​Quotes of the Day:

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

–​ John F. Kennedy

​"My fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country.​"

–​ John F. Kennedy

​"Let us not seek the Republican answer or the Democratic answer, but the right answer. Let us not seek to fix the blame for the past. Let us accept our own responsibility for the future.​"

–John F. Kennedy

​

On this Day in History:

President John F. Kennedy is assassinated

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/november-22/john-f-kennedy-assassinated

1.  Korea’s Human Rights Nightmare—North and South

2. The Two-Front Nuclear Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence

3. Seoul's human rights chief urges government to help NK prisoners of war in Ukraine come to South Korea

4. S. Korea-Japan cooperation committees discuss bilateral ties in Jeju meeting

5. U.S. affirms support for Japan over Taiwan tensions

6. S. Korea, Philippines discuss maritime cooperation

7. Japan-China Tensions Scuttle Trilateral Summit Plans

8. S. Korea pledges US$100 mln contribution to Global Fund for 2026-2028

9. Lee voices hope to elevate ties with France to strategic partnership in talks with Macron

10. Ferry Crashed After Operator Was Distracted by His Phone, Officials Say

11. Nuclear subs provide South Korea a security hedge, potential for nuclear weapons

12. South Korean Marines Conduct Amphibious Assault Landings in National Defense Drills

13. US, Republic of Korea Conduct Maritime Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise

1.  Korea’s Human Rights Nightmare—North and South

​

Summary:

Drawing on Lincoln’s “house divided” speech, Eberstadt argues Korea cannot remain half free, half enslaved. North Koreans, bound by songbun caste, famine, gulags and guilt-by-association, endure a system he deems even harsher than 19th-century American slavery. South Korea’s left, he contends, downplays or excuses this, preferring “people’s rights” and engagement that props up the Kim regime while eroding liberal norms at home through lawfare, speech controls, and moves toward one-party rule. Indifference to northern compatriots’ rights weakens South Koreans’ own defenses. Korea’s future, he concludes, hinges on whether free citizens actively fight for North Korean human rights.

Excerpt:

Whether history will regard the Korean story as a triumph or a tragedy depends upon how free Koreans choose to act. If they act decisively, this much will be remembered long from now: that in standing up for North Koreans’ human rights, South Koreans were given the chance to save their own.

Comment: A powerful essay based on Dr. Eberstadt's recent speech. We need a human rights upfront approach to Korea. Human rights are a moral imperative and national security issue. And I think Dr. Eberstadt's powerful conclusion is important: Koreans in the South will protect their own human rights by helping the Koreans in the north to attain those human rights tha the most despotic regime of the 21st century denies them.

December 2025 Asia

Korea’s Human Rights Nightmare—North and South

The free people of the peninsula are threatening their own freedoms by refusing to fight for the freedoms of their enslaved brethren

by Nicholas Eberstadt

commentary.org · Nicholas Eberstadt

https://www.commentary.org/articles/nicholas-eberstadt/north-south-korea-human-rights/

Once upon a time, America was split in two by slavery. We fought a Civil War over it. Our martyred president, Abraham Lincoln, died for the cause of reunifying America and freeing enslaved Americans for all time. But Lincoln was not only a martyr: He was also a prophet.

In the gathering crisis before our Civil War, he warned his countrymen that “a house divided cannot stand”—that America “could not endure, permanently half slave and half free.” Schoolchildren are still familiar with those ringing words. But that same speech contains an ominous message, less well attended in some free societies. When Lincoln foresaw that America’s house would ultimately “cease to be divided,” by that he meant America would ultimately “become all one thing, or all the other”—that slavery would ultimately be driven to extinction in the American house, or that slavery would instead finally be accepted everywhere. The least likely outcome, in his foretelling, was an unstable balance in which people were fully free in only one part.

For three long generations, Korea has been a house divided. Part of the peninsula enjoys great freedoms; the other part is wholly enslaved. For many in the South, the current status quo has proved to be a workable order. South Koreans can go about seeking their own modern comforts, engaging in their own pursuit of happiness, without worrying too much about the unending suffering endured by their cousins and compatriots just across the DMZ.

For those who accept the status quo, this relative indifference to human rights in the North may be unfortunate, or unseemly, but it is nonetheless an entirely manageable course of action.

This view—the consensus opinion in South Korea today—constitutes a fateful miscalculation.

Never mind its morality: From a purely practical, purely selfish standpoint, this indifference to human rights in the North places at risk human rights in the South.

Korea’s freedom is an indivisible quantity. If regarded instead by the public as a blessing bestowed only on some Koreans but withheld from others, it will remain a fragile blossom. Before too long, those who are unwilling to make the principled case for the defense of these human freedoms for their brethren on the other side of the peninsula will find their own freedoms endangered, too.

Abraham Lincoln was right about this. And the hour of reckoning for the divided house of Korea could be upon South Koreans with unexpected celerity.

_____________

The condition of enslaved Americans before their liberation and of North Korean subjects can and should be spoken of in the same breath. But the human rights situation actually looks less favorable for North Koreans today than for black slaves on American plantations in the 1850s.

It is true that North Koreans today, unlike U.S. slaves long ago, are allowed by their masters to learn to read and write. And some heinous slaver practices, such as tearing children from parents for profit, may have no direct counterpart in the North.

Yet in so many other respects, the human rights situation is worse for Pyongyang’s subjects than it was for slaves on U.S. plantations—vastly worse.

Consider:

• American slaves were allowed freedom of worship—that is the origin of America’s unique strain of gospel music. North Korea, by contrast, enforces endless idolatry of the Kim family regime. Although Pyongyang was once known as the “Jerusalem of the East,” the cradle of Korean Presbyterian Christianity, all genuine worship there is banned today, with grave punishments for anyone who dares keep the faith.
• Where American slaves were forcibly separated into two intrinsically degrading categories—“house” and “field”—North Korea’s official songbun system reduces each human being into one of 50-some assigned political classes that permanently decide their fate, raising state discrimination against the individual to exquisite, almost scientific, perfection.
• The logic of the North Korean state, furthermore, decrees that those with the lowest songbun are “hostile classes”: enemies of the state, officially regarded almost as if insects, with lives of no consequence—lives possibly even valued at less than zero.
• That is why the North Korean regime was so strangely unperturbed by Kim Jong II’s Great Famine in the 1990s, in which untold hundreds of thousands perished. This multitude of victims was culled overwhelmingly from the “hostile classes.” From the Dear Leader’s perspective, North Korea was better off without them: In his eyes, they were fit for extermination.
• In classical slave societies of old, where enslaved persons were treated as the property of others, nothing like the Dear Leader’s famine could have taken place—if only because it would have been too expensive.
• So, too, the distinction between the enforced terror of whippings and beatings on plantations and the industrial scale of incarceration and killing in North Korean political prison camps: Some minimal consideration for preservation of human life was accorded on the plantation, if only due to financial incentive.
• One last point. Over the course of America’s stained history of slavery, up to 100,000 enslaved people escaped to the North and to Canada. Given the size of the U.S. slave population—roughly 4 million in 1860—that would mean more than 2 percent of all enslaved persons at the time successfully sought freedom as escapees in the generations before our Civil War. That percentage looks to be orders of magnitude higher than the share of North Korean refugees who have made it to the South.

We should ask: Why?

In part, the differential attests to the more serious “barriers to exit” in totalitarian North Korea. In part, it speaks to what economists would call “differentials in demand.” There are fewer active networks facilitating escape, and fewer welcoming venues for the escapees—differences that in themselves might well invite some reflection on the part of South Koreans.

But part of that differential is also explained by the much more limited “supply” of escapees. Pyongyang’s odious system of “guilt-by-association” (yeon-jwa-jae) sanctions up to three generations of the same family for the perceived trespasses of one individual.

North Korea’s would-be escapees know very well that the Kim regime makes it policy to punish family members—wives, children, parents, even uncles, aunts and cousins—for political crimes of any given individual. And defecting from the Kim family’s paradise is most assuredly a political crime.

America’s slave states did not systematically punish the families of its runaways, but North Korea does—and that may tell you everything you need to know about the difference in human rights under those two oppressive “peculiar institutions.”

_____________

For many years, I have been involved in the international movement for human rights in North Korea—and on the global chessboard, the greatest weakness for this cause has always been its lack of support from South Koreans themselves. Millions of Koreans in the South seem to have hardened their hearts to the piteous condition of the millions just across the DMZ—people who share their heritage, their language,

even their ancestry.

In Seoul these days, one encounters protests against human rights abuse all around the planet—the Middle East, Africa, even the United States. Everywhere, it seems, except a few miles north, where the worst human rights emergency on earth is taking place right now and is befalling fellow Koreans.

The elected government acts at times as if the systemic denial of human rights in the North is a matter of utter indifference. Rather than lift a finger in support of human rights in North Korea, Seoul not infrequently abstains even from voting in favor of North Korean human rights at the United Nations—not always, but at least eight times in recent memory. On those occasions, UN motions on human rights in North Korea were carried thanks only to the votes of other countries.

How do so many South Koreans manage to treat the human rights nightmare next door as mere background noise? Two civil wars are currently underway on the peninsula. The first is the contest between Seoul and Pyongyang. The other is unfolding within South Korea itself—between the left and what is sometimes called the right, between the intellectual children of Marx, Stalin, and Mao and those of Locke, Montesquieu, and Lincoln.

Obsessed with historical grievance, South Korea’s radical left cannot forgive their countrymen for “collaborating” with foreigners, even though some of those foreigners (the ones known as Americans) provided Koreans with the “breathing space” and the moral, legal, and intellectual architecture that made possible the construction of the first-ever limited constitutional democracy on Korean soil.

The left partisans in this internal struggle cannot bring themselves to criticize socialism in Korea—even in its grotesque, freakish manifestation in the North. Under the sway of Marxist-Leninist thought—sometimes the more merciless versions, sometimes the softer, more palatable variants—they maintain doctrinally that there can be no violations of human rights under socialism in Korea. For them, that is a theoretical impossibility—so that even talking about the human rights problem in North Korea is an illegitimate act, a sort of unwarranted provocation.

Their preferred alternative to our conception of human rights is “people’s rights.” But as we have learned once and again—from the Red Terror in the Soviet Union to the Mao-made famine in China to the attempted murder of an entire nation in Khmer Rouge Cambodia—“people’s rights” can never be divided into inviolable individual portions under totalitarian dictatorships. The Kim regime is just another case in point.

Leftist apologists for Pyongyang’s misrule cannot bring themselves to talk about the Kim family regime’s depredation of its captives. Instead, their agenda for advancing human right in North Korea is to send food and money to the North Korean government. Yes, their alternative is to help the dictators feed their human livestock—if and when their regime permits these human chattel to eat.

When the left comes to power in the South, as it does with some regularity under the ROK’s open and competitive democracy, its impoverished conception of North Korean human rights guides national policy.

What do we see then?

• We get diversionary human rights reports training their attention on forced haircuts—in South Korean schools!
• We get South Korean officials apologizing to the North for taking in too many escapees, promising this will not happen in the future.
• We get North-South “joint statements” in which the South Korean government promises to collaborate in tamping down criticism in the South of the Kim regime. I guess there is some “collaboration” the Korean left approves of, after all.
• And we can always be sure we will get the same shameful official silence in international fora about human rights in North Korea.

Though the left in South Korea despises the idea of fighting for North Korean human rights, the dictatorship in the North positively fears the possibility of such a fight. Despite three generations of relentless, never-ending indoctrination of its captive population, despite the countless hours of “Ten Principles of Monolithic Ideology” study forced on every North Korean, the regime has no confidence that it has won the hearts and minds of its own subject people.

If it did, why would the Respected Comrade (that’s Kim Jong Un) be working overtime to tighten his border controls even further? No one wants to move into his country. The only possible risk at the borders is that North Koreans, perhaps in growing numbers, want to escape his paradise.

Fear of human rights is hardly new to the Kim family regime. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the North Korean state has been sounding alarms about “ideological and cultural infiltration”—in other words, Western ideas and values.

The regime issued a memorable warning to its cadres in 1997: “‘Reform’ and ‘opening’ on the lips of the imperialists is honey-coated poison.” In the estimate of the dictators themselves, the dictatorship could not withstand this.

And in late 2023 and early 2024, Pyongyang announced an extraordinary policy U-turn. After nearly eight decades of militating for reunification of divided Korea, the Respected Comrade suddenly abandoned the unification doctrine of his father and grandfather, declaring instead that the two Koreas are “fixed” and “hostile states,” “irreconcilable.” No longer are the people of North and South deemed “consanguineous or homogeneous.” Instead, the Southerners are now officially held to be a “strange clan.” Conquest of the South, to be sure, is still explicitly on the agenda. But not unification.

What explains this remarkable about-face? Perhaps the same considerations that prompted the regime to criminalize the use of South Korean slang and South Korean accents, and to punish Northerners caught with South Korean movies, or disseminating South Korean DVDs, with forced labor, the gulag, or even the firing squad. The unpardonable crime committed by these renegades? They want to be more like South Koreans. They yearn for what South Koreans already have.

Apparently the 2020 “Law on Rejecting Reactionary Thought and Culture” was not enough to stamp that hope out of North Korean hearts. So Pyongyang had to resort to formally, explicitly destroying the path to peaceful unification with the South. For the slaves don’t really love Master, after all. Instead, the “liberated masses” in the North look with longing at the lives of the “imperialist puppets” in the South.

The dictatorship in Pyongyang understands this all too well—much better, apparently, than its leftist sympathizers and collaborators in the South.

For South Koreans, the concern has always been that its hard-won freedoms would be threatened from without—by another military attack from Pyongyang or yet another attempt at unconditional reunification on Kim dynasty terms.

But at this late hour, we may now perceive that there is also a threat to South Korean freedoms from within. The very activists, intellectuals, and officials who seem more interested in the stability of the North’s totalitarian state than the well-being of the people it oppresses turn out to have a problem with human rights in the South as well.

And why wouldn’t they? To the radical leftist sensibility, formal guarantees of individual rights are nothing more than a storybook fiction—a tactical roadblock their opponents throw in their way to impede sweeping progress. The same people who have no use for human rights in the North are hardly more enamored of them in the South. With sufficient political power in their hands, they will aim to undo those rights, too.

Because South Koreans have been so complacent about the defense of North Koreans’ human rights, internalized defenses that should already exist against encroachments on the South’s human rights are just half built.

Lacking practice in standing up for human rights in North Korea, too many in the South lack the will, the know-how, and the readiness to do what may be needed to fight for their own. That same lack of muscle memory, furthermore, only emboldens those who would take advantage of it.

Historically, of course, human rights in Korea have come under assault from the right as well as the left. South Korea’s present open society and constitutional democracy evolved out of an authoritarian military government that many still remember firsthand. Just last year, a so-called conservative administration tried to declare martial law. But that foolhardy ploy was clownish, inept (it lasted just six hours), and inexcusable—and courts and voters did not excuse it.

Yet where the Korean right at times reprehensibly impinges on freedoms in practice, the Korean left does so in principle—because its worldview regards legal protections for the person as barriers to achieving its vision of “social justice.” So when admirers of Marx and fanboys of the CCP are in power, human rights are not safe at home.

Left-leaning governments have attempted to change the rules of South Korea’s democracy under recent administrations.

• A few years ago, a left-leaning administration began using what is now called “lawfare” to bankrupt and cripple its opponents—gaming South Korea’s loose libel laws to take critics to court for allegedly defamatory utterances. This wasn’t protection of individual rights—it was smash-mouth intimidation by official plaintiffs with unlimited resources to silence the little people. It had worked already for the government of authoritarian Singapore, and it succeeded here, too.
• Today, under a new left-leaning administration, Seoul is chilling free speech even further. With the inventive legal theory that burning the Chinese flag is “hate speech,” it is using police power to shut down protests against Beijing’s malign policies and practices: its crushing of the Uyghurs; its dismantling of Hong Kong’s freedoms; its growing menace to free Taiwan; and so much more. If hating the highly detestable CCP is illegal, what else is now off limits in the ostensibly free South Korea today?
• The new administration in Seoul has also used the martial law fiasco as pretext for a special prosecutor, investigating the supposed “insurrection” behind it. If that investigation should conclude that the opposition party was complicit in a “conspiracy,” the administration will be able to use its majority in the National Assembly to ban the opposition party from parliament—so that South Korea, like North Korea, would become a one-party state. At that point, its legislature would be in position to rubber-stamp any proposed constitutional amendments the ruling party fancies—potentially putting up for grabs the entire panoply of legal guarantees South Koreans now take for granted.
• And the new administration is proposing that the constitutional one-term limit to the presidency be tossed—possibly starting under the current president. They say they are asking only for a two-term presidency, which could mean an additional three years for the leader now in power. But what if this is just their opening bid?

Only practical exigency, not principle, will possibly spare South Koreans from a slide into left authoritarianism if the side that disdains the very notion of inviolable human rights in North Korea has its way.

Is there any doubt that a public more mindful of human rights violations against North Korean compatriots would also be more vigilant about protection of their own?

South Koreans who know their freedoms are at risk also know human rights are not some provisional gift from the state. These are not some theorem an intellectual came up with, 10,000 generations into our human story. Nor are they just a code of manners for polite governments to try to follow, when circumstances permit.

Human rights are inalienable natural rights: granted by the same creator who created our universe. They cannot be taken from us any more than our DNA, our breath, our ability to choose between right and wrong. They are part of our human nature. That is true today and ever shall be. And so here is Korea, half slave, half free. Which way will the story end?

Whether history will regard the Korean story as a triumph or a tragedy depends upon how free Koreans choose to act. If they act decisively, this much will be remembered long from now: that in standing up for North Koreans’ human rights, South Koreans were given the chance to save their own.

Photo: Getty Images

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commentary.org · Nicholas Eberstadt

2. The Two-Front Nuclear Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence

​Summary:

Iran’s accelerating nuclear program and north Korea’s maturing arsenal are converging into a two-front nuclear challenge that could overstretch U.S. deterrence, crisis management, and alliance cohesion. Pyongyang is moving toward a survivable – even warfighting – capability with diversified, potentially first-use nuclear options. Tehran retains technical capacity and fissile stock to “break out,” may adapt north Korea’s model, and could seek DPRK assistance. Simultaneous flare-ups in the Middle East and Northeast Asia would force parallel U.S. decision cycles under a credibility cloud. The article urges updated wargaming, tighter allied integration, and a redesigned U.S. strategy to deter both regimes at once.

Excerpts:

North Korea’s expanding warfighting delivery systems add another layer of risk: limited, precision escalation meant to test U.S. resolve. As the CRS notes, its ballistic-missile testing is designed to evade U.S. and regional defenses, putting American and allied forces at heightened risk. In effect, Pyongyang is developing not only a survivable deterrent but potential coercive leverage — just as Iran’s enrichment trajectory edges closer to a threshold that could trigger a U.S.-led military response.

“The possibility of Pyongyang providing nuclear assistance to Tehran is increasing,” Citrinowicz said. “The United States will need to focus its intelligence on this possibility, with the help of its allies who are monitoring developments.”

But that intelligence challenge intersects with another problem: mounting questions about U.S. credibility.

“President Trump has dealt a serious blow to U.S. credibility in both theaters,” Davenport asserted. “This risks adversaries attempting to exploit the credibility deficit to shift the security environment in their favor.”

​Comment: Iran "could" seek DPRK assistance? I think we should assume they have already sought DPRK assistance and will continue to do so. One thing this illustrates is why we cannot treat the four members of the Dark Quad or CRInK as discrete or separate threats. We must recognize and address their collusion. Congress should pass the DISRUPT Act to address these security threats.

Congress’s DISRUPT Act: The Blueprint for Political Warfare Against the “Dark Quad”

https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/congresss-disrupt-act-the-blueprint-for-political-warfare-against-the-dark-quad/

The Two-Front Nuclear Challenge: Iran, North Korea, and a New Era of U.S. Deterrence

By Hollie McKay

Contributing Cipher Brief Reporter

Hollie McKay is a Cipher Brief contributing writer, war crimes investigator, and author of "Only Cry for the Living: Memos from Inside the ISIS Battlefield". She previously worked as an investigative and international affairs/war correspondent for Fox News Digital for over fourteen years with a focus on war, terrorism, and crimes against humanity. 

19 November, 2025

https://www.thecipherbrief.com/nuclear-iran-north-korea

Kim Jong Un, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and president of the State Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, arrives for talks with Xi Jinping on September 4, 2025 (Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images) and an Iranian flag waves on top of a portrait of Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, during a war exhibition commemorating the 45th anniversary of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) in southern Tehran, Iran, on September 23, 2025 (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto via Getty Images).

DEEP DIVE — While Washington is focused on Iran’s accelerating uranium-enrichment program and increasingly aggressive regional posture, an equally consequential shift is unfolding with seemingly less fanfare: North Korea’s rapid nuclear and missile advancements are quietly reshaping the global threat landscape.

For U.S. policymakers, the danger is no longer a pair of isolated challenges but a converging two-front nuclear problem—one that threatens to push America’s deterrence posture, crisis-management capacity, and alliance coordination closer to a breaking point. To understand how these two fronts could interact, experts emphasize that Iran and North Korea share a long-standing strategic alignment.

“The Iran–North alliance represents a four-decade-long partnership driven by shared hostility toward the United States, economic needs, and strategic isolation,” Danny Citrinowicz, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Programs and former head of the Iran Branch in the Research and Analysis Division (RAD) in Israeli defense intelligence, tells The Cipher Brief. “The Iranians need to rearm and prepare for another campaign, which requires additional and fresh thinking regarding the depth of the relationship between Tehran and Pyongyang.”

He also warns that this moment may become an inflection point.

“If Iran seeks to change its nuclear strategy, it could ask North Korea for nuclear bombs or highly enriched material or spare parts for the destroyed nuclear facilities, such as the conversion facility in Isfahan,” Citrinowicz continued. “The potential damage in the event of such an event is so severe that it is essential that the intelligence organizations of the United States, South Korea, and Israel identify signs of this.”

related

Uncovering the Truth Behind Trump’s Call to Resume Nuclear Testing

Trump’s Next Test: Kim Jong Un’s Bid for Legitimacy and a Nuclear Normalization Deal

Pyongyang’s Nuclear Threat

Despite UN sanctions and diplomatic efforts, a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) brief underscored that North Korea continues to surge forward with both nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile development. For Kim Jong Un, analysts note, nuclear weapons are a guarantor of regime security, and he has no intention of abandoning them.

North Korea’s nuclear doctrine and capability sets are evolving in troubling ways. The 2025 CRS brief states that a September 2023 law expanded the conditions under which Pyongyang would employ nuclear weapons, lowering what had been a high threshold for use. The same report noted the regime “promised to boost nuclear weapons production exponentially and diversify nuclear strike options.”

On the delivery side, the brief outlines how North Korea is fielding solid-fueled road-mobile ICBMs, sea-based launch systems, and pursuing multiple warheads on a single missile — all elements that raise the question not just of deterrence but of crisis stability and escalation control. In short, Pyongyang appears to be reaching toward a survivable deterrent — or perhaps a warfighting capability — that can impose calculations on the U.S. and its allies in a far more challenging way than before.

“Kim’s investment in new nuclear-capable delivery systems reflects the strategic importance of the country’s nuclear arsenal,” Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association, tells The Cipher Brief. “North Korea is better positioning itself to evade and overwhelm regional missile defenses and target the U.S. homeland.”

Treston Wheat, chief geopolitical officer at Insight Forward, reinforces that intelligence picture, stressing that open-source assessments now “frame North Korea as a maturing nuclear-warfighting state,” with doctrine “trending toward first-use options in extreme regime-threat scenarios.” He notes that U.S. intelligence already evaluates Pyongyang as having achieved miniaturization: “A 2017 DIA assessment judged DPRK miniaturization sufficient for SRBM-to-ICBM delivery.”

Taken together, those capabilities point to a shifting threat environment for Washington.

“North Korea has tested missiles with the range necessary to target the continental United States,” Davenport underscored. “U.S. military planners have to assume that North Korea can target the United States.”

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Iran’s Nuclear Surge

Meanwhile, Iran is not standing still. Tehran has begun openly emulating aspects of Pyongyang’s nuclear playbook, indicating that if Western strikes against Iranian nuclear infrastructure forced Tehran to go underground, it could adapt quickly. That duality matters: Iran can arguably deploy its program overtly, under inspection and diplomatic cover, but at some threshold, it may decide the only path to survival is accelerated weaponization. If that happens while North Korea is already pushing new strategic capabilities, the U.S. is confronted with two simultaneous flashpoints — one in the Middle East, the other in Northeast Asia.

Deterrence, by definition, demands clarity of purpose, credible capabilities, and correctly calibrated signals. When the U.S. must manage a nuclear-armed North Korea and a near-breakout Iran at the same time, the risk is that strategic bandwidth becomes overstretched.

“Despite the failure of that approach, Iran maintains that its nuclear doctrine is unchanged and it does not intend to pursue nuclear weapons,” Davenport noted. “(But) without a pragmatic diplomatic approach that addresses Iranian economic and security concerns, Tehran’s thinking about nuclear weapons could shift.”

That potential shift in Tehran’s calculus becomes even more concerning when paired with broader warnings about Western inattention.

“If Western focus on the Iran threat dwindles, there is a risk the regime could take a new, covert path to nuclear weapons using remaining or reconstituted assets or foreign help,” Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director of the Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, tells The Cipher Brief. “Such a lack of focus is similar to how North Korea became nuclear-armed.”

Tehran, experts caution, still retains deep technical capacity.

“Iran retained enough fissile stock and technical expertise to rebuild quickly, meaning the setback was tactical rather than strategic,” Wheat noted.

From Washington’s vantage point, the real danger is a dual crisis hitting at once — an Iranian enrichment surge or strike on its facilities in West Asia, paired with a North Korean missile volley or nuclear test in East Asia. That scenario forces the U.S. into parallel decision-cycles, stretching military, diplomatic, and intelligence resources, straining alliances, and creating openings that adversaries could exploit.

North Korea’s expanding warfighting delivery systems add another layer of risk: limited, precision escalation meant to test U.S. resolve. As the CRS notes, its ballistic-missile testing is designed to evade U.S. and regional defenses, putting American and allied forces at heightened risk. In effect, Pyongyang is developing not only a survivable deterrent but potential coercive leverage — just as Iran’s enrichment trajectory edges closer to a threshold that could trigger a U.S.-led military response.

“The possibility of Pyongyang providing nuclear assistance to Tehran is increasing,” Citrinowicz said. “The United States will need to focus its intelligence on this possibility, with the help of its allies who are monitoring developments.”

But that intelligence challenge intersects with another problem: mounting questions about U.S. credibility.

“President Trump has dealt a serious blow to U.S. credibility in both theaters,” Davenport asserted. “This risks adversaries attempting to exploit the credibility deficit to shift the security environment in their favor.”

U.S. Intelligence and Strategic Implications

Open-source intelligence paints a worrying picture: North Korea may have enough fissile material for perhaps up to 50 warheads, though the accuracy and reliability of delivery remain questions. It also signals Pyongyang’s development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and multiple-warhead ICBMs. The regime has restored its nuclear test site and is now postured to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing.

The IAEA’s November 2025 report says it can no longer verify the status of Iran’s near–near-weapons-grade uranium stockpile after Tehran halted cooperation following the June 2025 Israeli and U.S. strikes on Natanz, Fordow, and Esfahan.

The last confirmed data, from September, showed Iran holding 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to 60 percent — a short step from weapons-grade and potentially enough for up to 10 bombs if fully processed. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi says most of this material is now entombed in damaged facilities. Moreover, satellite imagery activity around storage tunnels in Isfahan has raised serious red flags. The IAEA further cautions that oversight of this highly-enriched uranium site is “long overdue,” warning that the agency has lost “continuity of knowledge.”

Moreover, before the strikes, the IAEA assessed Iran could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb in about a week using part of its 60 percent stockpile at Fordow. Damage to centrifuges has likely slowed that timeline. Still, the larger question is political: whether Iran, under renewed UN sanctions and scrutiny, decides that staying within NPT safeguards costs more than openly moving toward a weapon, particularly if work resumes at undeclared or rebuilt sites.

“The U.S. and Israeli strikes have created a window of respite. What happens next depends greatly on Iran’s will to provoke new Israeli strikes,” Stricker said. “North Korea is a wild card and could provide nuclear fuel, facilities, and equipment to Iran.”

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Looking Ahead

For Washington, the takeaway is stark: systems designed to manage one nuclear threat at a time may crumble should two crises flare simultaneously. The U.S. would need tighter allied coordination, faster intelligence sharing, and stronger, more flexible military deployments to cope.

Yet above all, policymakers must anticipate the possibility of simultaneous escalation in different theatres.

In the coming months and years, key indicators will include North Korea’s choice to conduct a seventh nuclear test or field a credible submarine-launched nuclear force, and Iran’s enrichment trajectory or decision to strike a covert breakout path. The U.S. must also watch for signs of cross-coordination between Moscow and Pyongyang, or between Tehran and Pyongyang — though open links remain murky.

From a policy perspective, a dual-front scenario demands updated wargames, an inter-theatre force posture review, and close allied coordination across NATO, the Indo-Pacific, and Middle East partners. Washington must also guard against the “umbrella illusion” — the belief that the same deterrence logic will apply unchanged across two theatres facing two distinct adversaries with differing doctrine, capabilities, and thresholds.

Finally, media and public attention naturally tend to focus on Iran’s progress or North Korea’s missile launches — one at a time. However, deterring two simultaneous nuclear-adversary theatres demands strategic awareness that the world may not be sequentially configured. For the U.S., what happens in one theatre may shape adversary calculations in the other. The risk is that by the time Washington pivots from Iran, Pyongyang — or Tehran — may have forced a new reality.

In this two-front nuclear dilemma, the question is no longer whether to monitor Iran or North Korea, but how the U.S. will deter both at the same time — and whether its strategic framework is ready for that challenge.

Emerging forms of collaboration amplify that challenge.

“More concerning is that North Korea is positioning itself to benefit from Russian expertise and to further refine its missile systems using data collected from Russia’s use of North Korean systems against Ukraine,” Davenport added.

Read more expert-driven national security insights, perspective and analysis in The Cipher Brief because National Security is Everyone’s Business.

3. Seoul's human rights chief urges government to help NK prisoners of war in Ukraine come to South Korea

​Comment: And please help all Koreans in the north who have their human rights denied by Kim Jong Un so he can remain in power.

Seoul's human rights chief urges government to help NK prisoners of war in Ukraine come to South Korea

koreaherald.com · Hwang Joo-young · November 21, 2025

https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10621162

Ahn Chang-ho, chair of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, speaks at the National Assembly on Tuesday. (Yonhap)

South Korea’s top human rights official called on the government on Thursday to actively support the transfer of two North Korean prisoners of war held in Ukraine, stressing that they must not be forcibly repatriated to the North.

Ahn Chang-ho, chair of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, said in a statement that the government must pursue “swift and proactive diplomatic efforts” to ensure the soldiers’ safe arrival in South Korea.

Ahn also urged the South Korean government to request close monitoring from the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross to ensure that the North Korean POWs are treated in accordance with international law.

According to reports, the two North Korean soldiers captured during Russia’s war in Ukraine are seeking asylum in South Korea, fearing punishment if returned to their home country.

“This is not merely a diplomatic or security issue,” Ahn said. “It is a grave human rights matter that directly concerns the lives and safety of individuals.”

He emphasized that under the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war cannot be repatriated against their will and international law prohibits forced returns.

flylikekite@heraldcorp.com

koreaherald.com · Hwang Joo-young · November 21, 2025

4. S. Korea-Japan cooperation committees discuss bilateral ties in Jeju meeting

​Comment: Another positive step forward.

S. Korea-Japan cooperation committees discuss bilateral ties in Jeju meeting

koreaherald.com · Yonhap · November 22, 2025

https://www.koreaherald.com/article/10621472

Yonhap

South Korean and Japanese committees involved in public-private cooperation between the two countries held a joint annual meeting on Jeju Island on Saturday, bringing together public and private sector representatives to discuss the deepening of bilateral cooperation.

The 58th joint meeting of the Korea-Japan Cooperation Committee and the Japan-Korea Cooperation Committee was attended by Taro Aso, vice president of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party and head of the Japanese committee; Japanese Ambassador to South Korea Koichi Mizushima; Jeju Gov. Oh Young-hun; former Seoul Foreign Minister Park Jin; and Lee Dae-soon, chairman of the Korea-Japan Cooperation Committee, among others.

In his address, Kim Ki-byung, head of the Korea-Japan Cooperation Committee board, highlighted the significance of hosting the annual meeting in Jeju, calling the island a "global tourist city representing Korea."

President Lee Jae Myung delivered a congratulatory message, noting that this year marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between Seoul and Tokyo.

"At this symbolic milestone, Korea-Japan relations are more mature and solid than ever," Lee said in the message delivered by First Vice Foreign Minister Park Yoon-joo, calling on the committees to help both countries move toward a "more practical and future-oriented partnership."

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi also sent a congratulatory letter, saying the cooperation committees have long served as a driving force for exchanges across various private-sector fields. She also wished for the committee's continued development and for further progress in bilateral ties. (Yonhap)

koreaherald.com · Yonhap · November 22, 2025

5. U.S. affirms support for Japan over Taiwan tensions

​Summary:

Washington backs Japan over Taiwan tensions, affirms defense of Senkaku Islands, urges US–Japan–ROK cooperation against China and North Korea, increasing pressure on Seoul’s China policy.

Comment: Our silk web of friends, partners, and allies must remain united in the face of PRC and nK threats.

U.S. affirms support for Japan over Taiwan tensions

Posted November. 22, 2025 07:16,   

Updated November. 22, 2025 07:16

https://www.donga.com/en/article/all/20251122/5974732/1

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi marked her first month in office on Nov. 21, as tensions between China and Japan escalated over her remarks about potential Japanese involvement in a Taiwan contingency.

Amid the growing dispute, the U.S. State Department on Nov. 20 reaffirmed its support for Japan, saying, “Our commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan’s defense, including the Senkaku Islands, remains unwavering.” This statement made clear that the United States would defend the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, which Japan administers but China claims.

The State Department also emphasized the need for trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the United States, and Japan to address challenges in the Indo-Pacific, including the Chinese Communist Party’s revisionism and a hostile North Korea. Analysts say that with the Trump administration’s second term siding with Japan in the China-Japan dispute, the U.S. may also seek a role for its ally South Korea. Observers note that the Lee Jae-myung administration’s pragmatic diplomacy, which seeks to strengthen ties with China while maintaining the U.S.-South Korea alliance as a core pillar, faces increased pressure. The United States has repeatedly urged South Korea to participate in countering China, particularly after approving a nuclear-powered submarine.

U.S. State Department spokesperson Tommy Piggott mentioned the Senkaku Islands on Nov. 20 on X, stating that Washington opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, or the South China Sea. On the same day, U.S. Ambassador to Japan George Glass met with Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi. Glass described China’s ban on Japanese seafood imports and advisories against travel and study in Japan as “typical economic coercion” and pledged, “We will support Japan.” He also criticized Chinese Consul General Xue Jian in Osaka, who referenced beheading Takaichi, calling the remark “outrageous.”

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te posted a photo on Facebook on Nov. 20 showing himself eating sushi made with Japanese seafood, indirectly criticizing China’s restrictions. Takaichi said on Nov. 21 that she had no intention of retracting her remarks.

Russia and North Korea have expressed support for China. Chinese state media CCTV reported on Nov. 20 that Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova called Takaichi’s remarks “very dangerous” and stressed that Taiwan is part of China’s internal affairs. North Korea also voiced support on Nov. 18, saying, “Japan is denying and distorting its historical crimes.”

Jin-Woo Shin niceshin@donga.com

6. S. Korea, Philippines discuss maritime cooperation

​Summary:

South Korea and the Philippines held their fourth maritime talks in Manila, led by foreign ministry officials. They discussed cooperation on maritime security, economic ties, joint responses to transnational crimes like drug smuggling, and enhancing humanitarian and disaster-relief drills, shipbuilding, and shipping collaboration, with next year’s meeting set for Seoul.

Comment: Bilateral relations among allies strengthens the silk web of our multiple alliances, and friends and partners.

S. Korea, Philippines discuss maritime cooperation | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 22, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251122003100315

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- Senior officials of South Korea and the Philippines have held annual talks in Manila to discuss ways to strengthen bilateral maritime cooperation in areas ranging from the economy to security, Seoul's foreign ministry said Saturday.

The talks held the previous day and jointly led by Lee Dong-gy, director-general for ASEAN affairs at the foreign ministry, and Emmanuel Donato Guzman, assistant secretary of maritime and ocean affairs at Manila's foreign ministry, marked the fourth such meeting aimed at discussing maritime cooperation, according to the ministry.

In the meeting, Lee mentioned that the two countries are preparing to sign a memorandum of understanding on a joint response to transnational crimes, such as maritime drug smuggling, by sharing information.

Both sides concurred on the need to strengthen combined drills for humanitarian support and disaster relief as well as shipbuilding and shipping cooperation.

The next bilateral maritime talks will take place in South Korea next year.

Lee Dong-gy (R), director-general for ASEAN affairs at the foreign ministry, and Emmanuel Donato Guzman, assistant secretary of maritime and ocean affairs at Manila's foreign ministry, shake hands during their meeting in Manila on Nov. 21, 2025, in this photo provided by Seoul's foreign ministry the following day. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

mlee@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Lee Minji · November 22, 2025

7. Japan-China Tensions Scuttle Trilateral Summit Plans

​Summary:

China has torpedoed Japan’s plan for a January Korea-China-Japan summit, refusing to attend until Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi “responds appropriately” to her Taiwan-contingency remarks. Beijing has escalated with travel and seafood curbs and cultural-meeting delays, raising fears of a diplomatic freeze and stalled trilateral cooperation reminiscent of the Senkaku standoff.

Comment: PRC shows its true colors. It chooses not to be a responsible member of the international community.

Japan-China Tensions Scuttle Trilateral Summit Plans

Beijing's refusal over Taiwan remarks disrupts regional cooperation, reviving concerns of prolonged diplomatic freeze

By An Jun-hyen

Published 2025.11.22. 17:14

Updated 2025.11.22. 23:35https://www.chosun.com/english/world-en/2025/11/22/PGMUERUT6FBBPCDT3C7ZVNFH2M/

The Japanese government’s plan to hold a trilateral summit with South Korea and China next January has faced a de facto collapse due to China’s refusal. The situation reflects how Beijing’s backlash against Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on a “Taiwan contingency” has disrupted not only bilateral relations but also the trilateral cooperation framework.

On the 31st of last month, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi (left) and Chinese President Xi Jinping shake hands in Gyeongju. /Kyodo-Yonhap

According to diplomatic sources familiar with the matter, Japan, as the chair, had informally proposed to South Korea and China holding the summit in January next year after determining that hosting it within this year would be difficult. However, China conveyed through diplomatic channels that it “cannot attend the summit as Prime Minister Takaichi has not responded appropriately to the Taiwan issue,” confirming its refusal.

China’s hardline stance stems from Takaichi’s remarks during a House of Representatives budget committee meeting on the 7th. At the time, Takaichi suggested the possibility of exercising the right to collective self-defense, stating that a Taiwan contingency could become a “crisis concerning Japan’s existence.” China, which regards the “One-China Principle” as a core interest, immediately protested, and its refusal to attend the summit is seen as an extension of that response.

China’s discontent has escalated beyond diplomatic rhetoric into tangible retaliatory measures. Following Takaichi’s remarks, the Chinese government advised its citizens to refrain from visiting Japan and suspended import procedures for Japanese seafood. Additionally, it notified South Korea of a tentative postponement of the trilateral culture ministers’ meeting scheduled for the 24th in Japan, blocking even working-level consultations among the three countries.

While the Japanese government intends to push for an early summit, even if rescheduled after February next year, prospects remain bleak. February coincides with the Chinese Lunar New Year, and March is set for the country’s major political event, the Two Sessions (National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), making physical coordination of schedules challenging.

Former President Yoon Suk-yeol poses for a commemorative photo with Japan-China leaders before the 9th Korea-China-Japan summit held at the Cheong Wa Dae guesthouse on May 27 last year. From left: former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, former President Yoon, and Chinese Premier Li Qiang. /Courtesy of the Presidential Office

Diplomatic circles express concerns that a “cold spell” similar to past incidents could recur. In fact, the trilateral summit, suspended in September 2012 due to Japan’s nationalization of the Senkaku Islands (known as Diaoyu Islands in China), took approximately three years and six months to resume in November 2015 in Seoul. Analysts warn that the strained Japan-China relations since Takaichi’s administration could lead to a similarly prolonged stalemate.

The last trilateral summit was the 9th meeting held in Seoul in May last year. If a follow-up summit materializes, President Lee Jae-myung, Chinese Premier Li Qiang, and Prime Minister Takaichi would gather, but as of now, setting a concrete timeline appears difficult.

8. S. Korea pledges US$100 mln contribution to Global Fund for 2026-2028

Summary:

South Korea will contribute US$100 million to the Global Fund from 2026-2028, reaffirming support for combating AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. At the Johannesburg replenishment summit, Deputy Minister Kweon Ki-hwan praised the fund’s lifesaving impact, urged greater efficiency and innovation, and pledged to expand Korean companies’ participation in global disease-response programs.

Comment: South Korea is a global pivotal state that chooses to be a peaceful nuclear power, is a partner in the arsenal of democracies, and upholds the rules based international order.

S. Korea pledges US$100 mln contribution to Global Fund for 2026-2028 | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · November 22, 2025

SEOUL, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korea has pledged to contribute US$100 million to the Global Fund for three years, beginning in 2026, reaffirming its commitment to international efforts to combat major infectious diseases, according to the foreign ministry Saturday.

Kweon Ki-hwan, deputy minister for multilateral global affairs at the ministry, announced the pledge during the Global Fund's eighth replenishment summit held Friday in Johannesburg, South Africa.

The Global Fund, established in 2002, is the world's largest international public-private partnership dedicated to preventing and eradicating AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.

Kwon highlighted the Global Fund's achievements over the past two decades, including saving an estimated 70 million lives from the three diseases. He also underscored the need for greater efficiency, the introduction of innovative health products and improvements in program delivery amid a changing global development landscape.

The South Korean government said it will work to enable greater participation by Korean companies in the Global Fund's disease-response programs.

Kweon Ki-hwan, deputy minister for multilateral global affairs, speaks at the Global Fund's eighth replenishment summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on Nov. 21, 2025, in this photo provided by the Seoul foreign ministry. (PHOTO NOT FOR SALE) (Yonhap)

odissy@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Chang Dong-woo · November 22, 2025

9. Lee voices hope to elevate ties with France to strategic partnership in talks with Macron

Summary:

At the G20, President Lee pushed to upgrade Korea–France ties to strategic partnership, broadening cooperation in security and technology; Macron welcomed the initiative and pledged to visit.

Lee voices hope to elevate ties with France to strategic partnership in talks with Macron | Yonhap News Agency

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 23, 2025

https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251123000300315

By Kim Eun-jung

JOHANNESBURG, Nov. 22 (Yonhap) -- South Korean President Lee Jae Myung expressed his hope to elevate the bilateral relationship with France to a "strategic partnership" and deepen cooperation in culture, security, technologies and other fields, as he held a summit with French President Emmanuel Macron in South Africa on Saturday.

Their meeting on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit in Johannesburg followed their encounter during the Group of Seven summit in Canada in June, as the two nations prepare to celebrate the 140th anniversary next year of the establishment of their diplomatic relations.

"I hope to upgrade the two countries' bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership and bolster cooperation across various fields, including culture, the economy, security and cutting-edge technologies," he said.

Lee expressed his appreciation for France's deployment of troops to support South Korea when North Korea invaded the South during the 1950-53 Korean War, while nothing that the French Revolution had a sizable effect on the development of South Korea's democracy.

President Lee Jae Myung (C) and French President Emmanuel Macron (R) attend an expanded session of Group of Seven summit held in Kananaskis, Canada on June 17, 2025. (Yonhap)

Macron said that France hopes to expand cooperation in a wide range of areas, including security and emerging technologies, such as quantum, artificial intelligence, space, and nuclear and renewable energy.

He also thanked South Korea for its "clear commitment" regarding issues related to Ukraine and other matters that are important to France.

During the talks, Lee invited Macron to visit South Korea next year to mark the 140th anniversary of the bilateral relationship. In turn, Macron said that it would be "a great opportunity to prepare the visit," adding that he was "excited" about traveling to Korea.

ejkim@yna.co.kr

(END)

en.yna.co.kr · Kim Eun-jung · November 23, 2025

10. Ferry Crashed After Operator Was Distracted by His Phone, Officials Say

​Summary:

Investigators say a passenger ferry crashed after the operator became distracted by his mobile phone, ignoring navigation duties in the crucial minutes before impact. The collision injured passengers and damaged the vessel but could have been avoided with proper attention and safety protocols. Officials urge stricter enforcement of device-use rules.

Comment: So lucky there were no fatalities this time. We should all learn a lesson from this. Cell phones distract us.

Ferry Crashed After Operator Was Distracted by His Phone, Officials Say

NY Times · John Yoon · November 20, 2025

The operator and two other officers were charged with gross negligence after the ferry ran aground in South Korea on Wednesday carrying 267 people.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/20/world/asia/south-korea-ferry-crash.html

The operator and two other officers were charged with gross negligence after the ferry ran aground in South Korea on Wednesday carrying 267 people.

Listen to this article · 2:59 min Learn more

Ferry Crashed From Distracted Operator Looking At Phone, Officials Say

The ferry was carrying 267 passengers and crew members on board when it struck a rocky islet in South Korea on Wednesday. About 27 passengers suffered minor injuries or dizziness. The ferry’s captain and two officers were charged with injury by gross negligence.Credit...The Korea Coast Guard/Yonhap, via Associated Press

By

Reporting from Seoul

Nov. 20, 2025

A passenger ferry crashed into a rocky islet off the coast of South Korea on Wednesday because the man behind the wheel was looking at his cellphone and missed a turn, the local coast guard said.

All 267 passengers and crew members on board were safely evacuated, said Chae Su-jun, chief of the coast guard in Mokpo, a city near the island in the country’s southwest.

News of the crash shocked people in South Korea, where 250 schoolchildren heading to Jeju Island on a school trip drowned when an overloaded ferry capsized in 2014. The national tragedy raised questions about why such a wealthy country was plagued by so many human-caused disasters.

The ferry that crashed on Wednesday night, the Queen Jenuvia II, hit the islet at around 8:15 p.m. while making a roughly four-and-a-half-hour journey from Jeju to Mokpo in the Yellow Sea, Mr. Chae said at a news conference. About 27 passengers suffered from minor injuries or dizziness, he said.

Kim Hwang-gyun, the chief investigator of the Mokpo Coast Guard, said on Thursday that it had detained the ferry’s first mate, who was in charge of the ship when it crashed, and its helmsman.

The ship was last sailing at about 26 miles per hour and crashed less than an hour before its scheduled arrival, according to the coast guard and the vessel-tracking site VesselFinder. Passengers described hearing a violent bang and fearing for their lives as the ferry ran aground.

Mr. Kim said the coast guard had charged the two officers and the ferry’s captain with injury by gross negligence, a crime that carries a maximum prison term of five years upon conviction. The coast guard did not identify them, saying only that the captain is in his 60s and the other two officers are in their 40s.

The first mate, who was in charge of the ferry because the captain was off duty, told investigators that he had been checking the news on his cellphone at a time when he should have been turning the ship away from the islet, Mr. Kim told reporters.

By the time the ferry approached the rock, it was about two to three minutes too late to avoid it, the coast guard said. The vessel was on autopilot in the area of the accident, even though ships normally steer manually there because the sea channel is narrow, Mr. Kim said.

The first mate had initially told investigators that the rudder was not working properly, prompting a probe into possible defects in the ferry, but he later changed his statement to acknowledge that he had been looking at his phone, Mr. Kim said.

Mr. Kim said that the coast guard had charged the captain, who was not in the ferry’s wheelhouse at the time of the accident, on the suspicion that he failed to fulfill his duties on the ship.

Investigators were questioning the helmsman, who is Indonesian, through a translator, Mr. Kim said. They were also examining the crew members’ cellphones and the ferry’s data recorders and security camera footage.

John Yoon is a Times reporter based in Seoul who covers breaking and trending news.

NY Times · John Yoon · November 20, 2025

11. Nuclear subs provide South Korea a security hedge, potential for nuclear weapons

​Summary:

POTUS' approval of nuclear-powered submarines for South Korea gives President Lee Jae-myung a prestige capability to sell OPCON transfer and greater defense autonomy while satisfying U.S. demands for burden-sharing. Though non-nuclear-armed, the boats extend Korea’s blue-water reach against North Korean SLBMs and, secondarily, China, while placating powerful naval lobbies. Critics argue ISR assets and munitions should take priority over “big, shiny toys.” The deal’s hidden significance lies in enriched fuel and expanded US-approved fuel-cycle rights, which shorten Seoul’s path to nuclear breakout. Yet technology, regulatory, industrial, and training hurdles mean no submarines will likely deploy before the late 2030s.

Excerpts:

OPCON Transfer was initiated by the liberal Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008). It is expected to collapse the current — and potent — joint war-fighting staff structure, Combined Forces Command, led by a U.S. general, and otherwise affect the alliance.

Successive conservative administrations applied the brakes on the move. Mr. Lee, who took office in June, hit the accelerator.

“The right traditionally don’t want to do anything to weaken U.S. commitment,” said Mike Breen, Seoul-based author of “The New Koreans.” “The left focuses on Korea’s embarrassing level of dependence.”

Korean liberals’ demands for upgraded military punch blow a hole in accusations sometimes made by U.S. conservatives: “Lee is weak on security.”

His florid posture may quiet nerves at home.

Nuclear subs could “placate retired admirals and generals, a big lobby group,” said Daniel Pinkston, an international relations expert at Seoul’s Ewha University. “Procure sophisticated naval vessels and the admirals are on board.”

Comment: Will this make OPCON transition more likely? I have to take exception to Mr. Salmon's comment here: 

"it is expected to collapse the current — and potent — joint war-fighting staff structure, Combined Forces Command"

"Collapse" CFC? We should not be afraid of OPCON transition. If the current plan remains in place the ROK/CFC will remain intact and the only change will be a ROK general will be in command. It will remain a bilateral command reporting to both countries' NCMAs and equally "co-owned" by both countries.

Nuclear subs provide South Korea a security hedge, potential for nuclear weapons

Improved fuel enrichment would shift Seoul closer to nuclear weapons

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2025/nov/21/nuclear-subs-provide-south-korea-security-hedge-potential-nuclear/

By - The Washington Times - Friday, November 21, 2025

SEOUL, South Korea — The nuclear submarines President Trump green-lighted in his meeting with Lee Jae-myung last month may help the South Korean president reassure a public wary of an upcoming shakeup over control of South Korea’s troops — and move Seoul closer to developing nuclear weapons.

Mr. Lee, leading a liberal party that has customarily sought increased defense autonomy, has vowed to regain operational control of South Korean troops in wartime — or “OPCON Transfer” — from the U.S. by the end of his term in 2030.

With Mr. Trump demanding more of allies, that looks on point. But the move has been slow-walked since the early 2000s as it could have effects across the alliance.

Though the subs would be nuclear-propelled, not nuclear-armed, the deal is huge. Washington has shared related technologies with only one ally, the U.K., while Australia is also set to receive them per the 2021 AUKUS agreement.

The only other countries operating nuclear boats are China, France, India and Russia.

The agreement has multiple moving parts — technical, strategic and political. However, no subs — Seoul would need a minimum of three — are likely to launch before the late 2030s.

The great unspoken possibility is nuclear fuel enrichment, which would inch Korea toward a capability widely discussed, but never officially, among Seoul pundits: An atomic weapon.

Operational issues

Nuclear subs offer limitless range, but the South Korean Navy’s core mission is close-in: deterring North Korea. Still, its horizons have expanded.

A retired U.S. arms salesman recalled a Korean request in the late 1990s for long-distance, encrypted communications to talk to subs in the Malacca Strait.

The strategic maritime trade passage lies 2,500 nautical miles from the Korean peninsula.

Seoul has sought nuclear boats for “at least two decades,” said Yu Ji-hoon, a retired South Korean navy commander. The acquisition gained “urgency after 2016, when North Korea accelerated its development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles.”

Attack submarines provide one counter. Nuclear boats can remain submerged, on shadowing or ambush missions, longer than diesel-electric subs, which Seoul has been manufacturing and operating for 34 years.

“The primary and immediate rationale is very clear: Countering the North Korean SLBM threat,” said Mr. Yu, a research fellow at the Korea Institute of Defense Analysis. “However, Korea’s maritime interests extend well beyond its immediate waters.”

An export powerhouse and net energy importer, Korea relies on open sea lanes. In 2011, it conducted a commando strike on Somali pirates. Today, it joins multinational exercises as far flung as Australia.

Both dynamics require blue-water reach.

During the Moon Jae-in administration of 2017-2022, the possibility of adding nuclear propulsion to existing subs “entered policy-level review,” Mr. Yu said.

However, the first Trump administration rejected requests for the technology, said a U.S. source familiar with the discussions.

Asked why Mr. Trump shifted his stance, the source conjectured: “Maybe $350 billion” — the amount Seoul has pledged to invest in the U.S.

Power politics and public psychology

The same source warned, however, that if Seoul truly seeks defense autonomy, there are higher priorities than super-expensive nuclear subs.

Those priorities include expanded intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance assets, and massively increased stockpiles of smart munitions — ground and air-launched missiles, artillery shells and drones, he said.

A foreign naval officer, speaking off the record, sniffed at Korean desires for “big, shiny toys.”

That critique points to the primacy of domestic political issues.

OPCON Transfer was initiated by the liberal Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008). It is expected to collapse the current — and potent — joint war-fighting staff structure, Combined Forces Command, led by a U.S. general, and otherwise affect the alliance.

Successive conservative administrations applied the brakes on the move. Mr. Lee, who took office in June, hit the accelerator.

“The right traditionally don’t want to do anything to weaken U.S. commitment,” said Mike Breen, Seoul-based author of “The New Koreans.” “The left focuses on Korea’s embarrassing level of dependence.”

Korean liberals’ demands for upgraded military punch blow a hole in accusations sometimes made by U.S. conservatives: “Lee is weak on security.”

His florid posture may quiet nerves at home.

Nuclear subs could “placate retired admirals and generals, a big lobby group,” said Daniel Pinkston, an international relations expert at Seoul’s Ewha University. “Procure sophisticated naval vessels and the admirals are on board.”

Yang Uk, a defense analyst at Seoul’s Asan Institute, said the navy’s win from Mr. Trump stems from Mr. Lee’s distaste for the army: Army commandos undertook the botched auto-coup by conservative former President Yoon Suk Yeol in December.

Mr. Yang suggested an under-informed public is an issue. “We don’t have nuclear weapons, but a nuclear-powered sub looks like a nuclear weapon,” he said.

U.S. Navy Chief of Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle voiced during a visit to South Korea his “natural expectation” that the subs would be used to deter China.

Mr. Lee mentioned that factor to Mr. Trump during their October meeting.

While admitting that “blue water missions” are not the Korean navy’s “main driver,” Mr. Yu said nuclear subs — he anticipates a flotilla of at last three boats — would “expand Korea’s capacity to operate alongside U.S. naval forces across a wider operational area” in terms of “joint patrols, combined [anti-submarine warfare] operations and coalition responses to regional contingencies.”

Mr. Yang, who is dubious about the vessels’ utility to deter North Korea, sees one upside.

“This could be a blessing in disguise,” he said. “It might give us the courage to stand up to China.”

Toward atomic arms status

A greater potential remains unspoken.

The nuclear fuel used for the submarines could accelerate South Korea’s path to “break out” as an atomic power, a status North Korea attained in 2006.

Seoul runs a sophisticated nuclear energy sector — it exports reactors — and the infrastructure and human resources that operate it, prerequisites giving it “nuclear latency:” The capability to develop a nuclear weapon.

But for decades, Seoul’s nuclear ambitions have been quashed by a proliferation-wary Washington.

The U.S. pressured it to shutter a clandestine nuclear arms program in the 1970s and has since bound the country into bilateral and international treaties.

Even so, Mr. Pinkston notes that from the 1980s to early 2000s, low-key and semi-secret domestic efforts have been suggested or operated: planning for submarine fuel plants, uranium enrichment, plutonium processing and laser enrichment.

“It is no surprise considering the tough ’hood they live in,” he said.

South Korea is overshadowed by nuclear-armed China, North Korea and Russia. Koreans are also wary of fellow democracy Japan for historical reasons.

Nuclear sub fuel, however, is not weapons-grade.

“You need enrichment of about 20% for a nuclear sub,” Mr. Pinkston said. “For a bomb, you want as high as you can get; 95%, or 80% percent with more core material.”

The process of generating fuel accelerates breakout potential.

“If you produce it yourself, you are that much closer to bomb-grade enrichment levels,” Mr. Pinkston said. “If you can make it to within the 20% level, you can make it up to 90%.”

Korea is newly empowered in those domains.

Mr. Lee announced Nov. 14 that the U.S. had expanded Korea’s uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing authority.

“Throughout the talks, building our nuclear submarine in the U.S. was not discussed. The precondition of all conversations between the two leaders was that Korea’s nuclear submarine would be built in Korea,” National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac told domestic media. “Our request for U.S. cooperation was focused on gaining access to nuclear fuel.”

Though Mr. Trump signaled that the boats would be made in the U.S., the Korean comments make sense.

The Pentagon has agonized over U.S. shipbuilding shortfalls, notably whether it is able to manufacture enough nuclear attack boats for not just the U.S. Navy, but also the Royal Australian Navy, per the AUKUS deal.

Mr. Yu added that although Korean shipbuilder Hanhwa Ocean has acquired a shipyard in Philadelphia, the yard is unsuitable for nuclear submarines.

Still, given the boats’ lengthy delivery timeline — which will outlive the Lee and Trump administrations — there is plenty of time for a rethink on both side of the Pacific.

“Nuclear submarine development requires reactor and fuel-cycle arrangements, a nuclear safety regulatory system, specialized crew training and major infrastructure investment,” Mr. Yu said. “Even with strong U.S.-[South Korea] cooperation … a first vessel in the late 2030s or early 2040s would be the most realistic window.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

Copyright © 2025 The Washington Times, LLC. Click here for reprint permission.

washingtontimes.com · Andrew Salmon

12. South Korean Marines Conduct Amphibious Assault Landings in National Defense Drills

​Summary:

About 2,400 South Korean Marines conducted brigade-level amphibious assault drills near Pohang during the Hoguk national defense exercise, using two dozen ships, AAVs, K1 tanks and Marineon helicopters. The training rehearsed island defense, deep strikes and drone-enabled logistics, reflecting ROK Marines’ modernization amid threats from North Korea, China and Russia.

​Excerpt:

The modernization of South Korea’s Marine Corps aligns with Seoul’s broader modernization efforts that have placed Korean forces among the most capable in the region. This build-up of capabilities coincides with renewed threats from adversaries such as North Korea, China and Russia – with all three conducting military activities around South Korea in recent years.

​Comment: I think we should recognize that the ROK military understands there are threats beyond the Korean peninsula. It is time to put the controversy over US "strategic flexibility" to bed.

South Korean Marines Conduct Amphibious Assault Landings in National Defense Drills - USNI News

news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

November 21, 2025 11:17 AM

https://news.usni.org/2025/11/21/south-korean-marines-conduct-amphibious-assault-landings-in-national-defense-drills

Approximately 2,400 Republic of Korea Marines participated in amphibious assault drills around Pohang, a southeastern port city, Nov. 15-20, 2025. Republic of Korea Marine Corps photo

The Republic of Korea Marines Corps held landing drills this week on the country’s east coast, testing the force’s amphibious assault capabilities during Seoul’s joint service Hoguk defense exercise.

The Marine Corps brigade-level exercise, conducted Saturday through Thursday in the Sea of Japan, was one of the activities planned under the annual national defense drills, which are designed to increase interoperability between the ground, naval and aerial branches of the Korean military, reads a South Korean Marine Corps news release. American forces stationed in Korea are also participating in the drills.

Approximately 2,400 Marines participated in the drills around Pohang, a southeastern port city, over the week. Nearly two dozen amphibious assault ships, transport ships and warships were used in the amphibious component of Hoguk. The ships supported the landing operations of Korean Amphibious Assault Vehicles, K1 tanks and MUH-1 Marineon helicopters in disembarking the Marines.

The amphibious exercise included follow-on land operations that simulated strikes against enemy command and control, as well as rear areas, according to the news release. The Marines also worked with the Republic of Korea Navy in joint logistics operations involving the use of supply drones. The release highlighted that the drills took note of “tasks based on recent warfare trends and analysis of combat lessons.”

Nearly two dozen of the Republic of Korea’s amphibious assault ships, transport ships and warships were used in the amphibious component of Hoguk from Nov. 15-20, 2025. Republic of Korea Marine Corps photo

With Seoul’s longtime focus against North Korean forces, South Korean Marines hold at least two amphibious assault exercises a year to practice defending the numerous islands ringing the western and southern areas of the Korean Peninsula. For transport, the Republic of Korea Marine Corps could rely on the Navy’s amphibious fleet of two landing platform helicopters and eight landing ship tanks. The force is also responsible for the Northwest Islands Defense Command near North Korea, which was stood up following an artillery exchange in 2010.

Amid recent tensions in the region, South Korean Marines are set to field a dedicated drone battalion consisting of manned-unmanned teaming amphibious assault vehicles and multi-purpose autonomous vehicles under the force’s 1st Division. Korean defense firm Hanwha has also developed a variant of its K239 Chunmoo, called the High-Performance Multiple Rocket Launcher, in support of South Korean Marine requirements.

The modernization of South Korea’s Marine Corps aligns with Seoul’s broader modernization efforts that have placed Korean forces among the most capable in the region. This build-up of capabilities coincides with renewed threats from adversaries such as North Korea, China and Russia – with all three conducting military activities around South Korea in recent years.

news.usni.org · Aaron-Matthew Lariosa

13. US, Republic of Korea Conduct Maritime Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise

​Summary:

U.S. and ROK navies held four-day Maritime Counter Special Operations Exercise near Pyeongtaek, enhancing bilateral interoperability through ASW, air-defense, interdiction drills after trilateral Freedom Edge.

Comment: Sustaining combat readiness. Are these exercises and training at risk as the political leaders seek to engage Kim Jong Un?

US, Republic of Korea Conduct Maritime Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise

dvidshub.net

PYEONGTAEK, SOUTH KOREA

11.21.2025

Story by Lt. Victor Murkowski 

Commander, Destroyer Squadron 15  

https://www.dvidshub.net/news/551982/us-republic-korea-conduct-maritime-counter-special-operations-forces-exercise

Photo By Petty Officer 2nd Class Oscar Diaz | AT SEA (Nov. 18, 2025) – The Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy Chungmugong Yi...... read more

Photo By Petty Officer 2nd Class Oscar Diaz | AT SEA (Nov. 18, 2025) – The Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin-class destroyer ROKS Wang Geon (DDG 978), left, and Daegu-class frigate ROKS Daejeon (FFG 823), right, sail in formation aft of Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105) during the Maritime Counter Special Operations Exercise (MCSOFEX) with the ROK Navy, Nov. 18, 2025. Dewey is forward-deployed and assigned to Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15, the Navy’s largest DESRON and the U.S. 7th Fleet’s principal surface force. MCSOFEX is an exercise that promotes regional security cooperation, maintains and strengthens alliances, and enhances interoperability with the ROK Navy. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Oscar Diaz). | View Image Page

PYEONGTAEK, SOUTH KOREA

11.21.2025

Story by Lt. Victor Murkowski

Commander, Destroyer Squadron 15

US, Republic of Korea Conduct Maritime Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise

PYEONGTAEK, Republic of Korea – The U.S. Navy and Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy conducted a Maritime Counter Special Operations Forces Exercise (MCSOFEX) in Pyeongtaek, Republic of Korea, and its surrounding waters and airspace, Nov. 17-20.

This year’s 2nd iteration of MCSOFEX encompassed four days of enhanced bilateral training, focusing on naval interoperability and collaboration to address shared maritime security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. MCSOFEX follows the trilateral Freedom Edge exercise between the U.S., Japan, and ROK navies.

Participating U.S. assets were U.S. Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey (DDG 105), one MH-60R Seahawk helicopter, two U.S. AH-060E Apache helicopters, and one U.S. P-8A Poseidon.

“MCSOFEX is just a part of our continuous exercises with our ROK counterparts,” said Capt. Dave Huljack, commodore of Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) 15. “Through exercises like MCSOFEX, Freedom Edge, Ulchi Freedom Shield, and numerous others, we continue to enhance our shared interoperability between the U.S. and ROK navies and our allies and partners to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.”

During MCSOFEX, participating units conducted a wide range of training activities at sea and ashore, including in-port academics, a pre-sail conference, liaison officer exchanges, anti-submarine warfare training, anti-air warfare training, joint maritime interdiction operations, and dynamic formation sailing. Bilateral training activities like MCSOFEX provide valuable opportunities for the two navies to improve combined readiness, strengthen cooperation, and develop maritime capabilities.

Dewey is assigned to DESRON 15, the Navy’s largest DESRON and the U.S. 7th Fleet’s principal surface force.

U.S. 7th Fleet is the U.S. Navy's largest forward-deployed numbered fleet and routinely interacts and operates with allies and partners in preserving a free and open Indo-Pacific region.

NEWS INFO

Date Taken: 11.21.2025 Date Posted: 11.21.2025 02:04 Story ID: 551982 Location: PYEONGTAEK, KR Hometown: STOCKTON, NEW JERSEY, US Web Views: 123 Downloads: 0

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De Oppresso Liber,

David Maxwell

Vice President, Center for Asia Pacific Strategy

Senior Fellow, Global Peace Foundation

Editor, Small Wars Journal

Twitter: @davidmaxwell161

Phone: 202-573-8647

email: david.maxwell161@gmail.com