is to inflict harm on Israel and undermine the state, with the ultimate aim of obliterating it. But Israeli intelligence and decision-makers had come to believe that Hamas’s responsibilities in Gaza—where it essentially governed a de facto state of over two million Palestinians—had tempered its extremism. Hamas deceitfully encouraged this misperception in recent years, posing as a reliable actor and warning of escalation if Israel did not allow funding from Qatar to arrive in Gaza and did not permit more Gazan workers in Israel. When Israel agreed to those concessions, Hamas used the resulting money and the information gathered from Gazans allowed to work in Israel to clandestinely plot its murderous offensive.
This failure to properly comprehend Hamas’s nature and its intentions dates back to the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the subsequent Hamas coup against the Palestinian Authority there. Since then, Israel had operated on the premise that a deterred and weakened Hamas was preferable to a governance vacuum in Gaza and would allow Israel to focus on what it perceived as more critical strategic challenges, such as Iran’s nuclear aspirations and Hezbollah’s military buildup. Accordingly, each time a flare-up occurred in Gaza, Israel’s aim was to reestablish deterrence through a limited use of force. This allowed Hamas to carry out a long-term buildup of arms and military infrastructure and to improve its operational capabilities.
A broken fence in Kfar Aza, Israel, November 2023
Evelyn Hockstein / Reuters
When deterrence falters and early warnings fail to materialize, Israel’s traditional security doctrine falls back on its third pillar: the IDF’s defensive capabilities. In the past decade, the IDF has succeeded in mitigating two central threats from Gaza: rocket attacks (which Israel’s Iron Dome defense system intercepts) and tunnels infiltrating Israeli territory (which were neutralized by an underground antitunnel barrier that Israel completed along the border with Gaza in 2021). But Israel failed to imagine an aboveground invasion and did not reinforce defenses around Gaza in proportion to Hamas’s growing military capabilities, deviating from a key lesson learned during the Yom Kippur War: organize defense according to an adversary’s capabilities and not only to its assessed intentions. Consequently, Israeli forces in the area were outnumbered and caught off guard after the IDF reduced its troop presence around Gaza and granted leave to many soldiers during the Sukkot holiday.
The IDF had also become overly reliant on technological means of defending the border, such as cameras, advanced sensors, and remotely operated machine guns. Hamas used drones to neutralize those tools and breached the barrier with bulldozers: a combination of high-tech and low-tech means unlike anything Israel had anticipated.
The fourth pillar of Israel’s security doctrine is the concept of achieving a decisive military outcome—that is, securing an uncontested victory over the enemy by neutralizing both its military capabilities and its resolve to continue fighting. This idea has sparked extensive debate among experts and senior IDF leaders for many years about how to define “decisive outcome” and “victory” and how to apply them to conflicts with nonstate actors and terrorist groups. Israel now understands that although the jihadi ideology of Hamas may persist (as have those of the Islamic State, or ISIS, and al Qaeda), the IDF must dismantle the organization’s military capabilities.
THE GOAL IN GAZA
In the wake of Hamas’s brutal attack, Israel has come to see that it cannot coexist with a jihadi Islamist state akin to ISIS at its doorstep in Gaza. The era of intermittent cycles of fighting and cease-fires in Gaza is over. What will replace it is a continuous, protracted military campaign, one driven not by a desire for revenge but grounded in Israel’s paramount security interests and an unwavering commitment to the safe return of the hostages being held by Hamas.
Israel’s ground operation was only the first step, and the military effort will persist after the withdrawal of IDF forces from Gaza. An effective Israeli strategy demands the integration of several interrelated, parallel endeavors—military, civilian, and political—executed methodically within a structured framework, which must be continually realigned with the expectations of the Israeli public and combined with a diplomatic campaign that will secure the assistance and support that the country will need from allies and partners.
This war marks a return to the conditions outlined in the Oslo accords, which underscored Israel’s unwillingness to tolerate an armed Palestinian entity on its borders. The Israeli government is also seeking to restore the public’s trust in the IDF and other state institutions and send a signal that harming Israeli citizens will yield an unbearable cost for the country’s adversaries and lead to their eventual destruction. The extent of the damage inflicted by Hamas on Israel demands a decisive response, even if it entails significant sacrifices. The people of Israel, rallying for reserve duty in unprecedented numbers and orchestrating volunteer organizations to aid survivors and displaced people, are acutely aware of the formidable challenge ahead and are willing to bear the necessary burdens and costs.
Israel believed that Hamas’s responsibilities in Gaza had tempered its extremism.
The realistic objectives of the current ground phase of the war are not to eliminate every Hamas operative or completely demilitarize Gaza but to degrade Hamas (and its sometime ally, Palestinian Islamic Jihad) as a fighting force, destroy its infrastructure, and eliminate the direct threat it poses to Israeli communities near Gaza. This will require the destruction of Hamas’s nerve center in Gaza City, its underground facilities, and all its aboveground assets, such as military installations, headquarters, command-and-control centers, communications infrastructure, weapons manufacturing facilities, and arms depots.
In selecting targets to bomb or raid, the IDF painstakingly attempts to distinguish Hamas operatives and infrastructure from the noncombatant civilian population in accordance with the laws of war. This task is complicated by the intense density of Gaza’s population within which Hamas deliberately operates and entrenches its military infrastructure and by the network of approximately 300 miles of tunnels that Hamas has built during the past 15 years, subterranean fortifications that stretch beneath every city in Gaza, often under critical civilian structures such as hospitals and schools.
To contend with the dilemma this poses, the IDF has consistently urged Gazans to evacuate the main operational zone in the northern part of Gaza and move south through secure corridors the IDF has established. Furthermore, the IDF refrains from striking Hamas military targets in which many civilians reside, allowing them to evacuate. Despite these precautions, the war has nevertheless produced a significant number of civilian casualties, frequently as a result of Hamas’s tactic of using civilians as human shields. Hamas obstructs the evacuation of civilians from operational areas and sites, and it has even targeted the secure crossings established by the IDF with mortars, intentionally impeding civilians from relocating to the southern Gaza Strip. In the face of such tactics, the IDF has gone to extraordinary lengths to prevent civilian causalities, exceeding the precautions taken by the militaries of most other democratic countries. As the war progresses, the IDF must maintain those standards, consistently communicate and demonstrate its commitment to adhere to the laws of war, and acknowledge any lapses on its own part.
To alleviate human suffering and to maintain the legitimacy of its military effort, Israel has permitted the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza through Egypt. This excludes supplies that would directly aid Hamas’s war effort, however, such as fuel beyond the amount required for operations that meet humanitarian needs such as hospitals, bakeries, water desalination, and sewage pumping. It was, after all, the influx of goods and energy that Israel allowed into Gaza in recent years that enabled Hamas to build the terrorist army that attacked Israeli territory on October 7.
Israeli soldiers in the Gaza Strip, November 2023
Ronen Zvulun / Reuters
The ground operation will end only when Hamas ceases to function as a governing authority in Gaza and its military capabilities are significantly degraded. At that point, the campaign will transition to a new phase, likely spanning several years, at least until all the hostages have been released and have returned home safely. Targeted incursions into Gaza and airstrikes against Hamas will persist, and Israel will need to fortify a number of strategically significant areas near the border with Gaza to create a buffer zone to enhance border defense.
Meanwhile, the IDF will need to keep an eye on the Lebanese border. Israel wants to keep Hezbollah out of the conflict but is prepared for a potential escalation on its northern border, whether due to a miscalculation or to an Iranian decision to order its proxy to open a new front in the war.
Following the conclusion of the main ground operation in Gaza, Israel will need to confront the substantial threat posed by Hezbollah’s elite Radwan forces stationed along the Israeli-Lebanese border. These forces are a significant menace to Israel’s northern villages and cities, which had already been evacuated at the onset of the war in Gaza. Israel must mobilize international pressure on Lebanon and Hezbollah to enforce and abide by the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which prohibits Hezbollah (and any armed forces other than UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese military) from maintaining a military presence south of the Litani River, which runs about 18 miles north of the Israeli border, with the nearest point only 2.5 miles from the border. If diplomatic efforts prove unsuccessful, Israel will stand ready to take military action, even at the risk of escalating the hostilities into a broader conflict with Hezbollah.
GAZA AND GEOPOLITICS
To win this war, Israel will require the support of partners who share its strategic interests. A number of Arab states, the United States, and European countries will play pivotal roles. Their contributions will encompass military funding and support, a global campaign to curtail Hamas’s funding, humanitarian assistance for civilians and displaced persons within Gaza (and possibly beyond), reconstruction efforts, information campaigns to counter anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish propaganda worldwide, and, most crucially, the establishment of a legitimate governing authority in Gaza.
Under the leadership of President Joe Biden, the United States has played an important role in Israel’s wartime decision-making, counseling restraint to prevent escalation in the north, demanding adherence to the laws of armed conflict, and pushing Israel to address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. In the weeks since October 7, the Biden administration has deployed an unprecedented level of military aid and support. Aircraft carriers and U.S. forces have been rushed to the region on an unparalleled scale, intended to deter Iran and Hezbollah from intervening in the war, to protect American forces in the area from numerous attacks by other Iranian-backed Shiite militias, and to offer a robust response to such attacks. It is noteworthy, however, that Israel maintains its fundamental principle of defending itself by itself, refraining from requesting U.S. involvement at the cost of U.S. casualties.
Many European countries have also demonstrated unwavering support for Israel, extending beyond their immediate concerns regarding the safety of the European citizens held hostage by Hamas. High-ranking European leaders such as French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak have visited Israel to express solidarity. During his visit in late October, Macron even called for the establishment of an international coalition to combat Hamas, modeled on the one that has taken on ISIS since 2014.
To secure the ongoing assistance of American and European leaders, many of whom are contending with domestic criticism of their support, Israel needs to enhance its geopolitical alignment with the bloc best represented by the United States and its NATO allies. This may involve a reevaluation of Israel’s Ukraine policy, potentially leading to increased support for Kyiv’s defense against Russian aggression. Additionally, Israel should strive to further increase humanitarian aid to Gaza, make clear that it does not intend to permanently occupy the territory, consistently reaffirm its adherence to the laws of war (and acknowledge any errors in that regard), and place its mission in Gaza within the context of a broader Israeli-Palestinian political process that can advance robust security arrangements and sustain the viability of the two-state solution.
The era of intermittent cycles of fighting and cease-fires in Gaza is over.
In public, the leaders of many Arab states, including those with whom Israel maintains relations, have roundly condemned its war in Gaza, driven by the fear of unrest and domestic instability. Behind closed doors, however, they worry about the threat of a resurgent Hamas, an extremist Muslim Brotherhood organization that has always posed a grave threat to Arab regimes—and serves the interests of their primary regional rival, Iran. Governments in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates fear that any success Hamas achieves in the current struggle will embolden Sunni jihadi forces in their own countries and Shiite militias that Iran backs in nearby states such as Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.
In terms of securing global support for the war against Hamas outside of Europe, the United States, and the Gulf, the picture darkens. China and Russia have abstained from publicly condemning the Hamas attack, have sought to curtail Israel’s efforts to dismantle the organization by calling for an immediate cease-fire, and have unleashed anti-Semitic propaganda on social media and state-controlled media outlets. For its part, Russia is driven by a desire to divert the West’s attention and resources away from the war in Ukraine and believes it will benefit from a heightened Middle East conflict. There is little reason to think Israel can do anything to change Moscow’s orientation.
China’s position, however, is more nuanced. More than anything, the country fears a regional conflict that could trigger a surge in oil prices that might damage its flagging post-COVID economic recovery. Given Israel’s alignment with the West and the United States, it might be difficult for Israel to influence China’s policy toward its war efforts in Gaza. But Israel could leverage Beijing’s concerns about regional escalation to encourage it to pressure Iran to restrain Hezbollah and its proxies in Iraq and Yemen. Simultaneously, Israel must strengthen its strategic ties with India, which has notably supported Israel and condemned the Hamas attack; strong relations with New Delhi could help counter the criticism Israel faces from other countries in the global South.
THE STRUGGLE BACK HOME
Alongside the complex military and diplomatic operations, Israeli leaders must launch a number of initiatives at home that will be no less challenging. First, they must begin to restore a sense of normality in a traumatized society, beginning with the rebuilding of the communities near Gaza’s border devastated by the Hamas attack and the repatriation of residents who fled their homes in Israel’s north as a precaution against an attack by Hezbollah. Economic activities throughout Israel should recommence immediately and should gradually return to their customary levels.
More fundamentally, the government must work to restore trust in the state’s institutions among Israeli citizens. This will require new and unified leadership, the coordinated mobilization of all government ministries, and an official investigation into the origins of the Hamas attack. The current government—and especially Netanyahu—is unfit for this task. He and his close allies, after all, are responsible for the failure to address the problem of Gaza and Hamas over the past 15 years and for the unprecedented rift in Israeli society that reduced its preparedness in the months leading up to the attack. Israel will have to hold elections as soon as possible after the ground operation in Gaza ends, as long as security conditions, including in the north, allow for it.
Even before the main ground operation concludes and Israeli troops withdraw, Israel should initiate a dialogue with Arab countries and international partners to formulate a plan for the future governance of Gaza. The most promising approach would be the establishment of an interim administration to oversee the territory until the Palestinian Authority is capable of assuming that role. This administration would be led by the United States and the five Arab states that have established peace agreements with Israel. To pave the way for the PA’s eventual return to Gaza, the international community, with Israeli assistance and coordination, must work with the PA to build its governing capacities and address the corruption in its ranks.
Significant backing from the affluent Gulf Arab states will be indispensable to tackle the diverse economic, political, and security aspects of governance in Gaza. In this regard, the renewal of normalization talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia is crucial, as will be the integration of the kingdom into the project of governing Gaza. Tehran’s role in helping Hamas develop in recent years may have heightened the level of interest in normalization within the anti-Iranian bloc of Arab countries. A new Israeli government committed to strengthening the PA and maintaining an open perspective on a two-state solution could further propel the normalization process forward.
A war against Hamas and the possibility of discussing a two-state solution may appear to sit uneasily. But since its inception, Hamas has opposed and undermined the prospect of two states; whenever talks between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization seemed to gain momentum, Hamas reliably launched terror attacks. The organization adamantly rejects the Oslo accords, refuses to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist, and openly pursues its destruction. Consequently, the removal of Hamas from power in Gaza is not an impediment to the two-state idea: it is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for any positive advancements in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship and in the Middle East in general.
BACK TO BASICS
In the wake of the trauma of October 7, Israel finds itself in a new reality. Going forward, it will have to set aside perceptions, beliefs, and assumptions that have become customary in recent years and return to some foundational principles that it has neglected.
To deal with the presence of threatening military forces along its borders, Israel may find it necessary to shift from a reactive strategy of retaliation to a more proactive approach involving preventive strikes. Dismantling the Hamas regime in Gaza will help restore deterrence. The country will also need to reassess, enhance, and potentially overhaul its early-warning system, especially by increasing the use of human intelligence sources. The IDF will also need to shift its focus to anticipating breaches and building secondary lines of defense. The onus of achieving decisive outcomes will always rest on Israel’s shoulders. Despite Israel’s enduring commitment to self-reliance, however, it may prove necessary to formulate a more closely coordinated joint strategy with the United States, the country’s most steadfast ally, and even some additional partners.
The last time Israel faced a challenge even remotely like this was in 1973. And at first, the Yom Kippur War seemed like a defeat for Israel; the Arab states certainly saw it that way. In the end, however, Israel came out on top, and its victory led to a groundbreaking peace agreement with Egypt—an outcome that set in motion virtually every positive development that has taken place in the region since then. It is too early to tell whether Israel will be able to once again turn suffering and loss into peace and progress. But even in this grim new reality, there is some cause for hope.
- AMOS YADLIN is a retired Major General in the Israeli Air Force and served as the head of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate from 2006 to 2010. He is Founder and President of MIND Israel, a consulting firm.
- UDI EVENTAL is a retired Colonel in the Israel Defense Forces and a Senior Adviser at MIND Israel.
Foreign Affairs · by Amos Yadlin and Udi Evental · November 21, 2023
25. A Paradigm Shift in America’s Asia Policy
Excerpts:
Current trends in the United States’ domestic politics and foreign policy will facilitate deals of this kind. As U.S.-Chinese technological decoupling proceeds, as Washington onshores or friend shores critical supply chains, and as both Democrats and Republicans encourage investment in the American industrial and technological base, the costs to smaller Asian countries of being denied access to U.S. industries and markets will increase. China’s practice of reserving benefits for state-owned firms and national champions at the expense of foreign entities, meanwhile, will only make the United States’ offerings more attractive.
The era of light-touch diplomacy is over. Washington cannot assume that merely promulgating American principles or lifting trade restrictions and lowering tariffs will win it security partners. If the United States is to resist China’s challenge on both economic and military fronts, it must rally its allies and friends in Asia. These countries’ past inaction served Beijing’s objectives, but their agency today will serve Washington’s.
A Paradigm Shift in America’s Asia Policy
Washington Must Get More Countries Off the Sidelines in Its Contest With China
November 21, 2023
Foreign Affairs · by John Lee · November 21, 2023
In 1988, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz embarked on a three-week tour of Asia, stopping in Hong Kong and mainland China, Indonesia, Japan, the Marshall Islands, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Shultz sat through long meetings to assure his hosts of Washington’s enduring friendship and interest in the region—engaging in what the diplomat Nicholas Burns described in Foreign Affairs in 2021 as “weeding, watering, and watching over the diplomatic garden.” The gardening metaphor, adopted by Shultz himself, was meant not as a slight but as a recognition that U.S. interests would best be served by light-touch diplomacy. Economic and political liberalization, rather than heavy-handed pressure, the thinking went, would bring countries in the region into alignment with the world’s liberal democracies.
Two decades of peace and prosperity appeared to validate Shultz’s approach. The region’s traditional rivalries persisted and historical grievances remained unresolved, but as Asian countries prioritized economic development over military spending, the risk of conflict seemed low. The United States offered Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand open access to the American market, and in return it expected their governments to support its own strategic interests and naval presence in the region.
But Washington’s post–Cold War strategy in Asia is no longer viable. By focusing on trade and development, many Asian countries have not done enough to strengthen their militaries and have left themselves vulnerable to Chinese aggression. China has engaged in the most rapid peacetime military buildup by any country since the 1930s. And Beijing has exploited its neighbors’ neglect of defense spending and equivocal positions on important issues by expanding China’s military and paramilitary presence in contested areas such as the Taiwan Strait and the East China and South China Seas. China, with its natural advantages in size and scale, has used enormous subsidies and extended cheap credit to domestic firms to lower production costs at home and distort markets abroad. As Chinese firms crowd out their foreign competitors, China has absorbed the regional supply and value chains that once included companies in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia—and has accelerated the hollowing out of the American industrial and manufacturing base. Until Washington strikes a different bargain with its Asian allies and partners, these unfavorable trends will continue.
The United States has already recognized the dangers of China’s market practices, and it is encouraging allies to invest in their militaries. But an effective strategy must go further. China’s military advantage over the rest of the region is widening, and Beijing is becoming more bellicose in its territorial disputes with several of its neighbors. If necessary, governments in Asia must be willing to take sides, and even to sacrifice blood and treasure to protect themselves from Chinese expansionism. Washington cannot strong-arm Asian partners into supporting its own defense priorities over Beijing’s, but it can provide them incentives to cooperate more closely with the United States. Turning currently neutral powers into active U.S. partners is essential to making the region safer and less vulnerable to China’s territorial and geopolitical ambitions.
BEIJING GAINS THE ADVANTAGE
Over the last two decades, China has aimed to reduce the American presence in Asia and eventually ease the United States out of the region entirely. To accomplish this, Beijing has focused on weakening U.S. alliances and isolating countries such as Australia and Japan. Because of its geographical distance from the region, the United States relies on access to its Asian partners’ territory and assistance to keep its military in position. China, recognizing this vulnerability, has pressured these countries not to make security commitments to the United States or to build up their own defenses.
In essence, Beijing’s game plan is to clear the way for its own regional ambitions by taking formidable players off the board. If other Asian maritime states stay weak, inward-looking, and disinterested in strategic and military affairs, then China can more easily encroach on their territory and interests—and compel them to remain neutral in a contest between a revisionist China and a U.S.-led coalition.
China’s main tool for neutralizing its neighbors is economic. For example, with bilateral deals negotiated as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s global infrastructure development project, Beijing tempts the ruling elites of countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand with the promise of immediate economic benefits. But China invariably comes out ahead in these arrangements—and the deals carry the expectation that the recipient of Chinese largesse will acquiesce, or at least remain impartial, to Beijing’s expansionist maritime claims and plans for technological dominance. China’s neighbors have become increasingly submissive as their economic dependence makes them less able to resist Chinese demands. Even though Chinese coast guards routinely harass Filipino or Vietnamese ships in contested waters, for instance, other Southeast Asian states are reluctant to criticize Beijing. In September, Cambodia vetoed an Indonesian proposal for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to stage its first-ever exercises in the resource-rich North Natuna Sea off Indonesia’s northern coastline. China’s claims in the South China Sea include part of this zone.
Washington’s post–Cold War strategy in Asia is no longer viable.
It is in China’s interest for countries in the region to abstain from strengthening their military power. To that end, Beijing has prolonged multilateral discussions about how to manage the region’s territorial disputes—and used the extra time to change the facts on the ground. First, Chinese leaders dangled the promise of a code of conduct for the South China Sea, starting with negotiations in the 1990s that lead to a nonbinding declaration in 2002. Twenty-one years later, the parties have merely settled on guidelines for a binding agreement that has yet to materialize. In the meantime, China has rapidly modernized its armed forces and built militarized artificial islands in contested waters. With their defenses clearly outmatched, some smaller states have all but given up on balancing against China.
This lack of resolve is evident not just in Asian states’ aversion to calling out Chinese encroachment, but also in their military investments. As understandable as prioritizing economic development may be, it has come at the expense of these countries’ ability to defend their territory against a large, aggressive neighbor. Strategically important countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have spent, on average, just 1.0 to 1.5 percent of GDP each year on defense for the last decade. Indonesia spends even less; its defense budget has remained below 1 percent of GDP every year since 1998. Among the major maritime players in Southeast Asia, only Singapore and Vietnam seem to take defense seriously. Their annual spending has averaged between 4–5 percent and 2.0–2.5 percent of GDP, respectively, over the past few decades.
CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE?
Policymakers in Washington are often frustrated that more Asian states do not resist China’s routine denial of the rights of its smaller neighbors. But Washington’s frustration stems from a misunderstanding of Asian statecraft as it has evolved. Leaders in many Asian capitals have learned to maximize the benefits that they can extract from great powers. Southeast Asian countries, to use their common refrain, do not want to be forced to choose. They may bristle at a Chinese territory grab in the South China Sea, but they will not allow their outrage to disrupt their efforts to gain as much as they can from both Beijing and Washington.
This mindset explains the generally positive reception of China’s Belt and Road Initiative across the region. The countries formally participating in the BRI, including all the members of ASEAN and several Pacific Island nations such as Fiji and the Solomon Islands, signed up even though they were aware that Chinese firms would receive the lion’s share of the profits and that Beijing would dictate the rules and standards governing the projects. Modest gains were better than nothing, and they elected to approve BRI projects on a case-by-case basis. These countries have noted China’s growing power, the United States’ corresponding decline, and their own limited influence over the regional order. In their view, to ignore these dynamics and reject China’s overtures would be to court unacceptable risk and uncertainty. But for all these countries’ insistence that they not be forced to choose between the United States and China, their participation in the BRI and their determination to sit on the sidelines rather than balance against Chinese military power serve China’s purposes at the expense of the United States.
To be sure, Washington has made some recent advances in rallying Asian partners to resist Chinese influence. In 2019, for example, Singapore renewed a long-standing agreement to allow the United States the use of its air and naval bases. The city-state also responded positively to the AUKUS agreement—a defense deal among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States that includes provisions for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines—and indicated that Australian submarines would be welcome in Singaporean ports. The Philippines announced in April that it would make four new bases available to American forces (in addition to five existing ones) as part of an expanded defense agreement. In June, the Philippines for the first time conducted joint naval drills with the United States and Japan near its Bataan Province, whose coast lies along the South China Sea.
These are meaningful developments. But they do not represent the hardening of coalitions or alliances. Both Singapore and the Philippines, similar to most other countries in the region, would still prefer a de-escalation in U.S.-Chinese competition. Both countries maintain strong ties with Beijing, and neither has indicated an intention to follow in Australia’s or Japan’s footsteps and join a balancing coalition with the United States to push back against China’s presence in contested areas.
WASHINGTON PIVOTS IN ASIA
Under the past two administrations, the United States’ regional policy has focused on enhancing existing alliances. The Trump administration began working with Australia and Japan, the United States’ two most willing Asian allies, on trilateral military cooperation and “friend shoring” supply chains for critical minerals. The Biden administration has continued these efforts and deepened military cooperation with Australia and the United Kingdom through the AUKUS agreement. Importantly, Biden has coaxed the Philippines and South Korea, allies who had drifted from the United States under the previous two U.S. administrations, to accept a greater share of the security burden associated with managing China.
But if Washington is to retain its position in Asia, it will need to convince those maritime states drifting further into China’s orbit to change their approaches to security. The United States can no longer separate economic cooperation and market access from its broader geopolitical objectives, as it did in the first two decades after the end of the Cold War. But Washington also cannot follow the Chinese example and use arbitrary threats and economic coercion to compel smaller powers to join its side. Historically, the United States’ bilateral defense agreements have allowed Washington to help shape the strategies of its allies in Asia. The same logic should now guide a policy in which Washington extends tailored agreements that combine economic and security imperatives to key countries in the region.
The United States has already tested the waters with such an arrangement. Biden’s groundbreaking AUKUS deal built on the Trump administration’s decision in 2016 to include Australia and the United Kingdom in the United States’ National Technology and Industrial Base, will eventually allow these nations to share military technology and jointly develop and deploy weapons. More than just a defense agreement, AUKUS established a platform for the three parties to share information and technology and to integrate industry and supply chains related to national security. This collaboration should also boost civilian industry and yield other economic benefits down the road.
The AUKUS agreement was made possible by decades of security and intelligence cooperation among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It thus may not be wholly replicable, as other U.S. alliances in Asia lack this bedrock of close ties. But AUKUS does represent a new paradigm in which U.S.-led regional arrangements align economic privileges and technological benefits with strategic and geopolitical interests. It is no coincidence that U.S.-Taiwanese trade negotiations are moving forward at the same time that Taiwan is accepting greater responsibility for its own territorial defense.
PUTTING OFFERS ON THE TABLE
The United States cannot force other countries to make the decisions it wants them to make, but it can help them overcome their reluctance. Washington can offer economic opportunities, such as market access or special carve-outs to export controls, that these countries will not want to miss out on. And it must condition these offers on Asian countries’ agreement to raise their own defense spending, support the military presence and operations of the United States and its allies, resist China’s economic and military policies when those policies harm their own interests, and stand behind other targets of China’s threats and punishment, including Taiwan. Cultivating ready partners will help the United States forge the regional order it wants. Whereas Beijing’s economic incentives once pushed countries to defer to Chinese security interests, Washington’s incentives will increase the ability and resolve of smaller states to advocate for themselves.
This is not a proposal to indiscriminately flood the region with cheap capital in the hope of purchasing temporary loyalty to Washington. Instead, privileged economic, trade, and technological cooperation arrangements will encourage hesitant countries to choose to work with the United States and its allies. That choice includes making investments of their own. A confident and proactive network of smaller states will impose constraints on China’s advances toward regional dominance.
Not every country in Asia will wish to engage with the United States in this way. Washington should thus devote its diplomatic attention and economic resources to those countries that have expressed interest in bulking up their defenses against Chinese encroachment and assisting their neighbors’ efforts to do the same. South Korea under President Yoon Suk-yeol, for example, has already entered discussions with the United States about coordinating efforts to secure critical supply chains and addressing China’s restrictive policies on semiconductors, robotics, and advanced manufacturing. A bargain that combines economic policies that serve these objectives with steps to deepen bilateral strategic and military cooperation would be an attractive offer for Washington to bring to Seoul.
The Philippines is another obvious candidate. Its recent decision to grant the United States access to additional military bases increases the coverage and credibility of the U.S. security guarantee included in the countries’ bilateral defense treaty. The northernmost of these new bases, specifically, allows U.S. forces to be stationed closer to the Taiwan Strait, while the southern bases provide direct access to the South China Sea. In return for a larger deployment of U.S. forces and a greater investment by the Philippines in national defense, the United States can offer to fast-track assistance with the Philippines’ 5G rollout, update the country’s air transportation network, and finance upgrades to its railways, ports, and health-care system.
Washington cannot assume that promulgating American principles or lifting trade restrictions will win security partners.
Singapore is also an important U.S. defense partner, but it has enabled China’s economic ambitions by supporting the BRI and Beijing’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (the successor to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which had included the United States). It has also given China diplomatic cover by failing to criticize Beijing’s regional aggression—a noteworthy omission given the diplomatic authority Singapore holds. If Singapore takes a firmer stance against harmful Chinese economic and military policies, the United States could offer deeper collaboration in artificial intelligence, digital payment systems, biotechnology, and quantum applications—sectors that are crucial to the future of Singapore’s technology-based economy.
Current trends in the United States’ domestic politics and foreign policy will facilitate deals of this kind. As U.S.-Chinese technological decoupling proceeds, as Washington onshores or friend shores critical supply chains, and as both Democrats and Republicans encourage investment in the American industrial and technological base, the costs to smaller Asian countries of being denied access to U.S. industries and markets will increase. China’s practice of reserving benefits for state-owned firms and national champions at the expense of foreign entities, meanwhile, will only make the United States’ offerings more attractive.
The era of light-touch diplomacy is over. Washington cannot assume that merely promulgating American principles or lifting trade restrictions and lowering tariffs will win it security partners. If the United States is to resist China’s challenge on both economic and military fronts, it must rally its allies and friends in Asia. These countries’ past inaction served Beijing’s objectives, but their agency today will serve Washington’s.
- JOHN LEE is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute. He was Senior Adviser to the Australian Foreign Minister from 2016 to 2018 and Lead Adviser on the Australian government’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.
Foreign Affairs · by John Lee · November 21, 2023
26. Could JFK Have Gotten America Out of Vietnam?
What if????
Excerpts:
The die cast, the White House announced, on Oct. 2, 1963, the likelihood that U.S. forces would complete their work by the end of 1965, with the first 1,000 leaving by the end of 1963. Since those thousand performed tasks that had no bearing on the conflict, and since much could happen in two years to change his calculations, JFK faced few risks in announcing a limited withdrawal in the near term and a comprehensive one over the long haul. The press pilloried the administration, nonetheless, for telegraphing U.S. intentions, adopting unrealistic timelines, and obscuring the reality of the war.
Regardless, Kennedy would not live to see either withdrawal — neither the departure of those thousand troops, which did take place, nor the removal of additional forces, which did not. But the planning for withdrawal made sense nevertheless, as it forced his administration to align inputs with outputs and to consider more fully the ingredients for success. As for its announcement, virtually no good came from publicly disclosing its various timetables, especially since they failed to prompt the actions the administration sought. If anything, they further undermined South Vietnamese politics, contributing to the coup against Diệm that November and the instability that followed. Indeed, the track record for such pronouncements, given recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises questions about the virtues of publicizing timetables for future troop withdrawals.
Still, for Kennedy, the proposed withdrawal served specific and immediate purposes, allowing him to counter opposition at home, while potentially avoiding a quagmire abroad. But it also reveals a curious irony, one that complicates the story of Kennedy and Vietnam and the answer to the great what-if: Rather than signal an interest in leaving the war, the policy of withdrawal — the Kennedy withdrawal — allowed JFK to remain very much engaged in fighting it.
Could JFK Have Gotten America Out of Vietnam?
themessenger.com · November 20, 2023
Sixty years ago this week, President John F. Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas — a profoundly shocking act that traumatized Americans and peoples around the world. Although his successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, would realize Kennedy’s initiatives in civil rights, education, poverty, and health care, LBJ also escalated a war in Vietnam that claimed the lives of over 58,000 Americans and 3 million Southeast Asians.
Each of those ventures left indelible marks on American life. But it is the war in Southeast Asia that continues to invite broader speculation about what might have been had Kennedy lived.
Might the horrors of Vietnam — the loss of so many and the destruction of the land, as well as the ensuing distrust of government, cultural divisions, and political recriminations at home — have been avoided? Might Kennedy have gotten the United States out of Vietnam?
There’s reason to think so. His administration had engaged in planning to remove U.S. troops from South Vietnam, where a conflict between the non-Communist government in Saigon and a growing Communist insurgency was expanding in size and scope. Although JFK had escalated American assistance, increasing the number of U.S. military advisers from roughly 700 to almost 17,000, he was wary of the partnership and of South Vietnam’s mercurial president, Ngô Đình Diệm. Kennedy was sufficiently troubled that, in April 1962, he signaled his desire to wind down the effort, though the moment for doing so, as he put it, might “be some time away.” Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara heeded those words and, over the course of the next 18 months, developed a plan to withdraw the bulk American troops by the close of 1965, with the first thousand leaving by the end of 1963.
That planning was serious and systematic, involving key officials in the Defense Department for months on end. It also began during a period of optimism in the war, when U.S. assistance was beefing up, when programs to secure the loyalty and protection the South Vietnamese were advancing, and when the rhetoric of progress seemed to mirror the reality on the ground.
But it also reflected Kennedy’s belief that U.S. troops would serve only in an advisory capacity and that the war was Saigon’s to win or lose. Indeed, withdrawal planning continued to move forward as questions about Diệm’s leadership multiplied. With his handling of the war generating greater criticism, and with Vietnamese Buddhists protesting his crackdown on their activities, Diệm’s support cratered in both Saigon and Washington. Withdrawal planning therefore pointed to an exit strategy JFK might have enacted had he the opportunity to do so. The chance would not have emerged until after the 1964 election, as even his most ardent admirers acknowledge. But by 1965, in his second and final term in office, he would have had greater room for maneuver.
The likelihood of a Kennedy withdrawal is further buttressed by JFK’s aversion to the use of military force. He was loath to use lethal means — in Laos and in Berlin, for example — before exhausting other options. That was especially true in Cuba; dubious of the “experts” who led him astray at the Bay of Pigs, Kennedy wisely averted war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, even as his threats of force led to its resolution. Most significantly, he refused to send combat troops to Vietnam when virtually all his advisers had called for them, and he was wary of militarizing a conflict he saw as essentially political.
Yet Kennedy was reluctant to withdraw from Vietnam if the war was not going well. He said so multiple times in remarks captured on his White House taping system — privately to McNamara in May 1963, and widely to officials later that October. It would be “illogical” if the war was going “horribly,” and he questioned the wisdom of withdrawing under adverse conditions; if the 1965 deadline didn’t work out, they would simply “get a new date.” Moreover, he had spoken publicly and repeatedly of the need to stay in Vietnam and had dramatized the dangers of abandoning allies in their hour of need. Kennedy had thus staked out positions that committed him to Saigon and supported withdrawal only in the context of military success.
But the war’s politics suggested a change of course. Voices in Congress and the press had charged JFK with pursuing a muddled policy in Vietnam, backing a repressive regime, supporting its flagging military, and sliding dangerously into a new Korean War. Diệm, too, was unhappy, accusing Washington of challenging his rule and destabilizing his government. Withdrawal — and the public announcement of it — thus became increasingly attractive. To Americans, it signaled a limited commitment, mollifying those who feared deeper engagement; to the South Vietnamese, it presumed to inspire better performance, if not through the carrot of easing Diệm’s political burdens, then through the stick of an American departure.
The die cast, the White House announced, on Oct. 2, 1963, the likelihood that U.S. forces would complete their work by the end of 1965, with the first 1,000 leaving by the end of 1963. Since those thousand performed tasks that had no bearing on the conflict, and since much could happen in two years to change his calculations, JFK faced few risks in announcing a limited withdrawal in the near term and a comprehensive one over the long haul. The press pilloried the administration, nonetheless, for telegraphing U.S. intentions, adopting unrealistic timelines, and obscuring the reality of the war.
Regardless, Kennedy would not live to see either withdrawal — neither the departure of those thousand troops, which did take place, nor the removal of additional forces, which did not. But the planning for withdrawal made sense nevertheless, as it forced his administration to align inputs with outputs and to consider more fully the ingredients for success. As for its announcement, virtually no good came from publicly disclosing its various timetables, especially since they failed to prompt the actions the administration sought. If anything, they further undermined South Vietnamese politics, contributing to the coup against Diệm that November and the instability that followed. Indeed, the track record for such pronouncements, given recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, raises questions about the virtues of publicizing timetables for future troop withdrawals.
Still, for Kennedy, the proposed withdrawal served specific and immediate purposes, allowing him to counter opposition at home, while potentially avoiding a quagmire abroad. But it also reveals a curious irony, one that complicates the story of Kennedy and Vietnam and the answer to the great what-if: Rather than signal an interest in leaving the war, the policy of withdrawal — the Kennedy withdrawal — allowed JFK to remain very much engaged in fighting it.
Marc J. Selverstone is professor and director of Presidential Studies at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center of Public Affairs. His latest book is “The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam.”
themessenger.com · November 20, 2023
De Oppresso Liber,
David Maxwell
Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy
Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation
Editor, Small Wars Journal
Twitter: @davidmaxwell161
Phone: 202-573-8647
email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com
|
