Quotes of the Day:

“Start where you are. Use what you have. Do what you can.” 

– Arthur Ashe

“Don’t worry about siding for or against the majority. Worry about taking up any of their irrational beliefs. “ 

– Marcus Aurelius

“Hell is empty and all the devils are here.” 

– William Shakespeare

1. Special Operations Forces: Additional Oversight Could Help Mitigate High-Risk Training Accidents

2. Would the US win a war with China over Taiwan? US lawmakers briefed on the potential outcome

3. U.S. Department of Defense Vision Statement for a Prosperous and Secure Southeast Asia

4. US Task Force To Back Philippines In South China Sea

5. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 21, 2024                           

6. Opinion Is the U.S. military too ‘woke’ to win wars? Hardly. by Max Boot

7. DOD Adjusts Nuclear Deterrence Strategy as Nuclear Peer Adversaries Escalate

8. U.S. Defense Firms Are Warned About Russia’s Sabotage Campaign

9. China blames US for failure of defence chiefs to meet

10. Trump card or wild card? What Trump 2.0 could spell for Taiwan, China and regional stability

11.Europe Has Run Out of Time

12. The Saudi Solution?

13. China Is Off the Fence in Myanmar

14.  A Free Press Conversation with Natan Sharansky

15. How Native Americans guarded their societies against tyranny

16. Advocates fear dismantling of DOD’s extremism prevention, DEI programs

17. The US defense industrial base needs a revamp for speed and scale

18. Military Diversity Is Not the Problem

19. Musk, Ramaswamy Proposal to Slash Spending Could Include VA Medical Services

1. Special Operations Forces: Additional Oversight Could Help Mitigate High-Risk Training Accidents

Access the entire report at this link: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-106321

The 57 page report can be downloaded in PDF here: https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-106321.pdf

Special Operations Forces:

Additional Oversight Could Help Mitigate High-Risk Training Accidents

GAO-25-106321

Published: Nov 21, 2024. Publicly Released: Nov 21, 2024.

• Highlights
• Recommendations
• Full Report
• GAO Contacts

Fast Facts

Special Forces personnel conduct high-risk training to prepare for challenging missions. But serious accidents have raised questions about the safety of some of these activities.

About 80% of the over 3,600 on-duty, non-combat accidents reported from FY 2012-2022 occurred during training. Parachute and dive training accounted for about 40% of those accidents.

The U.S. Special Operations Command designated 7 training areas as high-risk, including parachuting, diving, and urban combat. But it hasn't analyzed accident trends in these areas or others that may be high-risk to improve safety.

Our recommendations address this and more.

2. Would the US win a war with China over Taiwan? US lawmakers briefed on the potential outcome

What has the pivot brought us?

Excerpts:

For years, the U.S. military has been pivoting its focus from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, "the most stressing theater," as Paparo describes it, given that China is the most capable potential adversary in the world.

According to Chinese policy, the CCP will invade only if Taiwan declares its independence from China, if a third power intervenes in the dispute or Beijing determines that "unification was irrevocably beyond its reach by any other means."

While the U.S. has no formal alliance with Taiwan, China has been encroaching on the air and sea territory of U.S. allies in the Pacific – Japan and the Philippines.

Paparo said he'd seen "the most rehearsal and the most joint exercises" from China over the summer that "I'd seen over an entire career of being an observer."

"This included on one particular day 152 vessels at sea," Paparo added.

China’s navy is the largest in the world, with more than 370 ships and submarines. The U.S.’s battle force includes 295 vessels, including 11 active aircraft carriers.

"This was the largest rehearsal we've seen on an upward trajectory of PLA [People's Liberation Army] modernization," Paparo said, referring to the Chinese military’s name.

Would the US win a war with China over Taiwan? US lawmakers briefed on the potential outcome

War games suggest a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would result in a huge cost to the US military

By Morgan Phillips Fox News

Published November 21, 2024 11:41am EST

foxnews.com · by Morgan Phillips Fox News

Video

President Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping meet at APEC Summit in Peru

President Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping met on Saturday, Nov. 16, 2024, at the APEC Summit in Lima, Peru. (Credit: Reuters)

House lawmakers were briefed Wednesday about the potential outcome if the U.S. were to find itself at war with China over Taiwan within the next two years, as the global superpower increasingly encroaches on U.S. allies.

The Chinese defense industrial base is operating at a "wartime footing," and now has a shipbuilding capacity 230 times greater than the U.S.’s, making a potential invasion of Taiwan a not-unlikely outcome.

U.S. military analysts have projected 2027 as the year by which China would be fully equipped for a military invasion of Taiwan. And the U.S. has long followed a policy of refusing to say whether it would come to the island’s defense under such a scenario.

But under war exercises gamed out by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 25 times and presented to members of the House China Select Committee, the alliance of the U.S., Taiwan and Japan defeated an amphibious invasion by China and maintained an autonomous Taiwan, but not without suffering heavy losses.

WOULD THE US DEFEND TAIWAN UNDER TRUMP IF CHINA INVADES? FOX NEWS INVESTIGATES

During the simulation, the cost for all sides was high – there were more than 10,000 casualties – and the U.S. lost 10-20 warships, two aircraft carriers, 200-400 warplanes and more than 3,000 troops were killed over the first three weeks of fighting.

China loses 90% of its amphibious fleet, 52 major surface warships, and 160 warplanes.

"In our tabletop exercise today, we walked through one simulation of what might happen in a worst-case scenario conflict with China and learned ways we can work together in a bipartisan manner to ensure that America is prepared to be the arsenal of democracy once more if called upon. No matter where or when, the United States and our allies must have the military means to defeat our adversaries," Rep. John Moolenaar, R-Mich., chairman of the committee, told Fox News Digital.

A China Coast Guard vessel patrols at the disputed Scarborough Shoal. (Castro/File Photo)

The report emphasized four key points: 1) Taiwan must "hold the line" of the ground invasion, 2) there is no "Ukraine" model where the U.S. can slowly escalate – it must decide immediately whether it will come to Taiwan's defense, 3) military operations would need to be conducted through Japan and 4) the U.S. needs to immediately increase its supply of anti-ship missiles.

The bottom line of the report is that China chooses "D-Day," but Taiwan and its defenders must be ready at any moment. The war game assumed a 2026 launch date for China’s invasion.

The scenario operates under the assumption that the U.S. under President-elect Trump would come to Taiwan’s defense, though no such promise has been made. It’s unclear what Trump would do under such a scenario – he has mused about Taiwan needing to pay the U.S. for giving it defensive aid.

Japan would be the U.S. and Taiwan’s key ally in such a fight because South Korea has not authorized the U.S. to launch combat missions from its territory. CSIS recommends deepening U.S.-Japan diplomatic relations immediately.

XI JINPING WARNS TRUMP US WOULD 'LOSE FROM CONFRONTATION' WITH CHINA AS RENEWED TRADE WAR LOOMS

"It certainly would be very helpful if South Korea stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us," said Matthew Cancian, researcher at the Naval War College and lead author of the project. The U.S. would likely move two of the four squadrons it has stationed in South Korea to help with the fight against China over Taiwan.

But, as the presenters warned, North Korea may try to take advantage of the situation and invade the south, especially after gaining operational experience from their fight with Russia against Ukraine.

The exercise also claimed that unlike U.S. aid to Ukraine, which passes over NATO territory to arrive there, the U.S. would not be able to arm Taiwan without sending in U.S. forces – China’s anti-tank or anti-air missiles would threaten any shipments making their way to the island.

"U.S. forces would have to be directly involved," said Cancian. "There is no way to achieve denying a takeover of Taiwan while also keeping U.S. forces safe."

And if the U.S. were to come to Taiwan's defense, there would be no time to waste since China is much closer geographically than U.S. forces. "If the U.S. were not to join the fight for two weeks [after an invasion], it would be too late. Chian would already have too strong a footing," said Cancian.

Chinese land attack missiles and anti-ship missiles would pose the greatest threat in the theater. Harpoons and coastal defense cruise missiles would be "absolutely critical" to Taiwan’s defense, according to the wargame exercise.

China is outproducing the U.S. on airplanes, ships and missiles, the exercise found, and in order to deter them from provoking war over Taiwan, the U.S. needs to immediately ramp up its production of key munitions, per the war games.

The U.S.’s current stockpile of anti-ship missiles, around 440, would run out in less than seven days in a war with China.

China would not be keen to give up easily, as a loss in Taiwan could be "very destabilizing" to the government’s legitimacy back at home.

The war games also underscored the need for the Taiwanese defense budget to stop focusing on expensive, large ships that China will easily destroy and focus on smaller, more survivable ships and submarines.

Freshmen attend a military training in Nantong, Jiangsu Province of China. (Xu Peiqin/VCG via Getty Images)

Chinese naval fleet passes through a mine threat area. (Sun Zifa/China News Service via Getty Images)

The U.S., too, must focus on arming Taiwan with smaller ships and cheaper munitions, with most iterations of the war games finding the U.S. losing two aircraft carriers and 10 to 20 large surface combatants.

"We need to make them fire their exquisite stuff at our non-exquisite stuff," said Rep. Carlos Gimenez, R-Fla. "They’re going to out-produce us… we need to wake up."

The U.S. and Taiwan must not attack the Chinese mainland, both to avoid risking escalation with a nuclear power and because Chinese air defense on the mainland is "too strong."

Ultimately, such an invasion could happen sooner, or not at all.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) head, Adm. Samuel Paparo, said recently he believes the U.S. would make it "exceedingly difficult" for China to mount a cross-strait invasion.

For years, the U.S. military has been pivoting its focus from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, "the most stressing theater," as Paparo describes it, given that China is the most capable potential adversary in the world.

According to Chinese policy, the CCP will invade only if Taiwan declares its independence from China, if a third power intervenes in the dispute or Beijing determines that "unification was irrevocably beyond its reach by any other means."

While the U.S. has no formal alliance with Taiwan, China has been encroaching on the air and sea territory of U.S. allies in the Pacific – Japan and the Philippines.

Paparo said he'd seen "the most rehearsal and the most joint exercises" from China over the summer that "I'd seen over an entire career of being an observer."

"This included on one particular day 152 vessels at sea," Paparo added.

China’s navy is the largest in the world, with more than 370 ships and submarines. The U.S.’s battle force includes 295 vessels, including 11 active aircraft carriers.

"This was the largest rehearsal we've seen on an upward trajectory of PLA [People's Liberation Army] modernization," Paparo said, referring to the Chinese military’s name.

foxnews.com · by Morgan Phillips Fox News

3. U.S. Department of Defense Vision Statement for a Prosperous and Secure Southeast Asia

How much of this vision will transition to the next administration?

Release

Immediate Release

U.S. Department of Defense Vision Statement for a Prosperous and Secure Southeast Asia

https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3973788/us-department-of-defense-vision-statement-for-a-prosperous-and-secure-southeast/

Nov. 21, 2024 |   

The United States aims to support a Southeast Asian region free of coercion where safety, security, sovereignty, self-determination, and prosperity are shepherded by ASEAN centrality. U.S. defense cooperation with Southeast Asian allies and partners, centered on ASEAN and its member states, seeks to empower the region through practical cooperation on building capabilities, exchanging expertise, ensuring free trade, and bolstering sovereignty, all underscored with collaboration and mutual respect. 

The United States has worked closely with ASEAN on defense and security in the Indo-Pacific region since former Defense Secretary Robert Gates attended the inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010. And at every ADMM-Plus since, a U.S. Secretary of Defense has attended and supported ASEAN. As we mark the fifteenth anniversary of the ADMM-Plus in 2025, we reflect on the ties of friendship and cooperation among our countries and those who defend us. The United States welcomes a strong ASEAN that speaks with a powerful voice on key issues and plays a leading role in upholding shared principles and international law. These aspirations, as articulated in the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, envision ASEAN playing a central role in ensuring peace, security, stability, and prosperity for the peoples across the Indo-Pacific. The principles on which the Outlook is based are complimentary with those in the United States' Indo-Pacific Strategy, which seeks to promote sovereignty, transparency, good governance, and a rules-based international order in conjunction with our allies and partners.

The United States' vision for defense capacity building reflects the history of U.S. investment in the Indo-Pacific's regional security architecture, which has supported the sovereignty, self-determination, and defense capabilities of Southeast Asian countries. Since 2005, the United States has:

• Elevated the U.S.-ASEAN relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2023, under the leadership of President Biden.
• Delivered more than $17 billion in foreign military sales to ASEAN Member States, providing world-class capabilities to address our partners' security needs.
• Conducted 40 bilateral and multilateral exercises with Southeast Asian nations on an annual basis, representing a commitment of 30,000 forces to support our partners' readiness and interoperability.
• Provided world-class professional military education to more than 76,000 students from Southeast Asia since 2005, advancing people-to-people ties and partner capabilities.
• Provided a maritime common operating picture and enhanced the maritime operational capabilities of seven ASEAN Member States through more than $475 million via the Maritime Security Initiative since 2016.
• Trained together with regional allies and partners to respond to natural disasters and operated together in real-world relief efforts in their wake.

Key Lines of Effort

Building on this robust base of defense cooperation, the United States seeks to advance the collective capacity of ASEAN and individual Southeast Asian nations by investing in the following areas: 

• Domain Awareness and Defense: Securing domain awareness, whether in the air, maritime, cyber space, or information environment — is a foundational aspect of supporting Southeast Asian allies and partners' sovereignty. It is the first step to enabling domain defense, including the capacity to respond to illegal intrusions and coercion. The United States will advance Southeast Asian nations' capacity building in domain awareness through the following programs:
• Air:  The United States will continue ongoing efforts to improve the capability of Southeast Asian partners to detect and identify activity within their sovereign airspace, including their Economic Exclusion Zones and Air Defense Identification Zones; fuse that information within their government information systems; and exercise their sovereign authorities, commitments to international agreements, and their ability to share the information regionally.
• Cyber: The United States will enhance engagement with the ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (ACICE) in Singapore through programs including table-top exercises to identify capacity gaps in regional response to cyber threats and training courses for cyber security professionals.
• Maritime: The United States will enhance maritime capacity building programs with a focus on using commercially available technologies to expand maritime domain awareness, continuous presence, and scientific research through unmanned systems complemented by artificial intelligence and machine learning tools to maximize awareness. Experts on maritime domain awareness will identify opportunities to support regional cooperation and synergies in this area, enabling Southeast Asian partners to protect their maritime territories more effectively under international law.
• Exercises: In addition to the annual comprehensive calendar of bilateral and multilateral exercises undertaken alongside Southeast Asian allies and partners throughout the Indo-Pacific region, including BALIKATAN, COBRA GOLD, and SUPER GARUDA SHIELD, the United States will convene a second ASEAN-U.S. maritime exercise in 2025. We will also work to develop targeted capabilities through U.S. participation in the ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups and related training exercises. Finally, we will work to expand the cooperation of Southeast Asian allies and partners through multilateral exercises and activities, building interoperability and relationships that promote resilience and peace.
• Education and Training:  The United States will continue to offer a broad range of training and educational opportunities to ASEAN partners, with the Emerging Defense Leaders' Program — which supports the professional development of young Southeast Asian defense officials — as a core offering. These specialized courses exist in addition to longstanding International Military Education and Training (IMET) courses for Southeast Asian ally and partner military officers and defense civilians. Furthermore, the Department of Defense's State Partnership Program — executed through the National Guard Bureau — has created lasting partnerships between the United States and six Southeast Asian nations.
• Defense Industrial Capacity Building:  In addition to security assistance, the United States will work to promote the defense industrial capacity of our Southeast Asian partners by leveraging government, academic, and industry engagements to deepen collaboration and promote mutually beneficial investments toward a more robust and integrated defense industrial base. These activities may include components such as science and technology demonstrations, academic exchanges and workshops, and industry prize challenges.
• Defense Institutional Capacity Building:  The United States supports the development of ASEAN's institutional capacity through robust participation in ADMM-Plus Expert Working Groups (EWGs). Between 2011-2013, the United States served successively as a co-chair for the Counterterrorism, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief, and Maritime Security EWGs, upholding international rules and norms focused on practical cooperation with ASEAN partners. In 2024, the United States became co-chair of the Military Medicine EWG with Indonesia, increasing medical expertise and incorporating the application of Women, Peace, and Security principles in partners' defense planning and operations. Additionally, our Ministry of Defense Advisors will continue to support professional development within partner ministries of ASEAN member states on a bilateral basis.
• Defense Mitigation of Climate Impacts: With input from ASEAN Member States, the United States will develop a series of workshops, technical demonstrations, and tabletop exercises to address climate resilience shortfalls and provide a platform for member states to share expertise in addressing climate change impacts to their respective defense organizations, readiness, and operational capacities. 

Timor Leste Accession: The United States supports ASEAN's decision-in-principle to admit Timor Leste as the eleventh member of ASEAN. We envision including Timor Leste in all lines of effort listed above as appropriate and in accordance with the Road Map for Accession. The United States is prepared to offer Timor Leste capacity building assistance in the defense sector to help it meet accession milestones.

4. US Task Force To Back Philippines In South China Sea

Excerpts:

The Philippine ambassador to the United States has previously said the Philippines has not asked Washington for support in resupplying its troops, and the U.S. was providing only “visuals” to help.

Confrontations between Beijing and Manila have been frequent of late, with China irked by Philippine resupply missions to soldiers on the Sierra Madre, a rusty warship that was intentionally grounded on the shoal 25 years ago to reinforce a territorial claim.

Tensions there have boiled over several times, with China’s coast guard accused of ramming vessels and using water cannon, injuring Filipino personnel.

China says the Philippines is intruding on its territory and claims indisputable sovereignty over the reef, located 1,300 km (808 miles) off its mainland and about 200 km from the Philippine coast.

US Task Force To Back Philippines In South China Sea

https://stratnewsglobal.com/asia/us-task-force-to-back-philippines-in-south-china-sea/

Task Force-Ayungin enhances U.S.-Philippine alliance coordination and interoperability in the SCS to deter Chinese coercion.

Edited By Anukriti - Nov 21 2024, 17:09

The US military is supporting Philippines operations in the South China Sea via a special task force, a U.S. embassy official said on Thursday, an initiative Manila said involves intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Multiple Lines Of Cooperation

Task Force-Ayungin, named after the Philippine designation for the contested Second Thomas Shoal, was first mentioned this week by U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin during a visit to the Philippines.

“Task Force-Ayungin enhances U.S.-Philippine alliance coordination and interoperability by enabling U.S. forces to support Armed Forces of the Philippines activities in the South China Sea,” said U.S. embassy spokesperson Kanishka Gangopadhyay.

“This initiative aligns with multiple lines of cooperation between U.S. and Philippine forces,” he said, without elaborating on what kind of support the task force provides.

China Sees Red

Defence ties between the Philippines and the United States have strengthened rapidly in the past few years, frustrating Beijing, which has a huge presence and vast claims in the South China Sea and sees Washington as an interfering power.

The United States says it has legitimate interests in ensuring peace and freedom of navigation in Asia’s most contested waters, through which more than $3 trillion of trade passes each year.

Surveillance and More

National Security Adviser Eduardo Ano said Philippine activities in South China Sea, including its missions to resupply troops at the Second Thomas Shoal, remain a “purely Philippine operation”.

“They are providing support to us, for example, ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance), maritime domain awareness, but on actual direct participation, it’s purely a Philippine operation,” Ano told reporters.

The Philippine ambassador to the United States has previously said the Philippines has not asked Washington for support in resupplying its troops, and the U.S. was providing only “visuals” to help.

Confrontations between Beijing and Manila have been frequent of late, with China irked by Philippine resupply missions to soldiers on the Sierra Madre, a rusty warship that was intentionally grounded on the shoal 25 years ago to reinforce a territorial claim.

Tensions there have boiled over several times, with China’s coast guard accused of ramming vessels and using water cannon, injuring Filipino personnel.

China says the Philippines is intruding on its territory and claims indisputable sovereignty over the reef, located 1,300 km (808 miles) off its mainland and about 200 km from the Philippine coast.

The two countries have since reached a “provisional arrangement” for the resupply missions, with no altercations reported so far.

(With inputs from Reuters)

5. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 21, 2024

China-Taiwan Weekly Update, November 21, 2024

https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-weekly-update-november-21-2024

Data Cutoff: November 18 2024

Reuters reported, citing anonymous sources, that ROC President Lai Ching-te plans to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December. The Taiwanese government did not confirm the report. Such a trip would be Lai’s first visit to the United States as president and would mirror former ROC President Tsai Ing-wen's 2017 South Pacific trip, which also transited Hawaii and Guam. The South Pacific states of Tuvalu, Palau, and the Marshall Islands are among the 12 countries that maintain formal relations with the ROC rather than with the PRC. Guam and Hawaii are both home to major US military bases that are likely to play a role in any US defense of Taiwan. The headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command are also in Hawaii. PRC MFA spokesperson Lin Jian stated that such transits violate the One China principle and will not stop the “inevitable trend” of China’s reunification. He urged the United States not to allow Lai’s transit.

Xi and Biden agreed not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems, signaling Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in issues about which it has previously been noncommittal. Xi and Biden agreed during their meeting at APEC that the United States and PRC would maintain human control — as opposed to AI control — over their nuclear arsenals. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan emphasized that the conversation aligned with Biden’s and Xi’s agreement to “work on AI safety and risk together” following last year’s Woodside Summit. Sullivan stated that he did not foresee an “imminent risk” that either power would “hand over the control of nuclear weapons to artificial intelligence” but that the discussion took place as a long-term stabilization measure.

The PRC’s acceptance of the US proposal marks a shift from the PRC’s earlier reluctance to accept limits on its application of AI. US National Security Council Senior Director for Technology and National Security Tarun Chhabra stated in June that the PRC was not in agreement with the US policy that AI should not be involved with nuclear weapons launch systems, following bilateral AI risk and safety talks in Geneva in May. The PRC also refrained from signing an international agreement on the use of AI in the military during the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) summit in Seoul on September 10.

Key Takeaways

• ROC President Lai Ching-te may plan to transit through Hawaii and possibly Guam during a trip to Taiwan’s South Pacific allies in late November or early December.

• The PRC released the captain of a Taiwanese fishing vessel whom it had detained since July following a visit by Taiwanese officials from Penghu County.

• Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to implement guardrails in areas that it has previously been noncommittal about cooperating in.

• The PRC debuted its J-35A stealth fighter at Airshow China 2024. The fighter is the PRC's second stealth plane and reportedly greatly expands China's power projection capability into the Pacific.

• Xi’s and Biden’s agreement not to integrate artificial intelligence (AI) into nuclear weapons control systems signals Beijing’s willingness to discuss AI safety despite previously withholding nuclear talks to punish the US for supporting Taiwan.

• The PRC did not interfere with a Philippine resupply mission to the Sierra Madre in Second Thomas Shoal. It is continuing to abide by a provisional agreement it reached with the Philippines in July 2024 despite continuing tensions over the two countries’ territorial disputes.

• The PRC warned the United States and the Philippines against increasing regional tensions following the signing of a US-Philippines intelligence sharing agreement.

• Anonymous European Union diplomats said that the EU has “conclusive” and “credible” evidence that a factory in the PRC’s Xinjiang region is producing and exporting drones for Russia.

6. Opinion Is the U.S. military too ‘woke’ to win wars? Hardly. by Max Boot

I have been retired for 13 years so I can only judge based on what I hear. But frankly I do not hear too much from active duty personnel on this specific issue. They have other more pressing issues.

Excerpts:

The extent to which the U.S. armed forces actually engage in diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) training has been vastly exaggerated. Most of the examples of “wokeness” that MAGA activists have dug up occur at the service academies, where students might receive instruction on issues of gender and race, just as their civilian counterparts do. But the military remains a conservative institution focused on deterring and defeating the nation’s enemies — not on promoting critical race theory.

In 2023, Army Sgt. Maj. Michael A. Grinston told the House Armed Services Committee that in basic training, 92 hours were dedicated to rifle marksmanship and only one hour to equal opportunity training, which includes dealing with sexual harassment and sexual assault. Air Force Chief Master Sgt. JoAnne S. Bass testified that her service “does not have pronoun training” and is focused on “warfighting.”

What would really degrade combat readiness is not DEI training but purging the senior officer ranks on political grounds and, as Trump has vowed to do, employing the military for domestic law enforcement tasks such as rounding up undocumented immigrants. Either undertaking would be a major distraction from preparing to fight China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other potential foes. MAGA politicization is a far bigger threat to the armed forces than “wokeness.”

Opinion  Is the U.S. military too ‘woke’ to win wars? Hardly.

The U.S. military’s patchy history this century is much more about the tasks it has been assigned.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/11/21/donald-trump-pete-hegseth-woke-military/?utm

Paratroopers assigned to 1st Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 2020. (Spec. Hubert Delany III/U.S. Army/AP)

By Max Boot

November 21, 2024 at 12:52 p.m. EST

Why does President-elect Donald Trump intend to nominate as his defense secretary Pete Hegseth, a 44-year-old Fox News host and former major in the Army National Guard who has no experience running a vast organization like the Defense Department and who is now embroiled in a sexual assault scandal? (He denies wrongdoing in the 2017 incident, and no police charges were filed.)

Sign up for the Prompt 2024 newsletter for answers to the election’s biggest questions

At least part of the explanation for the decision can be found in Trump’s desire to purge what he has described as “a woke military that can’t fight or win, as proven in Afghanistan.” In a book published earlier this year, Hegseth wrote: “Our generals are not ready for this moment in history. Not even close. The next president of the United States needs to radically overhaul Pentagon senior leadership to make us ready to defend our nation and defeat our enemies. Lots of people need to be fired.”

These criticisms might resonate with at least a portion of the public fed up with the costly futility of America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — and conditioned by relentless right-wing criticism into thinking that the armed forces have been hijacked by social justice activists. Although the military remains one of the most respected institutions in U.S. society, only 60 percent of those surveyed by Gallup in 2023 expressed confidence in the armed services — the lowest level in more than two decades.

Latest editorial cartoons

Next

OpinionFlu season horror stories

OpinionSpeaker Johnson cuts the lights on Gaetz report

OpinionCartoon by Matt Davies

OpinionCartoon by Mike Smith

OpinionUnqualified

OpinionDepleting vast quantities of energy: a chart

OpinionUsing the successes of X to inform the Department of Government Efficiency

OpinionTrump’s pick for attorney general

OpinionCartoon by Jimmy Margulies

OpinionCartoon by Walt Handelsman

OpinionThe winner of our discontent

OpinionThe people have spoken

OpinionCartoon by Matt Davies

OpinionCartoon by Mike Smith

OpinionIt’s a mystery

OpinionTrump wins the game

OpinionProcessing election disappointment

OpinionThese truths are self-evident

OpinionThe emotional rollercoaster of the past week (and other fairground rides)

OpinionThe end.

Yet the blame for what went wrong with the post-9/11 wars rests more with politicians than generals. It was America’s political leaders who gave the armed forces the thankless task of transforming Afghanistan and Iraq into Western-style democracies. That was probably a mission impossible, especially given the limited commitment Washington was willing to make in both countries. For example, when President Barack Obama announced in 2009 that he was sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, he also said they would begin coming home within 18 months — a timeline that encouraged the Taliban to wait them out.

Following Max Boot

Following

The U.S. military, having all but forgotten about counterinsurgency strategy before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, had its share of blunders in the early days of the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, but on the whole, military leaders proved resilient and adaptable. This can be seen in the successes of the 2007-2008 U.S. “surge” in Iraq, which brought the country back from the brink of civil war, and of the post-2014 period when U.S. forces supported Kurdish and Iraqi allies to defeat the Islamic State.

Some of the biggest U.S. policy disasters in recent history — such as the rise of the Islamic State after the U.S. pullout from Iraq in 2011 or the collapse of the Kabul government after the U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2021 — occurred when presidents disregarded military advice to keep a residual force in each country. It is particularly rich that the Trump transition team is reportedly discussing court-martialing officers involved in the bungled exit from Afghanistan during President Joe Biden’s administration when Trump was the one who negotiated the withdrawal in the first place — and he tried to pull out U.S. troops even earlier, before the end of his first term.

In the course of chronicling the U.S. wars of the past quarter-century, I’ve grown to know and admire many of America’s most distinguished generals and admirals. Based on personal observation, I would say that Gen. David H. Petraeus, Gen. Jim Mattis, the late Gen. Ray Odierno, Gen. Lloyd Austin, Adm. James G. Stavridis, Adm. William H. McRaven, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster and other outstanding military leaders of recent decades are every bit the equal of any group of generals and admirals in U.S. history — and that includes Gens. George S. Patton and Douglas MacArthur, two deeply flawed historical figures whom Trump appears to venerate.

Many of today’s generals had considerable success fighting (as junior officers) in the 1991 Gulf War and (as more senior commanders) in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and they undoubtedly would have won more victories if they had fought more conventional conflicts. It was their bad luck — and the nation’s — that they were tasked with carrying out messy and unsatisfying counterinsurgencies and nation-building exercises.

But they certainly cannot be accused of putting “wokeness” above combat capability. Mattis, for one, is known for sayings such as “Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet.” Trump reviles Mattis as “the world’s most overrated general” not because Mattis is too politically correct but because Mattis resigned as Trump’s defense secretary and publicly criticized his policies.

Letters to the Editor

Next

OpinionI’m a federal employee. I’m not quitting, and neither should anyone else.

OpinionDemocrats can’t win on these stereotypes about immigrants

OpinionBiden’s presidency isn’t over yet. This is what he should do.

OpinionTrump can’t take over D.C. If he tries, the city should fight him.

OpinionPete Hegseth? Matt Gaetz? Buckle up: It’s going to be a bumpy ride.

OpinionReaders critique The Post: Don’t be so sure about four more years of Trump

OpinionLetters for Trump: Here are your to-dos

OpinionWho are you calling entitled? Americans earned their benefits.

OpinionAmericans have to try to understand each other

OpinionWhat keeps us safe? These readers say: A functional CDC and vaccines.

OpinionBluey. Bob Ross. Bach. And 10 other ways to battle election stress.

Opinion10 voters on why they backed candidates from more than one party

OpinionReaders critique The Post: Thank you, President Biden

OpinionAmericans have spoken. Will Democrats listen?

OpinionWho is responsible for Trump’s comeback? And what comes next?

OpinionTo these new citizens, voting is ‘mystical,’ ‘strange,’ ‘powerful’

OpinionHow to handle pot: Licensed lounges. Clearer labels. FDA regulation.

OpinionThe idea behind America is still great. This is how we live up to it.

Opinion‘I grew up in an autocracy. I do not want to die in one.’

OpinionReaders’ stories of love and friendship across political divides

I have no doubt that some “diversity” training involves trendy academic jargon that can be annoying to participants, and that it can backfire by dividing troops along ethnic or gender lines. But some diversity training is important in a very diverse force full of women and ethnic minorities. It’s important to make the military a welcoming destination for recruits of all backgrounds — not just White men.

Hegseth’s criticisms of affirmative action programs and women in combat assignments will probably make military recruiters’ jobs harder. There is little evidence to suggest, as so many on the right do, that “wokeness” hurts recruitment; internal military surveys show that young people don’t sign up primarily because they view military service as too dangerous and not a good career path.

The extent to which the U.S. armed forces actually engage in diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) training has been vastly exaggerated. Most of the examples of “wokeness” that MAGA activists have dug up occur at the service academies, where students might receive instruction on issues of gender and race, just as their civilian counterparts do. But the military remains a conservative institution focused on deterring and defeating the nation’s enemies — not on promoting critical race theory.

In 2023, Army Sgt. Maj. Michael A. Grinston told the House Armed Services Committee that in basic training, 92 hours were dedicated to rifle marksmanship and only one hour to equal opportunity training, which includes dealing with sexual harassment and sexual assault. Air Force Chief Master Sgt. JoAnne S. Bass testified that her service “does not have pronoun training” and is focused on “warfighting.”

What would really degrade combat readiness is not DEI training but purging the senior officer ranks on political grounds and, as Trump has vowed to do, employing the military for domestic law enforcement tasks such as rounding up undocumented immigrants. Either undertaking would be a major distraction from preparing to fight China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and other potential foes. MAGA politicization is a far bigger threat to the armed forces than “wokeness.”

Share

257

Comments

Opinion by Max Boot

Max Boot is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Pulitzer Prize finalist in biography, he is the author, most recently, of the New York Times bestseller “Reagan: His Life and Legend.”follow on X MaxBoot

7. DOD Adjusts Nuclear Deterrence Strategy as Nuclear Peer Adversaries Escalate

Seems like our nuclear strategists and planners are pretty agile.

DOD Adjusts Nuclear Deterrence Strategy as Nuclear Peer Adversaries Escalate

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3975117/dod-adjusts-nuclear-deterrence-strategy-as-nuclear-peer-adversaries-escalate/

Nov. 21, 2024 | By David Vergun, DOD News |   

Multiple nuclear peer adversaries challenge the U.S. and its allies' and partners' security, according to the Defense Department.

"We are now in a world where we're facing multiple nuclear competitors, multiple states that are growing, diversifying and modernizing their nuclear arsenals and also, unfortunately, prioritizing the role that nuclear weapons play in their national security strategies," said Richard C. Johnson. 

As the security environment evolves, adjustments to the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review may be required to sustain the ability to achieve nuclear deterrence, in light of enhanced nuclear capabilities of China and Russia and possible lack of nuclear arms control agreements after February, said Johnson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and countering weapons of mass destruction policy, who spoke on a panel at the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Project on Nuclear Issues event, yesterday in Washington, D.C. 

The underlying logic of nuclear deterrence remains sound. Also, the U.S. remains committed to a safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent, he said. 

However, the nuclear modernization program of record, while necessary, may be insufficient moving forward, he added.

DOD, in partnership with the National Nuclear Security Administration, has already taken steps to field capabilities to enhance nuclear deterrence and flexibility and to reduce risk to the department's nuclear modernization program, Johnson said. 

These include the B61-13 gravity bomb, delivered by aircraft, as well as the enhanced readiness of nuclear armed and powered Ohio-class submarines, he said. 

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration would produce the B61-13, which is a modern variant of the B61. 

On Nov. 15, the department submitted the 791 Report to Congress describing the nuclear employment strategy of the U.S. It's called the 491 because it was submitted in accordance with U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 491.  

The 491 report describes changes that have been made from previous guidance and accounts for the new deterrence challenges that are posed by the growth, modernization and increasing diversity of potential adversaries' nuclear arsenals, Johnson said. 

The report directs that the U.S.: 

• Plans to deter multiple nuclear-armed adversaries simultaneously. 
• Requires the integration of non-nuclear capabilities, where feasible, to support the nuclear deterrence mission. 
• Stresses the importance of escalation management in U.S. planning for responding to limited nuclear attack or high-consequence, non-nuclear strategic attack. 
• Enables deeper consultation, coordination and combined planning with allies and partners in order to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence commitments.  

The report also recognizes that deterrence alone will not address strategic dangers. It recognizes that arms control and that risk reduction and nuclear nonproliferation play indispensable roles as well, Johnson said.

Grant Schneider, vice deputy director for strategic stability at the Joint Staff, who also spoke, said that another part of the report is the significant intellectual and analytical work required to identify the range of scenarios and strategic circumstances that the U.S. might face alongside its allies going into the 2030s. 

"To be prepared for the 2030s, we have to modernize our nuclear forces, the nuclear command and control, and the associated infrastructure that will allow us to be flexible and adjust over time as new challenges arise, whether that's new threats or potential changes or delays in our modernization," Schneider said. 

8. U.S. Defense Firms Are Warned About Russia’s Sabotage Campaign

Sabotage and subversion – the two fundamental elements of an unconventional warfare campaign. Just saying.

Excerpt:

The warning highlighted Britain’s arrest of several people in an arson attack in March on a business linked to Ukraine, and Poland’s announcement in June that it had arrested 18 people accused of plotting sabotage attacks on behalf of Russia.

In addition, Western officials previously warned that Russia had plotted to plant incendiary devices in cargo planes and was potentially planning to set off those devices in U.S. warehouses or on planes bound for the United States.

So far all of Russia’s known sabotage attacks have taken place in Europe, although Russian intelligence has targeted many countries, including Britain, France, Germany, Lithuania and beyond. But some officials believe that Russia wants to expand its sabotage campaign to the United States, particularly if the Biden administration in its closing weeks continues to support Ukraine in its war against Russia or takes steps that Russia sees as escalatory.

A small fire at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania in September, and another incident at the same site in April, set off concerns that Russia had extended its campaign to the United States. But officials believe those fires were an accident, not sabotage.

U.S. Defense Firms Are Warned About Russia’s Sabotage Campaign

A new warning urges defense companies to increase security and to be on the lookout for surveillance and signs of trespassing.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/21/us/politics/defense-companies-russia-sabotage.html?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=user/newyorktimes

Red Square in Moscow. Russia’s campaign increases the risk to American companies overseas, U.S. officials said.Credit...Nanna Heitmann for The New York Times

By Julian E. Barnes

Julian Barnes covers American intelligence agencies and has been covering the Russian sabotage campaign.

Nov. 21, 2024

Updated 1:03 p.m. ET

Want to stay updated on what’s happening in Russia? Sign up for Your Places: Global Update, and we’ll send our latest coverage to your inbox.

U.S. officials warned on Thursday that Russia may be targeting American defense companies in a potentially stepped-up sabotage campaign.

The new warning said that Russia’s intelligence services had conducted sabotage operations against European defense companies “in an attempt to undermine Allied support for Ukraine.”

Russia’s campaign, officials said, increases the risk to American companies overseas and, at least potentially, in the United States.

The warning was issued by the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, which advises American businesses on intelligence threats from potential adversaries.

The center often warns about attempts by the Russian and Chinese governments to steal intellectual property or potential cyberthreats against American businesses.

The alert issued on Thursday urged executives at defense companies to be on the lookout for surveillance near their facilities and staff, as well as for signs of trespassing or vandalism. Intelligence officials also said defense firms should be extra watchful for potential disruptions and should increase their physical and online security.

In addition to protecting sites, the center suggested bolstering personal security for executives and other key employees.

The warning, according to people briefed on the matter, was spurred in part by concern about a Russian attempt to assassinate the head of a German arms maker.

In the notice published on Thursday, the center said defense company officials should be careful when discussing travel plans, vary their routes to and from work, and report suspicious incidents.

“Those involved in work tied to Ukraine or other geopolitical conflicts should be cautious about disclosing work, travel, personal and family information online,” the warning said. “Adversaries can use this information to identify access, location and personal vulnerabilities.”

The warning highlighted Britain’s arrest of several people in an arson attack in March on a business linked to Ukraine, and Poland’s announcement in June that it had arrested 18 people accused of plotting sabotage attacks on behalf of Russia.

In addition, Western officials previously warned that Russia had plotted to plant incendiary devices in cargo planes and was potentially planning to set off those devices in U.S. warehouses or on planes bound for the United States.

So far all of Russia’s known sabotage attacks have taken place in Europe, although Russian intelligence has targeted many countries, including Britain, France, Germany, Lithuania and beyond. But some officials believe that Russia wants to expand its sabotage campaign to the United States, particularly if the Biden administration in its closing weeks continues to support Ukraine in its war against Russia or takes steps that Russia sees as escalatory.

A small fire at the Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Pennsylvania in September, and another incident at the same site in April, set off concerns that Russia had extended its campaign to the United States. But officials believe those fires were an accident, not sabotage.

Intelligence agencies had previously assessed that if the United States allowed Ukraine to use longer-range missiles to strike Russian territory, Russia might attempt deadlier acts of sabotage.

The Biden administration this week allowed Ukraine to fire the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS, at targets in Russia. The U.S. move came in response to Russia’s decision to use North Korean troops in the war.

Michael Schwirtz contributed reporting from London.

9. China blames US for failure of defence chiefs to meet

Some finger pointing among the defense chiefs. (as well as finger wagging between the presidents)

Austin reportedly said China had declined the meeting, calling the decision "a setback for the whole region".

Beijing hit back on Thursday, saying "the responsibility for not holding a meeting ... lies solely with the US side".

"The US can't damage China's core interests on the Taiwan question while at the same time conducting exchanges with the Chinese military as if nothing had happened," defence ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said in an online statement.

China and the US have butted heads in recent years over Taiwan, the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as part of its territory and has refused to rule out the use of force to seize one day.

China blames US for failure of defence chiefs to meet

21 Nov 2024 09:40PM

(Updated: 21 Nov 2024 09:47PM) 

channelnewsasia.com

China blames US for failure of defence chiefs to meet

East Asia

The flag of the United States of America and the flag of the Republic of China fly together on flag poles. (Photo: IStock)

21 Nov 2024 09:40PM (Updated: 21 Nov 2024 09:47PM)

Bookmark

WhatsApp Telegram Facebook Twitter Email LinkedIn

BEIJING: China on Thursday (Nov 21) blamed Washington's support for Taiwan for the failure of the two countries' defence ministers to meet this week, after US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin called Beijing's no-show "unfortunate".

Multiple US media reported this week that Austin had hoped to meet his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun at a regional summit in Laos as part of efforts to maintain military contact between the two superpowers.

Austin reportedly said China had declined the meeting, calling the decision "a setback for the whole region".

Beijing hit back on Thursday, saying "the responsibility for not holding a meeting ... lies solely with the US side".

"The US can't damage China's core interests on the Taiwan question while at the same time conducting exchanges with the Chinese military as if nothing had happened," defence ministry spokesperson Wu Qian said in an online statement.

China and the US have butted heads in recent years over Taiwan, the self-ruled island that Beijing claims as part of its territory and has refused to rule out the use of force to seize one day.

On Saturday, President Xi Jinping warned his outgoing US counterpart Joe Biden that support for Taiwan was a "red line that must not be challenged" during a meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation summit in Peru.

The US approved a US$2 billion arms sale package for Taiwan in October.

Xi also said Beijing was ready to work with the incoming administration of Biden's successor, Donald Trump, whose first term in office yielded a damaging trade war between the world's two largest economies.

Source: AFP/lh

channelnewsasia.com

10. Trump card or wild card? What Trump 2.0 could spell for Taiwan, China and regional stability

Excerpts:

However, rhetoric during the US presidential hustings suggests a shift in Mr Trump’s tone. In a late October interview, Mr Trump accused Taiwan of "stealing America's chip industry" and threatened to impose tariffs on Taiwanese semiconductor exports.

The businessman-turned-politician has also demanded that Taipei pay for US protection, and called for the island to increase its defence spending to at least 10 per cent of its gross domestic product, up from the current three to five per cent.

Mr Trump’s remarks have raised concerns about the durability of Washington’s support for Taiwan as China looms ever larger, and the implications for regional stability in the years ahead.

“Trump has long taken a more transactional approach to security cooperation, prioritising trade and economic strengthening over security,” said Dr Wu from Taiwan Thinktank.

“Such a stance is undoubtedly causing anxiety within Taiwan, especially as China has intensified pressure on the island to an unprecedented scale in the past one to two years.”

Trump card or wild card? What Trump 2.0 could spell for Taiwan, China and regional stability

Will Taiwan become a bargaining chip in the US-China rivalry under US President-elect Donald Trump’s transactional diplomacy, and how might Beijing respond? 

Taiwanese soldiers salute during "National Day" celebrations in front of the Presidential Building in Taipei, Taiwan. (Photo: AP/Chiang Ying-ying, File)

Lee Gim Siong

21 Nov 2024 12:24PM

(Updated: 21 Nov 2024 12:37PM)

channelnewsasia.com

SINGAPORE: US President-elect Donald Trump’s second presidency - with his hawkish cabinet picks - could change the dynamics of US-Taiwan relations, as well as the calculations behind China’s strategy towards the self-ruled island, say analysts.

This comes as Beijing evolves its military strategy to blockade Taiwan, a tactic that observers believe is designed to intensify pressure on the island and sway public sentiment from within.

With China hardliners set to hold key roles in Trump 2.0, they are likely to lock heads with Beijing on numerous fronts, potentially keeping China preoccupied and easing Chinese pressure on Taiwan, observers note.

However, a deterioration of US-China ties also raises risks of miscalculation that could escalate tensions in the Taiwan Strait and threaten broader stability, they add.

On the other hand, Mr Trump’s brand of transactional diplomacy and “America First” stance, including demanding Taiwan pay for US protection, raises questions about the reliability of US support for the island.

“While it remains unclear exactly what policies Trump and his administration will adopt regarding the Taiwan issue, his strongman image and the hawkish stance of key cabinet appointees on China could provoke a strong response from Beijing in its long-standing claims over Taiwan,” Dr Wu Se-chih, director of Taiwan Thinktank's China Research Center, told CNA.

FANNING PRESSURE FROM ALL CORNERS

Taiwan has been facing growing pressure from Beijing in recent years. On the economic front, China has reinstated tariffs on 134 items it imports from the self-ruled island and is studying further trade measures.

But it’s Beijing’s military press that has captured global attention. Air and naval sorties around Taiwan have become a near-daily occurrence, with many crossing the median line that once served as an unofficial border between the two sides.

Major war games staged just last month saw Chinese forces effectively encircling the island, similar to a previous exercise in May. Named “Joint Sword-2024B”, Beijing described the drills as a warning against “separatist acts”.

They were carried out three days after Taiwanese President William Lai’s “Double Ten” speech on Oct 10 to mark the founding of Taiwan. During his remarks, he declared that Taiwan and China “are not subordinate to each other” and China had no right to represent the island.

According to Dr Wu, China’s major military exercises towards Taiwan in the past two to three years have centred on a blockade scenario, departing from past drills that simulated aggressive attacks aimed at an eventual invasion.

Such drills have been inching closer to the island. The ones in May and October saw nearly all military assets positioned significantly beyond the median line towards Taiwan, according to deployment maps shown by Chinese state news agency CCTV.

He views this shift as part of China’s ongoing efforts to influence public sentiment in Taiwan, particularly among those who support eventual unification with the mainland or those who remain undecided.

“For example, pro-unification or anti-independence politicians in Taiwan may leverage the proximity of these drills to heighten fears of a potential conflict, potentially swaying public sentiment in their favour,” Dr Wu said.

“The new Trump administration is likely well aware of this perspective.”

He explained that such drills are intended to demonstrate China’s ability to blockade Taiwan’s trade routes, effectively crippling the island’s economy and disrupting its society.

A blockade would also have global ramifications by potentially crippling supply chains for advanced technologies such as semiconductors, considering Taiwan’s production prowess in this domain. Taiwan produces approximately 70 per cent of the world’s semiconductors and over 90 per cent of the highest-end models.

China's Liaoning aircraft carrier takes part in the "Joint Sword-2024B" military drills east of Taiwan, in this screenshot from a handout video released by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) Eastern Theatre Command on October 14, 2024. (Photo: PLA Eastern Theatre Command/Handout via REUTERS)

A blockade is an “intermediate possibility” for how China might try to use “coercive leverage” to manoeuvre Taiwan towards unification, said Professor Scott Kastner from the University of Maryland’s Department of Government and Politics.

“Many people are more worried about (such) a scenario than an actual invasion, because it would, in some sense, be more doable from the Chinese perspective,” he highlighted during a guest lecture in Singapore in September.

At the same time, Prof Kastner cautioned that a blockade also entails significant risks for Beijing because a prolonged standoff could compel intervention from external parties, including the US.

“Historically, it's very hard to get another state to capitulate using a blockade alone. They generally don't work like that … (and) if there's an effort by the US to try to break the blockade, the situation can escalate very quickly,” he explained.

ASSESSING POTENTIAL AMERICAN ACTION

The rub is how the US will approach the issue of Taiwan under a second Trump presidency.

Washington has long followed a policy of strategic ambiguity, being intentionally vague about how it would support Taiwan should China attempt a takeover. While observers say Mr Trump has not indicated he intends to change the status quo, they caution that the devil is in the details.

During his first term, Mr Trump was a vocal supporter of Taiwan. In December 2016, soon after winning the US presidential election, he made headlines by accepting a congratulatory call from then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen.

This marked the first time an American president-elect spoke directly with a Taiwanese leader since 1979. At the time, Mr Trump described the discussion as revolving around the “close economic, political, and security ties” between Taiwan and the US.

Then-Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen speaks on the phone with US President-elect Donald Trump at her office in Taipei, Taiwan, Dec 3, 2016. (Photo: Taiwan Presidential Office/Handout via REUTERS)

Public data reveals that under Trump 1.0, the US approved US$21 billion in arms sales to Taiwan across 11 packages, compared to US$7 billion under the Biden administration.

However, rhetoric during the US presidential hustings suggests a shift in Mr Trump’s tone. In a late October interview, Mr Trump accused Taiwan of "stealing America's chip industry" and threatened to impose tariffs on Taiwanese semiconductor exports.

The businessman-turned-politician has also demanded that Taipei pay for US protection, and called for the island to increase its defence spending to at least 10 per cent of its gross domestic product, up from the current three to five per cent.

Mr Trump’s remarks have raised concerns about the durability of Washington’s support for Taiwan as China looms ever larger, and the implications for regional stability in the years ahead.

“Trump has long taken a more transactional approach to security cooperation, prioritising trade and economic strengthening over security,” said Dr Wu from Taiwan Thinktank.

“Such a stance is undoubtedly causing anxiety within Taiwan, especially as China has intensified pressure on the island to an unprecedented scale in the past one to two years.”

Dr Chang Ching, a research fellow at the Taipei-based Society for Strategic Studies, highlighted growing concerns that Taiwan may be leveraged as a "bargaining chip" by the US in its negotiations with Beijing on broader geopolitical and economic issues.

Dr Chang said such speculation has raised fears that Taiwan could be effectively “sacrificed” in exchange for concessions on other strategic matters. But he isn’t convinced.

"Some people fail to understand that the US does not have ownership of Taiwan and therefore cannot 'give Taiwan away' to Beijing in exchange for concessions," he told CNA.

ALL EYES ON TRUMP’S CABINET PICKS

Against this backdrop, observers say Mr Trump’s team picks have drawn significant attention in Taiwan due to the considerable sway the appointees have in determining administration policy.

“More so for the US than most governments, personnel is policy,” Mr Steven Okun, senior advisor from the public affairs consultancy firm APAC Advisors, previously told CNA.

Taipei is likely reassured to some degree by the appointment of Mr Marco Rubio as US secretary of state and Mr Mike Waltz as national security advisor, given their history of pro-Taiwan statements, Associate Professor Chong Ja Ian from the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore (NUS) told CNA.

In 2019, after Mr Xi made a fresh call for Taiwan to embrace “peaceful reunification” with China and reject independence, Mr Rubio reaffirmed his support for the island in a tweet, describing it as “an independent democracy and strong ally of the United States”. He further emphasised that the US should strengthen ties with Taiwan “in the face of China's increasingly aggressive actions and rhetoric”.

Mr Rubio has also introduced several pieces of legislation aimed at boosting American support for Taiwan.

One such legislation aims to strengthen US-Taiwan ties by elevating the US representative to Taiwan to a Senate-confirmed position, akin to how an ambassador to a foreign country or international organisation must be confirmed by the senate.

Another, the Taiwan Peace Through Strength Act, focuses on expediting US arms sales to Taipei, increasing joint military training and establishing a munitions acquisition fund.

Alongside Mr Rubio and Mr Waltz, the emerging Trump 2.0 administration also includes military veteran and news commentator Pete Hegseth as the nominee for defence secretary.

Observers have pointed out that all three men are outspoken critics of China. They are known for highlighting alleged and perceived threats posed by Beijing across various domains, and advocating for tough countermeasures.

Dr Wu expects Mr Rubio as secretary of state to advocate for tough measures to challenge Beijing on the international stage, across multiple fronts like trade, tech and security. The international affairs observer suggests this could preoccupy China, potentially resulting in a less immediate focus on exerting pressure on Taiwan.

Assoc Prof Chong concurs that having China hawks in key diplomatic and security roles within Mr Trump's cabinet may benefit Taiwan. However, he also noted the high turnover of key officials during Mr Trump’s time in the Oval Office.

“(Trump) has a tendency to cycle through his key personnel quickly, particularly when their loyalty is called into question. So, the question of how long Mr Rubio will remain in office is uncertain,” said Assoc Prof Chong, who is also a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China.

Republican presidential nominee former US President Donald Trump greets Senator Marco Rubio during a campaign rally in Raleigh, North Carolina on Nov 4, 2024. (Photo: AP/Evan Vucci)

RAISING THE REGIONAL TEMPERATURE

Regardless, analysts anticipate that Mr Trump’s assembling of a foreign policy and national security team dominated by China hawks signals an inevitable deterioration in US-China relations.

They warn that this raises the risks of conflict, even as both sides are likely to make calculated moves to avoid unnecessary escalation.

Dr Wu from Taiwan Thinktank noted that Mr Trump has signalled his intention to shift resources away from Europe, including reducing military deployments and support, in favour of strengthening America’s presence in the Indo-Pacific - a region that was prioritised during Mr Trump’s first term.

"Such a move would undoubtedly escalate tensions in East Asia and the South China Sea, both of which are fraught with potential flashpoints," Dr Wu said. He pointed out that while an increased US military presence in the region could enhance Taiwan’s security, it also raises the risk of accidents or miscalculations.

Mr Trump has warned China against using military force to achieve reunification with Taiwan.

“Given his strongman image, his administration may believe that China would hesitate to challenge his stance on the issue. However, they could be mistaken, and the consequences of such a miscalculation could be significant,” Dr Wu cautioned.

Should China decide to blockade Taiwan, a tough response by the US under Mr Trump might get Beijing to be more cautious or restrained, Assoc Prof Chong said. But he warned that it could also yield the opposite effect.

China has repeatedly underscored it will not tolerate any internal or external attempts towards Taiwan independence. Chinese President Xi Jinping has framed it as the first red line that must not be crossed in bilateral ties - a refrain that he echoed recently at the APEC summit in Peru.

According to a Nov 20 commentary by University of Venice analyst Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado on The Diplomat site, Beijing’s leadership is convinced that a new Trump administration will swiftly ramp up preparations, which will in turn influence their strategic calculations and responses toward Taiwan.

“If the Trump administration decides to clearly break with the ‘status quo’ that has maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades, the Chinese Communist Party is unlikely to back down or simply yield,” he added.

As regional uncertainty looms, analysts say what’s certain is that Taiwan should focus on strengthening itself rather than relying on support from external parties like the US.

Washington does not have official relations with Taiwan, but is legally obligated to provide the island with the means to defend itself, including through the sale of weapons and military assets.

According to reports from the Financial Times earlier this month, Taiwan has contacted the incoming US administration with a proposal to acquire US$15 billion worth of weaponry, including an Aegis destroyer.

The article suggested that F-35 fighter jets could also be requested - although analysts have said the likelihood of Washington supplying them is slim, due to concerns over riling Beijing as well as fears such military technology could fall into Chinese hands.

“The real issue is whether Taiwan is willing to rely entirely on the US for its security, or whether it should focus on strengthening its own military capabilities to safeguard its sovereignty,” said Dr Chang from the Society for Strategic Studies.

“I believe the answer is clear.”

channelnewsasia.com

11. Europe Has Run Out of Time

A view from Germany.

Excertps:

A failure to prioritize defense efforts now will leave Europe deeply vulnerable to continued Russian aggression. Any reluctance to take on more of the continental defense burden, moreover, will strain transatlantic relations at a critical time. Retaining the United States as a security partner is undeniably in Europe’s interest. But to do so requires that Europe be proactive, constructively engaging Washington to work out a new balance of responsibilities and to discuss shared security goals.

This includes improving transatlantic cooperation on issues beyond Europe. First and foremost, the European Union—including both the European Commission and national capitals—and the United States must align their strategies for addressing the axis of hostile powers that are working to challenge the international order. China, Iran, and North Korea are supporting the Russian war in Ukraine by providing weapons and dual-use goods, while Russia is supporting the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. On top of this, China has exploited the West’s distraction to expand its power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Beijing is taking a close look at the Western response in Ukraine, contemplating Russia’s invasion as a potential blueprint for an attack on Taiwan. It would be shortsighted for the United States and Europe to view these threats in isolation or to attempt to counter them alone. If leaders on both sides of the Atlantic want the international liberal order to endure, with the United States at its core, they must tackle these challenges together.

It is now up to Europeans to fulfill the continent’s potential as a credible security actor, thereby salvaging transatlantic relations and checking Russia’s imperialist ambitions. Should this effort fall short—and should U.S. support fall away—the price will be steep. Without strong defenses standing in his way, Putin will have no reason to stop at Ukraine. After decades of relative peace, war could once again become a fixture of European politics.

Europe Has Run Out of Time

With Trump’s Return, the Continent Must Take Charge of Its Own Security—and Quickly

By Norbert Röttgen

November 22, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Norbert Röttgen · November 22, 2024

For decades, the transatlantic alliance has been the bedrock of European security. But today, Europe’s partnership with the United States is at a critical juncture. With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, there is a genuine risk that U.S. engagement in Europe could drop precipitously. If the United States halts its military aid to Kyiv, the consequences will be profound, both for the war in Ukraine and for the rest of Europe’s defenses against external threats, a revanchist Russia chief among them.

Although Trump’s second term will most likely usher in a radical break from previous U.S. policy, the reality is that discontent with the European contribution to the transatlantic relationship has been simmering in the United States for years. Europe, however, squandered the time it should have spent investing more heavily into the relationship—including by building up its own defenses. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 should have been the final wake-up call, creating real momentum behind Europe’s effort to become a credible security actor in its own right. Instead, once again, it relied on the United States to take the lead in a European war. Now, that fallback option is at risk of disappearing, and European leaders cannot simply shift the blame for their predicament to Washington.

European leaders must act decisively to advance a unified strategy to ensure the continent’s peace and stability. They must quickly ramp up their economic and military support for Ukraine, begin a serious effort to create an integrated European defense industry, and demonstrate to the United States that Europe is prepared to hold up its side of a mutually beneficial partnership. From now on, Europe’s security will have to be European—or it won’t exist at all.

NO TURNING BACK

Since the United States entered World War II, it has considered European security to be a fundamental U.S. interest. Only with the support of a stable, peaceful Europe could the United States project power globally. Washington’s engagement with Europe was never only about strategy, though. The alliance was also values-based, grounded in a shared commitment to defend democracy against dictatorship. During the Cold War, the transatlantic partnership strengthened further. The formation of NATO, in 1949, created an American security umbrella that enabled Europe to rebuild and thrive, and the U.S.-European economic and military partnership over the next several decades was an overwhelming success.

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new era of U.S. unipolar power, however, a dangerous sense of complacency set in on both sides of the Atlantic. The relative stability of this period led many European countries to reduce their defense spending, assuming that war had been banished from the continent for good. Most European armies were restructured to focus on interventions abroad, and in the process neglected their ability to accomplish homeland defense. Meanwhile, the United States became entangled in costly conflicts in the Middle East that stretched its resources thin.

During those years, Europe and the United States ignored or downplayed rising threats. Starting roughly a decade ago, Russian and Chinese challenges to the U.S.-led international order began to grow. In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and launched a war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. After Xi Jinping assumed leadership of China, in 2012, he overhauled China’s economic and foreign policy and positioned the country as a global power determined to stand on equal footing with the United States. At home, Western countries grappled with the negative effects of globalization, including industrial decline, diminished competitiveness, an erosion of social cohesion, and discontent with the political status quo.

From now on, Europe’s security will have to be European—or it won’t exist at all.

In his 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, Trump effectively channeled the public grievances that arose from these problems. Many Americans had become disillusioned with global leadership, angry that large amounts of taxpayer money were spent on U.S. activities abroad while parts of the country struggled. Trump’s vow to put “America first” and demand that allies pay up resonated. What many on the other side of the Atlantic understood too late was that although Trump’s voice may have been the loudest, the underlying sentiment—at least as it applied to Europe—was widespread within the U.S. political establishment. Even Trump’s predecessor, President Barack Obama, had concluded that the United States should reduce its footprint in Europe and the Middle East in order to shift its focus to the Indo-Pacific.

The misguided hope, which many European leaders have held since 2016, that Europe can simply wait out the Trump presidency must be consigned to the dustbin of history. Although the Russian war against Ukraine led the Biden administration to reprioritize European security, this was only a temporary deviation, not a general change in U.S. strategy. Today, not all U.S. leaders would draw back Washington’s commitment to Europe as quickly—or speak of the alliance with as harsh a tone—as Trump may be inclined to do. But these differences aside, they will likely agree with Trump’s basic demand that Europe take significantly greater responsibility for its own security.

For Europe, then, there is no time left to waste. Trump has repeatedly expressed his support for an immediate halt to any U.S. military aid to Ukraine, and Europe must prepare for the possibility that for the first time since World War II, it will be the principal party tasked with ending a major conflict on the continent. An even bigger risk is that Trump might pursue a deal with Russian President Vladimir Putin to freeze the fighting. Putin understands that once Trump enters negotiations, he will face domestic pressure to close a deal—a constraint that Putin does not share. This imbalance gives Putin leverage, and any deal that emerges from such negotiations would be highly unlikely to include adequate protections for Ukraine—and thus for Europe—against future Russian aggression. For Washington to essentially accommodate Moscow’s war aims would critically undermine NATO’s credibility, shaking the foundations of Europe’s security architecture.

CAPACITY BUILDING

Europe now has no choice but to manage its own security. There is no doubt that it has the economic potential to do so; the combined GDP of the European Union is roughly ten times that of Russia. What holds Europe back is a lack of political will. That deficiency of will is glaringly obvious when it comes to military support for Ukraine: the technologically backward and economically decrepit North Korea is estimated to have supplied more artillery shells to Russia during the past year than the entire EU has provided to Ukraine over the same period. This pitiful state of affairs has arisen even though the EU has a strong industrial base and counts four of the world’s ten largest arms exporters among its members.

Europe needs to step up its defense capabilities—and fast. But this project requires political leadership, which is currently hard to come by. In Germany, the coalition government has collapsed, and the country’s politicians will spend the coming months occupied by snap elections scheduled for February 23 and the coalition-building process that will follow. In France, President Emmanuel Macron lost his parliamentary majority this summer, leaving him politically weakened. Meanwhile, the EU’s relationship with the United Kingdom, one of Europe’s most formidable military powers, remains fraught, even as both sides make sincere efforts to improve cooperation.

Fortunately, other EU members such as Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries are willing to take the lead. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is already trying to bring together leading European NATO states to improve coordination on Ukraine and ramp up support for Kyiv. But any substantial defense buildup will need Germany’s economic power and political clout to succeed, which means that the new government in Berlin will need to take the continent’s security challenges seriously and be willing to put money behind a broader European effort.

What holds Europe back is a lack of political will.

Anticipating a withdrawal of U.S. support, Europe also needs to significantly increase its financial and military support for Ukraine. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy’s Ukraine Support Tracker, the combined military aid that Germany, France, and the United Kingdom have supplied to Ukraine since the start of the full-scale war is less than half of what the United States has contributed. Although it may not be feasible to immediately and completely fill the gap left by the United States, the goal should be to come as close as possible. For a start, EU countries will need to turn to international markets, including the United States, to purchase weapons systems and ammunition that Europe cannot yet produce in sufficient quantities itself. Germany in particular should also take steps that it has been delaying for far too long: sending long-range Taurus missiles to Ukraine and removing the remaining restrictions on Kyiv using Western weapons to strike military targets deep inside Russia. The United States recently lifted these restrictions on the use of its ATACMS missiles, and France and the United Kingdom, which have already delivered their own cruise missiles to Ukraine, seem to be following suit.

In the medium to long term, the EU will need to overhaul its defense capabilities and industry if Europe is to meaningfully backstop its own security. Right now, Europe purchases the lion’s share of its arms from abroad; this practice must come to an end. A credible security provider must be able to meet most of its own defense needs. Europe will have to overcome the national self-interests that treat defense industries as mere extensions of domestic industrial policy. Instead, these industries must be reshaped to serve Europe’s collective security interests. This will require the continent’s foremost military powers—France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and the United Kingdom—to lead the development of a joint European strategy. In practice, the process will involve scaling up production and cutting costs by integrating every part of the production cycle, from capability planning to development to procurement. If this integration is managed successfully, the European defense industry can compete on the level of the U.S. defense sector.

SECURING EUROPE’S FUTURE

A failure to prioritize defense efforts now will leave Europe deeply vulnerable to continued Russian aggression. Any reluctance to take on more of the continental defense burden, moreover, will strain transatlantic relations at a critical time. Retaining the United States as a security partner is undeniably in Europe’s interest. But to do so requires that Europe be proactive, constructively engaging Washington to work out a new balance of responsibilities and to discuss shared security goals.

This includes improving transatlantic cooperation on issues beyond Europe. First and foremost, the European Union—including both the European Commission and national capitals—and the United States must align their strategies for addressing the axis of hostile powers that are working to challenge the international order. China, Iran, and North Korea are supporting the Russian war in Ukraine by providing weapons and dual-use goods, while Russia is supporting the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen. On top of this, China has exploited the West’s distraction to expand its power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Beijing is taking a close look at the Western response in Ukraine, contemplating Russia’s invasion as a potential blueprint for an attack on Taiwan. It would be shortsighted for the United States and Europe to view these threats in isolation or to attempt to counter them alone. If leaders on both sides of the Atlantic want the international liberal order to endure, with the United States at its core, they must tackle these challenges together.

It is now up to Europeans to fulfill the continent’s potential as a credible security actor, thereby salvaging transatlantic relations and checking Russia’s imperialist ambitions. Should this effort fall short—and should U.S. support fall away—the price will be steep. Without strong defenses standing in his way, Putin will have no reason to stop at Ukraine. After decades of relative peace, war could once again become a fixture of European politics.

• NORBERT RÖTTGEN is a member of the German Bundestag and its Foreign Affairs Committee. He served as Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee from 2014 to 2021 and was Federal Minister of the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety from 2009 to 2012.

Foreign Affairs · by Norbert Röttgen · November 22, 2024

12. The Saudi Solution?

Excerpts:

Israel is counting on the hope that its escalations will tip the regional power balance. And it is betting that the United States will eventually be drawn into this dynamic, yielding a weaker Iran and a stable Middle Eastern future anchored by alliances between Israel and the Gulf states. That vision may have underpinned the development of the Abraham Accords, but five years later, it can no longer guide a profoundly transformed region. Israel is much more willing now than it was then to use violence to bolster its deterrence. Saudi Arabia relies less solely on the United States, having diversified its engagements by strengthening its ties with China and stepping up security talks with Iran. The issue of Palestinian statehood can no longer be glossed over. And a Palestinian state cannot be achieved merely by a transaction between Israel and the Gulf states; it has become a global cause led by Saudi Arabia and backed by a wide variety of countries, including Iran.

Although U.S. President-elect Donald Trump may try to pursue normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel following the template of the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia should counter that by advancing a two-state solution right away, before normalization. This may disappoint Trump, but the United States should welcome such a Saudi effort as a way to end the conflict that currently engulfs the region. In fact, the new kind of balancing that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have begun to pursue makes them increasingly well placed to de-escalate regional tensions. They have positioned themselves as acceptable to all regional actors, a position neither Iran nor Israel holds.

For Riyadh to maintain its strategy, it will have to extract security guarantees from Tehran, such as a mutual nonaggression pact. It could then use these guarantees to push Israel to acknowledge that its escalatory strategy is backfiring by strengthening ties between the Gulf states and Iran and diminishing the prospects for normalization with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s efforts to coordinate a coherent GCC position on Palestinian statehood can also help calm regional tensions by pressuring the United States, Europe, and powers such as China and Russia to back their approach to end the conflict in the Middle East. That kind of broad backing could eventually yield a coexistence framework between Israel and Iran with the Gulf states as mediators—a paradigm that requires Israel to halt its provocative attacks and Iran to restrain its retaliatory responses.

Above all, Washington should realize that a stronger Saudi Arabia serves everyone. It can dilute Iran’s power. It can also push Israel to make peace with the Palestinians. In doing so, the Saudis are uniquely positioned to help halt the fighting that has wreaked havoc across the Middle East.

The Saudi Solution?

How Riyadh’s Ties to America, Iran, and Israel Could Foster Stability

By Maria Fantappie and Bader Al-Saif

November 22, 2024

Foreign Affairs · by Maria Fantappie and Bader Al-Saif · November 22, 2024

Over the past decade, and especially since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, Israel has assumed that its military, intelligence, and technological prowess can buy it allies among the Arab Gulf states. In more recent months, Israeli officials also came to believe that escalation would turn the regional equilibrium in their favor: a wider war between Israel and Iran and its proxies could force the Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, to finally and fully join with the Israelis.

If war engulfed the Middle East, Israeli leaders thought, the responses of Iran and its proxies to Israel’s provocations would erode the already fragile reconciliation between the Gulf states and Iran, leaving them—and Saudi Arabia, in particular—dependent on security guarantees from Israel’s main ally, the United States. Israeli officials believed that Arab leaders’ opposition to Israeli operations in Gaza and their diplomatic efforts in support of the Palestinians were, ultimately, not their primary concern; their own self-interest was. And thus escalation by Israel would confirm that Iran was the main threat to its Arab neighbors, leaving the Gulf states no choice but to align themselves more closely with Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly articulated this calculus in his September speech at the UN, referring to the Gulf states as Israel’s “Arab partners of peace” and called for Saudi Arabia to ally with it to counter “Iran’s nefarious designs.”

Israel's presumptions, however, have proved erroneous. In fact, Israel’s war in Gaza and the wider region is driving Saudi Arabia and Iran closer together. Israeli operations have indeed targeted some of Saudi Arabia’s enemies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. But the prospect of an all-out war in the Middle East—and Israeli dominance in the region—has put Saudi Arabia on the offensive. Riyadh has proactively recommitted to the cause of Palestinian statehood and sought to keep its strategic options open, engaging with the United States on the one hand and Iran and China on the other. Israel’s escalations against Iran and its proxies will no doubt press Tehran, fearing isolation, to intensify its security talks with Riyadh and, potentially, offer the Gulf states bolder security guarantees. For Saudi Arabia, such guarantees are more important than any intelligence that Israel can offer against Iranian attacks.

To Washington, the Saudi rapprochement with Iran may seem like bad news. U.S. officials, after all, have spent years pushing for Israel and Saudi Arabia to normalize relations. But the United States should welcome Riyadh’s pivot. If Saudi Arabia can forge working ties with both Iran and Israel, the country can play a new and useful role in moderating Middle Eastern tensions. It can act as a broker between competing parties, perhaps putting an end to the current Iranian-Israeli tit for tat. The events of the past year have upended long-standing redlines, deterrence parameters, and traditional rules of engagement among foes, and Riyadh is in a uniquely strong position to midwife a better regional order.

MISTAKEN IDENTITY

Israel’s recent show of military might has three main objectives: to incapacitate Iran and its proxies, to showcase Israel’s value as an ally to other neighboring countries, and to force Saudi Arabia to normalize diplomatic relations with Israel by emphasizing Riyadh’s security dependence on Washington. Israeli officials hoped that greater regional insecurity would pressure Saudi Arabia to lean harder on the United States’ security guarantees—guarantees that are, as of now, conditioned on Riyadh’s willingness to eventually normalize diplomatic relations with Israel. Events last spring appeared to support this calculus: as Iran lobbed missiles and drones at Israel, Jordan and other Gulf states cooperated with the United States to intercept them, giving the impression that concerted military cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states was finally in the offing. Back then, escalating against Iran appeared to have delivered results for Israel. By expanding the war beyond Gaza, Israel had provoked Iran into a direct response, and that had pushed the Gulf states to seek further protection under the United States’ security umbrella.

Although Saudi Arabia has been making efforts for years to restore ties with Iran, including a March 2023 deal brokered by China, Israeli officials have always been skeptical that these gestures were serious. Iran, after all, supports nonstate actors that threaten Saudi interests. Iran has also repeatedly criticized Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries for their lack of support for Palestinian statehood. Ironically, Israeli and U.S. officials have often bought into Iran’s criticism, doubting Saudi Arabia’s commitment to a Palestinian state and assuming, in particular, that younger Gulf leaders have little empathy for Palestinian suffering. Over the past year of war, a selective reading of the Gulf states’ actions may have played into this assumption. To many, it seemed that Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), by retaining their diplomatic ties with Israel, were already showing that they prioritized their national security over Palestinian statehood; it also seemed that Saudi Arabia, by negotiating a defense pact with the United States that did not close the door to normalization with Israel, was proving the same.

Saudi Arabia wants to become a key stabilizer in the Middle East.

Yet Israel’s read of Saudi Arabia, in particular, misunderstood the country’s comprehensive strategy. Saudi Arabia’s pursuit of its national interest and its support of an independent Palestinian state were never mutually exclusive. Both were part of a segmented strategy that started with the U.S.-Saudi defense deal, to be followed by a discussion on Palestinian statehood in coordination with the Palestinian Authority. Although Saudi Arabia’s priority has been to spare its territory from conflict, Saudi leaders believe that they must lead the region and support a Palestinian state to ensure their national security. Championing Palestinian statehood also offers Riyadh an opportunity to unify the other countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE—in hedging between Iran and Israel. It also helps the kingdom renew its role as a regional and global power.

Saudi Arabia wants to become a key stabilizer in the Middle East. To that end, over the past year, Riyadh has left its policy options open. It has continued to engage with U.S. officials on normalization with Israel in exchange for a U.S.-Saudi defense pact, but it premised normalization on Palestinian statehood and kept talking with Iran. This multipronged approach has paid dividends. In August, Riyadh convinced Washington to lift its three-year embargo on selling offensive weapons to the kingdom by leveraging the prospect of normalization with Israel. But by continuing to engage with Tehran, Riyadh was able to secure safe passage for Saudi ships transiting the Red Sea and protect Saudi oil installations against attacks from Iranian-affiliated groups.

Other Gulf states pursued a similar strategy, neutralizing security risks and leveraging opportunities offered by the regional conflict to boost their standing. Qatar did so by mediating between Hamas and Israel. Oman continued its mediations with the Houthis. The UAE used the rotating seat it gained in 2023 on the UN Security Council to push for resolutions calling for a humanitarian cease-fire in Gaza and leveraged its ties with Israel to deliver more humanitarian aid to the region and negotiate a day-after plan.

STATE IN PLAY

But as conflict in the region expanded, Saudi Arabia’s policy risked backfiring, and the country changed course. Israel’s intensifying operations in Gaza and its attacks in Lebanon, coupled with the fresh exchanges between Iran and Israel in September and October, demonstrated that the United States was unable or unwilling to rein Israel in. These escalations also revealed the extent of Israel’s determination to use raw military power to assert primacy in the region and to expose Saudi Arabia’s security vulnerabilities, narrowing Riyadh’s strategic options.

Since September, Saudi Arabia has thus begun to shift from quiet, behind-the-scenes diplomacy toward more forceful, public criticism of Israel and support for Palestinian statehood. Saudi leaders are showing that they are not willing to be locked into an exclusive alliance with the United States and, by extension, with Israel that would prevent them from forging other alliances. In a key September speech to the Shura Council, the deliberative body that advises the Saudi monarch, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman openly stated that normalization with Israel would be conditional on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In a Financial Times op-ed in early October, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan reiterated this message.

Saudi leaders have sought to demonstrate their power to organize Palestinian allies by hosting a Joint Arab Islamic Extraordinary Summit on Israeli Aggression Against the Palestinian People in November 2023 that convened representatives from more than fifty countries and called for the creation of a Palestinian state. And they have expanded their efforts beyond the Middle East, launching in September the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, which is set to meet again in Brussels in late November. Indeed, over the past months, Saudi Arabia has established a raft of new multilateral coalitions and alliances with other countries pushing for the establishment of a Palestinian state.

The cause of Palestinian statehood has also prompted an unprecedented level of coordination between the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia included) and Iran. On October 3, Doha welcomed the newly elected Iranian president to the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Summit, where GCC leaders reinforced their solidarity with the Palestinians and condemned Israeli aggression. On the same day, the Gulf Cooperation Council hosted a rare informal joint GCC-Iranian ministerial meeting, the first in more than 17 years, during which members affirmed the Gulf states’ unwillingness to allow their territory and airspace to be used to launch attacks against Iran. The UAE’s deputy prime minister and foreign minister even recently announced that the United Arab Emirates was “not ready to support” day-after planning for Gaza “without the establishment of a Palestinian state.”

GIFT HORSE

Israel is counting on the hope that its escalations will tip the regional power balance. And it is betting that the United States will eventually be drawn into this dynamic, yielding a weaker Iran and a stable Middle Eastern future anchored by alliances between Israel and the Gulf states. That vision may have underpinned the development of the Abraham Accords, but five years later, it can no longer guide a profoundly transformed region. Israel is much more willing now than it was then to use violence to bolster its deterrence. Saudi Arabia relies less solely on the United States, having diversified its engagements by strengthening its ties with China and stepping up security talks with Iran. The issue of Palestinian statehood can no longer be glossed over. And a Palestinian state cannot be achieved merely by a transaction between Israel and the Gulf states; it has become a global cause led by Saudi Arabia and backed by a wide variety of countries, including Iran.

Although U.S. President-elect Donald Trump may try to pursue normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel following the template of the Abraham Accords, Saudi Arabia should counter that by advancing a two-state solution right away, before normalization. This may disappoint Trump, but the United States should welcome such a Saudi effort as a way to end the conflict that currently engulfs the region. In fact, the new kind of balancing that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have begun to pursue makes them increasingly well placed to de-escalate regional tensions. They have positioned themselves as acceptable to all regional actors, a position neither Iran nor Israel holds.

For Riyadh to maintain its strategy, it will have to extract security guarantees from Tehran, such as a mutual nonaggression pact. It could then use these guarantees to push Israel to acknowledge that its escalatory strategy is backfiring by strengthening ties between the Gulf states and Iran and diminishing the prospects for normalization with Saudi Arabia. Riyadh’s efforts to coordinate a coherent GCC position on Palestinian statehood can also help calm regional tensions by pressuring the United States, Europe, and powers such as China and Russia to back their approach to end the conflict in the Middle East. That kind of broad backing could eventually yield a coexistence framework between Israel and Iran with the Gulf states as mediators—a paradigm that requires Israel to halt its provocative attacks and Iran to restrain its retaliatory responses.

Above all, Washington should realize that a stronger Saudi Arabia serves everyone. It can dilute Iran’s power. It can also push Israel to make peace with the Palestinians. In doing so, the Saudis are uniquely positioned to help halt the fighting that has wreaked havoc across the Middle East.

• MARIA FANTAPPIE is head of the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa Program at Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome.
• 
  
• BADER AL-SAIF is Assistant Professor of History at Kuwait University and an Associate Fellow at Chatham House.

Foreign Affairs · by Maria Fantappie and Bader Al-Saif · November 22, 2024

13. China Is Off the Fence in Myanmar

Has the US ceded the initiative and lost opportunities in strategic competition by ignoring and neglecting Myanmar/Burma? Or are we listening to Bonaparte who advises to never interrupt an enemy when he is making a mistake. Is China making a mistake in Myanmar/Burma?

Excerpt:

Going forward, China’s interventions are unlikely to do much besides undermine its own interests in Myanmar. Indeed, on Oct. 19, a small explosive device detonated outside the Chinese consulate in Mandalay, sparking China’s condemnation. Although it is unclear who is responsible, the bombing underlines the depth of anti-China sentiment now roiling within Myanmar as Beijing expands its open support for the hated Tatmadaw. Moreover, its reported house arrest of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s commander during negotiations in China is likely to only further weaken China’s leverage over its aligned border ethnic armed groups, who must now choose to listen to Beijing and cease fighting or soldier on against the Tatmadaw and risk Chinese retaliation.

For both the pro-democracy resistance and its most significant international supporter, the United States, it is far from time to enter negotiations with the Tatmadaw or give in to Beijing’s paranoia. Momentum is on the resistance’s side, and the coalition needs more time and support to develop a post-war political framework. For policymakers in Washington, it is increasingly clear that China is locked into a “cold war mindset” and little can reassure Beijing of U.S. intentions. Although Washington should not abandon cooperation with China where possible or provocatively cross any Chinese or regional countries’ red lines regarding lethal support, it should feel confident that an inclusive, federal democracy in Myanmar is in America’s strategic interests regardless of Beijing’s opposition to it. As such, the incoming Trump administration should provide expanded U.S. funding and non-lethal support in line with the BURMA Act for the resistance to offset the weight of Beijing’s pressure, assist in resolving Myanmar’s growing humanitarian crisis, and help buy them the time needed to achieve their Spring Revolution.

China Is Off the Fence in Myanmar - War on the Rocks

warontherocks.com · by Lucas Myers · November 22, 2024

On Nov. 6, the head of Myanmar’s military junta, Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing, finally traveled to China, meeting with Chinese Premier Li Qiang in Kunming as part of the Greater Mekong Subregion leader’s summit. The Xinhua readout prominently featured a photo of Min Aung Hlaing shaking hands with Li, who reportedly expressed support for the junta’s planned 2025 elections. This is a level of legitimacy and de facto recognition thus far denied to the Myanmar military junta, and it represents a fundamental shift in Beijing’s calculus.

China’s dual approach to Myanmar’s ongoing civil war has now veered sharply in the military junta’s favor. Since the summer, top Chinese officials have ramped up visits to Myanmar to bestow more legitimacy on the junta and its planned 2025 “elections,” as well as pressured key ethnic armed groups to cease fighting the military, known as the Tatmadaw. From Beijing’s perspective, the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which it has supported closely, is no longer acting in line with Chinese interests, and it sees the National Unity Government and allied pro-democracy People’s Defense Forces as hewing too close to Washington for Chinese comfort with their “Spring Revolution.”

The implications for Myanmar’s civil war are stark. China has gotten off the fence to shore up a faltering junta and marginalize what it sees as a too pro-American National Unity Government. Ironically, U.S. material support remains limited on the ground. Now, China’s support for the junta’s 2025 elections threatens to resurrect the Tatmadaw’s “divide-and-rule” strategy.

Become a Member

The Junta’s Failure to Stem the Bleeding

Since the military coup of February 2021, China has played a delicate game balancing ties between the Tatmadaw’s regime, ethnic armed groups along its border, and pro-democracy forces. Indeed, Myanmar’s fragmentation allows China to exert leverage over the various factions to position itself as the key power broker. This protects its economic and strategic interests, while also projecting an image of “noninterference.” China hopes that no matter who holds power in Naypyidaw, its interests are secure. However, this pragmatic positioning has now evolved into open support for the military junta because, in the end, China does not want a federal democracy: It desires the bare minimum stability to pursue its interests and it feels the junta is the horse to back to achieve this.

Over the past year, Myanmar’s military leaders have become increasingly restricted to the country’s center and urban areas, even if they have had more success fighting the resistance there. The main instruments of its most recent precipitous decline are the Three Brotherhood Alliance of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Ta’ang National Liberation Army, who have enjoyed close ties to China for years. Beijing has supported them, even going so far as to greenlight 2023’s Operation 1027 phase one to temporarily punish the junta for its support of cyberscams. Since the first phase of Operation 1027, the alliance has taken much of Rakhine and northern Shan States.

The second phase of Operation 1027 began in June 2024, violating a Chinese-brokered ceasefire. In this phase, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army captured Lashio city and the Tatmadaw’s Northeastern Regional Command Headquarters by early August, marking a watershed moment in Myanmar’s civil war. Meanwhile, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and People’s Defense Forces are now encroaching on the city of Mandalay. To the north, the allied Kachin Independence Army has rolled up territory along the Chinese border and taken valuable sources of rare earth minerals and jade. It has also continued supporting other People’s Defense Forces and the National Unity Government in Sagaing. Despite setbacks while attempting to take the larger cities of Myawaddy and Loikaw this year, the resistance coalition and People’s Defense Forces in the Bamar heartland in Sagaing and Magway, as well as key allied ethnic armed groups like the Karen National Union, are gaining ground through continuous guerilla tactics. Despite several counteroffensives and widescale terror bombing, the Tatmadaw has failed to stem its bleeding. For China, the Tatmadaw’s decline now presents an intolerable risk.

China’s Proxies Buck Beijing

Following Operation 1027 phase one in late 2023, Beijing negotiated a ceasefire in northern Shan state in January 2024. One member of the coalition, the Arakan Army, ignored Chinese efforts to cease its campaigning in Rakhine State, but the halt to fighting in Shan state gave the junta a much-needed lifeline by allowing it to focus on other battlefronts.

But, against China’s wishes, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army — perhaps sensing the junta’s weakness, feeling confident in their ability to reinforce their territorial gains, and distrusting China’s intentions — broke the ceasefire in June and July 2024. As the Three Brotherhood Alliance made significant gains against the junta — most notably taking Lashio — their growing autonomy and threat to the Myanmar junta unsettled Beijing’s strategic calculus.

Although Operation 1027 phase one had advanced China’s interests in stopping cyberscams against Chinese nationals, phase two took Lashio and now threatens Myanmar’s second-largest city, Mandalay. Importantly, the Three Brotherhood Alliance was also clearly coordinating with the National Unity Government and commanding People’s Defense Forces units in the field. By the end of August and early September, with fighting ongoing near its border, the Chinese government had become incensed, with the fall of Lashio city in early August being a clear red line for China. Beijing felt its allies had gone much too far in challenging the Tatmadaw.

Clearly unhappy, Beijing shuttered border crossings to areas under Kachin Independence Army and Three Brotherhood Alliance control. Its action restricted access to food, electricity, and supplies vital for continued campaigning and the local economy. The People’s Liberation Army then held live fire drills to signal China’s displeasure and send a warning.

China, largely under the auspices of its special envoy Deng Xijun, also began a renewed effort to pressure the border ethnic armed groups to cease their offensives. After the battle of Lashio, Deng met with and, according to a source close to the resistance, threatened the United Wa State Army to cut its support for the Three Brotherhood Alliance, including the flow of arms. China also stated that it does not recognize Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army control of Lashio and warned of supposed U.S. influence along the border. Intriguingly, we know of details from this meeting because the minutes were leaked, likely by the Wa, which indicates a level of dissatisfaction with China’s pressure.

Deng’s pressure clearly influenced the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, who are highly dependent upon the Chinese economy and weapons from the Wa. In response to China’s pressure, they issued a Chinese-language statement in September that denounced cooperation with the National Unity Government and announced a policy banning its officials from meeting with international actors — meaning Americans. They have also halted their offensives and entered a defensive pattern to consolidate their newly taken territory.

China’s backdoor pressure proved much less effective with the Kachin and Ta’ang, who are less dependent upon China than the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. In August, China issued an ominous, threatening letter via a local security committee to the Ta’ang National Liberation Army. China’s Foreign Ministry coyly refused to confirm or deny the threat, thus seemingly confirming it. Clearly incensed, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army has continued advancing and coordinated closely with People’s Defense Forces in Mandalay. The Kachin, meanwhile, have met with the Chinese government but have stubbornly kept taking territory along the border and publicly reaffirmed their commitment to ending military rule.

In sum, China’s influence is perhaps less than it hoped. That the United Wa State Army leaked their meeting minutes is a signal of their own displeasure and reminder that they are far from Chinese “yes men.” The Kachin and Ta’ang, as well as the Arakan Army in Rakhine, continue to resist China’s pressure.

Only the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army gave in publicly, but not enough to escape China’s wrath. Recent reports indicate that Beijing has allegedly detained the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance’s commander, Peng Daxun, in China after inviting him for talks in October, likely to coerce the group into withdrawing from Lashio completely. If true, this is a substantial escalation in Beijing’s pressure campaign, and it signals China is rapidly running out of patience. Whether the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army will cease behind-the-scenes cooperation with the National Unity Government and People’s Defense Forces, or give up hard-won Lashio, remains to be seen. The group violated earlier Chinese ceasefire negotiations to seize Lashio in the first place and must be well aware that the military will not allow them to keep their other conquests indefinitely.

China’s Longer Leash for the Junta

China has not only punished and pressured its aligned ethnic armed groups but also ramped up its direct engagement and support of the Myanmar military regime. After the fall of Lashio, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to Naypyidaw on Aug. 14 to meet face-to-face with Min Aung Hlaing. In this meeting, he emphasized that Myanmar must advance the “new Five-Point Road Map within the constitutional framework to realize political reconciliation and resume the process of democratic transition at an early date.” Although ostensibly a pro-democracy statement, in reality “constitutional framework” refers to the 2008 constitution that the military claimed to uphold with their February 2021 coup d’etat and that the pro-democracy resistance openly rejects. China’s promised support for the junta’s census and planned 2025 elections under this framework were later reaffirmed during Min Aung Hlaing’s November visit to Kunming. China is now a primary driver behind the Tatmadaw’s planned elections for 2025.

China’s support for the Tatmadaw now extends further than it did before. Although there are limits — China reportedly fired warning shots in October at a military bomber straying too close to the border — Beijing has acquiesced to the military’s escalated bombing of Lashio, occupied by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army. Indeed, despite the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s denunciation of ties to the National Unity Government and other resistance actors, Chinese pressure continues, as do the junta’s bombings, meaning that China wants them to abandon Lashio and enter peace negotiations with the junta. In a sign of their tacit approval of the junta’s strategic bombing campaign, China has delivered additional warplanes and considered supplying military drones. It has also reportedly proposed establishing a security company to enhance security for Chinese assets and Belt and Road projects in Myanmar. Most significantly of all, Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to China in November amounts to de facto recognition, something that the Chinese government had deferred thus far.

China’s Cold War Obsession and Turn to the Junta

Viewed together, China’s pressure on its wayward proxies and expanded help for the junta should be understood to mark a fundamental shift away from its “double game” toward a more assertive pro-junta stance. From a 50,000-foot view, Beijing greenlit Operation 1027 in 2023 to punish the junta (which soon moved its cyber scam operations away from China) before realizing that the Three Brotherhood Alliance was more autonomous than it had previously understood. Concerned with U.S. influence and spiraling instability in Myanmar, Beijing aims to rectify its error and ensure the junta comes out on top through elections under the 2008 constitution, which will undoubtedly prove unfree and unfair and result in a military-dominated “civilian” government.

The key evidence for this shift in Beijing’s thinking is that resistance success has not translated into a pragmatic China publicly or privately expanding its outreach to the National Unity Government and the loose coalition of pro-federal democracy forces. Instead, it has apparently kept them at arm’s length and only grown closer to the Tatmadaw, while pushing its aligned armed groups to cease fighting alongside the rest of the resistance.

Fundamentally, Beijing views the pro-democracy National Unity Government and its allies as too close to the United States for its comfort, despite China’s formerly close relations with the ousted Aung San Suu Kyi government. This belief started slowly in 2023 after the National Unity Government opened an office in Washington and the United States passed the BURMA Act. There is a “cold war-ization” dynamic in China’s thinking that has only deepened since then. Beijing’s paranoia is no doubt spurred by public U.S. government engagements, including those that occurred just after Wang was in Myanmar, expressing concerns about U.S. involvement.

The National Unity Government has worked to mollify China’s concerns, even issuing a January 2024 statement expressing its support for the One China policy. But despite this Beijing continues to publicly ignore the National Unity Government. Naturally, China’s support for the junta has generated real dissatisfaction among the resistance, especially behind closed doors. Recently, the National Unity Government promised not to recognize any debts to China incurred by the junta and expressed public frustration at China’s continued stonewalling. After Min Aung Hlaing’s November visit to China, the National Unity Government expressed its opposition to Chinese pressure and the 2025 elections: “The revolution must bring about a new system that leaves no room for the Myanmar military in the country’s politics, and that guarantees federalism for ethnic people. Just applying pressure won’t work and it won’t be good for China.”

Despite Beijing’s dislike, distrust, and desire to get rid of Min Aung Hlaing, China increasingly feels that only the Tatmadaw as an institution can hold the country together. China appears to buy into the narrative that Myanmar will Balkanize absent the Tatmadaw’s control over the state, a belief that the regime is careful to inculcate. Moreover, Beijing appears to (incorrectly) believe that elections in 2025 will somehow give this institution an out.

China’s backing for the elections is important, as it represents largely uncritical endorsement of the junta’s preferred offramp from its current battlefield and political dilemma. For decades, the Tatmadaw’s countrywide strategy has been “divide and rule,” aiming to buy off or coerce the various ethnic armed groups and isolate them from support. This approach has largely failed in the current iteration of Myanmar’s civil war, but the junta has repeatedly promised to hold elections under the 2008 constitution, which is heavily favorable to the military’s interests. In the past several months, the Tatmadaw has begun undertaking a census and asked the resistance fighters to join it in the elections (which they quickly rejected). Some resistance actors have also informed the author that Beijing ceased talking to them after Operation 1027 phase one, but quietly resumed outreach in recent months to pressure them to participate in the upcoming elections. Beijing seems to think that elections in 2025 are the only way to stabilize Myanmar, and it appears to reject any changes to the system as demanded by the resistance coalition.

China’s Weight Behind the Junta Demands a Counterweight

Fundamentally, what this all means is that China has picked a side in Myanmar’s civil war. At a time when the resistance coalition has grown from strength to strength on the battlefield, including taking control of areas surrounding Chinese investments, one would expect Beijing to become more open to the National Unity Government and the rest of the resistance. But, guided by a paranoid fear of U.S. influence and support (which is ironically quite minimal), the Chinese government saw the junta’s weakness and moved quickly to punish its allied armed groups for their success, shore up the Tatmadaw’s failing rule, and push all sides to enter peace talks and hold elections.

Beijing’s faith in elections is either a bet that it and the Tatmadaw can split members of the resistance coalition with carrots and sticks or a last-ditch effort to provide the military with a fig leaf of international legitimacy that will justify its further support, including in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In either case, 2025 elections conducted under the Tatmadaw’s purview will only result in continued military dominance or further fighting and instability. In any case, the resistance has little willingness to enter negotiations at this juncture. Despite China’s pressure, only the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army has ceased offensive operations within the Three Brotherhood Alliance, and the wider resistance continues to reject the Tatmadaw’s proposed elections.

Going forward, China’s interventions are unlikely to do much besides undermine its own interests in Myanmar. Indeed, on Oct. 19, a small explosive device detonated outside the Chinese consulate in Mandalay, sparking China’s condemnation. Although it is unclear who is responsible, the bombing underlines the depth of anti-China sentiment now roiling within Myanmar as Beijing expands its open support for the hated Tatmadaw. Moreover, its reported house arrest of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s commander during negotiations in China is likely to only further weaken China’s leverage over its aligned border ethnic armed groups, who must now choose to listen to Beijing and cease fighting or soldier on against the Tatmadaw and risk Chinese retaliation.

For both the pro-democracy resistance and its most significant international supporter, the United States, it is far from time to enter negotiations with the Tatmadaw or give in to Beijing’s paranoia. Momentum is on the resistance’s side, and the coalition needs more time and support to develop a post-war political framework. For policymakers in Washington, it is increasingly clear that China is locked into a “cold war mindset” and little can reassure Beijing of U.S. intentions. Although Washington should not abandon cooperation with China where possible or provocatively cross any Chinese or regional countries’ red lines regarding lethal support, it should feel confident that an inclusive, federal democracy in Myanmar is in America’s strategic interests regardless of Beijing’s opposition to it. As such, the incoming Trump administration should provide expanded U.S. funding and non-lethal support in line with the BURMA Act for the resistance to offset the weight of Beijing’s pressure, assist in resolving Myanmar’s growing humanitarian crisis, and help buy them the time needed to achieve their Spring Revolution.

Become a Member

Lucas Myers is the senior associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

The views expressed are the author’s own and do not represent the views of the US Government or the Wilson Center.

Image: Maung Sun via Wikimedia Commons

Commentary

warontherocks.com · by Lucas Myers · November 22, 2024

14.  A Free Press Conversation with Natan Sharansky

Pay attention to a man who has endured and survived such hardship.

I hope this provokes some critical thinking. Especially this excerpt. It is probably one of the most important descriptions of political philosophy today. The excerpt below is worth reading a few times and reflecting upon it.

Excerpts:

 BW: Why are so many highly educated people drawn to wokeness, or as you call it, neo-communism? 

NS: People instinctively want to make the world a better place. And that’s how communist ideology—which killed tens of millions of its own citizens—became so popular, especially among intellectuals. 

It’s nice to think of a society where everyone is equal. So neo-communists say: We’re destroying this world, where so much inequality exists, and we’re building a new one. And this ideology becomes so enticing that people are willing to give up their freedom for it. 

This is the reason why the most important conflict in the West is not between Democrats and Republicans. It’s between liberals and progressives. Progressives are hiding behind liberal ideas. And in order to live out the promises of liberalism—equality, freedom—progressives are willing to destroy our world for the sake of building a new one with absolute justice. That’s communism. It’s destruction. 

Martin Luther King Jr. was a liberal, not a progressive. He wanted African Americans to be integrated into society. Instead of dismantling the world he was born into, he fought to reform it. 

So many people don’t understand the principal difference between those who want to destroy and rebuild this world and those who want to improve the world we have now. 

Somehow, liberals became allies of the most primitive, totalitarian demagogues, who very closely resemble communists. And the woke movement looks a lot like the communist movement. 

At the beginning of communism, so many social democrats decided that, although the communists were rough and violent, they wanted the same type of growth. And that’s the danger. 

So we need to separate liberalism from progressivism.  

BW: Do you consider yourself a liberal?

NS: Yes, I’m a proud liberal.  

To be a liberal is to believe that everybody has the right to freedom and that all people are created equal, regardless of their identity. Liberals are partners, not dictators. From this perspective, the neo-conservative movement doesn’t understand that they’re liberals. 

They’re ashamed to be called liberals, and as a result, they leave the territory open to the neo-communists. We’ve let them have the title. We’ll call ourselves conservatives. 

Don’t give up the “liberal” title. Neo-cons shouldn’t be ashamed of the title! They’re liberals. The communists are not.  

 A Free Press Conversation with Natan Sharansky

The Soviet dissident says that the most important conflict in the West is not between Democrats and Republicans. It’s between liberals and progressives.

https://www.thefp.com/p/a-free-press-conversation-with-natan

By Bari Weiss

November 21, 2024

One of the signs that The Free Press has become a real newsroom is that important figures—intellectuals, politicians, comedians, and writers—swing by our office for conversations.

Of late: Rob Henderson, Simon Sebag Montefiore, Konstantin Kisin, and Paul Kingsnorth. And earlier this week: Natan Sharansky, one of the men who changed the course of the twentieth century.

I suspect readers of The Free Press need no introduction to Sharansky, who is no stranger to our pages. I’ve had the honor of interviewing Natan in Israel in the wake of October 7, and, most recently, we published his remarkable letters he exchanged with Alexei Navalny in the gulag.

But just in case you need a refresher:

Natan Sharansky was born in Donetsk, Ukraine—then called Stalino—in 1948, the same year as the birth of the modern State of Israel. A chess prodigy and a mathematician, he became a figure of international importance in 1977, when he was imprisoned by the Soviet Union—on manufactured charges of treason—for the real crime of wanting to emigrate to Israel. 

At his court hearing in 1978, he famously said, “To the court, I have nothing to say. To my wife, and my people, I say, next year in Jerusalem.”

Getting to Jerusalem took him longer than a year. 

Sharansky spent nine years in the gulag—often in solitary confinement. In 1983, he was in a tiny cell in a prison near the Siberian border when he learned that President Ronald Reagan had labeled the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” 

That empire fell eight years later, in no small part because of Sharansky, who emigrated to Israel upon his release from prison in 1986 and reunited with his wife, Avital, an activist who stared down presidents and prime ministers in order to free her husband and all refuseniks.

Sharansky then had a long political career, serving as a cabinet minister in every Israeli government from 1996 to 2005, including a stint as Ariel Sharon’s deputy prime minister from 2001 to 2003. He is the author of several books, including the memoir Fear No Evil and, most recently, Never Alone: Prison, Politics, and My People.

In the course of his remarkable life, Sharansky has been a key actor in the forever war of liberty versus tyranny. And while many American Jews have had the luxury over the past half-century of feeling as if history had ended—or that they had been on a permanent holiday from it—Sharansky has always lived inside of it. He is, as my friends at Tablet magazine recently put it, “a living monument to twentieth-century Jewish heroism.”

As the events of the twenty-first century speed up in ways that make the coming months and years profoundly uncertain, I can think of few people better to illuminate the way than Natan Sharansky. 

So we were thrilled that he took an hour to answer our questions. Below is an edited and condensed version of our staff’s conversation.

Bari Weiss: Give us a report from Jerusalem. What’s it like over there?

Natan Sharansky: Israel is so deep in this struggle, and it’s been over a year. We’ve never had fighting like this for more than a month. My son-in-law has been fighting for 280 days—away from his five small boys. And that’s the case for most of their neighbors. 

My daughter’s closest childhood friend just passed away. Our friend who played music in our sukkah this past month fell in the same battle. 

It’s been like one long funeral. 

Thousands have been killed. Ten thousand or more have been injured. Tens of thousands of people have PTSD. 

On the other hand, we have a united society with a devoted, young generation. They feel their mission is to continue their thousand-year history.

We’re not confused. We know we can defeat Hamas and Hezbollah rather than appease them. 

BW: Twenty years ago, most people would have seen the war in Israel and the war in Ukraine as being connected. Today, we have a strange phenomenon where, to put it crudely, Israel has become the cause of the American right, while Ukraine has become the cause of the left. What do you think about this political development? 

NS: The free world cannot choose between fighting Putin and fighting terrorism. It just won’t work. If you want to live in the free world, you have to find ways to resist. It’s awful when wars become issues exclusive to the right or left. We are talking about how to save the free world and guarantee its existence. 

On one hand, we have Putin who wants to restore the Russian Empire. He is determined to make Russia the mother of all nations. On the other hand, we have Iran-backed terrorists who say that, through terror, they can establish their power. And I would say they are more and more successful, and more and more forces are willing to appease them. 

Unfortunately, Israel has been one of the forces willing to appease. Now Israel has no choice. It has to fight. It is fighting so terrorists cannot blackmail the free world.

BW: This year, we’ve seen many Russian prisoners released, but we also saw the death of Alexei Navalny in an arctic prison. How do you characterize the current state of civic society in Russia? Do you see any precursors to regime change?  

NS: When I was released as a political prisoner, it was the first step towards decreasing pressure in society, and that ultimately brought about the fall of the Soviet Union. 

But that’s not the case anymore. In the last year, every human-rights activist I know has fled Russia. 

I had hopes when the war with Ukraine started, because if Putin were to look weak in Ukraine, there is no way he would survive as dictator of Russia. So he would be overthrown. But because, in part, the West was afraid to support a strong Ukraine in that first year, Putin remained strong and survived.

At the same time, the number of doublethinkers and dissidents have increased. But people today are more afraid than they were a year ago. 

So in the short term, I’m not very optimistic. At this moment, he is strong, and his power is absolutely totalitarian. 

Only when Russian civilians and members of the military feel they can’t rely on their dictator anymore, only when they decide that he is weak, can his regime fall apart. 

But the fact that there are more doublethinkers is the best guarantee of that eventual outcome.

BW: Israeli prime minister Bibi Netanyahu has made a point of telling the Iranian people to take their country back—making constant distinctions between the regime and its people. Do you detect a strategy to provide Israeli solidarity to the Iranian democratic struggle? 

NS: Is there, at this moment, any Western government which believes it has to talk to the people over the heads of dictators? I don’t think so. From that point of view, Bibi’s comments are revolutionary. But I don’t think it’s part of a larger strategy yet. 

BW: How are Israelis responding to the election of Donald Trump? In the short term, will it hurt Jews to be associated with him? What about in the long-term?

NS: I can’t say what Trump will do in the short-term, let alone long-term. But the people around him believe that it’s important for America that Israel be strong. But who knows?

In Israel, there was a sigh of relief when he won. Not because we love his character, but because there’s a much bigger chance that a Trump administration would be our ally against Iran, rather than trying to make another deal with them. 

We see what is happening on college campuses—this unbelievable explosion of antisemitism and the legitimization of antisemites. Even when we are under attack from the most awful enemies of the world, students celebrated it as the beginning of liberation! 

It’s clear that if anyone was going to fight against the most frightening antisemitism in academia, it would be the Trump administration, not the Harris administration. 

These are the questions that made it clear to the Israeli right and to the Israeli left that Trump is better for the safety and security of the State of Israel. 

But still a main challenge is to understand that mobs—of any political stripe—are not our friends. 

BW: Why are so many highly educated people drawn to wokeness, or as you call it, neo-communism? 

NS: People instinctively want to make the world a better place. And that’s how communist ideology—which killed tens of millions of its own citizens—became so popular, especially among intellectuals. 

It’s nice to think of a society where everyone is equal. So neo-communists say: We’re destroying this world, where so much inequality exists, and we’re building a new one. And this ideology becomes so enticing that people are willing to give up their freedom for it. 

This is the reason why the most important conflict in the West is not between Democrats and Republicans. It’s between liberals and progressives. Progressives are hiding behind liberal ideas. And in order to live out the promises of liberalism—equality, freedom—progressives are willing to destroy our world for the sake of building a new one with absolute justice. That’s communism. It’s destruction. 

Martin Luther King Jr. was a liberal, not a progressive. He wanted African Americans to be integrated into society. Instead of dismantling the world he was born into, he fought to reform it. 

So many people don’t understand the principal difference between those who want to destroy and rebuild this world and those who want to improve the world we have now. 

Somehow, liberals became allies of the most primitive, totalitarian demagogues, who very closely resemble communists. And the woke movement looks a lot like the communist movement. 

At the beginning of communism, so many social democrats decided that, although the communists were rough and violent, they wanted the same type of growth. And that’s the danger. 

So we need to separate liberalism from progressivism.  

BW: Do you consider yourself a liberal?

NS: Yes, I’m a proud liberal.  

To be a liberal is to believe that everybody has the right to freedom and that all people are created equal, regardless of their identity. Liberals are partners, not dictators. From this perspective, the neo-conservative movement doesn’t understand that they’re liberals. 

They’re ashamed to be called liberals, and as a result, they leave the territory open to the neo-communists. We’ve let them have the title. We’ll call ourselves conservatives. 

Don’t give up the “liberal” title. Neo-cons shouldn’t be ashamed of the title! They’re liberals. The communists are not.  

BW: Why does the left tend to have such poor leadership? 

NS: They are more willing to appease terrorists or totalitarian regimes. 

But in the case of America, the big challenge is how to divide between people with totalitarian ideals and real liberals. That’s why I’m reclaiming the label of “liberal.” 

Being for or against abortion doesn’t mean you’re for or against American values. Are you ready to defend the values on which America was built? That’s the question. 

BW: You played chess in your head during your nine years in the gulag. How have games impacted you? 

NS: When you’re tired of this world, you can go in your head and play chess. 

When I was a loyal Soviet citizen, my life was deprived of all meaning, and deprived of anything Jewish. What is more Jewish than saying “on one hand, on the other hand”? You don’t need to study Talmud. Just chess.

Then in prison my chess hobby became very useful. It was such a blessing for me to play chess in my head. I recommend it to everyone. Put yourself in the punishing cell deliberately, play only in your head, and you will find that you can enjoy life in every space. 

Bari Weiss is the editor in chief of The Free Press. Follow her on X @BariWeiss, and read her piece, “A Year of Revelations.”

15. How Native Americans guarded their societies against tyranny

Some fascinating history not taught in American schools (or at least not in mine).

How Native Americans guarded their societies against tyranny

theconversation.com · by Kathleen DuVal

When the founders of the United States designed the Constitution, they were learning from history that democracy was likely to fail – to find someone who would fool the people into giving him complete power and then end the democracy.

They designed checks and balances to guard against the accumulation of power they had found when studying ancient Greece and Rome. But there were others in North America who had also seen the dangers of certain types of government and had designed their own checks and balances to guard against tyranny: the Native Americans.

Although most Americans today don’t know it, there were large centralized civilizations across much of North America in the 10th through 12th centuries. They built massive cities and grand irrigation projects across the continent. Twelfth-century Cahokia, on the banks of the Mississippi River, had a central city about the size of London at the time. The sprawling 12th-century civilization of the Huhugam had several cities of more than 10,000 people and a total population of perhaps 50,000 in the Southwestern desert.

An artist’s depiction of life in Cahokia.

The ruins of these constructions remain, more than 1,000 years later, in places as far-flung as Phoenix, St. Louis and north Georgia.

The American Colonists and founders thought Native American societies were simple and primitive – but they were not. As research has found, including my own, and as I explain in my book, “Native Nations: A Millennium in North America,” Native American communities were elaborate consensus democracies, many of which had survived for generations because of careful attention to checking and balancing power.

Powerful rulers led many of these civilizations, combining political and religious power, much as monarchs of Europe in later centuries would claim a divine right to rule.

In the 13th century, though, a global cooling trend began, which has been called the Little Ice Age. In part because of that cooling, large-scale farming became more difficult, and these large civilizations struggled to feed their people. Elites began hoarding wealth. The people wanted change.

Casa Grande, an adobe castle that was home to the rulers of the Huhugam, as seen in 1892. photoCL 215 (112), Huntington Library

Spreading out

The residents of North America’s great cities responded to these stresses by reversing the centralization of power and wealth. Some revolted against their leaders. Others simply left the cities and spread out into smaller towns and farms. All across the continent, they built smaller, more democratic and more egalitarian societies.

Huge numbers left Cahokia’s realm entirely. They found places that still had game to hunt and woods full of trees for firewood and building, both of which had declined near Cahokia due to its rapid growth.

The population of the central city of Cahokia fell from perhaps 20,000 people to only 3,000 by 1275. At some point the elite left as well, and by the late 15th century the cities of Cahokia’s realm were completely gone.

Encouraging engaged democracy

As they formed these new and more dispersed societies, the people who had overthrown or fled the great cities and their too powerful leaders sought to avoid mesmerizing leaders who made tempting promises in difficult times. So they designed complex political structures to discourage centralization, hierarchy and inequality and encourage shared decision-making.

These societies intentionally created balanced power structures. For example, the oral history of the Osage Nation records that it once had one great chief who was a military leader, but its council of elder spiritual leaders, known as the “Little Old Men,” decided to balance that chief’s authority with that of another hereditary chief, who would be responsible for keeping peace.

Another way some societies balanced power was through family-based clans. Clans communicated and cooperated across multiple towns. They could work together to balance the power of town-based chiefs and councils.

The archaeological remains of the Cahokia mounds are in Collinsville, Ill. Andrew Lichtenstein/Corbis via Getty Images

An ideal of leadership

Many of these societies required convening all of the people – men, women and children – for major political, military, diplomatic and land-use decisions. Hundreds or even thousands might show up, depending on how momentous the decision was.

They strove for consensus, though they didn’t always achieve it. In some societies, it was customary for the losing side to quietly leave the meeting if they couldn’t bring themselves to agree with the others.

Leaders generally governed by facilitating decision-making in council meetings and public gatherings. They gave gifts to encourage cooperation. They heard disputes between neighbors over land and resources and helped to resolve them. Power and prestige came to lie not in amassing wealth but in assuring that the wealth was shared wisely. Leaders earned support in part by being good providers.

‘Calm deliberation’

The Native American democracy that the U.S. founders were most likely to know about was the Iroquois Confederacy. They call themselves the Haudenosaunee, the “people of the longhouse,” because the nations of the confederacy have to get along like multiple families in a longhouse.

In their carefully balanced system, women ran the clans, which were responsible for local decisions about land use and town planning. Men were the representatives of their clans and nations in the Haudenosaunee council, which made decisions for the confederacy as a whole. Each council member, called a royaner, was chosen by a clan mother.

The Haudenosaunee Great Law holds a royaner to a high standard: “The thickness of their skin shall be seven spans – which is to say that they shall be proof against anger, offensive actions and criticism. Their hearts shall be full of peace and good will.” In council, “all their words and actions shall be marked by calm deliberation.”

The law said the ideal royaner should always “look and listen for the welfare of the whole people and have always in view not only the present but also the coming generations, even those whose faces are yet beneath the surface of the ground – the unborn of the future Nation.”

T'ata Begay, of the Choctaw/Taos Pueblo Nations in Oklahoma, gets her son, Okhish Homma Begay, 2, who is of the Navajo and Chocktaw/Taos Pueblo Nations, ready for a performance on the National Mall in Washington, D.C., on June 26, 2024. AP Photo/Jacquelyn Martin

Of course, people do not always live up to their values, but the laws and traditions of Native nations encouraged peaceful discussion and broad-mindedness. Many Europeans were struck by the difference. The French explorer La Salle in 1678 noted with admiration of the Haudenosaunee that “in important meetings, they discuss without raising their voices and without getting angry.”

Politicians, government officials and everyday Americans might find inspiration in the models of democracy created by Native Americans centuries ago. There was an additional ingredient to the political and social balance: Leaders looked ahead and sought to protect the well-being of every person, even those not yet born. The people, in exchange, had a responsibility to not enmesh their royaners in less serious matters, which the Haudenosaunee Great Law called “trivial affairs.”

theconversation.com · by Kathleen DuVal

16. Advocates fear dismantling of DOD’s extremism prevention, DEI programs

Advocates fear dismantling of DOD’s extremism prevention, DEI programs

militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · November 21, 2024

Leaders of nonprofits that have advocated for stronger polices to bolster diversity in the military and keep extremists out of the ranks are now concerned that President-elect Donald Trump and his pick for defense secretary will quickly work to undo those measures.

Trump announced Nov. 12 he intended to nominate Army veteran and conservative commentator Pete Hegseth as his next secretary of defense. Hegseth has compared the Pentagon’s extremism policies to a “purge,” said he wants to fire “woke” military leaders and doesn’t believe women should serve in combat roles.

Members of Protect our Defenders and Human Rights First have advocated for stronger diversity and anti-extremism policies within the Defense Department, such as required training for troops about prohibited extremist activities and gender-affirming health care for service members. Now, they expect that Trump and Hegseth will work with their allies in Congress to roll back those policies and others.

“The individual who President-clect Trump has tapped to be the next Secretary of Defense – it seems like he’s very much trying to unwind those policies,” said Josh Connolly, senior vice president of Protect Our Defenders. “It seems like he has a very clear bias to dismantle efforts to address these issues.”

RELATED

Women in combat ‘proficient,’ SecDef says, dismissing calls for change

Austin praised women in the military and said they should not be removed from front-line fighting posts.

Hegseth targets ‘woke’ initiatives

On a podcast interview that aired two days after the election, Hegseth said the Pentagon’s focus on diversity, equity and inclusion, or DEI, erodes military values.

“The dumbest phrase on planet Earth in the military is ‘Our diversity is our strength,’” Hegseth said.

Hegseth, if he’s confirmed to lead the Pentagon, is likely to have allies in Congress in his effort to strip away those programs. Some GOP lawmakers, including Rep. Jim Banks, R-Ind., who sits on the House Armed Services Committee, have vowed to expunge “wokeism” from the military, referring to what they see as a rise in radically progressive policies at the Pentagon.

Opposition to the Pentagon’s diversity, equity and inclusion efforts, or DEI, has spiked among select conservative lawmakers since 2020, when Congress expanded such programs and mandated the Defense Department’s hiring of a chief diversity officer, said Liz Yates, an associate director with Human Rights First.

Since then, some lawmakers have attempted to dismantle the programs. Congress is currently considering the annual defense authorization bill for 2025, a large legislative package that determines military spending. Both the House and Senate versions of the bill contain several provisions that limit the Pentagon’s diversity initiatives, including one that would eliminate all diversity, equity and inclusion offices. Nine veteran and military organizations wrote a letter to lawmakers opposing the measures.

RELATED

Congress considers ‘very severe rollback’ of military’s DEI programs

Dozens of human rights and veterans organizations urged Congress to strike 22 anti-DEI proposals from the 2024 defense appropriations bill.

Opponents of the Pentagon’s DEI programs claim they harm recruitment efforts by deterring people with conservative views. Those who support the programs argue they can improve recruitment by showing would-be recruits that the military doesn’t tolerate discrimination.

According to a study published in 2021 by Blue Star Families, a nonprofit that supports military families and veterans, about 30% of service members identify as minorities. By 2027, most recruitable adults in the United States will be people of color, the study said. National security experts have increasingly viewed women, too, as having an important role to play in reversing the military’s recruitment woes.

“This is something that has just been incredibly politicized, when in reality these are the kinds of programs that have been supported by people throughout the services who see them as useful to the mission of trying to create a more lethal force and improve recruitment,” Yates said.

Little evidence exists, meanwhile, that DEI initiatives play much of a role in recruitment. The Pentagon’s Inspector General reported last year that the majority of would-be recruits are not enlisting because of fear of death in combat, having grown up hearing about casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is also increased competition between the military and the private sector for top talent, and private companies offer higher pay on average, the report states.

Trump supporters clash with police and security forces as people try to storm the US Capitol Building in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021. As of May 2024, 222 veterans and service members have been charged for their participation in the riot. (Photo by Joseph Prezioso / AFP)

A ‘full-court press’ to undo extremism prevention

In his book, “War on Warriors,” Hegseth downplayed the role of service members in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol, and he argued that military leaders remain distracted by efforts to root out extremism from the ranks.

His opposition to the Pentagon’s anti-extremism efforts is partly personal, he revealed on the podcast interview Nov. 7. During the interview, he said he had been removed from National Guard duty at President Joe Biden’s inauguration in 2021 because of a tattoo. The Associated Press reported that a fellow service member flagged Hegseth as an “insider threat” because one of his tattoos was associated with the white supremacist movement.

If Hegseth becomes the Secretary of Defense, the agency will likely “put their head in the sand” on the issue of extremism, Connolly said.

When it became known that some service members were part of the riot at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered a military-wide stand down against extremism. During the past four years, the Justice Department has charged 24 service members and 198 veterans for their participation in the riot, according to data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, known as START.

Recent research by START revealed that the number of violent extremists among the veteran and military population is small, but the group has an outsized impact once radicalized. From 1990 through 2022, 451 people with military backgrounds committed extremist offenses. Of those, 170, or nearly 38%, either plotted or followed through with a deadly terrorist attack, the research shows.

RELATED

Military service key factor in 3 decades of extremist attacks

One-quarter of all extremism-driven mass casualty attacks and plots from 1990 through 2022 were devised by perpetrators with military backgrounds.

To address extremism in the ranks, the Pentagon updated its definition of prohibited extremist activities. This summer, each service branch adopted new rules to ensure troops are trained about those off-limits activities and require commanders to act when they spot extremism in their units. A law passed by Congress in 2021 mandates the services to report allegations of extremism to the Inspector General’s Office – a process the Pentagon has been working to streamline over the past few years.

U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said that extremist activities “damage the nation’s trust and confidence in the Army as an institution,” “undermine morale” and “reduce combat readiness.”

Liz Yates, the associate director at Human Rights First, said she expected Trump to launch a “full-court press” to undo the new measures.

“It’s taken a lot of advocacy and it had been a long road, but we had seen some progress,” Yates said. “We’re concerned about that progress halting with this new administration. We expect this will be under attack.”

Connolly guessed the rollback of anti-extremism policies would have a negative effect on recruitment.

“The prevailing majority of individuals that serve in our military are not extremists, and if there’s a complicity or acceptance of extremist attitudes and behaviors, that does not produce an environment people want to serve in,” Connolly said.

There are already efforts underway in Congress to end the Pentagon’s focus on extremism. The annual defense authorization bill for 2025 includes a measure that prohibits leaders from using defense dollars on extremism-prevention efforts that were recommended by the Countering Extremist Activity Working Group. Lawmakers are expected to work on the bill in December.

This story was produced in partnership with Military Veterans in Journalism. Please send tips to MVJ-Tips@militarytimes.com.

About Nikki Wentling

Nikki Wentling covers disinformation and extremism for Military Times. She's reported on veterans and military communities for eight years and has also covered technology, politics, health care and crime. Her work has earned multiple honors from the National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, the Arkansas Associated Press Managing Editors and others.

militarytimes.com · by Nikki Wentling · November 21, 2024

17. The US defense industrial base needs a revamp for speed and scale

But how long will the revamp take? When will we be ready to fight tonight AND tomorrow?

The US defense industrial base needs a revamp for speed and scale

Defense News · by Jerry McGinn · November 21, 2024

One of the most pressing national security issues facing the incoming Trump administration is the resilience of our defense industrial base. The United States has the most lethal and capable fighting force in the world. However, recent experiences have demonstrated profound difficulties in our industrial base. Unless we get our defense industrial base on a war footing now, we face potentially catastrophic consequences should the balloon go up — to use a phrase first popularized in World War I to signify the imminent start of conflict — in East Asia or elsewhere.

Repeated war games have demonstrated that our munitions stocks will be decimated within a couple weeks in the event of major conflict. Significant production challenges supplying precision guided missiles to Ukrainian forces have underscored our inability to rapidly replenish weapons and major systems. While significant resources and attention have been focused on addressing these shortcomings recently, past mobilizations demonstrate that we are not doing enough. To deter our potential adversaries, we recommend three major actions that should be pursued in the coming term.

1. Speed. Despite a decade’s focus on innovating with commercial technology and using faster contract vehicles, the defense acquisition system largely remains focused on developing exquisite systems that take much too long to deliver. The Navy, for example, selected the “mature design” of the Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri Maritime Marine for its future frigate program back in 2020. One of the major reasons for its selection was the variant built for the U.S. Navy in a Wisconsin shipyard would have 85% commonality with existing models already in service in numerous foreign navies. Design alterations made by Navy engineers, however, dramatically reduced the commonality to 20% and added 3 years to construction timelines.

We need to turbocharge our efforts to change how we design and acquire capabilities. This starts with simplifying requirements to harness leading commercial solutions, rapidly iterating technologies, and delivering capabilities at speed. We also have to design systems for production, such as the Air Force is doing in its Enterprise Test Vehicle effort.

While more resources will help increase speed to a degree, DoD needs to work with Congress to transform the budget structure to increase flexibility in budgetary execution as the Congressional Commission on PPBE Reform outlined earlier this year. Additionally, our forces have gotten the prototyping game down, but we need to dramatically increase the use of follow-on production, “Other Transaction” contracts to rapidly transition prototypes to the battlefield.

2. Scale. Our industrial base can produce at the scale needed to succeed, but only if we change how we do business. For example, DoD went from the drop of the request for proposals to having over 16,000 Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles roll off the assembly line within three years during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Delivering life-saving capabilities at this speed and scale required tremendous leadership, simplified requirements, utilizing existing designs, and multi-sourcing.

Similar efforts are needed now across munitions, unmanned systems, and selected major systems critical to future contingencies. We need to build more production flexibility into contracts by establishing surge-related line items to reduce the time required to ramp production. Second sourcing and multi-sourcing can also be beneficial as shown with last year’s 155mm ammunition awards to nine companies, including three based outside of the United States. Creating more financing options like the Office of Strategic Capital and accelerating depreciation could also help attract private sector capital investment to scale production.

Another way to increase mass and scale capabilities in theater is to maximize the use of unmanned and attritable systems. The focus on unmanned and autonomous systems to increase fielded capacity has grown significantly in the past few years, but the fact is that we need vast numbers of attritable systems to meet near-term threats. This priority of scale cannot become victim to efforts focused on exquisite systems.

3. Sustain. Our sustainment challenges, from contested logistics and supply chains to sustaining forces at great distance, are probably the hardest facing us and unfortunately have the least developed solutions. AUKUS programs and the recent Regional Sustainment Framework are beginning to address this challenges, but sustainment requires much more attention and resources to ensure the resilience of our deployed forces and systems.

In all these actions, the partnership between government and industry will be critical. Fortunately, our existing authorities such as the Defense Production Act are strong and can be used now to create a modern-day War Production Board to facilitate that close collaboration.

Our experience with Ukraine, Israel and beyond has also made it crystal clear that the United States cannot do it all. We need a larger industrial base, involving our closest allies with whom we go to war, with robust international industrial partnerships that build the systems needed for current and future contingencies.

Unfortunately, time is not on our side. If the Davidson window is correct, we have two years.

The incoming administration and Congress, in partnership with industry and our close allies, must harness innovation, manufacturing capacity, and other means to unleash the true strength of our military and our defense industrial base to deter our adversaries in today’s very dangerous world. The time to do this is now, before the balloon goes up.

Jerry McGinn is the Executive Director of the Greg and Camille Baroni Center for Government Contracting in George Mason University’s Costello College of Business and the author of Before the Balloon Goes Up: Mobilizing the Defense Industrial Base Now to Prepare for Future Conflict.

18. Military Diversity Is Not the Problem

Military Diversity Is Not the Problem

military.com · November 21, 2024

The opinions expressed in this op-ed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Military.com. If you would like to submit your own commentary, please send your article to opinions@military.com for consideration.

Although most U.S. presidential nominees for cabinet positions usually sail through with pro forma approval, Pete Hegseth, President-elect Donald J. Trump's pick for secretary of defense, is one of several nominations already sparking controversy largely due to his past comments about women in the military and programs designed to foster diversity in the ranks.

Hegseth has served as an officer in the U.S. Army and was deployed with National Guard units to Iraq and Afghanistan. He received a number of medals for his performance, and like all veterans who perform with distinction, he commands gratitude and respect for his military service.

But in recent years, Hegseth, while working as a commentator and anchor for Fox News and writing several books, has been highly critical of the military's professional leadership, especially in the Biden administration. According to Hegseth, the U.S. armed forces are rife with "wokeness," especially at the higher levels of command. An institutional focus on diversity, equity and inclusion has distracted the U.S. military and civilian leadership from their primary missions of combat readiness and performance under fire, he believes. This critique is especially pronounced in his most recent book, "The War on Warriors."

Most would agree that the primary missions of the U.S. armed forces are deterrence of war or, if deterrence fails, to defeat American adversaries in battle. Hegseth's argument that the American military is suffused with wokeness to the extent of distraction from its primary missions is based on anecdotes from his personal experience. There is no body of larger studies by expert groups of Defense Department insiders or by outsiders from the larger community of defense analysts that supports this argument. To the extent that the U.S. military is underperforming in its deterrence or combat missions, the research suggests it has little to do with an overdose of political correctness.

The main reason for concern about the U.S. military and its performance has to do with the variety of U.S. commitments and the complexity of U.S. global responsibilities. A number of trends are moving the rules-based international order previously dominated by the United States toward a more pluralistic and competitive structure of interstate behaviors. These developments include the growing alignment of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea; the evolution of BRICS (originally Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, now evolving into an expanded membership, including important actors in the so-called Global South); the rise of China into an economic and military superpower, with its aspirations to dominate global infrastructure and connectivity; the persistent stalemate in Russia's war against Ukraine and the costs for the United States and its NATO partners in supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression; the continuation of unconventional warfare in the form of terrorist attacks by Iranian proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen; and, finally, the challenge of potentially breakthrough or game-changing technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, robotics (including upscale drones and hypersonics) and a growing dependency on space based systems.

A second reason for concern about the future performance of the U.S. armed forces is the need to compete with civilian occupations for talented enlisted and officer personnel. As the U.S. economy bounces back from COVID-19 aftereffects and sticker-shock hyperinflation, job growth in the private sector will offer increasing numbers of opportunities for ambitious young people who might otherwise consider the military as a career. Another factor is the impact of military service on families. A former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff once noted at his retirement ceremony that he and his family had moved 30 times during his career. And this list of disincentives for troops and their families applies mostly in peacetime. In times of war, they assume greater risks, including the possibility of ultimate sacrifice for their country.

A third reason for concern about the armed forces is the willingness, or lack thereof, of Congress to support the necessary ingredients of force structure, modernization, readiness and sustainability that is required by the demands made on the military by the president, the Department of State, the intelligence community and other components of the American government and body politic. U.S. troops are often placed into situations that call for "whole of government" solutions and interagency cooperation and preparedness. In too many instances, however, the warriors are expected to take on missions other than security and to act as economic recovery specialists, field anthropologists, cultural attaches and other "post-conflict stability" envoys. Often enough, the troops performed admirably in these roles, given the constraints of the assigned missions. If we expect this kind of versatility in future enlistees or officers, then suitable incentives will have to be provided for recruiting and retention of the active duty and reserve forces.

The immediately preceding point bears on Hegseth's argument about diversity as the cause of military recruiting difficulties and performance failures. To the contrary, the diversity of GIs reflects the diversity of America, and that variety is an advantage in recruiting and retaining combat and support personnel who must deploy to more than 100 countries. Diversity goes beyond race, including the cultural, linguistic and experiential backgrounds of U.S. armed forces, a melting pot of assimilation and patriotism in which all Americans can take pride.

Finally, all large bureaucratic organizations have a certain amount of inertial resistance to change. The history of the U.S. armed forces shows that it took persistence to turn President Harry Truman's initial order to desegregate the military into lasting changes in organizational behavior. "Don't ask, don't tell" was a compromise way station later superseded by permitting gays to serve openly in the military, but not without political controversy and some military hesitancy. Former Defense Secretary Ashton Carter issued a directive in 2016, permitting transgendered persons to serve openly in the military despite prior opposition within and outside of the Pentagon. The U.S. armed forces have shown adaptive agility with respect to social and cultural change precisely because their primary focus is on doing the mission, in a country and culture that are always on the move.

Stephen Cimbala is a distinguished professor of political science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues.

Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and universities, and he served as assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.

military.com · November 21, 2024

19. Musk, Ramaswamy Proposal to Slash Spending Could Include VA Medical Services

What impact will this have on recruiting? Will this be perceived as another broken promise to our veterans?

Musk, Ramaswamy Proposal to Slash Spending Could Include VA Medical Services

military.com

Musk, Ramaswamy Proposal to Slash Spending Could Include VA Medical Services | Military.com

1. Military News

Military.com

military.com

De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com