Quotes of the Day:

"And this, I believe: that the free, exploring mind of the individual human is the most valuable thing in the world. And this I would fight for: the freedom of the mind to take any direction it wishes, undirected. And this I must fight against: any idea, religion, or government, which limits or destroys the individual. This is what I am, and what I am about."

– John Steinbeck, East of Eden

"If you would be a real seek after truth, it is necessary that at least once in your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things." – Rene Descartes

“A year from now you may wish you had started today.”

– Karen Lamb

This Day in Army History-Son Tay-November 21st, 1970

https://www.dvidshub.net/video/772562/day-army-history-son-tay-november-21st-1970

1. The Web of Venezuelan Generals Accused of Fueling the Cocaine Trade

2. RC-135 Accompanied By Fighters Off Venezuela Testing Maduro's Air Defenses: U.S. Official

3. Trump Peace Plan Demands Major Concessions From Ukraine

4. The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated by Sir Lawrence Freedman

5. Fatal Flaw: Ex-CIA Analyst Says Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Backfire, Poison US–Kyiv Ties

6. Opinion | Trump Says Arms Are Going to Taiwan

7. Japan’s Takaichi says she wants better Beijing ties but refuses to retract Taiwan comments

8. Is Beijing’s spat with Japan sending a message to US and allies over Taiwan?

9. Top military lawyer raised legal concerns about boat strikes

10. Recognizing the Domestic Use of Irregular Warfare Techniques to Consolidate Executive Power

11. Interview with Clinton Hinote Reimagining Forward Defense as a Multi-Domain “Hellscape”

12. Things were already grim for US farmers, then China tensions worsened – again

13. After a Tragedy in 2002, Special Forces Soldiers Learned That Armed Drones Are a Combat Necessity

14. Ballast Books Announces Hard Mind, Soft Heart: A Warfighter’s Battle for Truth, Brotherhood & the Soul of the SEAL Teams

15. British firm Kraken wins USSOCOM deal for new drone vessels

16. Most of the Air Force’s biggest programs will now be overseen by a 4-star under the deputy SecDef

17. The time to move ICBMs from the Air Force to the Army is now

18. The Case for Treating Drones as Ammunition

19. Winning the Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Fight: Lessons from Centaur Squadron

20. Chance and Necessity: Evolving the Supporting Role of SOF to Cyber Operations

21. The Peril of Ousting Maduro

1. The Web of Venezuelan Generals Accused of Fueling the Cocaine Trade

Summary:

U.S. and Colombian officials say Venezuela’s “Cartel of the Suns,” a loose network of generals and senior officials tied to Nicolás Maduro, takes bribes to move Colombian cocaine through Venezuela to the U.S. and Europe. Washington will label it a foreign terrorist organization, targeting regime cohesion built on drug profits.

The Web of Venezuelan Generals Accused of Fueling the Cocaine Trade

WSJ

A diffuse group of officials and military men in Nicolás Maduro’s regime allow the drug to transit the country, U.S. officials say

By José de Córdoba

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Nov. 20, 2025 9:00 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/the-web-of-venezuelan-generals-accused-of-fueling-the-cocaine-trade-8bb251db

President Nicolás Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela, last month. Leonardo Fernandez Viloria/Reuters

For more than two decades, a loose-knit group of Venezuelan generals and senior officials has enabled the shipment of thousands of tons of cocaine to the U.S. and Europe, American and Colombian officials say.

While nearly all cocaine is produced in neighboring Colombia, Venezuela plays an important role in allowing the drug to move through its territory and then onto ships and planes that traffic it to Europe, the Caribbean and the U.S., the officials have said.

The country’s military permits Colombian guerrillas and cocaine gangs who pay millions of dollars in bribes to move cocaine through the country, officials said. The cocaine is then shipped by air to Central America or by sea to Caribbean islands and Europe.

“What Venezuela does is facilitate the security, the logistics by the National Guard and the Army to move the cocaine out of the country,” said Alberto Romero, a former director of intelligence and counterintelligence of Colombia’s National Intelligence Directorate.

Now this Venezuelan network, known to U.S. officials as the “Cartel of the Suns,” is in the Trump administration’s sights. The State Department says it will designate the Cartel of the Suns as a foreign-terrorist organization on Monday.

The group’s name, coined by Venezuelan media years ago, reflects the view that narcotics trafficking reaches high into the Venezuelan government and military. “Suns” refers to the gold insignia, equivalent to a U.S. general’s stars, worn on the epaulets of Venezuelan generals’ uniforms.

Sitting atop the group, U.S. officials say, is Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, on whom the U.S. has put a $50 million bounty. President Trump has said he wants Maduro to leave office, and the U.S. has assembled a large fleet in the Caribbean, including the world’s most advanced aircraft carrier, and stationed up to 15,000 troops in the area in what it calls “Operation Southern Spear.”

Since September, the U.S. has killed at least 82 people in strikes on 22 boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, saying the vessels were carrying drugs to the U.S., often from Venezuela. The U.S. has also threatened to launch strikes on Venezuela’s mainland. But in recent days, Trump has said he is open to talks with Maduro instead.

Venezuela denies that it facilitates the shipment of drugs to the U.S. But a 2020 indictment of Maduro spells out a yearslong, wide-ranging conspiracy during which Maduro, top Venezuelan generals and senior officials as well as Colombian guerrilla chiefs worked in tandem to traffic tons of cocaine to the U.S. and Europe.

It accused Maduro and his associates of enriching themselves and using cocaine as a “weapon” that flooded the U.S. with the drug and inflicted damage on Americans.

Maduro denies the charges. “It’s the worst sort of fake news launched against our country to justify an escalation into an armed conflict that will have a catastrophic impact on all of the continent,” he wrote in a September letter to Trump, urging dialogue over conflict.

U.S. prosecutors trace the drug-trafficking connections to the presidency of the late Hugo Chávez, who took power in 1999 and ordered generals to provide weapons to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, which fought the Colombian state until a 2016 peace accord. Maduro, then the country’s vice president, succeeded Chavez as president in 2013.

Since then, Maduro has presided over Venezuela’s economic meltdown, mostly because of mismanagement and corruption but exacerbated by U.S. economic sanctions imposed in 2019. Venezuela’s GDP has contracted by 80%, forcing eight million Venezuelans, a quarter of the population, to flee.

Maduro is accused of stealing two presidential elections. Last year, he claimed victory, but opposition leaders and election observers said candidate Edmundo González, now living in exile in Spain, trounced Maduro, winning about two-thirds of the vote.

Venezuela hardly grows any coca, the leaf from which cocaine is made, and has few laboratories. Most cocaine bound to the U.S. is shipped from Colombia’s Pacific coast and next door Ecuador. Unlike drug-trafficking organizations such as Mexico’s Jalisco cartel, the Cartel of the Suns isn’t a hierarchical cartel but rather a diffuse network mostly made up of military officers who facilitate drug shipments, getting payoffs along the way, said Phil Gunson, a Caracas-based analyst for the International Crisis Group, which works to prevent violent conflict in Venezuela.

“It is a convenient label for a loose and sometimes fractious group of generals and senior government officials that thrives amidst Venezuela’s endemic corruption,” Gunson said.

In announcing the Cartel of Suns designation, the State Department said the organization, along with others, was “responsible for terrorist violence throughout our hemisphere as well as for trafficking drugs into the United States and Europe.”

The U.S. accuses other senior Venezuelan leaders in the alleged conspiracy, placing a $25 million bounty on Venezuelan Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello and $15 million for Gen. Vladimir Padrino, Venezuela’s defense minister.

Both men have denied any involvement in drug trafficking. Cabello recently denied the existence of the Cartel of the Suns, which he calls an “imperialist narrative.” Likewise, Padrino said no cartels or drug capos exist in Venezuela.

But U.S. and Colombian officials have long said that the involvement of military officers in the drug trade is central to Maduro’s staying power. Permitting them to benefit from the drug trade binds them to Maduro, building regime cohesion by raising the costs of defection in the face of U.S. indictments, says John Polga-Hecimovich, a Venezuela expert at the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis.

“The regime has a lot to lose if it loses the loyalty of those who profit from drugs,” he said.

Two of the alleged members of the Cartel of the Suns are already in American prisons. Both Gen. Hugo Carvajal, a former head of Venezuelan military intelligence known as “The Chicken,” for his long neck, and Gen. Cliver Alcalá, have pleaded guilty to helping to smuggle tons of cocaine to the U.S., and providing weapons to the FARC.

The alleged involvement of senior Venezuelan officials in the drug trade stretches back to the early 2000s. In 2006, senior officials sent 5.6 tons of U.S.-bound cocaine in a DC-9 jet from the Caracas airport to Mexico, the Maduro indictment says. In 2013, Venezuelan officials sent another planeload with 1.3 tons of cocaine to Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris, the document said. They created an “air bridge” which in 2010 alone sent 75 cocaine-laden flights from Venezuela to Honduras, the indictment said.

The arrest in Colombia of Walid Makled, then Venezuela’s top drug boss on a U.S. warrant in 2010 shed a light on the links between senior government officials and drug traffickers. Then-Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara described him as a “king among kingpins” who at the height of his powers exported 10 tons of cocaine to the U.S. a month and allegedly controlled Puerto Cabello, Venezuela’s most important port.

“All my business associates are generals,” Makled said, claiming to have 40 generals on his payroll, in correspondence with an associate seen by The Wall Street Journal. In one incident, Makled bought about eight tons of cocaine from Venezuelan generals and law enforcement sources the officials had themselves stolen from major drug traffickers.

Drug trafficking even reached deep into Maduro’s own family, the Maduro indictment says.

In 2015, two of his wife’s nephews were arrested in a sting in Haiti after they offered to get hundreds of kilos of cocaine to DEA undercover agents, the indictment says. The two told agents they were “at war” with the U.S. and bragged about their connection to a top FARC commander, the indictment says. Convicted in 2016 in New York, the pair was set free in exchange for seven U.S. prisoners in 2022.

Write to José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com

Appeared in the November 21, 2025, print edition as '‘Cartel of the Suns’ Tied to Venezuelan Leaders Fuels Drug Trade'.

WSJ

2. RC-135 Accompanied By Fighters Off Venezuela Testing Maduro's Air Defenses: U.S. Official

Summary: 

U.S. F/A-18s and an RC-135V Rivet Joint flying near Venezuela are probing Nicolás Maduro’s air defenses as part of Operation Southern Spear, a large U.S. show of force in the Caribbean ostensibly aimed at narcotics trafficking. Fighters, B-52 bombers, F-35Bs, MQ-9s, AC-130s, P-8s and 15,000 personnel support the pressure campaign. The RC-135 collects detailed electronic intelligence on Venezuelan radars, tactics and readiness, enabling strike planning and signaling potential offensive options. Washington’s pending designation of Venezuela’s “Cartel de los Soles” as a foreign terrorist organization could unlock broader tools, heightening both operational pressure and psychological stress on Maduro’s regime.

Comment: Telegraphing punches or part of a deception plan? Pressure on the regime to capitulate?

RC-135 Accompanied By Fighters Off Venezuela Testing Maduro's Air Defenses: U.S. Official

The flights are part of a massive U.S. military presence in the Caribbean aimed at putting maximum pressure on Venezuela's Maduro.

Howard Altman, Tyler Rogoway

Updated Nov 20, 2025 9:27 PM EST

twz.com

https://www.twz.com/air/rc-135-accompanied-by-fighters-off-venezuela-testing-enemy-air-defenses-u-s-official

The TWZ Newsletter

Weekly insights and analysis on the latest developments in military technology, strategy, and foreign policy.

As the U.S. continues to raise the heat on Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro, online flight trackers tonight have noticed several F/A-18 Super Hornets and a U.S. Air Force RC-135V Rivet Joint electronic surveillance plane flying close to the South American nation’s coastline. A U.S. official told us these flights are part of the pressure campaign ordered by U.S. President Donald Trump against Maduro and specifically to test Venezuela’s air defense capabilities and response times. This is a staple tactic that is critical to assessing the status, locations, operating procedures, and sensitivity of an enemy’s defenses. The data garnered is especially critical for planning offensive operations.

You can catch up with our most recent coverage about what has been dubbed Operation Southern Spear in our story here.

“They are normal operational training flights from the aircraft carrier USS Ford and platforms performing training exercises,” the official told us. “They are also testing Venezuelan sensors and responses, and it is part of the pressure campaign to show U.S. capabilities in the Caribbean.”

F/A-18E/F Super Hornets like this one are flying near the coast of Venezuela. (USN)A US Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint. (USAF) A US Air Force RC-135V/W Rivet Joint. USAF

In addition to the Super Hornets and Rivet Joint, spotters also tracked B-52H Superfortress bombers in the region as well. The flight is the latest in a series of bomber sorties that have been flying near Venezuela since October 15.

USAF B-52 pinged near South America.

5/ https://t.co/8ScyfGI1wk

— TheIntelFrog (@TheIntelFrog) November 21, 2025

“For operational security reasons, we do not comment on the movement of aircraft supporting ongoing operations,” an Air Force Southern Command spokesperson told us earlier today when we asked about the flights. “We refer you to the…press release for information about Operation Southern Spear and the Joint Task Force established to conduct the operation.”

B-52H Superfortresses. (USAF/Staff Sgt. William Rio Rosado) USAF/Staff Sgt. William Rio Rosado

The flights are part of a massive U.S. presence in the Caribbean for an operation that was ostensibly launched to counter the flow of narcotics into the U.S. but has morphed into a huge show of force aimed at Maduro. In addition to the Ford, there are at least seven surface combatants, a special operations mothership, and several support vessels. There are also F-35B stealth fighters, MQ-9 Reaper drones, AC-130 Ghostrider gunships, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, among other assets, and about 15,000 U.S. personnel deployed to the region.

Thursday evening, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told OAN news that the looming designation of Cartel de los Soles as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, alleged to be headed by Maduro, “brings a whole bunch of new options to the United States.” That designation goes into effect on Nov. 24 unless challenged by Congress.

OAN to Air Exclusive Sit-Down Interview with Secretary of War Pete Hegseth in Prime Time — Watch tonight at 5 pm EST, 7 pm EST, and 11 pm ESThttps://t.co/tdOmMHEBFZ

— One America News (@OANN) November 20, 2025

RC-135 Rivet Joints are no strangers to this part of the world, as we have written about in-depth before. But the aircraft’s arrival at this time, along with tactical fighters and bombers, and many other aircraft that do not show up on tracking systems, is of great interest. The fact that some of these aircraft are showing up on tracking sites at all is clearly a conscious choice in messaging. Even more so, the fact that a U.S. official confirmed the aircraft were stimulating Venezuelan defenses in order to gather critical intelligence is also a very rare admission. Such activities go back many years and happen around the globe regularly to this day to varying degrees of sophistication. But this appears to be a more complex operation, especially considering Venezuela is on high alert for an impending military operation. It’s worth noting that the RC-135 would also have had fighter cover for its collection mission, which could have been provided by USS Gerald R. Ford’s Super Hornets.

By gathering this type of intelligence, and the RC-135 is arguably the best asset on earth to do it, commanders have an up-to-date assessment of the enemy’s electronic order of battle. Once again, this includes the status, types, geolocations, tactics, and readiness of these systems. That intelligence is critical for planning strikes as it informs what air defenses need to be suppressed or destroyed in order for missiles and/or aircraft to best make it to their targets. It also directly dictates what routes those missiles and/or aircraft would take.

At this time, we have no indication that this is all prelude to an actual offensive military operation that strikes into Venezuela, but it is certainly one indicator. And that may very well be the point, as it puts extreme pressure on Maduro, signaling that his reality could shift dramatically in the coming days.

For both tactical and psychological operations reasons, it won’t be surprising if the RC-135 and its fighter escorts and ‘stimulators’ don’t become a relatively common sight off the Venezuelan coast over the coming days.

Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com

Howard Altman

Senior Staff Writer

Howard is a Senior Staff Writer for The War Zone, and a former Senior Managing Editor for Military Times. Prior to this, he covered military affairs for the Tampa Bay Times as a Senior Writer. Howard's work has appeared in various publications including Yahoo News, RealClearDefense, and Air Force Times.

Tyler Rogoway

Editor-in-Chief

Tyler’s passion is the study of military technology, strategy, and foreign policy and he has fostered a dominant voice on those topics in the defense media space. He was the creator of the hugely popular defense site Foxtrot Alpha before developing The War Zone.

3. Trump Peace Plan Demands Major Concessions From Ukraine

Summary:

A leaked administration peace blueprint would end the Ukraine war by freezing current front lines and forcing Kyiv to cede Donbas and accept Russia’s control of Crimea and other occupied regions. Ukraine’s army would be capped and NATO membership barred, in exchange for limited U.S. security guarantees and reconstruction aid. Russia would gain sanctions relief, G-8 reentry and U.S. recognition of its gains, plus economic cooperation in energy, AI and the Arctic. Kyiv publicly rejects territorial concessions, while Europe drafts a more favorable counterplan, underscoring deep divides over sacrificing Ukrainian sovereignty for a Trump-chaired “win-win” settlement imposed by Washington.

Trump Peace Plan Demands Major Concessions From Ukraine

Leaked proposal reveals Ukraine would have to cede territory, while Russia would receive incentives

By Alexander Ward

Follow and Lara Seligman

Follow in Washington and Laurence Norman

Follow in Berlin

Updated Nov. 20, 2025 10:27 pm ET.  https://www.wsj.com/world/u-s-peace-plan-for-ukraine-faces-resistance-from-europe-and-kyiv-0f2bb501?st=jJKmp9

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Ukraine’s deputy U.N. ambassador says Kyiv has received President Trump’s draft peace plan and is ready to engage “constructively,” while underscoring the country’s non-negotiable red lines. Photo: Anatolii Stepanov/Reuters

Quick Summary

• The Trump administration’s peace plan for Ukraine requires Kyiv to cede the eastern Donbas region and accept Russia’s control over other areas.View more

The Trump administration’s peace plan for Ukraine demands sweeping territorial and security concessions from Kyiv while offering Moscow major economic and political incentives, including U.S. recognition of its claims to parts of Ukraine, to halt the nearly four-year-old war.

The White House has been pursuing a deal to end the conflict since President Trump took office in January, but the details of the terms he and his top aides were offering Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have been kept largely under wraps until now.

A draft of the blueprint posted online that the White House confirmed was authentic calls for Ukraine to cede the eastern Donbas region now under its control to Moscow and accept Russia’s de facto control of other parts of Ukraine where the front line would be frozen. 

Ukraine’s military would be capped at 600,000 personnel and its goal of joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be foreclosed.

Taken together, the proposals seek to address many of Putin’s longstanding demands for ending the war. The inducements offered to Ukraine are far more limited, reflecting Trump’s prioritization of ending the bloodshed over maintaining U.S. support for the target of the Kremlin’s 2022 all-out invasion.

Kupyansk

Luhansk

11.3% of the Donbas is still controlled by Ukraine

Lyman

Russia

Pokrovsk

Ukraine

Donetsk

Russian Forces

Sea of Azov

100 miles

100 km

Source: Institute for the Study of War and AEI's Critical Threats Project

Many of the White House ideas were so at odds with longstanding Ukrainian positions that some analysts called the blueprint a nonstarter for negotiations. 

In addition to the 28-point plan, a separate U.S. document lays out security guarantees White House officials are prepared to offer Ukraine in case Russia renews the war, including “intelligence and logistical assistance” or “other steps judged appropriate” after consultations with allies. It doesn’t commit the U.S. to provide direct military assistance, a copy of the document reviewed by The Wall Street Journal shows. The guarantees would last 10 years and could be extended.

If the overall deal is adopted, Russia would be invited to rejoin the Group of Eight, and promised, on a case-by-case basis, the lifting of sanctions that have deprived the Kremlin of hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue. Washington and Moscow would collaborate on artificial intelligence, data centers, energy deals and rare-earth mining in the Arctic, under the 28-point plan.

“This plan was crafted to reflect the realities of the situation, after four years of a devastating war, to find the best win-win scenario, where both parties gain more than they must give,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said in a statement.

U.S. officials said they were carefully coordinating the terms of the deal with Kyiv. Rustem Umerov, secretary of Ukraine’s national security and defense council, had endorsed “the majority of the plan” in talks with U.S. officials, Leavitt said.

Zelensky, who has sought to align himself closely with the White House since a clash with Trump in February, took a conciliatory stance after a briefing on the plan Thursday, saying he was ready to work with the U.S. on halting the war.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky meeting with U.S. Army Secretary Dan Driscoll in Kyiv on Thursday. UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE/AFP/Getty Images

A senior Ukrainian diplomat told the United Nations Security Council that Ukraine opposed ceding territory to Russia and other provisions of the plan. “Ukraine won’t accept any limits on its right to self-defense, or on the size or capabilities of our armed forces,” said Khrystyna Hayovyshyn, Ukraine’s deputy permanent U.N. representative.

In addition to provisions aimed at halting the fighting, the proposal calls for Kyiv to agree to hold elections in 100 days, which could see Zelensky ousted as he and his administration stumble through a mounting corruption scandal at home.

Top Trump administration officials have worked on the blueprint over the past month and discussed it with Ukrainian counterparts in recent days. The proposal was a working document and would likely be altered during negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, U.S. officials said.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Thursday said the Russian and U.S. sides were not actively engaged in discussing a cease-fire and that any deal needed to address the root causes of the war—Moscow’s shorthand for its displeasure over NATO’s eastern expansion, Ukraine’s pro-Western tilt and the West’s dismissal of Russia as a great power.

Moscow would have to promise not to re-invade Ukraine, forging a nonaggression pact with Kyiv and Europe and not placing troops in land Ukraine unilaterally surrenders. But the regions of Luhansk, Donetsk and Crimea, would be “recognized as de facto Russian,” the document says, including by the U.S. 

A family rehabilitation program would also be set up, an attempt to address Ukraine’s outrage over the forced abduction and disappearance of thousands of Ukrainian children into Russia. Ukraine would retain the right to join the European Union. 

Ukrainian recruits at an undisclosed location. Ukraine Armed Forces/AFP/Getty Images

In a provision aimed at Ukraine neighbors worried about the threat from Moscow, the plan says, “It is expected that Russia won’t invade neighboring countries.” European governments were neither included in the drafting of the plan nor briefed on its contents as of Thursday evening, European officials have said.

Meanwhile, the U.S. would reap benefits from Ukraine’s reconstruction, which would be partly funded by the World Bank. The U.S. would rebuild Ukraine’s gas pipelines and help create a fund for artificial-intelligence projects and data centers in Ukraine. A peace council, chaired by Trump, would oversee the implementation. 

The U.S. plan also calls for dividing up the power distribution from Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant between Russia and Ukraine. Moscow seized the plant, Europe’s biggest, in the first days of the war. 

The framework seeks to dictate what happens to the $300 billion in immobilized Russian central-bank assets, the bulk of which are held in Europe. 

European leaders are working on their own counteroffer for how to end the war on alternative terms and are looking to persuade Ukraine to back its plan, which is designed to be more favorable to Kyiv. Europe hopes to have the plan ready within days, but Kyiv has so far not committed to joining it. 

Apartment buildings damaged by a Russian strike in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Ukrainian Armed Forces/Reuters

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R, S.C.), a staunch Trump ally, hadn’t been shown the 28-point plan but said “any peace deal probably should come before the Senate,” adding: “I think they need to read us in on what they are going to do.”

A senior U.S. official said that Ukraine significantly changed one of the 28 points in the version that appeared online. In an apparent move to expose alleged corruption, the draft had called for an audit of all international aid Ukraine had received. The language was changed to say all parties will receive “full amnesty for their actions during the war.”

Write to Alexander Ward at alex.ward@wsj.com, Lara Seligman at lara.seligman@wsj.com and Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com

Corrections & Amplifications

Rustem Umerov is secretary of Ukraine’s national security and defense council. An earlier version of this article incorrectly said he was Ukraine’s defense minister. (Corrected on Nov. 20)

Appeared in the November 21, 2025, print edition as 'U.S.’s Terms for Peace in Ukraine Revealed'.

4. The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated

Summary:

The Witkoff-Dmitriev “28-point” peace plan, drafted by non-diplomats and leaked to gain momentum. He argues it reflects a Russian wish list: Ukrainian territorial concessions in Crimea and Donbas, limits on Ukraine’s army, permanent exclusion from NATO, vague Russian non-aggression pledges, and dubious U.S. “compensation” and profit clauses on frozen assets. Ukraine gets security guarantees, reconstruction funds and EU prospects but little agency, with a U.S.–Russia working group and a Trump-chaired Peace Council overseeing implementation and full amnesty for wartime actions. Freedman judges the plan incoherent, legally fuzzy and politically unworkable, inviting prolonged negotiations and delay.

Excerpts:

Wisely Zelenskyy has said he’ll work with the Americans on the plan. He might as well wait until the Russians formulate a response. For now their reaction has been muted. If the Russians just accepted it they could claim a sort of victory but it would not quite be on their terms. As I surmised yesterday and have shown above this is not a fully developed plan which could be presented, as was the Gaza plan, on a take it or leave it basis. Even then Netanyahu fiddled with the details at the end.

This is a plan that even if there was no change to the underlying principles and concessions would require a lot more work, and so will delay a ceasefire. As soon as both sides can object and amend that will lead to a protracted negotiation and so even more delay. The advantage is that having a plan set down allows one to see the pitfalls. It does not necessarily enable one to see a way though them.

The Witkoff-Dmitriev peace plan annotated

Lawrence Freedman

Nov 21, 2025

https://samf.substack.com/p/the-witkoff-dmitriev-peace-plan-annotated?utm

We now know a bit more about the process which led to the new peace plan and we now have a copy of its contents, to which I will turn soon.

Yesterday I noted that the plan, which was largely drafted by Steve Witkoff and Kirll Dmitriev, neither of whom are professional diplomats, was slanted in Russia’s favour, had been leaked by Dmitriev apparently to give it a push, had not been negotiated with either Kyiv or Moscow, and that many provisions were unclear even though the stories insisted that it was to be presented to Kyiv as a fait accompli.

With more reporting since I posted it seems that the proposal is more developed and has involved more people around the Trump administration. My guess is that as people looked at the plan it was starting to get pushback (possibly from Ukrainians) and that Dmitriev leaked it to give it a higher status and invest it with momentum, but that is only a guess.

At any rate if that is what was intended it succeeded as it is now being discussed as something real and in play. But it is clearly insufficiently developed to be presented as a fait accompli, and contrary to the original leaks, that will not now happen. This is not least because the Russians have been blindsided and are unhappy with the process and some of the content. So it is up for consultation and discussion with both sides.

We can now go further because a copy of the ‘28 point plan’ is in circulation, which I assess below. In key provisions, most importantly the territorial, but also in limiting the Ukrainian army and keeping Ukraine out of NATO, it reflects a Russian ‘wish list’, but it is only to fair to acknowledge that in some respects, notably on security guarantees and reconstruction, it tries to offer something to Ukraine. The effort appears to be one of trying to come up with a package that could work for both sides, though requiring both to make concessions.

By the nature of the conflict, the most important concessions come from Ukraine as it was the victim of aggression and it is its territory and not Russia’s that is occupied. But there is a lot in this that Russia still won’t like or at least will want to reframe. As important, it’s a dog’s breakfast, with some strange provisions, leaving open many questions for contentious interpretation and potential reframing.

I’ve provided annotations, noting the issues it raises. Others I’m sure will pick up points I’ve missed.

1. Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.
2. A full and comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All ambiguities of the past 30 years will be considered resolved.
3. [What ambiguities? Promises of non-aggression have been made before, for example in the 1997 Founding Act, so while these are good things to say it remains unclear how much they can be trusted]
4. Russia is expected not to invade neighboring countries, and NATO will not expand further.
5. [No membership of NATO for Ukraine, and also in this formulation, any other potential candidates, has been a feature of Trump plans from the start. What is ‘an expectation not to invade.’ It imposes no obligations. A simple ‘will not’ would suffice.]
6. A dialogue between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, will be held to address all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation, in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.
7. [How can the US ‘mediate’ a dialogue between Russia and an alliance of which it is a part? Otherwise similar aspirations have been found in previous treaties].
8. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.
9. [More on this below].
10. The size of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will be limited to 600,000 personnel.
11. [This is more than envisaged under previous Russian proposals - in 2022 it was 85,000 - but why is it needed for a sovereign country? There is no mention of limitations on particular classes of weapons - aircraft, tanks etc. There are no restrictions envisaged on Russian forces.]
12. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include a provision in its charters that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.
13. [Ukraine aspires to join NATO. Its constitution can be changed to preclude that, though this will be contentious. It can then be changed back again at a later date. If this is referring to the 1949 Washington Treaty that was signed and sealed in 1949. It has only been amended to take account of new members. The NATO Council could certainly promise not to admit Ukraine, although it could also change its mind].
14. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.
15. [There goes the Coalition of the Willing (CoW), or at least the part of the plan that envisaged small European military contingents backing up Ukrainian front line forces (which would now also be limited).]
16. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.
17. [It’s an odd statement, as it is up to Poland, but I presume this is intended to rescue the part of the CoW plan that envisaged air support that could impose a no-fly zone. I can’t imagine Russia will be delighted by this but in practice it could happen anyway. No mention of potential role for CoW naval forces.]
18. U.S. guarantee:

• The United States will receive compensation for providing the guarantee.

[What does this mean? From whom, in what form and how much? A security guarantee is a promise to act in certain contingencies. It doesn’t cost much to make the promise. This plays to Trump’s transactional view of alliance security but it is a weird insertion in a peace treaty]

If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee.

[Of course unlikely but remember that the Russian pretext for the full-scale invasion was that Ukrainian forces were ‘invading’ the Luhansk enclave]

If Russia invades Ukraine, then in addition to a decisive and coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked.

[Well unless the US intends to do it all by itself ‘decisive and coordinated’ means a NATO response and not just a US one (so does NATO get compensated?). In fact this has more automaticity than NATO’s Article V. So Ukraine should be happy with this but for the same reason Russia will not. Once sanctions have been removed it will not be easy to reinstate them. If Ukrainian territories have been integrated into Russia does that mean that the US would lead a fight to get them back or just withdraw recognition?]

If Ukraine, without cause, launches a missile at Moscow or Saint Petersburg, the security guarantee will be considered void.

[But Rostov would be OK? And what would be sufficient cause to justify a missile launch? Another weird clause.]

Ukraine has the right to EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is under consideration.

That is up to EU but nice if Russia conceded as this whole wretched business began when Putin tried to stop Ukraine signing an association agreement with the EU in 2013]

1. A powerful global package for Ukraine’s reconstruction, including but not limited to:

a. Creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing sectors, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence.

b. The United States will cooperate with Ukraine to jointly restore, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage.

c. Joint efforts to rebuild war-affected territories to restore, reconstruct, and modernize cities and residential areas.

d. Infrastructure development.

e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.

f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.

[In principle all good but this will require a lot of money. (e) presumably refers to the US-agreement on minerals but it is not explicit]

1. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:

a. Sanctions relief will be discussed and agreed upon gradually and individually.

b. The United States will conclude a long-term economic cooperation agreement aimed at mutual development in the spheres of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, Arctic rare-earth mining projects, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities.

c. Russia will be invited to return to the G8.

[Not surprising but Russia will worry that (a) will be a slow process, and it is very dependent upon EU and UK so they will need to agree package. This is their major leverage over the fate of this plan

Equally it is not for the US to decide alone if Russia can rejoin the G7. It has to be agreed by the other members]

1. Frozen assets will be used as follows:

US$100 billion of frozen Russian assets will be invested in U.S.-led efforts for Ukraine’s reconstruction and investment. The United States will receive 50% of the profits from this initiative.

Europe will add US$100 billion to increase the investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. European frozen assets will be unfrozen.

The remaining frozen Russian assets will be invested in a separate U.S.–Russia investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in designated areas. This fund will aim to strengthen relations and increase shared interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.

[I can’t believe that Russia will agree to any of this. They want their assets back. Equally Ukraine wants them as reparations for all the losses they have suffered - and even then it will not be enough. What is with the US making a profit from this?]

1. A joint U.S.–Russia security working group will be established to facilitate and ensure implementation of all provisions of this agreement.
2. [At the very least Ukraine should also be part of this process, otherwise it is wholly reliant on the US to look after its interests when it has been doing the mediating. Russia will continue to accuse Ukraine of breaking provisions and Ukraine needs to be able to defend its position and point to areas of Russian non-compliance. As drafted denies Ukraine any agency over the implementation ]
3. Russia will codify a non-aggression policy toward Europe and Ukraine.
4. [Following the UN Charter would be a start. I’ve no idea what this could mean. Non-aggression should not be conditional.]
5. The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation and arms control treaties, including the START I Treaty.
6. [The non-proliferation is not time limited so it does not need extension. I presume they mean New START rather than START 1, and its extension would be welcome.]
7. Ukraine agrees to remain a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
8. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant will be put into operation under IAEA supervision, and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine — 50:50.
9. [This assume Zaporizhzhia remains de facto part of Russia see below]
10. Both countries commit to implementing educational programs in schools and society aimed at fostering understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:

a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and protection of linguistic minorities.

b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education.

c. All Nazi ideology and activity must be rejected and prohibited.

[Well good luck with all of that if it is supposed to apply to Russia. As the Kremlin has adopted its own self-serving definition of what constitutes Nazi ideology and activity (more or less anything hostile to Russia) we can only guess how this would be used. Equally interesting to see how Ukrainian rights are to be protected in Russia.]

1. Territories:

a. Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.

b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, effectively granting de facto recognition along that line.

c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.

d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

[This meets Russia’s core territorial demand, although with some strange twists. De facto is less than de jure. It normally refers to a situation that exists in reality and cannot easily be changed, but is not necessarily recognized in law. In the event of a ceasefire being agreed it was always safest to assume that the occupied territories would become de facto Russian, without being recognised as such by Ukraine or the wider international community (as with Crimea). De jure refers to situations that are legally recognised and have official status. Russia has incorporated the four claimed oblasts into its constitution and wants them officially recognised. At any rate you don’t formally recognise something as de facto - it just is. So this would be meaningless. Russia will want de jure.

Turning the remaining part of Donetsk into a neutral demilitarised zone is an odd sort of compromise. First this is full of Ukrainian defences, including minefields (there are no reference to demining anywhere in the document). Demilitarising it would be no small matter. And if it is part of Russia - even if de facto - how can it be neutral. Ukrainians also live there. Are they supposed to abandon their homes or become Russian or have some limbo status because they are in neutral territory?]

1. After future territorial arrangements are agreed, both Russia and Ukraine commit not to alter them by force. Any security guarantees will not apply if this obligation is violated.
2. Russia will not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnipro River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain through the Black Sea.
3. [There were agreements on this in the past which Russia abandoned]
4. A humanitarian committee will be created to resolve outstanding issues:

a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an “all for all” basis.

b. All civilian detainees and hostages, including children, will be returned.

c. A family reunification program will be implemented.

d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of victims of the conflict.

[Hard to object but not exactly strong on detail]

1. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.
2. [There is a need for Ukrainian elections but it also requires the conditions for them to be conducted safely. Can the residents of Donetsk vote? At rate elections are up to the Ukrainians as a sovereign country. Why not include a demand for free and fair Russian elections?]
3. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for actions during the war and agree not to bring claims or pursue grievances in the future.
4. [War crimes go unpunished].
5. This agreement will be legally binding.
6. Its implementation will be monitored and guaranteed by a Peace Council chaired by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.
7. [This is modelled on Gaza. How does it relate to point 15 or indeed the other provisions on guarantees? What happens when Trump goes? Who will be on this Peace Council? What will be the terms of reference? Most peace treaties will have provisions to deal with disputes and if necessary provide for arbitration. With Gaza the Trump plan was backed by the great majority of regional states and the aim was to write Hamas out of the script. The military and political relationships were quite different.]
8. Once all parties accept this memorandum, a ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides withdraw to the agreed points for the start of the agreement’s implementation.

Wisely Zelenskyy has said he’ll work with the Americans on the plan. He might as well wait until the Russians formulate a response. For now their reaction has been muted. If the Russians just accepted it they could claim a sort of victory but it would not quite be on their terms. As I surmised yesterday and have shown above this is not a fully developed plan which could be presented, as was the Gaza plan, on a take it or leave it basis. Even then Netanyahu fiddled with the details at the end.

This is a plan that even if there was no change to the underlying principles and concessions would require a lot more work, and so will delay a ceasefire. As soon as both sides can object and amend that will lead to a protracted negotiation and so even more delay. The advantage is that having a plan set down allows one to see the pitfalls. It does not necessarily enable one to see a way through them.

5. Fatal Flaw: Ex-CIA Analyst Says Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Backfire, Poison US–Kyiv Ties

Summary:

Former State Department adviser and ex-CIA analyst Paul Goble says Trump’s leaked Ukraine “peace plan” is fundamentally unworkable and “not a settlement.” He argues it grants one-sided concessions to Russia, reflects Trump’s deference to Putin, and serves domestic political and business aims. Goble predicts Kyiv will reject any deal requiring capitulation after massive sacrifice and destruction. Forcing Ukraine to accept such terms would, he warns, poison U.S.–Ukraine relations, with Washington blamed alongside Moscow for legitimizing Russian gains. The result could be no real peace, a humiliated Ukraine, and a self-inflicted strategic fiasco for the United States.

Fatal Flaw: Ex-CIA Analyst Says Trump’s ‘Peace Plan’ Will Backfire, Poison US–Kyiv Ties

kyivpost.com

In an interview with Kyiv Post, Paul Goble, former State Department special adviser and CIA analyst, warns that “the proposed settlement is not a settlement” and could shatter US-Ukraine relations.

by Alex Raufoglu | Nov. 21, 2025, 6:23 am

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/64663

Paul Goble testifies at a US Helsinki Commission hearing on May 11, 2011 (Photo by Josh Shapiro /US Helsinki Commission)

Flip

The leak of the Trump administration’s latest framework for a Ukraine settlement has detonated in Washington and Kyiv like a political explosive device. But according to veteran intelligence analyst Paul Goble, the proposal is fundamentally unworkable.

The former State Department special adviser and CIA analyst says the circulated documents – which he characterizes as “one-sided” concessions to Moscow – rest on a fatal miscalculation: the belief that stopping the fighting equals solving the conflict.

In an interview with Kyiv Post on Thursday, Goble offered a blistering critique, arguing the initiative looks less like a serious attempt at a durable peace and more like a political performance by President Donald Trump designed to showcase deference to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Real goal: deference and domestic cover

Goble says the US administration’s motivation appears to be a blend of personal and domestic political calculation. First, he believes, “Trump is trying to show how deferential he’s prepared to be to Putin.”

At the same time, Goble argues, the US president may be banking on congressional Republicans to block the deal if it becomes politically toxic.

“If he has to back away, he can say, ‘Well, I tried, but, you know, we have domestic political things too,’” Goble said.

A deeper political current, in his view, involves Trump’s own longstanding business ambitions. “I really think... Trump believes that if he can just get this, the fighting stopped, everything will be solved, and then he can develop his economic interests in the Russian Federation,” he said.

Other Topics of Interest

Ukraine War: Is There a New Peace Plan?

As with Trump’s Gaza peace plan, Turkey and Qatar are said to have been involved in the drafting, with no representatives of Ukraine or the EU.

Goble added that Trump appears convinced that “you stop the fighting, and that solves the problem,” a belief he calls a profound mistake.

On the ground: a plan headed for collapse

But Goble argues that the most immediate rejection will come from Kyiv, which he believes will refuse to accept the blueprint outright. The proposals circulating, he says, are far too generous to the Kremlin.

“I don’t see any way that Ukrainians are going to accept anything close to what plans that I’ve seen circulated. They’re one sided, they’re concessions of the Russians, and I think there will be enormous resistance,” he warned.

For Ukrainians who have watched their people be “killed, massively” and their property “destroyed,” Goble says the idea of endorsing such terms is politically impossible.

“I don’t think the Ukrainians are going to look too kindly at anybody who says, now to end this war, what you’ve got to do is basically do what the Russians want,” he said.

He added bluntly: “I simply don’t believe that [it’s] going to go that way.”

The core error, Goble argues, is the assumption that a neat agreement can be struck “that Kyiv will accept it, that the Ukrainian people will accept it, and that we will have peace in our time.”

Coming reckoning: US-Ukraine relations at risk

The failure of the plan, Goble warns, would not simply stall diplomacy – it would severely damage America’s relationship with one of its most critical European allies.

If Washington tries to pressure Kyiv into granting Russia the concessions outlined in the leaks, he predicts deep resentment inside Ukraine.

“It will poison some Ukrainians [against] the United States,” he said.

In that scenario, the US – Ukraine’s principal military and political backer – would be blamed alongside the Kremlin for insisting Kyiv accept territorial and political losses.

“The US will be blamed for having accepted what the Russians want… And then the US will be in the minds of some Ukrainians [blamed] as well as Russians,” Goble said.

The result, he argues, would be a “very frightening situation” in which Washington manages to alienate Kyiv without achieving any real peace—an outcome he sees as a political fiasco in both countries.

In Goble’s view, “the proposed settlement is not a settlement.”

Alex Raufoglu

Alex Raufoglu is Kyiv Post's Chief Correspondent in Washington DC. He covers the US State Department, regularly traveling with US Secretary of State. Raufoglu has worked extensively in the South Caucasus and Black Sea regions for several international broadcast outlets, such as VoA, BBC, RFE/RL, etc. He holds an MA in Interactive Journalism from American University, Washington DC.

6. Opinion | Trump Says Arms Are Going to Taiwan

Summary:

A $330 million U.S. arms sale to Taiwan, the first of POTUS' second term, signals continued support despite courting Xi on trade. The package and promised faster deliveries aim to strengthen deterrence as China expands militarily. The WSJ Editorial board urges more asymmetric capabilities and warns about Taiwan’s energy vulnerabilities and gray-zone coercion.

Opinion | Trump Says Arms Are Going to Taiwan

WSJ

The first sale of his second term is an assist for Pacific deterrence.

By The Editorial Board

Follow

Nov. 20, 2025 5:45 pm ET

https://www.wsj.com/opinion/donald-trump-taiwan-arms-sale-china-japan-xi-jinping-c8f7815f

Soldiers attend the inauguration ceremony of M1A2T Abrams Main Battle Tanks, Hsinchu County, Taiwan, Oct. 31. Chiang Ying-ying/Associated Press

One of the biggest questions in global affairs is whether President Trump is chasing a grand bargain with Beijing’s Xi Jinping—and at what cost to the United States. So it’s good news that the Administration is showing that America won’t be bullied from defending its Pacific interests, with an arms sale to our friends in Taiwan.

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency has notified Congress of a $330 million potential arms sale for the island democracy. Items include spare parts for fighter jets and transport aircraft, as well as U.S. technical and logistics support. But more important than the details is that this marks the Administration’s first sale to Taiwan in Mr. Trump’s second term. Rumors had spread this year that Mr. Trump was withholding arms for Taiwan as he wooed Mr. Xi on a trade deal.

Calibrating U.S. arms sales to the Chinese Communist Party’s reaction is a fool’s errand. A Chinese diplomat recently mused about cutting off Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s head after she suggested that a Chinese military assault on Taiwan—in Japan’s backyard—would threaten her home country’s survival. Concessions to China’s ambitions won’t ease communist designs on Taiwan.

The hope is that the arms sale is a sign of more to come. Taiwan needs a richer mix of capabilities to defend itself, including more mines and autonomous vehicles, to build what U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander Adm. Sam Paparo has called a “hellscape” for the Chinese military if it attempts an invasion across the Taiwan Strait.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said earlier this month that the Administration is revamping foreign military sales to speed up deliveries. “Every conversation I have with every president, prime minister, and minister of defense,” Mr. Hegseth said, “is: ‘What is wrong with your foreign military sales? We ordered it in 2014. It’s 2025 and it’s scheduled to deliver in 2032.’”

Taiwan deserves to be first in line for the weapons it has ordered given its urgent need, and faster deliveries are essential to help the island reach its goal of spending 5% of its economy on defense by 2030.

Meanwhile, Taiwan and the U.S. will also have to prepare for a challenge short of a shooting war. A new report from the Foundation for Defense of Democracies details Taiwan’s energy vulnerabilities owing to its near total reliance on imports. China could deploy “economic, legal and cyber levers to throttle Taiwan’s fuel supply and fracture its political will,” according to the report. The island can store only a few weeks worth of liquefied natural gas.

China’s recent launch of a third aircraft carrier with advanced technology is a warning that Beijing’s ambitions are far greater than hoisting a new flag over Taipei. Credit the Administration for taking a step for deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.

Review & Outlook: Likening the global threat level to that of 1939, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth unveils reforms to the Pentagon acquisition process that will ‘rebuild the defense industrial base into a new arsenal of freedom.’

Copyright ©2025 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8

Appeared in the November 21, 2025, print edition as 'Trump Says Arms Are Going to Taiwan'.

WSJ

7. Japan’s Takaichi says she wants better Beijing ties but refuses to retract Taiwan comments

Summary:

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi refuses to retract her remark that a Taiwan conflict could be a “survival-threatening situation” justifying Japanese military involvement, insisting Tokyo’s policy remains consistent while expressing a desire for better ties with Beijing. China demands a full withdrawal of her “erroneous” comments as a condition for improved relations and has escalated pressure with economic and people-to-people countermeasures, including renewed seafood import bans, travel warnings that triggered hundreds of thousands of flight cancellations, and cultural restrictions. Beijing has also ruled out high-level meetings at the G20 and postponed a China-Japan-ROK ministerial, accusing Takaichi of undermining cooperation.

Comment: The Iron Lady of Asia.

China-Japan relations

Japan’s Takaichi says she wants better Beijing ties but refuses to retract Taiwan comments

Sanae Takaichi insists Tokyo’s policy on Taiwan has been consistent when asked about Beijing’s demands to retract her comments

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3333718/japanese-leader-says-she-wants-better-ties-china-doesnt-withdraw-taiwan-comments?utm

Fan Chen

Published: 7:00pm, 21 Nov 2025Updated: 7:28pm, 21 Nov 2025

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said on Friday the country had been “consistent” over Taiwan but insisted she wanted better relations with Beijing.

Beijing has insisted she must retract her recent comments that Japanese troops might intervene in a conflict over the island because it could be a “survival-threatening situation”.

But when asked if she would do so, she did not answer directly but said Tokyo would “make a comprehensive judgment based on all available information regarding a situation threatening Japan’s existence”.

Speaking to reporters before she left for the Group of 20 summit in South Africa, she added: “I myself have repeatedly stated this position in my responses. The government’s stance remains consistent.”

Takaichi added that she still hoped for better relations with China. She said that when she met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the recent Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in South Korea, they had “confirmed the broad direction of comprehensively advancing our strategic and mutually beneficial relationship and building a constructive and stable relationship”.

She added: “There has been no change whatsoever in this stance.”

As well as calling on her to withdraw the comments, Beijing has also asked Tokyo to stick to its political commitments.

Why have Takaichi’s Taiwan comments sent China-Japan ties into a tailspin?

It regarded them as meddling in its internal affairs, and was concerned that they could mark a departure from Japan’s strategic ambiguity on how it would react to a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

On Friday, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning repeated the demand when asked about Takaichi’s comments about wanting better relations.

She said if that really was the case, Japan should “immediately retract its erroneous remarks and truly translate its commitments to China into concrete actions”.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China and has never ruled out the use of force to reunite it with the mainland.

Most countries, including Japan and its main ally the United States, do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

Beijing has previously said that Premier Li Qiang, who is representing China at the G20 summit, will not meet Takaichi at the event.

It has also postponed a planned ministerial meeting between China, Japan and South Korea, saying the Japanese leader had “undermined the basis and atmosphere for cooperation” among the three countries.

Beijing has also announced a series of economic countermeasures and threatened further action if there is no retraction.

On Wednesday, it reportedly reimposed a ban on Japanese seafood imports only weeks after lifting it. The previous ban was imposed because of concerns about the release of treated waste water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant.

Takaichi and Xi Jinping pictured at their recent meeting in South Korea. Photo: Xinhua

Beijing has also urged its citizens to avoid travelling to Japan, resulting in the cancellation of about 590,000 flight bookings, aviation analyst Li Hanming said on Friday.

Imports of some Japanese films have also been halted and several concerts cancelled.

Meanwhile, the education ministry has urged students to reconsider any plans to study there.

Fan Chen

Fan Chen joined the Post in 2024. She has reported in Cambodia, Nepal, and the Czech Republic. Her work appears in Reuters, Newsweek, and Southern People Weekly. She holds two journalism degrees from Columbia Journalism School and New York University.

8. Is Beijing’s spat with Japan sending a message to US and allies over Taiwan?

Summary:

Beijing’s harsh reaction to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remark that a Taiwan conflict could be a “survival-threatening situation” is meant as a broader warning, Chinese analysts say. By punishing Japan diplomatically and economically, China signals to the U.S., South Korea, Australia and other allies not to move from ambiguity to explicit commitments on Taiwan contingencies. The message: do not sit on the front line of confrontation with China or join U.S.-led intervention plans or sanctions schemes. Beijing reiterates Taiwan as a highly non-negotiable “core interest,” while Washington openly backs Tokyo, approving new arms sales to Taipei despite Chinese pressure.

ChinaDiplomacy

Is Beijing’s spat with Japan sending a message to US and allies over Taiwan?

The furious reaction may be a warning to other US allies such as South Korea and Australia not to change their Taiwan policy, analysts say

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3333653/beijings-spat-japan-sending-message-us-and-allies-over-taiwan?utm

Orange Wang

Published: 6:00pm, 21 Nov 2025

Beijing’s recent fury directed towards Japan is hammering home a point on Taiwan to the wider world, especially the United States and its allies, analysts in mainland China have suggested.

Earlier this month, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said a conflict in the Taiwan Strait might be a “survival-threatening situation” that would justify military intervention.

The comments appeared to challenge Japan’s policy of strategic ambiguity about how it would respond to any crisis – something Beijing said would undermine the post-war international order.

Beijing warned Tokyo to brace for “all the consequences” before unleashing a series of retaliatory measures this week, while suggesting more might follow.

This stance could be a “multilayered” strategic signal, according to Chen Yang, director of the Japan Research Centre at the Beijing-based think tank Haiyi Institute.

“[It] is not only aimed at Japan but also a reminder to the United States and its system of allies – including Australia and South Korea – as well as a broader range of Asia-Pacific nations: stay prudent on the so-called Taiwan contingency,” he said.

Beijing’s response “creates a ‘demonstration effect’ in the regional strategic context: it conveys a warning to all countries that might be drawn into the Taiwan situation but have yet to take an explicit stance”, according to Chen Hong, director of the Australian Studies Centre at East China Normal University in Shanghai.

He said Beijing’s message included “do not position yourselves on the front lines of confrontation with China”.

“Overall, the approach can function both to uphold [Beijing’s] position on Taiwan and to issue an early warning against the potential spreading of intervening roles within the network of US Asia-Pacific allies.”

Takaichi’s comment – which she said was “hypothetical” but has refused to retract – made her the first Japanese leader since World War II to directly state that the country’s troops might intervene in a conflict over Taiwan.

Official media in mainland China accused her of displaying an “ambition” to militarily intervene and of making a “threat of force” against Beijing – both unprecedented since Japan’s defeat in 1945.

Japan’s post-war constitution renounces the use of force to settle international disputes and says its military can only be used for self-defence.

Earlier this year, the Financial Times reported that the US was pressing Japan and Australia to make clear what role they would play in the event of a war over the island.

According to the report, the Japanese defence ministry responded that it was “difficult to answer” a hypothetical question of that nature.

Why have Takaichi’s Taiwan comments sent China-Japan ties into a tailspin?

A recent report by the Rand Corporation think tank said the two countries could play a “core” role in US-led sanctions designed to deter an attack on Taiwan.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said last month that his country supported “the status quo when it comes to Taiwan”.

“We have a bipartisan position for the one-China policy, but we also don’t want to see any unilateral action,” he added.

Takaichi’s remarks could be read as a “belated” open response to the US request and a signal Japan was willing to align with Washington on the issue, according to Chen from Haiyi.

“[Beijing’s] warning to Japan is ringing alarm bells for the American alliance system, making other US allies such as Australia and South Korea clearly recognise the huge cost of following suit in intervening,” he said.

“That also serves as an indirect warning to the US … [that] any attempt to interfere in China’s internal affairs by leveraging alliance power will be countered.”

He also said that Beijing’s recent actions were sending a clear message to the international community about “respecting each country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”.

Beijing sees Taiwan as part of China to be reunited by force if necessary.

Most countries – including the US, Japan and other American allies – do not recognise Taiwan as an independent state, but Washington is opposed to any attempt to take the island by force and is committed to supplying it with weapons.

On Thursday, George Glass, the US ambassador to Japan, said Washington was supporting Takaichi in the row with Beijing.

“I just want to say directly from the president and from myself and from the embassy … we have her back,” Glass said, according to Kyodo News.

Official media in mainland China has criticised the Japanese leader over her comments. Photo: Kyodo

Last week, the US approved the first arms sales to Taiwan since Donald Trump returned to the White House, triggering strong condemnation from Beijing.

Earlier this month, the Chinese embassy in Wellington posted the full text of the 1972 joint communique issued when New Zealand switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing – which “acknowledged” Beijing’s one-China policy – in an apparent protest about a group of MPs attending a reception at Taiwan’s de facto embassy.

Also last week, China’s ambassador to South Korea Dai Bing cautioned against “changing the strategic goals” of the alliance between Seoul and Washington, and warned them “not to play with fire” on Taiwan.

Beijing describes Taiwan as a “core interest”, where its official positions are not subject to negotiation or compromise.

“Advancing the cause of national reunification” ranked as a priority in the framework for the five-year plan adopted by the Communist Party’s Central Committee last month.

Orange Wang

Based in Beijing, Orange covers a range of topics including China's economy and diplomacy. He previously worked in Hong Kong and had a stint in Washington. Before joining the Post, Orange worked as a Shanghai Correspondent for ET Net, a Hong Kong financial news agency.

9. Top military lawyer raised legal concerns about boat strikes

Summary:

The senior JAG at U.S. Southern Command, Col. Paul Meagher, warned that lethal strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats near Venezuela could constitute extrajudicial killings and expose U.S. troops to legal risk. Overruled by higher officials, including DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel, he was joined by other worried military lawyers, though the Pentagon publicly denies any internal dissent. The administration claims an “armed conflict” with narco-terrorists and cites 82 killed in 21 strikes, but critics say Congress never authorized force and cartel crimes are law-enforcement matters, not attacks justifying war. Experts warn participants could face liability once POTUS leaves office.

Top military lawyer raised legal concerns about boat strikes

The lawyer at U.S. Southern Command, which oversees the operations against alleged drug-smuggling boats near Venezuela, disagreed that the strikes are legal and was overruled, according to six sources.

NBC News · Gordon Lubold, Courtney Kube and Dan De Luce · November 20, 2025

https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/top-military-lawyer-raised-legal-concerns-boat-strikes-rcna243694

WASHINGTON — The senior military lawyer for the combatant command overseeing lethal strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats near Venezuela disagreed with the Trump administration’s position that the operations are lawful — and his views were sidelined, according to six sources with knowledge of the legal advice.

The lawyer, who serves as the senior judge advocate general, or JAG in military parlance, at U.S. Southern Command in Miami, raised his legal concerns in August before the strikes began in September, according to two senior U.S. officials, two senior congressional aides and two former senior U.S. officials.

His opinion was ultimately overruled by more senior government officials, including officials at the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, the six sources said. Other JAGs and military lawyers at various levels of seniority weighed in on the boat strikes, as well. It’s unclear what each of their opinions were, but some of the military lawyers, including civilians and those in uniform, also expressed concerns to senior officials in their commands and at the Defense Department about the legality of the strikes, the two senior congressional aides and one of the senior former U.S. officials said.

The JAG at Southern Command specifically expressed concern that strikes against people on boats in the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean, whom administration officials call “narco-terrorists,” could amount to extrajudicial killings, the six sources said, and therefore legally expose service members involved in the operations.

The opinion of the top lawyer for the command overseeing a military operation is typically critical to whether or not the operation moves forward. While higher officials can overrule such lawyers, it is rare for operations to move forward without incorporating their advice.

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell said in a statement: “The War Department categorically denies that any Pentagon lawyers, including SOUTHCOM lawyers, with knowledge of these operations have raised concerns to any attorneys in the chain of command regarding the legality of the strikes conducted thus far because they are aware we are on firm legal ground. Our current operations in the Caribbean are lawful under both U.S. and international law, with all actions in complete compliance with the law of armed conflict.”

A spokesperson for Southern Command referred questions to the Defense Department, which the Trump administration calls the War Department. A spokesperson for the White House did not respond to a request for comment.

The JAG is Marine Col. Paul Meagher, according to three people familiar with the matter. Attempts to reach Meagher for comment were unsuccessful.

The strikes on alleged drug boats have drawn support from Republicans, as well as criticism from members of both parties, NBC News has reported.

The opinion of the Southern Command JAG, which has not been previously reported, adds a new dimension to concerns that lawmakers, retired military officers and legal experts have raised about the administration’s legal justification for striking alleged drug boats.

Those concerns have centered on questions about whether the strikes violate international and U.S. law.

Since Sept. 2, it says, the administration has killed 82 people in 21 strikes on small vessels it says were transporting drugs bound for the United States.

Administration officials have not put forward any specific evidence backing up their claims.

The administration has told members of Congress that President Donald Trump determined the United States is in “armed conflict” with drug cartel members, NBC News has reported. The administration designated some drug cartels in Latin America as foreign terrorist organizations this year.

Trump has argued that drugs from the region pose a significant threat to American citizens. He has linked the boats to fentanyl to argue that the military strikes have saved tens of thousands of American lives, although fentanyl is typically smuggled into the United States by land across the Mexican border. Cocaine, which is most often moved via sea, is considered far less lethal than fentanyl.

JAGs' opinions on possible military operations are usually shared with higher authorities, including the Defense Department’s general counsel, Justice Department officials and ultimately the White House, according to current and former U.S. officials familiar with the process.

JAGs typically play an integral role in defining the legal parameters of any military operation, and often their collective advice would be the primary guiding principle as political leaders decide whether to take such action, according to the current and former U.S. officials familiar with the process.

In the Trump administration’s campaign against alleged drug boats, politically appointed lawyers at senior levels have often defined the legalities of the operations with minimal lower-level legal input, according to the two senior congressional aides and one of the former senior U.S. officials.

There have been other signs of disagreement within the administration over the strikes. The head of Southern Command, Adm. Alvin Holsey, plans to step down after less than a year in a job that typically lasts about three years.

Holsey announced in October that he will depart next month.

In addition to concerns about the legality of the strikes, Democrats and Republicans on Capitol Hill have complained that the administration has not provided them enough information about the legal rationale or the intelligence used to target the vessels and people the administration purports are bringing drugs into the United States.

“There is no world where this is legal,” said a current JAG, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to speak publicly.

Congress has not declared war or authorized the use of military force against the drug traffickers, and U.S. law allows the president to take military action without lawmakers’ approval only if there is a national emergency due to an attack on the country or American forces.

Dan Maurer, an associate professor of law at Ohio Northern University and a former Army JAG, argued that the drug cartels’ narcotics smuggling and other actions are crimes but do not qualify as an armed attack on the United States as defined by U.S. and international law.

“These drug cartels may be violent, they may be aggressive, they may be transnational,” Maurer said in an interview. “They may be doing terrible things within their own countries; they may be importing terrible things into our country that have bad consequences. But all of those are crimes, and none of which meets the traditional meanings of an attack or invasion.”

Maurer and other former military lawyers and experts believe the Trump administration’s legal rationale for the strikes is so tenuous it could put commanders and troops in legal peril after Trump leaves office in 2029.

Trump administration officials have defended the legality of the strikes and argued that they have shared ample information about them with members of Congress.

The legal debate about the strikes is likely to intensify if Trump decides to hit targets inside Venezuela, as he has threatened to do. The current legal rationale for strikes on vessels does not apply to any strikes on land, a senior administration official told lawmakers in a closed-door briefing last week, according to two additional congressional aides.

Some of the military’s strikes on boats have killed people who critics of the operations say may be noncombatants or even immigrants who are hitching rides on the vessels and have nothing to do with the drug trade. Two survivors of a strike were captured and repatriated to Colombia and Ecuador rather than taken into U.S. custody, a decision that one of the congressional aides said raises questions about whether there is sufficient evidence to prosecute them for a crime.

The internal differences over the legality of the boat strikes echo a similar debate more than 20 years ago. During President George W. Bush's administration, senior military lawyers for the Army, the Air Force and the Marines raised objections over proposed “enhanced” interrogation techniques in 2003 and later testified to Congress about their concerns. They warned that U.S. courts could find those techniques amounted to torture and were illegal.

John Yoo, the controversial legal architect of Bush’s “war on terror” after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, now argues the Trump administration’s boat strikes risk crossing the line between “crime fighting and war.”

“Americans have died in car wrecks at an annual rate of about 40,000 in recent years; the nation does not wage war on auto companies,” he wrote recently in an op-ed in The Washington Post. “American law instead relies upon the criminal justice or civil tort systems to respond to broad, persistent social harms.”

NBC News · Gordon Lubold, Courtney Kube and Dan De Luce · November 20, 2025

10. Recognizing the Domestic Use of Irregular Warfare Techniques to Consolidate Executive Power

Summary:

Irregular warfare concepts help explain how elected leaders can quietly concentrate power at home without changing laws. He outlines how executives can repurpose courts, data agencies, DOJ, budgets and regulators; weaponize timing, emergencies and contracts; and fuse grievance, identity and media spectacle to punish dissent and reward loyalty. External networks of litigators, think tanks, state governments and aligned media then lock in gains even if elections change leaders. Drawing on Turkey and Hungary, he stresses this is a diagnostic map, not a manual, showing how crisis and procedure can slowly erode rules-based liberal democracy.

Excerpts:

Conclusion 

This IW toolkit shows how executive power can be concentrated through non-violent methods that sit inside existing law. The approach is cumulative: repurpose neutral machinery so independence feels risky and alignment safe; convert grievance into mobilization so supporters act on cue and critics hesitate; and build a parallel ecosystem—doctrine, people, lawsuits, states, standards, and media—that keeps the line in place even when formal control wobbles. These levers run together, each amplifying the rest. 

The effects endure because procedure becomes pressure: approvals turn into favors, timing becomes a weapon, money becomes a message. Courts may uphold individual steps while the combination shifts how the system behaves; over time, terrain that was neutral becomes contingent on political clearance. 

This is not a prediction but a map. The same clarity that makes it a “how-to” also makes it a diagnostic: if the aim is resilient, rules-bound governance, the pressure points are visible—costs, cadence, and capacity. 

Recognizing the Domestic Use of Irregular Warfare Techniques to Consolidate Executive Power

by Michael Greif

|

11.21.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/21/recognizing-the-domestic-use-of-irregular-warfare-techniques-to-consolidate-executive-power/

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan shake hands [Attila Kisbenedek/AFP]

Introduction 

“Irregular Warfare” (IW) is a U.S. military term for tactics used by state and non-state actors to pressure or persuade populations and decision-makers, shape legitimacy, and wear down an adversary’s will—generally below the threshold of open war. In broader strategic literature, this same sub-threshold space is often called the “gray zone.” Familiar tools in both realms of literature include disinformation, deception, sabotage, economic coercion, and the use of proxies, guerrillas, and covert operations. 

Across that literature runs a recurring sequence: demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization. The first two erode confidence and capacity; the third—crisis—opens a narrow window when pressure and fatigue converge, allowing rapid moves that harden into the new normal. It is at that hinge that irregular warfare dynamics can migrate from foreign battlefields into U.S domestic governance—where crisis becomes both the means and the cover for the consolidation of executive power without changing a single statute. 

The following tactics are a diagnostic guide, not an endorsement. They describe mechanisms so practitioners can recognize— not replicate them. This guide is generic and nonpartisan; it makes no claims about any actor’s intent or any step’s legality. Individual actions can be lawful even as their combined, repeated use functions as an IW instrument. Many steps are routine on their own; repeated, coordinated, and timed tactics shift incentives in such a way that independence grows costly and alignment feels safe. 

A glossary of IW terms with source citations appears at the end of this guide. 

Section I — Repurposing Institutions to Concentrate Power 

This section lays out how the executive branch can convert the neutral machinery of government into levers of control without changing a single statute. The institutions at issue are: the courts; the Department of Justice (DOJ); the agencies that publish jobs, inflation, and growth numbers; the budget scorekeepers; the central bank; the intelligence community; inspectors general; and the regulatory, grantmaking, procurement, and contracting offices (including guidance writers) that turn rules and money into action. 

The method is systematic: cast doubt on those institutions, refit the bureaucracy to reward loyalty, use law and procedure to determine who faces pressure and who gets protection, turn regulation and money into bargaining chips, and move fast enough that checks arrive after decisions take hold. 

These moves do not unfold in sequence; they operate simultaneously and reinforce each other. Casting doubt on courts and data softens the ground for staffing changes. Staffing changes narrow what leaders see. Legal gatekeeping shapes which cases advance and which stall. Oversight, budgets, and approvals become pressure points. And a steady tempo of crises and churn keeps remedies behind the curve. 

The practical effect is cumulative: independent judgment begins to feel risky, alignment feels safe, and timing and visibility move into political hands. What follows are the concrete ways to achieve this effect 

1. Strike the Institutions that Anchor Legitimacy

Objective: Raise the personal and professional cost of independent judgment across the institutions that anchor public governance—courts, official statistics agencies, the budget scorekeepers, the central bank, and the intelligence community. 

IW Tie-Back: Information operations (narrative shaping) + infiltration of institutions + reflexive control. 

Methods: 

• Set the frame and counterprogram. Say plainly and repeatedly that courts, statistics offices, the budget office, the central bank, and the intelligence community aren’t neutral; make “bias” the backdrop to disputes; question motives; publish “companion analyses” that contradict official methods and metrics. 
• Gate and sandbag data. Require a “data review committee” to clear major statistics or reports; send drafts back for “methods checks”.
• Stage visible reviews. Announce “quality reviews” or audits and hint that officials may be moved—the chill is the message.
• Tag dissent. Use simple labels (“deep state,” “traitor”) that travel fast and stick.
• Control who’s in the room. Limit who can brief so fewer independent voices are heard.
• Manage access. Rotate analysts off sensitive work; rotate or downgrade analysts who won’t mirror the line.
• Throttle recurring indicators. Trim support for the monthly or quarterly measures that generate problematic results, causing delays or cancellations. 

Result: The institutions that produce official facts and independent judgments no longer feel neutral. Warnings arrive later, disputed numbers land softer, and inconvenient findings slide to the margins; inside, staff self-edit, and outside, users of those outputs hedge and delay. Independent calls grow rare; matching leadership’s position becomes the safest default. 

1. Reclassifying the Civil Service to Centralize Control

Objective: Turn the civil service into a loyalty-first workforce by redesigning roles, protections, and hiring so alignment is the safe career choice. 

IW Tie-Back: Infiltration of institutions + coercion. 

Methods: 

• Change terms. Where lawful, convert key posts to easier-to-dismiss status; extend probation; shorten appeal windows.
• Gate hiring. Require a political countersignature for policy-influencing hires.
• Screen in the paperwork. Rewrite job descriptions around “mission alignment,” speed, and communications awareness; build the same filter into onboarding training and assessments 
• Reshape reporting. Merge or split offices so crucial functions report through appointees; put compliance, legal, and communications on one chain.
• Maximize “acting.” Keep key roles provisional within the limits of the Vacancies Act.
• Manage exits and placements. Use buyouts and early retirements to move skeptics out of policy-influencing roles; assign holdouts to long back-office projects while seating aligned staff in the rooms that brief and decide.
• Use timing as leverage. Fast-track preferred candidates; slow-walk others, including clearances and transfers.
• Reassign authority. When removals are messy, shift signature rights and system permissions to aligned roles. 

Result: After a few cycles, people learn the safest path is to match the line. Loyalists apply and advance; skeptics are sidelined. Expertise doesn’t vanish, but it defers—briefings and memos come from teams that share the same view, and the system starts to run on loyalty first. 

1. Gatekeeping the DOJ through Executive Branch Control

Objective: Use law and procedure to control who faces pressure and who gets protection—deciding which cases move, where, and when. 

IW Tie-Back: Lawfare + tempo control. 

Methods: 

• Set priorities. Elevate some case categories; raise the approval bar for others—higher sign-off means fewer cases move.
• Choose forum and timing. File where venue is friendlier; transfer when possible; schedule actions around hearings and news cycles.
• Reshape units. Stand up new teams that report up; consolidate or retire task forces that don’t; reassign their case inventories to reset momentum.
• Control assignments. Put aligned attorneys on charging decisions and courtroom roles; rotate skeptics to training or admin work; decide who signs and argues.
• Raise or lower thresholds. Require extra memos/approvals and “special-matters” panels for disfavored matters; streamline the path for favored ones.
• Use settlements and declinations. Where lawful, resolve matters leniently for allies; pursue full penalties for opponents.
• Gate referrals and disclosures. Require DOJ clearance before agencies refer or announce certain enforcement and keep deliberations in privileged channels to limit disclosures.
• Target visible organizations. Open civil-rights reviews, grant-compliance audits, tax-exempt inquiries, and consumer/antitrust probes of universities, large nonprofits, media/platforms, major contractors/law firms, or state/local agencies; announcements and document demands create public pressure and operational drag. 

Result: Statutes don’t change, but control over approvals, venue, and timing does. Matters that help allies move; matters that threaten them slow, shift venues, or close—over time, pressure concentrates on opponents and protection wraps allies. 

1. Weaponizing Oversight, Regulation and Purse Strings

Objective: Turn rules, budgets, approvals, and enforcement discretion into leverage that rewards alignment and penalizes resistance. 

IW Tie-Back: Economic coercion + lawfare. 

Methods: 

• Pause and densify process. Put grants, permits, and rulemakings on short “reviews,” add impact statements/stakeholder rounds/legal checks, and control the timing of each step.
• Centralize sign-offs. Require an appointee countersignature for major grants, settlements, consent decrees, and enforcement actions.
• Let timing bite. Hold just long enough for application windows to close, matching funds to lapse, construction seasons to pass, or academic years to turn.
• Tilt scorecards. Weight “mission alignment,” “community partnerships,” or “innovation” so allies are already set up to win.
• Pace the money. Release funds quickly for favored programs and slowly—or in small tranches—for others.
• Direct and forbear. Accelerate some enforcement categories and ease penalties or oversight for aligned actors; maintain full pressure on others.
• Shape procurement. Bake behavioral conditions into contracts and eligibility rules; require compliance to bid and renew.
• Stage audits. Launch targeted audits where leverage is sought; the audit’s existence often changes conduct.
• Use timing on appropriations. For money Congress already approved, have OMB release funds in small, timed batches—sometimes with footnotes requiring pre-approvals before agencies obligate; agency budget offices then trickle those batches to bureaus. Late dribs can make one-year funds lapse without a formal denial (“pocket rescission”).
• Reopen baselines. Announce reconsideration of bedrock scientific/legal findings so dependent rules and programs sit in limbo.
• Condition eligibility and clearances. Signal that “enterprise risk”—including representation choices—will weigh in contract eligibility, facility clearances, and special-access reviews. 

Result: Criteria-based approvals turn discretionary and politically conditioned. Money moves for allies and waits for others; for some, rules feel flexible, for others, heavy—the administrative state becomes leverage. 

1. Administrative & Contracting Ratchets

Objective: Build one-way decisions—namely contracts, guidance, and precedents—that are lawful to make and expensive to unwind. 

IW Tie-Back: Ratchet effects + lawfare. 

Methods: 

• Lock in vendors. Sign multi-year contracts with termination fees; lean on unique software or data formats that are costly to replace.
• Bank consent decrees. Resolve disputes with agreements that set durable practices and court-enforced timelines.
• Seed guidance chains. Issue cross-referenced manuals so many processes depend on one central text.
• Shift data standards. Change how information is collected and reported; downstream systems will follow.
• Transfer assets/authority. Move programs, property, or decision rights to entities that are harder to claw back.
• Stage precedents. Time actions to generate favorable rulings; once on the books, they shape future choices.
• Layer approvals. Require multiple sign-offs to reverse a step; more gates mean more time. 

Result: Successors face time, money, and legal friction. Even with will and votes, reversing course means breaking contracts, retooling systems, and litigating against precedent—lock-in without new law. 

1. Controlling Tempo, Churn & Crisis to Lock-In Consolidation of Power

Objective: Use speed, churn, and staged crises to compress decision time so checks and remedies arrive after decisions take effect. 

IW Tie-Back: Tempo control + crisis exploitation + faits accomplis. 

Methods: 

• Keep a crisis rhythm. Sustain multiple “urgent” issues—announcements, investigations, emergency reviews—so watchdogs trail events.
• Compress windows. Issue “effective immediately” directives, Friday-night memos, and short deadlines; run comment periods at the legal minimum.
• Govern by emergency. Invoke emergency authorities where they exist, renew as allowed, and umbrella related moves under one declaration.
• Create faits accomplis. Move first, litigate later: execute reassignments, obligate funds, sign contracts, or shift assets before a stay arrives.
• Play vacancy games. Leave key roles unfilled or “acting”; use temporary delegations so decision-makers remain provisional and dependent.
• Start the IG removal clock. Send the 30-day notice (e.g., “loss of confidence”), place the IG on leave, and name an acting; use the window to redirect audits and staff.
• Engineer churn. Reshuffle leaders, spin up short-lived task forces and “czars,” rename or reorganize offices so procedures never harden into counterweights.
• Project federal presence—push the envelope. Within arguable authority, federalize Guard units or deploy other federal assets; expand protective perimeters; surge DHS/DOJ task forces.
• Flood and fragment oversight. Generate parallel controversies and heavy productions; assert privileges; drip materials in formats that slow review.
• Exploit timing and mootness. Toggle policies or reissue revised directives just before rulings, stack deadlines during recesses/holidays, and reset clocks to blunt review.
• Fast-track procurement. Use emergency and no-bid awards to lock in vendors before oversight reacts.
• Litigate for time. Seek stays and strategic venue changes; pursue appeals that extend timelines even if outcomes are uncertain.
• Narrate urgency. Cast resistance as risky to safety or order so speed sounds responsible and delay looks reckless.
• Erode stamina. Freeze hiring, cut training, and overload key teams so errors rise and capacity to resist falls. 

Result: Decisions take effect first and are reviewed later. Courts, inspectors, and legislators arrive after the fact; opponents are spread thin; what begins as exception becomes habit—and tempo itself, more than any single order, concentrates power. 

Section II — Turning Grievance Into Mobilization 

This section shows how to turn grievance into action by using identity, ritual, and media to rally supporters and chill critics—without changing any law. These moves do not unfold in sequence; they run in parallel and reinforce the institutional levers in Section I. 

1. Loyalty Filtration & Retaliation

Objective: Sort officials and influencers by loyalty and raise the career cost of independence. 

IW Tie-Back: Psychological operations (PSYOP/MISO) + narrative warfare. 

Methods: 

• Set the baseline. Praise those who stay on message; treat departures as suspect.
• Tag dissent. Use quick labels (“disloyal,” “enemy,” “deep state”) that travel and stick.
• Tie access to alignment. Link briefings, invitations, airtime, and committee roles to message discipline; pull access after visible breaks.
• Gate opportunities. Condition endorsements, fundraising lists, and rally slots on public alignment; publish “watch lists” to steer donor money and volunteer time.
• Signal sanctions. Threaten or deliver demotions, reassignments, clearance delays, or removal after repeated breaks.
• Coordinate allies. Nudge donors, media, and advocacy groups to reward aligned figures and freeze out skeptics.
• Use “reviews” as deterrents. Announce investigations into alleged bias or misconduct; the announcement alone sends the message.
• Offer protection to loyalists. Use pardons, commutations, or public defense to show that loyalty carries insurance. 

Result: Access, assignments, endorsements, and protection track message discipline; criticism brings labels and career costs. Many echo the line, some go quiet, a few step aside. Over time the bench tilts toward those least likely to break ranks; independence fades because the price is clear. 

1. Identity and Faith as Mobilizers

Objective: Wrap policy in national, cultural, and religious identity so agreement signals belonging and disagreement reads as disloyalty. 

IW Tie-Back: PSYOP/MISO + legitimacy shaping. 

Methods: 

• Stage policy in symbolic venues. Announce major actions at patriotic or religious sites so the setting carries the message.
• Turn rituals into loyalty moments. Time rollouts for holidays, memorials, and ceremonies that double as public tests of “who is with us.”
• Define the “we.” Use plain imagery—flags, pledges, heritage themes—to draw a bright line between “us” and “them.”
• Build official channels. Create offices, councils, and initiatives that link faith and cultural leaders to policy campaigns.
• Reframe education and heritage. Promote curricula and public-history projects that reinforce the favored national story.
• Link policy to protection. Cast proposals as safeguarding children, community, or sacred values; opponents then appear to threaten the group.
• Elevate martyrs and exemplars. Spotlight “unfairly treated” allies and honor supportive leaders to model desired conduct.
• Micro-target messaging. Tailor outreach to congregations, cultural groups, and local networks; provide ready-made talking points and tasks. 

Result: Policy disputes become identity tests. Agreement signals belonging; disagreement reads as betrayal or sacrilege. Supporters act to “defend the group,” and neutrality feels unsafe. 

1. Spectacle to Digital Mobilization

Objective: Use spectacle, humiliation, repetition, and timed releases to set the agenda, mobilize supporters, and deter critics before verification can catch up. 

IW Tie-Back: Information operations + PSYOP/MISO + reflexive control. 

Methods: 

• Script the show. Use rallies, briefings, and posts to single out opponents by name or type; turn conflict into shareable clips.
• Make discipline public. Announce firings, demotions, or rebukes in ways designed to be clipped, captioned, and spread.
• Flood the zone. Push rapid, repeated claims and frames so familiarity outruns fact-checking; keep tomorrow’s headline ready today.
• Pre-bake content. Maintain an in-house video/graphics pipeline to publish short clips, quotes, and calls to action within minutes.
• Direct action. Point followers to call, comment, attend, file complaints, or boycott; publicize volume to amplify pressure.
• Discredit fact checks. Cast independent media and fact-checkers as partisan; fold corrections into a story of “attacks on us.”
• Sync with influencers. Feed friendly voices early material; coordinated posts create momentum and the appearance of consensus.
• Control cadence. Post at peak-attention moments; pair controversial steps with distracting spectacle to crowd out scrutiny.
• Keep channels sticky. Run parallel newsletters, groups, and video feeds so preferred narratives have persistent homes. 

Result: Attention concentrates where directed. Supporters are energized and organized; would-be critics see the cost of speaking up. Perception sets before facts land, and grievance stays lit long enough to move real behavior. 

Section III — Lock-In Through a Parallel Ecosystem 

Disruption opens the door (Section I) and grievance mobilizes supporters (Section II). Lock-in comes from building durability outside the federal structure—so the line holds even if formal control wobbles. These moves do not unfold in sequence; they run in parallel and reinforce one another; the more parts stood up, the harder any single part is to unwind. 

1. External Playbooks & Alignment Pipelines

Objective: Pre-commit agencies to a single line by shifting playbooks and staffing pipelines to an external network that outlasts turnover. 

IW Tie-Back: Preparation of the environment (cadre development) + infiltration of institutions. 

Methods: 

• Commission action kits. Outside groups draft ready-to-file orders, guidance, FAQs, procurement templates, and org charts—sequenced for week one, month one, quarter one.
• Pre-screen rosters. Maintain candidate lists vetted with scenario drills and references that test implementation choices (not party labels).
• Run fellowship-to-placement tracks. External short courses feed directly into legal, budget, and regulatory roles with placement agreements and mentors.
• Provide legal/communications backstop. Donor-funded counsel and rapid-response communications support aligned appointees; deviations lose cover.
• Offer landing spots. Post-service fellowships, think-tank roles, and media platforms reward those who hold the line. 

Result: New officials arrive with actions, timelines, and support already built. Deviation carries cost; staying on script brings resources and protection. Even with turnover, the external network keeps the program moving—lock-in by pre-commitment, not statute. 

1. External Litigation & Legal Pressure Networks

Objective: Build outside-government permanent legal firepower that advances priorities, defends contested moves, and shapes precedent. 

IW Tie-Back: Lawfare. 

Methods: 

• Stand up litigation shops. Fund nonprofit firms to bring test cases, defend policies, and coordinate amicus support.
• Bank cases in favorable venues. File in waves on fact patterns likely to generate helpful rulings.
• Use remedies strategically. Seek injunctions and settlements that set durable practices and are costly to unwind.
• Subsidize defense. Create legal-support pools for aligned officials and organizations so they can hold their ground.
• Leverage public-records law. File targeted requests and suits that tie up adversaries while surfacing material for narratives. 

Result: The legal terrain tilts. Allies act with cover; opponents face cost and delay. A stack of orders and precedents accumulates, making reversal slow and expensive. 

1. State-Level Force Multipliers

Objective: Use states to run the program in parallel so momentum persists across federal election cycles. 

IW Tie-Back: Proxies/partners. 

Methods: 

• Publish model bills. Provide ready-to-introduce texts that mirror national priorities.
• Build attorneys-general coalitions. Coordinate joint suits, investigations, and comment campaigns.
• Write interstate compacts. Lock cooperative programs across state lines so they outlast any single administration.
• Mirror and extend. Encourage states to adopt parallel rules, guidance, and procurement terms that reinforce federal aims.
• Align public finance. Use state purchasing and pension policies to reward aligned conduct and raise costs for resistance.
• Use state courts. Seek declaratory judgments and state-law remedies that keep pressure on even if federal action pauses. 

Result: The project has many fronts instead of one. Even if Washington slows, states carry the program; undoing it later means fighting on multiple legal and policy battlefields at once. 

1. Narrative & Distribution Infrastructure

Objective: Keep preferred frames dominant and police in-group orthodoxy across platforms and communities. 

IW Tie-Back: Information operations. 

Methods: 

• Own channels. Support outlets, newsletters, podcasts, and social feeds that carry daily cues.
• Pre-produce content. Maintain a small studio for short videos, graphics, and one-pagers; publish within minutes of news.
• Coordinate influencers. Give friendly voices early material and talking points; synchronize releases for momentum.
• Seed community networks. Work through churches, civic groups, and local leaders with tailored scripts and tasks.
• Standardize language. Issue daily “lines to take” so surrogates and officials sound consistent.
• Measure and adapt. Track engagement; keep what sticks, drop what doesn’t.
• Pressure advertisers. Encourage allied groups to organize advertiser pulls; publicize defections to signal momentum. 

Result: The same story appears everywhere at once. Supporters know what to say and do; critics see the costs of dissent. Agenda-setting happens upstream of verification. 

1. Standards, Accreditation & Philanthropy

Objective: Tilt the rules of recognition—what counts as quality, compliance, and merit—so downstream institutions align by default. 

IW Tie-Back: Legitimacy shaping. 

Methods: 

• Place allies on boards. Target accreditation bodies, editorial boards, and professional associations where standards are written.
• Rewrite rubrics. Adjust criteria and scoring (eligibility, “mission fit,” partnership requirements) to privilege aligned approaches.
• Aim grants and prizes. Set RFP and award criteria that steer money and prestige toward preferred programs and research.
• Influence rankings. Back rating systems that elevate aligned behaviors and penalize others.
• Endow capacity. Fund institutes, centers, and chairs that keep producing work consistent with the frame. 

Result: Education, research, healthcare, and professions begin to reflect altered yardsticks. Statutes stay the same, but the criteria that govern access, funding, and prestige shift toward the preferred line. 

Section IV — Comparative Glimpses: When Democracies Use IW-Style Methods 

Hungary and Turkey are contemporary examples of elected governments using irregular-warfare-style methods at home to concentrate executive power. In both, consolidation began with tactics that pressured institutions, shaped narratives, and reweighted incentives—well before later legal changes locked the shift in place. The difference matters: much of the de-facto control arrived through administration, media concentration, prosecutions, emergency authorities, and timing—then constitutions and framework laws ratcheted permanence.

Turkey 

For years before the 2017 referendum that created an executive presidency, the Erdoğan government relied on emergency authorities, prosecutions, and information control to centralize power. After the 2016 coup attempt, an extended state of emergency enabled sweeping decree laws (KHKs), mass purges—well over 100,000 civil servants. It also brought judicial reshuffles, and broad closures of media and associations, all by executive order. A new “disinformation” law later criminalized speech deemed “contrary to the truth.” Electoral venue and tempo tactics also surfaced: Turkey’s election authority annulled the opposition’s March 2019 win in Istanbul and ordered a re-run—an episode observers flagged as extraordinary manipulation of process and timing. The through line: emergency decree powers, prosecutorial leverage, and media control shifted behavior first; the 2017 constitutional change sealed it. 

Hungary

Beginning in 2010, the Orbán government moved quickly through ordinary laws to capture regulators, reshape the civil service, and pressure the Constitutional Court’s remit. It later adopted a new Fundamental Law and “cardinal” statutes to entrench changes. Media was consolidated via a government-stacked regulator and, later, the creation of KESMA, a giant pro-government foundation that unified hundreds of outlets and steered state advertising to friends. Civil society and academia were squeezed by “foreign-funded NGO” rules and measures that pushed Central European University out of Budapest, signaling that supporting critical institutions carried costs. Oversight bodies and courts were reconfigured, and sector-specific taxes/regulations burdened unfriendly media. The pattern: administrative and market pressure moved first; constitutional and “cardinal” laws locked the gains. 

Conclusion 

This IW toolkit shows how executive power can be concentrated through non-violent methods that sit inside existing law. The approach is cumulative: repurpose neutral machinery so independence feels risky and alignment safe; convert grievance into mobilization so supporters act on cue and critics hesitate; and build a parallel ecosystem—doctrine, people, lawsuits, states, standards, and media—that keeps the line in place even when formal control wobbles. These levers run together, each amplifying the rest. 

The effects endure because procedure becomes pressure: approvals turn into favors, timing becomes a weapon, money becomes a message. Courts may uphold individual steps while the combination shifts how the system behaves; over time, terrain that was neutral becomes contingent on political clearance. 

This is not a prediction but a map. The same clarity that makes it a “how-to” also makes it a diagnostic: if the aim is resilient, rules-bound governance, the pressure points are visible—costs, cadence, and capacity. 

Glossary of IW Terms 

Coercion (in IW context) — A mode of influence in irregular warfare characterized by the application or threat of pressure, constraint, or adverse consequences—without resorting to overt force—to shape another actor’s behavior. In IW, coercion is typically applied via indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric means (e.g., economic, informational, legal, or administrative) to compel compliance, deter resistance, or degrade the target’s will. 

Crisis exploitation — The deliberate creation, amplification, or opportunistic use of crisis conditions to accelerate decisions, outpace oversight, and lock in administrative, legal, or narrative outcomes below the threshold of open war. In practice, crisis exploitation couples long-term narrative and legitimacy work (demoralization), targeted institutional disruption (destabilization), and tempo-driven action in compressed windows (crisis) to achieve consolidation — the practical lock-in of authority that precedes any later normalization. (This term is introduced here as an analytic synthesis. It combines the concept of crisis—as framed in gray-zone and irregular-warfare literature (e.g., the IW Annex’s discussion of exploiting instability and tempo advantage)—with the established strategic idea of exploitation (the use of opportunity to secure positional or institutional gain). The term integrates doctrinally recognized IW mechanisms into a single descriptive label for how crises can be operationalized as instruments of governance.) 

Economic coercion — Instances in which a state (including through its designees) uses, or threatens to use, trade and investment barriers or constraints to other forms of economic engagement to interfere with the legitimate sovereign choices of another government.  

Faits accomplis — A strategy in which an actor unilaterally changes the status quo and then presents others with a finished, often irreversible situation. The move is typically limited in scope but calculated to force acceptance — on the assumption that opponents will avoid escalating a larger conflict to undo it. In gray-zone and irregular-warfare campaigns, fait-accompli tactics secure incremental gains that accumulate into lasting advantage without crossing into open war. 

Information operations (IO) / narrative shaping — Integrated use of information-related capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary decision-making. 

Infiltration of Institutions — Installing aligned personnel, rules, or processes inside key offices so decisions tilt without changing statute. (This term is introduced here as an analytic synthesis from irregular-warfare concepts of infiltration and political-warfare influence, applied here to institutional capture within governance systems.) 

Lawfare — The strategy of using or misusing law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve objectives.  

Legitimacy shaping — Deliberate efforts—through information, legal, institutional, symbolic, or narrative means—to influence how target audiences perceive the authority, rightfulness, and moral or normative fitness of an actor or institution. The goal is to build, preserve, or restore consent (or acquiescence) in the governed population (and relevant elites), thereby reducing resistance and increasing the effectiveness of governance or coercion. 

Narrative warfare — The sustained construction, projection, and reinforcement of a coherent story that defines legitimacy, identity, and causality — framing perceptions of reality so that audiences internalize desired conclusions without feeling coerced. 

Proxies/Partners — Outside groups or local actors used to carry out parts of a campaign on behalf of a government or sponsor. They extend reach, add deniability, and keep pressure on multiple fronts without the sponsor acting openly. Proxies can include militias, political movements, contractors, media outlets, or other organizations that share goals and receive guidance, resources, or protection in return.  

Psychological operations (PSYOP/MISO) — Planned operations to convey selected information to influence emotions, motives, and objective reasoning.  

Ratchet effects — Any process where movement is in one direction and difficult to reverse. 

Reflexive Control — Control over their opponent’s decisions by imposing on them assumptions that change the way they act. 

Tempo control — Not a formal doctrine term used by the U.S military, the word “tempo” is used in U.S military IW literature to encompass the practice of managing speed and sequencing so checks, reviews, and counters arrive too late to matter. 

Tags: executive power, irregular warfare, liberal democracy

About The Author

• 
  
• Michael Greif
• Michael T. Greif is an attorney with over 45 years of experience in law, business, and governance. He brings disciplined legal reasoning to public policy issues, drawing on a career focused on complex corporate structures and institutional frameworks in both domestic and international contexts.

11. Interview with Clinton Hinote Reimagining Forward Defense as a Multi-Domain “Hellscape”

Summary:

Retired Lt. Gen. Clint Hinote (“Q”) explains how U.S. overmatch built on superior platforms plus battle and logistics networks has eroded as China’s A2/AD offset creates regional parity. The “Overmatch Brief” showed the U.S. losing credible wargames, driving Third Offset thinking toward autonomy, swarms and JADC2. His “Hellscape” concept is a multi-domain, swarm-based, defensive battle network that shreds a PLA assault in the first island chain, nested in a three-layer global defense (forward Hellscape, mid-ocean conventional forces, homeland “Golden Dome”). He urges revolutionary, domain-agnostic force design, warning this is a dangerous window as China nears or passes peak advantage.

Interview with Clinton Hinote

by Octavian Manea

|

11.21.2025 at 06:00am

https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/11/21/interview-with-clinton-hinote/

CSDS-SWJ STRATEGY DEBRIEFS – 11/2025

Interview with Clinton Hinote Reimagining Forward Defense as a Multi-Domain “Hellscape”

This interview is part of a collaborative initiative with the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy.

Lt. Gen. S. Clinton Hinote served as the Deputy Chief of Staff, Strategy, Integration and Requirements, United States Air Force. In that role, he served as the senior Air Force leader responsible for Air Force Futures. In this position, he focused on developing Air Force strategy and concepts, conducting strategic assessments of the operating environment through wargames and workshops, manifesting an integrated future force design and achieving timely and effective operational capabilities required for tomorrow’s Airmen to fight and win. He was a military assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense during the Third Offset Strategy (3OS).

Octavian Manea: The current Netflix series – “Dept. Q” – reminded me about the designation “Q” in military circles. Tell us a bit about the symbolism of your personal use of “Q” as a signature.

Clinton Hinote: It is not as mysterious as you might think. When I was a wingman fighter pilot – my first fighter squadron – my job was to program all of the pods, the missiles and the threat warning devices. And back then, there were lots of different pieces of machinery that each had to do one of those things. In my office, in the back of the squadron, we kept all of those pieces of machinery and they looked like gadgets. It had the appearance of walking into Q’s office in the James Bond series. And so I got the call sign Q, and it stuck.

There is a culture in the United States Air Force of using call signs in many circumstances. It comes from the importance of being able to talk to somebody individually over the radio without using real names. So, as an example: if somebody saw that I needed to take action in the air – maybe a missile had been fired at me – they could say (and I have actually heard this happen): “Q, break right”. It is a way of getting someone’s attention quickly. But it is also grown into a deeply ingrained cultural practice within the Air Force.

Octavian Manea: A key notion that we have heard since the days of the “Third Offset Strategy” is that of parity – particularly of peer competitors that are on the verge of achieving parity in precision-guided munitions and theater-level battle networks. For some, parity might suggest equilibrium and an inherent stabilizing reality. For others, parity is an omen for war. Why should parity be a call for action for change, for trying to restore overmatch or trying to fight differently? Why is parity perceived as a danger, as something to be avoided at all costs?

Clinton Hinote: The notion of parity is something US strategists have tried to avoid for decades – all the way through the Cold War. From the start, the idea was that we did not want to match up tank for tank, ship for ship, aircraft for aircraft with the Soviet Union. That path would almost certainly leave us at a numerical disadvantage, and if it came to an actual fight, the outcome would be anything but certain.

As a military strategist, I always have to assume deterrence could fail/break down – that we might actually have to fight and win. And I think you can see some of the big problems of/with parity on full display in Ukraine today, which is precisely what we have been trying to avoid.

One of the things we are always trying to avoid is battlefield parity. That is why we consistently seek some form of advantage – because parity often leads to stalemate, where countless lives are lost for no real strategic purpose. We have seen that before in Europe, and we are seeing it again in Europe today. As we think about the future of warfare, we do not believe that seeking parity is good for the international order or for our own chances of securing an advantage if we actually have to fight. It is a deeply held belief within the strategist community and I share it. I have always felt it was incumbent on all of us charged with building a future force to seek advantage wherever we can find it.

If you are the underdog and you achieve parity, you feel pretty good. But if you are the one who has been enjoying overmatch for some time, and then parity comes, it does not feel good at all – you feel like you have lost advantage.

That is exactly the situation we found ourselves in coming out of the Cold War: a period of unipolarity, with a very dominant United States – certainly in a military sense. But as China rose and built up its military capabilities, we began to see a loss of advantage as they were achieving some level of parity. They were certainly achieving parity – particularly in key areas of the globe that included their near abroad, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the strategist community in the US was searching for other ways to restore and sustain advantage.

Octavian Manea: Recent US National Defense Strategies can, in many respects, be seen as acknowledgements of the obsolescence of the post–Cold War American Way of Warfare and its traditional expeditionary approach. Why has this legacy model become outdated?

Clinton Hinote: We were seeking overmatch at the end of the Cold War. That was central to the strategy: we did not want to go aircraft-to-aircraft, tank-for-tank, ship-for-ship. The goal was to defeat a larger force with a more qualitatively superior force. By the end of the Cold War, we had qualitative advantages in nearly every aspect of warfare.

But it was not just that our platforms were better. We were also beginning to integrate them through advanced communications – this was the essence of the battle network concept. Soviet strategists became deeply concerned about this. They feared the cumulative advantage of battle networks over legacy forces – legions of tanks, fleets of ships, wings of aircraft. The idea that a qualitatively superior force, connected through a battle network, could achieve decisive effects – effects approaching those of a nuclear weapon – was alarming to them. They did not believe they could match it. And so, even as the Cold War was winding down politically, militarily there was a clear advantage accruing to the US: the qualitative superiority of platforms plus the ability to knit them together into a battle network.

Fast forward to the Iraq War. The interesting advantage that we leveraged was that, in addition to battle networks, we had also built a logistics network. Its original purpose was to support the massive logistical lift required to fight and sustain a war in Europe – to get our aircraft, tank divisions and everything else across the Atlantic and keep them in the field. In many ways, then, it was not just a battle network revolution – it was a logistics network revolution as well. When you put the two together, the effect was striking: we could deploy large numbers of qualitatively superior equipment and formations – ships, aircraft, tanks – position them just outside the reach of Iraq’s forces and simultaneously put in place the logistics infrastructure to sustain them in the field. And critically, we had the ability to decide when to fight.

Iraq, which at the time had one of the largest militaries in the world, could not do much about it. This became the new American way of war: deploy large formations of qualitatively superior systems, integrate them through a multi-domain battle network and support them through a robust logistics network.

The Chinese – just as the Soviets before them – recognized the extraordinary power that came from the combination of the logistics network and the battle network. They understood that if nothing changed, they could be coerced by that military capability. And in fact, that is exactly what happened during the Taiwan Strait crisis: they were compelled to back down because the US possessed a vastly superior military force, leveraging together the logistics and battle networks.

In that context, China began a multi-decade effort – one that continues to this day – to offset that military capability, to achieve some measure of battlefield parity/ bring some level of parity to the battlefield that would prevent coercion. For them, it was existential. They saw the alternative as nothing less than the possible end of the Chinese Communist Party.

Their answer was to develop their own offset strategy, one premised on adapting and leveraging many of the technological advances we had pioneered and fielded: precision weapons, sensors, communications, data, information – the battle network itself. But instead of trying to replicate our global reach, they built a regional battle network-centered on the southern mainland, the Taiwan Strait, Japan and the South China Sea. That became what we now call the anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability. It was their version of an offset strategy – a way to achieve parity without needing to match us platform-for-platform in quality/without having to have qualitatively equal platforms.

As they were fielding their A2/AD capabilities, they were, at least initially, relying on systems that were qualitatively inferior. But when assembled into an integrated network – and especially when deployed in large numbers – those systems became something the United States could not simply fight through. This did not happen overnight. While the US was focused on Iraq and Afghanistan during the 2010–2020 timeframe, China was making steady, deliberate gains toward its objective: offsetting US military advantage in its near abroad.

They succeeded in building a formidable A2/AD network. And what is more, they have not just moved to parity using this offset strategy – in some cases, we are now seeing their platform quality rise to the point of being comparable with Western standards.

In other words, they have realized their offset strategy in their near abroad through A2/AD, and they have simultaneously raised the quality of their platforms. The result is that China no longer feels coerced by US military power like in the past. Instead, they now believe they can pursue their national interests in ways that simply were not possible for them back in the 1990s. It is a long story – a 30-year story – of China identifying what it needed to do, and then executing that strategy with remarkable consistency.

Octavian Manea: You mentioned this parity through reverse engineering on the Chinese side. What exactly are they targeting in the model you have just described? Because in many ways, it seems to collapse – or even neutralize – the very method the United States relied on in “Desert Storm”. So, what center of gravity are they aiming at?

Clinton Hinote: I talked about the combination of the battle network with the logistics network. That, in a nutshell, was – and is – the American way of war. The Chinese offset – the so-called A2/AD – directly counters both pillars of that American way of war. The anti-access component is a direct challenge to the logistics network. The area-denial component is aimed squarely at the battle network. And the two work together in tandem, just as our logistics and battle networks were designed to reinforce each other.

The way they think about and they have structured their A2/AD network is deliberate: it prevents our ability to get logistics where it needs to be, and in doing so, it undermines the effectiveness of our battle network, it prevents the battle network from being effective. It is a very astute – and very effective – way of offsetting our advantages.

Octavian Manea: What was the “Overmatch Brief” and what picture did it paint? I think it is highly indicative/symbolic in terms of the structural trends that pushed for 3OS.

Clinton Hinote: It was produced by the Office of Net Assessment (ONA), contracted through RAND, and the brief itself was meant to communicate what was happening – particularly in relation to China, although there was a Russia component as well – and to show how the technologies that enabled the battle network were proliferating.

Other countries – very much China, but also Russia – were adopting these technologies, integrating them into their own battle networks. And because of the tyranny of geography and the scenarios we were wargaming, it would mean the difference between victory and defeat for us.

So if we believed we were going to have to defend NATO on NATO’s eastern front – well, that’s a home game for Russia. They could bring their battle networks to bear and use them against NATO forces. In its near abroad, China had established A2/AD battle networks. Essentially, the same technologies that had been pioneered by the US in the 1980s were, by the 2010s, being adopted and operationalized by China. The big punchline of the brief was that – in the most credible war games we had been fighting – we were losing all of them.

It was a shock to the political leaders who took the Overmatch Brief. And that is what the ONA tried to do. They wanted everybody to see what they had been seeing. They had been watching the development of these networks. They had been watching how the war games were unfolding. They believed that they were seeing a change in the way military advantage was being wielded. Political leaders were shocked because the general belief was that there was no military as strong as the US, and that it was not going to be challenged. All of a sudden, we see that there is some level of parity between the US when it deploys and tries to do these scenarios with Russia and China playing a home game and brings its battle networks to the field. It was a deep shock.

It was a shock to the political leaders who took the Overmatch Brief. And that is exactly what the ONA was trying to achieve. They wanted everyone to see what they had been seeing. They had been watching the development of these networks and they had been observing how the war games were unfolding. They believed they were witnessing a shift – a change in the way military advantage was being wielded. Political leaders were shocked because the prevailing belief was that no military on Earth could rival the US – and certainly not challenge it. But all of a sudden, we are seeing signs of parity when the US deploys and runs these scenarios against Russia and China, playing the home game and bringing their battle networks into the field. It was a deep shock.

For those who actually took the brief – who took the time to understand it – I do not think they will ever forget it. I remember seeing it for the first time, and I still remember going back to my office, slumping down in my chair and just thinking, “Man … the world has changed”. It was a wake-up call.

Octavian Manea: As someone who worked with Bob Work on the Third Offset, I want to revisit his call for a multi-domain Operational Fires Network. That idea, first aimed at NATO’s eastern flank after Crimea, now surfaces in the Indo-Pacific as the Joint Fires Network (JFN) and Hellscape concept. How effective is a multi-service JFN at deterring aggression in the first island chain, and how directly does this doctrine trace back to Third Offset multi-domain thinking?

Clinton Hinote: I will preface my answer by saying this: every branded strategy tends to get built up too much by one side and politically denigrated by the other. As if the other side cannot have a good idea, you know? In our polarized politics, the Third Offset has that branding problem. If you are in a Republican administration, you cannot admit that 3OS was a good thing. That being said, I am coming at it strictly from a military strategist’s point of view.

Just as the US was seeking advantage in the Cold War – never wanting to go ship for ship, tank for tank, aircraft for aircraft – it felt, after the Overmatch Brief and as China achieved parity through A2/AD battle network, like it was time to find a new way of gaining/achieving advantage.

We are always trying to achieve an advantage. Everyone in the military is looking to achieve an advantage. No one is aiming to match China ship for ship, tank for tank, aircraft for aircraft. We are always going to be looking for something different – something that lets us fight through their A2/AD capabilities and still win. That is the essence of the offset strategy. And I believe any Republican or Democrat would go for it. I still believe there is strategic continuity between administrations on this issue.

For me, personally, that is why I wanted to join Bob Work’s office – because he was thinking differently. He was looking at the technologies that were emerging, and more importantly, how to combine them and put them together.

So no military technology exists in a vacuum. The way you get overmatch is by putting them together in different ways. The Germans did this early in World War II – knitting together emerging technologies in a way that gave them an almost unstoppable advantage in the Blitzkrieg. In the very same way, we were looking to gain an advantage by combining and integrating new technologies. So, what were those technologies?

Certainly, communications were becoming better – more secure, more ubiquitous. We had packaging. Our navigation systems were far more advanced, much more accurate and much more widespread. Accuracy itself became an advantage. At the same time, computing power was growing exponentially. We saw the very beginnings of artificial intelligence. We saw breakthroughs in microelectronics – packing immense computing power into an incredibly small space. That was new. And then, you start to see how the technology of autonomy was becoming increasingly viable.

And we have had autonomous weapons for a while. A US AMRAAM missile, or certain gun-defense systems – they have been autonomous for years. But the new versions of autonomy were far more capable, far more reliable, far more advanced. So, when we started knitting those technologies together, you could begin to see how a new concept might emerge. That concept relied heavily on autonomy. And now, with major advances in autonomy, you could start thinking about autonomous systems at scale in mass. Lots of them. This is where the vision of many drones comes in – drones in the air, on the land, on the ocean, under the ocean’s surface. Satellites operating autonomously in space. Suddenly, you could see how entire battle networks could be built around autonomous systems.

And if you knit enough of these systems together into your network, you might achieve something that feels like swarming – many autonomous entities, operating across domains (in air, land and sea, under the sea and in space), acting together for common purpose. And the technology was moving so quickly that autonomous operation meant one person could now control many.

Eventually, one command node could control the swarm. That is where we saw the real advantage: creating battle networks using autonomy – large numbers of uncrewed, unmanned vehicles, spread across multiple domains, operating together. That, in turn, would begin to create a kind of defense the world had never seen. No modern force has ever fought through a truly multi-domain defense. And by that, I mean all the domains – land, air, sea, undersea, space – operating together, organically as one.

And this became the notion of Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The battle network evolving to the next level, integrating all of this together so that it is operating as one. It is all working together for the same purpose. So it is not some cosmic concept. It is really just the next version of the battle network. You are expanding the number of nodes within the battle network and they are all working together. They are connected – air, land, sea, space, cyberspace – and they are integrated. Ultimately, the leap to JADC2 meant a transition from essentially a domain-centric joint force to one that is all-domain, able to move seamlessly and operate fluidly across domains.

But the bigger point to be made is that no modern force has ever fought through a multi-domain defense. That, I believe, is the brilliance of this Hellscape idea. And what I will say is that I saw versions of the Hellscape beginning to take shape in 2018. Now, it may have started earlier, but I personally saw advanced – or at least preliminary – versions of Hellscape in 2018. And I believe it represents exactly the way we need to think.

Octavian Manea: Is it too far to say that this multi-domain defense is the operational legacy of the Third Offset Strategy? I think it could be argued that in many ways, a multi-domain swarming defense is the legacy of the 3OS strategists, who were able to see beyond the horizon. Some of what we see taking shape today was, in fact, schematized and sketched out back in 2014 and 2015.

Clinton Hinote: I believe that multi-domain defense is a direct descendant of the thought process that was leveraging emerging technologies and knitting them together into an operational concept – one that could gain advantage over A2/AD, that could gain advantage over China. I believe that’s the Third Offset. But I understand – the label throws people off. You know, the label distracts. What I would say is that there has been real intellectual work – work that began as these technologies were emerging – and it continues to this day. It is at least ten years in the making.

Octavian Manea: Going back to the 3OS days, another notion debated then was the need to develop a kind of Assault Breaker 2.0. Is Hellscape some sort of Assault Breaker 2.0?

Clinton Hinote: So it is interesting you bring up Assault Breaker. Assault Breaker, of course, was the name for the battle network produced at the end of the Cold War. It was quite offensive in nature – meaning, the offence was ascendant. You could penetrate using low-observable technology, you could communicate, you could hit what you were aiming at, use far fewer weapons than before and you could create all sorts of systemic effects deep inside enemy territory. It was system attack – and Assault Breaker could do system attack.

What we are talking about with Hellscape is turning that around to a degree – making it defensive in nature. Now, there are people who would propose an Assault Breaker 2.0 – another version of offence. And yes, you could use that against China, you could use it against Russia. But there are deep disagreements – especially within places like the Department of Defense – about whether or not that is advisable. But there is very little disagreement on the advisability of creating a multi-domain swarming defense – which is what we are talking about with Hellscape.

The concept of Hellscape is very much a defensive game. And I think that is important because I believe the battle network of today – using autonomy, using advanced communications, using large numbers of unmanned vehicles across all domains, all connected through JADC2 – is inherently defensive. It has a tremendous defensive advantage. It is defensive dominant.

Now, there are parts of today’s technologies that are offence-dominant. And I think it is important to say – it is not like all the technologies we see out there are defensive by nature. Depending on how you place them in a scenario, I could make a strong argument that either the offence or the defense has the advantage. But what I believe is that as we begin putting together the battle network of Hellscape, we have the potential to create a very defense dominant battlefield.

I believe that is good for us – strategically and geopolitically – because China and Russia have to go somewhere to achieve their objectives. We do not. We are status quo powers. We just have to keep what we have got. So if we can create a battlefield where defense is dominant, and geopolitically, all we need to do is hold our ground – that reality is massively in our favor. What that does is align the high, grand strategic interests with the military operations. And when those are in alignment, we have the potential for really good results.

So, as an example – if we were fighting Russia in Ukraine, I would say: put Hellscape in Ukraine. And in my humble opinion, there would be nothing the Russians could do to gain ground. No matter how many men they threw at the problem, it would be almost impossible for them to take ground. We would deploy the battle network – Hellscape – on land, against Russia, and let them try to fight through it. Well, good luck with that. And so, I do believe it creates tremendous continuity – from grand strategic all the way down to tactical. And if you have got that, and you do not use it – I think you are just putting people on the line.

Octavian Manea: How adaptable/fungible is the Hellscape concept across different theaters? In other words, are its operational principles theater-specific, or can they be applied more broadly in diverse environments and against varying A2/AD challenges?

Clinton Hinote: So, I would say the platforms and the weapons are distinct. The types of swarms you had have on land, at sea and in other domains – those would be different. But the concept, I believe, is fungible between a Taiwan scenario and a NATO defense scenario. That is forward defense.

What I would say is, we have preserved an advantage in what you might call the middle defense – so maybe that’s the Pacific Ocean in a China scenario. So yes, we need to put Hellscape in place for the Taiwan scenario. But if China wants to do damage to the United States – and they might – I mean, I have seen it. In war games, they always try to hit the US. They try to strike with all sorts of weapons.

And they have to fight through what we have called in this interview the continuity forces or legacy forces. So yes, they had have to fight through four carrier strike groups, a submarine net and the fighters you would need to get past in order to reach Hawaii. And I mean – they do not have the advantage there. There is no parity there. Not yet.

So not only do you have the Hellscape defense forward, but you also have a conventional advantage in the middle – and then, what I believe you will see is “Golden Dome” as the concept for defending the homeland against strikes.

So there are three kinds of zones: there is the forward defense – you might call that the battle network of Hellscape; then there is the middle defense – that is conventional force on conventional force, where they have to fight through your carrier strike groups; and finally, you have your homeland defense.

The combination of all that gives you a way of thinking about defense across the depth of the globe – from hemisphere to hemisphere. I think if you put that in place, the chances of war are low. What I absolutely believe is: you do not get into great power wars if you implement that three-layer defense. You have created deterrence for this century – not the last century, but for the next. That is where I believe we are going.

Octavian Manea: You have talked extensively about this multi-domain swarming defense. Let us unpack what Hellscape would actually look like in practice – specifically in the First Island Chain.

Clinton Hinote: I am happy to unpack what I believe a defensive concept of Hellscape should look like. We actually called it the purple woodchipper: all-domains, bringing together the colors of the core service stakeholders, while at the same time carrying the symbolism of, “put your face in the woodchipper and see how that feels.”

The way to think about it is to describe what China would experience if it were trying to get off the Taiwan Strait. Well, at the very beginning, they would face tremendous difficulty – friction in their logistics – because you would see all sorts of cyber and kinetic attacks on their logistics systems. In addition, you would start seeing fires – attacks – on their ports, on their actual platforms, while they are cross-loading the platforms, while they are trying to get all their logistics in place. Then they would begin sailing – and they would start to encounter fires from the air. Some of those would come from drones. Some of them would be missiles.

The sensing network would be in place – and it would be impossible for them to knock it out. Not least because hiding a ship on the open ocean is not easy. And even if they managed to knock out parts of the sensing grid, they would still be pretty vulnerable – because their ships are on the ocean. And that is not a very hard problem for sensors. So they would have to knock out a tremendous amount.

The sensing grid will remain in place – to some level. So they will start receiving fires. They will have to do something about that. They will have to figure out how to maneuver through the fires. Some of them will be attrited. They will reach the very difficult currents of the Taiwan Strait. And at that point, they will not just be receiving fires from drones – they will start receiving fires from underwater. Some of those will come from unmanned submarines.

Some of those will come from manned submarines. Some will come from mines. And now, they will start receiving surface-to-surface missiles from Taiwan itself. At that point, they have to fight through the confusion that comes with attrition. And you are going to see electromagnetic warfare, where their communications become very difficult. Now, we will not be able to fully disrupt their communications – and they will not be able to fully disrupt ours – but there will be tremendous difficulty. Young Chinese commanders on those ships will begin to feel isolated.

They will have a hard time coordinating with anything beyond what they can directly see. They might still be able to use basic signaling and such – but coordinating a coherent attack? That is going to be very difficult. And as they approach the shore, they will start receiving artillery fire from the land. They will take fires from the air – air-to-surface fires, loitering munitions, drone attacks. Not all of those will be lethal.

Some of them – on their own – might feel like nuisance attacks. But when you have 10, 20, 50 of those hitting a single ship, you begin to see how each little pinprick adds up – making it all the more difficult for those Chinese invasion forces to reach the island.

As they get closer to the island, they start receiving real fire from Taiwan. The Taiwan Defense Forces have been rehearsing this. They know the exact distances. They know where their firing positions are. They have mined the beaches. They have mined the approaches to the ports. They have probably blown up the ports. I do not know that – but I suspect that might be the case as the Chinese were getting close.

If China tries to insert airborne forces – I mean, it was incredibly difficult in Normandy. Just figuring out where all their people were was a massive challenge. I think you would see a lot of the same kinds of confusion on the battlefield if they tried to drop airborne troops in. It is not likely they will be able to seize a runway and use it as a staging area – because a runway is fixed. And if nothing else, we are going to keep providing fires to Taiwan to take out all of the Chinese assets on that runway. So then – you get to the beach. And whoever gets to the beach has to fight their way through crossfire. They have to coordinate amongst themselves – somehow.

And then they have to start thinking: Where do I create a port? And I do not believe they can create a port. I fundamentally do not believe that – because a port is fixed. And as long as there are munitions that can hit fixed targets, I do not think you can truly create that port – that logistics hub. So I do not believe they get armor – or certainly not armor of any real substance – onto the island.

They have had to fight through this air, land, sea, space and cyberspace defense. They have been attrited in a major way. They can only get sporadic forces on the island. And when they do get on the island, they really cannot consolidate into a single fighting formation – and they cannot be logistically supported.

All of that adds up to this: China has not won. In fact, I believe Taiwan is winning at that point –because all Taiwan has to do is hold on. I do not believe that if you put a full – a multi-domain defensive battle network – in place, the Chinese can get enough force in the right position to subdue 23 million people who want to maintain their democracy and their freedom. And it would be horrible. There would be an incredible amount of death and destruction.

I do not know what the political outcome would be inside mainland China – because I think the Chinese Communist Party would feel like it has to win, very much like Putin feels like he has to win. But I do not know what that looks like – when Xi cannot win. And I do not know what it looks like when the Chinese Communist Party cannot win. I think it looks like they have weakened their country to the point of exhaustion.

Certainly, no one on the Taiwan or American side chose for China to invade Taiwan. But if they choose it, I think we have an operational concept that can prevent the Communist Party from extending control over the island.

Octavian Manea: Let us turn to the broader transformation underway within the services. You were at the forefront of this process in the Air Force. We see a similar process inside the Marine Corps with the broader FD2030 and the establishment of the Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) and their shift toward distributed, mobile, sea-denial operations and long-range strike capabilities. Could you describe the context behind these changes, the direction they are taking, and the progress made so far in these transformations?

Clinton Hinote: So, I will start with the four services you could call the legacy services: the Army, the Air Force, the Marine Corps and the Navy. They each have different stories – and it is worthwhile to understand those stories. Because the reason we are where we are today is because of them. We did not start with a clean sheet. We never started with a clean sheet.

First of all, the legacy of Desert Storm was: why would you change when you are so good? You come out of that period feeling pretty confident about your operational concepts, your doctrine, your platforms – everything. Then 9/11 happens and we get very, very involved – especially on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I think you could say for both the Army and the Marine Corps, that consumed the lion’s share of their attention.

So their ability to modernize the force was limited. With a few exceptions – you could point to some anti-IED capabilities that were modernized. But in general, the counterinsurgency period for both the Marine Corps and the Army was a period of near exhaustion, where their focus was fully on Iraq and Afghanistan. And as they came out of those wars, they had not modernized. They had concepts and an entire force tailored for counterinsurgency. To expect them to turn on a dime and adopt offset strategy technologies – that would be difficult. And I understand why.

The Navy and the Air Force had a slightly different story. They were, of course, involved in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I was the air strategist for Iraq and Afghanistan for a time in the 2006–2007 timeframe, so I am very familiar with everything we were doing. And we were doing a lot. And it was expensive. But at the very same time, we were also trying to modernize our platforms. For the Air Force, that meant mainly airplanes. For the Navy, that meant airplanes, ships, and – to some degree – submarines.

And those platforms became more and more and more expensive – exponentially expensive. As an example: the F-22 was, at the time, the most expensive airplane ever produced. And then, of course, came the B-2 – which was even more expensive. So the way we were modernizing was through very expensive platforms. We were continuing the qualitative trajectory we had been on at the end of the Cold War. But each of these ships, each of these aircraft, each of these submarines – was costing more and more.

At the same time, the military’s budget did not grow with the demand. It did not keep pace with the two demands: the demand of actually fighting, and – at the very same time – the demand created by exponential cost growth. And our budgets did not expand to cover that. Eventually, the pressure on modernization inside both the Navy and the Air Force became unbearable. We started slipping. We stopped modernizing. And we are still in that hole. So again – we do not start with a clean sheet.

And I argued very, very hard – beginning in 2019 – for a Hellscape-like concept, for the Air Force to adopt Hellscape-like capabilities. At first, I was not welcome. There were a lot of people who argued against me. And their point was: we had to reestablish the qualitative advantage over China that we had at the end of the Cold War over Russia. But you could not. There is only so much budget to go around – and each platform was taking an increasing percentage of it. So the crunch really hit. And – at least in the Air Force – there was not the margin to change the force into a Hellscape-like force.

There were people who did not believe in a Hellscape-like force. It was not in doctrine. We had never fought a war that way. It seemed very experimental. So people were willing to run experiments – but they were not willing to, say, actually field force structure. The force structure was built around the very best cargo airplanes, the very best bomber airplanes. It was fixated on continuing the types of platforms that had gained us the advantage at the end of the Cold War. In that sense, it was an evolution. Hellscape would have been, in some ways, a revolution.

And most military services in history – not just the United States, but throughout history – have not adopted the revolutionary path over the evolutionary one. I would say both the Navy and the Air Force had that problem. Now, there have been an increasing number of people within those services – still true even today – who believe that revolutionary, Hellscape-like capability is what’s going to help us recreate overmatch. But the budgets, they have not really expanded.

Bottom line: coming out of the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army and the Marine Corps were spent. They had not modernized, and they were looking for what was next. The Air Force and the Navy, meanwhile, were dealing with this incredible growth in cost per platform – and finding it very difficult to squeeze in anything new.

And this is where, just a few years ago, you began to see the Marine Corps totally change. I would argue that the way they are thinking about distributed operations throughout the First Island Chain is exactly right. And I believe it is revolutionary. But, as you might expect, they ran into tremendous pushback – from people who believed it needed to be an evolutionary change, not a revolution.

I think you are seeing the Army go through its revolution right now. You are seeing fires become increasingly important – artillery, long-range missiles, air defense. At the same time, you are seeing large ground formations decrease in importance. That is a revolution in the Army.

In the Navy, you are seeing a major push underwater – fires underwater, maneuver underwater. That includes manned submarines, but it also includes smart mines and unmanned vehicles. And then, on the surface, the goal is to decrease risk – so you are using a lot of unmanned vehicles on the surface, along with significant air defense. I think you are going to see the Navy play a huge role in the “Golden Dome”, as an example.

Finally, you’re seeing a revolution in the Air Force with the advent of collaborative combat aircraft. And now there is increasing interest in producing air power for Hellscape that does not rely on runways – so you do not have the vulnerability of attaching your air power to a fixed runway.

All four of those are revolutionary. So you are seeing the tension between the evolutionary (“we need better platforms, and we need to keep spending money on those”) versus the revolutionary (“we need unmanned, autonomous swarms across all domains, working together with JADC2”). It looks to me like the evidence is increasingly clear that the revolutionary side is going to continue to grow.

Ultimately, this entails that our whole approach to joint warfare must change. It needs to become domain-agnostic, compared with our traditional formations that were domain-centric and move across domains without artificial seams and boundaries. The true revolution is the transition from a domain-centric joint force to a domain-agnostic joint force. But will this happen fast enough? I do not know. I do not think it is fast enough now. If Taiwan, Japan, Australia and the US invest heavily in Hellscape-type technologies and weave them together, then I do not see how China can believe it could be successful.

I do believe we are watching a window. And that window, to me, feels like it may be closing –especially if you see sustained investment carried forward by this administration. If that is the case, then we are in a dangerous part of history – watching China try to figure out what its true options are. So Xi is going to have to decide: is there a window? And is it closing? Because the Chinese Communist Party has, for decades, believed the window was coming – that it was ahead of them, that they were going to get stronger, that they were going to have a better opportunity to reestablish the “Middle Kingdom” – that their power was growing compared to everybody else and that they were in ascendance. But it is possible now that we are actually watching a peak – and a descent – in their military advantage.

And if that’s true… it is a dangerous time.

Tags: Air Force, CSDS Interview, Future of War, Offset Strategy

About The Author

• 
  
• Octavian Manea
• Octavian Manea is a PhD Researcher at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) that he joined in October 2021. He is interested in the changing character of conflict and the implications of such alterations for the US-led alliance system. Octavian is also broadly interested in strategic studies, transatlantic relations and security issues. He worked for many years as a journalist, and is currently a contributor at the Romanian weekly 22 and the Small Wars Journal. In addition, Octavian was the managing editor of the Eastern Focus Quarterly in Bucharest and was affiliated with the Romania Energy Center (ROEC). Octavian was a Fulbright Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, where he received an MA in International Relations and a Certificate of Advanced Studies in Security Studies. He also holds a BA and an MA in political science and international relations from the University of Bucharest.

12. Things were already grim for US farmers, then China tensions worsened – again

Summary:

High costs, low prices and weakened Chinese demand have pushed many US soybean and rice farmers toward bankruptcy and severe mental stress. POTUS' renewed tariffs and slow, uncertain Chinese purchases have not restored pre-trade war export levels, while promised deals with Japan, Bangladesh and others cannot replace lost Chinese demand. Farmers are forced to sell at a loss, store crops, or rely on delayed federal aid as farm bankruptcies rise. Rural communities face layoffs, mounting debt and suicides, even as many farmers still back POTUS, hoping he can eventually reverse the damage to their livelihoods and communities across the Midwest.

US-China trade war

USEconomy, Trade & Business

Things were already grim for US farmers, then China tensions worsened – again

Strains with Beijing have deepened American agriculture woes, fuelling stress and bankruptcies amid high costs and low prices

https://www.scmp.com/news/us/economy-trade-business/article/3333207/things-were-already-grim-us-farmers-then-china-tensions-worsened-again?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

Khushboo Razdanin Washington

Published: 11:00pm, 18 Nov 2025Updated: 4:15am, 19 Nov 2025

Randal Shelby planned carefully and waited years to ditch a career spent in hospitals and medical centres to chase a dream in which he traded antiseptic hallways full of sick patients for the great outdoors.

His new life started six years ago, after he secured about US$1.3 million in financing for a Case combine and other equipment, fertilisers, seed and labour needed to produce soybeans and rice, staples that enjoyed strong demand overseas, primarily from China.

High fuel costs, rising interest rates, falling crop prices and depressed Chinese demand amid geopolitical tensions had already eroded farm profits during the previous Joe Biden administration.

Then came a seismic shift in US politics, which brought a tariff-loving president back to the White House, further rattling an industry still struggling to recover from market convulsions caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and the surge in fertiliser prices triggered by Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Today, Shelby faces the possibility of returning to a life he thought he had left behind, just to make ends meet.

“I won’t have a choice. I’ll have to … that’s not what I wanted … I’d like to just pay the bills,” said the 50-year-old soybean farmer from Arkansas, a deep-red US state. “It should be my choice, not due to political practices,” he added.

Randal Shelby says he is close to losing everything he has invested in his farm in Arkansas. Photo: Randal Shelby

Shelby is teetering on the edge of losing everything he had invested, and more. “I’ll have to file bankruptcy … very soon. I’m talking within a couple of weeks … they’ll come in and auction everything off,” he said in a voice heavy with anxiety.

“You’re in debt all year long. You know, you have no choice but to finance everything.”

The emotional toll, he shared, has been devastating. “We’re frustrated. We’re out of time. We’re stressed out.

“We’ve already had five Arkansas farmers commit suicide … one guy not far from one of my farms. The stress is breaking up families … everything.”

Trade promises fail to deliver relief

Weeks after Donald Trump celebrated a promise by Beijing to resume soybean purchases as a “spectacular” win, coupled with pledges from Japan and Bangladesh to buy billions in US agricultural products, farmers in the battered heartland offer a starkly depressing narrative.

They say the trade deal pledges still do not appear to bring supply and demand back into balance.

Bankruptcies are climbing, input costs are soaring, and farmers are being forced to sell crops at a loss or store their harvests at mounting expense while they wait for federal aid, even as China continues to diversify its suppliers.

The mental toll is worsening: reports of farmer suicides are emerging in local news and community accounts, though official data remains unavailable.

Experts say such deaths are often misclassified as accidents to spare families the burden of stigma, insurance complications and added trauma.

Despite the hardships, some farmers remain steadfast in their political loyalties, even as others acknowledge a dip in Trump’s standing in the community, highlighting the complex calculus of risk, expectation and survival in America’s heartland.

After Chinese President Xi Jinping met Trump in South Korea on October 30, the White House announced that Beijing had agreed to buy 12 million tonnes of soybeans through the rest of 2025 and 25 million tonnes annually over the next three years.

According to new data from the US Agriculture Department, since the Trump-Xi meeting, China has bought 332,000 tonnes.

On Monday, soybean futures rose as much as 3.2 per cent after media reports that China had placed orders for at least seven more cargoes of soybeans.

During a bilateral meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia, Trump on Tuesday claimed that China’s buying of US farmer products is “pretty much on schedule”.

But he added that he’d like US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to call “them” to say “if they could speed it up, it would be good”.

According to Shelby, “this is not a win”, as prices are still “way down compared to what our input costs are”. He said “these numbers aren’t even close” to what China was buying before, and “there’s nothing on paper”.

Soybeans: China’s new bargaining chip in trade war with US?

Pointing to the absence of an official announcement by Beijing that confirms the numbers cited by the Trump administration and any enforcement mechanism, he noted that the Biden administration had also failed to enforce the phase one deal with China negotiated by Trump in his first term.

“I don’t know how you’re going to tell another country you’ve got to do this, you know, because that doesn’t seem to work,” he said, contending that he agreed with Trump’s tariffs but “this whole trade war here is all on the back of the American farmer, and 99 per cent of it [on] the American soybean farmer”.

Amid Trump’s sweeping tariffs on China and months of tense trade negotiations, Beijing halted purchases of US soybeans for much of the year.

Recent reports now suggest that China has resumed modest buying. While Beijing has lifted tariffs of up to 15 per cent on select agricultural products, about a 13 per cent levy on soybean imports remains.

Trump has long defended tariffs as a powerful tool to force countries to yield to US demands. In China’s case, he touted them as leverage to secure greater market access. But the numbers tell a different story.

Too little, too late

According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, China’s projected purchases of 12 million tonnes through the rest of 2025 would bring total US soybean exports to just 18.2 million tonnes this year, a 32 per cent drop from 2024’s 26.8 million tonnes and the weakest level since 2018.

Before Trump’s tariffs, from 2013 to 2017, the US sold China an average of 28.8 million tonnes annually, according to the Department of Agriculture. The new deal guarantees only 25 million tonnes, nearly 4 million less each year.

China imports about 104 million to 106 million tonnes of soybeans annually, with only 25 million coming from the US. America now supplies roughly a quarter of China’s demand, down from 40 to 50 per cent a decade ago, leaving room for Brazil and Argentina.

Executives from the US Grains Council also took part in the 8th China International Import Expo in Shanghai last week, eyeing a return to the Chinese market. According to state-run Global Times, new orders were signed.

John Bartman, a soybean farmer from Illinois, said that still “a quarter of our production does not have a home, and that’s what China normally would have purchased”.

He blamed the Trump administration for not doing anything to increase domestic demand. “They didn’t increase the amount of biofuels required, especially for soy diesel. And had he done that through for biodiesel, we would be in a much better situation.”

The Trump administration has been pushing to diversify away from China. Earlier this month, US Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins announced that Bangladesh would purchase US$1.25 billion worth of soybeans over the next year, up from about US$350 million last year.

Japan has also agreed to buy US$8 billion annually in American farm goods, including soybeans, corn and bioethanol.

Illinois soybean farmer John Bartman faults the Trump administration for not doing anything to increase domestic demand. Photo: John Bartman

For Bartman, it is too little, too late. He welcomed the new trade deals but argued that these pledges were “nothing compared to what China can purchase”.

He criticised the administration for “flying all over the world” announcing agreements with countries that “normally buy beans from us”, calling it “a grandiose gesture” rather than real progress.

“In reality, this is just business as usual,” he said. “Until we see a real increase in domestic demand and exports, we’ll keep dealing with low farm prices.”

He added that the fallout had spread beyond farms. “Farmers are on the verge of bankruptcy, and factory and steel workers who make our equipment are being laid off because of the collateral damage from this administration.”

An October letter to the White House from the American Farm Bureau Federation highlighted that a majority of US farms were losing money, threatening the stability of small towns and rural economies.

According to the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, farm bankruptcy filings rose to 93 in the second quarter, up from 88 in the first and nearly double the 47 at the end of 2024.

A July report from the University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture noted that in 2019, 599 Chapter 12 bankruptcies were filed across the US, the highest in at least a decade, which allow farmers to restructure debt and continue operations. By 2021, that number had fallen to 276.

Can farmers survive the breaking point?

Years of instability in the sector have deepened a long-standing mental health crisis among farmers.

In the US, farmers are 3.5 times more likely to die by suicide than the general population. The suicide rate among male farmers, ranchers and ag managers is 43.7 deaths per 100,000 people, according to the National Rural Health Association.

According to the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, suicide rates in the US rose sharply over the two decades from 2000 to 2020, with rural areas experiencing a 46 per cent increase compared with a 27.3 per cent increase in metropolitan areas.

Karen Endress, who works on farmers’ mental well-being at the Wisconsin Farm Centre, said there was a cultural tendency among farmers of being independent, not “wanting to ask for help”.

She highlighted that income unpredictability, along with isolation, was found to be among the top five stressors for farmers, in a recent survey.

Endress, who is also part of a nationwide group working on farmers’ mental health, noted that suicide data was not abundant in the US. She added that in a recent call with her counterparts from other states, the issue of suicide also came up.

“I know the woman who is my counterpart in Missouri was talking about that they were aware of three soybean farmers who had died by suicide … Illinois had mentioned two farmers that died by suicide. I had heard of one in Minnesota,” she said.

Jeff Winton, a New York farmer and founder of Rural Minds, a non-profit organisation centred around farmers’ mental health that his family launched in 2019 after losing his 23-year-old nephew to suicide in 2012, said “there’s a lot of anecdotal data, and that’s part of the issue”.

“It gets back to the stigma and the shame around suicide in rural areas,” he added, noting that “my phone is ringing off the hook”.

Jeff Winton is a New York farmer and founder of Rural Minds, a non-profit organisation created after his 23-year-old nephew died by suicide in 2012. Photo: Jeff Winton

He said he was getting texts and phone calls from farm families “24 hours a day” and “way more than I ever experienced up until six months ago”.

He said many people were contacting him because they feared a loved one “involved in agriculture is considering suicide … that there’s suicidal ideation occurring in that individual”.

Winton linked the worsening crisis to Trump’s policies on tariffs and immigration, which he said had affected hundreds of thousands of farm workers, including documented ones, in recent months.

In September, hundreds of farmers gathered at a church in Northeast Arkansas to seek both divine and political interventions. After a short prayer, they voiced their concerns to visiting representatives from the offices of US Senators Tom Cotton and John Boozman, as well as US congressman Rick Crawford.

During the town hall, Jill Beck, who finances agricultural equipment, said five of her customers had died by suicide in the past 14 months.

“It is serious,” she said. “These men and women live out in isolated areas working on a piece of equipment they owe a lot of money on, on land they owe a lot of money on. They might be losing the family farm because of this situation. That’s how serious it is.”

Chris King, a farmer from Arkansas’ Woodruff County, said this year’s prospects were the worst he had seen in 39 years of farming, calling on Trump to deliver on his words.

“Mr Trump, you looked at me and said, ‘I love you,’” King said. “Mr Trump, I need to see the fruit of that love.”

The University of Arkansas Division of Agriculture report showed that Arkansas accounted for over 25 per cent of Chapter 12 filings in the first quarter. In 2023, China, Arkansas’ third-largest export market, imported mostly agricultural products from the state. The state government estimates a “US$1.145 billion shortfall for 2025”.

Rollins has indicated a US$10 billion-US$13 billion farm aid package, blaming the shutdown for delays. Trump has proposed funding it with tariff revenues, but it remains unclear whether the bailout will resemble the US$28 billion programme from his 2018-19 trade war with China.

Winton, however, noted that not all farmers voted for Trump. And the ones who voted for him were having “buyer’s remorse”.

He said that around his farm, even after the election those who voted for Trump still had Trump signs on display but that “most of them have been taken down now because farmers finally have realised what is happening”.

Shelby, who claimed he was forced to sell his entire harvest at a loss, said he would still vote for Trump, calling him the “only qualified businessman who has been in there in years and years”.

“You cannot please everybody,” he added, but stressed that “somebody is going to get hurt, you know. But appropriations need to be made … but I believe that he is the only person who could turn this around.”

He acknowledged that “it is hurting a lot of people” and that a “majority of them will still side with him”.

For now, Shelby is focused on immediate concerns.

“We don’t even know what to plan to plant for next year …” he said. “Do we plant a bunch of beans again if we’re not even gonna have a market for [it]?”

Khushboo Razdan

Khushboo Razdan is a senior correspondent based in Washington. Prior to this, she worked for the Post in New York. Before joining the team, she worked as a multimedia journalist in Beijing and New Delhi for over a decade. She is a graduate of the Columbia Journalism School.

13. After a Tragedy in 2002, Special Forces Soldiers Learned That Armed Drones Are a Combat Necessity

Summary:

The 2002 Battle of Takur Ghar showed Special Operations how exposed helicopters and ground teams were without persistent armed overwatch. A Night Stalker MH-47 inserting SEALs was hit, SEAL Neil Roberts fell to the summit, and a 17 hour fight followed as Rangers and airmen were ambushed and killed on “Roberts Ridge.” An MQ-1 Predator, flown remotely from CIA headquarters, provided real time video, guided strikes, and fired Hellfire missiles that destroyed an enemy bunker and helped survivors hold out. The tragedy cemented armed drones and 160th SOAR partnerships as essential tools of modern U.S. counterterrorism warfare.

Excerpt:

The Predator is a long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle that can transmit color, black-and-white, and infrared imagery from an onboard video camera and infrared sensor to a ground control station. It was designed solely to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights. But in the summer of 2001, a team of technology specialists with a U.S. Air Force rapid-innovations unit known informally as Big Safari (officially, the 645th Aeronautical Systems Group) modified Predator 3034 to carry two Hellfire missiles. A Big Safari expert nicknamed the “man with two brains” (real name withheld) then devised a patchwork of undersea fiber-optic cable and Europe-to-Asia satellite signals, enabling pilots and sensor operators in a ground control station parked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to remotely fly the newly armed Predator over Afghanistan. The goal was to give policymakers a way to kill Osama bin Laden.

Comment: We have military and intelligence professionals who know how to innovate. We just need to help them or let them get on with business. How can we better enable and support people like those described in the excerpt and in this entire essay? Find the "man with two brains" and put him in charge.

After a Tragedy in 2002, Special Forces Soldiers Learned That Armed Drones Are a Combat Necessity

Smithsonian · Richard Whittle ·

National Air and Space Museum

Why the Predator is here to stay.

https://www.smithsonianmag.com/blogs/air-space-museum/2025/11/20/after-a-tragedy-in-2002-special-forces-soldiers-learned-that-armed-drones-are-a-combat-necessity/

The Afghan Special Security Force, advised by U.S. Special Forces, prepares to load an MH-47 Chinook in Afghanistan’s Kapisa province. Helicopters played a pivotal role in Operation Enduring Freedom, which lasted from 2001 to 2021. Alamy/Bob Collet

The Battle of Takur Ghar began three days into Operation Anaconda—an attempt by thousands of U.S. and allied troops to encircle Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan’s Shah-i-Kot Valley in March 2002. Small reconnaissance teams were being deployed to establish observation posts in strategic locations, where they could direct U.S. air power against enemy targets.

At about one o’clock in the morning local time on March 4, Razor 03 (the call-sign for a U.S. Army Boeing MH-47E helicopter) tried to insert one such team at Takur Ghar, a mountain of more than 10,000 feet. But U.S. forces were unaware it was an enemy stronghold, where Al Qaeda had positioned fighters to fire on helicopters and troops operating in the valley below. While landing, Razor 03 was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade and gunfire, causing U.S. Navy SEAL Neil Roberts to fall from the helicopter. The heavily damaged MH-47E then made an emergency landing about three miles away.

U.S. Navy SEAL Neil Roberts was the first casualty of the Battle of Takur Ghar. Alamy/US Navy

What came next was an intense 17-hour fight at the top of Takur Ghar. The legendary battle will be represented by two artifacts on exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum’s Modern Military Aviation gallery, which opens next year on July 1. One of the artifacts is a General Atomics MQ-1 Predator (initially designated RQ-1), the first of its type to be armed and used to attack ground targets with AGM‑114 Hellfire missiles, a weapon designed to be fired from helicopters. The Museum’s MQ-1 flew 196 combat missions in Afghanistan.

The second artifact, which will be displayed on a mannequin, is a desert-tan flightsuit of the type worn by helicopter pilots of the U.S. Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR). Organized in 1981 and known as the Night Stalkers, the 160th regiment was used intermittently for special operations in the 1980s and 1990s. According to an official history, between November 1993 and October 2001, the unit flew only non-combat missions.

But the war in Afghanistan transformed both the MQ-1 and the Night Stalkers from supporting roles to leading actors in the drama of 21st century warfare. The lead curator for the Modern Military Aviation gallery is Michael W. Hankins, who specializes in post-World War II military aircraft. He notes that the displays relating to the war on terrorism will depart from the exhibit’s overarching theme. “We’re telling the story of American military aviation from the end of World War II up until today,” says Hankins. As such, many of the nearly 200 items in the gallery reflect how nuclear weapons and global reach affected the evolution of aviation technology after World War II. The 160th uniform and the MQ-1 reflect the fact that the “perceived threat to the United States in the early 2000s is much different than it was at the height of the Cold War,” says Hankins.

Roger Connor, the Museum’s curator for drones and rotorcraft, says the MQ-1 and the 160th uniform are apt artifacts for telling the most recent history of U.S. military aviation. “Having the Predator and the 160th uniform really speak to this new moment in warfare that we see in early 2002, when the war on terror is becoming very dependent upon the changes in U.S. military aviation that have been wrought in the post-Vietnam, post-Reagan era,” says Connor. “So, we see much greater emphasis on UAS (unmanned aerial systems). We see much greater emphasis on special operations capability: the ability to conduct operations without large-scale ground forces.”

An MQ-1 Predator, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles, flies a combat mission over southern Afghanistan. The MQ-1 played a crucial role in the Battle of Takur Ghar. US Air Force/Lt Col Leslie Pratt

A Tale of Two Artifacts

Both the MQ-1 Predator (tail number 3034) and the 160th uniform have been in the Museum’s collection for some time. The Predator, manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, was displayed in the former Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles gallery at the Museum in Washington, D.C., from 2008 to 2018. The Night Stalker uniform has been exhibited at the Museum’s Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia.

The Predator is a long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicle that can transmit color, black-and-white, and infrared imagery from an onboard video camera and infrared sensor to a ground control station. It was designed solely to perform intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights. But in the summer of 2001, a team of technology specialists with a U.S. Air Force rapid-innovations unit known informally as Big Safari (officially, the 645th Aeronautical Systems Group) modified Predator 3034 to carry two Hellfire missiles. A Big Safari expert nicknamed the “man with two brains” (real name withheld) then devised a patchwork of undersea fiber-optic cable and Europe-to-Asia satellite signals, enabling pilots and sensor operators in a ground control station parked at CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, to remotely fly the newly armed Predator over Afghanistan. The goal was to give policymakers a way to kill Osama bin Laden.

The Air Force and civilian contractor crews who flew 3034 and two other armed MQ-1s over Afghanistan from the CIA parking lot never got a shot at bin Laden. But they made other uses of the new weapon—igniting a drone revolution still unfolding today.

The Night Stalkers usually fly in darkness, often on short notice, frequently at ground-hugging “nap-of-the-earth” altitude, and usually both carrying special operations troops and providing armed escort for them on risky missions. The Night Stalker uniform displayed at the Museum was set up with the assistance of Alan C. Mack, author of Razor 03: A Night Stalker’s Wars, a memoir of his 17 years as a 160th pilot during a 35-year Army career. “It’s just a generic uniform, but I marked it up as if it were mine,” says Mack, who retired at the rank of Chief Warrant Officer 5. “My blood type is [written] on the boots, and my initials are on the back of the boots. The vest itself is set up how I wore mine. There’s some variability in how people set up their equipment.”

Alan Mack flew MH-47Es while serving in the U.S. Army. He has written a memoir about being a pilot in the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment. Courtesy Alan C. Mack

Besides the basic flightsuit, air crew coat, boots, flying gloves, and helmet, the display includes gear and weapons that Night Stalker pilots carried in the early 2000s, depending on the mission: an armored vest, a survival vest, night vision goggles, a knife with a scabbard, a pistol and holster, M-16 and M-4 carbines, and pouches for ammunition, a radio, a first aid kit, and other items.

Mack says he and other pilots who flew in Afghanistan in the early 2000s also used or wore non-military items to cope with the high altitudes and cold temperatures when flying over the Afghan mountains. “The GPS, for example, was just a Garmin that they bought,” says Mack. “Some of the cold weather gear was straight from North Face or Columbia.”

The high altitudes often required 160th crews to use oxygen masks. But the sort worn by fighter pilots became very cumbersome with night vision goggles, which also strap onto the user’s head. “So, we ended up going with a commercial, off-the-shelf product of an oxygen bottle with nasal cannula,” says Mack. “Turned out that at our altitudes, 25,000 feet and below, that was sufficient to give you enough supplemental oxygen, and it was much more comfortable to wear for hours at a time versus an old-fashioned mask. We looked like a bunch of emphysema-ridden pilots before they quit smoking.”

The 160th regiment, like the Joint Special Operations Command it falls under, emerged in the aftermath of several military reforms following the humiliation of the failed April 24, 1980 mission to rescue 53 Americans held hostage in Iran. “It was recognized after Operation Eagle Claw that the United States Army needed an elite special operations aviation unit,” says Sean Naylor, who covered special operations for the Army Times.

Initially activated on August 15, 1981, as Task Force 160, the Night Stalkers were one of the first helicopter units to routinely train in darkness using night vision goggles—an often-treacherous task given the quality of goggles of that era.

The 160th’s intensely trained pilots fly three main types of specially equipped, heavily armed helicopters of different sizes: AH-6 and MH-6 Little Birds made by Boeing and several models of Sikorsky MH-60 Black Hawks and Boeing MH-47 Chinooks. Regular passengers on Night Stalker flights include Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, and Air Force special operators. The Night Stalkers’ creed pledges members to be “ready to move at a moment’s notice anytime, anywhere, arriving time on target plus or minus 30 seconds.” Missions to capture or kill high-value targets are a specialty. Two secretly developed 160th Black Hawks equipped with technology to muffle the noise from their tail rotors delivered the SEAL Team 6 members who killed bin Laden. The next month, the Army made Night Stalkers an official designation.

While in Afghanistan, Mack flew the MH-47E Chinook, a special operations version of the massive and powerful CH-47 heavy lift transport. The MH-47E was especially valued in Afghanistan for two reasons: its ability to reach altitudes higher than any other U.S. helicopter and its possession of a terrain-following radar. This feature “provides airspeed, steering, and power commands for the pilots to maintain a desired terrain clearance altitude, selectable by the pilots to fly at 100, 300, and 500 feet above the terrain ahead,” Mack explains in his book.

A 160th MH-60M DAP Black Hawk test fires 2.75-inch rockets. While sharing the same airframe as the MH‑60M, this variant is configured as a highly weaponized platform to provide air support and armed escort during special operations, setting it apart from other Black Hawks focused on transport and utility roles. Wikipedia/US Army

Mack says Night Stalker training routinely includes expensive exercises such as flying in the U.S. Rocky Mountains on oxygen, refueling at night over water, and firing powerful weapons that include the M-134 mini-gun—a six-barrel, Gatling-style rotating machine gun that fires 7.62-mm shells at a rate of 6,000 rounds per minute. A special Night Stalker version of the Black Hawk, the MH-60L DAP (direct-action penetrator), can carry varying combinations of 7.62-mm mini-guns plus a 30-mm cannon, 2.75-inch folding-fin rockets, and Hellfire missiles.

The unit’s first combat mission using night-vision goggles was on September 21, 1987, when three AH-6 Little Birds used mini-guns and rockets to disable an Iranian navy vessel laying mines to disrupt oil tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf, enabling SEALs to board and seize it. Two years later, when U.S. forces deposed Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, Night Stalker AH-6 and MH-6 Little Birds helped Delta Force rescue imprisoned U.S. citizen Kurt Muse. A 160th MH-60 then took Noriega to a U.S. Air Force base after he surrendered.

Since most of their missions are secret, the public, unfortunately, tends to remember the 160th for two operations that turned tragic. The first, made famous by the book and movie Black Hawk Down, occurred in 1993, during the U.S. intervention in the civil war in Somalia. A second took place on March 4, 2002, five months into the war in Afghanistan, on the peak of Takur Ghar—the first operation in which the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment and armed Predators both took part, though not by design.

Fog of War

Mack was at the controls of one of two 160th MH-47Es assigned to take Navy SEALs to the base of Takur Ghar. The SEALs were to climb the mountain in darkness and set up a covert observation post overlooking the valley.

Things began to go wrong when mechanical problems with one helicopter delayed departure, leaving the SEALs too little time to climb the mountain before first light. During the Soviet occupation, Afghan rebels had created hide sites, bunkers, and fighting positions all over the Shah-i-Kot Valley and its mountains. But the leader of the SEAL team had told Mack there was no evidence of enemy forces on Takur Ghar. When he asked Mack to take the SEALs to the top of the mountain, Mack reluctantly agreed.

As he flared his Chinook to land the first group of SEALs on Takur Ghar’s snow-covered peak at about 3 am, “I caught sight of a rocket-propelled grenade flying at us,” Mack wrote in his book. The grenade hit just behind Mack’s seat, knocking out much of the Chinook’s electronic gear and its electric-powered mini-guns and starting a fire in the cabin. As Mack jerked the helicopter upward to fly away, one of the SEALs, Petty Officer First Class Neil Roberts, fell or jumped off the open back ramp. Mack told the crew they would return for Roberts, but with the Chinook’s engines now underpowered and its flight controls crippled by a transmission spewing hydraulic fluid from bullet holes, that proved impossible. Mack was barely able to fly the Chinook to a rough landing at the base of the mountain to await their own rescue.

Two hours later, at about 5 am, another Night Stalker Chinook helicopter dropped the SEALs back on Takur Ghar in a futile attempt to rescue Roberts, who as it turned out was already dead (in honor of the fallen SEAL, American troops now informally refer to Takur Ghar as Roberts Ridge). This Chinook, though also badly shot up on landing, managed to fly away. But under heavy enemy fire, the SEALs were forced to retreat down the side of the mountain. Air Force Technical Sergeant John Chapman, a combat controller who was attached to the SEALs to communicate with aircraft and call in close air support, was badly wounded and presumed dead (subsequent investigations indicating that Chapman fought for another hour have been a point of contention in the military community).

At about 6:10 am, with the sun coming up, a third Chinook landed on Takur Ghar, this one carrying a Quick Reaction Force of Rangers sent by what Naylor described in his 2015 book, Relentless Strike, as a “confused” headquarters commanding Operation Anaconda from an island off the coast of Oman. Unaware they were landing in a hornet’s nest, the helicopter that brought the Rangers was met with a barrage of bullets and rocket-propelled grenades. A crew chief and a Ranger were killed, and a pilot and another crew chief were wounded as they landed. Two more Rangers were shot dead as they stepped off the back ramp. The others scrambled for cover behind rocks to one side of the aircraft.

The catastrophic scene was witnessed as it unfolded through the camera of an armed Predator, tail number 3037, being flown about 12 miles from Takur Ghar by a pilot and sensor operator some 7,000 miles away. They were stationed in one of two ground control stations on the CIA’s campus in northern Virginia, next to a double-wide mobile home used as the operations center. With approval from higher-ups, the joint CIA-Air Force team, which used the radio call-sign “Wildfire,” would soon play a major role in the Battle of Takur Ghar.

The air crew of Razor 03, who attempted to insert a reconnaissance team at Takur Ghar. Courtesy Alan C. Mack

“Basically, we rubbernecked into one of the biggest fights in Afghanistan,” wrote Mark Cooter, a retired Air Force colonel, and Alec Bierbauer, described as the “CIA’s point man in the development of the Predator program,” in their 2021 memoir Never Mind, We’ll Do It Ourselves. The two men were the operational leaders of the Air Force and CIA Predator team at the “Trailer Park,” as they jokingly called it, whose members were flying the only two armed Predators in existence, tail numbers 3034 and 3037, having lost a third—number 3038—to a communications failure early in the war.

Two different Wildfire crews and their commanders watched and listened via radio as Air Force Staff Sergeant Gabriel Brown, a combat controller with the Rangers on Takur Ghar, worked desperately to direct fighter aircraft in bombing and strafing runs at the enemy bunker. With bullets snapping through the air around him, having to shout over gunfire as the Rangers fought, trying above all to be sure the bombing and strafing runs didn’t hit his side in the fight, it took Brown some time to realize that one of the voices using his call-sign, Slick Zero One, and offering help was a Predator pilot using the call-sign Wildfire 54.

“I was calling him, saying, ‘Hey, Slick, this is Wildfire,’ ” recalled the Predator pilot, who wishes to be identified only as “Big” (his radio moniker in 2002). “ ‘I’ve got those guys at the helicopter’s two o’clock underneath that tree,’ ” Big recalled telling Brown. “ ‘I’ve got two Hellfires. I can take them out for you.’ ”

Three weeks earlier, Brown had seen a news article reporting that an armed Predator had taken out a target in Afghanistan, but that was all he knew about the new weapon. “He kept selling it, and I took the bait,” says Brown.

By 2009, the Night Stalkers had their own armed-drone unit, Echo Company, which flies the MQ‑1C Gray Eagle. This drone is powered by a heavy-fuel engine for higher performance, better fuel efficiency, and a longer lifetime. US Army

For reasons participants disagreed on years later, Big and his sensor operator—whose job in part was to use a laser designator to guide the Hellfire to its target after the pilot launched it—put their first shot into a tree near the enemy bunker. But the second Hellfire destroyed the bunker.

That was a turning point, though not the end of the battle. With higher-ups unwilling to risk more helicopters in daylight, the Rangers were stuck on the mountaintop all day, taking mortar and small-arms fire from remaining enemy fighters as Senior Airman Jason Cunningham, a pararescueman, slowly died of wounds received while he was administering trauma care to others.

Brown called in other fighters and the Predator crew used their laser designator to “buddy-lase” bomb runs that killed or held off many enemy combatants. They also used their camera to spot enemy movements and alert the Rangers.

After darkness fell, the Predator’s laser illuminator served as a sort of infrared flashlight whose beam was visible through night vision goggles—enabling the Rangers to see around them. The illuminator also guided two Chinooks that flew in at 9:15 pm to pick up all the Americans at Takur Ghar, including the seven troops killed.

Reports of the armed Predator’s role at Takur Ghar inspired the Air Force to begin arming its own fleet of Predators shortly before the 2003 Iraq War. Soon, 160th pilots and many others in the U.S. military came to rely on the MQ-1. By 2009, the Night Stalkers had their own armed drone unit, Echo Company, flying a Predator derivative built by General Atomics—the MQ-1C Gray Eagle.

It’s a partnership that began on a mountaintop in Afghanistan, and it will long be commemorated with Predator 3034 and a Night Stalker uniform displayed at the National Air and Space Museum.

Richard Whittle, a former Verville Fellow at the National Air and Space Museum, is the author of The Dream Machine: The Untold History of the Notorious V-22 Osprey and Predator: The Secret Origins of the Drone Revolution.

This article, originally titled "Night Stalkers Down," is from the Fall 2025 issue of Air & Space Quarterly, the National Air and Space Museum's signature magazine that explores topics in aviation and space, from the earliest moments of flight to today. Explore the full issue.

14. Ballast Books Announces Hard Mind, Soft Heart: A Warfighter’s Battle for Truth, Brotherhood & the Soul of the SEAL Teams

Ballast Books Announces Hard Mind, Soft Heart: A Warfighter’s Battle for Truth, Brotherhood & the Soul of the SEAL Teams

einpresswire.com · Sarah De Vos · November 20, 2025

https://www.einpresswire.com/article/868949530/ballast-books-announces-hard-mind-soft-heart-a-warfighter-s-battle-for-truth-brotherhood-the-soul-of-the-seal-teams

Navy SEAL (Ret.) Capt. Bradley Geary Photo

Navy SEAL (Ret.) Capt. Bradley Geary

Ballast Books Logo

Valor Press Logo

The groundbreaking memoir from Navy SEAL (Ret.) Capt. Bradley Geary is set to release in 2026 following a mandatory Department of Defense review.

WASHINGTON, DC, UNITED STATES, November 20, 2025 /EINPresswire.com/ -- Ballast Books, together with its veteran-focused imprint, Valor Press, is proud to announce the forthcoming release of Hard Mind, Soft Heart: A Warfighter’s Battle for Truth, Brotherhood, and the Soul of the SEAL Teams, the highly anticipated memoir from Navy SEAL (Ret.) Capt. Bradley Geary.

Capt. Geary—one of the most respected leaders in the Naval Special Warfare community—shines a light on the truth in his memoir on faith, leadership, and suffering. As the commander of Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/S) training in 2022, Geary was thrust into the center of a national controversy shaped by incomplete reporting, political pressure, and narratives that failed to capture the reality on the ground. Finally, not only does he expose the full, untold truth, but he also tells the stories that shaped a leader willing to risk it all in defense of the navy’s core values and those entrusted to his care.

In Hard Mind, Soft Heart, Geary sets the record straight about the death of SEAL candidate Kyle Mullen and the US Navy’s cover-up. He offers an unflinching, deeply human account of what happened, why it still matters, and how the fallout affected not only his career but the very soul of the SEAL Teams. The book also chronicles Geary’s decades-long journey through Naval Special Warfare—from the grit and grind of training to the comradeship of combat deployments to the painful losses of teammates who gave everything for their country. You will discover how his leadership philosophy was forged in love for others.

“Brad Geary is finally telling the full story of what happened after the tragic yet politicized death of a BUD/S candidate,” said Andy Symonds, president and publisher at Ballast Books. “This book isn’t just about a tragedy; it’s about leadership, accountability, and the Brotherhood that defines the SEAL community. It’s time the full truth comes to light.”

Built on extensive documentation, firsthand experience, and years of reflection, Hard Mind, Soft Heart offers readers unprecedented transparency into one of the most scrutinized events in recent SEAL history. More than that, it celebrates the men of the Teams—those still serving and those who made the ultimate sacrifice.

Ballast Books and Valor Press are honored to bring Capt. Geary’s story to a national audience at a moment when conversations about military culture, training, and accountability have never been more urgent.

About Ballast Books

Ballast Books is an independent publisher specializing in compelling nonfiction, memoirs, investigative works, and impactful stories that challenge prevailing narratives. Based in West Palm Beach, Florida, Ballast is committed to elevating voices with something to say—and the courage to say it.

About Valor Press

Valor Press, an imprint of Ballast Books, is dedicated to publishing books and elevating the stories of veterans, military families, and first responders. Valor champions authentic stories of service, sacrifice, leadership, and patriotism.

For media inquiries, advance interview requests, or rights information, please contact Sarah De Vos at sarah@ballastbooks.com

einpresswire.com · Sarah De Vos · November 20, 2025

15. British firm Kraken wins USSOCOM deal for new drone vessels

British firm Kraken wins USSOCOM deal for new drone vessels

ukdefencejournal.org.uk · November 21, 2025

Kraken Technology Group has been awarded a United States Special Operations Command agreement worth up to $49 million to accelerate the development of new uncrewed surface and subsurface vessels.

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/british-firm-kraken-wins-ussocom-deal-for-new-drone-vessels/

The award gives the British firm a route into rapid prototyping for US special operations forces at a time when both the United States and European allies are seeking faster access to non traditional defence technology.

The company said the agreement follows two successful SOCOM innovation cycles involving the United Kingdom and Norway. Its pitch has centred on platforms built in close consultation with operators, with design choices shaped by direct feedback rather than lab led development. Under the new agreement Kraken will produce prototype craft that use advanced materials, reduced signature features and modular payload bays that can be reconfigured for intelligence gathering, logistics support or limited strike roles.

Chief executive Mal Crease said: “We are honoured to partner with USSOCOM in support of its mission to field disruptive maritime capabilities. This OTA represents a validation of our technology roadmap and underscores the critical need for next generation uncrewed platforms that deliver superior agility, survivability, and operational versatility in the maritime domain.”

Kraken has expanded quickly across Europe over the past two years, completing NATO’s Task Force X activities, securing parallel investment from the NATO Innovation Fund and the British Business Bank’s National Security Strategic Investment Fund, and winning orders from several NATO states. It has also integrated systems with the UK Ministry of Defence, giving it a domestic operational record to point to as it pursues wider export opportunities.

The systems covered by the agreement will include autonomous navigation suites, low observable shaping and scalable sensor and effector packages. They are intended for use in littoral environments where traditional crewed platforms face growing risk. The company argues that small uncrewed craft can complicate adversary targeting and give special operations teams a more resilient set of tools.

The US award uses the Other Transaction Authority mechanism, which allows the Pentagon to work with firms outside the traditional defence sector and adopt emerging technology at a quicker pace. Kraken says it intends to use the agreement as a platform for further expansion and closer collaboration with the UK and allied armed forces.

ukdefencejournal.org.uk · November 21, 2025

16. Most of the Air Force’s biggest programs will now be overseen by a 4-star under the deputy SecDef

Summary:

The Air Force will place its largest, most troubled programs under a new four-star Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager, Lt. Gen. Dale White, who will report to the deputy defense secretary. Centralizing control of Sentinel, B-21, F-47, and VC-25B aims to speed acquisition, though experts warn it contradicts recent delegation-focused reforms.

Most of the Air Force’s biggest programs will now be overseen by a 4-star under the deputy SecDef

defenseone.com · Thomas Novelly

Lt. Gen. Dale White takes part in a panel discussion at the Air and Space Forces Association’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference, Sept 17, 2024. U.S. Air Force / Andy Morataya

The centralization of the ICBM, B-21, F-47, and Air Force One programs appears at odds with the Pentagon’s professed acquisition approach, one expert said.

By Thomas Novelly

Senior Reporter

November 20, 2025 03:40 PM ET

https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/11/most-air-forces-biggest-programs-will-now-be-overseen-4-star-under-deputy-secdef/409669/

The Air Force is yanking most of its biggest programs out from its existing program-management structure and putting them under a new four-star who reports to the deputy defense secretary.

On Tuesday, the White House nominated Air Force Lt. Gen. Dale White and to become the first Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Critical Major Weapons Systems, including the Sentinel and Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, the B-21 bomber, the F-47 fighter jet, and the VC-25B presidential aircraft, an Air Force spokesperson confirmed. If confirmed, White will be promoted to full general and report directly to Deputy Defense Secretary Steve Feinberg.

“By directing the execution of critical Air Force programs, this DRPM role will help streamline the acquisition process, enabling faster decision-making and expediting the delivery of major systems,” the spokesperson said in an emailed statement.

White’s nomination follows President Donald Trump’s April executive order calling for an overhaul of the defense industrial base. It also follows Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s push to speed up defense acquisition.

It’s unclear how the position is related to the defense secretary’s call to condense existing program executive offices under service-branch portfolio acquisition executives who oversee broader groups of programs.

But one defense budget expert said the creation of the DRPM appears to be at odds with that directive.

“I think the purpose is they want to centralize control of key programs or problem programs,” said Todd Harrison of the American Enterprise Institute. “But it is fundamentally at tension with some of the acquisition reforms that they're pushing, which talk about delegating down, pushing down the decision-making authority to lower levels. This is going in the exact opposite direction.”

The service spokesperson defended the move, writing that the position “aligns with the Department of the Air Force’s ongoing acquisition reform efforts to enhance efficiency, reduce redundancy, and accelerate capabilities for our warfighters in direct support of Secretary Hegseth’s move to a Warfighting Acquisition posture.”

All of the programs to be overseen by the new DRPM—except the months-old F-47 effort—have faced cost overruns, sudden delays and Congressional infighting.

Harrison said putting the position under the defense secretary “reflects a lack of trust in the services to be good stewards of these programs.”

The Sentinel ICBM program was forcibly restructured last year after costs skyrocketed to $141 billion—more than 81% above initial estimates. Discussions for accelerating the B-21 production stalled due to the government shutdown. This summer, the Pentagon asked for permission to reprogram $150 million to speed-up delivery of two VC-25B aircraft to 2027.

Amid VC-25B delays, lawmakers have raised alarm over Trump’s use of a gifted luxury Qatari jet in the interim. Air Force Secretary Troy Meink said this summer that some funds from the Sentinel ICBM program were needed to upgrade the jet for use as Air Force One.

White currently serves as the military deputy for the Air Force’s Assistant Secretary for acquisition, technology, and logistics, according to his service biography. Before that, he was the program executive officer overseeing fighters and advanced aircraft at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio.

If confirmed, White would be “assisted by a small, highly specialized staff resident in the Pentagon, with the current acquisition workforce supporting the DRPM critical major weapons systems programs to remain in place,” the Air Force spokesperson wrote, adding the service plans to stand up the new office “over the next few months.”

17. The time to move ICBMs from the Air Force to the Army is now

Summary:

Land-based ICBMs no longer fit the Air Force’s identity or structure and should transfer to the Army, which already manages long-range land-based missiles. Moving Sentinel and its enterprise would ease Air Force modernization burdens, align missions with Army long-range fires, and more effectively strengthen nuclear deterrence.

Comment: Wow. I do not think I ever expected to read this kind of proposal which seems to be an out of the box one at the moment. An opposite proposal might be to transfer all air and missile defense capabilities to the Air Force (said with some sarcasm).

The time to move ICBMs from the Air Force to the Army is now - Breaking Defense

breakingdefense.com · Todd Harrison

Todd Harrison of the American Enterprise Institute explains in this op-ed why now is the right time to move the ICBM enterprise from the Air Force to the Army.

By Todd Harrison on November 20, 2025 1:23 pm

https://breakingdefense.com/2025/11/the-time-to-move-icbms-from-the-air-force-to-the-army-is-now/

In his first message to airmen, new Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach said it plainly: “At our core, we fly and fix aircraft. It is the heart of who we are and what we do.” He’s right — and yet, for decades, the land-based leg of America’s nuclear triad has sat within a military service fundamentally mismatched to the mission.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ended up in the Air Force in the early days of the space age when missile and rocket technology were deeply intertwined. The architects who championed ICBMs — figures like Gen. Bernard Schriever — have long since passed. What remains is an ICBM force sliding into disrepair and a troubled modernization program that is 81 percent over budget and risks undermining the credibility of America’s nuclear deterrent.

With the ICBM enterprise at a crossroads, Congress and the administration should move this critical mission to the Army, where it logically belongs today.

The moment is right for decisive change: The Sentinel program is already being restructured, and new missiles, silos, and support facilities will begin to take shape in the coming years. The question is whether we use this opportunity to fix a long simmering structural mismatch, or whether we pour new systems and even more funding into an outdated structure that continues down the failed path of the past 30 years.

There are three fundamental reasons why the Air Force is no longer a fit for the ICBM mission, and why the Army is.

First, as Wilsbach’s message indicates, silo-based missiles are simply not core to the Air Force identity or mission, and they never will be. With a fleet of aircraft that is the oldest and smallest it has ever been, the nation needs an Air Force that is laser-focused on restoring and expanding US airpower — not managing a missile force.

Second, the missileer career field has no natural synergy with the rest of the Air Force and is increasingly orphaned and disconnected. Missile operators and maintainers train and work separately from the rest of the service, and gain experience that does not translate well to airborne missions or most senior leadership roles in the Air Force. Combined with an ICBM force that has been shrinking since the end of the Cold War, the missileer career field has chronic morale problems, limited promotion opportunities, and an unsustainable size — issues documented repeatedly over the past 30 years.

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The jet-powered transport’s speed, survivability and multi-mission agility position it as a viable option to the C-130 for the US and NATO allies.

Third, because its missile fields are widely dispersed, the Air Force currently sustains a fleet of utility helicopters it does not otherwise need to fly crews between silos — along with helicopter pilots, maintainers, security forces, and training pipelines unique to the ICBM mission. At a time of shrinking force structure and financial pressures, maintaining a separate fleet of aircraft and supporting career fields just to protect the ICBMs seems wasteful.

In contrast, the Army already operates all of the nation’s other land-based missiles, including the military’s only other silo-based missiles — the ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and Vandenberg Space Force Base, California. Long-range fires is a growing and highly valued Army mission, and Army personnel in ICBM jobs would build skills better aligned with other jobs in the Army. Moreover, the Army already has the utility helicopters and force structure needed to take on the ICBM security mission more effectively and efficiently than the Air Force. The ICBM mission is a natural fit for the Army.

Certainly, this idea will find kneejerk opposition inside the Air Force. After all, no one wants to lose the prestige, history nor budget associated with this vital mission. But we hear again and again from Air Force advocates how this is the oldest, most brittle air service the US has ever had, and how that could cost American lives in a future conflict. If that’s the case, then the service needs to be free of extraneous mission sets and able to focus on what Wilsbach termed the “core” of the US Air Force.

The nuclear deterrence mission is too important to be a secondary responsibility within any service, and the Air Force simply does not have the bandwidth to modernize its fighters, bombers, tankers, and ICBMs simultaneously.

Reassigning the ICBM mission to the Army would give each military department responsibility for one leg of the nuclear triad, relieve the Air Force of an unsustainable modernization burden, and reinforce the Army’s growing emphasis on long-range fires. Importantly, the transfer can and would be conducted with the upmost attention to nuclear safety and assurance — something that can never be compromised.

Now is the best time for a clean transfer of the entire ICBM enterprise — people, programs, facilities, and funding — from the Air Force to the Army.

Todd Harrison is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he focuses on defense strategy, defense budgeting, and space policy.

breakingdefense.com · Todd Harrison

18. The Case for Treating Drones as Ammunition

Summary:

Ukraine’s mass use of cheap drones shows they function like expendable munitions, not delicate aircraft. The authors argue the US Army should classify small drones as ammunition, run them through the existing ammo enterprise, standardize roles and controllers, and forecast, issue, fly, and turn them in like Javelins in training.

Excerpts:

The Army can start this now. First, the Army should add drone lines to unit annual allocations, starting by adding drones to squad and platoon level tasks. Second, the ammunition enterprise should stand up role-based drone families starting with reconnaissance and first-person view drones as they roll out of the SkyFoundry. Third, the Army could pilot this at posts with transforming-in-contact brigades, which have experience with small drones. Together, these changes will ensure that suppliers get predictable demand, units process a single piece of paperwork instead of a property loss investigation, and the Army scales drones through the ammunition system it already understands.

As an additional benefit, this approach is agnostic to other drone debates. Treating drones as ammunition is still an improvement if the Army expands drone-related occupational specialties. Second, this approach opens the door for other families of drones. The war in Ukraine continues to demonstrate the value of ground and maritime drones. The ammunition system could handle them as well. Finally, there may be questions about whether to classify larger, more complex one-way attack drones as ammunition or property. The ammunition system currently handles missiles as expensive and complex as the $4 million Patriot, so treating drones as ammunition could handle either approach.

Small drones are ammunition. The Army should treat them as such.

The Case for Treating Drones as Ammunition

warontherocks.com

Zachary Griffiths and Jeff Ivas

November 21, 2025

https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/the-case-for-treating-drones-as-ammunition/

Ukraine burns through small drones like belts of ammunition — fed, fired, and reloaded. Piloted from behind the front lines, drones hunt on the battlefield. This summer, Ukraine’s drone production increased 900 percent to 200,000 per month from 20,000 the previous year. Costs, too, are ammunition-like: reconnaissance and first-person view drones cost in the low thousands, akin to 120mm mortar rounds and far cheaper than a $200,000 Javelin anti-tank missile. Despite limits to drone performance, the United States will certainly need more drones than it has now. Acquiring, maintaining, accounting for, and delivering drones exceeds what the U.S. Army’s supply system can do.

Fortunately, the Pentagon has opened the door to a new approach. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth stated that “Small [aerial drones] resemble munitions more than high-end airplanes.” He then directed the services to treat small drones as consumables and to “modify or delete” policies that slow procurement, testing, training, and fielding. The Army has taken these directives seriously. The Army Transformation Initiative explicitly aims to change how the Army fights, trains, organizes, and buys, while the new SkyFoundry effort will produce 10,000 small drones per month. Drone-filled Pelican cases will stack up fast without a day-to-day execution model inside the Army that turns consumable intent into routine practice.

Luckily, there is already a system built for mass turnover and accountability: the ammunition enterprise the Army runs for the joint force. The Army and Defense Department should first designate small aerial drones as conventional ammunition under the Army’s lead and then ensure their availability in peace and war through the ammunition system. Here, we focus on the small, rucksack portable quadcopters and first-person view drones launched by hand. As Europe-oriented Special Forces officers who have fired a lot of ammunition and lead one of the best drone detachments in the Army, we have a hunch this could work.

BECOME A MEMBER

The Miraculous Army Ammunition System

Drones are hard for the Army right now. Senior leaders say to treat them like munitions, but units still buy and maintain them with operational funds, track them like gear, and fix them with ad hoc parts purchases. Historically, once a drone was lost or destroyed, removing it from the books triggered a painful property loss investigation. No squad leader should spend a Tuesday night writing a loss memorandum for a drone meant to be lost. While recent initiatives have helped remove this administrative burden, they will not suffice when the Army has a million drones. Instead, treating drones as the munitions they are offers a ready-made way to forecast, draw, fly, and turn in drones in both training and war.

Javelin live fire training shows how the ammunition system works from the unit’s point of view. Weeks out, the detachment translates its training plan into rounds authorized by the Standards in Training Commission. Through the Army’s ammunition forecasting system, the detachment requests the specific Department of Defense identification codes for Javelin missiles and associated components. On issue day, the unit checks seals, stamps paperwork, and draws authorized ammunition by identification code and production lot.

When the detachment heads to the range, they bring their command launch units and draw missiles and batteries from the ammunition holding area. The Javelin command launch unit is durable equipment, maintained by the unit and on their hand receipt. Missiles are expendable and arrive crated, protected against the elements and transport hazards. Before a shot, the gunner unpacks the missile and inserts a single-use battery that powers and cools the seeker. After firing, the team records what was expended, separates any misfires for the ammunition inspectors and explosive ordnance specialists, and turns in dunnage — excess rounds, residue, and packing material — for reissue or disposal. Despite the $200,000 price tag, there is no investigation for normal use. Every step is auditable. This is exactly the accountable, loss-tolerant loop that small, consumable drones need.

Put small drones through this same system and the unit-level headaches disappear. Leaders would plan drone use based on their annual allocations, request drones by code through the ammunition forecasting system, draw the consumable drones with their other ammunition, and then expend or return them without drama. For the unit, this collapses everything into a familiar process. For the Army, it folds today’s ad hoc drone logistics into the predictable, scalable ammunition system.

Forecast, Issue, Fly, Turn In

Adding drones to the ammunition system should not be hard. Treat the airframe and payload kit as ammunition. Keep the controller and any launch gear on the unit’s property book. Units then forecast, draw, fly, and turn in drones alongside rifle rounds and smoke grenades.

This change will require thinking of drones in roles, rather than brands. Today’s headlines focus on the latest Skydio or Neros drones, but this is not how the Army fights. Role-based drone families should each have their own identification codes: a reconnaissance bin for small quadcopters that scout and spot, first-person view drones for training and attack, and others. Units already experiment with new ammunition types under experimental identification codes, so this system can accommodate cutting edge systems or new families as well. Then, ship these drones in weatherproof cases and handle their batteries like the Javelin’s. Once the families are set, the next step is standardizing how we fly them.

Standard drone controllers must allow platoons to swap dead drones in minutes. We’ve watched faulty rotors and bad fiber ground drones unexpectedly at takeoff. Common controllers must talk to any issued drone, connect quickly, and tie into the widely issued Tactical Assault Kit phones and software. Developers will need to keep that software and interface stable so units can refresh airframes rapidly without recertifying controllers.

Moving drones to the ammunition system does not mean that every training moment requires an ammunition drone. Virtual reality and desktop drone trainers are inexpensive and available for your home computer. Units could also buy low-cost training quadcopters and installation training centers could have them on hand for units to draw alongside rubber rifles or practice Claymore mines. As with all training, a crawl-walk-run progression through virtual and live exercises controls costs and maximizes effectiveness.

This approach will also help the drone industry by making demand predictable. Unit authorizations flow through the Army’s ammunition system into regular draws at installations across the Army. Factories see steady orders, tool capacity, and stabilize quality.

Some might object to this approach on the grounds of the pace of innovation or cost. However, the ammunition approach solves the pace of change problem. The Army should start with small tranches and iterate often. Then, by improving accountability and resupply, the Army unlocks live repetitions — the only reliable way to grow operator skill. Annual allocations also help contain costs. Commanders get ceilings up front, the ammunition forecasting system provides transparency, and predictable demand tames price volatility and improves quality over time.

Treating small drones as ammunition creates a simple, auditable loop — forecast, draw, fly, turn in — that gets capable drones into soldiers’ hands and aligns peacetime training with wartime use.

Treat Drones as Ammunition

The Army can start this now. First, the Army should add drone lines to unit annual allocations, starting by adding drones to squad and platoon level tasks. Second, the ammunition enterprise should stand up role-based drone families starting with reconnaissance and first-person view drones as they roll out of the SkyFoundry. Third, the Army could pilot this at posts with transforming-in-contact brigades, which have experience with small drones. Together, these changes will ensure that suppliers get predictable demand, units process a single piece of paperwork instead of a property loss investigation, and the Army scales drones through the ammunition system it already understands.

As an additional benefit, this approach is agnostic to other drone debates. Treating drones as ammunition is still an improvement if the Army expands drone-related occupational specialties. Second, this approach opens the door for other families of drones. The war in Ukraine continues to demonstrate the value of ground and maritime drones. The ammunition system could handle them as well. Finally, there may be questions about whether to classify larger, more complex one-way attack drones as ammunition or property. The ammunition system currently handles missiles as expensive and complex as the $4 million Patriot, so treating drones as ammunition could handle either approach.

Small drones are ammunition. The Army should treat them as such.

BECOME A MEMBER

Zachary Griffiths commands 4th Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Jeff Ivas commands the Advanced Technical Operations Company in 4th Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

The views and opinions presented here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army or any part of the U.S. government.

**Please note, as a matter of house style War on the Rocks will not use a different name for the U.S. Department of Defense until and unless the name is changed by statute by the U.S. Congress.

Image: Sgt. Chandler Coats via DVIDS

warontherocks.com

19. Winning the Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Fight: Lessons from Centaur Squadron

Summary:

Centaur Squadron at NTC fuses scouts, light infantry, UAS, EW, and anti-tank fires into a tactical reconnaissance-strike complex that wins the sensing and targeting duel, then enables combined-arms maneuver. Lessons for BCTs: seize key terrain, disperse formations, integrate drones and EW, and build resilient infantry-centric recon-strike companies for future wars.

Excerpts:

NTC rotations have tested generations of Army leaders in the closest thing possible to real ground combat at the brigade scale. The next generation of Army leaders, preparing to fight a war in which local American military supremacy is not guaranteed, can expect challenging and technologically realistic training when they come to NTC. Centaur Squadron represents Blackhorse’s nod to emerging military technologies and the novel task organizations that maximize their effectiveness on the battlefield. This poses a major challenge to any BCT, but its value to them is as a forcing function to adapt or fail. Learning to fight Centaur in this training environment, a feat within reach of any brigade in the Army, will prepare units to counter dangerous emerging threats on a rapidly changing battlefield.

Winning the Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike Fight: Lessons from Centaur Squadron - Modern War Institute

mwi.westpoint.edu · George Pavlakis

George Pavlakis and Randall Towles | 11.21.25

https://mwi.westpoint.edu/winning-the-tactical-reconnaissance-strike-fight-lessons-from-centaur-squadron/

Picture kilometer-long columns of destroyed tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Drones fly overhead while electromagnetic sensors silently parse through frantic radio transmissions. Thousands of soldiers are massed for an attack, only to stall under pummeling indirect fires. This scene could easily describe contemporary combat as warfare’s changing character makes reconnaissance and strike platforms available to any potential US adversary. But rather than an anecdote from a distant conflict, this scenario is what the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment “Blackhorse”—the National Training Center’s (NTC) resident opposing force unit—has begun to inflict on rotational training units (RTUs). At NTC, the realities of reconnaissance-strike battle are painfully present, posing a challenge for RTUs that can prepare them to face the real threat on future battlefields.

Centaur Squadron, Blackhorse’s purpose-built reconnaissance-strike complex, organically combines wheeled antitank and armored transport vehicles, scouts, unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operators, and electronic warfare (EW) assets. These platforms offer a combination of high tactical mobility, long-range observation, and dense firepower that feeds directly into the regimental targeting and integration cell to complete the kill chain. Centaur can also expand depending on mission variables to include light infantry, mortar carriers, and engineers.

During NTC decisive action rotation 25-07 in May 2025, we experienced Centaur’s power firsthand while attached to the squadron. Fighting against a US Army armored brigade combat team (ABCT), our own organic formation, the connection between reconnaissance-strike battle theory and lethal battlefield effects quickly became apparent. Just as NTC has adapted to replicate the emerging battlefield’s technological and organizational realities, ABCTs—and other brigade combat teams (BCTs)—can leverage emerging technologies too. Multifunctional reconnaissance-strike companies, combining mobile infantry, reconnaissance and strike UAS, and EW assets, can enable the brigade combat team to win the reconnaissance-strike battle, enabling decisive combined arms maneuver. Though only one anecdote from the field, we believe our experience fighting with Centaur Squadron holds important lessons for how BCTs can prepare to win their fight at the NTC and in large-scale combat operations.

Centaur Squadron and Reconnaissance-Strike Battle

Reconnaissance-strike battle conceptually connects multidomain operations from the strategic and operational echelons to the tactical. Where multidomain operations doctrine integrates joint capabilities across the air, space, land, sea, and information domains, reconnaissance-strike battle synchronizes and employs mission-relevant multidomain capabilities at the tactical level. In a military-technological environment where the US Army’s adversaries possess the tools and organizational structures needed to create a reconnaissance-strike complex, the reconnaissance-strike battle will see friendly and opposing reconnaissance-strike complexes duel to establish multidomain superiority over one another. The side that gains multidomain superiority will gain the opportunity to exercise combined arms maneuver on the battlefield.

Centaur Squadron reflects this emerging dynamic with its organic fusion of sensors and shooters, along with its direct organizational linkage to the regimental targeting and integration cell at the kill chain’s center. Centaur’s five operational principles—flexible task organization, manned-unmanned teaming, layered reconnaissance, intelligence-derived maneuver, and tactical control of operational-level enablers—allow it to rapidly deploy into the division tactical group security zone, gain and maintain contact with RTU elements, and attrit them using manned and unmanned strike systems. As the RTU attempts to deploy itself, Centaur Squadron fights the reconnaissance-strike battle across its depth. Denying both the RTU’s own reconnaissance efforts and its attempts to mass combat power for combined arms maneuver, Centaur forces it to culminate prematurely.

Infantry in the Reconnaissance-Strike Complex

During our rotation as guest Blackhorse light infantry, our company fought the reconnaissance-strike battle as part of Centaur Squadron. Light infantry provides two important qualities that complement other elements of the reconnaissance-strike complex: Its small signature makes it highly survivable against multidomain threats, and it can carry multidomain sensor and strike payloads deep into the battlefield’s most restricted terrain. While antitank scout vehicles are pushing deep into the division tactical group reconnaissance zone, road-mobile light infantry forces follow close behind to establish mountaintop observation posts from which they can sense and identify enemy elements miles away. Infantry forces can carry a variety of man-portable equipment with them, from first-person-view drones to antitank missiles and radio direction finders. Importantly, light infantry forces can immediately shift from fighting the broader reconnaissance-strike battle to repelling enemy attacks on their positions or taking the ground fight to the enemy. This factor, combined with infantry’s inherently low signature compared to mounted units, makes it highly lethal and survivable on a transparent battlefield where armored formations have proven vulnerable to precision-strike kill chains.

Evidence of infantry’s importance in the reconnaissance-strike battle is already apparent from the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. At a critical moment in Ukraine’s 2023 summer counteroffensive, a single Russian infantry platoon emplaced on a hilltop stalled the Ukrainian Army’s push south for twenty-four hours, buying enough time for the Russians to further entrench their lines behind the hilltop while continuing to attrit Ukrainian forces using strike assets. Both Ukraine and Russia rely on light infantry to progress forward on a battlefield where kill chains detect and strike armored and mechanized elements miles from the forward line of troops. Dismounted infantry formations disperse their combat power across dozens of individual soldiers in a platoon or company, can conceal and entrench themselves in restricted terrain that enhances survivability, and are still able to bring significant firepower to bear at long ranges using missiles and attack UAS.

Centaur’s Light Infantry at NTC

Though Centaur Squadron’s approach, and the emerging battlefield conditions facing the Army, appear daunting, BCTs have the capacity to tackle this challenge. During rotation 25-07’s Phase I, Centaur Squadron’s light infantry platoons seized key terrain overlooking the major east-west avenues of approach, providing up to fifteen kilometers of unobstructed visual observation. Antitank trucks then flowed through the mountain passes, penetrating even deeper into the security zone. This combination disrupted the ABCT as its units uncoiled, preventing them from initiating forward movement, let alone attacking Centaur’s infantry in the passes.

Although scout elements made some demonstrations against the infantry positions on the ridgelines, at no point did the RTU make a discernible attempt to dislodge us or our sister platoons from our observation posts. This was to their detriment, as we could observe almost the entire ABCT’s frontage from several kilometers away, providing advance warning of massing combat power for a concentrated push across the valley and the opportunity to pass targeting information up the kill chain.

Phase II featured the RTU’s attempt to breach Blackhorse’s main defensive line and capture the city of Razish. Blackhorse tanks and infantry fighting vehicles monitored their engagement areas while engineers had already emplaced antitank obstacles including dragon’s teeth, mines, and ditches. Once again, Centaur Squadron emplaced its light infantry in mountainous, restricted terrain overlooking the main defensive line’s approaches, as antitank trucks drove forward deep into the reconnaissance zone. Seeing RTU forces creep their way toward the breach, the antitank trucks could easily identify their disposition and objectives. Company after company of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles arrayed in neat formations may have been easier for their commanders to control and maneuver, but they were impossible to hide from Centaur Squadron.

After successfully attriting the ABCT’s first elements bearing down on the breach, the antitank trucks retrograded and handed the fight off to the light infantry. From their position, the platoons could see almost a dozen kilometers across the valley approaching the breach and passed accurate fires targets up to feed the kill chain. When what survived of this element crossed within two kilometers, the infantry engaged with antitank missiles, stalling the breach. Centaur Squadron, with the tank company on the near side of the breach, was able to bottle up the RTU’s main effort by feeding the Blackhorse kill chain faster than the ABCT could respond, winning the reconnaissance-strike battle. The RTU made piecemeal attempts to dislodge the infantry from the hills, but never enough to prevent them from disrupting the breach or maneuvering on rear-echelon high-value targets including air-defense Strykers. Additionally, if infantry or scout elements from the ABCT had seized our hilltops, they would have had nearly unobstructed observation of every Blackhorse battle position overlooking the main defensive line, and could have passed targeting information up their own kill chain.

This pattern repeated itself during Phase III. Blackhorse set another main defensive line with its tank and mechanized infantry battalions overlooking engagement areas in a valley while Centaur Squadron occupied key terrain and pushed antitank trucks forward. As the RTU maneuvered westward toward its breach, the massed formations of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles evoked real-world scenes of Russian armor massing for attacks on cities such as Vuhledar and being destroyed in the process.

How BCTs Can Prepare to Win the Reconnaissance-Strike Battle

Centaur Squadron combines emerging military technologies and existing platforms to enable rapid target identification as part of Blackhorse’s reconnaissance-strike complex. Observation—whether through a UAS, EW collection, or an infantryman’s binoculars—is Centaur’s most dangerous weapon, and one that RTUs can take meaningful steps to counter by simply changing their behavior. As a BCT prepares for its fight, identifying key terrain that provides long-range unobstructed observation is critical. Centaur will almost certainly emplace observers there, who will identify and direct fires on any RTU elements within range. RTU forces can effectively use terrain to obscure themselves from these points as they approach, something the ABCT came close to doing on several occasions during rotation 25-07. In addition, as we ourselves realized while defending the main defensive line during Phase II, leaders must recognize that key terrain is as relevant for friendly forces as it is for the enemy. If an enemy infantry platoon with tank and preparatory fires support had attacked our hilltop and seized it, it could have decimated Blackhorse’s entire defense in that sector of the main defensive line by passing accurate targeting information to the RTU kill chain.

BCTs can only effectively maneuver on Centaur Squadron, however, if they eschew massed formations for smaller maneuver elements, potentially at the section level or below. Centaur Squadron’s observers can easily spot a tank or mechanized infantry platoon up to ten kilometers away from an elevated observation post. Companies and battalions are visually observable from even farther away, and only the weather and platform range limit UAS or EW systems. In comparison, light infantry’s small signature allows small units to infiltrate great distances with a far lower chance of detection by the enemy’s reconnaissance-strike complex. The urge to consolidate forces, easing control over them, is understandable, especially when navigating long-distance movements in the desert. Mission command, however, offers a promising alternative. Dispersing individual vehicles at release points outside Centaur’s sectors in the reconnaissance zone, with clear commander’s intent and a rally point to mass combat power just before the attack, can help commanders maintain surprise and audacity. The Russian Army has already learned this lesson in Ukraine, often releasing entire sections or platoons to maneuver on an objective as individual soldiers to avoid omnipresent attack UAS destroying them in massed formations.

Centaur’s natural habitat is restricted terrain. Whether it be hilltops, rock piles, villages, or draws, restricted terrain allows Centaur Squadron to hide in plain sight while observing the RTU at a distance. If BCT elements can see it, they can be seen from it. BCTs cannot afford to neglect restricted terrain and must at least actively reconnoiter these positions to enable their own freedom of maneuver elsewhere on the battlefield. This means that infantrymen, especially those in a reconnaissance-strike complex, must be physically fit enough to move several miles across Class 2 and 3 terrain just to reach the fight. The tank fight on open plains depends on how effectively infantry can dislodge observers nestled in hilltops, while the infantry fight in the cities depends on well the BCT can observe avenues of approach leading to them.

The RTU was eventually able to take the fight to Centaur Squadron using its own emerging technologies. Shortly after our platoon observed unknown reconnaissance drones near our positions during Phase I, drone-observed indirect fires destroyed the company’s supply trucks and command post a few hundred meters away. Had the RTU attacked at this moment, it could have dislodged the infantry from the key terrain, opened the passes, and maneuvered armor-infantry teams through them unopposed. Centaur Squadron kills the enemy by observing its forces at a distance, including with UAS and EW systems, but is just as vulnerable to ABCTs who can effectively use theirs.

Winning The First Fight

Several BCTs across the Army have already made progress toward winning the reconnaissance-strike battle. We believe that the multifunctional reconnaissance-strike company builds on these existing efforts while reflecting the payload-agnostic nature of small UAS platforms. As a brigade-level asset, this company would combine the reduced signature and high mobility of infantry with the survivability and firepower of a combat formation armed with antitank missiles and strike UAS. The soldiers in this formation must be physically fit enough to traverse miles of difficult terrain and reach observation posts close to the enemy’s manned zone, from where they can feed targeting information up the kill chain while engaging with missiles and strike UAS. They must also be competent and well-trained enough to accomplish this task, exercising mission command with a high degree of autonomy. A unit with the right people, equipment, and training can win the reconnaissance-strike duel, enabling combined arms maneuver for the rest of the BCT. Thanks to recent policy changes aimed at “unleashing U.S. military drone dominance,” brigade commanders can foster this change at their level and equip their formations for reconnaissance-strike battle.

NTC rotations have tested generations of Army leaders in the closest thing possible to real ground combat at the brigade scale. The next generation of Army leaders, preparing to fight a war in which local American military supremacy is not guaranteed, can expect challenging and technologically realistic training when they come to NTC. Centaur Squadron represents Blackhorse’s nod to emerging military technologies and the novel task organizations that maximize their effectiveness on the battlefield. This poses a major challenge to any BCT, but its value to them is as a forcing function to adapt or fail. Learning to fight Centaur in this training environment, a feat within reach of any brigade in the Army, will prepare units to counter dangerous emerging threats on a rapidly changing battlefield.

Captain George Pavlakis is a US Army officer who served as a guest Blackhorse light infantry platoon leader for NTC rotation 25-07. He currently serves in 1-68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, holds degrees from the United States Military Academy and the Technical University of Munich, and has deployed to Poland.

Sgt. 1st Class Randall Towles is a US Army noncommissioned officer who served as a guest Blackhorse light infantry platoon sergeant for NTC rotation 25-07. He currently serves in 1-68th Armor Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, and has deployed to Afghanistan, Senegal, and Poland.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Image credit: Spc. Christopher Bailey, US Army

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mwi.westpoint.edu · George Pavlakis

20. Chance and Necessity: Evolving the Supporting Role of SOF to Cyber Operations

Summary:

USSOF should make support to cyber operations a core activity. By partnering with industry, integrating cyber into security force assistance, and using SOF-peculiar authorities as a pathfinder and testbed, USSOCOM can help close U.S. cyber gaps and keep SOF relevant in strategic competition with peer adversaries.

Excerpt:

Monod’s observation about the interconnectedness of necessity and chance underscores that evolution is never arbitrary. For Ukraine, necessity demanded resilience against Russian aggression, while chance enabled the rapid adoption of drones and commercial communications. USSOCOM now faces its own evolutionary inflection point. By employing cyber capabilities and cutting-edge US technology as an effective instrument of national power, USSOCOM can ensure that its supporting role in non-kinetic operations not only enhances the effectiveness of all USSOF but also secures enduring relevance in the broader strategic competition. In this way, USSOCOM’s future role will likely exemplify Monod’s dictum: military evolution, like biological evolution, is driven by the twin forces of chance and necessity.

Comments: A very thoughtful essay. Based on the headline I started reading this with a biased view but I have come around to his argument on SOF and cyber and it is worth reflecting on. However, I also think there is a deeper message on the foundation for innovation - chance and necessity. I think we need to reflect on that. Of course we must recognize the necessity for evolution but how can we identify and capture the opportunities of chance? I suppose it is like our old football coach used to say that luck (or chance?) happens when opportunity meets preparation. 

Chance and Necessity: Evolving the Supporting Role of SOF to Cyber Operations

irregularwarfare.org · Ben Soltisz

November 21, 2025 by Ben Soltisz 

https://irregularwarfare.org/articles/chance-and-necessity-evolving-the-supporting-role-of-sof-to-cyber-operations/

Introduction

“Evolution is driven by chance and necessity.”

This was the mantra of Nobel Prize winner Jacques Monod. While Monod was primarily known for his work as a French biologist and philosopher, he also served as Chief of Staff for Operations for the French resistance organization, the Forces Françaises de l’Interieur, during the Second World War. A true Renaissance man, he was equally adept at both exploring the field of enzymology and conducting railroad bombings. Monod’s evolutionary principle applies seamlessly to both protein enzymes and irregular warfare, as it offers a useful analytical lens for understanding the adaptation of military organizations to the evolving character of warfare.

The most obvious recent example of chance and necessity colliding on the battlefield is the explosive expansion of attritable drones in the Ukrainian conflict. The Ukrainian civilian sector’s ability to rapidly develop, produce, integrate, and field swarms of quadcopters and other unmanned systems was met with the necessity of defending its sovereignty against Russian aggression.

However, a less observable, but equally significant aspect of this combat evolution was the role that cyber operations played in the opening days of the invasion, blunting the effectiveness of Russian tactics. American companies, including Microsoft and Palo Alto Networks, provided vital cyber defense capabilities. These efforts protected critical infrastructure from Russian hackers and enabled greater command and control (C2) of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Simultaneously, Starlink has fielded over 50,000 high-speed, resilient satellite data terminals to the Ukrainian front lines, providing unparalleled data transport capabilities that even Russian forces cannot rival. Starlink’s capabilities have been so effective that it has been called “…the essential backbone of communications” for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. Ukrainian tactical units have even adapted the Low Earth Orbit technology to control attack drones. These successes make evident the importance of cyber capabilities and technology to achieve strategic security objectives.

Concurrently, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) now finds itself at a similar inflection point following decades focused on counterterrorism. Indeed, in 2022, Lt Gen Jim Slife, former Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) Commander, stated, “AFSOC is at its third strategic inflection point. We have to… respond to crises on behalf of the nation on short notice anywhere around the globe and maintain pressure on counter-violent extremist organizations. We have to be prepared for conflict with peer adversaries in contested environments, and we have to compete strategically with global competitors…”

Against this backdrop, what should the next evolution of SOF become? Where can USSOF be most relevant in strategic competition? The cyberspace domain provides opportunities for SOF to apply its problem solving and innovation in new ways, and Microsoft, Palo Alto Networks, and Starlink’s successes in Ukraine demonstrate an opportunity for a significantly high return on investment.

Background: The Current State of Cyberspace

The Department of War continues to face longstanding deficiencies in cyberspace. According to War on the Rocks, United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has encountered difficulties in developing and retaining qualified cyberspace operators, hindering its ability to sustain force generation. In “The Sad and Sorry Tale of Cyber Command’s Seven-Year Failure,” Aden McGee explains that this failure is attributable to organizational confusion, service parochialism, and deficiencies in processes and culture. Ultimately, this situation results in the deployment of significantly fewer offensive and defensive cyberspace operation forces than necessary, thereby impairing the overall effectiveness of US forces in cyberspace.

Recognizing that in the modern era, cyberspace operations serve as both a prerequisite for and an enabler of follow-on kinetic operations, USSOF are uniquely positioned to address certain aspects of network operations that have proven difficult for conventional forces. These aspects might include gaining physical access to isolated networks, bolstering the network defense capabilities of allies and partners in politically sensitive areas, or simply increasing data-centric C2 capabilities for partner forces across all domains.

Integration of cyberspace operations within USSOF is not unprecedented. LTG Braga, then United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Commanding General, and now commanding Joint Special Operations Command, introduced the SOF-Space-Cyber triad as one of USASOC’s key priorities for future modernization efforts. He described the triad’s relationship between special operations, the space domain, and the cyber domain as “a convergence of trans-regional, multi-domain, and joint capabilities to exponentially increase the holistic strategic effects of each capability across the spectrum of conflict now and in the future.” This convergence is the result of both necessity and chance—the necessity of integrating non-kinetic capabilities to remain effective below the threshold of open conflict and the chance to exploit unique opportunities in domains where conventional forces face structural constraints.

SOF Support to Cyber Operations

As USSOCOM’s evolution reaches an inflection point, adding support to cyber operations as a core activity becomes important to enhance the effectiveness of integrating cyber and technology in national power. Support to cyber could consist of four distinct pursuits: strengthening relationships with industry; streamlining coordination with interagency cyber counterparts; modernizing security assistance to include cyber operations; and leveraging SOF as a testbed for cyber technology for the wider force. This approach shows how SOF can support cyber and also integrate it into traditional SOF mission sets.

Firstly, USSOCOM must strengthen its relationships and efforts in the cyber domain, specifically with civilian commercial and non-military organizations. The SOF community already enjoys organizational relationships with USCYBERCOM, the intelligence community, and other government agencies that exceed what conventional military forces possess. But enhancing these connections is necessary to integrate different departments and agencies’ efforts in cyberspace, synchronize disparate targeting data, and streamline communications.

Collaboration with industry leaders is necessary to maintain access to the cutting edge. SOF are uniquely positioned to maximize impact through their natural team building and creating purpose-built coalitions. By partnering with US companies, USSOF can increase the “value” of allies’ and partners’ engagement with US cyber and space-focused training entities. Widespread adoption of Microsoft’s technology has created a global infrastructure ecosystem, one where product utilization increases productivity and international relevance. The ability to include these industry-standard partners in foreign military sales or security forces assistance (SFA) activities may persuade uncertain countries to partner with the United States, thereby increasing US reach in strategic locales.

USSOCOM must also embrace cyber and space as fundamental aspects of SFA activities. Doctrinally, SFA is defined as activities based on organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising various components of foreign security forces. Typically, these activities are aligned with country-specific combat arms functions, such as providing training to conduct area defense or seizing key terrain. However, the necessity of defending national cyber infrastructure now rivals the importance of holding physical terrain.

American network defense capabilities are world-renowned, and information technology equipment and training are often more politically acceptable to allies and partners than receiving military equipment. For instance, in addition to donating approximately $400 million in digital infrastructure and support to Ukraine, Microsoft also provides cybersecurity training to 28 countries globally. Microsoft Vice President Kate Behncken states, “These countries have an elevated cyber threat risk, coupled with a significant gap in their cybersecurity workforces…” Consequently, the inclusion of defense cyber operations and network development and operations into SFA activities would influence additional nations to partner with USSOF, bolstering the partner nation’s capabilities, expanding access and placement in areas previously deemed politically too sensitive, and ultimately advancing US national policy objectives.

Lastly, USSOCOM must utilize its SOF-peculiar authorities to confront challenges in cyberspace. As the conventional services struggle to implement tactical effects within the cyber domain, USSOCOM is uniquely capable of performing a pathfinder role and providing lessons learned on organization, training, and equipment for DoW-wide implementation. Furthermore, USSOCOM entities, such as Special Operations Forces Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (SOF AT&L) and SOFWERX, can rapidly develop, test, and field cyber capabilities tailored to specific battlefield needs—and improve commercially procured equipment for cyber and space-related SFA activities. Additionally, USCYBERCOM currently struggles with the accession, training, and follow-on retention of personnel as members rotate through assignments and back to individual services. Aligning a portion of Cyber Command’s billets with USSOCOM’s selective manning model, following a selectively manned precedent similar to that used by the AFSOC Special Operations Surgical Teams, would eliminate this issue and allow for increased continuity of operations for highly specialized personnel, which is vital to the success of slow-burning cyber operations. Admittedly, utilization of SOF-peculiar authorities is a temporary solution to broader organizational issues within the US cyber milieu. However, these authorities allow for rapid adaptation to an ever-changing digital landscape, which is necessary for continued global relevance as a premier technological leader.

USSOF initiatives within this domain should not be conducted in isolation or separate from those undertaken by USCYBERCOM, the Department of State, and other interagency partners. Strict cross-agency coordination is required to ensure these operational means align with national security strategic ends. Doctrinally, USSOF must maintain a supporting force posture, allowing for the technical expertise of cyberspace professionals to leverage the access, placement, and SOF-specific authorities that only USSOF can provide. Furthermore, these cyber-focused efforts would not be done at the expense of other SOF core activities. If implemented correctly, the organic inclusion of cyberspace activities will increase the effectiveness of all future USSOF missions, as well as the missions of other combatant commands.

Conclusion

Monod’s observation about the interconnectedness of necessity and chance underscores that evolution is never arbitrary. For Ukraine, necessity demanded resilience against Russian aggression, while chance enabled the rapid adoption of drones and commercial communications. USSOCOM now faces its own evolutionary inflection point. By employing cyber capabilities and cutting-edge US technology as an effective instrument of national power, USSOCOM can ensure that its supporting role in non-kinetic operations not only enhances the effectiveness of all USSOF but also secures enduring relevance in the broader strategic competition. In this way, USSOCOM’s future role will likely exemplify Monod’s dictum: military evolution, like biological evolution, is driven by the twin forces of chance and necessity.

Ben Soltisz is an IWI Nonresident Fellow and an active-duty US Air Force expeditionary communications officer with extensive Special Operations experience. A graduate of the US Air Force Academy, he also holds a Master of Science degree from Oklahoma State and a Master of Military Studies degree from the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Currently, Ben attends Georgetown University through the USAF McConn Strategy Fellowship, where he is earning a Master of Policy Management degree. Professionally, he is heavily focused on the role of Irregular Warfare in future conflict and has deployed numerous times throughout the Middle East, Central/South America, and Asia. The opinions presented in this article are his own and do not represent the official positions of the US Air Force or the Department of War.

Main Image: 1SFG with SDN. Courtesy of DVIDS.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Irregular Warfare Initiative, Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project, the Modern War Institute at West Point, or the United States Government.

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21. The Peril of Ousting Maduro

Summary:

U.S. naval buildup, covert action, and Venezuelan opposition hard-liners see Nicolás Maduro’s fall as imminent, but the article warns forced regime change could unleash armed groups, military factions, and prolonged low-intensity conflict. Venezuela’s economy is collapsing, fueling public support for violent solutions, yet history shows opposition gains have come through elections and negotiations. Armed colectivos, guerrillas, and criminal gangs like Tren de Aragua would likely resist any new government, while generals might replace Maduro with an equally repressive successor. The author argues only sustained, internationally backed negotiations and a gradual transition can restore rule of law and durable democracy.

Excerpts:

Negotiations led by international mediators have also created room for the opposition to make gains. It was the so-called Barbados agreements between the government and the opposition Democratic Unitary Platform in October 2023, backed by the Biden administration’s offer to ease sanctions on the country, that paved the way for Machado’s primary victory that month and González’s July 2024 triumph in the presidential election. Maduro agreed to an internationally monitored election only because it was part of the terms of these agreements.

Rather than encourage them to build on their successes, these victories have pushed opposition hard-liners to pursue quicker paths to unseating Maduro. In doing so, they risk repeating the same mistake Maduro’s opponents made when they set up the interim government in 2019: outsourcing strategy to a foreign power with overlapping but fundamentally different objectives. Machado and others seek the rule of law and the end of Chávez’s failed legacy, but the United States is focused on curbing drug trafficking, migration, energy costs, and China’s expansion in the region. That means Washington is unlikely to give the opposition the deliverance it seeks even if American troops invade. Trump is once again talking about reopening negotiations with Maduro, offering a glimmer of hope for diplomacy. But such a strategy is only likely to work if Washington and the hard-line opposition in Venezuela understand that a power transition is a gradual process, not a single event.

Venezuela, in other words, cannot be promptly transformed into a free country. No matter how unreliable Maduro’s government is at the negotiating table, trying to force regime change through violence will ultimately undercut the goal of both the opposition and the vast majority of Venezuelans to set up a safe, stable, and law-based system to replace Maduro’s rule. Attempting a shortcut could leave the country even worse off than it is today.

The Peril of Ousting Maduro

Foreign Affairs · More by Phil Gunson

Only a Gradual Transition—Not Regime Change by Force—Can Restore Venezuela’s Democracy

Phil Gunson

November 21, 2025

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/peril-ousting-maduro

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela, September 2025 Leonardo Fernandez Viloria / Reuters

PHIL GUNSON is Senior Analyst for the Andes at the International Crisis Group and is based in Venezuela.

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To many officials in Washington, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro appears to be on the ropes. The U.S. military has built up its largest naval deployment in the southern Caribbean since the Cuban missile crisis of the 1960s, blown up small boats allegedly carrying drugs, and sent an aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, to the region. In October, President Donald Trump authorized the CIA to mount covert operations in Venezuela. Top members of Trump’s team insist that Maduro is losing his grip on power and will soon either resign or be ousted by his own military. As James Story, the former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, told Politico, the Trump administration sees three options for Maduro: “Exile him, extradite him, or send him to meet his maker.”

Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October, is equally confident about Maduro’s imminent downfall. “With or without negotiation, Maduro is leaving,” she said in an interview after she was granted the award. Machado has been vocally supportive of the U.S. military pressure on Maduro, even as she insists that a full invasion of Venezuela will not be necessary. “Maduro started this war, and Trump is finishing it,” she declared this month. Top government figures in Venezuela are certainly aware of the growing possibility of targeted U.S. drone, rocket, or missile strikes. Trump has long claimed to advocate restraint in foreign policy, but the United States’ attacks on Iranian nuclear sites in June sent a message that the administration is willing to intervene beyond U.S. borders.

A clear majority of Venezuelans want Maduro gone. But the assumption that forcefully overthrowing the current government will lead to a smooth transition to democracy is dangerous. Venezuela is full of armed groups that would resist the regime’s collapse and undermine any effort to restore the rule of law. Generals currently loyal to Maduro might install an even more repressive leader. Without a viable strategy for what comes after the government falls, ousting Maduro could lead to even greater repression and hardship for Venezuelans.

Rather than attempting to force Maduro to fold at gunpoint, Americans and the opposition should focus on the only strategy likely to lead to a sustainable, peaceful transition: comprehensive, internationally backed negotiations. Such talks would be challenging, and they would take time. With a $50 million bounty on his head, an outstanding U.S. grand jury indictment for drug trafficking, and an ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court for possible crimes against humanity, the Venezuelan president knows he is safest staying where he is. The conditions for diplomacy, in other words, are not yet in place. But violent shortcuts are only likely to make matters worse.

HARD-LINERS ASCENDANT

The main opposition has not always been hawkish. Control has oscillated between hard-liners and moderates over the past two decades. But in 2014, when Machado was still a relatively minor political figure, she and two prominent opposition politicians broke with the moderate leadership to pursue what they called la salida, or “the way out,” which led to months of mass demonstrations designed to pressure Maduro into immediately stepping down. Maduro responded with a brutal crackdown in in which 43 people died. Similar mass protests in 2017 and 2019 met with similar results. Machado thus concluded that removing Maduro required foreign military intervention.

Other senior opponents of Maduro disagreed. The opposition’s U.S.-backed parallel government, which claimed to be the legitimate leadership of Venezuela from 2019 to 2023 though it had little sway, incorporated both moderates and hard-liners. Machado, who remained on the sidelines, bitterly criticized this interim government for what she saw as its reluctance to call for a regional intervention force to overthrow Maduro under the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Rio Treaty, a hemispheric collective security pact that Venezuela signed in 1947 but which Maduro has publicly rejected.

The collapse of the interim government at the end of 2022 and the flight into exile of its leader, Juan Guaidó, left most of those associated with it discredited. Machado’s independent stance and perceived integrity saved her from that fallout. Despite her long-standing preference for direct action over electoral competition, she sensed an opportunity to become the leader of the opposition through the ballot box. In October 2023, she won the presidential primary and became the candidate of Venezuela’s main opposition coalition, the Democratic Unitary Platform, poised to challenge Maduro in the July 2024 presidential election.

Without a viable strategy, ousting Maduro could lead to even greater hardship for Venezuelans.

Machado was promptly banned by the government from standing in the election. But she eventually agreed to support a substitute candidate, the retired diplomat Edmundo González, and campaigned with him despite the many obstacles the government put in her way. González won more than twice as many votes as Maduro, according to the opposition’s rigorously verified official tallies. Yet the government refused to acknowledge the result and swore Maduro in for another term.

After the authorities proclaimed him the winner, thousands of angry voters took to the streets in protest. But Machado and her team failed to take advantage of the moment. A top Machado adviser, Carlos Blanco, admitted in a recent interview that the team thought the July 2024 election result would force Maduro to negotiate his exit. Instead, government forces killed two dozen protesters and jailed more than 2,000 others in the days after the voting. Dissenters learned their lesson. Fear of repression has, for now at least, crippled the opposition’s capacity to mobilize the masses.

Machado’s failure to oust Maduro caused her standing with voters to fall. But she remains popular and projects optimism. As one leading pollster in Caracas explained to me, although Venezuelans are skeptical that Machado will be able to fulfill her promises—her credibility had fallen to half of what it was before the 2024 election—“her image remains strong. She could bounce back if things change.” In other words, if the United States successfully forces regime change and the opposition manages to take power, Machado is positioned to be the prime beneficiary.

STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE

Between threats of U.S. intervention, fears of more intense repression, and a lack of confidence in the opposition’s next moves, Venezuelans find themselves facing another destabilizing crisis: mass economic hardship. The Venezuelan economy, which began to grow over the past few years after collapsing between 2013 and 2021 to around a quarter of its former size because of economic mismanagement, falling oil prices, and U.S. sanctions, is once again showing signs of severe strain.

Annual inflation, which only last year was in the double digits, is projected to rise to nearly 700 percent in 2026, according to the International Monetary Fund. The gap between the official government exchange rate and the parallel rate, the market exchange rate used for unofficial transactions, has widened rapidly, suggesting that the national currency is massively overvalued. In January 2025, the two rates were nearly the same; today, the official rate of 226 bolivars to the dollar is far behind the parallel rate of over 300 to 1.

The minimum wage of 130 bolivars a month, now worth less than one U.S. dollar, is far too low to allow workers to survive. Even with large bonuses, many public-sector employees are lucky to earn more than the equivalent of $100 per month. Feeding a family in Venezuela now costs about five times that amount.

The government in Caracas denies that the economy is in dire straits. In fact, in October, Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodríguez boasted that the country had experienced 18 consecutive quarters of GDP growth and projected an expansion of 8.5 percent this year—highly optimistic statistics that are primarily based on increased oil production. But 80 percent of Venezuelans live in poverty, and the middle class is vanishing. A car repairman I spoke with this month said that 2024 was the worst year he had ever experienced economically and calculated that his income has dropped about 60 percent since 2023. Roughly eight million Venezuelans have fled the country in recent years, mostly because they could no longer afford to live there.

Given the scale of hardship, many Venezuelans are prepared to back a violent end to Maduro’s reign, as long as it is swift. This has emboldened many opposition supporters to endorse any approach that could accelerate regime change, regardless of the risks. Machado’s allies dismiss talk of potential instability after a government collapse as fearmongering and accuse critics of U.S. military intervention of being Maduro sympathizers. But such an attitude is dangerous.

WHAT LIES BEYOND

No matter how bad Maduro’s regime is, some of Venezuela’s possible futures could well be worse. If a powerful military faction were to determine that Maduro is a liability and move to replace him, there is no reason to believe that its first choice would be to empower opposition hard-liners such as Machado. One possible outcome is the installation of an equally repressive—and perhaps even less competent—regime.

The fall of Maduro could also empower Venezuela’s patchwork of nonstate armed groups, including Colombian guerrillas and criminal gangs. These powerful organizations fear what might come after the current regime and are likely to resist any restoration of the rule of law. The National Liberation Army, a Colombian Marxist guerrilla group that first took up arms in the 1960s, may have thousands of armed combatants in Venezuela. To the extent that these fighters are held in check under Maduro, it is because of the organization’s alliance with the current government.

The same applies to other armed groups. The so-called colectivos, bands of armed civilian thugs who serve leading politicians, are entrenched in several major cities. Despite Trump’s claims, Maduro is not the head of the infamous Tren de Aragua, a powerful criminal network that has spread across the Venezuelan diaspora over the past decade and that Trump has officially designated as a terrorist group. But government officials have benefited from close relations with the gang. After Maduro became president in 2013, his government began trying to curb a soaring murder rate by signing nonaggression pacts with Tren de Aragua and other armed groups, an arrangement that ultimately allowed them to become more powerful. Recently, Chilean prosecutors asserted that Caracas hired gang members to assassinate an exiled Venezuelan dissident.

It is unlikely that all military officials would back Machado if she won power.

The precarious stability between these groups and the government would be likely to collapse with Maduro’s exit, especially if change were to come suddenly and challenge the hold that the president’s allies have on the levers of power. As Juan González, a former top adviser to U.S. President Joe Biden’s on Latin America, has noted, conditions in Venezuela are ripe for protracted low-intensity warfare. This could make Venezuela look more like Colombia or Mexico, rife with selective assassinations, bombings, and occasional street battles, yet lacking the kind of stable elected government that exists in Bogotá or Mexico City. Machado speaks confidently of an ambitious 100-day plan she has readied that includes restoring institutional rule, stabilizing the economy, reforming the armed forces, and addressing a poverty-driven humanitarian crisis. But if the Trump administration declined to contribute significant U.S. ground forces to Venezuela, an incoming opposition government would be reliant on the same generals it now accuses of running drug cartels to survive.

Machado and others say that plenty of military officers are ready to switch sides, which would mean that in the event of a coup, Maduro could be handed over to U.S. authorities. But similar assumptions have turned out to be hollow in the past. In 2019, a few months after establishing the interim government, Guaidó and other opposition leaders waited in vain outside a military airbase in Caracas for the coup they had been told would ensue but never happened.

Machado could be right in predicting that some military officials would back her if she managed to win power. But it is unlikely that all of them would. And if the military were to split into competing factions or if a post-Maduro administration were to dissolve the army and dismiss civilian officials, the chances of violent chaos would increase further. A Machado-González government without sufficient military backing, domestic or foreign, would be unlikely to be able to fend off a campaign of violent harassment by armed groups seeking to destabilize it.

DURABLE DEMOCRACY

The Venezuelan opposition’s biggest gains in the quarter century since Hugo Chávez, Maduro’s mentor and predecessor, became president in 1999 have been achieved through negotiation and at the ballot box, not violence. In a 2007 referendum, citizens successfully voted down an attempt by Chávez to enshrine socialism in the Venezuelan constitution. In the 2015 legislative elections, a united opposition comprising over a dozen parties emerged with a supermajority, which would have allowed them to change the composition of the country’s Supreme Court and electoral authority in their favor had the government not stripped parliament of its power as a way of thwarting opposition control. And although Maduro held on to the presidency after losing the 2024 election, those elections may have been the opposition’s greatest political victory so far. By collecting and digitizing over 80 percent of the vote tallies, Maduro’s opponents presented irrefutable evidence that the president had no legitimate claim to power.

Negotiations led by international mediators have also created room for the opposition to make gains. It was the so-called Barbados agreements between the government and the opposition Democratic Unitary Platform in October 2023, backed by the Biden administration’s offer to ease sanctions on the country, that paved the way for Machado’s primary victory that month and González’s July 2024 triumph in the presidential election. Maduro agreed to an internationally monitored election only because it was part of the terms of these agreements.

Rather than encourage them to build on their successes, these victories have pushed opposition hard-liners to pursue quicker paths to unseating Maduro. In doing so, they risk repeating the same mistake Maduro’s opponents made when they set up the interim government in 2019: outsourcing strategy to a foreign power with overlapping but fundamentally different objectives. Machado and others seek the rule of law and the end of Chávez’s failed legacy, but the United States is focused on curbing drug trafficking, migration, energy costs, and China’s expansion in the region. That means Washington is unlikely to give the opposition the deliverance it seeks even if American troops invade. Trump is once again talking about reopening negotiations with Maduro, offering a glimmer of hope for diplomacy. But such a strategy is only likely to work if Washington and the hard-line opposition in Venezuela understand that a power transition is a gradual process, not a single event.

Venezuela, in other words, cannot be promptly transformed into a free country. No matter how unreliable Maduro’s government is at the negotiating table, trying to force regime change through violence will ultimately undercut the goal of both the opposition and the vast majority of Venezuelans to set up a safe, stable, and law-based system to replace Maduro’s rule. Attempting a shortcut could leave the country even worse off than it is today.

Foreign Affairs · More by Phil Gunson

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com